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ON THE EDGES OF EUROPE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RADICAL RIGHT SOCIAL MOVEMENT
ORGANISATIONS IN HUNGARY AND GREAT BRITAIN

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A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

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On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of radical right social movement
organisations in Hungary and Great Britain
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This project examines questions of collective action, namely why people seek to participate in social movement organisations and why they maintain membership in those organisations. This study looks specifically at radical right organisations in Hungary and Great Britain, and asks why individuals adopt nationalist views. Two groups were compared: The Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM) and the English Defence League (EDL).

Three methodologies were used for comparison. Secondary survey analysis was conducted in order to provide insight into the Hungarian and British social context and some factors which move people to adopt right-wing and far-right views. Online analysis was conducted on organisations' websites and social media accounts to examine methods utilised by the organisation to recruit members and to explore their movement identity formation. Finally, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with movement members, specifically examining how they developed radical right views, why they joined the organisation, and why they maintain membership.

Findings of the statistical analysis showed that in both Hungary and the UK, those with politically right-leaning attitudes and those with far-right attitudes generally had a high satisfaction with their lives. It was also shown that in both the UK and Hungary those with far-right views believe immigrants have a negative effect on their country's cultural life, although these feelings were slightly stronger in the UK sample. In Hungary, results suggest that those on the far-right believe immigrants negatively impact the economy, whereas in the UK this was not found to be a significant factor. Findings of the online analysis revealed the importance of social media to both MÖM and EDL, in terms of recruitment, promoting emotion, and strengthening solidarity among supporters. Qualitative interviews with MÖM members and textual interviews with EDL supporters gave insight into pathways into the movement and the importance of solidarity and emotion.

This study demonstrates the advantage of mix-methods and cross-national comparative studies. This project challenges the idea that radical right supporters are unsatisfied with their lives. The results demonstrate that relative deprivation theory is not enough to explain support; it is rather a person's fear of losing what they already have that can drive them to seek collective action. This study has challenged the idea of strain theory; in a nationalist context, strain theory could be applied to concern over other fellow nationals and not the individual self. This project clearly shows the central importance of the online sphere, especially social media, in the development of movement identity, in the fostering of views and attitudes, and in soliciting support that is not geographically-limited. Finally, this is the first study of its kind and the first study to have access to the Hungarian Defence Movement.

To my father.

Thank you for everything.

I wish you could have seen the final product,

but I suppose there's the 0.01^n chance you can.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This project will examine collective action in radical right street-level organisations in Hungary and Great Britain. There are three main questions which will frame the focus of this investigation: why individuals come to have radical right feelings and attitudes, why individuals choose to join radical right organisations (and specifically the ones they have joined), and why individuals choose to maintain membership in these organisations.

As both recruitment into a movement[1] and an individual's experience of activism are dependent on social context, it is important to consider a comparative approach to these questions to better identify cross-cutting issues (Klandermans, 2013). Hungary and Great Britain were chosen for several reasons, mostly due to their contrasting nature in terms of history and politics. Both countries can be considered outliers of Europe, and the study can be framed in somewhat of an 'east vs. west' dichotomy. As will be seen through the overview of the countries' histories, Great Britain is very much defined by its imperialist past, while Hungarian national identity is very much influenced by centuries of foreign rule. Great Britain sees varying degrees of questions of 'Britishness' and 'Englishness', and a reconfiguring of what it means to be British (further discussion at the end of Section 1.2.1). Hungarian nationalism, on the other hand, is firmly rooted in an identity centred around Hungarian history and irredentism – the desire to reunite lost Hungarian lands and those ethnic Hungarians inhabiting them. Both countries share a dubious perspective of membership in the European Union, as evidenced by the UK's recent referendum voting to leave the EU and by the Hungarian government's constant challenges to EU values and

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[1] Movement, or social movement (see Chapter 2), refers to a larger group of individuals with shared attitudes and goals. Organisations refer to smaller organised groups within movements, with shared attitudes, goals, and under one leadership. There can be several organisations within one social movement. Both terms will be used throughout this study.

laws. Lastly, radical right movements and right-wing political parties have generally had difficulty surviving in Great Britain, while they are strengthening in Hungary.

It is worth noting here the use of both 'the United Kingdom' and 'Great Britain'. In this project, the UK will be used to describe the nation-state, particularly when discussing political issues such as laws, membership in the European Union, and Brexit. When discussing nationalism and radical right organisations in the area, however, Great Britain will be used as a point of reference. Northern Ireland will be largely excluded from discussion due to their different political and social identities, closely tied to religion (Mitchell, 2005) and history. Indeed, YouGov surveys have shown that less than 50 percent of people in Northern Ireland identify as British, compared to 82 percent in England, nearly 80 percent in Wales, and nearly 60 percent in Scotland (Devenport, 2018). Only 4 percent of those from a Catholic background identify themselves as British. While some radical right organisations do demonstrate in Northern Ireland, the politics of Northern Ireland are not the focus here and would detract from the focus of discussion on Great Britain and Britishness. However, while this project largely deals with Great Britain, survey datasets used for the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 did include Northern Ireland in their sample, hence discussing the UK for that methodology, not Great Britain.

Cross-national comparisons are important in criminology (Beirne & Hill, 1991; Farrington & Wikstrom, 1994; Nivette, 2011; Vagg, 1993), politics (Castano, 2004; Jackman, 1985), nationalism studies (Brubaker, 2001; Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Dekker, Malová, & Hoogendorn, 2003; Phalet & Poppe, 1997; Weiss, 2003) and social movement research, especially to better understand mobilisation (Hanspeter, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 2015; Klandermans & Mayer, 2006). Much of the European empirical data, however, offer cross-national comparisons between Western European countries; few look to Eastern Europe (save some exceptions, for example Dekker et al.,

2003; Phalet & Poppe, 1997; Weiss, 2003) and even fewer produce comparisons between Eastern and Western European countries (Dekker et al., 2003 being one exception). The present study will offer a cross-national comparison between Western and Eastern European[2] countries, bringing a unique element to social movement studies and investigations of radical right organisations.

The two groups that will be examined in this study will be the English Defence League (EDL) and the Hungarian Defence Movement (*Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom*, MÖM). These groups were chosen, aside from the accidental synchronisation of their name, for several reasons. The EDL was chosen as it is still one of the largest radical right protest organisations in Great Britain that is still active,[3] and relatively moderate in comparison to some of their more extreme counterparts. In Hungary, MÖM was chosen as they are a larger radical right organisation who are regularly active and are not as extreme as some of their counterparts. Additionally, both groups have relatively large membership numbers and, perhaps most important to this study, are both very active online.

This project has three major phases, which will be used in an attempt to shed light on the research questions. These questions are why individuals adopt nationalist attitudes, why they join radical right movements, and why they maintain membership in these movements. The first phase of this research will be secondary survey analysis of European Social Survey data, in order to help set the context of causation of right-wing and far-right attitudes in Hungary and the UK. Next, an online analysis will provide insight into how these organisations attempt to recruit and how they wish to display the image of their organisation. Lastly, qualitative interviews will be presented with organisation members,

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[2] While Hungary is often referred to as a Central European country, here it will be referred to as Eastern due to its nature as a post-Eastern bloc country.
[3] While the EDL is still an active organisation, as of April 2019 they have been permanently banned from most social media platforms including Facebook and Instagram.

to look further into why individuals join radical right movements and maintain membership.

To begin, a discussion of terminology surrounding the far-right, radical right, and extreme right will be presented in order to clarify terminology used throughout this project. Then, to set the stage for a comparison of radical right organisations in both countries, a short introduction to modern British and Hungarian history will follow. Following that, a short overview of the current landscape of the British and Hungarian radical right movements will be provided to better situate the organisations at the centre of this study.

1.1 DESCRIPTION OF TERMINOLOGY

The following section will attempt to provide clarification on terminology surrounding the radical right and its relationship to other key terms, such as the far-right, and explain the terminology that will be used throughout this study. Following this section, a brief history of events leading to the formation of a far-right in both Great Britain and Hungary will be overviewed. Then, the landscape of the radical right in both Hungary and Great Britain will be presented, including an introduction to the two organisations at the centre of this study.

The discussion of political activism, regardless of ideology, is often framed in a left-right dichotomy. While there is not yet a consensus on the proper terminology for collective action organisations that are the subject of this research, they are unequivocally placed on the right-end of the political spectrum. The use of the left-right dichotomy began in 1789 France, where a seating pattern emerged in the new French National Assembly (Eatwell, 1989a). The nobility and clergy positioned themselves to the right, and those demanding constitutional limitation of the King's power sat to the left. Roger Eatwell (1989a) defines the main oppositions of the right and left. Historically, the right defended the absolute monarch while the left looked to democratic systems to elect a representative body. Economically, the right was in defence of feudal systems and governmental monopoly, while the left defended the free market and protection of the poor. Socially, the right defended the role of the Church and placed importance on authority and tradition, while the left tended to be secular and placed reason above mysticism.

Several authors have attempted to better define the left-right dichotomy. In the 1960s, the right was characterised as an acceptance of the importance of established authority, the acceptance of only advanced institutions, and an emphasis on the individual rather than social rights and needs (Pickles, 1964). In the 1980s, the right was defined by

several characteristics: conservative and perhaps authoritarian doctrines; the importance of obedience, legitimacy, and piety over contract, consent, and justice; the reluctance to separate law and morality; cultural conservatism; respect for heredity and inflexible rights; belief in private property; the belief in elementary freedoms; the belief that free enterprise and capitalist economy are the only systems that can work with human freedom; and belief in original sin (Scruton, 1982). Clearly these definitions are problematic, as they use vague key terms and do not clearly define why an ideology is 'right' as opposed to 'left' (Eatwell 1989b). According to Eatwell, while they do not solve the issue of the left-right dichotomy, several major themes can be seen in the definitions of the right. These are authority and authoritarianism; freedom and liberty; equality, egalitarianism, and elitism; nationalism, racism, and militarism; and human nature (Eatwell 1989b). As British conservative politician Ian Gilmour once said: the right "cannot be exactly defined [but], it is, like the elephant, easily recognized when it is seen" (Gilmour, 1977: 12).

In 1985, British political scientist Nigel Ashford described the right as being associated with hostility to minorities, racism, and xenophobia (in Eatwell, 1989a). While this may be true for some of those on the right, it is not a defining factor for the whole of the 'right'. Here, then, lies the problem. Eatwell (1989c) divided the right into five styles of thought: reactionary, moderate, radical, extreme, and new. The first two types, reactionary and moderate right, can be traced back to eighteenth century thought, namely to an emphasis on freedom and the individual, and the idea that society and people could be made perfect. The following two types, radical and extreme right, are developments of the last two centuries and are a response to the rise of social movements. Finally, the new right was created as a response to socialist governments.

There is no consensus as to the appropriate terminology for these groups, as the landscape of far-right activism is ever-changing: continuously creating new types of

organisations and making others obsolete. While in no way an exhaustive list, the ideologies of organisations and parties similar to those at the centre of this study - combining forms of nationalism, nativism, xenophobia, racism, and authoritarianism - have been described in numerous ways, such as extreme right (Caiani and Parenti, 2013; Wolfreys, 2013), far-right (Akçalı and Korkut, 2012; Mieriņa and Koroļeva, 2015; Pirro and Róna, 2018), radical right (Bar-On, 2018; Buštiková, 2018; Goodwin and Dennison, 2018), right-wing radicalism (Minkenberg, 2002), right-wing populism (Wodak, KhosraviNik, and Mral, 2013), far-right extremism (Treadwell, 2013), right-wing extremism (Mammone, Godin, and Jenkins, 2013; Williams, 2013), extreme right activism (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006; Jackson, 2015), racist extremism (Mudde, 2005), anti-minority mobilisation (Busher, 2016), anti-Islamic mobilisation (Rosenberger and Hadj-Abdou, 2013), among others. Thus, some examples of terminology used to describe those types of organisations and parties subscribing to the above-mentioned attitudes are radical right (Minkenberg, 2002), far-right (Castelli Gattinara and Pirro, 2018; Froio and Ganesh, 2018), extreme right (Mudde, 2000; Mammone, Godin, and Jenkins, 2012), populist radical right (Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2014; Grimm & Pilkington, 2015), and populist street movements (Bartlett, Birdwell, and Littler, 2011).

It is clear that there is no consensus on terminology for these types of organisations, movements, and parties. Far-right will be here considered as an umbrella-term (Feldman and Stocker, 2017) encompassing several types of organisations. Far-right can include political parties, and refer to organisations that have nationalist, nativist, anti-democratic and xenophobic attitudes, among others, and most importantly who do no directly insight violence. Within this umbrella of the 'far-right' is the radical right, referring to the wide range of organisations who are often protest movements and those that can, on some level, insight violence due to their paramilitary nature. Most often, violent organisations will fall

into the extreme right category, discussed below; radical right organisations most often prefer electoral politics (such as Britain First) or street-level protests (Feldman and Stocker, 2017). The English Defence League and Hungarian Defence Movement both fall into the broader category of radical right organisations.[4]

The term radical right is not without problems, however. It can be problematic as there is little agreement on its use (Eatwell, 1989c), and because it can have an ambiguous connotation due to its original American usage and reference to non-partisan organisations, which are not necessarily anti-systemic: "This definition is too ideographic and too loose to account for right-wing political organizations in contemporary Europe" (Ignazi, 2003: 28). Radicalism as a concept is quite important, however, as it focuses on activism and seeks to justify something which does not yet exist (Eatwell, 1989c). What is considered 'radical' is indeed dependent on the political culture and context of a country (Mudde, 2007). While this is clearly problematic in a country like Hungary - where the government promotes ideas of illiberal democracy, xenophobia, and nativism – the term 'radical right' will be understood as a family of organisations believing in certain attitudes, irrelevant of cultural context. At its base, the definition of 'radical' can be understood as an "opposition to fundamental values of liberal democracy" and 'right' as "the belief in a natural order with inequalities" (Mudde, 2007: 26).

Part of the difference between the far-right and radical right lies in "the paucity of its intellectual tradition" (Eatwell, 1989c: 71): while the reactionary, moderate, and perhaps even far-right have generated noteworthy political theorists, the radical and extreme rights

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[4] It must be mentioned that while these organisations are referred to as 'radical right' throughout, the statistical analysis of survey data (Chapter 3) refers to the 'far-right'. This is because the statistical analysis utilises a political left-right scale ranked from 0-10, with 9 and 10 being considered 'far-right'. Measures used for the statistical analysis look at the political standpoint of respondents, not their attitudes and ideology. Hence, it can be said that individuals fall on the 'far-right' of the political scale, but not that they necessarily subscribe to a radical right ideology. However, it can be assumed that if one places themselves at the far-right of the scale, they likely subscribe to many of the values held by the radical right, such as more radical nationalism, nativism, and xenophobia.

have tended to produce propagandists - telling people what to think and not how. The radical right has a significant mythology, centring mainly around nationalism and racism (Eatwell, 1989c). It refers to political movements characterised by, among other things, an allegiance or rejection of pluralism and democratic institutions, an inclination toward authoritarian modes of rule, a fundamental chauvinistic nationalist orientation, a tendency to have a biological understanding of 'race' and ethnicity, and xenophobia (Szayna, 1997).

While often used to refer to political organisations (for example, Minkenberg, 2007; Rydgren, 2007; Mudde, 2012), the term radical right has been used by several scholars (Minkenberg, 2002; Bar-On, 2018; Buštiková, 2018; Goodwin and Dennison, 2018) to refer to those organisations mentioned above, who often rely on protest, who are less violent than those on the more extreme fringes, and who subscribe to nationalist, nativist, xenophobic, and racist attitudes. While political parties can fall under the term radical right, this should be approached with caution; those parties bridging the line between political party and protest movement can be included in this category, such as Britain First in the UK and Mi Hazánk in Hungary, but larger electorally-significant and mainstream parties fall rather under the 'far-right' heading.

The term 'populist right' has also recently been gaining popularity when discussing far-right political activism, especially in electoral politics. Populism is fundamentally a radical understanding of democracy as a government by the people (Pelinka, 2013). It can simply be described by the famous words of Abraham Lincoln: a "government of the people, for the people, and by the people." However, this begs the question: who decides who belongs "to the people'? Again, this term does have political connotations and implies a group's desire to govern.

Those organisations on the more extreme fringes of the radical right are referred to as extreme right organisations. They are often quite violent, hold a white-power ideology,

and subscribe to neo-Nazism. These are the most violent of organisations, but simultaneously the smallest organisations. In the UK and Hungary these would include international organisations such as Blood and Honour and Combat 18. Eatwell (1989c) describes the extreme right as referring to any form of right-wing thought that does not conform to the notion of 'normality'. By definition, 'extremist' views lie outside the mainstream of society, whatever the issue or dimension (Wintrobe, 2006). One significant issue with the term is that 'extreme right' "seems to imply that movements are rather like the non-extreme right, but just a bit more so" (Billig, 1989: 146). The term 'extremism' can also be quite ambiguous in its meaning, as it can refer to any form of extremism. For example, in the twentieth century the term defined the civil rights movement in the United States and anticolonialism in the UK (Wintrobe, 2006).

While part of the appeal of the left-right spectrum lies in its ability to operate as both a duality and a continuum (Eatwell 1989a), this is also part of the danger of using 'left' and 'right' as descriptive terms. In Britain especially, the left-right spectrum has only relatively recently been accepted as the norm in political discourse. Indeed, in surveys conducted in the 1960s, only 25 percent of respondents placed themselves in a left-right political spectrum (Butler & Stokes, 1969). By 1985, this percentage had grown to 82 percent (Heald & Wybrow, 1986). Probably one of the greatest examples of this ambiguity is fascism. According to Piero Ignazi, there are many types of extreme right, and "by extreme right we mean that political/ideological space where fascism is the key reference" (1997: 49). But can fascism really be placed in the right of the political spectrum?

1.1.1 Fascism

The term fascism describes the ideology of a wide variety of far-right movements, especially in the 1930s and 40s, but still seen today (see, for example, Koronaiou, Lagos,

Sakellariou, Kymionis, and Chioraki-Poulo, 2015). It is commonly held that the original meaning of Fascism derives from the latin *fasces*, denoting a bundle of elm or birch rods which were carried by Roman lictors and symbolising unity and authority (Wilkinson, 1987). However, according to Roger Griffin (1998), it derives from the word *fascio*, meaning league, and was chosen by Mussolini to describe his cellular movement of revolutionaries called the *Fasci di combattimento*.

Fascism, with a small 'f,' remains a term difficult to define, and an ongoing academic debate. Wilkinson describes fascism as combining "mass revolutionist strategies with reactionary ideologies compounded of virulent ultra-nationalism, exaltation of irrationality, illegality, violence and fanatical anti-communism" (Wilkinson 1987: 227). Eatwell claims fascism is "a form of thought which preaches the need for social rebirth in order to forge a holistic-national radical Third Way" (Eatwell, 1995: 11). Sternhell claims fascism of the early twentieth century "was a synthesis of organic nationalism and anti-Marxist socialism, a revolutionary movement based on rejection of liberalism, democracy and Marxism," and he asserts that it rejected "materialism-liberalism, democracy and Marxism" (Sternhell, 1987: 148).

Generally, the most accepted definition is Roger Griffin's description of fascism as "a form of palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism" (1995: 4), whereby palingenesis is a total transformation of state, economics, and society, from the governmental through to the cultural level (Szele, 2012). Accordingly, generic fascism "is identified with a whole range of forces which crush any genuine human creativity of word or deed: totalitarianism, brainwashing, state terror, social engineering, fanaticism, orchestrated violence, blind obedience" (Griffin, 1995: 1).

Researchers have long sought to define a 'fascist minimum,' that is, the lowest common denominator of the defining features of fascism (Griffin, 1995). Indeed, Griffin

himself struggles with its definition, and has continued to modify his original elegant definition of fascism. In 1998 he stated that researchers seem to agree on the following definition: "fascism is a genus of modern, revolutionary, 'mass' politics which, while extremely heterogeneous in its social support and in the specific ideology promoted by its many permutations, draws its internal cohesion and driving force from a core myth that a period of perceived national decline and decadence is giving way to one of rebirth and renewal in a post-liberal new order" (Griffin 1998:14). Later in 2004, Griffin defined fascism as a "revolutionary form of nationalism bent on mobilizing all 'healthy' social and political energies to resist the onslaught of 'decadence' so as to achieve the goal of national rebirth, a project that involves the regeneration (palingenesis) of both the political culture and the social and ethical culture underpinning it" (Griffin and Feldman, 2004: 6).

According to Cas Mudde's survey of 58 differing approaches of fascism in academic studies (1996; 2000), five features were common to nearly all the authors surveyed: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and a strong state. However, it seems that there can never be an objective definition of fascism since, as also seen in Mudde's survey, this definition at most is an 'ideal type.' Therefore, this term is too abstruse for the current study, but if and when the term does arise Roger Griffin's definition will be understood.

1.1.2 Nationalism

Found at the centre of the attitudes of these organisations, regardless of the terminology used to describe them, is undoubtedly a radical form of nationalism. For this reason, nationalism deserves discussion. The definition and origin of nationalism is something that has occupied many a scholar and theorist. While this is not the place for an

in-depth discussion of the debate, some of the key points relating to this study will be overviewed.

Firstly, it should be clarified what is meant when discussing a 'nation', the concept which is central to that of nationalism. 'Nation' is indeed different from 'nation-state', the later term describing the political borders surrounding a country. The UK provides a great example for this: The UK being the nation-state and Great Britain a nation. A subjective definition of the nation is, as Benedict Anderson famously put it: "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1983: 6). Nations are often seen as relatively homogeneous entities occupying one homeland and sharing common myths and stories. According to Ernest Gellner (1983), individuals belong to one nation if they share one culture and, crucially, recognise one-another as belonging to the same nation. Nation, here, will be considered as a shared culture; one can be considered as belonging to a nation if one feels they belong to the nation, in other words if they identify as such. According to the attitudes of the right, however, a shared history and ethnicity is crucial to one's belonging to a nation: if one is not born into a nation, they will never become part of the nation.

Anthony Smith, often regarded as the founder of nationalism studies, defined nationalism as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining identity, unity and autonomy for a human population" (Smith, 1995: 13). Nationalism offers a symbolism and language to grasp a special vision of the world (Smith, 1995). Nationalism can be understood as an organising political principle that places high importance on national homogenisation and gives priority to national values and 'interests' in aiming to achieve 'national goals.' Gellner, on the other hand, saw more importance in the idea of nation versus nation-state, defining nationalism in terms of political legitimacy, requiring "that

ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones" and that those ethnic boundaries "should not separate power-holders from the rest" (1983: 1).

Dekker and colleagues described nationalism as one element on the cline of 'national attitudes,' whereby an attitude is described as an amount of affection towards something (Dekker, Malová, & Hoogendoorn, 2003). They describe a 'neutral' attitude as a feeling of belonging to one's country. Positive national attitudes are liking one's country, feeling pride in one's country, preferring one's country to others, feeling that one's country is superior to others, and ultimately nationalism, which is essentially a sense of belonging to a particular 'nation' with a common origin and a desire to keep the 'nation' pure. They also describe possible negative feelings towards one's nation. Here, the term 'nation' can be thought as being community occupying a homeland, having common myths, a shared history, and a common public culture (Smith, 2001).

Often confused with the term nationalism is patriotism, which must be understood as a separate, yet related, concept. Adorno and colleagues defined patriotism as "blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups" (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sandford, 1950: 107). More recently, Schatz et al. defined patriotism as "a sense of positive identification with and feelings of affective attachment to one's country" (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999: 152). They also divided the concept of patriotism into two levels: constructive and blind patriotism. According to Schatz and colleagues (1999), constructive patriotism is an attachment to one's country where the individual still questions and criticises current group practices that are intended to be positive. Blind patriotism, on the other hand, is characterised by a positive evaluation of one's country that is beyond reason, absolute allegiance, and by an absolute inability to accept criticism about one's nation.

According to Smith (1995, 2001), there are two types of nationalism: civic, or territorial, nationalism and ethnic, or genealogical, nationalism. The first type is usually found in Western Europe; the nation is seen as a territorial community whose members are subject to common laws and institutions. These citizens are united by an over-arching and common culture. The latter has been generally found in Central and Eastern Europe from the nineteenth century onward and can alternatively be called *ethno-nationalism*. The nation is viewed as a community of descent, whose members are related by fictive kinship ties to a supposed ancestor through compelling origin myths, nativistic history, folk culture, and a populist political philosophy. This type is often seen in post-independence movements, irredentist movements, and 'pan' nationalisms. In the ethnic and genealogical type, the nation will seek to grow by including ethnic 'kinsmen' outside the present boundaries of the 'ethno-nation' and the lands in which they live (Smith, 2001). This can often be represented as irredentist movements, as seen in Hungary. Crucially, if considering Smith's typology, both types of nationalism are seen in the UK. Civic nationalism was evidenced in the Brexit referendum and can be seen when considering one's identity as a member of the UK, while ethnic nationalism is seen in those identifying as British. The UK presents an interesting discussion for theories of nationalism, as both ethnic and civic nationalism can also be found regionally within the country. Further discussion of this issue will be provided at the end of Section 1.2.1.

If one takes Smith's (1995) approach, it is ethnicity which is one possible answer to the ambiguity in the concept of nationalism. In this case, one should take the French concept of *ethnie*, with its basis in common racial, cultural, religious, and historical experience. This approach then leaves no room for immigrants, people with their own cultural practices, new religions, or anyone else who poses a perceived 'threat' to the

nation. Hence, from an ideological point of view, the groups in question can be considered ethno-nationalist.

Nationalism, however, is still too broad a term to distinguish the organisations at the centre of this study from others; it is indeed difficult to make the distinction between more 'moderate' nationalists and the 'radical' nationalists in question. Hence, the term nativism has been employed to draw the distinction (Mudde, 2007). Taken from anthropology, nativism encourages power returning to the natives of a given area, a resurgence of native culture, and the decline of any colonisers who may be present (Mudde, 2007). Its essence is truly a "preference for the native exclusively on the grounds of its being native: (Michaels, 1995: 14). Indeed, Mudde (2007: 19) defines nativism as "an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation state."

Before presenting a larger discussion of ideology and attitudes of such organisations, a discussion of activist organisations themselves is warranted. As a framework, a discussion of Roger Griffin's (2003) idea of a groupuscule will be presented.

1.1.3 The Groupuscule

As this study will not focus on populist political parties, it is necessary to discuss the terminology of the smaller non-governmental activist organisations. In an age of relative political stability, these smaller groups are ideally suited to the task of perpetuating revolutionary extremism (Griffin, 2003). One suggestion for the naming of these groups, as proposed by Roger Griffin, is *groupuscule*.

The French word *groupuscule* refers to an organisation whose primary characteristic is its small size (Bale, 2002). Groupuscules are intrinsically small, politically-

motivated (but not party-political), revolutionary, and activist-oriented, "with an ultimate goal of overcoming the decadence of the existing liberal democratic system" (Griffin, 2003: 30). It must also be made clear that 'groupuscule' does not apply to factions of larger groups or individual units of larger-scale organisations, but to individual autonomous groups (Griffin, 2003). That being said, a groupuscule can form another groupuscule as a separate entity of the original, much like a 'rhizome' or a tree, "constantly producing new shoots as others die off in an unpredictable, asymmetrical pattern of growth and decay" (Griffin, 2003: 34).

This 'rhizomic nature' offers several advantages to the groups (Virchow, 2004). Firstly, these smaller groups can be so diverse that all ideologies can be catered to; these smaller groups can coexist, and there is no need to combine them into a larger organisation. A second advantage is that these smaller groups of varying ideologies give a larger basis to recruit followers. Thirdly, new groupuscules can easily be created to satisfy new interests and ideologies without bureaucratic difficulties. Lastly, these smaller groups make it much more difficult to rid of the movement in its entirety, as there is no hierarchy or organisation.

More specifically, Griffin defines a groupuscule as "a movement whose natural habitat is uncivil society, rather than political or even civil society, and that it is both polycratic and rhizomic in character" (Griffin 2003: 35). In this definition, uncivil society refers to that section of civil society which personifies extra-parliamentary protest, anti-liberal ideology, and anti-systemic politics. The term 'polycratic' is used to sharply differentiate from 'monocratic' movements, which have only one point of power, emphasising the groups' heterogeneous and loosely coordinated nature.

There has been a general tendency to ignore the study of political groupuscules due to their small size, which is often equated with insignificance, in favour of larger electoral parties (Bale, 2002; Griffin, 2003). However, most European far-right groups, and those

extremist groups important throughout history, fall into this category, and ignoring them "can only result in total failure to appreciate the historical significance of the post-war radical right" (Bale, 2002: 25). This 'groupuscular right' is not characterised as a political party movement, but rather as an ideological counter-culture, and "is ideally adapted to the task of perpetuating revolutionary extremism, however utopian in pragmatic terms" (Griffin, 2003: 30).

1.1.4 Conclusion

The organisations at the centre of this analysis will collectively be referred to as radical right organisations, which can be considered as radical right groupuscules or activist organisations. The ideology of both organisations, the English Defence League and the Hungarian Defence Movement, are naturally not the same, however, and is discussed below.

This study will at times, however, refer to organisations and groups as far-right or extreme right. The term far-right, implying something 'right of the right,' will generally be used to describe the version of radical nationalism that is seen in the political sphere, especially in Hungary. This will especially be true in the chapter on secondary survey analysis, as a political motivation had to be defined to conduct the quantitative analysis. The term 'extreme right' will be used when reviewing the literature on motivations to extremism.

The following section will present an overview the important aspects of both British and Hungarian history, in order to better explain the unique forms of nationalism and nationalist attitudes present in both countries. This will be followed by an overview of the current landscape of the radical right in both countries.

1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

An overview of the history of the Great Britain and Hungary will be presented. This is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to highlight historical events and trends that have influenced the ideology of nationalism and the radical right. A basic familiarity of the history of both countries will facilitate the understanding of radical right ideology and aid in developing a comparative framework for this study. An awareness of the popularly accepted version of histories of both countries is also important for the contextualisation of interviews later in this study.

This overview will cover a modern history of Great Britain, beginning in the eighteenth century and extending to modern times. This period is important for the development of British national identity as it sees the development and destruction of the British Empire, which is critical to the understanding of twentieth century ethnic tensions. A brief overview of contemporary events galvanising some political activist groups will also be reviewed.

The review of Hungarian history will begin with the conquering of the Carpathian Basin and foundation of the state. It is important to briefly overview the entire history of Hungary as Hungarian nationalism heavily relies on its early history, or the time of the 'true' ethnic Magyars. A review of its subsequent history will reveal that a notion of a genetically and ethnically pure Magyar is unfounded, although it is central to the ideology of not only radical right organisations in Hungary but the political radical right as well. Additionally, this review will show the history of foreign rule in Hungary, setting a basis for a perceived 'need' by the far-right to rekindle Hungarian national identity.

1.2.1 Great Britain

Great Britain and British Empire

To better understand ethnic tensions in Great Britain, it is important to understand Britain's colonial and imperial past. A review of the major events in British history leading to the influx of immigration seen in the mid-twentieth century will be provided, followed by a history of the far-right political sphere in Britain in the twentieth century. Lastly will be a discussion of the contemporary far-right in British politics; radial right street-level organisations will not be discussed here but in Section 1.2, where the EDL will also be introduced.

The modern history of Great Britain really begins on May 1, 1707 when the Kingdom of Great Britain came into being; England, Wales, and Scotland were then united (Colls, 2002; Lang, 2011), to which Ireland was added in 1800 to create the United Kingdom. Britain claimed rule of the Indian port of Bombay (Mumbai) in the seventeenth century, after King Charles II (r. 1660-1685) received it as a wedding gift (Robbins, 1998; Lang, 2011). The East India Trading Company, which was created on the very last day of the seventeenth century, about half a century later defeated the French East India Company and claimed control of Bengal. By the 1770s the Company was nearly bankrupt, and after the failure of the Company to properly govern India, in additional to a famine killing five million Indian people, the government of Britain decided to assume rule over India.

In the seventeenth century, the English began to take interest in the harvesting of sugar, which is why the English were so keen on gaining control from France of the West Indies. This led to a triangular African slave trade: Britain traded goods for African slaves, those slaves were transported by ship to the West Indies where they were sold, and that profit was used to buy sugar that was shipped back to Britain. The slave trade was eventually abolished in 1806 and outlawed in the British Empire, but slavery remained legal

in British colonies until 1833 (Lang, 2011). The slave trade in Britain, as in the United States, greatly influenced, and at the time strengthened, the archaic European idea of Africans and people of colour as inferior and 'barbaric'.

The British Empire grew quickly, and the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw colonisation by most of the world's current greatest powers. Colonies in the Americas began in the sixteenth century in parts of what is now the United States of America, while colonisation of today's Canada began in the eighteenth century. In the late eighteenth century, Britain began sending prisoners to Australia and New Zealand after they could no longer be sent to America, which gained independence from Britain in 1776. Britain also gained control of Hong Kong and Beijing, China through interests in the opium trade and gained interest in several areas of Africa. Some of the British colonies eventually grew to govern themselves. Canada gained independence in 1867, Australia in 1901, and New Zealand in 1907 (Lang, 2011).

A major economically and socially significant event that took place in Britain during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was the Industrial Revolution, which involved the transition from an agrarian economy to one of new manufacturing processes involving machinery and factories. As these factories were located in cities and many farmers lost common land, urbanisation occurred with many people moving from the countryside into towns and industrial cities. During the Industrial Revolution, which lasted from about the 1770s until the 1830s (although these dates are subject to debate), the population of Britain more than doubled. This was not primarily due to immigration, but rather to factors such as earlier marrying age and improvements in health care, meaning a lower rate of infant mortality. As urban dwellers, people lived in closer proximity to strangers than ever before in the agrarian past, even as an influx of immigrants entered Britain in the twentieth century.

Great Britain and the Question of Immigration in the Twentieth Century

Immigration into Britain began mostly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with the influx of Irish immigrants into several parts of England (Solomos, 1993). Numerically, Irish immigrants have far exceeded any other group of immigrants into Britain in the last few centuries (Solomos, 1993). The late-nineteenth century also saw a large number of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe; anti-Semitism was often used as a scapegoat to explain unemployment and poverty (Solomos, 1993). At the same time The end of the nineteenth century also saw the immigration of Black seamen to some port-towns of England and Wales; the Black community further grew during the Second World War, when Black workers and soldiers came from the colonies to help in the war effort (Solomos, 1993).

After British colonialism continued to crumble in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conflicts began in India where a nationalist movement led by Mahatma Gandhi was growing. After considerable tensions, India gained its independence under a British Labour government in the 1940s. Although Gandhi wished for one united India, the Muslim population demanded their own state; as a result, Pakistan was created in 1947. Many of the old British colonies, like India, Pakistan, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, remain part of the Commonwealth, which set the stage for mass movements of people into Britain.

At the end of the 1940s, the British government passed the Nationality Bill, which stated that all persons who were citizens of any of the Commonwealth countries should be British subjects (Boyce, 1999). At this time, free entry into Britain was allowed for Indian and Pakistani citizens. In 1945 Churchill 'warned' about the consequences of permitting free entry of British subjects into the UK, saying that it would likely lead to a continual increase in the number of "coloured people" (Boyce, 1999).

The years after the Second World War saw a large increase in immigrants, especially from the West Indies. The first shipload of immigrants, on the Empire Windrush, arrived in 1948 with just over 400 people, subsequently creating many social problems in the areas where they settled (Thurlow, 1987). The Commonwealth Immigration Act was passed in 1962 to control immigration, requiring immigrants to either have a specific job, have a recognised skill or job that was in short supply, or have served in the British forces during the war in order to obtain priority treatment for immigration (Solomos, 1993). Even with these controls, immigration rose from 2,000 people in 1953 to 136,000 in 1961 (Thurlow, 1987). The end of the 1950s saw several race riots, especially in Nottingham and Notting Hill against the Black communities, and in 1965 the parliament passed the Race Relations Act which sought to outlaw racist speech and behaviour.

On April 20, 1968, the Conservative MP for Wolverhampton, Enoch Powell, gave his famous 'Rivers of Blood' speech, where he warned that the volume of immigrants coming to the UK would end in disaster, and that it would undermine the common bonds of national identity: "I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood" (quoted in Boyce, 1999: 249; Driver, 2011). Powell spoke out against the large number of immigrants coming to Great Britain from Asia and Africa, claiming the English were now "strangers in their own land" (Whipple, 2009). This was a ground-breaking speech, as it was the first time a leading politician referred to the impact of the new ethnic communities in an inflammatory way, stating that the immigrant population should be re-emigrated (Eatwell, 1996). Fifty years on and this speech is still creating controversy in the UK (Sweney, 2018).

The Immigration Bill was passed in 1971, which was the first permanent legislation dealing with immigrants from Commonwealth countries (Boyce, 1999). The Bill stated that immigrants from the Commonwealth would henceforth be treated as aliens, with the need to apply for work permits allowing only temporary residence. Additionally, in 1986 the

Nationality Act was passed, which stipulated that from that point forward only the British-born children of British-born or naturalised British parents would receive British citizenship (Boyce, 1999).

The British Far-Right in the Politics of the Twentieth Century

After the First World War, Oswald Mosley entered parliament as a Conservative MP, but in 1929 he joined the Labour party to become junior minister (Driver, 2011). In 1931, the frustrated Labour MP created the New Party. Mosley's party offered massive government spending, work for the unemployed, and national revival. After a tour through Italy, he returned in October of 1932 to rename his new party the British Union of Fascists (hereafter BUF). In early 1934, BUF had just around 50,000 members, though later that dropped to between 5,000 - 10,000 (Eatwell, 2000). After France fell to the Nazis in 1940, the British state took action and imprisoned more than 800 leaders in the fascist movement, including Mosley, and proscribed the BUF (Macklin, 2006). This was a huge blow to the British fascist movement and "marked a 'watershed' in its history. Never again was British fascism representative of a mass movement" (Macklin, 2006: 288).

Mosley launched the Union Movement in 1948, which continued the politics of BUF: small meetings, harassment of Jews, and conflicts with anti-fascists (Eatwell, 1992). After 1948, the number of immigrants grew rapidly, initially mainly from the West Indies and later from the Indian sub-continent. Hence, the Union Movement was again revived in the 1950s due to the opposition to 'coloured' immigration (Eatwell, 1992).

In 1954, the League of Empire Loyalists was founded by conservatives who wanted to keep the British Empire from dissolving, which contributed to the founding of the National Front in 1967 by John Tyndall and Martin Webster (Eatwell, 1992; Mammone & Peace, 2012). The ideology of the National Front was 'Britain for the British', with

traditional National Socialist themes of ultra-nationalism, anti-Semitism, and white supremacy (Driver, 2011). National Front's prime was the late 1970s, when conflicts with anti-fascists were common and they often marched in the streets. In 1975 the membership of the National Front numbered about 20,000, but by 1980 fell to about 5,000 (Driver, 2011). In general, in the 1960s and 1970s there was extensive support for radical right principles, such as a desire for strong leadership and nationalist views. According to a survey, twenty-five percent of participants agreed with compulsory repatriation of non-white immigrants (Eatwell, 1992).

In the early 1980s a split occurred in the National Front, which resulted in the foundation of the British National Party (hereafter BNP) in 1982, led by John Tyndall. At the time, however, the BNP was considered "by many as nothing more than a joke," as they were just a small group of "extremists with no serious hope of electoral success" (Mammone & Peace, 2012: 291), and its membership was never more than 3,000 (Eatwell, 2000). The modernization process of the BNP started in 1999 when Nick Griffin, the new leader of the party, attempted to dampen the violent and threatening image of the BNP: the party no longer used overt racist language, and "even the term 'race' was replaced by the term 'identity'" (Mammone & Peace, 2012: 291). They then created a genuine electoral strategy based on grassroots campaigning and took advantage of local issues and complaints.

The Contemporary Far-Right in British Politics

In 2001, under the leadership of Nick Griffin, the BNP's candidates averaged 3.6 percent of the vote in the national elections (Goodwin & Dennison, 2018). The party's rhetoric centred around problems of immigration and the threat of Islamic immigration, which resonated with working class voters. By 2009 the BNP reached 6.3 percent of votes

and won two seats in the European Parliament. After not winning any seats in parliament in the 2010 national elections, subsequent financial hardships, and infighting, the BNP fell apart. Now, under new leadership, they are still involved in electoral politics with very little support.

As eloquently stated by Goodwin and Dennison, the far-right "in the United Kingdom has traditionally been associated with failure" (2018: 521). Until about 2010, the attitudes of the far-right in the UK were centred around biological racism, anti-Semitism, and a hostility toward parliamentary democracy (Goodwin & Dennison, 2018). After the BNP dissolved, two new parties arose: UKIP and Britain First. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), originally founded in 1993, had the main goal of pulling the UK out of the European Union. UKIP won nearly 13 percent of the vote in the 2015 UK national elections and played a significant role in the 2016 Brexit referendum, most especially with their anti-immigrant "Vote Leave" campaign. After achieving success in the Brexit referendum, effectively losing their identity in their devotion to the UK leaving the EU, the party fell apart. Now under the leadership of Gerard Batten, UKIP has employed Tommy Robinson, founder of the EDL and the UK chapter of PEGIDA, as an advisor.

Britain First was created out of the BNP by James Dowson and is now led by Paul Golding, with one-time co-leader Jayda Fransen leaving the party in early 2019. The organisation was launched in 2011 via a website and claimed their aim to be the protection of British and Christian morality (Allen, 2014). They identify Islam as a highly destructive element in the UK and claim it must be opposed. Britain First has stood candidates in both local and European elections, without much success.

In the last decades, several events, both in Great Britain and overseas, have fuelled further negative feelings towards immigrants and most especially towards Islam. The world first took real notice of Islamic terrorism with the attacks on the World Trade Center's Twin

Towers in New York City, on September 11th, 2001. However, from the perspective of Great Britain, the London bombings of July 7, 2005 struck closest to the British heart. Three British Islamic men and Germaine Lindsay, a recent convert to Islam, left for London early in the morning of July 7th. Three of the bombers detonated their bombs on underground trains leaving King's Cross Station, and one on a double-decker bus. Fifty-two people were killed, and hundreds injured, marking it as the biggest terrorist atrocity to occur on British soil (Rodgers, Qurashi & Connor, 2015).

An event that really highlighted the issues between white and Islamic communities in Britain was the so-called Bradford Race Riots in Bradford, England in early July 2001. The riots involved clashes between far-right groups, law enforcement, and people of the Asian community. A group called the Anti-Nazi League organised a protest march against the National Front, mainly attended by around 500 of the Islamic community. The riots lasted several days, from July seventh to the ninth, and in the end involved attacks on police officers as well. This riot followed others in Burnley and Oldham which happened a few weeks and months earlier.

Lastly, the event probably most cited by the British far-right is the 2013 murder of Lee Rigby, a drummer for the British army, who was run over by two Jihadists and stabbed to death. Images of the attack were displayed everywhere in British media, horrifying people around the country. This instantly sparked a backlash; in the following days two mosques were attacked, another firebombed, and an Islamic centre burned down (Feldman & Stocker, 2017). Hate crimes against Muslims nearly quadrupled in the week following the attacks. Radical right protest organisations organised demonstrations after the attack, and it is still regularly exploited by the radical right. All of these events served to justify anti-Islamic feelings among the British radical right.

For the past few years the most important event in British politics, both for the general public and the radical right, has been the Brexit referendum. Anger and hostility from the far- and radical right amounted to the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox just a week before the referendum vote in June 2016. Since the referendum, in which the UK voted to leave the European Union by a margin of under four percent, hostility has been rising from the radical right. Indeed, there are fears of potential rioting or violence if decisions are delayed further (Doffman, 2019; Mackey, 2019). However, crucially, while the referendum result reflects a general fear of immigrants, surveys have shown declining feelings of negativity toward immigration since 2011 in the UK. While one YouGov poll showed people have largely become more supportive of their vote on 2016 (Smith, 2019), others have shown that the opposite outcome would be reached if there were a second referendum (James, 2019).

The Question of Britishness and Englishness

Crucial for any further discussion of identity in Great Britain is the question of 'Englishness' and 'Britishness'. Indeed, the words 'English' and 'British' are clearly seen in the names of many radical right organisations in the area (English Defence League, Britain First, British National Party, For Britain). Even so, there is quite a bit of confusion and distortion between the lines of what is English and British, and the identities with which individuals identify. Indeed, as will be seen later in Chapter 5, even those in the EDL identify themselves as British more often than English.

While the question of British identity and nationalism is a crucial one, there was truly little discussion of English nationalism before the last twenty years (Kumar, 2000). British nationalism can be considered the nationalism of imperial states, which is not unique to Great Britain. For this reason, it may seem for the English as though they do not

have a nationalism of their own (Kumar, 2000). The English, then, are currently in the predicament of having to redefine themselves as a nation and normalising their own form of nationalism (Kumar, 2000).

Imperial nationalism is crucial in any discussion of Britishness. Rather than stressing ethnic identity, as can be seen in ethnic forms of nationalism, it rather stresses "the political, cultural, or religious mission to which they have been called" (Kumar, 2000: 579-80). Britain's primary identity and sense of belonging in the world is indeed linked to its imperialist past. Here, there are both internal and external identities at play.: the internal being that of Great Britain and the UK, while external are the colonies.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, Britishness was seen as far more important than Englishness. Especially after the union with Scotland in the early eighteenth century, efforts were made to promote this new political identity (Kumar, 2000). People were not Britons, not separately English, Welsh, or Scottish. Britain and the British were quickly identified with the crown, parliament, the empire, and even religion. The eighteenth century saw a resurgence of English nationalism, however, with the "cultivation of a distinct English historiography, the clarification and codification of the English language," more emphasis on English literature, and "the celebration of a particular type of landscape as quintessentially English" (Kumar, 2000: 592). With the Second World War, however, this emphasis on English identity shifted again. As the UK fought together with the Commonwealth, an insistence on English nationalism would have been both distasteful and dangerous (Kumar, 2000).

In other words, the identity of the British, or Britishness, is firmly rooted in imperialism. It is an identity which many can claim, whether English, Welsh, Scottish, or even Northern Irish. It is an identity tied to territory, akin to Smith's civic nationalism (1995, 2001), and engrained in history. In other words, to be English, Scottish, or Welsh

refers to culture, whereas British refers to an allegiance (Crick, 2018; Mann, 2011). Englishness, on the other hand, is more difficult to define. To be English is often conflated with British, and the English often have difficulty distinguishing themselves from others of the UK (Kumar, 2003). The English, in turn, "seem to have found it best to turn in on themselves. Never have they had an identity as an ethnic group, never having needed one, they are now…in the process of inventing one" (Kumar, 2000: 593). Throughout their history the English have never really had to define who they were, or what counts as English (Mann, 2011), until now.

1.2.2 Hungary

From Foundation to the Eighteenth Century

To fully understand contemporary nationalistic ideology and attitudes in Hungary, it is important to have a grasp of Hungary's turbulent history. Modern ideas of Hungarism, irredentism, and turanianism, all ideologies at the core of the Hungarian extreme right, are closely tied to the country's foundation and history. This section will provide a brief overview of Hungarian history leading to the twentieth century, followed by a more focused look at the political history of the twentieth century in Hungary. Lastly will be a discussion of the contemporary far-right in Hungarian politics; radical right street-level organisations will not be discussed here in detail but in Section 1.2, where the Hungarian Defence Movement will also be introduced.

The history of Hungary begins in 895 C.E., when the nomadic Magyar tribes arrived from the East and settled in the Carpathian Basin. For the next several centuries, the descendants of the Magyar chieftain Árpád ruled the territory. Hungary officially became a country around Christmas of the year 1000, when King István (Stephen) was crowned. Since the Magyars were originally a pagan people, Stephen then completed the country's

transition to Christendom that his father had begun, and for this he was proclaimed a saint in 1083 (Benda 1986; Ignotus, 1972; Macartney, 1962; Engel, 2001). The following two centuries saw many short reigns and struggles for power in Hungary. In 1241 the Mongols invaded and this, along with the plague and the starvation which followed it, cost Hungary much of its population (Bolla, 1982; Szűcs, 1993; Benda, 1986; Engel, 2001). The following several centuries focused on the reconstruction of the country and Hungarian society.

In 1526 Hungary was occupied again when the Ottomans conquered the country, marking the end of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary. Not long after, while still under Ottoman rule, Hungary was divided between Hungarians and the Austrian Habsburgs. The areas were ruled as Ottoman tributaries, and after 150 years of military confrontation between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, the Ottomans left Hungary in 1718 (Ágoston & Masters, 2009; Macartney, 1962; Simon, 1998). By this time, well over a quarter of the country's population was lost (Simon, 1998). People immigrated from several other parts of Europe, specifically Russia, Austria, Italy, Germany, and France, to such an extent that ethnic Hungarians only made up thirty-five percent of the total population by 1786. According to one source (Király, 1969), the population of Royal Hungary in 1720 was 1,717,861, and by 1787 it had risen to 6,467,829. This increase in population was due to a major civic building program and to encouragement of agricultural workers to settle in and around towns (Fletcher et al., 2003).

In the 1784-1787 census, the state numbered 23.3 million individuals, 9.5 million of whom lived under the Hungarian Crown, or historical Hungary, which included Transylvania and Croatia. By the 1804, the population had increased to 10.5 million: "once again, Hungarian demography was level with England, as it had been prior to the Ottoman wars" (Molár, 2001: 148).

Revolution and War: Hungary in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

The early nineteenth century saw a golden age of Hungarian art and literature and was also a time of intelligentsia, a golden time that has formed a large part of Hungarian identity. Indeed, Count István Széchenyi (1791-1860) founded the Academy of Sciences and Club of Magnates, and developed ideas about banking, credit, and industry, which he attributed to his numerous visits to England. Széchenyi was a reformer and saw equalizing civic duties and imposing taxes on the nobility as a way of progress (Molnár, 2001). Also, he saw the danger in the more radical views of Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894). The debate between Széchenyi and Kossuth was rooted in nationalism: Széchenyi held "that assimilation would come about through the beneficial effects of general progress" (Molnár, 2001: 173), while Kossuth believed in a general 'Magyarisation' and separation from Austrian rule. Indeed, Kossuth has been referred to as "no more or less than the 'precursor of Hitler and Mussolini'" (Molnár, 2001: 174). Széchenyi warnings to Kossuth that his views would lead to revolution became reality in the revolutionary war of 1848-1849.

The Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy was formed in 1867, lasting until the end of the First World War. After October 1918, Hungarians were left both enthusiastic for their new-found independence and nostalgic for the days of the Habsburgs. Naturally the anti-Habsburg tradition was retained in the Hungarian collective memory, while the kings of Austria were venerated (Molnár, 2001). The anniversary of the 1848 revolution was remembered, as was October 6th, the day thirteen generals were executed during the War of Independence. At the same time, Kossuth's anti-Habsburg assertions began to fade from the collective memory.

The federalisation of Austria was declared in October of 1918, marking the end of the Austro-Hungarian empire. This meant that Hungary, too, would be federalised and would lose most of its national minorities: Slovaks, Romanians, Germans, Croats, Serbs,

and Ruthenians (Molnár, 2001). After the Treaty of Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920, Hungary went from a population of eighteen million to a small country of just less than 8 million (Hajdú & Nagy, 1990). Hungary had lost about two thirds of its territories and three fifths of its inhabitants; parts of northern Hungary went to the Slovaks and Czechs, the south went to the Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenians, and Transylvania became part of Romania (Molnár, 2001).

Hungary was now "the most nationally aggrieved state in all of Europe" due to "the great proportion" of land and people that the country had lost (Payne, 1980: 110). Indeed, the Treaty of Trianon and anti-Habsburg sentiments are at the core of Hungarian radical right ideology. The signing of the treaty deeply disturbed Hungarian society, as it was the biggest loss the country had seen in 500 years. All of Hungary was against the Treaty, but there was division on where the country's borders should be: the Social Democrats and bourgeois Left demanded settlement along ethnic lines, while many desired the borders of pre-war Hungary to be reinstated (Hajdú & Nagy, 1990).

The period following the signing of the Treaty was characterised by a power struggle between the three major ideas concerning the structure of the new state. The first group believed in the old parliamentary form of government. The second believed that a parliamentary system was no longer useful, and rather that a dictatorship should be introduced; that Christian Hungarians should take over the economic roles and other occupations of Jewish people. This group, led by future prime minister Gyula Gömbös, lead to the establishment of The Hungarian National Defence Association and the Association of Awakening Hungarians (Ormos, 1990). The final group rejected both the re-establishment of old ruling circles and the formation of a rightist dictatorship.

Fascists and Soviets

One of the most important figures in the Hungarian interwar era was Miklós Horthy, regent to the Kingdom of Hungary from March 1920 until October 1944. His influence quickly grew in the 1920s, and Horthy's anti-liberal and dictatorial character became all the more apparent (Hoensch, 1988). Stanley Payne described Horthy's regime as a moderate conservative authoritarianism, "governed by a restrictive parliament of limited suffrage, headed by a monarch or in this case regent (Horthy) as surrogate" (Payne, 1980: 111). Racist slogans tied to revisionist and irredentist ideology contributed to a type of cultural arrogance and also "resulted in a militant rejection of liberalism, democracy and socialism, all of which were viewed as 'alien to the Hungarian spirit'" (Hoensch, 1988: 114). Hoensch argues that it would be incorrect to characterise Horthy's regime as fascist, as "despite its anti-liberal, conservative-authoritarian political system, it never attempted to employ demagogic methods to mobilise the masses or…to overthrow the system" (1988: 114).

However, several fascist and national socialist parties emerged in the 1920s and particularly in the early 1930s. They were proponents of a kind of moderate fascism, inspired by Italy, or were national socialist parties representing a more radical imitation of German national socialism (Payne, 1980). In the early 1920s, the *Egységes Párt* (Unity Party), for which Gömbös was vice-chairman, gained support. It went as far as to receive 45.5 percent of the vote in the 1922 elections. His party called for a remodelling of Hungary based on national and Christian values (Hoensch, 1988). Gömbös and his supporters left the Unity Party on August 2nd, 1923 and founded the right-wing *Fajvédő Párt* (Party of Racial Defence). The party never succeeded in gaining much power, but Gömbös became obsessed with *Turanianism*, the idea that the ancestors of the Magyars came from Asia and that Hungarians have closer ties to Asia than to Europe. Gömbös eventually rejoined the

Unity Party in 1928, strengthening the Unity Party's liberal-conservative wing (Hoensch, 1988).

On October 1, 1932 Gyula Gömbös, the first politician to openly label himself as 'Hungarian National Socialist,' took power and began his fascist government. He visited both Mussolini and Hitler, attempting to convince them of a German-Italian-Hungarian-Austrian alliance (Hoensch, 1988; Ormos, 1990). Hitler offered Czechoslovakia to Gömbös, but Gömbös would only be satisfied with gaining Transylvania. After the violent election of 1935, Gömbös' Party of National Unity gained 170 of 245 seats in Parliament, which meant the extreme right now dominated Hungarian politics (Ormos, 1990). Gömbös, however, quickly lost support of his followers. Horthy was to dismiss the prime minister, but rather waited until his natural death on October 6, 1936.

At this time, the extreme right started to centre around Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the newly-formed *Nemzet Akaratának Pártja* (Party for National Will). The party was characterised by militant anti-Semitism and suggested bringing all people of the Carpathian Basin, who were separated with the Treaty of Trianon, together under Hungarian leadership (Hoensch, 1988). Szálasi professed that his movement was not anti-Semitic, but rather 'a-Semitic', meaning that he advocated all Jews leave Hungary for elsewhere (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017; Payne, 1980). Szálasi was arrested in April 1937, and his party dissolved. The Racial Defence-Socialist Party was formed shortly thereafter by László Endre, and on October 24th, 1937, eight other right-wing groups joined it to form the *Magyar Nemzeti Szocialista Párt* (Hungarian National Socialist Party) (Hoensch, 1988). The new Hungarian National Socialist Party subscribed to Szálasi's ideas of *Hungarism*, which had strong Christian, spiritual, and economic values (Hoensch, 1988). Unfortunately for Szálasi, who was once again imprisoned in November 1937, his new party was banned on February 21, 1938. That year, Hungary's National Socialists were greatly encouaged by Germany's

annexation of Austria, and they formed the new *Nemzeti Szocialista Magyar Párt –*
Hungarista Mozgalom (Hungarian National Socialist Party – Hungarist Movement). Their
idea was that for the Hungarians to be the leading world-race all 'Judeo-plutocracies,' such
as Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, should be dissolved, and
instead Latin, German, Slavic, Islamic, and Hungarian nations should form their own
Lebensraum (Kürti, 2006). The *Nyilaskeresztes Párt – Hungarista Mozgalom* (Arrow Cross
Party – Hungarist Movement) was founded on March 9, 1939 with a relatively moderate
programme whose only radical feature was anti-Semitism, but was a conscious imitation
of German Nazism (Hoensch, 1988; Kürti, 2006). This led to the party's substantial success
in the May 1939 elections, gaining a quarter of the vote. Altogether in those elections,
fascist candidates received more than forty percent of the vote in Buda and Pest counties
(Kürti, 2006).

The Prime Minister of Hungary at the beginning of the Second World War, Pál
Teleki, said Hungary would remain a peaceful country. He did not allow the Germans to
freely come through Hungary's borders "and opened Hungary's borders to more than
150,000 Polish military and civilian refugees" (Hoensch, 1988: 148). However, Szálasi
took over the merged United National Socialist Party and the Arrow Cross upon his early
release from prison in October of 1940. He received considerable support from Germany,
and again founded the Hungarian National Socialist Party on September 18, 1941. After its
fusion with the Party of Hungarian Revival a few days later, it became the Hungarian
Revival and National Socialist Alliance led by Jenő Rátz (Hoensch, 1988). At this point,
the only way Teleki could retain power was to himself adopt right-wing policies, but he
was eventually replaced.

From 1940 on, Jewish men were forced to work in 'labour companies,' while the
women, children, and old men were left behind. Smaller deportations of Jews began in

Hungary in August 1941, beginning with 787,000 people at that time. Hungary was invaded by the German Nazi army on March 19, 1944. In the following months, nearly half a million people were deported to extermination camps, helped by the Arrow Cross and the Hungarian army. Ferenc Szálasi was again appointed Prime Minister and, in the winter of 1944-1945, he and the Arrow Cross brought down a reign of terror on the remaining Jews who had not yet been deported (Hoensch, 1988).

In January of 1945 the Russians entered Budapest, liberating Hungary from the Germans and marking the beginning of 45 years of Socialist rule. Hungary was newly plunged into a new period of terror, this time lasting decades. Those who opposed the party and regime were tortured, executed, or sent to gulags in the East. Learning Russian became mandatory in school, religious schools were nationalised, religious leaders were government-appointed, travel was nearly impossible, and every aspect of people's lives was controlled by the State.

Even by the 1950s, the Hungarian people were becoming restless under the yoke of oppression. Beginning in October of 1956, students began to meet at Hungarian universities. They drew up a list of demands: "a free press, the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, the creation of a genuine multi-party system, guarantees of civic rights and personal freedom, an end to the country's economic exploitation and the punishment of those responsible for the terror of the Stalinist era" (Hoensch, 1988: 216). Revolution broke out on October 23, 1956, launched by shots fired by the revolutionaries from atop the Radio Budapest building during a peaceful protest. Fighting continued for weeks until November 11th, when the revolutionaries were defeated by the Soviets. After October 31st, under the leadership of János Kádár, Hungary remained Socialist but pursued a policy of neutrality. This began the Kádár era of the so-called 'goulash communism.' Hungary remained under Soviet occupation for nearly the rest of the twentieth century. After the country's liberation

in 1990, known as *rendszerváltás* in Hungarian ('system change'), nationalism and the far-right underwent somewhat of a rebirth. This will be covered in the following section.

Nationalism and the Far-Right in Post-Soviet Hungary

At the end of the 1980s Hungary saw a renaissance of far-right organisations due to the changing political climate (Karsai, 1999). The first major far-right political party to emerge after Kádár was removed from power in 1988 was the anti-Semitic *Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja* (Hungarian Justice and Life Party; henceforth MIÉP). The party was founded by nationalist writer and journalist István Csurka in 1993 (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). MIÉP argued that the post-communist transition was being led by people who were 'anti-Hungarian,' which led those on the far-right to connect Jews with liberalism, the Soviets, and Bolshevism (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Around this time, Albert Szabó created the Hungarian Welfare Association (*Magyar Népjóléti Szövetség*, MNSZ), a political party that included a skinhead youth faction, which ultimately disbanded in 2000.

In the 1998 national elections, MIÉP received 5.5 percent of the vote and 14 seats in parliament; in 2002 they only received 4.4 percent of the vote. In 2005 the party joined forces with the new Movement for a Better Hungary (*Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*; hereafter Jobbik). Jobbik was originally founded in 2003 as a neo-fascist political party, which openly had close links to radical right movements and paramilitary organisations (Kyriazi, 2015), namely the Hungarian Guard (see Section 1.2). Joining forces in the 2006 elections, Jobbik and MIÉP together received 2.2 percent of votes. Jobbik, however, quickly became the third-largest political party in Hungary with 16.67 percent of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary elections, growing to 20.22 percent in 2014. At this point their ideology was openly anti-liberal and anti-EU, and their rhetoric was generally homophobic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma (Bartlett, Birdwell, Krekó, Benfield, & Győri, 2012;

Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Following the 2014 national elections, Jobbik attempted to change their image and adopt a 'softer' and more moderate tone (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). The party's leader, Gábor Vona, even described his new vision for Jobbik as a 'modern conservative party' (Thorpe, 2016).

This image change did not succeed as well as Jobbik had hoped, as in the 2018 Hungarian national elections they achieved only 19.06 percent of the vote and 26 seats in parliament. Although a fall in percentage, Jobbik did become the second largest party in the Hungarian parliament. However, immediately following the election, Vona kept his promise to his party: if they lost the election, he would step down. His resignation sparked a fractioning of the party, and several left in June of 2018 to form a new radical right political party, the Our Homeland Movement (*Mi Hazánk Mozgalom*). This party is led by László Toroczkai, the founder of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (see Section 1.2), which has openly expressed desire for a 'white' Hungary (ECHO TV, 2018).

The current Hungarian far-right government, Fidesz, a one-time conservative party, was founded in 1988 as an anti-communist party called the Alliance of Young Democrats (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége*). Led by the now infamous Viktor Orbán, in the past the party has been described as a "mainstream conservative party with radical right policies" (Mudde, 2015); now, however, it can be argued that they are firmly situated in the far-right. In the period after Fidesz's election in 2010 and their second consecutive term re-election in 2014, they rewrote the Constitution, erected a fence along the country's southern borders, led a highly xenophobic campaign against 'migrants,' and turned Hungary into "a culture within which racist speech and prohibited far-right paramilitary activities are tolerated" (Fekete, 2016: 40). In 2017, Fidesz began an aggressive campaign against the Jewish Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros and has endeavoured to close the Central European University, which he founded.

Fidesz won the 2018 Hungarian elections by a landslide, with 49.3 percent of the vote, and 133 of the 199 seats in the Hungarian parliament. Not only that, but Fidesz has managed to nearly decimate their opposition, leading Hungary dangerously close to a single-party state. They have managed to do this through nearly full control of the media, especially in rural areas, control over the education system and the content of school textbooks, and through large-scale propaganda campaigns. Hours after their election win, Fidesz announced plans to enact a 'Stop Soros' bill, obviously intended to crack down on NGOs, intelligentsia, and opponents of Fidesz. Prior to the elections, Fidesz announced that they had created a list of 2000 'Soros agents,' of which 200 names were published in the pro-Fidesz *Figyelő* magazine immediately following the April 2018 elections. On this list were people working for various humanitarian NGOs in Hungary and academics at the Central European University in Budapest. The gravity of this list remains questionable, however, as among other names are those of at least two deceased individuals. In June of 2018, the 'Stop Soros' bill was approved in parliament, effectively criminalising any act or organisation which helps refugees in Hungary.

In addition to now being obviously far-right, the Fidesz government has also legitimised many aspects of far-right ideology. In primary schools, important texts from Hungarian Jewish authors have been removed from the reading curriculum, while the works of anti-Semitic writers of the interwar period are on suggested reading lists (Fekete, 2016; Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Even more recently, kindergartens are to teach 'Christian culture' and 'strengthen national identity,' beginning in September of 2018 (Dull, 2018). The party also has a reputation of presenting awards to people of questionable moral standards. For instance, journalist Zsolt Bayer who received the 2016 Golden Cross of Merit had, a few years earlier, written that many Roma are "not fit to live among human beings. They are animals and behave like animals," and suggested that drivers should step

on the gas if they have the chance to hit a Roma child (Goulard, 2016). The 2013 prize for journalism was given to a TV broadcaster who once described Roma as 'apes,' and the 2013 Golden Cross of Merit was given to János Petrás, the lead singer of the nationalist band Kárpátia (Fekete, 2016; Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Far-right and xenophobic views have now become the mainstream in Hungarian political rhetoric (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017), serving to further legitimise the ideology the Hungarian radical right.

1.2.3 Discussion of History

The purpose of this section was to offer the reader a background of both countries, to better understand the placement of some attitudes and ideologies held by the organisations under investigation in this study. When considering the histories of these two countries, it becomes clear that they are different in significant ways.

Firstly, Great Britain has a past as an empire, as a force that colonised a large part of the world. Hungary, though once much larger, has a history of being conquered by outside forces and cultures. The history of immigration into both countries is also quite different. In Great Britain, much of the influx of immigration happened in the second part of the twentieth century, which is recent enough to remain fresh in many people's minds. In Hungary, on the other hand, much of the immigration into the country occurred between the medieval period and the eighteenth century, sufficiently long ago to be forgotten by all but academics. The perception of supposed dangers posed by immigration is a third area of difference between the two. In Great Britain, the influx of immigrants, and Islam in particular, in the late twentieth century is perceived as a threat to an established national British identity by the far-right, especially in low-income areas. In Hungary, the fear of immigrants, especially so-called 'illegal migrants,' has been encouraged by the Fidesz government and is increasingly on the rise. However, this fear is rather seen in the

conservative right rather than in radical right culture; the desire to re-establish a long-lost cultural identity remains one of the strongest characteristics of the Hungarian radical right. In Great Britain, on the other hand, the radical right is concerned with national identity as it relates to immigration and Islam in particular.

Although the dream of a strong national identity remains a strong driver of nationalism and the radical right in both Great Britain and Hungary, each looks to a different ideal. In Great Britain, the radical right looks to a 'golden era' of Imperialism, a time when Great Britain ruled many of the world's current major powers. In Hungary, the radical right harkens back to a mythic time when Hungarians were 'pure' Magyars. The beginnings of xenophobia are another area of difference between the two. In Great Britain, xenophobic attitudes began with the movement of people into urban centres during the Industrial Revolution and were further heightened by the influx of immigrants from the Commonwealth in the mid-twentieth century, followed by more recent economic migrants from EU countries. Hungary, on the other hand, had a much different history in the twentieth century as half of it was spent under Soviet rule. During that time, immigration was at a stand-still; xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes are just now on the rise.

1.3 THE LANDSCAPE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND HUNGARY

This study will look at one group from both Hungary and Great Britain in a comparative context. The groups were specifically chosen as extra-parliamentary activist movements. In Hungary, interviews will be conducted with members of the Hungarian Defence Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom; MÖM). In the UK, the English Defence League (EDL) will be the subject of this study. This section will present an overview of attitudes and the landscape of the British and Hungarian radical right, to better situate the two groups.

1.3.1 The Landscape of the British and Hungarian Radical Right

Much of radical right ideology is rooted in history, to a time when the nation was supposedly more ethnically and culturally 'pure'. In Great Britain it incorporates a strong sense of xenophobia and Islamophobia, inflamed by the magnitude of immigration into the more impoverished towns and areas in the mid-twentieth century and further fueled by current global events. The ideology of the far-right today is carried on through a lineage of far-right groups, from Mosley's Blackshirts, to the National Front, to the BNP. This is quite a contrast to the Hungarian situation, which only had about twenty-five years to develop but draws from its early twentieth century history.

Much of Hungarian radical right attitudes look back to the time of the Magyars when the nation was 'ethnically pure.' This can be somewhat confusing, however, as radical right movements in Hungary see the European Christian identity as one of their centre-points, which is in direct conflict with the idea of the Shamanistic Magyars.

Hungarian nationalism can also be characterised by some common attitudes, although all radical right organisations identify with these to different degrees. The strongest radical right attitude in Hungary is that of irredentism. The Treaty of Trianon

conjures negative emotion in many ethnic Hungarians, and Hungary's pre-Trianon borders are referred to as 'Greater Hungary' by radical right supporters. In connection with the idea of the 'pure' Magyar, pan-Turanism, a term that stems from the Iranian term *turan* referring to a region of Central Asia, is the concept of the unity of ancient Central Asian people. This serves to differentiate the Hungarians from their mostly Slavic neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe and situates them as ethnic Asians. Still seen in some movements and in far-right politics is anti-Semitism, especially in the form of Holocaust revisionism which involves the idolisation of Szálasi and the idea that Horthy was actually helping the Hungarian Jews, and not an ally of Hitler. The Fidesz government has adopted a platform of Holocaust revisionism, even erecting a revisionist statue[5] in Budapest's Freedom Square, and has fuelled xenophobia in Hungary. Anti-Semitism has also been recently evident in the Hungarian government through the large-scale anti-Soros campaign and subsequent 'Stop Soros' bill.

One of the largest characteristics of the Hungarian far-right is antigypsyism, which occurs throughout much of Eastern Europe. This refers to negative sentiments and feelings toward the Roma, an ethnic minority living in much of Europe. It is thought that the Roma first arrived in Hungary around the eleventh century, followed by more migrations lasting until about the fourteenth century. By the sixteenth century, many of the Roma were musicians and craftsmen. As they were not professional, so to speak, they were placed as the lowest class by the Ottomans who occupied Hungary. The Roma have suffered much persecution and continue to do so today. Indeed, the term *cigánybűnözés*, 'gypsy criminality,' was successfully reawakened by the Jobbik party (Juhász, 2010), and many do indeed believe that Roma are genetically programmed to be criminals. Roma remain the

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[5] A statue was erected in April 2014, directly following the national elections, depicting the Archangel Gabriel (Hungary) being attacked by a large eagle (Germany). This statue was met by a huge amount of protest and has been heavily criticized for being revisionist given the implication that Hungary was innocent in the Holocaust and in itself a victim, while the country was indeed allied with Germany.

most threatened minority in Hungary, with several hate crimes being committed against them including a series of murders between 2008 to 2009 (Halász, 2009) and large-scale civil patrols of Roma villages in 2011 and 2012 (Ahmari, 2012).

Symbolism

Radical right groups also adopt symbols, and these are most often entrenched in history. The British radical right often makes use of British symbolism such as the Union Jack, English bulldog, and major figures such as Winston Churchill. With regard to the English Defence League (see below), the symbolism becomes a bit more intricate. They generally fly the Knight's Templar battle flag, which is a black cross on a white background with the red St. George's cross in the centre (Pilkington, 2016). The colour symbolism here is important, making use of white, black, and red – the colours of England, not the UK. Most critical, however, is the use of Christian symbols and the symbol of the crusader, presumably as a symbol of a war against Islam. Also seen are words and certain phrases such as 'no surrender.' These symbols can be seen on clothing and flags, and often times as tattoos on supporters.

In Hungary, a prominent symbol of the radical right is the Árpád Flag, which consists of alternating red and white horizontal stripes, originally the flag of the Magyar tribes and of the first Hungarian Dynasty. Revived by the Arrow Cross Movement in the 1930s, the flag was banned by the Soviets less than two decades later. After the end of Soviet rule in Hungary, however, the flag has seen a rebirth in the Hungarian radical right.

Other noticeable symbols of Hungarian radical right supporters are the wearing of a *tarsoly*,[6] the use of ancient Hungarian runic writing, and the image of *turul* (mythical

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[6] A leather pouch with ornate designs of animals or flowers, made to be hung from a belt. They were originally used by the Magyars to carry flint.

ancient Magyar bird). Most of the symbolism used by the radical right harkens back to the pre-Christian times, when there is a perception that Hungarians were the 'pure' Magyars. It is worth noting that other important national symbols to the Hungarian people that arise out of later periods have not been adopted by the Hungarian radical right; for instance, the raven with a ring in its beak as a sign of King Matthias Corvinus (r. 1458-190), one of the most highly regarded Hungarian kings, has not been appropriated.

As mentioned, one of the strongest radical right attitudes in Hungary is irredentism; hence, the most important symbol of Hungarian nationalism is that of Greater Hungary. The symbol is recognised in the form of an idea, with the concept of 'Greater Hungary' symbolising the reunification of all ethnic Hungarians. It can also be represented physically by the image of present-day Hungary set within the pre-Trianon borders of the country, which often appears on decals, jewellery, and clothing. In another incarnation it appears as a common chant used by all radical right groups: *"Vesszen Trianon!"* or "Down with Trianon!"

1.3.2 Current British Radical Right Organisations

The landscape of the British radical right is ever-changing, especially as groups begin to dissolve and new ones form in their place. The far-right has historically been electorally unsuccessful, as demonstrated by the disintegration of the British National Party and by the very small support of Britain First. UKIP were the most electorally successful far-right (or near far-right) political party in Britain but it disappeared after their success with the Brexit referendum. Anti-Islam activist and co-leader of Pegida UK, Anne Marie Waters, founded a new political party called For Britain after her defeat in the leadership elections for UKIP, but the party is very minor on the British political scene. The party's website boasts a motto of "For the forgotten majority" and policies include placing the

interests of British people over the citizens of other nations. Britain does have some radical right protest movements and fringe organisations, which will be briefly reviewed.

This overview will start with the English Defence League, the UK organisation at the centre of this study. A few other organisations will also be discussed, such as National Action, which was originally intended to be the focus of this research but disbanded one year after it began, and some fringe organisations. As mentioned previously, radical right organisations have had trouble surviving in the UK. An examination of the current organisations in the UK shows how small the radical right is there, in sharp contrast to the Hungarian radical right discussed in the following subsection.

The English Defence League

The English Defence League (EDL) was founded in 2009 in response to a street protest by an Islamist group against a homecoming celebration of British troops in Luton (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016). The EDL was formed as an anti-Jihadist street movement and has always had a strong single-issue identity. While not an exhaustive list, the EDL have been referred to as 'new far-right' with "an aggressive, anti-Muslim agenda" (Jackson, 2011: 5), as an "Islamophobic new social movement" (Copsey, 2010: 5), a populist street movement (Bartlett et al, 2011), an anti-Islamist movement (Pilkington, 2016), and as an anti-Muslim protest group (Busher, 2016).

The launch of the EDL was announced on June 27th, 2009, on Facebook (Busher, 2016). Thanks to extensive media coverage, the EDL experienced a rapid growth in membership in 2010. This in turn encouraged the group's leaders to "adopt a more strategic approach to their activities by forming group hierarchies, splitting the management and administration of the group along area-based and thematic divisions" (Bartlett and Littler 2011: 10). However, the EDL has no formal membership, which makes it difficult to

estimate levels of support (Pilkington, 2016). In 2016, the EDL's national Facebook page had 181,000 'likes' (Pilkington, 2016), but now has just under 5,000 due to new Facebook takedown rules around hate speech. There are several regions with their own Facebook pages, the largest of which has just over 20,000 'likes.' Since April of 2019 the EDL, along with Britain First and the BNP, have been permanently banned from Facebook (Hern, 2019).

The organisation was originally led by Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll, who resigned in late 2013. Shortly thereafter the movement was run by a committee of regional organisers until Ian Crossland was elected as leader of the EDL in December 2015 (Pilkington, 2016). The group is known for its public demonstrations and clashes with anti-fascist organisations. Somewhat contrary to the Hungarian situation, the EDL has tried to distance itself from other far-right groups, especially the British National Party. They openly reject the far-right label and want to distance themselves from explicit 'extreme right' activity (Jackson, 2011a). The EDL promotes a commitment to human rights and a support for democracy, while being openly anti-Islamic, with an over-arching encouragement of the maintenance of traditional English culture (Bartlett and Littler, 2011).

National Action

Self-identifying as Britain's premier radical right street movement, National Action, founded in 2013, described themselves as a National Socialist youth organisation with members who are "clean, intelligent, and ambitious people typically in their late teens or twenties" (National Action website, no longer exists). Paul Jackson described them as a "small, neo-Nazi groupuscule" (2015: 100). They very adamantly stated that they were *not* extremist, but radical. According to their now-defunct website, if they were extremist, they

would resort to illegal violence to achieve their goals. Rather, they were radical as they only advocated legal violence through state power and the complicity of state institutions.

National Action were quite a secretive organisation and had rules preventing their members from speaking directly about the organisation. The founder and leader of the movement was 25-year-old Benjamin Raymond, a Politics graduate from Essex University. Other members of the movement have also been known to attend British universities and actively campaign on British university campuses. Their founders openly used their real identities, but, according to their old website, a need for anonymity arose for future members when the authorities and media betrayed their good intentions.

Their first strategy document was published on their website in September 2013. Their stated goal was to "bring honesty to the political process" (National Action website). Their efforts were mostly aimed at correcting the 'broken right-wing' so that it could become an effective political institution. The factor that distinguished National Action from other British radical right groups, however, was their open anti-Semitism (Jackson, 2015). Within the openly anti-Semitic and wider neo-Nazi groups National Action differentiated themselves through a unique style, and often criticised other British far-right groups for failing to have an exciting aesthetic style (Jackson, 2015).

National Action was proscribed in December of 2016. Later, in September of 2017, the home secretary additionally banned two related organisations, Scottish Dawn and NS131 (Travis, 2017). After National Action were banned, their website and social media pages quickly disappeared.

Other organisations

The British Movement is a white power neo-Nazi organisation with close ties to the National Front (Feldman & Stocker, 2017). Their Twitter profile, which at this point has not been updated since the end of December 2017, states that they do not promote the hatred

of any race, only love for their own people. This statement is followed by '14W," which is widely known to refer to the 'Fourteen Words' of the white power movement: "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children." The movement and party were formed in the early 1960s, with support growing in the 1970s and 1980s after the fragmentation of the National Front. In 2015 they had a membership base larger than that of the white power Combat 18 and its splinter-group Racial Volunteer Force, but now number around 50 members (Feldman & Stocker, 2017).

The Democratic Football Lads Alliance split in 2018 from the Football Lads Alliance, originally formed in 2017 as an 'anti-extremist' movement. The organisation has, however, increasingly become associated with the radical right. Their marches have been met with anti-fascist protestors and have erupted in violence, going as far as threatening to kill a police officer (Forrest, 2018). While they claim to be anti-racist and anti-violent, several anti-Islami speakers have spoken at their marches and they openly support Tommy Robinson (Keoghan, 2018).

Another organisation is the German Pegida movement, of which the UK chapter was founded by Tommy Robinson in at the beginning of 2016, although without the approval of the original German chapter. Pegida stands for *Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*, or 'Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West,' and is heavily anti-Islam. After a few protests and some initial interest from other British radical right groups like the BNP and EDL, the organisation fell apart. The organisation is still attempting to hold demonstrations both in the UK and in the rest of Europe, but interest has seriously dwindled.

Several white power and skinhead movements exist in Britain, although now with quite low numbers of supporters. Combat 18, for instance, were founded in 1992 as bodyguards for BNP leaders and currently have between 30 to 50 members (Feldman & Stocker, 2017).

The '18' of their name is white power symbolism where '1' represents the letter 'A' and '8' represents the letter 'H', or AH, Adolf Hitler. The organisation has now spread overseas to the United States and around Europe. They are extremely violent and their members are barred from working in prisons or joining the police force. In 2002 the Racial Volunteer Force (RVF) split from Combat 18, who are essentially a small ultra-violent splinter group.

The group Blood and Honour has links to Combat 18 and was also founded in 1987 in the UK. It is both a political group and, in largest part, a white power music promotion network, organising white power concerts and festivals. The name comes from the motto of the Hitler Youth, and they often use the number 28 (BH) as a symbol for their name. They have chapters in countries outside of the UK but have, for example, been banned in some countries, such as Germany and Spain.

1.3.3 Current Hungarian Radical Right Organisations

The landscape of the Hungarian far-right is quite broad. It can essentially be divided into three main groups of organisations: the political movements (the far-right), the social movements (radical right), and the fringe movements (extreme right). The political movements have been previously described here; they are political parties that can be situated in the far-right, namely Jobbik, Fidesz, and the new Our Homeland movement. The second groups are those larger radical right organisations that may have a political affiliation, but do not take part in politics. The last group includes more extreme fringe movements and organisations with smaller membership numbers, including chapters of international skinhead organisations. Several of the prominent radical right social movement organisations will be introduced here.[7] This should not be seen as an exhaustive

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[7] Four of these organisations – The New Hungarian Guard, the Hungarian Defence Movement, the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, and the Outlaw Army – were covered in a 2017 policy publication, written by the author for this project and utilised for the policy report. Those descriptions will bear resemblance to what is found here. See Holdsworth and Kondor (2017) for the publication.

list, as it must be remembered that the landscape of the far-right is ever-changing and fluctuating. Quite small fringe groups, like the Hungarian chapters of Combat 18 and Blood and Honour, will not be covered in this overview. Additionally, smaller organisations with little relation to the Hungarian Defence Movement, such as Pax Hungarica, the Guardians of the Carpathian Homeland Movement, and the Hungarian National Front will not be covered herein.

This subsection will first look at the Hungarian Defence Movement, the organisation at the centre of this study. Then other organisations will be introduced, beginning with the New Hungarian Guard as they are the organisation which the Hungarian Defence Movement essentially grew out of. The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement and the Outlaw Army will also be discussed as both have ties to the Hungarian Defence Movement, and they will be mentioned again later in this study.

Contrary to the situation in the UK, most of the larger groups in Hungary exist in a tight network with each group filling a different role. The New Hungarian Guard is somewhat of an 'old boys' club; the Hungarian Defence Movement is an anti-Roma organisation which values community and volunteer activities; the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement has the youngest membership profile, organises demonstrations, and has a strongly irredentist identity; and the Outlaw Army is an organisation of violent muscular men who often serve as security at events. Several of these organisations are also tied to political parties. Gábor Vona, ex-leader and founder of Jobbik, was a member of the Hungarian Guard. Several members of the Hungarian Defence Movement are also members of Jobbik, and the two groups often organised charity events together. László Toroczkai, founder of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, was a mayor for Jobbik in the town Ásotthalom and has now formed a new party, the Our Homeland Movement.

The Hungarian Defence Movement

The Hungarian Defence Movement (*Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom*) was formed in October of 2014 out of the organisation For a Better Future Hungarian Self-Defense (*Szebb Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem*; henceforth Better Future), originally For a Better Future Civil Guard Organisation (*Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület*). The Better Future movement was founded in 2010 after the fragmentation of the Hungarian Guard following its proscription. Founded and led by Attila Tibor László, the Better Future Movement was disbanded in 2014 for activities in Gyöngyöspata, Kunhegyes, Cegléd, and Devecser. The Better Future Movement became nationally famous in 2011 for incidents in the village of Gyöngyöspata, where the group patrolled the village for several weeks terrorizing Roma residents. The movement was accused of threatening the rights and safety of people in Cegléd, and at events in Kunhegyes and Devecser they likened Roma to criminals, using terms like "vermin, spawn of Satan, and rats" (Janecskó, 2014).

Currently, the Hungarian Defence Movement is quite active online, with a regularly-updated website, a Facebook presence, and an Instagram account. Their Facebook page, where they identify themselves as an NGO, has nearly 5,400 supporters; having gained about 3,000 supporters in the last year alone. They seem to be present at most radical right demonstrations and the group's leader is regularly photographed with other major figures in the Hungarian radical right movement, especially Zsolt Tyirityán (Outlaw Army, Strength and Dedication) and László Toroczkai (Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, Our Homeland Movement).

The group regularly organises events and music festivals supporting Hungarian far-right bands. The group presents an image of a community organisation, organising food and clothing drives and depicting families along with children on their Facebook page. They organise an annual summer camp for children who are taught about Hungarian history

and presumably radical right values, and which serves as a community-building event. There is also a paramilitary section of the organisation, which offers combat training to members. The Hungarian Defence Movement still regularly patrol streets of areas with high Roma populations, who they refer to as 'pigs' on their website. They strongly feel that nothing is being done to protect the 'Hungarian' population around Hungary, and that it is their duty to do so.

The New Hungarian Guard

The Hungarian Guard Movement was formed in 2007 with 56 members, a number chosen to commemorate the 1956 revolution (LeBoer, 2008). The Hungarian Guard was dissolved by the government in 2009 for civil soldier marches in Tatárszentgyörgy, a village with a high population of Roma. The group was re-formed as the New Hungarian Guard Movement (*Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom*) only three weeks later and is now strategically split into local chapters. They now have chapters in most of Hungary's nineteen counties but are seemingly less active than in the past.

The Hungarian Guard are a radical right organisation whose members pledge to defend Hungarian values and culture and consider themselves "a self-defence alliance that transcends parties and borders" (Új Magyar Garda Mozgalom, 2013). Their seven tenets are: honour, 'Hungarianness,' trust in God, fellowship, helpfulness, bravery, and loyalty to the organisation. According the Hungarian Guard's website, their goals can only be those which abide by the official Hungarian constitution (Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom, n.d.1). At the same time they profess that their goals must abide by the ancient rights of freedom and ancient traditions. They say they only have one rule: to protect the Hungarian state and the interests of the Hungarian nation.

According to their website (Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom, n.d.2) membership in the

Hungarian Guard is open to anyone who is at least eighteen years old, believes in God, identifies as a member of the Hungarian nation, speaks Hungarian, is familiar with and respects Hungarian tradition and history, promises to protect Hungarian national identity, and will not allow anyone to differentiate between true Hungarians. It should be mentioned that the latter point is an irredentist nod to those ethnic Hungarians living across national borders (in areas of pre-Trianon Hungary) and emphasises the idea that Roma are not part of the Hungarian nation. Ironically, according to their initial introduction letter, anyone can join the Hungarian Guard, regardless of nationality, religion, political affiliation, or ethnic minority, as long as they love Hungary and sympathise with the goals of the movement. The organisation has also revitalised fascist symbols of the 1944-1945 Arrow Cross, by using the red-and-white striped Árpád flag in their emblem and wearing a uniform of black boots, black pants, black military waistcoats, white shirts, and a black cap emblazoned with the Árpád stripes. The symbolism is quite prominent, and, according to one author, could be "a homage to Mussolini, if not Hitler, and to the fusion between race, state, and national unity" (LeBoer, 2008: 34).

The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement

The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (*Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom*; henceforth: HVIM), self-identify as a radical youth nationalist movement. Founded on April 21st, 2001 by László Toroczkai, the movement's name is an homage to the sixty-four counties of Hungary, excluding Croatia, before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. Their slogan is "Faith, loyalty, bravery," their symbol is the royal orb, and their ideology is strongly irredentist.

They believe that the centre of Hungary is not Budapest, but indeed lies in Csongrád county. This area in southern Hungary is believed to be where the original Blood Oath was

made, which according to legend was the official pact between the original seven tribes of Hungary. The area is also one of the areas where ancient burial mounds can be found. Additionally, it is the birthplace of Sándor Rózsa, the Hungarian Robin Hood, who in reality was a highwayman who led his own company into battle in the 1848 Hungarian Revolution. Lastly, the River Tisza flows through the county, which is said to be 'the most Hungarian river' as it used to lie entirely in Hungary – now crossing several national borders. As Szeged is Csongrád county's County Town, it is held as the main seat for both HVIM and the related, yet more violent, paramilitary Outlaw Army (*Betyársereg*).

The founders of HVIM came from Hungary, Germany, and the Hungarian region of Serbia: Szeged, Hódmezővásárhely (the only Székely town outside of Transylvania), Budapest, Stuttgart, and Subotica. Their original meeting place was a farm with old ruins, owned by Toroczkai, in the very town where Sándor Rózsa went into hiding. One of the strongest ideologies of HVIM is irredentism and the desire for autonomy for Hungarian lands outside of Hungary's borders. Indeed, after only one year of existence, in 2002 they entered *Székelyföld*, or the Szeklerlands, where they show their support for Szekler autonomy and clash with police. In 2018, two members of their Szekler chapter were sentenced to five years in jail for terrorism, for allegedly planning to set off homemade bombs in 2015 at a Romanian national celebration (Horváth, 2018).

The origin of the Székely, or Szekler, people is constantly under debate, but one theory is that they were a separate tribe who originally came to the Carpathian Basin with the ancient Magyars. Another theory states that they went the area of today's Szeklerland in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries. Regardless, they are considered by most Hungarians to be somewhat 'ultra-Hungarian,' and to have retained the ancient culture of the Hungarians before the series of invasions. The area is found in eastern Transylvania, originally belonging to Hungary until the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, and today belonging

to Romania. Many Szekler people now actively seek autonomy from the Romanian state, a fight which HVIM has very quickly joined. The leaders of HVIM are regularly banned from entering Romania. They also have several chapters in Slovakia, where László Toroczkai was declared a *persona non grata* for five years in 2006.

Since their foundation in 2001, HVIM has been incredibly active in organising various conferences, organising meetings and protests in Hungarian regions of surrounding countries, organising anti-Trianon and other demonstrations, and even holding an annual music festival and annual youth camp. Their Facebook page had nearly 13,000 supporters in 2015. After Facebook deleted their page as part of their sweep of radical right movements, a new Facebook page had over 3,600 supporters before being banned under Facebook's new crackdown on radical right organisations. The most recent deletion of their Facebook page and of their old website has prompted the banner "They can erase us from the internet, but we'll meet on the streets!" on the latest incarnation of their website.

The Outlaw Army

Formed in 2008, the motto of the Outlaw Army (*Betyársereg*) is "Ne bánstd a magyart, mert pórul jársz!" which loosely translates to "Don't hurt Hungarians, or else!" Their online self-description states that they do not believe in the laws of the state, rather in the ancient laws of the *puszta*, or Hungarian plains. Like the outlaws of days past, they say they have been forced by the powers that be to act outside of the law. In other words, they say they are not outlaws by choice, but by necessity. The Outlaw Army is closely tied to other radical right organisations, and often provide 'security' for different protests and radical right events. They are very popular among the Hungarian radical right, even selling their own merchandise.

The Outlaw army is led by Zsolt Tyirityán, who is one of the most well-known figures in the Hungary radical right scene. They assert that they are a loose alliance or society of self-organised clans that work under the traditions of Eurasian civilisations – thus avoiding the ascription of 'army' or 'organised group' so they cannot be dissolved. According to an interview with Tyirityán conducted in February of 2016, the group has approximately 300 members spread out across the country, divided into 10-15 clans (Kittensinurface, 2016). He claims that the Outlaw Army is merely a defence organisation that tries to draw criminal, dangerous, and anti-social elements of society to the attention of law enforcement. Tyirityán stated that one must have right-wing values to become a member of the Outlaw Army, which to him mean patriotism (*patriotizmus*) and communal spirit (*közösségi szellem*). Potential members of the organisation must also have a strong history in either martial arts or strength training. The group has repeatedly claimed to not be a threat and to only exist to aid Hungarians and protect the country in ways the government cannot.

Other Organisations

The Identitarian movement has also appeared in Hungary with two separate and unrelated organisations. The short-lived Identitesz was formed in September 2015 at a university in Budapest, originally under the name of the Conservative Student Society. The organisation was led by Balázs László and claimed to build a 'new right'. Identitesz has since dissolved, after announcing an intent to become a political party and, ultimately, joining forces with the Outlaw Army. On 8 July 2017, the two organisations formed a coalition movement called Strength and Devotion (*Erő és Elszántság*), at which time Balázs László resigned as the leader of Identitesz. Strength and Devotion has since essentially disappeared.

The other organisation is the Hungarian branch of the Generation Identity movement (*Identitás Generáció*). The Hungarian Generation Identity was formed in 2014 and seemingly in 2017 had about 100 members (Kulcsár and Halász 2017). Along a different line from the more traditional radical right organisations in Hungary, Generation Identity see an importance in protecting both a European and Hungarian identity, namely against migration and the 'threat' of Islam. They claim to not have any issues with any one particular group of people, Muslims included, but are against the 'Islamisation' of Europe. They are concerned with a supposed replacement of European people by migrants and refugees, and subscribe to ethnopluralist views. Their actions around Budapest have included displaying large banners in public areas that read things like, for example, "Islamisation kills!" (Dezse 2017) and organising a demonstration commemorating the Siege of Buda on 2 September 1686. This is particularly important as it commemorates a defeat of Ottoman forces and is now reinterpreted as freeing the Hungarians from Islam. toward the future and the goal of "making Hungary more European" (Sellner 2017).

Lastly is the newer Hungarian Legion (*Légió Hungária*) formed in the summer of 2018. As they are a fairly new organisation not much is known; it can be assumed by the black Celtic Cross flags displayed at their events that they are part of the white power network, and their logo is essentially the Celtic Cross formed out of a laurel wreath and two crossed swords. Their organisation is based on three fundamentals: tradition, consciousness, and community. They see traditional family as crucially important and have a close relationship with the Outlaw Army.

1.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has overviewed the modern histories of both Great Britain and Hungary to set a context for comparison in this study. Then, the landscape of the far-right in Hungary and the Great Britain was provided, again to help set context for this study. Lastly, a discussion of terminology was provided to clarify choices of terminology for this study

The two groups which will be examined in this study will be the English Defence League and the Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM). These groups were chosen, aside from the accidental synchronisation of their name, for several reasons. The EDL was chosen as it is one of the only radical right organisations in Great Britain which is still relatively moderate; other groups are considered to be more extreme. In Hungary, MÖM was chosen as they are a larger radical right organisation who are regularly active and are not as extreme as some of their counterparts (such as the Outlaw Army, for example). Additionally, both of these groups have relatively large membership numbers, and perhaps most importantly, were both very active online.

This project has three major phases, which will be used in an attempt to shed light on the research questions. These questions are: why individuals adopt nationalist attitudes, why they join radical right movements, and why they maintain membership in these movements. The first phase of this research will be secondary survey analysis of European Social Survey data in order to help set the context of causation of right-wing and far-right attitudes in the UK and Hungary. Next, an online analysis will provide insight into how these organisations attempt to recruit and how they wish to display the image of their organisation. Lastly, qualitative interviews will be presented with organisation members to look further into why individuals join radical right movements and maintain membership. First, however, an overview of the literature will be presented.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

As mentioned, this study will examine three overarching research questions: why individuals adopt radical right attitudes, why individuals join social movements, and why they maintain membership in these movements. These questions will be approached from the framework of radical right social movement organisations in Hungary and Great Britain. All of these questions are extremely involved and must be approached from several different angles; an attempt to provide a comprehensive review of these approaches from different disciplines will herein be provided. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this project, there is a huge body of literature to draw from and it is accepted that there will be omissions. There has been no directly analogous research previously conducted; the most cognate pieces of work were chosen to frame the current study.

The first section will look at why people adopt extremist views. Why someone adopts extreme views does not explain why they join a group, and this question must be considered separately. The second section will then look at what drives people to political action, namely why people join social movements and organisations.

There have also been several studies examining questions of the adoption of extremist attitudes and the motivation to join groups, both of which will be discussed further below. However, most of these studies have focused heavily on Western Europe (especially Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands), while Eastern Europe has been largely ignored. There has also not yet been a study exploring these questions of group membership in Hungary. Therefore, this work will attempt to fill several holes in the literature, namely an exploration of the Hungarian radical right, thus furthering the study of radial right protest movements as social movement organisations (SMO), and comparing two differing social and ideological contexts in terms of radical right social movement organisation (NSMO) participation and adherence.

2.1 WHY DO INDIVIDUALS ADOPT EXTREMIST VIEWS?

The first part of this review will focus on why individuals adopt extremist views and, specifically, radical right-wing attitudes. Scholars in many fields have attempted to confront this question, many drawing from social psychology but also from political and social studies. This section will first look to theories of extremist and deviant attitudes from the point of view of social psychology, political and social studies, and criminology. Lastly, a brief discussion of extremist attitudes will be provided.

2.1.1 Personality and Politics

The question of extremist attitude is one that has troubled researchers for much of the twentieth, and now the twenty-first, centuries. Early social psychologists were concerned with the idea of a so-called *authoritarian personality* being the explanation for people adopting extremist views. Right-wing authoritarianism can be considered as the combination of three basic characteristics in one individual (Altemeyer, 1996): *authoritarian submission*, which is a high degree of submission to the authorities who are seen to be established and legitimate in one's society; *authoritarian aggression*, which is general aggressiveness directed against various persons; and *conventionalism*, which is a high degree of adherence to traditional social norms (Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer, 1996).

One of the first and most well-known works in the field is Adorno et al. (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality*. Here, Else Frenkel-Brunswick traced 'Fascist potential' to early childhood experiences. The thought was that future authoritarians were raised by threatening and forbidding parents who punished improper behaviour severely and seemingly randomly. This has since become a stereotype, but scientific evidence is unconvincing (Altemeyer, 1988). Naturally this is a very difficult theory to test, as it requires a long period of follow-ups with participants. Bob Altemeyer did test the theory in

his 1981 *Right-Wing Authoritarianism* and found that there was no correlation between childhood experiences and potential to authoritarianism. This was also shown to be unsupported by evidence by Hyman and Sheatsley (1954).

The original measure of authoritarianism was the F scale, dubbed as such because it was designed to predict fascist tendencies (Adorno et al. 1950; Christie, 1954). The idea of an authoritarian personality is still used by some researchers. Bob Altemeyer conducted several surveys based on his Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale, mostly on university students. The RWA scale is a thirty-item attitudinal scale, where choices range on a scale from -4 (very strongly disagree) to +4 (very strongly agree) with no neutral choice. A number of characteristics of authoritarian aggression have come to light from these surveys. For example, those with High RWA scores are more likely to be hostile to homosexuals, tend to be the most ethnically and racially prejudiced people in samples, would be the first to help if the government decided to wipe out some group, tend to be more mean-spirited, adhere to more traditional religious teachings, and, if male, are more likely than most to assault women (Altemeyer, 1996). It is also important to consider, as Altemeyer (1996) points out, that major social events can shift an individual's level of authoritarianism at any point in their adult lives.

While a person's nature and biographic experience are important in their personality formation, social psychology has also shown "how easily situations trump individual difference" (Altemeyer, 1996: 8). This was shown, admittedly with research methodology that would not be reproduced today due to ethical constraints, by Stanley Milgram in the 1960s (Milgram, 1974). The experiment involved three individuals: the Experimenter, the Teacher, and the Learner. The Experimenter and Learner were both part of the research team, while the Teacher was the subject. The Teacher was told that the Learner must memorise word-pairs and would receive an electric shock every time a mistake was made.

The Experimenter then ordered the Teacher to push numbered buttons, which the Teacher believed were delivering electric shocks to the Learner, growing ever more powerful as the numbers got higher. In reality, no shock was delivered and pre-recorded sounds were played at each interval. The final shock of the experiment was a lethal 450-volt electric shock, which an astonishing 65 percent of the Teacher subjects administered. Subjects were under obvious stress throughout the experiment and visibly uncomfortable. This experiment was groundbreaking in showing the power of obedience and how a great number of people are willing to carry out orders that conflict with their own moral code. It also showed that those who do traditionally 'authoritarian' actions, or seemingly embody those attitudes, do not necessarily have an 'authoritarian personality,' showing the need for research in teasing out why individuals adopt extremist (or radical right) attitudes and ideologies.

Others have attempted to approach this question from the perspective of politics. Rudolf Heberle (1951), in his *Social Movements*, outlines the various theories of personality types as related to politics. In the 19th century, Swiss political scientist Johann Bluntschli correlated four party types with temperament; progressive with sanguine temperament, conservative with phlegmatic, radical with choleric, and reactionary with melancholic (Heberle, 1951). Before Bluntschli, Lord Macaulay correlated political attitudes with temperament (Macaulay, 1986 [1848-1861]), and Friedrich Rohmer correlated political parties with age group: the radical party with boyhood, the liberal party with adolescence, the conservatives with manhood, and the absolutistic with old age (Heberle, 1951).

In the early twentieth century, Eduard Spranger (1928) distinguished the political and social types from the 'contemplative-scholarly,' economic, aesthetic, and religious types (Heberle, 1951). While now jumping ahead, it should be mentioned that Spranger

also differentiated between those people who lead movements and those who join them, claiming that 'political attitudes' were more characteristic of the more active participants of social movements and of the leaders of political parties, whereas 'social attitudes' were more prevalent among the 'joiners' of social movements (Heberle, 1951). The 'political types' are those people for whom power is the highest value, to which everything else is inferior and subservient. The 'social type,' on the other hand, is motivated by sympathy and a genuine interest in others. These are referred to as an ideal type, which may be used in empirical studies to understand political leaders and their followers (Heberle, 1951).

Heberle (1951) also discusses the concept of frustration. Those people who are prevented, by conditions that may be out of their control, from attaining their goals may react to their situation in two ways: face the facts and try to fix the situation, or "they may become frustrated, that is, develop attitudes of aggression" (Heberle, 1951: 107). Politically, if an individual seeks change or has views outside of the norm, they may become frustrated and aggressive if they do not feel they are heard. This aggression is not only manifest physically but can also influence a person's online behaviour, and ultimately cause a strengthening of their views and attitudes.

There is also a growing body of research into radicalism, which can be defined as "increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict. Descriptively, radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of that group" (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 416). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) differentiate between individual, group, and mass radicalisation; here, the focus is on individual radicalisation. They describe four types: individual radicalisations by personal victimisation, individual radicatisation by political grievance, individuals being gradually radicalised by a persistent radical group or organisations, and radicalism that occurs

through the love and closeness felt for group members after joining a radical organisation. In the latter case, individuals are often recruited to the group through personal contacts. Of course, it must be remembered that there are both radical actions, in other words the behaviour of an individual, and radical attitudes, which are their aims and perceptions (Della Porta & LaFree, 2012). While they are linked, radical attitudes do not always lead to violence (Della Porta & LaFree, 2012).

It is also crucial to understand the social and political context in which radicalised individuals live. In a study of national variation in support for far-right political parties in Western Europe, researchers discovered that there were several factors which encouraged far-right voting (Wilcox, Weinberg, & Eubank, 2003). Far-right voting was found to be higher in countries where: people believe they have little control over their lives, people are more dissatisfied with their lives as a whole, people are more religious, people are less likely to trust their own fellow citizens, and people are less likely to agree that scarce jobs should be shared with disadvantaged groups (such as women, immigrants, the elderly, and the disabled). In these same countries, people were more likely to believe that if their fellow citizens live in need, it was because of laziness and a lack of willpower.

2.1.2 Criminological Theory

Criminologists have long been interested in why people turn to deviance and crime. While a right-wing extremist and/or political activist is not necessarily a criminal, they can generally be considered a deviant in most societies (Haslam & Turner, 1998). Most criminological theories of deviance can then, in turn, be applied here. It is important to remember that crime itself is a social construct, and deviance itself is indeed 'in the eye of the beholder' (Treadwell, 2013). There is nothing inherently criminal about any act (Treadwell, 2013), so the context of the society in which the crime is committed must be

considered. This is the same for extremist views: an extremist view in one society may not be so extreme in another.

Some early theories of why people turned to crime were found in a biological approach. One of the earliest crime theorists, Cesare Lombroso (1836-1909), believed that there were 'born criminals' and he promoted the idea that behaviour is biological (Treadwell, 2013). In the same vein, Johannes Lange (1931) suggested that criminal behaviour was inherited from one's parents. These biological theories were then later applied to psychological theories of crime and criminality. For instance, Hans Eysenck in his *Crime and Personality* (1964) proposed that personality was biologically determined. He suggested that personality was composed of three major factors: extroversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism. Hereditary brain abnormalities could, he suggested, affect one's ability to learn from, and adapt to, the environment around them. This, then, would lead to the exaggeration of one of these personality types, leading to criminal behaviour. Of course, this was shown in the previous section to be highly unlikely, as several scholars have discussed the importance of personality and social conditions on extremist attitudes and behaviour. Others, including James Wilson and Richard Herrnstein (1985), have suggested that early social circumstances and family influences can affect someone's propensity toward criminal behaviour through a development of a "defective personality" (Treadwell, 2013: 42).

The largest number of theories of crime and deviance have come from sociology. As there are an extensive number of theoretical viewpoints, only those which can be applicable to political activism will be overviewed. Some major theories will, as a result, be left out of this review, with a focus rather on those which can be applied to membership in radical right movements: differential association, strain theory, status frustration, and labelling theory.

Sutherland and Cressey (1978) suggested that criminal behaviour could be learnt and transmitted or could be invented by an individual. Criminal behaviour could be learnt through social interaction, often within intimate social groups (Treadwell, 2013). This theory is known as *differential association* and emphasises the idea that a person's subculture heavily influences their attitudes and ideas. This then presents somewhat of a 'chicken and egg' problem when later discussing membership in social movement organisations: does an individual join a group because they share common ideologies, or do they develop those ideologies after joining a group?

Somewhat akin to the ideas of relative deprivation in social movement theory (discussed below) is Robert Merton's *strain theory* (1938; 1968). Merton suggested that an inequality is felt between the culturally-approved goals in a society "and the means of achieving those goals" (Treadwell, 2013: 51). This discrepancy between the means and goals could encourage those individuals deprived of legal means to turn to illegal ones. Merton argued that people are encouraged to place a high importance on the goal of financial success (Agnew & Brezina, 2010). Many individuals are prevented from achieving those goals (for example, due to belonging to a lower class, or having low education), resulting in frustration. This frustration and resentment can cause individuals to adapt by choosing deviant routes to success, and hence are motives for criminal behaviour. Later, Robert Agnew (1992) elaborated on Merton's theory to put more focus on the psychological impacts of this discrepancy on an individual.

A theory that has been applied to gang and subculture studies is that of *status frustration* (Treadwell, 2013). Status frustration theory is descended from strain theory and looks at ways in which illegal activities (rather than legal) have been endorsed by some groups. Albert Cohen (1955) looked at crimes of delinquent boys who often offended together, and he speculated that being denied status in society can lower self-esteem. He

suggested that young boys growing up in a city often formed groups, and would experience common problems, be "exposed to common stereotypes and stigmas, subject to similar formal controls…setting themselves against common others who might disrespect or attack them" (Rock, 2012: 69).

Criminology's *labelling theory* derives from the sociological concept of symbolic interactionism, which suggests that people respond to their idea of the world and that individuals derive their sense of self through interaction with others (Rock, 2012). Labelling theory proposes that those labels given to deviants by those in power can reinforce or create criminal identity (Treadwell, 2013). It is questionable to what extent this can be applied to radical right organisations, at least for this study, as both organisations have openly denied common labels such as 'extreme right'.

Again, this was not meant to be a comprehensive view of all theories of criminal behaviour. Rather, those criminological theories were reviewed which could be applied to the study of political activism and social movement analysis. Particularly important to this study are those theories which come from sociology. It is likely not just one theory that is correct, but a combination. For instance, strain theory could play an important role as many people may feel as though they do not have the same means of achieving their goals as others. If they then begin to move in certain circles, differential association suggests that individuals can be influenced by those around them. Cohen's idea of delinquency suggests that people can band together against a threatening 'other', and labelling theory proposes that once an individual is labelled as a delinquent, 'fascist', 'nazi', or extremist, they may begin to believe it of themselves.

2.1.3 Extremist Attitudes

Several authors have focused specifically on extremist attitudes, their sources, and their implications in social groups. Ronald Wintrobe describes three definitions of extremism (2002). The first is an extremist person or group, which is one who sees the centre position as not in the interior of a dimension (for example, a political left-right scale) but at a corner. The second is an extremist move, which is a move away from the centre and towards one of the extremes in the aforementioned dimension. Lastly, a political extremist can be seen as one who uses extremist methods, "for example, bombings, inflammatory language, terrorist activity, and so forth, but whose platform is or may be centrist rather than extremist in political (left-right) space" (Wintrobe, 2002: 25).

Wintrobe argues that extremist behaviour can be understood using a rational choice approach, and that aspects of extremism (passion, conformity, leadership, and loyalty) are consistent with rational choice (Wintrobe, 2002; Wintrobe 2006). He considers extremism to be a form of political competition, since social movements, including extremist movements, are seen "as the main vehicle for excluded people to gain access to and influence within an established political system" (Wintrobe, 2002: 24).

Sunstein (2009) points out the importance of *confidence* in extremist behaviour, as cautious people tend to choose a midpoint between extremes and moderate their views. However, if people become more confident as they see that other people seem to share their views, they may be more inclined to move in a more extreme direction. In the same vein, if an individual is a member of a group that believes the same ideology that they do, they will hear relatively few opposing views and their ideas will only be reinforced (Sunstein, 2009). In such a case, most group members are likely to be affected, and most will shift further in the direction of extremism by merely being a member of such a group. This is also emphasised by *norms of exclusion*, in other words that those people with the right

characteristics and views are allowed into a group, while others are excluded (Hardin, 2002). Hence, the less committed members of a group leave while the extremists remain. Similarly, as extremists are strongly committed to their beliefs, if they hear evidence contrary to their views "they can become still more committed, not less so" (Sunstein, 2009: 51). This isolation from other views and members of society can generate paranoia, where people begin to suppose the worst of all others from outside their social group and from those with whom they are not in direct contact (Hardin, 2002).

2.2 WHY INDIVIDUALS SEEK COLLECTIVE ACTION

The question of why individuals seek collective action is intricate and complicated, and encompasses a number of issues. The first is that of why people seek collective action, and why people feel the need to join an organisation of like-minded peers. Similarly, it is important to consider the question of why some people join organisations and others do not, although they may share similar attitudes and ideologies. Secondly, it is crucial to consider the factors behind group involvement. Some consider that the reason people join groups is rooted in psychology and personality, of which a key question is whether certain identity traits influence group involvement (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Others see the roots of involvement in social and economic factors, such as relative deprivation or social capital. Likely, however, the answer is found in some combination of all potential aspects. Many scholars have used historical and political contexts to explain protest, but this approach has been criticised as ignoring cultural context (Jasper, 1997). Thirdly, the question of whether protest is a rational choice or an irrational and emotional reaction has been a large source of debate among researchers: on one side, "theorists have demeaned protestors as irrational, altogether outside normal flows of life; at the other they have assumed an extreme form of self-interested rationality that equally divorces protestors from their cultural contexts" (Jasper, 1997: 19). Lastly, the question can also be seen from the perspective of the organisation, and why they succeed in recruiting certain supporters but fail to recruit others.

This section will give a brief overview of the theoretical attempts at answering these questions. It will begin with an overview of social movement analysis, as this is the field which first began a serious exploration of the issue of group involvement. Following that, I will discuss specific theoretical perspectives of differential recruitment, such as the theory of relative deprivation, social capital, and social psychological factors such as identity and

an individual's personal biography. The last section will outline general empirical studies on differential recruitment, with some studies of specifically extremist groups. There is quite a large body of work on social movement and organisational membership, but this area is somewhat lacking in studies of extreme right groups.

2.2.1 Approaches to Social Movement Analysis

McCarthy and Zald define a social movement as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (1977: 1217-1218). As the definition is subject to some controversy, it has more recently been defined as "collectivities engaged in noninstitutionalized discourses and practices aimed at changing the existing condition of society" (Garner, 1997: 1). The emphasis in both of these definitions is change: a social movement exhibits a conscious commitment to promote change, has a minimum degree of organisation, and has normative commitment and participation (Wilkinson, 1971). While much of the literature does deal with social movements in general, this project will be examining smaller social movement organisations (SMO). A SMO is a "complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement…and attempts to implement these goals" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1218). The goals of social movements can include public challenges directed toward the state as well as a large variety of actions carried out by smaller entities as part of a struggle for social change (Whittier, 2002). The specific, or target, goals of an SMO can range anywhere from obtaining equal rights for women (Taylor & Whittier, 1992) to the eradication of all Islamic people from Britain (Solomos, 2013).

Early social movement researchers in the 1940s and 1950s mostly focused on the irrationality of movements (Garner, 1997). The focus of analysis was the individual rather than that of a group; the answer to why and how an individual joined an organisation was

seen to lie within the individual themselves, in their personality, predispositions, and propensities. Social psychology was at the forefront, and beliefs were seen to be shaped by personality or by informal micro-pressures (Garner, 1997).

In the mid-1960s, social movement analysis began to use more specific organisational and political arguments to explain social protest, transforming what was an earlier focus of *collective behaviour* to one of *collective action*, *social movements*, and *social movement organisations* (McAdam & Scott, 2005; Gamson, 1968; Gamson, 1975; Zald & Ash, 1966). Collective action can be understood as an idea that encompasses an extremely wide array of empirical phenomena, "from raising an army to raising a barn; from building a bridge across a gulf separating states to building a faith community that spans the gulf between races; from organizing a business cartel to organizing a small partnership to compete in a crowded market; from the food riots of revolutionary France to the progressive dinners of charitable New York" (Marwell & Oliver, 1993: 1-2). The important thing is that these represent mutual interests and the possibility of some benefit from this action. In simpler terms, collective action can be defined as "actions taken by two or more people in pursuit of the same collective good" (Marwell & Oliver, 1993: 4).

Much of the work on social movements built on the ideas of Philip Selznick, who used an institutional perspective to analyse the relationship between value commitments and concerns surrounding survival in the development of an organization (McAdam & Scott, 2005; Selznick, 1948; Selznick, 1952). The understanding of protest changed from one of irrational behaviour to one of instrumental action and began to focus on instruments of mobilisation rather than common grievances (McAdam & Scott, 2005). Movement behaviour was now seen as rational action within structural constraints, or in other words, a set of rational responses to the social environment (Garner, 1997; Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975).

In the decades that followed, several new theories emerged in the fields of social movement analysis and organisational studies. In the 1970s, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald began to publish on resource mobilisation, a newer economistic approach to social movement analysis (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & McCarthy 1987). This approach stressed that movements require some form of organisation to be sustained, whether that is strong leadership, structure, incentives for participation, or something else, as well as a means for obtaining resources.

Shortly before McCarthy and Zald, Oberschall (1973) also began to suggest alternatives to the collective behaviour approach by introducing the concept of resources. According to Oberschall (1973), people and groups can manage resources in different ways, including exchanging them for others, borrowing them, or recalling earlier investments. Group conflict can also be seen from this perspective of resource management, and resource "mobilization refers to the processes by which a discontented group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals" (Oberschall, 1973: 28). Additionally, conflicting groups are often in competition for the same resources. Group members possess different resources required to produce the 'collective good,' such as time and money, and the contribution of these resources is necessary for collective action (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). Resource mobilization theory began to be criticised by the mid-1980s, however, for straying too far away from social psychology in the analysis of social movements (Klandermans, 1984).

The importance of the social, economic, and political environments in which an organisation is situated began to gain attention, and other works stressed the importance of power and politics within organisations and in its relation to the environment (Gamson, 1975; Zald & Berger, 1978). The political process perspective began to be pursued by Charles Tilly and colleagues, placing emphasis on 'political opportunities' (Tilly, 1978;

Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly, 1975), and the combination of an 'external' focus on the political environment with an 'internal' analysis of grassroots settings (for example, work and the local area) in facilitating collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996).

The two major fields in this area to develop in the late-twentieth century are those of organisations studies (OS) and social movement (SM) analysis. Initially OS paid more attention to structure (formal and informal) within and among organisations, and only recently have OS scholars looked at the actual *creation* of organisations. SM theorists, while embracing the concepts and arguments of OS, concentrated on social processes, the mobilisation of people and resources, the construction and reconstruction of identities, the building of alliances, and the creation of ideologies and cultural frames to support and sustain collective action (McAdam & Scott, 2005). SM scholars place much emphasis on the determination of those conditions under which new (movement) organisations arise and do or do not succeed. Scholars are rather movement-centric, sometimes focusing on a single movement organisation or on organisations of the same type (an organisational population). McCarthy and Zald (1977) appropriated the concept of industry (organisational field) from OS, which was generally used to examine the effects of other, sometimes rival, movements on a central movement organisation. Additionally, while OS places emphasis on organisations as systems of domination, SM theories have always highlighted the crucial role of power and politics in social life.

Organisational studies stress forces and factors affecting economic regulation, while social movement analysis has a focus on movements aimed at influencing social regulatory policies. OS is characterised by an emphasis on stability, existing forms of movements, prescribed politics (the activation and reproduction of established authority), and specific systems (McAdam & Scott, 2005; McAdam, 1999). On the other hand, SM emphasises change, emerging forms of movements, contentious politics, and society-wide

systems (McAdam & Scott, 2005). Both methods of analysis have their own important and unique perspectives, which is highlighted by the growing convergence between OS and SM scholarship.

2.2.2 Economic theories

Several scholars have drawn from economic theories to explain membership in social movements. Social scientists seeking to explain human behaviour are generally interested in the knowledge or beliefs of those people. Hardin (2002) suggests that an economic theory of knowledge would address this question. "Such a theory would not focus on the object of belief but on the ways people come to hold their beliefs" (Hardin, 2002: 5). There are three features of an economic theory of knowledge: knowledge is a resource and has value, and therefore is an economic good, the acquisition of knowledge often entails costs (resources, time, etc.), and "happenstance knowledge is in various ways fortuitously available when we use it" (Hardin, 2002: 6). It is because of this high cost of knowledge that individuals often rely on authorities for most of their knowledge.

One borrowed economic theory is that of social capital, which adapted to the political and sociological literature, and "generally refers to the set of norms, networks, and organizations through which people gain access to power and resources, and through which decision making and policy formulation occur" (Grootaert, 2001: 10). In other words, by connecting to others, people are able to accomplish things they either could not achieve by themselves, or only could with great difficulty. "People connect through a series of networks and they tend to share common values with other members of these networks; to the extent that these networks constitute a resource, they may be seen as forming a kind of capital" (Field, 2008: 1). The more people one knows, and the more they share common

values and identity with those people, the "richer [they] are in social capital" (Field, 2008: 1) and the more effectively they can "pursue shared objectives" (Putnam, 1996: 66).

Social capital is simultaneously both individual and collective, "a private face and a public face" (Putnam, 2000: 20). It is both the 'worth' of an individual that is built up by social contacts, and the social ties than an individual has. Putnam (2000) describes two types of social capital: bridging social capital and bonding social capital. *Bridging social capital* generates broader identities, and "encompass people across diverse social cleavages" (Putnam, 2000: 22). More important for this research and for social movements in general, however, is *bonding social capital*, which is "inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups" (Putnam, 2000: 22).

Of course, this works in the face of the rational choice model, which "assumes a highly individualistic model of human behaviour" where people only try to "serve their own interests, regardless of the fate of others" (Field, 2008: 24). Economist Eli Berman has suggested there is a rational basis for movement membership and radicalism through the application of the club goods model. The model, borrowed from economics, states in the 'club', or group, "the actions of other members appear in each others' objective functions," but any effects on external actors is ignored as they only apply to club members (Berman, 2000: 906). Berman has used this club goods model to rationally explain some interesting features of Ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture in Israel (Berman, 2000), as well as membership in volunteer religious organisations such as Hamas and the Taliban (Berman & Laitin, 2008).

2.2.3 Social Psychology of Collective Action

Identity and Solidarity

Social psychological factors of group involvement have always been of great interest to scholars, especially the question of whether various identity traits influence decisions to move to action, and how they do so. The "presence of feelings of identity and of collective solidarity makes it easier to face the risks and uncertainties related to collective action" (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 94).

Identity theory is essential in order to understand the mechanisms underlying an individual's decision to be involved in collective action and join SMOs (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Stryker, 2000). Jasper (1997) outlines three types of identity. *Personal identity* is "a sense of who one is, a sense of self," and emerges "from the idiosyncratic biographies of individuals" (Jasper, 1997: 85-86). *Collective identity* "consists of perceptions of group distinctiveness, boundaries, and interests" (Jasper, 1997: 86) and "concerns the mesh between the individual and cultural systems" (Gamson, 1992: 55). It "is an act of the imagination, a trope that stirs people to action by arousing feelings of solidarity with their fellows and by defining moral boundaries against other categories" (Jasper & McGarry, 2015: 1). This is similar to what Tajfel labels as *social identity*, which is "that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (1981: 225). It is a "shared sense of 'one-ness' or 'we-ness' anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of 'others'" (Snow, 2001: 2213).

Lastly, Jasper (1997) distinguishes collective identity from *movement identity*, which "arises when a collection of groups and individuals perceive themselves (and are

perceived by others) as a force in explicit pursuit of social change" (1997: 86). It is important to note that in this model, personal identity is of a biographical nature, collective identity is influenced by the cultural context of an individual, and movement identity comes from the interaction between the culture of one's society and the internal culture of a movement (Jasper, 1997).

There is a general tendency to focus on the collective identity of an individual in the context of social movement research, but it is important to consider that a person's involvement cannot be fully understood by collective identity alone. Also, the collective concepts of identity for analysis of movements as 'wholes,' or comparative analysis crossing movements, are problematic for analysis of variable behaviour of members within movements (Stryker, 2000). One should be careful not to treat movement identities as existing in isolation from other identities. Collective identity can also pose important strategic dilemmas: the same identity that attracts some recruits may turn other away and may also cause negative attention from outsiders (McGarry & Jasper, 2015).

A recent perspective is that a collective search for identity is an essential movement activity (Stryker, 2000). Collective identity derives from common interests, experiences, and a 'we-feeling' of a group, which is created, activated, and sustained through their interaction in the movement (Taylor, 1989; Stryker, 2000). This is important to maintaining membership in organisations, as in order to devote time and effort to protest, people generally must feel excited to be part of a larger group they think can help (Goodwin & Jasper, 2015).

This 'we-feeling' can be considered group solidarity, which "concerns the mesh between individuals and the social system" and importantly involves "how individuals develop and maintain loyalty and commitment to collective actors – that is, to groups or organizations who act as carriers of social movements" (Gamson, 1992: 55). Solidarity is,

of course, closely related to collective identity, but it is possible to have one without the other (Gamson, 1992). An individual can identify with the ideology of a movement but feel alienated by an organisation. Also, someone can feel personal loyalty to an organisation (through personal ties, family, etc.), but not identify with their ideology. The question, then, is what promotes solidarity to a movement and/or organisation. As with the previous discussion about recruitment, it is quite likely that pre-existing social relationships are one of the biggest factors promoting solidarity (Gamson, 1992; Snow et al. 1980).

Differential Recruitment

One of the major questions of social movement analysis has been, and continues to be, that of differential recruitment (Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson, 1980). Before the 1960s, protestors were seen as acting in abnormal and irrational ways due to frustration with their own lives (Goodwin & Jasper, 2015). It was thought that marginalised and alienated members of society were more likely to join social movements (Kornhauser, 1959). However, since the 1960s the rationalist perspective has been dominant in social movement research, to the point where emotions and other elements are ignored (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001b; Marwell & Oliver, 1993; Oberschall & Kim, 1996). It is important to remember that social actors act and make decisions within a system of interdependence with other actors (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Several scholars have emphasised the importance of considering nonrational elements like emotions (anger, fear, disgust, joy, and love), feelings, and affections to research on politics and protest (Flam, 1990; Jasper, 1997; Goodwin & Jasper, 2001b; Goodwin et al. 2001).

Emotions

Emotions have increasingly become a popular research area in the study of social movements (van Troost, van Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 2013). In the past, emotions have been seen in direct opposition to rationality, but this idea has been refuted (Aminzade & McAdam, 2001; Gould, 2009; van Troost et al., 2013). Aminzade and McAdam (2001) suggest that the definition of emotion should include five main points: thoughts and cognitions (about a situation), feelings, actions, interpretation (one's own cultural viewpoint), and thought and affect (how one is affected by a situation). When considering how emotions are affected by different cultural contexts, it is important to consider appraisal theory. The first and most important tenet of appraisal theory is that "emotions propel behaviour but different emotions propel different behaviour" (van Troost et al., 2013: 187). The second is that different people can evaluate, or appraise, the same event in different ways "and consequently have different emotional responses" (van Troost et al., 2013: 187). Emotions are important to activism in all stages, from recruitment, to continued participation, to, perhaps, even withdrawal.

It has been suggested that activists and movement organisers work to create moral outrage in order to provide a target for common emotions, especially anger (Goodwin et al., 2001b; van Troost et al., 2013). The importance of moral outrage was described by Nepstad and Smith (2001) in their study of Central American peace movements in the 1980s. Americans were moved to help people in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, likely through American religious communities. These communities had access to information, network ties, and importantly helped shape a Christian identity. Moral outrage is certainly a strong motivation for protest when there is someone or something to blame for a perceived injustice (Nepstad & Smith, 2001).

One important tool used by movements to create moral outrage, common identity, and recruit new participants is the use of 'frames,' which can be metaphors, symbols, and cognitive cues. Activists should "frame issues in ways that resonate with the ideologies, identities, and cultural understandings of supporters and others who might be drawn to their cause" (Campbell, 2005: 48). The use of frames in social movement studies was mostly derived from the work of Goffman (1974; Benford & Snow, 2000). Goffman described schemata that aid people in interpreting the world around them, and to identity, perceive, and label occurrences and experiences (Goffman, 1974).

Framing

As these frames are used to drive people to collective action, they are generally referred to as *collective action frames*. Framing is essentially the calculated creation and manipulation of shared understandings and views of the world. This is somewhat of a 'filtering lens' to highlight a specific frame: who should act, why, and how (Campbell, 2005; Goodwin & Jasper, 2015; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Snow and Benford (1988) outline three types of framing important for successful recruitment: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing is used by movements to convince potential recruits that a problem must be addressed, prognostic framing is used to persuade potential participants of appropriate strategies and tactics, and motivational framing encourages them to get involved in these activities. These can also be explained in terms of mobilisation: consensus versus action mobilisation. Movements can disseminate information and manipulate emotions to create a shared definition, or frame. As a drive to action, individuals must "*sympathize* with the cause, need to *know* about the upcoming event, must *want* to

participate and they must be *able* to participate" (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2013: 895; emphasis in original).

One effective form of framing is to convince potential participants that they are being deprived of something to which they are entitled. This phenomenon is known as *relative deprivation* (RD), which can be defined as a term used "to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence" (Gurr, 1970: 23). In the view of some authors, it is some source of dissatisfaction combined with a feeling of deprivation which encourages people to join social movements, "[t]hat is, people must be dissatisfied because they believe they have been deprived of what is their due" (McLaughlin, 1969: 70). In other words, it is an inconsistency between value expectations, which refer to the goods and conditions to which people feel they are entitled, and value capabilities, which are the goods and conditions which people feel they are able to obtain and keep (Gurr, 1970). The emphasis here is on the *perception* of deprivation: a person can be subjectively deprived of something with reference to their expectation, although it may be seen differently by an objective observer. Similarly, someone experiencing absolute deprivation (in other words, abject poverty) may not consider themselves deprived (Gurr, 1970). An individual's original point of reference is important, and can be anything from their own past, to an abstract ideal, or even to values articulated by a group leader (Gurr, 1970).

Social ties

Other important aspects to group recruitment are the social ties that an individual has and the social networks of which they may be associated (Diani & McAdam, 2003). One of the leading theories as to why an individual joins a movement is quite simply because they already know someone in the movement. "The vast empirical literature

prompts the contention that the presence of a network tie to someone already engaged in a movement is one of the strongest predictors of individual participation in that movement" (Snow & Soule, 2010: 120). Indeed, the first and most commonly cited fact about social ties and activism is that the individual was drawn into the movement by someone they already knew (Gould, 2003; Snow et al., 1980; McAdam, 1986; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). An individual can sympathise with the ideologies of a movement without joining, but a social relationship (for example, with a friend or relative) to someone in the movement can help them overcome any obstacles between sympathising and participating (Gould, 2003).

Doug McAdam (2003), however, suggests that we should reject the overly simplistic idea that people only get involved in a movement because they already know someone. His first point is that when a movement first forms, there are no 'others' to pull individuals into activism. Hence, this explanation would only be useful for a portion of members, and not for initial members of an organisation. McAdam, importantly, also points out that this explanation fails to account for the fact that people "invariably possess a multitude of 'prior social ties'" (2003: 286). Issues also exist in research methodology, especially with the dependent variable, as research is mostly done on activists already in a movement. Lastly, McAdam emphasises that "showing that these activists were linked to the movement by some prior social tie does not prove the causal potency of that tie" (2003: 286). However, McAdam does contest that any model of individual action must consider the social nature of humans and suggests that perhaps shared involvement in a movement or organisation can be seen as a way of enhancing an already existing close relationship.

Efficacy

Efficacy refers to the idea that it is possible to achieve social change through protest (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) describe two types of efficacy: group and political. Group efficacy drives people to action as they believe that larger group-related problems can be solved by collective effort. Political efficacy is similar but is the belief that political action affects political processes. The more effective a person believes their participation in collective action could be, the more likely they are to participate (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013).

One problem for mobilisation to social movements can be the *free rider* problem as described by Olson (1965). Some individuals will assume that others will work toward the public good, and therefore not join a group if they feel they can gain the benefits without participating (Olson, 1965). In other words: Why do only certain individuals participate in social movement activity, while other people in similar social and economic situations sit on the sidelines (Snow & Soule, 2010)? It is quite logical to assume that supporters will choose not to expend their resources, such as time, energy, and money, if there will still be a similar outcome from the collective action of others. As Olson (1965) pointed out, this is only true of larger movements and does not apply to smaller group sizes. In smaller groups, everyone must participate, but in larger groups it is more difficult for an individual to recognise their personal efficacy, that is, to see that their individual actions are making a noticeable difference to the public good.

2.2.4 Biographical Factors Influencing Group Involvement

Another important aspect to be considered is one's own personal biographical factors, that is, a person's life experiences that now influence how they view the world. These factors are outside the cultural ones which influence all individuals: "the implicit and

explicit mental constructs that [one] shares with others are cultural; those [one] does not share are biographical" (Jasper, 1997: 54). Snow and Soule describe these personal constructs as *resonant socialization experiences*, that is the combined experiences of "learned values, norms, motives, beliefs, and roles of the groups and society with which one is associated," and "changes in value orientation, beliefs, and identity during one's life course" (2010: 126). Biographical factors are concerned with the first one of these processes, especially intergenerational transmission (Snow & Soule, 2010). That is, the information passed from parents to their children. Research has shown the importance of family and parental influence. In a study of political activists from the left and right, Rebecca Klatch (1999) discovered both sides of the political spectrum were heavily influenced by their parents and upbringing. There were differences in the backgrounds of the two sides, but similarities in the way they were brought up. This research shows the importance of the level of political interest of parents, regardless of ideology. If parents are encouraging of an interest in politics, participation in political events and movements are not foreign to their children.

Another important biographical factor is prior engagement in politics and movements (Snow & Soule, 2010). A person's attitude to movement participation is influenced by their prior level of political involvement, whether that is simply political interest, knowledge of politics, or actual movement activity. Lastly, an important biographical factor is biographical availability, which are the various personal factors that can influence one's availability such as "being married, having children, and being employed full time" (Snow & Soule, 2010: 130). According to Snow and Soule (2010), empirical research on biographical factors has been difficult to assess properly, partly due to the unavailability of data in relation to different stages of movement participation, and

because these factors can influence willingness to participate but do not necessarily determine movement participation.

2.2.5 Empirical Studies of Differential Recruitment

There has been an incredibly large body of work written in the last century on social movements. This is especially true for studies on differential recruitment, which have been undertaken by several authors.

Differential recruitment has fascinated social movement scholars for decades, and there is an ever-increasing body of work examining the relationship between support for a movement and the drive to participate and move to activism. These studies have revolved around several different types of movements and organisations with widely differing ideologies, ranging from senior citizens movements (Simon, Loewy, Sturmer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, & Spahlinger, 1998), gay movements in the US (Simon et al., 1998), Dutch farmers (Klandermans & de Weer, 2000) peace movements (Oegema & Klandermans, 1994), grassroots environmental movements (Kitts, 1999), striking workers (Dixon & Roscigno, 2003), civil rights movements of the American south (McAdam 1986), US Sanctuary activists (Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991), women in extremist organisations (Blee, 2002), the Swiss solidarity movement (Passy & Giugni, 2001), homeless movements (Corrigall-Brown, Snow, Smith, & Quist, 2010), to anti-hunger movements (Barkan, Cohn, & Whitaker, 1995; Cohn, Barkan, & Whitaker, 1993), just to name some of the wide range of movements.

Klandermand and Oegema (1987; 1994) looked at participants in a Dutch peace movement against the deployment of cruise missiles. They found that about 75 percent of the community under study were sympathetic to the goals of the movement, but only about one of every twenty people actually participated in the movement's protest. Klandermans

and Oegema ascribe this low ratio of participation to three factors: not all of these sympathisers were targeted, only one-sixth of those targeted had motivation to participate, and only a third of those who had a desire to participate actually did. Non-participation by supporters was attributed to various obstacles, such as work or family commitments. This study shows that a willingness to participate does not, indeed, guarantee actual involvement in a movement.

This study also demonstrates that an individual may not participate in a movement because of certain social or personal obstacles, but also because of the simple fact that they were not asked to participate. Similarly, Schussman and Soule (2005) conducted an analysis with a survey administered in 1990 to adults in the United States who had recently taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration. They found that "being asked to" participate "was found to be the strongest predictor of participation" (Schussman & Soule, 2005: 1081).

There is a growing body of work on available on radical right protest movements. More systematic studies of individual radical right activists are relatively rare, but several exist (Billig, 1978; Bjørgo, 1997; Blee, 2002; Busher, 2015; Pilkingon, 2016). In the 1990s, Linden and Klandermans (2007) conducted life-history interviews with 36 extreme right activists in the Netherlands. Depending on the types of stories they told and their trajectories into activism, interviewees were given one of four labels: the revolutionaries, the wanderers, convert, and compliants. Revolutionaries were those who wanted to change the world and meet others with the same motivations. Wanderers were simply looking for others who shared their ideology and where they could feel 'at home'. Converts had undergone some traumatic event and were generally angry; they were not so much driven by ideology. Lastly, compliants were those who identified with others in the movement and

participated mainly to maintain relationships with family and friends. Some of the interviewees clearly were a combination of these types.

One study comparing the life histories of extreme right activists across national contexts appears in Klandermans and Mayer's (2006) book *Extreme Right Activism in Europe*. They and a team of researchers asked the question 'Who joins the extreme right and why?' and interviewed extreme right movement members in five countries: the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, and Germany. They conducted life history interviews in an attempt to understand how motives to join develop during a person's life, critical events that may have encouraged them to join, and to what extent these (or other) motives function to maintain commitment to the organisation (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006). They aimed to interview people at different levels of the movement, but mostly at the lower levels, and deliberately oversampled women. The book provides detailed chapters on the extreme right activists of each individual country sampled. They found that participants in the study were not as extreme as originally thought: they appeared to be normal, socially integrated people. Almost all participants were anti-immigrant, but most avoided openly racist and anti-Semitic comments, and few considered themselves to be 'extreme right' (Klandermans and Mayer, 2016a).

Great Britain

As this research will specifically focus on radical right activists in the Great Britain and Hungary, a brief overview of research published in those areas will now be provided. In Great Britain, several scholars have attempted to gain access and insight into radical right protest movements. Most of what does exist is focused on the British National Party (Ford & Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin, 2011; Goodwin, 2012; Rhodes, 2011), the English Defense League (Allen, 2011; Busher, 2015; Goodwin, Cutts, & Janta-Lipinski, 2016;

Jackson, 2011; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2014; Oaten, 2014; Pai, 2016; Pilkington, 2016; Treadwell & Garland, 2011; Winlow, Hall, & Treadwell, 2017), both the BNP and EDL (Richardson, 2013), and a very few on other extreme right groups (Allen, 2014; Jackson, 2015).

Extensive work has been done on the EDL as they are the largest radical right protest movement in Great Britain. Several authors have gained access to interview members (for example, Busher, 2015; Pai, 2016; Pilkington, 2016; Treadwell & Garland, 2011; Winlow et al., 2017), others have analysed the EDL in the online sphere and social media (Allen, 2011; Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Jackson, 2011), offered a discourse analysis of the EDL's publicly available texts (Kassimeris & Jackson, 2014), and theoretically analysed the nature of the organisation (Alessio & Meredith, 2013; Jackson & Feldman, 2011; Oaten, 2014). Three of these works (Busher, 2015; Pilkington, 2016; Winlow et al., 2017) will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5, Qualitative Interviews.

Studies investigating factors influencing far-right and radical right support in Great Britain have often looked at support for the British National Party. As Matthew Goodwin found (2012), support for the BNP is strongest in areas in which people feel deprived, and those who are generally less-educated members of the working class. These supporters feel under threat from immigrants, particularly those from Muslim countries (Goodwin, 2012). In his book *New British Fascism*, Goodwin (2011) asks the question 'who votes BNP?' In order to answer this question, he conducted life history interviews with BNP supporters. Goodwin discovered that the most important predictors for someone supporting the BNP are hostility toward immigration and dissatisfaction with the other major political parties. The interviews revealed that "supporters are overwhelmingly concerned about immigration, settled Muslim communities, and the impact of minority ethnic groups on wide society" (Goodwin, 2011: 175). Interestingly, BNP supporters are highly concerned

about Muslims and immigrants, but are becoming less concerned with other minority groups who are now slowly becoming accepted in British society.

Hungary

There is very little empirical evidence on radical right movements in Hungary. What scholarly works do exist are focused around the history of the extreme right in Hungary (Bernáth, Miklósi, & Mudde, 2005; Szayna, 1997; Szele, 2012), authoritarian attitudes among Hungarians (Todosijević & Enyedi, 2008), an overview of nationalism in Hungary (Krekó & Juhász, 2018), the political party Jobbik (Bartlett, Birdwell, Krekó, Benfield, & Győri, 2012; Kovács, 2013), and, very occasionally, the Hungarian Guard (LeBoer, 2008). One study that directly involved radical right supporters in Hungary was a documentary video entitled *All for Hungary* (van Iterson & Heezen, 2013), in which university-aged Jobbik voters were interviewed. What became clear from this video is that Jobbik voters were not always as radical as was generally believed, rather many voted because of a perceived lack of other option. A thesis was also completed at a Hungarian university on history through the lens of 'radical nationalists' in 2009, in which several members of HVIM were interviewed (Várhalmi, 2009). A book entitled *The Hungarian Far Right* (Krekó & Juhász, 2018) was recently published as the first comprehensive book on the Hungarian far-right in English. The title is misleading, however, as the book is focused on Jobbik with little mention of far-right, or radical right, organisations.

A study was published by Bartlett and colleagues surveying Jobbik followers on Facebook (Bartlett et al. 2012). These surveys discovered several interesting things about Jobbik supporters. For instance, a significant percentage have university education: they make up 22 percent of Jobbik Facebook supports, as opposed to only 15 percent of general Jobbik voters. This can likely be accounted for by the tendency of Jobbik voters to reside

in the more impoverished areas of Hungary, and hence be less likely to have access to a computer and the internet. Bartlett and colleagues also found that Jobbik Facebook follower under 30 are less likely to be unemployed than the national average. The top concerns of Facebook Jobbik supporters are integration of Roma (28 percent) and crime (26 percent, as compared to the 3 percent national average). One of the biggest differences found among Jobbik Facebook followers and European extreme right activist movements is a lack of concern among Jobbik supporters over immigration and Islamic extremism, which are the top two concerns in Western European movements (Bartlett et al. 2012). Interestingly, there is a low level of trust among Jobbik Facebook followers; 26 percent think people in general can be trusted and 42 percent think they cannot. The latter statistic is the interesting one, however, as the Hungarian national average for thinking that people cannot be trusted is 79 percent. Considering this, Jobbik supporters seem to be more trusting of others than are average Hungarians.

2.3 CONCLUSION

As evidenced by this overview, the area of social movement research is vast and encompasses many disciplines and areas. This is also true for the specific questions of differential recruitment to and participation in social movements.

There is a vast body of literature dealing with all aspects of radical right protest movements and the far-right in Europe, but fewer examining these groups from the perspective of social movement analysis. The exceptions are mentioned above. Among those studies dealing with the radical right, fewer yet are focused on differential recruitment to, and participation in, those social movements, especially in Eastern Europe, or to comparative contexts.

While there are several studies on the EDL, the Hungarian context is very much lacking a focus on non-political radical right organisations. Most of what is written about the Hungarian far-right is focused around the political party Jobbik. There are no articles, as yet, approaching the question of movement membership in Hungarian street-level social movements and organisations, and no one has yet attempted an analysis of differential recruitment to any groups in a Hungarian context.

Additionally, as can be seen in the overview of empirical work, very few studies attempt in-depth or life history interviews with extreme right movement activists. These can be quite difficult to conduct due to issues of access and trust, but can provide incredibly valuable insight.

This study will add to the growing body of literature on protest movements, from the perspective of social movement and criminological theory. This research will continue the discussion of differential recruitment and participation in the framework of social movement organisations. It will also contribute to knowledge of radical right organisations, specifically in terms of their movement membership. This study will examine a group in

Hungary that has not yet been studied academically, and it will be one of few studies that have conducted in-depth interviews with radical right social movement activists.

While this chapter has overviewed much of the literature relating to the current study, there will still be some omissions due to its decidedly interdisciplinary nature. Even so, several gaps in the literature can be identified, which this research will attempt to fill. There is a need to further study motivations in seeking collective action in a radical right framework; a very timely topic considering the current political climate. There is also further need to study these questions in a cross-national comparative framework and, crucially, on street-level protest movements rather than political parties. While members and supporters of political parties can offer insight into questions such as why people seek collective action, they will likely have political motives and will not provide a clear and unbiased sample. There is also a need to further study methods of recruitment, especially in the online sphere, as well as the use of social media and its effects on movement participation. These gaps will all be addressed in this project using secondary survey analysis, online analysis, and qualitative interviews, which will make for the first mixed-methods interdisciplinary study of this kind.

Overview of the Study

This research examines radical right social movement organisations from three aspects. Firstly, it asks what factors influence an individual to adopt far-right and radical right views. Secondly, it endeavours to discover what motivates individuals not only to support political activism, but also to join a radical right movement organisation. In other words, why is it that organisations can differentially recruit members, that is, why can they inspire certain people to join over others who do not. Thirdly, this research ventures to uncover what factors encourage individuals to maintain membership in these movement

organisations. This project will take a comparative approach and look at radical right social movement organisations in two different countries to see how these factors diverge in differing contexts.

To explore these research questions, three different methodologies were utilised: secondary survey analysis, online analysis, and qualitative interviews. Mixed methods can often be difficult as they necessitate a knowledge of both quantitative and qualitative methods. Mixed methods research is not to be confused with multimethod research studies, in which research questions are explored through the use of two or more research methods from the same quantitative or qualitative tradition (Campbell and Fisk, 1959). In mixed methods research, on the other hand, both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to explore one research question, in either parallel or sequential phases (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). Mixed methods research can provide several advantages: it can answer research questions that other cannot, it can provide stronger inferences, it allows for research to develop in a more comprehensive way, it provides the opportunity to present a larger diversity of views, and the field of analysis is less likely to be restricted by the methods themselves (Morse, 2003; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). The potential weakness of mixed methods research, however, is that data is not as saturated and the smaller analyses are not as in-depth as they normally would be if they were a single-method study (Morse, 2003). Even so, mixed methods are quite valuable as they can strengthen the validity of results and contribute to knowledge creation (McKim, 2017). These particular methods were carefully chosen to provide a more well-rounded study and to gain a better understanding of the phenomena in question in two different contexts.

To first explore the question of what predisposes people to be on the political right and on the far-right, secondary survey analysis was conducted using the European Social Survey to explore the attitudes of the general public in the United Kingdom and Hungary,

on two separate rounds of the survey. It is very difficult to narrow the reasons for extremist attitudes and behaviour, or even deviancy, into just a few variables. This depends very much on the context of a particular country, including feelings toward immigration, the political situation, and other cultural influences (Bjorgo & Witte, 1993; Sutton & Wright, 2009). Especially in the case of a cross-national comparison, it is critical to draw out the similarities and differences between the two countries. This, then, provides a cultural and social base on which to form a context for later analysis.

The chapters following secondary survey analysis will present the second and third phases of the project. Online analysis of the websites and social media of the EDL and MÖM will be examined, in order to explore how these organisations attempt to recruit members and how they present their collective and movement identities. Both organisations at the centre of this study were quite active online and used the online sphere for advertisement and recruitment, hence providing an excellent tool for analysis.

Following that, questions of why individuals seek activism, join these movements, and why they maintain membership in these organisations will be explored through semi-structured in-depth interviews and textual interviews with organisation members. Indeed, individuals in an organisation have different motivations for seeking collective action; the best way to understand why individuals act is to speak to them directly. The focus of the interviews and creation of the interview schedule were informed by the research questions, while also taking into account the results of the secondary survey analysis (sociopolitical context) and online analysis (identity and attitudes of the organisation). Survey analysis examined the sociopolitical context of each country, allowing for a deeper understanding of several attitudes found expressed in the online analysis and during interviews. The online analysis gave insight into the identity and attitudes of the organisations; these were crucial

to the deeper understanding of qualitative interviews, particularly from the perspectives of identity formation and levels of support for the organisations.

Rather than a traditional organisation of methodology, results, and discussion, each of these sections will be covered individually within each phase of the study. These three phases are intended to be smaller studies in their own right, all adding up to inform the research questions from different perspectives. Each methodology approaches the research questions from a special angle and lends to the understanding of the phenomenon in different ways. For an idea of how these methodologies intersect, see Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Depiction of the intersection of research methodologies and which themes they will analyse.

Motivation to Activism

Statistical survey analysis

Context

Social drivers and motivations

Online Analysis

Recruitment

Messaging and representation

Drivers to right-wing views

Qualitative Interviews

Personal narratives

Individual drivers and motivations

Motivation to join specific organisation

&

Maintaining Membership

CHAPTER 3: SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter provides an investigation into theories of strain theory, arguing that perceived deprivation can lead to support for the far-right. It employs quantitative analysis to explore the role of a range of factors, namely satisfaction with life and opinions on immigration, in influencing an individuals right-wing and far-right identity in two differing contexts.

The focus of this chapter is the factors that predispose individuals to adopt right-wing, and specifically far-right, political identities. To explore this, the chapter presents the results of analysis using Hungarian and UK survey data from Rounds 7 and 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS). Results of this analysis were used to shape enquiry undertaken in later chapters, specifically framing the design of research questions on the recruitment and retention of members by the social movement organisations (SMOs) that are the focus of this thesis.

To explore the question of how social and political outlooks predispose individuals to endorse far-right views, insights were drawn from several theoretical models common in Criminology. These largely address the impact of relative deprivation and economic exclusion on the exhibition of extreme and far-right tendencies. In this context, 'relative deprivation' is defined as "the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and … 'is' of collective value satisfaction" (Gurr, 1970: 23); or, in lay terms, the gap between expectations of goods and circumstances and how their actual availability is perceived. Important here is the emphasis on *perception* in the context of deprivation, as a person can be subjectively deprived of something only with reference to their expectations; it remains possible that it may be seen differently by an objective observer.

In order to test the impact of these perceptions of deprivation this chapter will focus on the relationship between right-left political affiliation and measures of income,

employment, level of education, satisfaction with life, and pro/anti-migrant sentiment. Employment and years in education were both used as control measures in regression analyses. Because of this perception of deprivation, 'satisfaction with one's life' will be used as a variable to test this theory. Additionally, immigrants are often condemned by governments as the source of economic issues. This is especially true in Hungary, as was seen in the major anti-migrant billboard campaigns organised by the Fidesz government (for example, see HVG, 2015). Because of this, 'immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy' was also used as an independent variable, along with 'immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life.'

Similarly, Robert Merton's strain theory (1938; 1968) suggests that an inequality is felt between the culturally-approved goals in a society "and the means of achieving those goals" (Treadwell, 2013: 51). Merton, although looking specifically at the context of the United States, argued that people are encouraged to place a high importance on the goal of financial success (Agnew & Brezina, 2010). Many individuals are prevented from achieving those goals (for example, due to belonging to a lower class, or having low education), resulting in frustration. For these reasons, along with those mentioned above, 'immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy' and 'immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life' were used as independent variables to test this theory.

3.1 HYPOTHESES

To answer the broad research question that is the focus of this chapter, the following hypotheses were tested:

H_1: Low satisfaction with life as a whole correlates with a right-side placement on the left-right political scale.

H_2: Believing that immigrants are bad for the economy correlates with a right-side placement on the left-right political scale.

H_3: Believing that immigrants undermine cultural life correlates with a right-side placement on the left-right political scale.

The following hypotheses were tested with relation to placement on the far-right of the left-right political scale:

H_4: Low satisfaction with life predicts a far-right placement on the left-right political scale.

H_5: Believing that immigrants are bad for the economy predicts a far-right placement on left-right political scale.

H_6: Believing that immigrants undermine cultural life predicts a far-right placement on the left-right political scale.

3.1.1 Null hypotheses

In order to accord with Popper's (1963) arguments regarding falsifiability, the following null hypotheses were also tested:

H^0_1: Low satisfaction with life as a whole does not correlate with placement on the right side of the left right political scale.

H$^0_2$: One's opinion on whether immigrants make one's country a worse or better place to live does not correlate with a right-side placement on the left-right political scale.

H$^0_3$: One's opinion about whether immigrants undermine cultural life does not correlate with a right-side placement on the left-right political scale.

H$^0_4$: Low satisfaction with life as a whole does not predict far-right placement on the left-right political scale.

H$^0_5$: One's opinion on whether immigrants make one's country a worse or better place to live does not predict far-right placement on the left-right political scale.

H$^0_6$: One's opinion about whether immigrants undermine cultural life does not predict far-right placement on the left-right political scale.

3.2 METHODOLOGY

3.2.1 Data

The data analysed in this chapter are drawn from European Social Survey (ESS), a major pan-European study of social and political attitudes collected every two years. Analysis made use of round 7 (collected in the United Kingdom between September 2014 to February 2015 and October to December 2015, and in Hungary between April and June of 2015) and round 8 (collected from September 2016 to March 2017 in the United Kingdom and between May to September of 2017 in Hungary) data, details on the demographic spread of which are presented in table 3.1, below. Hungary is still considered as part of the 2016 survey round although the data was collected in 2017 and released in 2018. It must be noted that, longitudinally, these two data sets do not offer a perfect comparison as data was not collected at precisely the same times (see below) and different samples of respondents were surveyed in each Round. This analysis does, however, give a broader understanding of the social contexts of the two countries over several years.

It should also be noted that the data were collected across the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, and it is consequently extremely difficult to disaggregate data collected exclusively in Great Britain. Therefore, in this chapter the comparison will be between the political and social contexts of Hungary and the United Kingdom; the remainder of this thesis focuses on Great Britain, with the exclusion of Northern Ireland (as mentioned previously).

Half of the questionnaire is repeated every round of surveys. All Rounds of the surveys cover three broad categories: value and ideology (including religion, political views, and morality), cultural and national orientations (national and ethnic identity), and the social structure of their society (class, education, social exclusion) (Fitzgerald & Jowell,

2010). The 2014 survey covered more specific questions of immigration and the 2016 questions covered questions of climate change. For the purposes of this study, variables under the categories of socio demographics, politics, and the broad category of 'subjective well-being, social exclusion, religion, national and ethnic identity' were used.

Participants were all residents in private households, regardless of nationality, citizenship, or language, and were aged 15 years or older, with no upper age limit imposed on inclusion; all were selected by strict random probability methods. A fuller exploration of sampling is provided in the European Social Survey technical report (for the current sampling guidelines, see Lynn et al., 2018).

The Hungarian Round 7 data sample was made up of 1698 individuals. Several individuals were removed from the sample prior to statistical analysis as they were under 18 years of age. This resulted in a total of N = 1663 individuals for the analysis, with 704 males (42.33%) and 959 females (57.67%), with an average age of 46.9 (see Table 3.1). The Hungarian Round 8 data sample was made up of 1614 individuals, with a total of N = 1576 individuals used in analysis; of these respondents, 662 were male (42.01%) and 914 were female (57.99%), with an average age of 49.

The UK Round 7 data sample was made up of 2264 individuals. Several individuals were removed from the sample prior to statistical analysis as they were under 18 years of age. This resulted in a total of N = 2206 individuals for the analysis, with 995 males (45.10%) and 1211 females (54.90%), with an average age of 47.3. The UK Round 8 data sample was made up of 1959 individuals, with a total of N = 1892 individuals used in analysis; of these respondents, 845 were male (44.7%) and 1047 were female (55.3%), with an average age of 48.

Table 3.1: Demographic description of all ESS Rounds in both Hungary and the United Kingdom, showing distribution by gender, mean age of each sample, and standard distribution.

Country	Round	Male (N)	Male (%)	Female (N)	Female (%)	Age Mean	Age SD
HU	**7**	704	42.3	959	57.7	46.9	19.1
HU	**8**	662	42.0	914	58.0	49.0	18.2
UK	**7**	995	45.1	1211	54.9	47.3	17.8
UK	**8**	845	44.7	1047	55.3	48.0	18.2

3.2.2 Analysis

Analysis made use of previously-collected survey data, which is generally freely available online. This method of survey analysis has several advantages. It saves resources by eliminating the need for a large research team, as is generally needed in cross-national surveys such as the ones utilised here. It also saves time, as the surveys are already completed and available. Lastly, it also circumvents data collection problems as data is already computerised as machine-readable survey data (Kiecolt & Nathan, 2004).

However, there are also limitations. Researchers can have problems locating specific information that is needed, especially in vast data archives (Kiecolt & Nathan, 2004). Data may also not be available in the format that is needed for specific research, depending on the original intentions of those who conducted the survey. Also, errors made in the original survey are no longer visible; any typos and coding errors have disappeared into the survey and been forgotten (Kiecolt & Nathan, 2004). Lastly, surveys also rarely contain all the values of interest to a secondary researcher.

Keeping in mind these issues, secondary survey analysis was found to be the best method for this research as the data was already freely and readily available. Additionally, the same set of questions was asked of both the Hungarian and UK respondents. The ESS also covered the questions that were essential for this study, namely those surrounding left-

right political scale placement, satisfaction with life, views on immigrants, and the proper demographic information.

Three methods of analyses were used to explore the relationship between self-positioning on the left-right political scale, life satisfaction, and views on immigration: bivariate correlation, linear regression, and binary logistic regression. In all cases positioning on the scale was the dependent variable. This analysis will begin with bivariate correlation, in order to explore whether a relationship exists before continuing to more complex analyses. Linear regression will then be applied, to gain a level of complexity by the addition of control measures. This allows to see whether demographic factors, such as age, gender, education, partnership, and employment, have any effect on the correlation, or if differences are purely due to the independent variables. Finally, this analysis will specifically explore far-right views, defined as values 9 and 10 on the political scale, through binary logistic regression. All analyses were conducted through SPSS and data was weighted using post-stratification weights in order to reduce the effects of sampling error and non-response bias.

Initial bivariate analyses were completed to find general relationships between dependent and independent variables. All correlations were completed using SPSS with Spearman's rho, as questionnaire answers were completed on a Likert scale and are at an ordinal level of measurement. Some questions could have been interpreted at an interval level of measurement, but a nonparametric test was necessary as variables were not found to have normal distributions.

To gain levels of complexity, linear regression analysis was completed with the addition of control measures. This second level of analysis explored the same hypotheses as for the bivariate analysis (H_1, H_2, and H_3). Predictors were gender, age, employment, partnership, and years in education. Gender and employment were transformed into binary

measures, while partnership was found by combining those individuals with legal marital status and those cohabiting with a partner. Age and years in education are scale measures.

Hierarchical linear regression was run using SPSS. Regressions were run in two steps: the first including only control measures, with the second step introducing the key independent variable. The results of the two models were then compared to measure the effect of adding the independent variable. Results were compared between the Hungarian and UK samples.

Bivariate analysis and linear regression explored the relationship between the independent variables and placement on the left-right political scale. In order to go one step further, binary logistic regression was employed to explore the relationship between the independent variables and far-right placement on the political scale (H_4, H_5, H_6), while utilising control measures. Individuals were classed as far-right if they identified as a 9 or a 10 on the left-right political scale, which ranged from 0-10.

Several control measures were transformed to be binary in nature. For gender, males were transformed to '1', while all others '0'. Similarly, for employment, those who were employed at the time of the survey were '1', all others '0'. Partnership was found by combining those individuals with legal marital status and those cohabiting with a partner: these were given '1', all others '0'.

Logistic regression was run using SPSS in a stepwise fashion, with the first step testing for demographic predictors and the second step including one independent variable. Goodness of fit was tested using the Hosmer-Lemeshow test, the Omnibus test showing the effect of the model, and Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 showing the relationship between the predictors and the prediction of the model. Results were compared between the Hungarian and UK samples.

A 10 percent alpha level was used for all tests. It was decided that a significance level of p = .1 would be used mainly due to the preliminary nature of this analysis. Conventionally there is a reliance on the 5%, or even 1%, significance level, but that is now thought to be merely arbitrary (Gerber & Malhotra, 2008). Since these research questions were chosen to examine a new theoretical perspective on these samples, it can be argued that the risk of a false positive outweighs the consequences of incorrectly identifying a relationship. Once this new theoretical perspective has been established, further testing is possible at lower alpha levels in the future.

3.2.3 Ethics

Some attention must now be turned to examining the ethical considerations of secondary survey analysis. The European Social Survey (ESS) data is freely available on the Internet, including an online analysis tool, hence permission for further use is implied. However, the ESS does have one condition for the use of their data: they require a 'deposit,' meaning that users are required to register all bibliographic information in all forms of publication referring to ESS data to an online ESS bibliography database. This condition will be fulfilled once this research is submitted, and once any of this analysis is published.

The ESS have anonymised their data, so it is impossible to trace the data back to any individuals. However, even when data has been anonymised there can still be a risk that a participant may be identified (ESRC, 2012). While it is appreciated that this must be considered in any data dealing with individuals and possible risk, it would still be very difficult to trace a specific participant through ESS data. It would be especially impossible to trace a participant through the analysis in this study, as no specific participant numbers or correlated information is shared. Individual cases will not be discussed, and this research aims to find macro-level trends.

3.3 DATA DISTRIBUTION

3.3.1 Dependent Variable Distribution

Before looking at the correlation analyses, it is important to understand the distribution of self-placement on the left-right political scale. Five was the most common placement number for both countries, in a range from 0-10 with 0 being 'left' and 10 being 'right.' In Round 7 of the Hungarian sample, 305 individuals did not give a response, and in Round 7 of the UK sample 231 individuals did not respond. Round 7 of the Hungarian sample showed that 526/1388 individuals, or 39.73%, chose the middle value. In the UK sample, 765/1938 individuals, or 39.47%, chose the middle value. It can be said, then, that more than a third of the survey respondents were unsure of their political leanings, and/or were likely not overly involved with the country's political situation. Also, 18.72% of Hungarian respondents and 10.65% of UK respondents either refused to answer entirely or were unsure of their answer in Round 7. In Round 8 of the Hungarian sample, 285 individuals did not give a response, and in Round 8 of the UK sample 151 individuals did not respond. Round 8 of the Hungarian sample showed that 346/1291 individuals, or 26.8%, chose the middle value, almost exactly 10% less than in Round 7. In the UK sample, 696/1741 individuals, or 39.98%, chose the middle value. The distribution of the Hungarian sample for both rounds 7 and 8 can be found in Table 3.2 and of the UK sample in Table 3.3.

Table 3.2: Distribution of left-right political scale self-placement in Hungarian sample Rounds 7 & 8

Scale Placement	Total Number R7	Percentage (%)	Total Number R8	Percentage (%)
0 (Left)	59	4.46	54	4.18
1	20	1.51	26	2.01
2	51	3.85	50	3.87
3	82	6.19	86	6.66
4	70	5.29	71	5.5
5	526	39.73	346	26.8
6	118	8.91	134	10.38
7	153	11.56	174	13.48
8	126	9.52	160	12.39
9	43	3.25	61	4.73
10 (Right)	75	5.66	129	10.0
TOTAL	**1324**	**100**	**1291**	**100**

Table 3.3: Distribution of left-right political scale self-placement in UK sample Rounds 7 & 8

Scale Placement	Total Number R7	Percentage (%)	Total Number R8	Percentage (%)
0 (Left)	61	3.14	39	2.3
1	47	2.43	21	1.24
2	81	4.18	100	5.9
3	207	10.68	164	9.67
4	189	9.75	230	13.56
5	765	39.47	693	40.86
6	201	10.37	178	10.5
7	204	10.53	136	8.02
8	117	6.04	85	5.01
9	32	1.65	17	1.0
10 (Right)	35	1.81	33	1.95
TOTAL	**1938**	**100**	**1696**	**100**

There is a clear difference between the distributions of the two samples. The UK sample, as can be seen, is relatively evenly distributed between left-wing (0-4) and right-wing (6-10) self-placement for both Rounds 7 and 8. The Hungarian sample, on the other hand, shows a different trend: for Round 7, 21.3% of the sample self-describes as somewhere on the left-side of the spectrum, while 38.9% describe as being on the right-side of the left-right political scale. For Round 8, 22.22% of the sample self-describes as falling on the left-side of the scale, while 50.98% place themselves on the right-side of the

political scale. Of these, 14.73% self-describe as what is being considered for the purposes of this study as far-right, up from 8.91% two-years prior.

The results of the UK show that distribution of the scale stays fairly consistent from Round 7 to Round 8. The distribution is also centred around the middle of the scale showing lower values on the extremes of the scale. The results, however, showed a slightly larger change in Hungary between 2015 and 2017. Firstly, more than 10% less people chose the middle-value in 2017. While could be due to differences in the sample, this could also be taken to mean that around 13% of people were more confident in their political leanings. These were firmly applied to the right-side of the scale, with all values increasing; most notable, "10" nearly doubled, from 5.66% to 10%. This could be due to differences in sampling, as they did not sample the same respondents for both rounds, but could also indicate a shift to the right in the Hungarian population. Additionally, this could mean a different interpretation of '10' in the Hungarian population: this could be interpreted by respondents as highly conservative (a Fidesz supporter), for example, and not as far-right.

Comparing the Hungarian and UK samples highlights the more centrist tradition in UK politics. This is reflective of the party tradition in the UK, of the moderate-right Tories and moderate-left Labour. It could very-well be that answers to this question are more along the line of political voting preference in the minds of respondents, hence self-identification reflecting the political identity of the party they tend to support, not necessarily perfectly reflecting their own attitudes and political ideology. This would also explain the higher amount of far-right self-identification in Hungary, given the constant shift towards the far-right of the Fidesz party.

3.3.2 Independent Variable Distribution

The three independent variables used in these analyses were satisfaction with life, opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy, and opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life.

Satisfaction with life was measured on an 11-point scale, with 0 being 'extremely dissatisfied' and 10 being 'extremely satisfied.' Table 3.4 shows the variable distribution for the both rounds 7 and 8 for the Hungarian sample and Table 3.5 for the UK sample, showing both the total number of respondents and corresponding percentages for each value. By looking at the percent distributions, it becomes obvious that respondents in the UK sample were largely more satisfied with their lives than in the Hungarian sample, which is true across both Rounds.

Table 3.4: Distribution for satisfaction with life for both rounds of the Hungarian sample, where 0 is extremely dissatisfied and 10 is extremely satisfied.

	Frequency R7	Percentage R7	Frequency R8	Percentage R8
0	38	2.36	22	1.41
1	20	1.24	17	1.09
2	94	5.83	52	3.32
3	146	9.06	86	5.5
4	126	7.82	102	6.52
5	336	20.86	216	13.8
6	200	12.41	230	14.7
7	271	16.82	328	20.96
8	222	13.78	302	19.3
9	80	4.97	105	6.71
10	77	4.78	105	6.71
TOTAL	**1611**	**100**	**1565**	**100**

Table 3.5: Distribution for satisfaction with life for both rounds of the UK sample, where 0 is extremely dissatisfied and 10 is extremely satisfied.

	Frequency R7	**Percentage R7**	**Frequency R8**	**Percentage R8**
0	21	.97	13	.69
1	14	.65	18	.95
2	33	1.52	25	1.32
3	60	2.77	52	2.75
4	76	3.51	76	4.02
5	203	9.36	143	7.57
6	179	8.26	148	7.83
7	432	19.93	337	17.83
8	562	25.92	548	28.99
9	351	16.19	309	16.35
10	237	10.93	221	11.69
TOTAL	**2168**	**100**	**1890**	**100**

Opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy was measured on an 11-point scale, with 0 being 'bad for economy' and 10 being 'good for economy.' Table 3.6 shows the variable distribution for both Rounds 7 and 8 for the Hungarian sample and Table 3.7 for the UK sample, showing both the total number of respondents and corresponding percentages for each value. The distribution reveals that Hungarian respondents were largely more pessimistic about immigrants' effect on the economy than were UK respondents. Again, while these data sets cannot provide a perfect comparison, observing the results of Rounds 7 and 8 reveals a marked increase in pessimism among the Hungarian sample and an increase in optimism in the UK sample, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Table 3.6: Distribution for opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for economy for both rounds of the Hungarian sample, where 0 is 'bad for the economy' and 10 is 'good for the economy.'

	Frequency R7	Percentage R7	Frequency R8	Percentage R8
0	186	12.32	308	21.1
1	103	6.82	141	9.66
2	215	14.24	154	10.55
3	251	16.62	204	13.97
4	169	11.19	184	12.6
5	347	22.98	260	17.81
6	120	7.95	119	8.15
7	46	3.05	59	4.04
8	35	2.32	17	1.16
9	5	.33	1	.07
10	33	2.19	13	.89
TOTAL	1510	100	1460	100

Table 3.7: Distribution for opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for economy for both rounds of the UK sample, where 0 is 'bad for the economy' and 10 is 'good for the economy.'

	Frequency R7	Percentage R7	Frequency R8	Percentage R8
0	161	7.51	79	4.24
1	98	4.57	44	2.36
2	168	7.83	79	4.24
3	189	8.81	133	7.14
4	173	8.07	127	6.81
5	485	22.61	430	23.07
6	230	10.72	222	11.91
7	300	13.99	318	17.06
8	212	9.88	247	13.25
9	59	2.75	98	5.26
10	71	3.31	87	4.67
TOTAL	2145	100	1864	100

Opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of a country was measured on an 11-point scale, with 0 being 'cultural life undermined' and 10 being 'cultural life enriched.' Table 3.8 shows the variable distribution for both Rounds 7 and 8 for the Hungarian sample and Table 3.9 for the UK sample, showing both the total number of respondents and corresponding percentages for each value. The distribution pattern is largely the same for both data sets, with Hungarian respondents being somewhat more unsure than UK respondents (given the higher percentage of the middle-choice '5') in

Round 7. This is likely due to the lower frequency of immigration into Hungary than into the United Kingdom.

In Round 8, the UK sample is strongest around values 5-8, suggesting a moderate optimism about the effects of immigrants on cultural life. These results are not strikingly different from the results of Round 7: we do see a drop by half in the zero-value from 7.9 percent to 4 percent along with a rise in positive values and decline in negative values, but the changes are relatively marginal. Indeed, these results support similar findings by large-scale surveys in the UK, such as findings by Ipsos MORI that Britons are becoming more positive about the impacts of immigration on the UK (Kaur-Ballagan, Gottfried, and Holden, 2019). However, according to Goodwin and Milazzo (2017), negative feelings towards immigrants began to be more pronounced after the 2004 accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union, after which many people came to the UK. A decade later, after 2015, these concerns were strengthened by the refugee crisis, especially given the anti-EU and anti-immigrant campaigning by parties like UKIP (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). The results here, however, show the opposite effect: that views toward immigration, at least in terms of its effect on cultural life, are becoming more positive since 2015.

The Hungarian sample, however, paints a different picture. The Round 7 results reveal an uncertainty among people about immigrants and whether they have an effect on cultural life. In Round 8, however, the results become markedly pessimistic. The 0-point, suggesting immigrants undermine cultural life completely, went from 4.61 percent in round 7 to 16.86 percent in round 8. The rest of the values at the lower-end of the scale, number 2-4, increased in percentage while the rest lowered. This suggests that the xenophobic and nativist nation-wide anti-migrant campaigns of the authoritarian Fidesz government, beginning in the summer of 2015, indeed worked to influence the Hungarian people. This

is also a frightening demonstration of the lack of alternative dialogue and discourse in Hungary, especially in the media, leading to the indoctrination of a large percentage of Hungarians.

Table 3.8: Distribution for opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of a country for both rounds of the Hungarian sample, where 0 is 'undermine cultural life' and 10 is 'enrich cultural life.'

	Frequency R7	**Percentage R7**	**Frequency R8**	**Percentage R8**
0	63	4.17	248	16.86
1	28	1.86	97	6.59
2	134	8.91	134	9.11
3	196	12.99	196	13.32
4	161	10.67	180	12.24
5	435	28.83	295	20.05
6	158	10.47	144	9.79
7	172	11.4	102	6.93
8	85	5.63	44	2.99
9	21	1.39	6	.41
10	57	3.78	25	1.7
TOTAL	**1509**	**100**	**1471**	**100**

Table 3.9: Distribution for opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of a country for both rounds of the UK sample, where 0 is 'undermine cultural life' and 10 is 'enrich cultural life.'

	Frequency R7	**Percentage R7**	**Frequency R8**	**Percentage R8**
0	153	7.16	73	4.0
1	92	4.31	43	2.35
2	170	7.96	77	4.22
3	234	10.96	121	6.63
4	193	9.04	135	7.39
5	380	17.79	337	18.46
6	203	9.5	201	11.01
7	259	12.12	301	16.48
8	237	11.1	296	16.21
9	115	5.38	122	6.68
10	101	4.73	120	6.57
TOTAL	**2136**	**100**	**1826**	**100**

3.4 CONTROL MEASURES

As a range of demographic factors can influence placement on the left-right political scale, control measures were used in both multivariate analyses. All control measures were recoded before running statistical tests and missing data was excluded, in order to conserve degrees of freedom within the model.

Predictors included gender, age, employment, partnership, and years in education (Table 3.10, Table 3.11, and Table 3.12). Gender and employment were transformed into binary measures, while partnership was found by combining those individuals with legal marital status and those cohabiting with a partner. Age and years in education are scale measures. Predictors were tested for multicollinearity by examining Variable Inflation Factors in SPSS. No predictors or independent variables showed multicollinearity in either the Hungarian or UK sample.

Table 3.10: Transformation of control variables

Control Variable	Original Variable	ESS Variable	Type	Recoding
Gender		gndr	Categorical	Male = 1, Female = 0
Age		age	Scale	No
Employment		emplrl	Categorical	Employed = 1, Unemployed = 0
Partnership	Marital Status	marsts	Categorical	Combination of legal marital status and those cohabitating with a
	Cohabitation with Partner	icpart1	Categorical	partner = 1, No partner = 0
Years in Education		eduyrs	Scale	No

Table 3.11: Control variables for multivariate analysis for ESS Round 7

Control Variable	Mean HU	Mean UK	Mode HU	Mode UK	SD HU	SD UK
Gender	N/A	N/A	Female	Female	N/A	N/A
Age	50.58	52.80	41	40	17.87	17.94
Employment	N/A	N/A	Employed	Employed	N/A	N/A
Partnership	N/A	N/A	Partner	Partner	N/A	N/A
Years in Education	12.64	13.86	12	11	6.25	5.79

Table 3.12: Control variables for multivariate analysis for ESS Round 8

Control Variable	Mean HU	Mean UK	Mode HU	Mode UK	SD HU	SD UK
Gender	N/A	N/A	Female	Female	N/A	N/A
Age	51.49	52.02	42	67	18.24	18.32
Employment	N/A	N/A	Employed	Employed	N/A	N/A
Partnership	N/A	N/A	Partner	Partner	N/A	N/A
Years in Education	12.18	14.34	12	11	4.77	6.9

3.5 BIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Three variables - satisfaction with life as a whole, opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy, and opinion on whether immigrants undermine the cultural life of the country - were individually correlated with placement on the left-right political scale. Correlations were conducted using Spearman's rho; a 10 percent alpha level was used for all correlations.

3.5.1 Hypothesis 1

ESS Round 7

Hypothesis 1 tests whether satisfaction with life influences respondents' placement on the left-right political scale. In the Hungarian sample, satisfaction with one's life and left-right scale placement were moderately positively correlated, $r(1197) = .13$, $p < .001$. This indicates that the more satisfied they are with their life as a whole, the more likely they are to place on the right side of the left-right political scale.

In the UK sample, satisfaction with one's life and left-right scale placement were moderately positively correlated, $r(1932) = .13$, $p < .001$. This indicates that the more satisfied they are with their life as a whole, the more likely they are to place on the right side of the left-right political scale.

It is striking that in both the Hungarian and UK samples, a higher satisfaction with one's life is positively correlated with right-side placement on the left-right political scale, rejecting H_1 and supporting the null hypothesis in both cases. This is likely due to the right-side scale placement including moderately conservative and conservative individuals, as well as those on the far-right of the scale. This is by no means a measure of individuals on the far end of the scale, for which further tests are necessary.

In Round 8 of the Hungarian sample, satisfaction with one's life and left-right scale placement were moderately positively correlated, $r(1290) = .27$, $p < .001$. This indicates that the more satisfied they are with their life as a whole, the more likely they are to place on the right side of the left-right political scale.

In the UK sample, satisfaction with one's life and left-right scale placement were moderately positively correlated, $r(1566) = .13$, p < .001. This indicates that the more satisfied they are with their life as a whole, the more likely they are to place on the right side of the left-right political scale. Both of these results are quite similar to the results of Round 7, which were $r(1385) = .16$, $p < .001$ for the Hungarian sample and $r(1976) = .12$, p < .001 for the UK sample.

3.5.2 Hypothesis 2

ESS Round 7

Hypothesis 2 tests whether opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy influences self-placement on the left-right political scale. In the Hungarian sample, individual opinion on whether immigrants are bad or good for the economy is marginally negatively correlated, at $r(1152) = -.09$ p = .002. In the UK sample, individual opinion on whether immigrants are bad or good for the economy is marginally negatively correlated with placement on the left-right political scale, $r(1911) = -0.11$, $p <$ .001. This suggests that those individuals who believe immigrants to be worse for the country are slightly more likely to place on the right-side of the left-right political scale.

When looking to attitudes towards immigration, the Hungarian sample showed a slight negative correlation, indicating that those individuals believing that immigrants are bad for the country's economy are slightly more likely to fall on the right side of the left-

right scale, supporting H$_2$ and rejecting the null hypothesis. The UK sample results showed a slight negative correlation, indicating that those individuals believing immigrants are bad for the country's economy are slightly more likely to fall on the right side of the left-right scale, supporting H$_2$ and rejecting the null hypothesis.

ESS Round 8

Much like the results of the Round 7 data, the results of Round 8 of the Hungarian sample show a significant correlation between opinion of whether immigrants are bad or good for the economy and scale placement. For the Hungarian sample these variables are moderately negatively correlated, $r(1566) = -.16$, $p < .001$. In the UK sample, individual opinion on whether immigrants are bad or good for the economy is also moderately negatively correlated with placement on the left-right political scale, $r(1696) = -0.14$, $p < .001$. This suggests, like Round 7, that those individuals who believe immigrants to be worse for the country are slightly more likely to place on the right-side of the left-right political scale.

3.5.3 Hypothesis 3

ESS Round 7

Hypothesis 3 tested whether respondents' opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life influenced their self-placement on the left-right political scale. Opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of a country was marginally negatively correlated with left-right political scale placement in the Hungarian sample, $r(1144) = -.11$, $p < .001$. This indicates that those who believe the country's cultural life to be undermined by immigrants are slightly more likely to place on the right side of the left-right political scale.

In the UK sample, opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of a country was moderately negatively correlated with left-right political scale placement, $r(1919) = -.15$, $p < .001$. This indicates that those who believe the country's cultural life to be undermined by immigrants are more likely to place on the right side of the left-right political scale.

Results were only slightly negatively correlated for beliefs of cultural life in the Hungarian sample, indicating that those who believe the country's cultural life to be undermined by immigrants are slightly more likely to place on the right side of the left-right political scale, supporting H3 and rejecting the null hypothesis. In the UK sample, results also showed a negative correlation, also supporting H3 and rejecting the null hypothesis, though the results were stronger than in the Hungarian sample.

ESS Round 8

For Round 8, opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of a country was moderately negatively correlated with left-right political scale placement in the Hungarian sample, $r(1249) = -.23$, $p < .001$. In the UK sample, opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of a country was moderately negatively correlated with left-right political scale placement, $r(1566) = -.24$, $p < .001$. These results indicate, as in Round 7, that those who believe the country's cultural life to be undermined by immigrants are more likely to place on the right side of the left-right political scale.

3.5.4 Discussion of Bivariate Results

As findings rejected Hypothesis 1 in both Round 7 and Round 8 data, this suggests that low satisfaction with one's life does not correlate with a right-side placement on the left-right political scale. Indeed, it seems that a higher satisfaction with life makes it

somewhat more likely that an individual will place to the right. While this does not support the theoretical perspectives of relative deprivation and strain theory, it must be remembered that placement on the right-side of a left-right political scale is not the same as placement to the far-right of the scale. These findings could suggest significant implications considering previous empirical findings, which will be further discussed following the results of the regression analyses. The only potentially significant result between the Round 7 and Round 8 data is found in the Hungarian dataset, where life satisfaction is more positively correlated in the Round 8 data ($r(1290) = .27$, $p < .001$) than in the Round 7 data ($r(1385) = .16$). This could indicate a slight change in the way Hungarians identify with their political position between spring 2015 and summer 2017, but could also simply be due to the fact that these datasets sampled different respondents. Longitudinal results from datasets with different samples must be approached carefully as they do not represent a perfect comparison.

Hypothesis 2 was supported for both the Hungarian and UK Round 7 and Round 8 datasets, indicating that right-side placement on the political scale correlates with opinion on the effect of immigrants on the economy at the $p = .1$ significance level. The Hungarian sample was found to have a very marginal correlation in Round 7 at $r(1152) = -.09$ $p = .002$, which rose to a moderate correlation ($r(1225) = -0.26$, $p < .001$) in Round 8. The correlation in the UK data rose slightly between rounds, from a very marginal correlation ($r(1954) = -0.08$, $p = .001$) in Round 7 to a slight correlation ($r(1696) = -0.14$, $p < .001$) in Round 8. The change in the Hungarian data between spring 2015 to summer 2017 could indicate the effects of the migrant crisis of the summer of 2015 and subsequent anti-migrant campaign by the Hungarian Fidesz government, but again it should be reiterated that this must be approached cautiously as it is not a perfect comparison. Similarly, the change in

the UK Round 7 and Round 8 data could should the effects of the anti-immigrant nature of the 'Vote Leave' Brexit campaign.

When examining Hypothesis 3, results for Round 7 indicate that feelings were stronger in the UK sample ($r(1958) = -.14$, $p < .001$) than in the Hungarian sample ($r(1313) = -.08$, $p = .005$) regarding the right when it comes to whether immigrants undermine the cultural life of the country. This difference is worth noting and could be due to the cultural context of the countries. The United Kingdom has a much larger percentage of immigrants than Hungary, with a steadily increasing influx of immigration over the last decade and-a-half (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). This is especially true after 2004, when an increasing number of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe began to immigrate to the UK. In 2014-2015, when Round 7 of the survey was run, tensions were rising in the UK due to immigration as well as a number of other reasons, eventually leading to the 2016 Brexit referendum. However, the results of the Round 8 datasets show the opposite relationship, as feelings are slightly stronger in the Hungarian sample ($r(1249) = -.23$, $p < .001$) than in the UK sample ($r(1695) = -.21$, $p < .001$) regarding the question of whether immigrants undermine the cultural life of the countries. This change can likely be attributed to the migrant crisis of 2015, when thousands of refugees crowded the train stations of Hungary's capital. Tensions rose sharply as, subsequently, the right-wing Fidesz government launched an 'anti-migrant' billboard campaign across the country.

All correlation relationships are stronger and more significant in Round 8 than Round 7, with most having considerably stronger correlations. Again, results of longitudinal studies conducted with differing datasets must be approached with caution. This does not allow for a perfect comparison but does give some idea of cultural context in both countries before and after major contemporary political moments; more specifically, the migrant crisis of summer 2015 in Hungary and the Brexit referendum, held 23 June

2016, in the UK. Results, in both the UK and Hungary, show stronger life satisfaction, stronger negative feelings about immigrants in relation to the country's economy, and stronger negative feelings about immigrants in relation to the culture of the country among respondents who place themselves on the right-side of the political scale in the Round 8 datasets. Results also indicate stronger correlations for all of these variables in the Hungarian Round 8 datasets as compared to the UK Round 8 datasets.

As these relationships are complex and multifactorial, bivariate analysis does not provide a sufficient platform for properly analysing these relationships. These ideas and values are shaped by a range of influences that cannot be controlled for during bivariate tests. As regression analysis allows to control for other factors, and the left-right scale is a scale-level variable, we will move to linear regression to gain a level of complexity.

3.6 LINEAR REGRESSION

A hierarchical linear regression was calculated in the Hungarian and UK samples to predict placement on the left-right scale based on satisfaction with one's life, opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy, and opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life. Predictors were gender, age, employment, partnership, and years in education. Gender and employment were transformed into binary measures, while partnership was found by combining those individuals with legal marital status and those cohabiting with a partner. Age and years in education are scale measures. Predictors were tested for multicollinearity by examining Variable Inflation Factors in SPSS. No predictors or independent variables showed multicollinearity in either the Hungarian or UK sample.

3.6.1 Hypothesis 1

Hungarian Sample

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if life satisfaction significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 7 (See Table 3.13). All R-value and ANOVA tables can be found in Appendix A. The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 5.2% of the variance ($R^2 = .052$, $F(5,1308) = 14.31$, $p < .001$). It was found that gender significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale ($\beta = .09$, $p = .001$), as did age ($\beta = -.21$, $p < .001$) and employment ($\beta = .06$, p = .029). The second step indicated that the addition of life satisfaction to the five predictors explained an additional 1.0% of the variance, at 6.2% ($R^2 = .062$, $F(6,1307) = 14.34$, $p < .001$). It was found that gender ($\beta = .1$, $p < .001$), age ($\beta = -.2$, $p < .001$), and employment ($\beta = .07$, $p = .017$) significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale, as did life satisfaction ($\beta = .1$, p

< .001). As the standardised coefficient (β = .1) indicates a positive relationship between life satisfaction and right-side placement on the political scale, H_1 is rejected and the null hypothesis is supported in the Hungarian sample.

Table 3.13: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of life satisfaction on the model on the Hungarian sample Round 7 (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	*SE B*	β	*p*
Step 1	(constant)	6.00	.35		0
	Employment	.48	.22	.06	.029
	Partner	.18	.38	.01	.635
	Gender	.43	.12	.09	.001
	Age	-.03	.004	-.21	0
	Education	0	.02	0	.991
Step 2	(constant)	5.48	.37		0
	Employment	.52	.22	.07	.017
	Partner	.14	.38	.01	.719
	Gender	.44	.12	.1	0
	Age	-.02	.004	-.2	0
	Education	-.02	.02	-.03	.400
	Life Satisfaction	.11	.03	.1	0

Note. R^2 = .05 for Step 1; ΔR^2 = .06 for Step 2.

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if life satisfaction significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 8 (See Table 3.14). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.5% of the variance (R^2 =.035, $F(5,1284)$ = 9.22, $p < .001$). It was found that employment significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale (β = .08, p = .008), as did partnership (β = .05, p = .076) and age (β = -.18, $p < .001$). The second step indicated that the addition of life satisfaction to the five predictors explained an additional 4.8% of the variance, at 8.3% (R^2 =.083, $F(6,1283)$ = 19.43, $p < .001$). It was found that employment (β = .08, p = .006) and age (β = -.14, $p < .001$) significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale, as did life satisfaction (β = .23, $p < .001$). As the standardised coefficient (β = .23) indicates a positive relationship

between life satisfaction and right-side placement on the political scale, H_1 is rejected and the null hypothesis is supported in the Hungarian sample.

Table 3.14: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of life satisfaction on the model on the Hungarian sample Round 8 (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	**SE B**	**β**	**p**
Step 1	(constant)	6.15	.41		0
	Employment	.92	.35	.08	.008
	Partner	.26	.15	.05	.076
	Gender	.09	.14	.02	.506
	Age	-.03	.004	-.18	0
	Education	-.01	.02	-.01	.644
Step 2	(constant)	4.23	.46		0
	Employment	.92	.34	.08	.006
	Partner	.13	.14	.03	.348
	Gender	.16	.14	.03	.242
	Age	-.02	.004	-.14	0
	Education	-.02	.02	-.04	.153
	Life Satisfaction	.28	.03	.23	0

Note. $R^2 = .04$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .08$ for Step 2.

UK Sample

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test whether life satisfaction significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 7 (See Table 3.15). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.1% of the variance ($R^2 = .31$, $F(5,1925) = 12.43$, $p < .001$). It was found that gender ($β = .11$, $p < .001$) and age ($β = .14$, $p < .001$) significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of life satisfaction to the five predictors explained an additional 1.3% of the variance, at 4.4% ($R^2 = .044$, $F(6,1924) = 14.69$, $p < .001$). It was found that gender ($β = .11$, $p < .001$) and age ($β = .13$, $p < .001$) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did life satisfaction ($β = .11$, $p < .001$). As the standardised coefficient ($β = .11$) indicates a positive

relationship between life satisfaction and right-side placement on the political scale, H_1 is rejected and the null hypothesis is supported in the UK sample.

Table 3.15: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of life satisfaction on the model for the UK sample Round 7 (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	*SE B*	β	*p*
Step 1	(constant)	3.83	.3		0
	Employment	.18	.22	.02	.416
	Partner	-.01	.22	0	.983
	Gender	.41	.09	.11	0
	Age	.02	.003	.14	0
	Education	.001	.01	.002	.934
Step 2	(constant)	3.16	.32		0
	Employment	.17	.22	.02	.435
	Partner	.01	.22	.001	.954
	Gender	.42	.09	.11	0
	Age	.02	.003	.13	0
	Education	-.004	.01	-.01	.763
	Life Satisfaction	.11	.02	.11	0

Note. $R^2 = .03$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .04$ for Step 2.

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test whether life satisfaction significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 8 (See Table 3.16). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.8% of the variance ($R^2 =.038$, $F(5,1689) = 13.34$, $p < .001$). It was found that partnership (β = -.07, $p = .002$), gender (β = .21, p = .019), and age (β = .02, p < .001) significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of the life satisfaction variable to the five predictors explained an additional 1.4% of the variance, at 5.2% ($R^2 =.052$, $F(6,1688) = 15.57$, $p < .001$). It was found that gender (β = .2, p = .025) and age (β = .02, p < .001) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale. The variable measuring life satisfaction was found to be significant (β = .11, $p < .001$) in the Round 8 sample. As the standardised coefficient (β = .11) indicates a positive relationship between life satisfaction and right-side placement on

the political scale, H₁ is rejected and the null hypothesis is supported in the Round 8 UK

sample.

Table 3.16: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of life satisfaction on the model on the UK sample Round 8 (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	**SE B**	**β**	**p**
Step 1	(constant)	3.77	.26		0
	Employment	.27	.22	.03	.209
	Partner	.17	.1	.04	.079
	Gender	.21	.09	.06	.019
	Age	.02	0	.16	0
	Education	-.01	.01	-.04	.124
Step 2	(constant)	3.0	.3		0
	Employment	.31	.22	.04	.145
	Partner	.1	.1	.03	.313
	Gender	.2	.09	.05	.025
	Age	.02	0	.16	0
	Education	-.01	.01	-.04	.112
	Life Satisfaction	.11	.02	.12	0

Note. R^2 = .04 for Step 1; ΔR^2 = .05 for Step 2.

3.6.2 Hypothesis 2

Hungarian sample

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 7 (See Table 3.17). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 5.3% of the variance (R^2 =.053, $F(5,1256)$ = 13.96, $p < .001$). It was found that gender (β = .09, p = .001), age (β = -.21, $p < .001$), and employment (β = .07, p = .015) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy to the five

predictors explained an additional 1.0% of the variance, at 6.3% (R^2 =.063, $F(6,1255)$ = 14.02, $p < .001$). It was found that gender ($\beta = .09$, $p = .001$), age ($\beta = -.21$, $p < .001$), and employment ($\beta = .07$, $p = .014$) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy ($\beta = -.1$, $p < .001$). As the standardised coefficient ($\beta = -.1$) indicates a positive relationship between opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy and right-side placement on the political scale, H_2 is supported in the Hungarian Round 7 sample.

Table 3.17: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy on the model for the Hungarian sample Round 7 (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	*SE B*	β	*p*
Step 1	(constant)	5.98	.36		0
	Employment	.55	.22	.07	.015
	Partner	.16	.39	.01	.683
	Gender	.43	.13	.09	.001
	Age	-.03	.004	-.21	0
	Education	-.002	.02	-.002	.938
Step 2	(constant)	6.31	.36		0
	Employment	.55	.22	.07	.014
	Partner	.17	.39	.01	.667
	Gender	.43	.13	.09	.001
	Age	-.03	.004	-.21	0
	Education	.004	.02	.01	.822
	Immigrants Economy	-.11	.03	-.1	0

Note. R^2 = .05 for Step 1; ΔR^2 = .06 for Step 2.

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 8 (See Table 3.18). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.9% of the variance (R^2 =.039, $F(5,1219)$ = 9.85, $p < .001$). It was found that employment ($\beta = .08$, $p = .012$), partnership ($\beta = .06$, $p = .031$), and age ($\beta = .02$, $p < .001$) significantly

predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy to the five predictors explained an additional 5.6% of the variance, at 9.5% (R^2 =.095, $F(6,1218)$ = 21.25, $p < .001$). It was found that employment (β = .05, p = .078), partnership (β = .05, p = .079), and age (β = -.18, $p < .001$) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy (β = -.24, $p < .001$). Because of this, H_2 is supported in the Hungarian Round 8 sample.

Table 3.18: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the Hungarian sample Round 8, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	*SE B*	*β*	*p*
Step 1	(constant)	6.22	.44		0
	Employment	.93	.37	.08	.012
	Partner	.32	.15	.06	.031
	Gender	.12	.15	.02	.421
	Age	-.03	.004	.02	0
	Education	-.01	.02	-.02	.457
Step 2	(constant)	7.13	.44		0
	Employment	.63	.36	.05	.078
	Partner	.26	.15	.05	.079
	Gender	.17	.14	.03	.238
	Age	-.03	.004	-.18	0
	Education	.002	.02	.004	.896
	Immigrants Economy	-.26	.03	-.24	0

Note. R^2 = .04 for Step 1; ΔR^2 = .1 for Step 2.

UK Sample

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 7 (See Table 3.19). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.1% of the variance (R^2 =.031, $F(5,1906)$ = 12.26, $p < .001$). It was found that gender (β = .11,

p < .001) and age (β = .14, *p* < .001) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy to the five predictors explained an additional 0.8% of the variance, at 3.9% (R^2 =.039, $F(6,1905)$ = 12.79, *p* < .001). It was found that gender (β = .12, *p* < .001) and age (β = .13, *p* < .001) significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy (β = -.09, *p* < .001). Hence, H_2 is supported in the UK Round 7 sample.

Table 3.19: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy on the model for the UK sample Round 7(adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	*SE B*	β	*p*
Step 1	(constant)	3.84	.3		0
	Employment	.19	.22	.02	.192
	Partner	0	.22	0	.013
	Gender	.42	.09	.11	0
	Age	.02	.003	.14	0
	Education	0	.01	.001	.918
Step 2	(constant)	4.02	.3		0
	Employment	.19	.22	.02	.384
	Partner	.004	.22	0	.986
	Gender	.46	.09	.12	0
	Age	.02	.003	.13	0
	Education	.01	.01	.02	.317
	Immigrants Economy	-.07	.02	-.09	0

Note. R^2 = .03 for Step 1; ΔR^2 = .04 for Step 2.

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 8 (See Table 3.20). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 4.1% of the variance (R^2 =.041, $F(5,1672)$ = 14.31, *p* < .001). It was found that partnership (β =

.17, $p = .074$), gender ($\beta = .22$, $p = .012$), and age ($\beta = .02$, $p < .001$) significantly predicted

placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on

whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy to the five predictors

explained an additional 1.0% of the variance, at 5.1% ($R^2 = .051$, $F(6,1671) = 14.98$, $p <$

.001). It was found that partnership ($\beta = .18$, $p = .063$), gender ($\beta = .25$, p $= .005$), and age

($\beta = .02$, $p < .001$) significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions

on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy ($\beta = -.08$, $p < .001$). As

the standardised coefficient ($\beta = -.08$) indicates a negative relationship between opinion of

whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy and right-side placement on the

political scale, H_2 is supported in the UK Round 8 sample.

Table 3.20: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the UK sample Round 8, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	**SE B**	**β**	**p**
Step 1	(constant)	3.72	.26		0
	Employment	.26	.22	.03	.235
	Partner	.17	.1	.04	.074
	Gender	.22	.09	.06	.012
	Age	.02	0	.17	0
	Education	-.01	.01	-.04	.13
Step 2	(constant)	4.18	.28		0
	Employment	.29	.22	.03	.175
	Partner	.18	.1	.05	.063
	Gender	.25	.09	.07	.005
	Age	.02	0	.15	0
	Education	-.01	.01	-.02	.338
	Immigrants Economy	-.08	.02	-.1	0

Note. $R^2 = .04$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .05$ for Step 2.

3.6.3 Hypothesis 3

Hungarian Sample

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 7 (See Table 3.21). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 5.1% of the variance (R^2 =.051, $F(5,1248) = 13.52$, $p < .001$). It was found that gender (β = .1, p = .001), age (β = -.2, $p < .001$), and employment (β = .06, p = .033) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life to the five predictors explained an additional 1.6% of the variance, at 6.7% (R^2 =.067, $F(6,1247) = 15.02$, $p < .001$). It was found that gender (β = .09, p = .002), age (β = -.21, $p < .001$), and employment (β = .06, p = .033) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy (β = -.13, $p < .001$). Hence, H3 is supported in the Hungarian Round 7 sample.

Table 3.21: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the Hungarian sample Round 7, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	$SE\ B$	β	p
Step 1	(constant)	5.86	.36		0
	Employment	.49	.23	.06	.033
	Partner	.39	.39	.03	.318
	Gender	.44	.13	.1	.001
	Age	-.03	.004	-.2	0
	Education	.01	.02	.01	.76
Step 2	(constant)	6.45	.37		0
	Employment	.49	.23	.06	.033
	Partner	.4	.38	.03	.305
	Gender	.4	.13	.09	.002
	Age	-.03	.004	-.21	0
	Education	.02	.02	.02	.431
	Immigrants Economy	-.13	.03	-.13	0

Note. R^2 = .05 for Step 1; ΔR^2 = .07 for Step 2.

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 8 (See Table 3.22). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.5% of the variance (R^2 =.035, $F(5,1243)$ = 9.08, $p < .001$). It was found that partnership (β = .05, p = .069), age (β = -.18, $p < .001$), and employment (β = .08, p = .01) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life to the five predictors explained an additional 4.2% of the variance, at 7.7% (R^2 =.077, $F(6,1242)$ = 17.29, $p < .001$). It was found that age (β = -.17, $p < .001$) and employment (β = .05, p = .064) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy (β = -.21, $p < .001$). Hence, H3 is supported in the Hungarian Round 8 sample.

Table 3.22: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the Hungarian sample Round 8, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	$SE\ B$	β	p
Step 1	(constant)	6.21	.43		0
	Employment	.93	.36	.08	.010
	Partner	.27	.15	.05	.069
	Gender	.12	.15	.02	.392
	Age	-.03	.004	-.18	0
	Education	-.01	.02	-.02	.442
Step 2	(constant)	7.11	.44		0
	Employment	.66	.36	.05	.064
	Partner	.21	.15	.04	.155
	Gender	.17	.14	.03	.237
	Age	-.02	.004	-.17	0
	Education	-.002	.02	-.003	.922
	Immigrants Economy	-.21	.03	-.21	0

Note. $R^2 = .04$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .08$ for Step 2.

UK Sample

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 7 (See Table 3.23). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.3% of the variance ($R^2 = .033$, $F(5,1912) = 13.21$, $p < .001$). It was found that gender ($\beta = .11$, $p < .001$) and age ($\beta = .15$, $p < .001$) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life to the five predictors explained an additional 2.0% of the variance, at 5.3% ($R^2 = .053$, $F(6,1911) = 17.87$, $p < .001$). It was found that gender ($\beta = .11$, $p < .001$) and age ($\beta = .13$, $p < .001$) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad

for the country's economy (β = -.15, p < .001). Hence, H3 is supported in the UK Round 7 sample.

Table 3.23: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the UK sample Round 7, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	*SE B*	*β*	*p*
Step 1	(constant)	3.83	.3		0
	Employment	.18	.22	.02	.403
	Partner	-.002	.22	0	.992
	Gender	.43	.09	.11	0
	Age	.02	.003	.15	0
	Education	0	.01	-.001	.971
Step 2	(constant)	4.14	.3		0
	Employment	.17	.22	.02	.421
	Partner	.03	.21	.003	.893
	Gender	.44	.09	.11	0
	Age	.02	.003	.13	0
	Education	.02	.01	.04	.101
	Immigrants Economy	-.11	.02	-.15	0

Note. R^2 = .03 for Step 1; ΔR^2 = .05 for Step 2.

Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life significantly predicted respondents' placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 8 (See Table 3.24). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.9% of the variance (R^2 =.039, $F(5,1671)$ = 13.43, p < .001). It was found that gender (β = .21, p = .015) and age (β = .02, p < .001) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life to the five predictors explained an additional 4.2% of the variance, at 7.1% (R^2 =.071, $F(6,1670)$ = 21.29, p < .001). It was found that age (β = .13, p < .001), partnership (β = .16, p = .089), and gender (β = .23, p = .007) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on whether

immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy ($\beta = -.14$, $p < .001$). As the standardised coefficient ($\beta = -.14$) indicates a negative relationship between opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life and right-side placement on the political scale, H_3 is supported in the UK Round 8 sample.

Table 3.24: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the UK sample Round 8, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	**SE B**	**β**	**p**
Step 1	(constant)	3.75	.26		0
	Employment	.27	.22	.03	.215
	Partner	.15	.1	.04	.112
	Gender	.21	.09	.06	.015
	Age	.02	0	.17	0
	Education	-.01	.01	-.04	.145
Step 2	(constant)	4.6	.28		0
	Employment	.29	.21	.03	.169
	Partner	.16	.09	.04	.089
	Gender	.23	.09	.06	.007
	Age	.13	0	.13	0
	Education	0	.01	-.01	.699
	Immigrants Economy	-.14	.02	-.19	0

Note. $R^2 = .04$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .07$ for Step 2.

3.6.4 Discussion of Linear Regression Results

Linear regression was used to control for demographic variables and their effects on the model, adding a level of complexity to the analysis. The effects of the control measures on the samples in each country are worthy of consideration. More specifically, in the Round 7 data for both samples, age and gender show statistically significant results for their influence on the dependent variable. However, in the Hungarian sample, employment status is also a significant predictor of placement on the left-right scale, while in the UK sample employment status is not a significant predictor. In both samples, years in education

is not shown to be a significant predictor. In Round 8, age is a significant predictor in both the Hungarian and UK data. Employment status is also a significant predictor of placement on the left-right scale in the Hungarian data, as is partnership in one instance. Education is not a significant predictor in the Hungarian Round 8 data. In the UK data, gender and age are both significant predictors, as is partnership in two instances. Employment status and education are not a significant predictor in the UK data.

Hypothesis 1 was rejected in both the Hungarian and UK samples for both Rounds 7 and 8, similar to the results of the bivariate analysis. This shows that a higher level of satisfaction with life is a predictor of right-side political scale placement, which is not influenced by demographic factors. According to a study of life satisfaction among Republicans and Democrats in the United States, it was found that life satisfaction is greater when the political climate is favourable rather than unfavourable (Mandel & Omorogbe, 2014). This result is also seen in the Hungarian context by the upswing in right-wing views in the political sphere and the election of the Fidesz party. Similarly, in the United Kingdom the Conservative party was in government at the time of the surveys. Other studies based in North America have shown greater life satisfaction and happiness among conservatives versus liberals (Napier & Jost, 2008; Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012).

Hypothesis 2 stated that believing immigrants are bad for the country's economy predicts a right-side placement on the left-right political scale, which was supported in both the Hungarian and UK samples for both Round 7 and Round 8. Results of the Hungarian and UK Round 7 and 8 results supported H_2 in bivariate tests. This indicates that feelings of immigrants being bad for the country's economy was a predictor for right-side placement on the political scale, exclusive of demographic factors, in both Hungary in spring 2015 and the United Kingdom in 2014-2015. Again, while a longitudinal comparison must be

approached cautiously, the Hungarian summer of 2017 and UK 2016-2017 survey respondents showed similar results.

Hypothesis 3 was also supported in both the Hungarian and UK Round 7 and Round 8 samples, similar to the results of the bivariate analysis. This suggests that the opinion that immigrants undermine a country's cultural life is a predictor of right-side political scale placement, which is not influenced by demographic factors. This result in unsurprising given the political climate in both Hungary and the United Kingdom even in 2014, with the increasingly radical right Fidesz in Hungary and the imminent Brexit referendum in the UK. Especially around 2015 and 2016, both Hungarian and British media were overrun by anti-immigrant discourse, with Fidesz' migrant campaign and UKIP's leave campaign.

Bivariate analysis and linear regression provide insight into the effects of these independent variables on political scale placement. In all cases, correlations were found to be quite moderate. As the interest here is rather on those individuals with far-right views, it is necessary to measure the effects of those responses, to see if they are indeed influencing the results of the correlation analyses. To do this, we now turn to binary logistic regression.

3.7 BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Bivariate analysis and hierarchical linear regression examined the effects of three variables - life satisfaction, opinions on whether immigrants are better or worse for the country's economy, and opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country - on respondents' placement on the left-right political scale. As this research explores the factors that predispose people to develop right-wing attitudes, binary logistic regression can aid in measuring the effects of these three independent variables on whether a person is on the far-right of the left-right scale. Far-right, here, is defined as placing oneself at a 9 or a 10 on a scale ranging from 0-10. This placement was then transformed into a binary measure, with 9 and 10 being 'far-right,' and 0-8 being 'other.'

As the first three hypotheses focused on the influence of independent variables on right-side placement on the left-right political scale, a new set of hypotheses was necessary. This binary logistic regression will explore hypotheses H4, H5, and H6.

3.7.1 Hypothesis 4

Hungarian Sample

Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. Satisfaction with life was added as an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 37.12$, $p < .001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 6.38$, $p = .605$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased with the addition of life satisfaction, from $\chi^2(5) = 29.51$, $p < .001$ to $\chi^2(6) = 37.12$, $p < .001$. As Table 3.25 shows, gender ($p < .001$), age ($p = .028$), employment ($p = .062$), and life satisfaction ($p = .007$) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that satisfaction with one's life does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. However, this effect is positive, rejecting H4 and supporting the null hypothesis.

Table 3.25: Logistic regression values of life satisfaction for Hungarian Round 7 sample.

		B	*SE B*	**Wald χ^2**	*p*	*OR*
Step 1	Employed	.59	.36	2.64	.104	1.8
	Partner	.41	.53	.6	.44	1.5
	Gender	.84	.20	17.33	0*	2.32
	Age	-.02	.01	5.95	.015*	.99
	Education	.01	.03	.09	.765	1.01
Step 2	Employed	.69	.37	3.49	.062*	1.98
	Partner	.33	.53	.38	.538	1.39
	Gender	.88	.20	18.91	0*	2.42
	Age	-.01	.01	4.82	.028*	.99
	Education	-.01	.03	.16	.693	.99
	Life Satisfaction	.13	.05	7.38	.007*	1.14

Note. pseudo R^2 = .06 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 37.12$, $p < .001$. * $p < 0.1$

For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 83.11$, $p < .001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 5.05$, $p = .75$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .1 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased

with the addition of life satisfaction, from $\chi^2(5) = 18.95$, $p = .002$ to $\chi^2(6) = 83.11$, $p < .001$. As Table 3.26 shows, employment status ($p = .015$) and life satisfaction ($p < .001$) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that satisfaction with one's life does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. However, this effect is positive, rejecting H_4 and supporting the null hypothesis.

Table 3.26: Logistic regression values of life satisfaction for Hungarian Round 8 sample.

		B	***SE B***	**Wald χ^2**	***p***	***OR***
Step 1	Employed	1.17	.53	4.77	.029*	3.21
	Partner	.35	.17	4.46	.035*	1.42
	Gender	-.004	.16	0	.982	1.00
	Age	-.01	.01	1.84	.175	.99
	Education	.03	.01	4.14	.042*	1.03
Step 2	Employed	1.32	.54	5.98	.015*	3.74
	Partner	.22	.17	1.59	.207	1.24
	Gender	.09	.16	.34	.563	1.10
	Age	-.001	.01	.05	.832	1.00
	Education	.02	.01	1.97	.161	1.02
	Life Satisfaction	.34	.05	54.22	0*	1.40

Note. pseudo $R^2 = .1$ (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 83.11$, $p < .001$. * $p < 0.1$

UK Sample

Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. Satisfaction with life was added as an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 32.08$, $p < .001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 10.69$, $p = .22$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased with the addition of life satisfaction, from $\chi^2(5) = 26.76$, $p < .001$ to $\chi^2(6) = 32.08$, $p < .001$. As Table 3.27 shows, gender ($p = .001$), age ($p = .001$), and life satisfaction ($p = .028$) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that satisfaction with one's life does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. However, this effect is positive, rejecting H4 and supporting the null hypothesis.

Table 3.27: Logistic regression values of life satisfaction for UK Round 7 sample.

		B	*SE B*	Wald χ^2	*p*	*OR*
Step 1	Employed	-.18	.67	.07	.787	.84
	Partner	-1.81	1.45	1.56	.212	.16
	Gender	.91	.27	11.4	.001*	2.48
	Age	.02	.01	11.69	.001*	1.03
	Education	.03	.03	.6	.44	1.03
Step 2	Employed	-.19	.67	.08	.776	.827
	Partner	-1.79	1.45	1.53	.217	.17
	Gender	.92	.27	11.61	.001*	2.51
	Age	.02	.01	10.09	.001*	1.02
	Education	.02	.03	.4	.53	1.02
	Life Satisfaction	.16	.07	4.8	.028*	1.17

Note. pseudo R^2 = .06 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 32.08$, $p < .001$. * $p < 0.1$

For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 23.38$, $p = .001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 6.67$, $p = .57$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased with the addition of life satisfaction, from $\chi^2(5) = 14.58$, $p = .012$ to $\chi^2(6) = 23.38$, $p = .001$. As Table 3.28 shows, gender ($p = .049$), age ($p = .006$), and life satisfaction ($p = .004$) had

a significant effect on the model, indicating that satisfaction with one's life does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. However, this effect is positive, rejecting H4 and supporting the null hypothesis.

Table 3.28: Logistic regression values of life satisfaction for UK Round 8 sample.

		B	*SE B*	**Wald χ²**	*p*	*OR*
Step 1	Employed	.92	1.13	.66	.418	2.5
	Partner	-.02	.31	0	.956	.983
	Gender	.58	.3	3.82	.051*	1.79
	Age	.03	.01	8.99	.003*	1.03
	Education	-.01	.03	.1	.747	.99
Step 2	Employed	1.01	1.13	.79	.374	2.74
	Partner	-.17	.32	.29	.588	.84
	Gender	.59	.3	3.88	.049*	1.8
	Age	.02	.01	7.6	.006*	1.02
	Education	-.01	.03	.18	.675	.99
	Life Satisfaction	.27	.1	8.15	.004*	1.31

Note. pseudo R^2 = .06 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6)$ = 23.38, p = .001. * $p < 0.1$

3.7.2 Hypothesis 5

Hungarian Sample

Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. Opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy was added as an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6)$ = 50.25, $p < .001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8)$ = 13.35, p = .100.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .08 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased

with the addition of opinions of whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy, from

$\chi^2(5) = 25.66$, $p < .001$ to $\chi^2(6) = 50.25$, $p < .001$. As Table 3.29 shows, gender ($p < .001$),

age ($p = .010$) and opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy ($p <$

.001) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether immigrants

are good or bad for the economy does have an effect on whether a respondent could be

classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. As this effect is negative, H_5 is supported

in the Hungarian sample.

Table 3.29: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy for Hungarian Round 7 sample.

		B	**SE B**	**Wald χ^2**	**p**	**OR**
Step 1	Employed	.49	.36	1.85	.174	1.64
	Partner	.43	.53	.65	.42	1.53
	Gender	.79	.20	14.98	0*	2.21
	Age	-.02	.01	5.78	.016*	.99
	Education	.007	.03	.05	.83	1.01
Step 2	Employed	.48	.36	1.73	.189	1.61
	Partner	.51	.54	.89	.345	1.66
	Gender	.79	.21	14.83	0*	2.21
	Age	-.02	.01	6.71	.01*	.98
	Education	.02	.03	.51	.473	1.02
	Immigrants Economy	-.23	.05	22.85	0*	.8

Note. pseudo $R^2 = .08$ (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 50.25$, $p < .001$. * $p < 0.1$

For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically

significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably

distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 79.97$, $p < .001$). The

Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model,

$\chi^2(8) = 10.07$, $p = .26$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .1 indicated a very moderate relationship between

prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased

with the addition of opinions of whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy, from

$\chi^2(5) = 19.29$, $p = .002$ to $\chi^2(6) = 79.97$, $p < .001$. As Table 3.30 shows, partnership ($p =$

.026), education ($p = .027$) and opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy ($p < .001$) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. As this effect is negative, H_5 is supported in the Hungarian sample.

Table 3.30: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy for Hungarian Round 8 sample.

		B	*SE B*	**Wald** χ^2	*p*	*OR*
Step 1	Employed	1.07	.54	3.99	.046*	2.92
	Partner	.42	.17	6.06	.014*	1.53
	Gender	.02	.16	.01	.919	1.02
	Age	-.01	.01	2.99	.084*	.99
	Education	.02	.01	2.76	.097*	1.02
Step 2	Employed	.85	.54	2.44	.118	2.33
	Partner	.39	.18	4.93	.026*	1.48
	Gender	.06	.17	.15	.698	1.07
	Age	-.01	.01	2.28	.131	.99
	Education	.03	.02	4.87	.027*	1.03
	Immigrants Economy	-.29	.04	53.22	0*	.75

Note. pseudo $R^2 = .1$ (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 79.97$, $p < .001$. * $p < 0.1$

UK Sample

Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. Opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy was added as an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 27.14$, $p < .001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 10.49$, $p = .233$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .05 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased with the addition of opinions of whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy, from $\chi^2(5) = 35.06$, $p < .001$ to $\chi^2(6) = 27.14$, $p < .001$. As Table 3.31 shows, only gender ($p = .001$) and age ($p = .001$) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy does not have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. Results reject H5, supporting the null hypothesis.

Table 3.31: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy for UK Round 7 sample.

		B	*SE B*	Wald χ^2	*p*	*OR*
Step 1	Employed	-.2	.67	.09	.767	.82
	Partner	-1.8	1.45	1.55	.214	.17
	Gender	.88	.27	10.55	.001*	2.4
	Age	.02	.01	10.91	.001*	1.02
	Education	.03	.03	.71	.398	1.03
Step 2	Employed	-.20	.67	.09	.762	.82
	Partner	-1.84	1.45	1.6	.206	.16
	Gender	.91	.27	11.28	.001*	2.48
	Age	.02	.01	10.48	.001*	1.02
	Education	.04	.03	1.42	.233	1.04
	Immigrants Economy	-.07	.05	2.09	.148	.93

Note. pseudo $R^2 = .05$ (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 27.14$, $p < .001$. * $p < 0.1$

For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 14.34$, $p = .026$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 7.37$, $p = .497$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .04 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased only very slightly with the addition of opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for

the economy, from $\chi^2(5) = 14.22$, $p = .014$ to $\chi^2(6) = 14.34$, $p = .026$. As Table 3.32 shows,

only gender ($p = .043$) and age ($p = .005$) had a significant effects on the model, indicating

that opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy does not

have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample.

Results reject H₅, supporting the null hypothesis.

Table 3.32: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy for UK Round 8 sample.

		B	$SE\ B$	Wald χ^2	p	OR
Step 1	Employed	.88	1.13	.6	.438	2.4
	Partner	-.01	.32	0	.964	.99
	Gender	.6	.3	4.03	.045*	1.82
	Age	.02	.01	8.3	.004*	1.02
	Education	-.01	.03	.1	.748	.99
Step 2	Employed	.89	1.13	.62	.432	2.43
	Partner	-.01	.32	0	.974	.99
	Gender	.61	.3	4.1	.043*	1.83
	Age	.02	.01	7.84	.005*	1.02
	Education	-.01	.02	.07	.786	.99
	Immigrants Economy	-.02	.06	.11	.737	.98

Note. pseudo $R^2 = .04$ (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 14.34$, $p = .026$. * $p < 0.1$

3.7.3 Hypothesis 6

Hungarian Sample

Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political

scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors.

Opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life was added as

an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full

model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the

predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right'

respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 70.65$, $p < .001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for whether

immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 14.02$, $p = .081$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .11 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased with the addition of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life, from $\chi^2(5) = 27.53$, $p < .001$ to $\chi^2(6) = 70.65$, $p < .001$. As Table 3.33 shows, gender ($p < .001$), age ($p = .018$) and opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life ($p < .001$) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. As the effect is negative, H_6 is supported.

Table 3.33: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life for Hungarian Round 7 sample.

		B	$SE\ B$	Wald χ^2	p	OR
Step 1	Employed	.64	.39	2.67	.102	1.89
	Partner	.42	.53	.63	.427	1.52
	Gender	.85	.21	16.58	0*	2.34
	Age	-.01	.01	4.88	.027*	.99
	Education	.01	.03	.13	.72	1.01
Step 2	Employed	.53	.39	1.8	.18	1.69
	Partner	.46	.54	.72	.395	1.59
	Gender	.77	.21	13.28	0*	2.17
	Age	-.02	.01	5.58	.018*	.99
	Education	.03	.03	.86	.354	1.03
	Immigrants Culture	-.3	.05	40.44	0*	.74

Note. pseudo R^2 = .11 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 70.65$, $p < .001$. * $p < 0.1$

For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 50.97$, $p < .001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 9.18$, $p = .328$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased with the addition of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life, from $\chi^2(5) = 15.06$, $p = .01$ to $\chi^2(6) = 50.97$, $p < .001$. As Table 3.34 shows, partnership ($p = .073$), education ($p = .072$) and opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life ($p < .001$) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. As the effect is negative, H_6 is supported.

Table 3.34: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life for Hungarian Round 8 sample.

		B	$SE\ B$	Wald χ^2	p	OR
Step 1	Employed	1.02	.57	3.63	.057*	2.77
	Partner	.35	.17	4.19	.041*	1.41
	Gender	.04	.16	.08	.781	1.05
	Age	-.01	.01	1.74	.188	.99
	Education	.02	.01	2.15	.142	1.02
Step 2	Employed	.83	.54	2.36	.124	2.29
	Partner	.31	.17	3.22	.073*	1.36
	Gender	.09	.16	.32	.573	1.10
	Age	-.01	.01	1.26	.261	1.00
	Education	.03	.02	3.25	.072*	1.03
	Immigrants Culture	-.20	.03	33.67	0*	.82

Note. pseudo $R^2 = .06$ (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 50.97$, $p < .001$. * $p < 0.1$

UK Sample

Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. Opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life was added as an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the

predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 34.68$, $p < .001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 9.88$, $p = .273$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .07 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased with the addition of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life, from $\chi^2(5) = 26.64$, $p < .001$ to $\chi^2(6) = 34.68$, $p < .001$. As Table 3.35 shows, gender ($p = .001$), age ($p = .001$), and opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life ($p = .005$) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. As the effect is negative, H_6 is supported in the UK sample.

Table 3.35: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life for UK Round 7 sample.

		B	*SE B*	**Wald χ^2**	*p*	*OR*
Step 1	Employed	-.14	.31	.21	.651	.87
	Partner	.29	.25	1.38	.241	1.34
	Gender	.80	.25	10.46	.001*	2.22
	Age	.03	.01	12.98	0*	1.00
	Education	-.007	.03	.07	.794	.99
Step 2	Employed	-.22	.67	.11	.742	.8
	Partner	-1.82	1.45	1.57	.211	.16
	Gender	.92	.27	11.63	.001*	2.51
	Age	.02	.01	10.42	.001*	1.02
	Education	.05	.03	2.03	.154	1.05
	Immigrants Culture	-.14	.05	7.95	.005*	.87

Note. pseudo R^2 = .07 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 34.68$, $p < .001$. * $p < 0.1$

For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between 'far-right' respondents and others ($\chi^2(6) = 23.38$, $p = .001$). The

Hosmer-Lemeshow test for opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, $\chi^2(8) = 6.67$, $p = .573$.

Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ^2 indicated that the effect of the model increased with the addition of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life, from $\chi^2(5) = 14.58$, $p = .012$ to $\chi^2(6) = 23.28$, $p = .001$. As Table 3.36 shows, gender ($p = .051$), age ($p = .015$), and opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life ($p = .003$) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. As the effect is negative, H_6 is supported in the UK sample.

Table 3.36: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life for UK Round 8 sample.

		B	*SE B*	Wald χ^2	*p*	*OR*
Step 1	Employed	.89	1.13	.62	.432	2.43
	Partner	-.02	.31	.06	.944	.98
	Gender	.58	.3	3.78	.052*	1.78
	Age	.02	.01	8.92	.003*	1.03
	Education	-.01	.03	.1	.752	.99
Step 2	Employed	.99	1.13	.75	.387	2.66
	Partner	.02	.31	0	.959	1.02
	Gender	.58	.3	3.81	.051*	1.79
	Age	.02	.01	5.96	.015*	1.02
	Education	0	.02	.21	.884	1.00
	Immigrants Culture	-.17	.06	9.01	.003*	.85

Note. pseudo R^2 = .06 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(6) = 23.38$, $p = .001$ * $p < 0.1$

3.7.4 Discussion of Logistic Regression Results

These analyses present a clear picture in respect of the factors that predict far-right identification. When considering three independent variables – satisfaction with life, opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy, and opinion on

whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life – in the Hungarian sample, all three variables are shown to be predictors of far-right placement on the left-right political scale for both Rounds 7 and 8. However, in both the UK Round 7 and Round 8 models, opinion on immigrants and cultural life as well as life satisfaction are shown to be significant predictors, while economic concerns about immigrants is not.

As results show for Round 7, gender significantly predicted far-right placement in all cases, and age in all but one. Findings show that partnership, employment status, and years in education did not affect far-right placement. In Round 8, however, findings show that in the UK data gender and age significantly predict far-right placement for all variables. In the Round 8 Hungarian data, employment status significantly predicted far-right placement for the life satisfaction variable, while partnership and education significantly predicted far-right placement for variables dealing with opinions on immigration.

Satisfaction with life did significantly predict far-right placement in both Rounds 7 and 8 of both the Hungarian and UK samples. However, positive life satisfaction predicted far-right views, not negative life satisfaction as originally thought, hence rejecting H_4 and supporting the null hypothesis. This is contrary to empirical findings of nonsignificant results for the relationship between right-wing attitudes and psychological well-being (Onraet, van Heil, & Dhont, 2013) and life satisfaction (Butler, 2000). Particularly interesting here is the consideration of those on the far-right, as they are indeed often portrayed as "angry white men" upset about not having all they should. Considering that those on the far-right may be actually more satisfied with their lives paints a completely different picture of even those radical right activists in the movements being examined here-in. This does not necessarily mean that relative deprivation theory is wrong, but perhaps that it is applied in some other way and ties in to another sense of identity, as will be explored later. This could also, additionally, allude to the mainstreaming of right-wing

and far-right values and the larger acceptance of self-identification as someone with right-wing views.

Views on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy significantly predicted far-right placement in the Hungarian sample (supporting H_5), but not in the UK sample (rejecting H_5 and supporting the null hypothesis). The same results were found for both Round 7 and Round 8 datasets. Crucially, when looking at the UK data, economic concerns over immigration show significant correlations with those on the right-side of the left-right political scale, but not with those on the far-right. At the same time, as will be shown below, cultural concerns over immigration are indeed linked to a far-right placement on the scale. This indicates that a placement on the far-right of the scale could be more ideologically based, tying more into ideas of nativism, nationalism, and homogeneity than with fiscal political concerns. In Hungary economic concerns over immigration are shown to be significant even in the far-right, likely as the entire discourse and media are dominated by similar rhetoric.

Lastly, H_6 was supported in both the Hungarian and UK samples for both Rounds 7 and 8, indicating that believing immigrants undermine the cultural life of one's country is a predictor of far-right views. Indeed, several authors have linked concerns over immigration to far-right voting and sentiments in Europe (for example: Cochrane & Nevitte, 2012; Froio & Ganesh, 2018; Halla, Wagner, & Zweimüller, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2015; Stockemer, 2015). The results of this study serve to strengthen this idea in the contexts of Hungary and the United Kingdom. In Hungary, concerns over refugees and 'migrants' has become one of the biggest current political issues, especially adopted by the Fidesz government. In the United Kingdom concerns over immigration have become central, especially considering the results of the 2016 Brexit referendum.

3.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This analysis examined aspects of relative deprivation and economic strain theories, with relation to predictors of right-wing views. To test this, three independent variables were used: satisfaction with life, opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy, and opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country's cultural life. These variables were tested for their predictive power of right-side political scale placement, and later for far-right placement. These factors were tested using European Social Survey Round 7 and Round 8 data from Hungary and the United Kingdom. These survey datasets do not offer a perfect longitudinal comparison given that they sampled different respondents, but do offer some general insight into views of respondents in those particular time-periods and places.

Firstly, bivariate correlations were conducted to test for factors influencing left-right political scale placement. The next step was to conduct linear regression in order to include demographic factors on left-right scale placement. Finally, binary logistic regression was conducted to attain a deeper understanding of the relationships between the independent variables and placement on the far-right of the left-right scale. Five control measures were used: age, gender, employment status, partnership, and education. In nearly all Round 7 tests, age and gender were found to show statistically significant results for their influence on the dependent variable. In the Hungarian sample, employment was also a significant predictor for placement on the left-right scale, whereas, in the UK sample, partnership was found to be significant. Findings show, however, that partnership, employment status, and years in education did not affect far-right placement.

In Round 8, age is a significant predictor in both the Hungarian and UK data. Employment status is also a significant predictor of placement on the left-right scale in the Hungarian data, as is partnership in one instance. In the UK data, partnership and education

are also all significant predictors in addition to age, as is gender in two instances. Employment status is not a significant predictor in the UK data. When it comes to far-right placement, findings show that in the UK data gender and age significantly predict far-right placement for all variables. In the Hungarian data, employment status significantly predicted far-right placement for the life satisfaction variable, while partnership and education significantly predicted far-right placement for variables dealing with opinions on immigration.

When considering the bivariate analysis of the samples, in both Round 7 and Round 8 datasets of both the Hungarian and UK samples, a higher satisfaction with one's life is positively correlated with right-side placement on the left-right political scale. This is likely due to the right-side scale placement including moderately conservative and conservative individuals, as well as those on the far-right of the scale. In both the Hungarian and UK samples for Round 7 and Round 8, results indicated that high satisfaction with life is not only a predictor of politically right attitudes, but also of far-right attitudes. This is contrary to the theory that individuals with far-right values have low satisfaction with their lives and also to previous empirical findings.

For both the Hungarian Round 7 and 8 data, opinion on immigrants being bad for the economy predicted a politically right identity when factoring in demographic measures in linear regression. It was also found that an opinion of immigrants being bad for the economy predicts a far-right identity. In both the Round 7 and Round 8 UK datasets, it was found that opinion on immigrants being bad for the economy predicted a politically right identity but did not predict a far-right identity. The results suggest that opinions on the effect of immigrants on the country's economy is not a reliable indicator of far-right political scale placement, but could be of left-right political scale placement.

Opinions on immigrants undermining a country's cultural life was a predictor of both right and far-right political identity in both the Hungarian and UK samples, in both Round 7 and Round 8 datasets. Round 7 results were only slightly negatively correlated for beliefs of cultural life in the Hungarian sample, indicating that those who believe the country's cultural life to be undermined by immigrants are slightly more likely to place on the right side of the left-right political scale. Round 8 results, however, yielded a much stronger correlation, indicating a possible change in general pessimism towards immigrants. The UK Round 7 sample showed the same trend as the Hungarian sample when it came to beliefs about immigrants and cultural life, but results were much more significant; the Round 8 results, however, were less significant than those of the Hungarian sample.

From these results it seems obvious that those on the far-right of the political scale seem to be highly satisfied with their lives in the UK and Hungary. This is, of course, contrary to the idea that those with far-right views are dissatisfied with their lives. It was also shown that in both the UK and Hungary, those with far-right views believe immigrants have a negative effect on their country's cultural life. These feelings were slightly stronger in the 2014-2015 UK dataset than the spring 2015 Hungarian dataset, which saw a change in the subsequent two years. The summer 2017 Hungarian dataset showed quite a jump from the results from two years prior and was found to be more significant than the UK 2016-2017 data. This likely indicates the effectiveness of the national anti-migrant campaign of the Fidesz government in Hungary, indicating much stronger feelings against refugees in 2017 than in the spring of 2015.

In Hungary, results suggest that those on the far-right believe immigrants negatively impact the economy, whereas in the UK this was not found to be a significant factor. These factors will be kept in mind during the second phase of the research, looking to online

analysis to explore how the organisations recruit members and how they portray their group identity.

CHAPTER 4: ONLINE ANALYSIS

Several questions were explored in this research; most importantly, the main purpose of this analysis was to determine what draws people into radical right organisations, and particularly how the use of the internet encourages individuals to join such movements. Of the two groups analysed in this study, the English Defence League (EDL) is much more active online than Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM) and presents a more sophisticated online profile. Indeed, EDL members are often more active online than they are on the streets (Bartlett & Littler, 2011). While MÖM has a Facebook page that is updated regularly, as well as an Instagram page, website, and some videos on their YouTube 'news' channel, the EDL has a professional website, Facebook page (until April 2019), Instagram page, Gab feed (after the suspension of their Twitter account), discussion forum, Tumblr, and YouTube channel. The EDL's Gab feed, forum, and Tumblr were not covered in this analysis as they had no counterpart for MÖM.

The initial research for this chapter was conducted using the official websites, Facebook pages, Instagram pages, and YouTube channels of the EDL and MÖM. Radical right groups are particularly active online; most organisations have their own websites and are active on social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Gab. The personal webpages of these groups tend to be outdated, though some are regularly updated. Although the Facebook page of each organisation had several thousand followers each when conducting the initial research for this project, it has recently[8] become increasingly difficult to carry out research of some radical right organisations using Facebook, as Facebook has been attempting to inhibit and deter these groups by deleting the pages of such movements and organisations. Following the Unite the Right rally in the United States

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[8] It is worth noting that these issues arose after the start of this project, which began in late 2015. Hence, these issues were not factored into the initial plan of the research.

in the summer of 2017, the company stated that they would commit to removing and banning those pages which violate their hate speech policy (Umoh, 2017): "content that attacks people based on their actual or perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender or gender identity, sexual orientation, disability or disease is not allowed" (Facebook, 2018: online). Although this only removes a fraction of this type of group from their platform (Heilweil, 2017), it meant that after the summer of 2017 the official Facebook page of the EDL was taken down, though a new page emerged with a few thousand followers. The pages of the separate EDL chapters did not seem to be affected by this removal. The EDL's new national Facebooks page and MÖM's original Facebook page were quite active until spring of 2019, and both groups also had regularly updated websites in this time.

In April 2019, however, the UK proposed new regulations on the online space, legally requiring social media companies to protect users from hate speech (Doffman, 2019). Because of this, Facebook permanently banned the most significant radical right organisations in the UK from their platform, including the EDL, Britain First, the BNP, and the National Front, as well as some prominent radical right figures in the UK (Doffman, 2019; Griffin, 2019; Hern, 2019). The EDL's official Facebook page, along with local chapter pages, were removed from the platform; the organisation is now unable to create replacement pages and their name does not appear in searches. Additionally, the EDL's Instagram account had also seemingly been removed in spring of 2019, as they no longer appear in any Instagram search results.

This chapter is structured into three sections. The first section will outline the methodologies used in conducting online analysis of websites, social media, and YouTube, including ethical considerations of such research throughout. The second section will present the results, which will be given separately for each group and for each online

platform. This will be followed by section three, the discussion and comparison of the findings. First, however, a brief review of some relevant research on the radical right's use of the online space will be provided.

The Radical Right Online

The radical right has made use of the online space since the early development of the internet (Burris, Smith, & Strahm, 2000; Perry, 2000; Berlet, 2001), using the online space for radicalisation, recruitment, message dissemination, community-building, general activism, merchandising, and financing. Radical right organisations have recently been so successful in their strategic use of the online space that, in specific instances, they have even influenced elections in some European countries, such as Italy and Sweden (Colliver, Pomerantsev, Applebaum, & Birdwell, 2018; Ebner & Davey, 2018). While indeed much of the scholarship examining radicalisation online has focused on Islamic extremism (for example, Conway & McInerney, 2008; Silber & Bhatt, 2017; Yasin, 2017), there is a growing body of work focused on online radicalisation into right-wing extremism (for example, Berlet, 2001; Koehler, 2014; Fielitz & Thurston, 2019).

In problem-focused interviews with eight ex-radical right members in Germany, Koehler (2014) found that the use of the online space by activist organisations allows for a few key factors. First, the internet is cheap and efficient for communication, allowing for more communication, organisation, and integration of potentially geographically disparate members. Second, the online space allows for more of an ideological development and progression as an infinite amount of people can be involved in a given theoretical discussion; this also allows organisations to better monitor the attitudes of their members. Third, the online space is not constrained and allows for anonymity; people tend to speak and act more radically online than they do offline (Dobratz, 2001; Koehler, 2014). Finally,

Koehler (2014) also found that the online space offers the organisations the chance to directly reflect the effect of their propaganda and to adapt to the demands of their target group.

As suggested by van der Waak and Wagenaar (2010), the internet cannot be regarded as a causal factor in radicalisation but rather strengthen and accelerate the process; suggesting that those individuals engaging with radical organisations online have already been radicalised by external factors. While the analysis of the online sphere is now crucial in the study of radicalisation and radical right activism, it is crucial to keep in mind that individuals are likely to already be radicalised by the time they seek out these organisations online.

The online space also offers an opportunity to cover all possible factors of radicalisation, allowing organisations to attract membership, whether they are more personal factors such as frustration, loneliness, or a need for excitement; or external factors such as a shocking event; or group-related factors such as an attractive image of the organisation and ideological recognition (van der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). The online space allows for lower costs of communication and more effective idea dissemination (Perry, 2000; Van Laer, 2011; Koehler, 2014), and facilitates the building of an internal network within the organisation while simultaneously reaching out to those outside the organisation (Pfeiffer, Greven, & Grumke, 2006).

However, a danger of this so-called "e-activism" for activist organisations is that the online space creates 'users' rather than 'members' (Earl & Schussman, 2003). This identification as a 'user' rather than actual organisation-member suggests a lower level of support than traditional street-level activists (see textual interviews with EDL supporters, Chapter 5, for further discussion of this issue). This can also suggest lower levels of loyalty to the organisation; the more an organisation relies on online support, the more fragile the

organisation's membership becomes. Crucially, while is it easier for an individual to become a supporter through the Internet, it is just as easy for them to opt out of the organisations (Earl & Schussman, 2003).

More research is needed on strategies used for recruitment and support maintenance by radical right organisations themselves and on the use of "non-political online structures" such as Facebook (Koehler, 2014). Activist organisations, including radical right organisations, increasingly make use of the online space for recruitment, and indeed the online space serves as a gateway into a movement's beliefs, ideals, and culture (Bowman-Grieve, 2013). Among studies focused specifically on the radical right, few directly analyse recruitment strategies of specific organisations rather than general radicalisation processes. For example, Ray and Marsh II (2001) examined the attempted recruitment of children and adolescents by 'white extremist groups', finding that these online extremist organisations do not pose a large threat to children as they are not found in the mainstream of the online space and are not well-organised. Wong, Frank, and Allsup (2015) found that recruitment was one of the main reasons organisation members used white supremacist forums, along with information dissemination and networking. Others (Back, 2002) have emphasised the importance of the online space in recruitment, as online supporters are likely to become involved in online support activities and eventually become drawn further into the movement.

Finally, several authors (Wojcieszak, 2010; Tarrow, 2011; Adams & Roscigno, 2015; Simi & Futrell, 2015; Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 2018) have discussed the importance of the online space in solidarity building and identity formation. Indeed, Tarrow (2011) identified emotions and collective identities as two of the main frames, or 'powers in a movement', that encourage action in a movement. Others have also discussed the importance of the online space in building a sense of unity and collective identity around

perceived grievances (Wojcieszak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2015; Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 2018). Adams and Roscigno (2015), with a textual analysis of white supremacist websites, found that the online space helped to create collective identities among different organisations due to common attitudes and concerns.

As radical right messaging so easily permeates into the mainstream, it is becoming increasingly important to understand these organisations' use of the online space. Indeed, the internet has made radical right discourse more accessible to broader society (Brown, 2009); ideas are no longer just kept between organisation members but are on public platforms for anyone to see. This not only allows for the further dissemination of radical right ideology and messaging in an already-fragile socio-political context but allows organisations to recruit a larger base of supporters, although supporters may be less involved than in the past. Additionally, rhetoric once relegated to the radical right have been adopted by some governments in Europe and America (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), such as anti-immigration and anti-EU messages, further normalising these attitudes in certain areas. Because of this, it has become now, more than ever, crucial to analyse the ways in which the radical right use the online space, most specifically to spread their messages and recruit supporters of their organisations.

4.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Through the analysis of these websites and social media sites, two main questions were investigated. The first question is how these groups try to portray themselves to the public; for example, do they provide a narrative of power and aggression, or rather present as more politically-oriented and peaceful? How do they define their ideology: for instance, do they present a radicalised, nationalist, and nativist image, or do they confine themselves to anti-Muslim rhetoric? The internet offers a good venue for organisations to present their ideal image of themselves through carefully placed text and images. The second question investigated the methods which these groups use to attract and recruit new members and supporters. Are the organisations open to recruiting anyone in order to grow their numbers, or do they consider themselves to be more exclusive? What standards do they set for their potential members?

In order to address the first question of how these groups wish to portray themselves to the public, a document analysis of their public websites and social media pages was conducted. The focus of this analysis were keywords relating to ideology and self-description, as well as image analysis of their main website. This was done through text and image content analyses, and the thematic analysis of websites and social media pages. The second question of how groups attempt to recruit new members was explored through the examination of the organisations' public websites and social media pages to determine what they expect of new members and how new members can apply.

Most data was collected over several months in August and September of 2017.[9] Over this time, the websites, Facebook pages, and YouTube channels were examined for both the English Defence League and the Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM). Data

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[9] A second round of data collection was to be run in spring of 2019 but was impossible due to the EDL being removed and banned from using Facebook (see above).

from the organisations' Instagram pages was collected in February of 2018. Data was stored in separate labelled folders on a password-protected personal computer and external storage device.

4.1.1 Internet-Based Research

Internet-mediated research (IMR) has been used for more than twenty years for several types of qualitative and quantitative analyses. The first researchers to use the internet for research purposes in the 1990s used earlier technologies such as email and discussion groups (Hewson, 2014). The internet was primarily used by researchers to conduct interviews and focus groups, as well as for observational analysis. In the last fifteen years, much has changed with the development of *Web 2.0* (Hewson, 2014). The internet today is much more interactive, with users commenting and posting on blogs, websites, and social media. Additionally, with the ubiquitousness of mobile telephones and tablets, the internet is constantly accessible, and most users find a sense of attachment to its information and social media platforms (Hewson, 2014). This sense of attachment, combined with the ability for users to engage directly with others, has allowed the creation of virtual communities on the internet; it has generated a new way for individuals to interact with the world and form relationships.

The internet is a very effective and efficient way to disseminate information. Indeed, most information for social gatherings and events can be found online, either as a 'flier' on websites or as an advertisement on social media such as Facebook and Twitter. Social movements and political organisations, such radical right organisations, have caught on to this trend. Indeed, most have websites for their organisations, stating information like their goals, traditions, contact information, and events. Most groups are also present on social media such as Facebook and Twitter, either as an official page run by the group itself,

or as a 'fan' page run by a supporter. Importantly, social media websites and certain search engines (such as Google) allow for targeting of potential audiences or supporters. This can lead to virtual connections between internet users, and aids in growing a community, organisation, or social movement.

Hence, the internet provides a host of readily available and searchable content for analysis. This online space also offers a good venue for social movement organisations to present an ideal image of themselves through carefully placed text and images, in order to disseminate their ideology and recruit more members and supporters. While the internet can be used for interviews and focus groups, it can also be used for participant observation, non-participant observation, and data analysis. It is the last two types that will be the methodological focus here. The specific data sources used for this study will be outlined, followed by a discussion of non-participant observation (online observation) and data analysis (online document analysis).

4.1.2 Data Sources

Most organisations and movements have an online presence, and this is no different for radical movements and specifically radical right organisations. Recently, social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube have begun to shut down the accounts of certain types of organisations considered to be disseminating radicalised messaging. This means that certain pages, especially those belonging to some radical right organisations like the ones under study here, have been removed from Facebook, as well as Instagram and YouTube. Twitter has also begun briefly blocking and warning members who search for radical right movements, as personally experienced in this research.

This has complicated document analysis for this project, as fair comparisons will be more difficult to conduct. The EDL had a strong presence on Facebook, as evidenced

by the fact that on February 22, 2016 they had 287,492 'likes' (followers) on their page. In July of 2016, the EDL's Facebook page seemed to have been deleted, but their "automatically generated" page "based on what Facebook users are interested in" (Facebook notification) had 38,391 likes. Their Facebook page reappeared and was functional in the summer of 2017 when the initial research was conducted. It was then deleted again for violating Facebook's hate speech rules, but subsequently resurfaced. In February of 2018, the EDL's main Facebook page had nearly 2,000 supporters. They also had several other pages dedicated to geographic chapters, the biggest of which was the North East English Defence League with nearly 11,000 followers. In April of 2019, however, the EDL was permanently banned from Facebook (Doffman, 2019; Griffin, 2019; Hern, 2019), which means the organisation may no longer have any form of presence on the social media platform.[10]

The EDL also had a presence on Twitter, with nearly 6,000 followers and over 15,000 'tweets' between June of 2014 and the summer of 2017. In December of 2017 Twitter suspended the EDL's account (Roberts, 2017). They have since regrouped on Gab, a social media platform that claims to defend free speech. Besides their official webpage, the EDL also has their own forum and YouTube channel. Their YouTube channel had over 1,200 subscribers in the summer of 2017, with 30 videos dating from August 17, 2015 until October 7th, 2016. Older videos, from 2014 and earlier, can be found on 'Tommy old EDL channel Robinson'. The EDL also operates an Instagram account, which seems to have been created at the beginning of 2017 as their first photo was posted on January 25, 2017.

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[10] It was intended that a second round of research be conducted in spring of 2019, examining the responses of supporters of these pages. The EDL's Facebook page was removed, and permanently banned, just prior to this planned phase of research. There are lessons here about taking screenshots when researching social media pages and the urgency of this type of online analysis, which will be further covered in the limitations section in Chapter 6.

The account had 417 followers in February of 2018, and now seem to post about once every one or two weeks.

MÖM has a strong presence on Facebook. At the time this research was conducted, in August of 2017, their main page had around 2,800 supporters. By February of 2018, this number had grown to around 5,000 supporters, and in spring of 2019 to over 6,000. Many local chapters of the group also have Facebook pages, ranging from 90 supporters to around 2,000. A MÖM supporters page also exists, with around 5,500 followers. While other Hungarian radical right organisations have had their Facebook pages suspended, MÖM have seemingly avoided this by being vigilant about not posting material that constitutes 'hate speech', rather posting about events and their community endeavours.

MÖM is most active on Facebook, but they do have a personal website that is regularly updated with news of the group's activities. They also have a YouTube channel, which in August of 2017 had 35 subscribers, growing to 42 subscribers by February of 2018, and 56 in summer of 2019. All of the videos found on their YouTube account can also be found on their Facebook page, while there are several videos found on Facebook that are not cross-posted to YouTube. MÖM also has an Instagram account, created in late-2017. Their Instagram account had 279 followers in February of 2018 and seems to average about two to five posts per week. In summer of 2019 the organisation's Instagram account had grown slightly to 317 followers, but no posts were made since May 4th, 2018.

While both the EDL and MÖM have Facebook pages for the main group and for local chapters, only the main Facebook pages will be analysed for this research. The main pages are more likely to be maintained by the core leadership of the groups, hence better reflecting their core attitudes and recruitment philosophy. Also, not all local chapters maintain a Facebook page, making comparison of local chapter pages between the EDL and MÖM difficult.

Although there is not much data on the subject, it can be speculated that these websites and social media platforms are visited and 'followed' by group members, supporters, and sympathisers. Research conducted by Bartlett and Littler (2011) showed that 81 percent of supporters of the EDL's main Facebook page were male, and 19 per cent female (n = 38,200 in September 2011). Seventy-six per cent of the sample considered themselves to be members of the EDL, while 23 per cent did not. Fifty-two per cent of respondents to the study considered themselves to be involved in 'online activism', while 44 per cent attended local demonstrations. Importantly, 41 per cent of respondents stated opposition to Islam as their main reason for joining the EDL. The second most common reason, at 31 per cent, was related to English identity and preserving national values. No such data is available for MÖM.

Both the EDL and MÖM were quite active online, at least until the EDL was banned from Facebook in April of 2019. In Great Britain, Britain First is quite active in the online sphere, but portray themselves as more of a 'pro-British' political party with anti-Islamic views. The EDL is much more clearly a one-issue group, as will be seen below. In Hungary, other larger radical right organisations have an online presence, but none of these more central organisations, aside from MÖM, are currently active on Facebook or Instagram[11]. While many videos of these groups exist on YouTube, it is not clear whether they have explicit central YouTube channels.

4.1.3 Online Observation and Document Analysis

Online observation involves observing exchanges between people as available on the internet. These exchanges are often publicly available, but some social media platforms

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[11] Although, since October 2017 the 64 Counties Youth Movement have become quite active on Instagram. Their account no longer appeared on Instagram searches in spring of 2019.

do require membership before they can be seen. These exchanges are most often text-based, but most social networking sites also allow for multimedia exchanges involving pictures and video. Social media exchanges can also involve the use of 'memes': an image with humorous text, which is spread rapidly among users.

Online observation can be completed in 'real-time,' but can also be conducted by looking at 'logs' of events (Hewson, 2014). If the observation is covert, then there is likely no real advantage to real-time observation and document logs should be sufficient. Additionally, archived materials generally contain time stamps, as do comments found on blogs and social media. The only advantage that real-time observation can offer occurs when using sites like Facebook, as they archive posts after a certain amount of time. If a large number of posts are posted in short periods of time, they can be archived and are generally only available to the public for about 72 hours.

It is often difficult to distinguish online observation from document analysis, as even the most 'static' and seemingly unchanging online documents can be edited over time and have comments added to them. While online observation involves interaction between people, document analysis seeks to systematically analyse documents which can be either printed or electronic (Bowen, 2009). Online document analysis involves published documents such as on websites and personal homepages, blogs, new articles, and other forms of public media that have been created without a researcher's involvement (Bowen, 2009). Documents can be found by conducting a search on a public search engine, such as Google. Searches for content-specific information can also be conducted within a website or social media site, such as on Facebook or Twitter. As with all qualitative research, document analysis necessitates the interpretation of data in order to draw conclusions about its meanings and potential functions (Bowen, 2009). Indeed, document analysis is found in

mixed-methods studies, especially those combining both quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Bowen, 2009).

There are several advantages to conducting online document analysis. First, the information is readily available in a convenient format, saving time and resources for the researcher. Second, information is available regardless of geographical location, collapsing geographical boundaries (Hewson, 2014) and enabling special analysis and comparison. Third, an archive is kept of documents, so in certain cases chronological comparison may be possible. Finally, and most controversially, when using documents in the public domain disclosure is not necessary, thus simplifying the research process.

One major ethical question that arises when considering online observation is whether disclosure is necessary to website owners and social network participants (For example: Bowker & Tuffin, 2004; Eynon, Fry, & Schroeder, 2012; Taylor 1999; Zimmer, 2010). It can be argued that in the case of participant observation, which involves interaction with those individuals being observed, disclosure and consent would be necessary to conduct research. This is the same if the researcher must become a member of a private community in order to observe private information, then their motives should be disclosed and permission granted by the website moderator. However, in the case of radical right social movement websites, the information is disseminated to the public with the intention of reaching as many people as possible and assisting in the recruitment of new participants and members. This public availability negates the need for disclosure and permissions when conducting non-participant observations as "in cases where potential data can be considered to be 'in the public domain,' undisclosed observation is ethically justified and acceptable" (Hewson, 2014: 440). However, there is a difference between simply accessing online materials and analysing them (including the publication of that information). For this reason, questions of ethics do arise even in online document analysis.

However, there is currently no "accepted set of standards for ethics in online observational research" (Hewson, 2014: 442). The main question is that of researcher disclosure: if one is merely observing publicly-available information on the internet with the intent of analysis, is there a duty to disclose that to the author and obtain informed consent, at least in a situation where the post is not anonymous or archived.

However, several projects have used information considered in the public domain without disclosure (Brady & Guerin, 2010; Bordia, 1996; Denzin, 1999). Of course, whenever possible the anonymity and confidentiality of contributors must be maintained (Hewson, 2014), although this may not be appropriate when considering websites with obvious institutional authors (for example, an organisation or movement's personal website). Any mention of comments made by individuals on social media should be kept anonymous.

In this project, online observation was conducted on the main websites of the EDL and MÖM. Analysis was also conducted of the organisations' Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube sites; this will be further discussed below. For this analysis, the organisations and site moderators were not contacted to disclose my research, as observational analysis was being conducted of publicly available material. I did, however, ensure to anonymise any information about supporters of the pages and have kept confidential any identifying information.

The focus of the website analysis was to find themes in the use of colour, symbolism, and rhetoric. Websites were analysed in detail, with screenshots taken regularly. Articles (EDL) and regularly updated news posts (MÖM) were also analysed. Analysis was conducted in the framework of two research questions. Firstly, how do these groups attempt to portray themselves to the public, in terms of image and ideology.

Secondly, how these groups attempt to recruit new members was also investigated, including any guidelines they set for new members.

4.1.4 Data Collection and Analysis

Analysis was conducted to explore two research questions. Firstly, how these organisations attempt to portray themselves to the public, in terms of image and ideology. Secondly, how these organisations attempt to recruit new members and supporters, including any guidelines they set for new members. Websites were analysed for text and image content, including symbolism such as the use of colour and historical symbolism, and rhetoric. Facebook posts, Instagram posts, and YouTube videos were coded for content.

Content analysis was conducted on the official Facebook pages, Instagram accounts, and YouTube channels of the EDL and MÖM. The Facebook pages of both the English Defence League and the Hungarian Defence Movement were studied over a two-week period, from 10th August 2017 until 23rd August 2017. Every post made by the page moderators from this two-week period was recorded, ensuring a systematic approach and limiting selection bias. Several screenshots were taken of certain posts that were randomly selected, and each post was given a code to represent the main topic of the post. These codes were then analysed to find main themes on the organisation's Facebook page.

Similarly, the official Instagram accounts of both the EDL and MÖM were analysed. Instagram posts were analysed in February of 2018, as MÖM's Instagram account did not exist in the summer of 2017. The last twelve posts of each group were coded, with posts receiving only one code each. Two screenshots were taken from each group, ensuring no faces of members were visible and hiding all personal information. A number of posts were chosen over a given time-period as the groups post at much different frequencies, and the EDL's Instagram page came into existence earlier than MÖM's.

Hashtags were also recorded from each post. These codes and hashtags were then analysed to find main themes.

All videos from both the EDL and MÖM's YouTube channels posted before February 2018 were examined and coded for content. Videos were often given more than one code each, as many were longer speeches and covered various topics. Videos were only used if they were posted by the group on their official channel. This research seeks to analyse how the groups portray themselves to the public; hence it was important to only use those videos which were approved and uploaded by the group officially.

The following section will review the findings of the online observational analysis. Results will be reviewed by data source, beginning with the organisations' official websites, followed by their Facebook pages, Instagram accounts, and YouTube channels. Findings are discussed separately for each organisation by data source, followed by a discussion and comparison between the British and Hungarian findings for each data source.

4.2 WEBSITES

The main focus of the content analysis of these websites was the organisations' use of symbols. Symbols are "objects, acts, concepts, or linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for a multiplicity of disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and emotions and impel men to action" (Cohen, 1974: ix). In the present analysis, the majority of symbolism that will be discussed is in the form of images, as people generally respond more strongly to images than to text (Bogerts & Fielitz, 2019). Virtually anything can serve as a symbol, given that a symbol represents something broader or unlike itself (Alvesson, 1991). Symbols aid in communication (Firth, 1973); some are objective and always identified in the same way by different people, while others evoke emotion associated with a situation (Edelman, 1985).

4.2.1 The English Defence League

On visiting the EDL's official website, a repeating pattern of the EDL logo appears, with a scrolling main page in the centre. The banner at the top of the page shows various flags present at a protest, including the slogans 'no surrender' and 'no more mosques' written on English flags (Figure 4.1). Underneath the banner are found page headings, beneath which is a box of rotating news stories. To the right is a prominent PayPal Donations box.

Figure 4.1: The EDL website's homepage in August 2017.

Symbolism and Identity

The most prominent imagery seen on their website are red crosses on white backgrounds. This is seen in the use of the flag of England, the Saint George's Cross, in their website banner and on many EDL posters and protest signs. Also seen on their website, and in their logo, is a red cross fleury which can be interpreted in terms of a Crusader motif; indeed, this Crusader motif (especially those of the Knight's Templar) among the radical right is not unique to the EDL (Koch, 2017). Several 'Defense Leagues' (including in Norway and Spain) use the cross of St. George as well as the old crusader slogan "In Hoc Signo Vinces" (*in this sign conquer*, or under this sign we conquer) (Koch, 2017), as do the EDL.

The EDL's webpage and logo are both dominated by a colour theme of black, red, and white. Presumably these colours were carefully chosen to continue the Crusader imagery, particularly as the logo is divided between a black and white background (see Figure 4.1). This is strikingly close to the war flag of the Knight's Templar, known as a Baucent, shown by thirteenth century sources as a flag with a white upper half and a black

lower half (Hourihane, 2012) with a red cross in the centre. The Baucent was said to hold a lot of power: while it was flying, Crusaders were not permitted to retreat.

There are several advantages and functions of using such strong symbolism; symbols can give an organisation a seemingly larger meaning or purpose, ultimately drawing in individuals and evoking "powerful emotions of identification with a group" and can "be used as rallying points for group action" (Firth, 1973: 77). Additionally, symbols can promote identification with a group in several ways, as the symbol can serve as a representation of the group and strengthen emotional ties between an individual and an organisation. The symbol aids in ingroup identification, hence encouraging individuals to distinguish their group from another in an effort to boost self-esteem (Schatz & Lavine, 2007). Symbols strengthen ties within a group as they, in themselves, communicate 'groupness' (Schatz & Lavine, 2007).

There is significant symbolism in the use of the cross and flag of the Knights Templar as the Crusades were a series of Christian religious pilgrimages and wars striving to take control of the Holy land from Muslim rule.[12] This has a significant anti-Islam message, hence it's extensive use by the counter-Jihad movement. This symbolism emphasises the movement identity of the EDL as protectors of a Christian Europe, or in this case Britain, against a Muslim threat; this presents the idea of 'reclaiming' land from Muslims, presumably here meaning to reclaim Britain from Muslims who have invaded. Additionally, the Knights Templar were the main fighting unit of the Crusades, suggestion the symbolism was carefully chosen to represent the EDL as those at the centre of the fight against the threat of Islam.

Others have interpreted the black and white background of the EDL logo quite differently. According to Richards (2017), the emblem of the EDL, the Crusader-style

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[12] The irony of the selection of religious symbolism is not lost, as the Crusades ultimately failed.

cross, is often displayed on a black and white background to "stress the importance of 'black and white in harmony'" (Richards, 2017: 101). This is to stress the 'welcoming' nature of the group to other minorities: black people, Jewish people, and members of the LGBTQ community. The existence of an LGBTQ faction of the EDL is noteworthy, as Islamic radicals are often portrayed as being homophobic (Richards, 2017). These types of interpretations show how the EDL could be trying to move away from a typically radical right image; however, their Crusader symbolism is undeniable. These two messages are disconnected, as the Crusaders were about spreading their Western Christian culture and not about accepting others as they were.

Movement Identity and Anti-Islam Discourse

The slogans mentioned above, combined with the colour choices and crusader symbolism, give a clear message that the identity of the organisation is based in the counter-Jihad movement and clearly Islamophobic. This imagery firmly defines them as a single-issue organisation, which could be a strategic move to avoid any accusations of racism, anti-Semitism, or homophobia, for example.

The EDL's main webpage has several overarching themes. The first, and most obvious, is the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim nature of the group. They indeed have an 'Islam' heading on their website (notably the only religion highlighted in this way), which contains several articles about Islam such as 'Lying in Islam', 'Islam and Homosexuality', and a constantly-updated list of all 'Muslim grooming gangs and rape jihad convictions'. This anti-Islam nature is also clear in the crusader symbolism, with the use of the red and white colours, cross of the Knight's Templar, the baucent flag, and crusader's slogan. Crucially, this symbolism is not only about the threat of Islam itself, but about the threat it poses on Englishness or Britishness (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of these terms). The British way

of life is threatened and must be protected; indeed, many EDL supporters cite protecting Britain as an important element of their support for the organisation (see Chapter 5). The use of the war banner itself is a powerful image, calling supporters to action.

Further pushing their image of acceptance, the first thing appearing in the 'About Us' section is a quote by Albert Einstein, who is quoted as being a "refugee from Nazi Germany" (EDL, 2017): "The world is a dangerous place to live in; not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don't do anything about it." This is significant both in the representation of a well-known person of Jewish descent and also in that the quote states that there are dangerous people in the world, and something must be done about them; in this case, presumably alluding to Muslims. Following this is the EDL's Mission Statement, in which they state several points including "The English Defence League stands for human rights," including standing "for the right of British Muslims to speak freely about problems deriving from Islam," and that they educate the public about Islam, "lead and inspire the struggle against global Islamification," stand for British tradition, and stand for democracy and the rule of law (EDL, 2017). Again, there is a clear attempt to portray themselves as non-racist, and crucially as non anti-Muslim. Supporters of the EDL have often stated that they are indeed not anti-Muslim, but anti-Islam (see Chapter 5). Also, significant here is the use of the term 'British' rather than 'English'. This shows that there is not a clear consensus on the discrepancy between the terms: an organisation that has 'English' in their name claims to stand for the rights of British people and traditions, not English. It is clear, then, that the terms English and British are often muddled, showing that people in England often define 'Britishness' as English, excluding the traditions of Scotland and Wales (see Chapter 1 for further discussion).

Under 'EDL says' is the statement: "A national anti-sharia strategy to reduce the Islamist threat." As no one in the UK has yet put "forward a coherent, detailed program"

against this 'threat', they suggest a new 'UK Anti-Sharia Strategy'. This strategy includes having open discussion about issues, holding on 'to that which is good', making Britain impervious to Sharia, and making the UK unattractive to Islamists (here, then, conflating the terms 'UK' and 'Britain', as well as seemingly conflating the terms 'English' and 'British' as mentioned above). In order to do this, they advocate a long list of items including banning the wearing of burkas and niqabs in public, ceasing state aid for Islamic faith schools, ending public demonstrations that promote Islam, banning all mosque construction and expansion, freeing employers from any obligation to pay employees for prayer time, and allowing the criticism, parody, and ridicule of Islam. This is clearly contrary to many claims of supporters being anti-Islam, not anti-Muslim, as it would ban the traditions of Muslims people and allow open hate speech against them. These terms also show their desire to protect Britain and the 'war' they are taking against Islam, further supporting the idea that the Crusader symbolism was carefully chosen or the representation of the organisation.

Promoting Activism

The second overarching theme of the EDL's official website recruitment and the promotion of action, in the advertising of upcoming demonstration; here, most of the emphasis is on the legal nature of the group and demonstrations. Under the heading 'media' is found information on demonstrations since May 2016, including announcements and media briefings. The media briefings outline what they are demonstrating against, and why they are demonstrating in a specific city. There is undoubtedly an emphasis on Islam in these briefings, with protests being held against sex grooming gangs and terrorism. These briefings are carefully laid out and seem to serve to try to convince the authorities and media that what they are doing is justified and right. It seems as though they are saying

they are not racist, and indeed in March of 2017 the EDL held a demonstration in South Shields against "Muslim racism."

From their website, it becomes quite obvious that the EDL is a single-issue organisation. Their main goal is to rid Britain of Islam, at any cost, and to protect Britain from its 'threat'. Their 'Join Us' button takes the user to a list of local chapters, meaning that a supporter can join locally but not the organisation 'as a whole', so to speak. Other than the 'donate' box and this 'Join Us' button, there is not much emphasis on recruitment. The website functions to promote their anti-Islamic ideology, rather than to directly recruit new participants. The EDL has never had a distinct membership list or membership status, so this website can serve to disseminate their ideology and recruit supporters. For the EDL, as with many radical right organisations, social media is what serves as a recruiting tool over their website.

Summary

An analysis of the EDL's official webpage and symbolism gives a clear idea of the image and identity the organisation wishes to promote. Their use of Crusader symbolism is a clear statement against Islam; additionally, the use of the baucent in their logo, the fighting banner of the Knight's Templar, demonstrates that the organisation wishes to promote an image of an active fight against Islam. This, then, carries through to the idea of protecting Britain from this external threat. These ideas will be further discussed in Chapter 5 in the analysis of textual interviews of EDL supporters. There, however, it will become clear that these images and identity are promoted by the organisation, but are not held by all supporters of the organisation; concerns of EDL supporters indeed extend past simply the fear of Islam.

4.2.2 The Hungarian Defence Movement

The first thing that strikes a visitor to the Hungarian Defence Movement's website is the use of red, white, and green, which are the colours of the Hungarian flag. The main page of the website is also the news page, which is updated regularly. The top of the page hosts a banner: an image of the Carpathian Mountains with the red, white, and green 'Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom' overtop (see Figure 4.2); the colours of course representing the modern Hungarian flag.

On the left of the page is a petition for "Amnesty for Budaházy"; an image of György Budaházy's face with the words "Freedom for Budaházy" and "Support jailed political prisoners!" In August of 2016, György Budaházy and 16 other members of his organisation The Arrows of the Hungarians (Magyarok Nyilai) were sentenced for acts of terrorism, which were conducted between 2007 and 2009 (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Budaházy was sentenced to 13 years in prison, which is highly disputed among the Hungarian radical right. In 2017 MÖM was gathering signatures for a petition to free Budaházy, seen on the left of Figure 4.2 as hands breaking free of their binds and the words "You should also sign!"

Figure 4.2: Homepage of MÖM's website in August 2017.

Symbolism and Identity

It is crucial to consider history when exploring symbolism, especially symbolism used by radical right organisations, as these historical images can reference a golden age of heroism and root groups and nations in a mythological past (Elgenius, 2011). The most significant 'golden age' in Hungarian nationalist rhetoric and symbolism is the Conquering Period (895-1000 C.E.), when the Magyars migrated from the East and had not yet mixed with their new Slavic neighbours or adopted Christianity.[13] The sides of the website's banner feature the organisation's logo of a red-and-white striped shield with a black *turul* bird, the mythical bird of the Magyars. The use of the black mythical turul bird says volumes about their ideology; this symbolism is widely used by radical right organisations to tie themselves to the ancient Hungarians and show a 'tradition-keeping' image. Also important here is the shield shape used in their logo; the shield with the red and white stripes is common in medieval imagery and likely serves purpose of harkening back to the Middle Ages when Hungarians were skilled warriors, likely demonstrating a willingness to fight and protect the nation.

Moreover, the Árpád flag used as the base of the shield is a crucial element of their symbolism, consisting of alternating red and white horizontal stripes, originally the flag of the Magyar tribes and of the first Hungarian Dynasty. Originally revived by the Arrow Cross Movement at the very end of the1930s, the flag was banned by the Soviets just over a decade later. After the end of Soviet rule in Hungary, however, the flag has seen a rebirth in the Hungarian radical right movement; the flag is a well-known and recognised symbol of the radical right. While they claim to simply be a volunteer organisation, their messaging certainly says otherwise.

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[13] Again, the irony of this is not lost, as Hungarian radical right organisations hold Christianity as a core value.

Recruitment and Promoting Activism

Besides the main page, the site has six other pages: contact, videos, about the movement, forum, financial support, and news. The financial support button was added most recently and includes bank account information so that people can donate to their "patriotic values of social engagement and assistance to those in need." They encourage people to either "stand among us or support our goals." The forum button still says "coming soon," and the videos button leads to three fairly outdated videos about the organisation.

These videos were uploaded in October 2016, March 2017, and August 2017; the first two are unavailable as they are blocked on copyright grounds. The last video is about the organisation's annual summer camp in 2017, the Hungarian Defence Days, which is an annual gathering of radical right organisations, including the Outlaw Army among others. The video shows pictures of this 'self-defence' camp, including many images of families and children, set to the radical right rock group *Romantikus Erőszak*'s (Romantic Violence) song *100% Magyar*.[14]

The 'about the movement' section, however, does make it clear that MÖM is not just simply a volunteer organisation without ulterior motives. Presumably, the purpose of this section of the website is to encourage individuals to support the organisation; not just any person, however, but those that share the same values. The organisation also veils many of its attitudes and much of its ideology. They state that they fight against social injustice and protect Hungarian national values; they are a national network of which the most important value is reciprocity, based on self-defence and the creation of local groups. A key duty of the organisation is to provide social assistance for its members, family

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[14] By 2019, two of the three videos containing music were no longer available due to being blocked on copyright grounds; only the video with the song '100% Magyar' was not blocked.

members, and fellow human beings. The main objectives of the organisation are to develop the physical, defence, law-enforcement, and community-building skills of its members, as well as to strengthen the 'ancient warrior spirit' that stands up for the Hungarians. MÖM's main goal is to contribute to the quick rise of the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin, so that Hungary can take its 'rightful place' among the world's nations for its 'glorious' history, traditions, and current values. Finally, they mention that it is the responsibility of the current generation to ensure the development of the country's destiny.

The News portion of the website was last updated on July 23, 2017. Much of the news on the website pertains to marches and demonstrations in areas with large Roma populations. The language used is extremely veiled, which provides a distinct contrast to the EDL's website. MÖM do not refer, or at least rarely refer, directly to Roma in their articles. Similarly to the EDL, MÖM portray themselves as law-abiding and a group that helps the Hungarian community. Most of their news and posts show them doing 'community service' and helping poor (white) Hungarians in need. Many news articles include community service that the group has done, such as collecting charity for an animal shelter, giving gifts of plush toys and scarves to a kindergarten in the Hungarian countryside, and collecting blood donations for one of their ill supporters. It seems that, not unlike the EDL, MÖM see themselves as the protectors of the Hungarian people. This is visible through their charity work and, most especially, through articles about their patrols of areas with high Roma populations. Many other news articles are about new MÖM chapters forming around Hungary, which seem to have increased in the summer of 2017.

Compared to the EDL, MÖM place quite a bit more emphasis on recruitment, particularly on recruiting the 'right' type of supporters. This is due to the fact that both organisations have quite different levels of membership. For MÖM, they have well-defined membership criteria: individuals can first join as supporters until they are asked to join as

full members, in which case they are tested and eventually fully accepted into the organisation (see Chapter 5). Perhaps it is because of this that they so clearly define the way they would like their organisation portrayed, as a volunteer organisation that helps the Hungarian people. Their radical right imagery and attitudes are undeniable, however; anyone wishing to join the organisation would likely sympathise with these attitudes first and wish to help, and protect, their fellow Hungarians second.

Summary

The Hungarian Defence Movement's website gives insight into the identity of the movement, particularly through symbolism and through how they portray themselves to the public. MÖM use their website to display a finely crafted image of the organisation, painting themselves as non-racist and not extremist. They use clear symbolism representing the identity and attitudes of the movement, including historical symbols common to the radical right; while they are adamant about their position as a volunteer organisation looking for others who wish to help their fellow Hungarians, this symbolism clearly defines the organisation's ideology. The website places quite an emphasis on recruitment; it is clear that they seek a certain type of member, the true nature of which is cleverly veiled throughout.

4.2.3 Discussion

The most prominent theme seen on both websites is the historical symbolism used by both organisations; for the EDL the symbolism of the crusaders and Knights Templar, and for MÖM the symbolism of the Conquering Period Magyars and early Hungarians. National symbols, even historical in nature, can have great political power and evoke emotional expression of national identification, allegiance, and self-sacrifice (Schatz &

Lavine, 2007); they can induce "patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations" (Edelman, 1985: 6). National symbolism often makes claims to a specific history and sovereignty, and stress the distinctive nature of the nation (Elgenius, 2011); it places emphasis on a nation's historical past that can then be glorified, romanticised, and mythologised (Schatz & Lavine, 2007).

National symbols allow radical right organisations to project their image to their own group members as well as to others outside the organisation, giving their ideology a shape and form (Breuilly, 1993). There is quite a range and variation of symbolic items used by the radical right, but they do tend to mimic those seen in a national context. Most common is a flag, whether contemporary or historical, but it can also be any other item, piece of clothing or general appearance, slogans, chants, and even specific numbers.[15] It is important to consider that "a symbol is under the direct authority of, or capable of being manipulated by, the person wishing to affect the behaviour of others" (Firth, 1973: 84). Particularly in a political context, symbols are selected and combined to provoke certain emotions and refer to specific ideas (Mach, 1993); in this case, these symbols provoke ideas of purity, nation, and of fighting for the homeland.

From the perspective of symbolism and movement identity shown on their official websites, both organisations are fairly similar in that they have both finely crafted an image of a non-extremist organisation, with a few key differences. First, the EDL's symbolism more clearly shows them as an organisation against something very specific, namely Islam, while MÖM's symbolism simply harkens back to a historical period of 'purity'. Secondly, MÖM's symbolism is heavily rooted in Hungarian nationalism and symbols of the nation,

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[15] For example, the number 14 representing the fourteen words of the white power slogan: "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children," or the number 18 representing the first and eight letters of the alphabet, or "Adolf Hitler."

while the EDL's symbolism is not. Both give a fairly clear image of what each organisations stands for; and undoubtedly root themselves in traditional imagery of the radical right.

The official websites of both organisations are on some basic level geared toward recruitment, but at the same time the websites do not seem to be well-maintained. MÖM is more focused on showing the organisation's activities, that they are a family-oriented organisation who primarily work to help their fellow Hungarians. At the same time, they make it evident what type of individual they seek: one that feels strongly about the nation and in protecting Hungarians against the threat of Roma. The EDL portray themselves as protectors of Britain and seek people to join them in their war against Islam; their recruitment is mostly focused on the advertisement of demonstrations around Britain. It is clear that, if anything, both organisations rely more heavily on social media for recruitment than their websites.

4.3 FACEBOOK

In August of 2017, both the EDL and MÖM had active Facebook pages which were regularly updated; both groups also had Facebook pages for local chapters. MÖM seemingly have Facebook pages for most of their local chapters, but these pages seem to mostly share posts from the main MÖM Facebook page. The EDL's local pages, on the other hand, were somewhat more independent of the main EDL Facebook page, generally sharing different material. Main pages were used for the purposes of this study, as these are more likely to be moderated by the central leadership of the groups and also for their ease of comparison. Each group has a different number of local chapters, with chapters not consistently active online, hence making a direct comparison quite difficult.

The Facebook pages of both organisations clearly have a different function than their official websites; the websites are a relatively static online presence (save when MÖM still regularly updated their 'news' section) while Facebook was updated regularly, indeed daily in the case of the EDL, and showed the current concerns and actions of the organisations. The main Facebook pages of the EDL and MOM were analysed from 10th August 2017 until 23rd August 2017.[16] All posts were recorded and coded, with each post receiving only one code.

4.3.1 English Defence League

The EDL's Facebook page had 77 posts in that two-week period, posting an average of five posts per day, and upwards of ten posts in one day. Table 4.1 shows the codes used and frequency. Only page moderators post to the EDL main Facebook page, so only those

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[16] A second round was analysis was due to be conducted in spring of 2019 incorporating post responses, but the EDL's Facebook page was permanently removed and the group banned from Facebook on 18th April 18 2019.

posts made directly by the EDL's page moderators were coded. Comments to posts were

not included in this analysis.

Table 4.1: Code descriptions and frequencies for posts on the English Defence League's
Facebook page, from 10th August 2017 until 23rd August 2017.

CODE	CODE DESCRIPTION	FREQUENCY	%
Migrant Criminality	Suggesting that migrants are criminals.	3	3.90
Sex Gangs	Anything relating to the ongoing investigation of Asian sex grooming gangs in the UK.	6	7.29
Muslims/Islam	News sources relating to Muslims, but not in an obviously negative way.	7	9.09
Anti-Muslim	Anything posted with purpose of inciting fear of or hatred toward Muslims.	16	20.78
Terrorism	Referring directly to terrorist acts (allegedly) conducted by Islamic groups and/or individuals.	10	12.99
ISIS	Referring directly to members of the Islamic State, or implying relationship of Muslims to the Islamic State.	4	5.19
Barcelona	Relating to the Barcelona terror attacks on August 17, 2017, generally with a focus on suspects.	10	12.99
Action	Generally, notices of upcoming demonstrations.	5	6.49
Politics	Related to UK politics.	4	5.19
Other	Anything from emotion-evoking posts to random news articles, articles related to Lee Rigby's death, complaints about Facebook taking down the United States Defence League page, and so on.	12	15.58
TOTAL		77	

What becomes quickly obvious about the EDL's Facebook page is the focus on anti-

Muslim posts, carrying on from the symbolism seen on their website. Posts are constantly

and regularly published throughout the day, most of which incite fear, anger, and hatred.

Many posts focus around 'Asian' grooming gangs and terrorist attacks, evoking fear and

anger in readers. Posts and news articles, which are often from questionable sources such as the *Daily Mail*, are specifically chosen to paint an image of the 'evil' and 'dangerous' Muslim; hence, serving to other Muslims and to show they are the enemy who they must take up arms against. This is done by seemingly selecting the most emotionally charged and negative articles possible about Muslims and migrants, and posting these at regular intervals. A follower of the EDL's page would see these constantly and would quickly develop much stronger anti-Muslim feelings, especially if they do not follow any pro-Muslim pages. Their strategy largely seems to be an often-repeated one, of re-blogging news stories and adding their own commentary (Jackson, 2011). This serves to legitimise their attitudes and ideologies to a wider public; anti-Muslim feelings and ideas are hence normalised to the page's followers, while at the same time inciting moral panic among supporters.

As seen in Table 4.1, the largest number of posts are 'anti-Muslim' in nature. These posts range in topic, from a focus on how Islamic culture supresses and disrespects women (for example, alleged death threats from Islamic men for bikini pictures, Islamic men wanting to see girls covered in the United Kingdom, and an Uber driver locking women in his car), to seemingly far-fetched and absurd articles such as one claiming that Muslims put faeces and tuberculosis in Starbucks coffee. Those posts coded in the study simply as 'Muslims/Islam' covered topics such as Muslims believing plucking eyebrows is a sin, an article about India's divorce laws, and an article describing Hamou Bachir, the Paris attack suspect (this was not coded under 'terrorism' as the article made no mention of him as a terrorist).

Other codes are relatively self-explanatory, as posts coded as 'ISIS,' 'Barcelona,' and 'sex gangs' were generally articles about their respective topic. Posts coded as 'Other' included a wide variety of topics, including a photo stating "Stay true to yourself, even if it

means standing alone." Posts coded as 'Action' were all posters about upcoming demos, an example of which is seen in Figure 4.3. This image is quite telling, for example, as it shows the image of Newcastle in two hands with the words "Help me" in the palms of the hands. This poster is meant to evoke the feeling of helping the people of Newcastle, perhaps saving them from some 'menace' through the supporter's attendance at this demonstration. "Help me" could symbolise the girls abused through grooming gangs in Newcastle; this is clear from the "Operation Sanctuary" in red letters, referring to the investigation into grooming gangs in Newcastle (Perraudin, 2018). This ties back to observations of the EDL's official website, and specifically to their symbolism and identity. The EDL see themselves as the protectors: those who attend the demonstration in Newcastle will presumably be doing something to help the city and fight against those that threaten their way of life, or in some way the demonstrators are aiding the fight against grooming gangs.

Figure 4.3: Posted to EDL's Facebook page on August 14, 2017.

The EDL's Facebook page, updated quite regularly, similarly to their website was almost wholly focused on anti-Muslim rhetoric; this rhetoric could be surrounding Muslims and Islam more generally, terrorism, or grooming gangs. Additionally, they did include

posts about other issues such as recruitment for their demonstrations, UK politics, and several other issues. This heavy focus on anti-Muslim rhetoric is quite interesting, as many of the EDL's Facebook followers are quite concerned with other issues such as immigration, politics, and Brexit (see interview analysis in Chapter 5).

4.3.2 The Hungarian Defence Movement

The Hungarian Defence Movement's Facebook page is far less active than the EDL's was, but posts are still regularly published. Although the group generally posts once or twice daily, two days of the two-week research period had no posts. On 23rd August, however, the group posted five times with posts relating to Budapest and the rising black population. It should be noted that Hungarian radical right organisations are not often openly vocal about ethnic groups other than the Roma in Hungary; the posts referred to one area of Budapest known to be generally unsafe and quite 'ethnic,' and related to either the drug use of these individuals or to the story of one supporter who was not served at an African restaurant. Table 4.2 shows codes used and frequency, with posts only coded once each. Only page moderators post to MÖM's main Facebook page, so only those posts made directly by MÖM's page moderators were coded. Comments to posts were not included in this analysis as the focus of this analysis was the perspective of the organisation.[17]

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[17] A second phase of research was to be conducted in Spring of 2019 to include the comments and views of supporters, but the EDL were permanently banned from Facebook in April of 2019.

Table 4.2: Code descriptions and frequencies for posts on the Hungarian Defence Movement's Facebook page, from 10th August 2017 until 23rd August 2017.

CODE	CODE DESCRIPTION	FREQUENCY	%
Recruitment	Posters attempting to recruit members, or encouraging members to form new chapters.	4	21.11
Event	In this case, a video of 'Hungarian Defence Days' 2017.	1	5.26
Recruitment Event	Event with the specific purpose of recruiting new members	1	5.26
Action	Description of action the group has taken, usually 'patrols', generally including photos.	5	26.32
Praise	Praise and thanks that the group received for one of their 'patrols'.	1	5.26
Anti-Black	Openly anti-black posts about the rising African population in Budapest.	2	10.53
Other	Includes news articles, a post about religion, and one about the (forced) cancellation of a planned far-right commemorative event.	5	26.32
TOTAL		19	

What is striking about the MÖM Facebook page is the lack of openly anti-Roma posts. It is well-known that the group is anti-Roma (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017), and they often hint at 'white Hungarians' being victimised by Roma. This anti-Roma sentiment is revealed, however, if one looks deeper into their posts and actions; for example, all "mood improving" patrols are conducted in areas of high Roma populations. They do not often make open anti-Roma comments, but have stated that they are going on patrol due to "norm-defying individuals" and posts have likened Roma to 'pigs' (MÖM, 2017). The only openly racist posts seen on their Facebook page were against the black population of Budapest, as mentioned earlier, which first appeared on any MÖM online sources on 23rd August 2017.

Figure 4.4: Example of a MÖM recruitment poster, posted on 11th August 2017
[Join us! Let's make our living space livable together!].

Much like their website, MÖM's Facebook page is largely focused on recruitment, either by showing their activities through posts and videos or by posting actual recruitment posters. On their social media they also portray themselves as a volunteer organisation seeking to help their neighbours, while also trying to maintain Hungarian tradition (especially seen through posts about their Hungarian Defence Days). Looking at their imagery and symbolism, in addition to their posts such as the ones about the black community of Budapest, there remains little doubt of the underlying attitudes of the organisation.

4.3.3 Discussion

The EDL and MÖM's Facebook pages, while different in their use, do present some similarities. Both organisations, similarly to the imagery seen on their official websites, present themselves as protectors of the nation: the EDL against a Muslim threat, and MÖM against the loss of national identity and against specific threats towards their fellow Hungarians. Both organisations also used images they often create for the purpose of

posting on Facebook. These images are often created to arouse emotions; for example, images referring to grooming gangs, to 'taking up the fight', or referring to 'we need you'. Indeed, it has been shown that images inciting emotion are more likely to be shared; not only, but those provoking anger are the most likely to be shared by followers (Berger & Milkman, 2013). Other studies have found that virality is most strongly associated with positive and emotional content, as well as content that induces anger (Heimbach & Hinz, 2016). MÖM did not seem to focus as much on the emotionally-driven and anger-inducing content, other than perhaps the music and images selected for their videos. The EDL, on the other hand, did post many images and articles aimed at inducing anger in their followers.

Several other differences can also be gleaned from studying the two Facebook pages. First, the EDL is significantly more concerned with international events than MÖM. MÖM had no mention of major international events, such as the Barcelona terrorist attacks of 2017, while these seemed of high importance to the EDL. This is likely due to the fact that the EDL is very centrally focused on their anti-Islamic stance; such terrorist attacks are covered extensively in the media and give much material for them to post. The EDL is mostly focused on removing Muslims from Great Britain, but uses any 'evidence' they can from anywhere in the world to speak out against Muslims. MÖM, on the other hand, is very much only focused on 'making Hungary better for Hungarians'. International events really have no place in their ideology, as they are so locally-focused.

The comparison of the two Facebook pages reveals a number of additional differences. The second, and most obvious, difference is the frequency with which the two groups post updates. The EDL had vastly more posts in this two-week period, with 77 to MÖM's 19. This could be strategic on the part of the EDL, or it could be because they have more people managing the Facebook page. Both organisations use Facebook for the

dissemination of their messaging and for recruitment to upcoming events. The EDL used a distinctive strategy to constantly bombard followers with their messaging on their newsfeeds; the more exposed followers are to the messages, the more the message can get through. MÖM did not use this strategy; rather, they rely on updates about their activities and recruitment posters. Clear from examining both their website and Facebook page, MÖM is looking to recruit a very specific type of supporter, and eventual member. Because of this, they do not need to bombard their followers with posts about their ideology and attitudes; not only that, but MÖM attempts to veil their attitudes in their online presence. The EDL, on the other hand, are seeking numbers; as they do not have a specific membership list, they may look to spread their message and recruit followers regardless of their level of support.

Third, the focus of the two groups is considerably different. As evidenced from their online presence, the EDL's sole purpose is to be anti-Muslim in its promotion of the hatred and fear of Muslims. MÖM, for the most part, use their Facebook page to show the 'good' deeds that they do while protecting white Hungarians from the 'Roma threat.' MÖM is not openly racist on their Facebook page, with the exception of a post on the last day of analysis; even then, this was not targeted at Roma, but at the black community. Fourth, MÖM uses their page for recruitment more than the EDL, as MÖM had posts with the specific purpose of recruiting members.

Finally, the EDL had very little about specific group members and no word from their leader. MÖM, on the other hand, has many photographs on their Facebook page, clearly showing their members, and generally show posts from the group's leader. This shows a distinctive difference in the structure and organisation of both organisations. The EDL is more loosely organised and likely does not have a membership list or specific membership criteria. MÖM, however, seem to specially select their membership, keep track

of their membership, and even have a process for becoming a member. This is also why MÖM's Facebook page gives the feeling of an organisation being promoted, with not just demonstrations but recruitment events advertised. The EDL's Facebook page gave the feeling that they were spreading a message, an ideology, and that people were encouraged to come support a 'cause' at specific demonstrations.

4.4 INSTAGRAM

Instagram is a popular application with youth, as teenagers now favour it over Facebook, according to data and research firm eMarketer (2017). Radical right organisations have seemingly caught on, and now have Instagram accounts of their own. Instagram is a photo and video sharing application allowing little room for lengthy text; given that Instagram has a far younger demographic than Facebook (Smith & Anderson, 2018), it is largely less popular with the organisations analysed herein, who have older demographics. The official Instagram accounts of the Hungarian Defence Movement and English Defence League were analysed, looking at the most recent twelve posts from each account. The last twelve posts were analysed rather than using a date range, as MÖM and the EDL post at much different frequencies, with MÖM posting one to six posts per week, and the EDL only posting about one every week or second week.

4.4.1 English Defence League

The last twelve posts from the time of data extraction (February 2018) included two coded as 'Event/demonstration', two coded as 'Terrorism' (including ISIS), three coded as 'Anti-Islam', two coded as 'sex gangs', and three coded as 'Other'. The images from their demonstrations showed photographs of two EDL supporters, both heavily built bald men. The interesting thing about Instagram is its use of 'hashtags' to sort posts into themes and topics. Hashtags included here were '#edl, #patriot, #pride, #rightwing, #nosurrender, with one warning against #reversecolonization. Posts coded as 'Terrorism' included a warning that "ISIS will be here soon," and hashtags such as #allah, #isis, #jihadists, and #terror. Like many of the EDL's Facebook posts, these images are likely carefully selected to elicit fear and anger from their followers; in the case of Instagram, however, these hashtags are used to further drive their message. Those posts coded as 'Anti-Islam' included a

photograph of Muslims praying in the streets, with the hashtags #disgusting and #islamicinvasion (Figure 4.5), and a photograph of two Muslim women walking in a street with a mosque in the background (Figure 4.6), with the hashtags #refugeesnotwelcome and #londonistan. Both of these images were carefully selected to seem as though Britain is being overrun by Muslims and, crucially, that the government (in this case represented by a police officer in Figure 4.5) is protecting and embracing Muslim culture.

Figure 4.5: Image of Muslims praying, from the official EDL Instagram account.

Figure 4.6: Image from the official EDL Instagram account.

The 'Other' code, which included three images, included posts against liberals and the United States, as well as President Trump, and about Britain First. Largely, these posts

reflected the same imagery and identity as seen on the EDL's Facebook page and official website. The difference here was that there was quite obviously less of an emphasis on the Crusader imagery, on the call to action that was seen on the other two platforms. Here, rather, it seemed images were carefully selected to insight fear, anger, and disgust in their followers.

4.4.2 The Hungarian Defence Movement

MÖM's Instagram account is obviously much more recruitment-focused than that of the EDL. Of their twelve posts, two were coded as 'recruitment event', two as 'recruitment', one as 'event', two as 'action', two as 'help', two as 'other', and one as 'donate'. MÖM is far less creative with their hashtags than the EDL, as posts all had the same hashtags: #Magyaronvedelem (Hungarian defence), #MOM, #Hungary, and #MagyarÖnvédelmiMozgalom. Some posts also included the hashtags #EU, #Csatlakozz (join), and #join. MÖM's Instagram account was far less focused on inciting fear and anger than the EDL's was, also reflecting results of the analysis of Facebook posts.

It seems that in the six weeks period of this analysis there was a recruitment drive for the town of Győr, as most 'recruitment' and 'recruitment event' posts were centred around that town. One post stated that the local chapter would have three main activities: building a local defence unit, charitable volunteer work, and providing legal representation and the protection for victims. They were looking for men aged 18 and over, while those aged 14-18 could join the youth league. Again, while veiled, the reference to building a local defence unit is striking; there was no specification as to who the defence unit would protect against, or as to who, or what, terrorised the victims who would be protected. This does, however, closely align with much of the symbolism and identity evident in the previous two analyses, of MÖM as protectors of the Hungarians.

Posts coded as 'Action' included a photo of four individuals (three men and one woman) dressed in black with black boots, who had performed a patrol of Budapest's 17th district, as well as a poster for a charitable clothing and food distribution drive to be held in Budapest's 14th district (Figure 4.7). Posts coded as 'help' included a story of a man looking for help from the group, who often felt threatened by the 'ethnic' population of his neighbourhood, and another post asking for blood donations for a group member.

Figure 4.7: Poster advertising a clothing and food drive in the 14th district of Budapest, from MÖM's official Instagram page

MÖM's Instagram largely reflected the themes seen in the previous two analyses. The organisation mostly represents itself as protectors and as people who strive to help their nation, particularly the impoverished and those who are victims of some unnamed threat. MÖM's Instagram profile almost solely focused on recruitment and in presenting this image of a volunteer organisation. This differs from their Facebook page where there were posts revealing the highly nationalist and radical right ideology of the organisation, in the form of videos and posts with racist content.

4.4.3 Discussion

While MÖM's Instagram account is newer than the EDL's, they were much more active during the analysis-period for this study.[18] The themes of posts on both accounts differ quite a bit, while being largely reflective of posts on their respective Facebook pages. The EDL's Instagram account is much more focused on the group's attitudes and ideology, clearly showing their anti-Islamic views. Hashtags also include phrasing like #islamic invasion, #jihadists, and #refugeesnotwelcome. MÖM's Instagram account, on the other hand, is much for focused on recruitment: in this case for a new chapter in Győr. Other posts focus on charitable events, local 'patrols', and ways they help other Hungarians. Hashtags are simply focused around the group's name, often including the hashtags #Csatlakozz and #join.

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[18] MÖM's Instagram account has no new posts since 4th May 2018, however. The EDL's Instagram account has been removed, given that the EDL was banned from Facebook and Instagram in April 2019.

4.5 YOUTUBE

4.5.1 The English Defence League

The EDL's YouTube channel currently has 1,227 subscribers and 30 videos. This seems to be a new YouTube channel that was created in 2015, as videos from 2014 and earlier can be found on 'Tommy old EDL channel Robinson.' This is currently Tommy Robinson's channel, the EDL founder and ex-leader who resigned as leader of the organisation in 2013 due to various concerns such as his family's safety and his inability to control the group he created (Goodwin, 2013), and concerns over using violence to "counter Islamic ideology" (Symonds, 2013).

Of the 30 videos, 21 were of leaders and members giving speeches at rallies; six were videos of demonstrations showing images, videos, and short clips of speeches; one was a commemorative video for the 7/7 bombing; one was a trailer for the EDL documentary; and one a full-length EDL documentary. Of all 30 videos, these were the three that were obviously created to incite emotion in the viewers, much like many of their Facebook and Instagram posts. In the other videos, speeches had an overtone of anger, with speakers often shouting to their audience.

Videos were coded for main themes; this proved to be difficult, however, as speeches and other videos had several themes contained in one video. By far the most overarching themes were anti-Islam, anti-Muslim, and Islamophobic sentiments, which were found in all thirty videos. Table 4.3 shows the various themes found in the videos; most videos received more than one code due to the nature of speeches.

Table 4.3: Code descriptions and frequencies for videos found on the English Defence League's YouTube channel.

CODE	CODE DESCRIPTION	FREQUENCY	%
Anti-Islam, Anti-Muslim		30	100.0
Sex Gangs	Anything relating to the ongoing investigation of Asian sex grooming gangs in the UK.	15	50.0
Migrants	Including migrant criminality.	3	10.0
Terrorism	Including attacks, ISIS.	3	10.0
Defend England, white England		4	13.33
English as victims		2	6.67
Fight	Anything referring to war or fighting, for example "wipe them out," "annihilate Islam"	2	6.67
Action	Generally, notices of upcoming demonstrations.	2	6.67
Anti-left		6	20.0
Politics	Regarding UK politics.	5	16.67
TOTAL VIDEOS		30	

Some other themes also became apparent, but were not included in Table 4.3 as they were not found mentioned in any significant amount. One theme was the depiction of the EDL as a charitable and caring organisation, which is interesting when contrasted with MÖM given that they mainly represent themselves as a volunteer organisation. Videos also made mention of the police not working to their full potential, which emphasises the idea of the EDL and protecting Britain and doing work that should be done by the police; this theme is also found in MÖM's online content. Some videos also made mention of the EDL closing mosques around the country, showing that the organisation seeks to promote the 'good' deeds they are accomplishing.

Another theme that was seen was anti-EU and anti-Merkel sentiments, unsurprising as these videos were created after 2015 and the start of the Vote Leave campaign. Other themes included mention of the new Pegida UK organisation (once), the EDL documentary

and trailer, patriotism toward the EDL, and speaking specifically about the town or city that they were currently in. Speaking about the city in which they are demonstrating likely has the strategic purpose of inciting emotion among demonstrators and listeners, given as most likely reside in that area.

As the most recent video was from September of 2016, it is obvious that the EDL do not any longer use their YouTube channel. It seems that the channel serves as an archive of speeches at demonstrations, mostly showing EDL members speaking to crowds of supporters. Videos did not seem to have a purpose, per say, as recruitment or directly dissemination of their ideology.

4.5.2 The Hungarian Defence Movement

MÖM's YouTube channel had 35 subscribers and 12 videos at the time of this analysis. The group also features videos on their Facebook page, not all of which also feature in their YouTube account. It is unclear as to how the group decides which videos are featured on their Facebook page and which are featured on YouTube. Since the summer of 2018 a few videos have been removed.

One of those removed videos was MÖM's first official YouTube video, which was posted on 20th April 2015. This video is a twenty-second video showing people, likely of Roma origin, removing a washing machine from an apartment, entitled "Those with disparate livelihoods video message for Hungarians." This video has 1,051 views and is the only video that is specifically anti-Roma. It is unclear, but perhaps the video insinuates the washing machine is being stolen; it is suspicious, of course, that this video was one of the two removed since August 2018.

The other videos mostly show photographs of events and community-building activities, played over emotionally-charged music. Of the seven videos using songs, all of

them are by bands from the Hungarian far-right music scene. One uses the introduction of a song by MagyaRock (A play on words between Hungarian rock and *Magyar*, the word for 'Hungarians'), one by a band called Romantikus Erőszak (Romantic Violence), two by the most famous far-right Hungarian band, Kárpátia (eluding to the Carpathian basin), and three by a relatively new band to the Hungarian radical right scene, Nemzeti Hang (National Voice). Hungary has a strong tradition of nationalist-themed and even radical right music, with some of it even making its way into the mainstream (most especially the band Kárpátia). Some of these videos are not unavailable due to music copyright issues.

Table 4.4 gives a summary of the main themes of the videos. Videos were each given one code each. There was some overlap between codes, for example one video coded 'children' was of the children's yearly summer camp; obviously it is an event, but with the main purpose of showing the group's support of children. One video, which was coded 'event' as it was of the Hungarian Defence Movement Days 2017, was also distinctly about community-building, showing images of smiling group members and supporters. It is fairly obvious, however, that most of their videos are of events, though not of patrols and other controversial activities in which the group may be involved. The videos are intended to show the fun and sense of community of the group; the photographs and music are very specifically chosen to elicit emotion from viewers, hence, seemingly, most of these videos have the underlying intention of recruitment. These videos also show that the organisation aims to recruit a certain type of member: one that is perhaps family-oriented, likely above the age of 30, and who is not too extreme in their views. While videos to show radical right imagery, they tend not to show specific white power imagery, for example, as can be seen with other Hungarian radical right organisations. This is likely due to MÖM's close connection to the Jobbik party; showing specific white power and distinct radical right imagery would likely harm the image of the party, if someone were to make the connection.

Table 4.4: Code descriptions and frequencies for videos found on the Hungarian Defence Movement's YouTube channel.

CODE	CODE DESCRIPTION	FREQUENCY	%
Event	Videos showing images from past events, including speeches.	5	41.67
Recruitment	Videos with the specific purpose of recruiting new members.	1	8.33
Community	Videos with the purpose of community-building, including thank you to supporters.	1	8.33
Children	Any videos with the distinct purpose of showing how the community supports children, and events they have organised for children.	2	16.67
Other	Includes interviews with locals, a men's choir singing, and one of Roma.	3	25.0
TOTAL		12	

4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This analysis set out to investigate two main research questions. The first question was how these groups attempt to portray themselves to the public: do they display themselves as violent, or rather more peaceful? Are they open about their ideology? The second question investigated was how these groups attempted to recruit new members, or the seeming importance of recruitment to these groups.

Image and Identity

Through the online activity of both organisations, it is clear that both groups present themselves as patriotic, making use of their respective country's colours and historical symbols. This use of historical symbolism is evidence of nationalist attitudes and the idea of going back to a 'better' time of national purity. No matter how much these organisations attempt to portray themselves as political activists (EDL), volunteer organisations (MÖM), not radical right, and not racist, it is still clear that they are, at the root of it, radical right organisations. Also, there are likely two more reasons for the use of these symbols: the formation of collective identity and the incitement of emotions to encourage fear of social change and feelings of community.

When considering the formation of an 'image' and the recruitment of members to an organisation, both collective and group identity become important. Collective identity is based in the idea of group distinctiveness and difference, and the perception of interests (Jasper, 1997). The very existence of these feelings of collective identity and community ease feelings of risk and uncertainties related to collective action (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Jasper (1997) distinguishes collective identity from movement identity, which is the identity, perceived by the group and outsiders, of those involved in a movement seeking social change. Of course, both collective and movement identity must be considered from

the perspective of the individual and their own personal identity, and also from the perspective of one's own culture and the culture in which a group exists. Therefore, it is impossible to know how an individual's perception of identity will be influenced by these online materials, but something can be said about how the organisations wish to portray their identities and potential influence others. Collective and movement identity formation is critical for social movement organisations in order to arouse feelings of solidarity and define moral boundaries (Jasper & McGarry, 2015). Of course, collective identity can also pose important strategic dilemmas: the same identity that attracts some recruits will turn other away and can cause negative attention from outsiders (McGarry & Jasper, 2015).

In the case of these organisations, collective identity was largely defined through the symbolism and imagery use in their online presences. Indeed, it has been shown in the literature that the online space helps create collective identities as it brings together common attitudes and concerns (Adams & Roscigno, 2015). The EDL used strong imagery, most especially on their official website of the Crusades and Knight's Templar. This imagery combines several important aspects of their identity: the anti-Islam nature of the organisation, the desire to protect their homeland from a Muslim threat, and their image as an organisation who is at war and fighting for the culture of their land. MÖM's symbolism is similar, but perhaps not as strong and specific as the EDL's. The use of popular national symbols, and specifically historic symbols, shows the important the organisation places on the purity of the original Magyars. This imagery combined with offline imagery, such as the wearing of combat boots and uniforms, demonstrated the paramilitary nature of the organisation; their identity as protectors of Hungary is also evident through their activity, such as patrols.

This feeling of a collective identity, even in the online sphere, can also help to promote ideas of togetherness and solidarity. Indeed, it is impossible to have one without

the other (Gamson, 1992). This allows for organisations to encourage feelings of solidarity on an everyday basis, easily accessible through sympathisers' computers and mobile phones. There is no longer the need to attend common demonstrations, meetings, and events to promote solidarity; it can now happen constantly through the ubiquitous nature of digital media and mobiles. Radical right organisations can now promote feelings of solidarity even before individuals are regularly physically active with the organisation and can also promote these feelings to those individuals who may live further away or are unable to travel. It can encourage the formation of new chapters of the organisation in areas where the movement is not yet mobilised.

It is also apparent that both the EDL and MÖM utilise perceived grievances to build this sense of unity and solidarity among supporters. Indeed, this is well documented as a common feature of the radical right's use of the online space (Wojcieszak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2015; Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 2018). The EDL grievances are undoubtedly surrounding Islam, which they made unmistakably evident through their communication on their Facebook page and through the imagery of their official website. Additionally, the EDL continually posted articles and images chosen to incite fear and anger in their supporters, especially aimed at Muslims. MÖM also have clear grievances but are somewhat more difficult to tease out of their online profile; their grievances on the surface seem to be against the government not helping impoverished Hungarians and not doing enough about crime in certain areas of the country. Looking deeper, however, one finds that perhaps these grievances could be against one ethnicity, namely the Roma.

The symbolism, imagery, and content promoted by both organisations is obviously calculated to incite emotion in existing and potential supporters. Emotion has been shown to be an important factor in promoting social movement activism (Berezin, 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001b; Jasper, 1998; Tarrow, 2011; Virchow, 2007). Emotion is

intimately tied to moral values, which can be manipulated in order to recruit supporters. Emotion is also tied to moral shock, which is often the first step of the recruitment process (Jasper, 1998). An unexpected event or piece of information can cause extreme outrage, so that people may become inclined toward activism (Jasper, 1998). In addition, organisations can point to someone to blame for this moral shock, which can result in externally-directed shared emotions that are held in common by group members (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001b). The EDL especially has used the moral shock of sex grooming gangs and terrorist events in order to place blame on the Muslim community, furthering the shared emotions among supporters.

Recruitment

The online space is crucial for recruitment into social movement activism, especially in the case of the radical right (Back, 2002); supporters often become involved online and eventually become more active in the movement. While much of the EDL's following is online, they place far less emphasis on recruitment than MÖM does, both on their website and on their Facebook page. They do heavily promote demonstrations and have a quite visible PayPal donation button on their website, but seem to be less concerned with recruiting core members. Again, this could be because the EDL does not have clearly defined membership criteria, and mostly seeks to grow their numbers at demonstrations around the country. MÖM, on the other hand, regularly have recruitment events, and often post both on their website and Facebook page, attempting to gain members. They have far fewer demonstrations than the EDL, however, and instead participate in charity events and 'patrols'. Most of these events are only announced after the fact as news about the organisation's activities. Open MÖM events for supporters, such as the summer camp for children and commemorative events in conjunction with other groups, are advertised in

advance. When people express an interest in joining the EDL, it appears they are directed to local chapters. On the other hand, most MÖM recruitment posters feature the personal phone number and email address of the group's leader; often supporters are encouraged to start new MÖM chapters if there isn't one already in their area.

This comparison shows that the EDL and MÖM fundamentally differ in several ways. MÖM seem to have a stronger membership identity than the EDL. MÖM are looking for hardworking, loyal, 'God-fearing' members who will represent the organisation well. The EDL, on the other hand, seem to seek supporters with the one goal of taking down Islam (this, however, is not the main concern of supporters; see Chapter 5). From the information available on their online presences, it seems as though MÖM define themselves based on a strong collective identity and self-image they seek to portray, while the EDL seem to have less of a sense of self and define themselves solely within the othering of Islam. While MÖM seek loyal new members and leaders to start new local chapters, while the EDL seek supporters and monetary donations; MÖM value loyalty and the quality of their members, while the EDL care about growing their army.

This difference is also evident in the nature of their respective YouTube accounts. What is striking about the EDL's YouTube account is that most of the videos, 27 of 30, are of demonstrations. On the other hand, most of the videos on the official MÖM YouTube channel showed the organisation's community involvement and seemed also to serve as recruitment tools. Evident in both the YouTube channels, Facebook pages, and Instagram accounts is the distinct difference between the emphasis of the two groups. The EDL have a very obvious emphasis on being anti-Islam, while MÖM focus more on recruitment and gaining supporters. The EDL attempt to grow their numbers through fear of Islam, while MÖM portray an image of caring for their fellow Hungarians and recruiting people who 'care about their country'.

Conclusion

The analysis of the online presences of the EDL and MÖM explored two of the research questions of this study. First, the questions of what draws people into radical right organisations, and specifically the organisation in question. Second, this study aimed to explore how the use of the internet encourages individuals to join such organisations. These questions were approached from the perspective of the organisation; namely, how to the organisations present themselves to potential supporters, how do they portray their identity to narrow what type of supporter they attract, and the actions they take to recruit supporters.

Both organisations present clear images of their group identity, giving a good idea of who they seek as supporters. The EDL presents an image of a single-issue organisation who demonstrate and march in the streets, all to protect the country from the threat of Islam. This imagery suggests that they seek people who are willing to join these marches to grow their numbers, but does not suggest they seek any further loyalty or solidarity from their members. MÖM, on the other hand, is quite the opposite; much of their imagery is family and community-focused. MÖM clearly seek supporters and members who will be loyal to the organisation and its values, and who are willing to devote their time to aiding the organisation in their various activities. In the case of MÖM particularly, it is clear that they are not attempting to radicalise supporters through the use of the online space. It has indeed been suggested that the internet cannot be regarded as a causal factor in radicalisation, but that it can strengthen and accelerate the process (van der Waak & Wagenaar, 2010).

These differences are also shown through the recruitment strategies employed by each organisation. The EDL post flyers for upcoming demonstrations around the country, seeking to grow their numbers. If one would like to contact the organisation to join, the person is directed to a local chapter rather than speaking directly to leadership. In contrast,

MÖM seek to specifically recruit individuals who share their attitudes and views; interested individuals are to contact the organisation's leader directly. In addition to flyers posted on their website and Facebook page, MÖM also advertises their community events and volunteer activities, to which people can also join.

In the following chapter an analysis of interviews conducted with MÖM and EDL members will be presented. The interviews draw on themes of identity and solidarity as seen from the online analysis; they ask how respondents developed their radical right attitudes, why individuals joined these organisations, and why they maintain membership in the organisations.

CHAPTER 5: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

The third methodology used, and sequentially the last, was in-depth biographic interviews. In-depth interviews were used to analyse all three research questions: why individuals adopt nationalist views, why they join radical right movement organisations (and specifically the ones that they have joined), and why they maintain membership in a radical right movement organisation. A portion of the interview schedules drew on ideas surrounding solidarity, loyalty, and identity as understood through online analysis (see Chapter 4). Analysis of the interviews was conducted with consideration for the results of the secondary survey analysis, namely bearing in mind ideas of life satisfaction and views of immigration.

This chapter will first overview the methodological approaches taken in this research, how participants were recruited (or attempted to be recruited), procedures, ethical considerations, and limitations of this phase of the research. A narrative of the findings of the Hungarian data will then be presented, followed by a summary and discussion of the British data. Lastly, there will be a discussion and comparison of the Hungarian and British data.

5.1 METHODOLOGY

5.1.1 Methodological Approach

Taking a biographic approach to in-depth interviews aims to discover aspects of a person's whole life, from their perspective. There are three basic approaches to biographic interviewing, which tend to overlap in practice (Miller, 2000). The first is *realist*, or inductive, which is used to come up with general principles about social phenomena. The interviewing method is non-structured, the researcher takes as objective an approach as possible, and many interviews are needed to look for common trends. Second is a *neo-positivist*, or deductive, approach to biographic interviews, meaning that "pre-existing networks of concepts are used to make theoretically based predictions concerning people's experienced lives" (Miller, 2000: 12). This deductive approach utilises semi-structure interviews for analysis to test hypotheses. The third is *narrative*, which is focused on the interviewee's perspective of their own life story. The relationship between the interviewer and interviewee is crucial to this approach (Miller, 2000).

This research predominantly took Miller's (2000) neo-positivist approach, by conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews. However, this methodology also overlaps with the other two approaches, as an attempt was made to stay as objective as possible and also to consider how the interviewee was constructing the narrative of their own life story, forming somewhat of a quasi-narrative approach. Both the realist and neo-positivist approaches share common trends, in that they use "responses to evaluate a pre-existing framework" and "use real world information in order to develop or refine abstract concepts" (Miller, 2000: 15). They also share the belief that micro phenomenon (such as the individual) can lead to information about the macro (such as social phenomena) (Miller, 2000). Unfortunately, these approaches do not allow for the respondent's voice to be the only voice heard in the analysis, as would be more the case if taking a narrative approach.

This was not possible, however, due to limiting factors such as time and ethical constraints (further discussed under Limitations, Section 5.1.6). This primarily-deductive approach was chosen as it best meets the aims for this phase of the research and facilitates the exploration of specific research questions, namely why individuals joined these radical right organisations and why they maintain membership.

Yeo and colleagues (2014) outline several core features of in-depth interviews. These are: the combination of structure and flexibility, an interactive methodology between researcher and participant, an opportunity to 'get below the surface' and delve into a participant's experiences, the generation of new data, and a focus on how participants express themselves. Of course, the extent to which these features are covered is dependent on the interviewer as well as the interviewee (Yeo et al., 2014). As ultimately this study aims to find the motivating forces behind individuals, the best way to better understand these is to speak to movement members directly. While there are always issues surrounding interviews and interview techniques (see limitations section 5.1.6), they are highly beneficial to such a study.

While it would have been desirable to have less structured interviews to allow participants to develop their own narratives, semi-structured interviews were beneficial for this study due to limited time and resources. Also, as in the case of MÖM interviews were conducted over the telephone, it was quite difficult to determine when a participant was finished speaking, also showing the benefits of structured questions. Telephone interviews have been found to be a successful and viable method to collect interview data (Cachia & Millward, 2011; Drabble, Trocki, Salcedo, Walker, & Korcha, 2016; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004).

5.1.2 Participant Recruitment

Firstly, ethics for this phase of the project was approved by the School of Human and Health Sciences' School Research Ethics Panel at the University of Huddersfield. The ethical requirements stated that all interviews must be conducted via telephone, but not from a personal phone, and that participants may not see the researcher's image. These precautions were put in place to safeguard the researcher's personal wellbeing. This made it a challenge to find both participants and to conduct appropriate interviews, which will be further discussed in a section on limitations (section 5.1.6).

As is often the case with any research, this project did not quite follow the expected best-case plan. In order to properly explore the research questions set out in this project, it would have been ideal to interview members of both the EDL and MÖM. Sadly, however, this did not happen due to not recruiting participants from the EDL. In order to solve this issue, EDL supporters completed textual interviews. While not as ideal as oral interviews, this had the added benefit of recruiting a large number of participants.

For this study, it was important that those interviewed were current and full members of each organisation. When it came to MÖM, it was easier to define the inclusion and exclusion criteria. A member was defined as someone who was fully accepted into the organisation, receiving their official movement uniform. This was easy to determine, as all participants in this study were selected by the organisation's leader (see below). When it came to the EDL, however, it was more complicated as they do not have any firm definition of membership (Pilkington, 2016). Here, those supporters were considered suitable participants who reside in Great Britain and follow the EDL Facebook page. All participants were above 18 years of age.

Participants in Hungary were recruited through personal contacts in the far-right. Contact was originally made with the leader of the organisation, who was willing to help

due to the 'word' of my personal contact. He then suggested four people who could be interviewed. This was both positive and negative: positive as it was easier to find interview participants, but negative since participants were hand-picked as those who would be loyal to the organisation and not say things that 'they should not.' This obviously, as well, did not allow for the option of snowball sampling; this will also be discussed further in the limitations section.

Unfortunately, no members of the English Defence League could be recruited to participate in telephone interviews as there was no advantage of a gatekeeper to the British radical right movement. First, a researcher Facebook account was set up, where my image would not appear. Several people were contacted through this account, chosen as supporters of EDL Facebook pages or having selected 'going' to EDL Facebook events. Only one person responded and communicated with me via Facebook but he was not willing to participate as he could not see my photograph. A Facebook advert was then set up, which was run for one week in March of 2018, linking to a survey. The survey was set up via SurveyMonkey, on which they could provide their email address for further information. In order to provide their email address, the respondent must click 'yes' to "I am at least 18 years old," "I am a member of the EDL," and "I am a UK resident." Nine people provided their email addresses in that week, but unfortunately, again, it did not go further. One potential issue could have been, as stated by one potential respondent, that the title of the study includes "nationalist social movements." This particular potential-respondent confused this with 'national socialist movements,' believing the EDL was claimed to be a Nazi movement. Even after this individual was politely corrected, he still declined to be interviewed. Both the administrators of EDL pages and supporters of the pages were contacted via Twitter and Gab, but to no avail. Lastly, personal acquaintances with contacts in the EDL also attempted to recruit participants for this project, also to no avail.

Unfortunately, there seems to be a serious lack of trust in EDL members with any outside individuals. This may stem from the negative representation of the group by popular media sources. Even with emphasising the fact that this was an academic study and all respondents would remain anonymous, people were still hesitant. In order to overcome these issues of trust, however, textual interviews were conducted. Participants were recruited through Facebook

Interview questionnaires were sent out via Facebook, specifically targeting individuals who 'liked' the EDL's main Facebook page and who reside in the United Kingdom (it was not possible to only select Great Britain). This questionnaire was 'live' on Facebook for ten days, between March 11 to 21, 2019. It was clearly written above the textual interview that this was part of a research project, that their information would remain anonymous, and that they are giving permission to use this information as part of a doctoral project and future publications. This succeeded in recruiting respondents, as 105 people responded to these textual interviews, of which 99 were used for analysis. The timeframe of this recruitment was lucky, to say the least, as the EDL was permanently banned from Facebook less than one month later.

5.1.3 Procedure

Hungary

Each participant was sent an information sheet via email and given time to consider their participation. The information sheet emphasised that participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time (see Appendix D). Participants were also sent a consent form allowing the interview to move forward, to use the information gathered for this thesis, and to audio-record the interview (see Appendix C). These consent forms were

reviewed verbally at the beginning of the interview, and verbal consent was given to all points by participants.

Interviews with Hungarian participants were conducted in March of 2018. Contact was originally established over email. Participants were then contacted via Skype-out call to their personal telephones. Interviews were audio-recorded using the MP3 Skype Recorder program, and participants were given explicit instructions not to give any identifying features about themselves. Careful notes were also taken as appropriate. Participants' names were not recorded with the notes; participants were referred to as HR1 (Hungarian Respondent 1), HR2, HR3, and HR4. Pseudonyms were later given to all participants during analysis.

The audio recordings of the interviews were carefully stored on an encrypted storage device and on a personal computer. Data on the personal computer were deleted once analysis was completed, leaving only the encrypted storage device. Confidentiality of all data was ensured, and all data was anonymised.

Participants were interviewed individually, and each interview lasted between 20 to 40 minutes. As these were semi-structured interviews, an interview schedule was utilised which can be found in Appendix E. Interview questions emphasised description over explanation, in order to make participants more comfortable throughout the interview (Busher, 2016). This also encouraged participants not to become defensive and to speak more openly. Research questions focused on why and how participants joined the organisation, their personal experience in the organisation, and what they gain from being members.

The aim was to develop a narrative of the participant's journey into and through their membership in a radical right organisation. Unfortunately, the length of the interview was quite limited, partly because of the nature of them being telephone interviews and

mostly to encourage participation. Indeed, it is suggested that qualitative interviews are more ideally around ninety minutes in length (Elliott, 2005). Even with limited time, participants were encouraged to tell stories and speak about what they wished and were never stopped if they veered from the questions.

Great Britain

Interviews were collected textually to avoid issues around mistrust; this way, respondents would not have to give their names or any contact information and also wouldn't show their image. Textual interviews provide complete anonymity to the respondent, but do come with the disadvantage of relatively short answers and no opportunity to request elaboration from respondents.

Interview questions were based on the planned interview schedule and selected as those which were most easy to answer textually; an example of the interview schedule can be found in Appendix G. Interview questionnaires were sent out via Facebook Marketplace, specifically targeting individuals who 'liked' the EDL's main Facebook page and who reside in the United Kingdom (it was not possible to only select Great Britain). This questionnaire was 'live' for ten days, between 11th to 21st March 2019. During this time the interview questionnaire received 105 responses. Participants spent anywhere between 1:58 and 51:40 to complete the interview questionnaire, with most participants spending less than 15 minutes on the interview; one participant spent over an hour (1:12:09) and another two and-a-half hours (2:33:47). As the latter two interviews did not have much more data than others, this length could be due to the interview questionnaire being open without participants actively working on the interview.

Of the 105 interviews, 99 were used for analysis. The six interviews were removed for several reasons. Four were removed as they were clearly trying to skew the data: one

citing "right wing nationalism" as the biggest issue affecting Great Britain at the moment, another citing "white people" as an answer to the same question, another obviously having no interest in the EDL and answering "my socks" to what they would lose if they left the organisation, and another answering "cheese" (or variations thereof) to all questions. The other two, of the six total exclusions, were excluded as they clearly had never heard of the EDL before; both participants were above 70 years of age. It seemed one of these individuals believed the interview questionnaire to be given by the EDL, although the purpose of the questionnaire was clearly stated. The 99 respondents that remained were not necessarily all members or even direct supporters: they were individuals who agree with the EDL's mission and support the organisation on some level.

5.1.4 Ethical Considerations

Qualitative interviews, and indeed any form of research whereby the researcher comes into contact with human participants, is subject to many ethical issues and concerns. The ethics of interviewing is indeed not black and white, and sometimes researchers must consider what is best for all parties in a specific situation. Indeed, some researchers have speculated whether qualitative research is ever really ethical, as each study requires some level of deviation from rules and principles (Shaw, 2008). Interviewing individuals with unpopular and controversial views is a good example of a time when this deviation may occur. As much as the researcher may find these views to be wrong, in certain instances they may have to hide their own views; especially in instances where there has not been enough time for rapport to develop.

Participation must always be voluntary and free from coercion or pressure (Webster et al., 2014). It is important that participants are given all information about the research project, and informed that they can withdraw at any time. This, however, brings up issues

of deliberate deception. There may be times when giving all information to a participant could be harmful to the research or researchers themselves, or could sway the outcome of the interview.

Another issue that arises is that of confidentiality. Confidentiality must be maintained at all times, except in certain cases of illegal activity. This must be outlined to the participant at the start of the interview. According to the British Society of Criminology's *Statement of Ethics* (2015), researchers are legally obliged to report certain types of information to authorities. These are: 1) knowledge of terrorist activity or the financial involvement in terrorist activity, 2) money laundering, and 3) the abuse and/or neglect of a child. Indeed, while a researcher has a duty to abide by the guidelines and follow the law, this raises the question of whether it is "ever ethical to disclose information revealed in confidence when it is believed that the information would not have been disclosed but for the guarantee of confidentiality" (Finch, 2001: 42). In other words, which is more unethical: breaking the confidentiality promise of a research participant, or not disclosing knowledge of illegal activity to the authorities? Confidentiality was ensured by not recording the participants' original names on the audio files or notes, but by assigning serial numbers to them (see above). Later, these number were converted to pseudonyms during analysis, again not recorded on the files. All files are stored on an encrypted USB device.

Lastly, harm must be avoided. This means anonymising all data and securing all data after interviews. Personal information, such as names and contact information, must be stored separately from research data. This includes all audio recordings and transcriptions of interview. This can be achieved by giving each participant a serial number, or pseudonym, which is then assigned to their research data (Webster et al., 2014).

Electronic files must be password protected and encrypted, and access limited to just the researcher.

As can be seen, the ethics involved in social science research is never simply black and white. It involves a delicate balance between following ethical guidelines and codes as closely as possible, while making the best decisions for the safety and wellbeing of research participants. For the interviews with MÖM members, see appendix B for this study's ethics form, Appendix C for consent forms in both English and Hungarian, and Appendix D for information sheets in both English and Hungarian. In the case of the textual interviews with EDL supporters, the purpose of the interview was clearly stated at the top of the questionnaire (see Appendix G).

5.1.5 Analysis

Hungary

The interviews were transcribed from the audio recording. As the interviews were conducted in Hungarian, they were transcribed in Hungarian; important quotes were translated to English. All transcribing and translating was done by the researcher, who is a native speaker of both English and Hungarian. Transcriptions were then reviewed by the researcher several times, noting observations and similarities among the transcripts. It is important that interviews are conducted in a participant's native language, hence the need to conduct the interviews in Hungary in Hungarian. Much can be lost if interviewees are not speaking their native language, due to less familiarity with the language and different ways of expressing themselves. For this reason, it was important that the researcher transcribe and translated any relevant sections of the interviews in order to discern any nuances of the language.

The first approach to this analysis was to conduct a thematic analysis. This allows for better organisation of the data, so that later a cohesive narrative could be created about the participant's journey through activism. Of course, a thematic analysis reflects the researcher's bias and interpretation of what was said, and can never truly be objective.

Because this project only included four interviews, it was decided not to use an electronic coding program such as NVivo, but to code via Microsoft Word. Pre-Coding was done during the transcribing of interviews, with all important quotes being highlighted in bold. Notes were also taken on any observances. After transcription was finished of all four interviews, the first step of coding was structural coding. This structural coding was done by highlighting major basic groups in different colours: demographic data (grey), personal involvement with MÖM or other group (green), MÖM actions/structure (light blue), MÖM ideology/attitude (purple), and own ideas (yellow; including values, beliefs, and attitudes). Every part of the text was highlighted except those which had no significance to the interview, for example random chatter, one participant putting down the phone as the police drove by, and discussions about misunderstandings which were later clarified.

The next step was to go through each of these colour-highlighted groupings and code. This First-Cycle coding was done both as structural coding for most categories, and values coding for the category 'own ideas'. Values coding reflects "a participant's values, attitudes, and beliefs, representing his or her perspectives or world view" (Saldaña, 2009: 89). Here, a value is an importance placed on a person, thing, or idea; an attitude is *how* we think and feel about a person, thing, or idea; and a belief includes both values and attitudes, plus a person's personal knowledge, experience, and interpretations of the social world (Saldaña, 2009). Coding was done by using the 'comments' feature on Microsoft Word. Each of these categories was coded separately, across all four interviews. First the demographic data was coded; then MÖM actions/structure; next MÖM ideology/attitude,

personal involvement with MÖM or other group; and, finally, the respondents' own ideas and beliefs. This was done as it was felt to be more accurate by the researcher, as one coding frame could be kept across all interviews. First-cycle coding resulted in about 150 individual codes, with several seen across multiple interviews (see Appendix F).

These 150 codes were then exported using a Macro for Microsoft Word to export comments into a new Word document. These codes, along with the associated textual data, were then copied into Excel and then sorted by the First Cycle codes. These First Cycle codes were then copied into a Word document for Second Cycle coding. These codes were organised by pattern coding, which develop category labels identifying similarly coded data, in order to organise and attribute meaning (Saldaña, 2009). These 150 codes were then grouped and narrowed to 27 codes, which could again be grouped in Excel in order to have the associated textual data. These 27 categories, or themes, were created while keeping in mind the project's three main research questions: Why individuals found the need to join a radical right social movement, why they specifically chose to join this particular organisation, and why they maintain membership in the organisation.

Analysis of the interviews took on a quasi-narrative approach, in which the fragments of the participant's story were gathered together into one narrative for ease of understanding. A narrative approach can provide the point of view of the interviewee, can reveal information about the interviewee's social and cultural situation, and, in this case, can give a sequence of experience leading to their participation in radical right movements (Elliott, 2005). The narrative approach is also useful with any sample size, as it focuses on the content of the narrative evidence (Elliott, 2005).

Great Britain

While there were a large number of respondents from Great Britain, as textual interviews were conducted rather than telephone interviews a similar coding approach was taken to the analysis of the British data as to the Hungarian data. The first approach to this analysis was to conduct a thematic analysis. This allows for better organisation of the data, so that later a cohesive narrative could be created about the participant's journey through activism. Of course, a thematic analysis reflects the researcher's bias and interpretation of what was said and can never truly be objective.

As with the previous interviews, all coding was conducted via Microsoft Word. Firstly, structural coding was done by highlighting major basic groups in different colours, including both sources of respondents' frustration as well as involvement in the EDL. In essence this was a combination of both structural coding and values coding. Values coding reflects "a participant's values, attitudes, and beliefs, representing his or her perspectives or world view" (Saldaña, 2009: 89). Here, a value is an importance placed on a person, thing, or idea; an attitude is *how* we think and feel about a person, thing, or idea; and a belief includes both values and attitudes, plus a person's personal knowledge, experience, and interpretations of the social world (Saldaña, 2009). The structural codes were: motivations to nationalism and personal ideology (yellow), motivations and pathways to joining EDL (red), personal views of the EDL (dark yellow), and level of involvement (dark grey). The values codes were: Brexit (purple), immigration (light blue), cultural/social concerns (including the NHS, poverty, knife crime) (light green), concerns over mainstream politics and media (pink), anti-EU sentiments (light grey), and Islam/Muslims (teal).

This level of coding was conducted on all 99 respondents used in this study. The most mentioned of the values codes was a distrust in politicians and/or the political system,

which 71 respondents mentioned. 61 respondents mentioned immigration as an issue, although sometimes in a veiled context. A further 51 respondents mentioned Islam and/or Muslims (although some were quick to point out that Islam is the issue, not Muslims), Brexit was mentioned by 43 respondents, anti-EU sentiments by 29, the media by 12, and various other cultural and social concerns, such as knife crime and the NHS system, by 29 respondents. This contradicts other findings where Islam was found to be the biggest concern of EDL activists (for example, Bartlett and Littler, 2011).

Then, First Cycle coding was done using the 'Comments' function on Microsoft Word as well as highlight colours, with the aid of the original structural and values-based codes. This First Cycle coding served to explore and highlight the three research questions of this study, in addition to frustrations felt by the respondents. These four codes were: why a respondent turned to nationalism (yellow), how and why they joined the EDL (green), why they support the EDL specifically (light blue), and what their level of personal involvement is in the organisation (pink). This was level of coding was also completed on all 99 respondents used in the study. First Cycle coding also served to draw out those interviews which would be more useful to the thematic analysis. These were complete and partial interviews where respondents answered the interview questions, and where it was clear that the respondent was currently, or had been in the past, a member or supporter of the EDL. This resulted in 43 complete and 14 partial interviews.

These four codes from the 57 interviews were then exported via Microsoft Word into new Word documents, one for each of the four codes, for Second Cycle coding (See Appendix H for a code map and Appendix I for a table of codes). These codes were organised by pattern coding, which develop category labels identifying similarly coded data, in order to organise and attribute meaning (Saldaña, 2009). Each of these four categories received their own sets of codes, which resulted in individualised thematic

analyses for each of the research questions, in addition to exploring respondents' frustrations and potential catalysts towards nationalism. The Second Cycle codes for the heading 'Turn to Nationalism' were: immigration (light blue), veterans (green), disenchantment and frustration (yellow), Islam/Muslims (teal), politicians (pink), the EU (light grey), Brexit (purple), online activity and the media (dark yellow), and mention of specific events (red), such as the Luton demonstration, the murder of Lee Rigby, the 7/7 bombings, and the Manchester attacks. The Second Cycle codes for the heading 'Joining the EDL' were: not a member/ex-member/supporter (red), member (green), supporter (yellow) sympathiser (blue), member of another organisation (dark yellow), heard of EDL online or in the news (including those who only follow online) (pink), joined through friends/colleagues/family (teal), and street-level involvement (dark grey). The Second Cycle codes for the heading 'Why EDL' were: immigrants (light blue), Muslims/Islam (teal), veterans (dark yellow), 'making a difference' (including things like 'stand up for the little guy' and wanting to be heard) (yellow), politicians (pink), British culture/identity/pride (green), and EDL as a community (red). Lastly, the Second Cycle Codes for the heading 'Investment in Organisation' were: pride (green), community (pink), investment (including positive and negative) (dark grey), dignity and respect (yellow), patriotism and hope for Britain (light blue), and those who are not members (red). The analysis for these textual interviews then took a thematic approach, analysing each research question separately.

5.1.6 Limitations

The methodologies used in this study presented several limitations, which will be discussed here. Firstly, ethical constraints presented several limitations for this study. Initially, the project was to conduct interviews face-to-face with participants, but the

decision was made to conduct interviews via telephone due to several factors. Firstly, telephone interviews are much quicker and easier to set up, especially as this research is multi-cited and intended to be in two countries, hence saving research time and money. Secondly, although interviews were conducted via Skype-out calls which carried a cost, they were still much cheaper to conduct than the cost of any potential train-travel in Hungary, or potential flights to Great Britain and train-travel within Great Britain, in the instance of conducting interviews with EDL members. Lastly, and most importantly, it was decided that for the protection of both the researcher and participants, it would be best if images were kept confidential – hence not conducting the interviews via Skype video. This, as well, sped up the interview process as interviewees could participate in an interview while conducting other tasks, such as driving longer distances.

Of course, telephone interviews have their limitations, and perhaps the biggest limitations were in rapport building. It was difficult to build any meaningful relationship with the respondents given the 20-40 minutes of the interview and limited prior contact. The interviews would have been more successful if there would have been opportunity to meet prior to the interview and if respondents had a chance to become more comfortable, especially due to the sensitive nature of the topic. This was evident throughout the interview as respondents seemed to be much more cautious in the beginning, while most eventually relaxed as the interview went on. The lack of rapport-building, of course, was not only limited by the nature of telephone interviews, but also by time. This portion of the study was conducted in just a few months - a longer study spanning at least one year would have allowed for far more rapport building with participants. Also, as the interviews were conducted via telephone, most respondents did not care to spend more than 20-30 minutes talking. Because of this, I had to ensure that the most important questions were covered for this study, not allowing time for the discussion of many other possible topics.

Another limitation to this study was the selection of respondents. Hungarian participants were found through a personal contact who then put me in touch with the group's leader. The organisation's leader then gave me the contact information of the respondents that he thought would well represent the organisation and encouraged those individuals to participate. While it was possible that other interview participants might have been recruited through these selected group members, none were willing to go against the leader's wishes as he chose who to interview. Again, this could have been potentially avoided if it were possible to meet with respondents in person and conduct a longer ethnographic study.

Lastly, a serious limitation to this study was the issue of access, which ultimately resulted in the inability to find participants for telephone interviews among the EDL. Most often these types of groups "tend to regard academics as untrustworthy or hostile and seek to prevent entry into their groups or access to members" (Pilkington, 2016: 17). As with the Hungarian sample, it would have been helpful to have a personal contact with access to the EDL. It was absolutely a detriment to be able only to contact potential participants online, and most especially not to be able to show the researcher's image. Even those few (alleged) EDL members with whom contact was made over social media, were, in the end, unwilling to talk as they could not see who I was, hence mistrusting the project and researcher. More time would have been needed to build a relationship and trust with potential participants, as well as permission to meet group members and participants in person.

In order to overcome this issue of access, interviews were written up and circulated in textual form over Facebook, utilising the Facebook Marketplace tool. The Facebook advert with the textual interviews targeted individuals living in the UK who 'liked' the EDL's main Facebook page. While this method did result in 106 responses, it also had clear

limitations. Firstly, sampling was limited to only those individuals who supported the EDL on social media. This meant that those supporters who were not online were completely excluded from the sample and, also, that the sample contained individuals who only supported the EDL online and not on the streets. Secondly, there were limitations in the nature of the interviews themselves: textual interviews resulted in respondents more likely to skip questions. When they did answer questions, they were more likely to answer questions in one-word answers. One solution to this would be to have an option where respondents could answer verbally through a voice recording. Such programs were found to target business and marketing, but it is recommended that such a program be developed for the research sphere. Thirdly, textual interviews do not allow the opportunity for the researcher to clarify answers or to dive deeper into a respondent's answer. Even with these limitations, conducting textual interviews was a solution to gaining access to this hard-to-reach population.

5.2 RESULTS OF HUNGARIAN INTERVIEWS

Four interviews were conducted with members of the Hungarian Defence Movement. All participants were male and had varying positions and status in the organisation. All participants were given pseudonyms and any specific identifying information will not be discussed.

This section will first provide an overview of the four participants and interviews, through presenting their narratives in response to the main research questions: the origins of the participants' nationalist feelings, why participants chose to join these particular groups, and why participants maintain membership in these organisations. Secondly, the findings from the thematic analysis of the interviews will be presented.

5.2.1 Participant Narratives

Peter

Peter was the oldest participant interviewed, into his fifties with adult children. He has a trades certificate and still works in trades. Peter was very polite and gentlemanly, and very obviously cautious about not saying too much. He has a leadership role in the organisation, hence seemingly has a responsibility to present the organisation in a specific way. Peter had been involved with other radical right organisations. He joined MÖM before it existed in its current form, when it was still the For a Better Future movement.

Peter only developed nationalist feelings in his forties, when he went to an annual event which loosely translates to *Hungarian National Assembly*. This meeting involved a celebration of Hungarian culture, including recreations of ancient Magyar culture, as well as lectures by revisionist Hungarian scholars. After attending this event, Peter began to feel that he should be proud of his Hungarian heritage. Before this, he said he was a 'normal' father taking care of his children and making money to simply move forward. He also came

to believe that what he had been taught in school about Hungarian history was, in fact, directly the opposite of the truth.

Peter also spoke about his childhood growing up, and about being beaten by the local gypsy children because he was an excellent student: "And I didn't know what to do, I didn't know how to process what was happening, just by going on living my life and being afraid of gypsies." He also expressed confusion about why gypsies are so aggressive. Having attended the Hungarian National Assembly event and because he was seen as an important figure in his village, he was made aware of a situation happening in a nearby town. Gypsies had stolen the fence of an 82-year old woman, including the fencing around her pig-pen. A nine-member Roma family also moved in next to the elderly woman, as far as was understood, on her property. Her son then contacted Peter asking for help, after which Peter got in touch with the For a Better Future movement in 2013.

After this, Peter began attending meetings and began helping the group with organising events and other activities. Eventually he was asked to officially join and he remained a member after the For a Better Future movement was disbanded and reformed as MÖM. The thing that struck Peter the most about the For a Better Future movement and MÖM is how much they are like a family. He had met members of other radical right organisations, such as the Hungarian Guard and the Outlaw Army, but did not find this feeling of family. Peter spoke a lot about the importance of this feeling: "It's as though we're living in a family, just a national family" and "we stand up for each other, we help, and if anyone has a problem, we solve it." When asked what it meant to him to be a member of MÖM, he answered very simply: "Pride."

When asked what he would lose if he left the organisation, Peter was surprised. He said it would be strange, but that he couldn't imagine it. He was also asked how he would feel if his children decided to leave. Peter's response was that they are adults and can make

their own decisions, but "it would surely hurt if it was this way, but right now it doesn't feel like they're pulling away but their ties are getting stronger."

Each time after the interview questions were finished, the interview was opened up for participants to ask questions or discuss whatever they would like. Peter began to talk more about his own personal viewpoints and attitudes than he had during the interview. Like most participants, he held back many of his views and answered questions about the organisation as diplomatically as possible. At one point Peter began to speak about racism, and said: "So, racism doesn't mean hatred of races, it doesn't mean, umm, that someone hates every race, rather it means that someone protects their own race." He continued along this line, saying:

> "So, the races, well, the white race is white. Black is black. There are anthropological markers of each. Just like the, umm, the slanty-eyed, just like those of Roma descent, each one has those characteristics that are, umm, characteristics. But the white race, it's not, well I don't know, well if my theory is racist, then I accept it. But science – why have I not heard of a Black scientist? Why are there no gypsy inventors? Why are there no, um, well people should get some sort of rational answer to these questions, no?"

Although unprompted, Peter began discussing labelling of himself as far-right or nationalist. He conceded that, "If it's far-right that I love my home, that I love my nation, then I absolutely accept it."

László

László is in his mid-twenties, single, and works for a security company. He's a man of few words, often answering questions pointedly and not elaborating a great deal. He joined the organisation in 2014, shortly after its formation. László ties his nationalist feelings to his childhood, as he started to have strong beliefs in Christianity at six years old, completely independent of his family. He also remembers learning about the ancient

Hungarians in school: "In school, I come from the [redacted] family, and in school we learned about the ancient Magyars, our ancestors: Lehel, Emese, Attila, Árpád, and it filled me with pride that we have a one-thousand-year old past, and I have these types of ancestors." He was also the only participant to state the personal importance of the *Magyar Hiszekegy*[19] (Hungarian Believe in One), which is important to several radical right movements.

László knew a member of MÖM while in a men's choir, a man who encouraged him to join. His friend told him stories about the organisation, but László says he had not heard of these types of organisations before this point. Then, a few villages over MÖM members were doing some volunteer work, so László went with this friend and helped out. Then he went to more and more organised events, until he moved to a bigger city and finally decided to become a member.

In order to become a member, László first received some information to study, including general citizenship knowledge, knowledge of defence and defending an area. He also received information on how to protect himself legally and other legal advice, for example how to speak to law enforcement. László then had to write a test on these topics, which was graded, and incorrect answers were revised orally in a meeting. Only after completing this testing process did László become a member of the organisation.

László talked about how much MÖM helps the Hungarian community, of which he considers the most important to be legal help. László described the 'health-care walks' they often take, saying that "sometimes if, for example if the authorities for whatever political reason don't do their jobs in a given community, then we go out with 'x' number of people,

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[19] The *Magyar Hiszekegy* is a poem written in 1920 by a general's wife, for a competition run by an anti-Trianon movement. It was later lengthened and put to music. It goes: "I believe in one God, I believe in one home, I believe in God's eternal truth, I believe in Hungary's resurrection. Amen." [original: "Hiszek egy Istenben, hiszek egy hazában, hiszek egy Isteni örök igazságban, hiszek Magyarország feltámadásában. Amen."]

patrol the area, sorry, go for health-care walks." He described one particular instance where they helped a community: "For example, last year in [redacted] county there was a city, where certain types of people umm, were in public areas and during the day, doing drugs, selling drugs, and throwing these drug remnants in the public area. The police did nothing about this. So we, with our presence showed that yes, there really is a problem here, and the problem was solved quite quickly."

László also spoke several times about MÖM as a family and as a community of friends. While he spoke carefully throughout much of the interview, when asked what he would lose if he left the organisations he, without any hesitation, replied "a community. A community of friends. Family." László stressed the importance of helping fellow organisation members. László also spoke about the importance of raising children correctly: "They shouldn't be criminals, shouldn't do drugs, and umm, and they shouldn't be aggressive, and so on." László finds children to be so important that he takes a large role in organising and helping with MÖM's annual children's camp. While László does have friends outside of the organisation, he says that what he would miss most about it is this family and community of friends.

Zoltán

Zoltán is middle-aged with a Secondary School diploma and has a leadership role in the organisation. More than with the other participants, it was evident that Zoltán knew what to and what not to say, and this could be felt in the careful wording of many of his answers. Zoltán was involved with other radical right organisations before becoming involved with MÖM, namely the For a Better Future movement and the Hungarian Guard, where he also had leadership roles.

Before joining, Zoltán was a working father raising his children. He says he originally joined a radical right organisation because he believes he was already "this kind of person" and because he wanted to help his fellow man. Zoltán also became very upset when then-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány "had opinions that were openly against the nation and against Hungarians." He only joined radical right organisations in his early thirties and said: "It's amazing how this [nationalist feeling] is inside us naturally, that is genetically, and it more and more intensely came out."

Zoltán believes about one-quarter of Hungarians support these radical right organisations, which would be about "one or two million people or more." He believes only a "certain layer of society is radical. This could be 20-25 percent, but not more." Zoltán was also quite critical of the Hungarian government and touched on the change in the government's politics: "Even though it [nationalism] was not usual here, nowadays it is usual, and politics has also has also seized this national feeling."

Zoltán talked a lot about helping the Hungarian people. He spoke about how it is important to the organisation to not walk past those fellow people in need. Indeed, MÖM frequently organises donations and volunteer work to help poor people across Hungary. He also talked about protecting people: "Yes, we need to look out for each other and our fellow man, and we need to protect them if they get into that sort of situation."

Out of all four participants, Zoltán has the most responsibility in the organisation. When asked about what he would do if he left the organisation, his reaction and answers strikingly differed from the other interviewees. He did not seem surprised by the question and emphasised that perhaps his life could go back to some level of 'normality'. His answers made him seem as though he is tired, but he did emphasise how much he would miss the organisation. Zoltán also stated: "You can never leave something like this, in my opinion, I think."

Árpád

Árpád was the most open of the four participants and the least cautious in his phrasing. He is in his early thirties, married with no children, and has a trades technician certificate and full-time job. He's a reclusive type with a love for nature, and prefers to live away from a lot of people. He originally sought out a paramilitary organisation and had tried out several radical right organisations before seeking out MÖM in 2014, ultimately becoming more active in 2016 or 2017.

Árpád initially joined Jobbik in 2013 when, in his words, they were much more radical. He was also involved with the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, which 'wasn't for him,' applied to the Hungarian National Front right around the time that they found themselves in serious trouble,[20] and also had some involvement with the Outlaw Army, which Árpád said was too extreme for him: "They were far too extreme for me, it would have been too serious." He then learned about MÖM and got into contact with them. Árpád and his wife attended a children's camp organised by MÖM, to which he also brought his nephew and niece. Árpád said that's where he really initially saw the real community in the organisation, which was a very good experience for him. At the camp he met several of the group leaders and announced his intention to join. It was a slow process, but, as Árpád said, he knew he was a member once he was allowed into the 'inner circle.' He also added that he has not been able to be very active in the organisation as most of the activities happen in eastern Hungary, whereas he lives in the west:

> "You know, this organisation was formed in the east in Békés county, where there's a pressure from gypsies, now I have to say it this way; it's much stronger because of the gypsy-pressure, it's much more active."

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[20] The group was disbanded in 2016 after their leader, István Győrkös, allegedly shot and killed a police officer.

Árpád said that he and his fellow MÖM members have discussed the origins of their nationalist feelings. For him it was different than for a lot of other members:

> "We often talk here with my comrades, that everyone usually has some ancestor, a father, grandfather, uncle, or someone who, you know, showed them the way, showed them a path, who influenced them in some way – I absolutely can't say I had this."

Árpád's brother listened to nationalist rock music, which has been popular in Hungary since the transition after 1990. His brother stopped at listening to that type music, as that was enough for him - but Árpád's attitudes became influenced by these bands. Árpád did emphasise several times that he was not influenced by outside forces but felt that this is what he had to do. As he said: "There's a saying, now I don't know if this is correct or not, but 'A real warrior doesn't fight because he has to fight, but because he must fight.' This is an interesting thought that no one told me to do this."[21]

According to Árpád, there is a wide range of attitudes and ideologies in MÖM: "There are so many different ways of thinking in MÖM; those who are more radical, and those who aren't more radical than me, as I don't consider myself to be too radical." Árpád also spoke openly about MÖM's ideology as a group. He emphasised that there are many ways of thinking in the organisation: "So, here within MÖM there's a very wide scale that's covered, I think. If I had to summarise it, this national, national sympathiser line is most important. This Hungarian, this nationalist line - not fascist, nationalist." As with all the respondents, Árpád was careful to steer away from the 'extreme right' or 'fascist' label.

Árpád spoke a lot about MÖM as a family and a brotherhood. He spoke about members going out of their way to help other members in need, often by giving them items like firewood, computer monitors, and so on. If he would leave the group, Árpád said he

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[21] Perhaps ironically, this seems to be somewhat akin to the also very fitting G.K. Chesterton quote: "A true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him."

would most miss this community of friends, but that he likely would not feel it as much as others due to where he lives.

With Árpád, too, the discussion continued after the line of interview questioning was finished. Here we discussed more about his attitudes and the ideology of the organisation, and he was much more willing than the others to open up.

> "Here the emphasis is more on bringing back the ancient Hungarian values and following them in our everyday lives. I would forget this fucking, oh sorry, this garbage multiculturalism, because it's disgusting, I think."

Árpád was quite open about there being serious radicalism behind what MÖM does, saying it several times, but he did not open up more than that. He was very interested in the project and after looking up the EDL online, offered insight into a comparison between their organisation and the EDL: "So, we really want to regain our national identity, and are not trying to push another culture out."

5.2.2 Analysis

The first cycle of coding analysis resulted in approximately 150 codes[22]. Nearly all of the interview text was coded, save some parts where respondents were giving clarification, or speaking about something that did not pertain to the interview. These first 150 codes were coded using both structural codes and value codes. Structural codes included, for example, 'time joined MÖM,' 'MÖM protects people,' 'origin of nationalist feelings,' 'way joined MÖM,' 'self-sacrifice for MÖM,' and so on. Value codes were coded based on values (V), beliefs (B), and attitudes (A), for example 'B: Hungarians as martyrs,' 'Hungarians are proud people,' 'Hungarians are hardworking,' 'V: must help own people,' 'V: furthering nationalist knowledge,' 'A: reality of Trianon,' and so on.

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[22] See Appendix F (F1-F4) for a listing of codes and meta-codes by participant.

These 150 codes were then grouped into 27 meta-code categories based on pattern coding. Seven of these meta-codes were found in all four interviews; four of them were seen in three interviews, seven were found in two interviews, and nine themes were seen in only one interview each. Meta-codes found in all four interviews were: Personal life; Origin of nationalist feelings; Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people; MÖM as family, community, brotherhood; Personal experience in MÖM; MÖM ideology; Joining MÖM. Meta-codes found in three interviews were: Involvement with other groups; Roma; MÖM general information; MÖM members. Meta-codes found in two interviews were: Media; Law enforcement; MÖM Paramilitary; Traditional values; Children are important; Hungarians as victims and martyrs; Personal views: nationalism; civilian soldiers. Lastly, those meta-codes found in only one interview were: Hungarian government; Nationalism in Hungary; Disbanded nationalist groups; Personal attitudes and values; Problems in Hungary; Radicalism in MÖM; Comparison with EDL; MÖM outside of Hungary.

These 27 meta-codes could then be grouped into four overarching general themes (see Table 5.1). Here, personal opinions and information about the respondents themselves were combined with information and views about the organisation to create the themes, while also keeping in mind the project's research questions. This is because, as members of the organisation, the respondents' views do portray the attitudes of MÖM's members. While all four respondents were careful to portray MÖM as a volunteer organisation with the sole purpose of aiding those in need, the analysis still reveals the radical right roots of such an organisation.

Table 5.1: General interview themes in Hungarian interviews.

General themes	Meta-Codes	Description
Being a MÖM member	Personal experience in MÖM Joining MÖM MÖM general information MÖM members Involvement with other groups	Involvement with MÖM, including why and how they joined and information about membership.
Personal views	Origin of nationalist feelings Traditional values Personal life Personal attitudes and values	Personal views and attitudes, and origin of nationalist feelings.
MÖM as a helpful and good organisation	Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people MÖM as family, community, brotherhood Media Law enforcement Children are important Hungarians as victims and martyrs MÖM outside of Hungary	Portraying MÖM as a helpful volunteer organisation and a good community.
MÖM as a nationalist organisation	Roma MÖM ideology MÖM Paramilitary Personal views: nationalism Civilian soldiers Disbanded nationalist groups Hungarian government Nationalism in Hungary Problems in Hungary Radicalism in MÖM Comparison with EDL	Nationalist tendencies in MÖM, including views on Roma, paramilitary training, and acting as civilian soldiers. This theme also includes views on Hungarian and nationalism, as well as open discussion about radicalism within MÖM.

These themes provide an overview of the topics discussed throughout the interview, hence will be referred to as interview themes. Additionally, three overlapping themes pertaining to membership also become evident. These are 'the soldier,' 'family and community,' and 'the social protector.' These will be further discussed below.

These interviews also served to shed some light on the major research questions of this study: why individuals develop nationalist feelings, why they join radical right organisations, and why they maintain membership in these organisations. This will be further discussed in the next section, looking specifically at pathways into the organisation,

interview and membership themes, and emotional themes which became apparent throughout the study.

5.2.3 Discussion

It was evident while conducting the interviews that respondents were keen to present their organisation in a certain light: one that is non-violent, a volunteer organisation, and existing for the purpose of helping their fellow man. While it cannot be denied that the organisation does help many in need, it also became clearly evident through the coding process that there a very real underlying nationalism is apparent in the organisation.

Each respondent was given the opportunity to ask questions and discuss anything they wished after the interview questions were finished, something which two of the four respondents took advantage of (Peter and Árpád). These respondents seemed to open up when it was simply a casual conversation, which could also be explained by rapport building that occurred during the approximately thirty-minute interview. In both cases it became evident that respondents had both racist and far-right attitudes.

These attitudes were also evident in the way respondents talked about Roma, although all tried mostly to avoid the topic. Roma were spoken of as being natural criminals, aggressive, and people to be afraid of (Peter: "Why are gypsies so aggressive? Why?"). They were described as stealing everything they could get their hands on, even from elderly women. One respondent spoke of eastern versus western Hungary, and how the 'pressure' from Roma was much stronger in the east (Árpád), hence explaining the regional strength of MÖM in that area. It should be noted, however, that these attitudes are common among many people in Hungary today (Todosijević & Enyedi, 2002).

Finally, it seemed that all four respondents viewed the goals of the organisation somewhat differently. Zoltán, who is in a position of leadership, viewed the main goal of

the organisation as the work of civilian soldiers and the protection of Hungarian people, especially in poorer rural areas. László also expressed the importance of this vigilantism, and also mentioned the inability of law enforcement to do their jobs properly. Others (Peter and Árpád) emphasised the nationalist character of MÖM a lot more, as well as the importance of fostering a Hungarian identity. Árpád also expressed the importance of the paramilitary side of MÖM, which only Zoltán mentioned in passing.

Looking back to the research questions of this study, namely motivations to join the movement and maintain membership, more attention will now be specifically paid to pathways into the organisation and themes of involvement in the organisation.

Pathways into MÖM

Although difficult to generate distinctive pathways into the Hungarian Defence Movement with only four respondents, some pathways did become evident. All four respondents joined the organisation of their own will and were quite adamant about expressing this fact. Of the participants, two joined MÖM in its current form (László and Árpád), and two joined in its previous form as the For a Better Future Movement (Peter and Zoltán). For the purposes of discussing pathways into the movement, both groups will be seen as the same organisation.

Both Zoltán and Árpád were members of other radical right organisations before joining MÖM/For a Better Future, while Péter and László's first radical right organisation was MÖM/For a Better Future. Three of the respondents (Peter, Zoltán, and Árpád) specifically sought out such an organisation, for various reasons such as frustration and seeking a paramilitary movement, while László was introduced to the idea of radical right organisations by a personal contact.

Two respondents, Peter and László, could trace the origin of their nationalist feelings back to childhood. It is possible however, that participants have created a narrative of their childhood in order to explain the present; understandably, it is impossible to verify those narratives. Zoltán spoke of becoming disenchanted with the current political system as an adult, and Árpád was unsure of how his nationalist feelings originated but did seek to join a more paramilitary-style organisation.

Linden and Klandermans described three possible motives for joining an activist group in their study of Dutch extreme-right activists: instrumentality, identity, and ideology. Those labelled with the instrumentality motive are seeking to fight injustice, whether this fight is ideologically motivated or angry (Pilkington, 2016). Secondly, some seek to find a sense of identity, whether it is the wanderer in search of a like-minded community or a compliant who remains in the movement through identification with others (Pilkington, 2016). Lastly, those motivated by ideology join a movement to express a view. It appears all four respondents could be classified as 'identity compliant,' as they all find a sense of identity through their interaction with other organisation members. While each organisation member's identity differs, members within the organisation develop an identity as part of the organisation; they become MÖM members, and many identify as protectors of the Hungarian people and part of a larger radical right movement. This identification as an organisation member then strengthens feelings of pride. Ideology may also play a role in their membership, but this is not something that is openly advertised outside of the organisation. They also all spoke of protecting their fellow Hungarians, which would seemingly also imply a motive of instrumentality in their membership.

Two main sets of themes arose from this study. Firstly, there are four general themes which resulted from the categorisation of codes. These are themes which largely encompass what was discussed in the interviews. The other types of themes are membership themes, which were interpreted from the narrative analysis of the interviews.

The four general themes have already been discussed throughout this analysis. These themes are: personal views, being a MÖM member, MÖM as a helpful and good organisation, and MÖM as a radical right organisation. These themes helped with organisation, especially in reference to the study's research questions. The last two of these general themes will be further discussed with reference to emotional themes.

As mentioned, three overlapping themes pertaining to membership also became evident throughout each participant's narrative: 'the soldier,' 'family and community,' and 'the social protector.' The first theme, 'the soldier,' arose because participants spoke about being 'civil soldiers' and going on patrols. One participant even sought out the organisation as he was seeking a paramilitary-style organisation. It seems as though members view themselves as somewhat of a civilian army fighting for the protection and preservation of a 'Hungarian' Hungary. The second theme of 'family and community' was obvious throughout all interviews. All participants emphasised the importance of solidarity and feelings of family, brotherhood, friendship, and community. Members of MÖM regularly help one another, which participants found important. Lastly, the theme of 'social protector' was evident through discussion of helping their fellow Hungarians. Some gave concrete examples of how the organisation went out and helped people. Others spoke about drawing the attention of law enforcement to undesirable situations. Participants spoke about not only of helping people physically, through their regular patrols for example, but legally as well.

Emotions

It is important to consider the emotional aspects of political activism and social movement participation when discussing such an organisation (Jasper, 1998; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2001; Pilkington, 2016). Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta (2001) describe two types of emotions in social movement participation. The first is 'reciprocal' emotions, which refer to the ongoing feelings of group members towards one another. These emotions can be felt as feelings of friendship, love, solidarity, and loyalty, and serve to bind the group together. The other type of emotion is 'shared,' which is common to all group members but directed externally through protest movements, most especially in the form of anger and outrage, or perhaps disgust or fear. Emotions can be important in both maintaining membership in a movement, through feelings toward fellow group-members, and in joining an organisation, if an individual is moved to join after attending an emotionally-charged event. Assemblies of people, whether at demonstrations, volunteer activities, or memorials, can create emotional energy in individual participants (Collins, 2001).

When it comes to members of MÖM, reciprocal emotions are much more common, or at least more openly discussed, among group members than are shared emotions. As Árpád mentioned during his interview, there are many different attitudes and ideologies represented in MÖM. While there could be shared emotions of fear towards the Roma population, this was not explicitly expressed in the interviews. Given the evidence for activity in Roma-populated areas, and comments about Roma by the organisation, the emotion of fear can be assumed, given prior evidence of the relationship between fear and prejudice (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). All four respondents did, however, emphasise the ideas of friendship, solidarity, and family, implying that one of the reasons individuals maintain membership in the organisation is due to close ties with other members.

The main positive emotional themes that were common among respondents were solidarity and pride. Solidarity was quite evident in several forms. Respondents discussed solidarity with fellow group members: the feeling of a brotherhood, a family, and a close group of friends. They also discussed solidarity with the Hungarian people: "We need to look out for each other and our fellow man, and we need to protect them should the situation arise" (Zoltán).

The theme of pride was also brought up in reference to pride in being a MÖM memberand pride of being Hungarian. Peter said: "It's beautiful being Hungarian" and described the Hungarians as a proud, intelligent, and hardworking people. Árpád explained: "We know that we're a culture that left a mark on the world." All respondents exhibited pride in being members of the organisation, which was shown in several ways: in simply stating that they are proud to be a member, in discussing their importance and how they've gained an intimate knowledge of the legal system, in discussing their role in the organisation as a leader and/or teacher, and in discussion of the effects of their actions on encouraging law enforcement to act.

Summary

All four participants had quite different narratives of activism, while sharing commonalities. When it came to the origin of their nationalist views and feelings, two respondents traced their origins back to their childhood. This could be due, however, to a creation of their own narrative; it is impossible to unequivocally know whether this is indeed where they originated. One respondent spoke of moral outrage driving him to activism, and another was unsure but maintained that it was not due to family influence.

Three of the four respondents specifically sought out such organisations. This was for various reasons, such as frustration and moral outrage, and one participant sought a

paramilitary-style movement. Only one of the fours respondents joined through a personal contact who invited him to his first event.

The question of why participants maintain membership can best be answered through the development of a collective identity and through emotion. All participants spoke of similar emotions in relation to the organisation, the most important of which are feeling of solidarity, loyalty, and pride.

5.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF BRITISH INTERVIEWS

Textual interviews resulted in 105 responses, six of which were not used. These were removed for several reasons. Four were removed as they were clearly trying to skew the data: one citing "right wing nationalism" as the biggest issue affecting Great Britain at the moment, another citing "white people" as an answer to the same question, another obviously having no interest in the EDL and answering "my socks" to what they would lose if they left the organisation, and another answering "cheese" (or variations thereof) to all questions. The other two were excluded as they clearly had never heard of the EDL before; both gentlemen were above 70 years of age. It seemed one of these individuals believed the interview questionnaire to be given by the EDL, although the purpose of the questionnaire was clearly stated. The 99 respondents that remained were not necessarily all members or even direct supporters: they were individuals who agree with the EDL's mission and support the organisation on some level. Of all respondents, 13 individuals specifically stated they were either members or supporters of the EDL.

Of these 99 respondents, 85 (85.86%) were male, 12 (12.12%) female, and two gave no answer. This discrepancy in gender was also found by Bartlett and Littler (2011), as 81 percent of EDL Facebook supporters in their study were male and 19 percent female (n = 38,200). A similar ratio was also found by Pilkington (2016) offline, at 77 percent male and 23 percent female (n = 35). Most respondents fell into the 50-59 year-old age group at 36 individuals (36.36%), with the second largest age groups being 60-69 years old at 21 individuals (21.21%) and 40-49 years old with 18 individuals (18.18%); two people refused to give their age (see Table 5.2 for demographic distribution of respondents). This sample seems consistent with Busher's (2016) study of EDL activists, where 66.67 percent of respondents (n = 18) were between 36-65 years of age.

Table 5.2: Demographic distribution of British textual interview respondents.

Age Group	Male	Female	Refused	TOTAL
18-29	10	0	-	10
30-39	3	0	-	3
40-49	17	1	-	18
50-59	31	5	-	36
60-69	17	4	-	21
70+	5	2	-	9
Refused	-	-	2	2
TOTAL	85	12	2	99

Importantly, these textual interviews show a representative sample of those individuals who followed the EDL's Facebook page and supported them online, not a sample of definitive supporters and/or members. Of the 99 respondents who participated in the textual interviews, seven (7.07%) either stated that they were members of the EDL or discussed greater involvement in the organisation. It should be noted that several respondents stated that the EDL does not have a membership list, hence it being impossible to be an official member of the organisation. A further four people stated that they were sympathisers (4.04%) and 28 (28.28%) people either directly stated that they were supporters of the EDL or alluded to such. Six (6.06%) respondents stated that they had now left the EDL.

These results are quite different from those found by Bartlett and Littler in 2011, where they found that 76 percent of the sample considered themselves to be members of the EDL, while 23 percent did not. This difference could be due to differences in defining who is a member, but even if supporters and sympathisers were added to those identifying as members in this study, that would only be 39.39 percent and far less than the 76 percent found in 2011. The sample sizes of the two studies are considerably different, however, with 99 individuals in this sample and 38,200 in the 2011 study. Also, crucial to consider is the departure of the EDL's founder, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (better known as Tommy Robinson), in 2013. Several respondents in this study expressed less involvement in the

organisation since his departure; surely this had an effect on the number of individuals considering themselves members of the EDL, but the question remains whether it would account for a nearly 40 percent difference in the findings. The lower percentages of members and supporters found in this study shows that it cannot be assumed that followers of an organisation's Facebook page are necessarily direct supporters of the group or, indeed, even have an idea of what the organisations stands for.

Of the 99 textual interviews analysed and coded, 57 interviews and partial interviews will be discussed herein. The remaining 42 interviews were removed as either they did not give any answers to the research questions, did not give enough detail to provide any necessary information, or in a few cases, as it was apparent that the respondent was not actually a supporter or sympathiser of the EDL.

Results will be given thematically, divided by research question and underlying themes. The themes are categorised in four sections. First presented will be themes surrounding why respondents turned to nationalism; what their main concerns and frustrations are. Then, the three research questions will be taken in turn; namely, why individuals joined the EDL, what they have learned or get from the EDL, and why they maintain membership in the organisation. As these are textual interviews, all quotes are presented as they were written by the respondents; where necessary, clarification can be found in square parentheses.

5.3.1 The Turn to Nationalism

While this category is not directly one of the research questions, it is crucial to examine those factors that drive supporters to adopt nationalist, or radical right, attitudes and develop a radical right identity, and to understand what drives their frustration. Understanding these factors aids in recognising what drives individuals to radicalism, as

well as what ultimately can make them more likely to support organisations like the EDL. Indeed, as pointed out by Busher (2016), the EDL is somewhat of a 'lightning rod' for different interests; one individual may be more interested in patriotism, while another far more concerned with Islam. The main themes that arose here were immigration, concern over Islam, disenchantment with politics and politicians, anger of the disrespect of British soldiers, general disenchantment and frustration, and the effects of the online space and specific major events.

Immigration

Immigration is seemingly one of the biggest concerns of EDL supporters, according to this data, with 61 of the overall 99 respondents citing it as such. Of the 57 interviews ultimately used in this thematic analysis, 30 coded under 'turn to nationalism' suggested that immigration was one of their major concerns. These concerns over immigration could largely be divided into four groups: those feeling that immigrants had taken over their homes and neighbourhoods, those who felt that immigrants are given advantages over the native Brits, those feeling that immigrants are generally ruining the country and making it worse in some tangible way, and those who feel that the British way of life and British people are threatened by immigrants.

Some respondents (6, 30, and 63) expressed the idea of immigrants taking over working-class communities. Indeed, Winlow and colleagues (2017) found that many of the EDL supporters who they interviewed were frustrated as they saw their neighbourhoods changing and becoming more diverse, and felt that they were in turn becoming a minority. Respondent 63 expressed that he grew up in a poor working-class family and saw immigrants receive free housing. Respondent 30 expressed how he saw his neighbourhood changing; in his words, "the evolution of where I live." He witnessed the "demographic

destruction" of his home, especially over the last five years; five years ago, there were still "indigenous Brits" in the area. He articulated that Syrian refugees, who do not speak English, "won't be going back to where they came form." Lastly, Respondent 30 expressed frustration over never having 'been asked' if he, and his community, wanted this to happen.

Others (13, 50, 56, 63, 73) seemed to express concern over immigrants and minorities being given more advantages and privilege from the government than the 'native' British public, and that immigrants are favoured over native Brits (Respondent 13). These sentiments were generally found together with a negative view and distrust of the government and politicians, further implying that respondents blame politicians for their favouritism of immigrants. Respondent 63 followed his discussion about immigrants receiving free housing by claiming that if one is "born and bred British you can lay in a shop door" waiting to die, but that 'illegal' immigrants receive free housing, healthcare, and education. They will never be hungry or homeless, he claimed. Respondent 56 expressed having bad experiences with foreigners who "abuse the system and rip me off and abuse my good nature." They claim that the lives of British citizens are 'in decline' due to immigration, although it is not clear whether they are referring to the number of individuals, life expectancy, or quality of life. Respondent 73 similarly expressed that immigrants come to the country to receive free housing and benefits, "while people born here are struggle just to live."

Few respondents (13, 63, 94) also discussed how immigrants were making the country worse in some tangible way. Respondent 13 said that the country was "better before" immigrants brought violence in; it is not clear whether this respondent believes there was no violence before the arrival of immigrants. Respondent 63 expressed that "mass uncontrolled immigration" should be stopped and that "illegal immigrants" should be deported – according to them, upwards of 600,000 per year. Immigrants, according to

Respondent 63, are the reason for both the housing crisis and the NHS crisis. Lastly, Respondent 94 has always been against immigration, unless the immigrants bring something 'good' to the country. He believes that "they" should not just let anyone into the country, and that "illegals" should be deported immediately, indeed the same day they are caught.

Lastly, a more significant proportion of respondents (30, 31, 32, 47, 52, 59, 83, 101, 105) believed that immigrants threaten British identity and the British way of life. Respondent 47 expressed concern over the establishment "chipping away at our values" and "giving our country away." Respondent 105 felt that British culture is being pushed out by other cultures, and also feels that immigrants are racist against "white British people." He feels that "traditional values and culture not respected," and expressed frustration over not finding British food at restaurants in London. One respondent (52) specifically expressed turning to nationalist attitudes when they felt that Brits "became non-existent in our own country." Others (32) turned to these attitudes once "non compatible people" began arriving. Respondent 101 felt that only bad has come from "mass immigration and multi culturusm [multiculturalism]" and was concerned that there are "too many immigrants here and changing our identity." Similarly, Respondent 59 was concerned over a loss of British culture and felt that the government is allowing uncontrolled immigration. Similarly, Respondent 31 had concerns over uncontrolled immigration, but was okay with "people from the right countries." Lastly, Respondent 83 expressed concern over the "systematic replacement of British people" and that the government had been "flooding our country with wankers."

Concern over Islam

Given that the EDL is often cited as an anti-Islam and anti-Muslim (Copsey, 2010; Jackson, 2011; Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016) protest movement, it is clear that Islam is one of the biggest concerns of EDL supporters. In this analysis it was found to be the third-biggest concern, behind immigration and mainstream politics, with 51 of the overall 99 respondents citing it as such. This change could likely be due to the above-mentioned analyses being conducted before the recent wave of immigration and subsequent Brexit referendum, demonstrating that the concerns of those in the British radical right are shifting. This is unsurprising given the recent rise in far-right protest in Great Britain, apparently the largest numbers seen since the 1930s (Dearden, 2019). Of the 57 interviews ultimately used in this thematic analysis, 27 coded under 'turn to nationalism' suggested that Islam was one of their major concerns. Some of these were mixed with concerns over immigration and some were quite veiled in their speech, citing concerns over 'grooming gangs' and 'religion' rather than Islam directly.

Some respondents (20, 35, 48) expressed concern over terrorism, and suggested that knowledge of terror attacks ultimately drove them to adopt far-right attitudes. Respondent 20 read about terrorists and 'rape gangs' in the newspaper, while Respondent 48 saw Muslims killing "inisent" [innocent] people in the news. Respondent 35 expressed concern over the government apparently doing little about terror attacks. Respondent 87 referred to convicted Jihadist Anjem Choudary as a "hate preacher" who is "spewing hate on the streets of England."

Several respondents had negative views of Islam for various reasons (26, 36, 56, 61, 85, 86, 87, 88), and seemed to take issue with the religion and people themselves. Respondent 36 expressed always being against organised religion but had "a special loathing for Islam" due to its "extreme dogma and misogyny." Respondent 56 described

Muslim culture as "sick and twisted"; they had dated a Muslim man in the past, and, because of this, expressed having a familiarity with the culture. They explained that the goal of Muslims is to outnumber the natives "and control us and force Sharia onto us." Similarly, Respondent 88 has a Muslims friend who opened their "eyes to what Islam is about and the hate preaching that is going on." Some responses expressed much more immediate concern, such as Respondent 61, who claimed that Muslims say each day that they will behead and kill all infidels, and kill all British soldiers. Muslims, supposedly, will not integrate and always say: "We're not here to integrate, we're here to dominate." "They want to change everything that is British," said Respondent 61, "Merry Christmas. Happy Easter and even Valentines Day. Our Customs, Our Values our forefathers fought and Died for!" It seems that Respondent 61 turned to far-right attitudes after the 2017 Manchester and London attacks.

Others (41, 58, 87, 93) seemed convinced that Muslims were actively attempting to hurt native British people or impose Islam on them. Respondent 93 referred to working with "people who want to change the British culture to suit themselves." Others referred to the grooming or rape gangs (86, 87) of Rotherham and elsewhere.

Finally, two respondents referred to Muslims as victims and emphasised the negative aspects of Islam, not Muslims. Respondent 68 expressed that "Muslims are victims, victims of Islam. We should help them understand that Christianity is the way." Respondent 95 expressed that his views of "Islam as a religion" hadn't changed in some time, "but what people need to remember is that Islam is the problem not all Muslims."

Political Concerns

The biggest concern of EDL supporters seems to be mainstream politics and politicians, according to this data, with 71 of the overall 99 respondents citing it as such.

Of the 57 interviews ultimately used in this thematic analysis, 20 coded under 'turn to nationalism' suggested that politicians were one of their major concerns. Several people (68, 75, 77, 83) cited corruption of politicians as a main concern. Others expressed anger over how Brexit was being handled by the UK government (29, 40, 53, 78).

Some respondents (35, 52, 58, 60) felt like the government sat back and allowed the country to be overrun by immigrants or allowed terror attacks to happen (35). One elderly respondent (52) turned to nationalism when they felt Brits "became non-existent in our own country"; they expressed heartbreak over how the country was being run. Others (40, 47, 53, 58) expressed disenchantment and distrust in politicians; while Respondent 40 suspected a possible "collusion wit the EU" by the UK government. Respondent 58 felt that politicians were not controlling Muslims well enough, stating "the appeasement of the so called religion of peace" as an issue. Finally, Respondent 47 felt that the 'establishment' had been "chipping away at our values" and "giving our country away."

Beyond a direct distrust in mainstream politicians themselves, several other issues were cited by respondents such as concerns over the EU (32, 39, 40, 56, 67, 75, 95) and Brexit specifically (29, 40, 53, 67, 68, 78, 84, 89, 102). These concerns closely connect to a distrust in politicians, as many feel the government has not been respecting the voice of the people since the 2016 Brexit referendum' indeed, there has been some discussion of concern over the anger of the radical right if Brexit discussions are further postponed (Mackey, 2019). It seems that this is a fairly new concern of EDL supporters and a newer driver towards the radical right in Great Britain, as it has not been previously mentioned as a driver in the literature. It is likely that this has become a greater driver since the Leave campaign in 2015 and most especially since the Brexit referendum in 2016. Until now, the literature has discussed the influence of radical right attitudes on Brexit, but there has been little discussion of the impact of Brexit on radicalisation.

Disrespect of British Soldiers

Six Respondents cited concern over the way veterans were treated: both in terms of negative treatment by Muslims (49, 58, 61) and disrespect by politicians and the general public (11, 73, 103). One respondent (58) discussed the "disgusting behaviour of muslims at returning soldiers," and the lack of any police presence to fairly deal with the situation. This was also combined with the feeling that the government also did not deal with the situation appropriately, seemingly leading to further distrust in politicians. Respondent 58 specifically cited the example above as the reason they sought out a radical right organisation to join.

Another respondent (61) stated that each day Muslims specifically say they will behead all infidels and kill all British soldiers. Respondent 49 specifically referred to the organisation 'Islam4UK' (although the Respondent referred to the group as "Islam for UK"), a radical Islamist group proscribed since 2010, as being against soldiers. This comment, however, may have been in reference to the first EDL demonstration in Luton in 2009. Another respondent (103) referred to a "witchunt of soldiers who served in NI," however with no clarification of what this witch-hunt could entail. Lastly, Respondent 73 expressed concern over soldiers being homeless on the streets, with no help from the government, which was combined with frustration over immigrants who receive housing and benefits.

Disenchantment and Frustration

Several Respondents expressed feelings of disenchantment and frustration (12, 29, 30, 31, 40, 56, 63, 85, 97, 101). These feelings were often combined with worry about the future of the country and the feeling that others were given advantages over the

Respondent's own people. The latter was especially connected to feelings of immigrants being given advantages over British natives (13, 63). Respondent 30 expressed frustration over "never being asked" about immigrants and, most especially, Muslims coming into the country.

Feelings of disenchantment were generally aimed at the government: feelings of disappointment in the government over allowing immigrants into the country and over the way Brexit has been handled thus far (29, 40, 85). Respondent 40, for instance, mentioned a perception of weak politicians and a possible "collusion with the EU" over Brexit. Indeed Respondent 29 expressed that they may have turned to the far-right through a combination of the effects of the leave campaign (this is assumed as the respondent mentioned the referendum, as well as having adopted radical views after 2015) and through a disenchantment with British politicians.

Other respondents (56, 63, 97, 101) seemed to be frustrated over not being able to speak out and say how they feel, as they are often labelled negatively for their views. Respondent 56 expressed that political correctness only favours Black people and Muslims, although they explicitly stated that they do not have an issue with Black people "but its like they have a problem with me. Not all blacks, just some." This respondent seemed to be frustrated that they could not speak out about people of colour, but felt that they could speak out against white people. Respondent 101 felt that they are "patriotic which seems to be a sin these days"; there indeed seemed to be concern over British people not being able to express their patriotism. Respondent 97 began to turn to nationalism after noticing double standards being imposed, that people would be called fascist, racist, and Islamophobic if their opinions differed from 'leftists'; he felt that it is unfair that groups like the EDL are vilified while ANTIFA are not. Finally, Respondent 63 voiced that those, like himself, who are against immigration are automatically labelled as nazis: "ironically my family fought

the Nazis to keep Britain free from extremists who views are not compatable to British democracy." This was a crucial statement that well defines some of the issues in the discussion of the British radical right, particularly issues surrounding terminology and the changing socio-political context.

References to Radicalisation

Some Respondents made specific reference to self-radicalisation. It was not named as such, but described hearing about these ideas, or the moment they realised they need to do something about certain situations. These instances were either found through the internet or news media, or through some specific event that they naturally heard of through the media.

Seven respondents (16, 58, 59, 68, 75, 85, 102) mentioned being radicalised, although stated differently in their own words, through the internet and news media. One respondent (16) self-described as being radicalised through the internet, stating "Www. Eye opening information" to the question: "Have you always felt this way about these issues? Do you remember what made you begin to feel this way?" Another respondent (85) claimed that he found himself turning to the radical right due to more online availability of alternative views, and that he had not always felt this way.

Other respondents spoke generally about the media, not the online space. Most of these Respondents spoke about concerns over media bias and general distrust in the media (58, 59, 75, 85). Respondent 102 expressed concern that the media covered up serious crimes, like the "rape of children in Rotherham." This apparently opened his eyes to many evils. Respondent 59 felt that the media produces propaganda and states that being an "English patriot if [is] racist but not if you are Welsh, Scottish or Irish." Both of these concerns with the media involve the feeling of the media protecting the 'other' and not the

'real' English people; they protect Islamic criminals and allow the Welsh, Scottish, and Irish to be patriotic, which is unfair to the English.

Five respondents made reference to specific events affecting them to such a point that they turned to nationalism. Busher (2016) describes these as a type of 'moral shock' over four major events in particular: the New York attacks of 11th September 2001, the London bombings on 7th July 2005, an event in Barking on 15th June 2010, and an incident in London on 11th November 2010. Given that Busher's research was conducted in 2011-2012, there are newer events that also elicit this same 'moral shock' among respondents. Respondent 61 made specific reference to the Manchester and London attacks in 2017; this respondent was, in turn, heavily Islamophobic. Respondents 31 and 86 reference to the 7/7 attacks: "I felt like this since the bombs went off in London" (31). Respondent 49 mentioned attending the first EDL demonstration in Luton, and Respondent 103 specifically mentioned joining the EDL after the murder of drummer Lee Rigby in May 2013.

Summary

This section explored the question of what first turned respondents to nationalism and radical right views. The three main reasons, as stated by respondents, were immigration, disenchantment with politics and politicians, and Islam. Traditionally, the main concern of EDL supporters has been Islam; this is still seen on their website and was seen on their social media. As discussed in Chapter 4, much of the imagery and content of the EDL online did indeed concern Islam and Muslims. However, these textual interviews demonstrate that EDL supporters are far more concerned with immigration and politicians, likely due to Brexit and frustration over how it has been handled. Combined with the results of the statistical analysis, it becomes clear that concerns over immigration involve issues

of immigrants being of other cultures, particularly Muslim, and issues around politicians favouring immigrants over native Brits; economic concerns are less of an issue for those on the far-right, which was also supported by the textual interview data. Additionally, respondents cited concern over the disrespect of British soldiers, expressed general frustration, and referred to specific events as the point when they were encouraged to develop radical right views.

5.3.2 Pathways to the EDL

The next analysis was of pathways into the EDL and level of membership of respondents; only those interviews were coded in this category who answered the questions about their involvement in the EDL, namely "Can you tell me how you became a member/supporter of the EDL and how long you've been a member/supporter? How did you hear about the organisation (through friends, online...)? How did you join (did you just show up?)?" and "What made you originally want to join the EDL?"

Of the 57 textual interviews which were ultimately used for this study, eight respondents explicitly stated not being a member or supporter, 11 were members, 22 were supporters, and five were sympathisers. Some of those coded as non-members were members of other organisations, such as Britain First (56) or the BNP (63). One Respondent stated that it is impossible to join the EDL as there is no membership list (38), and another claimed that the organisation no longer exists (97). While the organisation clearly does still exist, it is not nearly as successful as it was before the departure of leader Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, more commonly known as Tommy Robinson, in 2013.

For a respondent to be coded as 'member' they must have explicitly stated such; most referred to 'joining' the EDL, but some explicitly used the word 'member'. One respondent (86) had been a member of the EDL for nine years and referred to himself as "a

active edl chap." However, he did follow by stating that no one could officially join the EDL as they are a voluntary street movement; indeed, more often respondents would refer to themselves as supporters, not members. In one case (39), the respondent spoke as though they were involved with the organisation but spoke of the EDL as "they" (for example, "they take a stand"). This language revealed that the respondent did not see themselves as being a part of the organisation, hence could not be an official member (if such a thing exists). Generally, if a respondent did not refer to themselves directly as a supporter but seemed to have a lot of involvement in the organisation without explicitly stating their level of involvement, they were classed as a supporter. Respondent 99 indeed stated that the EDL has never had a members list, it is open for anyone to "turn up and show their support, regardless of race colour ethnicity religion etc. anyone could support this movement." Those who seemed to only follow the EDL online or who agreed with the message of the organisation without further involvement were classed as sympathisers.

Some respondents did specifically refer to street-level involvement with the organisation (6, 11, 18, 53, 75, 87, 89, 102). These street-level events were all demonstrations in various cities around Britain, such as Luton (11), Rotherham (18), Brum (87), and Dewsbury (75). The latter demonstration was described as a "load of fun" by Respondent 75, for whom this was his first demonstration; he went with a school friend and his father.

Looking to the literature, several pathways into the EDL have been described. Joel Busher (2016) identified six major pathways into the EDL in his study interviewing 18 activists in 2011-2012. The first pathway he described as 'the football lads,' who came to the EDL through football firms. They comprised an estimated 30-40 percent of the core activist community in London and Essex between March of 2011 and May of 2012. They

were all male, of all the same age groups, and had little or no previous involvement with social movement activism.

The second pathway was those already engaged in 'patriotic' activism, such as previous members of the United British Alliance (UBA), March for England (MFE), and UK Patriots. These individuals distanced themselves from more political groups such as the British National Party (BNP) and National Front (NF), likely in avoidance of the 'far right' label, and have a preoccupation with Islam.

The third pathway was those individuals coming from traditional far-right groups. This was approximately 20-30 percent of the core EDL members in London and the Southeast between February of 2011 and May of 2012. These individuals generally came to the EDL from the BNP, NF, English Democrats, or small groupuscules like Combat 18. Busher also mentions that a few activists identified themselves as racist, while others sought to distance themselves from 'nationalist' groups. For example, one of Busher's respondents, a former BNP activist, joined the EDL because, among other things, it was "*not* a nationalist group like the BNP" (Busher, 2016: 40, emphasis in original). Similarly, in this study, two respondents (17 and 103) alluded to the EDL being a non-racist and anti-extremist organisation (see below).

The fourth pathway were those who entered EDL activism through the counter-jihad network. This was a very small proportion of people, no more than five percent, and they were keen to distance themselves from the traditional far right. Despite their small numbers, these activists had a strong ideological influence in the organisation as they were seen as experts on Islam.

Busher refers to the fifth pathway as 'swerveys,' and they are those individuals who were previously involved in some form of radical political and/or religious scene other than (or sometimes even opposed to) the far right. These activists eventually left their initial

scene and connected to anti-Muslim or 'patriotic' activism. This comprised about five percent of EDL members. These individuals were highly articulate and often engaged in intellectual arguments, and generally argued that EDL was not racist or far right.

Lastly, Busher calls the sixth pathway 'the converts,' which is essentially an 'other' category. This category comprises people who did not have any of the previously-mentioned backgrounds and represented about 20-30 percent of the core activist community. Some were involved in political action (such as animal welfare, for example), and others had never previously engaged in any form of social movement activism.

Busher also describes the importance of social ties, especially in the activists' accounts of how they initially entered the group. Only four of the 18 activists interviewed did not describe their social ties as playing an important part in their recruitment. Activists were also more quickly welcomed into the group if they had someone to vouch for them, and also talked about being welcomed and feeling part of a community. Of course, as Busher points out, there is a sampling bias here – the interviewees were all core members of the organisation, hence being more likely to have been immediately welcomed. Lastly, members were not expected to cut ties with other non-EDL activist individuals.

Hillary Pilkington (2016) also discussed the respondents' pathways into the EDL, which she does through using the paths and motives to extreme right activism set out by Linden and Klandermans (2007) in their study of Dutch extreme right activists. Three pathways were described: continuity, conversion, and compliance. Continuity is the result of prior political socialisation, which is then split into revolutionaries who have had a life-long commitment to the movement and wanderers who have moved between organisations. In the conversion pathway, the newly-found activism marks a break with the past. Those individuals who are persuaded to become active by those already committed to a movement or organisation are following a compliance pathway.

Pilkington described the most prominent type in the EDL as 'convert', those who struggle against perceived injustice, while in the EDL's fringe-groups the 'revolutionary' type is often seen. She also points out that nearly all of the respondents joined the movement through their own personal desire. Some respondents ('converts') associated their involvement with a response to national or international events, such as September 11th or the 7/7 bombings, while other came from 'racist' hometowns. According to Pilkington, and contrary to Busher's (2016) findings, surprisingly few respondents discussed the influence of peers or friends: "the movement appears, rather, as a site for making new or 'real' friendships" (Pilkington, 2016: 79). Five respondents did say they first heard of the EDL through friends and attended their first event with them. The most common route into the EDL seemed to be football firms, which seven respondents stated as their pathway.

Lastly, Winlow and colleagues (2017) also analysed pathways into the EDL. Some came to the EDL from football firms, very few had been active in other right-wing organisations prior to joining, and for the vast majority of respondents it was their first time being politically active. Some of the respondents joined the EDL still in the early days of the organisation, while others came later, many hearing about the group from news reports of demonstrations (Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell 2017).

As this study was conducted through textual interviews, it was impossible to follow-up with respondents about answers. Therefore, only that information which the respondent originally volunteered can be used for analysis. This could mean that important information was left out and a complete picture was not offered. With the information that was given from these 57 interviews, the pathways that were mentioned by Busher (2016) seen here were those coming from traditional radical right organisations, 'swerveys', and converts. Looking at Pilkington's (2016) categorisation, all three pathways were seen: continuity, compliance, and conversion. Results seemed to largely support what Winlow and

colleagues (2017) found, namely that for many supporters this was their first time being politically active. Crucially, results of this study did not find one single mention of supporters coming from football firms, save one respondent who mentioned supporting the DFLA. What was explicitly seen was a few respondents coming from other organisation, many who found the group online or heard of it through news media, and several who were encouraged to join through friends, colleagues, and family.

Member of another organisation

Six Respondents cited being members of other radical right organisations or political parties (13, 47, 56, 63, 77, 89). Most of these respondents seemed to be primarily members of the other organisation while supporting the EDL online. These other organisations included Britain First (56), the BNP (63), and UKIP (77). One respondent (89) specified not being a member of the EDL; they used to be a supporter of the BNP but were put off by their radial policies. Now they support the Democratic Football Lads Alliance and the Yellow Vests, but have gone to some EDL events. Respondent 47 stated that they were a BNP member in the past, but now support the EDL. Lastly, Respondent 13 expressed joining the EDL through friends and past involvement with the National Front. These last two examples fall into Busher's (2016) third pathway, of those individuals coming from other traditional far-right organisations.

Heard of EDL online or in the news

As these textual interviews were conducted online and targeted those people who supported the EDL's Facebook page, there was likely a bias toward those supporters who became radicalised or 'joined' the organisation online. That being said, 11 respondents explicitly mentioned hearing about the EDL online (26, 32, 37, 40, 51, 52, 67, 81, 84, 85,

87). A few other respondents heard about the EDL through news media and decided to join the organisation, one presumably though news broadcast (73) and another through the newspapers (101). Interestingly, one respondent (50) seemed to equate membership/support with following the organisation on Facebook. They discussed joining and spoke as they were part of the organisation, but seemed to only follow the EDL on social media.

This again broaches an important issue: the question of who can be defined as a member or supporter of the EDL. It now seems that a large part of their support base is online, with less people attending their demonstrations on the streets. Or at the very least, it seems as though many people are content being online supporters. In a 2011 study of EDL activists on Facebook, Bartlett and Littler (2011) found that 52 percent of respondents considered themselves as only involved in 'online activism', while 44 percent attended local demonstrations. Crucially, though, this means the organisation could promote their attitudes, ideology, and a sense of solidarity through the online space, without ever truly having to organise on the streets. This idea is supported by the anti-radicalisation efforts of social media companies like Facebook, who banned the organisation (and other British radical right organisations) in April of 2019.

Joined through pre-existing relationships

Eleven Respondents described joining the organisation, or at least being introduced to the organisation, by family, work colleagues, and friends. Respondent 35, who joined due to concerns over "the rise of militant Islam," heard about the EDL through family and just 'showed up'; this respondent did not specify whether their family members were also members of the EDL.

Some respondents became aware of the EDL through work colleagues (29, 68, 102). Respondent 29, who met EDL members through work, expressed that where he lives it is difficult to socialise with people who are "similar" due to "ideological differences"; ultimately, he joined due to "social reasons." Respondent 68 also heard about the EDL through work colleagues and became interested in the organisation once some friends began experiencing specific things that Tommy Robinson spoke about; although unspecified, these issues are likely to do with Islam as he later did specify joining the EDL due to a complete lack of engagement by authorities against Islamic issues. Another respondent (102) had been a member for many years, attending several local demonstrations, where he "was encouraged to attend by work mates."

Seven respondents were introduced to the EDL by friends (13, 20, 39, 41, 48, 75, 87). Some simply mentioned friends asking them to join (20), others heard of the organisation through friends (39), others heard of the organisation both through friends and online (41, 48). Respondent 41 expressed that he wanted to join others who felt like he did. Respondent 75 showed up to an EDL march in Dewsbury with a school friend and his father, which he described as "a load of fun." Respondent 87 joined after Lee Rigby was murdered and Tommy Robinson was arrested for doing a "charity walk"; he went to his first demonstration with some local "lads" who has booked a coach to go. Finally, one respondent (13) described joining the EDL through friends and involvement in the National Front; he did not specify further as to whether these friends were in the NF or perhaps were members of the EDL and convinced him to join.

In contrast, as mentioned earlier, according to Pilkington (2016) surprisingly few respondents discussed the influence of peers or friends. Five respondents in her study did say they first heard of the EDL through friends and attended their first event with them. The most common route into the EDL seemed to be football firms, which seven respondents

in Pilkington's (2016) study stated as their pathway; crucially, not one respondent in the current study stated coming to the EDL through a football firm.

Summary

This section analysed respondents' involvement in the EDL. Namely, it looked at their level of involvement: firstly, whether they consider themselves as members, supporters, or sympathisers of the organisations, and secondly whether they are active on the streets as well as online. It was found that 22 (38.6%) of respondents were supporters of the EDL, as opposed to 11 (19.3%) members and five (8.8%) sympathisers. Only eight (14.0%) respondents specifically discussed attending events and demonstrations. Again, the nature of this study naturally biased the data toward those who are active online, given that respondents were found through the EDL's (now banned) Facebook page. However, this data does demonstrate the lack of specific membership criteria for the EDL, hence seemingly less of a sense of solidarity and loyalty among the organisation's followers.

Then, this section analysed pathways into the EDL, looking at how individuals joined (to whatever level they did so) the organisation. The most common pathways were found to be joining through pre-existing relationships, such as family and friends, and hearing about the EDL online; these pathways were each cited by 11 (19.3%) respondents. Additionally, six (10.5%) respondents cited joining the EDL after membership in other radical right organisations. Crucially, no respondent cited joining the EDL through a football firm, which had been cited in other studies (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016) as the most common pathway.

5.3.3 Why the EDL

The third theme examined why respondents specifically chose the EDL to join over other radical right organisations, and what drove them to join the organisation in the first place. These ideas were explored through the interview questions: "What does it mean to you, personally, to be a supporter/member of this organisation?" and "Can you tell me what you've learned from being a member/supporter of the EDL?" As expected, many respondents support the EDL due to their stance on Islam. Others mentioned what Busher (2016) would call 'chronic moral outrage', such as agreeing with their position on immigrants, on standing up for veterans, and on speaking out against corrupt politicians. Many respondents felt that they could really make a difference by being a part of the organisation, others felt that supporting the EDL represented British identity and pride, and some referred to the EDL as a community.

While the EDL is seemingly heavily anti-Islam, it draws supporters with a multitude of concerns. This means that some individuals, such as Respondent 75, consider the EDL to not have a specific platform. This particular respondent remarked: "the more you silence no platform groups like EDL the more you hold the door open for more extreme neo-nazi groups like nationalist [National] action" (75). Here, the respondent referred to the organisation National Action, who were proscribed in 2016.

Their stance on Islam

The EDL has often been described as a single-issue organisation primarily focused on anti-Islam (Copsey, 2010; Jackson, 2011; Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016). Indeed, 21 respondents mentioned the EDL's stance on Islam as a reason for supporting the organisation. This 36.8 percent of supporters is close to Bartlett and Littler's (2011) finding of 41 percent of respondents stating opposition to Islam as their main reason for joining the

EDL. However, in this study views on Islam was found to be the second largest issue, while British identity and pride was the largest (see below). Respondents felt that the EDL 'speaks the truth' about Islam (16) and is the only group who actively stands up against Muslims (20) and militant Islam (35); one respondent (86) expressed being proud of having helped "wake people up regarding militant Islam." The EDL are "trying to stop the epidemic of grooming gangs (87); they highlight FGM, Sharia law courts, and "barbaric halal slaughter" (87).

Two Respondents supported the observation proposed by Busher (2016) that some EDL supporters view the EDL as an anti-racist movement. As mentioned earlier, one of Busher's respondents, a former BNP activist, joined the EDL because, among other things, it was "*not* a nationalist group like the BNP" (Busher, 2016: 40, emphasis in original). Respondent 17 expressed that the EDL protests against racism, with the idea that Muslims are indeed the racist ones. Respondent 103 agreed with the EDL's stand on extremism and expressed a belief that the EDL is an anti-extremist organisation; Muslims, in this case, being the extremists.

Other respondents are divided into two groups when it comes to support for the EDL due to their stance on Islam. The first group are those respondents who simply support, and agree with, the EDL's views on Islam (18, 36, 49, 56, 68, 75, 93). One respondent (75) felt that the EDL was the only option, "the only people giving answers," when he realised he didn't like how the "Pakistanis" in his area were acting towards "others." Other respondents suggested that they would like to have Islam removed from Britain and have every person obey the same laws (93), suggested that there is an "Islamic problem" in the UK[23] (49), referred to the "special status being afforded to adherents of the dangerous cult of Islam" (36), learned through the EDL that politicians lie (68), and learned that politicians

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[23] UK is mentioned here rather than Great Britain as respondents specifically discussed the UK.

do nothing about the creation of mosques and the mass influx of Muslims that drive British people out of their homes (56).

The second group are those individuals who feel that the EDL is actively doing something about the issues surrounding Islam in Britain (6, 59, 61, 94, 95, 102). Respondent 61, for example, stated that the British people "are waking up to the nightmare ahead that is Islam" and implied that the EDL would help save the future of the country, as well as English heritage. Another respondent (59) suggested that the EDL is a patriotic organisation "trying to prevent" their "English Christian society from disappearing." This respondent was also convinced that "millions of ordinary people feel the same but are scared to show their feelings because of the bias of the media." This brings up a crucial point: seemingly, some supporters of the EDL feel that their views are the norm. That all British people must feel the way they do, but that others are not brave enough to stand up against the establishment and 'fight'; this ties in with the idea of the Crusader, as found in the online analysis (see Chapter 4), and the idea that the EDL is standing up and fighting for the 'true' British people, identity, and heritage.

Their stance on various ideological issues

Beyond their stance on Islam, several respondents discussed supporting the EDL for various other ideological issues, namely their position on immigration, due to the fact that the EDL stands up for veterans, and because they have learned a lot about the true nature of British politicians from the EDL.

Eleven Respondents expressed supporting the EDL due to some aspect of their stance on immigration (6, 13, 32, 34, 51, 59, 53, 77, 81, 94, 99). Respondent 32 supports the EDL for "our country and future" and not, as he states, for personal reasons: "I support their patriotism and desire to keep Britain essentially British." Similarly, Respondent 50

seemed concerned over Brits losing their identity, and Respondent 53 mentioned being proud of the 'British tradition': and the EDL is symbolic of the struggle to keep this as such." These comments about protecting British identity or the struggle to keep Britain British are very obviously anti-immigrant sentiments, as the feeling is that immigrants somehow pollute, and hence dilute, British identity. Indeed, two other respondents mentioned standing up for the "real" (94) and "native" (77) British people. Respondent 51 expressed that, because of the EDL, there "may be hope for the British way of life," and as Respondent 13 very simply put it, the EDL will help "take back our country." Finally, there seemed to also be concern over the favouring of immigrants over the native British people; "free speech is being taken away from TRUE BRITS," expressed Respondent 34, and the country is "swamped with benefit chasers that we can't afford." Similarly, Respondent 99 expressed that there is a "clear bias" towards "certain community's over British nationals in this country."

Secondly, three Respondents (11, 60, 97) mentioned supporting the EDL due to their stance on supporting veterans and those in the armed forces. One respondent (11) specifically mentioned becoming interested in the EDL due to the fact that they protested against the abuse of the troops, presumably referring to the demonstrations in Luton in 2009. Similarly, Respondent 60 mentioned seeing the way the troops were treated in Luton, and how the police allowed the abuse to occur. Respondent 97, as well, mentioned that the EDL are patriotic people who stand up for the armed forces, as the police and government do little to deal with the "problem." This anger of the apparent abuse of British military veterans likely ties into feelings of frustration over a perceived loss of British identity and culture. This views also seem to correlate with negative views on immigration and, at least in the case of Respondent 97, with feelings of distrust in politicians and the political system.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, many respondents expressed disenchantment and distrust in the British political system and in politicians. It appears these issues have arisen since 2016, after the Brexit Leave campaign and the Brexit Referendum in June 2016. Respondents expressed feeling that they are not being listened to; that the people spoke through the referendum, but that politicians have done nothing in the past three years to honour the wishes of the people. In connection with this, several respondents (34, 47, 56, 60, 68, 81, 94) expressed feeling that the EDL sheds light on the problems with politicians and the establishment. Respondents mention realising how corrupt and self-serving politicians are (34, 47, 94), feeling that the government lies and does little about Islamic issues (56, 68), and that politicians care more about 'foreigners' than British nationals (81). "Organisations like the EDL are showing the public what crap the politicians are prepared to feed us" (34).

Being a Members Makes a Difference

Many respondents suggested that being part of the EDL is important to them as they, in some way, feel like they are making a difference and doing their part for the country. These sentiments generally revolved around the EDL giving them a voice and allowing them to be heard (16, 41, 55, 78, 99), the EDL standing up for ordinary people (47, 73, 84, 99), the EDL is protecting the country and making a difference (35, 48, 86, 89, 102), and that the EDL speaks out and tells the truth about difficult issues (34, 51, 75, 77, 95, 101).

Firstly, respondents expressed that being a part of the EDL gives them a platform for their voices to be heard, as the establishment and politicians do not care (16). The EDL are the only organisation to understand the problems; being a member means they have a voice and will make the "government take note that the people a fed up" (55). One

Respondent (99) who stated that his eyes had been opened "to a global plan that I never knew existed until a few years ago" expressed that the EDL gives "a place to voice the frustration felt by many, a place of union and solidarity."

Secondly, several stated that the EDL represents and supports ordinary people. The EDL stands up for the "common English man even though they were made out to be the bad guys" (73). The organisation, according to respondents (84, 99), stands up for working class people. Respondent 84 expressed that no one else truly understands how he feels about what is happening in the country and that it makes him "sad" that he 'must' be a supporter of the organisation. As Respondent 99 stated:

"The EDL was a reaction to a problem a voice for the working class who were not being represented by the government. Rather than listen to the reason behind the movement the establishment went after that movement in an aim to again stifle the message that the organisation represented."

Thirdly, respondents felt that the EDL truly makes a difference (35, 48, 86, 89, 102). Respondent 48 is a member of the EDL as he, along with others, is trying not to lose his identity and "protect what our forefathers died for"; through the EDL he has learned to stand up for what he believes in and to never give up. Similarly, Respondent 86 felt he is proud to have helped "wake people up regarding militant Islam." There is most definitely a feeling among supporters of saving the country from outside evils, namely immigrants and Islam. However, newly, it seems supporters of the EDL are also wanting to protect the country from 'inside' issues, such as the corruption of politicians who, in turn, aid immigrants and Muslims. For Respondent 102, being a member of the EDL means that he is no longer hiding away, and that the organisation is helping to force politicians to act on their promises.

Finally, six respondents expressed that the EDL speaks out and tells the truth (77, 95) about difficult issues. They feel that their free speech is being taken away (34) and "organisations like the EDL are showing the public what crap the politicians are prepared to feed us" (34). The EDL dare to say what many people are already thinking (101); they have a "back bone strong enough to talk about the real issues that the 'politically correct' cower away from" (51). Indeed, the EDL were "the only people giving answers" (75).

British culture, identity, and pride

Twenty-four respondents mentioned supporting the EDL due to feelings of British pride, identity, or patriotism. In 2011, Bartlett and Littler found that the second most common reason for individuals to join the EDL was related to English identity and preserving national values, at 31 percent. In this study it was found that this was actually the most commonly mentioned reason, at 42 percent.

These feelings were often combined with a feeling that the EDL is helping to save the country, protect the country's future, and to keep it ultimately British. Three respondents (35, 53, 89) specifically referred to the EDL as representing national pride or giving a sense of "English pride" (53). For Respondent 53, the EDL "is symbolic of the struggle to keep" the British tradition alive.

Other respondents referred to the EDL as a patriotic organisation (47, 59, 101), or simply answered "Patriotism" (81) to the question "What does it mean to you, personally, to be a supporter/member of this organisation?" Respondent 101 explained that the EDL are unfairly portrayed, they are "just patriotic people annoyed with what had happened to their country."

The next category ties in closely with the "Being a member makes a difference" category mentioned above, but in this case only refers to those cases that discuss, or imply,

saving British culture and identity (13, 20, 38, 39, 61, 73, 77). In other words, these respondents see the EDL under a lens of a sort of 'identity protectionism'; that the EDL is the only hope for British culture. Some respondents felt that the EDL are fighting for the country's future (20); they are fighting for Britain and because they are members, they are also helping in this fight (77). The EDL will help save the future of the UK and English heritage (61), will help "take back our country" (13), helps to keep Britain safe (38), helps protect the country's history (38), and stands up for the "common English man even though they were made out to be the bad guys" (73).

Finally, the EDL represents British identity and a protection of that British identity (16, 32, 40, 48, 50, 51, 52, 67, 87, 93). It is worth noting here that most respondents referred to themselves and their national identity as 'British'; although supporters of an organisation called the *English* Defence League, few explicitly referred to themselves as English. Some respondents (40, 67) felt that being a member of the EDL represents being truly British. One respondent (50) joined as he was afraid of losing his identity and explained that being part of the EDL represents feeling part of his "country folk." The EDL, to some, represents hope for the future (93) and can make supporters feel that there "may be hope for the British way of life" (51). Respondent 32 expressed that he supports "their patriotism and desire to keep Britain essentially British."

Community

Lastly, six respondents (20, 26, 29, 50, 51, 52) discussed feeling that the EDL is a supportive community. Respondents 26 and 50 expressed that the EDL make them feel like they are not alone, that there are others who feel the same way they do. Respondent 51, similarly, expressed that being part of the EDL helped him realise there are others who feel the same way he does. Respondent 52 felt that the EDL "has" their back, and Respondent

20 described the EDL as a family. Several authors mention the importance of feeling togetherness and solidarity, even specifically among the EDL (Busher, 2016; Winlow et al, 2017). Indeed, as Respondent 85 mentioned, it is important to feel that one belongs and that one's ideas are shared by other people.

Summary

This section analysed reasons why respondents chose to specifically support, and in certain cases join, the EDL over other radical right organisations. The most common reason stated by respondents for choosing the EDL was reasons of British identity, pride, and general patriotism, at 24 (42.1%) individuals. This idea of the EDL as the protector of British values and identity ties in with observations of the EDL's website and imagery (see Chapter 4), namely the Crusader imagery so strongly portrayed. It remains a question as to how strongly this imagery actually influences the organisation's followers, or whether supporters come to the organisation seeking these values.

The second largest reason stated as the reason or joining the EDL was the organisation's stance on Islam, at 21 (36.8%) individuals. Looking at how the EDL markets itself online (see Chapter 4), with their predominantly anti-Islam imagery and rhetoric, this is unsurprising; indeed, this has been found in other studies as a common reason for supporting the EDL (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016). Additionally, 11 (19.3%) respondents mentioned joining the EDL due to their stance on immigration, three (5.3%) referred to their support for British soldiers, and seven (12.3%) expressed that the EDL sheds light on current political issues in Britain. 19 (33.3%) respondents expressed that the EDL in some way makes a difference in British life, whether that be through standing up or ordinary people, protecting the country, or speaking the truth when others will not; six (10.5%) respondents described the EDL as a supportive community.

5.3.4 The Meaning of Membership

Respondents had varying levels of investment in the organisation. Respondents' involvement and commitment to the organisation was interpreted through the question: "What would you lose if you left the EDL?" This question gave great insight in the Hungarian interviews as to respondents' personal involvement in the organisation, hence was utilised in the British interviews as well. Of the 44 people who in some way indicated involvement in the organisation, 13 showed very little or no investment in the EDL, nine were not members, and three had already left the organisation (Respondents 58, 73, 95). Of the people who showed higher level of investment, the most common themes that emerged were pride, dignity and respect, community, and patriotism and hope for Britain's future.

When asked what they would lose if they left the organisation, four respondents (6, 13, 47, 52) stated that they would lose "pride." Most of the respondents seemingly meant pride in themselves, or to do with themselves, but Respondent 47 suggested they would lose a sense of pride in the country. Other respondents suggest they would lose dignity (47) and respect (13, 35, 77, 102) if they left the organisation. Respondents 35 and 77 specifically referred to losing self-respect, but Respondents 13 and 102 did not specify if this was self-respect or the respect of others. Busher (2016) discussed the importance of both pride and dignity, as the EDL provides activists with an opportunity "to express feelings of attachment to and pride in their national or cultural identity" (Busher, 2016: 59). They express their cultural pride in everyday life, for example by displaying flags in their homes. Some also showed pride in becoming increasingly well-informed about legal regulations.

Six Respondents (11, 20, 40, 48, 50, 53) suggested that they would lose their community if they left the EDL. Respondents 40 and 48 stated that they would lose "support" if they left, with Respondent 48 stating that he would lose the support of

thousands of people who think he same but do not have the courage to stand up and say something. Respondent 50 suggested that they feel they are a part of something, but in an online community; they felt a sense of community and belonging through support on social media. Respondent 11 said he would lose good friends and "brotherhood," while Respondent 20 seemed to also have a deeper involvement in the organisation as his friends were also involved. Respondent 53 stated that he would lose "brethren" if he left the EDL.

Pilkington (2016) described respondents discussing the importance of friendship, loyalty, and standing up for one another. They discussed the importance of looking out for other organisation members. One respondent (Euan) discussed the difficulty of considering departure from the EDL: "Because you've made friends, some real good friends you know. People who you'd genuinely miss" (Pilkington, 2016: 198). Others described the organisation as a family, as Lisa did: "It's like a family, you are all there for the same reason aren't you at the end of the day" (Pilkington, 2016: 199). Several respondents talked about the EDL helping them through a difficult phase in their life, from suffering from depression to leaving an abusive relationship. In the end, Pilkington draws a contrast with Virchow's (2007) conclusion that collective emotions are strategically created and manipulated by organisation leaders to construct emotional collectives. She finds, rather, that these bonds in the EDL are "generated from the bottom-up, emerging from a sense of 'togetherness' generated through shared activism…that binds members of a movement" (Pilkington, 2016: 202).

Finally, several respondents felt that the EDL offered hope for the future of the country represents a way to save the country from its fate. Respondent 29 stated that if he left, he would lose "a means to implement positive change." Similarly, Respondent 61 stated that he would lose his "last hope of saving my Country." Others also felt that they would lose hope for the country and culture (93), would lose their chance to 'have their

say' if they left (41), that the EDL represents a belief in the country (26), and two respondents (87, 94) stated that they would never stop supporting the EDL. Respondent 87 stated that they would never leave as there is too much work to do: they "need to make people aware of what's going on." Respondent 67 expressed that they would lose their British identity if they left the organisation.

Summary

The last section of the analysis of textual interviews with EDL members involved exploring why respondents maintained membership in the organisation. As respondents had varying levels of investment in the organisation, only 44 were used in this part of the analysis; of these 44, 13 showed very little on no investment in the EDL, nine were not members, and three had already left. Of the remaining 19 individuals the most common themes for maintaining membership that emerged were pride (four respondents), dignity and respect (six respondents), community (six respondents), and a hope for Britain's future and identity(seven respondents). It appears supporters are not particularly encouraged to maintain membership in the EDL, which could be done through further solidarity and loyalty building or making individuals feel as though they are truly part of the organisation, as seen in other groups. This clearly connects to the issues of not having a clear definition of membership in the organisation and is likely affected by this sample of respondents being largely online supporters..

5.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

A comparison between group members of MÖM and the EDL can be made, though of course not a perfect one given the different interview styles and vastly different sample sizes. Primarily, there were only four members of MÖM interviewed as compared with the 57 textual interviews with EDL Facebook supporters which were ultimately used. To facilitate comparison, similar interview schedules were used for both sets of interviews. The interview schedule used for the EDL textual interviews was a simplified version of the schedule used for MÖM members; it included those questions which yielded the most success in the interviews with MÖM members. The EDL respondents were found on Facebook and had varying degrees of participation in the organisation. Unfortunately, there was no direct contact between the interviewer and the respondents. In the case of MÖM, all participants were suggested by the group leader and interviews were conducted via telephone, not allowing for a good rapport to be developed.

A large majority of respondents were male in the EDL sample, 85 of the 99 total respondents, and all four of the Hungarian participants were male. This reflects the previously found gender-ratio of the organisations, where nearly 20 percent of the EDL is female (Bartlett & Littler, 2011); the gender ratio is unknown in MÖM. Images showing regional members generally portray mostly male members, but images of their events and meetings show many women present. More research is needed to determine a more accurate gender ratio. Members of the EDL are traditionally from the working class (Busher, 2016), which is similar to what is seen among the Hungarian participants: two participants had vocational jobs and one worked as a security guard. Several similarities and difference became apparent: the denial of association with the far-right is a common theme, as are common emotions, but pathways, attitudes, and ideologies differ somewhat. These similarities and differences will now be discussed in terms of themes surrounding the

origins of membership in the respective organisations, why respondents chose those specific organisations, and why they maintain membership in these organisations.

5.4.1 Joining the Organisations

The first crucial difference between the membership of the EDL and MÖM is the definition of membership itself. In the EDL it is not at all clear who is a member, supporter, or sympathiser and exactly what each of those entail. In fact, it seems even the respondents themselves did not have a clear idea of who was a member, with some saying that it was impossible to join the EDL as there was no membership list. Yet another respondent claimed that the organisation no longer exists. In MÖM, on the other hand, membership is clearly defined. While respondents were fairly cryptic about the actual process of becoming a member and seemed careful not to give too much information, it is clear that individuals do indeed become full members after a vetting process; full membership is then symbolised by the presentation of the MÖM waistcoat.

Of those 57 textual interviews which were ultimately used for this study, eight (14.0%) respondents explicitly stated not being a member or supporter, 11 (19.3%) were members, 22 were supporters (38.6%), and five (8.8%) were sympathisers. Some of those coded as non-members were members of other organisations, such as Britain First or the BNP. Clearly this is in stark contrast to the interviewees from MÖM, given that all four were full members.

Although difficult to generate distinctive pathways into the MÖM with only four respondents, some pathways did become evident. All four respondents joined the organisation of their own will and were quite adamant about expressing this fact. Of the participants, two joined MÖM in its current form (László and Árpád), and two joined in its previous form as the For a Better Future Movement (Peter and Zoltán). For the purposes of

discussing pathways into the movement, both groups will be seen as the same organisation. Both Zoltán and Árpád were members of other radical right organisations before joining MÖM/For a Better Future, while Péter and László's first radical right organisation was MÖM/For a Better Future. Three of the respondents (Peter, Zoltán, and Árpád) specifically sought out such an organisation, for various reasons such as frustration and seeking a paramilitary movement, while László was introduced to the idea of radical right organisations by a personal contact.

Pathways to the Organisations

A few common pathways into the EDL also became apparent through the responses to the textual interviews. From past studies on the EDL, it seems the most common pathways into the organisation are through football firms and membership in other radical right organisations, as well as those members who had no previous experience in protest movements. Crucially, results of this study did not find one single mention of supporters coming to the EDL from football firms, save one respondent who mentioned supporting the DFLA. In Hungary, while football hooliganism exists, most often associated with the Ferencváros team, its association is stronger with smaller white power and skinhead organisations. An association with football is not generally seen in the larger radical right organisations such as MÖM. Of the four members interviewed, two had previous experience with other radical right organisations, and for the other two participants MÖM/For a Better Future was the first radical right organisation they joined. One participant was looking for a paramilitary-style organisation and found several others too extreme, while others were looking for an organisation that helped their fellow Hungarians. As for the EDL, six respondents cited being members of other radical right organisations or political parties, such as Britain First, the BNP, UKIP, the DFLA, and Yellow Vests.

Two respondents in particular mentioned coming to the EDL through another organisation, namely through involvement the National Front and through disenchantment with the BNP.

Eleven respondents specifically mentioned hearing about the EDL online, while two others heard of the organisation through news media and decided to join. One respondent even explicitly equated following the organisation on Facebook with membership in the organisation. It could be, however, that this sample is potentially biased through those individuals who supported the EDL online, as these textual interviews were conducted online and targeted those people who supported the EDL's Facebook page.

This again broaches an important issue: the question of who can be defined as a member or supporter of the EDL. It now seems that a large part of their support base is online, with less people attending their demonstrations on the streets. Or at the very least, it seems as though many people are content being online supporters. However, eight EDL respondents did specifically refer to street-level involvement with the organisation. These street-level events were all demonstrations in various cities around Britain, such as Luton, Rotherham, Brum, and Dewsbury. This is in stark contrast to organisations like MÖM, whose identity is almost solely based on their offline activity. The organisation has chapters all over Hungary where members meet regularly, and MÖM regularly organises events from summer camps, to food drives, to remembrance ceremonies, to their so-called 'mood-improving walks'.

It is clear that some people become involved in the EDL after attending a demonstration or other emotionally-charged event, such as a memorial; this can also be seen in past studies of the organisation, where it was found to be more common that in this study (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016). In MÖM, while they often do attend memorial days, most became involved after attending either a community-building activity, such as the children's summer camp, or some sort of volunteer activity like giving food to the poor.

This ties back to the theme of 'social protector' that was seen across the interviews. When looking at the landscape of the Hungarian radical right, it becomes apparent that MÖM do seemingly strive to fill this role among the organisations.

Eleven Respondents described joining the EDL, or at least being introduced to the organisation, by family, work colleagues, and friends. One respondent, who met EDL members through work, expressed that where he lives it is difficult to socialise with people who are 'similar' due to 'ideological differences'. Ultimately he joined due to 'social reasons'. Others mentioned friends asking them to join, hearing about the organisation through friends, and others yet heard of the organisation both through friends and online. One respondent went to a demonstration with a school friend and his father, while another went to his first demonstration with some local people he knew.

Reasons for Joining and Radicalisation

Linden and Klandermans described three possible motives for joining an activist group in their study of Dutch extreme-right activists: instrumentality, identity, and ideology. Those labelled with the instrumentality motive are seeking to fight injustice, whether this fight is ideologically motivated or angry (Pilkington, 2016). Secondly, some seek to find a sense of identity, whether it is the wanderer in search of a like-minded community or a compliant who remains in the movement through identification with others (Pilkington, 2016). Finally, those motivated by ideology join a movement to express a view.

It appears all four respondents from MÖM could be classified as 'identity compliant,' as they all find a sense of identity through their interaction with other organisation members. While each organisation member's identity differs, members within the organisation develop an identity as part of the organisation; they become MÖM members, and many identify as protectors of the Hungarian people and part of a larger

radical right movement. This identification as an organisation member then strengthens feelings of pride. Ideology may also play a role in their membership, but this is not something that is openly advertised outside of the organisation. They also all spoke of protecting their fellow Hungarians, which would seemingly also imply a motive of instrumentality in their membership.

Supporters of the EDL, however, could be primarily labelled under 'instrumentality'. Many respondents seemed frustrated and angry over feelings of injustice, often times feeling like 'others' were given privilege over British natives; this also led to feelings of anger toward politicians. Some respondents also expressed a desire to protect their British identity or feeling that the organisation provided them with a sense of identity. While supporters expressed different ideologies and reasons for joining the organisation, these generally came from a feeling of frustration rather than a particularly strong radical right ideology.

Two respondents from MÖM, Peter and László, could trace the origin of their nationalist feelings back to childhood. It is possible however, that participants have created a narrative of their childhood in order to explain the present; understandably, it is impossible to verify those narratives. Zoltán spoke of becoming disenchanted with the current political system as an adult, and Árpád was unsure of how his radical right attitudes but did seek to join a more paramilitary-style organisation.

The EDL is indeed somewhat of a 'lightning rod' for different interests (Busher, 2016); one individual may be more interested in patriotism, while another far more concerned with Islam. The main themes that arose in this study, namely looking at what drove respondents to nationalism, were numerous: immigration, concern over Islam, disenchantment with politics and politicians, anger of the disrespect of British soldiers,

general disenchantment and frustration, and the effects of the online space and specific major events.

This study found that the biggest concern of EDL supporters was mainstream politics and politicians, with 71 of the overall 99 respondents citing it as such. Of the 57 interviews ultimately used in this thematic analysis, 20 coded under 'turn to nationalism' suggested that politicians were one of their major concerns. Several people cited corruption of politicians as a main concern, while others expressed anger over how Brexit was being handled by the government. Beyond a direct distrust in mainstream politicians themselves, other issues were cited by respondents such as concerns over the EU (seven respondents) and Brexit specifically (nine respondents).

According to this data, immigration is the second biggest concerns of EDL supporters, cited by 61 of the overall 99 respondents and ultimately 30 of the 57 interviews used in the thematic analysis. These concerns over immigration could largely be divided into four groups: those feeling that immigrants had taken over their homes and neighbourhoods, those who felt that immigrants are given advantages over the native Brits, those feeling that immigrants are generally ruining the country and making it worse in some tangible way, and those who feel that the British way of life and British people are threatened by immigrants.

Surprisingly, only the third most common concern of EDL supporters was Islam, cited by 51 of the overall 99 respondents and 27 of the 57 textual interviews used in the thematic analysis. Some of these were mixed with concerns over immigration and some were quite veiled in their speech, citing concerns over terrorism, 'grooming gangs', and simply 'religion' rather than Islam directly.

There were several concerns mentioned by EDL supporters that were not mentioned by the members of MÖM. While there are obvious contextual differences, the large

discrepancy in sample size cannot be disregarded. Had this study interviewed a similar number of members of MÖM it is likely that more concerns would have arisen. That being said, no members of MÖM mentioned specific events as drivers to nationalism, while several members of the EDL did. Five EDL respondents made specific reference to events affecting them to such a point that they turned to nationalism. These instances of 'moral shock' tied to specific events was also described by Busher (2016) as driving individuals to support organisations like the EDL. Respondents in this study made specific reference to the Manchester and London attacks in 2017, the 7/7 London bombing, and the murder of drummer Lee Rigby in 2013.

5.4.2 Appeal of the Organisations

One common theme among both groups was the denial of any association with the far-right. The EDL have traditionally been adamant about denying any labels of extremism or of racism, saying they are a protest party against Islam. In the case of this study, two respondents alluded to the EDL being a non-racist and anti-extremist organisation. MÖM respondents also denied this association, except one participant who suggested he would accept the label for himself (but made no mention of the organisation). While the EDL is a protest movement, after interviewing the small sampling of members of MÖM it has become apparent that they are a movement with strong radical right attitudes. Their activities include volunteering to help poor Hungarians in rural areas, community-building, and vigilantism in the sense of acting as civilian soldiers.

The appeals of the organisations, however, differ. For the members of MÖM it seems as though the appeal lies in a few possibilities: those who seek out a paramilitary-style organisation, those who seek to help their fellow Hungarians, and those who are looking for a community of people with similar views to their own. Three overlapping

themes pertaining to membership in MÖM became evident throughout each of the four participants' narrative: 'the soldier,' 'family and community,' and 'the social protector.' The first theme, 'the soldier,' arose because participants spoke about being 'civil soldiers' and going on patrols. One participant even sought out the organisation as he was seeking a paramilitary-style organisation. It seems as though members view themselves as somewhat of a civilian army fighting for the protection and preservation of a 'Hungarian' Hungary. The second theme of 'family and community' was obvious throughout all interviews. All participants emphasised the importance of solidarity and feelings of family, brotherhood, friendship, and community. Members of MÖM regularly help one another, which participants found important. Lastly, the theme of 'social protector' was evident through discussion of helping their fellow Hungarians. Some gave concrete examples of how the organisation went out and helped people. Others spoke about drawing the attention of law enforcement to undesirable situations. Participants spoke about not only of helping people physically, through their regular patrols for example, but legally as well.

There were several themes that came up among EDL supporters, in terms of the reasons their support the organisation. One important contrast to MÖM is that most of these themes are to do with ideological issues and frustration rather than physical reasons. As many EDL supporters seem to only support the organisation online and not on the streets, this is unsurprising. The very nature of the organisations obviously affect how and why supporters are attracted to the organisation, hence an organisation who is largely based online will attract people for more ideological and philosophical reasons.

The most common reason cited by respondents for supporting the EDL was British identity, pride, and patriotism, cited by 24 of the 57 respondents. These feelings were often combined with a feeling that the EDL is helping to save the country, protect the country's future, and to keep it ultimately British. Some respondents referred specifically to the EDL

as representing national pride, others as a patriotic organisation. Respondents discussed the EDL struggling to keep the British tradition alive and some suggested that the EDL is helping to save British culture and identity. In other words, these Respondents see the EDL under a lens of a sort of 'identity protectionism'; that the EDL is the only hope for British culture. It seems that the EDL gives hope to those who fear the loss of a British identity and culture; as one respondent stated, he supports the EDL's "patriotism and desire to keep Britain essentially British."

The second most common reason cited by respondents was views on Islam. Respondents felt that the EDL 'speaks the truth' about Islam, and is the only organisation who actively stands up against Muslims and militant Islam. Seven respondents simply supported, and agreed with, the EDL's views on Islam, while six others mentioned feeling that the EDL is actively doing something about the issues surrounding Islam in Britain. One respondent, for example, stated that the British people "are waking up to the nightmare ahead that is Islam" and implied that the EDL would help save the future of the country, as well as English heritage. It is not clear exactly how the EDL is 'saving' the country from Islam, as beyond demonstrations no street-level activities were mentioned by any respondents.

Beyond their stance on Islam, several respondents discussed supporting the EDL for various other ideological issues, namely their position on immigration (11 respondents), due to the fact that the EDL stands up for veterans (three respondents), and because they have learned a lot about the true nature of British politicians from the EDL (seven respondents). Other respondents suggest that being part of the EDL makes them feel as though they are making a difference and helping their country, although they do not clarify *how* they are making a difference and helping. These are people who support the EDL as the organisation gives them a voice and allow their grievances to be heard, the EDL stands

up for ordinary people, and that they speak out and tell the truth about difficult issues. Finally, six respondents expressed supporting the EDL as it is a community, helping them realise there are others who feel as they do and giving them a feeling of belonging.

As can be clearly seen from the results of this study, and as mentioned as well by Busher (2016), there are many different interests and grievances among members in the EDL. Some may be more patriotic, while others are far more concerned with Islam. This is quite like what Árpád described, in that MÖM also has many different types of people within the organisation. This was somewhat apparent among the respondents in this study, as well, as some were more concerned with the volunteer aspect of MÖM while others more so with radical right ideology. Many in the EDL also referred to specific traumatic events that lead to their political activism, such as the terror attacks of 9/11 or 7/7. This is not seen among the members of MÖM, likely as they are not an openly-racist, single-issue protest party. The members of MÖM are more concerned with protecting the Hungarian people, often times against a perceived non-Hungarian 'threat', and bringing back 'real Hungarian values.'

Considering these results against the results of the statistical analysis (Chapter 3), it becomes clear that the far-right and radical right in both countries are frustrated and concerned with immigration, but in slightly different ways. The statistical analysis showed far-right supporters in both Hungary and the UK to have concerns over immigrants and their effects on the culture of the country, but only Hungary showed concern over the effect of immigrants on the country's economy. Hence, it becomes clear that the concern of EDL supporters is not over their economic situation, but rather around not being heard, feeling immigrants are favoured over native Brits, and politicians not delivering on their promises. The perceived economic threat of immigrants in Hungary could have to do with the already

poor economic situation of the country, especially after the transition; also, one must not rule out the influence of the current political climate.

5.4.3 Maintaining Membership

In order to explore why respondents maintained membership in their respective organisations, they were asked what they would lose if they left their organisations. This question was actually quite successful, resulting in some insight into the varying levels of investment in the organisations. Both groups exhibit a lot of pride in both their nation and their organisation. Probably strongest among both groups is the obvious importance of the feeling of friendship, family, brotherhood, loyalty, and general solidarity with the movement.

In the Hungarian interviews, this resulted in the discussion of several emotional themes. The main positive emotional themes that were common among respondents were solidarity and pride. Solidarity was quite evident in several forms. Respondents discussed solidarity with fellow group members: the feeling of a brotherhood, a family, and a close group of friends. The theme of pride was also brought up in reference to pride in being a MÖM member and pride of being Hungarian. All respondents exhibited pride in being members of the organisation, which was shown in several ways: in simply stating that they are proud to be a member, in discussing their importance and how they've gained an intimate knowledge of the legal system, in discussing their role in the organisation as a leader and/or teacher, and in discussion of the effects of their actions on encouraging law enforcement to act.

When asked what they would lose if they left the organisation, four EDL respondents stated that they would lose "pride." Most of the Respondents seemingly meant pride in themselves, or to do with themselves, but one respondent suggested they would

lose a sense of pride in the country. Other Respondents suggested they would lose dignity and respect if they left the organisation. A few respondents also expressed that the EDL offered hope for the future of the country, suggesting that they maintain membership because of this feeling of hope. One respondent went as far as to say that he would lose his British identity if he left the EDL, suggesting a belief that a 'true' Brit would be a member of the EDL.

Of the 57 respondents, six suggested that they would lose their community if they left the EDL. Two of these respondents stated that they would lose "support" if they left, with one of them stating that he would lose the support of thousands of people who do not have the courage to stand up for themselves. One respondent in particular suggested feeling as though they are part of an online community, feeling a sense of belonging through support on social media. Finally, one respondent stated that he would lose good friends and "brotherhood," and another would lose "brethren" if they left the EDL.

From these results, it become clear that the feelings of brotherhood and solidarity can be tied to the level of membership in the organisation. As all the MÖM respondents were full members of the organisation and move deeply involved, they all expressed a deeper sense of brotherhood and hence solidarity and loyalty. Two EDL respondents did specifically say that they would lose 'good friends' and 'brethren'; both of these respondents expressed a deeper level of involvement in the organisation, also attending demonstrations. As the EDL does not seemingly have such strict membership criteria, supporters will likely not be as invested in the organisation as if they were 'official' members and representatives. It is much easier, and presumably less dangerous, to simply unfollow an organisation on Facebook, as in the case of many EDL supporters, than it would be to hand back a MÖM waistcoat that one received after being vetted, most especially if that individual lives in a small community.

5.4.4 Conclusion

Qualitative interviews were completed with four members of the Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM) and textual interviews collected from supporters of the English Defence League (EDL), of which 57 were used for thematic analysis. Interviews explored questions of how individuals became members of their respective organisations, why they chose those organisations, and why they maintained membership. It was found, in both instances, that individuals join radical right organisations for a variety or reasons and concerns. EDL supporters were found to be primarily disenchanted with politics, and upset over immigration and Islam, among other things. Supporters were driven to activism for a number of reasons including, for example, a moral shock due to terrorist events. Some supporters had a strong sense of attachment to the organisation, but the majority seemed to only be active online. Members of MÖM did not discuss specific ideology, but interviewees did mention things like disenchantment with the current political system, Christianity, and feeling like someone needed to help the Hungarian people. Respondents joined MÖM for a number of reasons, such as seeking out a paramilitary organisation, wanting to help their fellow Hungarians, and seeking out people with similar views to their own. All respondents emphasised the community and brotherhood aspect of the organisation, along with solidarity and loyalty.

Árpád summed it up best during our discussion of this project, comparing MÖM and the EDL: "So, we really want to regain our national identity, and are not trying to push another culture out." MÖM is trying to recreate and reacquire an identity that was supressed by 45 years of socialism. There is a tendency among MÖM to view Hungarians as victims who have been invaded by foreigners, and they see Hungarian values and traditional culture as being in jeopardy. They seem desperately afraid of losing the idea of the 'true Magyar,' which is what drives their involvement. Members of the EDL, on the other hand, see a

threat from the outside as well as a threat to their national identity. It is not a matter of regaining an identity, per se, but of trying not to lose it. This identity is now threatened by the influx of immigrants, most especially, it seems, from the European Union.

Of course, these differences can be attributed to different histories, cultures, and social structures between the two countries. Great Britain historically has a much larger amount of immigration than Hungary ever has, especially in terms of people from the Muslim backgrounds. Hungary is still relatively homogeneous, even with the Hungarian government's recent attempt to scare citizens with the 'migrant threat'; Hungary's Fidesz government led a billboard campaign against migrants during the European crisis in 2015 and has recently criminalised the aid of refugees (Walker, 2018). Political activists in Great Britain are afraid they will lose their national culture and national identity to a (however exaggerated) influx of immigrants (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). This can even be observed in the broader British electorate, especially through the results of the Brexit referendum; the latter has especially promoted a distrust in mainstream politics in supporters of the EDL. On the other hand, those on the radical right in Hungary are desperately trying to regain a national identity which has been ostensibly weakened through decades of Soviet rule and membership in the European Union.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

This study aimed to explore three research questions: why individuals develop nationalist feelings and attitudes, why they join radical right social movements and activist organisations, and why they maintain membership in those movements and organisations. This study also aimed to offer a comparative approach through the use of Hungary and Great Britain, and a mix-methods approach by using both qualitative and quantitative methods.

At the beginning of the study it was intended for this to be a larger project: to look at several radical right organisations in Hungary and Great Britain. It quickly became obvious, however, that this would be impossible. The first reason was that one of the organisations in Britain intended to be studied was National Action, who were proscribed in December of 2016, one year into this project. As this project was aiming to study street-level organisations and not political parties, this left few suitable organisations in Britain. Due to this situation and the issue of time and money, it was decided to limit the project to two organisations: The English Defence League (EDL) in Great Britain and the Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM) in Hungary.

This concluding chapter will first provide an overview of the findings of the research, and offer a discussion synthesising the separate methodologies and findings to relate them back to the theory. Then, research limitations will be discussed, followed by broader impacts of the study, specific cultural and social contexts, and possible practice and policy implications. Finally, this chapter will explore future possible avenues of research which can branch from this study.

The results of this research highlight the importance of having an intimate understanding of the context in which a social movement is created, including society's culture and history, political climate, and social climate. Statistical analysis has shown that

supporters of the far-right are not necessarily dissatisfied with their lives, as was previously held by relative deprivation theorists, but indeed tend toward being happier with their current lives. In Hungary, people with conservative-right and far-right views tend to be concerned with immigration from the perspective of both culture and economy, whereas in Great Britain this concern is limited to culture, but not economy. Results of the statistical analysis indicate that there was no significant change in these concerns in light of the Leave campaign in Britain and the anti-migrant campaign in Hungary.

The centrality of the internet, and especially social media, is apparent in both the EDL and MÖM's use of the online sphere. Both organisations use the internet to create a collective identity and to promote feelings of solidarity. As the EDL portray themselves as a single-issue protest movement, their use of the internet is directed more towards building their collective identity of anti-Islam protest. MÖM, on the other hand, portray themselves more so as a community organisation. Hence, while fostering a collective identity, MÖM had a much stronger focus on promoting group solidarity online and encouraging the feeling of the organisation as one big family. Through the use of the internet and social media, support is no longer limited geographically and potential supporters can now be solicited from all over the world.

Using semi-structured interviews with MÖM members, this study found that there are several pathways to collective action in Hungary, which can include both seeking activism and being brought in through a previous contact. Individuals were encouraged to seek activism through values and attitudes fostered in childhood, moral outrage felt in adulthood, or the motivation to find a paramilitary organisation. The main factors influencing all participants to maintain membership were emotions such as pride, and the solidarity and loyalty felt in an organisation considered to be a family, community, and brotherhood. Textual interviews with EDL members revealed that the organisation is not a

single-issue organisation as it has been portrayed, but supporters have several other concerns; often times concerns such as immigration and politics are stronger than anti-Islam sentiments. Many respondents found the organisation online, while some were introduced through acquaintances. Individuals seemed to seek activism for a number of reasons, including moral outrage in adulthood and moral shock due to a specific event. EDL respondents, overall, did not seem as invested in the organisation as the interviewees from MÖM.

Taken together, this study demonstrates the advantage of mix-methods and cross-national comparative studies. This project challenges existing knowledge of radical right social movement participation by offering new insight and uncovering new dynamics. Firstly, this project has shown the importance of context when studying radical right organisations, as motives for developing far-right attitudes are culturally, historically, and individually dependent. Second, it challenges the idea that radical right supporters are unsatisfied with their lives. The results demonstrate that relative deprivation theory does not fully explain this phenomenon; it is rather a person's fear of losing what they already have that can drive them to seek collective action. Third, this project has challenged the idea of strain theory and found new application in a radical right context. Indeed, in a radical right context strain theory could be applied to concern over *other* fellow nationals and not the individual self, as fellow nationals can be considered an extension of an individual's own national identity. Fourth, this project clearly shows the central importance of the online sphere, especially social media, in the development of movement identity, in the fostering of views and attitudes, and in soliciting support that is not geographically-limited; it demonstrates the need for further study in this area and for stronger regulation on social media. Finally, this is the first study of its kind and the first study to have access to the Hungarian Defence Movement.

6.1 RESEARCH FINDINGS

This study used three methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, to examine questions of involvement in radical right social movement organisations in Hungary and Great Britain. The first of these were bivariate correlations and regression analyses of European Social Survey data. Second, a content analysis was conducted of the organisations' online profiles, including their personal websites, Facebook pages, Instagram accounts, and YouTube channels. Lastly, in-depth interviews were conducted with movement members and supporters insofar as possible. The following section will review the findings of this study from the perspective of the main research questions: the development of nationalist feelings and attitudes, motivations to collective action and seeking social movement organisations, and maintaining membership in radical right organisations.

6.1.1 Development of Radical Right Attitudes

The question of how and why radical right attitudes develop was explored through two phases of the research. First, to place the study in a cultural context and explore some general questions of right-wing attitudes, statistical analysis was completed on European Social Survey data. This analysis tested the variables of life satisfaction and feelings towards immigrants, with respect to economy and cultural life, and their predisposition toward right-wing and, more specifically, far-right views. Secondly, qualitative interviews provided some insight into how respondents developed these attitudes.

Views of immigrants were found to be a contributing factor to far-right attitudes. In Hungary, concerns over immigrants affecting the economy predicted both politically right and far-right views, while in Britain predicted politically right but not far-right views. One reason for this difference could come down to semantics, as the word 'immigrant' could

have different connotations to British and Hungarian people. Great Britain traditionally has a long history of immigrants, and the British public, especially of the conservative right, has been quite open about its issues with immigration, particularly as seen in the recent Brexit referendum. Indeed, textual interviews showed that immigration is one of the main concerns of supporters of the radical right in Britain. Among the British far-right, the issues with immigrants, particularly Muslims, could be more of a cultural question than economic. In Hungary, the issue could be that Hungarians may see the Roma people as immigrants to the country, as Roma are considered 'non-white.' There is a tradition in Hungary of blaming Roma for abusing the welfare system and receive most of the public funds (Krekó & Juhász, 2017), especially in terms of child support. These feelings are equally projected onto actual immigrants to the country (Krekó & Juhász, 2017). Additionally, the propaganda of the Hungarian right-wing government also encourages the Hungarian people to believe that 'migrants' are ruining their way of life (for example, Nolan & Walker, 2018).

In both Britain and Hungary, those with conservative views, as well as far-right supporters, believe that immigrants undermine their country's cultural life. This view likely ties into a protective view of national identity among those on the right, and the idea that immigrants influence, change, and 'threaten' the national identity of a country. It is also evident, through high life satisfaction and an idea that immigrants endanger cultural life, that xenophobia is high among the conservative right and far-right in both countries. However, it cannot be said that xenophobia is one of the strongest factors among these supporters as more variables would have to be tested to make this claim.

It was found that, in both Hungary and Britain, a high satisfaction with life predicted both politically right and far-right attitudes. This is contrary to the idea in relative deprivation theory, often applied to explain support for the far-right, that individuals with far-right values have low satisfaction with their lives. Relative deprivation is essentially a

discrepancy between what people believe they should have and what they actually have; it is the very perception of deprivation that is the issue. These feelings of entitlement then tie into feelings of dissatisfaction, as they believe they are deprived of what should be theirs (McLaughlin, 1969). These results contradict the typical image of radical right movement supporters as 'angry white men.' Given the results of the statistical analyses, perhaps another explanation can be given. Likely, it is not in fact relative deprivation theory that can explain these phenomena, as movement members do not feel deprived or dissatisfied. Perhaps it is rather a *fear* of this deprivation; the belief that outsiders are a threat to this satisfaction they feel in their lives. Considering the insecurity of losing status or financial wellbeing felt by radical right supporters offers a new avenue in exploring the support of radical right attitudes. These results, combined with the results of the immigrants and cultural life variable, lead to the conclusion that this fear of outsiders, in other words xenophobia, is strong among both conservative right and far-right supporters in both Hungary and Britain.

Similar is Merton's strain theory (1938; 1968), which suggests that frustration can result from individuals prevented from achieving perceived economic goals. Statistical analysis indeed showed a concern for economics in the Hungarian sample but not in the UK sample. As seen throughout this study, one of the main concerns of radical right protest movement participants in Britain is the cultural influence of Islam, along with disenchantment in politicians and immigration having a negative impact on British identity; consistent with the statistical results. Strain theory is not a sufficient explanation for considering an individual's radical right movement participation in Hungary, however, as all Hungarian interview respondents seemed to have financial stability and made no mention of economic concerns. Nevertheless, there was great concerned expressed about the financial wellbeing of fellow Hungarians. Therefore, in the context of the radical right,

strain theory could be applied to concern over *other* fellow nationals and not the individual self, as other members of the nation can be considered an extension of an individual's own national identity.

When considering the results of the qualitative interviews from a theoretical viewpoint, criminology's differential association theory does maintain validity. Again, this is the suggestion that criminal behaviour can be learnt through social interaction, often within intimate social groups (Treadwell, 2013). As this implies that a person's subculture heavily influences their attitudes and ideas, if this is extrapolated outside of criminal behaviour to radical ideologies and attitudes, it can then be applied to membership in radical right social movement organisations. Given the ambiguity of some of the respondents about where their nationalist feelings came from, this may be applicable in at least certain cases. While new organisation members must at least sympathise with the movement when joining, their attitudes and ideology become much stronger as they feel part of a group and are surrounded by friends and 'family' who support those attitudes.

Biographical factors were shown to play a role in certain instances, but not as strongly as originally thought. Klatch's (1999) findings that both left and right political activist are heavily influenced by their upbringing could only be confirmed in one case of the four Hungarian respondents, as EDL respondents did not mention their upbringing. Two respondents explicitly stated that they were not influenced by their parents and upbringing to sympathise with the radical right movement, and another two did not go into specifics but stated that they only began to sympathise with the movement in adulthood. However, one of the respondents (Peter) did state that both of his children were members of the movement and integral parts of the organisation. Snow and Soule (2010) imply that factors such as being married, having children, and having full time employment, in other words biographical availability, discourage individuals from social movement participation. This

was not shown to be the case among these respondents, but more research participants and more in-depth biographical interviews would be necessary to further explore this idea, most especially among EDL supporters. Finally, Snow and Soule's (2010) resonant socialisation experiences could play a role in the activism of the Hungarian respondents, as some participants mentioned the role of primary school (László) and bullying (Peter) in developing their attitudes.

6.1.2 Motivations to Collective Action

Motivations to collective action in these radical right organisations was explored through two of the research phases: online analysis and qualitative interviews. Online analysis of websites, Facebook pages, Instagram accounts, and YouTube channels served to illuminate how the organisations attempt to recruit members and how they portray their group identity and self-image to the public. Questions of why individuals joined a radical right organisation were covered through the qualitative interviews.

When it comes to recruitment, the organisations seem to have quite different strategies. The EDL places far less emphasis on recruitment than MÖM does, both on its website and their social media pages. The EDL does heavily promote demonstrations through posters and Facebook events, and a quite visible PayPal 'donations' button on their website. It seems, however, that they are less concerned with recruiting core members; the focus seems to be on sympathisers and supporters. MÖM post regularly on their website and social media pages, attempting to recruit new members. Organisation events are advertised to the public, as are events that are specifically for recruitment purposes. They do not organise demonstrations and protests but they do attend some organised by other radical right organisations. They generally do not publicly advertise their attendance at these events, however. They do openly advertise their charity events, such as a regular food

and clothing drives in the 14th district of Budapest, but do not openly advertise 'patrols' and other core group events.

The organisations' websites, social media accounts, and YouTube channels show that the EDL and MÖM fundamentally differ. MÖM seem to have a stronger membership identity, and perhaps collective identity, than the EDL. MÖM are looking for hardworking, loyal, 'God-fearing' members who will represent the organisation well and portray a good image. The EDL, on the other hand, seem to seek supporters to grow demonstration numbers. As the EDL are portrayed as a single-issue activist movement, they seek to increase the image that many are against Islam in Britain. MÖM, on the other hand, seem to want to promote solidarity and loyalty among members. This may account for the success of organisations in Hungary over those in Britain.

Qualitative interviews were also used to explore the idea of pathways into radical right organisations. While difficult to generate distinctive pathways into MÖM with only four respondents, some pathways did become evident. All four respondents joined the organisation of their own will and were quite adamant about expressing this fact. Of the participants, two joined MÖM in its current form and two joined in its previous form as the For a Better Future Movement. Both groups are essentially the same organisation, however, as MÖM was formed after the For a Better Future Movement was disbanded. Two respondents were members of other radical right organisations before joining MÖM/For a Better Future and two respondents were not members of any organisation before joining MÖM/For a Better Future. Three of the respondents specifically sought out such an organisation for various reasons such as frustration and seeking a paramilitary movement, while one respondent was introduced to the idea of radical right organisations by a personal contact. One member in particular referred to being motivated to seek out collective action after becoming frustrated and angered by the previous (left-wing) Hungarian government.

Emotion is an important factor in promoting social movement activism (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001b; Jasper, 1998), and is ultimately tied to moral shock, which is often the first step of the recruitment process (Jasper, 1998). An unexpected event or piece of information can cause extreme outrage, so that people can become inclined toward activism (Jasper, 1998). In addition, organisations can point to someone to blame for this moral shock, which can result in externally-directed shared emotions that are held in common by group members (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001b). The EDL especially has used the moral shock of sex grooming gangs and terrorist events in order to place blame on the Muslim community, furthering the shared emotions among supporters.

Textual interviews with EDL supporters revealed several pathways into the organisation. Crucially, empirical studies have suggested that one of the main pathways into the EDL was through football firms (Busher, 2016, Pilkington, 2016), but it was not mentioned by one respondent in this study. A few respondents cited coming from different radical right organisations and far-right political parties. Others mentioned hearing about the EDL online or through news media and deciding to join on their own accord. Some were brought to the organisation by family, friends, or colleagues, while others joined after attending a demonstration or other emotionally-charged event.

The current data suggests similar pathways into the organisation, namely through existing relationships, through other radical right organisations, or joining after attending a protest or an event. However, the actual path to becoming a member in both organisations is quite different, which is also closely connected to the emotional investment that supporters have in the organisation. EDL respondents mentioned joining the organisation online, and indeed several respondents seemed to equate their involvement with the EDL with their online activity. This means that anyone can be a supporter of the EDL; much of the 'protest' is done online, members to not regularly meet in person, and a supporter does

not have to invest much energy into the organisation in order to label themselves as a member of the EDL. In order to join MÖM, however, potential recruits must go through a serious vetting process. They are not immediately allowed into the organisation but can first attend events and get to know members. Once seen fit they undergo some testing (exactly what this testing entails is unclear) and, if deemed worthy, they are then made to be a full member of MÖM and receive their waistcoat. This rite of passage creates a feeling of brotherhood and solidarity among members that is much more likely to keep people in the organisation and active. Supporters of the EDL, however, are in a way kept in a liminal state; they are members without ever being full members.

6.1.3 Maintaining Membership

The question of why individuals maintain membership in radical right organisations was mostly explored through qualitative and textual interviews. Unexpectedly, the online analysis phase also shed some light on this question. Empirical data from this research found that identity and emotion played the largest parts in individuals maintaining membership in radical right organisations.

All four interview respondents from MÖM appear to have found a sense of identity through their interaction with other organisation members. While each organisation member's identity differs, members develop an identity as part of the organisation; they become MÖM members, and many identify as protectors of the Hungarian people and part of a larger radical right movement. This identification as an organisation member then strengthens feelings of pride. Ideology may also play a role in their membership, but this is not something that is openly advertised outside of the organisation. They all also spoke of protecting their fellow Hungarians, which would also imply a motive of instrumentality in their membership.

Consideration of the representation of an organisation's collective and movement identities is imperative, as the development of these identities can help motivate people to collective action, produce feelings of solidarity, and define moral boundaries. Through social media and the online sphere, feelings and emotions can today be promoted on a daily basis, regardless of a sympathiser's location or time allowance. There is no longer the need to attend common demonstrations, meetings, and events to promote solidarity; it can now happen constantly. Radical right organisations can now promote feelings of solidarity before individuals even attend their first meeting or event and can also promote these feelings to those individuals who may live further away or are unable to travel.

Busher (2015) and Pilkington (2016) both describe the importance of solidarity and pride to the membership of the EDL. Busher defines four positive emotional themes: the excitement felt from demonstrations, feelings of belonging and solidarity, collective agency and possibility, and pride and dignity. Pilkington describes emotional themes of 'togetherness,' solidarity, friendship, and loyalty. She also discusses the importance of collective rituals, such as demonstrations, and the importance of symbolism. Demonstrations, the main activity of the EDL, help to magnify these feelings of belonging and solidarity, and create an othering of 'them' and 'us.'

Textual interviews with EDL members did not reveal as strong a feeling of solidarity, however. Few respondents revealed strong feelings of pride in their involvement in the EDL. Others tied their involvement in the EDL together with feelings of dignity and respect, hope, and their British identity. Some respondents mentioned the importance of community, stating the importance of the support of their fellow EDL supporters and other British people who rely on the EDL to stand up for their interests. Only two respondents specifically referred to the ideas of solidarity and brotherhood. Many respondents seemed frustrated and angry over feelings of injustice, often feeling like 'others' were given

privilege over British natives; this also led to feelings of anger toward politicians. Some respondents also expressed a desire to protect their British identity or feeling that the organisation provided them with a sense of identity. While supporters expressed different ideologies and reasons for joining the organisation, these generally came from a feeling of frustration rather than a particularly strong far-right ideology. This shows that in the EDL, shared emotions of frustration and anger towards common targets - like Muslims, immigrants, and politicians - seem to be more common than reciprocal emotions between group members themselves. This is unsurprising, given that much of the activity of EDL supporters seems to be online, meaning that they are less likely to form meaningful connections with other supporters.

When it comes to members of MÖM, reciprocal emotions are much more common, or at least more openly discussed in the interview, than are shared emotions. All four respondents emphasised the ideas of friendship, solidarity, and family, implying that one of the reasons individuals maintain membership in the organisation is due to close ties with other members. The positive emotional themes that were most common among respondents were solidarity and pride. Solidarity was quite evident in several forms. Respondents discussed solidarity with fellow group members, feeling of a brotherhood, a family, and a close group of friends; and also with the Hungarian people. These feelings of family and solidarity are reinforced through community events, such as the annual children's summer camp. Respondents were proud of being MÖM members and proud of being Hungarian. All respondents exhibited pride in being members of the organisation, which was shown in several ways: in simply stating that they are proud to be a member, in discussing their importance and how they have gained an intimate knowledge of the legal system, in discussing their role in the organisation as a leader and/or teacher, and when discussing the effects of their actions on encouraging law enforcement to act.

This feeling of a collective identity, even in the online sphere, can also help to promote ideas of togetherness and solidarity. Indeed, it is impossible to have one without the other (Gamson, 1992). This allows for organisations to encourage feelings of solidarity on an everyday basis, easily accessible through sympathisers' computers and phones. There is no longer the necessity to attend common demonstrations, meetings, and events to promote solidarity; it can now happen constantly. Radical right organisations can now promote feelings of solidarity before individuals are even regularly physically active with the organisation and can also promote these feelings to those individuals who may live further away or are unable to travel. It can encourage the formation of new chapters of the organisation in areas where the movement is not yet active.

6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXISTING KNOWLEDGE

The results of these three analyses, when taken together, paint a picture of two different organisations who have been shaped by the culture and history of their respective countries while still holding commonalities. Great Britain historically has a much greater amount of immigration, especially from the Muslim world. Hungary is still relatively homogeneous, in spite of the Hungarian government's recent attempt to scare citizens with the 'migrant threat.' This concern over immigration shows a common fear of the 'other,' which could be related to a fear of potential deprivation. Radical right political activists in Britain are afraid they will lose their national culture and national identity to an influx of immigrants; this fear has been seen in the larger British culture through the results of the Brexit referendum. On the other hand, those on the radical right in Hungary are desperately trying to regain a national identity which has been ostensibly weakened through Soviet rule and membership in the European Union. This shows that, in both contexts, there is a concern over the loss of a 'true' identity; radical right organisations are seeking to regain and/protect that identity in the face of perceived threat.

This research contributes to the literature of collective action, social movement organisations, and particularly radical right organisations in a comparative framework. It also adds to the literature on the Hungarian radical right, particularly on a radical right organisation that had not been previously studied in an academic context. Additionally, this study is one of the first to conduct in-depth interviews with MÖM members. Finally, it provides new empirical evidence of a relatively large sample of EDL supporters, with new insight into the EDL's support-base in a post-Brexit campaign and referendum context.

The statistical analysis adds to the literature on relative deprivation theory in showing that, at least in the Hungarian and British contexts, it cannot necessarily explain movement membership. It was found that, in both Hungary and the UK, a *high* satisfaction

with life predicted both politically right and far-right attitudes, not low satisfaction as would be expected. Likely, it is not in fact relative deprivation theory that can explain these phenomena, as movement members do not feel deprived or dissatisfied. Perhaps it is rather a fear of this deprivation or a strong feeling of insecurity; the belief that outsiders are a threat to this satisfaction they feel in their lives. These results, combined with the results of the immigrants and cultural life variable, lead to the conclusion that this fear of outsiders, in other words xenophobia, is strong among both conservative right and far-right supporters in both Hungary and the UK.

In a comparative framework, it shows both the British and Hungarian far-right are concerned with the perceived effect that immigrants might have on their country's cultural life. This leads to the conclusion that this fear of outsiders, in other words xenophobia, is strong among both conservative right and far-right supporters in both Hungary and the UK. The statistical results also show a stronger feeling of xenophobia in the UK, consistent with the findings that radical right protest movement participants in Great Britain are highly concerned with immigration and the cultural influence of Islam.

Additionally, conservative-right and far-right supporters in the UK are less concerned with the effect of immigrants on the economy than are Hungarian supporters. This result, combined with the results of the qualitative interviews with Hungarian radical right organisation members, shows that strain theory is not a sufficient explanation for considering an individual's radical right movement participation in Hungary. Respondents did, however, express great concern about the financial wellbeing of fellow Hungarians. Therefore, in a radical right context strain theory could be applied to concern over other fellow nationals and not the individual self, as other members of the nation can be considered an extension of an individual's own national identity. Perhaps people do not seek collective action in radical right movements for seemingly selfish reasons, rather they

see the nation as a larger community to which they belong. If members of this imagined community (Anderson, 1983) are perceived to suffer economically and socially, it could provoke the same mechanisms of frustration as is suggested through strain theory.

The online analysis adds to the literature on social movements and radical right organisations in an online sphere. It found that radical right organisations do rely on the internet, mostly social media, to recruit new supporters and members; this was proved effective by textual interviews with EDL supporters, where many stated that they joined the EDL online. They also, to differing extents, use the online sphere to promote collective and movement identities, and feelings of solidarity and loyalty. Social media has made it far easier for organisations to recruit, both in spreading the message of their activism and in pulling people into their movement. The reach of such groups has become far larger than in the past, and now organisations are able to promote solidarity among members before they attend their first event. This analysis had extended previous knowledge of social movement activity online, recruitment patterns of social movement organisations, and the use of the online sphere by radical right organisations.

It is crucial to consider the option of joining a radical right organisation online, as this can be closely connected to the emotional investment that supporters have in the organisation. EDL respondents mentioned joining the organisation online, and indeed several respondents seemed to equate their involvement with the EDL with their online activity. This means that anyone can be a supporter of the EDL; much of the 'protest' is done online, members to not regularly meet in person, and a supporter does not have to invest much energy into the organisation in order to label themselves as a member of the EDL. In order to join MÖM, however, potential recruits must go through a serious vetting process and are only full members after a distinctive rite of passage. This creates a feeling of brotherhood and solidarity among members that is much more likely to keep people in

the organisation and active, as opposed to EDL supporters of which many seemed to question their level of involvement.

Lastly, this study is one of few to conduct interviews with radical right movement members in Hungary, and the only academic study to have conducted interviews with MÖM members. Radical right organisations from Eastern European countries are generally underrepresented in radical right and social movement studies, especially due to language barriers and a lack of scholars who are native-speakers of those languages. The ideology and attitudes of radical right organisations in Eastern Europe are unique in the landscape of the European far-right, which is why it is important they are studied. As the sample size is fairly small, it is difficult to draw elaborate conclusions. This research does, however, add to the discussion of why individuals are drawn to collective action and join radical right organisations, why they develop nationalist feelings, and why they maintain membership in radical right organisations.

6.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

As with any study constrained by time and other factors, this research encountered several limitations. The first is that this project was originally designed to look at more groups, in order to offer a better-rounded idea of differential recruitment and radical right organisation membership. As this was not possible, the study is now more limited in scope than was intended. The project was also originally designed to look at somewhat more 'extreme' groups in Great Britain, such as National Action who were disbanded in 2016, as there was already a large body of work on the EDL. When it comes to the quantitative analysis, the study was limited by the use of only one social survey and by using only three variables to test. The online analysis is also somewhat limited by time, and by the assumption that what is seen online is how the organisations intended to portray themselves. Finally, four major limitations of the qualitative interviews were: not finding EDL members to participate in telephone interviews, conducting only a small number of interviews in Hungary, the necessity of conducting telephone interviews, and the large discrepancy in sample-size between the Hungarian and British interviews.

This study was originally designed to look at more groups, as well as to examine less-studied and less well-known organisations. Studying more organisations would have been important in order to draw more accurate conclusions and gain a better understanding of the research questions. Unfortunately, this was limited by time and the availability of non-political party radical right organisations in Great Britain. There would have been more possibility to include radical right organisations in Hungary, but this was kept to one organisation to form a better balance in comparison with the British data. It was also the aim to study less well-known organisations, as the original idea was to look at the British organisations National Action. Unfortunately for this study, National Action was proscribed in December of 2016, making them impossible to include.

Another limitation is that this study only tested data from one survey and three variables. A more well-rounded analysis may have been provided by including other survey data, although this was thought unnecessary at the time of analysis as other surveys (such as the European Values Study) largely cover similar variables. More variables could have also been tested, but for the purposes of testing relative deprivation theory and xenophobic attitudes these variables proved to be enough from those available.

The online analysis would have perhaps benefited from a study conducted over a longer period of time. An additional element could have been added to the study if comments on social media posts were also studied to analyse the emotion and collective identity of sympathisers. As the original aim of this study was to examine recruitment from the point of view of the organisations, this was not included in the original plan of study. An analysis of social media posts was intended in spring of 2019. Unfortunately, the EDL were permanently banned from Facebook in April 2019, just before the planned commencement of that study (Hern, 2019). This posed a valuable lesson for future online research: when conducting research of social media posts, especially of radical oragnisations, screenshots should be made of each image and attached discussion. Similarly, videos should be downloaded, and comments under the videos screenshotted. Had these been done, later further analysis may have been possible.

The qualitative interview analysis yielded several unexpected limitations. The original, quite ambitious, plan for this project was to interview five to ten members of organisations from Great Britain (EDL) and from Hungary (MÖM). Interviews were to be semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted in person. Due to a sudden university-change in the midst of the project, a new ethics application had to be submitted just at the time interview respondents should have been sought out. Time was of the essence at this point, and the decision was made to conduct interviews via telephone in order both to speed

up the ethics process and limit travel time to conduct interviews. This also only allowed a few months to find interview participants. Due to having personal contacts in the Hungarian radical right, participants could be found from MÖM. However, as I was limited to finding EDL members online, all while not showing my image, I was originally not able to find members of the EDL to participate in interviews. The solution for this was to conduct textual interviews with EDL supporters; this way, respondents did not have to share any of their personal information or image. While textual interviews yielded far more responses than originally expected, many respondents gave very short or even one-word answers. Due to the nature of textual interviews it was impossible to follow-up on interesting cases and answers, and to dig deeper.

The interviews with MÖM members were not without problems, either. First, only pre-selected members of MÖM were interviewed for this project. Other issues arise in the conducting of the interviews with MÖM members. Firstly, these participants were selected by the organisation's leader and would have naturally been strategically chosen as those 'loyal' to the group's cause. This skews the data towards stronger feelings of solidarity and loyalty. It would have been more successful to find participants either online or at an event, and to interview a random sampling of members. Interviews were also conducted over the phone, which made building a rapport with interviewees quite a challenge. While perhaps not so desirable when considering safety, interviews conducted in person would likely yield more reliable results.

Overcoming these limitations in the future is mostly a matter of allowing for more time. Time is needed in order to receive proper ethics clearance for larger and more complex studies, especially for those involving face-to-face interviews with those the university may deem unsafe. Time is also needed for a more in-depth statistical study including, for example, the European Values Study in addition to the European Social

Survey, adding more variables, and having several response years to plot trends. Time is also needed to build rapport with potential interview participants, which could lead to finding participants in groups like the EDL and more participants from MÖM. When it comes to interviews, it would be helpful for both rapport building and for the validity of the data to conduct interviews face-to-face, preferably in person. Of course, there is also a matter of time, money, and, potentially, safety.

6.4 IMPLICATIONS

The comparative analysis of the EDL and MÖM makes it clear that studying the use of the online sphere by radical right movements has broader implications for understanding recruitment and the use of the internet for creating collective identity and feelings of solidarity, and should be further investigated. It is obvious that the use of social media has made it easier for radical right organisations to recruit larger numbers of sympathisers than in the past, as well as to recruit sympathisers not excluded by proximity. Movement organisers can also constantly manipulate their supporters regarding ideology and identity formation through the strategic use of social media. This, of course, is not limited only the radical right, but it is valuable to understand the role that social media plays for all forms of social movement and collective action.

If the spread of radical right organisations is to be curtailed, limiting their use of the online sphere would be a natural starting point. Protest movements like the EDL rely on the internet to recruit supporters and advertise demonstrations. They rely on their website and social media to disseminate demonstration flyers, which is now free as they do not need to be printed, and they can reach a much wider audience in a very short period of time. They also used Facebook's 'event' feature, which allows supporters to share the event instantly with their own circles, and to remind supporters of upcoming events. It remains to be seen how the EDL's permanent banning from Facebook will affect numbers at their demonstrations. MÖM, on the other hand, use social media to advertise recruitment events (including the contact information of the organisation's leader), demonstrations, and community-building events. Granted, not all organisations have as large an internet presence as these two, since these were specifically chosen for being active online.

It could be possible to try and limit more radical ideologies and attitudes online. A major problem with regulating the internet, however, is that domain names are controlled

by the governing bodies of different countries. Most domains are accessible from all over the world, regardless of country of origin; if banned in one country, organisations can simply use an American internet service provider, little limited due to the First Amendment and universal free speech (Foxman & Wolf, 2013). Policy and laws against hate speech have little effect in dealing with the issue of radicalism and hate online (Foxman & Wolf, 2013). What is clear, however, is that any policy attempting to regulate extremism online must have a transnational approach, with cooperation between American and Europe (Littler, 2017).

This study has also shown the importance of collective identity and emotion to movement participation. While the Hungarian political and social context becomes more in line with the attitudes of the radical right, namely staunch nationalism, irredentism, anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism, and homophobia, the radical right must seek out new aspects of collective identity to contrast themselves with the government. Otherwise, members of radical right organisations could lose the desire to protest and be active in the movement. Now, however unfounded, organisation members seem to be upset about the government's perceived help of minorities over Hungarians, the perceived inability of law enforcement to complete their duties, and the corruption of the Fidesz government.

The political climate of both Hungary and Great Britain has changed over the course of this four-year study. Four years ago, both were indeed outside of the norm of Europe in terms of their history and culture, but not as clearly as they are today. The United Kingdom has now voted on a referendum to leave the European Union, which is now set to occur by the end of October 2019. Hungary has increasingly been seen in the news for the anti-EU and anti-democratic values and policies of Fidesz and Viktor Orbán. Now, more than ever, studies tackling nationalism and the far-right in Europe are critical.

Results of the textual interviews with EDL supporters showed that those in the British radical right are becoming more disenchanted, and less trusting, of politicians. These sentiments are combined with extremely negative views of the European Union and strong anti-immigrant attitudes. Strong anti-EU attitudes and distrust in politicians were not mentioned in studies conducted prior to the 2015 Vote Leave campaign, suggesting that Brexit had a strong influence on those who support, and indeed driving people to support, the radical right. Not only that, but several respondents mentioned anger over how Brexit was being handled by the government, suggesting that the government is ignoring the will of the people.

This suggests that if Brexit were to be finalised and the UK indeed did leave the EU, those who support the EDL on the basis of anti-EU attitudes would lose their motivation for support. Naturally it is quite possible that these supporters would adopt other attitudes, such as stronger anti-immigrant attitudes. However, given that these supporters seemed altogether less invested in the EDL, it is likely they would lose their motivation for membership. A crucial development in UK politics is the election of Boris Johnson as the new British Prime Minister and Leader of the Conservative Party in July 2019. Boris Johnson's new Cabinet is now nearly entirely made up of Vote Leave campaigners and 'Brexiteers' (Blanchard, 2019); this combined with the building of new infrastructure in many pro-Brexit areas of England may indeed alleviate much of the frustration of some on the radical right. This raises a question relevant in many parts of Europe: that of what happens to radical right activists once the very thing they protest disappears.

The political climate in Hungary has also been changing since the start of this project. In recent years, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party have been facing increasingly sharp criticism for their radical politics from opponents, the European Union, and scholars. During the refugee crisis of 2015, Fidesz introduced a xenophobic campaign

against migrants and built fences along Hungary's southern borders. Fidesz also rewrote the constitution, and now rule over a country in "which racist speech and prohibited far-right paramilitary activities are tolerated" (Fekete, 2016). In 2017 Fidesz began what many are calling an anti-Semitic campaign against Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros. Prior to the April 2018 elections, Fidesz announced that they had created a list of 2000 'Soros agents,' of which 200 were published in the pro-Fidesz *Figyelő* magazine immediately following the elections. On this list were people working for various humanitarian NGOs in Hungary and academics at the Central European University in Budapest, among others. In June of 2018 the 'Stop Soros' bill was approved in parliament, effectively criminalising any act or organisation which helps refugees in Hungary.

At the same time, Hungary has a new extreme-right political party. The new Our Homeland movement (*Mi Hazánk Mozgalom*), led by ex-Jobbik member László Toroczkai, openly promotes radical right attitudes, with Toroczkai stating on national TV: "Hungary could be a white island in Europe. This is one of our goals" (ECHO TV, 2018). It becomes readily apparent when looking at the movement's Facebook page that they are intimately connected with radical right organisations, including MÖM.

In a political climate where the ruling party has legitimised radical right ideology, the question arises of what need people have for being politically active in a radical right movement. However, Hungarian radical right organisations show no signs of disappearing, and new movements and parties have even appeared. Perhaps this is one reason why Hungarian radical right organisations do not tend to be political activist organisations as is the case in Great Britain; there is simply no need for them to be activists.

6.4.1 Policy and Practice

The findings of this research lead to several potential implications for public policy. It must be pointed out, however, that in the Hungarian political context it is realistically quite difficult to make policy suggestions. Suggesting policy recommendations about the limit or control of radical right organisations to a nationalist and far-right government seems futile, to say the least. Therefore, these recommendations will focus on the level of the European Union and abroad, and not on individual countries.

The first policy implication is for the continued limiting of radical right organisations on social media. The difficulty here is that ownership of social media sites is most generally in the United States, but nevertheless there should be encouragement of site owners and administrators to be more vigilant. As shown in this study, radical right organisations often use social media to recruit members and to strengthen solidarity among supporters and members. The use of the internet, and most especially social media, allows distance not to be a factor any longer in supporter recruitment, meaning the organisation can grow more easily and rapidly. The removal of hate speech on social media has begun in the EU (Fioretti, 2018) as well as the removal of the social media pages of certain radical right organisations, but many organisations can continue. To do this most effectively would likely require the employment of local experts to find radical right organisations active online.

A second recommendation is that there must be a consensus on limiting hate speech that reaches internationally. A major problem with regulating the internet is that domain names are controlled by the governing bodies of different countries. Most domains are accessible from all over the world regardless of country of origin; if banned in one country, organisations can simply use an American internet service provider, little limited due to the First Amendment and universal free speech (Foxman & Wolf, 2013). However, it should

be noted that Foxman and Wolf (2013) emphasise that policy and laws against hate speech have little effect in dealing with the issue of nationalism and hate online.

A third recommendation is to limit demonstrations by radical right organisations. As previously discussed, demonstrations serve to strengthen feelings of solidarity among organisation members. This is especially important Great Britain, where besides online, one of the EDL's main means of recruitment are their regular demonstrations around Britain. These are generally pre-advertised online, through images on social media and Facebook 'events,' and could be easily spotted and shut down before they occur.

Several of the Hungarian respondents pointed to learning about Hungarian history and traditional values in school. The Hungarian example illustrates the importance of education, especially when it comes to critical thinking and learning about other cultures throughout all of Europe. Indeed, at the moment the Fidesz government is trying to do the very opposite, by instituting the teaching of 'Christian culture' and the strengthening of 'national identity' in kindergartens (Dull, 2018), as well as calling for the banning of gender studies programs in Hungary (Adam, 2018).

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, an EU-wide body for limiting hate speech and radical right organisations should be called for, especially given that some EU governments already support them. This is especially of concern in several Eastern and Southern European countries, such as Hungary, Poland, and Italy, but need is growing all over Europe. Limiting the activity of radical right organisations is virtually impossible in a country governed by those who support the same values; the control of this can only start on the level of the European Union.

6.4.2 Recommendations for Future Research

While this was a fairly small-scale study, nevertheless it suggests several future avenues of research due to the timely nature of the topic and to the political environment of the European region. It is, in today's world, especially critical to understand why individuals adopt views of radical nationalism, and what drives these views in specific cultural and social contexts. If Europe continues to draw further to the right in the following years, it will become increasingly important for opposition parties, democratic governments, civil society, and NGOs to understand how to combat this trend. It is also important to understand why individuals join radical right organisations: without understanding motivation, protest activity cannot be forestalled. If democratic governments wish to prevent the growth of the radical right, especially more violent organisations, it is crucial that they understand what drives their citizens to join and maintain membership.

With these points in mind, the first avenue could be to expand this study to include several other European countries. This would obviously be a much larger-scale study and would require the involvement of native speakers of each country. Comparative studies could be approached from several angles: a survey or experimental analysis of several European countries examining social factors such as the influence of political climate on the rise of, and membership in, radical right organisations; the use of the online sphere in recruitment in various social and cultural contexts; and interviews with radical right organisation members in less-researched countries, for example in Eastern Europe. Further comparisons in a 'east versus west' dichotomy could also yield interesting results.

It would also be important to compare the motivations to join and maintain membership in different radical right organisations within Hungary, as most have different membership profiles. More 'peaceful' groups could be compared to those who hold more demonstrations (such as HVIM), and to those who are far more violent (such as the Outlaw

Army). A comparison between those individuals who choose to join non-political radical right activist movements (such as MÖM, HVIM, and the Outlaw Army) could also be compared to those who join political parties (such as Jobbik and the newly-formed Our Homeland party), in order to illuminate what drives individuals towards radical right politics.

It is also critical to further explore the use of the internet by radical right organisations, especially in other social and cultural contexts. Specifically, would the limitation of internet use and exposure for such organisations influence the turnout at their demonstrations and events. If so, this could have major implications for future social media controls and regulations.

The ideas of emotions and collective identity in radical right social movement organisations and activist organisations could also be further explored. Do supporters and sympathisers differ in their feelings of solidarity and loyalty from full-fledged members, and if so, how? How do emotions and collective identity differ in these levels of support, and what are the factors determining whether someone remains a supporter or seeks membership?

As governments are tending toward the right in many countries, such as Hungary, Poland, and Italy, it would be important to understand how these trends are influencing radical right organisations and membership. As governments become more illiberal and radical, it can be argued that they support many of the same values and attitudes of radical right social movements. In such a political environment, do these social movements grow or shrink? Do individuals choose to become members of street-level organisations, political parties, or both? Do the lines between street-level movements and political parties begin to blur, and if so, how?

If qualitative interviews are to be conducted with members of organisations, they should be conducted in person and not via telephone. Far more than just a few months is needed to develop a good rapport with participants, and especially to recruit participants. Follow-up interviews may also be necessary in some cases. Textual interviews could offer an excellent avenue for future research of hard-to-reach populations, if these interviews can be disseminated via a cite such as Facebook. Of course, this would require this organisation to be active on social media. In order to avoid the issue of short and one-word answers, a possible solution would be to find, or develop, a program to allow respondents to answer questions vocally. This way, the anonymity of the textual interview is maintained while overcoming the issue of participants potentially not wanting to type their answers. Of course, these textual interviews also do not allow for the building of any rapport with respondents, but they could be a good place to start.

In a larger-scale project with similar research questions, another important angle of study would be from the perspective of gender. The study could investigate how these groups are marketed toward males and females, and examine the general 'masculine' nature of radical right organisations. Interviews could be conducted with female and male members of several radical right movements to illuminate the origin of their nationalist attitudes, why they joined the movement, and why they maintain membership.

6.5 FINAL THOUGHTS

The aim of this study was to add to the discourse of radical right and political protest organisations, and of social movement studies. Namely, this study intended to explore the questions of why individuals adopt radical right views, why they join social movement organisations, and why they maintain membership in those organisations. These questions were examined through both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and intersect several disciplines: political sociology, criminology, social psychology, and sociology.

The question of why individuals adopt nationalist views was explored through both statistics and qualitative interviews. This research could not firmly answer these questions, but that was not the intention of the study. Obviously, such a small-scale study cannot answer such complex questions that have been studied for decades; the aim was rather to add to the discussion. This study succeeded in adding to discussions about relative deprivation theory and about the adoption of radical right attitudes in both the Hungarian and British context.

The question of why individuals join social movement organisations, and specifically those at the centre of this study, was explored through both online analysis and qualitative interviews, including primary source data on interviews conducted by other researchers. This study did not succeed in finding one specific path into activism, but rather learned that several pathways are found in each radical right organisation. A much larger and more detailed study would be necessary to further develop the intricacies of pathways into activism. The online analysis did find, however, that emotions are a major contributor for the support of radical right organisations and a factor for driving people to seek collective action.

The question of why individuals maintain membership in such organisations was explored through qualitative interviews and comparative primary-source data. It was found

that the main factors influencing individuals to maintain membership are emotions such as pride and also the solidarity and loyalty felt in an organisation considered to be a family, community, and brotherhood. It was also found that emotions like solidarity and loyalty are increased if the organisation has a strong definition of membership combined with a feeling of exclusivity.

This research endeavoured to add to the discourse on collective action and social movement activism, especially in the realm of radical right organisations. This is an incredibly timely topic, as a rise in the far-right, extreme right, radical right – whatever one chooses to call it – is very real across both Europe and around the world. It is important to understand what drive people to hate, and more so, what drive people to feel such hatred, or perhaps fear, that they seek social change to reflect their attitudes. While the more radicalised far-right is fading in Great Britain, a very different image has been appearing in Hungary. Hungary is a country where radical right movements thrive both in street-level movements and in the political sphere; understanding the motivations of its members and supporters will be increasingly essential in the years to come.

APPENDIX A

LINEAR REGRESSION *R* AND ANOVA TABLES

Table A1: *R* values for linear regression analysis for the effects of life satisfaction and predictors on left-right scale placement for Hungarian sample.

	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. Error of the Estimate
Model 1	.22[a]	.049	.045	2.276
Model 2	.25[b]	.063	.059	2.259

a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, life satisfaction

Table A2: ANOVA results for the effects of life satisfaction on left-right scale placement for Hungarian sample.

Model		Sum of Squares	*df*	Mean Squares	*F*	*p*
1	Regression	365.97	5	73.19	14.13	0[a]
	Residual	7141.38	1379	5.18		
	Total	7507.36	1384			
2	Regression	472.34	6	78.72	15.42	0[b]
	Residual	7035.01	1378	5.11		
	Total	7507.36	1384			

a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, life satisfaction

Table A3: *R* values for linear regression analysis for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants or good or bad for the country's economy and predictors on left-right scale placement for Hungarian sample.

	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. Error of the Estimate
Model 1	.22[a]	.047	.044	2.285
Model 2	.22[b]	.050	.046	2.282

a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants good or bad for economy

Table A4: ANOVA results for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy on left-right scale placement for Hungarian sample.

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F	p
1	Regression	343.19	5	68.64	13.15	0[a]
	Residual	6910.48	1324	5.22		
	Total	7253.67	1329			
2	Regression	364.28	6	60.71	11.66	0[b]
	Residual	6889.40	1323	5.21		
	Total	7253.67	1329			

a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants good or bad for economy

Table A5: R values for linear regression analysis for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life and predictors on left-right scale placement for Hungarian sample.

	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. Error of the Estimate
Model 1	.22[a]	.049	.045	2.283
Model 2	.24[b]	.056	.052	2.276

a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants undermine or enrich country's cultural life

Table A6: ANOVA results for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life on left-right scale placement for Hungarian sample.

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F	p
1	Regression	351.44	5	70.29	13.48	0[a]
	Residual	6813.50	1307	5.21		
	Total	7164.93	1312			
2	Regression	400.13	6	66.69	12.88	0[b]
	Residual	6764.80	1306	5.18		
	Total	7164.93	1312			

a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants undermine or enrich country's cultural life

Table A7: *R* values for linear regression analysis for the effects of life satisfaction and predictors on left-right scale placement for British sample.

	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. Error of the Estimate
Model 1	.20[a]	.040	.037	1.971
Model 2	.22[b]	.049	.046	1.962

a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, life satisfaction

Table A8: ANOVA results for the effects of life satisfaction on left-right scale placement for British sample.

Model		Sum of Squares	*df*	Mean Squares	*F*	*p*
1	Regression	315.65	5	63.13	16.25	0[a]
	Residual	7652.73	1970	3.89		
	Total	7938.38	1975			
2	Regression	391.54	6	65.26	16.96	0[b]
	Residual	7576.84	1969	3.85		
	Total	7968.38	1975			

a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, life satisfaction

Table A9: *R* values for linear regression analysis for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants or good or bad for the country's economy and predictors on left-right scale placement for British sample.

	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. Error of the Estimate
Model 1	.20[a]	.040	.037	1.973
Model 2	.21[b]	.045	.042	1.968

a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants good or bad for economy

Table A10: ANOVA results for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy on left-right scale placement for British sample.

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F	p
1	Regression	312.50	5	62.50	16.05	0[a]
	Residual	7586.01	1948	3.89		
	Total	7898.51	1953			
2	Regression	356.58	6	59.43	15.34	0[b]
	Residual	7541.92	1947	3.87		
	Total	7898.51	1953			

    a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants good or bad for economy

Table A11: *R* values for linear regression analysis for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life and predictors on left-right scale placement for British sample.

	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. Error of the Estimate
Model 1	.20[a]	.041	.039	1.967
Model 2	.24[b]	.058	.055	1.951

    a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants undermine or enrich country's cultural life

Table A12: ANOVA results for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life on left-right scale placement for British sample.

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F	p
1	Regression	325.10	5	65.02	16.80	0[a]
	Residual	7553.41	1952	3.87		
	Total	7878.51	1957			
2	Regression	453.22	6	75.54	19.85	0[b]
	Residual	7425.29	1951	3.81		
	Total	7878.51	1957			

    a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants undermine or enrich country's cultural life

APPENDIX B

ETHICS FORM

THE UNIVERSITY OF HUDDERSFIELD
School of Human and Health Sciences – School Research Ethics Panel

APPLICATION FORM
Please complete and return via email to:
Kirsty Thomson SREP Administrator: hhs_srep@hud.ac.uk

Name of applicant: **Katherine Kondor**

Title of study: On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of nationalist social movements in Hungary and the United Kingdom

Department: Criminology   Date sent: October 26, 2017

Please provide sufficient detail below for SREP to assess the ethical conduct of your research.
You should consult the guidance on filling out this form and applying to SREP at
http://www.hud.ac.uk/hhs/research/srep/.

Researcher(s) details	Katherine Kondor Budapest 1071 Dembinszky utca 33, III/4 katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk
Supervisor(s) details	Dr Carla Reeves Dr Mark Littler
All documentation has been read by supervisor (where applicable)	YES / NO / NOT APPLICABLE This proposal will not be considered unless the supervisor has submitted a report confirming that (s)he has read all documents and supports their submission to SREP
Aim / objectives	The aim of my research is to understand what motivates people to: • adopt extremist (specifically right-wing) attitudes, • join extreme right organisations, • join the particular organisation to which they belong, • to maintain membership in these organisations.
Brief overview of research methods	This research will focus on two far-right street-level organisations from both the United Kingdom and Hungary, one from each country. I plan to conduct semi-structured interviews via telephone with approximately five members of each organisation. Phone calls will be made by me to the participant, from a program such as SkypeOut, using an account created for this research project, to ensure that they do not have access to my personal phone number. Semi-structured interviews would constitute the third empirical chapter of my dissertation. The first two chapters involved secondary survey analysis and online content analysis, respectively. Research was conducted at the University of Hull, where it received ethical approval and has already been completed.
Project start date	As soon as ethics approval has passed, hopefully January 2018 for this phase.

Project completion date	Planned submission: September 2018.
Permissions for study	Permissions only from the individuals participating in interview, see below.
Access to participants	Participants will be members of the English Defence League in the United Kingdom and the Hungarian Defence Movement in Hungary. All participants will be above 18 years of age. In the Hungarian Defence Movement, "member" is more clearly defined as individuals must undergo an initiation ritual where they are given an official movement waistcoat. Only when they have this waistcoat are they considered full members of the organisation. Of course, as interviews will be conducted via phone it will be difficult to absolutely ensure someone is a full member, which is always a risk that must be considered. This will be based on self-identification as a member and will not be checked. As for the English Defence League, "member" is more difficult to define as they do not have such strict initiations. In this case, I will seek active supporters of the group, with 'active' being defined as someone who regularly attends demonstrations and is in regular contact with other supporters of the group. Again, this is will be based on self-identification as an active supporter. Participants in Hungary will be recruited through pre-existing personal contacts, which can lead to snowball sampling to recruit more participants. In Hungary, I have contacts who have access to far-right groups, who will provide me with a contact to the Hungarian Defence Movement. Additionally, I can seek to gain access to participants in both Hungary and the UK through paid public advertising. This can be done over social media platforms such as Facebook, targeting the organisations' pages. Participants will be briefed on my research, stressing that this is investigatory research on political activism. Participants will be provided with an information sheet and asked to sign or verbally approve a consent form. They will also be briefed on their rights, and on how I will be maintaining confidentiality.
Confidentiality	All data will be anonymised, with participants being given aliases. A list of names with their coinciding alias will be password protected and stored separately from any interview data or material. Participants will also be asked not to give any identifying characteristics. I will be the only person with direct access to the data. My supervisors may have access to portions of the anonymised data in the case where I am in need of aid with understanding or interpreting the data. Data will be encrypted and stored on my personal computer. Data will also be backed up on an external storage device, which will be stored in a safe and secured place.

| Anonymity | All data will be anonymised, with participants being given aliases. A list of names with their coinciding alias will be password protected and stored separately from any interview data or material. Participants will also be asked not to give any identifying characteristics, and I will refrain from using their names in the interview.

Especially in the case of the Hungarian Defence Movement, the particular chapter to which the individual belongs may also have to be anonymised. Certain regional chapters have a very small number of members, in which case it would be easier to determine the identity of the participant.

This research is only focused on interviewing members of the organisations, and not the movement leadership. This will avoid any problems associated with the ease of identifying the leaders of the groups. |
|---|---|
| Right to withdraw | I will be offering participants the right to withdraw, which can be done through personal communication with me. Communication will be through my University email address, where participants will be able to contact me with questions and concerns. If they choose to withdraw from the study and have their data destroyed, their data will be deleted in its entirety. Participants may withdraw until 30 days from the time of the interview, after which they will lose their right to withdraw from the study. |
| Data Storage | Interviews will be audio recorded. Interviews will not be transcribed in their entirety, for the sake of time-constraints and confidentiality.

Data will be encrypted and stored on my personal computer in a password-protected file. Data will also be backed up on an external storage device, which will be stored in a safe and secured place. |
Psychological support for participants	Throughout the course of the interview I will endeavour to avoid asking any questions that can be considered personally distressing. Given the flight chance that this may cause distress, I will have the contact information of support services available (for example, the Samaritans in the UK).
Researcher safety / support (attach completed University Risk Analysis and Management form)	See attached.
Information sheet	See attached
Consent form	See attached.
Letters / posters / flyers	N/A
Questionnaire / Interview guide	See attached.

Debrief (if appropriate)	After the conclusion of the interview, I will ensure the participant has information about the study, in the form of the information letter (which they will receive prior to the interview). I will also ensure the participants has my and my supervisor's contact information, in the event they would like to follow up on the findings. I will also give information for psychological support, should it be required.
Dissemination of results	Portions of the data will be presented in my PhD thesis, as well as used for future publication. There is, of course, the option available to embargo my dissertation for a period after completion.
Identify any potential conflicts of interest	This project is self-funded and will not involve any participants previously known to the researcher.
Does the research involve accessing data or visiting websites that could constitute a legal and/or reputational risk to yourself or the University if misconstrued? Please state Yes/No If Yes, please explain how you will minimise this risk	No, as this phase of research requires qualitative interviews. I did access such websites, Facebook pages, and YouTube channels for earlier stages of my dissertation research, which was granted ethical approval by the University of Hull (where I attended until September 2017). It should be noted that these websites are all legal sites, relating to legal organisations.
The next four questions in the grey boxes relate to Security Sensitive Information – please read the following guidance before completing these questions: http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2012/oversight-of-security-sensitive-research-material.pdf	
Is the research commissioned by, or on behalf of the military or the intelligence services? Please state Yes/No If Yes, please outline the requirements from the funding body regarding the collection and storage of Security Sensitive Data	No
Is the research commissioned under an EU security call Please state Yes/No If Yes, please outline the requirements from the funding body regarding the collection and storage of Security Sensitive Data	No

Does the research involve the acquisition of security clearances? Please state Yes/No If Yes, please outline how your data collection and storages complies with the requirements of these clearances	No
Does the research concern terrorist or extreme groups? Please state Yes/No If Yes, please complete a Security Sensitive Information Declaration Form	No. While the groups I will be interviewing are considered "extreme right," they are not classed as terrorist or extremist groups by their respective governments (for example, by being proscribed).
Does the research involve covert information gathering or active deception? Please state Yes/No	No
Does the research involve children under 18 or participants who may be unable to give fully informed consent? Please state Yes/No	No
Does the research involve prisoners or others in custodial care (e.g. young offenders)? Please state Yes/No	No

Does the research involve significantly increased danger of physical or psychological harm or risk of significant discomfort for the researcher(s) and/or the participant(s), either from the research process or from the publication of findings? Please state Yes	As long as data is anonymised appropriately, participants are not at risk for harm. Of course, there is always the chance that participants will inform others of their participation in the study, but that is the participant's choice to reveal that information. Participants also have the opportunity to withdraw from the study and have their data destroyed should any concern for their safety arise. There are certain instances in which I may have to breach confidentiality, as are certain types of information that I would be legally obliged to report to authorities. These are: 1) knowledge of terrorist activity or the financial involvement in terrorist activity, 2) money laundering, and 3) the abuse and/or neglect of a child. Participants will be reminded of this during the interview if deemed necessary. Risk of stress and/or anxiety should also be quite low for participants, as I only plan to ask broad questions. Participants can then decide how much information they are willing to share. I will not be debating with participants on their views, but asking them to describe their views and association with their respective groups. After considering the potential harm to myself, it was decided that interviews would be conducted via phone or skype (phone only), from an account used solely for this research project. Although risk for harm would be low if interviews were conducted in person, this eliminates any potential for physical harm that may arise. Participants will not have access to my image or any personal information about myself, other than my name and my attendance at the University of Huddersfield. I will also ensure that my picture is not publicly available on social media. As for my emotional well-being, I have resources available for support. I can go to my supervisors for assistance, and also utilise the University's wellbeing services. I have the opportunity to end an interview if it should become difficult, or if a participant should become abusive. I have read and will adhere to the Code of Safety published by the Social Research Association, available at http://the-sra.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/safety_code_of_practice.pdf
Does the research involve risk of unplanned disclosure of information you would be obliged to act on? Please state Yes	There are certain types of information that I would be legally obliged to report to authorities. These are: 1) knowledge of terrorist activity or the financial involvement in terrorist activity, 2) money laundering, and 3) the abuse and/or neglect of a child. These topics will be avoided in the interview questioning, and participants will be asked to avoid these topics. They are covered in the information and consent forms.
Other issues	
Where application is to be made to NHS Research Ethics Committee / External Agencies	N/A
Please supply copies of all relevant supporting documentation electronically. If this is not available electronically, please provide explanation and supply hard copy	

All documentation must be submitted to the SREP administrator. All proposals will be reviewed by two members of SREP.

APPENDIX C

CONSENT FORM

On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of nationalist movements in Hungary and the United Kingdom

Katherine Kondor, PhD Candidate
katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk

Please initial box

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw up to thirty (30) days after the date of the interview, without giving reason, in which case I may ask for my data to be destroyed.

3. I agree to take part in the above study.

Please initial box

	Yes	No
4. I agree to the interview being audio recorded	☐	☐
5. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications	☐	☐
6. I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it has been anonymised) and may be used for future research and publication.	☐	☐

_____   _____   _____

Name of Participant   Date   Signature

_____   _____   _____

Name of Researcher   Date   Signature

BELEEGYEZÉSI NYILATKOZAT

Európa Szélén: Egy összehasonlítási tanulmány Angol meg Magyar nemzeti mozgalmokról [*On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of nationalist movements in Hungary and the United Kingdom*]

Kondor Katalin, PhD jelölt
katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk

Kérjuk jelőlje be a kockákat a neve kezdőbetuivel

2. Megerősítem, hogy elolvastam és megértettem a fenti tanulmány tályékoztató lapját, és hogy volt lehetőségem kérdéseket feltenni.

3. Tudomásul veszem, hogy részvételem önkéntes, és szabadon visszavonhatom az interjút követő harminc (30) napig indokolás nélkül, mely esetben megkérhetem, hogy megsemmisítsék az adataimat.

3. Beleegyezem, hogy részt veszek a fenti tanulmányban.

Kérem, válassza a megfelelő kockát

	Igen	Nem
4.Beleegyezem, hogy az interjut hangfelvételre rögzítsék.	☐	☐
5. Beleegyezem, hogy idézeteimet névtelenul használhatják publikációkban.	☐	☐
6. Beleegyezem, hogy a jelen tanulmányban összegyűjtött adataim tárolhatók (anonimizálás után), és felhasználhatók a jövőbeli kutatásokhoz és kiadványokhoz.	☐	☐

Résztvevő Neve	Dátum	Aláírás

Kutató Neve	Dátum	Aláírás

APPENDIX D

INFORMATION SHEET

Katherine Kondor
katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk

On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of nationalist social movement organisations in Hungary and the United Kingdom

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully!

This study is seeking to look at political activists in certain organisations. Specifically, I am interested in why someone becomes politically active, why someone joins a movement or organisation, and why they stay a member of that organisation. I am particularly interested in politically-motivated organisations concerned with cultural and political issues.

The study is composed of three parts. First, I looked at the European Social Survey (ESS) data to gain an understanding of the wider national feelings towards specific things like immigration, politics, and economics. Then, I looked at websites and social media sites to better understand politically active social movements and organisations, such as the one you are a member of. The last part of this research involves interviews with members of these organisations. Interviews are planned for March 2018.

Why have I been invited to participate?
You have been invited to participate because you, or someone else, has suggested that you are a member the organisation of interest to this study, namely the English Defence League.

Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part in this research. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. <u>You are free to withdraw at any time during the interview and up until 30 days after</u>, and without giving a reason.

In addition to being able to withdraw up to thirty days after the interview, should you feel uncomfortable about anything discussed in the interview you can contact Samaritans UK at 116 123, where people are available to anonymously discuss any issues you may have over the phone (www.samaritans.org).

What will happen to me if I take part?
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to take part in an interview with me, which will happen over the phone, at no cost to you. This interview can last anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour. This interview will be recorded, with your

consent, to aid my research and analysis of the interview. This recording will only be used for the purposes of this research, and will be kept absolutely secured.

Will what I say in this study be kept confidential?
Confidentiality, privacy, and anonymity will be ensured during the collection, storage, and publication of the research material. All information disclosed within the interview will be kept confidential, except where legal obligations would necessitate disclosure by the researchers to appropriate personnel.

In order to ensure your privacy, data will be anonymised. I would ask that you not reveal any 'tell-tale' details about yourself (for example, a unique tattoo) or any specific names. You will be given an alias, and your real name will not be revealed throughout the research project. In all reporting of the research you will be anonymised and identifying information, if present, removed.

The data collected (ie. the recording of the interview and any notes) will be kept secure at all times. Any computers and external storage devices on which data will be stored will be encrypted, and data will be password protected. The data generated over the course of this research must be kept securely in paper or electronic form for a period of ten years after the completion of the research project.

I am conducting this research as a student at the University of Huddersfield for my PhD dissertation in Social Sciences. Parts of the dissertation will eventually be published in the form of conference presentations and journal publications, but no interview will be published in full. This research has been approved by a Research Ethics Committee at the University of Huddersfield.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?
Your participation in this study would greatly help further knowledge of social phenomena and activism. Specifically, as someone who is politically active, you would help us understand what motivates people to political activism. Not to mention, you would be greatly helping me with my PhD!

What should I do if I want to take part?
If you are willing to take part in the study, I would like to speak with you over the phone. This interview could last anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour. I will phone you so that you do not incur any of the cost of the phone call.

If you wish to take part in this research or would like further information, please do not hesitate to contact me. I can be reached via email at katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk. If you have any concerns about the way in which the research was conducted, please contact my supervisor at the University of Huddersfield, Dr. Mark Littler, at m.littler@hud.ac.uk.

I know your time is valuable, so thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for considering participation in this study.

Sincerely,
Katherine Kondor
January 10, 2018

Résztvevő Információ Lap

Kondor Katalin
katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk

Európa Szélén: Egy összehasonlítási tanulmány Angol meg Magyar nemzeti mozgalmokról
[On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of nationalist social movement organisations in Hungary and the United Kingdom]

Ön meghívást kap arra, hogy részt vegyen egy kutatási tanulmányban. Mielőtt eldöntené, hogy részt vesz-e vagy sem, fontos megérteni, hogy miért történik a kutatás, és mit fog tartalmazni. Kérem, alaposan olvassa el az alábbi információkat!

Ez a tanulmány bizonyos szervezetek politikai aktivistáit vizsgálja. Konkrétan az érdekel, hogy miért válik politikailag aktívvá a személy, miért csatlakozik valaki egy mozgalomhoz vagy szervezethez, és miért maradnak a szervezeti tagok. Különösen érdekelnek a kulturális és politikai kérdésekkel foglalkozó, politikailag motivált szervezetek.

A tanulmány három részből áll. Először az *European Social Survey* (ESS) adatokat vizsgáltam, hogy megértsem a szélesebb értelemben vett nemzeti érzelmeket olyan konkrét dolgok iránt, mint a bevándorlás, a politika és a közgazdaság. Ezután megnéztem a weboldalakat és a közösségi médiaközpontokat, hogy jobban megértsem a politikailag aktív társadalmi mozgalmakat és szervezeteket, például mint azt a szervezetet, aminek Ön tagja. A kutatás utolsó része az ilyen szervezetek tagjaival folytatott interjúkat tartalmazza. Az interjúkat 2018 februárra tervezem.

Miért hívtak meg?
Ön meghívást kapott arra, hogy részt vegyen, mert Ön vagy valaki más azt állította, hogy tagja a Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalomnak.

Részt kell vennem?
Önön áll, hogy eldöntse, hogy részt vesz-e ebben a kutatásban. Ha úgy dönt, hogy részt vesz, akkor kerjük, hogy ezt az adatlapot őrizze meg, és megkérem hogy irja alá a beleegyezési nyilatkozatot vagy az interjú elején szóban egyezzen bele. Ön indoklás nélkűl meggondolhatja magát és visszavonhatja a nyilatkozatait az interjú során vagy az azt követő 30 napon belűl.

Hogyan fog történni az interjú?
Ha úgy dönt, hogy részt vesz ebben a tanulmányban, akkor felkérem Önt, hogy vegyen részt egy általam készített interjúban, amely telefonon keresztül történik, az ön számára költségmentesen. Az interjú körülbelül 30 percet fog tartani. Ezt az interjút az ön beleegyezésével rögzítjük, hogy segítse a kutatásomat meg az interjú elemzését. Ezt a felvételt csak ezen kutatás céljára használom fel, és teljes mértékben biztonságban lesz.

Biztosan titokban tartják-e azt, amit ebben a tanulmányban mondok?

Az anonimitás a kutatási anyag gyűjtése, tárolása és közzététele során biztosított. Az interjú során közzétett valamennyi információt bizalmasan kezelem, kivétel ha a jogi kötelezettségeknek kell eleget tenni.

Annak érdekében, hogy a titoktartást biztosíthassam, az adatokat anonimizálom. Megkérem hogy az interjú során ne említsen magáról semilyen névre, személyre utaló jelet (pl: egyedi tetoválás). Ön álnevet kap, és a valódi neve sosem fog megjelenni a kutatási projekt során. A kutatás minden felhasználásában Ön anonimizálva lesz és azonosító adatok, ha vannak, el lesznek távolítva.

Az összegyűjtött adatok (pl. az interjú rögzítése és a jegyzetek) mindenkor biztonságban lesznek. Minden olyan számítógép és külső adattároló eszköz, amelyek az adatokat tárolják, titkosítva lesznek, és az adatok jelszóval védettek lesznek. A kutatás során keletkezett adatokat, papír vagy elektronikus formában biztonságban kell tartani a kutatási projekt befejezését követően tíz évig.

Ezt a kutatást a Huddersfieldi Egyetem hallgatójaként vezetem a társadalomtudományi doktori disszertációmhoz. A disszertáció egyes részeit konferencia prezentációk és folyóiratcikkek formájában fogom majd publikálni, de teljes interjú egészben sosem kerül nyilvánosságra. Ezt a kutatást a Huddersfieldi Egyetem Kutatói Etikai Bizottsága hagyta jóvá.

Milyen előnyökkel járhat a részvétel?

A jelen tanulmányban való részvétele nagymértékben segítené a társadalmi jelenségek és az aktivizmus további megismerését. Pontosabban, Ön mint valaki, aki politikailag aktív, segítene nekünk megérteni, mi motiválja az embereket a politikai aktivizmusra. Nem is beszélve, nagyon segítene a PhD-mal!

Mit tegyek, ha részt szeretnék venni?

Ha Ön hajlandó részt venni a tanulmányban, szeretnék telefonon beszélni Önnel. Ez az interjú körülbelül 30 percig tart. A hívást én kezdeményezem, hogy önt ne terheljék költségek.

Ha kellemetlenül érzi magát az interjúban tárgyalt témákkal kapcsolatban, akkor kapcsolatba léphet a Magyar Lelki Elsősegély Telefonszolgálatok Szövetségével (LESZ) a 116-123-as számon, ahol telefonon keresztül az emberek névtelenül megvitathatják az esetleges kérdéseket (www.sos116-123.hu).

Ha szeretne részt venni ebben a kutatásban, vagy további információkat szeretne, kérjem, ne habozzon kapcsolatba lépni velem a katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk e-mail címen. Ha a kutatás lefolytatásának módja bármilyen aggodalomra ad okot, kérjem, forduljon a témavezetőmhöz a Huddersfieldi Egyetemen, aki Dr. Mark Littler, és elérhető a m.littler@hud.ac.uk e-mail címen.

Tudom, hogy az Ön ideje értékes, ezért köszönöm, hogy időt szánt az információs lap olvasására és hogy fontolóra vette a tanulmányban való részvételt.

Köszönettel,
Kondor Katalin   2018. Január 10

APPENDIX E

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Demographics
Age group *Hány éves?*
Employment status *Mi a munkakőre?*
Level of education achieved *Mi a legmagasabb tanulmányi végzetséged?*
Marital status *Házas?*
Date of entry into the organisation *Mikor léptél be a MÖMbe? Mióta tagja a MÖMnek?*

2. Ideology and Identity
An introductory question:
1. Could you tell me about the goals of your organisation?
Tudnál beszélnél a szervezet céljairól?
2. What is the ideology of the organisation?
Milyen eszmékben hisz a szervezett?

With some potential follow up questions:
Could you tell me which of these ideas are most important to you?
Ezekből mik a legfontosabbak számodra?
Have you always felt this way about these issues?
Mindig is ugy gondoltad ezeket a dolgokat?
Do you remember what made you begin to feel this way?
Arra emlékszel, hogy mi váltotta ki ezeket az érzéseket?

3. Becoming and Staying a Member
Can you tell me how you became a member of x?
Hogy lettél tagja a MÖMnek?
Why did you join x and not another group? What's special about x?
Miért MÖMhöz csatlakozot és nem egy másik szervezethez? Mi a különleges a MÖMbe?
What made you originally want to join x?
Mi késztetett arra hogy csatlakoz a MÖMhöz?
Can you remember how happy you were with your life before you joined x? How has that changed?
Vissza tudsz emlékezni hogy mennyire boldog voltál MÖM előtt? Hogy változott?
Tudd e külömbséget tenni a MÖM csatlakozás előtti és jelenlegi élete közt?
What does it mean to you, personally, to be a member of this organisation?
Mit jelent neked, személyesen, a MÖM tagja lenni?
What are the most important activities of x?
Mik a MÖM legfontosabb tevékenységei?
Can you tell me what you've learned from being a member of x?
Mit tanultál a MÖMben eltöltött idő alatt?
Have you ever considered leaving the organisation?
Valaha gondolt e arra hogy elhagya a szervezetett?
What would you lose if you did leave?
Mit vesztenél, a elhagyná?

CODE LIST FOR ZOLTÁN

CODES	META-CODES
Age Children Education Employment Marital Status	Personal life
New saying: Uniformed criminals Politics in Hungary are now nationalist Government pursuing nationalist groups B: Government doesn't help people B: Government doesn't help people B: Group unfairly disbanded	Hungarian government
Nationalism common in Hungary B: Hungarian people support nationalist group B: Hungarian people support nationalist group B: Only fraction of society is radical B: People were waiting for something in country to change	Nationalism in Hungary
Change in civilian soldier laws Citizen soldiers Citizen soldiers Civil policing V: Importance of good Civilian Soldiers	Civilian Soldiers
Disbanded nationalist groups Disbanded nationalist groups Nationalist group was very strong B: They looked for reasons to disband movement B: They looked for reasons to disband group	Disbanded nationalist groups
Hungarian Guard filled a void Hungarian Guard was very popular Creation of Hungarian Guard Creation of Hungarian Guard Involvement with Jobbik Jobbik and Hungarian Guard Other nationalist groups Other nationalist groups Other nationalist groups Other nationalist groups Other nationalist groups Szebb Jövő Szebb Jövő Szebb Jövő Other nationalist groups Other nationalist groups Other nationalist movements Importance of networking B: Other groups not good Civilian Soldiers B: People don't trust other nationalist movements	Involvement with other groups

Gypsies	Roma
Life before nationalism Origin of nationalist feelings Origin of nationalist feelings Origin of nationalist feelings Heard of nationalist groups in past B: Nationalist feelings are innate B: Nationalist feelings are innate	Origin of nationalist feelings
Internet Internet Media Media MÖM: Media won't advertise Popularity of nationalist media	Media
MÖM active regions MÖM acts legally MÖM Foundation MÖM uniform MÖM: Foundation	MÖM General information
MÖM and police MÖM and police MÖM: Confrontations with police Working with police Followed by police Nationalist groups stronger than law enforcement A: Eventually get tired of police	Law enforcement
MÖM helps people MÖM helps people MÖM helps people MÖM helps people MÖM helps people: Attention through media MÖM helps people: physical MÖM helps people: poor MÖM protects people MÖM protects people V: Must help own people V: Must help own people V: Must help own people V: Must help own people V: Must protect own people	Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people
MÖM is a family MÖM: Importance of community MÖM: Importance of community MÖM: Importance of community MÖM: Importance of community MÖM: Show Hungarian people importance of community MÖM: Show Hungarian people importance of community B: Community most important to the survival of the nation	MÖM as family, community, brotherhood
MÖM: A lot of responsibility MÖM: A lot of responsibility MÖM: A lot of responsibility	Personal experience in MÖM

MÖM: A lot of work MÖM: Can never leave MÖM: Can never leave MÖM: Would miss it MÖM: Would miss it MÖM: Would miss it If left MÖM Knows a lot of people Legal troubles MÖM: Gained respect My word is important Didn't change after joining Self-sacrifice for MÖM Pressure of leadership A: Eventually get tired of not doing what you want A: Self-awareness A: This did not make me a bigger person A: Time in Szebb Jövő wasn't easy A: Tired B: People count on me B: People trust me V: Important to keep your word V: Integrity	
MÖM: Hungarian nationalism	MÖM ideology
MÖM: Members MÖM: Members MÖM: Members	MÖM members
MÖM: Paramilitary MÖM: protect themselves MÖM: Protect themselves MÖM: Protect themselves	MÖM paramilitary
Time joined MÖM Why joined MÖM Why people join specific groups	Joining MÖM

CODE LIST FOR PETER

CODES	META-CODES
Age Children Children Education Employment Employment Marital Status	Personal life
A: Pride in self V: Teaching V: Teaching A: Self-awareness A: Self-awareness	Personal attitudes and values
A: Christian V: Importance of marriage V: Politeness	Traditional values
A: Reality of Trianon A: Racism A: Racism A: Racism A: Racism A: Racism A: Radical right A: Radical right V: Serving the nation B: Being Hungarian is beautiful B: Hungarian women are the most beautiful B: Hungarians are a proud people B: Hungarians are an intelligent people B: Hungarians are hard working B: Hungarians are hard working B: Hungarians had a hand in all important inventions B: MÖM is needed	Personal views: nationalism
B: Hungarians as martyrs	Hungarians as victims and martyrs
Gypsies Gypsies Gypsies Gypsies	Roma
Knows major figures in Hungarian RR Szebb Jövő Szebb Jövő	Involvement with other groups
MÖM Foundation	MÖM General information
MÖM helps people MÖM helps people: Legal MÖM helps people: Physical MÖM helps people: poor MÖM protects people V: Important to help people	Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people

MÖM is a family MÖM is a family MÖM: Helping fellow members	MÖM as family, community, brotherhood
MÖM: Autonomy for Hungarian lands MÖM: Hungarian national identity MÖM: Hungarian nationalism MÖM: Hungarian nationalism MÖM: Hungarian pride MÖM: Hungarian pride MÖM: Hungarians stick together MÖM: Importance of Hungarian ancestors MÖM: Trianon	MÖM ideology
MÖM: Members	MÖM members
Origin of nationalist feelings Road to nationalist feelings	Origin of nationalist feelings
Position in MÖM Position in MÖM Position in MÖM Proud to be MÖM member Proud to be MÖM member Self-sacrifice for MÖM Would never leave MÖM Family involvement in MÖM Family involvement in MÖM Family involvement in MÖM Family involvement in MÖM	Personal experience in MÖM
Reason joined MÖM Reason joined MÖM Time joined MÖM Way joined MÖM Way joined MÖM Way joined MÖM Why MÖM	Joining MÖM

APPENDIX F3
CODE LIST FOR ÁRPÁD

CODES	META-CODES
Age Education Employment Marital Status Children Parents V: Importance of nature B: Lives in a good region of country	Personal life
Children's camp Children's camp MÖM: Children MÖM: Children V: Guiding children	Children are important
MÖM helps people: Legal MÖM helps people: poor B: Everyone in the country should help each other	Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people
MÖM active regions MÖM active regions MÖM: Foundation MÖM: group structure	MÖM General information
MÖM: Hungarian national identity MÖM: Hungarian nationalism MÖM: Hungarian nationalism MÖM: Hungarian nationalism MÖM: Hungarian nationalism MÖM: Hungarian pride	MÖM ideology
What is national identity V: Furthering nationalist knowledge B: Helping each other Hungarian trait B: Hungarian history mostly wrong B: Hungarians are hard working B: Hungarians are hard working B: Hungarians left mark on the world B: Multiculturalism is bad B: Magyars were strong	Personal views: nationalism
B: Hungarians made to seem weak and stupid B: Magyars were painted in a bad light B: They took away our history B: Communists ruined the country	Hungarians as victims and martyrs
B: Problems in country B: What they taught in school was wrong	Problems in Hungary
Gypsies Gypsies	Roma
MÖM: A real team MÖM: Importance of community MÖM: Importance of community MÖM: Importance of community MÖM: helping fellow members MÖM: Helping fellow members MÖM: helping fellow members	MÖM as family, community, brotherhood

MÖM: helping fellow members	
MÖM: Members MÖM: Members MÖM: Members MÖM: Members MÖM: Members	MÖM members
MÖM: paramilitary MÖM: Physical	MÖM paramilitary
MÖM: Large scale of radicalism MÖM: Radicalism MÖM: Radicalism MÖM: Radicalism Rest of interview was nice side of MÖM	Radicalism in MÖM
Origin of nationalist feelings Origin of nationalist feelings Origin of nationalist feelings Origin of nationalist feelings Origin of nationalist feelings Origin of nationalist feelings B: I'm not so radical	Origin of nationalist feelings
Involvement with Jobbik Involvement with Jobbik Other nationalist groups Other nationalist groups	Involvement with other groups
Being a MÖM member a good thing Belief in MÖM strengthened Personal involvement in MÖM Position in MÖM Proud to be a MÖM member Proud to be a MÖM member Involvement in MÖM B: MÖM is important	Personal experience in MÖM
Looked for nationalist group Reason joined MÖM Reason joined MÖM Time joined MÖM Way joined MÖM Way joined MÖM Way joined MÖM Why MÖM How they knew they were a member	Joining MÖM
Comparison with EDL Comparison with EDL Comparison with EDL Comparison with EDL Comparison with EDL Migrants	Comparison with EDL

CODE LIST FOR LÁSZLÓ

CODES	META-CODES
Age Education Employment Marital Status Friends outside of MÖM	Personal life
B: Hungarians always Christians in spirit B: Importance of Christianity MÖM: Holy crown MÖM: Importance of Christianity	Traditional values
B: Many police want to help B: Police aren't brave enough B: Police don't act due to politics MÖM and police MÖM encourages police to work Reasons why police may not act	Law enforcement
Children's camp Children's camp Children's camp Children's camp Helps with children's camp Helps with children's camp Helps with children's camp MÖM: Children MÖM: Children	Children are important
Learned Hungarian pride in school Origin of nationalist feelings Magyar Hiszek Egy	Origin of nationalist feelings
MÖM: Trianon MÖM: Trianon	MÖM ideology
MÖM abroad MÖM: Action in Transylvania	MÖM outside of Hungary
MÖM and media	Media
MÖM helps people: Legal MÖM helps people: Legal MÖM helps people: Physical MÖM helps people: Physical MÖM helps people: Physical MÖM helps people: poor MÖM helps people: poor	Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people
MÖM is a family MÖM is a family MÖM members everywhere MÖM: A real team B: Blood-brotherhood important MÖM: Community of friends MÖM: Creating a friendly community MÖM: helping fellow members	MÖM as a family, community, brotherhood

MÖM: Oath Personal involvement in MÖM Personal involvement in MÖM	Personal experience in MÖM
Preparation to join MÖM Preparation to join MÖM Preparation to join MÖM Preparation to join MÖM Preparation to join MÖM: Careful what say and do Preparation to join MÖM: Legal Preparation to join MÖM: Legal Way joined MÖM Way joined MÖM Way joined MÖM Reason joined MÖM Time joined MÖM	Joining MÖM

APPENDIX G

TEXTUAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR EDL

Hi! My name is Katherine Kondor and I'm conducting some research on new political activist movements as part of my doctoral research at the University of Huddersfield. I am particularly interested in politically-motivated organisations concerned with cultural and political issues. I would be most grateful if you could answer a few questions about your involvement in the EDL. You're not required to answer all questions, if there's anything you're uncomfortable with (or nothing comes to mind), you can just skip it. We hear a lot of things about different organisations, so my goal here is to find out the truth from members and to be completely objective while doing so.

Your answers will be kept completely anonymous; I will not ask you for your name and you are not required to give me any contact information. If you have any questions, however, you can contact me at katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk. As this is for my doctoral research, by answering these questions you are giving me permission to use this (anonymous) information in my research and future publications.

If you fill this out, THANK YOU! If not, thank you anyway for clicking. I'd greatly appreciate you passing this link along to anyone you think may fill it out!

1. What are the biggest issues affecting the UK at the moment?

2. Have you always felt this way about these issues? Do you remember what made you begin to feel this way?

3. Can you tell me how you became a member/supporter of the EDL? How long have you been a supporter/member? How did you hear about the organisation?
After Respondent 13: Can you tell me how you became a member/supporter of the EDL and how long you've been a member/supporter? How did you hear about the organisation (through friends, online...)? How did you join (did you just show up?)?

4. What made you originally want to join the EDL? How did you join?
After Respondent 13: What made you originally want to join the EDL?

5. What does it mean to you, personally, to be a supporter/member of this organisation?

6. Can you tell me what you've learned from being a member/supporter of the EDL?

7. What would you lose if you left the EDL?

8. Now for a few basic questions. What is your gender? M/F/Other

9. How old are you? (age groups)

10. Is there anything you'd like to add? Anything you think is important for me to know about the political situation in the UK, or otherwise?
After Respondent 13: Is there anything you'd like to add? Anything you think is important for me to know about the political situation in the UK, or otherwise? Please include your email address if you'd be willing to have me contact you to clarify answers, if need be.

APPENDIX H

CODE MAP FOR EDL INTERVIEWS

APPENDIX I

TABLES OF CODES FOR EDL INTERVIEWS

Research Themes	First-Cycle Codes	Second-Cycle Codes	Description
Adopting Radical Right Attitudes	Immigration Muslims Politics and Politicians Media Brexit Anti-EU Social Concerns	Immigration Muslims Politics and Politicians Media Brexit Anti-EU Social Concerns	Personal views and attitudes; origin of nationalist feelings.
Joining the EDL	Level of membership Motivation to Join	Not a member Member Supporter Sympathiser Through another organisation Heard of EDL online or in the news Pre-existing relationships	Involvement with EDL, including why and how they joined and information about membership.
Why the EDL	Views of EDL	Muslims/Islam Immigration Speak truth about politicians Feels heard/makes a difference Fighting for the nation and identity They support the troops Solidarity/brotherhood	Why they support the EDL specifically and not another organisation.
Connection to the EDL	Investment	Pride Self-Respect Community Doing something good Not invested Not a member/supporter	How involved they are with the organisation and how loyal they are; questions of solidarity and why respondents maintain membership.

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