MICHAEL FOOT, THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND THE LABOUR LEADERSHIP ELECTIONS OF 1976 AND 1980

Andrew Scott Crines

A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2010

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

Dedicated to Patricia and Harold Crines, loving parents of the author.

Michael Foot
(1913-2010)

ABSTRACT

The orthodox interpretation of Michael Foot's election as Labour Party leader in 1980 is that it resulted from a left-wing surge within the broader Party throughout the 1970s. This thesis challenges this assumption. It does so by presenting a contextualised analysis of Foot, the Labour Party and the leadership elections of 1976 and 1980. This thesis argues that it was Foot's reputation and loyalty in government that enabled his political evolution to accelerate towards becoming a conciliatory figure during his leadership.

To undertake this reconsideration of the orthodoxy, this thesis has adapted a previously illuminating research approach as utilised by Timothy Heppell. Heppell has produced a number of analyses upon ideological compositions of the Conservative Party during leadership elections, and, more recently, the Labour Party. This research approach was initially devised to consider only ideology. The approach has been improved by this thesis by including non-ideological considerations in order to draw out Labour specific factors in this analysis, because the extent to which the approach can be transferred to a different party at a different time required scrutiny.

It is also necessary to acknowledge the need for a re-categorisation of the ideological factions within the Labour Party in order to gain a more complete understanding of Labour's ideological eclecticism. The social democratic right, the centrists, the inside left and outside left demonstrate that the simple assumption of 'left' and 'right' conceals a more complex Parliamentary composition.

It is important to contextualise the analysis with a philosophical and historical discussion which places Michael Foot within Labour history. This enables a greater understanding of why he became the Labour leader to emerge. Foot's appropriateness as leader can only be fully appreciated by considering those who influenced him and his career in the Party along with the divided nature of the Labour Party over the period prior to his election.

Through these discussions it becomes clear that Foot was able to secure the leadership because of his loyalty to the Labour Party, his record in government, and his Parliamentary interpretation of socialism which separated him from the outside left. This enabled him to be a leader the mainstream of the Party were able to broadly accept at a time of extreme division. His increased appropriateness as leader becomes more evident when contrasted against the likelihood of destructive divisions had a more ideologically dogmatic candidate such as Denis Healey or Tony Benn secured the leadership. The prevailing circumstances as well as the man must, therefore, be considered.

This thesis also evaluates Foot's leadership with a view to demonstrate his ability to navigate the Labour Party following his election. The conclusion must be drawn that Labour's ability to prevail without disintegrating illustrates Foot's success as leader, and that the simplistic view that his leadership was simply the result of a left-wing surge is inadequate.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the help of my supervisor, Professor Brendan Evans who ensured I remained focused throughout the exhaustive research undertaken. Thanks must also be extended to Professor Jim McAuley for providing guidance into the direction of the research.

I should also like to thank Doctor Andrew Mycock, Doctor Catherine McGlynn, Doctor John Craig and Mr. Robert Nicholls, who have assisted me at various points of this research.

On a personal level, I should like to thank my brother, Darren Lee Crines for providing me with the finance necessary to undertake these years of exhaustive research. Without his money, I should surely have retreated to a bank job some years ago!

I should like to thank John Isles for helping me 'keep it real', and also I should like to thank Kevin Hiley for putting up with my fears and doubts for so many years. Special thanks to Carl Bowler.

Extra special thanks must be extended to Lord Clark, Lord Rodgers, Lord Anderson, Lord Graham, Stanley Crowther, John Cartwright and to those who did not wish to be named for the assistance they provided in guiding this research.

Although very frail, Michael Foot took the time to respond to my early request for an interview. He was unable to reciprocate due to his ill health, which unfortunately caught up with him earlier this year. However, my supervisor, Professor Evans had previously interviewed him and was invaluable in disclosing relevant insights into Foot's political career.

I should also like to express my profound thanks to the following organisations that have allowed me to access their archives in the course of the research of this thesis. The staff of the *People's History Museum* in Manchester, the staff of the *University of Huddersfield Library and Archive*, the staff of the *University of Leeds* library (especially their Hansards collection), the staff of the *John Rylands University Library* at the *University of Manchester,* and the staff of the *British Library* in London. These organisations have provided a great deal of primary sourced materials upon which this thesis relies.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Alternative Economic Strategy	AES
British Broadcasting Corporation	BBC
Britain In Europe	BIE
Campaign for Labour Party Democracy	CLPD
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament	CND
Constituency Labour Party	CLP
European Union	EU
Industrial Relations	IR
International Monetary Fund	IMF
Labour Representation Committee	LRC
London School of Economics	LSE
Member of Parliament	MP
National Executive Committee	NEC
National Referendum Campaign	NRC
National Union of Journalists	NUJ
National Union of Mineworkers	NUM
Parliamentary Conservative Party	PCP
Parliamentary Labour Party	PLP
Trade Union Congress	TUC
Social Democratic Party	SDP

LIST OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

A deep affection for the aspirations and values which underpinned the evolution of the Labour Party ensured the central theme of this doctoral thesis should be the Party of my upbringing. No other political Party would have been able to appeal on such a level. Growing up in a socialist home, with a dedication to socialism from a young age and a strong sense of opposition to the laissez-faire policies of Thatcherism, it was clear that any period of sustained political research would revolve around the Party.

New Labour studies did not appeal to me on a similar level. As a result, I felt the research for this thesis should revolve around a period of pre-New Labour history where the debates of previous decades resonated strongly within the Party. This was the Party of the people; the party of Clement Attlee, Hugh Gaitskell, Aneurin Bevan, Michael Foot and Tony Benn. The Labour Party is not, in my view, a mechanism for gaining power for a selection of elitist individuals. It exists to defend the exploited through engagement with the people through a strong rank and file movement.

My supervisor, Professor Brendan Evans continually guided this research by pointing out areas for development and also potential shortfalls of specific arguments made during various chapters. By doing so, Professor Evans prevented this thesis being much less than has materialised, and provided the tracks through which it was guided. My second supervisor, Professor Jim McAuley also made a number of valuable suggestions which have improved this thesis.

As part of their formal role in the research monitoring process, Dr Andrew Mycock and Dr John Craig made valuable suggestions. It is a common trend in contemporary political

analysis to specifically use the memory of Foot's leadership as an illustration and justification for the development of New Labour. This risks being at the expense of *both* traditional left and old right ideologies of the Labour Party. In reality, Foot's contributions to the Labour Party go beyond merely providing a justification for New Labour; rather, Foot should be commended for campaigning for the leadership, against his initial desires, to ensure the survival of the Party. He also fought against the threat of entryism and potential disintegration of the Party. He deserves credit for this achievement, and so this research seeks to avoid the orthodoxies of the New Labour historical narrative.

Robert Nicholls, a fellow doctoral researcher provided invaluable advice and direction for this thesis. On our trips to Manchester and Leeds together to conduct research, I developed a great deal of respect for his ability to see clarity. He also recommended amendments to parts of the thesis in order to ensure its presentation and arguments were drawn out to their full potential.

The University of Huddersfield has provided the opportunity for me to conduct this research, and especially Dr Ian Pitchford has been of considerable administrative assistance throughout. He enabled all the pitfalls of procedure to be adequately navigated.

Thanks must also be extended to the People's History Museum in Manchester for providing me with copies of *Labour Weekly, The New Statesman* and of course *The Foot Papers* among other sources. Finally, thanks must be made to all those in other various libraries who have assisted in aiding with the research to draw from an eclectic range of sources.

Andrew Scott Crines
November 2010

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

1.0: Introduction

How and why did Michael Foot become the leader of an ideologically riven Labour Party in 1980 when he had apparently shown no previous aspirations towards the leadership? Such an outcome would have been unlikely even in the late 1960s. This thesis presents the results of research into the composition of Foot's electoral performance in the Labour leadership elections of 1976 and 1980. To aid the analysis two sets of data of the Parliamentary Labour Party are presented. The data is supported by a contextual analysis of Foot's political education, his evolution to becoming a member of the front bench and his period as Labour Party leader.

This chapter briefly describes its main character, Michael Foot. It also presents the approach which is used in the thesis to test previous work undertaken on leadership elections in British political parties as well as advancing an ideological characterisation of the Parliamentary Labour Party in the period under review.

It must be noted that both Kenneth Morgan (2007) and Mervyn Jones (1994) have contributed seminal works on Foot. Both works provide excellent biographical accounts of his political and personal life. They discuss his youth, schooling, and family relationships as well as his political career up to 1992 and beyond. This thesis, however, is not such a biography. It does not strive to provide a detailed narrative of Foot's life. Rather this thesis uses Foot to focus upon the ideology of the Labour Party in a particular period, through a study of leadership elections in which he was engaged. Morgan dedicated just three pages to the 1976 leadership campaign, and just five pages to the 1980 leadership campaign,

whilst Jones dedicates two pages to the 1976 campaign and nine pages to the 1980 leadership campaign. This demonstrates that the contests are a significantly under researched area of political analysis (Morgan, 2007, pp.328-330; pp.376-380; Jones, 1994, pp.394-395; pp.447-455).

1.1: An Introduction to Michael Foot's Political Character.

An understanding of Foot's character and political background is important in enabling a full explanation for his eventual election as Labour leader. It is necessary in order to appreciate why MP's, including some who were agnostic or hostile towards his political beliefs, turned to him rather than Denis Healey in 1980. Foot represented a non-dogmatic interpretation of socialism within the Labour Party and also maintained respect for the history of the British Parliamentary system. His personal character and loyalty to the Labour Party enabled him to develop an appeal beyond his ideological roots. His socialism evolved from liberal and socialist ideas and he eschewed the certainties of Marxist scientific socialism.

Foot rejected Communism as a viable political system because of its anti democratic and illiberal restrictions on individual liberties; he only opposed the policies of *any* government when they appeared to ignore the aspirations of his liberal socialism (Schneer, 1988, p.1;9;12). He was also a highly literate man with a sound comprehension of the importance of history, the impact of literature towards inspiring political ideals and he had a deep affection for the romanticism of some liberal reformers. This approach to his socialism enabled some commentators to ask...

> ...in what role was a man with such talents most useful to his party? One suspects that Foot himself preferred to be a spur, a voice, exhorting the government to live up to its heritage, and the people to support it. Probably he did not even conceive that he could be the future leader of the Labour Party (Schneer, 1988, p.222).

"Unusually, for a senior politician, Michael Foot was not fired by strong personal ambition" (Shore, 1993, p138). Foot was not a careerist. The means by which such an individual, who had few apparent aspirations towards achieving high political office, came to lead the Labour Party during one of its most turbulent periods is a journey of significant interest.

The quotations which have been cited suggest that Foot's preferred position within British Politics was to remain on the edges of government and Party, acting to promote the ideals and aspirations of the inside left. How then did he become Party leader? It is vital to understand his background, political ideals and experiences and to couple them with a greater understanding of the ideological divisions of the PLP in the 1970s and 1980s. Without an understanding of both Foot's and Labour's political history the answer would be less clear.

Since joining the Labour Party, Foot opposed those who sought to appease capitalism and place restrictions on civil liberties (Morgan, 2007). Throughout his career, Foot saw himself as the enemy of dogmatic theories of economic management from both the right *and* left. His opposition to Bennite socialism was almost as fierce as his opposition to Thatcher's free market ideas. He retained his left-wing credentials throughout his career, including the 1970s when his evolution towards the mainstream was being consolidated.

In government Foot successfully established himself as a Secretary of State who was capable to effecting virtually immediate improvements to the circumstances that had undermined Edward Heath's government. He repealed Heath's divisive anti-union legislation, swiftly ended the miners strike and he also campaigned against continued British membership of the Common Market (Pelling, 1985, pp.162-174). His effectiveness in government enabled him to perform impressively during the 1976 leadership election, which in turn helped establish his credentials and credibility for the subsequent leadership election in 1980. Throughout the decade Foot's reputation continued to grow. These events are discussed later in chapters 4 and 5. It must be remembered that Foot's

development owes much to his experiences in the 1970s, and that without such an evolution his leadership potential would have been much reduced.

Both Healey and Benn were more identified with their respective ideological bedfellows and so lacked the confidence of MP's required to unify the PLP. Healey's personal shortcomings resulted in his potential supporters doubting his ability to lead the Party. It must also be remembered that increasingly influential militant left-wing groups within the broader Labour movement created an image of entryism and extremism. Foot was perceived to be a potentially healing figure when these problems were bedevilling the Labour Party. With both James Callaghan and Healey, Foot's main opponents in each respective leadership election favouring a 'right'-wing position, and Tony Benn, Foot's main 'left'-wing challenger in 1980 favouring a harder 'left'-wing position, only Foot appealed to the PLP as the candidate most likely to maintain the traditional coalition of views.

Even committed social democrats within the Labour Party such as Giles Radice acknowledged Foot was "an honourable man and an outstanding orator, journalist and writer" (Radice, 2004, p.500). Over the course of his political lifetime, he evolved within the Labour Party from political protest and towards the mainstream of cabinet government. His membership of the cabinet from 1974-1979 provided the launching pad for his successive bids for the leadership of the Labour Party.

1.2: The Development of the Research Approach.

This thesis goes beyond political history in explaining how Foot became leader of the Labour Party. The leadership elections of 1976 and 1980 were the final ones in which the electorate was confined to the members of the PLP. Such a limited electorate facilitates the utilisation of the approach previously devised by Heppell to undertake an analysis of the ideological affiliations of MP's in leadership elections within the Conservative Party.

Heppell has produced a number of journal articles relating to purely ideological conflicts within the Conservative Party. These conflicts enabled Heppell to produce illuminating insights of the Conservative Party. Given the success of his approach to the Conservative Party, might an application of an adapted version to the Labour Party possess the potential to produce equally insightful results? An adapted version is necessary because a shortcoming in his approach is his assumption that the exclusive dominance of a ideological variable can explain an MP's voting behaviour in leadership elections. Given the complex character of the Labour Party's internal debates, a simplistic dualism between left and right is inadequate.

Heppell's approach has its origins in an article entitled *Rebels and Rebellions: Conservative MP's in the 1992 Parliament* by Phillip Cowley and Phillip Norton which examined the leadership of John Major (Cowley & Norton, 1999). Influenced by Cowley & Norton's findings, Heppell developed his own approach to assess voting behaviour of MP's during leadership elections. By doing so, he argues that it becomes possible to see the ideological motivations underpinning leadership votes.

For his research into the leaderships of John Major, William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and more recently David Cameron, Heppell (2002; 2006; 2008; 2010) proceeded to construct ideological typologies that consisted of three similar variables. It is worth noting that Heppell's ideological typology was also the genesis[1] of the approach of this thesis. The three ideological divides which Heppell analysed were the attitudes of Conservative MP's towards social, sexual and morality issues, economic policy, and Euroscepticism. Heppell argued that Conservative MP's were either 'wet' or 'dry' on his three ideological divides. As will be argued later in the chapter a nuanced approach to Labour in the 1970s prevents an analogous typology of simply left and right. This was supplemented by a database of MP's positioned against the candidate for whom they voted. The anonymity of the vote was overcome by researching broadsheet newspapers published around the day of the ballot, analysing published interviews, and writing to Conservative Parliamentarians (Heppell & Hill, 2008, p.70). By undertaking these actions, Heppell was able to construct an ideological typology.

While Heppell influenced the collection and analysis of the data in this thesis it proves unsatisfactory as a complete approach in the context of the leadership elections in which Foot was a candidate. Heppell's simple dualism can not simply be transferred to the Labour Party. First, Labour's ideological tensions were more complex than those which Heppell discerned in the Conservative Party. Second, Heppell assumes ideology to be mono-causal in shaping voting behaviour in leadership elections. The reverse could be true. Downs (1957) argues that ideology can be adapted to acquire power and can shift to achieve that aim. A Labour MP's voting behaviour may be linked to his or her region or external affiliations such as trade union and Clark (2010) suggests that MP's elected in or after 1970 had a different outlook from those who served in the earlier postwar debates.

[1] The typology subsequently utilised has been augmented by additional factors in order to operate effectively for the PLP.

The particularly fractious and ideologically riven nature of the Labour Party in the 1970s predisposed MP's to consider candidates for the leadership who might be able to unify the Party (Clark, 2010). It would be an oversimplification to argue that ideology played no role in this. Heppell *et al* (2010) subsequently attempted the transfer of his approach to the Conservative Party on to the Labour Party in a paper entitled 'Ideological Alignments within the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Leadership Election of 1976' (Heppell *et al,* 2010). The three issues which Heppell utilised to classify Labour MP's as either left or right were British membership of the Common Market, defence policy and economic policy (*ibid*). There appears to be no problem in accepting defence as an issue since MP's were either unilateralist, and therefore to the left, or multilateralist, and therefore to the right of the Party. Positions on the Common Market are also acceptable as an indicator of left or right leanings although it must be recognised that there were exceptions with left-wing supporters of the Common Market and right-wing opponents sometimes being evident (Hayter, 2005, p.6). Heppell's utilisation of the economic dimension is particularly inadequate owing to his view that Labour MP's can be readily classified as either consolidators or expansionists and with the consequent assumption that they respectively reflected a right-wing or a left-wing position. In the economic sphere they did not appreciate the complexity of the economic issues at the time and assumed a simple dualism of left and right would suffice. The variable of economic policy is too complex as applied to the Labour Party debates in the 1970s.

This requires a different approach in understanding Labour's leadership elections of 1976 and 1980. The variable of economic policy is too complex as applied to Labour Party debates in the 1970s. The intra-party debates on economic policy covered a wider range

of issues. They included whether an MP was for or against continued nationalisation, attitudes towards public expenditure symbolised by the IMF intervention in 1976, views on monetarism, support or opposition to the Alternative Economic Strategy as proposed by Holland (1975), opinions on incomes policy and orientations towards trade union reform (Booth, 2002, p.125; Cronin, 2004, pp.42-43; Rosen, 2005, pp.331-337; p.353). Heppell reduced an MP's position on economic policy to the simple alternatives of *expansionist* or *consolidator* (Heppell *et al*, 2010). Heppell's distinction between expansionist and consolidator fails to reflect the realities faced by the riven PLP during the debates on economic policy in the 1970s. Fortuitously many Labour MP's classified themselves ideologically in the 1970s by their decision to join either the Tribune or Manifesto Groups (Hayter, 2005, p.4; p.6). Whilst some MP's chose not to identify themselves as leaning towards the centre right in the Party reflected by the Manifesto Group, or the centre left reflected by the Tribune Group, nevertheless, membership or non-membership is broadly indicative of a right, left or centrist position within the Party. For this reason, group membership is substituted here for Heppell's use of economic policy as an indicator of stances adopted by Labour MP's.

In order to produce a more meaningful understanding of the leadership election results this thesis includes a selection of other determinants which Heppell's approach excluded. These variables seek to produce considerations beyond ideology. Principally, these are the region which an MP represented, the majority the MP was defending, trade-union affiliation (if any) as well as the MP's length of service within the House of Commons. An MPs' length of service has the potential to affect their voting intentions because their experiences and Parliamentary careers may affect their expectations from a new leader. The region and their constituency location may also have the potential to affect their vote. For example, an MP from a working-class constituency in the north of England may be

expected to behave differently to an MP from a middle-class constituency in the south. Also, an MP's voting behaviour may be affected by the size of his or her majority. An MP with a smaller majority may vote for a leader most likely to prove electorally beneficial, thereby enticing them to vote for a candidate that does not necessarily appeal to them politically. Also, an MP's trade union affiliation may affect their vote, given the role of such organisations historically within the Party and especially following on from the 1979 electoral defeat. When combined with the ideological factors, a more complete understanding of the leadership elections can be achieved, thereby building upon the approaches provided by Cowley & Norton and Heppell. The heuristic value of Heppell's approach is undeniable, but it has only partial validity when transferred to the Labour Party.

Two databases for the leadership elections of 1976 and 1980 are presented and analysed in chapters 4 and 5. Each database has been thoroughly researched to ensure the credibility of the results are maintained. Initially, the names of all MP's were gathered from the relevant *Dods Parliamentary Companions* (Dods, 1977; Smith, 1980), with any deaths or changes researched via *The Times* obituaries throughout the period. Given *The Times* accepted reputation as the *paper of record*, it was utilised for the purpose of gathering specific information. The initial ideological database was then constructed, yet when the inadequacy of the economic field became clear, further research was undertaken to construct the ideological groupings. Biographies and diaries such as Benn's (1989) *Against the Tide* and Hayter's (2005) *Fightback!* provided information regarding ideological group memberships. In addition, *The Times* was again instrumental in providing membership lists of both groups, enabling the list to be completed. MP's voting behaviour, voting lists from *The Times* and other broadsheets, and Norton (1980) provided invaluable

information relating to MP's views on nuclear disarmament and the Common Market. By consistently voting in favour or against unilateralist measures, or Britain's position as a member of the Common Market, it became possible to determine an MP's view on either or both policy areas.

The other aspects of the database, such as an MP's constituency, age, majority, length of service and union affiliation were drawn from the *Dods Parliamentary Companion* and *The Times.* Once completed, the two databases provided a comprehensive source upon which to evaluate the 1976 and 1980 Labour leadership elections.

The role of ideology in an MP's behaviour accounts for a significant part of their vote. However, factors such as the personal likability of the candidates remain significant. It was apparent that Foot was the object of a great deal of affection within the Labour Party (Clark, 2010). Heppell produced an analysis which examined ideology as a mono-causal influence. Given the riven nature of the Labour Party during the period under review, it would be inadequate to follow uncritically Heppell's approach in restricting the analysis to a single factor of political analysis such as ideology. For this reason an enhancement to Heppell's approach is used. It is necessary to explain why Heppell's simplistic approach requires a more penetrating analysis when applied to the Labour Party in the period under review.

1.3: The Ideological Character of the Labour Party.

It is necessary to explain why Heppell's approach is not sufficiently penetrating within the PLP in the 1970s. The Labour Party has since its inception been a disparate collection of groups and individuals united behind a quest for a more socialist society. Since its founding, the Labour Party evolved as a coalition of different views and policy positions in which diversities coexisted. This ensured that the Labour Party would be characterised by division and debate. These are normal enough components of a democratic socialist Party. Labour evolved over the twentieth century as a colourful, vibrant and divided Party. To achieve socialism in Britain, individuals and groups diverged into differing theories about how to effect socialist change. Some believed the harsher characteristics of capitalism could be tamed, whilst others believed it must be abolished entirely, whilst few adhered to the Marxist theories of revolutionary change. These ideas, however, all existed within the same Labour Party, and so its ideological character was eclectic. Yet, over the course of the 1970s, the intra-party coalition started to deteriorate when outside militants, some with radical socialist sympathies, began to gain gradual control of the mechanisms of the Party through the infiltration into CLP's and annual conference. To understand the ideological characterisations advanced in this thesis, it is necessary to consider the intensifying ideological conflicts which culminated in the period under review.

Broad terms such as 'left' and 'right' are frequently used to classify individuals into ideological categories within the PLP[2]. Heppell was influenced by commentators such as Kellner (1976) who defined left and right using arbitrary criteria including an MP's position

[2] It has been necessary to challenge the simple orthodox interpretation of a simple left/right dualism within the Party. MPs should not be pigeon holed into easily devised ideological categories. The research undertaken has revealed that model 'left' and model 'right' wing MPs are in the minority, with the majority gravitating towards plural positions on specific policies. For example, an individual MP may hold an perceived 'left' wing position on the Common Market, yet hold a perceived 'right' wing position on defence. This 'paradox' indicates that the composition of the PLP is more complex than a simple binary distinction, beloved of contemporary commentators would suggest.

on Britain's membership of the Common Market. Kellner argued that an opponent of Britain's membership automatically indicated a left-wing perspective.

However, this definition negates the possibility that the MP may oppose UK membership of the Common Market for reasons other than ideology, such as pressure from their more left leaning constituency party or a view of British economic interests. Consequently, this dualism is too crude.

Individual MP's are frequently not so easy to classify and even those who accept the labels of left- and right-wing will often be inconsistent in the policies they support. Because of these deviations, determining a set of left- or right-wing policies which can be attributed to every MP is highly problematic. Left and right are, therefore inadequate terms without considerable qualification, but remain vital aspects of the Labour Party because they are commonly used by MP's, journalists and academics. It is argued in this thesis that left and right facilitate a lazy shorthand account of the complexities in the Labour Party. The following demonstrates the diversity of "the left" and why accepting simplistic terms must be avoided:

> Commentators lost few opportunities to contrast Nye Bevan's 'passionate Parliamentarism' and the Bevanite 'legitimate left' in the 1950s, with the anti-Parliamentary extremism of the Bennites and the hard left of the 1980s. Asked in 1980 what Bevan would have thought of the hard left then, Harold Wilson briskly replied 'Nye wouldn't have been seen dead with that lot'. (Jeffreys, 2002, p.82).

It will be a perverse overreaction, however to abandon the concepts of left and right entirely. The concepts are so long entrenched in the political discourse that to discard them would be iconoclastic. However, it must always be remembered that overarching terms, such as Heppell's *expansionist* in economic policy as an indicator of a 'left' position,

would place Bevan and Benn in the same category without any qualification (Heppell et al, 2010). Clearly this would be inadequate.

Heppell's own extension of this approach to the Labour Party negates the concept of the centre of the PLP. This is admittedly fluid as it encompasses MP's with a softer allegiance to either social democracy or to the inside left, or who place loyalty to the Labour Party over all other considerations. Because of the shifting meaning of ideological terms within the Labour Party throughout the twentieth century, it is necessary to briefly define the terms used throughout this thesis. The key terms are *inside left*, *outside left*[3], *social democratic right*, *traditional right* and *the centre* (Bernstein, 1899; Kogan & Kogan, 1982).

The inside left, also regarded as the legitimate left within the Labour Party, was loyal to what its members saw as the ethical socialism[4] of the early Labour Party and did not associate with proscribed organisations, nor did the inside left set up pressure groups in local constituencies (Kogan & Kogan, 1982, p.37). The goals of ethical socialism were to be gained through an extension of nationalisation, an active state, greater equality and an ethical foreign policy. It argued that through nationalisation came greater equality and that an extended role for the state in industry is an effective means of rearranging industry in the public interest. Its ethical foreign policy was to be gained by an independent British foreign policy working with other socialist groups throughout Europe and the Commonwealth in order to create a *third* power bloc separate from the United States and the Soviet Union, without adopting a fully neutralist foreign policy. The inside left were willing to criticise Labour governments through publications such as *Tribune*, yet this did

[3] The inside left and outside left are also frequently referred to as soft and hard left by some journalists, commentators and academics. Soft left and hard left can be interpreted as judgemental terms which imply either a lukewarm approach or a dogmatic approach to socialism, both of which carry negative commentations. Inside and outside left are preferable given their non-judgemental and more descriptive nature.

[4] Early ethical socialists fused their understanding of socialism with a Christian ethos which sought to improve the lives of those in poverty through good works (Clark, 2010).

not extend to destructive attacks. It argued that the Labour governments must be preserved in order to prevent Conservative rule. Yet this did not preclude it from arguing against the policies of the Labour government on matters such as Vietnam, the Common Market and the pace of socialist change. The pedigree of the inside left in postwar Britain can be traced through the *Keep Left* group of 1947, Bevanism in the 1950s and the *Tribune* journal. Its supporters were Parliamentary socialists, who believed in representative democracy. Foot must be placed firmly within the inside left throughout his active political life, as he remained broadly committed to these ideals even during his time on the Labour front benches.

As Whitely (1983) argues, "one of the apparently innocuous decisions taken in 1973 as a result of the swing to the left in the Party was the decision to abolish the list of proscribed organisations" (Whitely, 1983, p.6). The Proscribed List had acted as a safeguard against individuals belonging to hard, outside left organisations with radical socialist sympathies trying to infiltrate and pursue their agenda within the Labour Party. Its abolition, however, removed this safeguard and, subsequently, the outside left groups straggled the ideological boundaries of the Labour Party. Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, the outside left were represented by groups such as the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy and the Labour Coordinating Committee, inspired by an ideal that underpinned Bennite Direct Democracy (Kogan & Kogan, 1982, p.37; p.50). Direct Democracy was a commitment to both industrial and political democracy, with workers and Party members controlling their workplaces and the rank and file controlling the Parliamentary representatives. Just as outside left groups transcended the boundaries of the Labour Party, so they overlapped with external organisations which were infiltrating the Party,

such as the Militant Tendency[5]. Outside left adherents viewed socialism as a unified ideology so that all who professed themselves socialists could be retained within the ranks of the Labour Party. In short, they were adhering to the Kerensky dictum of "no enemies to the left", whereas the inside left implicitly accepted the existence of an ideological boundary to the left of the Party (Mosse, 1967, p.107). For example, when called upon to vote in favour of naming 25 companies for compulsory nationalisation during 1973, Foot voted *against* other figures on the left and voted *with* the social democrats arguing such a statement would be electorally damaging (Hatfield, 31 May 1973, p.1). Admittedly, the desire of Labour's leadership to protect the precise definition of the ideological boundaries of the Labour Party was difficult to distinguish from electoral considerations. The outside left, however did not possess such a constraint. It was essentially a hybrid grouping seeking radical social change and encompassed extreme democrats and various versions of Marxism, loosely associated with a sometimes messianic view of Benn. A key difference between the political ideologies of Foot and Benn was that Benn was radicalised by his period in political office and that he was a "pedantic advocate of strict adherence to manifesto, conference resolution and NEC edict" and that he "chose defiantly to pursue his own path" within the outside left (Benn, 1979, p.16; Morgan, 1987, p.302-303). Benn's socialism connects the Levellers and the radicals of the seventeenth century English revolution with present day socialists. Speaking in Burford in 1976, Benn remarked that the Levellers were part of "a popular liberation movement that can be traced back to the teachings of the Bible and which has retained its vitality over the intervening centuries and which speak to us here with undiminished force" (Brind, 21 May 1976, p.3). Indeed, Benn also sought to shift decision making processes from any Labour cabinet and towards the PLP. In a letter to Foot, Benn remarks that

[5] The Militant Tendency was an outside left group which sought to infiltrate the Labour Party at constituency level in order to perpetuate and spread their interpretation of Marx and Marxist economic theory (Seyd, 1987, p.51). To advance its aims, it engaged in entryism (taking control of existing Labour organisations) and, thereby being able to influence the broader Labour Party through the representation this gave it at the annual conference.

> I think there ought to be more deliberate arrangements made also for general discussions within the Parliamentary Party before any Cabinet decisions are taken... I would hope to see many more debates taking place at an earlier stage within the Parliamentary Party so that the discussions should have a genuine influence on the decisions (Benn, 1976, p.3).

The change of procedure advocated by Benn in this instance would enable the factions and ideological groups within the PLP to influence the decisions taken by the cabinet. Without wishing to repudiate the role of the conference, Foot, by contrast was an exponent of Parliamentary democracy and was content for Members of Parliament to remain the main sources of policy scrutiny.

The social democratic right were those who sought to modernise the Labour Party to ensure it reflected the expectations of the electorate and the evolving nature of capitalism. Social democracy aims to look beyond the class-war ideals which underpinned revolutionary socialism. Their historical philosophy derived from figures such as Eduard Bernstein who argued that the influence of socialism

> would be much greater than it is today if the social democracy could find the courage to emancipate itself from a phraseology which is actually outworn and if it would make up its mind to appear what it is in reality today: a democratic, socialistic party of reform (Bernstein, 1899).

Anthony Crosland provided the contemporary intellectual weight to the ideas behind this wing of Labour thought, arguing that the Party constitution of 1918 had little relevance to the Britain of 1955 and that its objectives had to be updated. Labour's 'one class image' made it appear outdated to those amongst the electorate who did not subscribe to class based politics (Jeffreys, 1999, pp.76-78). Gaitskell felt that responsibility and respectability within the Labour Party would be best demonstrated by its gradual, reformist approach to capitalism and by rejecting the emotionalism and romanticism of transforming capitalism in

"one go" (Brivati, 1997, p.290). Gaitskell, the Labour Leader after 1955, sympathised greatly with the ideas that underpinned this argument, yet shied away from constitutional reform until Labour's electoral defeat in 1959 (*ibid*). This defeat led to an attempt to reform Labour's commitment to nationalisation by way of Clause 4. This was a key target of the social democrats because they argued nationalisation was an unnecessary ideological commitment and that the benefits gained by state ownership of key industries can be achieved by other means. They argued that the nature of capitalism had changed and that democratic socialism was to be achieved and consolidated through increasing public expenditure, redistributive taxation and an egalitarian education system (Crosland, 1956, p.46).

Social democracy in the Labour Party must not be confused with the Social Democratic Party. This distinction is encapsulated by the ideas of Crosland, Gaitskell and figures such as Giles Radice. Radice warned against those considering defection to the SDP, arguing they should "stay in the party and fight" for their ideas rather than establish their own party (Radice, 30 January 1981, p.7). "Centre party apologists have made great play of claiming the traditions of both Crosland and Gaitskell for their 'new politics'. Lady Gaitskell reminded them in the *Guardian* that her husband would never have considered leaving the Labour Party" (Holland, 6 February 1981, p.10). Consequently, the social democrats within the Labour Party should not be confused with the SDP.

The traditional right, who dwindled over the course of the 1960s, were content mainly to consolidate the achievements of the Attlee administration. The primary advocate of this position, Herbert Morrison accepted nationalisation, but did not wish to extend it beyond the vital industries that dominated the economy. Those MP's who gravitated more towards

this position included Alfred Broughton, Michael Cocks, Stanley Cohen, Jack Dunnett, Andrew Faulds and Brynmor John (Evans, 2010). They initially identified more with the traditional right yet mostly gravitated towards Manifesto Group membership during the 1970s. This indicates that the traditional right evolved more towards the social democratic right of the Party.

Those MP's, who can be best characterised as constituting the centre, avoided the conflicts between left and right. Essentially, they were Labour Party loyalists who carried little ideological baggage beyond a generalised appreciation of a vague commitment to social democracy (Clark, 18 May 2010). Their motivation was maintaining party unity and to ensure they remained electable. They also consisted of MP's who gravitated towards more rightish perspectives such as social democracy on some issues but tended towards an agnosticism towards intra party ideological debates. In some cases they adhered to the traditional Morrisonian dictum that "socialism is what the Labour Party does" (Nelson, 1 January 2006). They eschewed membership of Parliamentary groups as the Tribune and the Manifesto Groups, preferring instead to remain independent. While the group of centrist MP's were relevant within the debates of the 1970s, as a group they are under researched.

Some MP's were located in the centre because they were sceptical about the contentious issue of the Common Market. Wilson, whilst coming initially from a centre left position owing to his associations with Bevan, in many ways symbolises the centre grouping in the PLP. "As leader, Harold Wilson had seen it as his prime function to hold the party together, whatever the cost in ideology" (Castle, 1980, p.12). He remained unenthusiastic about Common Market membership. The changing economic circumstances did not blind him to

the potential benefits of Common Market membership, along with his desire to keep the Party together (Clark, 18 May 2010). In short it is suggested here that by the 1970s Labour tendencies were not simply those of left and right but were inside left, outside left, centrist and social democratic. These categories are utilised in the data analysis in the course of this thesis.

This analysis of the ideological tendencies within the PLP confirms that Foot must be positioned within the inside left. As is discussed in chapters 2 and 3, he was initially a Liberal who became socialist and went on to evolve politically towards the inside left of the PLP (Harris, 1984, p.143). As a well known figure of the broader left, Foot drew from his literary and philosophical knowledge to extend the message of greater social justice and the sovereign nature of Parliamentary democracy to both the electorate and those within the Party, even if this sometimes meant standing up against his own colleagues. Despite these moments of contention, he was fiercely loyal to the Labour Party, even at times of great ideological contention. This was partly because he believed it was the sole body capable of posing a credible opposition to the established orthodoxies of the Conservative Party (Rollyson, 2005, p.160; Foot, 2003, p.150).

1.4: Conclusion.

This thesis uses Foot's candidacies for the position of Labour leader as a means of presenting the results of exhaustive research focusing upon the composition of his vote. The leadership elections of 1976 and 1980 act as windows through which an understanding of the PLP in that period can be discerned. Personality matters in politics. Through understanding Foot, his loyalty to the Party, his evolution towards the mainstream and his cross-party appeal at a time of internal division, it becomes possible to understand his election as leader at the second attempt. Foot's personal political history enhanced his reputation and explains his evolution towards the leadership. The data analysis presented in the thesis is contextualised by describing his political character and the historical circumstances in which he conducted his career.

It is clear that Heppell's singular focus upon the importance of ideology requires qualification as does his simple dualism between left and right. The assumption that MP's can be subdivided and labelled exclusively on a bipolar dualism is crude. Both left and right have their own ideological subdivisions, also any analysis of the Labour Party which rejects the importance of the ballast provided by the centre is incomplete. To understand the subdivisions of left and right within the Labour Party during the 1970s, it is necessary to consider the various debates and contentions in the Party during that period. It is also necessary to remember the relevance of non ideological factors, and to exclude them, as Heppell does, becomes problematic when attempting to determine the motives behind MP's voting behaviour.

Chapters 2 and 3 respectively discuss Foot's political education and his progress from left-wing critic to front bench stalwart. Chapters 4 and 5 present the data on MP's voting

behaviour and an analysis of their motivations in casting their vote. The immediate circumstances following Foot's election and his role in stabalising a turbulent party is the subject of Chapter 6.

CHAPTER TWO
Michael Foot's Political Education

2.0: Introduction.

Foot was a man of deep scholarship and learning which led to him acquiring respect within the Labour Party. His scholarship assisted the development of his deep political convictions and his learning enabled him to acquire a reputation as a clever man who was perceived by many in the Labour Party as occupying a higher intellectual plane than most politicians. This enhanced his credibility as a potential leader. His intellectual capacity sets him apart from most politicians as an intellectual who drew inspiration and determination from a rich array of historical and contemporary figures. Foot's philosophical richness distanced him from the dogmatic socialism of figures such as Benn and traditional Labour politicians. Thinkers such as Hazlitt and Marx influenced the development of Foot's liberal socialism. Foot's political education was a blend of philosophical influences and contemporary inspirations who comprise an interesting, eclectic collection of thoughts and ideas. They both confirm and challenge his liberal socialism. They contributed towards his own principles, yet also possessed anomalous characteristics within themselves. For example, Beaverbrook's Conservatism conflicted with Foot's socialism, whilst Marx's advocacy of inevitable violent revolution contrasted to Foot's passionate commitment to Parliamentary democracy[6]. These anomalies were disregarded by Foot because he drew from them *specific* intellectual arguments or inspiration which overrode any evident contradictions.

Foot was also given to a sense of loyalty towards individuals which enabled him to conceal from himself these inconsistencies. It can be a relatively thin line between

[6] Foot rejects many of the revolutionary arguments advanced by Marx, but the critique of capitalism remained an influential argument on Foot's political education.

being a person of deep principle, rather than of purblind dogmatism, which prevented Foot from recognising the contradictions.

This chapter provides an interpretation and evaluation of a selection of major historical and contemporary figures who inspired and challenged Foot. This examination of Foot's political development enables the reader to benefit from a greater, richer appreciation of Foot's political philosophy and personality.

Foot's emerging values drew from the philosophers who both reflected and developed his views. He was by no means a *tabula rasa* which these thinkers determined. The philosophers served to confirm and nourish his existing values, although they represented conflicting political ideologies in themselves, such as socialists, conservatives or liberals as well as independent thinkers. Burke as a Tory, Cobbett as a rural nostalgic, Wells as a eugenicist, Beaverbrook as a patron; these anomalous characteristics are subverted by Foot's loyalty to the richness they contributed to his broader political analysis. He was, of course selective in the arguments and views which he drew from these influences.

When considering the political decisions made by Foot during his career, appreciation of his positions can be achieved by considering those with whom he drew close as well as the philosophical influences. Together they had an impact on his beliefs regarding the potential role of a political party as a force for developing a fairer and more equal society.

Foot possessed a capacity to universalise political principles which cross political divisions and he managed to select common strands. He disregarded temporal political limitations if they appeared to distance him from a political principle that he admired and utilise these selective strands of philosophical thought to enhance his own knowledge of politics.

2.1: Michael Foot's Political Education.

To understand Foot adequately and to comprehend his political background, it is necessary to summarise aspects of his political development. To this end, this chapter introduces Foot as a political *liberal socialist*, backed up by an eclectic range of writers and thinkers from across the political spectrum. Foot's upbringing coloured him with the liberal arguments for political and electoral reform and the need to oppose Conservatism. His father, his education, and his reading of various political thinkers ensured that he retained a liberal instinct throughout his political career. His socialism was drawn very much from the political and social situations he encountered in the prewar years. The squalor of Liverpool, the decline of the Liberal Party, and the arguments for greater collectivisation of the economy against the excesses of the free market ensured that his political maturity would be as a socialist. Foot merged what he considered to be the best ideas of the liberal arguments drawn from the age of reform with the very urgent need to advance a socialist alternative, thereby making him a liberal socialist.

Foot was from a large Liberal family. His father, Isaac, served as a Liberal MP, read widely, and influenced all his children to develop a love of books and intellectualism. Before joining the Liberal Party, he trained as a solicitor in Plymouth and served on the city council, rising to the position of Deputy Mayor. His Parliamentary career was retarded by repeated electoral defeats until 1922, whereby he remained in Parliament for two years before losing his seat. However, he returned to Parliament for a longer period in 1929, remaining an active Liberal MP until finally losing his seat for the final time at the 1935 general election. As a father, he instilled an instinct to fight against Toryism into his children and instructed them in such a manner as to ensure that they

> ...fight the good fight and keep the faith. Books were weapons, the most beloved and the sharpest. And there spread out before us were enemies enough for a lifetime: historical figures and their modern counterparts melted into one; brewers, Protectionists, Papists, apologists for Lord North and the Chamberlain family; Spanish tyrants and Stuart Kings; Simonites and appeasers, men of Munich and Suez; sons of Belial or Beelsebub, normally disguised as West Country Tories, an especially reprehensible branch of the species (Foot, 1980, pp.13-14).

The fight was very much to be fought through learning and subverting ignorance by and immersing themselves in the knowledge which books provided their reader. For Foot, his battle against the Tories would be fought through the Labour Party, which included fighting the enemies of liberal socialism. His father gave him the tools with which to find the knowledge required to arm himself. This enabled him to use the literary weapons which he deployed so well to engage against those who were his political enemies.

Foot characterises his father as a man who possessed a "zest for living and reading, a seemingly single unquenchable quality" and that "he was Wordsworth's happy warrior, the servant of high causes" (Foot, 1980, p.11). He was addicted to reading, who drew knowledge and inspiration from sources such as *Paradise Lost, Shakespeare, Johann Sebastian Bach, Victor Hugo, Thomas Hardy, Thomas Carlyle* and *The Bible* (Foot, 1980, pp.19-20). "He read everything he could lay his hands on about his favourites" (*ibid*). There can be no doubt that Foot's father aimed to instill a widely read view amongst his politically aware children, which they could then use to defend their values against Toryism.

The thirst to read, to expand his knowledge and build a literary library was a quality Foot inherited. It was a quality which remained with him throughout his life. His own

literary journey brought him into contact with an eclectic array of writers and thinkers across the political ages, from the times of overt civil unrest in England to the Enlightenment and beyond. Foot possessed a solid grasp of the masters of political thought. Before considering his key influences, however it is necessary to briefly consider his youthful years of liberalism.

Foot developed his passionate *hatred* for "Tory England" during his liberal upbringing. His upbringing propagated the virtues of a liberal England that would be free of the excessive forces of conservatism (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.12). Prior to his university education at Oxford, Foot attended the Quaker-inspired Leighton Park, which appeared from the outside to be similar to the many other fee paying middle-class boarding schools. Importantly, Foot's pre-University education was devoid of the military culture and training which was a familiar inclusion of most boarders (Jones, 1994, p.19). At Leighton Park, Foot excelled at history, motivating him to apply to attend Oxford to read this preferred subject. Whilst at Oxford, however, Foot studied Politics, Philosophy and Economics, which drew in the study of history as a significant aspect (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.42).

At Oxford, Foot retained his pacifist beliefs. Hoggart and Leigh (1981) argue that his Quaker education encouraged him to renounce the use of state violence (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.45). So strong was his pacifism at the time that even under the threat of war within Europe, he assisted in the passing of a motion within the Oxford Union that emphasised their refusal to fight for the King under absolutely any circumstances (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.45). The motion caused outrage outside Oxford, yet it serves to demonstrate the depth of feeling and commitment Foot held at this time for his beliefs.

This pacifism was also reflected by the then Labour Leader, George Lansbury, who in 1933 said his government would

> ...close every recruiting station, disband the army, dismantle the Air Force. I would abolish the whole dreaded equipment of war, and say to the world 'do your worst'. I believe it would do its best. England would not become a third class power as some people think. She would become the greatest, strongest and the safest country in the world... (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.45).

Foot's opposition to war extended to opposing foreign armies such as the growing National Socialist threat in Europe, however the Labour leader would advocate dismantling Britain's ability to defend herself against such a foe. Lansbury's pacifism appealed to Foot, who was at that time sympathetic to that cause. This drew him closer to the Labour Party. However it must be remembered that his pacifism waned with age, as evidenced by his full support for the military action undertaken by Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany (Foot, 1980, p.99).

Foot's move towards the Labour Party was not a departure from his liberalism. He joined the Labour Party believing it would be in a stronger position to challenge the established Conservative Party as the dominant political force in British politics. Given Foot had been brought up to oppose the Tories through any means available, his move to Labour was compatible with that aim. As a member of the Labour movement, Foot brought with him a mature liberalism that had inspired the calls for British Parliamentary reforms before and after the revolutions in France and America (Grayling, 2000, p.35). His liberalism was based on the writings of reformers whilst his socialism would be enriched by Wells and Marx. Through a discussion of the writings of key influences such as these, it will enable a stronger understanding of those who developed his

political character to emerge. This understanding will demonstrate how and why Foot was able to stand apart from his other Labour colleagues.

To understand how and why Foot was able to stand apart from other leadership contenders whilst simultaneously demonstrating his conceptual understanding of the plight of the working classes, it is necessary to briefly summarise how his inspirations coloured his political ideals. The defining effect of the key thinkers such as Hazlitt, Cobbett, and Marx upon Foot's political ideals can not be underestimated (Foot, 1988, p.19). Hazlitt inspired and guided Foot throughout his career through both his political writings and literary works (Foot, 1988, p.13). Any understanding of Foot's politics must consider Hazlitt to be of paramount significance. Foot sets Hazlitt apart, describing him as his guide and that "no would be reader and writer, no democratic socialist could wish for a better one" and that "it was part of Hazlitt's genius that had anticipated so much of the revolutionary impulse of the subsequent century" (Foot, 1988, pp.13-14).

Foot places Hazlitt[7] at the heart of his socialism. He argued that Hazlitt's genius enabled him to anticipate the social arguments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, connecting Hazlitt's proto socialism with the politics of contemporary democratic socialism. For Foot, embryonic socialism was present in Hazlitt's writings, even if the concept had not yet come into being. Foot believed Hazlitt anticipated some of the ideas that became characteristic of socialism. By bringing the liberal Hazlitt into the family of socialism, Foot attempts to bridge the two ideologies against the common Conservative enemy. Hazlitt expressed his views through his writings which extend to

[7] Hazlitt was an essayist, artist and philosopher who wrote on various topics social political reform, intellectualism, and the role of Parliament. As a journalist, much of his work received public attention, but following his death his impact upon political debates diminished. His life was thwart with poverty and unsuccessful relations with the opposite sex, although his analysis remained valuable to his fellow reformist peers.

such topics as intellectual superiority and good nature. Foot complimented Hazlitt's writing style for its readability and steady wit against Conservatism (Foot, 1980, p.26).

For Foot, political reforms were the bedrock of change towards a democratically socialist system and that the risk of violent revolution could be curtailed through reform whereas the conservative *status quo* potentially provoked revolution through its inaction. Hazlitt attacked and denounced this largely conservative establishment because it fought against calls for vital political reforms. This anti-Toryism drew Hazlitt to Foot. The conservative orthodoxy argued that they feared political change because they believed reforms increased the risk of Britain repeating the violence of the French revolution (Grayling, 2000, pp.1-4).

Hazlitt's contributions to English thought are regarded by Foot to be at least as equal to those of Samuel Johnson or George Orwell. This admiration and respect for Hazlitt is beyond doubt, as Foot says in the opening pages of *The Politics of Paradise: A Vindication of Byron:*

> William Hazlitt was my guide. No would be reader and writer, no democratic socialist could wish for a better one. For him, the paths of politics and literature crossed and re-crossed in an endless interweaving. (Foot, 1988, p.13).

A contemporary of Hazlitt, Edmund Burke is considered to be a conservative thinker. Despite Hazlitt and Foot's opposition to the Conservative Party, Hazlitt speaks well of him. Hazlitt describes Burke as “an orator (almost a poet) who reasoned in figures, because he had an eye for nature”, whilst adding that

> I always entertained a great opinion of Burke, and that (as far as I could find) speaking of him with contempt might be made the test of a vulgar democratical mind. (Hazlitt, 1970, p.49).

Hazlitt's great opinion of Burke was based on the intellect conveyed in his work and his oratory. In explaining the anomaly of Hazlitt's respect for Burke, Foot argues that the romanticism that drew Hazlitt to the French revolution[8] was based upon the *ideals* that underpinned the revolt and it was to those ideals which Foot admired (Foot, 1980, pp.27-28). Both Foot and Hazlitt were republicans, who rejected the absolute divine right of Kings to govern, and so supported moves which advanced that aim (Foot, 1980, p.27). Burke's opposition to the French Revolution was to argue that the preferred method of change was 'reform' and yet "a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation" (Burke, 1969, p.106). Reform, therefore is vital to conserving the state. Burke continues to argue that during the Civil War, England had "lost the bond of union" which made progressive change impossible, potentially leading the way to totalitarianism (*ibid*). Given Foot rejected revolutionary change, and Hazlitt advocated the ideals which underpinned the French revolution whilst rejecting the Reign of Terror, it can be concluded that both figures sought progressive reform in opposition to the violent revolution witnessed in France.

However, Burke's preference to use limited reforms to maintain the *status quo* does not reflect the scale of reforms preferred by Foot and Hazlitt. Burke sought to present a philosophical framework to conserve elitist institutions, such as the established Church, Monarchy and the House of Lords, which Foot wanted to reform out of existence. Foot and Burke both opposed the Reign of Terror and their desire not to repeat the violent mistakes of the French Revolution in England, they were divided on how non revolutionary reformist tools were to be utilised. To this end, Foot's preference was for democratic Parliamentary socialism.

[8] "The change of English opinions about the French Revolution had begun after the terrors and excesses of the years 1793-4. To begin with it was not merely liberals and reformists in England who had welcomed the Revolution, for many believed that the early events in France were a sign that the *ancien regime* prevailing there was being reformed in something like an English direction. But the Reign of Terror changed minds" (Grayling, 2000, p.69).

As an intellectual politician, Foot came into contact with commentators who did not possess his conceptual understanding of his politics. This was a significant disadvantage for Foot when attempting to convey an argument on a contemporary issue. Hazlitt wrote an essay regarding the situation in which Foot found himself entitled the *Disadvantages of Intellectual Superiority.* Hazlitt argued that a man of knowledge is potentially disadvantaged because "he strides on so far before you, that he dwindles in the distance!" (Hazlitt, 1970, p.187). This 'superiority' created a disadvantage for Foot during interviews and other public appearances. Hazlitt went on to argue also that if a man of superior knowledge attempts to conceal his wisdom in order to converse with people of lesser intellect, then he would be found out and ridiculed. This is significant for Foot, as often he would be criticised by political commentators as appearing to be either aloof or out of touch with the issues of the day. Foot's considerable intellect undoubtedly provided him with a greater conceptual understanding of specific issues, however his incompatibility with the masses was because most people were unable or uninterested in connecting with Foot on his intellectual level. This helps to explain why Foot appeared uncomfortable to some.

As well as the writings of Hazlitt, Foot was also drawn to aspects of William Cobbett's[9] political experiences. As with Hazlitt, Foot admired Cobbett's anti-Toryism, who expressed it by simply referring to it as 'the Thing' (Foot, 1980, p.228). Foot quotes Cobbett's definition of a Tory as:

[9] Cobbett stood against the establishment given it represented the authority of the elite over the majority. Following on from his release from prison for condemning the public flogging of militiamen, he fled England to the United States where he developed a warmth for the liberty enjoyed by the inhabitants. When he returned to England, he campaigned with other reforms for greater enfranchisement of the population.

> one who is governed by sense and habit alone. His principle is to follow the leader; and this is the infallible rule to have numbers and success on your side, to be on the side of success and numbers (Foot, 1988, p.47).

Cobbett also detested the changes brought about to England by the initial stirrings of industrialisation, which established the living conditions for the working classes that Foot contested. The effect of the growing towns and industrial machinery undermined the England of old, for which Cobbett had considerable admiration (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.58). Industrialisation enabled money lenders and bankers to become the new power elite, with a stronger emphasis on the importance of profit over noble traditions. Those who grew to dominate the capitalist system and thereby become the enemies of Foot were effectively born in this period.

Foot admired Cobbett because he was "a man of genius in the use of his pen" and was "gifted too in his knowledge of the new phenomenon of popular politics" (Foot, 1988, p265). Foot was drawn to Cobbett's distaste for Tories and their fondness for capital and exploitation. Although he did not hearken back to the England of old, Foot embraced Cobbett's writings for their opposition to the *inequalities* generated by embryonic capitalism.

Foot naturally endorsed Cobbett's critique of Thomas Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population*[10]. His proposed checks involved actively using primitive means of contraception to prevent the poor from procreating. Malthus did not believe the poor were capable of demonstrating sexual restraint, and that direct physical action must be taken to curb their appetites. By preventing the poor from engaging in procreation, Malthus argued all forms of welfare relief would become unnecessary as the poor

[10]. To summarise the essay, Malthus argued that population controls amongst the poor were necessary in order to prevent the population growing beyond the nations ability to provide for them (Evans, 2001, p.52).

would ultimately eliminate themselves. These views brought him much disapprobation from Hazlitt, Cobbett and later Foot, and he was regarded by reformers as exemplifying the inhumanity of unrestrained capitalism.

Foot attacked Malthus for his inhumanity and remarked that he had put forward a case that presented a menacing

> textbook for Tories, a faith as firm as a mathematical equation which could salve their consciences and cast the cloak of religion over the whole scene of human wretchedness (Foot, 1988, p.31).

Foot argues that Malthus attempted to justify greed and inhumanity by using Christian doctrine as a shield. For Foot, the solution to destitution and poverty presented by Malthus was no solution at all, and rejected entirely any suggestion that such ideas would be beneficial.

Much like Foot and Hazlitt, Cobbett was also a supporter of Parliamentary reform. He attacked “the evil of leaving the making of laws in the hands of men of mere money” because money disconnected them from the plights of the people (Cobbett, 1968, p.113). He believed that the rich could not possibly address the distresses of the poor because they would be unable to empathise with their problems. The lack of wealth amongst the people contrasted sharply with that of the rich Parliamentary candidate.

In contemporary society, the House of Lords remains the anomaly of the British Parliamentary System. Given its unelected status, it represents the opposite of the democratic socialist society to which Foot wished to advance. Foot wanted to see the House of Lords abolished because it was undemocratic and was comprised of wealthy individuals who were detached from the plight of the working classes (White, 2010). This

connects Foot, Cobbett and Hazlitt in their mutual aspirations of abolishing the role of money and privilege in Parliament and reforming an unfair Parliamentary system. They called for reforms aimed at increasing the accountability of the Government by ensuring the Houses of Parliament more accurately reflected the conditions faced by the population of the country. At the time both Hazlitt and Cobbett were writing, Parliament reflected the interests of only the land and property owning classes.

As stated earlier, for Foot the changes to Parliament must be achieved through reform rather than revolution. Yet for some on the outside left of the Labour Party, who come to the forefront from the late 1960s a more radical approach than that suggested by Foot, Hazlitt and Cobbett was preferable. The approach suggested by the outside left would have more revolutionary undertones and were at least influenced by Marx. Foot was drawn to some of Marx's writings, yet Foot was not a Marxist. He appreciated the contribution of Marxists to political debate as they encouraged political discourse amongst the intellectual classes, yet he distanced himself from Marxism because of its inadequacies as a practical political system (BBC, 1997). Intellectually Marxism offered a valuable critique of imperialism and capitalism, yet failed to offer a workable alternative to which Foot could subscribe. Because of this inadequacy, when Foot became a socialist he retained many of his liberal beliefs, rejected the Marxist dogma of some of his socialist colleagues, making him a *liberal* socialist rather than a Marxist socialist. It is important to remember that Marx's critique of capitalism was attractive to Foot, but that its conclusion of inevitable revolution was not. Foot did not advocate a Marxist revolution, preferring steady reform instead. Revolution required violent political change outside of the Parliamentary route, a method strongly condemned by Foot as undemocratic, and risking totalitarianism as seen in the Reign of Terror.

Despite Foot's rejection of Marxism, he values the contribution of Marx's analysis to political debate. Through Marx, the flaws in the capitalist system were illustrated clearly to a wider number of workers, making them more politically aware. Although Foot had many sympathies for the analysis Marx provided, he continually argued for socialism to be brought to Britain through the Parliamentary system.

After joining the Labour Party, Foot read *Das Kapital,* which argues that the working classes are exploited by capitalism through dehumanising the workforce and separating them from the produce of their labour whilst paying a wage that generates an excessive surplus value for the employer (Marx, 1995). During his lifetime, Marx produced a considerable amount of material on the mechanical process of this exploitation. Foot read Marx most enthusiastically in the 1930s at a time when many on the left defined their socialist philosophy in opposition to the growth of European fascism. Some on the political left were drawn to Marx as an alternative intellectual inspiration.

This attraction to Marx was assisted by the emergence of fascist elements in Britain. "Oswald Mosley had formed the British Union of Fascists and was bringing his blackshirts on to the streets in provocative rallies. We on the left knew that the collapse of democracy could happen in Britain too, because there were many secret admirers of Hitler amongst the well-heeled ruling class and many would be appeasers in the government" (Castle, 1993, p.66). Because of the clear separation of ideology between the ruling class fascists and the intelligentsia of the left, as alluded to by Castle,

Marxism provided an antitheses to the arguments used by fascist figures such as Mosley[11].

For Foot, the value of *Das Kapital* came in his belief that the work "could and should be extended to establish a full-scale critique of imperialism" because it explained the mechanisms through which exploitation occurs (Foot, 1980, p.141). An understanding of the means of exploitation laid the foundations of popular support for counter activity against capitalism. It must also be remembered that reading Marx was almost an expectation throughout the intellectual left at the time. In the pages of *Debts of Honour,* Foot remarks that

> ...almost the entire Labour movement in Britain, left, right and centre was blindly, vehemently eager to be pro-Russian and pro-Stalin. (Foot, 1980, p.139).

Foot argues that given the potential for fascism taking hold across Europe, the left developed pro-Stalin arguments in order to demonstrate their opposition to fascism (Foot, 1980, p.139). Yet, following the Second World War and the decline of the threat of fascism, Foot distanced himself from the rhetoric of the Marxists from whom he came into contact. This distancing was reinforced when the horrors of Stalin's regime emerged into public view. Foot summarises Stalin's crimes, saying

> He sent to their deaths almost all the leaders of the revolution. He distorted the Socialist aim in a manner which would have horrified both Lenin and Marx. He then falsified the history of the revolution itself (Foot, 1958, p.230).

Any suggestion that Foot possessed any sympathy for the Soviet Union under Stalin is greatly misplaced. For him, socialism promoted liberal democratic freedoms, yet Stalin had curbed many of the freedoms which he considered sacrosanct.

[11] Mosley, having fallen out of favour within the Conservative Party regarding Britain's approach to Ireland, joined Labour whereby be subsequently suggested a programme of public works to establish industrial state capital to combat unemployment. Mosley joined the Fabian Society to advance his aims, as well as attempting to align himself with the Left. He was later frustrated by his inability to advance within the Labour Party, and so established 'the New Party', which following its heavy defeats during the 1931 General Election moved towards fascism.

The role Marx played in Foot's life was not as great or inspirational as Hazlitt or Cobbett. Foot was an internationalist, yet the Soviet Union promoted nationalistic divisions. Marx was not a nationalist, but Leninism and Stalinism rejected internationalism in favour of collectivism in one country. Foot also opposed the class war in much the same way as he opposed both world wars. Given Foot's understanding of socialism was to emphasise cooperation and equality, the notion of a class war was contradictory to him. Foot also rejected the totalitarianism and undemocratic nature of those who claimed to be Marxist; to join such a grouping would be to associate himself with those who governed in a manner which offended his belief in Parliamentary democracy (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.43-44, p.47, p.53, p.58, pp.65-66).

Foot also believed that Marxism concentrated too much on the power of economics. He believed that the leaders “attributed too much discernments and rationality to the leaders of 'financial capitalism' who controlled events. Strategy, not economics, governed diplomacy” (Foot, 1980, p.142). He also believed that opponents of imperialism did not need Marxism to explain the horrors inflicted on human beings. Such horrors would be self evident to any empathic person. Foot believed that the working classes were not as unaware of their exploitation as Marxists often believed, thereby leaving themselves open to accusation of under estimating the workers.

Another of Foot's inspirations, H.G Wells was a socialist who also attracted controversy amongst those who he encountered. Unlike Marx, however, Foot admired Wells for his literary socialism, and attempted to steer him from accusations of elitism.

Wells was a socialist who, like many other intellectuals joined the Fabian Society. Whilst the Fabians sought to intellectualise the transformation of society from capitalism to socialism, Wells argued that *direct action* in this process was vital. Far from being capable of taming, capitalism was in fact a violent and savage animal which had to be destroyed before the new order could be created (Foot, 1995, pp.53-55). Foot's preference for Parliamentary reform appeared, therefore to contradict with Wells desire to embrace direct action. This contradiction suggests that Wells was an anomaly within Foot's political inspirations.

More controversially Wells was also an advocate of *eugenics*. Foot argues that the form of eugenics advocated by Wells was *social reformist* rather than biological. To achieve this, humanity would be improved by progressive politics rather than forced genetics. Yet eugenics was a popular idea for population manipulation and control in the early years of the twentieth century and was highly discredited following the Nazi's use of the eugenics arguments. In his work, *A Modern Utopia,* Wells proposes that:

> it is our business to ask what Utopia will do with its congenital invalids, its idiots and madmen, its drunkards and men of vicious mind, its cruel and furtive souls, its stupid people, too stupid to be of use to the community, its lumpish, unteachable and unimaginative people? And what will it do with the man who is "poor" all round, the rather spiritless, rather incompetent low-grade man who on earth sits in the den of the sweater, tramps the streets under the banner of the unemployed, or trembles. (Wells, 1905).

Wells believed in eugenics because he felt that without a system of human improvement, the advancement of socialism would be restricted by those incapable of contributing effectively to the collective good. They would be incapable of contributing fully to the advancement of a socialist society because of their position imposed upon

them by the capitalist system. This disadvantage would cut them off from being able to conceptualise the socialist alternative. This position under capitalism may render them uneducated or unfit, thereby making themselves unable to effect the socialist change Wells advocated.

Wells argued his views on eugenics could not be divorced from his socialism, and that the socialist utopia he sought to envision would need to engage in a form of social eugenics. Foot explains the eugenics Wells sought to advocate was achievable by abolishing poverty by providing equal welfare, by abolishing ignorance through education, and creating gender equality between the sexes thereby improving humanity. Wells "became the champion of a social reformist eugenics looking to female emancipation, birth control and the welfare state to improve the species" (Foot, 1995, p.61). Foot argued the arguments for eugenics advocated by Wells could be more effectively achieved by directing state assistance to those in need. Wells argued that through social eugenics, society would be restructured towards socialism.

Although contemporary society has excluded eugenics as a practical means of social reform, at the time Wells was writing, it was very much considered a plausible method of reform. Foot's defence of Wells, however falls short of defending his views in their entirety. Foot argues that Wells

> ...remained until his dying day a servant of truth, a champion of youth, and a man who could not live without the companionship of women - some of them, in his case, among the most powerful and attractive women of the century. But, alas, that did not make him a feminist or even an unqualified champion of women's rights. At the height of the suffragist or suffragette campaigns, he had looked for

> other ways for human advancement, and had never quite been prepared to acknowledge his error (Foot, 1995, p.306).

Foot championed Wells for his socialism, yet condemned him for retreating from feminism, and for failing to admit this mistake. Equality amongst humanity includes all, regardless of gender, yet Wells retreated to social eugenics for answers to the problems faced by society whereas Foot argues the answer resides in changing attitudes. However, Wells use of the *language* of eugenics opens him up to the accusation of elitism and Foot can be accused of euphemist disingenuousness in supporting Wells, although he is correct to want to locate Wells in his temporal and ideological context.

When the leader of the Labour Party, Callaghan resigned in 1980, the Labour Party was drawn into a leadership crisis. The election of either the former chancellor, Healey or the rising champion of the outside left, Benn as party leader was proving to be highly divisive. At this time, Foot became the reconciler, a figure who had the respect of both wings of the Party to hold them together. Under pressure to stand for the leadership, Foot travelled to Dublin undistracted by a lecture tour to commemorate the anniversary of the death of another figure of inspiration, Jonathan Swift (BBC, 1995).

> In a speech just prior to his successful election bid to become leader of the Labour Party, Michael Foot told a congregation at St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin: 'The best recommendation I could make is that everyone standing for political office in Dublin, the United States and even in London should have a compulsory examination in Gulliver's Travels (*Labour Weekly*, 19 December 1980, p.7).

This demonstrates the level of respect Foot held for Swift. Both Foot and his father shared a deep admiration for Swift, with the father pressuring the son to write a book

about his life. Foot ultimately respected the wish, writing *The Pen and the Sword* in 1957, shortly after his defeat at the polls in the previous general election.

Foot can be accused of admiring anti-establishment figures simply because they oppose the *status quo*. Foot appears to forgive Swift of his Conservatism because of his position against the Tories view of Ireland. Swift's defence of Ireland and opposition to a selection of Conservative individuals endeared him to Foot.

Foot characterised Swift's Conservatism as “much to be desired” and demonstrates an anomalous characteristic (Foot, 1980, p.221). Foot argued that Swift believed in a static society, opposed modernisation, opposed reform, and would have strongly opposed scientific progress. Consequently, why did Hazlitt rally to his defence and why should Swift be counted amongst Foot's political influences?

First, Swift defended the people of Ireland against the English establishment, thereby making him an enemy of figures such as Johnson. Indeed, Foot also notes that the Irish revolutionaries took him as one of their own and attributes him with the honour of giving Ireland the courage to stand against the dictates of Westminster (Foot, 1980, pp.222-224). Second, *Gulliver's Travels* developed what could almost be described as a cult following amongst reformers such as Hazlitt, Cobbett and the husband of Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin. The work was also serialised in a number of reformist publications. Swift joined the family of anti-Tory reformers as an adopted brother, ready to oppose the imperialist war machine of Conservative England. The importance of this work to reformers can be best expressed by Foot himself:

> *Gulliver's Travels* is still the most powerful of pacifist pamphlets. And, of course, it is these aspects of his iconoclasm which have won for him such persistent

> allegiance on the left. It is not surprising that Hazlitt, Cobbett, Leigh Hunt and Godwin, in the midst of another great war when spies and informers were at work in the interests of exorbitant authority, in the age of the press gang and Peterloo, treasured *Gullivers Travels* as a seditious tract. (Foot, 1980, p.228).

Foot is arguing that Swift became a friend of the reformers because his most controversial work, which gained him the attacks of Conservatives such as Johnson, carried a peaceful, anti-war message. This is significant because not only does it explain why Swift gained a place in the hearts of the reformers, but it also brings together a selection of Foot's political influences into a single cause. It should also be remembered that given Britain was engaged in warfare and imperialism at various points during Swift's lifetime, the state feared ideas which counteracted the accepted, conservative political orthodoxies. Consequently for Swift, a message of peace in an era of war only attracted condemnation and ridicule from advocates of the *status quo*, whilst gaining the admiration and respect of liberal reformers and subsequent progressives such as Foot.

Foot eclectically gathered from an array of varying political thinkers. They fall short of being a community of thinkers because of their diverse political circumstances and their contradictory views on key political issues. They differ in their eras and styles, yet are drawn together to build upon Foot's existing political beliefs. For example, the analysis of capitalism provided by Marx provides a reason to campaign for the reforms advocated by Hazlitt. Also, the contrast between the pre-capitalist and industrialised systems provided by Cobbett highlighted the demise of an older Britain in favour of industrialisation whilst disregarding the merits of the past. For a lover of history, this analysis demonstrates that the capitalist society marked a sharp turn away from traditional rural lifestyles in favour of industrialisation. Hazlitt's demands for reforms

appealed to the old Liberal in Foot, as the Parliamentary system must be modernised in order to reverse the flaws identified by Cobbett and Marx through extending the franchise. Wells directly attacked the symptoms of capitalism, which Foot believed should be a cornerstone of all reformist socialism.

A deeply significant strand of common purpose which runs through each of Foot's key influences is the desire for reform. Reform of Parliament, that would in turn reform the economy of the country in order to make society a fairer and more equal place. The ridicule received by Swift for his work provided the reformers with a romantic hero defending the moral case for peace. Foot's key influences sought change and reform to Britain's orthodox conservativism, and he derived from their writings a critique of traditional authority and a distaste for the exploitative effects of industrial capitalism.

As well as the key philosophers and political thinkers, a number of other influences affected and inspired Foot's political education. These contemporaries include Lord Beaverbrook, Aneurin Bevan, and Barbara (Betts) Castle[12], each contributing towards Foot's political development. Whilst Bevan became a political hero on the same ideological scale as Foot, Beaverbrook was a Conservative media tycoon who became a close personal friend to Foot following the Second World War (Taylor, 1972, p.238). Through Beaverbrook, Foot was provided with employment within his media empire to advance his arguments, and housing to aid his temporal needs. He was a close friend as well as inspirational figure who relished the political debates both men shared. Bevan was a life-long Welsh socialist, a man of deep political principle and was deeply loyal to the Labour Party. Despite his loyalty to the Party, he also had an ability to

[12] Barbara Betts Castle was from a political family, a socialist, and was active in the ILP. In the Labour Party she positioned herself in the left, and was a friend to both Foot and Bevan. Later in her political career, she advanced ahead of Foot to achieve a position in Wilson's cabinet in 1965.

disrupt its delicate balance. Foot was drawn to Bevan's analysis of the need for a socialist alternative to capitalism and became a close personal friend through much of their association together. Castle shared a long intellectual friendship with Foot which begun during their mutual reading of political philosophy and Fabian works such as *Industrial Democracy* at her Bloomsbury flat in the 1930s (Morgan, 2007, pp.42-43). Consequently, when considering Foot's political education, the contributions of these contemporary figures also should be considered at least as valuable as the key political philosophers and thinkers.

Lord Beaverbrook was politically Foot's antithesis. Beaverbrook's Conservatism had rewarded him with a seat in a wartime Churchill cabinet and guiding the developing Conservative press to adopt anti-socialist positions. Hoggart and Leigh (1981) quote Foot saying “I loved him, not merely as a friend, but as a second father” (Hoggart and Leigh, 1981, p.70). For Foot, Beaverbrook presented a friendship based on mutual respect and admiration rather than political ideology. There can be little ambiguity in Foot's expressions of affection towards Beaverbrook but why would a liberal socialist such as him develop a clear, strong, and personal relationship with such an outspoken enemy of British socialism?

Despite the differing political ideologies, Foot respected Beaverbrook's openness of character, intellectualism, and willingness to converse with those who did not share his views. Being able to create a close friendship with an advocate of strong, contrasting conservative opinions demonstrates Foot's equal ability to look beyond ideological boundaries. Foot saw the potential for discourse and debate, rather than simply another ideological enemy. It must also be remarked upon that as well as Foot

developing a controversial friendship with Beaverbrook, Beaverbrook too broke the mould of ideological alignments by seeking out those who could guarantee him a debate of worth, as opposed to a sycophantic discourse with fellow Conservatives (Foot, 1980, pp.79-84). Within *Debts of Honour*, Foot (1980) described Beaverbrook as a "wary, high spirited, erratic, cunning, calculating, passionate, sentimental, restless, impulsive" man for whom he had a great deal of respect and admiration (Foot, 1980, p.90). These characteristics made Beaverbrook a fascinating figure to Foot; effectively, a worthy political opponent with whom to challenge and engage. This view is strengthened by an essay for the *Evening Standard* in 1992 in which Foot characterised Beaverbrook as a man who "loved argument but hated sycophancy" and who loved to debate and argue about the topical news stories of the day (Foot, 2003, pp.316-319). This rejection of sycophancy led Beaverbrook to look for intelligent conversation with those other than his political peers. Consequently, it can be seen that both figures shared the same need to seek out those who could pose an effective challenge to their existing views. These qualities endeared Beaverbrook to Foot, and Foot to Beaverbrook. Both men enjoyed the company of independent, open minded mavericks even if their political views were polar opposites. Morgan (2007) remarks that Beaverbrook "delighted in Foot's personality", and that Foot's experiences and beliefs gave their discussions passion to such an extent that differences of political views ceased to prevent the two from becoming firm friends (Morgan, 2007, p.67).

It must also be remembered that Beaverbrook employed Foot to work for him on the *Express* and potentially had the authority to control his output. It is doubtful that Foot would have acted as a willing puppet of Beaverbrook as the contradiction in their political ideologies remained. Beaverbrook was also in a position to deride or ridicule

socialism through his newspapers. This potential for ridicule did not prevent Foot from standing by his socialist principles; indeed, such ridicule also served to reinforce his views. The oxymoron of their friendship transcended political boundaries and ideology, but Foot disregarded the fact that Beaverbrook's papers sought to hold back Parliamentary socialism.

Another of Foot's political heroes, H.G. Wells also developed a friendship with Beaverbrook, which Foot discussed in Wells' biography, describing both Wells and Beaverbrook as “friends and enemies” (Foot, 1995, p.278). In addition to Wells, Bevan also developed an intense friendship with Beaverbrook, which Campbell (1987) describes as being “drawn into a sinister web” of talented young socialists who engaged in Beaverbrooks dinner discussions of political intrigue (Campbell, 1987, p.64). Beaverbrook enjoyed the company of his political opponents so he had an opportunity to expand his knowledge and foster an understanding of their beliefs within an amicable setting. Although this appeared surprising to those socialists and Conservatives who had not been invited to take part, it enabled Foot to develop their very genuine and open friendship. Both men were able to enjoy each other's intellectual discourse free of any mutual suspicion of either politically benefiting from their relationship.

So keen to keep intellectual discourse alive[13], when *Tribune*, a mouthpiece of opposition to the capitalism which Beaverbrook supported became financially pressured, he stepped in to provide financial assistance. In 1951 *Tribune* lost Sir Stafford Cripps as a patron, prompting Foot to turn to Beaverbrook for help. Foot

[13] It can also be argued that Beaverbrook's support for Tribune kept the Labour Party divided given it could be accused of having the effect of being a mechanism for keeping Labour divisions alive.

became a material beneficiary when Beaverbrook provided £3,000 to keep *Tribune* operating, which Taylor (1972) notes was charged to the *Daily Express* account. The general manager of *the Daily Express*, E. J. Robertson was not pleased with this move and protested directly to Beaverbrook.

> When Robertson objected, Beaverbrook replied 'where should we get our recruits without *Tribune*? (Taylor, 1972, p.598).

Given Beaverbrook admired the journalism of *Tribune* to such an extent of recruiting from the publication, had it disappeared from the political debate then the quality of his own newspapers potentially stood to suffer. Left without a challenge, the capitalist press would become over confident. Taylor (1972) argues that this is a key moment when the friendship between Foot and Beaverbrook flourished at its greatest, with Foot renting a cottage from Beaverbrook at Cherkley, remaining a close neighbour of Beaverbrook until his death (Taylor, 1972, p.598)**.**

Friends of Foot found the close friendship to be incomprehensible and at odds with his well known and respected democratic, liberal socialism. Foot remarks that Brendan Bracken had shouted “look at you, swilling Max's champagne and calling yourself a socialist” at a timid and subservient Bevan (Foot, 1980, p.77). However, given this was reported by Randolph Churchill in a newspaper article, Foot calls into question the validity of such a remark (*ibid*). Given Bevan's volatile temperament, Foot argues it is highly unlikely to be an accurate description of the argument as Bevan would not be inclined to allow anyone to shout insults or discredit his passionate socialism (*ibid*). However, the sentiment of Churchill's comment demonstrates the argument used against socialists who became, in their eyes, too friendly with Beaverbrook. Foot, aware of the contentious nature of the friendship, says that many of his friends found

the friendship "absurd, inexplicable, discreditable, scandalous" and even "evil" (Foot, 1980, p.79).

Put simply, Foot loved Beaverbrook after years of friendship. Foot attributes his relationship with Beaverbrook's willingness to listen.

> He *listened.* He took in everything said to him, everything he overheard and on this level of personal exchange there was no cant, no personal pretension, no side, no snobbery. (Foot, 1980, p.80).

These qualities were built into their friendship, which ensured an active interest and intellectual fulfilment remained between the two figures. Beaverbrook thirsted for information, and he was driven by a desperate urge to get to the core of debates. Such an individual appealed to Foot regardless of the political differences of opinion because of the open nature of their discussions. Theirs was a genuine friendship, based on frank discourses ordinarily associated with that of a father to son. Yet it must be remembered that other figures within the Labour Party, especially on the left, found Foot's friendship with Beaverbrook inexplicable, although he undoubtedly attempted to influence the media tycoon towards his ideas.

Another of Foot's contemporary inspirations was Aneurin Bevan. Despite Bevan's volatile character, potential for egotism and tendency to splinter the Labour Party, Bevan was admired by Foot for the principles he fought for.

> Aneurin Bevan was unique. There was no one else even remotely like him. As a man, a speaker and political leader he always acted in a style completely individual to himself. (Foot, 2003, p.253).

Foot opened Bevan's obituary in *Tribune* in 1960 with the above quotation. As it demonstrates, Foot had an almost reverential respect for Bevan because he was a man who allowed his principles and passions to act as a guide to his politics. For

Bevan, his passion made politics a mechanism to aid the deprived. Foot continues the obituary saying that Bevan "wanted a Labour Party seriously determined to change society to its foundations and a Britain sufficiently independent and sceptical of all the clichés of the Cold War" so that global peace and cooperation could be promoted (Foot, 2003, p.255). Foot believed Bevan was a man of no small ambitions and that the Labour Party had a unique duty and role to promote ethical political reform in opposition to the excesses of western capitalism and eastern communism.

As part of his book *In Place of Fear,* Bevan wrote that boldness in *words* and in political *deeds* are vital.

> Boldness in words must be matched by boldness in deeds or the result will be universal *malaise*, a debilitation of the public will, and a deep lassitude spreading throughout all the organs of public administration. Audacity is the mood that should prevail among Socialists as they apply the full armament of democratic values to the problems of the times (Bevan, 1961, p.52).

This boldness within politics should, he argued, take the form of *principled* collective actions designed to prevent individual suffering. Politics was not about maintaining the *status quo*, but rather about remoulding the nation towards an ethical, socialised nation where equality would be the new and accepted norm. Bevan also argued strongly that no civilised society can tolerate the sufferings of its people, given such tolerance would undermine its civility. It would become paradoxic for any nation to tolerate squalor and ignorance at the expense of prosperity and equality. For Bevan, a key step towards achieving a civilised society is the delivery of universal healthcare at its heart because the health of a nation determines the living conditions of its citizens. To this end, Bevan moved to establish a nationalised healthcare system.

In terms of practical politics, Bevan fought this principled position as a member of the Attlee cabinet. His failure to convince social democrats such as Hugh Dalton or Gaitskell of the principle of equality did not mask Bevan's strong desire to stick to his beliefs, an action which many on the left admired. Foot was such an admirer. For Foot, this made Bevan a political *hero*. The opening words of Foot's first biography of Bevan are quoted from Hazlitt, which read

> It is hard for any one to be an honest politician who is not born and bred a dissenter. (Foot, 1975, p.13).

For Foot, challenging and attacking the conservative and orthodox view is a central aspect of any socialist politician, and Bevan embodied this trait. As Foot quoted from Hazlitt concerning political dissent

> ...no patriotism, no public spirit, not reared in that inclement sky and harsh soil, in 'the '*hortus siccus* of dissent', will generally last: it will either bend in the storm or droop in the sunshine. (Foot, 1975, p.13).

Bevan's background nurtured his dissenting attitude towards the established order. He was a son of the Welsh mining town of Tredegar, where he endured the very harsh living conditions characterised by Hazlitt. His father, David died of a preventable illness which gave him a sense of determination that health care in Britain was unjust and inadequately provided. Whilst working at the colliery, he became a trades union activist where he embraced socialism, and became a Labour supporter.

Bevan's passion to do that which he believed to be correct with determination is a key characteristic which drew Foot to Bevan. With Bevan and Beaverbrook, Foot had two very strong willed personalities in his daily life. Both Bevan and Beaverbrook believed strongly in different principles. Bevan's strength of character and dedication to his principled socialism endeared him to Foot.

Foot also was influenced by a large number of women during his political career. The love of his life, Jill Craigie supported Foot throughout, yet this did not preclude him from having other female friends. A key individual was Barbara Castle. Both she and Foot shared a close friendship through much of their mutual political careers. Castle became infatuated by Foot's political analysis and philosophical intellect (Morgan, 2007, p.58). For both, it was a form of love at first sight. Yet the relationship appeared to cool over the ensuing decades with her devising the critical phrase “the collective Foot type” to describe his *romantic rationalism*. He argued in retort that her diaries should be treated “with strict circumspection” because as a general rule diaries “purport to tell all” yet are incapable of conveying the whole truth as they are, by design, from one perspective (Morgan, 2007, p.493; Foot, 1986, p.55). Foot's dislike of diarists is clear, arguing that the diarist can put their interpretation of events to the reader as an accurate record of debatable events, leaving those discussed to dispute their validity. Diaries are presented as transcripts of events, thus appearing to be a detailed and accurate record. It is for this reason that Foot did not keep a diary, given its reliability can fall under scrutiny.

In her autobiography, Castle comments that both she and Foot read together, however she recalls whilst he read the political analysis of *Das Kapital,* she was immersed in the Dickensian classic *Martin Chuzzlewit;* significant because although both read together, they had not read the same literary works (Castle, 1993, p.79). Whilst significant, it should be remembered that during these reading sessions Castle introduced Foot to Marx as discussed earlier in this chapter.

On matters of government, Castle comments that it was Foot's “rigid principles” which compelled him to refuse “office in Wilson's first government because he found it too right-wing” (Castle, 1993, p.78). She, however did join the government, thereby separating their definition of the role of Labour socialists; Foot remained outside to critique the government, Castle joined it in order to aid the government implement its policies. Foot remained outside of the government so that he could retain his independence from collective cabinet responsibility. This cooling, however, does not mask the evident length of their friendship, which started when they met at the Socialist League[14]. Castle, like Foot also drew from historical influences. Foot admired the civil war leader and first Lord Protector of the English Republican Commonwealth, Oliver Cromwell and Castle admired the Victorian artist, author and socialist, William Morris (Castle, 1993, p.179). Historical republican figures gave their socialism roots in the long struggle against the inequalities, power and privilege of the dominant Conservative establishment.

More significant to Foot was his life partner and wife, Jill Craigie. She was a writer, film maker and feminist who was an active participant of Foot's political life. They were both socialists, advocates and friends of Bevan. However, they did not always agree on significant aspects of political thought. Her feminism, for example conflicted with her husband's. This conflict extended to a critique of a key political influence on Foot. Craigie is quoted by Rollyson (2005) saying:

> Wells was a kind of feminist. The feminists today hold it strongly against him because he was opposed to the women's voice. The reason for that was that he had little faith in parliamentary democracy. At the time he didn't think it mattered all that much. And I regard this as a black mark against him. Michael, I am sure, will find excuses. (Rollyson, 2005, p.345).

[14] The Socialist League was created in opposition to the ILP disengaging with the Labour Party. It mainly sought to oppose fascist ideals in British politics. It was proscribed by the Labour Party after engaging with the Communist Party and Popular Front, which led to its dissolution.

As she predicted, Foot launched a defence of Wells, arguing that he “learned from his lovers all the time”, and that this deference to women vindicated him as a feminist (Rollyson, 2005, p.346). As a strong feminist, however Craigie was not inclined to allow her husband to defend such views without fierce debate (BBC, 1997).

Aesthetics and art were hallmarks of her socialism because she appreciated their power to convey messages to the masses and their ability to convey both simplicity and complexity. Indeed, Foot's commitment to making Plymouth one of the most beautiful cities in the country drew her to his interpretation of how post war reconstruction can be an opportunity to beautify the nation (BBC, 1997). She believed that Foot subscribed to her belief that socialism should embrace the aesthetics. *To Be A Woman* deconstructs the arguments used supporting the subjugation of women in twentieth century Britain and anticipates arguments deployed by later feminists. Craigie was such an influence upon Foot that she influenced his decision to stand for the leadership in 1980. Hattersley confirms the effect Craigie had upon Foot saying "I think that Jill Foot was responsible for a very large part for Michael's candidature" (BBC, 1995). Evans (2010) also remarked in an interview that Craigie had "expressed her pleasure" at influencing Foot to stand in the leadership election (Evans, 2010). There can be little doubt, therefore that she was a significant influence upon Foot including his decision to stand for the Labour leadership.

By drawing ideas respectively from an eclectic range of political and social philosophers Foot found support and inspiration for his liberal socialist outlook. From Hazlitt, Foot confirmed his liberal romanticism which had been established by his father prior to his formal education. Hazlitt helped to shape the continued development of Foot's political philosophy during the early years of his socialist conversion from the Liberal Party by emphasising the case against conservatism and privilege. Hazlitt "wrote about political ideas and political history, about immediate controversies of the age, about the motives of politicians, about political parties and the conduct within parties, about the resolute capacity of those who hold power" (Foot, 1981, p.30). During Foot's political career, he sought to emulate this style of critique against both Tories and some within his own party in order to ensure an effective scrutiny of those who held political power. Foot came to see himself as the heir to Hazlitt's political romanticism which he adapted in the modern age.

Cobbett was "a man of genius in the use of the pen but gifted too in his knowledge of the new phenomenon of popular politics" (Foot, 1988, p.265). Foot deeply respected Cobbett's ability to anticipate the inequities and inhumanities which would result from the ideas which Malthus advocated. Foot was able to link in his mind the oppositional arguments advanced by Cobbett towards the Conservatives with the issues he faced throughout his own career. For example, the growth of neo-liberalism within the Conservative Party over the course of his time on the Labour front benches demonstrated the link between the arguments advocated by Cobbett and those which Foot challenged.

From Marx came the influence of the economic case against capitalism. Granted Foot was not an economist nor a revolutionary, but this did not prevent him from understanding and drawing from the strong critique Marx provided of capitalism in *Das Kapital*. Foot's liberal

socialism took “some minor sprinklings from Marx for seasoning”, which helped to underscore his left-wing critique of capitalist exploitation (Morgan, 2007, p.480). From Marx, Foot drew a conceptual understanding of the exploitative effects of economic liberalism, although this did not extend to embracing fully all the consequences Marx predicted would occur. Rather Foot preferred the reformist approach as advocated by Hazlitt and Cobbett with just a 'minor sprinkling' from Marx.

Swift provided Foot with a critique of imperialism which endeared him to those seeking Parliamentary reform. Indeed, Foot argues that “across the gulf of time and politics, there is a kinship between their spirits, and the common strand runs through *Gulliver's Travels.*” (Foot, 1981, p.208). Foot used throughout his life the arguments conveyed by Swift as his case against war and in favour of peacemaking. Foot was not a pacifist, but he did oppose the imperialist wars such as those against Ireland which Swift eloquently opposed.

From H.G Wells, Foot was able to draw a clear intellectual identification of the symptoms of industrial capitalism and also a case for political and social reform. Although the methods of eugenics had fallen out of favour during Foot's career, he identified Wells as a pioneer of social reform given his willingness to engage with the debates which others appeared to shy away from (Foot, 1995, p.61). Foot argues that Wells correctly identified many of the negative effects capitalism had upon the working-class, and so believed that through social reform these effects may be reversed, leading to a more politically active class that favoured socialism.

It can be clearly seen that Foot drew from his philosophical influences a strand of reform that opposed both capitalism and its political ally, the Conservative Party. His

contemporaries, such as Bevan and Castle, underpinned the more socialist weight in his outlook whilst he gravitated to more predominately romantic, liberal and reformist influences which he learned from an earlier philosophical tradition. All those who influenced him, however, advocated a Parliamentary road to the advancement of social progress.

2.2: Conclusion.

Foot's political life was drawn in part from the influences and experiences which had been described in this chapter. They are key to understanding how his political career developed, which culminated in him securing the leadership of the Labour Party. The reformists, the critics, the romantics and the unlikely Tory each had their roles in Foot's multiple, historic philosophical inspirations. They moulded his liberal socialism, distaste for privilege and injustice, his belief in Parliamentary democracy as an alternative to revolution, his analysis of western capitalism and his feminism. The rationale for this consideration of Foot's political influences is their contributory affect upon Foot, in separating him from the other Parliamentary candidates for the Labour leadership. Had they been absent from Foot's political life, then his political career would have been diminished.

Hazlitt and Cobbett are key to understanding his liberalism, whilst Marx provided Foot with a solid critique of capitalism. This critique of capitalism gave him a zeal for political and social reform towards which he dedicated his life. Swift was embraced by left-wing commentators and romantics such as Foot as his support for Ireland brought him into conflict with the Conservative establishment. Wells' socialism was founded on a basis for equality, whilst Foot shared with him a rejection of the caution of Fabianism. These key philosophers and thinkers shaped Foot's philosophical education. They brought out Foot's intellectualism throughout his life which enabled him to develop a distinctive appeal to many Labour MP's and Party members whilst some of them may not have understood their relevance, they took at face value the importance of his learning.

As well as the key philosophers, Foot was also inspired by those who he came into contact with throughout his life. Lord Beaverbrook was treated as a second father, in spite of his Conservatism. This paternal role developed as a result of their mutual trust and respect for each others values and opinions. This was met with dismay by some of Foot's fellow socialists, unlike another inspiration, Bevan. Foot treated Bevan as a hero and aspired to an similar style of inspirational oratory because Bevan adhered to the principles he believed in.

The women in Foot's life also motivated him. Castle and Craigie were the key women who shared his appreciation for liberal socialism. Castle and Foot's friendship may have appeared to cool as the decades passed, however the early stages of their association was a partnership which appreciated works of literature and political analysis. The love of Foot's life was, however Jill Craigie, the socialist film producer.

Foot's political education was a life-long journey through numerous philosophers, political thinkers and politicians drawn from various locations on the political spectrum. Yet each individual thinker or influence possessed elements which he absorbed into his political understanding. He can be criticised for a readiness to disregard anomalies, a tendency to hero worship and, until his participation in government, for a romanticism that Castle perceived. Some might argue he was unduly eclectic in his intellectualism though others would regard this as evidence of his 'hinterland'[15].

The spirit of rebellion and of challenge to the established orthodoxies demonstrated by Foot's inspirational influences suited his liberal socialism and his own political personality. Consequently, it must be concluded that Foot was philosophically grounded within the

[15] The use of the term *hinterland* was popularised by Healey to describe political figures with interests which go beyond politics.

liberal tradition of intellectual thought. The view that some of his influences were incompatible must yield to the interpretation that he established a consistency in the manner through which he drew from them. They supported his anti-establishment rebelliousness, his liberal ideals, his rejection of injustice and his determination to uphold Parliamentary democracy[16]. These values appealed to a significant number of Labour MP's in 1976 for Foot to become the favoured candidate of the left, whilst in 1980 they were sufficient for him to secure his election as leader.

[16] Callaghan's later characterisation of Foot as a *libertarian* falls short of appreciating his strong defence of Parliamentary socialism (Morgan, 2007, p.339).

CHAPTER THREE
Michael Foot's Political Background

3.0: Introduction.

Foot became a credible candidate for the Labour Party leadership as a result of the political events in which he became engaged after 1935. During the period from 1935 to his first challenge for the Party leadership in 1976 his ideology evolved from being a liberal to a *liberal socialist,* enabling him to present himself as a credible leader drawn from the inside left tendency in the Labour Party.

Foot's political career developed following a period of uncertainty about how to apply his talents. He left Oxford with a good degree and a keen interest in politics, yet he did not have a clear idea about how to apply his talents. Instead, he travelled around Europe, Asia and the United States, seeking learning and inspiration from the cultures he encountered. In the United States he delivered a series of political lectures on behalf of the Oxford Union.

Upon his return to the United Kingdom, he found employment in Liverpool, where he was presented with the realities of the destitution that excessive decades of industrialised capitalism reaped upon the working classes. This encounter compelled him to cease his long standing support for the party of his father in order to join the growing Labour Party. His conversion to Labour underpinned a growing belief that only socialism possessed the solutions to the deprivation he encountered in Liverpool. At a rally in 1981, Foot remembered that it was the "prevailing deprivation" which he saw in Liverpool which "persuaded him to become a politician" (Heren, 23 July 1981, p.4).

Once a member of the Labour Party, Foot immediately attempted to secure a Parliamentary seat. He failed to gain election in 1935 because Transport House had accepted his offer to stand in the safe Conservative seat of Monmouth. The outbreak of war prevented him standing again in 1940, forcing him to wait until the 1945 general election, at which time he fought a successful campaign in Plymouth Devonport, subsequently holding the seat until his defeat in 1955.

He spent his time out of Parliament developing his reputation by embracing *Tribune* and taking part in television debates. *Tribune* was a left-wing magazine which strove to provide a constructive critique of official Labour Party policies. *Tribune* promoted the belief that "the British Labour Party can be made a most powerful instrument for achieving socialism at home and peace abroad", and that to achieve this, a critique was necessary (*Tribune*, 1977, p.7). It acted as a significant mouthpiece for democratic socialists to advance their arguments and promote their ideology amongst their readership.

Foot returned to Parliament in 1960 as the MP for Ebbw Vale, the former seat of his friend and mentor, Bevan. Back in Parliament, he fought against Gaitskell's support for the Conservative governments attitude to the USSR and Wilson's[17] approach to the Vietnam War from the back benches whilst seeking to protect the relationship between the Labour Party and the trade unions. However, his early joy at the return of a Labour government in 1964 turned to disappointment by 1970, blaming the Labour leader for wasting the years of power. Between 1970 and 1974, Foot's career advanced towards joining the Labour front bench. He campaigned and lost against Roy Jenkins for the deputy leadership in 1970, enabling him to gauge his level of support and to determine the broader support for the

[17] Harold Wilson was the former Bevanite who moved towards the political centre during the 1950s. Upon Gaitskell's death, he became the leader of the Labour Party, whereby he fought and won four of the five subsequent general elections for the Party.

inside left within the PLP for a potential future leadership election. This evolution towards Foot's ultimately successful campaign for the Labour leadership in 1980 demonstrates his enduring loyalty to the Party and his consistency in articulating the causes to which he was committed.

3.1: Michael Foot and the Labour Party.

Foot's political evolution towards becoming a credible leadership contender began almost immediately upon joining the Party. Although not immediately apparent, by developing a loyal profile, a willingness to campaign for causes he believed in, as well as arguing against those who supported unrestrained capitalism, Foot's pedigree within the Party and broader movement became evident. He played active and significant roles within both the wartime and the first postwar Parliament. Although not a government minister, he was involved in the intellectual debates Labour faced during the key period between 1940 and 1960. Foot attacked Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax for their appeasement policies towards Hitler; he also helped in the establishment of the *1941 Committee* that aimed to win the war for a socially reformed Britain, and, as the editor for the *Evening Standard,* fought to retain threatened press freedoms. Following on from Foot's election to Parliament he assisted in the development of the *Keep Left* group. He used his oratory to oppose Russian communism and American capitalism, thereby demonstrating to both the Party and electorate his resistance to those ideologies. After 1955, Foot also consolidated his unilateralist views through his role in the founding of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). This demonstrates Foot's reputation as a key advocate for the inside left of the Labour movement (Foot, 1999, pp.68-69).

Foot's relationship with the Labour Party had its genesis in the early years of his life. Upon leaving Oxford he chose to sample various cultures around the world, visiting Palestine, Beirut, Athens, Belgrade, Budapest, and the United States (Jones, 1994, pp32-34; Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.52). During his lectures in the United States he attacked the policies of Hitler, promoted nationalisation as a potential economic tool, and opposed the use of military training in schools (Jones, 1994, p.34). These positions demonstrate Foot's alignment with a

left-wing position within the Labour Party. Foot also spoke out against American isolationism whilst speaking broadly in favour of Roosevelt's *New Deal,* seeing it as a progressive alternative to Republican laissez-faire (Morgan, 2007, p.35). This aligned Foot with socialist intellectuals such as Harold Laski (Foot, 2003, pp.237-243).

On Foot's return from the United States his friend, John Cripps, the son of the left-wing figure Stafford Cripps found employment for him at the Blue Funnel Line of the Holt company as the personal assistant to the company director, Leonard Cripps (Chavda, 2001). In Liverpool Foot saw for himself poverty on a scale he had previously never witnessed ensuring it made a lasting impression on his young mind. He found that his work colleagues lacked substantial intellectual capacity and regarded the routine administrative work mundane and to be as "dull as dishwater" (Jones, 1994, p.36). His later readings of Marx had spoken about the dehumanisation of labour, and in Liverpool he had been faced with the living embodiments of the exploited. Foot believed with the decline of the Liberal Party, only the Labour Party would be in a position to oppose the policies which allowed the inhabitants of Liverpool to be exploited in such a manner. Consequently, he broke with the party of his Liberal family, and joined the Labour Party. This is a key moment in Foot's political development, as it divorced him from the politics of his family, bringing him into his new family of socialists. It would subsequently be a dysfunctional relationship with arguments emerging about the means of achieving a socialist end.

Foot's reputation was enhanced in 1940 when he co-authored a short book detailing the events which he argued contributed towards Britain's lack of preparation prior to the Second World War. Entitled *Guilty Men* it had the effect of positively expanding Foot's public and Party exposure. Both were significant given the work effectively introduced Foot

to the Party and that he immediately began by challenging the Conservative establishment with a strong critique against their unwillingness to prepare Britain for the war they were fighting and, potentially, losing. This position distanced him from the pacifism which had been associated with the deposed leader, Lansbury and associated him with more mainstream positions.

Foot blamed the capitalist instincts of business for Britain's failure to prepare for war. He argued that the Treasury was hesitant to divert investment into war preparations because they simply did not want to "disorganise industry by turning the whole country into an arms factory" (Foot, 1940, p.113). As Hitler was using Jewish slavery in order to advance Germany towards a state of total war over Europe, Britain merely played the games of old and argued for a stronger economy. In so doing, Britain was ill prepared for war, and the *guilty men* were those who placed economic prosperity ahead of the survival of the state in the face of the Nazi threat (*ibid*).

Through *Guilty Men*, which built his reputation in the Labour Party at an early stage, Foot "caught a public mood, and amplified it to a legend" (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.80). The public was angry, and Foot tapped into that anger, thereby laying the foundations for the advancement of a new generation of political leaders. The book gave Foot a clear sense of patriotism whilst demonstrating his strong opposition to Nazism. Yet, Foot was very much aware of the need to prepare for peacetime and endeavoured to ensure the post First World War social failures did not repeat themselves. By putting forward the analysis of how the 'Guilty Men' led Britain to the edge of destruction, Foot was also able to build a reputation within the Labour Party. This enabled his profile both with the public and within

the Party to begin in principled opposition to those he believed left Britain at the mercy of Nazi Germany.

In addition to *Guilty Men,* Foot's reputation was enhanced within the Party when he joined the *1941 Committee.* For Foot, the committee aimed to ensure the government maintained its controls over the economy whilst ensuring that the workers were protected from private exploitation. These positions demonstrate that Foot's political evolution was developing him towards a clear left-wing position. To further its objectives, the committee issued a postwar plan which included the maintenance of workers councils, a commitment to full employment, and full state education. Foot's association with the committee demonstrates that he was looking to preserve the enlarged wartime economy in peacetime along with the added social benefits which had been denied to the population by prewar governments.

In the subsequent postwar years, Foot developed an almost nostalgic view of the mobilisation for war undertaken in Britain because it demonstrated that socialisation of the economy operated effectively under extreme conditions (Foot, 1984, p.47). He argued that wartime socialism had brought the people, industry and the functions of the state together in the common cause of national survival. It was clear to Foot, therefore, that Britain could operate as an effective, collective country and so should remain together in order to combat social injustice, inequality and poverty. By placing himself in favour of continued collectivisation in the postwar period, Foot advanced the case for peacetime economic socialism which appealed to those who were and later became associated with the inside left. As a result of his wartime activities, Foot sought to become a Labour Parliamentary

representative by standing for a seat at the bomb damaged city of Plymouth. It would be prudent, therefore to consider briefly Foot's attempts to become an MP.

In the context of his publishing *Guilty Men* and his involvement in campaigning for press freedoms and peacetime socialism, Foot was well positioned to stand for election to Parliament in 1945. He stood in the seat of Plymouth Devonport despite high expectations that he would fail, owing to the sitting candidate, Hore-Belisha defending a majority of 11,096 (*The Times*, 4 July 1945, p.8). *The Times* (1945) did concede, however, that the Conservative candidate was not having a good election. Foot strongly argued that through socialism Plymouth had the potential to become a beautiful city that would be able to attract the envy of the nation (BBC, 1997). He was also able to capitalise on accusations that Hore-Belisha had failed to give the Army the resources they needed in 1940 and had refused full compensation for injured service personnel (Morgan, 2007, p.106). It is worth noting that his distance from the pacifism of figures like Lansbury was valuable given the role of the Navy in defeating Nazism. Devonport was, after all a Naval town.

Against the expectations of critics, Foot secured the seat with a majority of 2,013 after a 14 per cent swing from Hore-Belisha (Morgan, 2007, p.107). In Parliament he was able to take forward his liberal socialism within the PLP, and to exploit the opportunities to argue from the national platform this forum granted him. It also led to his acquiring political allies on the inside left of the Party.

Foot joined with Donald Bruce, Richard Crossman and Ian Mikardo to become the 'ringleaders' of a group of MP's who became disgruntled by the diminishing socialist impetus of the Attlee government after 1947. They stood against the government's drive

towards Morrisonian consolidation of Labour's achievements on state ownership. Foot favoured extending the influence of the state into greater economic fields as outlined during his involvement with the *1941 Committee.* Any alternative would become a step backwards from achieving socialism in Britain and a betrayal of the promises made during the wartime Parliament.

To express their opposition to this retreat he and his colleagues published a pamphlet entitled *Keep Left* (Schneer, 1988, pp.60-61). *Keep Left* also became the name for a broadly intellectual group of left leaning idealists within the PLP. This group morphed and mutated through the following decades to become the Bevanites and, ultimately the foundations of the inside left of the PLP. Foot worked with Mikardo to write the sections entitled "What We Are Up Against", "The Job At Home", and "Twenty Things To Do" whilst Crossman wrote the foreign policy chapter entitled "The Job Abroad" *(ibid;* Foot, *et al*, 1947).

Foot and Mikardo argued that "we are living today in the midst of a coal crisis, a food crisis, a raw materials crisis, a manpower crisis, a trade crisis, a dollar crisis and more besides" (Foot, *et al*, 1947, p.3). There could be little doubt as to the precarious state of Britain's economy.

Foot's remedy was for the economy to be reinvigorated by the pillars of industry, such as fuel, power, transport and central banking (Foot, *et al*, 1947, p.11). In order to revive the economy, Foot argued that

> this nationalisation programme has been carried out vigorously, and needs to be continued to embrace every industry which has a hold over our national economy or which cannot be made efficient in private hands (*ibid*).

By bringing the vital industries for national survival into state hands, Foot argued this guarantees vital services would be provided and unemployment would be reduced. It must be remembered, however that Foot's call for a nationalisation programme was curtailed by his caveat that industries must be nationalised which "cannot be made efficient in private hands" (*ibid*). This reluctance to nationalise profitable companies was also evident in his opposition to an outside left proposal in 1973 to nationalise 25 of Britain's largest manufacturers[18] (Rosen, 2005, p.311). Foot's oppositional stance was likely to advance his position amongst centrist and social democratic MP's, thereby enhancing his credibility as a minister and leadership contender. However, this opposition would also have the effect of divorcing him further from those associated with the outside left.

Foot and *Keep Left* also argued that greater economic prosperity could be achieved through strengthened connections with the Commonwealth and European nations, cuts to imports of luxury items and the recruitment of more skilled foreign workers to kick start the foundries. In foreign policy, Foot argued that Britain should demobilise the armed forces to enhance the workforce, cut the British Empire, work more closely with Europe and the Commonwealth, reduce dependency on the United States' economic dominance, develop a European community, British withdrawal from Greece, Palestine and Egypt, develop African nations ahead of British withdrawal, work towards Indian independence and support the new United Nations in order to prevent American or Soviet domination of the world (Foot, *et al*, 1947, pp.45-47). This was a comprehensive set of proposals which were designed to develop a confident, progressively socialist Britain, free of the trappings of Imperialism whilst moving towards internationalism and economic independence.

[18] "Benn enthusiastically promoted their recommendations. Harold Lever, back in the shadow cabinet since November 1972, regarded it as 'a naive dream... of an omni-competent, all-seeing government, which can then act to inform, instruct, guide and persuade the hundred thousand different entrepreneurial components of private industry into one harmonious equivalent of the Russian Gosplan'" (Rosen, 2005, p.311).

By enhancing Britain's relations with Europe and the Commonwealth, Foot and the *Keep Left* group were arguing for a third power bloc to prevent a bi-polarisation of influence between the United States and the Soviet Union. The future, they argued, was not merely between American capitalism or Russian communism. Rather, the third option was for a democratic socialist Europe. By embracing Europe, Britain had the potential to help create a power bloc of socialist nations that would trade closer together with other nations, thereby ensuring Britain's economic independence from the United States and safety from the Soviet Union.

Foot's later opposition towards Europe emerged because the Common Market was "an insecure alliance of some Western European governments who were more ardent in defence of their national interests than in pioneering a Community of Europe" (Holland, 1975, p.316). The Common Market was *not* the vision Foot had for Europe. The elitism of the Common Market appeared to separate member states from broader international trade. Foot's commitment to internationalism saves him from the attack of changing his view since he wanted Britain to trade with European and non-European nations alike. The exclusivity of the Common Market made this difficult. It is also worth noting that the European community which he advocated was of a different character to the Common Market that subsequently emerged. These different views and visions of Europe did not damage Foot because it was Europe rather than his position which changed.

By Labour's ejection from office in 1951, Foot was at the forefront of the debates within the Party. Given that the position of the Morrisonian traditionalists was the consolidation of existing achievements and the social democrats who sought closer ties with the foreign and economic policies of the United States, Foot’s position was firmly in opposition to

both. Following the Party's electoral defeat, Labour became embroiled in a bitter dispute between these various camps. However, the position adopted by the left and the social democrats became the bedrock of the polarised debate. Foot discovered widespread support among constituency activists for his position. The brains trusts[19] and the NEC elections demonstrates the intra-party appeal for the policies of Parliamentary left-wing socialism.

Foot's public profile increased between 1951 and 1963 when he took on the mantle of responsibility for the operations of *Tribune* and became an active participant in television debates for both the BBC and Independent Television. Whilst the Labour Party embroiled itself in the Gaitskell-Bevan conflict during much of this period, Foot's public reputation grew. This brought him into controversies within the Party and beyond, but in general the publicity enhanced his reputation.

Foot's television experience enabled him to expose his views to some in a more direct fashion than his earlier writings. For the BBC, Foot regularly appeared on a political discussion forum entitled *In The News.* He engaged in debates with the historian A.J.P Taylor, the Conservative MP Robert Boothby and Independent MP William Brown (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.103). Both Foot and Boothby were considered *mavericks* within their respective parties, much to the mutual embarrassment of the Labour and the Conservative leaderships. Foot was becoming a highly visible thorn in the side of the social democratic Labour leadership, asserting *his* views rather than theirs. Realising this, the BBC circulated a memo to the executives of *In The News* saying

> Foot's continued appearance has made the Labour Party feel that the solid core of the party is overshadowed. Similarly the Conservative side the continued

[19] The brains trust were left wing MPs such as Foot, Bevan and Wilson who toured constituencies attempting to persuade Party members of their positions on key policy areas such as economic and defence policy (Coates, 1975, p.191).

> appearance of Boothby has not been acceptable to all Conservatives (*sic*) (Election Demon, 2009).

Such was the programme's popularity that Foot became something of a political celebrity, developing catchphrases such as "that's absolute tripe, and you know it" (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.104). It would, however be short lived on the BBC, the team were reunited on Independent Television in 1955 for a current affairs programme *Free Speech*, where their debates continued unabated.

For Foot, appearing on television was a chance for him to engage fiercely with his political opponents, to put his views and messages across, and to contribute to the broader debates within British politics. It was a productive vehicle for enhancing his reputation, which in turn enhanced his position on the inside left, earning him the respect of many of his fellow MP's. Through engaging in these regular debates, Foot became a *de facto* intellectual face of the Labour Party. His debating style, views and clear intellect throughout his career enabled Labour voters and supporters to believe that the Party was comprised of intelligent figures upon who they could trust (Watkins, 2010).

Foot “took up the editorial baton” of *Tribune* in 1955 and “remained there until his election to Parliament for Ebbw Vale five years later” (Morgan, 2007, p.164; p.166). Whilst there he worked with Jennie Lee and a fellow left-wing MP Bill Mallalieu as coeditor and he was able to use his position to state his views on issues such as on freedom of speech within the Party. Writing in *the Times*, prior to the 1955 general election the *Tribune* editorial board wrote a collective letter arguing that

> a real understanding of freedom means a willingness to tolerate, not only the views of the majority or those who have won considerable favour, but the irritating, defiant, even ill-expressed and outrageous opinions of the minorities which may

> still contain the essential grains of wisdom as small as a seed of mustard (*The Times*, 15 April 1954, p.8).

This was mainly directed towards those within the Party who sought to manipulate Party policy away from what Foot saw as its socialist aspirations. For Foot in the 1950s it was the *Tribune* intellectuals who were advancing the argument for socialism in Britain (Morgan, 2007, p.167).

Foot also assisted in the foundation and growth of the CND movement. The early CND was a gathering of like-minded figures seeking to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear weapons and their commitment to unilateralism. Given the Labour Party had all but officially abandoned the cause, supporters of unilateralism retreated to the CND, becoming a focal point of the opposition (Foot, 1999, pp.68-69). Foot saw the role of the CND as a vital instrument for reminding Labour and Conservative politicians about the "ugliness" of weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure that the life of Labour politicians did not become too "cushy" (Foot, 1999, p.70).

CND was an issue which saw an end to the Bevanites as a cohesive group. "What happened in 1957 was that this growing element in the Party was suddenly and rudely deprived of the leader to whom it had hitherto looked up to. One immediate consequence was the foundation of the unilateralist Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" (Campbell, 1987, p.340). Bevan's refusal to subscribe to the unilateralist cause had distanced him from those he had earlier inspired. "Nothing mattered, for the Bevanites certainly, but the feeling that they had been clubbed into insensibility" by Bevan's oppositional position (Foot, 1997, p.556). Bevan was concerned about relations with Britain's allies both inside and outside the Commonwealth (Foot, 1977, p.122). It was, for Bevan therefore a matter of broader international relations rather than whether Britain had the bomb or not. However, this

disagreement fractured Foot and Bevan's personal relationship, which would only be reconciled shortly before Bevan's death in 1960.

The 1959 General Election was described by Foot as

> ...a mildly progressive Tweedledum for a mildly reactionary Tweedledee to entice the floating voter by the moderation and so called 'statesmanship' of the leadership (Foot, 1977, p.123).

The Labour Party, Foot argued, was moderating its socialism to such a degree that its compatibility with the neutral, floating voter ensured that the Party "played into the hands of Macmillan and his publicity agents" (*ibid*). The Party was conceding the ideological argument to the Conservatives. By doing so, the electorate was faced by a choice of either a moderate Labour Party or a moderate Conservative Party, generating a stagnation of democracy. After Labour lost the election, and Foot again lost in Plymouth Devonport, he remarked that Britain had chosen five more years of "the unjust society, the casino society, the 'I'm alright Jack' society" whilst the Labour Party chose instead to engage in recrimination and disunity (*ibid*). By this point, the leadership of the PLP was proving to be a disappointment to Foot. He fell foul of the leadership of Gaitskell and in March 1961 was one of the five Labour MP's from whom the whip was withdrawn (*The Times*, 17 March 1961, p.14). Yet, despite this, the Labour Party remained the best hope for progressive policies (Morgan, 2007, p.216). This hope kept those aiming to reform Britain within the Party.

Ebbw Vale was a Welsh working-class area with a proud history of class-consciousness and a good environment for Labour comrades to associate. When Bevan died, Foot was adopted in September 1960 to contest his seat at Ebbw Vale. Foot's election meetings were very well attended, with hundreds of people packing the various halls in which they occurred. Ultimately, the election result was a resounding victory for Foot, giving him

20,528 votes with his nearest rival, a Conservative named Rhys-Williams, securing only 3,799 (*The Times*, 19 November 1960, p.4). After the announcement of the result, Foot reaffirmed his unilateralism saying

> we have fought this campaign on a clear policy of socialism and demand for a new foreign policy which repudiates nuclear strategy altogether (*ibid*).

Foot would never fear a weak electoral base again. Plymouth Devonport had given him an unstable base upon which to conduct his Parliamentary activities. In sharp contrast, Ebbw Vale, by the virtue of his majority and the sentiment afforded to the memory of Bevan, granted him an extremely stable base upon which to operate. It is worth noting that this victory would be the last to be witnessed by Foot's father, Isaac who died shortly afterwards.

Foot's re-election to Parliament in 1960 heralded the commencement of his second Parliamentary career. However, Gaitskell was less than tolerant towards Foot's debating style than Attlee had been. On a key Conservative vote on budgetary estimates for the armed forces, Gaitskell used the party whip to enforce an abstention in the House. However, Foot and several other like minded members voted *against* the government, defying the whip, thus demonstrating their defiance towards the authority of the leadership. By withdrawing the whip, Gaitskell unwittingly freed his opponents of the controls the constitution gave him over the rebels. Foot's return to Parliament demonstrated his independence of mind, showing a strong sense of purpose and willingness to stand up against the leadership on an issue close to his heart. This forceful characteristic showed that Foot was willing and able to sacrifice prestige for his principles. This position of left-wing integrity enhanced his reputation in a way that was beneficial to him in the condition of the Labour Party between 1976 and 1980.

At the Labour Conference in 1961, the conference voted to reject unilateralism. This had the potential to disengage unilateralists from the mainstream of the political process, encouraging MP's sympathetic to that cause towards groups such as the CND, where they may be tempted to take *direct action* to express their views (Hinton, 1983, p185; Jones, 1994, p260). Foot's Parliamentarian beliefs ensured he fostered a certain ambivalence towards this option. However others associated mainly with the more outside left positions felt no such hesitation. It was also a time when Britain would be compelled by international events to make a definitive association with the United States against the Soviet Union. By this time, any hope of a democratic, socialist Europe emerging that would stand confidently in opposition to both the United States and Soviet Union had fallen away into the realms of political fantasy. This distinguished the idea of socialist European Community, which Foot had favoured whilst part of *Keep Left,* from the capitalist-orientated Common Market which divided the Party.

Harold Macmillan, the Conservative Prime Minister reaffirmed Britain's continuing collaboration with the United States in the arms race against the Soviet Union (Macmillan, 6 March 1962, p.16). This alienated Britain from any third possible option with either Europe or the Commonwealth. On a visit to Washington, Gaitskell extended his support for the US position. However, Foot argued that by supporting the United States, Gaitskell risked damaging the Labour Party by disregarding the wishes of his own party. His opposition to the position adopted by Gaitskell was the result of a continuing opposition against nuclear weapons. He favoured complete nuclear disarmament on all sides and supported the existing ideology of neither the US or USSR power blocs.

This undoubtedly enhanced his position within the inside left. He rejected a pro-Soviet position whilst remaining unenthusiastic about the American nuclear alliance. Foot's active discontent with the leadership ceased abruptly, however when Gaitskell died. Gaitskell had succeeded in solidifying his hold over the Party leadership and in his tribute for *Tribune*, Foot commented that he lacked "imaginative sympathy, wisdom and power", which is why "he often found himself in such deep hostility to the aspirations of many of those he hoped to lead" (Foot, 1977, p.131).

Wilson's election as leader in February 1963 enabled Foot and his fellow rebels to feel confident enough to approach the Shadow Cabinet to request a restoration of the whip. After an initially frosty reception, the whip was subsequently restored (*The Times*, 30 May 1963, p.12). This reconnection with the broader PLP returned Foot to the inner fold of the Labour Party, enabling him to continue his political evolution. The new leadership undoubtedly provided Foot with a sense of renewal which, after the public arguments with Gaitskell, proved to be highly desirable. With the pinnacle of CND achieved, and the test ban treaty signed in Moscow, the arguments over nuclear disarmament had also began to fade from the mainstream public debate (Jones, 1994, p.270). Under Wilson, therefore a new era for Foot and the Labour Party appeared to have begun.

With the Conservative Party appearing out of touch with the selection of Sir Alec Douglas-Home as leader, and the Labour Party advancing the case for science and technology in cooperation with socialism, Labour was returned to government in 1964. Wilson's rhetoric has enabled the Party to appear modern and progressive which carried with it an implicit desire to lay the divisions of the 1940s and 1950s finally to rest (Cronin, 2004, p.92).

With Labour back in government, some within the left faced a dilemma between voicing their opposition to aspects of Labour's programme or remaining loyal to the leadership. Foot believed there was a limit to which loyalty should be pursued, but described it as an “outrage” if the left destroyed the Labour government's ability to govern (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.151). He argued for the need to moderate left-wing opposition in order to safeguard against a catastrophic failure of Labour in power and the return of the Conservatives.

This position was quickly tested when a potentially contentious aspect of foreign policy emerged as Labour's attitude towards the Vietnam War. Foot opposed the Vietnam war (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.154). In talks with the United States President Lyndon Johnson, Wilson was asked to send the Black Watch soldiers to Vietnam. Wilson literally remained silent. By remaining silent, he was able to retain a theoretical commitment to Britain's partnership with the United States without committing any British troops to the war. Wilson endeavoured to keep Johnson on side because of the economic threat any splinter would pose to Britain. When frustrated, Johnson appeared to be contemplating the use of nuclear weapons in the war zone. Concerned by this, Wilson flew to Washington where Johnson told him

> ...if you want to help us in Vietnam send us some men... now, if you don't feel like doing that, go on with your Malaysian problems (Ziegler, 1993, p.222).

Such was the *perceived* hold of the left over the Labour Party that Johnson blamed them for Wilson being unable to commit British troops to Vietnam. However, the left were not pleased by Wilson's endorsement of Johnson's actions despite refusing to commit British forces. Speaking in the House of Commons, Foot argued that...

> ...the reason that I would not send troops to Vietnam is that I think it is a shameful war, a war which I believe is being fought for the wrong reasons and which can never be brought to a successful conclusion. Those, surely, are adequate reasons

> for not sending British troops there. I hope that it will be understood by a Government in this country that they cannot send British troops to Vietnam, not only on the diplomatic technical grounds which my Right Hon Friend adduced but also because if the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in response to an American request, were to attempt to send British troops to Vietnam they would tear to pieces even the secure majority which they now have in the House (*Hansard*, 1966, p.610).

Again Foot distanced himself from the Labour Party leadership but not to the point of disloyalty. This differentiated him from Richard Gott. Prior to the 1966 general election, the Vietnam war invaded domestic politics at a Hull by-election where Gott, an outside left socialist stood against the Labour Party entirely on the Vietnam issue (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.154). Gott, who was a young *Guardian* journalist standing with the support of the *Radical Alliance,* argued that he was standing solely in opposition to the Vietnam war and did not seek to debate on any other political matter (*The Times*, 5 January 1966, p.6). Foot was fiercely opposed to Gott's actions because of the damage upon the broader interests of the Labour Party. He said

> Despite Vietnam, despite the immigration policy, despite many other deeds which have struck in electoral gullets, there is a widespread determination throughout the rank and file of the Party to do everything to win a fresh electoral victory, to do nothing to put it in jeopardy... if the Labour Party turns away from power at this critical moment, or if it tears itself to pieces for the convenience of the Tory enemy... we will be condemned for generations to ridicule and ineffectiveness (Hoggard & Leigh, 1981, p.155).

Despite the moral argument Gott and his supporters were making, Foot was not able to support them politically because his loyalty to the Labour Party transcended all other issues. This loyalty stood firm against the likelihood of a return of the Conservatives if the actions of outside left undermined the Labour government (*ibid*). Labour went back to the polls in March 1966 and increased its hold over the government handsomely. Labour

increased their number of seats to 363 over the Conservatives 253 (Dorey, 1995, p.340). Foot's undying loyalty to the Party coupled with his adherence to principle further endeared him to the Party rank and file and increased his appeal to a substantial minority of MP's; his future electorate.

In June 1967, Foot stood for election to the Party treasurership. *The Daily Telegraph* described Foot as an “artist” as opposed to a treasurer, and that his election to the position “would be tantamount to torture” (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.158). Yet Hoggart & Leigh (1981) argue that Foot stood in order to force an election for the position; had he not done so, then the Home Secretary, Callaghan would have secured the position uncontested. The irony of this position is that the case for a contested election supports Benn's arguments some years later when challenging Healey for the deputy leadership in 1981 as discussed in Chapter 6. In this context, however, Foot's actions had fewer divisive consequences and the Party could afford the election without the threat of divisive internal disunity. In retrospect, it appears that Foot was subtly changing to one of advancing the inside left of the Party from inside the structures of power.

By the late 1960s the issue of reform of Labour's industrial relations was high on the political agenda. In 1968, the former Bevanite Secretary of State for Employment, Barbara Castle sought in the White Paper, *In Place of Strife* to redefine the role of trade unions. The White Paper sought to force unions to register with the government, to subject strike action to ballots, to inflict financial penalties upon unions and employers over issues of recognition, and institute conciliation pauses to enable negotiations between workers and employers to take place (Castle, 1984, p.561). Castle's White Paper was later revived by the

Heath administration as a basis for the Industrial Relations Act which Labour fought hard against before resuming office in 1974.

The White Paper was attacked fiercely by Jack Jones in *Tribune*, saying that the conciliation pauses and ballots were designed to delay action and prolong the frustration of the workers. Also, the deductions from the workers wages had the potential for further industrial dispute and the processes would prolong any resolution of disputes where speed was necessary (Jones, 1977, p.158). Foot wrote that

> ...Harold Wilson and Co. have been persuaded that the way to establish themselves as big, brave men and women capable of *governing;* the way to prove they have hair on their chest; the way to show they don't give a damn for anybody, except of course the *New Mirror* or the *Daily Statesman* and, last but by no means least, the public opinion polls, is to declare war on the trade unions... (Foot, 1977, p.159).

Foot's reaction to the growing dispute was to place the Party leadership in the firing line against the trade unions.

Within Parliament, the inside left dominated *Tribune Group* backed an amendment to the Bill "on the ground that it contains proposals for legislation which would destroy certain fundamental rights of a free trade union movement" (*The Times*, 28 February 1969, p.3). After several months of negative press and attempts to dilute the harsher aspects of the White Paper through negotiations between the government and the TUC, the White Paper was dropped from the programme of legislation. Callaghan, who came from a strong trade union background had argued against Castle within cabinet that the government of the day must maintain a working relationship with the unions (Wood, 19 June 1969, p.1). Foot's stance on this contentious proposal bound him closely to the trade unions, and given that he

came from a non-labour as well as non-Labour background this further extended the constituency to which he appealed across the Party.

Foot was delighted when Labour was returned to power. But by 1970, his joy had turned to woe over the policies enacted by Wilson and the leadership. Labour's loss in 1970 was a dramatic blow to the Labour Party, for which Foot blamed the austerity economics pursued by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins and the role Castle's White Paper played (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.150; p.161). Positive advances in social housing and education had been largely concealed by the contention and disunity which had been unfairly magnified by Vietnam and *In Place of Strife*.

Recognising the need for greater involvement, Foot stood for election to the Parliamentary front bench for the first time in 1970. This was a turning point in his career. He had been unable to stand for the previous Wilson shadow cabinets, given his situation regarding the suspension of the whip. His success this time was rewarded with a position as opposition spokesman for Fuel and Power, and his first front bench position (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.163). He also put his name forward to the PLP to become the deputy leader of the Party. Although almost certain to fail, this was the first post defeat leadership election which had the potential to draw out members of the inside left and the social democratic right into direct debate regarding their period in office and the need for renewal. Foot's participation within the election can be interpreted as an attempt to determine the level of influence those who shared his views had within the PLP. He secured 67, the former agriculture minister and centrist figure Fred Peart secured 48 and the former Chancellor, Jenkins secured 133 votes (Wood, 9 July 1970, p.1). Foot secured more votes than had been

expected, and Peart's respectable result can be attributed to his opposition towards Britain's membership of the Common Market.

In opposition, Wilson argued against a 'postmortem' of the defeat, arguing that no corpse existed for such an analysis to take place on. His desire to avoid an examination of the reasons for defeat in 1970 did not prevent *Tribune* from considering the reasons, with Wayland Young writing

> We lost because we never took hold of the country... instead of boldly doing that which had to be done, we acted blandly, as if we did not yet have the power... we lost because we did not pay enough attention to little things which require great importance... we lost because we had already lost the active party workers... the Party conference knew what words it wanted. The Government would not say them... (Young, 1977, p.180).

Young (1977) blames the government for lacking the confidence required to follow a socialist programme, for alienating the rank and file and for disregarding the voice of conference. These issues intensified during the 1970s, ultimately embroiling Foot during his period on the front bench and as leader. By refusing to engage with these views in 1970, Wilson had put back a necessary evaluation of his government's failure to engage with his own party's supporters.

The social democratic right of the Party preferred to concentrate on the successes of Wilson's administration whilst the inside left focused on reaffirming Labour's traditional support bases. Both sections of the Party aimed to reaffirm Party links with the trade unions after the humiliating defeat of *In Place of Strife.* By turning back to the trade unions, Labour's argument that it had a strong connection with the workers and unions could be restated (Cronin, 2004, pp.118-119). Foot would be able to utilise this structural connection

upon Labour's return to government regarding the NUM and the miners dispute in 1974, another step towards challenging for the leadership.

In the House of Commons, the Labour front bench benefited from Foot's articulate style to such a degree that Wilson promoted him to Shadow Leader of the House in 1971, enabling him to speak on a wide variety of issues (Morgan, 2007, p.265). The issues Foot would have to debate included the Conservative application for Common Market membership and the passing of their Industrial Relations Act. Both these events would lay the foundations for the divisive intra party debates concerning Britain's relationship with the Common Market and Industrial Relations. Foot's gradual conversion to the mainstream of the party leadership can be best illustrated by a vote in May 1973 when he joined with Callaghan, Healey and Williams to vote down a proposal by left-wing MP's to nationalise "some twenty five of our largest manufacturers" (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.164). Foot voted against the proposal because of the potential electoral consequences of such a policy. Hoggart & Leigh (1981) argue that the incident openly separated him from the outside left and made Foot's active participation in the next Labour Government a likely eventuality. This also signposts a significant shift in Foot's political activities. Whereas previously Foot had been able to rebel from the back benches, he now had to consider the greater potential for electoral damage to Labour of his actions. This shift, however did not prevent him from opposing key policies of the next Labour government from within the cabinet in his role as Secretary of State for Employment.

3.2: Conclusion.

Foot's political development demonstrates how his principles retained their left-wing flavour whilst he evolved towards joining the front bench. From witnessing the squalor in Liverpool, to the publication of the *Keep Left* pamphlet, Foot's conversion to socialism was the beginning of a long political career characterised by protest, debate and spreading the arguments for progressive socialism. This endeared him to *Keep Left* group, the Bevanite tendency, and ultimately ensured he became a key figure within the inside left of the Party.

In the country he also become a familiar figure as a result of his television work, enabling him to articulate his arguments to interested members of an electorate. Foot's time outside Parliament enabled him to remain in the public eye by participating in the development of the CND and Party through *Tribune*. By remaining in the eye of party activists, Foot continually solidified his reputation as a figure of the left. He developed a reputation within the Party as an approachable individual capable of a tolerant interaction with much of the Party. These were qualities which Foot and the Party needed to call upon as the 1970s progressed.

Following his re-election to Parliament in 1960, symbolically inheriting Bevan's constituency, and as his biographer, Foot was able to lay claim to inheriting the mantle as a leader of the left. His safe seat liberated him from a concern with electoral rejection. Foot was able to campaign for his beliefs even if this meant sometimes voicing opposition towards a Labour government. For example, he protested Wilson's stance on Vietnam, yet would not support a dedicated antiwar outside left socialist. Foot remained loyal to Labour despite his criticisms, legitimising his *inside* left credentials.

Understanding Foot's political background is an important step towards comprehending his election as Party leader. Foot's political profile was rooted within an ethical liberal socialism, which rejected the dogmatism of the outside left. In the 1970s, when the overall centre of ideological gravity in the Labour Party had shifted leftwards, disrupting the broad coalition of social democratic right and inside left ideological tensions, Foot's record of Party loyalty made him more acceptable to moderates of either ideological position and therefore an increasingly credible challenger for the leadership (Clark, 2010).

CHAPTER FOUR
The Political Consolidation of Michael Foot

4.0: Introduction.

Throughout the 1970s Foot undertook a journey from being a conscience driven opponent of the pragmatic policies favoured by the Party leadership to being an inside advocate on the Labour front benches. This journey enabled Foot to gain a favourable reputation amongst the PLP vital to becoming a potentially serious leadership contender. Prior to this moment, Foot had been free on the backbenches to say and campaign as his conscience dictated on issues such as disarmament and Vietnam. Yet he was not so constrained as to potentially risk the reputation or life of the Labour government; always critical when the moment demanded, yet unwilling to risk causing such political damage as to risk the return of the Conservatives. However, as a front bencher, Foot began a transformation which brought him face to face with the difficult realities of devising and implementing government policy. As part of the later Labour government, Foot would be called upon to devise legislation to replace unpopular Conservative legislation towards the trade unions.

> By 1974, Michael Foot was in a powerful position. His strong links with the Left made him a most important - if not *the* most important - link in the government's new Social Contract with the trade unions (*Labour Weekly*, 2 April 1976, p.6)

He would also be called upon to resolve industrial disputes which had the potential to threaten the stability of both the country and the government. Indeed, the decisions Foot took as Secretary of State for Employment had the potential to either save or damn the government, ensuring his importance in the cabinet was never disregarded. On the front bench, his political character morphed from being an outside critic with the luxury of conscience to being a key player in the decision making processes of the Labour government. His time on the front bench also solidified his reputation as a potential left-wing future leader of the Party.

This is not to say, however that Foot became an unprincipled pragmatist. He retained his opposition to the Common Market because he saw it as an undemocratic, capitalist only institution that served the interests of big business exclusively. He campaigned against Britain's continued membership of the community during a referendum on the subject, and continued to oppose it even once the decision to remain within was known. This did not, however prevent him from being a member of a government which was broadly pro-Common Market. In government, he could effect change. Out of government, he could do little but return to his life as an outside campaigner. Given the key decisions which affect lives are made within government, he understood that his causes would be best served with him remaining a loyal and effective member of the cabinet.

By conducting himself as a successful member of the government, Foot was able to develop a competent reputation strong enough to enable him to stand for the Labour leadership when Wilson departed. He was a highly credible candidate because of his competence and loyalty. His nearest ideological rival, Benn was unable to argue the similar characteristics. Foot's work as Secretary of State for Employment had ensured the survival of Labour's industrial policy, enabling Labour to retain its hold on power. As a result of this and his loyalty to Wilson, he was able to secure a highly respectable second place in the leadership election. By coming a respectable second place, Foot was able to command a degree of authority within the PLP. Realising this, Callaghan capitalised on this by making him Leader of the House, where Foot went on to pioneer Scottish and Welsh devolution legislation. At the time of Labour's return to opposition in 1979, Foot had consolidated his position within the PLP into a credible, likable contender in any subsequent election for the leadership position. Foot's activities within the House of

Commons under both Wilson and Callaghan saw his image transformed into a *loyal* Labour minister.

4.1: The Political Context of the 1970s.

Foot, along with the Labour government inherited a portfolio of turmoil when Heath went to the country after four years of Conservative rule. During their time in office, the Heath government had failed to implement new right economic ideals resulting in a dramatic spasm that unsettled the economy. Heath's retreat to the familiarity of Keynes discredited both him and the Conservative Party, forcing the returning Labour government to restore confidence in the economy. Foot's first position in government was to swiftly restore industrial relations by revising the Industrial Relations Act and ending the miners strike. These were challenging but vital areas. Heath's government influenced Foot's experiences as Secretary of State for Employment because it shaped the country Labour inherited. The IR Act, the miner's strike and Britain's membership of the Common Market were some of the issues that Foot would be called upon to administer or debate during the next Labour government.

By Labour's mid term the economic situation had improved considerably and industrial relations significantly improved. Yet by the time of the 1979 general election, the economy and issues relating to industrial relations would once again be causing the government of the day problems, as evidenced by the culmination of further strikes. Labour's performance is often criticised for the legacy it passed on to the incoming Conservative government, yet Labour's own inheritance was extremely challenging. During the years of Labour's administration, the economy went through a period of recovery before the inevitable cycle of capitalism brought about economic decline.

Labour's Programme 1973 sought to bind the next Labour government to price controls, the development of the social contract, an increase in pension provision, renegotiation of

Britain's terms of entry to the Common Market, the restoration of free collective bargaining, the repeal of the Conservative's Industrial Relations Act, the extension of industrial democracy, the National Enterprise Broad to control individual firms and extensive planning agreements with companies to control their business practices (Thorpe, 2008, pp.189-190). By putting forward these proposals, Labour were able to contrast Heath's inaction to their own decisive approach. They were able to sell themselves as a potential government with a clear purpose, able to clearly identify the aspects of Britain's economic failure and proposed plausible remedies to revitalise the economy. As shall be discussed later in this chapter, Foot took on the mantle of improving industrial relations by ending the miner's strike action, and by replacing the contentious Conservative IR Act.

Labour's ability to bring the strikes to an amicable resolution was partly as a result of the closer ties between the Party and the TUC as evidenced by the TUC/Labour Liaison Committee (Fielding, 1995, p.48). This was an avenue closed to the previous Heath administration. By working together, Labour and the TUC were able to agree a framework for the *social contract,* whereby the unions agreed to control wages in exchange for concessions favouring themselves. Foot's union ally, Jack Jones agreed to keep pay increases to a minimum, enabling Labour to keep a lower inflation rate (*ibid*). The private sector, however did not adhere to the social contract after 1977, forcing the government to impose a 5 per cent pay freeze, disgruntling the public sector employees, ultimately leading to strikes. Believing themselves to have been used by the government, the unions began to break with the agreement and agree much larger pay deals with private companies. This had the consequence of pushing up inflation and undoing much of the governments earlier economic repair work. The public sector unions called for strike action

in 1978, resulting in the period of strike action characterised by Labour's opponents as *the winter of discontent.*

Throughout the decade, Britain's economy was part of a collective of economies throughout Europe. As a member of the Common Market, many within the inside left argued that closer ties would constrain Britain's ability to govern the economy independently. Given economic policies such as import controls would be contrary to the spirit of closer ties with Britain's Common Market allies, figures on the inside left argued for Britain to remain outside the Common Market or, once in, for Britain's withdrawal. However, the social democratic right argued that Britain's economic prosperity was dependent upon *closer* ties with the Common Market given, they argued, the Common Market enhanced Britain's trade potential with other European nations. By breaking down national barriers, free trade would ensure greater profitability for multinational corporations. Therefore, when considering Labour's economic policy, it is also necessary to consider Labour's relationship with the Common Market.

On 1st January 1973, the United Kingdom joined the Common Market (Clark, 1 January 1973, p.1). During the negotiations for entry, a debate in the House of Commons took place in which Wilson had announced that the next Labour government would re-negotiate the terms agreed by Heath or leave the Common Market (Lloyd, 1993, p.430). On the day British membership commenced, Wilson argued the terms agreed by Heath would have harsh, negative consequences for agriculture that would leave the British electorate with a high financial penalty. Wilson also strongly argued that the European Parliament would be highly damaging to British sovereignty and the authority of Parliament, saying

> when the British Parliament has been stripped by the Government's European Communities Act of so many of its powers, we think it is meaningless to go to an

> almost functionless assembly and pretend that we should then be exercising any form of Parliamentary control (Clark, 1 January 1973, p.1).

The loss of sovereignty and authority of Parliament were significant aspects of Foot's objection to Britain joining the Common Market. *Labour Weekly* leaves little room for ambiguity in Foot's position, saying

> he believed that everyone, every institution, every ex-Prime Minister, every Other Place (that's the House of Lords), and every outside Commission (he meant the European one) should bow to the supremacy of the Commons (Langdon, 16 April 1976, p.3).

Ironically, Wilson's argument would be used some years later by those campaigning against his counter-recommendation to remain within the Common Market. The idea of a referendum on the issue was first discussed in 1972 after the French held a referendum on the subject of a larger Common Market, which in effect provided the French electorate with an opportunity to veto Britain's membership (Lloyd, 1993, p.431). Labour's irritation with the terms which Heath had agreed to bring Britain into the Common Market became an ongoing and highly divisive issue for the incoming Labour government.

Prior to returning to government, Wilson had been able to keep the debates surrounding Britain's membership of the Common Market at bay by promising to renegotiate the terms of entry before submitting them to the electorate for their approval or rejection through a referendum. In order to retain party unity, Wilson had used his skills as leader to prevent the issue becoming a premature divisive debate that had the potential to split the Party whilst in opposition (Ziegler, 1993, pp.381-383). By distorting the need to debate the issue, Wilson was able to present a united Labour Party to the electorate as a competent potential government over that of Heath's. However, given he had promised a debate during the next Labour government, he had merely postponed the debate, rather than

resolved it. In the February 1974 Labour manifesto, the commitment to holding a referendum held little ambiguity:

> Britain is a European nation, and a Labour Britain would always seek a wider co-operation between the European peoples. But a profound political mistake made by the Heath Government was to accept the terms of entry to the Common Market, and to take us in without the consent of the British people. (Labour Party, 1974).

The commitment to a consultation of the British electorate was subsequently re-stated in the October 1974 Labour manifesto:

> The British people were not given a chance to say whether or not they agreed to the terms accepted by the Tory Government. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals have refused to endorse the rights of our people to make their own decision. Only the Labour Party is committed to the right of the men and women of this country to make this unique decision. (Labour Party, 1974).

Wilson could no longer keep the issue of the Common Market off the immediate political agenda. The commitment to a consultation was too widely publicised and unavoidable regardless of the potential for a divisive split. Wilson's skills had worked well for him in opposition but in government he had little choice than to open Pandora's Box and allow the divisions to be exposed for all, including the electorate, to see. His suspension of the convention of cabinet collective responsibility enabled him to prevent the resignation of those who may not have been able to keep to the government's preferred policy, thereby portraying a united front on the other aspects of policy. This enabled both the supporters and opponents of Common Market membership to openly attack the policy position of their colleagues vis-à-vis the Common Market with little risk of repercussions. This also enabled the debate to cut across traditional party lines, ensuring the issue did not become simply a party political debate between the main parties.

Wilson kept to his word regarding the re-negotiations of Heath's terms of entry and the Foreign Secretary, Callaghan completed the re-negotiations for Britain's continued membership on 11th March 1975 in Dublin; they were then swiftly passed through Parliament with Conservative support (Jones, 1994, pp.374-375). Wilson's reliance on Conservative support illustrates the lack of support for Britain's membership from his own backbenches. The new terms of entry included greater trading freedoms with Commonwealth nations and greater financial benefits for Britain's budget payments (Morgan, 2007, p.326). With these changes in place, Wilson argued that the best option would be for Britain to continue as a member of the Common Market and so recommended a Yes vote to the electorate on 5th June 1975, but he still had to face a Special Conference in April whereby a large number of attendees voted for withdrawal (Hatfield, 29 April 1975, p.1). Despite the government being defeated at the conference, the commitment to a referendum ensured that the final decision rested with the electorate rather than the Labour movement. It is likely that the Labour Party conference had an influence on the mindset of the rank and file membership of the Labour Party, however the broader electorate would be less likely to support the position of the increasingly unpopular unions. It was in this context in which the campaigning during the referendum began.

Opposition to the Common Market was fragmented in its organisation. By spreading itself across organisations such as the 'National Referendum Campaign' (NRC), the 'Common Market Safeguards Campaign', the 'British Businessmen for World Markets', the 'Anti-Common Market League', and the 'National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations', Benn remarked that the eclectic group were “an awful rag-bag” and that his preference was simply “to get the Labour Party to come out against Europe” (Benn, 1989, pp.285-286). By fragmenting its supporter organisational structures, the No campaign lacked

a single avenue in which to express opposition to the Common Market. However, despite this, the NRC had extensive pedigree which aimed to mirror the “Britain In Europe” (BIE) group in terms of importance (Jones, 1994, p.379). Jones (1994) remarks that the amount of money spent by the two main groups (BIE and NRC) in their respective campaigns was vastly different. The BIE group spent £1,481,000 whilst the NRC spent £133,000 (*ibid*). This indicates that the pro-Common Market campaigners had greater opportunity to put the Yes perspective to the electorate in both time and scope given their ability to afford more extensive media coverage. This ability to pay for more publicity does not, however, negate the argument of the opponent, rather it merely drowns it. It is also worth noting that the financial donations to BIE came mainly from big businesses such as *Marks and Spencer, Imperial Chemicals Industries, Shell, Vickers* and *Keen and Nettleford* (Jones, 1994, p.380). Given a raison d'être of the Common Market is the freeing up of trade, then continued membership would be primarily beneficial to such corporate enterprises.

The Yes campaign was also supported by the press, including the *Daily Mirror*, and many of the broadsheets as well as *The Express*, despite a tradition of isolationism that derived from Beaverbrook's desire for an independent Britain (Jones, 1994, p.379). Before the day of the poll, an information pack was sent to each household in the United Kingdom containing three reports pertaining to Britain's relationship with the Common Market (*ibid*). The government, the BIE and the National Referendum campaigns each had an opportunity to convey their arguments for and again membership to the electorate. Put simply, the electorate were subjected to the case for continued membership *twice*, with the No campaign only having one opportunity. Wilson pushed the case for continued membership arguing he had secured “big and significant improvements” on the terms agreed by Heath (Wilson, 1 May 1975, p.4). He continued by arguing that the “better terms can give Britain a

new deal in Europe. A deal that can help us, help the commonwealth and help the community" (*ibid*). By drawing the benefits of the commonwealth into his new deal, Wilson was aiming to argue that a No result would undermine prosperity for all. The government article continues by quoting members of the commonwealth, such as the Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam who said

> I do not want to give any impression that the present Australian government sees any advantage for Australia, for Europe or the rest of the world in Britain leaving the community (Whitlam, 1 May 1975, p.4).

The inclusion of the view of the Australian Prime Minister serves the Yes campaign by closing down the argument of that internationalism would be better served with Britain out of the Common Market. By using Whitlam's views, the Yes campaign can emphasise the broader benefits to Britain, and that the issues raised by the No campaigners are not a significant basis for withdrawal. The government continued by arguing that if the No campaign were to be successful, then Britain would enter a period of increased uncertainty, higher unemployment and higher inflation (Wilson, 1 May 1975, p.4). Wilson firmly argued that the Common Market had significant economic benefits to Britain. Also at a Commonwealth Conference in Jamaica, the Jamaican Prime Minister told the conference that Britain's continuation as a member of the Common Market would, in fact, be beneficial to the Commonwealth as a collective (Ziegler, 1993, p.432). By engaging with influential Commonwealth figures, Wilson was able to convey the message that the anti-Common Market campaigners were incorrect to argue Britain in the Common Market would have a negative effect on Commonwealth nations. Also, the leading social democrat, Jenkins argued a possible scenario of Britain's withdrawal would see the United Kingdom "joining the Soviet bloc" (Benn, 1989, p.383). By making such arguments, the pro-Common Market campaigners were portraying Britain's future outside of the Common Market with a highly fearful outlook.

With Wilson's arguments about higher unemployment and higher inflation still in the minds of the electorate, on 5th June 1975, the electorate chose to remain within the Common Market with 67 per cent agreeing with the position suggested by Wilson whilst 33 per cent opposed Britain's continued membership (BBC News, 1975; Jones, 1994, p.375). The result was a clear victory for the Yes campaign and the arguments it had put forward. It was also a victory for many of the opponents of the inside left including Jenkins who said

> It puts the uncertainty behind us. It commits Britain to Europe; it commits us to playing an active, constructive and enthusiastic role in it. (BBC News, 1975).

The victory for the Yes campaigners, however would not lay the issue to rest. Foot, Benn, Castle, Peter Shore, John Silkin and Eric Varley are not prone to allowing a decision they believe to have been made on a false understanding of the issues to remain unchallenged (Jones, 1994, p376). Benn argued in his diary that approximately seventeen million people had voted to stay in, whilst eight million had voted to leave (Benn, 1989, p.387). Benn (1989) also notes that although the No campaign had lost, the result was still positive for the anti-Common Market campaigners because they lacked similar media support to that of the Yes group, little coordinated organisation given the number of opposing groups, and the support of antagonistic figures such as Powell had the potential to alienate rather than attract supporters.

The outcome of the referendum can be accounted for by considering four characteristic issues concerning Britain in 1975. Firstly, *partisan alignment* ensured that many Labour voters adhered to the recommendation of the Party leaderships with an assumption that they knew best. Generational Labour and Conservative voters were bound to their Party through loyalty to their political philosophy, and so are disinclined to deviate regardless of the non-partisan, cross-ideological nature of the issue (Heywood, 2002, p.242). Secondly,

given at the time of the referendum Britain was already a committed member of the Common Market, the innate *conservatism* of the electorate would be resistant to any change without significant cause. At the time of the referendum, Britain had already been a member of the Common Market for two years, and it had become the new *status quo*. Thirdly, the Yes campaign had drawn the electorate's attention to the threat of economic consequences which had the potential to deprive them of their employment. Given the industrial relations situation of the previous years, economic instability was a continuing concern in the mindset of the electorate and the arguments regarding Britain's relationship with the Common Market may threaten that prosperity. Fourthly, the Yes campaign had been given the opportunity to make a strong case with the aid of the media, government and big business. This had ensured that their *positive* representation of Common Market membership became the dominant recollection within the majority of the electorates decisions prior to polling. In this sense, the electorate had indeed been *manipulated* into voting to remain within the Common Market because the No campaign lacked comparable media exposure. Britain did not have an equal debate on the issue, thus leaving the result open to accusations of unfairness. And finally the electorate had become increasingly familiar with Europe through travelling to European destinations and so had developed closer cultural ties with the continent. This ensured that fear of Europeans was much less than had been the case in the previous decades.

Subsequently to Britain choosing to remain a member of the Common Market it began to be the odd nation out. Shortly after the referendum, Britain refused to finalise a date for community-wide elections and refused to allow France to be the sole representative at a north-south conference in Paris (Ziegler, 1993, p.433). Britain was uneasy with its relationship with the Common Market, and refused to allow it to operate as a single trading bloc of

nations. Instead, Britain retained an independence which belied the collective capitalism of the rest of the community. Britain developed an approach to the Common Market that appeared to assume an 'us and them' attitude that promoted the interests of Britain independently over those of the broader collective of nations.

4.2: Michael Foot as the Secretary of State for Employment.

As a government minister, Foot took charge of a significant government portfolio at the Department of Employment where he would engage with industrial relations as a matter of course. He found himself working with Albert Booth as the Minister of State and with both Harold Walker and John Fraser as under secretaries (Jones, 1994, p.353). His ministerial team were all from the left, which inevitably reduced the potential for ideological division over the policies Foot sought to pursue. Some press coverage was also broadly supportive of Wilson's decision to bring Foot into the cabinet, saying “one appointment, that of Foot, Secretary of State for Employment, is brilliant” (Hutchinson, 3 April 1976, p.14). A developing fashion within British politics was the migration of an idea from France concerning political advisers; whilst a selection of Foot's cabinet colleagues decided to take advantage of appointing a political advisor, Foot did not. He did not feel the need to make such an appointment, which is significant when key figures such as Benn and Castle appointed political advisers (Jones, 1994, p.352). However, Foot did enlist the assistance of Professor Bill Wedderburn from the London School of Economics (LSE), who possessed an extensive knowledge of labour law, who came from the Marxist left, and was a former member of the CND. Foot did seek to gain the advisory support of Wedderburn, however his commitments to the TUC and desire to retain his positions at the LSE prevented him from joining Foot at the department (Jones, 1994, p.353; Morgan, 2007, p.287).

Foot's first task in his new role would be to bring the miner's strike, which had effectively brought Heath's government down, to a successful resolution. Prior to becoming the Secretary of State for Employment, Foot had informed *The Times* that

> the miners will certainly need to be paid more. There is no compassionate, civilised person in this country who begrudges the miners more than £40 per week, provided their case is honestly put (Hamilton, 15 February 1974, p.5).

Foot continued to say that the Labour Government could end “this ridiculous three-day week” in a matter of days (*ibid*). As Employment Secretary, it would be his responsibility to find the resolution required to end the miner's strike and combat its secondary consequences. On 6th March 1974, pay negotiations were authorised by Foot to examine the miner's pay claim for an increase from the existing £8.21 to £12.71 per week (Routledge, 6 March 1974, p.1). Foot was clearly determined to put this issue at the heart of his departmental activities as a matter of urgency. The Conservatives were critical of Foot's actions, arguing that he was giving the miners a blank cheque because he ultimately agreed on a pay settlement which brought a coalface worker up to £45 per week; this was a good wage for the time, yet it could hardly be considered a blank cheque (Jones, 1994, p.354). Foot also assured the National Union of Miners (NUM) that free collective bargaining was to be restored, effectively bringing the strike to a conclusion (Morgan, 2007, p.298).

The increase in wages, however would have economic consequences such as exacerbating existing inflationary pressures. Jones (1994) observed that the increases in inflationary pressures could be traced back to Heath's policy of 'threshold payments', which automatically increased workers' wages on a monthly basis when inflation passed 7 per cent (Jones, 1994, p.354). The incomes policy was divided into three stages. The first and second stages of wage increases were introduced without inflationary complications however the third stage became problematic in its implementation (Gamble, 1988, p.77). The third stage of wage increases fuelled inflation with each subsequent increase. The failure of the Conservative incomes policy can be illustrated by the industrial unrest most profoundly expressed by the miners. Ultimately, Foot's assumption of the Ministerial position within the Department placed these issues firmly within his portfolio.

Labour's election victory in February 1974 left the Party with a majority so small which ensured a repeat election would be close at hand. In opposition, the Conservatives sought to undermine the fragile Labour government by pushing for a vote of no confidence. In a speech to the House of Commons, Foot argued that because “the truly wealthy have been inclined to threaten sanctions or preach sermons to people who have to fight every day of their lives to keep their heads above the inflationary flood”, the Conservatives must reconsider their endeavours of undermining the new Labour government (Rosen, 2005, pp.326-327). The power behind Foot's oratory shamed the Heath opposition into withdrawing their no confidence motion. Benn (1989) remarked in his diary that Foot's speech was “brilliant”, however given the minority nature of the government, any attempts by the government to act would be “a cork tossed on the sea of unsettled industrial power relations” (Benn, 1989, p.122). The lack of a workable majority ensured that the government would need to return to the country for a more substantial mandate.

Despite the earlier successful resolution of the miners' strike, the Labour government's precarious situation acted as a Sword of Damocles which threatened to end its life. Unpopular pieces of Conservative legislation, which appeared to attack Labour's core support base, remained to be repealed. Wilson was very much aware of the potential time constraint on the lifespan of his government, saying

> ...it was highly desirable that the legislations repealing the Industrial Relations Act should have reached the Statute Book before a general election took place (Morgan, 2007, p.300).

This gave Foot a degree of urgency in his legislation. In his time at the Department, Foot was able to pass six major Bills through Parliament (Morgan, 2007, p.297). One of the most significant Bills was the Trade Union and Labour Relations Bill; Foot preferred the name

Workers Rights Bill, however this was amended on the advice of the TUC to the less provocative name. TULRA was designed to subvert the anti-trade union legislation of the Heath administration, whilst guaranteeing the rights of unions to recruit, organise, and participate in collective bargaining and strike (Jones, 1994, pp.359-360). The Industrial Relations Act had introduced the National Industrial Relations Court, the Commission on Industrial Relation and the Registry of Union and Employers Associations (Morgan, 2007, p.300). These measures had the result of undermining worker's confidence and rights which they had secured since the early development of the Labour movement. Foot's TULRA was published on the eve of May Day in 1974, which opens with the phrase “the Industrial Relations Act 1972 is hereby repealed” (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.174). Yet the TUC did not secure all the provisions it demanded, such as stronger legal rights for picketers and an end to conscientious objections to joining a union (Morgan, 2007, p.300). Despite these omissions, the legislation succeeded in reversing a controversial piece of Conservative legislation that had undermined Heath's industrial relations. With the miner's strike resolved, and TULRA in place, the way was clear for the Labour Party to face the electorate with greater confidence.

The October 1974 Labour manifesto, entitled *Britain Will Win With Labour* contains a section written by Foot (Jones, 1994, p.361). The passage concerns the Social Contract and how he sees industrial relations developing in Labour's second term of office.

> At the heart of this manifesto and our programme to save the nation lies the Social Contract between the Labour Government and the trade unions, an idea derided by our enemies, but certain to become widely accepted by those who genuinely believe in government by consent - that is, in the democratic process itself as opposed to the authoritarian and bureaucratic system of wage control imposed by the Heath Government and removed by Labour. The Social Contract is no mere

> paper agreement approved by politicians and trade unions. It is not concerned solely or even primarily with wages. It covers the whole range of national policies. It is the agreed basis upon which the Labour Party and the trade unions define their common purpose. Labour describes the firm and detailed commitments which will be fulfilled in the field of social policy, in the fairer sharing of the nation's wealth, in the determination to restore and sustain full employment. The unions in response confirm how they will seek to exercise the newly restored right of free collective bargaining. Naturally the trade unions see their clearest loyalty to their own members. But the Social Contract is their free acknowledgement that they have other loyalties - to the members of other unions too, to pensioners, to the lower-paid, to invalids, to the community as a whole. It is these wide-ranging hopes and obligations which the General Council of the TUC described in its declaration of June 26 and which were overwhelmingly approved by the Congress on September 4. This is the Social Contract which can re-establish faith in the working of Britain's democracy in the years ahead (Foot, 1974).

Foot was clearly committed to the Social Contract (a term used to describe the cooperation of mutual interests between the state and unions). The aspirations of the contract was the propagation of improvements to state pensions, broader state benefits, price controls and council housing subsidies and rents (Jones, 1994, p.355). The Social Contract sought to involve the unions in creating a fairer society which revolved around the betterment of the collective, rather than the individual. In order to achieve a cooperative state of industrial relations, the Social Contract sought to bring the state into working with the unions. By advocating the contract and putting it forward in the Labour manifesto, the Party was seeking the support of the electorate for the expansion of the role of trade unionism at the centre of the nation.

Foot was a central national figure in Labour's election campaign, which included making speeches and strengthening the case for socialism in Britain. A *Times* journalist described him as “the living embodiment of Labour's conscience” who had struck a fair deal with the miners, returned Britain to a full working week within days, and provided railway workers, teachers and nurses with increases in their wages (Hamilton, 8 October 1974, p.4). These were the socially responsible policies the electorate expected from a Labour government, and Foot was able to claim them as his own. For Foot, the election was a positive experience; he was able to capitalise on the achievements of his department whilst utilising the press platform to convey his political ideology, and securing an increase in his share of the vote to 74.1 per cent (Morgan, 2007, pp.302-303).

As a counterbalance to Foot's election and Labour's Social Contract, Heath sought to push forward for a Government of National Unity of all the key parties. He wanted “to take the politics out of politics” (Butler & Kavanagh, 1975, p.45). Heath added that

> I have no doubt that the real hope of the British people in this situation is that a national coalition government, involving all the parties, should be formed, and the party differences could be put aside until the crisis is mastered (Jones, 1994, p.362).

Whilst Labour was proposing to reconstruct society around their Social Contract, the Conservatives appeared to be offering cooperation. Evans & Taylor (1996) argue that Heath's desire appealed to those who wanted to stop Labour through any means necessary, however he was undermined by the formation of the Centre for Policy Studies by Thatcher and Keith Joseph (Evans & Taylor, 1996, p.203). It should also be remembered that the Labour Party would be highly disinclined to join a coalition government to combat economic problems given that the memory of Ramsay MacDonald's defection remained a

bitter piece of Labour history. Despite this dissension in his ranks, Heath was able to secure more votes than Wilson, taking 37.9 per cent of the vote whilst Labour took 37.1 per cent (*ibid*). This was a disappointing result for Labour, who increased their number of MP's to 319, with a majority of only three whilst the Tories lost many of their 22 seats to Scottish or Welsh nationalists (Jones, 1994, p.363). This disappointing majority would ensure that Labour's second term would be fraught with difficulties.

Following the election, Foot returned to the Department for Employment where he set about creating the Advisory and Conciliation Service in conjunction with Jack Jones of the TUC (Morgan, 2007, p.303). The Service, which became known as ACAS was an independent body that investigated cases of unfair dismissal, equal pay rights, guaranteed maternity leave, and also sought to mediate in industrial disputes (Jones, 1994, p.367). This body endured the years of turmoil ahead and is a significant aspect of Foot's legacy to the state of British industrial relations.

However, Foot became embroiled in a dispute concerning some aspects of his proposed legislation which appeared controversial to those not wishing to engage with unions. This dispute characterised much of his remaining time as Secretary of State for Employment; Foot himself found the dispute to be unnecessary and counter-productive to the broader aims and objectives of his legislation (Jones, 1994, p.370). Despite his views, it would be a dispute which brought him into conflict with the press. The Employment Protection Bill aspired to improve free collective bargaining through state intervention by guaranteeing the rights of workers. Key to the legislation was the right of the worker to union membership, a recognition procedure to ensure employers negotiated with unions, employers would have to disclose relevant company information to union representatives,

reinstatement rights in ACAS judged to have been unfairly dismissed and the outlawing of deductions from wages for shop floor behaviour (Morgan, 2007, p.305). The legislation also included provision for the introduction of the closed shop. Prior to 1971, the closed shop had existed but was removed by the Conservatives' Industrial Relations Act. Foot was seeking to restore it on similar grounds, where a closed shop existed in cooperation between the employer and the trade union (Jones, 1994, p.370).

On this issue, Foot came in for a great deal of criticism. George Gale, the former editor of *the Spectator* and *Daily Mirror* wrote an extensive letter for *The Times* where he attacked Foot for appearing to miss the point concerning the potential the closed shop had for undermining press freedoms. He suggested that

> ...the situation before the Industrial Relations Act was unsatisfactory, for the NUJ had by then secured closed shops in certain newspapers and agency offices and had used its industrial power to restrict editorial freedom (Gale, 4 January 1975, p.13).

Gale argued that by reverting to the previous pre-Industrial Relations Act *status quo*, Foot was restoring an inadequate situation for the freedom of the press. Gale continued to argue that although the closed shop may be applicable in other industries, it was not justifiable in the communications industry. This was because decisions on news content and printable materials must be the preserve of the news editors and not any special interest or political body (*ibid*). The debate became unduly polarised between pro- and anti-closed shop positions. Foot was not an absolutist libertarian, yet he argued that the threat of media control was extremely remote. The closed shop aimed to provide workers such as journalists with representation within their work environment, yet because of the polarisation of the debate it instead became about the single issue of press freedoms.

The Council of the Guild of British Newspaper Editors sent an open letter to Wilson, attacking the implementation of the closed shop in the communications industry. Their key argument is expressed below:

> It remains the view of the council that the closed shop provisions of this Bill as they apply to editorial departments of newspapers represent a surrender to trade union militancy and sectional interests against the public interest. They would imperil the the free expression of opinion and the provision of an unfettered service of information to readers (*The Times*, 8 January 1975, p.3).

The concerns expressed by the council confirm their belief that the optional closed shop would prove to be highly damaging to the freedom of the press. *The Times* also argued that "unions such as the National Union of Journalists could force their members to publish only what is written by NUJ members" (*ibid*). It must be remembered that the fears of the editors were based upon possibilities if the NUJ asked journalists to join, and if they chose to publish materials only produced by NUJ members, and if the NUJ made editorial decisions based on political ideology. Within the Labour Party, Foot was also facing pressure from the social democrats within the Manifesto Group who argued that this move also threatened the freedom of the individual and their right to free speech because it threatened to place a legal obligation to become a member of a closed shop trades union (*New Statesman*, 2 April 1976, p.423; Clark, 22 January 1975, p.3; Morgan, 2007, p.310; Jones, 1994, p.375).

Other critics of the Bill included his brother Dingle Foot, Isaiah Berlin, Hugh Trevor-Roper, C.V Wedgwood, Arthur Koestler, J. B Priestley, his wife Jacquetta Hawkes and Rebecca West (Morgan, 2007, p.309; p.311). These were the cross-party intellectual cream coming out to voice objections to Foot's Bill. To illustrate the extent of the attacks from his own

ideological position, both Foot and West shared similar "literary gods"[20] of socialism (Foot, 1980, p.92). As discussed earlier, H.G Wells had a deep penetrating effect upon Foot's socialism. Foot could ideologically disregard the objections of members of the Manifesto Group, given their version of socialism always differed from his. Foot's disregard for the objections made by those who subscribed to an approximation of his own understanding of socialism can only be explained by his belief that the Bill was a genuine, necessary step towards expanding social justice and the development of industrial democracy.

In a letter to *The Times*, Foot defended his position by arguing that those who objected to the legislation had entirely misrepresented the purpose and potential effects of the Bill, arguing that the Bill did not propose to introduce, encourage or enforce closed shops upon any industry. He argued that the Bill sought "to remove the outlawry of the closed shop, which the Industrial Relations Act sought vainly to impose" and that the legislation concerning union membership seeks to be flexible (Foot, 24 December 1974, p.11). There was no compulsory aspect to the legislation. Within the same letter, Foot continued to argue that in certain white-collar industries, union membership would increase as a result of the legislation because of the low percentage of current union membership. Foot concluded his letter arguing that the objections "derived from an mistaken understanding of our Bill" (*ibid*). This mistaken understanding provided Foot with a highly contentious debate with the print media; given the nature of the communications industry, it is unlikely to have benefited Foot's public position. The communications industry has by its very nature a wide audience, and so was able to communicate their opposition to Foot's legislation directly to the electorate. However, Foot was seeking to revert to a previous long-standing arrangement between industry and unions. Foot later argued that the unions were much less guilty of manipulating members output than Rupert Murdoch, the owner of *The Sun,*

[20] Shaw, Bennett, Galsworthy, Wells.

and subsequently *The Times* who Foot argues "has contributed to so much to the debasement of moral standards in Fleet Street" (Jones, 1994, p.371). Foot also attacked the newspaper editors in the House of Commons on 12 March 1975 saying "if they had fought for the freedom of others with one-tenth of the ardour with which they have fought for their own, we should have a world that is much more free than it is at present" (Jones, 1994, p.371). Clearly Foot was not in a forgiving mood.

The controversy surrounding the Bill enmeshed Foot in a debate which he saw as meaningless and distracting. However, the Bill did serve to redress many of the imbalances to industrial relations which had been created by the Industrial Relations Act (Morgan, 2007, p.313). That said, ultimately the communications industry would be granted concessions by the government. They included the ability for employers and unions to determine the classes of employees who could be excluded from union membership. In the House of Commons, Albert Booth assured members that the government did not want to force union membership on any individual, and that any closed shop arrangements would be flexible. The Employment Protection Bill was granted its Royal Assent on 25 March 1976 (Morgan, 2007, p.312). In a speech to the Foreign Press Association shortly afterwards, Foot stated that the opposition to his proposal to improve representation of the workers had been "a farrago of fiction, falsehood and hysteria" (Jones, 1994, p.392).

Running parallel to the debate concerning press freedoms was the issue of inflation, which was proving to be highly problematic for the government. In December 1974, *The Times* was reporting that wage inflation was in a state of sharp acceleration as a result of a weekly pay increase of £1.20 (Westlake, 19 December 1974, p.17). The economy was facing "threats to sterling, and possible cuts of £1,000 million in public expenditure, with

unemployment rising to two million as a result" (Morgan, 2007, p.316). During 1974, prices increased by 17 per cent whilst wages increased by 22 per cent the following year, the inflation rate rose further to a peak of 27 per cent (Pugh, 2004, p.339). Facing such dire economic circumstances, immediate action would need to be taken in order to prevent hyper inflation. However, the unions had petitioned the cabinet for import controls and other means of protecting the British worker, yet these were rejected by the cabinet (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.178). Given Britain's membership of the Common Market, the government was constrained by the action it could take. An incomes policy was the preferred option, which Foot insisted must be on a voluntary basis (Morgan, 2007, p.317). Right-wing MP's, such as the Secretary of State for Education and Science, Reg Prentice argued that the unions had the choice of either allowing their members to face high unemployment or support the government's attempts to control inflation by cutting wages (Clark, 1 March 1975, p.2). Prentice continued to argue that inflation had to become the government's main economic concern, and that the unions must capitulate to that necessity. Prentice had, by making his proposals, stepped on Foot's toes by exceeding his portfolio (Smith, 7 March 1975, p.14).

Jack Jones proposed a £6 a week flat-rate increase; this voluntary concession was proposed as a means of aiding the government pull back from the edge of the precipice. On 22nd July 1975, Wilson proposed making the £6 flat rate a legal requirement, which would make it illegal for any employer to reward a higher pay increase (Morgan, 2007, p.317). The proposal was being drafted into a reserve Bill should the White Paper entitled *The Attack on Inflation* fail. The purpose of the White Paper was to put forward a case for a voluntary wage freeze. It opens saying

> ...a sharp reduction in the rate of inflation is an over-riding priority for millions of our fellow citizens, particularly the house wives and pensioners. It is also a pre-

> condition for the reduction of unemployment and the increase of investment which the government, the TUC and CBI all want to see (*The Times*, 12 July 1975, p.4).

The White Paper continues to argue that the rate of inflation has been the highest in the 1970s than in any other decade, and that its acceleration had to be curbed. It was to be curbed by controlling local authority borrowing, controls over private sector pay settlements, applications for state assistance to be contextualised against the needs of the broader economy, price controls, improvements to consumer information, allocating resources in the economy where growth is most likely to stimulate stability, improvements in training, and an expansion of banking credit (*ibid*). The White Paper was an attempt to stimulate the economy against the backdrop of a growing global recession. If the White Paper failed, then Wilson would put forward his reserve Bill which included the £6 wage increase as a legal requirement; Foot conceded that this would be a reversion to a statutory pay policy, which he suggested would be a resigning issue (Morgan, 2007, p317). Indeed, Foot added that he would have great difficulties in pushing a reserve powers Bill through Parliament (Noyes, 23 July 1975, p.1). In Parliament, Healey discussed how the Act would be used against those who violated the voluntary limit by advising the members that "the £6 was an upper limit" and that an Order-in-Council would be applied against an individual or employer who exceeded this amount (Healey, 22 July 1975, p.10). The White Paper passed through the House of Commons without the reserve Bill with 262 votes to 54; the Conservatives largely abstained from the vote because they felt it lacked the scope required to combat inflation (Noyes, 23 July 1975, p.1).

Ultimately, Healey would oversee higher unemployment, a tolerance for greater taxation and cuts of approximately £3 billion of public spending (Pugh, 2004, p.339). The apparent acceptance of unemployment as a price worth paying in order to combat the inflation rate was a key concession made to the Treasury. The Treasury was in the process of divorcing

itself from its tenuous relationship with Keynesian economics, whilst simultaneously beginning its focus upon the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. Such flirtations ultimately laid the foundations for the adoption of monetarism as the new *status quo* for economic governance (Cronin, 2004, p.169). The gradual conversion from Keynesian economics to monetarism became a key development in Britain's economic evolution.

Morgan (2007) observes that despite Foot's threat to resign over the issue of statutory wage increases, “he was felt by colleagues to be far more loyal” in respect of cabinet responsibility than some other members of the cabinet (Morgan, 2007, p.319). This loyalty undoubtedly endeared him to many of his cabinet colleagues and the broader PLP, including social democrats. By the beginning of his final year at the Department of Employment, Foot was able to enjoy the relative tranquillity of success. He had achieved a great deal within the Department. The moment of peace was not to last, however. On 16th March 1976 Wilson resigned in order to enjoy the retirement he promised himself when he reached 60 years of age (Jones, 1994, p.393). Wilson's departure made a leadership election an inevitability, which would guarantee political theatre. The election would disconnect Foot from the Department of Employment, bringing his time as Secretary of State for Employment to an end. During his time as Secretary of State for Employment, Foot pushed through legislation relating to trade union recognition as well as overseeing the development of the employment conciliation board, and he had stood by the Employment Protection Bill. Also during his time at the Department for Employment, he had assisted with the general election of October 1974 and stood by the developing governmental record. In government, Foot had undoubtedly become a loyalist. He was loyal to the government to which he was a member. However, he was still evidently loyal to the unions and to his political principles. He did not waver from them for political gain; indeed, when

he believed passionately in the restoration of the pre-1971 Industrial Relations closed shops, he stood his ground. Foot endeavoured to apply his liberal values that had been confirmed and expanded through his political education onto the policies he following within government. His opposition to the Industrial Relations Act and its subsequent replacement and resolution of the miners' strike became crusades for social justice against *Toryism*. His ability to effectively tackle and subdue two key areas of Conservative failure demonstrates his governing success at the Department for Employment.

4.3: Michael Foot and the 1976 Labour Leadership Election.

As Secretary of State for Employment, Foot was in a respectable position to campaign legitimately for the leadership of the Party when Wilson unexpectedly resigned. *Labour Weekly* noted that "the legacy which Harold Wilson most wants to leave at Number 10 Downing Street is a new Prime Minister who will take control of the existing Government economic strategy", which would be most manifest by the emergence of "a strong candidate from the political centre of the Party" (Langdon, 19 March 1976, p.1). Ultimately, his social democratic rival, Callaghan secured the leadership. However, the campaign improved Foot's profile as the *most likely* figure from the left of the Party to secure the leadership at some future point. Indeed, New Statesman argued that "Michael must stand... in order to demonstrate the strength of the left" (*New Statesman*, 2 April 1976, p.420). Initially, the PLP had a broad selection of candidates from which to select their new leader. Whilst representation of the left was splintered between Foot and Benn, the social democratic right was fractured between Callaghan, Crosland, Jenkins and Healey (Rosen, 2005, p.346). Foot's main competitor for the votes of broadly left-leaning MP's was Benn, however Benn, anticipating the probability of defeat, remarked that he would withdraw after the first ballot in order to support Foot (Benn, 1989, p.538). The New Statesman also predicted that this was not to be Benn's hour of success (*New Statesman*, 19 March 1976, p.1).

Foot was a credible candidate in the contest because he had proven himself to be an effective and, most importantly a *loyal* member of the Wilson government, demonstrating competence at resolving the miners' strike and reforming the Industrial Relations Act (Morgan, 2007, p.329). He also had more appeal to the centrist and social democratic members of the PLP than Benn. Yet Benn's participation in the election was not to achieve victory, but rather to test his support within the PLP (Benn, 1989, p.544). Consequently, in the

later ballots, the left would be able to congregate around a unifying single figure. The lack of a comparable left-wing fracturing on the scale of the right explains why Foot performed extremely well in the first ballot.

As a loyal Labour front bencher, Foot had proven to the backbenches that he could lead them. However, he lamented his lack of comparable time on the front bench. When asked by Benn if he regretted being absent from the 1964-70 Labour government, Foot replied “Yes, in a way I do” (Benn, 1989, p.542). This comment carries with it an implication that Foot regretted not being able to participate further in the decision making processes of the previous Labour cabinets and that his earlier input at cabinet level *may* have guided Labour policies in alternative directions. From the outside, Foot was able to campaign on the issues to which he had an attachment. By being on the inside, however Foot became confronted with the decision making process and so would have been able to affect and influence policy direction in a much more direct manner. On a more personal note, Foot's absence also deprived him of more time to solidify his ministerial reputation amongst some of the MP's he was now seeking to support him. This comment also shores up the shift in Foot's political character from being a likable rebel to a criticised loyalist.

As previously mentioned, the first ballot produced a highly respectable result for Foot. However, given that the results of his opposing candidates was due to fracturing of their support across their support base, it is necessary to briefly consider why they performed as they did in the first ballot (Stark, 1996, p.119).

Candidate Support in the 1976 Leadership Election

	First Ballot	Second Ballot	Third Ballot
Michael Foot	90	133	137
James Callaghan	84	141	176
Roy Jenkins	56		
Tony Benn	37		
Denis Healey	30	38	
Anthony Crosland	17		
Abstentions		1	
N=	314	313	313

Source: (Stark, 1996, p4)

Crosland secured the lowest figure in the first ballot because of his relatively low campaign profile and because he "lacked credibility having never held one of the three major offices of state" (Jeffreys, 1999, pp.193-194). Also, his attitude to ideological allies who supported Callaghan was also questionable. When Hattersley told Crosland of his intention to support another candidate, Crosland told him simply to "fuck off" (Jeffreys, 1999, p.191). It is hard to imagine Foot reacting in such a fashion. Crosland possessed a personal style and manner which did not have the potential to sit well with a future party leader. Crosland's attitude and level of alienation from his colleagues explains his low result, and why those who may have supported him ideologically gravitated towards either Callaghan or Healey.

Jenkins had lost the support of many within the PLP because of his stance on the Common Market, which had led to his resignation as deputy leader some years before, prompted by Labour's commitment to a referendum on Common Market membership (Campbell, 1983, p.143). Those who supported him did so because of his record as Home Secretary and Chancellor, whilst those who opposed him did so because he was unlikely to be a unifying candidate (Campbell, 1983, p.177). Also, the pro-Common Market MP's could still express their modest support for the Common Market by supporting a more moderate

candidate when contrasted to Jenkins active and passionate support for the Common Market.

It can be assumed that the majority of Crosland and Jenkins' votes gravitated towards Callaghan following their departure from the process. In contrast to Crosland and Jenkins, Healey remained within the contest. In paraphrasing the rationale from Barbara Castle, Healey says it was because “I was a pugilist, not a patrician” (Healey, 1989, p.447). His determination to fight on when others knew their time was up won him only an extra eight votes. This lack of success demonstrates the futility of this endeavour to be leader, whilst also demonstrating that his participation was as a mere irritation to the process rather than a threat to any of the primary candidates. Healey's continued participation also ensured that a third ballot would be inevitable. It could also be argued that Healey's failure to make substantial penetrations into the social democratic vote in early ballots acted as a forewarning for the 1980 leadership campaign. Healey is not the first choice amongst his social democratic peers, and so was overshadowed by the candidatures of the other figures. In contrast, Foot's performance strengthened his claim to make be the credible candidate of the inside left.

Despite Foot gaining a major personal boost following the publication of positive unemployment figures showing a fall for the first time in two years, on the second ballot, Foot fell into second place whilst the right re-coalesced around Callaghan (*Labour Weekly*, 26 March 1976, p.1). Foot secured the majority of Benn's votes, thereby increasing his number from 90 to 133, however Callaghan increased his vote from the departed Jenkins and Crosland, pushing him into the lead (Morgan, 1997, p.473). Following the ballot, Healey was withdrawn to enable to a contest between the two remaining candidates.

As Callaghan pushed ahead, John Silkin, Foot's campaign manager argued to *The Times* that

> ...the ballot remains absolutely wide open... the question is what happens to the 38 Healey votes. They are really Healey votes and not block votes at all (Wood, 31 March 1976, p.1).

Whilst speaking to *Labour Weekly*, Silkin continued saying Foot "would hope to capture 26 which would be two more than they would need to win. The reason was they were 'Healey Votes, not block votes' and they had been cast by 'rather individual, sturdily independent characters'" (Langdon, 2 April 1976, p.1). Consequently, Foot had just cause to feel broadly optimistic as both he and Callaghan entered the third and final ballot.

Ultimately, however the Healey votes gravitated towards Callaghan, depriving Foot of the leadership. However, Foot's admirable performance had granted him greater authority within the cabinet and Party (Morgan, 2007, p.330). Foot had been able to demonstrate to both his supporters and opponents that he had a sizeable support base within the PLP, and that despite being unable to defeat Callaghan, he was a force which could not be disregarded. This was a fact that Callaghan appreciated during the subsequent reshuffle, who appointed Foot the Leader of the House. Foot's position within the Party continued to excel by his participation within the contest, whilst simultaneously undermining the credibility of Healey, Jenkins and Crosland as future leaders.

In order to determine Foot's support base within the Party, it is necessary to consider the make up of those who comprised the electorate in the leadership election. Traditional assumptions of those who have provided an analysis of the 1976 leadership election have tended to rest upon Kellner's (1976) assumption of easily identifiable left- and right-wing

positions. The Kellner notion assumed that if an MP was anti-common market, then s/he was automatically *left-wing*, however this is not the case (Meredith, 2008, pp.9-12). Kinnock, also disagrees with this simplistic definition saying

> ...some people are very left-wing and pro-European. Others were on the right and very CND. And many in both cases so as to make the line a bloody zig-zag! (Hayter, 2005, p.6).

Kinnock's belief that the PLP is a mixture of ideological tendencies remains under-researched. As discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, Heppell's approach has been applied to a snapshot of the PLP in 1976 in order to provide a mono-causal assessment of the leadership election. Heppell, Crines & Nicholls (2010) have presented an argument which assumes the primacy of ideology as a factor in MP's voting behaviour. Whilst it is true that ideology is a significant factor, to argue that it can be utilised as the sole assessment method of the leadership election is to assume that MP's consider ideology above any other factors. This thesis extends the argument presented by Heppell *et al* (2010) to include other potential causes. Heppell's research framework has also been significantly updated and advanced in order to present arguments and conclusions beyond ideology whilst retaining the core ideological framework of Heppell's approach. For example, the approach as utilised throughout Heppell's research into the role of ideology within the Conservative Party has relied upon three core areas of concern. These were economic policy, social attitudes, and attitude towards the Common Market. This was slightly amended by Heppell for the paper concerning ideological alignments within the PLP by removing social attitudes and substituting it with attitude towards defence policy. This minor amendment, however was insufficient to distinguish it from Heppell's approach utilised within the Conservative Party. As Chapter One argues, Heppell *et al* (2010) set about the iconoclastic task of breaking down long-standing terms such as left and right in order to substitute them with their own terminology that collapsed a number of ideological

tendencies into simplistic overarching positions. Their terminology does not consider the difficulties of simplistically pigeon-holing Labour MP's into easily established boxes. For example, they disregard the differences between inside and outside left, and the differences between social democratic and centrist MP's. The research undertaken for this thesis discovered that any attempt to neatly allocate all MP's with a simplistic label produces deeply debatable and contestable results given an MP's position on the left / right divide can be subverted by external sources such as pressure from local constituencies and/or individual majorities or extra-Parliamentary affiliations. Heppell *et al* (2010) were only able to achieve this by breaking down the entire structure of the PLP into either *expansionist* or *consolidator;* terms which in themselves are deeply contentious and controversial. The way this thesis circumnavigated this significant hurdle was to remove the economic field from Heppell's approach and replace it with membership of either the Manifesto or Tribune Parliamentary groups. Even this can not be assumed to reveal that an MP is left or right-wing based on membership. Indeed, Benn was not a member of either group, yet his credentials as a left-wing MP are well documented. Consequently, the benefit of utilising these two groups is that it provides a broad illustration of the depth of support for the agendas of either group within the PLP, which can be characterised as either inside left or social democratic in tone. This does not, however assume that each MP subscribes to every aspect of group membership, nor that lack of membership automatically demonstrates a position. However, as stated above, it demonstrates broad sympathy with the groups overall positions, and provides a more meaningful assessment of left / right positions within the PLP than undertaken by Heppell *et al* (2010).

Retained from Heppell's article are the positions on the Common Market and the Defence Policy. These were retained because of their strong relevance to Foot's political ideals on

these policies which tended to flow against that of the social democratic PLP leadership, and therefore provides potential insight into how many supporters of the Common Market and how many multilateralists voted for Foot. Such findings would demonstrate a penetration into ideological ground that belonged to Foot's opponent. Inversely, it would be of interest to discover the number of opponents of the Common Market and how many unilateralists voted for Callaghan.

Heppell's approach has been extended by including non-ideological factors. This thesis investigates as to whether an MP's region, an MP's majority, trade union affiliation or length of service affected their voting behaviour. By combining these with the ideological issues, it will be possible to determine whether factors beyond ideology were significant or influential. In order to construct the following typologies within this thesis (both for 1976 and 1980), it has been necessary to undertake a prolonged period of extensive research of each MP's position. This significant problem was overcome by investigating broadsheet newspaper archives, such as *The Times*, *The Sunday Times, The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph* and *The Observer*. These provided a considerable amount of information relating to each MP's voting behaviour, voting intentions, and positions on key policy areas such as attitudes to the Common Market and defence. These were supplemented by a secondary examination of Norton (1980), who discusses dissension in Parliament by providing evidenced voting records. In addition to these two primary sources, secondary sources such as diaries, biographies, autobiographies, Party documents, *Dods Parliamentary Companions*, and private papers held in the *Labour History Museum* were also utilised. Following on from this extensive period of research, it became possible to construct the following databases as accurately as possible.

This thesis will firstly present the results of the databases. The first database shows each MP and their positions on the key areas stipulated above. The second database shows which MP voted for which candidate for the leadership in the decisive ballot. Following on from these databases, an analysis of the leadership election is undertaken. The analysis compares the two databases before extrapolating key indications of voting behaviour. By conducting this undertaking, it becomes possible to determine both the ideological and non-ideological factors which affected the vote. This process is later repeated for the 1980 leadership election.

Composition of the Parliamentary Labour Party Membership 1976

Region

L: London
S: South of England
N: North of England
WM: West Midlands
EM: East Midlands
Sc: Scotland
W: Wales

Ideological Classifications

Ind: Independent
Man: Manifesto Group
Tri: Tribune Group
Uni: Unilateralist
Mult: Multilateralist
Pro: Pro Common Market
Anti: Anti Common Market.

Name	A	S	R	Constituency	Maj.	Union	Grp	Nuc.	EEC	Yrs
Abse, Leo	59	M	W	Monmothshire	18695	None	Ind.	Uni.	Pro.	18
Allaun, Frank	63	M	N	Salford East	7836	NUJ	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	21
Anderson, Donald	37	M	W	Swansea East	20721	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Archer, Peter	50	M	WM	Warley West	14857	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Armstrong, Ernest	61	M	N	Durham North West	18756	NUGMW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Ashley, Jack	54	M	WM	Stoke on Trent South	16495	NUGMW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Ashton, Joseph	43	M	EM	Notts. Bassetlaw	12169	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	8
Atkinson, Norman	53	M	L	Haringey	9216	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Atkins, Ronald	63	M	N	Preston North	1784	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Bagier, Gordon	52	M	N	Sunderland South	13030	NUR	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Barnett, Joel	53	M	N	Heywood & Royton	7899	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Barnett, Guy	48	M	L	Greenwich	9906	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	5
Bates, Alfred	32	M	N	Bebington & Ellesmere	6491	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	2
Bean, Robert	41	M	S	Rochester & Chatham	2418	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Benn, Tony	51	M	S	Bristol South East	9373	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	13
Bennett, Andrew	37	M	N	Stockport North	1824	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Bidwell, Sydney	59	M	L	Ealing South	9983	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Bishop, Edward	56	M	EM	Notts. Newark	5771	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Blenkinsop, Arthur	65	M	N	South Shields	14825	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Boardman, Harold	69	M	N	Leigh	14635	USDAW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	31
Booth, Albert	48	M	N	Barrow-in-Furness	7354	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Boothroyd, Betty	47	F	WM	West Bromwich	14799	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	3
Bottomley, Arthur	69	M	N	Teeside	13807	NUPE	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Boydon, Harold	66	M	N	Bishop Auckland	11095	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Bradley, Thomas	50	M	EM	Leicester East	3811	TSSA	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Bray, Jeremy	46	M	Sc	Motherwell & Wishaw	4962	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Broughton, Alfred	74	M	N	Batley & Morley	8248	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	27
Brown, Hugh	57	M	Sc	Glasgow Provan	9974	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Brown, Robert	55	M	N	Newcastle-upon-Tyne West	15074	NUGMW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Brown, Ronald	54	M	L	Hackney South & Shoreditch	13295	AUEW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Buchan, Norman	54	M	Sc	Renfrewshire West	5300	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12

Buchanan, Richard	64	M	Sc	Glasgow Springburn	8395	NUR	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Butler, Joyce	66	F	L	Haringey Wood Green	8211	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	21
Callaghan, L. James	64	M	W	Cardiff South East	10718	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	31
Callaghan, James	49	M	N	Middleton & Prestwich	3714	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Campbell, Ian	50	M	Sc	Dunbartonshire West	1814	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Canavan, Dennis	34	M	Sc	West Stirlingshire	367	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Cant, Robert	61	M	WM	Stoke on Trent Central	14653	None	Man.	Uni.	Pro.	10
Carmichael, Neil	55	M	Sc	Glasgow Kelvingrove	4119	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	15
Carter-Jones, Lewis	56	M	N	Eccles	9266	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Carter, Raymond	41	M	WM	Birmingham Northfield	10597	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Cartwright, John	43	M	L	Greenwich Woolwich East	12425	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Castle, Barbara	65	F	N	Blackburn	7652	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	21
Cocks, Michael	47	M	S	Bristol South	14984	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Clemitson, Ivor	45	M	S	Luton East	3677	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Cohen, Stanley	49	M	N	Leeds South East	11016	TSSA	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Coleman, Donald	51	M	W	Glamorganshire	17723	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Colquhoun, Maureen	48	F	EM	Northampton North	1538	NUGMW	Tri.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Concannon, John	46	M	EM	Nottinghamshire Mansfield	17279	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	10
Conlan, Bernard	53	M	N	Gateshead East	17599	AEU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Cook, Robin	30	M	Sc	Edinburgh Central	3953	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Corbett, Robin	43	M	S	Hemel Hempstead	485	NUJ	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Cox, Thomas	46	M	L	Wandsworth Tooting	7855	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Craigen, Jim	38	M	Sc	Glasgow Maryhill	9418	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Crawshaw, Richard	59	M	N	Liverpool Toxteth	7250	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Cronin, John	60	M	EM	Leicestershire Loughborough	2348	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Crosland, Anthony	58	M	N	Grimsby	6982	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Cryer, Robert	42	M	N	Rotherham	3081	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Cunningham, G	45	M	L	Islington Sth & Finsbury	9593	None	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	6
Cunningham, J	37	M	N	Whitehaven	9933	GMWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Dalyell, Tam	44	M	Sc	West Lothian	2690	None	Man.	Uni.	Pro.	14
Davidson, Arthur	48	M	N	Accrington	6220	GMWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Davies, Bryan	37	M	L	Enfield North	4793	NATFHE	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Davies, Denzil	38	M	W	Llanelli	22301	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Davies, Ifor	66	M	W	Gower	16204	APEX	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Davis, Stanley	48	M	L	Hackney Central	12853	None	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	6
Deakins, Eric	44	M	L	Waltham Forest	10664	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Dean, Joseph	53	M	N	Leeds West	7607	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
De Freitas, G	63	M	EM	Northamptonshire Kettering	11170	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Dell, Edmund	55	M	N	Birkenhead	9484	ASTMS	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Dempsey, James	59	M	Sc	Coatbridge & Airdrie	10568	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	31
Doig, Peter	65	M	Sc	Dundee West	2802	TGWU	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	13
Dormand, John	57	M	N	Durham Easington	20937	NUT	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Douglas-Mann, B	49	M	L	Merton Mitcham & Morden	6191	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Duffy, Patrick	56	M	N	Sheffield Attercliffe	21558	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6

Dunn, James	50	M	N	Liverpool Kirkdale	9481	TGWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Dunnett, Jack	54	M	EM	Nottingham East	5596	NUGMW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Dunwoody, Gwenth	46	F	N	Crewe	7255	NUR	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Eadie, Alexander	55	M	Sc	Midlothian	4084	NUM	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Edge, Geoffrey	33	M	WM	Aldridge Brownhills	2519	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Edwards, Robert	70	M	WM	Wolverhampton South East	11698	TGWU	Ind.	Uni.	Pro.	2
Ellis, John	46	M	N	Brigg & Scunthorpe	6742	TGWU	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Ellis, Robert	52	M	W	Denbighshire Wrexham	16366	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	6
English, Michael	46	M	EM	Nottingham West	9265	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Ennals, David	54	M	N	Norwich North	9204	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Evans, Alfred	62	M	W	Glamorganshire Caerphilly	13709	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	8
Evans, Ioan	49	M	W	Aberdare	16064	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Evans, John	46	M	N	Newton	16472	AUEW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Ewing, Harry	45	M	Sc	Stirling Falkirk & Grangemouth	1766	AUEW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	5
Faulds, Andrew	53	M	WM	Warley East	8177	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Fernyhough, Ernest	68	M	N	Jarrow	15851	NUDAW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	29
Fitch, Alan	61	M	N	Wigan	18827	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Flannery, Martin	58	M	N	Sheffield Hillsborough	12308	NUT	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Fletcher, Edward	65	M	N	Darlington	3714	AEU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Fletcher, Leopold	55	M	EM	Derbyshire Ilkeston	15858	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Foot, Michael	63	M	W	Gwent Ebbw Vale	18059	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Ford, Benjamin	51	M	N	Bradford North	8589	AEU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Forrester, John	52	M	WM	Stoke-on-Trent North	15072	NUT	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Fowler, Gerald	41	M	WM	Shropshire Wrekin	6838	None	Man.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Fraser, John	42	M	L	Lambeth Norwood	4771	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Freeson, Reginald	50	M	L	Brent East	8927	NUJ	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	12
Galpern, Myer	73	M	Sc	Glasgow Shettleston	6349	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Garrett, John	45	M	N	Norwich South	3405	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Garrett, William	56	M	N	Wallsend	21269	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
George, Bruce	34	M	N	Wallsall South	4662	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Gilbert, John	49	M	WM	Dudley East	12191	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Ginsburg, David	55	M	N	Dewsbury	6901	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Golding, John	45	M	WM	Newcastle under Lyme	7370	POEU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	7
Gould, Bryan	37	M	S	Southampton Test	530	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Gourlay, Harry	60	M	Sc	Kirkaldy	6101	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Graham, Edward	51	M	L	Enfield Edmonton	6828	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Grant, George	52	M	N	Northumberland Morpeth	14687	NUM	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Grant, John	44	M	L	Islington Central	9393	ETU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Grocott, Bruce	36	M	WM	Lichfield & Tamworth	331	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Hamilton, James	58	M	Sc	Lanarkshire Bothwell	10948	CEU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Hamilton, William	59	M	Sc	Fife Central	7986	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	26
Hardy, Peter	45	M	N	West Riding Rother Valley	32777	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Harper, Joseph	62	M	N	Pontefract & Castleford	23242	NUM	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Harrison, Walter	55	M	N	Wakefield	12806	ETU	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	12

Hart, Judith	52	F	Sc	Lanark	698	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	17
Hattersley, Roy	44	M	WM	Birmingham Sparkbrook	8521	ASTMS	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Hatton, Frank	55	M	N	Manchester Moss Side	4111	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	3
Hayman, Helene	27	F	S	Welwyn & Hatfield	520	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Healey, Denis	59	M	N	Leeds East	12311	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	24
Heffer, Eric	54	M	N	Liverpool Walton	9862	ASW	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Hooley, Frank	53	M	N	Sheffield Heeley	9406	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Horam, John	37	M	N	Gateshead West	9427	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Howell, Denis	53	M	WM	Birmingham Small Heath	14055	APEX	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	15
Hoyell, Douglas	46	M	N	Nelson & Colne	669	ASTMS	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Huckfield, Leslie	34	M	WM	Nuneaton	17761	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	9
Hughes, Cledwyn	60	M	W	Anglesey	5972	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	25
Hughes, Robert	44	M	Sc	Aberdeen North	9621	AEF	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Hughes, Roy	51	M	W	Newport	13816	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Hughes, William	44	M	N	Durham	18116	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Hunter, Adam	68	M	Sc	Dunfermline Burghs	5291	NUM	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Irvine, Arthur	67	M	N	Liverpool Edge Hill	6171	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	29
Irving, Sydney	58	M	S	Kent Dartford	4665	NUT	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Jackson, George	55	M	N	Brighouse & Spenborough	2177	NUJ	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Jackson, Margaret	33	F	EM	Lincoln	984	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Janner, Grenville	48	M	EM	Leicester West	9960	NUJ	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Jay, Douglas	69	M	L	Wandsworth Battersea Nth	11142	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	30
Jeger, Lena May	61	F	L	Camden Holborn St Pancras S	5441	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Jenkins, Hugh	68	M	L	Wandsworth Putney	2775	NUBE	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Jenkins, Roy	56	M	WM	Birmingham Stetchford	11923	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	28
John, Brynmor	42	M	W	Glamorganshire Pontypridd	18774	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Johnson, James	68	M	N	Kingston Upon Hull West	10121	NUGMW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Johnson, Walter	59	M	EM	Derby South	9332	TSSA	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Jones, Daniel	68	M	N	Burnley	11876	AUEW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Jones, Barry	38	M	W	Flintshire East Flint	9586	NUT	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Jones, Alec	52	M	W	Rhondda	34481	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	9
Judd, Frank	41	M	S	Portsmouth	1345	GMWU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Kaufman, Gerald	46	M	N	Manchester Ardwick	6783	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Kelley, Richard	72	M	N	West Riding Don Valley	27420	NUM	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	17
Kerr, Russell	55	M	L	Hounslow, Feltham & Heston	9147	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Kilroy-Silk, Robert	34	M	N	Ormskirk	8851	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Kinnock, Neil	34	M	W	Monmouthshire Bedwellty	22862	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Lambie, David	51	M	Sc	Ayrshire Central	9555	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Lamborn, Harry	61	M	L	Southwark Peckham	18827	USDAW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Lamond, James	48	M	N	Oldham East	8137	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Latham, Arthur	46	M	L	Westminster (Paddington)	2311	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	7
Leadbitter, Ted	57	M	N	Hartlepool	7894	NUPE	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Lee, John	49	M	WM	Birmingham Handsworth	3896	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Lestor, Joan	46	F	S	Eton & Slough	7663	GMWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10

Lever, Harold	62	M	N	Manchester Central	10611	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	31
Lewis, Arthur	59	M	L	Newham North West	13381	NUGMW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	31
Lewis, Ronald	67	M	N	Carlisle	6254	NUR	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Lipton, Marcus	76	M	L	Lambeth Central	8677	None	Tri.	Multi.	Anti.	31
Litterick, Tom	47	M	WM	Birmingham Selly Oak	326	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Lomas, Kenneth	54	M	N	Huddersfield West	1364	NUPE	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Loyden, Edward	53	M	N	Liverpool Garton	3300	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti	2
Luard, Evan	50	M	S	Oxford	1036	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	10
Lyon, Alexander	45	M	N	York	3689	None	Ind.	Uni.	Pro.	10
Lyons, Edward	50	M	N	Bradford West	4941	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Mabon, Dickson	51	M	Sc	Greenock & Port Glasgow	11955	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	21
McCartney, Hugh	56	M	Sc	Dunbartonshire Central	4385	NGWU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
McDonald, Oonagh	38	F	S	Thurrock	4839	ASTMS	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	0
McElhone, Frank	47	M	Sc	Glasgow Queens Park	8914	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	7
MacFarguhar, Rod	46	M	EM	Belper	5684	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
McGuire, Michael	50	M	N	Lancashire Ince	23530	NUM	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
McNamara, Kevin J	42	M	N	Kingston upon Hull Central	9821	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Mackintosh, John	47	M	Sc	Berwick & East Lothian	2740	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Mackenzie, James	49	M	Sc	Lanarkshire Rutherglen	7356	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Maclennan, Robert	40	M	Sc	Caithness & Sutherland	2560	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
McMillan, Thomas	57	M	Sc	Glasgow Central	6441	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Madden, Max	35	M	N	Sowerby	646	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Magee, Bryan	46	M	L	Waltham Forest Leyton	11513	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Mahon, Simon	62	M	N	Bootle	16890	TGWU	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Mallalieu, Bill	68	M	N	Huddersfield East	8414	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	31
Marks, Kenneth	56	M	N	Manchester Gorton	8864	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	9
Marquand, David	42	M	EM	Ashfield Nottingham	22915	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Marshall, Edmund	36	M	N	Goole	14097	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	5
Marshall, James	35	M	EM	Leicester South	1133	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Mason, Roy	52	M	N	Barnsley	24812	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	23
Maynard, Joan	55	F	N	Sheffield Brightside	7926	NUAAW	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Meacher, Michael	37	M	N	Oldham West	8037	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Mellish, Robert	63	M	L	Bermondsey Southwark	18581	TGWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	30
Mendelson, John	59	M	N	Penistone	15135	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	17
Mikardo, Ian	68	M	L	Twr Hamlets, Bethnal Gn, Bow	15949	ASTMS	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	31
Millan, Bruce	49	M	Sc	Glasgow Craigton	8781	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Miller, Maurice	56	M	Sc	East Kilbride	2704	MPU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Miller, Millie	53	F	L	Redbridge Ilford North	778	None	Tri.	Multi.	Anti.	2
Mitchell, Richard	49	M	S	Southampton Itchen	7795	NUT	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	5
Molloy, William	58	M	L	Ealing North	2922	TGWU	Ind.	Uni	Anti.	12
Moonman, Eric	47	M	S	Basildon	10551	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Morris, Alfred	48	M	N	Manchester Wythenshawe	14179	NUGMW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Morris, Charles	50	M	N	Manchester Openshaw	8513	UPOW	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	13
Morris, John	45	M	W	Mid & West Glamorgan	21752	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	17

Moyle, Roland	48	M	L	Lewisham East	8952	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Mulley, Frederick	58	M	N	Sheffield Park	23964	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	26
Murray, Ronald	54	M	Sc	Edinburgh Leith	3445	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	6
Newens, Arthur	46	M	L	Harrow	13451	NUT	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Noble, Michael	41	M	N	Rossendale	203	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	2
Oakes, Gordon	45	M	N	Lancashire Widnes	16871	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	5
O'Halloran, Michael	48	M	L	Islington North	6818	TGWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	7
Ogden, Eric	53	M	N	Liverpool West Derby	12519	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Orbach. Maurice	74	M	N	Stockport South	4220	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Orme, Stanley	53	M	N	Salford West	8572	AEU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Ovenden, John	34	M	S	Gravesend	2305	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	2
Owen, David	38	M	S	Plymouth Devonport	2259	ASTMS	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Padley, Walter	60	M	W	Mid-Glamorgan Ogmore	22204	USDAW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	26
Palmer, Arthur	64	M	S	Bristol North East	8591	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Park, George	62	M	WM	Coventry North East	15969	AUEW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Parker, John	70	M	L	Dagenham Barking	21994	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	41
Parry, Robert	43	M	N	Liverpool Scotland Exchange	12920	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Pavitt, Laurence	62	M	L	Brent South	11053	MPU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	17
Pendry, Tom	42	M	N	Stalybridge & Hyde	9757	NUPE	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Perry, Ernest	66	M	L	Wandsworth Battersea South	2851	NUGMW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Phipps, Colin	42	M	WM	Dudley	8525	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Prentice, Reginald	53	M	L	Newham North East	13541	TGWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	19
Prescott, John	38	M	N	Kingston Upon Hull	23793	NUS	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Price, Christopher	44	M	L	Lewisham West	5529	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Price, William	42	M	WM	Warwickshire Rugby	5204	NUJ	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	10
Radice, Giles	40	M	N	Durham Chester le Street	24278	GMWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	3
Rees, Merlyn	56	M	N	Leeds South	15265	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	13
Richardson, Jo	53	F	L	Barking	16290	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Roberts, Albert	68	M	N	Normanton West Riding	14633	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	25
Roberts, Gwilym	48	M	WM	Cannock	12222	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Robinson, Geoffrey	37	M	WM	Coventry	3694	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	0
Roderick, Caerwyn	49	M	W	Brecon & Radnor	3012	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	6
Rodgers, George	51	M	N	Chorley	2713	None	Tri.	Multi.	Anti.	2
Rodgers, William	48	M	N	Teeside Stockton	14474	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Rooker, Jeffrey	35	M	WM	Birmingham Perry Bar	3204	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Roper, John	41	M	N	Farnworth, Lancashire	14695	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Rose, Paul	41	M	N	Manchester Blackley	7119	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Ross, William	65	M	Sc	Ayrshire & Bute, Kilmarnock	7529	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	2
Rowlands, Edward	36	M	W	Merthyr-Tydfil	16805	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	4
Ryman, John	45	M	N	Blyth	78	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Sandelson, Neville	53	M	L	Hillingdon, Hayes, Harlington	9420	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	5
Sedgemore, Brian	39	M	S	Luton West	6439	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Selby, Harry	63	M	Sc	Glasgow Govan	1952	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Shaw, Arnold	67	M	L	Redbridge, Ilford South	1749	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	2

Sheldon, Robert	53	M	N	Ashton Under Lyne	10727	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Shore, Peter	52	M	L	Twr Hamlets, Stepney, Poplar	20976	TGWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Short, Edward	64	M	N	Newcastle-upon-Tyne Central	8114	NUT	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	25
Short, Renee	57	M	WM	Wolverhampton North East	14653	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Silkin, John	53	M	L	Lewisham Deptford	13034	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	13
Silkin, Samuel	58	M	L	Southwark Dulwich	7459	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Silverman, Julius	71	M	WM	Birmingham Erdington	8777	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	21
Skinner, Dennis	44	M	EM	Bolsover	21066	NUM	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Small, William	67	M	Sc	Glasgow Garscadden	7626	AEU	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Smith, John	38	M	Sc	Lanarkshire North	8341	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Snape, Peter	34	M	WM	West Bromwich East	7529	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Spearing, Nigel	46	M	L	Newham South	17721	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Spriggs, Leslie	66	M	N	St Helens	22066	NUR	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	18
Stallard, Albert	55	M	L	Camden, St Pancras North	7553	AUEW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Stewart, Michael	70	M	L	Hammersmith Fultham	5321	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	31
Stoddart, David	50	M	S	Swindon	10270	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Stott, Roger	33	M	N	Lancashire Westhoughton	13575	POEU	Man.	Uni.	Anti.	3
Strang, Gavin	33	M	Sc	Edinburgh East	8456	None	Tri.	Uni.	Pro.	6
Strauss, George	75	M	L	Lambeth Vauxhall	9766	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	26
Summerskill, Shirley	45	F	N	Halifax	4178	MPU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Swain, Thomas	65	M	N	Derbyshire North East	10237	NUM	Tri.	Multi.	Anti.	17
Taylor, Ann	29	F	N	Bolton West	906	None	Man.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Thomas, George	*67*	*M*	*W*	*Cardiff West*	*6672*	*NUT*	*Ind.*	*Multi*	*Pro.*	*31*
Thomas, Jeffrey	43	M	W	Monmouth Abertillery	18355	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Thomas, Mike	32	M	N	Newcastle-upon-Tyne East	6249	USDAW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Thomas, Ronald	47	M	S	Bristol North West	633	None	Tri.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Thorne, Stanley	58	M	N	Preston South	3749	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Tierney, Sydney	53	M	WM	Birmingham Yardley	4170	None	Tri.	Multi.	Anti.	2
Tinn, James	54	M	N	Teeside Redcar	10430	NUT	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Tomlinson, John	37	M	WM	Meriden	8966	AUEW	Ind,	Multi.	Pro.	2
Tomney, Frank	68	M	L	Hammersmith North	8122	OGMWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	26
Torney, Thomas	61	M	N	Bradford South	8255	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Tuck, Raphael	66	M	S	Watford	3957	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Urwin, Thomas	64	M	N	Durham Houghton le Spring	20401	AUBTW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Varley, Eric	44	M	EM	Chesterfield	17560	NUM	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	12
Wainwright, Edwin	68	M	N	Dearne Valley West Riding	27269	NUM	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Walden, Brian	44	M	WM	Birmingham Ladywood	9739	NUGMW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Walker, Harold	49	M	N	Doncaster	7430	AEU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Walker, Terry	41	M	S	Kingswood	2566	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Ward, Michael	45	M	S	Peterborough	1848	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Watkins, David	51	M	N	Durham Consett	19446	AEUW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Watkinson, John	35	M	S	Gloucester West	409	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Weetch, Kenneth	43	M	S	Ipswich	1733	None	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	2
Weitzman, David	78	M	L	Hackney N & Stoke Newington	13295	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	31

Wellbeloved, James	50	M	L	Bexley, Erith & Crayford	8467	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	11
White, Frank	37	M	N	Bury & Radcliffe	442	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2
White, James	54	M	Sc	Glasgow Pollok	7091	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Whitehead, Phillip	39	M	N	Derby North	4193	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Whitlock, William	58	M	EM	Nottingham North	6841	USDAW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Willey, Fred	66	M	N	Sunderland North	15671	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	26
Williams, Alan	46	M	W	Swansea West	4836	NUT	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Williams, Alan Lee	46	M	L	Havering Hornchurch	6801	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Williams, Shirley	46	F	S	Hertford & Stevenage	9046	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	12
Williams, William	61	M	N	Warrington	12261	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	15
Wilson, Alexander	59	M	Sc	Lanarkshire Hamilton	3332	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	6
Wilson, Harold	60	M	N	Lancashire Huyton	16233	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	31
Wilson, William	63	M	WM	Coventry South East	12131	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Wise, Audrey	41	F	WM	Coventry South West	2118	USDAW	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	2
Woodall, Alec	58	M	N	Hemsworth	31572	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Woof, Robert	65	M	N	Durham Blaydon	13466	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	20
Wrigglesworth, Ian	37	M	N	Teeside Thornaby	4648	NUT	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	2
Young, David	46	M	L	Ealing Acton	4065	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	2

(Heppell *et al*, 2010, pp.76-83).

Third Ballot Votes for Michael Foot (127)

Allaun, Frank
Atkinson, Norman
Atkins, Ronald
Barnett, Guy
Bean, Robert
Benn, Tony
Bennett, Andrew
Bidwell, Sydney
Blenkinsop, Arthur
Boardman, Harold
Booth, Albert
Buchan, Norman
Butler, Joyce
Callaghan, James
Canavan, Dennis
Carmichael, Neil
Carter-Jones, Lewis
Carter, Raymond
Castle, Barbara
Clemitson, Ivor
Cook, Robin
Conlan, Bernard
Corbett, Robin
Cox, Thomas
Craigen, Jim
Cryer, Robert
Davidson, Arthur
Davies, Bryan
Davies, Denzil
Deakins, Eric
Dean, Joseph
Dempsey, James
Dormand, John
Dunwoody, Gwenth
Eadie, Alexander
Edge, Geoffrey
English, Michael
Evans, Alfred
Evans, Ioan
Evans, John
Ewing, Harry
Fernyhough, Ernest
Flannery, Martin
Fletcher, Edward
Fletcher, Leopold
Foot, Michael
Forrester, John
Fowler, Gerald
Galphern, Myer
Garrett, John
Garrett, William
Gilbert, John
Gould, Bryan
Grocott, Bruce
Hart, Judith
Heffer, Eric
Hooley, Frank
Hoyle, Douglas
Huckfield, Leslie
Hughes, Robert
Hughes, Roy
Hughes, William
Hunter, Adam
Jackson, Margaret
Jeger, Lena May
Jenkins, Hugh
Jones, Alec
Judd, Frank
Kerr, Russell
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Kinnock, Neil
Lambie, David
Lamond, James
Latham, Arthur
Leadbitter, Ted
Lestor, Joan
Lewis, Arthur
Lewis, Ronald
Litterick, Tom
Loyden, Edward
Lyon, Alexander
McCartney, Hugh
McDonald, Oonagh
McElhone, Frank
Mackenzie, James
McMillan, Thomas
Marshall, Edmund
Marshall, James
Maynard, Joan
Meacher, Michael
Mendelson, John
Mikardo, Ian
Miller, Maurice
Molloy, William
Morris, Alfred
Morris, Charles
Newens, Arthur
Orbach, Maurice
Orme, Stanley
Parry, Robert
Prescott, John
Price, Christopher

Richardson, Jo
Roberts, Gwilym
Rooker, Jeffrey
Ryman, John
Sedgemore, Brian
Selby, Harry
Shore, Peter
Short, Edward
Short, Renee
Silkin, John
Silverman, Julius
Skinner, Dennis
Spearing, Nigel
Spriggs, Leslie
Stoddart, David
Strang, Gavin
Thorne, Stanley
Torney, Thomas
Tuck, Raphael
Walden, Brian
Watkins, David
White, Frank
Wilson, William
Wise, Audrey
Woof, Robert

Third Ballot Votes for James Callaghan (148)

Abse, Leo
Anderson, Donald
Archer, Peter
Armstrong, Ernest
Ashley, Jack
Ashton, Joseph
Barnett, Joel
Boothroyd, Betty
Bottomley, Arthur
Boyden, Harold
Bradley, Thomas
Bray, Jeremy
Broughton, Alfred
Brown, Ronald
Callaghan, L. James
Campbell, Ian
Cartwright, John
Cocks, Michael
Cohen, Stanley
Coleman, Donald
Colquhoun, Maureen
Concannon, John
Crawshaw, Richard
Cronin, John
Crosland, Anthony
Cunningham, G
Cunningham, J
Dalyell, Tam
Davies, Ifor
Davis, Stanley
De Freitas, G
Dell, Edmund
Douglas-Mann, B
Duffy, Patrick
Dunn, James
Dunnett, Jack
Ellis, Robert
Ennals, David
Faulds, Andrew
Fitch, Alan
Ford, Benjamin
Fraser, John
Freeson, Reginald
George, Bruce
Ginsburg, David
Golding, John
Gourlay, Harry
Graham, Edward
Grant, John
Hamilton, James
Hamilton, William
Hardy, Peter
Harrison,Walter
Hattersley, Roy
Hayman, Helene
Healey, Denis
Horam, John
Howell, Denis
Hughes, Cledwyn
Irvine, Arthur
Irving, Sydney
Jackson, George
Janner, Grenville
Jay, Douglas
Jenkins, Roy
John, Brynmor
Johnson, James
Johnson, Walter
Jones, Daniel
Jones, Barry
Kaufman, Gerald
Lamborn, Harry
Lever, Harold
Luard, Evan
Lyons, Edward
Mabon, Dickson
MacFarguhar, Rod
Mackintosh, John
Maclennan, Robert
Magee, Bryan
Mallalieu, Bill
Marks, Kenneth
Marquand, David
Mason, Roy
Mellish, Robert
Millan, Bruce
Mitchell, Richard
Moonman, Eric
Morris, John
Moyle, Roland
Mulley, Frederick
Oakes, Gordon
O'Halloran, Michael
Ogden, Eric
Owen, David
Padley, Walter
Palmer, Arthur
Park, George
Parker, John
Pavitt, Laurence
Pendry, Tom
Perry, Ernest
Phipps, Colin
Prentice, Reginald
Radice, Giles
Rees, Merlyn
Roberts, Albert
Robinson, Geoffrey
Rodgers, William
Roper, John
Rose, Paul
Rowlands, Edward
Sandelson, Neville
Sheldon, Robert
Silkin, Samuel
Small, William
Smith, John
Snape, Peter
Stewart, Michael
Stott, Roger
Strauss, George
Summerskill, Shirley
Taylor, Ann
Thomas, George
Thomas, Jeffrey
Thomas, Mike
Thomas, Ronald
Tomlinson, John
Tomney, Frank
Urwin, Thomas
Varley, Eric
Wainwright, Edwin
Walker, Harold
Ward, Michael
Watkinson, John
Weetch, Kenneth
Wellbeloved, James
White, James
Whitehead, Phillip
Whitlock, William
Willey, Fred
Williams, Alan
Williams, Alan Lee
Williams, Shirley
Wilson, Harold
Woodall, Alec
Wrigglesworth, Ian
Young, David

Unknown Voting (38)

Bagier, Gordon
Bates, Alfred
Bishop, Edward
Buchanan, Richard
Brown, Robert
Brown, Hugh
Cant, Robert
Doig, Peter
Edwards, Robert
Ellis, John
Grant, George
Harper, Joseph
Hatton, Frank
Kelley, Richard
Lee, John
Lipton, Marcus
Lomas, Kenneth
McGuire, Michael
Madden, Max
Mahon, Simon
McNamara, Kevin J
Miller, Millie
Murray, Ronald
Noble, Michael
Ovenden, John
Price, William
Roderick, Caerwyn
Rodgers, George
Ross, William
Shaw, Arnold
Stallard, Albert
Swain, Thomas
Tierney, Sydney
Tinn, James
Walker, Terry
Weitzman, David
Williams, William
Wilson, Alexander

What was the defining ideological composition of the Parliamentary Labour Party?

Left and right are concepts which are quantifiable only by maintaining an acceptance of their diverse and complex nature. They are not fixed, and do not bind politicians to follow one policy over another by adhering to a simplistic understanding of their ideology. It is evident that not all Labour MP's could be positioned because the reality was within the Labour Party there are the inside left, outside left, social democratic right and the centre. The existence of such a composition demonstrates the complex nature of the Party, and how any previous analysis has had to utilise broader terms such as left and right to position individuals within ideological groups. The PLP is, however an eclectic mixture of views and positions, which must only be termed *left* and *right* as broad descriptions. Left and right do exist, but they must be subdivided into inside left, outside left, social democratic right in order to appreciate the positions held by the members. They can not easily be typecast or stereotyped into *simple* definitions of left and right, despite the fact that such ideas play a vital role in defining the ideological make up of the PLP. To assume all factions within an overarching term hold the same views on key issues is a dramatic over simplification. Within Labour, the inside left and the outside left are brought together in their broad left-wing outlooks, but are separated by the means and ends to which they

aspire. For example, Benn was of the outside left whilst Foot was of the inside left. Both were left-wing, but they held different views on the role of Parliament and democracy. This demonstrates the inadequacies of the umbrella term. The broad nature of the PLP is such that the left is comprised of varying views and levels of intensity towards core ideological doctrine that can not automatically be transferred from member to member.

The Independents represent the centre ground of the PLP, however a caveat must be considered. Independent MP's are considered so because they are independent of either the Tribune or Manifesto Group. However, some did not join either group for fear of alienating their constituency members despite being broadly sympathetic with either groups ideals. They may remain either left or right, whilst also being independent. This again demonstrates the complex nature of the PLP and also why Heppell's existing approach may only provide meaningful results when applied upon the Thatcherite era of the Conservative Party.

The following is broken down into various sub-sections, with each section presenting a relevant question and answer relating to the data. Afterwards, an analysis of the data contextualises the information prior to presenting a discussion. After the questions, an analysis of the result is undertaken.

What were the group distributions for each candidate?

	Manifesto Group	Tribune Group	Independents
Foot	5	60	62
Callaghan	89	5	54

The Manifesto Group and the Tribune Group both represented polar opposites of political thought within the Labour Party. The Manifesto Group was a young group which argued for closer ties with the Common Market, a static relationship with the trade unions, and a move away from the policies of the left. The Tribune Group, however was an older group which presented a voice of the inside left within Parliament. Related to but distinct from the *Tribune* publication, the Tribune Group were MP's of the *legitimate* left, which had prevailed throughout much of Labour's post war history. The Independents were MP's of no specific group alignment, and so tended to act as the broad centre ground. The caveat must be remembered that figures such as Benn were independent, yet held firm outside left positions. Despite this, the majority of MP's who did not belong to either the Tribune or Manifesto Groups were independent because they did not subscribe in a firmly dedicated fashion to either philosophy.

It was not surprising that the bulk of the Manifesto Group MP's voted for Callaghan, whilst the bulk of Tribune Group MP's voted for Foot. Yet it is those who deviated from this assumption who are significant. From the data presented, there prevails a moderate penetration of 5 Manifesto Group MP's voting for Foot whilst 5 Tribune Group MP's voted for Callaghan. The so called *ideological defectors* broke from their assumed candidate and voted instead for the opposing candidate. Some MP's behaved in this fashion in order to safeguard Labour's electoral potential against the Conservatives, their personal career objectives, or personal taste. Brian Walden, a Manifesto Group member voted for Foot yet argued against the left. His vote for Foot, therefore can not be seen as a positive endorsement, yet it illustrates the complex nature of voting behaviour. Callaghan's subsequent majority was sufficient as to render the consequences of such actions limited.

The dominant grouping within Foot's vote were the Independents, who at 62 provided the bulk of Foot's support base. However, the bulk of Callaghan's support base came from the Manifesto Group, suggesting that Callaghan appealed more to his fellow thinkers whilst Foot appealed slightly more to the centre ground. However, Foot's Tribune Group support was only 2 votes short of the dominant Independents category. This enables the conclusion that Foot's result drew more support from the centre than Callaghan.

In terms of groupings, the power within the PLP rested with the Independents. With a combined known vote of 116, the Independents were in a position to grant the leadership to either Foot or Callaghan. Their fluidic nature, however ensures that both the left and right of the PLP must remain moderate in order to appeal to these king makers. Should the left or right exceed the comfort zone of the centre ground, then they risk losing the support of this vital group and with it control of the PLP.

What was the multilateralist or unilateralist vote for each candidate?

	Unilateralist	Multilateralist.
Foot	118	9
Callaghan	15	133

The debate within the Labour Party concerning unilateralism and multilateralism had less relevance in 1976 as the Cold War had shifted from the minds of the electorate since its heyday in the 1950s. However, for Foot the issue was still very much a significant aspect of his political agenda. For him, it was a matter of ethical principle that Britain must not possess nuclear weapons. Because of this significance, it is an issue worthy of consideration in assessing his vote. For the PLP also, the subject had waned in relevance as an electoral issue because of the cooling of the Cold War. The potential for nuclear

holocaust had drifted from the minds of the electorate, shifting their focus more towards economic issues and contemporary issues such as Britain's role within the Common Market. Foot, however had not shifted his position and remained a firm unilateralist.

Callaghan is known to have secured 15 votes from unilateralists as well as his expected 133 from multilateralists. It was also an issue upon which Foot was unlikely to expand his support base. Foot is known to have secured 118 votes from unilateralists and 9 votes from multilateralists. The unilateralists voting for Callaghan and multilateralists voting for Foot suggests that nuclear disarmament did not prevent some MP's from voting for a candidate that held contrary views to their own. This was because nuclear disarmament was not as significant a factor for the electorate or MP's as it was for Foot. Indeed, Foot held strong views on the subject having being a significant player in the CND movement, and would place considerable emphasis on the issue as leader even at the risk of confusing his colleagues (Butler & Kavanagh, 1984, p.96). However, the depth of feeling towards the issue within the PLP and broader country possessed less relevance for a potential Party leader. Multilateralists felt at ease voting for Foot safe in the knowledge that defence pacts through NATO and relations with the Soviet Union were not the exclusive preserve of the Prime Minister. Conversely, unilateralists voted for Callaghan accepting that other issues such as electoral appeal, the limited significance of nuclear disarmament when compared to economic policy and Callaghan's experience of industrial relations made him a credible electoral asset.

How was the Pro- and Anti-Common Market vote distributed for each candidate?

	Pro-Common Market	Anti-Common Market
Foot	9	118
Callaghan	123	25

In the year before the leadership election campaign, Britain had voted to remain within the Common Market in a referendum. It was an outcome that Foot did not wish to see, yet it was the verdict of the electorate. As a potential Labour Prime Minister, Foot would find reversing that verdict problematic, thereby forcing him to accept it against his preference. Foot's personal views, therefore had limited impact potential, yet given the scale of opposition within the inside left to the Common Market, it remained something of an issue for many MP's despite the verdict of the electorate in 1975.

Foot attracted the support of 9 Common Market supporters, thereby suggesting that his opposition was not sufficient enough to prevent him expanding his support base. Yet Callaghan was able to attract the support of 25 Common Market opponents. Callaghan was pro-Common Market, yet these opponents voted for a leader who opposed their view. This was because the Common Market issue had been debated thoroughly in the Party and country over the previous year, thereby making Labour appear out of touch if it adopted an anti-Common Market policy after the referendum. It was also an issue which had become less significant because of the extensive debate the year before. Fearing the potential electoral consequences, the PLP selected a leader who would appeal electorally.

An Evaluation of the Leadership Election Result

Foot was a literary intellectual rather than an expert of economics. As the former Chancellor, Callaghan, however had a great deal of economic experience along with his pedigree within the trade union movement. The difference of experience between each candidate can not be underestimated. Britain's economic position was in the heart of the PLP when selecting their leader, making Callaghan's penetrations into nuclear defence and Common Market areas possible. Foot's ethical arguments over the abolition of nuclear weapons did not prevent unilateralists from voting for the leader who would seek to mould the economy towards growth. Foot's opposition to the Common Market in order to build a socialist international community also did not prevent anti-Common Marketeers from voting for his opponent, whilst those independent of either the Tribune or Manifesto Group also voted for the leader who they believed possessed the greater economic experience. Callaghan's economic credentials and experience made him the preferred leader. At this stage, the Party did not need a conciliatory leader. Foot lacked the economic experience required to become Prime Minister at a time of growing economic crisis which subsequently fully manifested itself under Callaghan. Foot's intellectual weight is not in doubt, yet this was not sufficient to make up for his comprehensive lack of knowledge relating to economics. Callaghan's position with the trade unions had been enhanced following the defensive position he adopted against *In Place of Strife*. This demonstrated his personal commitment to the role of the unions, which continued to be powerful players within the Labour movement (Cronin, 2004, p.175). This appeal ensured that Callaghan was “the least challenging candidate of the centre-right” who would be “least likely to deviate from the path followed since 1974” (*ibid*). Foot's position had been strengthened by his performances in government, making him a credible challenger and subsequently became Callaghan's "effective deputy in the government" (Cole, 1995, p.146). To have evolved from being an outside critic of the government to 'deputy Prime Minister' in little over six years is

a significant achievement which few others have achieved. He had also demonstrated loyalty to the Labour government. Hatfield (1976) notes in *The Times* that

> Michael Foot, although aligned with the left philosophically, will not be party to any manoeuvres designed to make life uncomfortable for Mr. Callaghan or the government (Hatfield, 24 September 1976, p.14).

This indicates that Foot's loyalty to the leader would continue. Since joining the Labour front bench, Foot had undertaken a metamorphosis from being a thorn in the side of the Labour leader to now being a key ally in maintaining unity. In contrast during the same time period, Jenkins had undermined his once powerful position by resigning the deputy leadership and adopting a highly pro-Common Market position. Foot was now in a highly beneficial position which ensured he had a stronger voice in the government.

Whilst ideology doubtlessly played a role in the voting behaviour of some MP's, it should and must not be considered as the sole motivating factor in analysing the vote. Rather, other factors such as an MP's individual majority strength, trade union affiliation, length of service, and national distribution of constituencies may also be factors which potentially played a role. Consequently, it is necessary to consider these issue within this analysis as a means of building upon the ideological analysis.

1: What variations in MP's majorities were evident in the voting behaviour?

	2,000 or less	2,001-5,999	6,000 -11,999	12,000+
Callaghan	9	23	67	49
Foot	16	28	44	39

Callaghan is known to have gained the support of 36 per cent whilst Foot is known to have gained the support of 64 per cent of MP's with a majority of 2,000 or less. This indicates that those MP's at most risk from losing their seats preferred a potential Foot leadership as

opposed to a Callaghan leadership. Within the second field, Callaghan gained the support of 45 per cent whilst Foot gained the support of 55 per cent of MP's with a majority between 2,001 and 5,999. These figures demonstrates Foot's support amongst MP's who can be characterised as being at a high-to-moderate risk of losing their seats.

In contrast, in the third field Callaghan gained the support of 60 per cent whilst Foot gained the support of 40 per cent of MP's with majorities between 6,000 and 11,999. These MP's can be characterised as being above a moderate risk of losing their seats. This switching suggests that MP's at an above moderate risk of losing their seats felt that Callaghan, rather than Foot had the greater potential of maintaining Labour's electoral position. Factors for this shift may include the wishes of MP's at greater risk of losing their seats wishing to appeal to a candidate with a popular reputation amongst the rank and file of the Party. This would show and demonstrate their broad loyalty to the core ideals of the Labour movement and so maintain their vital support whilst canvassing. Those at moderate risk may wish to appeal to a candidate with broader electoral appeal who may maximise Labour's position outside of the interests of the rank and file.

In the fourth field, 55.5 per cent preferred Callaghan over the 44.5 per cent who preferred Foot, suggesting that those who can be characterised as being in safer seats voted for the candidate they believed would be most beneficial to the broader interests of Party unity or their personal career development, rather than for personal electoral gain. Given their safe electoral position, their vote is unlikely to have been constrained by issues regarding their majority.

These variations of vote distribution reveal that those at greater risk of losing their seats preferred a Foot leadership over that of Callaghan because of the need to rely on the support of Party activists, demonstrating Foot's support at rank and file level.

2: How many MP's with Union affiliations voted for Callaghan or Foot?

Callaghan	53
Foot	50

Callaghan gained the support of 51.5 per cent whilst Foot gained the support of 48.5 per cent of MP's with a trade union affiliation. Given Callaghan's reputation over his defence of the unions following the publication of Castle's *In Place of Strife*, it can be argued he would have expected to benefit from a stronger union vote than was in fact the case. However, given Foot's own popularity with the unions following his successful resolution of the miners' strike shortly after Labour secured office in 1974, and his willingness to engage with them, along with his the replacement of the IR Act with Labour's own legislation, both candidates have just cause to expect significant support from MP's with a union affiliation. As the results indicate, both candidates benefitted broadly from the support of such MP's, suggesting that both were potentially open to the suggestion that they had been endorsed by union MP's. It is more likely, however, that the unions were able to work effectively with either candidate, and so the election was determined by factors other than union affiliation; however, to suggest the union interest played no role would be an oversimplification given the figures reveal a broad endorsement of both candidates.

3: How many MP's serving 16 years or more voted for Callaghan or Foot?	
Callaghan	38
Foot	15

4: How many serving 15 years or less voted for Callaghan or Foot?	
Callaghan	109
Foot	112

Callaghan attracted the support of 71.5 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 28.5 per cent of longer serving MP's. In contrast, Foot attracted the support of 50.5 per cent whilst Callaghan attracted the support of 49.5 per cent of shorter serving MP's. These figures reveal that Callaghan had a greater support base amongst longer serving MP's, whilst Foot's support base derived mainly from shorter serving MP's. The implication of these results reveal that newer MP's had a broad tendency away from the traditional social democratic leadership style of Callaghan and towards Foot's inside left liberal socialism. They also reveal that longer serving MP's, considering issues such as long service to both Party and state, gravitated towards Callaghan. However, it must be noted that given the percentages gave Foot a narrow lead over Callaghan, it must be remembered that this can not be viewed as evidence of a general left-wing surge amongst new MP's, but rather as indicative of disinclination towards Callaghan amongst newer MP's.

5: How many MP's representing Scottish seats voted for Callaghan or Foot?	
Callaghan	13
Foot	20

6: How many MP's representing Welsh seats voted for Callaghan or Foot?

Callaghan	15
Foot	7

7: How many MP's representing English seats voted for Callaghan or Foot?

Callaghan	120
Foot	100

In Scotland, Callaghan gained the support of 39.5 per cent whilst Foot gained the support of 60.5 per cent of MP's. This indicates that Foot gained a significant endorsement of Scottish MP's, which contrasts with Callaghan's Scottish result in terms of percentage. These figures separate Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom as being the only country which provided Foot with a majority of votes. Factors for this can include Foot's interest in Scottish affairs up to and including devolution. In Wales, Callaghan gained the support of 68 per cent whilst Foot gained the support of 32 per cent of MP's. Given Wales' larger industrialised and trade union dominated sector than either Scotland or England, Callaghan would have been expected to gain greater support from the working-class heartlands. In England, Callaghan gained the support of 54.5 per cent whilst Foot gained the support of 45.5 per cent of MP's. This indicates that, although the numerical bulk of Callaghan's vote derived from England, in terms of percentage MP's representing English seats did not give him as great an endorsement as those representing Welsh seats. Indeed, Callaghan's support from English MP's was less than that of Foot's support from Scottish MP's, thereby enabling the conclusion to be drawn that Callaghan derived the bulk of his percentage support from Wales, with reduced support in England and little support from Scotland. Given the bulk of MP's numerical value came from England, it would now be necessary to break up the vote into a selection of regions for further analysis.

8: How many MP's representing Northern, Southern, East Midlands, West Midlands or London seats voted for Callaghan or Foot?

	Nth	Sth	EM	WM	L
Callaghan	54 (52.5%)	13 (54%)	13 (72%)	13 (46%)	27 (57.5%)
Foot	49 (47.5%)	11 (46%).	5 (27%)	15 (53%)	20 (42.5%)

Callaghan secured the majority of votes across England in each region with the exception of the West Midlands. Given Labour's traditional northern heartlands provided the numerical bulk of the vote, it was there where the election was to be won or lost. With the exception of the West Midlands, the prevailing view amongst English MP's was that Callaghan would appeal more to the electorate than Foot. However the differences between each region in the level of support for each candidate illustrates the varying degrees to which each would be most likely to appeal. For example, although Callaghan was the victor in most of the regions, the extent to which his popularity can be determined in each region can be seen by the size of his percentage over Foot. The south, therefore had greater support for Callaghan than in the north despite his victory over Foot in both regions. However, the sharp contrast between the East and West Midlands illustrates that Callaghan, by a significant margin, was felt to be the candidate most likely to appeal to the broader electorate in the East rather than in the West Midlands. However, in the West Midlands, Foot's endorsement is not as significant as Callaghan's in the East. Callaghan's support in London also indicates a degree of support from MP's representing city areas, along with his ability to identify with the unions. In this sense, Callaghan's experience on economic matters would be of greater benefit to an MP's re-election over that of Foot. It is important, therefore to remember that although Callaghan gained the greater support of

most regions in England, the extent to which that support was wholesale varies between regions[21].

When considering his election as leader, Callaghan remarked that "at no time did I have real doubts that I would be elected, and this determined my public attitudes during the three successive ballots that were necessary" (Callaghan, 1987, p.392). When considering his experience, his confidence is unsurprising. "Callaghan was the centrist figure, sceptical of the enthusiasms of the left and social democratic right, close to the unions both in style and substance, and with more experience of high office than any of his rivals" (Thorpe, 2008, p.195). This confidence, combined with his moderate views, and political experience ensured that the PLP felt most comfortable about Callaghan's electoral appeal (*New Statesman*, 9 April 1976, p.438). However, at the next Labour leadership election, the context and leadership skills required would be very different.

Electorally, however it was not over for Foot. In October 1976, the Labour Party debated whether to elect Foot unopposed to the position of Deputy Leader. By this point, he had been appointed Leader of House and had assisted Callaghan in composing his new cabinet (Jones, 1994, p.396). The social democrat, Shirley Williams contested Foot for the Deputy Leadership however, Foot held onto the position (*The Times*, 14 October 1976, p.15). This illustrates the growing discontent brewing amongst some social democrats towards the so-called advances made by the left which would lay the foundations for the disunity under Foot's leadership.

[21] During the 1980 leadership election, the Labour opposition placed Party interests over those of the economy because of the vastly different circumstances faced at that time.

4.4: Michael Foot and the Economic Strategies.

Keynesian economic theory had been the main policy position of the Labour Party throughout much of the post-war period (Donoughue, 1987, p.79). Simply put, it is a method of state involvement in economic policy, whilst allowing the private economy to continue. It also manipulates *consumer demand* in order to control unemployment. Effectively, this is what was known as *the mixed economy*. However, Labour's commitment to full employment and high expenditure within a Keynesian economy resulted in higher inflation and taxation (Donoughue, 1987, p.80). For many within the Labour movement, this was a price worth paying for the advantages of higher employment. However, the economic theory became increasingly problematic as the 1970s progressed, forcing a debate on all sides of the political spectrum on whether the mixed economy could continue. Monetarism was in the ascendency on the right, whilst a *socialist challenge* was in the ascendency on the left. An Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) was developed by some on the left to counter Keynesianism because "British capitalism had failed the nation and that the moment was ripe to push forward government control and public investment" (Cronin, 2004, p.181). Ultimately, Foot joined with Benn, Silkin, Shore and Orme in supporting the AES, which was based around import controls, import deposits and currency manipulation (Donoughue, 1987, p.90). The idea being that through isolationism the government would be able to manage the British economy through the global economic crisis.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) promotes capitalism within the nations which seek financial assistance. It is ideologically bound to promote free market ideals over those of collectivism. Consequently, when Healey approached them for a loan in 1976, he would be bound to their ideological conditions regardless of how much money the government drew from the loan (Holland, 1984, p.244). Holland (1975) warned that increasing monopolies within

industry meant that fewer firms were controlling more of the economy (Holland, 1975, p.49). With fewer firms came reduced competition, legitimising a larger role for the state to monitor their activities. Economic competition was illusionary because of the inequalities between those participating in the competition. Holland (1975) argued that international trade was giving way to multi-national trade between the same companies (Holland, 1975, p.62). The growth of these monopoly companies utilised transnational structures such as the Common Market to earn higher profits by increasing prices thereby increasing inflation. Holland argues that the Common Market's

> prevailing ideology of liberal capitalist integration is contradicted by the new dominant mode of monopoly-multinational capital which has swept Europe faster than Commission decrees against abuses of competition (Holland, 1975, p.317).

Holland is arguing that the Common Market acts as a platform for multinational companies to dominate international capital within the hands of a select group of companies, and that as an institution it is unable to control them. In this sense, the illusion of competition has given way to corporate domination. The idea that capitalism could be managed by the state was giving way as Keynesian theory gave way to an economic crisis. Keynesianism had failed to adequately manage this economic development, whilst monetarism would actively promote it. Only socialism could adequately analyse the problem and provide an alternative to the corporate domination of monopoly-multinational capital.

Foot was “brought up by Aneurin Bevan to be a socialist critic of Keynes” (Foot, 1984, p.184). As discussed in a previous chapter, Bevan was a key inspiration of Foot's political philosophy, and this extended to Foot's understanding of economic theory. Foot was a critic of Keynesian theory because as it acted as a preventative measure against socialism. Keynesianism enabled capitalism to continue alongside progressive steps towards social policy, thereby negating the need for a socialist society. However with the

gradual adoption of monetarist policies, Foot argued that the nation was risking the moderate progresses achieved through Keynesian economics and that “we should have to recapture that precious ground” (*ibid*). Foot continued to argue that co-operation with the key players of the mixed economy was a sensible action for the government to undertake. The IMF “seriously impaired” independent economic and social progress and that “the period 1977-79 was still a vastly more successful period than the period of, say, 1970-72” (Foot, 1984, p.185). Through co-operation, the social contract, and retaining the limited gains won through Keynesianism Foot was arguing the economy would operate more effectively than if the ideas of the IMF or monetarism were implemented.

The key economic symptoms which Britain was experiencing included interest rates at 15 per cent deterioration of the pound on the markets, and high inflation (Cronin, 2004, p.180). The crisis, Donoughue (1987) argued, was because

> the PSBR was above forecast and money growth was running well above the Treasury's 12 percent target – monetarism already secretly ruled and we were failing the basic monetarist test (Donoughue, 1987, p.93).

The solutions which Callaghan would endeavour to pursue brought controversy to the Labour movement; he argued that

> Britain has for too long lived on borrowed time, borrowed money, borrowed ideas. For too long, perhaps since the war, we postponed facing up to fundamental choices and fundamental changes in our society and in our economy. The cosy world we were told would go on forever, where full employment would be guaranteed by a stroke of the Chancellor's pen, cutting taxes, deficit spending, that cosy world is gone. [It is wrong] to think that you could just spend your way out of a recession and increase unemployment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists and insofar as it

> ever did exist, it worked by injecting inflation into the economy (Cronin, 2004, p.180).

With this announcement at the Labour conference, Callaghan broke free of the Keynesian economic theory which Labour had sought to pursue. Callaghan had divorced Labour from the Keynesianism[22], freeing them up to debate about the future of economic policy (Pugh, 2010, p.357). By breaking free of the theories of the past, Callaghan enabled both the left and right to begin a debate over which policies to adopt, with monetarist and socialist theories in the ascendancy.

Foot supported the AES because the alternative was to accept £2bn in ideological spending cuts demanded by the IMF (Jones, 1994, p.407). In cabinet Foot argued that

> there was no economic case for the cuts. Far from reducing PSBR (Public Sector Borrowing Requirement), the spending cuts would mean higher unemployment, which would in turn mean higher social security payments and lower tax revenues, this actually increasing the PSBR (Jones, 1994, p.408).

By demanding the cuts to public spending, Foot was arguing that the IMF would, in fact, *worsen* the economic situation by causing higher unemployment, leading to increases in welfare spending. Foot described the consequences of the cuts as “inconceivable” which would force the government to break with the deals it had made with the trade unions whilst also splintering the Party into various warring factions (Jones, 1994, p.408). Foot clearly believed that the ideological cuts would undermine Labour's *raison d'être*, which given the IMFs opposition to collectivism, it could be argued was the purpose of the condition. The demands were ultimately accepted by Healey, yet he would not draw on the full amount of the loan.

[22] This also solidified the Conservatives freedom from the consensus.

Foot opted not to resign given the precarious state of the government in the House of Commons and with it the threat of a Conservative government had an election been called. Despite their differences of opinion, Foot remained loyal to Callaghan and the government. Foot had "been leaning over backwards to support the Prime Minister" because he did not wish to undermine the Labour Government (Smith, 8 December 1976, p.16). The preservation of the Labour Party in power guarded against another term of potential Conservative rule, which Foot believed legitimised his continued support. Foot's support for the AES did not extend to destroying the government over a disagreement concerning economic theory.

Foot argued co-operation through the social contract was vital in order to avoid the "immense problems" of industrial breakdown and economic decline (Foot, 1984, p.195). The issue of pay restraint came to haunt the government when they imposed a 5 per cent wages policy (Cronin, 2004, p.189). This measure was designed to demonstrate the government's strength over the trade unions, and demonstrate to the capitalists and the electorate that the government was able to control them. This was not the kind of relationship Foot had argued for. However, this would have been an effective message to non-Labour voters that Labour remained capable of controlling the unions. The unions accepted this as a piece of electioneering. However, given Callaghan chose to hold back the election until the following year the trade unions then interpreted the policy as a genuine attempt to control them. As with *In Place of Strife,* the unions believed that Labour had again turned on them, and so this prompted a period of industrial unrest which came to characterise the final period of the Labour government as *the winter of discontent*.

On 22nd January 1979, a day of action intensified the symptoms of the strike on a single day during which schools, hospitals, ambulance drivers, dustmen, and grave diggers in Liverpool ceased working (Cronin, 2004, p.192). Callaghan's pre-election demonstration of strength over the unions had been proven an ineffective tool. The Conservative press were scathing of the government, running headlines such as “Target for Today: Sick Children” (Cronin, 2004, p.193). Shore described the disintegration of industrial relations as a “nightmare”, arguing that by bringing down the Labour government, the subsequent general election would produce a highly anti-union government (Shore, 1993, p.118). Shore (1993) also argued that Callaghan should have used civil resources such as the military to keep the country operating. Foot opposed the calling of a state of emergency or the use of the military, arguing in cabinet that the trade unions had a just cause of protest (Morgan, 2007, p.364). Ultimately, the period of industrial action petered out. The issues that the trade unions were fighting for were left largely unresolved whilst the Labour government was now left fighting for its life.

4.5: Michael Foot as Leader of the House and Devolution Debate.

Foot's performance in the leadership election demonstrated the authority and respect he held within the PLP. Consequently, Callaghan could not afford to ignore the runner up. Foot's level of support during the election warranted recognition. Callaghan rewarded Foot with the position of Leader of the House and elevation to being the Lord President of the Privy Council (Jones, 1994, p.398). When combined with Foot's role as deputy of the Labour Party, he was effectively acting as a deputy Prime Minister. Yet the mood amongst some on the left was that Callaghan's cabinet had reduced the power of Foot's ideological bedfellows. Castle (1980) noted in her diary that "I had a profound sense that the left has been weakened in this new cabinet" following Callaghan's dismissal of her (Castle, 1980, p.727). However, given Castle's role in the development of *In Place of Strife*, Callaghan had little sympathy for its author (Conroy, 2006, p.91). In his new position, Foot remained loyal to Callaghan as the Labour Prime Minister, whilst courting criticism concerning his attitude towards India, Public Lending Rights, and the development of devolution to Scotland and Wales.

Whilst the economic issues were being combated by Healey, both Michael and Jill Foot spent some time in India. Foot admired India and its Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi considerably. Foot believed that she was the "inheritor of the Nehru ideal of a democratic and socialist India", and so he believed she, as a friend deserved his loyalty (Jones, 1994, p.406). Foot also wished for assistance from India in seeking out a peaceful solution within Rhodesia given India's experience of resolving disputes (*The Times*, 7 October 1976, p.8). There can be little doubt that Foot held a personal loyalty towards India and that he believed it had a role to play in the development of international peace and the advance of liberal democratic socialism.

Yet the Prime Minister Foot admired had be disqualified by the High Court in Allahabad for political corruption. She retorted by clinging to power, by declaring a state of emergency and arresting opponents including approximately 2,000 students without charge whilst her son engaged in excessive suppression of opposition (Jones, 1994, pp.401-402). A campaigner, J. P. Narayan called for Foot's friend to be removed in the name of *freedom* (Levin, 6 April 1977, p.16). Freedom is a concept which Foot also argued strongly for, so to find himself on the receiving end of such demands is potentially indicative of a miscalculation of support on his part. Needless to say, some within the PLP such as John Lee argued that Foot was wrong to support the tyrannical regime saying

> ...the way Mrs Gandhi has petulantly reacted to every form of criticism suggests that power has gone to her head, or than she can not cope and, in a sense, that this is a kind of panic behaviour. I would like Mr Foot to realise that Mrs Gandhi has stifled the press in India. I think Mr Foot is wrong and he ought to remember that (*The Times*, 10 January 1977, p.4).

The curbs on freedom in India had also disturbed the Foreign Office, who advised Foot not to discuss the unrest with the Prime Minister whilst in India. Foot did, and he later described her during his meeting with her as having

> ...a gentleness and coolness which were much more characteristic than the fury which was sometimes alleged to take possession of her whole being (Jones, 1994, p.404).

Despite views to the contrary, Foot took the view that the Prime Minister was a gentle ruler and so deserved his admiration and respect.

Foot may well have been clinging to a notion that India's independence and that his anti-colonialism were strengthened by supporting Gandhi. Writing in his work *Loyalists and Loners*, Foot quotes James Cameron saying "the political world outside the word India equated almost automatically with the word Gandhi, which had gone almost into folklore"

(Foot, 1986, p.212). Foot was quoting Cameron talking about Mahatma, yet the view that the '*Gandhi'* name alone carried with it a special significance is not to be disregarded in considering Foot's support for the Indian Prime Minister.

During a speech over dinner, Foot rejected the notion that India was falling into dictatorship (Jones, 1994, p.405). His visit was short enough for his gaze not to have noticed any illegal detentions or curbs of individual freedom. The secretary of the Socialist Party of India criticised Foot's support of the state of emergency; E. P. Thompson later commented on the "devastating news that Foot had endorsed Mrs Gandhi's regime", whilst opponents of the regime were desperately trying to understand why Foot supported the supposed drift towards dictatorship (Jones, 1994, pp.405-406). Put simply, supporters of Foot were mystified as to how he could endorse such a harsh regime. Foot's political development had always been in favour of a free, liberal state and yet India appeared to becoming harsh and dictatorial. The answer is that Foot was *loyal*. Gandhi was a friend, and Foot stood by his friends regardless of the situations in which they found themselves. In this instance, his loyalty brought him into defending aspects of an indefensible state.

Back in the United Kingdom, Foot's 'Public Lending Rights Bill' endeavoured to provide authors with a financial bonus whenever their works are borrowed from a public library (Morgan, 2007, p.365). Effectively, it compensated authors for missed sales, given a reader would be more likely to borrow a book rather than purchase one, especially at a time of economic downturn. It would prove financially beneficial for the authors, although the principle of free libraries would be curtailed. At the time, however, the literary world was suffering from a significant degeneration of income with authors needing a financial boost which such a scheme would provide. The Bill was presented to the House of Commons in

1976, but was voted out in November 1977 due to a lack of Labour MP's in the House to vote for the proposal (Jones, 1994, p.409).

However, Foot was passionate on the subject and was not willing to give in, consequently the Bill was reintroduced the following year. Jones (1994) quotes Brigid Brophy saying

> Michael Foot, as Leader of the House, took command of the parliamentary events. He amassed an arsenal of procedural methods, most of which he never needed to use except as bargaining counters for containing, but not stifling and thus provoking, the filibuster (Jones, 1994, p.425).

The third reading of the Bill passed through into the House of Lords in March 1979. At a time of industrial crisis and the constitutional debate regarding devolved government to Scotland and Wales, Foot was able to achieve a final success before the downfall of Callaghan's government.

The Labour Party had a mixed history when concerned with devolved government. "There are divisions in both major parties on the subject, and the government is faced with the threat of revolts from two separate sections of its own backbenches" (Langdon, 16 January 1976, p.1). Older Labour figures such as Keir Hardie had argued that devolution enabled the Red Flag to be brought down to local level. Socialism would start at grass roots level, and if devolved, it would avoid the centralised bureaucratic route as discussed by Max Weber (Slattery, 1991, pp.306-307; Morgan, 1987, p.32). Socialists such as Hardie were devolutionists in so much as the reform benefitted the continued development of a socialist society. Municipal socialism would have direct connections with the working classes as opposed to centralised bureaucratic control. Yet decentralisation was opposed by socialists such as Bevan who believed devolution created an artificial sense of regionalised patriotism in the devolved nations. By remaining centralised, equality would be enhanced and socialism

could be cascaded to each part of the United Kingdom at the same time from the same location. Foot saw devolution as "a matter of principle" which was "a recognition of Scottish and Welsh nationhood and an advance of democracy" (Jones, 1994, pp.411-412). For a report entitled 'The Question of Devolution', Foot stated that

> Labour's prospects at the next election will also be greatly affected by the way in which we tackle the whole question of devolution. No doubt is possible, in my judgement, that we must carry through what we have promised - a real far reaching devolution - and we must do it ungrudgingly and ingeniously (Foot, 1976).

Foot was of the socialist school of thought which followed the view advocated by Hardie, arguing that devolved government was a benefit to the development of a socialist society.

The mechanisms on which to proceed with devolution was a matter of some contention for Foot. Referendums had not been the lefts' preferred decision making process given their failure to deliver a No verdict in the Common Market referendum. Also, given the Labour Party had contested the 1974 general elections with a commitment to devolved governments in the manifesto, there was technically no need for a referendum.

> The next Labour Government will create elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales. It will also consult with the local authorities and other interested parties about the democratisation of those regional bodies which are at present non-accountable. A separate statement setting out more detailed proposals has already been published by the Labour Party and the Government's proposals are set out in the White Paper. Separate manifestos are being published for Scotland and Wales (Labour Party, 1974).

Foot believed that Parliament should make the decision without consulting the electorate because of their electoral victory with the above within the Labour manifesto (Jones, 1994, p.412). However, obtaining a government majority would be highly problematic, given the divisions of pro and anti devolutionists on both the Labour and Conservative benches.

Attempts had been made to gain the backing of the Liberals and other minority parties within the Commons to help ensure the Bill passed (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.193).

The preparation of the devolution Bill did not intellectually stimulate Foot because of the logistical minutia, however this was compensated for by Foot's emotional stimulation (Morgan, 2007, p.355). During a television interview, Foot connected Scottish and Welsh devolution to the failure to grant full independence to Ireland. He argued that "I don't want them to turn to violence, of course, but I think its quite likely" should devolution not be granted to Scotland and Wales (Hoggart & Leigh, 1981, p.193). Despite Foot's view that devolution was vital, some did not agree. A group called *Labour Against Assemblies in Edinburgh and Cardiff* was formed which included figures such as Eric Moonman, Colin Phipps and Tam Dalyell. Dalyell argued that

> ...one of the objectives of this loose grouping is to give Michael Foot, Leader of the House, notice of the morass which the Devolution Bill will get into into the House of Commons as it is now composed (*The Times*, 2 August 1976, p.2).

Within the same article, Phipps estimated that 32 Labour MP's would vote against the government when the Bill came up for its second reading. Opposition to devolution came in even greater destructive fashion when George Cunningham moved an amendment stating that the Yes result must comprise of 40 per cent of the whole electorate (Rosen, 2005, pp.366-367). This enraged the nationalists in Scotland, given this figure amounted to approximately two thirds of the electorate who would be required to vote Yes despite securing a majority verdict (Jones, 1994, p.422).

Foot also argued that the referenda should be advisory, rather than mandatory. He argued that "no substantive result in regard to the Act would follow automatically on the outcome of the referendum" (Foot, 16 February 1977, p.12). Given Foot's distaste for the concept of

referenda subverting the primacy of Parliament, it is not surprising that he should attempt to turn around Cunningham's wrecking amendment by making the referenda advisory. However, by doing so, he also undermined the *raison d'être* for the consultative process.

The polls took place in March 1979. Against a backdrop of industrial unrest and a decaying Labour government, the results would be fatal for the government's survival. Devolution in Wales was favoured by only 11.8 per cent of the electorate, whilst devolution in Scotland was favoured by 32.85 per cent (Morgan, 2007, p.365). The Welsh result was a disaster, falling well short of Cunningham's amendment whilst the Scottish result, despite being more respectable still fell short of Cunningham's amendment. The Scottish Nationalists were outraged, and pledged to turn against the government. A vote of no confidence was put forward in the Commons; without the aid of Welsh or Scottish Nationalist parties, the government lost the confidence vote and was forced to call a general election (Cronin, 2004, p.195).

Foot was willing to fight on. Because he had argued that the referenda were to be consultative, he attempted to argue that the SNP should remain loyal to the government. It was still possible, Foot believed, to rescue Scottish devolution from the electoral defeat. When he tried to convince Callaghan of this strategy, however, it seemed as though Callaghan had accepted defeat. Sensing their opportunity, the Conservatives put forward the Confidence Motion which aimed to bring down the Labour government (Pugh, 2010, p.359-360).

The Lib-Lab pact had now ended and, during the confidence debate, Foot attacked the Liberal leader as much as the Conservatives, saying

> What the Right Hon Lady has done today is to lead her troops into battle snugly concealed behind a Scottish nationalist shield, with the boy David holding her hand. I must say to the Right Hon. Lady — and I should like to see her smile — that I am even more concerned about the fate of the Right Hon. Gentleman than I am about her. She can look after herself. But the Leader of the Liberal Party — and I say this with the utmost affection — has passed from rising hope to elder statesman without any intervening period whatsoever (Hansard, 1979, pp.461-590).

With the debate concluded, the Labour Whips began a hard fight to ensure Labour succeeded in defeating the Conservative motion. The Whips negotiated with MP's and pushed hard to ensure their own backbenches voted the motion down. Despite valiant efforts, three supporting MP's did not vote for the government. These were Gerry Fitt and Frank Maguire of the northern Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sir Alfred Broughton; Maguire and Fitt abstained, whilst Broughton was extremely ill and unable to physically visit Parliament (Morgan, 2007, p.367). As a result of the Whips inability to secure more supporters, the confidence vote was carried by a single vote (Turner, 2008, p.269). By losing the Confidence vote, a general election became an inevitability.

The Labour government had been brought down by the result of the failed devolution referenda. The confidence motion was lost because Labour had lost the support of the Liberals and the nationalists. Had Cunningham's amendment not been included in the Scotland Act, then it would have been a victory, and the Conservatives would have been unable to confidently put forward their motion. Had the Conservatives still done so, then it is likely the SNP would have voted with Labour. Cunningham had postponed devolution, but at the expense of the life of the Labour government.

4.6: Conclusion.

Foot underwent a transfiguration of his political identity as a member of the Labour Government. No longer was he the outside rebel who campaigned on issues which mattered to him regardless of the embarrassment inflicted upon the Labour government. As a member of the Labour government, Foot had to consider the effect his speeches and actions had upon the government to which *he* belonged. Granted, this did not prevent him from deviating from the Party line on subjects such as the Common Market, however given Wilson had suspended the convention of collective responsibility, this can hardly be described as disloyal.

As the Secretary of State for Employment, Foot successfully negotiated a peaceful settlement with the NUM, whilst also repealing the Industrial Relations Act. These two moves alone would endear him to those most likely to vote Labour. They also ensured that the Labour government's life expectancy would be prolonged, thereby moulding his image as a figure of stability and change. It became possible to rely on Foot as a loyal member of the government, and not a potential maverick. This fostering of his loyal reputation enabled him to progress his image towards the Party leadership. He became a credible inside left contender for the leadership, who would not be bogged down in socialist doctrine but rather understood the practical issues faced by a government on a daily basis. Consequently, when Wilson stood down, he was able to demonstrate his ability to appeal to many centrist MP's as well as to his ideological bedfellows. Foot was unable to secure the leadership because of Callaghan's strength of experience in the key positions of state. However, Foot was able to show that he was a credible alternative future leader, and in so doing became a figure of some authority in Callaghan's cabinet. His successes as Secretary of State for Employment would not be replicated so easily as Leader of the

House as he was plunged into an economic argument following the IMF debate. Foot was an advocate of the Alternative Economic Strategy, but not at the expense of the lifetime of the Labour government. He did not resign when the idea was rejected, choosing instead to remain loyal to Callaghan and the Labour government. He continued as Leader of the House, and became involved in devising the devolution legislation. Opposition was strong, but the legislation passed through the Houses. However, the referenda failed. This led to the nationalists abandoning the government to a Conservative confidence motion, which ultimately brought the Labour government down. Foot had attempted to save the Labour government, but failed due to the lack of support from Callaghan, who simply had become tired of the debates.

Foot's transformation was based upon his loyalty to Labour. He was loyal to the Labour government, because it was the most effective means by which to bring about the changes in society he believed was needed in order to emphasise equality and social justice. This sometimes meant compromising on issues such as the economic theory. But in return, Foot was able to push forward legislation that he believed in. Foot's personal success in this final Labour government before his leadership was his transition from being a broadly likable rebel of the left to being a criticised loyalist of the government.

CHAPTER FIVE
Michael Foot and the 1980 Labour Leadership Election

5.0: Introduction.

The 1980 Labour leadership election provides an insight into the nature of the ideological arguments within the Party as well as an opportunity to evaluate non-ideological motivations in the election of Foot and the rejection of Healey. As a member of the 1974-1979 government, Foot's loyalty to both Wilson and Callaghan enabled him to become the Labour leader at a time of considerable and destructive ideological debate (Clark, 18 May, 2010). This loyalty enabled him to develop a cross-ideological appeal in a way which Benn or Healey could not. Both Benn and Healey had appeal to a specific ideological position that served to divide rather than unite (*ibid*).

The Labour Party was returned to opposition in 1979 with no more of an electoral challenge to overcome than they faced following previous general election defeats. In October 1974, Labour secured 11,457,079 votes, yet in May 1979, Labour secured 11,532,218 votes (Dorey, 1995, p.341). Consequently, in selecting the leader, the Party did not initially face a situation which was insurmountable.

The amended Heppell approach, utilised for the 1976 leadership campaign is again utilised for the 1980 leadership campaign. An examination of the PLP is justified because the circumstances in which the Party found itself were vastly different to those faced four years previously. The Party was in opposition, and facing strong demands for reforms from the outside left which included reselection, the electoral college, and controls over the manifesto.

A key difference was also the advances made by the outside left within the mindset of the Party. In addition, the social democrats were increasingly uneasy about the apparent success of the outside left, and were becoming disillusioned with the Party. They believed that the survival of the Party which they recognised was at risk from these constitutional reforms, and some felt unable to remain within the 'broad church'. During the debates, they made their position known and sought to advance the alternative reform of One Member One Vote and the abolition of the block vote for the election of the leader (*Labour Weekly*, 31 October, 1980; *New Statesman*, 31 October 1980, p.6). As a result of these divisions, as the new Labour leader, Foot, would be called upon to navigate the Party through the demands whilst retaining Party unity.

5.1: Michael Foot and the Labour Leadership Election.

Because the Labour Whips had been unable to save the Callaghan government from a vote of no confidence following the result of the devolution referenda, a general election became a constitutional inevitability. Margaret Thatcher, the leader of the Conservative opposition had, with the voting assistance of disgruntled Welsh and Scottish Nationalist parties, succeeded in bringing down the Labour government. The nationalist parties held Labour accountable for the failure of devolution, and so they became the turkies that voted for Christmas by supporting the Conservative move.

It is worth noting that commentators often lay blame for the economic failure of Callaghan's government at the door of the trade unions and the left, yet the Alternative Economic Strategy advocated by some on the left in cabinet was never put into practice. Indeed, Callaghan's preferred monetarist polices were lukewarm proto-Thatcherite in tone which laid the foundations for future accusations of betrayal. Those blaming 'the left' for Callaghan's economic policies is, therefore an oxymoron. Callaghan had followed the policies of the social democratic right, which favoured policies that had common economic ground with those seeking to reform Labour following Foot's period of leadership. An illustration being that both Callaghan and Healey were pro-Common Market, which ultimately became the orthodox policy of the modernised Labour Party under Kinnock's post-Foot leadership. Yet the trigger for the public divisions and debates which characterised Foot's period as leader was Labour's electoral defeat. It is therefore necessary briefly to consider the 1979 General Election and the role it played in transforming Foot's fortunes in ultimately becoming the Labour leader.

For Foot, the election defeat provided him with a personal opportunity to return to his literary activities. Although still deputy leader of the Labour Party, Foot was able to find time to write *Debts of Honour*. *Debts of Honour* was a broad collection of essays regarding an eclectic mixture of his political and personal influences, some of which were pivotal in developing his *political education*, as discussed in Chapter 2. The work opens up with an essay on his father, Isaac Foot, which is followed by essays on Hazlitt, Disraeli and Beaverbrook amongst many others (Foot, 1981). It is unnecessary at this point to consider the contents of *Debts of Honour* in any great detail, however it is worth noting that it was a reflective examination on Foot's key inspirations at a time of degeneration for Labour. It was a moment of personal reflection and introspective political analysis for Foot given the electoral position of the Labour Party, which was in the process of being engulfed in debates regarding constitutional reform. *Debts of Honour* enabled Foot to restate and reaffirm his political beliefs at the end of his first and only period in government. This reflection was the closest Foot came to writing an autobiography, despite lacking a personalised historical narrative. The outside left had laid the criticism at Foot, having unrepentantly served in Callaghan's government, that he was a *traitor* to the left. *Debts of Honour* seeks to restate his ethical credentials as a liberal socialist of the inside left, and to separate himself and those of his ilk from the militants of the outside left (*ibid*).

Within 18 months of Labour losing the general election, Foot was elected leader of the Party. Between Labour's loss and his assumption of the leadership, it was a time of great discontent within the Party. The CLPD, who circulated to all CLPs "a suggested resolution on the reselection of MP's" made significant advances at securing support for its objectives at subsequent Labour conferences (*Labour Weekly*, 23 April 1976, p.12; Cronin, 2004, p.218). Yet they had not succeeded in achieving them. The argument against the reforms they

advocated was that the changes would lose Labour a significant portion of their mainstream electoral appeal. The social democrats, who were becoming increasingly disgruntled with the arguments and advances of the outside left, argued that a manifesto composed by conference, a leader elected by conference, and the mandatory reselection of MP's would be "a disaster" (Crewe & King, 1995, p.92). David Owen, describing the constitutional changes, attacked them arguing that "four trade union barons in a smoke filled room was no way to elect a Prime Minister" (*ibid*). The social democrats had preferred any constitutional amendments to be restricted to One Member One Vote, believing this to be more genuinely democratic and less ideologically dogmatic (Hayter, 2005, p.14). However, Labour's inability to retain power on the social democratic manifesto composed by Callaghan and his social democratic advisors had made the arguments advanced by the CLPD more compelling to a rank and file who were disgruntled by a Party leadership that was content to ignore them when in government.

Tracy (1983) argues that Foot was "equally committed" to the development of the policies preferred by Callaghan and Healey, despite his sympathy towards the Alternative Economic Strategy, because of the threat of a Conservative government if he or any other inside left figure succeeded in undermining the support for the Labour government (Tracy, 1983, p.33; Cronin, 2004, p.181). Once Labour had departed from office, Foot would be able to express his views without the governmental constraints of collective responsibility. Foot remained deputy leader of the Party and loyal to Callaghan, even to the extent of defending him through the heckling of the 1979 post-election conference (Morgan, 2007, p.375).

The CLPD had preferred and demanded the election of the leader by conference. However, given this would be highly unlikely to succeed, they focused their efforts instead on securing an *electoral college* system (Cronin, 2004, p.218). The electoral college would shift the bulk of the electorate from being exclusively the PLP and towards the trade unions, CLP's and the PLP. This would have the implication of making the winner the leader of the broader Labour *movement* as well as the Parliamentary party. In future debates, this would have the advantage of enabling the leader to argue he or she was speaking for the entire Labour movement, making it harder, but not impossible, for the any single faction of the Labour movement to contest the validity of Labour policy (Minkin, 1991, pp.640-641).

The main debates over the composition of the electoral college took place at the 1980 Labour conference in Blackpool (Thorpe, 2008, p.211). The outside left, chiefly articulated at the conference by Benn, blamed the centralisation of personnel during the Labour government for the electoral defeat (Stark, 1996, p.46).

> Blaming Callaghan and Healey for the last governments failure, they sought constitutional reform of the Party in order to make the leadership more directly responsible to the activists like themselves (Pelling, 1985, p.176).

Through groups such as the CLPD, the outside left sought to seize control of the leadership from the social democratic right and with it control of the Parliamentary Party. They disregarded the relevance of the older inside left, to which Foot belonged. Benn questioned Foot's legitimacy as a figure of left, saying "he hasn't been a figure of the left for a decade" (Benn, 1994, p.32). The conflict between Foot and Benn stemmed from their differing understanding of socialism and the role of Parliament. Benn advocated outside Parliamentary bodies such as the NEC dictating the policy of a Labour government, whilst Foot believed Parliament was sovereign and should not be circumnavigated in such a way

(Langdon, 16 April 1976, p.3). On this basis, both the inside left and the social democratic right found themselves under attack from the outside left, providing them with a common adversary in the fight for the heart and soul of the Labour Party.

Benn sought to distance himself from the achievements and failures of the Callaghan government in order to position himself as a credible future candidate to replace Callaghan amongst the anticipated new electorate.

> There was barely an MP who doubted that the move was designed to improve Mr. Benn's chances of winning the Labour leadership sometime in the future (Stark, 1996, p.46).

Yet in his diary Benn remarks that Callaghan felt the PLP would not accept him as leader (Benn, 1994, p.34). Given Benn's readiness for attacking the previous government and his growing popularity amongst the rank and file at conference, the potential for him securing the leadership became a real possibility which the PLP was unable to ignore. It is worth noting that given Benn was a senior minister under Callaghan, his desire to be disassociated from the achievements and failures of Callaghan's government demonstrates compartmentalised thinking that denies his collective cabinet responsibility in Labour's policies. Speaking to the conference, Benn made a number of 'factual inaccuracies', which some in the hall considered simply to be lies (Hayter, 2005, p.13).

The leadership election that granted Foot the leadership was prompted by Callaghan's resignation which was hastened by the CLPD's victory in securing the electoral college (Thorpe, 2008, p.212). It must be remembered that at the time Callaghan stood down, he had become increasingly exhausted, which Healey characterised as being "in limbo and in purgatory at the same time" (Healey, 1989, p.475). *Labour Weekly* argued that "the Labour Party's leadership crisis has been thrown even deeper into confusion by Jim Callaghan's

decision to resign" (*Labour Weekly*, 17 October 1980, p.1). Despite this the timing of the resignation is highly significant because even though the electoral college and the widening of the electorate had been opened up to include unions, the CLP's and PLP, the exact composition of the formulas by which the college would operate had not been decided. This position potentially risked the advances of the outside left. *Labour Weekly* suggests the benefits of the constitutional reforms may be jeopodised, by reporting that

> it is the worst possible outcome for the Left, which was anxious that the decision of the conference to widen the leadership franchise was not jeopodised by the election of a new, and possibly unfairly advantaged, incumbent selected by the Parliamentary Labour Party alone (*ibid*).

The fear was that Callaghan's decision to resign risked a social democratic leader. Because the October conference had been unable to agree upon the make up of the college, a special conference was needed to debate the outstanding issues. However, it must be noted that

> Callaghan decided a long time ago to step down as leader of the Labour Party after the 1980 conference. The changes made at Blackpool did not make him change his mind. However, Mr Callaghan's decision to go, and to go now, certainly creates difficulties for the Labour Party (*Labour Weekly*, 17 October 1980, p.6).

Foot favoured retaining the election of the leader by MP's only (Owen, 1991, p.440). This was because Foot believed that Parliamentary socialism was the primary mechanism by which genuine social and economic equality was to be advanced (Morgan 2007, pp.374-375). Outside Parliamentary protests achieved little beyond their populist appeal to certain outside left groups. Owen (1991) noted that during the debates over intra-Labour electoral reform, Foot's objections were supported by Callaghan because they would de-emphasise Parliament. Opponents of Benn's preferred method feared it would lead to ideological purges, potential witch-hunts of social democratic MP's and the dilution of the role of

Labour MP's to being little more than a *delegate* at the whims of his or her constituency members (Kavanagh, 1982, p.217; BBC, 1995). The result of such an arrangement would be an MP representing the interests of the CLP rather than their constituents. "It was felt by some", notes Shaw (1999), "that only Foot was in the position to halt the advance not only of Healey but of Benn, who, many believed, would use the new electoral college system to launch a bid for the leadership the following year" (Shaw, 1999, p.154). Shaw added "if Healey had been elected in 1981, he would have faced a challenge from Benn under the new arrangements, who might easily have succumbed", thereby opening the floodgates to more potential defections (*ibid*). This view is validated by Drucker (1981) who argued that...

> ...a Foot victory was preferred... because a Foot win in the PLP was seen as a way of ending an argument with the party which might conceivably end up forcing Benn on the PLP (Drucker, 1981, p.386).

Foot's election as an inside left, conciliatory figure who held appeal both within the left and right helped prevent such an occurrence. Radice (2004) remarks that "Benn is now almost a complete tool of the far left - and the Militant Tendency", making any suggestion of a Benn leadership highly divisive for the social democrats and inside left traditions within the Party (Radice, 2004, p.5).

The timing of Callaghan's departure, and the increasingly factious contention within the Labour Party, immediately triggered a further division. This new division concerned whether the old rules should be used for the election or whether the new leader should be a caretaker until the electoral college was operational (*Labour Weekly*, 24 October 1980, p.3; Shore, 1993, p.137). This debate provided Benn with a legitimate argument for not facing a potentially destructive vote at the hands of the PLP. Benn remarks that both Jo Richardson and Stuart Holland both recommended to him that if Foot stood, he should not contest against Foot (Benn, 1994, p.35, p.38).

In the midst of the constitutional wrangling, Foot headed to Dublin to deliver a lecture on one of his inspirational literary heroes, Jonathan Swift. Whilst there, well wishers continued to contact Foot's office in order to encourage him to stand. The long standing left-winger, Ian Mikardo, trade unionists Clive Jenkins, Bill Keys and Moss Evans, cabinet colleagues Stan Orme and Albert Booth, NUM member Arthur Scargill[23] and Foot's wife, Jill Craigie joined the chorus of supporters (Shore, 1993, p.138; Morgan, 2007, p.377). Upon his return to the United Kingdom, he had been overwhelmed by the support he received and so announced his intention to stand against the preferred social democratic successor, Healey. Foot neglected to inform another left-wing candidate, Peter Shore whose campaign, as a result, "was doomed from that moment" (Gould, 1995, p.139). Foot's involvement in the campaign now ensured that he would be the only credible left-wing candidate (Radice, 2004, p.20). Although initially a credible candidate, Shore lacked the appeal of a Foot leadership because "only Michael was strong enough to beat Healey and that the Party would be plunged into civil war if Healey became the Leader" (Shore, 1995, p.139). Any other candidate from the left or right of the Party would not be able to survive a challenge from the electoral college.

The PLP would have been highly unlikely to have elected Benn, hence his preference to wait for the new college system with the addition of the rank and file electorate. However, even after the new rules had been passed, Benn would have been unlikely to mount a successful challenge against the well-liked Foot. Had Healey succeeded Callaghan, then

[23] Routledge's biography of Scargill notes that "he had been involved from the beginning in the secret union campaign to draft Michael Foot and stop Denis Healey. In late October, he sought to ensure that Yorkshire-sponsored MPs would vote for Foot. His coalfield area council voted to instruct miners who sat on constituency general management committees of the Labour Party to call special 'elect Foot' meetings. They warned Yorkshire's five NUM-sponsored MPs that if they failed to toe the line they could not expect union backing when they came up for re-selection by local parties." (Routledge, 1993, pp.103-104).

the PLP risked facing a Benn challenge in the new year. Consequently, Foot became the 'stop Benn' candidate with whom the PLP was able to work. Berrington (1982) notes that

> the decisive vote which elected Mr Foot as leader of the PLP may have come from men of the centre and right, anxious to avoid a confrontation with the party outside Parliament, or from those expressing their like for Mr Foot as a man (Berrington, 1982, p.71).

Appealing to the centre and even to some social democrats enabled Foot to become Party leader. Some centrists and social democrats found an appeal in a Foot leadership over that of Healey and so voted for him in order to have a "soft life" (Radice, 2004, p.22). In order to address the composition of Foot's support base, it is now necessary to consider the anatomy of the leadership election in greater depth.

It must be remembered that 97 MP's who participated in the previous 1976 leadership election did not participate in the 1980 leadership election because they were no longer members of the PLP. The following individuals did not sit as MP's following Labour's electoral defeat.

MP's Who Did Not Sit In the PLP after 1979

Atkins, Ronald	Doig, Peter	Jenkins, Hugh
Bates, Alfred	Edge, Geoffrey	Jenkins, Roy
Bean, Robert	Ellis, John	Judd, Frank
Bishop, Edward	Evans, Alfred	Kelley, Richard
Blenkinsop, Arthur	Fernyhough, Ernest	Latham, Arthur
Boardman, Harold	Fowler, Gerald	Lee, John
Boydon, Harold James	Galphern, Myer	Lever, Harold
Broughton, Aldred	Gould, Bryan	Lipton, Marcus
Buchanan, Richard	Grocott, Bruce	Litterick, Tom
Butler, Joyce	Harper, Joseph	Lomas, Kenneth
Carter, Raymond	Hatton, Frank	Loyden, Edward
Castle, Barbara	Hayman, Helene	Luard, Evan
Clemitson, Ivor	Hoyle, Douglas	Macintosh, John
Colquhoun, Maureen	Hughes, Cledwyn	MacFarguhar, Roderick
Corbett, Robin	Hunter, Adam	McMillan, Thomas
Cronin, John	Irvine, Arthur	Madden, Max
Crosland, Anthony	Irving, Sydney	Mahon, Simon
Davies, Bryan	Jackson, George	Mallalieu, Bill
De Freitas, Geoffrey	Jackson, Margaret	Marquard, David
Dell, Edmund	Jegar, Lena May	Mendelson, John

Miller, Millie
Molloy, William
Moonman, Eric
Murray, Ronald
Noble, Michael
Orbach, Maurice
Ovenden, John
Padley, Walter
Perry, Ernest
Phipps, Colin
Prentice, Reginald
Price, William
Roderick, Caerwyn
Rodgers, George
Rose, Paul
Ross, William
Sedgemore, Brian
Selby, Harry
Shaw, Arnold
Short, Edward
Small, William
Stewart, Michael
Strauss, George
Swain, Thomas
Thomas, Roland
Tierney, Sydney
Tomlinson, John
Tomney, Frank
Tuck, Raphael
Walden, Brian
Walker, Terry
Ward, Michael
Watkinson, John
Weitzman, David
Williams, Alan Lee
Williams, Shirley
Wilson, Alexander
Wise, Audrey
Woof, Robert

Through either losing their seats, taking up new roles, retirement from active politics, or death, the character of the PLP had changed since the previous leadership election. In terms of Parliamentary group memberships, the PLP had lost 55 Independents, 23 members of the Tribune Group, and 21 members of the Manifesto Group. These figures reveal that both Foot's and Healey's core ideological support bases had been reduced by 23 and 21 members respectively. However the Independents had taken the greatest reduction at 54.

The PLP had benefited from 54 replacement MP's, who brought with them new positions on policies. Repeating the comprehensive analysis of the entire PLP as carried out in the previous chapter would possess limited relevance to evaluating Foot's election, given that Foot failed on that occasion to secure the leadership. However it is necessary to conduct an analysis of the composition of the PLP in order to draw out the elements which resulted in Foot's successful election as leader. Given the context of this leadership election had little in common with the previous election[24], the analysis will be conducted by considering these changing circumstances. The following database contains details of the eclectic make up of the PLP.

[24] The manner in which the election was called, the constitutional debates surrounding it, the advances of the CLPD and Labour's return to opposition created an election of vastly different character to the previous election. This warrants a second analysis.

Composition of the Parliamentary Labour Party Membership 1980

Region

L: London
S: South of England
N: North of England
WM: West Midlands
EM: East Midlands
Sc: Scotland
W: Wales

Ideological Classifications

Ind: Independent
Man: Manifesto Group
Tri: Tribune Group
Uni: Unilateralist
Mult: Multilateralist
Pro: Pro Common Market
Anti: Anti Common Market.

Name	A	S	R	Constituency	Maj.	Union	Grp	Nuc.	EEC	Yrs
Abse, Leo	63	M	W	Pontypool, Monmothshire	17368	None	Ind.	Uni.	Pro.	22
Adams, Allen	34	M	Sc	Paisley	13755	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Allaun, Frank	67	M	N	Salford East	5856	NUJ	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	25
Anderson, Donald	41	M	W	Swansea East	21220	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Archer, Peter	54	M	WM	Warley West	10051	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Armstrong, Ernest	65	M	N	Durham North West	15280	NUGMW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Ashley, Jack	58	M	WM	Stoke on Trent South	14246	NUGMW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Ashton, Joseph	47	M	EM	Notts. Bassetlaw	7179	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	12
Atkinson, Norman	57	M	L	Haringey, Tottenham	7133	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Bagier, Gordon	56	M	N	Sunderland South	8401	NUR	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Barnett, Joel	57	M	N	Heywood & Royton	2287	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Barnett, Guy	52	M	L	Greenwich	6842	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	9
Benn, Tony	55	M	S	Bristol South East	1890	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	17
Bennett, Andrew	41	M	N	Stockport North	333	NUT	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Bidwell, Sydney	63	M	L	Ealing Southall	11278	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Booth, Albert	52	M	N	Barrow-in-Furness	7741	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Boothroyd, Betty	51	F	WM	West Bromwich	9468	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	7
Bottomley, Arthur	73	M	N	Teeside	11409	NUPE	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	18
Bradley, Thomas	54	M	EM	Leicester East	2856	TSSA	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	18
Bray, Jeremy	50	M	Sc	Motherwell & Wishaw	10937	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Brown, Hugh	61	M	Sc	Glasgow Provan	18844	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Brown, Robert	59	M	N	Newcastle-upon-Tyne West	11236	NUGMW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Brown, Ronald	40	M	Sc	Leith	4017	AUEW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Brown, Ronald W	58	M	L	Hackney South & Shoreditch	6704	AUEW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Buchan, Norman	58	M	Sc	Renfrewshire West	8572	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Callaghan, L. James	68	M	W	Cardiff South East	8701	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	35
Callaghan, James	53	M	N	Middleton & Prestwich	1098	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Campbell, Ian	54	M	Sc	Dunbartonshire West	6457	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Canavan, Dennis	38	M	Sc	West Stirlingshire	10356	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Campbell-Savours D	37	M	N	Workington	5756	TGWU	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Cant, Robert	65	M	WM	Stoke on Trent Central	12603	None	Man.	Uni.	Pro.	14

Carmichael, Neil	59	M	Sc	Glasgow Kelvingrove	4759	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	19
Carter-Jones, Lewis	60	M	N	Eccles	8059	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Cartwright, John	47	M	L	Greenwich Woolwich East	10460	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Clark, David	41	M	N	South Shields	13124	NUPE	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	1
Cocks, Michael	51	M	S	Bristol South	11183	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Cohen, Stanley	53	M	N	Leeds South East	9372	TSSA	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Coleman, Donald	55	M	W	Glamorganshire, Neath	18616	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Concannon, John	50	M	EM	Nottinghamshire Mansfield	11331	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	14
Conlan, Bernard	57	M	N	Gateshead East	14698	AEU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Cook, Robin	34	M	Sc	Edinburgh Central	4661	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Cowans, Harry	48	M	N	Newcastle Upon Tyne Central	7413	NUR	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	1
Cox, Thomas	50	M	L	Wandsworth Tooting	5200	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Cunliffe, Lawrence	51	M	Sc	Leigh	9023	NUM	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Craigen, Jim	42	M	Sc	Glasgow Maryhill	17496	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Crawshaw, Richard	63	M	N	Liverpool Toxteth	6143	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Crowther, Stanley	55	M	N	Rotherham	13435	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Cryer, Robert	46	M	N	Keighley	78	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Cunningham, G	49	M	L	Islington Sth & Finsbury	4344	None	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	10
Cunningham, J	51	M	N	Whitehaven	5455	GMWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Dalyell, Tam	48	M	Sc	West Lothian	20082	None	Man.	Uni.	Pro.	18
Davidson, Arthur	52	M	N	Accrington	3294	GMWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Davies, Denzil	42	M	W	Llanelli	19945	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Davies, Ifor	70	M	W	Gower	10641	APEX	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Davis, Stanley	52	M	L	Hackney Central	8788	None	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	10
Davis, Terry	42	M	WM	Birmingham Stechford	1649	None	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	1
Deakins, Eric	48	M	L	Waltham Forest	4403	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Dean, Joseph	57	M	N	Leeds West	9664	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Dempsey, James	63	M	Sc	Coatbridge & Airdrie	15156	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	35
Dewar, Donald	43	M	Sc	Glasgow Garscadden	15198	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Dixon, Don	51	M	N	Jarrow	11528	GMWU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Dobson, Frank	40	M	L	Holborn & St Pancras Sth.	2323	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	1
Dormand, John	61	M	N	Durham Easington	17556	NUT	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Douglas, Richard	48	M	Sc	Dunfermline	7313	None	Ind.	Uni.	Pro.	1
Douglas-Mann, B	53	M	L	Merton Mitcham & Morden	618	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Dubs, Alfred	48	M	L	Battersea South	332	None	Ind.	Uni.	Pro.	1
Duffy, Patrick	60	M	N	Sheffield Attercliffe	18103	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Dunn, James	54	M	N	Liverpool Kirkdale	7709	TGWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Dunnett, Jack	58	M	EM	Nottingham East	3234	NUGMW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Dunwoody, Gwenth	50	F	N	Crewe	4237	NUR	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Eadie, Alexander	59	M	Sc	Midlothian	16936	NUM	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Eastham, Kenneth	53	M	N	Manchester Blackley	4504	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Edwards, Robert	74	M	WM	Wolverhampton South East	7901	TGWU	Ind.	Uni.	Pro.	6
Ellis, Raymond	57	M	EM	North East Derbyshire	5329	NUM	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Ellis, Robert	56	M	W	Denbighshire Wrexham	12149	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	10

English, Michael	50	M	EM	Nottingham West	2500	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Ennals, David	58	M	N	Norwich North	5591	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Evans, Ioan	53	M	W	Aberdare	20263	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Evans, John	50	M	N	Newton	11341	AUEW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Ewing, Harry	49	M	Sc	Stirling Falkirk & Grangemouth	15618	AUEW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	9
Faulds, Andrew	57	M	WM	Warley East	5097	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Field, Frank	38	M	N	Birkenhead	5909	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Fitch, Alan E	65	M	N	Wigan	12995	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Flannery, Martin	62	M	N	Sheffield Hillsborough	8350	NUT	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Fletcher, Edward	69	M	N	Darlington	1052	AEU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Fletcher, Leopold	59	M	EM	Derbyshire Ilkeston	8600	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Foot, Michael	67	M	W	Gwent Ebbw Vale	16091	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	20
Ford, Benjamin	55	M	N	Bradford North	7521	AEU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Forrester, John	56	M	WM	Stoke-on-Trent North	12424	NUT	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Foster, Derek	43	M	N	Bishop Auckland	6040	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Foulkes, George	38	M	Sc	South Ayrshire	1521	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Fraser, John	46	M	L	Lambeth Norwood	1940	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Freeson, Reginald	54	M	L	Brent East	6343	NUJ	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	16
Garrett, John	49	M	N	Norwich South	1198	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Garrett, William	60	M	N	Wallsend	16519	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	16
George, Bruce	38	M	N	Walsall South	1588	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Gilbert, John	53	M	WM	Dudley East	7687	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Ginsburg, David	59	M	N	Dewsbury	4381	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Golding, John	49	M	WM	Newcastle under Lyme	4228	POEU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	11
Gourlay, Harry	64	M	Sc	Kirkcaldy	13063	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Graham, Edward	55	M	L	Enfield Edmonton	1980	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Grant, George	56	M	N	Northumberland Morpeth	11831	NUM	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Grant, John	48	M	L	Islington Central	4139	ETU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Hamilton, James	62	M	Sc	Lanarkshire Bothwell	15217	CEU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Hamilton, William	63	M	Sc	Fife Central	18022	NUT	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	30
Hardy, Peter	49	M	N	West Riding Rother Valley	26002	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Harrison, Walter	59	M	N	Wakefield	7553	ETU	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	16
Hart, Judith	56	F	Sc	Lanark	5139	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	21
Hattersley, Roy	48	M	WM	Birmingham Sparkbrook	8319	ASTMS	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Haynes, Frank	54	M	EM	Ashfield	7797	NUM	Ind.	Uni.	Pro.	1
Healey, Denis	63	M	N	Leeds East	10536	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	28
Heffer, Eric	58	M	N	Liverpool Walton	7558	ASW	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Hogg, Norman	42	M	Sc	East Dunbartonshire	2324	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Holland, Stuart	40	M	L	Lambeth Vauxhall	4700	ASTMS	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Home Robertson, J	32	M	Sc	Berwick & East Lothian	1673	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Homewood, W	60	M	EM	Kettering	1478	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Hooley, Frank	57	M	N	Sheffield Heeley	4773	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Horam, John	41	M	N	Gateshead West	8312	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Howell, Denis	57	M	WM	Birmingham Small Heath	11467	APEX	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	19

Hudson Davies, G	51	M	W	Caerphilly	18497	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Huckfield, Leslie	38	M	WM	Nuneaton	7688	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	13
Hughes, Robert	48	M	Sc	Aberdeen North	19114	AEF	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Hughes, Roy	55	M	W	Newport	9177	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Hughes, William	48	M	N	Durham	11237	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Janner, Grenville	52	M	EM	Leicester West	8838	NUJ	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Jay, Douglas	73	M	L	Wandsworth Battersea Nth	6476	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	34
John, Brynmor	46	M	W	Glamorganshire Pontypridd	15687	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Johnson, James	72	M	N	Kingston Upon Hull West	8158	NUGMW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Johnson, Walter	63	M	EM	Derby South	6092	TSSA	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Jones, Daniel	72	M	N	Burnley	6110	AUEW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Jones, Barry	42	M	W	Flintshire East Flint	6273	NUT	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Jones, Alec	56	M	W	Rhondda	31481	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	13
Kaufman, Gerald	50	M	N	Manchester Ardwick	7272	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Kerr, Russell	59	M	L	Hounslow, Feltham & Heston	4105	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Kilroy-Silk, Robert	38	M	N	Ormskirk	858	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Kinnock, Neil	38	M	W	Monmouthshire Bedwellty	20436	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Lambie, David	55	M	Sc	Ayrshire Central	11704	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Lamborn, Harry	65	M	L	Southwark Peckham	10811	USDAW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Lamond, James	52	M	N	Oldham East	4632	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Leadbitter, Ted	61	M	N	Hartlepool	8162	NUPE	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Leighton, Ronald	50	M	L	Newham North East	10040	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	1
Lestor, Joan	50	F	S	Eton & Slough	1340	GMWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Lewis, Arthur	63	M	L	Newham North West	10455	NUGMW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	35
Lewis, Ronald	71	M	N	Carlisle	4566	NUR	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Litherland, Robert	50	M	N	Manchester Central	5992	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Lofthouse, Geoffrey	55	M	N	Pontefract & Castleford	19901	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Lyon, Alexander	49	M	N	York	1250	None	Ind.	Uni.	Pro.	14
Lyons, Edward	54	M	N	Bradford West	7755	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Mabon, Dickson	55	M	Sc	Greenock & Port Glasgow	11282	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	25
McCartney, Hugh	60	M	Sc	Dunbartonshire Central	12003	NGWU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
McDonald, Oonagh	42	F	S	Thurrock	6419	ASTMS	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	4
McElhone, Frank	51	M	Sc	Glasgow Queens Park	9478	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	11
McGuire, Michael	54	M	N	Lancashire Ince	14336	NUM	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
McKay, Allen	53	M	N	Yorks. W. Riding, Penistone	9701	NUM	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
McKelvey, William	46	M	Sc	Kilmarnock	11467	AUEW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
McMahon, Andrew	60	M	Sc	Glasgow Govan	8488	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
McNally, Tom	37	M	N	Stockport South	1125	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	1
McNamara, Kevin	46	M	N	Kingston upon Hull Central	7593	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	14
McTaggart, Robert	35	M	Sc	Glasgow Central	2780	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
McWilliam, John	39	M	N	Blaydon	8509	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Mackenzie, James	53	M	Sc	Lanarkshire Rutherglen	8023	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Maclennan, Robert	44	M	Sc	Caithness & Sutherland	2539	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Martin, Michael	35	M	Sc	Glasgow Springburn	12771	NUPE	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1

Magee, Bryan	50	M	L	Waltham Forest Leyton	4403	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Marks, Kenneth	60	M	N	Manchester Gorton	6284	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	13
Marshall, Edmund	40	M	N	Goole	11251	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	9
Marshall, David	39	M	Sc	Glasgow Shettleston	9161	TGWU	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Marshall, James	39	M	EM	Leicester South	1998	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Mason, Roy	56	M	N	Barnsley	22622	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	27
Maxton, John	44	M	Sc	Glasgow Cathcart	1600	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Maynard, Joan	59	F	N	Sheffield Brightside	17693	NUAAW	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Meacher, Michael	41	M	N	Oldham West	5777	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Mellish, Robert	67	M	L	Bermondsey Southwark	11756	TGWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	34
Mikardo, Ian	72	M	L	Twr Hamlets, Bethnal Gn, Bow	7554	ASTMS	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	35
Millan, Bruce	53	M	Sc	Glasgow Craigton	10472	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Miller, Maurice	60	M	Sc	East Kilbride	14273	MPU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Mitchell, Austin	46	M	N	Grimsby	6241	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Mitchell, Richard	53	M	S	Southampton Itchen	1602	NUT	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	9
Morris, Alfred	52	M	N	Manchester Wythenshawe	12113	NUGMW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Morris, Charles	54	M	N	Manchester Openshaw	7144	UPOW	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	17
Morris, John	49	M	W	Aberavon	18973	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Morton, George	40	M	N	Manchester Moss Side	4531	Mus. Union	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Moyle, Roland	52	M	L	Lewisham East	1593	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Mulley, Frederick	62	M	N	Sheffield Park	20324	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	30
Newens, Arthur Stan	50	M	L	Harlow	1392	NUT	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Oakes, Gordon	49	M	N	Lancashire Widnes	10281	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	9
O'Halloran, Michael	52	M	L	Islington North	4456	TGWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	11
O'Neill, Martin	35	M	Sc	Clackmannan & E Stirlingshire	984	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Ogden, Eric	57	M	N	Liverpool West Derby	8220	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Orme, Stanley	57	M	N	Salford West	7254	AEU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Owen, David	42	M	S	Plymouth Devonport	1001	ASTMS	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	14
Palmer, Arthur	68	M	S	Bristol North East	5652	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Park, George	66	M	WM	Coventry North East	10523	AUEW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Parker, John	74	M	L	Dagenham Barking	10107	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	45
Parry, Robert	47	M	N	Liverpool Scotland Exchange	11656	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Pavitt, Laurence	66	M	L	Brent South	11616	MPU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	21
Pendry, Tom	46	M	N	Stalybridge & Hyde	6580	NUPE	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Powell, Raymond	52	M	W	Ogmore	16087	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Prescott, John	42	M	N	Kingston Upon Hull	23692	NUS	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Price, Christopher	48	M	L	Lewisham West	1050	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Race, Denys	33	M	L	Haringey Wood Green	2515	NUPE	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Radice, Giles	44	M	N	Durham Chester le Street	22560	GMWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	7
Rees, Merlyn	60	M	N	Leeds South	14330	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	17
Richardson, Jo	57	F	L	Barking	7008	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Roberts, Albert	72	M	N	Normanton	12193	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	29
Roberts, Allan	37	M	N	Bootle	15159	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Roberts, Ernie	68	M	L	Hackney N & Stoke Newington	5221	AUEW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1

Roberts, Gwilym	52	M	WM	Cannock	7346	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Robertson, George	40	M	Sc	Lanarkshire Hamilton	14799	GMWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Robinson, Geoffrey	41	M	WM	Coventry North West	3971	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	4
Rodgers, William	52	M	N	Teeside Stockton	11127	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	18
Rooker, Jeffrey	39	M	WM	Birmingham Perry Bar	491	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Roper, John	45	M	N	Farnworth, Lancashire	8107	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Ross, Ernest	38	M	Sc	Dundee West	10457	AUEW	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Rowlands, Edward	40	M	W	Merthyr-Tydfil	17960	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	8
Ryman, John	49	M	N	Blyth	7060	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Sandelson, Neville	57	M	L	Hillingdon, Hayes, Harlington	3302	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	9
Sever, Eric	37	M	WM	Birmingham Ladywood	7759	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Sheerman, Barry	40	M	N	Huddersfield East	3095	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Sheldon, Robert	57	M	N	Ashton Under Lyne	8379	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Shore, Peter	56	M	L	Twr Hamlets, Stepney, Poplar	13015	TGWU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Short, Renee	61	M	WM	Wolverhampton North East	6060	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Silkin, John	57	M	L	Lewisham Deptford	7753	TGWU	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	17
Silkin, Samuel	62	M	L	Southwark Dulwich	122	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Silverman, Julius	75	M	WM	Birmingham Erdington	680	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	25
Skinner, Dennis	48	M	EM	Bolsover	17379	NUM	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Smith, John	42	M	Sc	Lanarkshire North	10820	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Snape, Peter	38	M	WM	West Bromwich East	1971	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Soley, Clive	41	M	L	Hammersmith North	3506	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Spearing, Nigel	50	M	L	Newham South	12773	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Spriggs, Leslie	70	M	N	St Helens	15555	NUR	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	22
Stallard, Albert	59	M	L	Camden, St Pancras North	5446	AUEW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Stoddart, David	54	M	S	Swindon	5899	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Stott, Roger	37	M	N	Lancashire Westhoughton	5287	POEU	Man.	Uni.	Anti.	7
Strang, Gavin	37	M	Sc	Edinburgh East	8817	None	Tri.	Uni.	Pro.	10
Straw, Jack	34	M	N	Blackburn	5490	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Summerskill, Shirley	49	F	N	Halifax	1234	MPU	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Taylor, Ann	33	F	N	Bolton West	600	None	Man.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Thomas, Jeffrey	47	M	W	Monmouth Abertillery	17085	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Thomas, Mike	36	M	N	Newcastle-upon-Tyne East	6170	USDAW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Thomas, Roger	55	M	W	Carmarthen	1978	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Thorne, Stanley	62	M	N	Preston South	621	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	6
Tilley, John	39	M	L	Lambeth Central	5976	TGWU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Tinn, James	58	M	N	Teeside Redcar	8053	NUT	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Torney, Thomas	65	M	N	Bradford South	4318	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	10
Urwin, Thomas	68	M	N	Durham Houghton le Spring	21076	AUBTW	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Varley, Eric	48	M	EM	Chesterfield	13604	NUM	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	16
Wainwright, Edwin	72	M	N	Dearne Valley West Riding	22735	NUM	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	21
Walker, Harold	53	M	N	Doncaster	2976	AEU	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Watkins, David	55	M	N	Durham Consett	15867	AEUW	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	14
Weetch, Kenneth	47	M	S	Ipswich	3741	None	Man.	Multi.	Anti.	6

Wellbeloved, James	54	M	L	Bexley, Erith & Crayford	2733	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	15
Welsh, Michael	54	M	N	Don Valley	17360	NUM	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	1
White, Frank	41	M	N	Bury & Radcliffe	38	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6
White, James	58	M	Sc	Glasgow Pollok	8492	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Whitehead, Phillip	43	M	N	Derby North	214	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	10
Whitlock, William	62	M	EM	Nottingham North	3072	USDAW	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	25
Willey, Fred	70	M	N	Sunderland North	12902	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	30
Williams, Alan	50	M	W	Swansea West	401	NUT	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	16
Williams, William	65	M	N	Warrington	10274	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	19
Wilson, Harold	64	M	N	Lancashire Huyton	7510	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	35
Wilson, William	67	M	WM	Coventry South East	7486	None	Tri.	Uni.	Anti.	16
Winnick, David	47	M	WM	Walsall North	5866	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	1
Woodall, Alec	62	M	N	Hemsworth	26043	None	Ind.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Woolmer, Kenneth	40	M	N	Batley & Morley	5352	None	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	1
Wright, Sheila	55	F	WM	Birmingham Handsworth	3209	None	Ind.	Multi.	Anti.	1
Wrigglesworth, Ian	51	M	N	Teeside Thornaby	5524	NUT	Man.	Multi.	Pro.	6
Young, David	50	M	N	Bolton East	1852	None	Ind.	Uni.	Anti.	6

Third Ballot Votes for Michael Foot (130)

Abse, Leo
Adams, Allen
Allaun, Frank
Atkinson, Norman
Barnett, Guy
Benn, Tony
Bennett, Andrew
Bidwell, Sydney
Booth, Albert
Brown, Ronald
Buchan, Norman
Callaghan, James
Canavan, Dennis
Carmichael, Neil
Carter-Jones, Lewis
Campbell, Ian
Campbell-Savours, D
Cant, Robert
Cook, Robin
Conlan, Bernard
Cox, Thomas
Cowans, Harry
Craigen, Jim
Cryer, Robert
Crowther, Stanley
Cunliffe, Lawrence
Dalyell, Tam
Davidson, Arthur
Davies, Denzil
Deakins, Eric
Dean, Joseph
Dempsey, James
Dixon, Don
Dobson, Frank
Dormand, John
Dubs, Alfred
Dunwoody, Gwenth
Eadie, Alexander
Eastham, Kenneth
Edwards, Robert
Ellis, Raymond
Ellis, Robert
English, Michael
Evans, Ioan
Evans, John
Ewing, Harry
Flannery, Martin
Fletcher, Edward
Fletcher, Leopold
Foot, Michael
Foster, Derek
Forrester, John
Fraser, John
Garrett, John
Garrett, William
Gilbert, John
Hamilton, James
Hart, Judith
Hardy, Peter
Haynes, Frank
Heffer, Eric
Holland, Stuart
Hooley, Frank
Huckfield, Leslie
Hughes, Robert
Hughes, Roy
Hughes, William
Jones, Alec
Kerr, Russell
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Kinnock, Neil
Lambie, David
Lamond, James
Leadbitter, Ted
Lestor, Joan
Lewis, Arthur
Lewis, Ronald
Litherland, Robert
Lyon, Alexander
McCartney, Hugh
McDonald, Oonagh
McElhone, Frank
McGuire, Michael
McKey, Allen
McNamara, Kevin
Mackenzie, James
Marshall, David
Marshall, Edmund
Marshall, James
Martin, Michael
Maxton, John
Maynard, Joan
Meacher, Michael
Mikardo, Ian
Miller, Maurice
Morris, Alfred
Morris, Charles
Newens, Arthur Stan
Orme, Stanley
O'Neill, Martin
Parry, Robert
Prescott, John
Price, Christopher
Race, Denys
Richardson, Jo
Roberts, Allan
Roberts, Gwilym
Rooker, Jeffrey
Ross, Ernest
Ryman, John
Sandelson, Neville

Sheerman, Barry
Shore, Peter
Short, Renee
Silkin, John
Silverman, Julius
Skinner, Dennis
Spearing, Nigel
Spriggs, Leslie
Stoddart, David
Strang, Gavin
Straw, Jack
Thorne, Stanley
Thomas, Jeffrey
Torney, Thomas
Watkins, David
White, Frank
Wilson, Harold
Wilson, William
Winnick, David

Third Ballot Votes for Denis Healey (119)

Anderson, Donald
Archer, Peter
Armstrong, Ernest
Ashley, Jack
Ashton, Joseph
Barnett, Joel
Boothroyd, Betty
Bottomley, Arthur
Bradley, Thomas
Bray, Jeremy
Brown, Ronald W
Callaghan, L. James
Cartwright, John
Clark, David
Cocks, Michael
Cohen, Stanley
Coleman, Donald
Concannon, John
Crawshaw, Richard
Cunningham, G
Cunningham, J
Davies, Ifor
Davis, Stanley
Davis, Terry
Dewar, Donald
Douglas-Mann, B
Duffy, Patrick
Dunn, James
Dunnett, Jack
Ennals, David
Faulds, Andrew
Field, Frank
Fitch, Alan E
Ford, Benjamin
Foulkes, George
Freeson, Reginald
George, Bruce
Ginsburg, David
Golding, John
Gourlay, Harry
Graham, Edward
Grant, John
Hamilton, William
Harrison,Walter
Hattersley, Roy
Healey, Denis
Horam, John
Home Robertson, J
Howell, Denis
Hudson Davies, G
Janner, Grenville
Jay, Douglas
John, Brynmor
Johnson, James
Johnson, Walter
Jones, Daniel
Jones, Barry
Kaufman, Gerald
Lamborn, Harry
Leighton, Ronald
Lofthouse, G
Lyons, Edward
Mabon, Dickson
McKelvey, William
McNally, Tom
Maclennan, Robert
Magee, Bryan
Marks, Kenneth
Mason, Roy
Mellish, Robert
Millan, Bruce
Mitchell, Austin
Mitchell, Richard
Morris, John
Morton, George
Moyle, Roland
Mulley, Frederick
Oakes, Gordon
Ogden, Eric
O'Halloran, Michael
Owen, David
Palmer, Arthur
Park, George
Parker, John
Pavitt, Laurence
Pendry, Tom
Radice, Giles
Rees, Merlyn
Roberts, Albert
Robertson, George
Robinson, Geoffrey
Rodgers, William
Roper, John
Rowlands, Edward
Sever, Eric
Sheldon, Robert
Silkin, Samuel
Smith, John
Snape, Peter
Stott, Roger
Stallard, Albert
Summerskill, Shirley
Taylor, Ann
Thomas, Mike
Urwin, Thomas
Varley, Eric
Wainwright, Edwin
Walker, Harold
Weetch, Kenneth
Wellbeloved, James
White, James
Whitehead, Phillip
Whitlock, William
Willey, Fred
Williams, Alan
Woodall, Alec
Woolmer, Kenneth
Wrigglesworth, Ian
Young, David

Unknown Voting (19)

Bagier, Gordon
Brown, Robert
Brown, Hugh
Douglas, Richard
Grant, George
Hogg, Norman
Homewood, W
McMahon, Andrew
McTaggart, Robert
McWilliams, John
Powell, Raymond
Roberts, Ernie
Soley, Clive
Thomas, Roger
Tilley, John
Tinn, James
Welsh, Michael
Williams, William
Wright, Sheila

Foot emerged victorious from the election campaign. It was a result that shifted the short term future of the Labour Party away from continued threats of constitutional reform from the outside left. With Foot as Party leader, Benn could no longer feel as comfortable as the most significant voice of the left, given Foot's popularity. Had Healey been victorious, then no such restraint would have existed, making a Benn challenge under the electoral college more likely. Such a challenge would not have favoured Healey, leading to an alternative history for the Labour Party, which would favour the new SDP.

Foot had secured 139 votes against Healey's 129 (Harris, 1984, p.143). Immediately after the announcement of the result Healey alienated his ideological supporters by announcing he would serve as Foot's deputy. For Owen, this was the moment when a breakaway party became an inevitability because Healey appeared unwilling to support his colleagues in voicing the social democratic opposition to *any* potential left-wing leader. Instead he appeared subservient and powerless (Owen, 1991, p.458). Despite Foot representing an ideal of left-wing philosophy that differed to that of Benn, Foot still supported policies which the social democrats were unable to accept. These policies were withdrawal from the Common Market, unilateral nuclear disarmament and a broad support for the alternative economic strategy. Despite Foot's character and relative 'soft left' nature when contrasted to that of the outside left, the small group of social democrat defectors began to make plans for an alternative platform on which to campaign. However, they made no official moves until after the Special Conference in January 1981.

It is now necessary to consider the composition of the vote in closer detail. By doing so, it becomes possible to understand from where Foot's electoral support base derived.

What were the group distributions for each candidate?

	Manifesto Group	Tribune Group	Independents
Foot	10	50	70
Healey	76	3	40

Assuming the orthodox view that Foot would be expected to secure the votes of all Tribune Group members, and Healey would be expected to secure the votes of all Manifesto Group members, then the data has demonstrated that Foot was able to subvert this assumption by securing the votes of 10 Manifesto Group members. In contrast, Healey was only able to secure the support of 3 Tribune Group members. This can be attributed to a selection of factors. These include the unique circumstances faced by the Labour Party at the time of the leadership vote,the potential for future defectors to vote for Foot in the hope of inflaming the disputes within the Party, and also Healey alienating potential voters by his hesitation to campaign to their expectations. It must also be noted that Foot was granted the endorsement of the majority of MP's who were independent of any ideological group.

Foot's vote was enhanced because the PLP chose the candidate most likely to prevent any future challenge that would potentially usher in a Bennite leadership. This fear, however was not the only issue which prevented the PLP from turning to Healey. It must be remembered that Healey's brash style of campaigning had alienated some social democrats. Healey's 'arrogance' of assumed votes pushed them away, forcing them to conclude that Healey had taken their support for granted. Healey *expected* their votes, and so saw no reason to spend vital time campaigning for them.

> John Cartwright, it is thought, was the MP who said flatly 'your answers have been very unsatisfactory'. There are an awful lot of us. Why should we vote for you?' And Healey answered bluntly 'You have nowhere else to go' (Pearce, 1997, p.230).

This arrogance also helped lay the foundations for a splintering of social democrats into a new party, thus undermining Labour future unity. It is an irony that it was Healey's direct actions, not Foot's, that led to the splintering within the Party for which Foot's election is often attributed.

Regardless of the voting behaviour of the Manifesto and Tribune Group members, the significance of the Independents must be considered. On this issue, Healey secured 40 votes whilst Foot secured 70. This is a significant endorsement for Foot from those of no ideological group membership. This illustrates further Healey's failure to secure the support of the broadly termed centrists. Foot was a known Tribunite, and a familiar commodity amongst his colleagues, whilst the Manifesto Group was a much younger group, with little pedigree within the PLP and so possessed limited familiarity to the Independents. The Independents clearly held the balance of power within the PLP, and so regardless of the ideological disputes between left and right, they selected a leader who they believed would be most likely to maintain the *status quo*. Pearce (1997) suggests that Healey may have, in fact have proven to be a more divisive force

> If Healey had been outspoken from the Labour right, would he have reconciled rather fraught people like Neville Sandelson and Tom Ellis who are thought to have voted for Foot to bring on the fever? One doubts it. Would he have scared off a larger number than that group of about five by heightening the panic of those already running scared? On balance, Healey had more to lose from the mice than the rats (Pearce, 1997, p.253).

Far from being the reconciler which the Labour Party found in Foot, Healey had the potential, Pearce argues, to aggravate further those irritated by the advances of the outside left. It must be remembered that unlike many of the social democrats within the Manifesto Group and the inside left within the Tribune Group, the Independents operate as a homogeneous group. Rather, they were a collection of individuals of differing priorities. Collectively their vote had the ability to sway the result.

> The main battle, however, was for the votes of MP's who had no strong political alignment, but were torn between their desire for a quiet life and their desire to at least hold their own seats at the next election (Healey, 1989, p.477).

Had Healey sought to make greater penetrations into this group rather than alienating his own potential voters, then his potential for success would have improved. Given these factors, it was Foot who they broadly turned to.

What was the multilateralist or unilateralist vote for each candidate?

	Unilateralist	Multilateralist.
Foot	105	25
Healey	14	105

The issue of nuclear disarmament was very close to Foot's political heart, and so his position *could* be expected to have affected the election result. Yet, given Foot's likely inability to enact his preference within the shadow cabinet, the issue possessed less relevance than either the Group membership or the Common Market issue. It should, however be included because of the importance to which Foot placed the issue. The PLP were aware that Foot, even as leader, would be highly unlikely to be given an opportunity or the support he needed to succeed in implementing a unilateralist policy at Parliamentary level. Indeed, the PLP had a larger number of multilateralist than unilateralist MP's,

thereby ensuring a unilateralist bill would be unlikely to pass through the Commons were it ever to be placed before them. Given this reduced practical political impact, the issue played only a symbolic role within the electoral processes. The symbolism of a unilateralist as the Labour leader did possess electoral impact and so must be considered in any analysis of Foot's political career. Foot's unilateralism was a declaration of political principle in favour of nuclear disarmament, contrasted with the social democrats and especially to Healey, highlighting a clear difference of view between the two candidates.

Foot's ability to attract the votes of 25 multilateralists demonstrates an improbable success for the unilateralist issue. Healey's ability to secure the votes of 14 unilateralists also demonstrates, yet in smaller figures, that the issue of nuclear disarmament possessed reduced impact upon members' voting decisions. Unilateralism was not, however, merely symbolic to Foot. Rather, he believed passionately in the issue as a committed unilateralist, and would express this position throughout his period as leader. This also ensured that during the leadership election, there was no issue of ambiguity and that those who voted for Foot were fully aware of his position on the issue. However, broadly speaking both candidates were able to secure the votes of the bulk of their ideological bedfellows. Given Heppell's approach appears to rely on ideological pigeon holes for each individual MP, the deviations illustrate the limitations of assuming a *one size fits all* mentality.

How was the Pro and Anti Common Market vote distributed for each candidate?

	Pro-Common Market	Anti-Common Market
Foot	29	101
Healey	93	26

Foot's long-standing view regarding the Common Market was one of British withdrawal, and he retained this position despite the decision of the electorate to remain members of the Common Market following the 1975 referendum (Heffernan, 2000, p.391). The potential perception for such a view disregarding the referendum did not prevent Foot attracting the votes of 29 pro Common Marketeers, whilst Healey secured the votes of 26 anti-Common Marketeers. Both figures represent a significant number of MP's who would have been expected to have voted for their opposing candidate. Pro-Common Marketeers were more secure in their position given the result of the recent referendum had been in their favour, reducing the chances of Foot succeeding in securing Britain's withdrawal from the Common Market. Had Foot pushed for and succeeded in gaining a second referendum, it is unlikely to have reversed the decision of the earlier result, thereby keeping Britain within the Common Market. With this in mind, the Party benefits of a Foot leadership outweighed the potential for Britain's relationship with the Common Market being changed. In addition, as with the nuclear issue, had Foot become Prime Minister, Cabinet and Parliamentary procedures would have ensured that Foot's position could not become a reality. Considering these issues, it can be argued that the issue of Britain withdrawing from the Common Market under a Foot Premiership possessed limited impact. Rather, the benefits of Foot's leadership to the cohesion of the Labour Party outweighed the issues of European integration and the debates concerning the virtues of Britain's membership. Electoralism and intra-party management diluted ideological determinism, therefore, in the choices made by individual MP's.

Did this affect the leadership result?

It can not be assumed that those MP's who voted for Callaghan also voted for his ideological successor. Broadly speaking, Foot attracted a comparable ideological support

base to those who voted for him in 1976. However, the same suggestion can not be made for Healey. Leo Abse, Ronald Brown, Ian Campbell, Tam Dalyell, John Fraser, James Hamilton, Peter Hardy, Neville Sandelson, and Harold Wilson had voted for Callaghan in 1976. However, in 1980 the context of the previous general election affected the voting behaviour of the PLP. Those who shifted position from the social democratic candidate to support Foot in the final ballot did so because they had the potential to affect the result by their combined action. Had they voted for Healey, Foot would not have become Labour leader. Healey emphasises this voting behaviour by arguing that his defeat was the result of *mavericks* voting for Foot rather than voting for him (Healey, 1989, p.478).

Yet Abse, Campbell, Fraser, Hamilton, and Wilson - the mavericks, as Healey called them - were not a member of any campaign group and so had the luxury of switching their vote. These MP's were a part of the vital centre ground which the candidates must appeal to in order to win the contest, and Foot was able to garner their support. As discussed in the previous chapter however, figures within the left had voted for Callaghan for what they believed to be the electoral benefit of the Party. However, this could not be said of Sandelson, who voted for Foot believing this would hasten a destructive side effect rather than act as a conciliatory influence upon the Party. Owen confirmed this tactic had been used, remarking that

> ...some on the right had deliberately abstained or even voted for Michael Foot in the belief that it was better to bring all the Party's problems to a head by electing Michael Foot (Owen, 1991, p.458).

The Manifesto Group was under ongoing pressure from within to make a stand against all advances of the left, yet felt alienated by Healey's complacency. The Group later provided key defectors to the SDP. These were individuals who Healey would have expected to have supported him in the leadership election.

Foot's election as leader needed the support of a significant number of centrist and social democratic MP's as well as supporters from the left. Most turned to Foot in order to offer him a positive endorsement to hold Labour together during the cataclysmic implosion of bitter ideological debates. With the outside left apparently in the ascendancy in the Party beyond Parliament, the PLP turned to Foot to guide the Party. Healey had shown himself to be a potentially de-stablising leader, who faced the threat of a leadership election by Benn in the new year. His earlier attitude also alienated his supporters more extensively than he initially comprehended. He had lost the emotional support of vital social democrats such as David Owen because he simply had not shown the will to fight (Owen, 1991, p.458). An illustration would be whilst Foot was happy to write an article for *The Guardian* attacking Thatcher's government, Healey declined to do likewise (Jones, 1994, p.452). Healey's brash style and unwillingness to "peddle bullshit" had contributed towards him making "quite a few" enemies (Pearce, 2002, p.538; BBC, 1995). Foot was also a candidate who represented an almost romantic era of Labour socialism; the era of Bevan, the intellectual rather than dogmatic left and ethical Parliamentary socialism (*New Statesman*, 2 April 1976, p.422; Harris, 1984, p.143). This appealed to those wishing to made a stand against the outside left. The rise of groups such as the CLPD had portrayed the left as constitutionalists with a zeal for power and revenge over the Parliamentary Party, whilst Foot was of the intellectual left who respected the vital role and sanctity of Parliament. The gradual rise of the outside left had also fostered a broad sense of detachment from the Labour Party by a small group of social democrats as illustrated by Jenkins' stirrings towards a new centrist Party. Jenkins had become disillusioned with the advances of the outside left over the course of the 1970s, arguing that "the disputes about who should elect the party leader and who should prepare the party manifesto raise wider questions

than can be solved by a simple defensive battle within the Labour Party" (Jenkins, 1982, p.25). The Jenkins lecture called for a re-assessment of the British political system, and whether proportional representation would produce a more realistic representation of voting intentions amongst the electorate. A further question concentrated on whether a small Labour Party constituency had the right to de-select the representative mandated by a majority of the electorate (*ibid*). Underpinning the mood amongst some social democrats was the belief "that the old Croslandite assumption that the purpose of social democracy was to increase the social wage[25] as rapidly as possible... had collapsed" within the Labour Party because of the outside left (Tracy, 1983, pp.40-41). As a result, remaining within the Labour Party became increasingly difficult for some social democrats.

Heppell's approach places ideological analysis at the centre of any analysis of MP's voting behaviour. However, given the inadequacy of this simple understanding of voting motivations, the following discussion introduces variables which Heppell's approach excludes. Despite the clear relevance of ideology, these other factors must also be included in order to produce a meaningful analysis of the vote.

1: What variations in MP's majorities were evident in the voting behaviour?

	(1): 2,000 or less	(2): 2,001-5,999	(3): 6,000-11,999	(4): 12,000+
Healey	17	25	51	26
Foot	20	28	46	36

Within the first field relating to the size of an MP's majority in the above table, Healey secured 46 per cent whilst Foot secured 54 per cent of the vote. This field represents MP's who can be characterised as being in the *ultra-marginal* seats, and are considered to be at

[25] *The social wage* is defined as additional benefits above and beyond an employees wage. These can include medical services, tax credits and free services such as education and social welfare.

a high risk of losing their seats. With the majority of these MP's favouring Foot, this demonstrates that they believed him most likely to be an electoral benefit to themselves given their potentially precarious electoral position. With MP's also relying upon the support of their CLPs to effectively operate and campaign during elections, it can be argued that MP's potentially voted for the candidate which constituency members, rather than they themselves as individuals, preferred to lead the Party. This being the case, MP's potentially acted as delegates for their CLPs, voting for either Healey or Foot respectively dependant upon local whims.

The second field relating to the size of an MP's majority continues to illustrate that Foot appears to be the preferred candidate of MP's with a potentially marginal majority. Whilst Foot enjoyed the support of 53 per cent, Healey found support amongst 47 per cent of MP's within this category. Within the third field of the majority table, the position shifted with Healey securing 52.5 per cent whilst Foot secured 47.5 per cent of the vote. This field represents MP's who can be characterised as being in the *marginal* seats, and are considered to be at moderate to minimal risk of losing their seats. The shift within this field towards Healey suggests that they felt he, rather than Foot, would be the leader most likely to secure their positions. This suggests that MP's within moderate risk of losing their seats felt that Foot may have been a greater electoral liability than Healey. MP's within this category potentially also enjoyed greater autonomy than those with a reduced majority given their safer position, and so potentially become less inclined to act as a constituency delegate.

Within the fourth field of the majority table, Healey secured 39 per cent whilst Foot secured 61 per cent of the vote. This field represents MP's who can be characterised as being in

the *safer* seats, and are not considered to be at risk of losing them. This field represents Healey's lowest support rating, whilst representing Foot's highest. This shift towards Foot suggests that those who are at a very limited chance of losing their seats favoured Foot. Without the risk of electoral challenge, the greater number of MP's in this field are less likely to pay as much attention to electoralism. They would be more inclined to select a leader who placed party interests ahead of electoral advancement.

These figures indicate a shift towards Foot in the marginal seats, towards Healey in the moderately marginal seats, and back to Foot in the safer seats. This is indicative of MP's belief that Healey was the leader most likely to appeal to MP's who are at moderate risk of losing their seats, whilst Foot is the preferred candidate of those with higher risk or safer seats. However, it must be noted that no single variable was all determining in relation to the voting behaviour of MP's. It was a complex combination of, for example the ideas, individual circumstances faced by each MP within their constituency, and also potential future re-election concerns which affected an MP's vote.

2: How many MP's with Union affiliations voted for Healey or Foot?

Healey	47
Foot	54

Foot secured the support of 53.5 per cent whilst Healey secured the support of 46.5 per cent of trade union MP's. Healey's role in the previous Labour government, which had culminated in the so called *winter of discontent,* had reduced Healey's potential support amongst the trade union movement and, importantly amongst the rank and file

membership within the CLPs. Given these had come under greater influence from the dictates of the outside left since the general election defeat, the MP's with trade union affiliations became less inclined to vote for the former Chancellor to be their new leader. Knowing the alienation and resentment which had grown between the former government and the trade unions following the demise of the Social Contract, the policies of income restraint and the fallout which occurred as a result, trade union MP's instead turned towards Foot. Foot had worked well with the unions following Labour's first electoral victory in 1974, and helped successfully resolve the ministers dispute. In the 1976 leadership election, Callaghan secured the vote of the majority (51.5 per cent) whilst Foot secured the minority (48.5 per cent) of trade union MP's. This shift towards Foot reflects both his ability to successfully work with the unions, as well as the dis-satisfaction with Healey following on from the period of industrial action which characterises the *winter of discontent*.

However, given the narrow nature of the vote split, the shift in support towards Foot should not be overstated. The difference of 6 per cent between the two candidates does not suggest a landslide endorsement. Indeed, given the trade unions disagreements with those on the inside left, such as Barbara Castle regarding *In Place of Strife* and the defence they received from Healey's political ally, Callaghan, it must be concluded that the support Foot received from the union affiliated MP's were as a result of the unique circumstances taking place within the Labour Party at the time, particularly relating to the constitutional reforms being pushed forward by the outside left.

3: How many MP's serving 15 years or shorter voted for Healey or Foot?	
Healey	73
Foot	97

4: How many MP's serving 16 years or longer voted for Healey or Foot?	
Healey	46
Foot	33

Healey attracted the support of 43 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 57 per cent of MP's with shorter length of service. In terms of determining the vote distribution amongst longer and shorter serving MP's, it is the shorter serving MP's who comprised the larger of the two groups. It is from the shorter serving MP's from where Foot's key support was derived, this suggesting that his support derived from less experienced members of the PLP. It is likely, as noted by Shaw (1988) that the earlier abolition of the proscribed list had enabled the "b-list of available Parliamentary candidates" to become Labour MP's by the time of Foot's election (Shaw, 1988, p.65). The so called "b-list" consisted of prospective and successful candidates during the 1970s who held outside left sympathies whose raison d'être was to oppose the social democratic dominance of the PLP. The implication being that the newer MP's possessed stronger left-wing sympathies, and so would be more inclined to vote for Foot over Healey.

In contrast, Healey attracted the support of 57 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 43 per cent of longer serving MP's. This suggests that the longer serving MP's felt that Healey rather than Foot would have the greater success in leading the Party. The implication also suggests that Foot's support from longer serving MP's was lower than

Healey's because their experience and potential careers within the PLP restrained their ability to break away from a traditional social democratic leadership in favour of Foot's inside left credentials. Having seen the development of the Labour Party over a longer time frame, their preference to remain with the *status quo* suggests an inert conservatism amongst some members of the PLP. With Foot deriving his support from shorter serving MP's whilst Healey gained his support from longer serving MP's, it must be concluded that the length of service of an MP affected the candidate to whom they gave support. Again, however it must be considered a contributory rather than decisive factor. Longer serving MP's tended towards more right-wing positions. In the north, Scotland and Wales they had been there for a long time before the outside leftist surge, and had origins within CLPs which had run local councils, therefore providing them with a less idealistic tendency towards political philosophy.

5: How many MP's representing Scottish seats voted for Healey or Foot?

Healey	13
Foot	27

6: How many MP's representing Welsh seats voted for Healey or Foot?

Healey	10
Foot	9

7: How many MP's representing English seats voted for Healey or Foot?

Healey	96
Foot	94

With Foot pioneering the legislation for devolution in the previous Parliament, the issue of Scottish representation must be considered when evaluating the anatomy of the vote.

Healey attracted the support of 32.5 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 67.5 per cent of MP's representing Scottish seats. This indicates a much greater support base for Foot from the Scottish nation, and carries with it an implication of support from Scottish Labour MP's for Foot's views regarding devolution. This, however assumes that the growing issue of devolution was a significant consideration for Scottish MP's, many of whom were also likely to be drawn from the inside left. Indeed, when taken in isolation, Foot attracted the support of 7 Scottish Tribune Group MP's whilst Healey attracted 0. Foot also attracted the support of 19 Scottish Independent MP's whilst Healey attracted the support of 4. Healey was only able to gain the support of the majority of Scottish Manifesto Group members, securing 9 MP's against Foot's 1. These figures demonstrate Foot's broad ideological appeal in Scotland remained consistently high amongst Tribune Group and, most importantly Independent MP's. When combined, this also indicates that Scotland was represented by more Manifesto Group MP's rather than Tribune Group MP's whilst the majority remained independent of *any* group, again demonstrating the dominance of the non-aligned vote. It is worth remembering that Foot had also gained greater support from Scottish MP's in the 1976[26] leadership election, and so posses a tendency to gravitate towards him regardless of devolution. However, Foot's support from Scottish MP's had increased from 57.5 per cent in 1976 (43 per cent nationally) to 67.5 per cent in 1980 (52 per cent nationally). These figures reveal that Foot's share of the vote increased by approximately the same in Scotland when compared to the national average. However, the additional percentage points towards a slight increase in his support base in Scotland. It must be remembered, however that his support in Scotland remained high in both leadership elections, and that his increase in support was in line with the trend throughout the rest of the United Kingdom.

[26] The Labour Party had increased its representation in Scotland at the 1979 general election.

Healey attracted the support of 52.6 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 47.4 per cent of MP's representing Welsh seats. This is a significant increase upon Foot's support from the 1976 leadership election, when he gained the support of only 32 per cent. Again, this increase of support for Foot implies a tacit support for his performance in government. The inverse can also be concluded regarding Healey's support, who reduced the percentage of support for the social democrats from 68 per cent in 1976 to 52.6 per cent in 1980. Although Healey was able to secure the greater number of votes from Welsh MP's, he had failed to retain the significant margin between Callaghan and Foot. This failure prevented Healey from gaining the support he needed in order to prevent Foot from becoming leader. Therefore this should be considered to be a successful swing towards Foot, although Healey's strong showing might suggest that Welsh MP's did not see Foot in national terms despite Ebbw Vale.

Foot's ideological vote in Wales derived mainly from Tribune and Independent MP's, having secured the support of 5 Tribune Group, 4 Independent and 1 Manifesto Group MP's. Healey was able to secure the support of 5 Manifesto Group, 4 Independent and 0 Tribune Group MP's. Broadly, therefore, both candidates produced a like-for-like result relating to the ideological group membership.

Healey attracted the support of 50.7 per cent whilst Foot attracted the support of 49.3 per cent of MP's representing English seats. Again, Foot increased his support by 4 per cent since the 1976 leadership election, however in the immediate term, this result represents a broadly even split in England between Healey and Foot. With England providing an even division between the two candidates, it must therefore be concluded that Foot's nationwide support and distribution of votes derived mainly from the votes of Scottish and Welsh

MP's, with Scotland providing the greater support for Foot in terms of percentages. Had the Scottish votes favoured Healey, then the balance of support would have tipped in his favour. However, the role of the English vote can not be discounted. Granted, it produced an even division between the two candidates, but the composition of the English vote is likely to reveal issues of regional variation which may impact upon the vote.

8: How many MP's representing Northern, Southern, East Midlands, West Midlands or London seats voted for Healey or Foot?

	Nth	Sth	EM	WM	L
Healey	51 (49%)	5 (55.5%)	8 (57%)	12 (52%)	20 (50%)
Foot	53 (51%)	4 (44.5%)	6 (43%)	11 (48%)	20 (50%)

The above figures reveal that, with the exception of the north of England, Healey was, in terms of percentages, the preferred choice of English MP's. Only in the north did Foot gain the greater support than Healey, and barely so. It must be noted, however that the north represents the heartlands of the English Labour vote. Northern MP's represented 104 of the above votes, whilst the combined vote of MP's from other regions represented 86 seats, and so it was the north where the balance of the English vote resided. With Foot securing the greater number of votes from the north, and combining his support from the Scottish and Welsh nations, it can be concluded that the national distribution of Foot's vote derived from MP's who represented seats outside of the middle England characteristic.

In England, Foot secured the support of 38 Tribune Group, 8 Manifesto Group, and 49 Independent MP's. Healey secured the support of 3 Tribune Group, 62 Manifesto Group and 30 Independent MP's. The Manifesto Group has stronger support in England than the

Tribune Group. The main strength of the groups can be found in the north, where the Tribune Group had 21 MP's whilst the Manifesto Group had 38. Both are subsequently overtaken by the 45 northern Independent MP's. Consequently, the main ideological strength in England alone favoured the social democrats rather than the inside left.

Throughout the rest of England, the divisions of ideological support for each candidate within the regions remained broadly in favour of the Manifesto Group. London, for example had 14 Manifesto Group MP's against 8 Tribune Group MP's. Both groups are dwarfed by the 18 Independent MP's. In terms of vote share in London, Foot secured the support of the 8 Tribune Group, 2 Manifesto Group, and 10 Independent MP's. Healey attracted the support of 12 Manifesto Group MP's, 0 Tribune Group MP's and 8 Independent MP's. Healey attracted the greater number of votes from his ideological support base, yet Foot secured the greater number of the vital Independent MP's. In this region, therefore, Healey had failed where Foot had succeeded in appealing beyond his ideological bedfellows towards the Independent MP.

The East Midlands had 3 Tribune Group MP's, 3 Manifesto Group, and 8 Independent MP's. Foot secured the vote of 2, whilst Healey attracted the vote of 1 of the Tribune Group MP's. Healey secured the support of the 3 Manifesto Group whilst both candidates each secured the support of 4 Independent MP's. When combined, Foot attracted the support of 6 whilst Healey attracted the support of 8 MP's from the East Midlands, with both appealing equally to the Independents.

The West Midlands had 6 Tribune Group MP's, 10 Manifesto Group MP's, and 7 Independent MP's. These figures reveal that the social democrats had a stronger hold over the West Midlands, greater than even the Independents. Therefore, this region could be assumed to be natural territory for Healey to do well in. Foot secured the support of 5 Tribune Group MP's, 2 Manifesto Group MP's and 4 Independent MP's. Healey secured the support of 1 Tribune Group MP, 8 Manifesto Group MP's, and 3 Independents. Again, Foot was securing the support of the larger number of Independent MP's whilst holding onto the majority of his ideological support base. Healey, in contrast was losing the support of the Independents and also the larger number of his ideological bedfellows. However, despite this, Healey was able to secure the support of the majority of MP's within the region. The analysis does demonstrate Foot's penetrations into support bases Healey should have expected to retain.

In the South, the Labour Party did not have a large number of MP's. However, of the number of MP's available, Foot secured the support of 3 Tribune Group MP's, 0 Manifesto Group MP's and 1 Independent. Healey secured the support of 0 Tribune Group MP's, 5 Manifesto Group MP's and 0 Independents. These reveal that Healey secured the greater support of southern MP's, however, given the majority of MP's were Manifesto Group members, this is is unsurprising. However, even here, Foot secured the penetration into the centre ground by gaining the support of the Independent MP whilst retaining his ideological vote.

These figures reveal that Foot's greatest numerical support base derived from the north amongst Independent MP's. In contrast, Healey's greatest support base derived from the north but amongst Manifesto Group MP's. This indicates that if group membership is to be

utilised as a broad weathervane of ideological positioning amongst MP's, then it must be concluded that the candidate attracting an ideological rather than pragmatic vote was Healey. The orthodox view that the Party had swung to the left must yield to the discovery that Foot was able to secure the support of the larger number of Independents. It must be noted, however, that the non-aligned MP's may have maintained their centre position but in an increasingly leftwards trend. This would suggest that the centre position shifted more towards a point where Foot would be able to make greater penetrations.

Why was Michael Foot elected leader of the Labour Party?

The conclusion of this analysis is that ideology is a significant factor when considering the composition of the Labour Party. However voting behavour can be affected by factors that go beyond it. Ideology is not mono causal in determining voting behaviour because political realities are not restricted to ideological or theoretical debates. Foot's election was achieved by his ability to appeal to members of the PLP who did not subscribe to his political ideology or necessarily sympathise with his philosophy. Rather it was his personal character and, most importantly the needs of the Party that made him a credible candidate. Previous Labour leaders tended to originate from a social democratic background because they were broadly considered to be more able to appeal to the majority of centrist and social democratic members. However, in the case of 1980, it was Foot, who had evolved progressively towards more mainstream positions during the 1970s and so was able to fulfill this necessity. Foot's election as leader continued the tradition of the successful candidate needing to appeal across the various traditions within the Party. The PLP voted for Foot in order for him to keep the coalition of inside left, social

democratic right and independent centrists together in the Party, a necessity which Healey and certainly Benn would have been less likely to achieve.

Foot's broad appeal and ultimate election as leader of the Labour Party derived from his progression towards more mainstream positions as a member of the Wilson and Callaghan governments. Foot's loyalty and evolution towards the mainstream made Foot's election less incredible. His election becomes understandable when the nature of the divisions within the Party and his personal evolution are considered. During the 1970's, Foot's loyalty enabled some of the social democrats to place greater trust in his abilities not to open the Party to the outside left. Equally, more left leaning MP's had longer standing loyalties to Foot because of his record of supporting their causes.

When combined with the concerns and aspirations of individual centrist members, each faction had less to fear from a Foot leadership than either a Healey or even a possible future Benn leadership. Healey's personal campaign failures had prevented him from gaining the emotional support of fellow social democrats. He also simultaneously presented the possibility of becoming a doorway to an unappealing successful Benn challenge shortly after his election. Such an outcome would have accelerated the growth of the SDP at the expense of the Labour Party. Given these factors, Foot became the clear choice at maintaining the Party as the broad coalition of left, right and centre views which had been its strength and appeal within postwar British Politics.

In addition, the tensions within the Party were such that they could only be navigated by a figure who was not clearly affiliated to either. Foot's record of consideration for his

colleagues views contrasted to those of Healey's clear social democratic loyalties and brutish approach, raising concerns about his ability to maintain the Labour coalition. Healey's potential failure to be a conciliatory leader increased the chances of Labour becoming an openly fractured Party, possibly even destructively so. The narrowness of Foot's victory indicates, however that many within the PLP remained loyal to Healey, who tended to focus on electoral success rather than maintaining the Party. Such considerations did not fully reflect the splintered nature of the Party at the time, and although a vote for Healey may have appeared more consistent with the needs of the Party under more conventional circumstances, the facts remain that the Party was facing an outside left determined to reform the Party towards its agenda. Effectively, the Party was not able to concern itself with conventional political activities whilst its fundamental raison d'être was being hotly debated. During the period, the Party had little choice than to consider its own future direction over that of conventional electoral issues. Foot was selected because of his political background, legitimate position within the Party, and his skills at being a standard bearer around whom more within the Party could rally.

The election of Foot reflected a need to address the debates which had been evolving within the Party during the previous decade in a conciliatory manner. These debates concerned the type of party Labour aimed to be and the type of socialism it wanted to represent. It had little option than to begin to address these debates and aim at maintaining its coalition of factions. Any of the other likely leaders available would have ultimately, though unwittingly led Labour to potential fragmentation. The extent to which Foot's election proved successful at preventing this fragmentation is evident in his legacy as leader.

5.2: Conclusion.

No single variable can explain the outcome of the vote. It can neither be attributed solely to ideology still less to any of the other factors considered. Rather, each factor discussed played a contributory role in understanding Foot's election, resulting in an eclectic mixture of motivations. Foot's success at securing the Labour leadership must also be seen as a result of the circumstances which the Labour Party were navigating. It must be remembered that had the Labour Party not engaged in a dispute over constitutional issues, then Healey would most likely have been the victor. However, that was not the case. The Labour Party *was* in the midst of a dispute, and so an alternative role for the leadership was necessary. Heppell's method has value as an approach, however, its usefulness is curtailed unless it permits the consideration of the political circumstances of when it is being applied. In the Conservative periods considered by Heppell, ideology made a more significant impact than in other periods even within that Party. The post-Thatcherite Conservative Party had become more prone to ideological concerns than during the pre-Thatcherite period. Equally, within the Labour Party, constitutional disputes and outside left infiltration led to circumstances likely to detract from concerns with mainstream electoral appeal.

The Labour Party became inwardly focused and potentially locked in a destructive ideological debate initiated by the outside left following the election defeat. These circumstances threatened the cohesive survival of Labour as a party capable of capturing the mainstream electorate. The evident threats were the outside left potentially transforming Labour into a radical socialist Party, and the flood of defections this would cause to the new SDP. Consequently, Foot's role as leader was to prevent these events from occurring and, in so doing, preserving the Party. It was a mission to which neither

Benn nor Healey were suited. Foot's broad appeal and record of loyalty in government was able to appeal to the majority within the Party and to hold it together. Granted, some social democrats splintered from the Party, but most remained within and aided Foot in his mission. As the defeated candidate, Healey acted as Foot's deputy whilst other social democrats continued to sit in his shadow cabinet. Therefore, Foot's election can not be seen as a high risk shift to the left, but rather as a healing and holding measure. It is also necessary to consider Foot's performance as leader in order to fully understand the justification for his election. It would be remiss of any analysis of Foot's election not to consider his subsequent success or failure, as well as his ability to be the conciliatory leader the Labour Party determined that it needed (*New Statesman*, 7 November 1980, p.2).

CHAPTER SIX
The Labour Leadership of Michael Foot

6.0: Introduction.

To determine whether Foot was a conciliatory leader, it is necessary to evaluate key episodes during his leadership from 1980 to 1983. When Foot assumed the leadership, the Party's poll rating increased to 50 per cent against the Conservatives 35 per cent (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1988, p.100). Thatcher's government was under pressure from high oil prices, taxation reforms such as the doubling of VAT, and increased prescription charges (Gamble, 1988, pp.98-99). Britain was enduring the early birth pangs of Thatcherism. Despite the promising showing for Labour its support declined. The figures below illustrate Labour benefitting from an unpopular Conservative government until the Falklands War restored a Conservative lead.

	1980				1981				1982				1983	
Quarter	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2
Conservative	39	39	37	35	32	30	28	27	31	43	43	42	42	43
Labour	45	45	47	50	41	38	36	28	32	29	30	34	30	27
SDP/Liberal Alliance	13	13	14	14	24	29	34	38	34	27	24	22	25	25

(Source: Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1988, p.100).

Foot's election as leader coincided with both a special conference to discuss the establishment of an electoral college to elect the Party leader, and, a subsequent challenge to his new deputy from the outside left's *personality*, Benn. Both these displays of disunity conspired against Foot's impressive initial opinion poll rating, setting Labour on course for electoral defeat. Any hope Labour had of victory at the polls had been jeopardised by these events and the electoral impact of the Falklands War was 'the final nail in the coffin'. It therefore must be concluded the 1983 election outcome was

determined well before the actual election date, and that the key events which brought it about were out of Foot's influence.

6.1: A Summary of the Splintering Social Democrats.

The first major challenge to Party unity Foot faced related to the reform of the leadership electoral system. The special conference, held in January 1981, was convened to resolve the issue. The question facing the conference was not *whether* an electoral college system should be used, but *how. The Times* argued that Foot preferred a formula of 25 per cent, 50 per cent, 25 per cent[27], with the PLP gaining the greatest voting block (Clark, 23 January 1981, p.5). The CLPD advocated 50 per cent, 25 per cent, 25 per cent in favour of the trade unions, whilst the NEC preferred the equal distribution of 33 per cent, 33 per cent, 33 per cent (Stark, 1996, p.55). The social democrats had attempted to argue for One Member One Vote as an alternative, however this suggestion did not impact significantly upon the conference, increasing the isolation of the future defectors to the SDP (Stark, 1996, p.54).

The CLPD gained the greatest support by switching their preferred option to 40 per cent, 30 per cent, 30 per cent (Kogan & Kogan, 1982, p.93). Kogan & Kogan (1982) quote Jon Lansman of the outside left as saying it

> won against the National Executive Committee, the Transport and General Workers Union, the Parliamentary Party, and Michael Foot (Kogan & Kogan, 1982, p.97).

The inside left and the social democrats had been defeated by the sheer determination and zeal of the outside left. This was the pinnacle of its power over the conference.

On the back of these debates, Labour's poll rating dropped almost ten points (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1988, p.100). Whilst the Conservatives were struggling with an economy in *"nosedive"*, the Labour Party were caught in an ruinous cataclysmic debate (Gamble, 1988, p.108). The electorate was, however, excluded from the debate and so appeared to be

[27] Trade union, Parliamentary Labour Party, Constituency Labour Party.

alienated from both parties, creating fertile ground for another party claiming to represent the centre of British politics.

At the conclusion of the special conference, Foot gave a speech arguing that it was in the interests of the Party that the ideological factions combine against the Conservatives (*The Times*, 26 January 1981, p.4). Foot argued "we must fight like men who have the enemy at their gates and at the same time like people working for eternity" (*ibid*). Foot failed to secure the formulae he preferred, yet he accepted the verdict of the conference and called upon others to do likewise. Some social democrats did not heed Foot's advice. Almost immediately after the conference, Foot begged Shirley Williams not to consider leaving (BBC, 1995). Foot attempted to reassure her that the Party would navigate the current problems and that her career would advance within it. However, following the special conference, the social democrats splintered and a small group formed the new SDP because of fundamental policy differences.

The Limehouse Declaration of 26th March 1981 was a forerunner for the formation of the Social Democratic Party (Owen, 1991, p.482). However, the divisions within the social democrats belied the unity the key defectors endeavoured to portray. Owen argues in *Time to Declare* that Jenkins wanted to create a new party as a route into the Liberal Party, making the SDP a bridge from Labour to the Liberal Party as its *raison d'être* (*ibid*, p.483). Also a significant number of social democrats remained within the weakened Labour Party such as Healey, Hattersley and Kaufman.

Foot survived the first quarter as Labour leader despite the splintering of the social democrats and the formula decided for the electoral college. The splintering social

democrats saw this as vindication of the view that Labour was disintegrating. By departing, the SDP weakened the remaining social democrats within the Labour Party, splintered the opposition to the Conservatives, and ensured that Labour appeared disunited. Despite this Labour remained ahead in the polls until the late summer of 1981, but for much of that year was shaken by an unwelcome deputy leadership challenge that again distracted the attention of the Party from challenging the Conservative government, plunging Labour's poll rating to the depths which set them on a course for certain electoral decimation.

6.2: A Summary of Tony Benn's Challenge for the Deputy Leadership.

Benn's destructive challenge for the deputy leadership increased the pressure upon Foot considerably. Benn's challenge embroiled Labour in a bitter dispute which they could ill afford. Coupled with the splintering of the social democrats, the outside left appeared to perpetuate the view that Labour had become divided beyond repair. The outside left campaigned for Benn by threatening pro-Healey MP's with deselection if they did not vote for Benn, heckling Healey as he attempted to make public speeches and as Foot remarks "belittle democracy itself" by reducing "the affairs of the Labour Party to the politics of the kindergarten" (Foot, 1986, p.123; Rosen, 2005, pp.426-427). As leader, Foot would need actively to differentiate his inside left views from those of outside left supporters by highlighting Benn's willingness to prolong the agony of the Party. Whilst the inside left served critically to support Labour, the outside left demonstrated its willingness to disregard the broader issues of Party unity in favour of advancing itself.

Foot emphasised the need for the Party to remain united, and that further discontent damaged Labours' future. Writing in *Loyalists and Loners*, Foot described how Benn pushed ahead for the deputy leadership "despite pleadings from almost every quarter" (Foot, 1986, p.123).

> Michael Foot reiterated his fear that month after month there would be mutual attacks in the Party, and said he had told the Shadow Cabinet this and he hoped there would be a speedy end to the discussion... Neil Kinnock said that Michael Foot had appealed to the Shadow Cabinet for a truce last week and that we now needed unity (Benn, 1994, p.112).

Foot characterised Benn as being "out to win, whatever happened" to the Party (Foot, 1986, pp.123-124). During the six months of hostile campaigning Labour's electoral chances were undermined as their poll ratings collapsed from 38 per cent to 28 per cent, where they

remained (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1988, p.100). Benn's challenge had placed Labour on course for certain defeat at the general election, and cemented the view that Foot's tenure as leader was a period of destructive divisions.

Benn was unable to challenge Foot directly because of Foot's popularity amongst the left. Because of this, Benn's only potential penetration into the Party leadership was to challenge Healey (Cronin, 2004, p.226). Supporters of Benn's challenge for the deputy leadership argued that the previous Labour leadership team had to be purged (*ibid*). Such a purging negates the fact that both Foot and Benn were key players in Callaghan's government, and that such an argument would preclude either Foot or Benn from the Labour leadership.

Foot firmly supported Healey as his deputy. Benn wrote in his diary that Foot described the challenge as "most inadvisable", and that Foot had asked him to delay the announcement of his candidature (Benn, 1994, p.114). Given the SDP had launched as an official political party only the previous day, Foot was extremely keen not to allow Benn to splinter Labour further, thereby potentially undermining Labour's core cohesion. Benn disregarded these pleas, and went ahead with the announcement in the early hours of the morning (BBC, 1995).

Supporters of Healey made their position known. The Solidarity Group, who were opposed to Foot's political philosophy, announced that they "deeply regretted Tony Benn's announcement" and that Benn's move was also "an attack on Michael Foot" as well as Healey (Hayter, 2005, p.137). Ironically, Benn had managed to unite some inside left groups with the social democrats in opposing his challenge. However, it must be noted that prior

to standing, Benn had joined the *Tribune Group* and had promptly split them over the legitimacy of his challenge (Foot, 1986, p.123). Foot argues that Tribune were "not quite so used to his methods as those of us who had seen him operate elsewhere" (*ibid*).

Irritated, Foot called upon Benn to challenge *him* for the Party leadership (Morgan, 2007, p.399). In reply to this, Benn issued a statement saying

> I voted for Michael Foot when he stood for the leadership of the Party against Denis Healey last November. I continue to support him in that role, and there is no question of my standing against him for the leadership (Benn, 1994, p.135).

Healey was the target because Benn believed he had a greater chance of victory over the social democrat. Healey described the campaign as "the busiest and least agreeable of my life" (Healey, 1989, p.481). He fought hard to deny Benn the victory he sought because

> ...if he had become Deputy Leader there would have been a haemorrhage of Labour defectors to the SDP both in Parliament and in the country (*ibid*).

Healey's comment illustrates the consequences of a Benn leadership and why Foot, as a non-militant inside left leader kept the majority of both ideological wings of the Labour Party together. Simply because of who he was and his reputation amongst some Labour activists, Benn became a *cult figure* within the Party despite taking pride in his denouncement of political personalities (Foot, 1986, p.121).

Healey saw standing up to Benn as vital to save Labour's dwindling support from intensifying. Benn's campaign team, organised mainly by the outside left Rank and File Mobilizing Committee, comprised of young militants who were subject to radical socialist influences (Morgan, 2007, p.399). This demonstrates a key aspect of a pro-Soviet stance adopted by some within the outside left, who were willing to subvert Parliamentary democracy. The Committee targeted Healey personally, seeking to destroy his position,

his career and reputation within the Party by jeering at and mocking his speeches (BBC, 1995).

On Sunday 27th September 1981, the ballot took place using the new electoral college at the conference in Brighton. Before the announcement of the result, Benn had been assured in various messages that he had won (Benn, 1994, p.154). The Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) had voted for Silkin in the first ballot, and sought to abstain during the second; however, some of the delegates on the conference floor defied this wish by voting for Benn (Healey, 1989, p.483). Healey (1989) argues that if the union had not voted in this way, then his majority would have been as high two and a half million. The final result of the ballot was 50.426 per cent for Healey and 49.547 per cent for Benn (Benn, 1994, p.154). Benn had failed in his attempt to unseat Healey, saving Foot from an outside left incursion into the Labour leadership and preventing a mass exodus of social democrats. The tide towards the outside left began to turn, but only after the electoral damage to Labour was done.

6.3: A Summary of the Conservative Ascendancy.

It is an oversimplification to assume the Labour Party lost the 1983 general election solely because of their internal divisions. Rather the surge of popularity enjoyed by the Conservatives also played a significant role in Labour's defeat. It is also worth remembering that SDP support "crept up on Labour as polling day approached", however the Conservative revival redressed the balance (Pelling, 1985, p.185). The internal divisions within the Labour Party provided Foot with a highly damaged electoral position from which to start. The Conservative Party had endured a tormented period of office, which in summer 1981 led to riots in Brixton, London and other major cities (Seldon & Collings, 2000, p.18). However in the closing years of the first term, the Conservatives enjoyed a significant increase in their polling support from 31 per cent to an average of 43 per cent (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1988, p.100). In contrast, Labour's poll rating had remained consistently low following Benn's divisive campaign for the deputy leadership.

The Conservative Party had been granted only a respectable mandate from the electorate in 1979. This acted as a constraint against any significant degree of ideological experimentation given their fear of defeat at the next general election. Consequently, the policies enacted by Thatcher's first government were not as economically liberal or socially conservative as they appeared to become following the 1983 victory. Thatcherism is a contested concept that does not completely represent the traditional Conservative Party. For much of the post-war period, the Conservatives worked within the loosely-termed post war consensus and maintained the social advances introduced by various Labour governments. However, Thatcherism emphasised a strong aspect of social conformity that revolved around traditional family values and law and order whilst simultaneously striving

for an economically liberal state (Evans & Taylor, 1996, p.231). These were key aspects of any elementary understanding of Thatcher's core political philosophy.

The Conservatives also emphasised a growing confidence in Britain as an independent state. Key alliances, such as with the United States, would be preserved. This included taking pride in the nation through patriotic loyalty, as illustrated by the surge of national pride unleashed throughout the country following the Falklands War. It is not necessary to consider the ideological arguments of Thatcherism or One Nation Conservatism in any greater depth at this point, however, the changes within the Conservatives failed to undermine their growing electoral success given the electoral alienation of the Labour Party.

Thatcher had to achieve her policies during the first term of office through compromise, negotiation and hard work (Evans, 1999, p.55). She had to prove that she was able to maintain both her and the Party's position. The government first attacked public expenditure, inflation and made cuts in the rate of income tax (Seldon & Collings, 2000, p.10). The Conservatives also combated the dominant role trade unions enjoyed in industrial relations via the 1980 Employment Act. Jim Prior, an economic wet, drew up the plans for immediate reforms because "the economic effects of union power were still painfully clear" (Thatcher, 1993, p.98). The effects were the increasing pay levels whilst a recession loomed (*ibid*). The trade unions, having undermined the Callaghan administration, now found themselves dealing with a much less sympathetic Conservative government.

The results of Conservative policies on the economy had resulted in a drop in manufacturing production by 16 per cent and had turned a falling unemployment level

when they assumed office to a sharp rising level, hitting two million in November 1980 (Seldon & Collings, 2000, p.14). The early Conservative government had, within a short space of time, appeared to be repeating Heath's mistakes. A key difference between the two, however, is that Thatcher did not retreat from the policies she sought to implement. Whilst Heath retreated to the decaying yet comfortable Keynesian economic theories, Thatcher continued with policies that she believed would provide an alternative to Keynes.

With critics within her cabinet calling for a Heath-style retreat, in January 1981 Thatcher asserted her authority over the cabinet by removing 'the wets'. Figures such as St. John Stevas, Francis Pym and John Nott were reshuffled out of important ministerial positions (Seldon & Collings, 2000, p.15). This was a significant moment as Thatcher assumed a position of dominance over her critics within cabinet (Gamble, 1988, p.110). Thatcher appeared to be a strong leader who attacked critics head on, whilst Foot tolerated his chief critics. Strength and authority were characteristics which the electorate expected in a Prime Minister whilst Foot was tolerant and compassionate.

Electorally, however, the Conservatives were trailing Labour in the opinion polls (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1988, p.100). Despite the trauma the Labour Party was putting itself through, the Conservatives were being blamed for the mass unemployment and growing civil discontent. It was a time when "recession was most sharply experienced in the old industrial areas" (Evans, 1999, p.60). Thatcher came under mounting pressure from the cabinet for a change of policy. However at the 1980 Conservative conference she famously attacked both her colleagues and outside critics saying

> ...to those waiting with bated breath for that favourite media catchphrase, the 'U-turn', I have only one thing to say. 'You turn if you want to. The lady's not for

> turning.' I say that not only to you, but to our friends overseas - and also to those who are not our friends (Thatcher, 1993, p.122).

The electorate were suffering the effects of monetarist Conservatism, whilst the Labour Party were too busy fighting its own battles to adequately fulfill their oppositional role. Despite the economic problems, however, the government's unpopularity was set to change.

In 1982 a *wartime mentality* acted as a reminder of the minor Victorian wars, creating a sense of patriotic fever (Pugh, 2004, p.353). Overstating the electoral role the war played in the re-election of the Conservatives and the defeat of Labour is a possibility. However its relevance can not be discounted. The Falklands War unified the political leaders in their condemnation of Argentina, however Foot reserved some criticism for the government. During a special debate held on Saturday 3rd April 1982, Foot attacked the government arguing that the islanders had been betrayed and that...

> ...the responsibility for the betrayal rests with the government. The government must now prove by deeds - they will never be able to do it by words - that they are not responsible for the betrayal and cannot be faced with that charge (Hansard, 1982, p.641.

In attacking the government for not taking sufficient actions to protect the islands, Foot was showing solidarity with the islanders against the invaders. He specifically attacked the government for withdrawing the HMS *Endurance* from the vicinity of the islands, which had been stationed there by Callaghan for protection. However the Defence Secretary was determined to deliver the cuts the cabinet demanded (Seldon & Collings, 2000, p.20; Morgan, 2007, p.410).

Concerning the effect the war had on the outcome of the election, Thatcher commented that

> ...it is no exaggeration to say that the outcome of the Falklands War transformed the British political scene... I could feel the impact of the victory where ever I went (Thatcher, 1993, p.264).

Clearly the *wartime mentality* had rallied a significant portion of the electorate behind keeping Thatcher as Prime Minister, as well as supporting the broader Conservative Party. Commenting on the position of the parties, Healey remarked that

> Gallup showed the Tories at 46.5 per cent, Labour at 27.5 per cent and the Alliance at 24 per cent. By August Michael Foot's popularity had shrunk to 15 per cent. The Tories kept their lead in the opinion polls. On May 12th 1983, after a tax-cutting budget, Gallup gave the Conservatives 49 per cent, Labour 31.5 per cent and the Alliance only 17.5 per cent. Mrs Thatcher dissolved Parliament and called a general election (Healey, 1989, p.484).

With the economy improving and a strong leader as Prime Minister, the Conservatives were electorally convincing. Contrasting the two parties, Foot appeared much less convincing as a potential Prime Minister. The Conservatives faced a Labour Party which had endured a period of sustained disunity. The electorate had seen how Thatcher would govern, and a sufficient portion decided that they wanted more, thus starting the dominance of the Conservatives over the 1980s.

6.4: A Summary of Labour's By-Election Performances.

There were sixteen by-elections during Foot's leadership. Each acted as a test of popularity for either Labour or the Social Democratic Party against the government. The SDP was keen to be seen as the future main opposition, whilst the Labour Party hoped to form the future government. However the aspiration of the SDP to overtake Labour quickly became unrealistic. As Drucker (1983) notes, the public arguments concerning the division of seats between themselves and their Liberal allies had taken the initial gloss from their high poll ratings: "while they had won Hillhead, their peak had passed. In November 1981, they were the most popular party in the country; by the summer of 1982 they had fallen to third behind Conservative and Labour" (Drucker, 1983 pp.71-72). The SDP, having gained initial support from disaffected Conservative voters, found themselves unable to capitalise upon this following the resurgence of the Conservatives following the Falklands war *(ibid).* This helped restore Labour to its position of main opposition, relegating the SDP to third place. The following illustrates the verdicts of each by-election throughout the Parliament, demonstrating that Labour remained a significant electoral force.

28

Constituency	Candidate	Party/Group	Date Held
Fermanagh & South Tyrone	Robert Sands	Anti H Block	April 9 1981
Warrington	Douglas Hoyle	Labour	July 16 1981
Fermanagh & South Tyrone	Owen Carron	Anti H Block	Aug. 20 1981
Croydon North West	William Pitt	SDP / Liberal Alliance	Oct. 22 1981
Crosby	Shirley Williams	SDP	Nov. 26 1981
Belfast South	Rev. Martin Smyth	Ulster Unionists	Mar. 4 1982
Glasgow Hillhead	Roy Jenkins	SDP	Mar. 25 1982
Beaconsfield	Timothy Smith	Conservative	May 27 1982
Mitcham and Morden	Angela Rumbold	Conservative	June 3 1982
Coatbridge & Airdire	Thomas Clark	Labour	June 24 1982
Gower	Gareth Wardell	Labour	Sept 16 1982
Birmingham Northfield	John Spellar	Labour	Oct. 28 1982
Peckham	Harriet Harman	Labour	Oct. 28 1982
Glasgow Queens Park	Helen McElhone	Labour	Dec. 2 1982
Bermondsey	Simon Hughes	SDP / Liberal Alliance	Feb. 24 1983
Darlington	Oswald O'Brien	Labour	Mar. 25 1983.

[28] (Thomas, 1981, p.1; Haviland, 1981, p.1; Thomas, 1981, p.2; Webster & Haviland, 1981, p.1, Ford, 1982, p.1; Haviland, 1982, p.1; Bevins, 1982, p.1; Haviland, 1982, p.1; The Times, 1982, p.2; Bevins, 1982, p.1; Bevins, 1982, p.1; Haviland, 1982, p.1; The Times, 1982, p2; Haviland, 1983, p.1; Faux, 1983, p.1).

Following on from the by-election Labour victory in Darlington in March 1983, Foot led the Labour Party into the general election. Although the Party were on a course for certain defeat, Foot seized upon the opportunity afforded to him by his position as leader of a major political party to express his inside left socialist views to the electorate. He sought to utilise the opportunity to debate unilateralism, given the issue was a central feature of his political ideology. However, given the nature of the forum, his debate included arguing with staunch political opponents both amongst the outside left, the Conservative Party, and social democrats inside and outside the Party.

As stated earlier, the by-elections can be used as an indicator of broad party support during the Parliament. Given the staunchly working-class, historical Labour-character of Warrington, the Conservatives could not be considered a serious contender. Campbell (1983) characterises Warrington as "a rock solid Labour constituency in industrial Lancashire, fifteen miles east of Liverpool" (Campbell, 1983, p.210). It was also a constituency which had a history of flirtations with militant infiltration, setting the scene for a potential outside left stronghold. Against this militant potential, the SDP were fielding Jenkins, a credible threat given his Labour background (Seton, 2 July 1981, p.2). Jenkins hoped that he could "light a torch which could not be put out for decades" for the SDP (*ibid*). Despite the long standing association with Warrington, Labour were not complacent in their election campaign. Recognising the threat posed by Jenkins and the SDP, Foot, Eric Heffer, and Clive Jenkins visited the constituency to campaign, underlying the importance they placed on victory (Johnson, 14 July 1981, p.1). For the Party leader to visit the constituency was an unusual demonstration of concern. On polling day, Labour held the seat. However their majority was slashed considerably to 1,759 (Haviland & Webster, 17 July 1981, p.1). Although

the SDP failed to take the seat, they succeeded in turning a solid Labour seat into a marginal overnight.

In the Croydon North West election, both the Labour and Conservative Parties collectively targeted the SDP Liberal Alliance through conventional tactics such as pamphlets, speeches and interviews (Witherow, 12 October 1981, p.2). The Alliance claimed to relish the attacks, as it showed them to be a credible threat to the established parties. In this context, the Alliance had become the early challenger it sought to be. On the day of the election, the Alliance candidate continued to canvass very hard to convince the electorate that both Conservative and Labour were inadequate alternatives (Haviland & Webster, 22 October 1981, p.1). The candidate, William Pitt fought a passionate campaign and was, ultimately, rewarded with success when he took the seat from the Conservatives with 13,800 votes to 10, 546, securing a majority of 3,254 (Haviland & Webster, 23 October 1981, p.1). This was the first by-election victory for the Alliance, and so marked the beginning of their electoral challenge against the established orthodoxy.

At Crosby, Shirley Williams succeeded in turning another Conservative, turning a solid 19,272 Conservative majority into a respectable 5,289 SDP majority (Haviland, 27 November 1981, p.1; Webster, 23 November 1981, p.3). This seat was won for the SDP without the aid of the Alliance, and so officially was the first *independent* SDP by-election victory. Its significance derives from the scale of the swing from the Conservatives. With both Croydon and Crosby coming from the Conservatives, it indicates that their advances were the result of disgruntled Conservative voters before the signs of economic recovery and the Falklands war.

Bruce Douglas-Mann, another SDP defector was one of the few who sought re-election. Foot had expressed the view that the SDP defectors should face the electorate again in their new colours. The defectors argue that they remained loyal to the manifesto upon which they were elected. However, Douglas-Mann did seek re-election for his Mitcham and Mordan constituency. The election occurred in 1982 at a time when the Falklands War and nationalistic pride were at their highest. The Conservative Party had no intention of losing, with approximately 40 MP's and Ministers visiting the constituency to canvass for Angela Rumbold (Haviland, 3 June 1982, p.2). When Rumbold won the seat, she said that it was "a great victory for Mrs Thatcher and the Conservative government at a time of national crisis", thereby validating the view that the Falklands War affected the result (Haviland, 4 June 1982, p.1). The Falklands War was a turning point for the fortunes of the SDP, as their victories vanished from the electoral arena. No more were the Conservative voters disgruntled.

Following on from two expected Labour victories in Coatbridge & Airdire and Gower, the anti-Bennite John Spellar was able to capture Birmingham Northfield from the Conservatives for Labour with a very small majority. *The Times* correspondent, Anthony Bevins (1982) had argued that "...a failure here might have so damaged Labour as to bring Michael Foot's leadership to an end" (Bevins, 29 October 1982, p.1). The Conservatives secured 15, 615 votes against Labour's 15,904 (*ibid*). Spellar was a passionate anti-Bennite and his win illustrated the limited support of Bennite ideology.

The Bermondsey by-election was the most devastating of Foot's leadership. The campaign became a debate about the *kind* of candidate the Party felt was appropriate to represent it in Parliament. Foot believed that Parliament is the primary institution by which

change can be implemented. However, some on the left argued that extra Parliamentary action is justified as a way of conveying messages to MP's. The selection of Peter Tatchell as the candidate appeared to suggest that those who are subservient to outside left committees would be able to represent Labour in Parliament. For Foot, this overrode the primacy of Parliament. But, Militant Tendency rejects the supremacy of Parliament whilst promoting the primacy of Party committees. Foot argued that Militant Tendency was a faction of hard liners who were a significant *threat* to Party cohesion (Cronin, 2007, p.229). This debate over the nature of the Labour Party became a central focus for the Bermondsey by-election.

It is important to remember that Tatchell was *not* a member of Militant Tendency. Despite this, however, he did gain Foot's disapproval because of his beliefs regarding Parliament. The press delighted in highlighting these divisions:

> Friday's *Sun* led with 'Furious Foot Disowns Red Pete - Militant Will Never Be an MP, says Labour chief'. More sedately, the *Guardian* reported the discussion at the meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party the previous evening Foot had justified his action with the claim 'Parliamentary democracy is at stake. There can be no wavering on that' (Tatchell, 1983, p.58).

In retort Tatchell argued that "Labour has long lost the radical and defiant spirit of its early pioneers" and that the Labour movement had grown dramatically as a result of a century of direct action (Tatchell, 1983, p.53).

In the House of Commons, Foot pledged that Tatchell will never be a Labour *member* rather than a Labour *candidate* (Morgan, 2007, p.421). This error caused Foot a great deal of personal humiliation prior to and during the Bermondsey campaign. Labour Party rules did not give the leader the authority to select the candidate for an election. In this sense, Foot

had exceeded his authority (*ibid*). The disquiet that followed was the result of an error which Foot had made in a most public of arena.

Because of Foot's condemnation of Tatchell, the right-wing press took this as a signal they were open to attack him *personally* as well as politically without any recourse from the Labour leadership. Tatchell's sexuality was also used against him. Tatchell argued that some within the press had launched a witch-hunt against him (Tatchell, 1983, p.131; Webster, 11 February 1983, p.2; *The Times*, 1983, p.2).

It is no exaggeration to argue that Bermondsey had become a battle for the future of Labour, and that the outcome would determine the ideological distribution within the Party. If the outside left Tatchell could not be stopped, then neither could other potential outside left candidates. As part of the growing fightback against the outside left, the day before the Bermondsey by-election, the NEC expelled five members of Militant (Benn, 1994, p.271).

After a bitterly divisive year the Alliance secured victory with 17,017 vote to Labour's 7,698 (Haviland, 25 February 1983, p.1). Foot had presided over a public ideological war and, as leader, was to be held accountable. It was a heavy price to pay for the ideological debate, and the Bermondsey constituents would not forgive either the Labour left or right for their collective indulgence. Possible threats to Foot's leadership were curtailed by Labour's later victory at Darlington, yet few expected Labour to win the general election (McLaughlin, 25 February 1983, p.3; *Labour Weekly*, 1 April 1983).

The Labour Party chose not to fight the Darlington by-election on internally divisive issues such as defence, but instead opted to focus upon domestic policy (Morgan, 2007, p.427).

Labour Weekly describes the result as "the best by-election performance for Labour since Southend" and that "its significance can not be underestimated" in boosting Labour's morale (*Labour Weekly*, 1 April 1983, p.8). The candidate, Oswald O'Brien was a non-militant, traditional socialist who was in the inside left tradition of older Labour MP's. Foot related the success of Darlington to potential success at the general election, saying

> One concrete reply I sought to use was that the Labour Party would summon up 'the spirit of Darlington', and having been there a few weeks before and participated in that considerable victory, I had a right to do so. The point was that the Darlington by-election, apart from sending an excellent new Labour MP, Ossie O'Brien, to Westminster, showed that the work Labour could do on the doorsteps in a few weeks of real campaigning could confound the pollsters. And clearly it was the task of any leader to re-awaken that spirit (Foot, 1984, p.29).

The result silenced disgruntled Labour figures[29] from sniping at Foot's leadership. This also ensured that Healey would not challenge Foot for the leadership. Had he done so he would have demonstrated a degree of disloyalty to Foot which may threaten to unite the inside left with the outside left against him and in favour of a subsequent Bennite challenge (Thorpe, 2008, p.218).

The early success of the SDP at constituencies such as Warrington and the subsequent popularity of the Conservatives produced an inconsistent message during the Parliamentary by-elections. Birmingham and Darlington provided Foot with an indication that Labour remained capable of winning elections, but the Bermondsey by-election produced a disastrous year for the Labour Party, which, despite the optimism of Darlington underpinned a depressed mood for the Party as it went into the general election campaign.

[29] Benn, Holland, Skinner and Race discussed a possible change in Party leadership following the Bermondsey result. Ultimately, they opted to show public support for Foot, whilst deeply critical of him in private (Benn, 1994, p.275).

6.5: A Summary of the 1983 General Election.

Despite Foot's calls to summon the 'spirit of Darlington', Labour's performance can be justly characterised as chaotic and disorganised (Butler & Kavanagh, 1984, p.60). "Mr. Foot certainly thought, on the basis of Darlington and the local election results, that Labour could make up enough ground to deny the Conservatives an overall majority" (Butler & Kavanagh, 1984, p.65). This was not possible because the campaign lacked a cohesive theme, co-ordination in expressing the Party message, and any meaningful comradeship from some who understood more than most the position faced by the leadership. "It was a recurring theme of complaint that speeches by leading Party figures appeared often to be uncoordinated" (Mortimer, 1983, p.1). The campaign was fought using traditional canvassing methods such as national tours, speeches to the party faithful, and rallies whilst the Conservatives utilised its familiarity with the media (BBC, 1995). However, despite this difference of campaigning style, Labour did itself few favours. Healey's insult suggesting Thatcher had been "'glorying in slaughter' during the Falklands war" courted controversy (Thatcher, 1993, p.301). Despite his subsequent apology, it is indicative of Labour's ability to damage its own cause whilst simultaneously enabling the Conservatives to claim the moral high ground.

The Labour and Conservative parties were effectively fighting the same election in two different periods. Whilst the Conservatives were able to capitalise on the strength of their leader, the Labour Party felt unable to similarly rally around Foot. Thorpe (2008) notes that "Foot was a liability, looking uncomfortable on TV, rambling when interviewed and lacking presence" (Thorpe, 2008, p.219). Yet, for Foot himself, he was "at his happiest pressing the flesh and addressing rallies of the party faithful", demonstrating a form of electioneering which had benefitted Labour historically (Butler & Kavanagh, 1984, p.272). Many of the Labour

rank and file were unable to comprehend some methods the Conservatives used, and so had little way of countering their effect (Jones, 1994, p.508).

As part of the election preparations, Foot chaired a meeting of the shadow cabinet to compose the manifesto. Hattersley anticipated a very long and drawn out process which had the potential to last through the night; the meeting, however was over within an hour (Haviland, 12 May 1983, p.1; BBC, 1995). Rather than the expected arguments from social democrats, Golding supported the inclusion of the most electorally contentious, outside left inspired policies devised by the conference since 1973 (Rosen, 2005, p.442; Haviland, 12 May 1983, p.1). Shocked and dismayed by Golding's position, Hattersley asked why he adopted this position. In reply, Hattersley quotes Golding saying

> ...this election is going to be fought on Tony Benn's terms, so we might as well thoroughly incriminate him. We can't win this election, so we might as well hang all his policies around his neck. (BBC, 1995)

With defeat accepted as a virtual certainty after Benn's challenge to Healey, Golding appeared to utilise the anticipated defeat for the benefit of the right by ensuring a sound foundation from which to transform the Labour Party into a prominently social democratic party after the election. Kaufman's often quoted remark that the manifesto was "the longest suicide note in history" would, ultimately, benefit his social democratic ideology (Cronin, 2004, p.232). Because of previous convention and the degree of discontent that Callaghan faced following the composition of the previous general election manifesto, Foot was unable to contest the decision of the unexpectedly unified meeting (Foot, 1984, p.31; Haviland, 12 May 1983, p.1). Whilst Hattersley was willing to argue for a more cautious manifesto, Golding had ensured that the manifesto was used as a means of blaming the left for the defeat.

As leader, Foot wrote an introduction to the manifesto, where he discussed Labour's plans over nuclear disarmament. He wrote

> One bunch of smears and scares with which Tory propagandists have already disfigured this election campaign suggests that the Labour Party proposes to throw away our defences, to abandon our alliances. It is just not true. And it should not be forgotten that one of the last acts of Mrs. Thatcher's government was to stop the debate in the House of Commons when these slanders could have been nailed.
>
> What we do propose to do is to get rid of the nuclear boomerangs which offer no genuine protection to our people but, first and foremost, to help stop the nuclear arms race which is the most dangerous threat to us all (Labour Party, 1983).

Disarmament was a subject on which Foot and Healey disagreed fundamentally, thus forcing the campaigners for Labour within both the inside left and social democratic right to be in opposition to either the leader or deputy leader. Ultimately, the issue was de-emphasised by the leadership, circumnavigating the division on a major policy area. The leadership "knew, above all, that our peace policy would be misrepresented and maligned" (Foot, 1984, p.36). The media, Foot argues, sought to misrepresent Labour's defence policy by emphasising fictitious divisions within the leadership (Foot, 1984, p.75). However, the former leader, Callaghan did emphasise the split. Foot remarks that Callaghan's approach "was not to support any Healey line. He had a line of his own; one which he had chosen to publicise with the maximum effect at the most critical moment" (Foot, 1984, p.79). Healey remarks that Callaghan's speech made it "impossible to conceal our deep divisions on defence any longer" and that "our defence policy certainly cost us the votes of many traditional Labour supporters" (Healey, 1989, pp.500-501). Callaghan's decision to voice his opposition to the official Labour policy agreed to by both Healey and Foot undermined further Labour's electoral chances (Harris, 1984, pp.204-205).

Few within the Party expected a Labour victory. Kaufman asked Foot to resign the leadership before the election date. Foot argued that...

> ...I had considered and rejected all ideas of throwing my hand in and abandoning the Party leadership. If those reasons were good before, they were stronger still at such a moment at the start of the campaign itself...
>
> ...However, I feel I must record that one member of the Shadow Cabinet, Gerald Kaufman, did come to see me on Monday morning, 16 May, and renewed the suggestion which only Jeff Rooker had put to me before. He put his point courteously and I replied, I trust, with equal courtesy, and that was that (Foot, 1984, p.41).

Kaufman believed that if Foot continued, then the result would be worse than if Labour was led by an alternative figure. However, as Thorpe (2008) has argued...

> ...Labour did not lose in 1983 because of Foot. The party would have been divided, and the economy recovering, whoever had been leader. In reality, it was an election that Labour could not have won (Thorpe, 2008, p.219).

Thorpe continues to argue that had Healey been Labour leader, then the outside left would have had a stronger position to lay siege to the leadership, thereby making Labour appear even less unified (*ibid*).

Indeed, James Curran of *The Times* and Peter Kellner of the *New Statesman*[30] noted that the Labour Party *had* become much more united in the 12 months preceding the general election. Curran attributes this to Foot's leadership, saying

> one year ago, it would have seemed inconceivable that the Labour Party would enter the general election with both its left and right-wings bonded in a close partnership. That this has been been achieved is a tribute to Michael Foot's dogged pursuit of party unity (Curran, 11 May 1983, p.10).

[30] New Statesman, 3 June 1980, p.7.

The accepted portrayal of Labour as fundamentally divided during the campaign is challenged by the factions submerging their policy disagreements. This accomplishment must be attributed to Foot's reconciliatory style of leadership enabling the factions to function within the traditional broad church.

On a personal level, Foot relished the challenge of the campaign. To paraphrase Gaitskell in 1960, he fought, fought and fought again for the Labour Party *he* loved. Foot was able to convey his political beliefs and philosophies to a much wider audience than previously. His opponents, however mocked Foot's image.

The Conservatives drew attention to Foot's appearance by using a poster parodying *The Wizard of Oz* with the phrase "if only I had a brain" (*The Times*, 26 April 1983, p.1). As *The Times* remarked, this was an abusive tactic, mocking Foot personally rather than debating policy. Further unfortunate reporting came following a visit Foot made to an old peoples home in the safe Conservative constituency of Banbury (Morgan, 2007, p.430). The press made connections between Foot and the residents, portraying him as a retired leader of the Party as well as cruelly comparing his walk to Charlie Chaplin (*New Statesman*, 3 June 1980, p.10).

"Michael Foot conceded the election shortly after 2am on Friday morning. He called it 'a tragedy for the nation', adding 'we have got to sit down and re-build the Labour Party'" (Harris, 1984, p.212). The election results were

Party	Total Votes	% of Vote	Seats
Conservative	13,012,315	42.4	397
Labour	8,456,934	27.6	209
Liberal	4,210,115	13.7	17
Social Democrats	3,570,834	11.6	6

(The Alliance)	(7,780,949)	(25.3)	(23)
Plaid Cymru	125,309	0.4	2
Scottish Nationalists	331,975	1.1	2
N.I Parties	764,925	3.1	17
Others	193,383	0.6	0

(Source: Dorey, 1995, p.342)

Given the stronger position of the third party and the changes to constituency boundaries since the 1979 general election, a like-for-like comparison would prove hazardous (Pelling, 1985, p.185). Even with that caveat, however, the Labour Party suffered a considerable electoral defeat for which Foot would be blamed.

The election should be regarded "as a verdict not so much on the campaign and the run up to it, as on the party's performance over a long period" and "Labour's major problems did not emerge over the few weeks of the campaign" (Butler & Kavanagh, 1984, pp.278-279). This view is confirmed by Jim Mortimer, then General Secretary of the Labour Party. He remarked in the post-election interim report to the NEC that

> the Labour Party entered the 1983 general election burdened by a reputation for disunity. In the months preceding the election efforts were made to build bridges between different views within the Party but the public view persisted that Labour's unity was shallow. It received some confirmation during the election campaign. But the most damaging impression of disunity caused by the earlier breakaway of a number of Members of Parliament and the formation of the SDP, including former cabinet ministers. Undoubtedly this breakaway represented a minority trend within the Labour Party but, when encouraged and boosted by the press, it evoked a response among a section of the public (Mortimer, 1983, p.4).

The Labour Party was judged by the electorate as unfit for government before the campaign had begun. Its judgement was based upon the earlier actions of some social democrats, and subsequently encouraged by an unsympathetic press. Foot's leadership had attempted to, and to some extent succeeded in bringing the inside left and social democratic right of the Party closer together in order to unite the Party against the outside

left. Yet they were highly unlikely to be able to benefit from these embryonic moves towards drawing a line under the divisions because of the public displays of disunity since losing office. Radice (2004) notes in his diary that prominent figures within the inside left and social democratic traditions began to meet to discuss removing the outside left by targetting Militant with the help of Foot (Radice, 2004, p.72). This indicates a tentative step towards a realignment within the Party away from the traditional battles of immovable ideological dogmatic positions and towards a more unified pragmatism, which slowly matured over the course of the next Parliament. Mortimer confirms that "the reputation for disunity and for internal strife was reinforced by other events during the preceding four years" (Mortimer, 1984, p.4). Other controversies included the divisions fostered by the outside left within the Party during the first post-defeat years which conspired against Labour and Foot during the subsequent years to produce the heavy defeat regardless of the policies within the manifesto or the presentation during the campaign. Labour lost the election before campaigning had started. Presentational failures, however can not be entirely disregarded as impacting upon the public view of Labour given they confirmed the existing view of a disunited Party.

To consider Foot's legacy *exclusively* as his failure to secure power for the Labour Party is to disregard his successful navigation of the Party through these turbulent years. To do that, it is necessary to remember that

> Foot faced an endless succession of crises - over the constitution of the party, the formation of the SDP, the deputy leadership election, the drive against Militant and the Falklands War (Shaw, 1999, p.167).

As Peter Shore notes, "no leader of the Labour Party - not even George Lansbury in 1931 - inherited so disastrous and bankrupt an estate as did Michael Foot in November 1980" (Shore, 1993, p.137). It is Foot's *success* that Labour emerged as a coherent political entity

from the years of crises which were mostly not of his making. Quoted by *The Times,* Neil Kinnock remarks that

> the roots of defeat which were put down by some of the elements of our Party in the two or three years after 1980 made victory difficult to achieve (Haviland, 10 June 1983, p.1).

Kinnock argues that Labour was on the course for defeat because the Party had been undermined by some within earlier in the Parliament. "It undoubtedly suffered from the legacy of the bitter internal fighting of the past four years" (*New Statesman*, 10 June 1983, p.3). Any consideration for a possible alternative to Foot can be dismissed. As Peter Shore confirms

> ...if Healey had won the 1980 PLP election for the leadership on a programme of resistance and conflict with the NEC, there is no question that he would have had to face an immediate challenge from Tony Benn for the leadership itself just as soon as the new electoral college system for electing a leader had been adopted. Even if - and that is a big 'if - he had won that further contest against Tony Benn, it is difficult to believe that he would have had the persuasive power that Michael Foot undoubtedly had in prising the soft left away from the hard left on the NEC. That 'ultimate peril' would not then have been averted (Shore, 1993, p.151).

Because Benn had lost his own Parliamentary seat he would be unable to put himself forward for the leadership. This defeat, along with the overall defeat of the Party, demonstrated the chance and need for change. The change, which Foot preferred was to return the Labour Party to a position of electoral success by improving their communication with the electorate.

> How to present policies and personalities effectively; how to organize for their presentation; how to put ourselves on even terms with our opponents, at least in the sense of recognising what advantages can be secured and what dangers can be avoided; how to ensure that the devil does not have the best tunes and the

> cleverest instrumentals - no Labour supporter, no Labour leader, who lived through the agony of the 1983 defeat will question the significance of these considerations (Foot, 1984, p.167).

Foot, recognising Labour's failure to communicate its message to the electorate because of the methods utilised by their opponents, argued that the Labour Party had to adopt different campaigning styles. However in order for this to be achieved, Foot would need to pass on the mantle of leadership to another generation. The era of Callaghan, Foot, Healey and Benn would need to be abandoned in order for the changes he advocated could take place under new leadership.

Foot's legacy to the Labour Party was its survival. It was a future, however which would only be possible if he resigned, which he did on 12th June 1983 (Bevins, 13 June 1983, p.1). At the Labour conference in October 1983, Foot gave a speech about his time as leader of the Party. Foot delivered a tribute to his deputy, Healey:

> Sometimes it is suggested in some quarters that Denis and I have not always seen eye to eye on every subject. I am not sure whether this is intended as a tribute or a criticism. However, I can assure you that during this time Denis has given me wonderful support and encouragement, and I am deeply grateful to him (*The Times*, 5 October 1983, p.4).

The tribute suggests that Foot advocated a Labour Party which was an alliance between the social democratic right and the inside left. Indeed, Foot argued that the outside left Bennite solution to Labour's unpopularity "was no solution at all; rather it was one source of the disease" which had caused the decline (Foot, 1984, p.161).

6.6: Conclusion.

Under Foot's leadership, the brewing arguments of the outside left exploded in the faces of the old social democratic Labour leadership. Foot's political credentials, philosophy and history with the inside left enabled him to counter those demanding a more militant Labour Party. A social democrat such as Healey would have been unable to engage in the same undertaking given his association with the policies the outside left despised.

Some members of the social democratic right splintered from the Labour Party, thus splitting that wing within the Party, giving the impression of a party in terminal decline. Benn challenged Healey for the deputy leadership illuminating a highly divisive period. These were difficult circumstances for *any* leader. Simply to maintain a party in circumstances such as these is an achievement in itself. Healey was able to maintain his position as deputy by a fraction of a vote, thereby starting the slow retreat of the outside left. However, at this stage, Labour was on an unavoidable course for defeat because the electorate had lost faith in Labour's ability to govern itself.

In contrast, the slow economic recovery and the Falklands War revived the Conservatives. Thatcher commanded strength over the Conservatives, which contrasted badly to the divisions within Labour. After the Falklands War, the general election became a battle for second place between the newly formed SDP and the Labour Party.

Foot led a principled campaign behind a manifesto supported by the social democrat, Golding and his ability to alter the manifesto was limited. Despite the poor election result, Foot had acted as a conciliatory leader who ensured that the Party continued to fight again.

CONCLUSION

Reconciling Protest and Leadership: A Vindication of Michael Foot?

The purpose of this thesis was to argue that a range of issues explain Foot's emergence as the Party leader. But it also serves two other purposes. First, in utilising the leadership elections of 1976 and 1980, it casts light and redefines the ideological divisions of the Labour Party in the period under review, during which Foot was a member of the front bench. Second, it tests an approach of analysing party leadership elections, that of Heppell, to examine whether it has validity in this case.

This thesis has demonstrated Foot's appeal to the Labour Party by discussing his political education, political history and broader career along with assessing the composition and ideological make up of the PLP during a specific historical period. Coupled with these discussions was an analysis of the 1976 and 1980 leadership elections, which argued that the complex nature of the PLP demonstrated that no single variable can be adduced to account for Foot's election or for the rejection of Healey. Ideology was a significant but not a mono-causal factor. To draw out the ideological composition of the PLP, Heppell's approach was central. Heppell's approach was chosen because it had previously produced useful and meaningful discussions of leadership contests within the PCP during its periods of ideological disputation. For the PCP, Heppell's approach had revealed that ideological divisions between 'wets' and 'dries' specifically on economic issues had a tendency to affect voting behaviour in leadership elections as discussed in chapter one.

Given, however, the vastly different compositions and histories of both parties, a simple transfer of Heppell's approach as utilised for his research on the Conservative Party has proved to be inadequate. A like for like comparison without significant revision to Heppell's approach would produce problematic results given the blurred and complex nature of

Labour's ideological composition. Within the Labour Party, the selection of the leader became a contested issue following the resignation of Wilson in 1976 and the resignation of Callaghan after the 1979 election defeat. The fluidity and diversity of ideological allegiances within the PLP proves a challenge to Heppell's approach as did the analysis of other influences upon MP's. The region, size of majority, union affiliation and length of service of individuals have been included in this analysis in order to take Heppell's approach beyond ideology, making it possible to produce a broader, more meaningful analysis of the Labour leadership elections. The conclusion of the analysis in chapter five was that Foot's election can not be entirely attributed to any single variable. Ideology was crucial, but simplistic 'left' and 'right' dualisms as preferred by Heppell are a barrier to understanding the totality of Foot's appeal.

The ideological history and character of the Labour Party is also significant in order to understand Foot's election. The Labour Party evolved as an organic body throughout the twentieth century, absorbing characteristics and personalities from across a broad ideological spectrum. Gaitskell and Crosland both contributed towards the foundations for a social democratic tradition on the right, whilst Bevan, Mikardo and others developed an inside left opposition to the established leadership. The outside left, however, did not have a sustained contributory history within the Labour Party until later in the 1960s, given its militancy and radical socialist outlook. A more penetrating ideological typology of the PLP is discussed in chapter four.

The centrists, who are ignored by many commentators, such as Kellner and even some political scientists such as Heppell, did not associate themselves formally with either of the major groups, remaining free to gravitate from one leadership candidate to the other.

These independents were the effective king makers in any leadership contest, and any candidate must attract the support of this informal group in order to achieve a majority. It is a reasonable assumption that a Manifesto Group member would vote for the social democrat and that a Tribune Group member would vote for the inside left candidate, although this research demonstrates that it is not automatic. It would also be an oversimplification to assume that an MP would remain a social democrat or a member of the inside left over long periods of time. An inside left MP in 1955 may well have become a social democrat by 1975. This reflects the continuing evolution of the Labour Party, the changing character of the PLP following major events such as the 1983 general election defeat along with the impact of changing political issues (Clark, 18 May 2010).

Ideologically, neither the inside left nor the social democrats were dominant within the PLP. In 1976, Callaghan had succeeded in securing his leadership by extending his support base beyond his social democratic allies and towards the centrists. At that time, the Labour Party had opted to elect Callaghan who, as a former Chancellor of the Exchequer had more economic experience over that of any other candidate from either ideological camp. Callaghan had "hinged his request" for unity on "the success of the economic policy" (*Labour Weekly*, 9 April 1976, p.1). Indeed, his closest potential rival, Foot had very little experience of economics, which in a time of economic crisis could prove problematic. Many Labour MP's would have considered that perceived general economic competence is an electoral asset and in the troubled economic circumstances of 1976, economic credibility was clearly important. Callaghan's stronger electoral appeal was also a factor in a general election. Other social democratic or left-wing candidates such as Jenkins or Benn respectively appealed too greatly to a set and divisive ideological stance, and so were seen as dogmatic by the centrists. This is apparent in Jenkins case for his

very pro-Common Market views, and for Benn for his moves towards a more radical form of socialism. By 1980, however the context of the political situation which Labour faced had changed dramatically. Now in opposition, some within the rank and file had, following a long campaign throughout the 1970s, established and placed themselves in powerful positions throughout the broader Labour movement. The outside left, which defined itself in opposition to both the inside left and social democrats, was a threat to the two traditions which had evolved since 1945.

Foot, as a long-standing figure of the familiar inside left, emerged as an attractive candidate given his ability to appeal across the Party towards the concerns of the centrists as well as the social democrats. Both felt able to work with a man willing to stand behind his record of loyalty towards Callaghan both in government and opposition. Foot's loyalty to Callaghan in government must not be underestimated when considering his position with the social democrats. He also possessed long-standing left-wing intellectual credentials which continued to appeal to many within the rank and file as well as to social democrats. There was a wide acceptance that despite the contrasting ideological positions the social democrats and those on the inside left possessed a credible intellectual foundation. Clark (2010) argued that the importance of other variables such as the capacity to unite the Party and personal likability were also important factors in an MP's voting behaviour[31]. However, the outside left's ideology was not welcome within mainstream democratic socialism. From where he had been placed intellectually, Foot was neither tainted by the outside left nor scorned by the blame directed towards the social democrats in 1980 for the alleged betrayal of the 1974 manifestos. There can be no doubt that Foot drew his understanding of the Party from the inside left, having evolved from an

[31] Lord Clark realistically stresses the importance of personal relationships, that can prove as important in defining behaviour as ideological positions.

early supporter of the Liberal Party to becoming a liberal socialist within Labour. This evolution brought him into contact with the rank and file of the Labour movement and with trade unionists particularly after this time as Secretary of State for Employment from 1974-1976.

Foot's inside left position was for the PLP a positive tradition from which to govern the Labour Party following its electoral defeat in 1979. This was because the social democrats had appeared to fail in government, and so were blamed *by the left* for Labour losing office. The accusation was articulated strongly by the outside left, who were vying for reforms designed to transfer power away from the traditional social democratic leadership of the Party and towards committees dominated by themselves. The inside left was not initially a target of their attacks, enabling Foot to appeal to the social democrats whilst also appealing to the left-wing amongst the rank and file of the broader Labour movement. Foot would also manage to gain some support from the outside left in so much as their antipathy towards the social democrats made him a preferred alternative, if temporary, leader to Healey. Yet other MP's voted for Foot to prevent a challenge by Benn, also assuming that his leadership would only be short term. Foot was in the unpleasant position of satisfying conflicting wings of the Party, both of which anticipated a temporary leadership, which was different from his own view of the significance of his election. His determination to remain leader, which can by seen by his rejection of Kaufman's suggestion that he resign shortly before the 1983 general election, demonstrates his intention to be something other than merely a caretaker leader.

In describing how Foot was elected leader of the Labour Party, this thesis draws on previous academic work by Heppell. Heppell's approach is very suggestive and valuable in

its previous applications and has yielded significant results relating to the Conservative Party. In testing it against other political parties and other leadership elections, its strengths emerge in demonstrating the undoubted importance of ideology and factionalism within the Labour Party, but its mono-causality meant it lacked universal application. The adaptations to Heppell's approach in this thesis to address variables beyond ideology produce a more rounded analysis.

Heppell's approach has been revised to incorporate considerations of other political phenomena. The value of Heppell's approach rests in its ability to extract information based on a searching analysis of the ideological stance of individuals. Its weakness rests in its assumption of the unique importance of ideology rather than on a more extensive use of the other data available on MP's. These include consideration of the electoral success of the Labour Party and sometimes its very survival, individual career prospects, pressures from constituency parties and other characteristics of individual MP's such as background, region or union affiliation.

As an individual, Foot was a man of philosophical and political substance. He was armed with the writings of many liberal thinkers and writers as well as the inspiration derived from contemporary political figures. Hazlitt, Cobbett, Swift, Wells, and Marx helped give Foot's socialism a rich texture of romanticism which enabled him to develop a strong reputation and position within the Labour Party as a literary intellectual figure.

He also felt Labour's policies under Wilson during the 1960s were dominated by social democrats and so failed to promote his inside left ideology. It would be facile to suggest this was the sole reason he did not join Wilson's cabinets given the earlier withdrawal of

the whip doubtlessly retarded his chances of Wilson appointing him to ministerial office in 1964, which undoubtedly suited him as it is likely he did not wish to join the mainstream at this point. By 1970, the changing political circumstances brought about by the growing challenges to Labour's electoral prospects, convinced Foot that a move towards the Party mainstream would be more beneficial in aiding the advancement of his political ideals.

Foot's intellectual heritage facilitated his increasingly influential role as leader of the Labour Party. As a writer, political commentator, critic, journalist and ultimately a minister and Party leader, Foot remained throughout his career committed to the ideals of reshaping Britain towards a fairer society with a strong commitment to Parliamentary socialism. Foot had striven to bring his literary intellectualism into the Labour Party since he joined in 1935. His in-depth knowledge of literary figures provided his socialism with a rich texture of romanticism which endeared him to many in the wider Labour movement. While a series of ideological disputations about socialism and Britain's role in the world raged within the Party during his period as a party member, Foot proved to be consistent in his application of his liberal, Parliamentary democratic socialism to the changing political environment.

The heavy defeat endured by Labour at the 1983 general election should not lead to the facile conclusion that Foot's leadership failed. It must be understood that Foot's role as leader was to keep the Party together; to prevent a considerably greater splintering of social democrats towards the SDP, and to prevent an outside left incursion into the Parliamentary leadership. If success is to be determined by these factors, then Foot was indeed a successful leader. Foot did not preside over a mass desertion of Labour's social democrats, nor did his election herald an era of unmanageable outside left infiltration into

the mainstream of the Party. Indeed, under Foot the Labour Party remained an eclectic mixture of members dedicated to opposing Conservatism in favour of a fairer and more equal society.

Foot's emergence as leader of the Labour Party would have seemed implausible given his reputation as a rebel, however likable, throughout his career, even as late as 1969 as earlier chapters have made clear. Yet, his developing political philosophy and his political activities after 1935 help to explain how a party riven with ideological ferment, and whose centre of gravity had shifted to the left, could elect a candidate with Foot's credentials. If his candidacy for the leadership was premature in 1976, it most certainly acquired credibility by 1980.

Foot's characteristics, including his personal charm, public oratory and deep affection for the Labour Party were important elements in elevating him to the Party leadership. Ideological factors alone are insufficient to explain his electability although it provided the base from which he could widen his appeal. For this reason, Heppell's approach, for all its heuristic merits, is an incomplete tool to explain why politicians become party leaders. Nor is personal character all important. Other determinants of voting behaviour can play a part. To understand Foot's emergence as leader, his personal history, liberal socialist ideology, character, and record in government and opposition must all be taken into account. The evidence of this thesis demonstrates that ideology matters but is not all determining in all circumstances. As a leader, Foot ensured that a fractious party could appear sufficiently united and politically relevant to remain electable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aitken, I, (1980), 'Labour picks Foot to heal party splits', *The Guardian,* November 11th 1980, http://century.guardian.co.uk/1980-1989/Story/0,,108171,00.html, (Accessed 10/07/2008).

Aitken, I, (2001), 'Bulldozer Healey tramples on Left' in *The Guardian*, September 19th 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/sep/19/labourconference.labour4, (Accessed 15/04/2008).

Anderson, D, (1983), 'What they are telling us', *The Times*, June 16 1983, p8.

Assinder, N, (2003), *Profile: Jack Straw*, (London: BBC News). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2950279.stm, (Accessed 20/07/2008).

Assinder, N, (2004), *Profile: Tam Dalyell*, (London: BBC News). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3391825.stm, (Accessed 21/07/2008).

Attlee, C, (1937), *The Labour Party In Perspective*, (London: Victor Gollancz).

Bailey, H, *et al*, (2003), *Biography: Mclennan, Robert*, (London: Liberal Democrat History Group) - http://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/item_single.php?item_id=52&item=biography, (Accessed 24/06/2008).

BBC, (1979), *Decision '79*, (Viewed 13/06/2008).

BBC, (1995), *The Wilderness Years*, (Viewed 05/09/2007).

BBC, (1997), *A Portrait of Michael Foot*, (Viewed 19/10/2008).

BBC, (2008), *Greg Dyke on Nye Bevan*, (Viewed 24/09/2008).

BBC, (2009), *A Parliamentary Coup*, (Viewed 10/04/2009).

BBC News, (1975), *UK Embraces Britain in Europe,* http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/6/newsid_2499000/2499297.stm (Accessed 10/04/2009).

BBC News, (2001), *Shore: Man of Principle*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1436253.stm, (Accessed 13/3/2007).

BBC News, (2002), *Donald Anderson – Profile*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2174292.stm, (Accessed 13/03/2007).

BBC News, (2002), *Andrew Bennett*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/uk_politics/2069559.stm, (Accessed 13/03/2007).

Benn, T, (1976), Labour Party Archive, *Letter from Tony Benn to Michael Foot*, C13/1, Labour History Archive and Study Centre [LHASC].

Benn, T, (1979), *Arguments for Socialism*, (London: Jonathan Cape).

Benn, T, (1981), *Arguments for Democracy*, (London: Jonathan Cape).

Benn, T, (1989), *Tony Benn: Against the Tide Diaries 1973-1976*, (London: Hutchinson).

Benn, T, (1994), *Tony Benn: Years of Hope: Diaries, Letters and Papers 1940-1962*, (London: Hutchinson).

Benn, T, (1994), *Tony Benn: The End of An Era Diaries 1980-1990*, (London: Arrow).

Benn, T, (1995), *The Benn Diaries – New Single Volume Edition*, (London: Hutchinson Publishers).

Benn, T, (1995), *The Benn Diaries*, (London: Hutchinson).

Bernstein, E, (1899), *Evolutionary Socialism*, (London: Independent Labour Party).

Berthoud, R, (1973), 'British MPs pioneer link with Brussels', *The Times*, February 20 1973, p5.

Berrington, H, (1982), 'The Labour Left in Parliament: Maintenance, Erosion and Renewal' in *The Politics of the Labour Party*, (London: George Allen & Unwin).

Bevan, A, (1949), 'Health Service Sacrosanct', *The Times,* September 26 1949, p2.

Bevan, A, (1961), *In Place of Fear*, (London: Macgibbon & Kee).

Bevins, A, (1981), 'Mason out of front bench fight', *The Times*, November 5 1981, p2.

Bevins, A & Kershaw, R (1982), 'Mulley rejected by constituency party', *The Times*, March 1 1982, p1.

Bevins, A, (1982), 'Labour win Gower: Tories trail third', *The Times,* September 17 1982, p1.

Bevins, A, (1982), 'Labour win at Northfield ends 11 years of defeat', *The Times*, October 29 1982, p1.

Bevins, A, (1983), 'Ten MPs who left the House speechless', *The Times*, January 18 1983, p28.

Bevins, A, (1983), 'Labour in state of panic over Tatchell', *The Times*, February 15 1983, p2.

Bevins, A, (1983), 'Labour prepares to play musical seats', *The Times*, February 16 1983, p5.

Bevins, A, (1983), 'Labour turns fire on Alliance at Darlington', *The Times*, March 1 1983, p1.

Bevins, A, (1983), ‘Labour reallocates seats with speed’, *The Times*, April 13 1983, p2.

Bevins, A, (1983), 'Kinnock heads the field in Labour leadership battle', *The Times*, June 13 1983, p1.

Bevins, A, (1983), ‘Kinnock ready to abandon pledge to leave EEC’, *The Times*, June 17 1983, p1.

Bevins, A, (1983), ‘Silkin fails to get on Tribune list’, *The Times*, October 25 1983, p2.

Biography Base, (2004), ‘Tam Dalyell Biography’ in *The Biography Base.* http://www.biographybase.com/biography/Dalyell_Tam.html, (Accessed 02/08/2008).

Booth, T, (2002), *Whats Left?*, (London: The Orion Publishing Group Limited).

Bradley, I, (1980), ‘Disaffected Right will stay away from conference’, *The Times*, May 31 1980, p1.

Bradley, I, (1980), ‘Right-wing Labour Group aims to field 200 candidates’, *The Times*¸ July 25 1980, p1.

Bradley, I, (1980), ‘Mr. Foot well ahead in constituency party poll’, *The Times*, October 31 1980, p2.

Brown, M, (1977), ‘Export aid sanctions follow Irish pay deal’, *The Times*, August 19 1977, p15.

Brown, A, (2002), ‘Heckling for Britain’ in *the Guardian*, April 13th 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2002/apr/13/foreignpolicy.politics, (Accessed 03/08/2008).

Bright, M, (2007), ‘Sunny Jims Big Mistake’, http://www.newstatesman.com/200707190008, (Accessed 09/09/2007).

Brind, D, (1976), 'Benn Levelling With The Past', *Labour Weekly*, May 21 1976, p3.

Brivati, B, (1997), *Hugh Gaitskell*, (London: Richard Cohen Books).

Bryant, C, (1997), *Stafford Cripps: The First Modern Chancellor*, (London: Hodder & Stoughton).

Burke, E, (1791), 'Letter to the National Assembly' in *Burkes Works II,* (London: Bohn's Standard Library).

Burke, E, (1969), *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books).

Burke, E, (1999), ‘Eternal Society’ in Rosen, M & Wolff, J, *Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Butler, D, & Kavanagh, D (1974), *The British General Election of February 1974*, (London: Macmillan).

Butler, D, & Kavanagh, D (1975), *The British General Election of October 1974*, (London: Macmillan).

Butler, D, & Kavanagh, D, (1984), *The British General Election of 1983*, (London: Macmillan).

Butler, D, (1989), *British General Elections Since 1945*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

Butt, R, (1976), 'Can Worker Control Deliver the Goods?', *The Times*, April 29 1976, p16.

Butt, R, (1976), 'Let Labour Be Warned: It is the Voter Who Knows the Real Truth', *The Times*, November 18 1976, p16.

Butt, R, (1977), 'This mockery of a free vote that is sabotaging the abortion bill', *The Times*, June 30 1977, p16.

Callaghan, J, (1976), 'Factions Warned Against Imposing Their Views', *The Times*, April 6 1976, p2.

Callaghan, J, (1987), *Time and Chance*, (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd.)

Campbell, J, (1983), *Roy Jenkins: A Biography,* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

Campbell, J, (1987), *Nye Bevan and the Mirage of British Socialism*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson).

Carr, J, (1976), 'Being married to Michael', *The Sunday Mirror*, March 28 1976, p9.

Castle, B, (1980), *The Castle Diaries 1974-1976,* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

Castle, B, (1984), *The Castle Diaries 1964-1970*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

Castle, B, (1993), *Fighting All The Way*, (London: Pan Books).

Chartres, J, (1976), 'Workington citizens sense instant fame on day after polling', *The Times*, November 2 1976, p4.

Charmley, J, (1996), *A History of Conservative Politics 1900-1996*, (New York: St. Martins Press).

Chavda, J, (2001), *Michael Foot,* (London: Labour History Group). http://heroicdesign.com/reisinger/LHGsite/footbio.html, (Accessed 22/10/2008).

Chavda, J, (2004), *Remembering John Smith*, (London: Labour History Group). http://heroicdesign.com/reisinger/LHGsite/smithevent.html, (Accessed 22/10/2008).

Chavda, J, (2007), *Michael Foot 1980-1983*, (London: Labour History Group), http://www.labourhistory.org.uk/?p=23, (Accessed 07/09/2009).

Clark, D, (2010), Interview with Lord David Clark at the University of Huddersfield on May 18 2010. Present were Mr. Andrew Scott Crines, Professor Brendan Evans, and Mr. Robert Nicholls.

Clark, G, (1971), 'Pompidou interpretation of terms disturbs some MPs', *The Times*, June 28 1971, p1.

Clark, G, (1971), 'Labour moderates put three point programme to avert clash on Market', *The Times*, July 26 1971, p2.

Clark, G, (1973), 'Party leaders in eve of entry clash on Britain's future in Europe', *The Times,* January 1 1973, p1.

Clark, G, (1975), 'Manifesto MPs Unhappy At Bill' *The Times*, January 22 1975, p3.

Clark, G, (1975), 'Mr Prentice Warns Trade Unions of Unemployment if they 'welsh' on the Social Contract', *The Times*, March 1 1975, p2.

Clark, G, (1976), '10 promotions, four resignations in Callaghan reshuffle', *The Times*, April 15 1976, p1.

Clark, G, (1977), 'Speaker will guide MPs today on role of Attorney', *The Times*, January 31 1977, p1

Clark, G, (1977), 'Move to expel MP over Poulson link', *The Times*, June 20 1977, p1.

Clark, G, (1979), ‘Dr. Owen rejects Jenkins plea for new radical centre group as most foolish course for Labour’, *The Times*, November 24 1979, p2.

Clark, G, (1980), ‘PLP ‘moderates’ form a new grouping with hope of uniting Labour’, *The Times*, March 26 1980, P2.

Clark, G, (1980), ‘Campaign for Labour Victory sends secret ballot plan to all members’, *The Times*, October 31 1980, p2.

Clark, G, (1980), ‘Labour Right attacks Mr. Foot over uproar in Commons’, *The Times*, November 15 1980, p1.

Clark, G, (1980), ‘Mr Foot’s appointments give equal weight to left and right’, *The Times*, December 16 1980, p2.

Clark, G, (1981), 'Mr Foot is pressed to support the formula favoured by MPs to elect Labour Party leadership', *The Times*, January 23 1981, p5.

Clark, G, (1981), ‘100 Labour MPs to demonstrate outside Commons’, *The Times*, April 30 1981, p3.

Clark, G, Evans, R, Noyes, H, (1981), 'Benn defies Foot in Commons vote on defence', *The Times*, May 21 1981, P1.

Clark, G, (1981), 'Turmoil in Labour Party: Challenge on dropping of MP', *The Times*, June 9 1981, p2

Clark, G, (1982), '69 Labour MPs call for truce', *The Times,* May 6 1982, p2.

Clemitson, I, (1977), Letters to the Editor, 'Stand against excessive pay claims', *The Times,* July 27, 1977, p17.

CLPD, (1982), *Open the NEC Books*, (London: Campaign for Labour Party Democracy Archive), http://home.freeuk.net/clpd/nslt26.htm (Accessed 20/11/2008).

Coates, D, (1975), *The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Coates, K, (1973), 'Socialists and the Labour Party', *The Socialist Register 1973*, (London: The Merlin Press).

Coates, K, (1983), *The Social Democrats: Those Who Went and Those Who Stayed*, (Nottingham: Russell Press Ltd.)

Cobbett, W, (1968), *Cobbetts England – A selection from the writings of William Cobbett*, (London: Parkgate Books).

Cole, J, (1995), *As It Seemed To Me*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

Coleman, T, (1976), 'Master of Consent', *The Guardian*, March 26 1976, p13.

Comfort, N, (1981), 'Anger Splits The Left', *The Times*, September 29 1981, p28.

Conroy, H, (2006), *Callaghan*, (London: Haus Publishing).

Cook, C, (1976), *A Short History of the Liberal Party 1900-1976*, (London: The Macmillan Press).

Cowley, P, & Norton, P, (1999), 'Rebels and Rebellions: Conservative MPs in the 1992 Parliament', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1999, pp84-105.

Cowley, P, & Norton, P, (2002), 'What a ridiculous thing to say! Which is why we didn't say it. A Response to Timothy Heppell', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2002, pp325-329.

Crewe, I, Day, N, Fox, A, (1991), *The British Electorate 1963-1987 - A Compendium of Data from British Election Studies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Crewe, I, & King, A, (1995) *The Birth, Life and Death of the Social Democratic Party*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Crewe, I, & King, A, (1995), 'Loyalists and Defectors: the SDP breakaway from the Parliamentary Labour Party 1981-1982' in (ed) Peter Jones' *Party, Parliament and Personality – Essays Presented to Hugh Berrington*, (Oxford: Routledge)

Crick, B, (2000), *In Defence of Politics*, (London: Continuum).

Cronin, J, (2004), *New Labour's Pasts – The Labour Party and its Discontents*, (Harlow: Pearson Longman).

Crosland, A, (1956), *The Future of Socialism*, (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd).

Crowther, S, (2005), *One Thing After Another*, (Stanhope: The Memoir Club).

Curran, J, (1983), 'The message Foot must get across', *The Times*, May 11 1983, p10.

Dale, I, & Foot, M, (2003), *Michael Foot at Ninety*, (London: Politicos Media), Recorded June 2003 for OneWord Radio.

Dalyell, T, (2002), 'Neville Sandelson', *The Independent*, 16 January 2002, http://news.independent.co.uk/people/obituaries/article35872.ece (Accessed 03/03/2009).

Dalyell, T, (2002), 'Ronald Brown: George Brown's MP Brother' in *The Independent*, August 2nd 2002, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/ronald-brown-638567.html (Accessed 04/08/2008).

Davies, H, (2003), *Frank Allaun MP*, (Salford: Working Class Movement Library).

Day, B, (1983), 'Jobs and trade would survive withdrawal from EEC, says Foot', *The Times*, June 7 1983, p5.

Day, R, (1989), *Sir Robin Day - Grand Inquisitor*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson).

Derbyshire, J. D & Derbyshire, I, (1988), *Politics in Britain from Callaghan to Thatcher*, (Cambridge: W. R. Chambers).

De Jouvenel, B, (1949), *Problems of Socialist England*, (London: The Batchworth Press).

Dods, (1977), *Dods Parliamentary Companion,* (London: Dods Parliamentary Companion Ltd).

Donoughue, B, (1987), *Prime Minister: The Conduct of Policy under Harold Wilson & James Callaghan*, (London: Jonathan Cape).

Dorey, P, (1995), *British Politics Since 1945*, (Oxford: Blackwell).

Downs, A, (1957), *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, (New York: Harper & Row).

Drucker, H, (1981), 'Changes in the Labour Party Leadership', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 369-391.

Drucker, H, (1983), 'The Parties and Parliament' in *Developments in British Politics,* (London: Macmillan).

Eatwell, (1979), *The 1945-1951 Labour Governments*, (London: Batsford Academic).

Election Demon, (2009), *Political Programmes*, (Accessed 11/09/2009), http://www.election.demon.co.uk/pt1.html

Emery, F, (1980), 'Labour Party delays decision on electing its leader', *The Times*, October 3 1980, p1.

Emery, F, (1980), 'Mr. Silkin says he has already beaten Mr. Foot', *The Times*, October 20 1980, p1.

Emery, F, (1980), 'Mr. Foot joins fight for Labour Party leadership', *The Times*, October 21 1980, p1.

Emery, F, (1980), 'Mr. Benn defeated by two votes in shadow cabinet poll', *The Times*, December 5 1980, p1.

Emery, F, (1981), 'Mr. Jenkins moves to cement alliance with 'Gang of Three'', *The Times*, January 19 1981, p1.

Emery, F, (1981), 'Dr Owen warns parties against unfair tactics', *The Times*, March 3 1981, p2.

Evans, B, & Taylor, A, (1996), *From Salisbury to Major: Continuity and Change in Conservative Politics*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Evans, B, (1999), *Thatcherism and British Politics 1975-1999*, (Stroud: Alan Sutton).

Evans, B, (2007), 'Labour and the West Riding of Yorkshire' in *Sons and Daughters of Labour*, eds Evans, B, *et al*, (Huddersfield: University of Huddersfield).

Evans, B, (2010), Interview with Professor Brendan Evans at the University of Huddersfield on September 10 2010. Present were Mr. Andrew Scott Crines.

Evans, E, (2001), *The Forging of the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870*, (London: Pearson Education).

Faux, R, (1981), 'Labour reselection: Scottish left shows reluctance to challenge sitting MPs', *The Times*, June 22 1981, p2.

Faux, R, (1983), 'Acceptable face for socialism', *The Times*, March 25 1983, p1.

Felton, D, (1983), 'Foot and Benn Counterblast' *The Times*, June 3 1983, p1.

Fielding, F, and Tanner, D, (2006), 'The Rise of the Left Revisited: Labour Party Culture in Post-War Manchester and Salford', *Labour History Review,* Vol. 71, No. 3 pp. 211-228.

Fielding, S, (1995), *Labour: Decline and Renewal*, (Manchester: Baseline).

Foot, M, (1940), *Guilty Men by "Cato"*, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd).

Foot, M, Crossman, R and Mikardo, I, (1947), *Keep Left*, (London: New Statesman and Nation).

Foot, M, (1957), *The Pen and the Sword*, (London: Wyman & Sons Ltd).

Foot, M, (1958), 'Now lets bury the Stalin myth' in *Tribune 21*, edited by Elizabeth Thomas, (London: Macgibbon & Kee).

Foot, M, (1958), 'Expulsion Order', *The Times,* June 13 1958, p11.

Foot, M, (1974), *Britain Will Win With Labour*, (London: The Labour Party). http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab74oct.htm, (Accessed 09/04/2009).

Foot, M, (1974), 'Editors and the closed shop', *The Times*, December 24 1974, p11.

Foot, M, (1975), *Aneurin Bevan 1897-1945*, (London: Granada Publishing Limited).

Foot, M, (1975), 'Putting Parliament At Stake', *The Times,* May 23 1975, p14.

Foot, M, (1976), Labour Party Archive, *The Question of Devolution*, C13/1, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, [LHASC].

Foot, M, (1977), 'Mr. Foot proposes consultative not mandatory referendums for Wales and Scotland', *The Times*, February 16 1977, p12.

Foot, M, (1977), 'Two Devolution Bills: No tax powers for Scotland or Wales', *The Times,* July 27 1977, p14.

Foot, M, (1977), 'Bevan and the H-Bomb' in Hill, G, (1977) *Tribune at 40*, (London: Quartet Books Limited).

Foot, M, (1980), *Debts of Honour*, (London: Harper & Row Publishers).

Foot, M, (1984), *Another Heart and Other Pulses: The Alternative to the Thatcher Society*, (London: Collins).

Foot, M, (1986), *Loyalists and Loners*, (London: William Collins and Sons Ltd).

Foot, M, (1988), *The Politics of Paradise: A Vindication of Byron*, (London: Collins).

Foot, M, (1995), *The History of Mr. Wells*, (London: Transworld Publishers Ltd).

Foot, M, (1997), *Aneurin Bevan*, (London: Victor Gollancz).

Foot, M, (1999), *Doctor Strangelove, I Presume*, (London: Victor Gollancz).

Foot, M, (2003), *The Uncollected Michael Foot: Essays Old and New*, (London: Politico's).

Foot, M, (2003), *Michael Foot at Ninety – In Conversation with Iain Dale*, (London: Oneword Radio), June 2003.

Foot, P, (1968), 'Harold Wilson and the Labour Left' in *International Socialism*, (London: Marxists Archive), No. 33, pp18-26, http://www.marxists.org/archive/foot-paul/1968/xx/wilson.htm, (Accessed 20/04/2008).

Ford, R, (1982), 'Setback for Paisley in Belfast poll', *The Times,* March 6 1982, p1.

Forster, A, (2002), *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties Since 1945*, (Routledge: London).

Gaitskell, H, (1983), *The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell 1945-1956*, (London: Jonathan Cape).

Gale, G, (1975), 'Restriction on Press Freedom', *The Times,* January 4 1975, p13.

Gallop, G, (1976), *The Gallop International Public Opinion Polls - Great Britain 1937-1975 Volume One*, (New York: Random House).

Gamble, A, (1988) *The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism*, (London: Macmillan).

Geddes, D, (1975), 'Reenactment of Newham fight feared in other areas with moderate Labour MPs', *The Times*, July 25 1975, p2.

Goodwin, A, (1967), *The French Revolution*, (London: Hutchinson University Library).

Gould, B, (1995), *Goodbye to All That*, (London: Macmillan).

Grant, J, (1999), 'Unions in the market' in *The Guardian*, September 14 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/1999/sep/14/tuc.uk4, (Accessed 06/06/2008).

Grayling, A. C, (2000), *The Quarrel of the Age: The Life and Times of William Hazlitt*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

Greenleaf, W. H, (1983), *The British Political Tradition, volume 2: The Ideological Heritage*, (London: Metheun).

Groser, J, (1974), 'Labour faces party crisis if nuclear reports are true', *The Times*, June 24 1974.

Haddinton, R.F, (1978), 'Crucial by-election for Tory Scots', *The Times*, October 17 1978, p4.

Haigh, A, (1983), 'Bitter Foot attacks SDP treachery', *The Times*, June 11 1983, p2.

Hailsham, (1976), 'Prime Ministers success 'in lap of gods'', *The Times*, April 6 1976, p2.

Hall, S, (1984), ‘The Crisis of Labourism’ in *The Future of the Left*, (London: Basil Blackwell).

Hamilton, A, (1974), 'Labour would end the three-day week 'in a matter of days' on return to power, Mr. Foot says', *The Times*, February 15 1974, p5.

Hamilton, A, (1974), 'Mr Foot Preaches the Gospel He Had A Chance to Practice', *The Times,* October 8 1974, p4.

Hansards, (1966), *Parliamentary Debates 1966,* Vol. 727, April 26 1966, pp542-669, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

Hansards, (1971), *Parliamentary Debates 1970*-1971, Vol. 823, September 22 1970 to 28th October 1971, pp2211-2218, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

Hansards, (1975), *Parliamentary Debates 1974-1975,* Vol. 889, March 24 1974 to April 11th 1975, pp 1365-1369, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

Hansards, (1979), *Parliamentary Debates 1979,* Vol. 965, March 28 1979, pp461-590, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

Hansards, (1980), *Parliamentary Debates 1980*, Vol. 976, 15 January 1980, pp1409-1411, (London: Hansards), http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/jan/15/nuclear-disarmament#S5CV0976P1-03363 (Accessed 15/07/2008).

Hansards, (1982), *Parliamentary Debates 1982*, Vol. 21, 3 April 1982, pp638-642, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

Harris, K, (1987), *David Owen: Personally Speaking*, (London: Pan Books).

Harris, R, (1984), *The Making of Neil Kinnock*, (London: Faber & Faber).

Hatfield, M, (1971), ‘MPs switch EEC attack to Shadow Cabinet’, *The Times*, November 3 1971, p2.

Hatfield, M, (1973), 'Labour executives approve plan for state control of 25 companies', *The Times*, May 31 1973, p1.

Hatfield, M, (1975), 'Referendum battle to control Labour machine', *The Times,* April 28 1975, p1.

Hatfield, M, (1975), 'Minister protests at anti-EEC move to run Labour machine', *The Times,* April 29 1975, p1.

Hatfield, M, (1976), 'Mr Hugh Delargy dies at height of dispute on Commons majority', *The Times*, May 5 1976.

Hatfield, M, (1976), 'The social contract will save Mr. Callaghan from any left wing challenge', *The Times,* September 24 1976, p14.

Hatfield, M, (1976), 'Mr Callaghan throws cabinet opponents of deflationary policy into disarray', *The Times*, December 8 1976, p1.

Hatfield, M, (1977), 'Moderates look to Mr. Rodgers as leader', The Times, February 9 1977, p4.

Hatfield, M, (1978), ‘Labour Feuds May Be Fought In Public’, The Times, September 28 1978, p4.

Hatfield, M, (1980), ‘Stop splitting party over EEC, Labour factions told’, The Times, June 9 1980, p1.

Hatfield, M, (1980), ‘Labour rift deepens over future of leader’, *The Times*, October 13 1980, p1.

Hatfield, M, (1980), ‘Labour Leftists Act to Block Mr. Healey with Franchise Move’, *The Times*, October 14 1980, p1.

Hatfield, M, (1980), ‘Left urged Mr. Benn to ignore PLP contest’, *The Times*, October 24 1980, p2.

Hatfield, M, (1980), ‘Left fails to halt vote for Labour leader’, *The Times*, October 29 1980, p1.

Hatfield, M, (1980), ‘Mr. Healey moves to criticism of rival’, *The Times*, November 8 1980, p2.

Haviland, J & Webster, P, (1981), 'Roy Jenkins slashes Labour majority: Tory loses his deposit', *The Times*, July 17 1981, p1.

Haviland, J & Webster, P, (1981), 'Alliance likely to win first by-election seat', *The Times*, October 22 1981, p1.

Haviland, J & Webster, P, (1981), 'Tory Croydon falls to Liberal SDP', *The Times*, October 23 1981, p1.

Haviland, J, (1981), 'Williams wins Crosby with 5,289 majority in first SDP victory', *The Times*, November 27 1981, p1.

Haviland, J, (1982), 'Triumphant Jenkins boosts claim to SDP leadership', *The Times*, March 26 1982, p1.

Haviland, J, (1982), 'Tories look assured of poll victory', *The Times*, June 3 1982, p2.

Haviland, J, (1982), 'Setback for SDP as Tories win poll', *The Times*, June 4 1982, p1.

Haviland, J, (1982), 'Strong Alliance leaves Tories third', *The Times,* October 29 1982, p1.

Haviland, J & Clark, G, (1983), 'Labour right wants to lose Bermondsey', *The Times*, February 19 1983, p1.

Haviland, J, (1983), 'Tatchell trounced in landslide for the Alliance', *The Times*, February 25 1983, p1.

Haviland, J & Webster, P, (1983), 'Slip the election leash, demand Opposition parties', *The Times*, April 14 1983, p1.

Haviland, J, (1983), 'Healey dissents on key foreign policy', *The Times*, April 27 1983, p2.

Haviland, J, (1983), 'Labour agrees its election manifesto at record speed', *The Times*, May 12 1983, p1.

Haviland, J, (1983), 'Foot reluctant to dispel doubt over future as leader', *The Times,* June 2 1983, p5.

Haviland, J, (1983), 'Mrs Thatcher back with a landslide', *The Times*, June 10 1983, p1.

Haviland, J, (1984), 'Left suspect plot as pit debate is delayed', *The Times*, April 5 1984, p1.

Haviland, J, (1984), 'Labour's Shadow Cabinet lines up for the session', *The Times*, November 8 1984, p34.

Hayter, D, (2005), *Fightback: Labour's traditional right in the 1970s and 1980s,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Hayward, R, (1973), *Discontinuation of the Proscribed List*, (London: The Labour Party).

Hazlitt, W, (1818), *Lectures on the English Poets*. http://www.jaffebros.com/lee/gulliver/quotes/on_swift.html, (Accessed 13/01/2009).

Hazlitt, W, (1949), *The Essays of William Hazlitt*, (London: Macdonald Illustrated Classics).

Hazlitt, W, (1970), *Selected Writings*, (London: Penguin Books).

Healey, D, (1975), 'Mr. Healey gives MPs glimpse of reserve powers bill', *The Times*, July 22 1975, p10.

Healey, D, (1989), *The Time of My Life*, (London: Penguin Books).

Heffer, E, (1976), 'The Marxist Strain in Labour Pedigree', *The Times*, December 20 1976, p10.

Heffer, E, (1983), 'Socialists and the Labour Party', *New Left Review*, No. 140, (London: New Left Review), http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=647 (Accessed 10/08/2007).

Heffernan, R, & Marqusee, M, (1992), *Defeat from the Jaws of Victory: Inside Kinnocks Labour Party*, (London: Verso Publishers).

Heffernan, R, (2000), 'Labour and the European Union since 1945' in Brivati B & Heffernan, R (eds) *The Labour Party: A Centenary History*, (London: Macmillan).

Heppell, T, (2002), 'The ideological composition of the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1992–97', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp229-324.

Heppell, T, (2006), *The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992-1997*, (Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press Limited).

Heppell, T, & Hill, M, (2008), 'The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1997: An Analysis of the Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians', *British Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp63-91.

Heppell, T, & Hill, M, (2009), 'Transcending Thatcherism? Ideology and the Conservative Party Leadership Mandate of David Cameron', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 80, No. 3, pp388-399, July-September 2009.

Heppell, T, Crines, A, Nicholls R, (2010), 'Ideological Alignments within the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Leadership Election of 1976', *British Politics,* Vol. 5, No. 1, pp65-91, April 2010.

Heren, L, (1981), 'Foot at 68: Patriot at war over man's inhumanity to man', *The Times,* July 23 1981, p4.

Heywood, A, (2000), *Key Concepts in Politics*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave).

Heywood, A, (2002), *Politics*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave).

Hewson, D, (1982), 'Class split among Welsh electors', *The Times*, September 16 1982, p2.

Hinton, J, (1983), *Labour and Socialism: A History of the British Labour Movement 1867-1974*, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd).

Hoggart, S & Leigh, D, (1981), *Michael Foot: A Portrait*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton).

Holland, S, (1975), *The Socialist Challenge*, (London: Quartet Books).

Holland, S, (1981), 'Too far, too fast', *Labour Weekly,* February 6 1981, p10.

Holland, S, (1984), 'Out of Crisis – International Economic Recovery', in ed., Curran, J, *The Future of the Left*, (Oxford: Polity Press New Socialist).

Hopkins, E, (1979), *A Social History of the English Working Classes*, (London: Edward Arnold).

Huckfield, L, (1975), 'The Governments Income Policy', *The Times*, July 25 1975, p13.

Humphrys, J, (1994), ‘Interview with Robin Cook’ on *BBC One The Record*, 11 December 1994, http://www.bbc.co.uk/otr/intext94-95//Cook11.12.94.html, (Accessed 15/07/2008).

Hutchinson, G, (1976), ‘Mr. Foot’s Giant Step Forward for The Left’, *The Times*, April 3 1976, p14.

Jay, D, (1962), *Socialism in the New Society*, (London: Longmans).

Jeffreys, K, (1993), *The Labour Party Since 1945*, (London: Macmillan).

Jeffreys, K, (1999), *Anthony Crosland: A New Biography*, (London: Richard Cohen Books).

Jeffreys, K, (2002), *Labour Forces: From Ernest Bevan to Gordon Brown*, (London: I. B. Tauris).

Jenkins, H, (1976), Labour Party Archive, *Letter from Hugh Jenkins to Michael Foot*, C13/1, Labour History Archive and Study Centre [LHASC].

Jenkins, R, (1982), 'Home Thoughts From Abroad', in Kennet, W. *The Rebirth of Britain,* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

Jenkins, R, (1991), *Roy Jenkins: Life at the Centre*, (London: Macmillan).

John, P, (2010), 'Quantitative Methods' in *Theory and Methods in Political Science* eds Marsh, D, and Stoker, G, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Johnson, D, (1976), 'Moratorium call to Labour Groups', *The Guardian*, March 22 1976, p6.

Johnson, S, (1890), *Life of Swift*, (London: George Bell & Sons).

Johnson, F, (1981), 'Labour puts heavy guns into Warrington', *The Times*, July 14 1981, p1.

Jones, A, (2007), *Britain and the European Union*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=TPIVYIO4NsoC&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22Frank+Field%22+%22eec%22&sig=ACfU3U3CxRsp98XHuAQp5JoMseKKTbY8kQ&source=gbs_book_other_versions_r&cad=0_1, (Accessed 20/08/2008).

Jones, (1977), 'Our Readers and Tribune Policy' in *Tribune 40: The First Forty Years of a Socialist Newspaper*, (London: Quartet Books).

Jones, M, (1994), *Michael Foot*, (London: Victor Gollancz).

Jones, T, (1977), ‘TGWU sets sights on £50-a-week minimum’, *The Times*, September 17 1977, p2.

Jones, T, (1996), *Remaking the Labour Party from Gaitskell to Blair*, (London: Routledge).

Jones, E, (1988), *Neil Kinnock*, (London: Robert Hale).

Kavanagh, D, (1982), *The Politics of the Labour Party*, (London: George Allen & Unwin).

Kavanagh, D, *et al*, (2004), *Politics UK* (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd).

Kellner, P, (1976), 'Anatomy of the Vote', *New Statesman,* pp461-463.

Kershaw, R, (1981), 'Labour rift in Yorkshire: Scargill 'hit list' aims to keep out the moderates', *The Times*, April 9 1981, p4.

Kershaw, R, (1981), 'Miners choose Benn supporter', *The Times*, June 30 1981, p3.

Kitchen, M, (1988), *Europe Between The Wars*, (Harlow: Longman).

Kogan, D, & Kogan, M, (1982), *The Battle for the Labour Party*, (Glasgow: Fontana Books).

Kynaston, D, (2007), *Austerity Britain: 1945-1951*, (London: Bloomsbury).

Labour Party, (1974), *Let Us Work Together: Labours way out of the crisis*, (London: Labour Party), http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab74feb.htm, (Accessed 10/04/2009).

Labour Party, (1974), *Britain Will Win With Labour*, (London: Labour Party), http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab74oct.htm, (Accessed 10/04/2009).

Labour Party, (1983), *A New Hope for Britain*, (London: Labour Party), http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab83.htm, (Accessed 09/07/2009).

Labour Weekly, (1976), 'Into Round Two: Events give a boost to Jim and Michael', *Labour Weekly*, March 26 1976, p1.

Labour Weekly, (1976), 'The Former Rebel who has strong trade union links', *Labour Weekly*, April 2 1976, p6).

Labour Weekly, (1976), 'There's No Catch, Says Jim', *Labour Weekly,* April 9 1976, p1.

Labour Weekly, (1976), '3-point plan by the CLPD', *Labour Weekly*, April 23, 1976, p12.

Labour Weekly, (1980), 'Who Rules The Party?', *Labour Weekly*, October 17 1980, p1.

Labour Weekly, (1980), 'Labour Party Leader', *Labour Weekly*, October 17 1980, p6.

Labour Weekly, (1980), 'Foot: Deputy Leader is pushed forward', *Labour Weekly*, October 24 1980, p3.

Labour Weekly, (1980), 'A Double Battle', *Labour Weekly, October 31 1980, p1.*

Labour Weekly, (1980), 'Fellow travellers', *Labour Weekly*, December 19 1980, p7.

Labour Weekly, (1983), 'The Darlington turning point', *Labour Weekly*, p8.

Langdon, J, (1976), 'Revolt in Looming!', *Labour Weekly*, January 16 1976, p1.

Langdon, J, (1976), 'The Race Is On!', *Labour Weekly*, March 19 1976, p1.

Langdon, J, (1976), 'A Close Finish', *Labour Weekly,* April 2 1976, p1.

Langdon, J, (1976), 'Best Foot Forward', *Labour Weekly*, April 16 1976, p3.

Laski, H, (1935), *The State in Theory and in Practice*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd).

Laybourn, K, (1988), *The Labour Party: 1881-1951*, (Gloucester: Alan Sutton).

Laybourn, K, (1988), *The Rise of Labour*, (London: Edward Arnold).

Laybourn, K, (1991), 'One of the Little Breezes Blowing Across Bradford: The Bradford Independent Labour Party and Trade Unionism 1890-1914' in James, D & Laybourn, K, eds, *The Rising Sun of Socialism*, (Hertford: West Yorkshire Archive Service).

Laybourn, K, (1995), *The Evolution of British Social Policy and the Welfare State*, (Keele: Keele University Press).

Laybourn, K, (2000), *A Century of Labour: A History of the Labour Party 1900-2000*, (Stroud: Alan Sutton & Sutton).

Levin, B, (1977), 'One eye for the glib and a salute to the brave', *The Times*, April 6 1977, p16.

Lloyd, T, (1993), *Empire, Welfare State, Europe: English History 1906-1992*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Lowe, N, (1998), *Mastering Modern British History*, (London: Macmillan).

Ludlam, S & Smith, M, (1996), *Contemporary British Conservatism*, (New York: St. Martins Press).

Macmillan, H, (1962), 'Support for Mr Kennedy and Assent from Mr Khrushchev', *The Times,* March 6 1962, p16.

McNabb, D, (2004), *Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe).

Magee, B, (2003), ‘I think therefore I write’ in *The Guardian*, June 7 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2003/jun/07/classicalmusicandopera.interviews, (Accessed 15/08/2008).

Marx, K, *et al*, (1974), *Marx Engels Lenin On Historical Materialism*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers).

Marx, K, (1995), *Capital*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Matthew, C, (2005), *The Nineteenth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

McCormick, P, (1980), 'The Labour Party: Three Unnoticed Changes', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp 381-387.

McLaughlin, C, (1983), 'Michael Foot and the 'conspiracy'', *Labour Weekly*, February 25 1983, p3.

Meredith, S, (2005), 'Labour Party Revisionism and Public Expenditure: Divisions of Social Democratic Political Economy in the 1970's', *Labour History Review*, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp 254-267.

Meredith, S, (2007), 'Factionalism on the Parliamentary Right of the British Labour Party in the 1970's: A Reassessment', *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp55-77.

Meredith, S, (2008), *Labours Old and New: The Parliamentary Right of the British Labour Party 1970-1979 and the roots of New Labour*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Mikardo, I, (1948), *The Second Five Years*, (London: Fabian Publishers)

Mikardo, I, (1951), *To Be A Woman,* directed by Jill Craigie, Great Britain, Outlook Films.

Minkin, L, (1991), *The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).

Mitchell, A, (1980), 'Controlling the money supply', *The Times*, March 17 1980, p24.

Mitchell, A, (1995), *Election '45 – Reflections on the Revolution in Britain*, (London: Bellew Publishing).

Moorehead, C, (1976), 'Tarnished prize that is still worth the winning', *The Times*, May 17 1976, p10.

Morgan, K, (1975), *Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist,* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson).

Morgan, K, (1987), *Labour People: Leaders and Lieutenants - Hardie to Kinnock*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Morgan, K, (1997), *Callaghan: A Life*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Morgan, K, (2007), *Michael Foot*, (London: Harper Collins).

Mortimer, J, (1983), Labour Party Archive, *Interim Report by the General Secretary to the National Executive Committee*, L26/18, Labour History Archive and Study Centre [LHASC].

Morton, A. L, & Tate, G, (1956), *The British Labour Movement*, (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd).

Moseley, B, (2007), *Joan Vickers*, (Plymouth: The Encyclopaedia of Plymouth History), http://www.plymouthdata.info/PP-VickersJoan.htm, (Accessed 07/09/2009).

Mosse, W, (1967), 'The February Regime: Prerequisites for Success', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp100-108.

Nelson, F, (2006), 'Cameron clouding the clear blue water', *Scotland on Sunday*, January 1st 2006, http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/conservativeleader/Cameron-clouding-the-clear-blue.2738840.jp (Accessed 07/10/2009).

New Statesman, (1976), 'The Choice Before Labour', *New Statesman*, March 19 1976, p1.

New Statesman, (1976), 'Why Foot Got Stuck', *New Statesman*, April 2 1976, p420.

New Statesman, (1976), 'Behind The Personalities', *New Statesman,* April 2 1976, p422.

New Statesman, (1976), 'The Press and Michael Foot', *New Statesman*, April 2 1976, p423.

New Statesman, (1976), 'The People's Jim', *New Statesman*, April 9 1976, p438.

New Statesman, (1980), 'Playing the percentage game', *New Statesman*, October 31 1980, p6.

New Statesman, (1980), 'Regan, Healey, Foot', *New Statesman*, November 7 1980, p2.

New Statesman, (1980), 'Labour pay the price of too much unity', *New Statesman*, June 3 1980, p7.

New Statesman, (1980), 'Mary Holland studies the press coverage of Michael Foot', *New Statesman*, June 3 1980, p10.

New Statesman, (1983), 'A Watershed Election', *New Statesman,* June 10 1983, p3.

Norton, P, (1980), *Dissension in the House of Commons 1974-1979*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Norton, P, (1990), 'The Lady's not for turning but what about the rest? Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party 1979-1989', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp41-58.

Noyes, H, (1975), ‘Labour rebels help to defeat Government on pensioner earnings’, *The Times*, January 30 1975, p1.

Noyes, H, (1975), 'Labours strains and tensions bubble up', *The Times*, July 11 1975, p1.

Noyes, H, (1975), 'Mr Foot threatens to quit if penal pay powers are used', *The Times*, July 23 1975, p1.

Noyes, H, (1980), 'Labour left will seek to cancel Polaris missile replacement', *The Times*, July 16 1980, p6.

Noyes, H, (1980), 'Heseltine climb-down on rent increases after Commons uproar', *The Times*, November 14 1980, p1.

O'Brien, C, (2002), *Edmund Burke*, (London: Vintage).

O'Brien, J, (1978), 'MPs Aide quits in Labour row', *The Times*, March 27 1978, p2.

Owen, D, (1987), *Personally Speaking*, (London: Pan Books).

Owen, D, (1991), *Time to Declare*, (London: Michael Joseph).

Panitch, L, (1986), *Working Class Politics in Crisis*, (London: Verso).

Parker, R, (1977), 'Lady Falkender wrote out honours list, Haines book claims', *The Times*, February 7 1977, p1.

Pearce, E, (1997), *The Lost Leaders: The Best Prime Ministers We Never Had*, (London: Warner Books).

Pearce, E, (2002), *Denis Healey: A Life in Our Times*, (London: Little, Brown).

Pelling, H, (1965), *The Origins of the Labour Party,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Pelling, H, (1985), *A Short History of the Labour Party*, (London: Macmillan Press).

Phillips, G, (1992), *The Rise of the Labour Party 1893-1931*, (London: Routledge),

Pimlott, B, (1985), *Hugh Dalton*, (London: Jonathan Cape).

Pollard, S, (2005), *David Blunkett*, (London: Hodder & Stoughton).

Pope, A, (1737), *Epistle to Augustus.*
http://www.jaffebros.com/lee/gulliver/quotes/on_swift.html, (Accessed 13/01/2009).

Powell, E, (1977), *Wrestling With The Angel*, (London: Sheldon Press).

Prescott, J, (2008), *Prezza – My Story: Pulling No Punches*, (London: Headline Review).

Pugh, M, (1999), *Britain Since 1789 – A Concise History*, (London: Macmillan).

Pugh, M, (2004), *State and Society: A Social and Political History of Britain 1870-1997*, (London: Arnold Publishers).

Pugh, M, (2010), *Speak for Britain: A New History of the Labour Party*, (London: The Bodley Head).

Punnett, R, (1984), *British Government and Politics*, (London: Heinemann).

Punnett, R, (1992), *Selecting the Party Leader: Britain In Comparative Perspective*, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).

Radice, G, (1981), 'Change Your Mind, David Owen', *Labour Weekly*, January 30 1981, p7.

Radice, G, (2002), *Friends and Rivals: Crosland, Jenkins and Healey,* (London: Little, Brown).

Radice, G, (2004), *Diaries 1980-2001 - From Political Disaster to Electoral Triumph,* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson).

Raphael, A, (1976), 'Foot may be ahead on first ballot', *The Observer,* March 21 1976, p1.

Raphael, A, (1976), 'Foot's manifesto: Our hopes and our dreams', *The Observer*, March 21 1976, p12.

Rapple, R, (2006), 'Government feared British withdrawal from EEC', *The Sunday Business Post*, January 1st 2006, http://archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2006/01/01/story10709.asp, (Accessed 15/08/2008).

Rayner, J, (2006), 'Frank Field: Still Thinking the Unthinkable', *The Guardian*, July 2nd 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/jul/02/publicservices.theobserver, (Accessed 31/10/2008).

Reuters, (1981), 'Labor Party In Britain Takes Turn to the Left', *The New York Times*, November 25th 1981, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE3D91638F936A15752C1A967948260, (Accessed 25/12/2008).

Robertson, D, (1976), *A Theory of Party Competition*, (London: John Wiley & Sons).

Rollyson, C, (2005), *To Be A Woman – The Life of Jill Craigie*, (London: Aurum Press).

Roper, J, (1978), *Paper submitted on behalf of the Labour Committee for Europe by its Chairman, Mr John Roper, MP*, (London: The Labour Party). http://www.ena.lu/point_view_labour_committee_europe_october_1978-020004530.html (Accessed 23/06/2008).

Rose, R, (1964), 'Parties, factions and tendencies' in *Political Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp33-46.

Rosen, G, (2005), *Old Labour to New: The Dreams that Inspired – The Battles that Divided*, (London: Politicos).

Roth, A, (2001), 'Frank Dobson' in *The Guardian*, March 19 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/mar/19/profiles.parliament7, (Accessed 20/07/2008).

Roth, A, (2001), 'Jack Straw' in *The Guardian*, March 20 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/mar/20/jackstraw, (Accessed 25/07/2008).

Roth, A, (2002), 'Neville Sandelson' in *The Guardian,* January 17 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2002/jan/17/guardianobituaries.obituaries, (Accessed 25/07/2008).

Roth, A, (2003), 'Bob Mitchell' in *The Guardian*, September 25 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2003/sep/25/guardianobituaries.obituaries, (Accessed 25/07/2008).

Rousseau, J.J, (2005), *Jean-Jacques Rousseau – Selected Writings*, (London: CRW Publishing Limited).

Routledge, P, (1974), 'Miners' pay talks start again as end of Phase Three is signalled', *The Times*, March 6 1974, p1.

Routledge, P, (1984), 'Unions split over Murray ban on sympathy strikes', *The Times*, May 21 1984, p1.

Routledge, P, (1993), *Scargill*, (London: Harper Collins).

Routledge, P, (1995), *Madam Speaker: The Life of Betty Boothroyd*, (London: Harper Collins).

Russell, B, (1946), *History of Western Philosophy*, (London: George Allen & Unwin).

Schneer, J, (1988), *Labour's Conscience*, (London: Unwin Hyman).

Seldon, A & Collings, D, (2000), *Britain Under Thatcher*, (Harlow: Longman).

Seldon, A & Snowdon, P, (2004), *The Conservative Party*, (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd).

Seton, C, (1981), 'SDP making running in Warrington', *The Times*, July 2 1981, p2.

Seyd, P, (1987), *The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left*, (London: Macmillan Education).

Shaw, E, (1988), *Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Shaw, E, (1999), 'Michael Foot: 1980-1983' in *Leading Labour from Keir Hardie to Tony Blair*, ed. Jefferys, K, (London: I. B. Tauris).

Shore, P, (1993), *Leading the Left*, (London: Weidenfield & Nicholson).

Short, R, (1971), *Negotiations with Great Britain,* http://www.ena.lu/, (Accessed 20/07/2008).

Silkin, S, (1981), 'Centre parties in an adult relationship', *The Times*, June 5 1981, p15.

Simkin, J, (1997), *Herbert George Wells*, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Jwells.htm (Accessed 12/01/2009).

Simkin, J, (1997), *1941 Committee*, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WW1941.htm, (Accessed 27/11/2009).

Slattery, M, (1991), *Key Ideas In Sociology*, (London: Macmillan).

Smith, G, (1974), 'Labour moderates all out to win party post', *The Times,* October 26 1974, p2.

Smith, G, (1975), 'The phoney war and the real conflict in the Prentice affair', *The Times*, March 7 1975, p14.

Smith, G, (1976), 'The real threat from the left if Labour goes out under an economic cloud', *The Times,* December 8 1976, p16.

Smith, G, (1980), 'Five women could change the shape of Labour's future', *The Times*, July 18 1980, p14.

Smith, J. B, (1980), *Dods Parliamentary Companion 1980*, (London: Dods Parliamentary Companion Ltd).

Smith, L, (1964), *Harold Wilson*, (London: Fontana Books).

Smith, L, (1992), 'Religion and the ILP' in eds James, D, *et al*, *The Centennial History of the Independent Labour Party*, (Halifax: Ryburn Publishing).

Stark, L, (1996), *Choosing a Leader: Party Leadership Contests in Britain from Macmillan to Blair*, (London: Macmillan Press).

Stevenson, J & Cook, C, (1994), *Britain in the Depression: Society and Politics 1929-1939*, (London: Longman).

Straw, J, (1980), 'Choice of Mr. Foot by Labour', *The Times*, November 13 1980, p15.

Tatchell, P, (1983), *The Battle for Bermondsey*, (London: Heretic Books).

Taylor, A. J. P, (1972), *Beaverbrook*, (London: Hamish Hamilton).

Thatcher, M, (1993), *The Downing Street Years*, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers).

Thatcher, M, (1995), *The Path to Power,* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers).

The Guardian, (1976), 'A victor who needs more than victory', *The Guardian*, March 31 1976, p1.

The Guardian, (1976), 'Foot Spurns Middle Road To Power', *The Guardian*, April 1 1976, p1.

The Telegraph, (2008), 'Hugh Brown' in *The Telegraph*, March 16 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1581540/Hugh-Brown.html, (Accessed 07/09/2008).

The Times, (1935), 'Government case in Wales', *The Times,* October 31 1935, p9.

The Times, (1945), 'Little Change Likely', *The Times*, July 4 1945, p8.

The Times, (1951), 'A Well Received Budget', *The Times*, April 11 1951, p6.

The Times, (1952), 'Mr. Gaitskell on Bevan group', *The Times*, October 6 1952, p6.

The Times, (1954), 'Mr. Bevan for Back Bench', *The Times*, April 15 1954, p8.

The Times, (1954), 'NUR Nominate Mr. Bevan', *The Times*, June 25 1954, p2.

The Times, (1954), 'Bevanites Defiant', *The Times*, November 11 1954, p8.

The Times, (1955), 'Labour Party Divisions', *The Times*, March 4 1955, p5.

The Times, (1955), 'Majority of 29 for action against Mr. Bevan', March 17 1955, p6.

The Times, (1959), '"Barmy" to vote Labour', *The Times*, October 6 1959, p15.

The Times, (1959), 'Personalities In and Out', *The Times*, October 9 1959, p12.

The Times, (1959), 'Conference applauds Mr. Bevan', *The Times,* November 30 1959, p10.

The Times, (1960), 'Mr Foot in at Ebbw Vale', *The Times*, November 19 1960, p4.

The Times, (1960), 'Both sides gain point in Labour Party dispute', *The Times,* December 1 1960, p8.

The Times, (1961), 'Labour whip withheld from 5 MPs', *The Times*, March 17 1961, p14.

The Times, (1963), 'Mr Wilson tops Labour leadership poll', *The Times,* February 8 1963, p10.

The Times, (1963), 'Whip restored to 5 Labour MPs', *The Times,* May 30 1963, p12.

The Times, (1964), 'Gay, Aggressive New Posters, but Provinces Stick to the Old Sort', *The Times,* October 8 1964, p16.

The Times, (1965), ‘Steel Defiance by 30 Left-Wingers’, *The Times*, November 11 1965, p12.

The Times, (1965), ‘End Bombing’ Call By 68 MPs’, *The Times*, December 18 1965, p6.

The Times, (1966), 'Radical Drive in N. Hull Election', *The Times*, January 5 1966, p6.

The Times, (1969), 'Backbench revolt on Castle plan gathers pace', *The Times*, February 28 1969, p3.

The Times, (1969), ‘Warning from Callaghan’, *The Times*, May 5 1969, p8.

The Times, (1972), 'Business Diary: 'Lefta', new Labour economic group', *The Times*, March 23 1972, p25.

The Times, (1972),’Rank and File demand more public ownership’, *The Times*, October 4 1972, P4.

The Times, (1973), ‘Problems of staffing hotels and restaurants’, *The Times*, July 11 1973, p7.

The Times, (1974), ‘Has anyone seen the left-wing bogymen?’ *The Times*, July 17 1974, p16.

The Times, (1974), ‘Left keeps hold on party’s European policy group’, *The Times*, November 20 1974, p2.

The Times, (1975), 'Protest by Editors over Closed Shop Bill', *The Times,* January 8 1975, p3.

The Times, (1975), 'Bill Enforcing Closed Shop is Criticised by MP', *The Times,* January 15 1975, p3.

The Times, (1975), 'Concessions for Editors in Closed Shop Bill', *The Times*, January 24 1975, p4.

The Times, (1975), ‘No action on PPSs in revolt on Queen’s pay’, *The Times*, February 28 1975, p4.

The Times, (1975) '38 ministers among 145 Labour MPs voting against the Government', *The Times*, April 10 1975, p4.

The Times, (1975), ‘How MPs voted on EEC White Paper’ in *The Times*, April 11 1975, p6

The Times, (1975), 'Mr Benn a Dracula, Sir Keith Says', *The Times,* May 8 1975, p3.

The Times, (1975), ’56 Labour MPs rebel on defence cuts’, *The Times*, May 8 1975, p3.

The Times, (1975), 'Mr. Foot fears the great coalition device', *The Times,* May 17 1975, p4.

The Times, (1975). 'The Attack on Inflation: White Paper explains reasons for £6 limit on pay rises', *The Times*, July 12 1975, p4.

The Times, (1975), 'Seven point plan for textiles fails to satisfy angry Labour MPs: industry 'fed up with promises', *The Times*, July 24 1975, p4.

The Times, (1975), 'Left Wing MPs vote against Anti-IRA Bill', *The Times*, November 27 1975, p4.

The Times, (1975), 'Defeat for left in union MPs elections', *The Times*, December 11 1975, p3.

The Times (1976), 'Moderates win two seats', *The Times*, May 14 1976, p2.

The Times, (1976), 'Labour group to fight devolution', *The Times*, August 2 1976, p2.

The Times, (1976), 'Mr Foot asks for India's help on Rhodesia', *The Times*, October 7 1976, p8.

The Times, (1976), 'Labour Looks for a Deputy', *The Times,* October 14 1976, p15.

The Times, (1976), 'Speaker to rule on SDA list of names', *The Times*, November 18 1976, p12.

The Times, (1977), 'Labour MP says Mr Foot is wrong over India', *The Times*, January 10 1977, p4.

The Times, (1977), 'Mr Tomney dropped from moderates European list', *The Times*, January 27 1977, p3.

The Times (1977), 'Left wingers criticize dismissal of aides', *The Times*, February 7 1977, p2.

The Times, (1977), 'NATO again puts off decision on Awacs', *The Times*, March 26 1977, p3.

The Times, (1977), 'Mr. Foot persuades MPs to put Guillotine on Scotland Bill: Majority 26', *The Times*, November 17 1977, p7.

The Times, (1978), 'High Taxation is a fine on success', *The Times*, April 18 1978, p8.

The Times, (1978), 'Mrs Thatcher's confidence challenge to Prime Minister', *The Times*, May 10 1978, p4.

The Times, (1979), 'Job prospects worsened', *The Times*, November 13 1979, p12.

The Times, (1980), 'Wrong for taxpayers to subsidize Eton', *The Times*, June 4 1980, p16.

The Times, (1980), ‘Mr Prior’s warning of hard slog ahead’, *The Times*, June 25 1980, p6.

The Times, (1980), ‘Media’s negative attitude to EEC’, *The Times*, November 25 1980, p4.

The Times, (1980), ‘Why the Labour Party structure must change’, *The Times,* September 22 1980, p12.

The Times, (1980), ‘Trade has improved in nearly all markets’, *The Times*, October 28 1980, p8.

The Times, (1980), ‘Shadow Cabinet discusses Leadership Election issue’, *The Times*, November 6 1980, p2.

The Times, (1980), ‘MLR cut ‘as soon as possible’, *The Times*, November 7 1980, p9.

The Times, (1980), ‘Media’s negative attitude to EEC’, *The Times*, November 25 1980, p4.

The Times, (1981), ‘To quit EEC would affect jobs badly’, *The Times*, January 22 1981, p11.

The Times, (1981), 'Foot plea for Party to accept verdict', *The Times*, January 26 1981, p4.

The Times, (1981), ‘Mrs Thatcher insists that way to provide sound long-term jobs is to fight inflation now’, *The Times*, February 4 1981, p9.

The Times, (1981), ‘Mrs Thatcher says it is unlikely that neutron bombs would need to be based in Britain’, *The Times*, February 6 1981, p10.

The Times, (1981), ‘Socialism by consent pledge in statement’, *The Times*, April 3 1981, p2.

The Times, (1981), ‘Employment: Ministers think young people are being paid too much’, *The Times*, July 1 1981, p8.

The Times, (1981), ‘Labour MP wins vote’, *The Times*, August 27 1981, p3.

The Times, (1981), ‘More Than 20 MPs Withhold Their Votes’, *The Times*, September 28 1981, p1.

The Times, (1981), ‘Labour censure motion on unemployment’, *The Times*, October 21 1981, p8.

The Times, (1981), ‘Six MPs promoted to Foot’s front bench’, *The Times*, November 28 1981, p2.

The Times, (1982), 'Tatchell to test Foot's peace pact', *The Times*, January 11th 1982, p2.

The Times, (1982), ‘Left MP in challenge to Varley’, *The Times*, February 24 1982, p2.

The Times, (1982), ‘Frigate ordered: Nott defends carriers sale’, *The Times*, February 24 1982, p4.

The Times, (1982), ‘EEC at its best and its worst’, *The Times*, May 27 1982, p4.

The Times, (1982), 'Poll Result', *The Times*, June 28 1982, p2.

The Times, (1982), ‘Mr. Frank McElhone – Obituary’, *The Times*, September 24 1982, p14.

The Times, (1982), 'Picture Gallery', *The Times,* December 9 1982, p2.

The Times, (1983), 'Tatchell plea for respite from press', *The Times*, January 15th 1983, p2.

The Times, (1983), ‘Pre-Budget clash over levels of family taxation’ *The Times*, March 9 1983, p4.

The Times, (1983), 'Abusive start to election campaign', *The Times*, April 26 1983, p1.

The Times, (1983), 'Labour losing votes on nuclear issue', *The Times*, May 31 1983, p4.

The Times, (1983), ‘Pressure to curb cost of CAP’, *The Times*, July 1 1983, p4.

The Times, (1983), ‘Labour looks again at Scottish devolution’, *The Times*, September 16 1983, p2.

The Times, (1983), 'Foot says farewell, and speaks of the shame of Conservative victory', *The Times*, October 5 1983, p4.

The Times, (1984), ‘The Economy: Shore on why MPs should stay at work’, *The Times*, July 27 1984, p4.

The Times, (1984), ‘Trade unions losing their good name’, *The Times*, August 1 1984, p4.

The Times, (1984), ‘Labour right field 15 for Shadow team’, *The Times*, October 15 1984, p2.

The Times, (1985), ‘The Economy: PM wants 3% inflation’ *The Times*, May 22 1985, p4.

Thomas, C, (1981), 'Party leaders to discuss Maze man's poll victory', *The Times,* April 11 1981, p1.

Thomas, C, (1981), 'Tenth Maze death rallies voters in Fermanagh vote', *The Times*, August 21 1981, p2.

Thomas, G, (1985), *George Thomas, Mr. Speaker: The Memoirs of Viscount Tonypandy*, (London: Guild Publishing).

Thomson, A, (2000), *An Introduction to African Politics*, (London: Routledge).

Thompson, L, (1971), *The Enthusiasts*, (London: Victor Gollancz).

Thorpe, A, (2008), *A History of the British Labour Party*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave).

Times Political Correspondent, (1951), 'Mr. Bevan Resigns from Government', *The Times*, April 23rd 1951, p4.

Thomson, A, (2000), *An Introduction to African Politics,* (London: Routledge).

Thomson, S, (2004), *Rt. Hon John Ernest Silkin*, http://www.stuartthomson.co.uk/books/biography/silkin/

Time Magazine, (1941), 'Great Britain: 1941 Committee', *Time Magazine*, April 21 1941, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,772686-1,00.html

Time Magazine, (1958), 'Foreign News: Tangled Feet', *Time Magazine*, January 20 1958, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,868165,00.html

Timmins, N, (1983), 'Councils to fight civil defence plans', *The Times*, April 29 1983, p2.

Tracy, N, (1983), *The Origins of the Social Democratic Party*, (London: Croom Helm).

Tribune, (1977), *Tribune at 40: The First Forty Years of a Socialist Newspaper*, (London: Quartet Books).

Turner, A, (2008), *Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 1970s*, (London: Aurum).

Watkins, A, (2010), 'Michael Foot: An Intellectual Prizefighter', *The Independent*, March 7 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/alan-watkins/alan-watkins-michael-foot-ndash-an-intellectual-prizefighter-1917426.html (Accessed September 14 2010).

Webb, C, (1975), 'Ford man is tipped for key post', *The Times*, April 26 1975, p17.

Webberburn, W, (1974), Labour Party Archive, *Letter from William Webberburn to Michael Foot,* C13/1, Labour History Archive and Study Centre [LHASC].

Webster, P, (1981), 'Williams heading for astonishing win, poll says', *The Times*, November 23 1981, p3.

Webster P, & Haviland J, (1981), 'Williams wins Crosby with 5,289 majority in first SDP victory', *The Times,* November 27 1981, p1.

Webster, P, (1983), 'Labour chiefs trying to lose', *The Times,* February 11 1983, p2.

Webster, P, (1985), 'The massacre that misfired', *The Times*, April 24 1985, p12.

Wells, H.G, (1905), *A Modern Utopia*, (North Carolina: University of North Carolina, The Project Guttenburg),

http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/mdntp10h.htm, (Accessed 12/01/2009).

Wells, H.G, (2005), *The Shape of Things to Come*, (London: Penguin Classics).

Wells, H.G. (2005), *The Time Machine,* (London: Penguin Classics).

Wells, H.G. (2005), *War of the Worlds*, (London: Penguin Classics).

Westindian World, (1976), 'We Say Michael Foot Is The Man For The Job', *Westindian World*, March 26-April 1 1976, p1.

Westlake, M, (1974), 'Thresholds Give Sharp Boost to Wage Inflation in November', *The Times,* December 19 1974, p17.

Westlake, M, (2001), *Kinnock: The Biography*, (London: Little Brown & Company).

White, M, (2010), 'Former Labour leader Michael Foot dies', *The Guardian,* March 3 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/mar/03/michael-foot-dies (Accessed August 11 2010).

Whitely, P, (1983), *The Labour Party In Crisis*, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd).

Whitlam, G, (1975), 'Better terms can give Britain a new deal in Europe, Mr. Wilson says', *The Times,* May 1 1975, p4.

Witherow, J, (1981), 'Alliance delight at attacks in Croydon battle', *The Times*, October 12 1981, p2.

Williams, P, (1982), ‘Changing Styles of Labour Leadership’ in *Politics of the Labour Party*, (London: George and Unwin).

Williams, F, (1950), *Fifty Years March: The Rise of the Labour Party*, (London: Odhams Press Limited).

Wilson, H, (1975), 'Better terms can give Britain a new deal in Europe, Mr. Wilson says', *The Times,* May 1 1975, p4.

Winder, J, (1980), *et al*, ‘Special conference in January will consider method of electing future party leader’, *The Times*, October 3 1980, p4.

Winder, J, (1983), 'Thatcher and Foot find agreement in PR attack', *The Times*, June 9 1983, p4.

Wolff, J, (1996), *An Introduction to Political Philosophy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Wood, D, (1967), ‘Incomes Stand By Union MPs’, *The Times*, February 2 1967, p1.

Wood, D, (1969), 'Anti-strike bill abandoned by Wilson', *The Times*, June 19 1969, p1.

Wood, D, (1970), 'Jenkins Elected Wilson's Deputy', *The Times,* July 9 1970, p1.

Wood, D, (1972), ‘Mr Wilson dismisses Market campaigner from his front bench’, *The Times*, January 20 1972, p2.

Wood, D, (1975), 'Mr Wilson's Europeanist Coalition', *The Times*, March 17 1975, p13.

Wood, D, (1975), 'Mr Wilson must stop anti-EEC rout or risk leadership', *The Times*, March 25 1975, p1.

Wood, D, (1975), ‘Last Left-Wing MPs their places on Labour liaison body’, *The Times*, November 28 1975, P3.

Wood, D (1976), ‘Mr Foot leads Mr Callaghan by six votes in the first ballot’, *The Times*, March 26 1976, p1.

Wood, D, (1976), 'Mr Callaghan wins second ballot by eight votes but Mr Foot will fight on', *The Times*, March 31 1976, p1.

Wood, D, (1976), ‘Mr. Callaghan likely successor after shock decision by Mr. Wilson’, *The Times,* May 17 1976, p1.

Wood, D, (1976), ‘Clear alternatives in two Labour elections’, *The Times*, December 6 1976, p3.

Wood, D, (1977), ‘Tories Are Warned Not to Write off Mr. Benn’s Leadership Potential’, *The Times*, November 28 1977, p2.

Young, J, (1983), 'Low turnout for Foot as job march ends', *The Times*, June 6 1983, p5.

Young, W, (1977), 'The Miners and the National Interest', in *Tribune 40 – The First Forty Years of a Socialist Newspaper*, (ed Hill, D) (London: Quartet Books).

Ziegler, P, (1993), *Wilson*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).