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**COMMUNITY CAPACITY BUILDING FOR DISASTER RISK  
REDUCTION: EXPOSING AND CHALLENGING LEVEL OF  
PRIORITISATION IN KENYA**

**STUART KATWIKIRIZE**

**A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial  
fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy**

**September 2019**

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## ABSTRACT

Global disaster reports continue to present a disturbing steady growth in the frequency and magnitude of disasters. The same reports also tell of escalating disaster effects and impacts on the myriad of at-risk communities. Despite the avalanche of these concerning reports, both literature and practitioner field views bemoan the current disconnect between upper (global and national) level disaster risk reduction (DRR) rhetoric and abysmal support to local level DRR action.

This study recognizes therefore that while there is a growing worldwide interest in DRR, poor local capacity for DRR remains probably the biggest impediment to speeding up required global DRR progress. The study also recognizes that community capacity building for disaster risk reduction (CCB4DRR) is a pivotal enabler to local DRR with knock-on effects to global DRR progression. In order to accelerate global DRR progress therefore, it is imperative to challenge the current state of key stakeholder prioritization and support for community capacity building for disaster risk reduction (CCB4DRR).

The study adopts case study research strategy and uses interviews, document reviews and observations to investigate the state of CCB4DRR within 6 INGO and donor case studies in Kenya. In addition, the study identifies factors behind one of Kenya's most successful CCB4DRR initiative---Yatta's Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO). The analysis of case study data reveals that while there's an overall general understanding of the importance of supporting local DRR action, support to CCB4DRR is at varying degrees within the 6 INGO and donor case studies. The analysis of factors behind OMO's great success reveals how it is one thing for DRR stakeholders to understand the importance of prioritising and supporting CCB4DRR and yet another for the same stakeholders to grasp how to practically get it right. This is the reason one case donor reflected, *"I think we are still very limited in the understanding of DRR and how to translate it into the practical things."*

The study adds nuance to our understanding of the present state of CCB4DRR in Kenya. It also underscores the importance of donors being intentional at providing informed guidelines on how funds allocated to government Disaster Risk Management (DRM) agencies should be prioritized between different DRM activities. The study recommends that donor guidance to respective partners should emphasize the need for targeting larger amounts of allocated funds to resilience-building DRR activities versus the on-going practice of allocating more to emergency preparedness and response. Probably the most important output of the study is the proposed conceptual framework aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the country understand which critical pieces of information are required for them to be able to make informed in-country DRR choices.

**Keywords:** community capacity building, disaster, risk reduction, local DRR action, donors, INGOs.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DC	District Commissioner
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
CB	Capacity Building
CB4DRR	Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction
CCB	Community Capacity Building
CCB4DRR	Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction
CMDRR	Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction
CIM	Christian Impact Ministries
CRED	Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters
EWS	Early Warning System
GA	General Assembly
GOK	Government of Kenya
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
MCA	Members of County Assembly
MoSSP	Ministry of State for Special Programmes
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
OMO	Operation Mwolyo Out
RM	Research Methodology
SF4DRR	Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction



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I must admit it here, there are people that suffered lots during the process of this research. As a self-funded student, my wife Joan and children gave up much more than I will ever make up for them. But your labour of love was not in vain. And lastly, but more importantly, I thank God for helping me all along the way.

## **DEDICATION**

To my father, Mr. Samson Kanyomushana. A selfless former primary school teacher that inspired me and very many others to always want to contribute more to society. You passed on toward the end of writing this thesis. It is an honour to be called your son.

## DECLARATION

This thesis is submitted under the University of Huddersfield rules and regulations for the award of a PhD degree by research. The researcher affirms that no portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for any another degree or professional qualification except as specified.

**Stuart Katwikirize**

September 2019

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# 1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background and Rationale

According to the World Humanitarian Data And Trends report (UN-OCHA, 2018), 95.1 million people were affected by natural disasters and 68.5 million people were forcibly displaced by violence and conflict in the year 2017 alone. And stepping into Africa, Eastern Africa which includes the Horn of Africa countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda is a region exposed to various disaster risks ranging from cyclic droughts and famines, floods, landslides, epidemics to conflict-induced people displacements. Relatedly, the region also benefits from enormous donor and local government development funding, where, unfortunately, development gains are repeatedly reversed and or wiped out by aforementioned cyclic disaster shocks.

On disaster risk reduction (DRR), a review across Gaillard and Mercer (2013), Robertua (2013), UNISDR (2013b), UNISDR (2013c), Izumi and Shaw (2012), Benicchio (2012), van Riet and van Niekerk (2012), Hagelsteen and Becker (2012), Scott and Tarazona (2011), J Twigg and Bottomley (2011), Kent (2011), Pelling (2007b), UNDP (2004), Walter (2004), Walter (2002) and Walter (2001) resounds with consensus on one critical aspect of disaster risk reduction: that while there is growing worldwide interest and focus on disaster risk reduction, poor local capacity for DRR remains probably the biggest impediment to speeding up required global DRR progress and cite ‘top-down approaches’ to DRR implementation as a top negating factor responsible for poor local DRR capacity and related poor DRR action.

As late as 2004, a United Nations DRR report lamented how *“examples of the successful and long-term strengthening of local communities do exist, but remain uncommon”* (UNDP, 2004). The lamentation is further corroborated by Pandey and Okazaki (2005) who in their work on community-based disaster management bemoan that issues of sustainability including local capacity building in most disaster mitigation initiatives are rarely addressed. In support of foregoing concerns, a consultations synthesis report on post-2015 framework for DRR indicates that the majority of stakeholders engaged called for more attention to capacity building targeting both local

governments and people living in vulnerable conditions (UNISDR, 2013c). This is the reason Robertua (2013) with urgency asserts that *“governments must realize that local communities are the first to be affected by disasters and enhancing the capacity of local communities will accelerate the creation of communities that are sustainable and well-prepared for disasters.”*

Fully aware of the importance and yet apparent weak state of community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) in the global remit of DRR, coupled with the a near absence of literature on the level of prioritization and support to CCB4DRR in Eastern Africa, the researcher set out to bridge the identified evidence gap by undertaking a study aimed at exploring, investigating and challenging the state of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR in Kenya; and to identify and analyse critical factors and or good practice concepts responsible for highly successful cases of CCB4DRR in the country. One of the study’s objectives is to develop a conceptual framework through which DRR stakeholders in the country including institutional donors and INGOs could determine how and where to prioritise DRR support.

## **1.2 Justification of Kenya as the focus research country, and Institutional Donors and INGOs in Kenya as units of analysis**

The Kenya Draft Disaster Management Policy (GOK, 2009, p. 5) indicates that the country ’s disaster profile is dominated by droughts, floods, fires, terrorism, technological accidents, diseases and epidemics that disrupt people’s livelihoods, destroy infrastructure, divert planned use of resources, interrupt economic activities and retard development. And while drought and floods are the most significant hazards affecting the country, effects of drought are the most severe in the country (Owuor (2015).

DARA (2011) asserts that *“at a glance, Kenya seems to be a regional success story”*. Given that Kenya has a fairly stable government in a region riddled by violent civil

conflicts, boasts the region's strongest economy and has attained middle-income status; has a very strong donor and INGO presence; is a regional humanitarian hub; benefits from enormous donor and local government development funding; and according to Swithern (2014) received US\$436 million in international humanitarian assistance to the 2011 drought and hunger crisis; it is conceivable therefore that **'community capacity building for disaster risk reduction'** ought to already be a priority consideration supported and mainstreamed by all the country's major relief and development partners.

In spite of the country's high disaster risk index (Birkmann et al., 2011), a very high in-country donor and INGO presence, very large emergency response expenditure (Development-Initiatives, 2017), by the time of conceptualising this study, there was a literature blackout on the level of prioritization and support given to community capacity building for DRR by multiple stakeholders in the country (Kenya). This study, therefore, set out to bridge the knowledge gap by way of exploring, investigating and challenging the state of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR in Kenya. Study findings will, therefore, enable key DRR stakeholders in the country to rethink the place of CCB4DRR in the overarching DRR remit in the country. And the resultant conceptual framework will aid DRR stakeholders in the country including institutional donors and INGOs to have a simple tool with adequate filters and lenses through which they could determine how and where to prioritise DRR support.

**NOTE:** relatedly, the justification for focusing on institutional donors and INGOs in Kenya is well described under section 2.4.3 which discusses Community Capacity Building for DRR, and in sub-section 2.4.3.1 which unpacks "the origins and role of institutional donors and INGOs in CCB4DRR."

## **1.3 Research Aim, Questions and Objectives**

### **1.3.1 Research Aim:**

The aim of the research was to explore and investigate the state of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) in Kenya, and to identify and analyse critical factors or good practice concepts behind highly successful CCB4DRR initiatives in the country. And the study was guided by the following research questions and objectives:

### **1.3.2 Key Research Questions**

- i. What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?
- ii. How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya determine DRR support priorities?
- iii. How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?
- iv. What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?
- v. What are the critical factors and or good practice concepts responsible for highly successful community DRR action where this has been achieved in the country?

### **1.3.3 Key Research Objectives**

- i. Explore current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities.
- ii. Establish how individual institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support.
- iii. Assess whether institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR understand the importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR

(by analysing how they measure DRR success and the changes they want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country).

- iv. Identify highly successful cases of community capacity building for DRR and analyse critical factors and or good practice concepts responsible for this success.
- v. Develop a conceptual framework through which institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR would determine where to prioritise DRR support.

## 1.4 Contribution to knowledge

The study intends to contribute to both theory and practice in multiple ways. Firstly, the study will provide insights into current case donor and INGO DRR priorities in the country, ways case donors and INGOs measure DRR success, country level (either upper or lower level) at which case donors and INGOs would like to see changes or results consequent to their effective engagement in the country's DRR agenda, and the status of CCB4DRR in the broad-spectrum of DRR in the country. A compendium of these findings will reveal whether or not target case INGOs and donors generally understand the importance of supporting local DRR action including support to CCB4DRR. Secondly, one of the study's greatest contributions to theory will be the identification of factors behind one of the region's most successful DRR initiatives—Yatta's Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO).

Thirdly, study findings will provide insights into how target case donors and INGOs in Kenya reflect in the mirror of previous studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) who uncovered a concerning global trend of **spending heavily** on disaster preparedness and response **while investing far less** in resilience-building DRR. Perhaps the study's greatest contribution to practice will emanate from the development of a conceptual framework aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the country understand critical pieces of information required for one to be able to make informed in-country DRR choices.

## **1.5 Structure of the thesis**

### **1.5.1 Chapter 1: Introduction**

This chapter introduces the research study explored and discussed in this thesis. The chapter begins by presenting the background and rationale to the research, followed by the justification of the research and Kenya as the focus country; research aim, questions and objectives; contribution to knowledge; and ends by presenting the structure of the thesis.

### **1.5.2 Chapter 2: Literature review**

Chapter 2 presents a detailed literature review of key concepts associated with this study. The chapter begins with a general overview of disasters and DRR, defines key terms used in the DRR discourse, presents the recorded history of DRR, highlights the overall DRR landscape of Kenya as a country, presents a global overview of community capacity building for DRR that dovetails into CCB4DRR in Kenya, and lastly presents conclusions showing knowledge gaps and possible areas of focus for this study.

### **1.5.3 Chapter 3: Research methodology**

Chapter 3 presents the various steps adopted by the researcher in studying the research problem along with the logic behind them (Kothari, 2004, p. 8). The chapter starts by discussing the research philosophy and research paradigms, followed by research approach, research strategy in which 'case study research strategy' is adopted for this study, methodological choices, and research techniques.

### **1.5.4 Chapter 4: Conceptual framework**

Chapter 4 presents a conceptual framework providing a theoretical overview of intended research (M. Miles & Huberman, 1984), key concepts and contexts of the research (Blaxter & Hughes, 1996), and what data are going to be collected and analyzed (Leshem & Trafford, 2007). The framework demonstrates how global and national level DRR priorities eventually affect the wellbeing of community-level DRR action.



### **1.5.5 Chapter 5: Data analysis and discussion of case studies**

Chapter 5 presents data analysis and discussion of individual case study by case study. Firstly, the chapter begins by presenting background information about case studies. Secondly, the chapter presents individual case study analysis and discussion of findings in the order that mirrors the research questions and objectives. And lastly, the chapter presents key findings from the cross-case analysis. The chapter doesn't not provide a discussion of amalgamated findings but leaves this for Chapter 6.

### **1.5.6 Chapter 6: Summary discussion of amalgamated findings**

With Merriam and Tisdell (2015) asserting that *"findings are the outcome of the inquiry--what you, the investigator, learned or came to understand about the phenomenon,"* this chapter presents a summary discussion of amalgamated findings which have been presented case study by case study in chapter 5.

### **1.5.7 Chapter 7: Conclusions**

Informed by the context obtaining from chapters 2-6, this chapter is dedicated to drawing conclusions about the aims and objectives of the thesis. In this chapter, therefore, findings are presented and evaluated in response to the research questions and objectives proposed in chapter one.

## **1.6 Summary and link**

This chapter presented the introduction to the research discussed in this thesis, highlighted the background and rationale behind the research, presented the justification for Kenya as a research country; indicated the research aim, questions and objectives; underscored contribution to knowledge; and lastly presented the structure for this thesis. The following chapter presents the literature synthesis undergirding the study.

## 2 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Introduction to the Literature Review

The rationale behind this literature review is to explore and present global scholarly evidence and opinion on the theme of ***“community capacity building for disaster risk reduction”*** as the first step to setting the stage for planned research on the theme in Kenya. The review will, therefore, provide a critical analysis of what’s already been researched and or published on the theme; identify gaps in reviewed literature and point out the relevance and feasibility of the planned research study. The review is presented in four inter-related sections, starting with a focus on *‘disasters and disaster risk reduction’*, followed by a review of *‘overall DRR in Kenya’*, moving on to *‘community capacity building for DRR’*, and ending with *‘conclusions’* linking the review to the planned research study.

### 2.2 Disasters and Disaster Risk Reduction

This section is arranged and presented under four sub-sections beginning with *‘definitions of disaster, disaster risk and disaster reduction’*, followed by a review of the *‘recorded history of disaster risk reduction’* and closing with a critical appraisal of both the *‘Hyogo Framework for Action’* and the *‘Sendai Framework for DRR’*.

#### 2.2.1 Definitions (Disaster, Disaster Risk and Disaster Risk Reduction)

##### 2.2.1.1 Disaster

In the words of Rutherford and de Boer (1983, p. 10), *“the universe, we are told, began with a big bang, and ever since, nature has provided a series of unexpected bangs and calamities of one type or another.”* It is these ‘calamities’ and ‘bangs’ that the world including the academia has come to refer to as ‘disasters’. And similar to other terms central to this study, the term disaster has been a subject of much debate (Parker &

Handmer, 1992) and therefore does not come into use without bringing its own share of confusion about meaning. According to Rodríguez et al. (2009), Shaluf (2007, p. 707), and al-Madhari and Keller (1997), there are many definitions of the term disaster and each definition seems dependent upon the discipline using the term.

Similarly, E. Quarantelli (1986) and Pidgeon (1997) pointed out that no definition of the term disaster is universally accepted. This is why Rutherford and de Boer (1983) humorously recognise that the term disaster is applicable to everything from an event like an earthquake to occasions when two ladies turn up for a party wearing the same dress. Moving forward, it will be helpful to explore definitions of the term disaster presented by some of the leading institutions and scholars.

In their work on 'risk management and disasters', Keller and Al-Madhari (1996, p. 19), define a disaster as an event localized both in time and space, and meeting one or more of the following results over a relatively short period of time: ten or more fatalities; damage cost exceeds US\$1 million; and 50 or more people evacuated. Relatedly, in their work with the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Guha-Sapir et al. (2012) indicate that CRED defines a disaster as *"a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering"*.

CRED maintains a worldwide database on disasters known as EM-DAT, and for a disaster to be entered into the database, at least one of the following criteria must be fulfilled: 10 or more people reported killed; 100 or more people reported affected; declaration of a state of emergency; and a call for international assistance (Guha-Sapir et al., 2012, p. 7). CRED's definition of a disaster has close similarities with that offered by Keller and Al-Madhari (above) for the two agree on the minimum number of fatalities and the call for international or external assistance. However, in comparison to Keller and Al-Madhari's definition, CRED adds another dimension of the 'number of people affected', and the 'declaration of an emergency' while omitting the 'value in damage cost.'

Raphael (1986, p. 5), describes a disaster as an overwhelming event and circumstance that tests the adaptational response of community or individuals beyond their capability, and lead, at least temporarily to massive disruption of function for community or individual. Raphael's definition, which is one of the most dated, brings out the aspect that different communities have different resilience and or capacity to cope with disasters. Another definition offered by notable scholars comes from Keller et al. (1989) who state that a disaster is 'an event that afflicts a community the consequences of which are beyond the immediate financial, material or emotional resources of the community'. Keller et al's definition seems to be more attuned to disaster effects more than any other element of disasters.

Still on defining the term disaster, after careful examination of the concept, Parker and Handmer (1992) suggested that the preferred definition of disaster is: an unusual natural or man-made event, including an event caused by failure of technological systems, which temporarily overwhelms the response capacity of human communities, groups of individuals or natural environments and which causes massive damage, economic loss, disruption, injury, and/or loss of life. Unlike foregoing definitions of the term disaster, it is Parker and Handmer that expand the margins of the definition to encompass 'technological accidents', 'disease outbreaks', and 'environmental consequences.'

To date, a more commonly used definition of the term disaster is that offered by UNISDR, stating that a disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources- UNISDR (2009, p. 9). Though seemingly simplified, the UNISDR definition covers the most critical aspects of a disaster, which include 'serious disruption', 'widespread effects' and 'exceeding the ability to cope'.

A read across all foregoing definitions of the term disaster points to the fact that while there is no universally agreed definition given that the term is defined fairly differently by different disciplines, there still remain binding strands in most of the

definitions. And it is the UNISDR definition that seems to collect and present a definition that encompasses the most important of these strands including: 'serious disruption', 'widespread effects' and 'exceeding the ability to cope'. One would assume that environmental impacts are covered under the 'widespread effects' wording of the definition.

During this literature review, the definition presented by Sunder and Sezhiyan (2007, p. p.v), was found to be veering off one of the three most common aforementioned definitive phrases used when defining the term disaster. Sunder and Sezhiyan state that *"a disaster is a crisis situation causing widespread damage which far exceeds our ability to recover."* Their application of the word 'recover' is not the same as using the word 'cope' when defining disaster situations. Sunder and Sezhiyan seem to suggest that all disaster-affected communities do not have the ability to recover, and this goes against known examples where communities ravaged by disasters have been able to rebuild their lives and livelihoods many times with very little or no external help, irrespective of initial disaster damage and losses suffered.

However, this is not to entirely dismiss the fact that there are times when disasters especially cyclic ones, have eventually eroded peoples' capacity to recover. Case examples of the latter can be cited from the Horn of Africa counties of Kenya and Somalia where cyclic droughts (1983-1984; 1995-1996; 1999-2001; 2005-2006; 2008-2009; and 2011-2012) coupled with cattle rustling-related conflicts have literally decimated many household livestock herds and crippled traditional community coping mechanisms where severely affected households used to be restocked by friends and relatives. And as reported by Ojwang (2009) and De Jode and Tilstone (2011, p. 21), there are people in the Horn of Africa presently known as 'pastoralist dropouts.' These are people that were once pastoralists but are no more. Many of these people are trying to 'cope' by adopting alternative livelihoods including dwelling near urban centres in search of menial jobs. One would be reasonable to, therefore, conclude that while this group of people did not 'recover' their previous pastoralist livelihoods, they are still coping and recovering by adopting alternative livelihoods, however difficult this

process must be. It is therefore inaccurate for Sundar and Sezhiyan (2007) to imply that a phenomenon is not a disaster if it does not exceed the people's ability to recover.

#### 2.2.1.2 Disaster Risk

UNISDR (2009, p. 9) defined disaster risk as potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future time period. Relatedly, ADRC (2005, p. 5) indicates that disaster risk can be explained as a function of the hazard, exposure and vulnerability as follows: Disaster Risk = function (Hazard, Exposure, Vulnerability). (Shaw et al., 2013) state that *"disaster is a function of hazard, vulnerability and capacity"*. Unlike ADRC, Shaw et al have introduced 'capacity' into the disaster risk equation while omitting 'exposure'. Equally, but with a distinctive addition, in her work on the "components of risk", Thywissen (2006, p. 39) explains how risk is understood as a function of hazard, vulnerability, exposure, and resilience; and could be presented as follows: Risk = f (hazard, vulnerability, exposure, resilience). Thus, while upholding the three elements presented by ADRC, and the three elements presented by Shaw et al, Thywissen introduces the fourth element of 'resilience' as an important factor in explaining how disaster risk can either be formed and or be reduced. In her definition of 'resilience' provided below, Thywissen explains the relationship between capacity and resilience in the disaster risk equation.

In relation to foregoing definitions of disaster risk presented by UNISDR, ADRC and Thywissen; Boshier (2013, p. 240), provides a good example by explaining that while hazards, such as earthquakes, cyclones and tsunamis are natural in origin; the way that disaster risk has become embedded in contemporary urban landscapes, for instance, is largely anthropogenic. Boshier observes that decades of mass urbanization accompanied by poor urban planning, non-existent or poorly regulated building codes and little or no proactive adaptation to the impacts of climate change have increased humanity's exposure to these hazards. And (Cannon, 1994, p. 16) supports Boshier when he asserts that hazards are natural but disasters are not.

Given that it is the interaction between the different elements presented by both ADRC and Thywissen (above) which result in disaster risk, it is reasonable to explore the meaning of each of these four elements.

**Hazard:** according to UNISDR (2009, p. 17), a hazard is a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage.

**Exposure:** ADRC (2005) describes exposure as that which is affected by natural disasters, such as people and property; while UNISDR (2009) describes it as people, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses. Similarly, UNDP (2004) describes exposure as the elements at risk, an inventory of those people or artefacts that are exposed to a hazard. Unlike the discourse on other terms already described in this literature review, there appears to be consensus on the definition of the term exposure.

**Vulnerability:** One of the earliest definitions of vulnerability in relation to disaster risk was presented by Piers et al. (1994) who described it as being prone or susceptible to damage or injury. Later on, UNISDR (2009) defined vulnerability as the characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard; while ADRC (2005) defined it as a condition resulting from physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes, which increases the susceptibility of a community to the impact of a hazard.” UNU (2012, p. 14) describes vulnerability as the social, physical, economic and environment-related factors that make people or systems susceptible to the impacts of natural hazards and adverse consequences of climate change. From these four definitions, the words ‘characteristics’, ‘factors’, ‘being’ and ‘condition’ emerge; words which point to inherent attributes of the substance being discussed, thus signalling consensus among the four authors.

**Resilience:** UNISDR (2009) defines resilience as the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and

recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.

Thywissen (2006, p. 38), argues that when considering disaster risk, the harm done does not only depend on hazard, vulnerability and exposure, but also on the coping capacity and the resilience of the element at risk. She observes that in various literature, most definitions show a large overlap between coping capacity and resilience and that the two terms are often used as synonyms. However, she agrees that the coping capacity and resilience dimensions of a harmful event cannot be easily separated from each other. Thywissen further explains that coping capacity encompasses those strategies and measures that act directly upon damage during the event by alleviating or containing the impact or by bringing about efficient relief, as well as those adaptive strategies that modify behaviour or activities in order to circumvent or avoid damaging effects. Thywissen stresses that resilience is all of these things, plus the capability to remain functional during an event and to completely recover from it. Thus while it is not easy to delineate coping capacity and resilience, resilience is the more encompassing term that includes coping capacity.

UNDP (2004) gave a good explanation of how the described foregoing elements interact to compound into disaster risk. They explain that for instance, without people **exposed** to hazardous events, there is no risk to human life. Physical **exposure is therefore not an indicator of vulnerability** but is a condition *sine qua non* for disaster risk to exist. Without people exposed to hazardous events, there is no risk to human life. Physical exposure, however, is insufficient to explain risk. This is the reason countries and or communities with similar levels of physical exposure to a given hazard experience widely differing levels of risk. Similarly, Boshier (2013); Cutter (2005); E. L. Quarantelli (2005); Benjamin Wisner et al. (2004) ; UNDP (2004); Mileti (1999); D. E. Alexander (1993) and O'Keefe et al. (1976) all agree that while hazards may have a natural origin, disasters are not defined by fixed events but by “social constructs”, and these are liable to change. In sync with the foregoing view, Cater and Walker (1994, p. 11), emphasise that disasters are human events, not natural ones.



### 2.2.1.3 Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)


UNISDR (2009, p. 10), defines DRR as the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. A closer look at the UNISDR definition of DRR confirms that DRR is only possible through addressing the four components of disaster risk already discussed above. Before reviewing the global history and current status of DRR in ensuing sections, this seems to be the right place to present some of the views and tell-tale status indicators of DRR especially during the period immediately before the advent of the HFA.

A report by UNDP (2004) indicates that for many people around the world, development does not appear to be working and that the escalating number and increasing intensity of disasters with a natural trigger are one way the crisis is presenting itself. While the report acknowledges the increasing impact of 'natural disasters' on development, its focus is on how development itself shapes disaster risk; demonstrating that disaster risk is not unavoidable, but on the contrary, can be managed and reduced through appropriate development policies and actions. Both UNDP (2004, p. 10), and Yodmani (2001, p. 4) observe that disasters are no longer entirely perceived as extreme events created by natural forces but increasingly being viewed as manifestations of unresolved development problems. In a related work on challenges to integrating disaster risk reduction into international development, Schipper and Pelling (2006) point to an assumption where scores of development practitioners think that disaster risk reduction is already incorporated into 'pro-poor development'. In alignment with both UNDP, and Schipper and Pelling's foregoing arguments, Adger (2006); Benjamin Wisner et al. (2004); Frankenberger (2003); Yodmani (2001); Jaspers and Shoham (1999); Chambers (1989); and Swift (1989) all agree that vulnerability (one of the key ingredients of disaster risk) and poverty are not the same.

From the preceding discourse, it emerges, therefore, that good intentioned development initiative may not necessarily reduce but many times inadvertently increase people's vulnerabilities. One of the critical objectives of DRR, therefore, is to support the strengthening and protection of development initiatives; for instance, to strengthen the livelihoods of poor rural people and protect the same livelihoods against external shocks. This is where the integration of DRR into development planning becomes a 'do-or-die' development requirement.

And going by Hardin's prioritization test of "*show me your chequebook, and I'll show you your priorities*"(Matthew B, 2015), the proportion of development related funding dedicated to DRR should be considered a prime indicator when assessing prioritization of DRR. In their report on 'Financing Disaster Risk Reduction' which looked back at the 20 years story of international aid from 1991 to 2010, Kellett and Caravani (2013, p. 5) assert that DRR had been at best a very low priority over these two decades. Their claim is backed by data revealing that the international community committed just over \$3 trillion in aid in the same period. Of this, \$106.7 billion was allocated to disasters and of that, just a fraction, \$13.5 billion, was for risk reduction measures before disasters strike, compared with \$23.3 billion spent on reconstruction and rehabilitation and \$69.9 billion spent on response. Of overall aid financing over 20 years, the \$13.5 billion spent on DRR accounts for just 0.4% of the total amount spent on international aid. Simply stated, for every \$100 spent on development aid, an abysmal 40 cents has been invested in protecting that aid from the impact of disasters. (Ref to Fig 2.1 for an illustration of the above detail).

Figure 2. 1: DRR spending Vs development spending (Watson et al., 2015, p. 2)



## 2.2.2 Recorded History of Disaster Risk Reduction

In regard to the documented history of DRR, probably the oldest record available is the Biblical story of Joseph and the seven years of famine preparedness in Egypt followed by seven years of famine and famine response in Egypt and surrounding countries; Stamps et al. (1984). And according to Habermehl (2013, p. 9), this ancient story of Joseph and his famine preparedness and response must have happened between 2700-2600 BC. While there must have been many other DRR efforts between Joseph's time and present-day history, little seems to be known and recorded about those efforts until the advent of the United Nations. UNISDR (2014a) presents a timeline of key milestones in the history of DRR following the formation of the United Nations, and the ensuing chronological bullet points are an adapted summary of this timeline.

### ***The 1660s: during this period, the United Nations General Assembly (UN/GA) adopted measures regarding severe disasters***

- 1962: The Buyin-Zara earthquake struck Iran and killed more than 12,000 people. The GA requests member states to intervene.
- 1663: The earthquake at Skopje, Yugoslavia, caused the death of more than 1,200 persons. The GA passed a resolution for assistance.
- 1963: A hurricane struck the territories of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago resulting in loss of thousands of lives and causing considerable material damage. The GA passed a resolution for assistance.
- 1968: A severe earthquake struck Iran killing Approx. 10,000 people. The GA requests the Secretary-General (SG) and heads of specialized agencies, in the light of funds available, to assist the Government of Iran including the reconstruction of the devastated areas when deciding on the services to be provided to the Member States.

### ***1970-1986: Assistance in cases of natural disaster***

- **1970:** Res.2717 supporting 'assistance in cases of natural disaster', invites the Secretary-General to submit recommendations in particular on (b) Pre-disaster planning at the national and international levels; (d) the application of technology

to, and scientific research for, the prevention and control of natural disasters, or a mitigation of the effects of such disasters, including arrangements to disseminate effectively to all countries the fruits of research from satellites and other sophisticated technology with a view to strengthening international co-operation to determine the causes and early manifestation of impending disasters and the development and improvement of early warning systems.

- 1971: Res. 2816 creates the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO).
- 1972: Res.2959; the GA reaffirms "the vital importance, in order to lessen the impact of disasters, of assistance to disaster-prone countries in preventive measures, disaster contingency planning and preparedness."
- 1978: The GA requests the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme at its next session to give consideration to the inclusion of technical co-operation activities for disaster preparedness and prevention in its regional and interregional programmes.
- 1979: The GA "Welcomes the decision taken by the Governing Council of the UNDP... to give consideration to the inclusion of technical co-operation activities for disaster preparedness and prevention in national and regional programmes; ... "Requests the Preparatory Committee for the New International Development Strategy to take into account, matters concerning disaster relief, preparedness and prevention;"

***1990-1999: The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR)***

- 1990: The GA "urges the international community to implement fully the International Framework of Action of the IDNDR (Res. 44/236), to establish national committees and reaffirms the need for the secretariat of the Decade work in close co-operation with UNDRO."
- 1991: The GA "endorses the New York declaration and the recommendations contained in the first annual report of the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) on the Decade as well as the proposal of the STC to convene in 1994 a world conference of representatives of national committees for the Decade."
- 1993: The GA "decides to convene in 1994 the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction."

- 1994: The World Conference was held at Yokohama, Japan from 23 to 27 May 1994. Res. 49/22 A endorses the Yokohama Strategy and its Plan of Action adopted at the World Conference.
- 1994: first steps for early warning systems
- 1995: The GA “decides to convene a closing event of the Decade in order to facilitate the full integration of disaster reduction into the substantive efforts for sustainable development and environmental protection by the year 2000.”
- As the IDNDR concludes, the international community is increasingly aware that natural disasters are a major threat to social and economic stability and that disaster prevention is the main long-term solution to this threat. The biggest challenge of the Decade lies, therefore, in the creation of a **global culture of prevention**. It is in this context that the **IDNDR Secretariat in the United Nations** has organized the IDNDR Programme Forum 1999 within the closing event of the Decade. Thematic and regional events with respect to natural disaster prevention have been held as part of the 1998 - 1999 Action plan for the concluding phase of the IDNDR; culminating in the IDNDR Programme Forum 1999 provided a platform for global multi-sectoral and inter-disciplinary dialogue between all concerned partners within IDNDR. Results of the Programme Forum will constitute a major input to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) deliberations on IDNDR.

#### ***2000-2007: Disasters, Vulnerability, and the ISDR***

- 2000: Taking note of Economic and Social Council resolution 1999/63 of 30 July 1999 on the successor arrangements for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, the GA endorses the proposal of the Secretary-General to establish an inter-agency task force and inter-agency-secretariat for disaster reduction, under the direct authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs; decides to maintain the observance of the International Day for Disaster Reduction on the second Wednesday of October.
- 2001: The GA requests the relevant organizations of the United Nations system to support the implementation of the goals of the Strategy and endorses the proposal of the Secretary-General to review the implementation of the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World.

- 2002: The GA requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the inter-agency secretariat for the Strategy, to plan and coordinate, in consultation with Governments and relevant organizations of the United Nations system, including international financial institutions, the 2004 review of the Yokohama Strategy.
- 2002: The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August-September 2002 provided the ISDR with a concrete set of objectives within the sustainable development agenda to which both the Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction and the UN/ISDR secretariat, along with partners, will increasingly turn their attention and capacities to integrating and mainstreaming risk reduction into development policies and processes. This is the Johannesburg plan of action.
- 2002: In his report on the ISDR (A/57/190) the UN Secretary-General specifies that: "This review process will help identify gaps and means of implementation in a way that will chart the course of action for the forthcoming decade while taking into account the outcome of the World Summit on Sustainable Development."
- 2003: The GA decides to convene a World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2005, to conclude the review of the Yokohama Strategy and its Plan of Action; to identify specific activities aimed at ensuring the implementation of relevant provisions of the Plan; to share best practices and lessons learned to further disaster reduction within the context of attaining sustainable development and identify gaps and challenges; to increase awareness of the importance of disaster reduction policies; and to increase the reliability and availability of appropriate disaster-related information to the public and disaster management agencies in all regions, as set out in the relevant provisions of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The ten-year review takes into account several relevant processes, such as the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, and will culminate in the Second World Conference on Disaster Reduction to be held in Kobe, Japan, in January 2005.
- 2005: GA Res. 60/195 endorses the Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: building the resilience of Nations and communities to disasters adopted by the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held at Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, from 18 to 22 January 2005.

- 2006: GA Res.61/198 notes the proposed establishment of a Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction as the successor mechanism of the Inter-Agency Task Force for Disaster Reduction, and, taking into account the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), decides that the Global Platform shall have the same mandate as the Inter-Agency Task Force for Disaster Reduction, and requests the Secretary-General to include information on the Global Platform, for consideration by the General Assembly, in his next report; Decides that the proposed establishment of the Global Platform should continue to be carried out in an inclusive and transparent manner and be open to all Member States.
- 2007: GA Res. 62/192 takes note with great interest and appreciation of the holding at Geneva, from 5 to 7 June 2007, of the first session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, the successor mechanism of the Inter-Agency Task Force for Disaster Reduction, as a useful forum for Member States and other stakeholders to assess progress made in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, enhance awareness of disaster risk reduction, share experiences and learn from good practice, identify remaining gaps and identify actions to accelerate national and local implementation.

Suffice to say it here therefore that while there must have been scores of DRR practices all over the world before founding the United Nations in 1945, such efforts did not marshal global synergies to culminate into a globally agreed DRR framework. It is the post-1960s incremental United Nations efforts which eventually resulted in the endorsement of the first global DRR framework for the period 2005-2015 known as the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). HFA is the focus for review in the following two sub-sections.

### **2.2.3 HFA: Purpose, Expected Outcomes & The 5 Priorities**

Writing on HFA, ISDR (2005) states that The World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in January 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, provided a unique opportunity to promote a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and risks to hazards; and underscored the need for, and identified ways of building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters. The Conference climaxed into the adoption of a



decade long (2005-2015) framework for action with the purpose of “Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters”. The Conference agreed to thereafter refer to the plan of action as the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). HFA’s expected outcome was the “the substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries.”

In the final Conference report, ISDR (2005, p. 3) stresses that the realization of the aforementioned HFA outcome will require the full commitment and involvement of all actors concerned, including governments, regional and international organizations, civil society including volunteers, the private sector and the scientific community. **Observation:** unless one thinks that local communities are part of the ‘civil society’ wording mentioned above, which seems unlikely, one would not be wrong to conclude that right from the start, community participation in the HFA agenda was not given the due diligence it deserved.

According to ISDR (2005), in order for the HFA to realize the aforementioned outcome, the Conference adopted the following five priorities for action:

1. Ensuring that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.
2. Identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning.
3. Using knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels.
4. Reducing the underlying risk factors.
5. Strengthening disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

A careful analysis of the HFA reveals that the five priorities form the core of the framework. It is upon the five priorities that more narrowed down and targeted activities are prescribed for implementation. The five priorities are also a reflection of lessons learned and gaps identified from the implementation of the previous decade’s Yokohama strategy. The following section will discuss the HFA progression.

## 2.2.4 HFA Assessment

According to UNISDR (2014b), HFA orchestration included systematic monitoring and reporting from regional and respective country DRR platforms on progress being




Figure 2. 2 HFA Progress per Priority Area: 2007-2012

made in implementing prescribed activities under the five HFA priorities. The reporting follows a common structure including reporting on each monitoring indicator under every HFA Priority. However, it is from the 2013 consultative reports on a post-2015 framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, presently dubbed HFA2, that one can effectively distil both what worked and did not work well during the implementation of the 2005-2015 HFA.

According to (UNISDR, 2013c), most progress was made under Priority Areas 1 and 5, with limited progress reported under Priority Area 4 (refer to [Fig.2.2](#)). This portrays improving capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters, though with abysmal attention given to addressing underlying causes. The more reason D. Alexander and Davis (2012) bemoan that *“If that priority (# 4) had been converted into positive action, then some dramatic reductions in vulnerability would have been possible.”*

A closer review of two UNISDR 2013 consultative reports UNISDR (2013b) and UNISDR (2013c) on Post 2015 Framework for DRR (HFA2) reveals that while the highest HFA progress was registered under Priority Area 5 ([strengthening disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels](#)), this progress did not happen at all levels, as described below.

One UNISDR (2013b) report presents key issues raised during the May 2013 Global Platform discussions on HFA2 and also provides a list of 12 proposals made for critical consideration while developing HFA2 (refer to [Box 1](#)). Of the 12 proposals, top on the list is ‘the importance of community-level involvement’. And all the first four proposals on the list can be summed up as ‘**local action**’. This is proof, therefore, that

much of the progress credited to Priority Area 5 did not trickle down to both community and local government level, the primary locus where ultimate DRR should be taking place and getting measured. Since disasters affect people and people dwell in communities whether rural or urban,

**Box 1: Issues Raised For Critical Consideration During the Development of HFA2**

1. The importance of community-level involvement
2. Targeting and including the most vulnerable populations
3. Women as leaders
4. Children and youths: new generation of opportunity
5. Health
6. Integrating climate change adaptation, development, and DRR
7. The role of science
8. Knowledge sharing and education
9. Capacity building: financing, risk assessment, preparedness and early warning
10. Private sector involvement in DRR
11. Political will and leadership
12. Governance, accountability, transparency, and inclusiveness

Source: UNISDR: Post-2015 Framework for Disaster

and knowing that its local people and their organizations that are both first responders and key players in DRR John Twigg (2004b); Walter (2004); Walter (2002), one should be worry to ascribe much progress to Priority Area 5 when **local DRR action** is still very much abysmal.

D. Alexander and Davis (2012, p. 2) provide a befitting conclusion on HFA when they assert that *“Despite a decade of action in the IDNDR and almost a decade of the Hyogo Framework, the world can still only count on a few beacon projects and a great deal of lip-service to ideals that remain elusive”*.

The following section provides a critical review of the SFDRR, the successor framework to the HFA.

### **2.2.5 The Sendai Framework For DRR (SFDRR)**

According to UNISDR (2015), the SFDRR 2015-2030 was adopted at the Third UN World Conference in Sendai, Japan, on March 18, 2015. It is the outcome of stakeholder consultations initiated in March 2012 and inter-governmental negotiations from July 2014 to March 2015, supported by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction at the request of the UN General Assembly. The Sendai Framework is, therefore, the successor instrument to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015.

UNISDR further states that building on HFA, the SFDRR aims to achieve the following outcome over the next 15 years: *“the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.”* To attain the above outcome, it was agreed the following goal must be pursued: *“prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience.”*

UNISDR explains that to enable the assessment of global progress in achieving the outcome and goal of SFDRR, seven global targets were agreed as follows:

1. a substantial reduction in global disaster mortality;
2. a substantial reduction in numbers of affected people;
3. a reduction in economic losses in relation to global GDP;
4. a substantial reduction in disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, including health and education facilities;
5. an increase in the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020;

6. enhanced international cooperation for developing countries;
7. And increased access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments.

Lastly but not least, UNISDR indicates that taking into account experiences gained through the implementation of HFA, and in pursuance of the expected outcome and goal, there is a need for focused action within and across sectors by States at local, national, regional and global levels in the following four priority areas:

Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk.

Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk.

Priority 3: Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience.

Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for response.

Table 2. 1Review of the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015-2030 by Marcus Oxley, July 2015  
 Marcus (2015) provides a rich critical review of the SFDRR. Table 2.1 is an expert from

Review of the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015-2030 by Marcus Oxley, July 2015.	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>STRENGTHS</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Adopted by 187 member states (HFA-167 member states)</li> <li>2. Extensive multi-stakeholder consultations</li> <li>3. Emphasis on disaster risk governance</li> <li>4. Focus on both risk creation &amp; reduction</li> <li>5. Inclusion of people in vulnerable situations, including a stronger role of women, children and youth, persons with disabilities, elderly persons and indigenous groups</li> <li>6. Enhanced multi-stakeholder engagement</li> <li>7. Increased international cooperation</li> <li>8. Preparedness for resilient recovery</li> <li>9. Thirteen guiding principles</li> <li>10. Seven global targets</li> <li>11. 15-year timeframe - synchronised with SDG / Climate frameworks</li> <li>12. Recognition of small scale, recurrent shocks</li> <li>13. Multi-scale approach: global/ regional / national/ local</li> <li>14. Stronger linkages with health issues</li> <li>15. Strong on the role of science and technology</li> <li>16. Recognised role of the private sector</li> <li>17. Broader scope – natural and man-made hazards.</li> </ol>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>WEAKNESSES:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Incomplete problem analysis which underutilizes lessons learnt and findings from HFA implementation and final review Complex, poorly-constructed goal, outcome &amp; priority areas</li> <li>2. Weak connecting logic between problem analysis, lessons learnt, principles, objectives, actions</li> <li>3. Ambiguous global targets – need specificity</li> <li>4. Some missing principles: legal basis (human rights); environmental integrity;</li> <li>5. Missing discussion on power dynamics shaping political economy of development</li> <li>6. Weak strategic connections with other post-2015 development frameworks</li> <li>7. Contextual appropriateness in situations of complexity; informality; fragility and insecurity (including conflict) not discussed</li> <li>8. Missing cultural dimensions – related to societal and individual behaviours, norms, values and perceptions of risk</li> <li>9. Weak on accountability and transparency</li> <li>10. Undervalues learning processes, including systemising post-disaster lessons learnt</li> <li>11. No additional or predictable financial resources through international cooperation</li> <li>12. <i>Specific versus comprehensive</i> risk management</li> <li>13. Strong emphasis on top-down government-centric actions with less emphasis on connecting and strengthening informal community-owned approaches</li> <li>14. Underplays significance of local knowledge and capacities, particularly in relation to small-scale disaster</li> <li>15. Underplays role of ecosystems in reducing/modifying natural hazards, including recognition of limits/thresholds</li> <li>16. Need to establish stakeholder advisory groups</li> <li>17. No policy guidance on the transition from HFA to SFDRR</li> <li>18. SFDRR formulation process was expensive – does the outcome doc represent value-for-money?</li> </ol>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Development of joint implementation actions (assessments, programming, monitoring, evaluation in conjunction with other post-2015 frameworks)</li> <li>2. Multi-stakeholder collaboration and partnership under a post-2015 sustainable development agenda</li> <li>3. Potential synergy of resources, time and effort with other development actors</li> <li>4. Resilience as a trans-boundary convening concept to breakdown thematic silos</li> <li>5. Linkages to human-rights agenda</li> <li>6. Development of strong domestic legal basis for reducing risk to acceptable levels</li> </ol>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>THREATS</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Limited relevance to local realities – fragility, insecurity, conflict, informality, small scale.</li> <li>2. Continued upwards trend in disaster losses</li> <li>3. Complex risk landscape – requires systems-wide perspectives and holistic approaches</li> <li>4. Lack of political commitment - weak implementation / limited impact / non-compliance and/or enforcement</li> <li>5. Lack of strategic coherence with other frameworks</li> <li>6. Competition amongst other higher profile post-2015 development agendas</li> <li>7. Inability to forge strategic coalitions to address underlying risk drivers ( as per HFA)</li> <li>8. High expectation within LDCs on increased international cooperation(resources)</li> <li>9. Less impact than the HFA despite increased losses and significant accrued learning.</li> </ol>

Marcus' review report.

A close look at Marcus' SWOT analysis of the SF4DRR reveals that just like the HFA, there is not a single 'Strength' alluded to local level or community engagement. Instead, under the 'Weaknesses' section, the SWOT underscores SFDRR's poor utilisation of lessons learned and findings from HFA implementation. Among the 18 weaknesses identified in the SF4DRR SWOT, two of them (# 13 &14) underscore the strong emphasis on top-down government-centric actions will less emphasis on connecting and strengthening informal community approaches, and underplaying the significance of local knowledge and capacities particularly in relation to small-scale disasters. The number one threat identified under the 'Threats' section of the SWOT underscores "limited relevance to local realities: fragility, insecurity, conflict, informality and small scale.

On lessons learned, gaps and challenges for the future identified from HFA, UNISDR (2015) reports that despite progress in reducing losses since the adoption of the HFA, evidence indicates that in all countries, (especially developing countries), the creation of disaster risk is increasing than the ability to enhance disaster risk management capacities. The result is a continued rise in disaster losses which undermine efforts to achieve sustainable development. Whilst this is a problem that needs to be addressed by SFDRR, Marcus (2015) observes that even though community resilience is the foundation and basic building block of a resilient society, under SFDRR, local action is not prioritised. Thus while Wahlström (2015) asserts that SFDRR champions an approach that is people-centred and preventive, it remains to be seen how this will be turned into reality without strengthened local DRR action.

## 2.3 Overall DDR in Kenya

### 2.3.1 Kenya in General

Kenya is one of the Greater Horn of Africa countries (others being Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Somalia and Uganda), and according to DARA (2011), *“at a glance, Kenya seems to be a regional success story”*. The country has a fairly stable government in a region riddled by violent civil conflicts, boasts the region’s strongest economy; has a very strong donor and INGO presence; is a regional humanitarian hub; benefits

Kenya’s Recent Disasters and Impacts		
Year	Approx. # of people that required humanitarian assistance (in millions)	US\$ spent on humanitarian Response (in millions)
2017	3.7M drought	
2013	1.8M (drought, floods, refugees, and clan conflicts)	\$269M
2012	2.86 M (drought and refugees)	\$405M
2011	4.3M (drought, refugees and IDPs)	\$283M
2010	2.3M (drought, floods, cholera, refugees and elections violence)	\$305M
2009	4.4M (drought, elections violence, and refugees)	\$216M
2008	1.34M (drought, elections violence)	\$38M
2004-2006	3.5M drought	
1999-2001	4.4M drought	340 million
1995	1.8M drought	

from enormous donor and local government development funding; and according to Swithern (2014) received US\$436 million in international humanitarian assistance to the 2011 drought and hunger crisis that affected all Horn of Africa Countries and parts of the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

And according to WorldBank (2019), in 2015 Kenya had a population of 47 million and a population growth rate of 1.8%. An estimated 43% of the population lives below the poverty line, and the county’s Human Development Index stood at 0.548.




### 2.3.2 Kenya's Disaster Risk Profile/ Exposure to Disasters

In the last two decades, the frequency and intensity of disasters in Kenya has been increasing (Owino, 2019). And according to UNDP (2019), UNDP (2017) and the Kenya Draft Disaster Management Policy (GOK, 2009, p. 5), the country's disaster landscape is dominated by droughts, fires, floods, landslides, terrorism, technological accidents, human conflict, and diseases and epidemics---all of which disrupt people's livelihoods, destroy infrastructure, divert planned use of resources, interrupt economic activities and retard development. And while drought and floods are the most significant hazards affecting the country, the effects of drought are the most severe in the country (Owuor, 2015). And according to the WorldBank (2019), on average, around 5.5 million people mainly in the central regions of Kenya are affected by water scarcity each year. And each year, 150,000 people and around 200 education and healthcare facilities nationally are affected by flooding.

According to Owino (2019), "extreme weather events, high poverty levels, and the vast size of arid lands have been identified as causes of disaster and exacerbators of its impact."

And in agreement with Owino, UNDP (2019) argues that "over time, the frequency and intensity of disasters in Kenya has increased due to a number of factors including climate change, widespread poverty and rapid population growth especially in the urban centres." UNDP therefore points out rapid population growth as yet another ingredient responsible for the increased frequency and impacts of disasters in the country.



Arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) cover the vast majority of Kenya (89%) and is home to more than one-third of Kenyans (36%).” He also observes that ASALs have some of the highest poverty indices in Kenya (Owino, 2019). Owino records that “eight out of the ten counties with the highest poverty headcount figures are in the most arid areas with aridity figures of between 85% and 100%.”

And according to WorldBank (2018), with over 60 percent of the ASALs population living below the poverty line, ASALs are characterized by some of the highest poverty levels and lowest levels of human development in Kenya and are the focus of national investment and economic development priorities. The World Bank further indicates that “ASALs contain 18 of the 20 poorest counties in Kenya; some counties in the north, such as Turkana, Marsabit, Wajir and Mandera, have between 74 percent and 79 percent of people living below the absolute poverty line.”

In one of their programme documents titled “Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction and Communities’ Resilience”, UNDP (2017) explains that “the arid and semi-arid lands in Kenya are highly vulnerable to natural and man-made calamities such as drought, floods and conflict. The impact of these disasters continues to intensify due to several factors such as; high frequency, severity and intensity of their occurrence as well as increasing levels of vulnerability among affected communities.” UNDP further explains that “in these regions, where communities rely heavily on pastoralism and agro pastoralism as their main source of livelihoods, majority are exposed to the prolonged droughts, unpredicted floods as well as perennial inter- community conflicts over natural resources.” UNDP also explains that besides being prone to disasters, counties in the ASAL regions are characterized by poor socio-economic conditions including high poverty levels, low literacy rates and limited access to basic services which exacerbates communities’ vulnerability.

Going by foregoing observations, one would be right to surmise that in general, Kenya’s vulnerability to disaster and risk exposure are therefore exacerbated by location (ASALs), rapid population growth, poverty, low literacy rates (in the ASALs), poor socio-

economic infrastructures, climate change through related extreme weather events, and effects of frequent resource-based conflicts especially in the majority ASALs.

Reporting on Kenya's Disaster Risk Profile, WorldBank (2019) underscores that Kenya and the Horn of Africa region experience droughts very frequently---“on average, a major drought occurs every decade and minor ones every three to four years. Recent droughts took place in 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2010-2011, and most recently in 2017. The 2011 drought left more than 3.75 million people in need of food assistance; and in 2017, around 3 million people required emergency food assistance.” On flooding, the same World Bank report reveals that “the large flood in 2018 killed more than 100 people in Kenya and hundreds of thousands of people were affected. And according to available disaster databases, there have been over 50,000 - 150,000 people affected each year by floods in the past decade.”

Kenya was ranked number of 5 out of the 10 countries with the highest % of their population affected by drought in the period 1991 to 2010 (Kellett & Caravani, 2013). And a Government of Kenya report (GOK, 2013) reveals that drought accounted for US\$12.1 billion in drought-related damages and losses between 2008 and 2011. **Table 2.2** provides numbers of people affected by key disasters in the country.

The 2011 World Risk Report (Birkmann et al., 2011) which uses the World Risk Index framework and analyses disaster risk as a complex interplay of natural hazards and social, political and environmental factors presents disaster risk as a function of exposure and vulnerability. Within the report, vulnerability is comprised of three main elements including ‘susceptibility’, ‘lack of coping capacities’, and ‘lack of adaptive capacities.’ The World Risk Index is therefore recorded and measured on the basis of **four components**; namely, ‘exposure to a natural hazard or a climatic stimulus’, ‘susceptibility’, ‘coping capacities’, and ‘adaptive capacities’(Birkmann et al., 2011, p. 14).

The report which provides data on 173 countries and presents its findings per country using the 'very low', 'low', 'medium', 'high' and 'very high' score on all the four aforementioned components presents Kenya's status among the 173 assessed countries as follows: has high exposure to natural and climatic stimulus; has very high vulnerability; has very high susceptibility; is among the top 15



Source: <https://www.alert.wordpress.com/tag/severe-drought-in-kenya/>

Figure 2. 3: 2011 drought decimated herds in Northern Kenya

countries with the poorest coping capacities; ranks high among countries with lack of adaptive capacities and is the 67<sup>th</sup> most disaster risk country out the 173 assessed countries (Birkmann et al., 2011, pp. 63-66). **Fig.2.3** shows some of the 2011 drought decimated herds.

And given the country's aforementioned regional development position and disaster profile, it is conceivable to assume that '**community capacity building for disaster risk reduction**' ought to already be a priority consideration supported and mainstreamed by all major Government of Kenya relief and development partners in the country.

### 2.3.3 Kenya's Disaster Risk Management Framework

A review across Owino (2019), UNDP (2019), WorldBank (2018), PreventionWeb (2018), UNDP (2017), Mondoh (2013), GOK (2013), Songok et al. (2011) and GOK (2009) reveals that by August 2019, the Government of Kenya had the following overall disaster management infrastructure, much of which developed in the wake of the HFA:

- a. Kenya's 2010 constitution underscores the importance of disaster management as reflected in articles 185 (2), 186 (1), 187, all of which providing enablers for disaster management legislation.

- b. In May 2018, Cabinet approved the National Disaster Risk Management Policy. This policy paper had been in draft since 2003. According to PreventionWeb (2018) which is a global knowledge platform for DRR, “the Policy is benchmarked on the best practices in disaster risk management. It lays down the strategies for ensuring the Government commits itself to enhancement of research in disasters and formulation of risk reduction strategies.”
- c. A WorldBank (2018) report observes that “As part of the transition to a more proactive approach to managing disaster and climate risks, Kenya has developed a series of disaster-related laws and policies. These include Sessional Paper No. 8 on the National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands (the “ASAL Policy”, 2012), the EDE MTP (2012), the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) Act (2013), and the National Climate Change Action Plan (2013).
- d. In addition, the WorldBank (2018) report on Kenya observes that, “**various entities have been established to support the country’s institutional architecture for DRM.** These include the National Disaster Operations Centre; the National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU); the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) and the State Department of ASALs.” The report further indicates that “an informal initiative known as the National Platform for Disaster Risk Management brings together stakeholders interested in DRM and provides an opportunity for State, non-governmental, private and international institutions to participate in consultation and decision-making processes for DRM. However, there is a lack of coordination across these agencies and initiatives.”
- e. In their report titled “DRM Governance in Kenya: Overview” which provides a list of Kenya’s leading Disaster Risk Management institutions, (UNDP, 2019) shows that “with support from the UN, a national DRR platform was established to support the Government in coordinating disaster issues at the national level. The Principal Disaster Risk Management Institutions include: the National Drought

Management Authority (established after the 2011 drought) and National Disaster Operation Center. Disaster Risk Management is coordinated by the Directorate of Special Programmes under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning while some disaster response functions are within the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government.” No doubt, this is evidence of the proliferation of government-funded disaster risk management institutions at the national level.

- f. According to PreventionWeb (2018), the National Disaster Operations Center (NDOC) was established to monitor, co-ordinate, mobilize and respond to disaster incidences in the country. Relatedly, NDMA (2019) asserts that “the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) is a public body established by the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) Act, 2016. It previously operated under the State Corporations Act (Cap 446) of the Laws of Kenya by Legal Notice Number 171 of November 24, 2011. The Act gives the NDMA the mandate to exercise overall coordination over all matters relating to drought risk management and to establish mechanisms, either on its own or with stakeholders, that will end drought emergencies in Kenya.
- g. Relatedly, the country had a drought risk management and ending drought emergencies medium plan (2013-2017), which is part of the Kenya Vision 2030.
- h. In one of her Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy Financing instruments to the Republic of Kenya aimed at improving the country’s capacity to reduce disaster risks and improve management of the socioeconomic and fiscal impacts of disasters, WorldBank (2018) comments that “under the devolved governance structure that was established by the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the country’s forty-seven county governments play a key role in DRM. The Constitution integrates key provisions on DRM including national level support to counties which are required to develop their respective DRM policies and programs in line with the National DRM Policy.”

- i. In a study to tracking sub-national investments in DRR in Kenya, Owino (2019) reports that “major progress is being made in addressing the DRR legislation both at the county and country level. However, slow implementation of the policies as a result of slow progress of policies at the debating stage, lack of political will and competing priorities in government will derail the overall goal of DRR legislation. Political interference during draft stage, poor prioritisation and weak coordination additionally add to the legislation hurdles.”
  
- j. Owino further reports that all the four sampled counties reviewed had bills and policies governing the management of disaster risk. He observes that, for instance, “Kisumu County Disaster Management Act 2015, Laikipia Risk Management Policy 2016, West Pokot Disaster Management Act 2016, and Baringo County Disaster Management Policy 2017 are the main reference documents for disaster risk management in the counties. Owino also observes that, generally, these policies are used to guide effective coordination and management of DRR activities, public awareness and sensitisation on DRR through community involvement and public participation and the integration of modern scientific technology to promote early warning systems. Additionally, these policies promote the creation of various institutions and mechanisms to help in mainstreaming DRR in the county development agenda.
  
- k. Regrettably though, According to Songok et al. (2011), “in Kenya, most policies are formulated with limited or no involvement of communities. Even as climate change and the need to better prepare for disasters is a major development concern, responses from key informant interviews confirm that the country does not have a policy on either CCA or DRR. In this regard, a common sentiment expressed by respondents during the FGDs and echoed by policy actors was that policymaking processes in Kenya are generally more inclined towards protecting political and institutional interests, with the needs of vulnerable agro-pastoralists less prioritized.”

- l. And finally, Owino (2019) observes that “while DRR is a responsibility of both county and national government, where counties are the first responders, the latter lack capacity to implement programmes. The institutions created by some of the policies and acts discussed above lack implementation structures and legal backing to execute programmes or policies in DRR. This coupled with competing priorities in the development (including education, roads and health) minimises economic resources available for DRR.”
- m. A document accessed by this research titled “Governance for DRR in Kenya” reads in part, “despite the exposure to recurrent natural and human-induced hazards in Kenya, her disaster management strategy has largely remained reactive. The Government is often compelled to re-direct development resources to address emergency response and reconstruction needs at the expense of development programmes” (UNDP, 2019).

A synthesis of the above anecdotes reveals a country in the throes of making steady progress in the area of DRM governance, but which is not yet out of the woods when it comes to translating the establishment of multiple DRM institutions and enactment of DRM-related policies into tangible grassroots resilience-building DRR outcomes. Part of the remaining DRM struggle to date, seems to be lack of political will to demand and lead a move away from the predominant multi-stakeholder focus on disaster preparedness and response to the politically less ‘vote-catching’ resilience building DRR agenda. And this is where in its mid-term review of HFA, UNISDR (2011b) sadly observed that “national institutional arrangements are not enough to promote effective action when resources do not reach local communities. For a nation can adopt marvellous laws, national platforms, plans, and all the things that the HFA recommended without truly affecting the grassroots in either city or countryside.” And regrettably, Kenya plays no exception to this sad reality.

#### **2.3.4 DRR Footprint Among Kenya’s Relief and Development Partners**

As an effort to gauge the DRR footprint in Kenya, a web-based secondary data review for 17 International Non-Governmental Agencies (INGOs) including ADRA, Action



Aid, CARE, Caritas, Danish Church Aid, Christian Aid, Cord Aid, Food for the Hungry, IIRR, IRC, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, Norwegian Church Aid, Save the Children, Samaritan Purse, and World Vision was undertaken. Additional on-line secondary data review for 5 UN agencies including FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP and 7 bilateral donor agencies including Australian Aid, DFADT/ CIDA, DFID, ECHO, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), SIDA, and USAID was completed.

Findings from this on-line presence lead to the conclusion that all the aforementioned INGOs, UN agencies and bilateral and multilateral donors indicate engagement with DRR in the country at various levels and in different forms. This DRR engagement is presented in the *'what we do'*, *'focus'*, and *'projects' tabs*; while for others, its woven into their online strategy papers, stories and reports. There is therefore enough on-line evidence to suggest that almost every international relief and development partner with the Government of Kenya is in one way or another involved in supporting DRR practice in the country. The following section will discuss community capacity building for DRR, the theme line for this research.

## 2.4 Community Capacity Building for DRR

Building on the preceding exploratory literature on **'disasters and disaster risk reduction'**, this section presents a literature review on **'community capacity building for DRR'**, an area critical for either making or breaking desired sustainable DRR at the community level. The section is presented in a cascading order starting with a focus on *'community'*, *'moving on to community capacity building'*, to *'community capacity building for DRR'* and ending with *'community capacity building for DRR in Kenya'*.

### 2.4.1 Community

The word **'community'** means different things to different people, and over the years, different academics and professional disciplines have defined the term *'community'* differently for their practice, (Craig (2007). The earliest definition this literature review accessed was that offered by Queen (1923, p. 382) where she describes community as "a local grouping of people who share a number of important

interests and activities, and who are more concerned about those things they have in common than about those wherein they differ.” In a much later work on community-based participatory research where 118 participants in four different locations in the US were involved in answering the question “*what does the word community mean to you?*”(Green & Mercer, 2001), a common definition of community emerged as “***a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings.***” Bates and Bacon (1972) corroborate the above definition by describing community as a group of people inhabiting a limited area, who have a sense of belonging together and who through their organized relationships share and carry on activities in pursuit of their common interests. Equally, Chaskin et al. (2001) define communities as functional units around which collective action may be mobilized.

A synthesis of various scholarly works including Ferdinand (2014), Matthews (2013), Craig (2007), Colclough and Sitaraman (2005), Green and Mercer (2001), Casswell (2001), McMillan and Chavis (1986), E. L. Quarantelli and Dynes (1985), Hillery (1982), Korten (1980), Bates and Bacon (1972) and Hillery Jr (1963) on definitions of the term ‘community’ reveals at least five core elements of a community. They include **sharing, joint action, social ties and diversity**. Whilst a variety of words and or different terms are used by different scholars in reference to the above five core elements, they all point to the same core elements.

And while there is consensus among various scholars on the application of the term ‘community’ like presented by aforementioned scholars, there also remain differing scholarly views on the same. For instance, in his sociological work that analyzed 94 scholarly definitions of the term community, Hillery (1982) indicates that rural sociologists tended to associate the ‘community’ concept to be a rural phenomenon. Rural sociologist, therefore, argued that urban communities tend to be larger, more complex and more diverse social units; and the complexity and diversity of these social relationships obscure the fundamental basis upon which community rests.

Similarly, Gusfield (1975) distinguished between two major uses of the term community. The first is the territorial and geographical notion of community-neighbourhood, town, and city. The second is "relational," concerned with "quality of character of the human relationship, without reference to location" (p. xvi). Gusfield noted that the two usages are not mutually exclusive, although in their work on 'sense of community', McMillan and Chavis (1986) reveal how modern society has developed community around interests and skills more than-around locality making territorial communities (neighborhoods) to be equal to relational communities, examples being professional and spiritual communities.

Chaskin et al. (2001) corroborates the preceding view and observe that while 'community' usually infers effective aspects of community solidarity, current aspects of increased ease of travel, population mobility and improved communications across large geographical expanses have all enabled relationships to extend beyond the local community, and the most intimate ties are no longer bound to the neighbourhood. However, for purposes of this research, the definition presented by Green and Mercer (2001) has been adopted on the basis that it provides a good reflection of the disaster-prone communities in Kenya.

#### **2.4.2 Community Capacity Building (CCB)**

While Duncan and Thomas (2000) described CCB as 'the New Holy Grail' in one of their reports, in his work on the shifting paradigms of capacity building practice, Kaplan (2000) laments how capacity building has become one of the most regularly invoked of modern development concepts and yet continues to resist a shared definition of what it means in practice. Equally, Craig (2007) argues that the term CCB was introduced as part of a political fashion especially in policy papers as far back as 1992 and that by 2001, use of the term CCB had become widespread within several Northern countries so much so that it had become the target of cynical humour. The more reason Eade (1997, p. 1) quips "*no UN summit goes by without ritual calls for capacity building programmes for NGOs and other social organisations...*". In sync with foregoing views, James (1994) acknowledges the growing interest and use of the capacity building vocabulary among Northern NGOs working in the South but bemoans their limited

understanding of what capacity building in reality entails. Based on the foregoing literature, there appears to be a wide gap between the CCB policy rhetoric and the realities on the ground.

In his work on community capacity building, Chaskin et al. (2001) indicate that the term capacity includes the ideals of both *containing* (holding, storing) and *ability* (of mind, of action). Chaskin also defines community capacity building as “*the interaction of human capital, organizational resources, and social capital existing within a given community that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve or maintain the wellbeing of that community*” (p. 7). His work, therefore, identifies particular capitals which when leveraged and helped to interact could lead to target people’s improved wellbeing. This view is supported by Duncan and Thomas (2000) when they suggest that CCB involves development work which strengthens the ability of community-based organizations and groups to build their structures, systems, people and skills. And Craig (2007) recommends that where there are organizations within target communities, building the capacity of such organizations should be considered part of CCB.

In a related work though on Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) capacity building, James (1994, p. 5) defines capacity building as “*an explicit outside intervention to improve an organization’s performance in relation to its mission, context, resources and sustainability*”. James’ definition, therefore, focuses on improved performance as the main outcome of capacity building. However, James is worried about the word ‘building’ within the term capacity building, for it brings the connotation of building something from scratch or using a blueprint approach. Nonetheless, he agrees the term capacity building is less clumsy in English compared to using, for instance, the term capacity strengthening.

#### **2.4.2.1 Approaches to CCB**

Apart from the general rhetoric and common misunderstanding of what true CCB entails (reference to the above literature), a review of some scholarly works shows that different entities engage in various forms of CCB using different approaches and having

different end results as their targets. In one of her works on CCB, Casswell (2001) identifies two different but overlapping approaches to CCB: community action and community development. Casswell argues that community action tends to be linked with the local-level implementation of specific public policies, for instance, policies on the use of alcohol and drugs. In contrast, community development approaches are characterized by the wider general goal of community empowerment rather than addressing the more specific policy goals. In addition, community action and community development initiatives tend to put emphasis on different things. For instance, reaching out to the under-represented will be more amplified in community development than it will be in community action initiatives.

In their related work on evaluating community projects, Duignan et al. (1993) stress that community action projects can usually rely on a reservoir of community concern over the issues being addressed, issues that grant moral but not vigorous support in the long term. On the other hand, a common characteristic of community development is that local actions are centred on community-defined issues. An analysis of the two approaches (community action and community development) to CCB reveals that though they have many overlaps and may even do the same things including enhancing networks, alliances and skills; the major difference lies in the value and emphasis put on community development processes.

#### **2.4.2.2 Importance of CCB**

McKnight and Kretzmann (1997) remind us that history shows significant community development only takes place when local community people are committed to investing themselves and their resources in the effort. They are categorical that development must start from within the community, for communities cannot be developed from the top down, or from the outside in, p.2. They further argue that communities have never been built upon their deficiencies; rather, community development has always depended upon mobilizing the capacities and assets of a people and a place, p.17.

On the importance of CCB, Eade and Williams (1996, p. 556) propose that the most useful form of support to marginalized communities is capacity building; and Eade (1997) reinforces the opinion that capacity building is one of the necessary essentials for development to become sustainable. And perhaps every discourse on CCB will be considered incomplete till Roberts Chambers' much acclaimed scholarly work on the subject has been reflected upon. Chambers (1998) presents evidence proving how the realities and priorities of poor people often differ from those imagined for them by professionals and policy-makers. He remarks, *"the challenge is to enable poor and marginalized people to analyse their conditions and identify their priorities in ways which freely express their realities, and generate proposals that are doable, credible and persuasive to policy-makers"*, P. 289. Chambers further suggests that for the realities of "lowers" to count, "uppers" have to "hand over the stick", a process he terms "empowerment", and the changes in the "uppers" dominant behaviour entail having respect, standing down, shutting up, facilitating, enabling and empowering.

Across the preceding literature, it emerges that while there are numerous reasons for undertaking CCB, the primary importance of CCB is to enable target communities make decisions and take actions that lead to improvements in their wellbeing; a process leading scholars on the subject including Robert Chambers have called 'empowerment'. Similarly, writing on the origins and background of capacity building, Eade (2007, p. 632) explains that the early origins of the capacity building concept lay in the belief that the role of an engaged outsider is to support the capacity of local people to determine their own values and priorities, to organize themselves to act upon and sustain these for the common good, and to shape the moral and physical universe that we all share.

#### **2.4.2.3 Empowerment**

Like many other terminologies used in the development discourse, the term empowerment doesn't seem to be used without its own share of complications. An array of scholars including Brown et al. (2014); Jupp et al. (2010); Adamson (2010); Maton (2008); Scrutton and Luttrell (2007); Alsop and Heinsohn (2005); Moore (2001); Page and Czuba (1999), Wilkinson (1998); Pastor (1996); Rappaport (1995); Perkins

(1995); Wolff (1993); Zimmerman (1990); Kieffer (1984), and Rappaport (1984) point to the confusion surrounding the definition of the term empowerment and its use, abuse and interchangeability with other conceptual terms. They note that in various literature, the term 'empowerment' is often used interchangeably with 'participation', 'involvement' and sometimes with 'engagement'. And in 1984, Rappaport, a leading scholar on the subject admitted that *"we do not know what empowerment is, but like obscenity, we know it when we see it"*, p.2.

Relatedly, in their literature review of articles demonstrating a focus on empowerment, Page and Czuba (1999) reveal how the review resulted in no clear definition of the concept, especially one that could cut cross disciplinary lines. Consequently, Page and Czuba note that many authors were employing the concept very narrowly, and even without having to define the term at all. Wilkinson (1998) agrees and notes that the term is used very loosely and it is not always clear whether we are comparing like with like. Page and Czuba, therefore, concluded that many writers had come to view "empowerment" as nothing more than a popular buzz word thrown in to make sure old programs attract new funding. And like Page and Czuba, Perkins (1995) observes that to most people, empowerment is a vague buzz word heard in political, community development, and management circles, p.776. In the words of an interviewed Africa-based donor staff, *"there is a lot of lip service paid to some of these issues at all levels, be it government, be it donors"* (Katwikirize, 2001, p. 50). The more reason Moore (2001, p. 331) delivers an open reprove when he states that *"the World Bank and other international development agencies have declared empowerment to be central to their anti-poverty programmes, but they are vague over meaning and may be using the term partly to advance their own organisational interests"*.

With the aforementioned confusion and seeming rhetoric, it's helpful to explore some of the working definitions for the term empowerment (within the concept of CCB) presented by some of the leading scholars on the subject. According to the literature reviewed, it is Rappaport (1987, p. 122) and Minkler (1989) that present the earliest definition of the term empowerment, and they commonly define it as **a process** and a mechanism by which people, organisations and communities gain mastery over their

lives/affairs and over their environment. A seemingly more referenced definition is provided by The Cornell Empowerment Group (1989, 2) who describe empowerment as an intentional, ongoing process centred in the local community, involving mutual respect, critical reflection, caring and group participation, through which people lacking an equal share of valued resources gain greater access to and control over those resources.

Relatedly, in their scholarly work on empowerment, Page and Czuba (1999) define empowerment as a multi-dimensional social process that **helps people gain control over their own lives**. They further describe empowerment as **a process that fosters power in people** for use in their own lives, their communities and in their society by acting on issues they define as important. Similarly, Maton (2008, p. 5) describes empowerment as a group-based, participatory, developmental process through which marginalized or oppressed individuals and groups **gain greater control over their lives and environment**, acquire value resources and basic rights, and achieve important life goals and reduce societal marginalization.

And according to (Pastor, 1996, pp. 2-3), there are two aspects of empowerment that must be considered for anyone to understand the empowerment concept fully. The first is **“personal empowerment”**, that is, that which individuals are responsible for doing for themselves in order to feel empowered in their lives regardless of circumstances. The second dimension of empowerment has to do with **“the way in which we work with others”** to nurture their sense of self-esteem, autonomy and growth. Pastor likens empowerment to an “anointing”, where the king takes his sword, lays it on the knight errant’s shoulder and tells him he is now empowered to lead the crusade, to sally forth into the realm and just “do it!”, whatever “it” is. Similarly, Pinkett and O’Byrant (2003, p. 194) agree that the foundation for community empowerment lies ultimately in the empowerment of the individual.

Though not in contrast with the above definitions, Moore (2001) offers two propositions to the definition of empowerment. He calls the first definition “materialistic”, under which the focus is on “improving the material status of poor



people” which translates into weakened social, economic and political dependences; thus providing poor people with greater freedoms and autonomy. However, Moore warns of how many governments in developing countries are brandishing this approach when it’s all but **“cheap talk”**. Thus, according to Moore, to talk seriously of empowerment calls for talking about the second proposition, which he calls “organisation”, and this, therefore, brings in a political dimension. Moore argues that left uncoordinated, poor people simply cannot do much in the different spheres of their lives. Similar to Moore’s foregoing second proposition of ‘organizing’ toward empowerment, which he notes then becomes political, Brown et al. (2014, p. 22) observe that participatory approaches, especially those that aim at empowerment are political tools for they aim to change the balance of power.

Upholding preceding insights on ‘power’ in empowerment, Page and Czuba (1999) and Smith (1997) recognize and state that at the core of the concept of empowerment lie the idea of power, which makes scores of scholars consider the process of empowerment to be partly political. In the words of Smith (1997, p. 120), **“to empower is to give power, to open up, to release the potential of people.”** Page and Czuba (1999) further explain that there are two things upon which the prospect of empowerment depends. First, empowerment requires that power can change. If power cannot change, if it is inherent in positions or people, then empowerment is not possible, nor is empowerment conceivable in any meaningful way. In other words, if power can change, then empowerment is possible. Second, the concept of empowerment depends upon the idea that power can expand. This second point reflects our common experiences of power rather than how we think about power.

Expounding further on this position, Page and Czuba explain that power is often related to the ability to make others do what we want, regardless of their own wishes or interests, and that traditional social science emphasizes power as influence and control, often treating power as a commodity or structure divorced from human action. And conceived in this way, power can be viewed as unchanging or unchangeable. However, Weber (2009) overcomes this limitation by recognizing that power exists within the context of a relationship between people or things. Power does not exist in

isolation nor is it inherent in individuals. By implication, since power is created in relationships, power and power relationships can change. Empowerment as a process of change, then, becomes a meaningful concept. Freedheim and Weiner (2013, p. 479) affirm the foregoing view and note that power in relationships can and does shift over time, leading to a focus on the process of empowerment. That's why Page and Czuba (1999) suggest that empowerment is a process that fosters power (that is, the capacity to implement) in people, for use in their own lives, their communities, and in their society, by acting on issues that they define as important.

Page and Czuba (1999) also suggest that three components of their definition (above) are basic to any understanding of empowerment. Empowerment is **multi-dimensional, social, and a process**. It is multi-dimensional in that it occurs within sociological, psychological, economic, and other dimensions. It also occurs at various levels, such as individual, group, and community. Empowerment, by definition, is a social process, since it occurs in relation with others. Empowerment is a process that is similar to a path or journey, one that develops as we work through it. They argue that other aspects of empowerment may vary depending on the specific context and people involved, but the three dimensions remain constant. Page and Czuba further note that in both the definition and process of empowerment, the individual and community are fundamentally connected.

Probably for this review, no other scholar gives better concluding remarks on the issue of 'power' in empowerment than Eade (2007, p. 630) **when she observes that many conventional NGO practices are ultimately about retaining power, rather than empowering their partners.** Eade further warns that when concepts like 'empowerment', or 'capacity building' become fashion accessories or mere buzzwords invoked in order to negotiate bureaucratic mazes, they are not only drained of any remaining political content but may actually end up crushing local capacities rather than releasing their potential. She further asserts that if capacity building means anything, it is surely about enabling those out on the margins to represent and defend their interests more effectively not only within their own immediate contexts but globally. **Eade laments that reading some of the literature, one could be forgiven for thinking both**

**that capacity building is an exclusively Southern ‘need’, and that international NGOs are among those best placed to meet it.** She remarks, *“The sad reality is that most development aid has precious little to do with building the capacities of ‘The Poor’ to transform their societies. Not even the best-intentioned NGOs are exempt from the tendency of the Development Industry to ignore, misinterpret, displace, supplant, or undermine the capacities that people already have”*, p.633.

In alignment with Eade’s foregoing remarks, Freire (2000, p. 45) suggests (in his classic work toward the liberation of the oppressed) that true generosity consists precisely in fighting to destroy the causes which nourish false charity. False charity constrains the fearful and subdued, the "rejects of life," to extend their trembling hands. True generosity lies in striving so that these hands—whether of individuals or entire peoples—need be extended less and less in supplication so that more and more they become human hands which work and, working, transform the world. And relatedly, Gill (2002, p. 315) concedes when he asserts that “empowerment is literally giving people power.” Gill further asserts that empowerment is about making people able to do what needs to be done and that in practice, empowerment is about giving people knowledge, skills, opportunity, freedom, self-confidence and resources to manage themselves and be accountable. Gill further points out that important aspects of empowerment include stimulating people’s intellects and imagination, in particular, their creativity in the change process.

A read across foregoing CCB literature presents a number of common grounds between authors. It emerges that the main purpose of CCB is empowerment whose ultimate result is people gaining mastery over their lives and their environment. However, as an array of authors noted, there is a big disparity between the continuing high-level rhetoric about CCB and realities on the ground, with many purported CCB actors ignorant and therefore not even able to grasp what true CCB entails, requires and what their intended outcomes should be looking like. It also emerged that at the core of empowerment is the transfer of power, a process which can be likened to using one torch of fire to light up many other torches without this original torch losing its fire. Empowerment doesn’t, therefore, mean emptying oneself of power but sharing the

power. And as noted by Eade (2007), capacity building is not an exclusively Southern need, and Northern actors including Northern NGOs need to evaluate their own limitations in this aspect. Inability and or unwillingness to do this will lead to the continued undermining of existing people's capacities in the South, a process that frustratingly leads to botched and non-sustainable development results.

### 2.4.3 Community Capacity Building For DRR

In their paper titled 'local DRR in Latin America urban areas,' Hardoy et al. (2011, p. 401) reflect that "it is at the local or neighbourhood level that disasters happen, lives and livelihoods are lost, houses and infrastructure are damaged or destroyed, and health and education compromised." In a corroborative work titled "Why is community action needed for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation?," Satterthwaite (2011, p. 340) explains that when disasters happen, the speed and effectiveness of response depends very heavily on local organizations that represent the needs of those most impacted and most vulnerable. Satterthwaite further explains that it is also at the local level that many of the disaster risks can be addressed before disasters occur. Satterthwaite argues that **local DRR action is best constituted of partnerships** between local government, communities and civil society.

In the aforementioned paper titled 'local DRR in Latin America urban areas,' Hardoy et al. (2011) acknowledge that disaster risk reduction is a development issue best addressed locally with community involvement as an integral part of local development. However, Hardoy and team also observe that there are many constraints and realities that complicate the attainment of this ideal. They strongly argue that "in order to be effective, **disaster risk reduction has to be driven locally** and must include the involvement of communities at risk as well as local governments." And in agreement, van Niekerk and Coetzee (2012) observe that "in essence, communities remain the most important element in understanding how disaster risk and vulnerability are created and how it can be reduced because they are the once's most affected."

In concert with foregoing views, Pandey and Okazaki (2005) demand that the emphasis of disaster management efforts should focus on communities and the people

who live in them. They argue that “unless the disaster management efforts are sustainable at individual and community level, it is difficult to reduce the losses and scale of the tragedy.” And while Hardoy et al. (2011) argue that disaster risk reduction needs to be community driven to be sustained over the long term, that actions must respond to local needs and possibilities and that they should address multiple problems at the same time, they also make yet another critical observation. In sync with Satterthwaite, they (Hardoy et al) observe that **“community driven” does not necessarily mean that the actions are designed and promoted by the community alone**, but rather, working together in association with local governments and other local actors.

Hardoy and team’s views on the need to enhance ‘community-driven’ DRR resonate with veteran development practice scholars including Chambers (1998), Eade (1997), and McKnight and Kretzmann (1997)---who argue that **development must start from within the community**, for communities cannot be developed from the top down, or from the outside. These veteran scholars all assert that communities have never been built upon their deficiencies; rather, community development has always depended upon mobilizing the capacities and assets of a people and a place. Therefore, every effort that helps to break the bankrupt top-down approach to local DRR action eventually contributes to the much needed CCB4DRR.

A read across various literature including Hardoy et al. (2011), Satterthwaite (2011), Carcellar et al. (2011), Davidson et al. (2007), and Weru (2004) indicate that **local DRR action takes place in two different but inter-related settings; the two settings being the ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ settings**. Relatedly, in his work titled “Managing Disasters, Involving Communities” where he shows the importance and advantages of community-based disaster risk management, Parkash (2013, p. 32) observes that *“although disaster mitigation has gained increasing credence in the recent past, most efforts tend to focus towards disaster management of populated and built areas, while hazards in remote and unpopulated areas are neglected.”*

And a read across Van Niekerk et al. (2018), Matthies (2017), Initiatives (2017), Chhoun (2016) Ranmuthugala et al. (2013), CATHERINE Fitzgibbon and ALEXANDRA Crosskey (2013) , Parkash (2013), van Riet and van Niekerk (2012), van Niekerk and

Coetzee (2012), Shaw (2012b), CORDAID and IIRR (2011), De Jode and Tilstone (2011), IFRC (2009), and John Twigg (2004a) reveals that **much of the CCB4DRR is effected through an approach dubbed “Community-Based Disaster Risk Management,”---shorted to CBDRM.**

In his panel remarks on CBDRM to the OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum, Krummacher (2014) reflected that *“over the past two decades, the concept of Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) has emerged and is now generally recognised in the fields of disaster preparedness and mitigation, and increasingly also in disaster response and recovery.”*

And to trace its roots, how did the CMDRR/CBDRM concept and or journey begin? Maskrey (2011) observes that “at the time of the 1984 Ocho Rios Conference, the bibliography on CBDRM was frugal, to say the very least. And while pioneering NGOs in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America were implementing projects and programmes at the community level, it was unusual for these to be systematically documented and even rarer to be explicitly described as CBDRM.”

And according to Van Niekerk et al. (2018), Levinson (2017) and Gaillard and Gomez (2015), the emergence of CMDRR/CBDRM approaches are rooted in critical research reflections which pointed out that for too long have communities been used as inputs to the research cycle and not treated as part of the knowledge creation process. It is this general reflection on the role of communities in the ‘knowledge creation process’ that eventually influenced disaster researchers on the need to reconsider the role of communities in the entire disaster management practice.

In their paper on CBDRM, Van Niekerk et al. (2018) explain that *“emerging from the 1980s, a shift in focus occurred in the management of disasters and also the role of communities within civil protection and disaster (risk) management. A growing realization from researchers and practitioners alike occurred, that a greater understanding of the dynamics of vulnerabilities, hazardous exposure and resilience can only be gained if the knowledge creation process is seated within, and by those effected. Local knowledge and culture need to be respected, and indigenous and scientific knowledge need not be mutually exclusive. However, limited resources, capacities and*

*technical abilities hamper random and spontaneous community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM). Therefore, outside intervention is still needed in most cases.”*

Relatedly, in a work titled “Overview of Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction,” Shaw (2012a) explains that community-based disaster-related activities have been termed differently over time. He shows that more than a century ago, before the existence of most of the states, people or communities were taking care of themselves through collective actions during disaster situations. And after the formation of state, government-based disaster risk reduction programs started, which failed to serve the needs of the people and communities. Shaw observes that for the past 20–30 years, we have been again talking about the need for community-based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR).

Shaw, therefore, argues that *“a culture of DRR exists in all communities...the community-based approach is not new. Rather, we are going back to the old and traditional approaches of risk reduction. CBDM had been a popular term in later 1980s and 1990s, which gradually evolved to community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM), and then to CBDRR. CBDRM and CBDRR are often used with similar meaning, with enhanced focus on ‘risk’; however, there still exists a thin line of distinction.”* Shaw explains that *“while CBDRR focuses more on pre-disaster activities for risk reduction by the communities, CBDRM focuses a broader perspective of risk-reduction-related activities by communities, both during, before, and after the disaster.”*

In regard to the question of **“what is CBDRM?”**, Van Niekerk et al. (2018), Krummacher (2014), Shaw (2012a), and Abarquez and Murshed (2004) agree on the common ingredients of CBDRM. They describe CBDRM as a process of disaster risk management in which at-risk communities are actively engaged in the identification, analysis, treatment, monitoring and evaluation of disaster risks in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and enhance their capacities. This means that the people are at the heart of decision making and implementation of disaster risk management activities. A CBDRM approach responds to local problems and needs, capitalizes on local knowledge and expertise, improves the likelihood of sustainability through genuine ‘ownership’,

strengthens community technical and organizational capacities, and empowers people by enabling them to tackle these and other challenges. It is about listening to people.

Van Niekerk et al. (2018) assert that in CBDRM, *“community empowerment and ownership through, and of the process is key.”* And Shaw and Goda (2004) emphasize that *“CBDRM is culture and context specific, and therefore, cannot be successfully implemented by “outsiders”. In CBDRM, local knowledge and trust becomes very important.”*

In a feature article titled “Managing Disasters: Involving Communities,” Parkash (2013) answers the question of “Why Community-Based Disaster Risk Management?” by first presenting five shortcomings of the dominant top-down DRR approach, followed by seven advantages of CBDRM. The five shortcomings of the top-down DRR approach include: 1. *“The same plan, regardless of the regional characteristics, is implemented or imposed everywhere; 2. Local knowledge, experiences, skills, resources and techniques are not given due importance. Rather external resources and techniques are proposed to be utilised; 3. Negligence about local cultural instincts and heritage; 4. Prioritisation is decided by an outsider and not the stakeholders or the community itself; 5. Local community does not have any information about the disaster management plans for their area and the role of different sectors in helping the community during disasters.”*

In addition to the aforementioned five shortcomings of the dominant top-down approach to DRR, Parkash identifies and shares the following seven advantages of CBDRM, as a rallying call to increase the adoption of CBDRM: *“1. Feelings of coordination and self-belonging to the society are developed; 2. Local geo-climatic and socio-cultural characteristics get the attention of people in development and disaster management; 3. Local initiatives begin, and the community provides assistance to executing agencies involved in disaster management; 4. There is exchange of knowledge, information, skills and techniques between the community and the experts involved from outside; 5. Community comes forward to put forward its ideas for selection of appropriate programmes suitable to their locality and society; 6. Community can monitor the quality of works being done in its locality. It will also generate a sense of responsibility among*



*the community; 7. It will lead to capacity building of the community on issues of disaster-safe developmental activities.”*

The more reason Walter (2004) asserts that during slow-onset crises such as drought, there are rural communities that have developed extraordinary capacities to cope and bounce back. However, top-down approaches by most agencies are undermining this local resilience. Corroborating Walter’s view, Pelling (2007a) observes that too often, local initiative and capacities continue to be overlooked during external interventions.

Relatedly, while writing and making the case for the need for wider adoption of CBDRM, Pandey and Okazaki (2005) reflect that “while different community empowerment programmes related to disaster mitigation have achieved their objectives, they are often short term, and issues on sustainability in these efforts are rarely addressed. Government, non-government and international organizations implement various programmes before and after the disasters. Most of them are very successful during the project period, but gradually diminish as the years pass. There are many reasons for this kind of phenomena, however, lack of effective participation and capacity building of local communities to pursue the program remain major factors for lack of sustainability.”

In their “Field Practitioners’ Handbook for CBDRM”, Abarquez and Murshed (2004) outline seven steps in the CBDRM process. These steps include:

- i. Selecting the community
- ii. Rapport building and understanding the community
- iii. Participatory disaster risk assessment
- iv. Participatory disaster risk management planning
- v. Building and training a community disaster risk management organization
- vi. Community-managed implementation
- vii. Participatory monitoring and evaluation.

With all its good intentions though, CBDRM doesn’t come and go without facing challenges. In her review of the CBDRM practice for Nepal, Laursen (2015) observed that

while CBDRM began in the 1980s and 1990s as an alternative to the top-down approaches which were dominant at the time, even with CBDRM, there are still top-down huddles with related stakeholder engagement. Laursen observes that until 1950, Nepal was a closed country. And when it opened up, the country began receiving foreign aid and many of the DRR programs in Nepal are donor driven. Laursen identified two things that make what would have been a community-driven CBDRM project to be a donor-driven project: the project's time period and content of the project.

Laursen reflected that “from the CBDRM program I looked at, NSET had prepared a proposal of activities, which the donor accepted. This is a normal procedure among most donor-driven programs. The problem is, however, that there is not much room for the community to influence the content of the program, which, in turn, impedes the community's actual participation. As several disaster committee members informed me, they had ongoing ideas for different activities. But, as Bhagawan explained: ‘We have requested NSET that certain such trainings will be very useful for us and out of all suggestions, and they have their own idea about what suggestion is, what trainings are needed here, as for example mason training that was their idea not ours, and we are pressing them for first aid training, rescue team training, exedra, but technically they are the very experts so they design the training, they design the survey and we accepted it, we accepted because they are experts.’”

Laursen laments that there is, therefore, an understanding that experts—because of the mere fact that they are experts—know best. In addition, because the content of the program is already fixed, which according to NSET is necessary for a donor to accept the proposal, it is not possible to change the activities. The community is therefore not included in the decision-making process for the content of the program. And on sad note, Laursen concludes that **“CBDRM in Kathmandu Valley is not straightforward.”** This anecdote from Nepal cannot be taken as a standalone experience and left to isolation. This is the actual frontline practitioners' reality. The devils of top-down DRM practice continue to haunt and harass good intentioned CBDRM approaches.

**Annexe 1** (which is an excerpt from Pandey and Okazaki (2005, pp. 6-7) provides a good example of a multi-country CBDRM project. This is a school earthquake safety

initiative which aimed at “Reducing Vulnerability of School Children to Earthquakes”. The project was supported jointly between United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) in Asia-Pacific region. And the project which was implemented in Fiji Islands, India, Indonesia and Uzbekistan included retrofitting of school building in a participatory way with the involvement of local communities, local governments and resource institutions; and trainings on safer construction practices to technicians, and disaster education in school and communities.

A review across Gaillard and Mercer (2013); Robertua (2013); UNISDR (2013a); UNISDR (2013b); Benicchio (2012); Djalante et al. (2012); Izumi and Shaw (2012); van Riet and van Niekerk (2012); Hagelsteen and Becker (2012); Scott and Tarazona (2011); J Twigg and Bottomley (2011); Kent (2011); Pelling (2007a); UNDP (2004) ; Walter (2004); Walter (2002); and Walter (2001)---much of which researched and written during the HFA tenure reveals consensus among these authors that while there continues to be a growing interest and focus on DRR, **poor local capacity for DRR remains a major impediment to making required progress.** And thus while the CBDRM movement is still growing, it is still minimal given its total required global footprint, and where it is growing, it still faces the top-down challenges, like indicated in the Laursen’s account on Nepal.

Knowing that towards the closure of HFA UNISDR (2013b) reported that while there already existed some community participation in DRR, this participation remained low compared to the potential it has got to grow, there is urgent need to address the gap between global DRR agendas, national level policies and strategies and local level risk reduction activities. Based on this increased realization, there’s a need to advocate in the early years of SFDRR to ensure that ‘**local DRR action**’ especially the CMDRR and CBDRM good practices get moved from the current state of low prioritisation to the fore of the global DRR agenda. And going by Ijaz’s emphasis that ‘what gets measured gets done’ (Ijaz et al., 2012), bringing local DRR action and its highly recommended CBDRM and CMDRR good practices from current state low prioritisation to the fore should not

be considered complete till adequate mechanisms have been put in place to both measure and report on progress being made.

#### **2.4.3.1 The origins and role of institutional donors and INGOs in CCB4DRR**

According to Khan and Shaw (2015), paradigm shifts have occurred in the understanding of disasters which consequently influenced the evolution of disaster management theory. Relatedly, according to Madu and Kuei (2017), Khan and Shaw (2015) and Abarquez and Murshed (2004), disasters are no longer seen as extreme events created entirely by natural forces but also as manifestations of unresolved problems of development. The more reason Khan and Shaw (2015) assert that “it is now recognised that risks (physical, social and economic) unmanaged or mismanaged for a long time lead to disasters.

And that is why Khan and Shaw (2015) and Sudmeier-Rieux et al. (2013) agree on the fact that there is a growing awareness that disaster risk reduction cannot be separated from pressing concerns of sustainable development, poverty reduction, social equity and environmental protection. The foregoing views are corroborated by Collins (2018) who argues that it is now common knowledge that disaster events impact on development possibilities, and this calls for the application of DRR to sustainable development. Collins further observes that this is the sole reason the SF4DRR is recognized as a driver for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Reflections therefore indicate that it is this growing realisation that disasters are a consequence of unsolved development problems that has translated traditional institutional donors who used to fund northern INGO-initiated development programmes (in developing and less developed countries) that resulted in the paradigm shift. It is a paradigm shift where the same donors are now channelling a portion of usual development assistance funding to the same INGOs to address disaster risk management issues in developing countries.

For instance, in their work titled “Disaster Risk Reduction Approaches in Pakistan”, Khan and Shaw (2015, p. 281) report that ‘non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a vital role in disaster risk reduction...This goal of development and resilience community can be achieved through contribution of NGOs in those sectors where government pays less attention or has least resources.’ And in a section of the same work titled “NGOs Funding in Pakistan”, Khan and Shaw reflect that “even though the work done by the NGOs is for the development and social uplift of local communities, there is almost no support provided by the federal or local governments. **Almost all of the funding is by international donor agencies...**Donors publish advertisements calling for Proposals. In response to that, NGOs submit project proposals...Several multilateral and bilateral donors are involved in DRM work in Pakistan...The guidelines for NGO operations and activities are generally provided by donors/funding agencies.”

A critical review of Khan and Shaw’s foregoing reflections shows that donors and INGOs are filling a gap left by either lack of government focus on local level development challenges and or lack of government capacity to address the same challenges. And in their study titled “Financing Disaster Risk Reduction: a 20 year story of international aid,” Kellett and Caravani (2013) highlight that “funding for DRR comes broadly from two interconnected sources: funding direct from donor nations and funding that is managed by a variety of development banks; and funding mechanisms and implementing agencies.”

This once again makes it clear that institutional donors and their implementing agencies who in most cases are the INGOs and host governments have a critical place in directing in-country DRR agendas. Field experience shows that apart from the disaster-prone communities, the most important DRR actors in many developing countries are institutional donors and INGOs, followed by host governments that are responsible for

creating a conducive DRM working environment including addressing DRM governance issues, policies, strategies and all required frameworks.

While Khan and Shaw (2015) observe that “donor support is imperative to ensure strengthening of DRR and climate change adaptation measures”, they also observe that in the past “outside support has been a low priority for DRR...Only 1% of total reported official humanitarian assistance to Pakistan between 2005-2009 was allocated to disaster prevention and preparedness.” Khan and Shaw further indicate that in recent years, DRR has gained great prominence and international recognition through global initiatives like the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (ISDRR).

**The aforementioned Pakistan donor and INGO engagement in DRR at all levels within the country is simply a case that represents many other developing countries.**

For instance, writing on the Philippines’ CBDRM experience as part of their work on “Partnerships for Disaster Reduction in South East Asia,” Torrente et al. (2008, p. 27) report that “agencies such as World Vision, Caritas-Manila and the Philippine Relief and Development Services have integrated CBDRM into their existing emergency services. At present, there are a number of NGOs--both local and international who have adopted the CBDRM principles. Aside from those mentioned, the others who are doing successful CBDRM as part of their socio-economic programs and projects are Plan International, International Organization for Migration, Christian Aid, and Oxfam, among others. The bilateral and multilateral donors have likewise been actively supporting CBDRM with their financial and technical assistance.”

Torrente et al. (2008) further assert that intrinsic in most of CBDRM initiatives is the deliberate effort to build and strengthen cooperation and networking among concerned stakeholders: the beneficiaries, community-based organizations, national and local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), donor community, and on a limited scale, the private sector. And in his work titled “Revisiting community-based disaster risk management”, Maskrey (2011) observes that because of the traditional role played by INGOs in the development sector, “it is probably not

coincidental that Community Based Disaster Mitigation heavily emphasized the potential role of NGOs as supporters of CBDRM.” Maskrey therefore concludes that “a key factor in the adoption of CBDRM has certainly been the uptake by international NGOs such as OXFAM, CARE, ActionAid, Tear- fund as well as by the International Federation of the Red Cross.

To conclude this sub-section, it’s clear that it was the emergence of a paradigm shift in the understanding of disasters which consequently influenced the evolution of the disaster management theory. And part of the evolved theory is that disasters are no longer taken as extreme events created entirely by natural forces but now viewed as manifestations of unresolved problems of development. And when lead development practitioners, especially intuitional donors and INGOs that depended on each other to respectively fund and implement programmes in developing countries realised that sustainable development is not achievable without complementary community-driven DRR through the CBDRM methodologies; the same symbiotic developments actors gradually adopted CBDRM as a critical element of their community focused developmental approaches.

Thus because of the traditional role of institutional donors and INGOs in the development sector especially within developing countries, the global adoption of community-driven DRR as a driver for sustainable development meant that by virtue of their place in the development sector, institutional donors and INGOs would therefore organically become key drivers of CBDRM and its ingrained CCB4DRR in all respective target countries. It may be a slow process, but the movement has steadily grown.

#### **2.4.4 Community Capacity Building For DRR in Kenya**

It is worth noting that a complimentary detailed background to this sub-section is provided under section 2.3 and its sub-sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 which present the country’s generic profile, followed by the country’s disaster risk profile,

followed by the country's disaster risk management framework, and lastly the DRR footprint among Kenya's relief and development partners.

This researcher thought it best to partly review the state of the country's CCB4DRR by firstly identifying what the country's (phased-out) HFA reports had indicated about CCB4DRR. The following collection of statements by Mondoh (2013) in his report on Kenya's national progress in the implementation of HFA (2011-2013), provide clues (thus not details) to the state of community capacity building for DRR in the country:

- Attempts at creating awareness on preventive risk reduction have been conducted. However, **due to limited resources..., such initiatives do not get to a level where they can be put to practice or implemented.**
- Do post-disaster programmes explicitly incorporate and budget for DRR for resilient recovery? No.
- Contingency planning for major hazards is not yet fully institutionalized in Kenya. **Subnational structures still lack the technical capacity to develop or implement contingency plans.**
- **Are there identified means and sources to convey local and community experience or traditional knowledge in disaster risk reduction? No**
- The challenge at the moment is the centralized national nature of disaster risk reduction institutions **with limited capacities to address community-level challenges in risk reduction.**
- **DRM governance has not fully been devolved to local communities in Kenya** save for ad hoc efforts mostly by the Non-Governmental Organizations.
- **The challenge here has been the 'response-oriented mindset'** among humanitarian agencies and institutions, government, communities and even donor agencies. There has been much concentration at allocating resources to response programs but little towards long-term risk reduction.

While the HFA has since been phased out and succeeded by the Sendai Framework for DRR (SF4DRR), Kenya's HFA assessment reports are invaluable in



providing an excellent baseline upon which to measure successive progress especially on identified areas of growth which include the much needed support to local DRR action, including CCB4DRR.

Apart from CCB4DRR anecdotes rendered by the HFA reports, what else do we know about the state of Kenya's local DRR action including CCB4DRR? In a revealing report titled "Tracking Sub-National Government Investments in Disaster Risk Reduction in Kenya", Owino (2019) reflects that **Kenya's capacity to manage disaster risk is partly constrained by a lack of deliberate action towards proactive disaster risk management.** Owino reports that in an evaluation of drought responses between 1999 and 2001 indicates that only US\$171 million would have been spent on relief responses instead of double that amount had the country put in place appropriate mitigation and preparedness measures.

The more reason why in their report titled "Political Will for Disaster Reduction: What Incentives Build It, And Why Is It So Hard To Achieve?", Ben Wisner et al. (2011) point out that one of the challenges of attracting political good will for DRR stems from the fact that because the success of good DRR is measured by way of disaster losses that are NOT incurred, the resultant absence of a crisis or loss does not grab headlines or win votes. For many a politician world-over, it is sensationalism that brings in the votes. And Scott and Tarazona (2011) concede that local politicians engage more in disaster response than risk reduction, as they perceive that a quick response will be more likely to win favorable publicity and, ultimately, votes.

And corroborating this view, Schipper and Pelling (2006) assert that "the low visibility of disaster risk reduction work in comparison to emergency relief has made it unattractive for governments chasing votes and international recognition and for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) dependent on disasters for funding". Schipper and Pelling argue that "when countries declare a state of emergency, international funds are more easily available, and blame gets placed on the hazard, rather than on the conditions of vulnerability that have resulted from, for example, poor governance and corruption, unchecked neo-liberal development policies and marginalisation of the poor."

And in concert with foregoing views, UNDP (2019) asserts that “despite the exposure to recurrent natural and human-induced hazards in Kenya, her disaster management strategy has largely remained reactive. The Government is often compelled to re-direct development resources to address emergency response and reconstruction needs at the expense of development programmes.” It is this lack of deliberate action towards proactive disaster risk management in the country, therefore, that continues to constrain the desired shift from key stakeholder overspending on disaster response to pre-disaster investments in resilience-building DRR actions. And CCB4DRR is an integral part of resilience-building DRR.

As already presented in the sub-section titled “*DRR Footprint among Government of Kenya Partners*”, to gain more information on the DRR footprint in Kenya, a review of web-based secondary data of 17 International Non-Governmental Agencies (INGOs), 5 UN agencies and 7 bilateral donor agencies was conducted. Based on their online presence, all reviewed INGOs, UN agencies and bilateral donors indicate engagement with DRR at various levels and in different forms across the country. This engagement is presented in the “*what we do*”, “*focus*”, and “*projects*” tabs; while for some, it is woven into their online strategy papers, stories and reports. There is, therefore, sufficient evidence to suggest that almost every international relief and development partner with the Government of Kenya is in one way or another involved in supporting DRR practice in the country.

However, across this online review, **there was little found on how reviewed Government of Kenya relief and development partners are engaged in supporting and or promoting community capacity building for DRR.** Findings from this web-based secondary data review of the aforementioned agencies, therefore, corroborate with statements presented by Mondoh (2013) in his report on Kenya’s national progress in the implementation of HFA (2011-2013). Evidently, there is a big gap between national level DRR achievements and local level DRR execution in the country.

## 2.5 Conclusion from Literature Review (Key Gaps)

This literature review unveiled a gap between policy rhetoric and grass-root or local level execution realities on critical development issues including but not limited to community capacity building and empowerment. And progress in the implementation of the already wrapped up 2005-2015 HFA did not demonstrate the exception to these gap realities, hence **poor local capacity for DRR remains probably the biggest impediment to making required global DRR progress.**

While the literature identified ‘poor local capacity for DRR’ as a major impediment to the global DRR agenda and highlighted ‘top-down approaches’ which for long have dominated DRR domain to be partly responsible for this poor local capacity for DRR and related action, the literature also noted the advent of an alternative to the top-down DRR approach, known as CBDRM, which advocates for community-driven DRR.

Given that examples of long-term strengthening of local communities for DRR remain uncommon (UNDP (2004), that the growing CBDRM practice is still faced with traditional top-down challenges as witnessed the case of Nepal (Laursen, 2015), that much of the available literature on CBDRM is from South America and East Asia with a handful from Africa, and with van Niekerk and Coetzee (2012) reporting that “individual countries and respective regions in Africa were (by 2012) still struggling to put the required governance and institutional arrangements in place to facilitate an empowering environment for risk reduction at community level,” it becomes important to investigate the current state of CCB4DRR in especially high disaster risk countries, including Kenya.

And given aforementioned teething challenges with the still growing community-driven DRR approaches, it is also important to identify the most successful community-driven DRR cases in Africa (and other regions) and analyze factors and or concepts which were adopted that contributed to the stellar success of these case studies for wider

sharing. A presentation of both supportive concepts and negating factors to local DRR action will equip related DRR stakeholders ranging from donors, national and sub-national governments, INGOs, local NGOs and local communities themselves with knowledge on enablers and disablers of local DRR action, thus identifying areas for critical emphasis especially as we continue with the Sendai Framework for DRR. Heeding professional advice from White (2006) who asserts that “you cannot conquer what you do not confront, and you cannot confront what you do not identify,” the aims, objectives and research questions in the ensuing research were, therefore, framed to address the key gaps that have been identified.

# 3 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (RM)

## 3.1 Introduction to Research Methodology

Kothari (2004, p. 8) describes Research Methodology (RM) as *“a way to systematically solve the research problem, and in it, we learn the various steps adopted by the researcher in studying the research problem along with the logic behind them.”* Remenyi (1998) asserts that RM is the procedural framework within which the research is conducted, while Jonker and Pennink (2010) describe RM as a domain or a map and refer to a method as a set of steps to travel between two places on the map.

And according to Wahyuni (2012, p. 72), RM *“refers to a model to conduct research within the context of a particular paradigm; and comprises underlying sets of beliefs that guide a researcher to choose one set of research methods over another.”* Similarly, Dainty (2008, p. 3) explains that in social inquiry, RM *“refers to far more than the methods adopted and encompasses the rationale and philosophical assumptions underlying a particular study.”*

## 3.2 Research Philosophy and Research Paradigms

Research philosophy is an overarching term relating to the development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge (M. Saunders, 2012, p. 127). Research paradigms address the philosophical dimensions of social sciences (Wahyuni, 2012, p. 69), and like any human action, research is implicitly or explicitly grounded on philosophical perspectives (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001, p. 95). Whilst philosophical backgrounds usually remain implicit in most research, they affect the research practice (Wahyuni, 2012, p. 69). Andrade (2009, p. 43) notes that *“researchers’ basic beliefs and worldviews lie behind their theoretical perspectives.”* Guba (1994) corroborates Andrade’s view and urges the need for researchers to make explicit both their ontological and epistemological assumptions before embarking on any research project. Following these suggestions, various research paradigms are discussed below to help

justify the theoretical assumptions and fundamental beliefs underpinning this particular research.

According to M. N. Saunders et al. (2011), Kalof et al. (2008) and Laughlin (1995), the two main philosophical dimensions to distinguish existing research paradigms are **ontology** and **epistemology**. The two relate to the nature of knowledge and the development of that knowledge, respectively.

### 3.2.1 Ontology, Epistemology & Axiology

According to M. Saunders (2012, p. 149), there are three major ways or branches of thinking about philosophy, namely: ontology, epistemology and axiology. Ontology is the view of how one perceives a reality (Dainty (2008); Wahyuni (2012)). It relates to the nature of reality, that is, what things, if any, have existence or whether reality is *“the product of one’s mind”* (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 1). The researcher’s view of reality (ontological view) is the cornerstone to all other assumptions, that is, what is assumed here determines the researcher’s other assumptions (Holden & Lynch, 2004, p. 5). The second assumption, epistemology, is the beliefs on the way to generate, understand and use the knowledge that is deemed to be acceptable and valid (Wahyuni, 2012). It is the study of the nature of knowledge, that is, how is it possible, if it is, for us to gain knowledge of the world? (Hughes & Sharrock, 1980). Epistemology is therefore concerned with the nature, validity, and limits of inquiry (Rosenau, 1991).

Answering the ontological question, *“what is the form and nature of reality, and therefore, what is there that can be known about it”* is the first step in defining how the researcher may approach a research problem (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). Because ontological views influence epistemological assumptions (Holden & Lynch, 2004, p. 3), the epistemological question, *“what is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known”* (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108) must be answered in a consistent way with the ontological view.

In addition to the first two fundamental research philosophies (ontology and epistemology), two other beliefs that affect the way to investigate reality are **'axiology'** and **'methodology'**. Axiology is a branch of philosophy that studies judgements about values and in particular focuses on the researcher's view of the role of values in research (M. Saunders, 2012, pp. 137, 140). Methodology refers to a model for undertaking a research process in the context of a particular paradigm (Wahyuni, 2012, pp. 69-70). Table 3.1 below provides a summary of the fundamental beliefs and how they relate with research paradigms.

### 3.2.2 Research Philosophies in Social Sciences

Table 3.1: Summary of Fundamental Research Philosophies-(Source: Sounders: 2012, 140)				
Fundamental Beliefs	Research Paradigms			
	Pragmatism	Positivism (Naïve realism)	Realism	Interpretivism (Constructivism)
<b>Ontology: the researcher's view of the nature of reality or being.</b>	External, multiple, view chosen to best enable answering of the research question.	External, <b>objective</b> and independent of social actors.	Is <b>objective</b> . Exists independently of human thoughts and beliefs or knowledge of their existence (realist), but is interpreted through social conditioning (critical realist).	Socially constructed, <b>subjective</b> , may change, multiple.
<b>Epistemology: the researcher's view regarding what constitutes acceptable knowledge</b>	Either or both observable phenomena and subjective meanings can provide acceptable knowledge dependent upon the research question. Focus on practical applied research, integrating different perspectives to help interpret the data.	Only observable phenomena can provide credible data, facts. Focus on causality and law-like generalizations, reducing phenomena to simplest elements.	Observable phenomena provide credible data, facts. Insufficient data means inaccuracies in sensations (direct realism). Alternatively, phenomena create sensations which are open to misinterpretation (critical realism). Focus on explaining within a context or contexts.	Subjective meanings and social phenomena. Focus upon the details of the situation, a reality behind these details, subjective meanings and motivating actions.
<b>Axiology: the researcher's view of the role of values in research</b>	Value plays a large role in interpreting results, the researcher adopting both objective and subjective points of view.	Value-free and etc. Research is undertaken in a value-free way; the researcher is independent of the data and maintains an objective stance.	Research is value-laden; the researcher is biased by world views, cultural experiences and upbringing. These will impact on the research.	Research is value bound, the researcher is part of what is being researched, cannot be separated and so will be subjective.
<b>Data collection techniques most often used.</b>	Mixed or multiple method designs, qualitative and quantitative.	Highly structured, large samples, measurement, quantitative, but can use qualitative.	Methods chosen must fit the subject matter, quantitative or qualitative.	Small samples, in-depth investigations, qualitative.

Table 3. 1 Summary of Fundamental Research Philosophies-(Source: Sounders: 2012, 140)



### 3.2.3 Philosophical Positioning for this Research

“Institutional donor and INGO support to community capacity building for DRR” is the social phenomena to be studied under this research. And the aim of this research is to explore and investigate the state of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) in Kenya, and to identify and analyse critical factors or good practice concepts behind highly successful CCB4DRR initiatives in the country. To realise the research aim, the researcher had to interact with target research participants (donors and INGOs), listen to and capture their different narratives, interpret each of their stories and seek to construct meaning from every conversation. This was, therefore, a highly subjective research process.

Based on the subjective nature of this research and taking into consideration philosophical assumptions presented in Table 3.3, **this research (and NOT the researcher) identifies itself more with the interpretivism research paradigm and therefore takes the posture of an interpretive/constructivist research.** The highly objective *positivism* and *realism* research paradigms were not conducive for this highly subjective research. However, while this research has adopted the interpretivism research paradigm, the researcher allies himself more with the **pragmatism paradigm** where a research paradigm is simply chosen to best enable answering of the research question. The **interpretive/constructivist research** paradigm was therefore chosen on the basis that it was best suited to answering the research question.

## 3.3 Research Approach

M. Saunders (2012) presents 3 research approaches, namely **deductive**, **inductive** and **abductive**. When research starts with a theory, often developed from reviewing academic literature and the research develops a strategy to test the theory, that research would be using a **deductive approach**. Key characteristics of deductive approach include using a **structured methodology**, following the **principle of reductionism** where problems as a whole are better understood when reduced to the simplest possible elements; and careful sample selection to enable **generalisation**. On

the other hand, when research starts by collecting data to explore a phenomenon, and one builds up a theory often expressed as a conceptual framework, then one is using an **inductive approach**. The **abductive approach** combines both deductive and inductive approaches, with the purpose of generating either a new or modifying an existing theory that may also be subsequently tested through additional data collection. And according to M. Saunders (2012, p. 149), no approach is better than the other, they are all better at different things, depending on where the research emphasis lies.

The literature reviewed identified poor local capacity for DRR as a major impediment to the global DRR agenda and highlighted top-down approaches which dominate much of the DRR domain to be partly responsible for this poor local capacity for DRR and related action. The literature, however, did not unveil other hindrances to local DRR action nor factors required for successful local DRR action including CCB4DRR. Thus both negating and or supportive factors for local DRR action (including CCB4DRR) remain largely unidentified, undocumented, unshared and therefore unaddressed. With examples of long-term strengthening of local communities for DRR remaining uncommon (UNDP (2004), it is important to investigate reasons for this uncommonness, and identify factors responsible for the uncommon successful CCB4DRR when found.

Reflecting on the research questions and objectives, **this research sought to address more of the ‘why is this happening’ and less of ‘what is happening’**. The research, therefore, adopted an **inductive approach** where the process flow started with data collection followed by exploring them to identify emerging themes and ended with theory building.

### **3.4 Research Strategy**

A research strategy is *“a plan of how a researcher will go about answering a research question(s),”* and it is the nature of research questions and objectives that inform methodological choices and subsequent research strategies (M. Saunders, 2012). According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009), there are two major research methodologies: quantitative and qualitative, and the two are respectively related to positivism and interpretivism. A third methodology, referred to as integrated

methodology (Cibangu, 2010, p. 178) or multiple methodology (M. Saunders, 2012, p. 164), can also be adopted, depending on the researcher or research questions.

This, therefore, presents three research design options: quantitative, qualitative or multiple method research design. A quantitative research design is generally more associated with positivism and deductive approaches, while qualitative research is associated with an interpretive philosophy. The integrated/ multiple methodology is likely to combine both deductive and inductive approaches (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; M. Saunders, 2012). According to Creswell and Clark (2007), one methodology may be embedded into another, e.g. when quantitative questions are included in an interview schedule. Creswell and Clark refer to this as “**embedded mixed methods research.**”

According to M. Saunders (2012, p. 170), the way a researcher frames research questions determines the **nature** or **purpose of the research**, and there are three ways of looking at this: **exploratory, descriptive** or **explanatory**. Exploratory studies ask open questions aimed at discovering what is happening to help further understanding. Descriptive studies aim at gaining an accurate profile of events. Explanatory research aims at studying a situation/ problem in order to explain the relationship between variables.

#### **3.4.1 Types of research strategies, and those not adopted for this study**

M. Saunders (2012, p. 173) lists eight types of research strategies, namely: experiment, survey, archival research, case study, ethnography, action research, grounded theory and narrative inquiry. Saunders asserts that experiments and surveys are exclusively linked to quantitative design; archival research and case study may involve quantitative or qualitative research, or a mixed design combining both. The final four strategies are principally linked to a qualitative research design. The following narrative explains why most of the above research strategies were not adopted for this

research, while the strategy adopted for the research will be discussed in the subsequent sub-subsection.

**Experiment** as a research strategy was not used because it uses a predictive hypothesis rather than open research questions that form the core of this research. **Surveys** were not used because they are generally associated with deductive research designs, and are good at answering the 'what', 'who', 'how much', and 'how many' types of questions (M. Saunders, 2012). While document review was one of the data collection techniques employed in the research, **Archival Research** was not adopted as a research strategy because of its overreliance on archival records as the main source of data.

**Ethnography**, which is a research strategy most suited for studying people groups in their settings was not deemed appropriate in a study where institutional donors and INGOs and successful community DRR projects were the main cases to be studied. The purpose of an **Action Research** strategy is to promote organisational learning through identifying issues, planning action, taking and evaluating action, and repeating the cycle (M. Saunders, 2012, p. 183). Both the purpose and process of Action Research were not found appropriate for research questions identified for this study. While the **Narrative Inquiry** strategy is somewhat similar to in-depth interviews employed in qualitative case studies, it (narrative inquiry) is more suited to investigating events, and according to (M. Saunders (2012, p. 190), the Narrative Inquiry does not have a well-developed set of analytical procedures, thus could make data analysis very cumbersome. It is on these two grounds that the Narrative Inquiry strategy was not adopted for this research.

### 3.4.2 Justification for the adopted research strategy

With regard to choosing a research strategy, expert advice from M. Saunders (2009, p. 141) observes that *“What is most important is not the label that is attached to a particular strategy, but whether it will enable you to answer your particular research question(s) and meet your objectives. Your choice of research strategy will be guided by your research question(s) and objectives, the extent of existing knowledge, the amount*

*of time and other resources you have available, as well as your own philosophical underpinnings.” Saunders further observes that “no research strategy is inherently superior or inferior to any other.”*

**Case Study Strategy:** according to M. Saunders (2012, p. 179), the case study strategy has considerable ability to answer the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of questions and is most often used in exploratory and explanatory research. Since this research aimed at exploring and investigating the state of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) in Kenya, and to identify and analyse critical factors or good practice concepts behind highly successful CCB4DRR initiatives in the country; and the research therefore sought to answer the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of questions, it was deemed appropriate to adopt the **case study research strategy**.

In their seminal research practice work titled ‘Designing Qualitative Research’, Marshall and Rossman (2014), argue that “when relying primarily or exclusively on qualitative methods, the researcher may be informed by the assumptions or strategies of a variety of qualitative genres...thus blending the genres.” Marshall and Rossman further argue that “single-standing genre or not, case studies present many advantages, chief among them being the flexibility to incorporate multiple perspectives, data collection tools, and interpretive strategies.”

Relatedly, it should be noted that initially, the researcher had initially nurtured interest in blending the research strategy genres by adopting the Case Study Strategy and adapting it by bringing on board some of the Grounded Theory strategy practices as recommended by Andrade (2009). However, after careful examination of the two strategies, it emerged that while both are intense and were appropriate in answering the research questions, Grounded Theory requires considerable time to master and therefore more practical competence (M. Saunders, 2012, pp. 180, 186) which given the part-time student’s timelines was not going to be practically possible. It is on this basis that the researcher opted to leave out elements of Grounded Theory and stick to Case Study Strategy alone.

By definition, a case study is a research strategy that explores a research topic or phenomenon within a context, or within a number of real-life contexts (M. Saunders, 2012, p. 179). It is a research strategy focused on gaining a rich understanding of the dynamics present within single settings (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001, p. 99; Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534). According to Yin (2014), all case study research starts from the same compelling feature: the desire to derive an-up-close or otherwise in-depth understanding of a single or small number of “cases” set in their real-world contexts. And according to Marshall and Rossman (2014), even though there have been many attempts to define the case study, and despite the variations existing among these definitions, “the centrality of contextualised deep understanding is recognised almost uniformly”. Marshall and Rossman further assert that “case studies favour intensity and depth, as well as exploring the interaction between case and context.” The following section presents selected units of analysis, rationale behind case selection, case boundaries and type of case study design.

### **3.4.3 Units of Analysis and Case Boundaries**

In his seminal work titled “A Brief Refresher on the Case Study Method”, Yin (2014) points out that “when doing contemporary case studies, three steps provide a helpful framework for the minimal design work.” Yin lists these three steps as: 1. Defining a ‘case’; 2. Selecting one of the four types of case study designs; and 3. Using theory in design work. Yin therefore argues that when doing contemporary case studies, the first step is to define the “case” that you are studying. He also observes that “even a tentative definition helps enormously in organizing your case study.” Yin further points out that generally, one should stick with their initial definition because one might have reviewed literature or developed research questions specific to this definition.” And this is the route which was taken by this study---for the research questions were designed specific to case definitions. However, Yin also advises that “a virtue of the case study method is the ability to redefine the ‘case’ after collecting some early data. Such shifts should not be suppressed.”

According to Yin (2014), “a ‘case’ is generally a bounded entity (a person, an organization, a behavioural condition, an event, or other social phenomenon), but the boundary between the case and its contextual conditions—in both spatial and temporal dimensions—may be blurred.” Yin further explains that “the case serves as the main **unit of analysis** in a case study.”

The following sub-section presents the cases (the main units of analysis), describes the rationale behind case selection, defines the case boundaries and also points which of the four types of case study design represents this research. The following sub-section presents selected units of analysis.

#### **3.4.3.1 Selected Units of Analysis**

Guided by expert advice from Yin (2014) who observed that all case study research share a compelling and common desire to derive an-up-close or otherwise in-depth understanding of a single or small number of cases set in their real-world contexts, the research identified and selected cases according to the research questions. For research questions 1-4, three case institutional donors and three case INGOs were selected for data collection; while for research question number 5, three NGO-supported CCB4DRR projects had been selected. However, as a result of the riots and violence that followed the annulment of the 2017 presidential elections results in Kenya, the ensuing insecurity made it impossible to reach two of the three CCB4DRR projects leaving only one (Yatta’s OMO) safe to visit and investigate.

The following sub-section presents the rationale behind individual case selection.

#### **3.4.3.2 Rationale for Individual Case Selection**

According to Eisenhardt (1989, p. 537), selecting an appropriate population controls extraneous variation and helps to define the limits for generalizing the findings. However, this being a **theory-building research** from would-be selected cases, an unusual sampling of cases from the chosen population was adopted. This was **theoretical sampling**, that is, cases were chosen for theoretical and not statistical

reasons (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Regarding the actual selection of cases, and as recommended by Patton (2002) and Sandelowski (1995) it was important for the researcher to choose those cases that would be of most use analytically.

And as indicated in Chapter 5, each case was given pseudonym to help protect the case identity during the research process and therefore anonymise the presentation of findings. The three INGO cases were anonymised as INGO1, INGO2 and INGO3; while the three institutional donor cases were anonymised as Don1, Don2, and Don3. The leadership of Yatta's OMO (the only accessible CCB4DRR project during data collection) permitted open presentation and discussion of Yatta's OMO because they want its success to be unveiled.

Starting with institutional cases and ending with the only CCB4DRR case, the following paragraphs present brief descriptions rationalising why each case was individually selected.

**INGO 1** is a humanitarian relief and development organisation that had by Dec 2017 been working in Kenya for more than 40 years. It has an annual country office budget of more than US\$ 60 million, works in more than 70% of Kenya's 47 counties, reached more than 1.5million people through **direct implementation** in 2017---making it one of the largest INGOs in the country in terms of budget size, geographic coverage and direct population reach through its varied integrated programs. **INGO1 was therefore selected because she represents the large-sized INGOs working on DRR in the country.**

**INGO 2** is a humanitarian and development organisation that has worked in Kenya since the 1990s, **works through partners, and is therefore not a direct implementing agency.** It has very strong advocacy and influencing agenda with a keen focus on **'shifting power'** to local institutions and works in less than 20% of Kenya's 47 counties. Its budget and geographic spread make it fit the middle-sized INGO category in the country. **INGO2 was therefore selected to represent middle-sized INGOs engaged in**



**the DRR agenda in the country, and with the added uniqueness of being an NGO that would represent INGOs that work through partners.**

**INGO 3** is a faith-based INGO that works with partners and uses three integrated pillars for its programming. The three pillars include community development, disaster relief and rehabilitation, and peace and justice. Through its local partners, INGO 3 supports people in community groups to work together to overcome illiteracy, malnutrition, unemployment, child mortality and injustice. Its budget and geographic spread make it fit the small-sized INGO category in the country. INGO3 was therefore selected to represent small-sized INGOs engaged with the DRR agenda in the country.

**Don1:** with an annual development and humanitarian grant contribution of more than US\$ 90 million to the government of Kenya, Don1 is a European donor that falls under the large types of donors in the country. Don1 therefore represents the large types of donors engaged in the Kenya's DRR agenda.

**Don2** was selected because she represents unique qualities of being one of the donors from the Far East with strong use of technical volunteers deployed to its overseas development missions.

**Don3:** With a published expenditure of about US\$ 27million for her Kenya Country Programme in 2017, Don3 aims to address poverty, inequality and exclusion in an integrated and area-based approach supporting communities and government to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth. Based on her 2017 expenditure budget, Don3 was selected to represent the category of medium to small-sized donors engaged with the country's DRR agenda.

Concerning research question # 5 and research objective # 4 which focused on identifying the most successful cases of community capacity building for DRR and analysing factors and or good practice concepts responsible for this unusual success, three cases had been selected for data collection and analysis. Yatta's OMO, which is

located in the South Eastern part of Kenya was and remains the most prominent of the three cases, and the other two are respectively located in Kisumu County (Western Kenya) and Turkana County (North Western Kenya).

Yatta's Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO) which means 'operation kick dependency out' was selected on the basis that it is probably the most successful CCB4DRR project in the East Africa region having transformed a hitherto well-known drought-prone community from decades of dependency on food handouts to becoming on-going export-oriented market producers in the last ten years.

There are clear indicators which point to Yatta's OMO as a big regional success story. For instance, by the time this researcher visited Yatta's OMO in December 2017, OMO's visitors' book showed that 84 different study groups from Kenya, Tanzania, and Sudan, including INGOs, government delegations, community groups, donors, universities and banking institutions had visited Yatta in the year 2017 alone (**refer to Annexe 7: 2017 List of Study Groups to Yatta's OMO**). The same visitor's book shows that Yatta's OMO has received study groups from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Malawi. This is testament to how much INGOs, churches, universities, donors, governments and media houses have come to appreciate OMO's unique success story.

### 3.4.3.3. Case Boundaries

When using the case study strategy, Baxter and Jack (2008, p. 546), Yin (2003), and Stake (1995) recommend putting boundaries on the case (**binding the case**) to ensure the study remains within reasonable scope. For this research, **‘place’- in this regard Kenya, and ‘activity’- in this regard being ‘engaged in supporting DRR activities in Kenya’** were the two boundaries placed on selected cases.

**Table 3.2** presents this study’s units of analysis and their boundaries.

Units of Analysis	Case Boundaries
Institutional donors and INGOs	Must be present in Kenya and engaged in supporting the Disaster Risk Reduction agenda in the country.
Successful CCB4DRR Project	Must be a successful community capacity building for DRR project in Kenya.

Table 3. 2 Units of Analysis and Case Boundaries

### 3.4.3.3 Type of Case Study Design

As indicated in the foregoing text, Yin (2014) explains that a second step in case study design calls for deciding whether your case study will consist of a single or multiple case—what then might be labelled as a *single* or a *multiple-case study*. Yin indicates that whether single or multiple, one can also choose to keep the case *holistic* or to have *embedded* subcases within an overall holistic case. The resulting two-by-two matrix leads to four different case study designs; namely: single holistic, single embedded, multiple holistic, and multiple embedded.

M. Saunders (2012) offers a plausible rationale for choosing either single or multiple case study designs when he asserts that “a single case is often used where it represents a critical case or, alternatively, an extreme or unique case. Conversely, a single case may be selected because it is typical or because it provides you with an opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon that few have considered before.” Saunders further explains that “a case study strategy can also incorporate multiple cases, that is, more than one case. The rationale for using multiple cases focuses upon the need to establish whether the findings of the first case occur in other cases and, as

a consequence, the need to generalize from these findings. For this reason, Yin (2003) argues that multiple case studies may be preferable to a single case study and that, where you choose to use a single case study, you will need to have a strong justification for this choice.

Going by explanations offered by Yin (2014), M. Saunders (2012), and Yin (2003), **this study is therefore categorized as a multiple-holistic case study design.** This is because the study is exploring and investigating multiple cases of institutional donors and INGOs (for research questions 1-4) and successful CCB4DRR projects (for research question 5) as the units of analysis.

### 3.5 Methodological Choices

According to M. Saunders (2012), there are two main methodological choices, that is, 'mono-method' and 'multiple methods'. **Mono method** is where a single data collection

technique and corresponding analytical procedures are used. This may either be qualitative or quantitative.

Multiple methods refer to using more than one data collection

technique and associated analytical procedures to answer a research question. **Multiple methods** are in turn divided into multi-method research and mixed method research. In multi-method research more than one data collection technique is used with associated analysis procedures, but this is restricted within either a quantitative or qualitative




Figure 3. 1 Methodological Choices

design (M. Saunders, 2012, p. 165). In mixed research design, both quantitative and qualitative research is combined in research design (ref to Fig. 3.1).

Guided by Figure 3.1, and having adopted a case study research strategy which would include the use of interviews, document reviews, and observations with related data analysis, this research is classified as a **multi-method qualitative study**.

## 3.6 Research Techniques

This section presents research techniques chosen for this study, including data collection and data analysis techniques. The two reflect the **interpretivism/constructivism research paradigm; exploratory and explanatory research** (based on research questions); and are recommended for the **multi-method qualitative study**.

### 3.6.1 Data Collection

According to Baxter and Jack (2008, p. 554) and Gillham (2000), the hallmark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources. Relatedly, Yin (2014) presents six common sources of this evidence: 1. Direct observations (e.g., human actions or a physical environment); 2. Interviews, e.g., open-ended conversations with key participants; 3. Archival records e.g. student records; 4. Documents e.g., newspaper articles, letters and e-mails, reports; 5. Participant-observation e.g., being identified as a researcher but also filling a real-life role in the scene being studied; and 6. Physical artefacts, e.g., computer download of employees' work.

Based on Yin's suggested case study sources of evidence, this study employed semi-structured interviews to answer questions prepared for selected donors, INGOs and assisted communities and triangulation with the government of Kenya officials. And as an effort to increase the reliability of interview findings from multiple cases, the study adopted use of a **case study interview protocol for each case type**. The purpose behind the protocol was to provide the case study researcher with uniform sets of procedures on how to consistently prepare for, collect and analyse data from multiple cases, and write and present the research report using approaches that enrich reliability. The protocol, therefore,

helped to minimise variations by laying out specific guidelines for each stage of the case study.

The study also reviewed both donor and INGO policies, strategies, reports and other relevant print or electronic publications. Observation was used and complimented drawing on all five senses, taking field notes and ultimately creating a narrative based on what had been seen, heard, and or sensed. Visual observation was greatly used during the visit to Yatta where the researcher spent two interactive days with OMO's leadership, OMO's participants, and participants on a study expedition to Yatta's OMO. Some of the aids to be used in this technique included an audio recorder, and an integrated still and video phone-camera.

### **3.6.2 Data Analysis**

As explained in sections 3.4.2, 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2 above, the study adopted a case study research strategy with a multiple holistic case study design in which six institutional case studies (three institutional donors and three INGOs) were conducted to address research questions 1-4; and one CCB4DRR case study (out of the initially intended three CCB4DRR cases) was conducted to address question 5.

[It should be noted that cross-case analysis was only intended between the six institutional cases (donors and INGOs) selected for data collection to answer questions 1-4; and between the three identified successful CCB4DRR projects selected to for data collection to answer question 5. There was therefore no planned intention for cross-case analysis between institutional cases (donors and INGOs) and CCB4DRR projects, because the two case types were investigating different variables which couldn't therefore be compared and contrasted. However, it is the sum total of findings from the two case types that help to achieve the research aim.)

Within the six case institutional case studies and one CCB4DRR case study, data were mainly collected through semi-structured interviews (with key informants), document reviews, social-media reviews (for the CCB4DR case) and direct observation when the

researcher made an interactive research visit to Yatta's OMO. Interview questions were guided by research questions and objectives, and were therefore designed to capture:

- current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities,
- how individual institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support,
- how institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success
- the changes institutional donors and INGOs want to see as a result of their contribution to Kenya's DRR agenda,
- whether institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya understand the importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR.
- Factors and or good practice concepts behind OMO's unusual CCB4DRR success.

Altogether, 17 semi-structured interviews were conducted within the six institutional and one CCB4DRR case studies with the following breakdown:

- a. 3 interviews within the 3 donor cases, which is one interview per donor case.
- b. 3 interviews within the 3 INGO cases, which is one interview per INGO case.
- c. 11 interviews in the CCB4DRR case study. This included 1 interview with the leader of Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO), 5 with OMO community participants, and 5 from members of a visiting team whose participants had been drawn from different parts of Kenya and were on a two-day learning expedition to Yatta's OMO.

### **3.6.3 Procedures adopted in analysing the case studies**

As indicated in the preceding section, 17 semi-structured interviews were conducted within the six institutional and one CCB4DRR case studies.

And as explained in section 3.6.1, a uniform interview guide was prepared for institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya with the aim of capturing respective current DRR support priorities in the country, how they decide which DRR priorities to support; how they measure DRR success; the changes they want to see as a result of their contribution to country's DRR agenda; and whether these intuitional

donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya understand the importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR. Relatedly, four different interview guides were prepared for four different types of participants within the CCB4DRR case study, that is, one for OMO's leadership, one for OMO community participants, one for members of the visiting team to OMO, and one for the leadership of the visiting team.

Prior to conducting each semi-structured interview, target institutional donor and INGO participants received a briefing pack that included a research brief, participant information sheet, the interview guide and a participant consent form. For the community case study, only the leader of Operation Mwolyo Out received the briefing pack in advance. In all the 7 case studies and their 17 interviews, participants gave consent for the researcher to use a digital audio recorder and record interview proceedings. In keeping with the recommended practice of commencing data analysis early in the data collection process (Forman & Damschroder, 2007; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015), immediately after every interview, the researcher wrote memos summarising key reflections, observations, impressions, hunches and things to pursue during subsequent interviews.

For every interview, writing of aforementioned first impressions memos was then followed by transcribing the audio interview recording into full MS Word transcripts and thereafter comparing transcripts with audio recordings, a process that would aid the researcher to make direct quotations from interviews during data presentation, hence **increasing the reliability and validity of findings**. Annexe 4 presents a sample exhibit of a memo written after the interview with INGO2, while Annex 3 presents a sample exhibit of a transcribed case study interview. And as described in detail in section 3.6.2.1 of the Methodology Chapter, the researcher used qualitative content analysis techniques in which data are analysed solely qualitatively without the use of counting or statistical techniques, and aiming at detail and depth rather than measurement (Forman & Damschroder, 2007; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2000; M. B. Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002).



It should be noted that for the greater part of content analysis, the researcher embraced the recommended approach of dividing content analysis into three phases, namely: **immersion**, **reduction**, and **interpretation** (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Gillham, 2000; M. B. Miles & Huberman, 1994; Sandelowski, 1995).

It is during **the immersion phase** that the researcher:

- wrote quick memos summarising key reflections, observations, impressions, hunches and things to pursue during subsequent interviews;
- listened to audio interview recordings to further engage with the data before doing transcription;
- transcribed audio interview recordings into MS word transcripts;
- concurrently read interview transcripts alongside listening to their source audio recordings;
- Wrote sense-making memos from emerging thoughts triggered by the process of both reading/ and or listening to recorded interviews.

Following expert emphasis from Baxter and Jack (2008); Yin (2003) and ) on the importance of creating and using a **case study database** to effectively organise raw data to enable independent inspection thus **improving reliability**; during **the reduction phase**, the researcher **used NVivo software (Version 11 Plus)** to create a **case study database**, organise and **apply codes** to segments of data deemed relevant to answering the research questions.

And as recommended by Forman and Damschroder (2007, p. 45), the researcher used a combination of **deductive and inductive codes**. Deductive codes were identified/constructed from the literature reviewed (relevant empirical work), the conceptual framework guiding this research, research questions, and data collection categories which were the interview questions. Inductive codes were developed from the data itself. Deductive codes were only used as **parent codes (or parent Nodes in NVivo language)** to develop a framework upon which relevant raw data represented by

**child codes (or child nodes in NVivo language)** could be coded. Inductive codes were therefore used as **child codes** under parent nodes.

Codes, therefore, helped to reduce the raw data and reorganize remaining relevant data into categories in a way that addressed the research questions. The end result of coding was the generation of code reports. When the researcher felt he had reached saturation point in the reduction/ coding process, he embarked on the **interpretation process**. The interpretation process included writing descriptive and interpretive individual **case study summaries** in the form of **mind maps**. This was followed by the development of a **consolidated mind map** summarising key findings from the 3 donor case studies and a separate mind map summarising key findings from the 3 INGOs case studies. **Individual case study mind maps** were used to support **cross-case analysis**, while separately consolidated donor and INGO mind maps were used to compare and contrast findings for donor case studies with those of INGO case studies. All the while, this iterative process that included reading, coding, writing memos, drawing summaries, comparing and contrasting and checking back with the data and memos---aimed at discerning patterns in the data and drawing preliminary conclusions.

# CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

## 4.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters respectively presented the literature review and research methodology pertaining to this study. This chapter highlights the importance a study's conceptual framework, discusses the process adopted for the development of this study's conceptual framework, the different pieces which were brought together to construct the framework, and presents the conceptual framework itself. The chapter is therefore structured as follows:

- Firstly, the importance of a conceptual framework is explained.
- Secondly, the process of developing the conceptual framework is discussed.
- Thirdly, key issues identified from the literature, the researcher's experiential knowledge, and experiences of peers in the disaster risk management practice are discussed.
- Fourthly, the constructed conceptual framework of the study is presented and also interpreted.

## 4.2 The importance of a conceptual framework

Both J. A. Maxwell (2012) and Robson and McCartan (2016) describe a conceptual framework as *"a system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories that support and inform your research."* Maxwell further points out that a conceptual framework is primarily *"a conception or model of what is out there that you plan to study."* M. B. Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 18) define a conceptual framework as *"a visual or written product, one that explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied—the key factors, concepts, or variables—and the presumed relationships among them."* And in an earlier text, M. Miles and Huberman (1984, p. 33) defined a conceptual framework as *"the current version of the researcher's map of the territory being investigated."*

Relatedly, expert opinion from Baxter and Jack (2008) and M. B. Miles and Huberman (1994) indicates that a study's conceptual framework serves several purposes, including (i) identifying who will and will not be included in the study; (ii) describing what relationships may be present based on logic, theory and/or experience; and (iii) providing the researcher with the opportunity to gather general constructs into intellectual bins. Baxter and Jack maintain that *"The conceptual framework serves as an anchor for the study and is referred at the stage of data interpretation."*

The importance of conceptual frameworks in research is further underscored by Kumar and Antonenko (2014) who assert that *"As a tool for organizing professional practice inquiry, conceptual frameworks allow practitioner-scholars to connect their problems of practice with their experiential knowledge, contextual features, and relevant theoretical foundations and design studies that provide both practical and theoretical contributions to the field."* Suffice it to close this section with a quote from J. A. Maxwell (2012) asserting that *"your conceptual framework is a theory, however tentative or incomplete it may be."*

### **4.3 The process of developing the conceptual framework**

J. A. Maxwell (2012, p. 41) reasons that *"a conceptual framework for your research is constructed, not found. It incorporates pieces that are borrowed from elsewhere, but the structure, the overall coherence, is something that you build, not something that exists ready-made."* Maxwell further asserts that your research problem is part of the conceptual framework because it identifies something that is going on in the world, something that is itself problematic or that has consequences that are problematic. Relatedly, Locke et al. (1993, p. 48) observe that in any active area of inquiry, the current knowledge base is not in the library but in the invisible college of informal associations, unpublished papers and heads of people. They also argue that exclusive orientation toward literature leads the researcher to ignore own experience, his/her speculative thinking and any pilot and exploratory research the researcher may have done.

Guided by forgoing expert opinion, the researcher drew upon the research problem, the literature reviewed, informed opinions from peers in the Disaster Risk Management practice, and added to these a layer of his own experiential knowledge in the disaster risk management practice and contextual knowledge of Kenya to construct the study's conceptual framework. The following section presents the body of key issues assembled from various sources to inform the construction of the study's conceptual framework.

#### **4.4 Issues from critical sources that informed the conceptual framework**

Beginning with the end in mind, Merriam and Tisdell (2015) assert that *"findings are the outcome of the inquiry---what you, the investigator, learned or came to understand about the phenomenon."* The focus phenomena being studied is, therefore, a critical piece in the process of constructing the conceptual framework. The social phenomena to be studied under this research is 'institutional donor and INGO support to community capacity building for DRR,' while the aim of this research is "to explore and investigate current institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR in Kenya." Both the social phenomena to be studied and the aim of the research were critical pieces in constructing the study's conceptual framework.

The second piece that informed the construction of the conceptual framework was the literature reviewed. Chapter 2 presented a detailed literature review of key concepts associated with this study, beginning with a general overview of disasters and DRR, followed by definitions of key terms used in the DRR discourse, recorded history of DRR, the overall DRR landscape of Kenya as a country, global overview of community capacity building for DRR that dovetailed into CCB4DRR in Kenya, and lastly presented conclusions showing knowledge gaps and possible areas of focus for this study.

The literature review unveiled a gap between policy rhetoric and grass-root or local level execution realities on critical development issues including but not limited to community capacity building and empowerment. And progress in the implementation of HFA did not demonstrate the exception to these gap realities, hence poor local

capacity for DRR remains probably the biggest impediment to making required global DRR progress. While the literature identified 'poor local capacity for DRR' as a major impediment to the global DRR agenda and highlighted 'top-down approaches' which dominate much of the DRR implementation to be partly responsible for this poor local capacity for DRR and related action, the literature reviewed did not reveal other factors affecting local DRR action. Other factors affecting the progression of local DRR action therefore still remain unidentified, undocumented, unshared and therefore unaddressed.

The literature also showed that examples of long-term strengthening of local communities for DRR remain uncommon (UNDP (2004)), thus uncovering the need to investigate reasons for this uncommonness. This also revealed the need and importance of identifying successful cases of CCB4DRR to analyze and document factors responsible for their unusual success for wider sharing. The aim, objectives and research questions in the ensuing research were framed to address these identified knowledge gaps, and they, in turn, informed the construction of the conceptual framework. At the same time, the construction of the conceptual framework helped to refine the research aim, objectives and research questions.

The researcher's experiential knowledge of the goings-on in the disaster risk management practice is what in the first place led to the desire to undertake this research. The researcher has many years of working at the nexus of development and emergency response sectors and has over the years been struck by the disconnect between high-level rhetoric on disaster risk reduction and real-life realities of risk reduction at the community level. This included working with organizations that have had 'resilience-building DRR language' well woven in the fabric of their organizational strategies, but not being intentional at executing much of what is required to get to the desired end picture. This is not the researchers' lone experience, but an increasing outcry from many disaster risk management professionals. Experience has also shown the researcher that Donors and INGOs play a critical role in driving DRR agendas in many developing countries. This is the reason the research prioritised to focus the phenomenon under inquiry on donors and INGOs and not on other stakeholders.

Section 4.5 (**Figure 4.1**) presents the study's conceptual framework constructed using the foregoing issues assembled from indicated critical sources.

## 4.5 The conceptual framework

Research Topic: Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction: Exposing and Challenging Level of Prioritisation in Kenya




Figure 4. 1 The Conceptual Framework

Proposition: the state of community DRR action is highly influenced by level of prioritisation given to it by both global and national level actors



#### 4.5.1 Interpreting the conceptual framework

As indicated in Fig.4.1, “Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction: Exposing and Challenging Level of Prioritisation in Kenya” is the research topic that captures and summarises the phenomena under study. Literature review together with the researcher’s knowledge shows that DRR agendas are orchestrated within a multi-layered context. This context includes the global level, national level, sub-national level, and community level contexts. It is within the global level context that we find global DRR agendas including DRR frameworks, the on-going one being the Sendai Framework for DRR (SF4DRR). A review of these frameworks reveals critical stakeholders in moving DRR forward, including governments, donors, INGOs, NGOs and the private sector. Consequently, the literature reviewed within the global context revealed a near absence of meaningful focus on local DRR action.

Because donors and INGOs were identified to be critical DRR drivers within the developing countries, at least within the East Africa context, this is the reason donors and INGOs are the focus units of analysis within the national level context. At the sub-national level, Kenya as a country has county and district government structures. It is a group of districts that make up a Kenya county. Lastly, within the contextual DRR hierarchy, we have a community level context. It’s within the global context that the literature review revealed gaps between high-level DRR rhetoric and local/ community level DRR action. And because of the importance of CCB4DRR in enabling local DRR, the study focused on exploring the status of CCB4DRR among donor and INGO cases in the country.

As indicated by the framework, there are a number of important relationships among different variables; and there are also a number of assumptions informing the conceptual framework. For instance, the framework assumes that when support for local DRR including CCB4DRR is prioritized at the global level especially through on-going DRR frameworks, this global prioritization would have a cascading effect by way of how donors and INGOs also prioritize support to local DRR action including CCB4DRR within

their in-country strategies. The conceptual framework is undergirded by the assumption and or proposition that the state of community DRR action is highly influenced by the level of prioritisation given to it by both global and national level actors.

## **4.6 Summary and conclusion**

In summary, the study's conceptual framework presents the research phenomena to be studied (the research topic), shows the overarching context for the research, highlights some of the critical gaps identified by reviewed literature, shows who will and will not be included in the research, highlights relationships between key variables in the study, and presents key underlying assumptions including the stated proposition.

The following chapter presents data analysis and discussion of case studies.

# CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION OF CASE STUDIES

## 5.1 Introduction

While Chapter 4 illustrated the process involved in developing the conceptual framework for the research, this chapter presents **data analysis and discussion of case studies** and the chapter is organised as follows:

- Firstly, background information about case studies are once again explained.
- Secondly, the **analysis and discussion** of institutional (donors and INGOs) case studies are presented in the order that mirrors their research questions and objectives, which includes exploring current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities; establishing how individual institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support; and assessing whether institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR understand the importance of prioritizing and supporting community capacity building for DRR.
- Thirdly the analysis and discussion of the only CCB4DRR case (Yatta's OMO) is presented mirroring research question # 5 and research objective # 4 with a focus on identifying factors and or good practice concepts behind OMO's unusual success.
- Thirdly, key findings from cross-case analysis of the six institutional case studies are presented. Cross-case analysis of CCB4DRR project cases was not possible since only one out of the 3 had-been identified cases remained accessible.

All findings presented served to accomplish the following research aim:

to explore and investigate, and where need be, challenge the state of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) in Kenya; and to identify and analyse critical factors or good practice concepts behind highly successful CCB4DRR initiatives in the country.

## 5.2 Background Information to case studies

### 5.2.1 Background Information and Case Study Description

In order to keep the identities of investigated cases anonymous, a pseudonym was assigned each of the donor and INGO cases. However, pseudonyms were not used in the community case study because the community has opened itself up for visitation, offers CCB4DRR related training to willing learners from within and without Kenya and therefore invites people with keen interest to come and have an interactive experience. There is, therefore, nothing private about the community case study.

As an effort to enhance a good flow of presenting the analysis, the researcher thought it prudent to commence each individual case study analysis with the case study description. Each case study analysis and discussion section, therefore, starts off with the case study description. And as an effort to strengthen donor and INGO case anonymity, only brief descriptions are provided per case study thus leaving out major details that would easily give away individual case identities.

## 5.3 Analysis & Discussion of Case Study 1 – INGO1

**INGO 1** is a humanitarian relief and development organisation that had by Dec 2017 been working in Kenya for more than 40 years. It has an annual country office budget of more than US\$ 60 million, works in more than 70% of Kenya's 47 counties, reached more than 1.5million people through **direct implementation** in 2017---making it one of the largest INGOs in the country in terms of budget size, geographic coverage and direct population reach through its varied integrated programs.

### 5.3.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?

During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include 'government-focused priorities', 'community-focused priorities', 'intra-agency focused

priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of INGO1’s response to the question revealed that INGO1’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under 3 of the 4 aforementioned broad categories. The 3 broad categories include government-focused priorities, community-focused priorities, and intra-agency focused priorities. The ensuing presentation of analysis and discussion follows the same sequence, and therefore starts with ‘government–focused DRR priorities’.

***Government-focused priorities.***

Under government-focused priorities, INGO1 presented two sub-areas of focus, and these are ‘**institutional capacity building for DRR**’ and a combination of ‘**advocacy and influencing**’ aimed at securing required governance changes in the way the Government of Kenya generally manages the entire DRR agenda. On supporting institutional capacity for DRR, INGO1 explained,

*“we are supporting county governments at the level where we are working, which is at the sub-county level, to train heads of departments in DRM and supporting them to come up with DRM strategies that may contribute to the county DRM strategy”.*

Data analysis further reveals that INGO1 is strategically using its capacity building support to county government institutions with the aim of eventually being able to influence them towards greater DRR support especially in sub-counties where INGO1 has a presence.

*“Unlike before, County Governments have a lot of resources. This is why we were targeting Heads of Departments and the Members of the County Assembly (MCAs) ---the politicians in those areas. They come to the training---including the commissioners, and actually the DCs (District Commissioners) ---that line of commissioners from the office of the President. They have been coming to our five-day training.*

On linking INGO1’s support to county government capacity building for DRR with eventual influencing for county governments to resourcefully support local DRR action, INGO1 further explained,

*“...we are very proud of Katito and Lambwe programs in the Lake Region...They have very good community DRM teams...Once communities have come up with their risk reduction strategies, they (communities) lobby and market these strategies to their county leadership knowing there are more resources in the Counties...And because the networking with government by those two programs has been so tight and amicable, they have been getting a lot of support from the government.*

Explaining more on advocacy and influencing, INGO1 narrated,

*“We are using advocacy so that we engage at different levels starting at the national level through the national platform because we are active participants on the national platform. For example, in 2016 we were part of the national platform team that came up with DRR priorities for the country for the next 2-3 years. This is based on the Sendai framework that Kenya is a signatory to. So we were part of that process and the Platform in their own wisdom decided to make us (INGO1) the lead agency for priority number 2 which is about strengthening risk governance for effective disaster risk management...we are on the forefront engaging the government and advocating that Government should dedicate up to 10% of its budget to Disaster Risk Management”.*

This is, therefore, advocacy and influencing aimed at improving disaster risk governance in the country as asserted by Wahlström (2015) when she points out that that the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction requires strong commitment and political leadership both at national and local levels. Wahlstrom reasons that this is essential to ensure stronger risk governance and capable institutions that can take the lead and mobilize and motivate stakeholders.

### ***Community Focused Priorities***

The analysis of INGO1’s community-focused priorities revealed three areas of emphasis at this level. The three areas include CCB4DRR, partner CB4DRR and Child-led DRR.

Speaking about CCB4DRR, with a beam reflecting a sense of mastery in the subject, INGO1’s DRR Advisor explained,

*For DRR, our flagship is in training community members in community managed disaster risk reduction. And to drill the point home, he emphasised, this is at the community, grass root level.*

On supporting partners with capacity building for DRR (CB4DRR), INGO1 explained,

*We developed guidelines and have transformed what as an organisation we used to call 'community disaster preparedness plans'---the CDPPs-- that were reviewed annually. Instead of being the CDPP at the grass root level, we have elevated it so that we work with the county heads of department, other partners, NGOs, religious groups, FBOs, the youth, and women groups at county level so that we support them to strengthen some of their structures for disaster risk management activities. In the last one year alone, I am proud to say we have covered nine different counties in the sub-county where we work.*

During the HFA tenure, it was Kenya's Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MoSSP) which was responsible for collaborating with contributing stakeholders and compiling related HFA progress reports. INGO1's 2010 HFA-related report to the MoSSP reads in part,

*...The government's and partner agencies' efforts in development are facing major setbacks as communities' capacities barely enable them to cope. This has left communities vulnerable in the face of risks, hence disasters. Aware of this situation from many years of working with needy and resource-constrained communities, INGO1 initiated a DRR project to be managed through the community... The project purposes to train 120 Disaster Management Committee (DMC) members, 320 community members, 160*



Figure 5. 1 members of one community DMC conducting hazard mapping. The photo shows effluent from a sisal farm polluting a community water source.

*community volunteers, 80 teachers, and 160 students in the target communities in 8 districts... In addition, DRR is also being mainstreamed in all the programs designed and implemented by INGO1 from 2008. The overall aim of these is to strengthen community capacities for disaster mitigation and preparedness, with a view to anchoring them on a solid foundation for ('good') transformational development.*

Back et al. (2009) and Benson and Bugge (2007) assert that engaging children directly in the design and delivery of DRR activities can have many benefits and that this work is referred to as 'child-led' DRR and covers a broad spectrum of actions. Data analysis indicated that INGO1 is a strong believer in child-led DRR, and during the interview, INGO1's DRR advisor passionately reflected,

*We have proven that children actually try and implement what they have been taught. If you go to a place like Katito, a place like Lambwe, where with small funding we trained teachers on child-led DRR---they took it up and went and trained their children in their clubs---some of them formed clubs---some of them used clubs which were existing---which is what we like. For instance, these schools use health, agricultural, or environment clubs, or any existing clubs including first aid clubs and introduce child led DRR into them—and they have done wonders.*

### ***Intra-agency focused priorities***

Besides having government-focused and community-focused DRR support priorities, the analysis showed that INGO1 also had intra-agency or internally focused DRR priorities. By the time of conducting the interview with INGO1, the organisation had been implementing various integrated programmes in 37 counties and had also just completed a massive restructuring process. Explaining the intra-agency DRR priorities, INGO1 commented,

*By the time of doing the restructuring, we had trained 68 staffs in direct DRR engagement---right from the national level including all the technical leads and programme officers in the field. And due to usual uncertainties that come along every announced restructuring process, by the time the restructuring process*



*started, a number of the 68 staffs had left. But during the actual restructuring process alone, we lost 22 staff.*

*...it is like starting afresh from last year---so we have not had the requisite capacity to effect much of the Sendai Framework. So right now, when we planned for this FY, we have planned to train staff in all the 37 counties--- We have 37 counties where we are operating and we are going to train two staff in each as point persons for DRR.*

Reflecting on all data collected on INGO1 together with the preceding analysis, it becomes clear that INGO1 has a very strong history of long-term engagements with prioritised communities around the world. Analysis showed that in Kenya, INGO1's DRR priorities have a lot to do with strengthening local DRR action. Even capacity building for county government institutions is aimed at influencing the same local/ county governments to be able to eventually release resources in support of community-prioritized DRR activities. Relatedly, in agreement with Howard's affirmation that 'we cannot teach what we don't know' (Howard, 2014), INGO1's internally-looking priority of training more staffs in DRR is aimed at ensuring the organisation has adequate DRR implementation capacity in all its program areas.

### **5.3.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?**

While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised under 'externally looking', 'internally looking' and 'not involved' criteria, INGO1 uses externally looking criteria to select her DRR priorities.

#### ***Externally looking selection criteria***

Data analysis showed that INGO1 uses an externally looking lens to scrutinise and decide her DRR priorities. It was evident INGO1's DRR advisor had a clear understanding of global DRR frameworks and had been involved in HFA's National DRR Platform in the country, and was presently engaged in the Sendai Framework discourse in the country.

Explaining factors which influence how they select their DRR priorities, INGO1 pointed out,

*...right now, the main thing is the Sendai Framework...On the Sendai Framework, we look at those areas that are going to contribute more on the delivery of our core programming areas which include health, livelihoods and resilience, WASH, and Education---as well as issues to do with gender and disability in DRR. Even through our trainings, we ensure that gender issues are captured during assessments.*

INGO1 then pauses the question, “how do we then choose”, and goes on to answer it,

*We look at it from the angle of government priorities---like the ones we crafted in Naivasha last year based on the Sendai Framework. We then match these priorities with our intervention sectors/areas, e.g. to address or implement through education or through WASH. And because county integrated development plans also try as much as possible to align themselves with National Policies and Strategies, we also try as much as possible to fit into the framework or those priorities. That is how we chose our DRR activities.*

In summary, INGO1 supports community managed DRR and supports communities in sub-counties of presence in the process of identifying their disaster risks, coming up with DRR priorities and working with sub-county leaders to ensure these select DRR priorities get adopted into county integrated development plans. It was extraordinary to, therefore, note that INGO1 also considers community identified DRR priorities during the process of determining her DRR priorities; a practice that points to INGO1’s high level of prioritisation for CCB4DRR.

### **5.3.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks**

In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on agency DRR priorities. INGO1’s DRR advisor was found to be very conversant with both HFA and the SF4DRR. “I am aware of HFA...During preparation of the last HFA report,

*Government invited NGOs and INGOs working in the field of disaster management to share our contribution or what we have been implementing in the community...We compiled and submitted a report on our DRR activities...and these are some of the documents the government used to come up with reports they were sharing with the rest of the world.”*

INGO1 also revealed a good grasp of SF4DRR and engagement with the government in coming up with country-specific SF4DRR priorities. However, INGO1 observed, “we haven’t done much because the Sendai Framework came out around February 2015, and a lot of our organisational restructuring started around May 2015...Things were not as normal in-house. There was too much apprehension, guys looking for space within and outside, it wasn’t a good working environment. So I can confess that it wasn’t until the restructuring ended and staffs settled that we started looking at the Sendai Framework critically.”

In summary, INGO1 exhibited a very good grasp of global DRR frameworks and showed proof of using them both within and without the organisation. The frameworks have influenced some of INGO1’s DRR priorities especially in the area of advocacy and influencing toward better DRR governance. And in INGO1’s perspective, the organisation is contributing more to the DRR framework discourse and reporting in the country than the lead government department is actually reporting back to key in-country stakeholders. There seems to, therefore, be a gap between what DRR stakeholders contribute to the DRR discourse in the country and how the lead DRR government department engages with wider stakeholders.

#### **5.3.4 Funding for CCB4DRR**

With Kellett and Caravani (2013) reporting that financing for disaster risk reduction makes up a tiny fraction of overall investments in development aid; Watson et al. (2015) revealing that development assistance for DRR supports a range of actions but is biased towards enhancing preparedness for effective response and building back better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction leaving only 8% of development assistance to DRR going to investing in DRR for resilience; and Kelman (2013) reporting that every \$1 invested in preventive DRR saves \$7 (and sometimes more); this research

considered it important to investigate the state of overall DRR funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.

When asked about how much of the organisation's non-grant development funding goes to DRR and then to CCB4DRR, INGO1's DRR advisor disclosed, *"I will be honest with you, we have not computed it, partly because we are doing things (meaning DRR) through mainstreaming and through integration."* However, by the time of conducting this interview, INGO1 was in the process of developing an internal DRR position paper, and the DRR advisor reflected, *"...because we are on the forefront of engaging government through advocacy and advocating that government should at least budget up to 10% of their funding to go into DRR, we felt that things should start from in-house for us an organisation, and we came up with a draft DRR position paper that we can use for in-house and external engagement."*

This paper had been circulated to INGO1's key internal stakeholders and the DRR advisor was waiting for feedback before the paper could be revised and submitted to the board for approval and adoption. Upon reflection and nudged by the interview, the DRR advisor made a voluntary pledge promising that *"...in that paper (the then draft DRR position paper) I will propose that we have at least between 5% and 7% of our non-grant development budget going to DRR in total...As a technical person, I would propose that at least 4% of DRR funds should go into supporting community capacity building. But if the DRR allocation starts at 7%, I will go up to 6% of that DRR allocation toward CCB4DRR because the need is massive in communities"*.

### **5.3.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?**

For all the six case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 2 categories, and the two categories were:

- i. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and
- ii. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.

And for INGO1, the analysis revealed three top indicators by which the organisation measures DRR success. The three indicators include 'household coping

ability in the face of shocks’, ‘continued household commitment to DRR practices’ and ‘continuity and performance of child-led DRR.’

When asked how as an organisation INGO1 measures the effectiveness and success of her contribution to the country’s DRR agenda, INGO1’s DRR advisor revealed that the organisation implements multi-phase and multi-year projects. At the end of each project phase, INGO1 conducts an evaluation, and the DRR team contributes to the evaluation indicators used. Upon probing into some of the top indicators used to measure DRR success, the DRR advisor responded,

*We were looking at **how many households faced disasters in the last one year and were able to implement risk reduction strategies and remain safe...**The other one was about **how many community member were trained in disaster risk reduction in the last one year and have remained active post training.** They would have to give you examples of how they have remained active...Some of our priorities are on child-led DRR. So we looked at **some of the clubs that were formed or where DRR activities were being undertaken, and then what they have done in the school and in the community under child-led DRR.** Those are some of the indicators we use.*

Going by the above response, it’s clear that there are other indicators INGO1 uses to measure DRR success but chose to share the above three, probably because INGO1 considers them to be the most important. And a closer look at the three indicators shows that they all focus on measuring DRR success at the grass-root level, another indication of the importance INGO1 attaches to prioritising and supporting local/community level DRR.

### **5.3.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?**

The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out **where** or **at what level** both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their

DRR contribution in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR seriously, reduced hazard impacts and things that need to be stopped. Data analysis assigned INGO1's response to 5 of the 9 categories, namely: **improved DRM governance, better resource allocation, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, and things that need to be stopped**. The analysis is therefore presented in that order.

### ***Improved DRM governance***

When asked 'what specific changes or improvements INGO1 would like to see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country', as if he had been waiting all his life to answer the question, the DRR advisor firmly responded: ***"the first one is about risk governance"***. After a pause, he continued, *"...to me that is the starting point."* And then he went on to elaborate, *"you can imagine as we are talking now, this country has taken over 15 years without a national policy for managing disasters. And you know when you don't have a national policy for disaster risk management, even your strategies are not well aligned to anything constructive"*.

And to explain further, the DRR advisor pointed out what the country has taken very long to finalise and adopt a National DRM policy. *"I think there has been a deliberate delay to pursue for this policy...In risk governance, **this country is romancing response activities**. Just like the drought now, they are romancing it (meaning the drought response) because it is an easy milk cow for enriching those who are at the top of the country's leadership. Response is expensive, is not sustainable--but the bottom line is the response is making so many Kenyans rich out of corruption."* Corruption was therefore singled out as a critical factor delaying the finalisation and adoption of Kenya's National DRM Policy. This is probably one of the reasons D. Alexander and Davis (2012, p. 3) lament that *"in the modern world, aid, relief and development are big business. The agencies that provide them have often been accused of perpetuating situations of inequality, aid dependency and injustice."*

Still, on governance, INGO1 pointed out the proliferation of national disaster management departments and the need to shrink and harmonise them at the national level. The DRR advisor angrily lamented, “...*why do we have so many organisations or agencies managing disaster at the national level? There’s a lot of duplication at the top, with a lot of political appointees to represent various interests.*”

### ***Better Resource Allocation & Improved Community Capacities***

Elaborating more on desired changes and improvements, the DRR advisor identified better resource allocation to DRR as the 2<sup>nd</sup> area that needs improvement. He asserted, “*When risk governance is improved, I would like to see **adequate funding given through the various government agencies and departments, and improving the capacity building of community members at the grass root level...so that their level can be raised to reduce their exposure, give them good awareness and help them reduce their own vulnerability so that they can take charge at that particular level to manage their own risks in their own environment... sometimes they need some resources to make their safety become a reality. So I would like to see that one also change in this country.***” In the foregoing paragraph, ‘improving community capacities’ aimed at enabling people to take charge of reducing their vulnerabilities were identified as the 3<sup>rd</sup> area that requires improvement in the country.

### ***More Child-led DRR***

Increased child-led DRR was identified as the 4<sup>th</sup> area that needs improvement by way of scaling up. After enumerating how different supported schools have registered greater DRR engagement and results, the advisor concluded by underscoring, “*they have done wonders!... I would like to see a lot of engagement of children and youths in disaster risk management---because it is proven that children actually try and implement what they have been taught*”.

### ***Things that need to be stopped***

Lastly, data analysis (partly by inference) identified and assigned some of the responses to the category of **'things that need to be stopped'**. These include the need to shift focus **from disaster response to resilience-building focused DRR** and the need to **move from rhetoric to executing for results**. The DRR advisor pointed out,

"In risk governance, this country is romancing response activities."

--INGO1--

*"In risk governance, this country is romancing response activities"*. And this view was shared by Mondoh (2013) in his HFA Progress Report on Kenya when he observed the challenge of the prevalence of a **'response oriented mindset'** among humanitarian agencies and institutions, government, donor agencies and communities. Mondoh's report asserted *"There has been too much concentration at allocating resources to response programs but little towards long term risk reduction"*. And as reasoned by Fawcett et al. (2011), Kellett and Caravani (2013), Kelman (2013), and Mondoh (2013), INGO1 wants to see a country-wide shift from focusing on disaster response to resilience-focused DRR.

Still on 'things that need to be stopped', INGO1 raised concerns over **a lot of talk that doesn't lead to executing for results**. And citing examples, the DRR advisor revealed how this a problem both within INGO1 and also in some of the lead government's disaster management departments. Talking about the rhetoric that leads to no execution, the DRR advisor sadly noted,

*And unfortunately the same obtains even in INGO1, and those are some of the things that incited me to propose the 5%-7% funding toward DRR. There is nothing as unpleasant as your strategy saying you want to build community resilience, and to quote our former county director, saying "from now onwards our language is going to be resilience, resilience, resilience", but when you look at the tools of trade and resources to ensure that, you find there is nothing dedicated to taking you in that direction.*

In addition to the country director's 'resilience building' rhetoric, for INGO1, technical specialists including the DRR advisor do not have control over funding allocation toward their priorities. Instead, field managers are responsible for budgeting



for everything that falls under 'field programmes' including resilience related DRR activities. These budgets are then submitted to the Operations Department at National Level (Nairobi) for eventual approval. Sometimes, field managers don't include DRR in the budgets, and other times, the operations department in Nairobi significantly cuts down DRR in the overall budget.

*And there is nothing as unpleasant as being reduced to plead with people to put a budget for your priority activities in their respective areas. Yet these are the same people who would have either produced or reviewed Community Disaster Preparedness Plans (CDPPs) and brought them to Nairobi for endorsement, and therefore they know critical DRR issues that demand budget allocation...There has always been a mismatch between priorities outlined in the CDPP and resource allocation to enable execution of these priorities...Thus even in-house, it's unfortunate that to some greater extent we are not serious about community capacity building for DRR.*

This lamentation is corroborated by C Fitzgibbon and A Crosskey (2013) in their assertion that holistic development planning in the marginal dryland areas of the Horn of Africa (which includes Kenya) is severely lacking, and capacity to develop quality strategic development plans that tackle multi-sectoral issues such as DRR, poverty reduction and resilience building is weak. Fitzgibbon and Crosskey further observe that too often, development actors are stuck in sectoral silos, and consequently, staff working in one area cannot see any link or overlap between their sector and others. This appeared to be the case with INGO1 vis-à-vis the recounted struggle to have DRR accorded due consideration by all lead planners. And because such lamentations reportedly abound across many aid agencies, D. Alexander and Davis (2012, pp. 3-4) concluded that *"many of the world's leaders still view disaster risk reduction as an 'optional extra', the first thing to be eliminated when fiscal stringency is needed."*

On government rhetoric, the DRR advisor quips *"there have been so many meetings especially in the last two years of the National Disaster Risk Reduction Platform. Unfortunately, it is more of a talk shop"*. And he continued by citing a more

recent example centred on national preparations for the May 2017 Cancun/ Mexico Global DRR Platform.

*Two-three weeks ago, they (referring to a government department) still had the audacity to call us for another meeting to prepare for going to the May 2017 Global DRR Platform in Cancun, Mexico---and once more wanted us to write and share what we have done so that they can go and present at the global level---the way they did with the Hyogo Framework. I have been looking at emails flying left, right and centre and professors (mentioning two universities) are telling them "you have been misusing us." They have told the National Disaster Operation Centre off. This researcher accessed one of the emails indicating frustration, and it read in part, "**none of the agreements we have been having along the way have ever been implemented, and yet you keep on calling us for more meetings to prepare for international presentations when we are doing very little in our communities.**" In a conclusive remark, the DRR advisor noted, "Therefore no meeting has taken place. They have refused".*

Overall, in terms of desired changes consequent to effective DRR work in the country, INGO1 exhibits greater desire to see more changes around DRR governance with the hope that once governance issues have been fixed, there will be less talk and better DRR execution resulting into tangible results at the grassroots level.

### **5.3.7 Comments on 'upper Vs local DRR support'**

For all the six donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured interview guide asked the following question, "What would be your comments on growing literature that seems to suggest there's inadequate support to community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?"

Responding to the question, the DRR advisor agreeably stated, "*This is very true because just as the statement reads, it's a funnel. A funnel of activities with so much at the top and a trickle downstairs.*" The advisor further reflected, "*I might not have had the opportunity to be at the international level, but look at the national level! Let me talk about Kenya. There have been so many*

*meetings especially in the last two years of the National Disaster Risk Reduction Platform. Unfortunately, it is more of a talk shop”.*

Furthermore, in support of literature, INGO1 highlighted that this is the reason Kenya as a country had a proliferation of disaster management departments at the national level, that is not reflected in execution at the grassroots. It’s in line with the literature that INGO1 went on to reveal how some members of the National DRR Platform refused to engage with the lead government department when asked to support preparations for participation in the May 2017 Mexico Global DRR Platform. And as already stated, in their refusal, their lamentation specified ***“none of the agreements we have been having along the way has ever been implemented, and yet you keep on calling us for more meetings to prepare for international presentations when we are doing very little in our communities.”***

#### **5.3.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this research may be used.**

Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading as follows: “There’s ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would INGO1 be willing to use this kind of evidence?” In response, INGO1 stated,

*“This is evidence that can strengthen our draft DRR position paper-- when it sees the light of day. We can use that for in-house engagement and also use it for external engagement/ and or advocacy with both the national government and county government so that they see the sense in giving DRR the priority it deserves during both budgeting and implementation.”*

Going by the above narrative, it appears there is willingness to use findings from this research as part contributory evidence to inform DRR goings-on in the country.

### 5.3.9 Overall comments

**DRR priorities:** Reflecting on all data collected on INGO1 together with the preceding analysis, it becomes clear that INGO1 has a very strong history of long-term engagements with prioritised communities around the world. Analysis showed that in Kenya, INGO1's DRR priorities have a lot to do with strengthening local DRR action. Even capacity building for county government institutions is aimed at influencing the same local/ county governments to be able to eventually release resources in support of community-prioritized DRR activities. Relatedly, INGO1's internally-looking priority of training more staffs in DRR is aimed at ensuring the organisation has adequate DRR implementation capacity in all its program areas; and this is corroborated by Howard's contention that *'we cannot teach what we don't know'* (Howard, 2014).

**Priorities' selection criteria:** INGO1 uses an externally looking lens when selecting DRR priorities. Top considerations include national and country government priorities and county government DRR priorities would usually include community identified DRR priorities. The latter is what points to INGO1's high level of prioritisation for CCB4DRR.

**Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks:** INGO1 has very good knowledge and use of DRR frameworks to a level where the advisor indicated INGO1 seems to be reporting more to the government on INGO1's contribution toward the implementation of frameworks than the government is actually intentionally engaging INGO1 on the same. This appears to be a general weakness on the government side. INGO1's advocacy and influencing agenda toward better DRR governance in the country is rooted in their understanding and use of the HFA and SF4DRR narratives.

**DRR Funding:** good to note how the interview led to a voluntary pledge to introduce minimum thresholds for DRR and CCB4DRR funding. It is baby steps, but a good start. It also shows how making relevant and compelling literature to practitioners has the power to make them make informed decisions.

**Ways of measuring success:** Going by the above response, it's clear that there are other indicators INGO1 uses to measure DRR success but chose to share the above three because they are the most outstanding. And a closer look at the three indicators

shows that they all focus on measuring DRR success at the grass-root level, another indication of the importance INGO1 attaches to prioritising and supporting local/community level DRR.

**Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country:** overall, in terms of desired changes consequent to effective DRR work in the country, INGO1 exhibits greater desire to see more changes around DRR governance with the hope that once governance issues have been fixed, there will be less talk and better DRR execution resulting in tangible results at grassroots level.




Figure 5. 2 A Mind Map of INGO1 Findings

## 5.4 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 2 – INGO2

**INGO 2** is a humanitarian and development organisation that has worked in Kenya since the 1990s, **works through partners, and is therefore not a direct implementing agency**. It has very strong advocacy and influencing agenda with a keen focus on **‘shifting power’** to local institutions and works in less than 20% of Kenya’s 47 counties. Its budget and geographic spread make it fit the middle-sized INGO category in the country.

### 5.4.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?

During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include ‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of INGO2’s response to the question revealed that INGO2’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under 3 of the 4 aforementioned broad categories. The 3 categories include community-focused priorities, government-focused priorities and cross-cutting priorities. The ensuing presentation of analysis and discussion follows the same sequence, and therefore starts with ‘community–focused DRR priorities’.

It should be noted that by the time of conducting the case study interview with INGO2, the organisation had just completed a 5-year resilience-building programme in the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya and was in the process of reflecting and preparing to launch another phase of resilience programming.

#### ***Community Focused DRR Priorities***

It is worthy of mention here that for INGO2, community-focused priorities were the first to be brought out during the interview. Under this category, data analysis revealed four dimensions or sub-areas of DRR focus, and they include: (a) community managed DRR (CMDRR), (b) building community capacity to lobby, (c) strengthening

accountability to communities, and (d) enhancing access to timely early warning (EW) information.

Firstly, INGO2 highlighted that much of their most recent DRR work in Kenya was a result of the severe 2011 Horn of Africa drought that ravaged especially Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia leaving in its wake '000,000s of people dead and millions of livestock decimated. Consequent to this drought, INGO2 secured DFID resilience-building funding for the period 2011-2016. Referring to the DFID-funded resilience program, INGO2's DRR advisor explained,

*That was the bulk of our resilience work that also encompassed sections on DRR where we made major interventions. **Our priority areas were building community capacity and empowering communities to be able to identify risks in their own localities and how they would manage those risks.** Communities would, therefore, come up with their action plans, and then from prioritized risks, we would look at how to facilitate communities; either through their own resources or with resources from INGO2 to come up with projects that would address identified risks.*

The analysis revealed that linked to INGO2's support for CMDRR, was the 2<sup>nd</sup>-tier community focused priority of 'equipping target communities with lobbying skills.'" *The communities were **trained on advocacy skills** to come up with key areas where they would want **to lobby government or any other agencies for inclusion.** For our case, we had the county integrated development plans. We assisted our communities **to ensure that their action plans have also been integrated into those plans.***

Linked to INGO2's quest to build community capacity to lobby is the 3<sup>rd</sup> tier community-focused priority of "**strengthening**



Figure 8: people in Ele Borr, Northern Kenya, identified disease and maternal health as a key problem in their community. With help from one of INGO2's local partners, they succeeded in getting government funding to build a clinic in their community.



**accountability to communities**”, to which INGO2 explained,

*The other bit (referring to DRR priorities) was mainly on accountability to communities affected by disasters and just ensuring that there is accountability right at the community because we work through local partners. ...we are building accountability mechanisms that communities are able to hold INGO2, our local partners, any other agencies and the government accountable to ensure that their priorities are being looked at.*

Expounding on key areas of emphasis when working on strengthening accountability to communities affected by disasters, the DRR advisor pointed out the importance of sharing project information including sensitive aspects, for instance, budgets, and being able to follow up with whichever stakeholder and ask the right questions.

*If there are budgets that the government has set aside for DRR interventions, for instance, water projects, ---do communities have information and even the budget? What allocation is there? Can communities ask questions and follow up for instance with contractors on the ground? ...We felt accountability is one key area because we must move away from this tokenistic way of doing things and help communities understand what their rights and entitlements are and that they are able to understand how to ask questions in case things don't go right.*

Rooted in lessons learned from the 2011 Horn of Africa drought crisis, the 4<sup>th</sup> tier of INGO2's community-focused DRR priorities was the **'promotion of community access to practical early warning information'**. Evaluations had revealed that while there was adequate EW information on the severity of the crisis by as early as March 2010, the situation remained unrecognised, and there was no early action leading to avoidable catastrophic malnutrition levels and mortality (Kim & Guha-Sapir, 2012). This is where Basher (2006, p. 2171) recommends adopting the 'end-to-end' concept to EWS where information is communicated to all key stakeholders and is acted on with a built-in monitoring and feedback mechanisms. For the 2011 Horn of Africa drought crisis, it is action on existing EWS that had largely been the missing link in closing the EWS loop.

Armed with the above lessons, the DRR advisor explained, “*Part of the funding that we got was to enable communities get early warning information---climate information services*”. The advisor further explained that INGO2 had developed a working relationship with the Kenya Meteorological Department in which the latter would conduct end-user field visits to INGO2-supported communities and take time to explain EW information to people, and how they should use shared information.

### **Government Focused DRR Priorities**

Under government-focused priorities, INGO2 revealed that in addition to building community capacity to lobby key stakeholders, the organisation had ‘**advocacy and influencing**’ high on its DRR priorities. The advocacy and influencing agenda focuses on elevating issues springing from community level to national, regional and global platforms.

*We engage in different platforms--- at the national level, regional level, even globally. This is in a bid to push for issues that have come from communities that we feel have no voice to reach the national government or the global platforms. In these situations, we would have our own staff pitching the voice at that level. We, therefore, connect right from communities going up to the national and regional levels even up to the global levels.*

More remarkable here is the fact that INGO2’s advocacy and influencing agenda is driven by issues arising from their community engagements.

### **Cross-Cutting DRR Priorities**

Data analysis further revealed that in order to leverage its ‘advocacy and influencing’ priority, INGO2 adopted a strong empirical research agenda aimed at generating compelling community-rooted evidence in support of advocacy and influencing at national and global levels. Citing one example of the ‘Shifting Power Project’ which aims to strengthen the capacity of local and national organisations so they can play a leading role in decision making during humanitarian crises, INGO2 explained,

*The Shifting Power Project (funded by a European donor) was born out of research that INGO2 and a group of other agencies did. We were checking out who are the first responders whenever there is a crisis, so it was identified that the first responders are actually the local communities and the local organisations that we work with who are always at the forefront whenever there is a crisis before even INGOs decide to get into the crisis and maybe do their appeals... why can't they (referring to community groups and local NGOs) also be given space and opportunity to engage in these platforms and bring their voices to this level so that they are heard because they play a big role?*

INGO2 also showed that the research findings that proved local NGOs were the first responders from which the Shifting Power Project was born, were also used to push the 'localisation agenda' during the Grand Bargain discourse at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. The localisation agenda aims to allocate at least 25% of international humanitarian funding to local organisations (the first responders). Referring to the research, its findings, and the need to support local NGOs, INGO2 stressed,

*Those are the areas that INGO2 really pushed for during the Grand Bargain because we had evidence to back that up from the different crises we have had in Kenya and from other regions where INGO2 works...Local responders should have an opportunity, should be funded better and should be facilitated to respond...they are the front liners in any situation. That is just one example of how we used the evidence.*

In summary, the analysis revealed that while INGO2's DRR priorities fall under the three broad categories of 'community-focused priorities', 'government-focused priorities' and 'cross-cutting priorities', all the three broad categories have one thing in common. They all zoom in on community issues. For instance, INGO2's advocacy and influencing focus on elevating issues raised from community level to national and global levels. And INGO2's research studies also aim to generate local level evidence that feeds

into the advocacy and influencing agenda. INGO2's priorities, therefore, demonstrated a good level of support for CCB4DRR.

#### **5.4.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?**

While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised under 'externally looking', 'internally looking' and 'not involved' criteria; analysis revealed that INGO2 uses externally and internally looking criteria to select its DRR priorities.

##### ***Externally Looking Selection Criteria***

Explaining factors influencing how INGO2 selects her DRR priorities, the DRR advisor pointed out how the organisation considers the country's development indicators to select priority geographic areas.

*We have had different ways of approaching it, but mostly, it is in terms of where the needs are...Our mandate is usually working with the most marginalized or the most vulnerable or the poorest of the poor so that we ensure we are not furthering issues of power imbalances...Most of our work is targeted to the arid and semi-arid counties. We feel that those are the counties that are most vulnerable given historic issues that development has not probably reached most of these communities because of marginalization.*

As indicated in INGO2's case study description, the organisation has worked in Kenya since the 1090s. And because of her prioritisation of the most marginalised geographic areas, in addition to supporting communities during times of stress, INGO2 explained: "we feel that beyond emergency response, we should also look at resilience so that we consolidate the gains that we have had throughout the years." It is clear therefore that **building the resilience of target communities** in the most marginalised areas of Kenya is a key DRR priorities' selection criteria for INGO2, hence the adoption of **resilience-building focused DRR interventions** in target communities.

The analysis also revealed that once the matter of selecting the right geographic areas has been dealt with, INGO2 uses a ‘community-led’ approach to determining required priority interventions in target communities. *“We decided to approach issues of resilience building which also encompass our DRR work using a community-led approach...out of what communities generate in their action plans, we also pick out issues to engage with... issues that are raised at the community level become the basis upon which we engage at every level.*

This a commendable approach to working with communities and echoes Robert Chambers’ observations in his seminal work titled **“whose reality counts”**. In this seminal work, Chambers (1998) asserts that the realities and priorities of poor people often differ from those imagined for them by professionals and policymakers. Chambers observes and recommends that the challenge is, therefore, to enable poor and marginalised people to analyse their conditions and identify their priorities in ways that freely express their realities and generate proposals that are doable, credible and persuasive to policymakers.

#### ***Internally Looking Selection Criteria***

In addition to using an externally-looking lens while scanning for which DRR priorities to support, INGO2 indicated the organisation also looks from within the global organisation to inform her in-country DRR priorities. Thus further to pointing out the aforementioned externally looking criteria, INGO2 added, *“And of course INGO2 has her priorities even at the global level, and most of these are drawn from our different community experiences. We try to see how we can use them for supporting more areas.”*

In summary, a closer look at both INGO2’s externally and internally looking DRR priorities’ selection criteria reveals an organisation that has developed the ability to listen to target communities, support them to determine their priorities and use community generated priorities to even inform the organisation’s global agendas/priorities. INGO2, therefore, uses a DRR priorities selection criteria that has communities and community capacity building for DRR at its core.

### 5.4.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks

In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic compilations and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment reports. Are you aware of these reports?”

To the above question, INGO2 responded, *“I would say partly yes because as I mentioned, there was a different colleague who was championing this work; even engaging in the different platforms both at the regional level and sometimes globally. I have seen some but I have not engaged in them to that level as compared to him as a Resilience Officer. I would say that I have had information from time to time. Like for the HFA, I remember there was one in Nigeria, as a build up towards the post-2015, so those engagements I had information on, but I wouldn’t say I have all reports or I am aware of all reports but I have seen some of them.”* And probed further into whether HFA progression assessment reports may have had any influence on Christian Aid’s work in Kenya, the advisor responded, *“I wouldn’t confidently say that any of the progression reports have significantly influenced any of the work that we are doing.”*

Asked whether the advisor was aware of the Kenya National DRR platform, the advisor indicated awareness of the existence of the Kenya DRR platform but acknowledged *“we have been participating but not consistently”*. Relatedly, however, the advisor pointed out the existence of an interagency working group (IAWG) that has a DRR sub-working group in which INGO2 is a regular and very keen participant. This disclosure, corroborated by INGO1’s aforementioned stakeholder agitation during preparations for the May 2017 Cancun Global DRR Platform seems to point to low stakeholder buy-in into the Kenya DRR platform and its would-have-been functions.

On the SF4DRR, it was obvious the DRR advisor had some knowledge of the framework but didn’t disclose much to show greater comprehension of SF4DRR. The advisor highlighted that while INGO2 was in a gap period between the phased out

resilience-building program and waiting to find out whether there would be funding opportunities to launch a possible successor program, the organisation is still keenly engaged with SF4DRR because there are other countries that have active DRR programmes.

To recap this section, the DRR advisor exhibited some level of awareness of HFA and SF4DRR but did not have what would be considered ample working knowledge of the two frameworks. On the contrary, this is one organisation that has a very strong CCB4DRR commitment but seems to draw very little if anything from the in-country government led DRR agendas. It appears INGO2 is well engaged into global DRR framework goings-on, but due to seeming weaknesses with the Kenya National DRR Platform, INGO2 is less informed and engaged with how to contribute to the implementation of SF4DRR within the country. In addition, while there seemed to be a disconnect between INGO2's global engagement with DRR frameworks and cascading this to the lower levels, the gap may be a result of staff attrition at the country level.

#### **5.4.4 Funding for CCB4DRR**

Studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013) revealed that abysmal development assistance funding goes to DRR and whatever goes to DRR is also biased towards preparedness for effective response leaving only droppings if any going to investing in DRR for resilience. With those studies' intimation, this research considered it essential to examine the state of overall DRR funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.

Asked about how much of the organisation's disaster management funding goes to DRR and then to CCB4DRR, INGO2's DRR advisor disclosed, *"Out of the total grants, if I can pick from the last financial year that we had, out of the total grants that we sent out which was almost 2.4 million Euros, up to 50% were either directly or indirectly looking at issues of DRR and climate change work"*.

And asked how much of the commitment to DRR was going to CCB4DRR, the advisor revealed *"we had four projects in total... A good estimate would be out of the total amount, each project would have like 15-20% allocation on just capacity building"*. However, INGO2 also indicated that *"sometimes it is hard to put a specific figure to it"*

*because for different projects we have looked at different ways of aiding capacity building. For instance, we sometimes identify community champions who we would take for sensitive training or use them as TOTs, and other times do exchange visits or even invite other agencies like KENYAMET to help communities with climate information sharing.”*

In a summary, of the three INGO case studies covered by this research, INGO2 reported the highest funding commitment to both DRR (up to 50% of total budgets) and CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds). This is corroborated by INGO2’s adoption of community-led approaches to its work, much of which being focused on **resilience-building DRR interventions**. INGO2 is walking the talk. **No rhetoric**.

#### **5.4.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?**

For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 2 broad categories, and the two categories were:

- iii. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and
- iv. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.

And for INGO2, the analysis revealed three top indicators by which the organisation measures DRR success. The three indicators include **‘community capacity to successfully lobby upstream’**, **‘community capacity to attract external resources’**, and **‘results from policy influencing.’** The first two indicators fall under the broad category of ‘measures focused at local-level DRR successes’, while the last one on policy and influencing falls under the broad category of “measures focused at national-level DRR success”.

##### ***Community capacity to successfully lobby upstream***

Asked how as an organisation INGO2 measures the effectiveness and success of its contribution to the country’s DRR agenda, the DRR advisor started her response by pointing to results of INGO2’s priority to build community capacity to lobby upstream. With an introspection question, the advisor reflectively explained, *“have we enabled*



*communities to be able to raise their voice and ask and lobby and actually tell government or whichever other agencies that want to work in their locality that 'these are the priorities we have, these are the ones that have already been resourced, can you come in and help fill this specific gap?'"* Still, on community capacity to lobby, the advisor further explained, *"the other one is how community action plans have been incorporated into the county integrated development plans... so that we know that the priorities that the communities came up with have actually been taken up"*.

### ***Community capacity to attract external resources***

Related to measuring DRR success by looking at results from 'community capacity to lobby upstream', is the measure that looks at 'community capacity to attract external resources.' To the latter, the DRR advisor explained, *"we always look at the community action plans we have had. Beyond our own funding, we look at percentage funding that communities were able to attract through their own lobbying to other agencies or the government for support to their DRR activities."*

### ***Results from policy influencing***

Still, on how INGO2 measures the success of their contribution to the country's DRR agenda, the advisor exposed, *"another area is our influence on various policies...As INGO2, we look at how we are influencing policy out of the evidence or out of the information we come up with from the communities we are working with. Are we able to influence government policies at different levels---at the county level, at the national level, and beyond?"*

In summary, INGO2 presented strong emphasis of measuring DRR success at the community level, and much of the yardstick looks at whether target communities have the capacity to take DRR matters into their own hands, lobby, attract resources and hold key stakeholders more accountable. Even the measure of success that looks at policy results at national level seeks to identify results from community-focused influencing agendas. And as argued by Eade (2007, p. 632) who in her seminal work "Capacity Building: Who Builds Whose Capacity?" points out that the role of an engaged outsider in CCB is to support the capacity of local people to determine their own values and

priorities, to organize themselves to act upon and sustain these for the common good; INGO2 is using the right yardstick in measuring DRR success. It is all about people-power. And like reasoned by Lao Tzu's assertion that *"when the best leader's job is done, the people say 'we did it ourselves'"* (Gill, 2002, p. 315), INGO2 has passed the baton to its target communities.

#### **5.4.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?**

The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out **where** or **at what level** both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR seriously, reduced hazard impacts, and lastly, things that need to be stopped. Data analysis assigned INGO2's response to 3 of the 9 categories, namely: **'improved DRM governance'**, **'better resource allocation'**, and **'things that need to be stopped.'** The analysis is presented in that order.

##### ***Improved DRM Governance***

Asked 'what specific changes or improvements INGO2 would like to see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country', the DRR advisor pointed out the need for vital changes around policy issues, and in part reflected, *"beyond the many policies and frameworks we have had at the country level, is there a way to bring all these together?"* Like now, we have the climate change policy, we have the draft policy on disaster response, at what point then do these speak to each other?" In addition to desired policy and frameworks harmonisation related changes, the advisor also singled out the need to harmonise DRR governance structures.

*We have so many departments, we have so many people running around with different things, yet at the end of it all, communities experience these things together so they (communities) will not tell you that this is climate change that*

*we are doing, or that this is disaster response or this is development work. Unless we get that meeting point, we will continue running with so many things fairly apart from each other and will not be able to bring everything together. That is the worry that I have.*

INGO2, therefore, desires to see a couple of DRM governance changes in the country, and the two include harmonisation of DRM policies and frameworks and the reduction and harmonisation of national DRM departments.

### ***Better Resource Allocation***

Expounding more on desired changes consequent to successful DRR in the country, the advisor added, *“Another desired change is to provide more resources to communities to help them lead their own preparedness plans or DRR activities. A lot of the resources should not just end at the County level... Sometimes they (communities) may have good DRR committees and plans at that level but it is not resourced...”* Still, on better resource allocation, INGO2 shared reflections from research they had conducted as a part contribution to the May 2016 Grand Bargain inputs. The advisor reflected, *“Clearly, there was that disparity as most of the funding was going to INGOs and UN agencies...very little resources go to first responders.”*

INGO2, therefore, desires to see changes leading to adequate DRR resource allocation to local NGOs and actors compared to the level of especially financial resources presently allocated to INGOs and UN agencies. INGO2’s quest for better resource allocation to local NGOs that play the crucial role of first responders is validated by Craig (2007) and Duncan and Thomas (2000) who in their respective works on CCB assert that CCB involves development work which strengthens the ability of community-based organizations and groups to build their structures, systems, people and skills. They, therefore, recommend that where there are organisations within target communities, building the capacity of such organisations should be considered part of CCB.

### ***Things that need to be stopped.***

Illuminating more on specific changes and or improvements INGO2 would like to see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country, the DRR advisor pointed out several things that need to be stopped.

*I feel there is the missing link from the community to the county and to the national level. For example, we have an agency like the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) that gathers early warning information, say for drought; and from what I have seen or experienced, it is an extractive way of getting information...there is no feedback loop back to the community. NDMA would have an early warning bulletin, but for a community like Marsabit, they have no access to this information. This information would only be relevant to someone like me who has access to the internet in Nairobi...But there is no way the community gets this feedback for them to make timely decisions...*

INGO2, therefore, would like to see **a stop to processes that only extract** from communities, and see them replaced with those that **provide value-addition feedback loops to communities**. This desired change is in concert with views by D. Alexander and Davis (2012) who assert that one of the ‘elephants in the room’ in official publications and international gatherings convened to discuss DRR is the **‘human right to hazard information’**. Alexander and Davis argue that in scores of countries around the world, the right of access to knowledge of the risks that citizens face, are persistently denied.

By inference, one of INGO2’s outcry pointed to the desired need to **stop spreading especially scarce resources thin, and be more focused**. *“So, you have one project here, another one there, many times commissioned by the county government. For example, they may have put up health facilities and spread them across. But they have not resourced them, so there are no staffs and no drugs”*.

Related to the importance of freeing and allocating more resources to the community level, INGO2 lamented, *“resources actually do not get to where they should get...A lot of the resources should not just end at the County level”*. It appears that due to the country’s devolution governance system in which budgets are allocated to both the central government and to the 47 counties, the two layers of government trap and

retain more resources leaving very little trickling down in support to community development programmes including resilient building DRR activities.

In summary, 5 out of INGO2's 7 desired changes aim to improve local/ community DRR action. This again highlights the importance INGO2 gives the overall agenda of prioritising things that Maton (2008) and Page and Czuba (1999) reasoned foster power in people and translate to increased community capacity to take charge of their wellbeing.

#### **5.4.7 Comments on 'upper Vs local DRR support'**

For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured interview guide asked the following question, "What would be your comments on growing literature that seems to suggest there's inadequate support to community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?"

Intrigued by the questions, the DRR advisor agreeably responded,

*I think this is a valid point, given some of the work that I have mentioned to you earlier. A case example is the 'Shifting the Power Project' that we have. Out of the research that was done looking at what resources were given to local partners and communities for disaster response versus the kind of work they do, and in comparison looking at what INGOs and UN bodies take out of the global funding for humanitarian response...we felt that where the need is most and where most of the work is done and where the communities are left after we have all pulled out is where very little resources go. Very little resources go to first responders and to those who remain with communities when we have all gone.*

The advisor argued this is the sole reason INGO2 took the finding seriously and used it as part input to the 2016 Grand Bargain. The May 2016 Grand Bargain is a global compact within which aid organisations and donors committed to having by 2020 reached a global aggregated target of allocating at least 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible to improve outcomes for affected people and reduce transactional costs (Spiegel, 2017, p. 4).

#### 5.4.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this research may be used.

Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading as follows: “There’s ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would INGO2 be willing to use this kind of evidence?”

In response, INGO2 showed willingness to use these research findings as input into its already community-focused research agenda.

*For us, because one specific area we believe in is advocacy, so we would use such kind of evidence to build on the advocacy plans or the advocacy agendas that we already have. I believe that this strongly complements some of the advocacy issues that we have actually raised beyond communities at the county and at the national level and at the regional or global level. So we would use it for different audiences: our donors, our supporters, and the government because they are the main duty bearers in terms of ensuring communities are thriving and are better prepared to face any kinds of crisis. So we would use that for a strong advocacy agenda to complement most of what we have already actually voiced out and ensuring that community-led processes are supported because it is the most effective way of doing things.*

For DRR actors like INGO2 who are already ahead in moving forward CCB4DRR, the research would help to validate what they are already doing very well.

#### 5.4.9 Overall comments

**DRR priorities:** In summary, the analysis revealed that while INGO2’s DRR priorities fall under the three broad categories of ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘government-focused priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’, all the three broad categories have one thing in common. They all zoom in on community issues. For instance, INGO2’s advocacy and influencing focus on elevating issues raised from community level to national and global levels. And INGO2’s research studies also aim to

generate local level evidence that feeds into the advocacy and influencing agenda. INGO2's priorities, therefore, demonstrated a good level of support for CCB4DRR.

**Criteria for selecting priorities:** In summary, a closer look at both INGO2's externally and internally looking DRR priorities' selection criteria reveals an organisation that has developed the ability to listen to target communities, support them to determine their priorities and use community generated priorities to even inform the organisation's global agendas. INGO2, therefore, uses a DRR priorities selection criteria that have communities and community capacity building for DRR at its core.

**Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks:** The DRR advisor exhibited some level of awareness of HFA and SF4DRR, but did not have what would be considered ample working knowledge of the two frameworks. On the contrary, this is one organisation that has a very strong CCB4DRR commitment but seems to draw very little if anything from the in-country government led DRR agendas. It appears INGO2 is well engaged into global DRR framework goings-on, but due to seeming weaknesses with the Kenya National DRR Platform, INGO2 is less informed and engaged with how to contribute to the implementation of SF4DRR within the country.

**DRR Funding:** In a summary, of the three INGO case studies covered by this research, INGO2 reported the highest funding commitment to both DRR (up to 50% of total budgets) and CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds). This is corroborated by INGO2's adoption of community-led approaches to its work, much of which being focused on **resilience-building DRR interventions**. INGO2 is walking the talk. **No rhetoric.**

**Ways of measuring success:** In summary, INGO2 presented strong emphasis of measuring DRR success at the community level, and much of the yardstick looks at whether target communities have the capacity to take DRR matters into their own hands, lobby, attract resources and hold key stakeholders more accountable. Even the measure of success that looks at policy results at national level seeks to identify results from community-focused influencing agendas. Like argued by Eade (2007, p. 632) who in her seminal work "Capacity Building: Who Builds Whose Capacity?" points out that the role

of an engaged outsider in CCB is to support the capacity of local people to determine their own values and priorities, to organize themselves to act upon and sustain these for the common good; INGO2 is using the right yardstick in measuring DRR success. It is all about people-power. And as reasoned by Lao Tzu's assertion that "*when the best leader's job is done, the people say 'we did it ourselves'*" (Gill, 2002, p. 315), INGO2 has passed the baton to its target communities.

**Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country:** In summary, 5 out of INGO2's 7 desired changes aim to improve local/ community DRR action. This again highlights the importance INGO2 gives the overall agenda of prioritising things that Maton (2008) and Page and Czuba (1999) reasoned foster power in people and translate to increased community capacity to take charge of their wellbeing.

In a nutshell, INGO2 has very strong commitment to local DRR including CCB4DRR as indicated by its current DRR priorities, criteria for selecting these priorities, how much of its funding goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, emphasis of measuring DRR success at community level, and 5 out of the 7 desired DRR-related changes in the country are all focused on improving local/community DRR action.






Figure 5. 3 A Mind Map of INGO2 Findings

## 5.5 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 3 – INGO3

**INGO 3** is a faith-based INGO that works with partners and uses three integrated pillars for its programming. The three pillars include community development, disaster relief and rehabilitation, and peace and justice. Through its local partners, INGO 3 supports people in community groups to work together to overcome illiteracy, malnutrition, unemployment, child mortality and injustice. Its budget and geographic spread make it fit the small-sized INGO category in the country.

For the following analysis, it must be noted that INGO3's interview respondent was a person of very brief responses.

### 5.5.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?

During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include 'government-focused priorities', 'community-focused priorities', 'intra-agency focused priorities' and 'cross-cutting priorities'. And a close examination of INGO3's response to the question revealed that the organisation's current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under the '**community-focused priorities**' broad category. The ensuing presentation of analysis and discussion uncovers the details.

#### ***Community-focused DRR priorities***

The analysis of INGO3's community-focused priorities revealed a strong focus on 'community managed DRR' and 'child-led DRR'. In his response, the DRR advisor in part indicated, "*INGO3 is currently supporting the community managed disaster risk reduction initiative, CMDRR*". To explain further, the DRR advisor cited a number of examples including the case where INGO3 worked with displaced communities in North Western Kenya following the country's severe 2007/2008 post-election violence.

*It was a huge number (referring to post-election violence-displaced people) and so INGO3 worked with them. What was common there was diarrhoea and waterborne diseases, so we taught them on hygiene and then drilled boreholes*

*so that they could have clean water. Above all we trained them on community managed DRR and they came up with their own committee which they have now registered. What this committee does up to today is for example if there is drought approaching, **they will tell the community**, “Two years ago drought came and we lost much of our livestock, since we are anticipating drought, please sell your livestock, remain with small stocks.” **They will tell the community**, “The rainy season is about to start, and during the rainy season the spread of cholera is so much and so frequent, so what do we need to prepare to do? Let us prepare and have water purification tablets, let us be careful with the water we drink”. And it has worked so well because it is done in the indigenous language.*

In addition to using examples to explain CMDRR as a top priority, the DRR Advisor revealed a tight link between CMDRR and child-led DRR. *“Besides that (referring to CMDRR), we also took the same to schools. In fact, in schools, we went ahead and did pit latrines besides training the pupils and doing a competition on hygiene and sanitation. So now these schools have DRR clubs in Turkana and that has helped.”*

In summary and as brief as the response was, the analysis showed that INGO3 is supporting CMDR including child-led DRR in rural schools. CMDRR is a great contributor to CCB4DRR.

### **5.5.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?**

While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised under ‘externally looking’, ‘internally looking’ and ‘not involved’ criteria; analysis revealed that INGO3 uses externally and internally looking criteria to select its DRR priorities.

#### ***Externally Looking Selection Criteria***

Explaining factors influencing how INGO3 selects their DRR priorities, the DRR advisor pointed out, *“Our priorities are based on **information from the National Disaster Management Authority**. So we would study the NDMA, then study the **county***

**government strategic plan and priorities** and see if it aligns with our capacity and then look at INGO3 global priorities. In addition to this, we would look at a fourth component that is the XYZ (pseudonym) Alliance which we are members of. So we also **promote the priorities of XYZ Alliance**. We would merge the four, then based on that we would be able to see where we fit and what to run with.”

The proliferation of guns and resultant perpetual violent conflicts among Kenya’s arid and semi-arid pastoralist communities has long been a deterrence to many INGO and donor willingness to prioritise some of these areas for programming support beyond emergency responses (ref to Fig 5.4). Relatedly, INGO3 is one of the 2 Case Studies that



Figure 5. 4 an armed herder from a village in Baringo County, Kenya drives his cattle to grazing fields [Anthony Langat: Al Jazeera]

identified **security or access to an area** as one of the criteria used to prioritise where to work. In addition to security and access to an area, INGO3 revealed that **“funding is a factor.”** This funding factor is probably best demonstrated by INGO2’s already reported situation where the organisation phased out a 5-year resilience-building programme and by the time of the interview was still in the waiting mode for funding opportunities before it could launch another related multi-year programme.

#### ***Internally Looking Selection Criteria***

In the foregoing section, INGO3 indicated that after studying and collating both NDMA and County government DRR plans and priorities, they also map these collated priorities against INGO3’s internal capacities and global priorities. INGO3’s **internal capacities** and **global DRR priorities** are therefore part of internal criteria used to select their DRR priorities. The desire **to strengthen and disaster-proof existing development programmes** was also identified as a key DRR priorities selection criteria. Citing an example, the DRR advisor explained,

*“Our development work could be at risk because of disasters. For example, in*

*Magarini we have a community food security programme where we are teaching farmers on agriculture. And we have come to the realization that the work is at risk because of frequent droughts, like two years droughts followed by another year of flooding. So we realized that if we do not embed DRR in that work then we are going to lose the work.”* This rationale is commended by Schipper and Pelling (2006) when they point to a poor assumption where scores of development practitioners think that DRR is already incorporated into ‘pro-poor development’ leading to awful manifestations of what UNDP (2004) and Yodmani (2001) call ‘unresolved development problems.’

In summary, INGO3 revealed that national/NDMA and country government DRR priorities, security and access to communities, funding availability, internal capacities, organisational global priorities and the need to disaster-proof on-going programmes form the criteria used to determine INGO3’s DRR priorities. When compared and contrasted with INGO1 and INGO2’s DRR priorities’ selection criteria, INGO3’s selection criteria doesn’t immediately reveal anything that speaks to how community DRR needs (including the need for CCB4DRR) influence INGO3’s DRR priorities. However, the researcher noted that INGO3’s commitment to CMDRR must be where community DRR priorities come to the front only that INGO3 didn’t bring this up.

### **5.5.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks**

In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic compilation and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment reports. Are you aware of these reports?” To this question, the DRR advisor responded: *“Yes I am aware.”*

To every participant in the six INGO and donor case studies that answered affirming knowledge and awareness of HFA and its related progress assessment reports,

a probing question aimed at finding out whether and how the reports may have had any influence on the organisation's DRR support priorities in the country was asked. A thorough analysis of the participant's answer quickly revealed the advisor was neither conversant with the HFA nor its related progress assessment reports. Asked whether he was conversant with the SF4DRR, the advisor responded, *"to a very small extent, yes"*. And asked whether he would be willing to share the little he knew about SF4DRR, the advisor explained, *"I can talk but very minimally. In terms of providing good direction, in terms of assessment, it is an eye-opener, but as I said it is still limited."*

In summary, the DRR advisor acknowledged to be having limited knowledge and utilisation of HFA and SF4DRR, **and these two frameworks, therefore, didn't seem to have had any direct influence on INGO3's DRR priorities.** To some extent, this points to a gap between what the Kenya DRR Platform exists for and what it is delivering especially in the area of creating awareness on globally agreed priorities and creating a sustainable movement to localise and implement these priorities.

#### **5.5.4 Funding for CCB4DRR**

It was Matthew B (2015) who asserted that institutional budgets are a great indicator of respective institutional values and priorities. For DRR, Mathew's assertion is corroborated by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013) whose studies revealed that abysmal development assistance funding goes to DRR and whatever goes to DRR is also biased towards preparedness for effective response leaving only droppings if any going to investing in DRR for resilience. With those studies' intimation, this research considered it essential to examine the state of overall DRR funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.

Asked about how much of the organisation's disaster management funding goes to DRR and then to CCB4DRR, INGO3 explained, *"DRR is a very small component of INGO3's disaster management because about 90% mostly goes to disaster response. So for disaster risk reduction we only have about 10%. But we are saying that in the coming years it will grow so that even non-disaster projects should have a percentage going towards disaster risk reduction. So it will probably rise to 20 % or 30 % but at the moment*

*it is within 10 %.* On funding for CCB4DRR, the DRR advisor stated, *“Actually I can say about 80% of the 10% is dedicated to community capacity building for DRR.”*

Based on foregoing data, it emerges therefore that for now, about 10% of the organisation’s disaster risk management budget goes to DRR. And because INGO3 uses community managed DRR approaches to its DRR work, much of the DRR allocation (80%) goes to CCB4DRR. This research was however not able to find out the % proportion of INGO3’s budget that was dedicated to disaster risk management. This would have helped to calculate over all % budget allocation to DRM, DRR and CCB4DRR.

In summary, similar to findings from studies undertaken by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013), INGO3 is spending more on disaster response and far less on resilience-building DRR, though it was encouraging to note that much of the DRR funding goes to CMDRR which is strong on CCB4DRR. Thus while CMDRR (and CCB4DRR) is a high priority, it’s a low ranking priority when viewed from how much of the INGO3’s budget is dedicated to DRR.

#### **5.5.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?**

For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 2 broad categories, namely:

- i. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and
- ii. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.

And for INGO3, the analysis revealed that the organisation uses one compound indicator to measure DRR success. This single indicator is **“Community Transformation”**, and it falls under the broad category of “measures focused at local-level DRR success”.

Asked how as an organisation INGO3 measures the effectiveness and success of her contribution to the country’s DRR agenda, the DRR advisor stated, *“Overall, I would say, INGO3 measures by transformation. The question being ‘Have these activities led to transformation?’”* To explain this further, the DRR advisor went on to describe characteristics of how community transformation would look like: *“And if we break*

*down the transformation, we will look at adoption, application and ownership. In addition, is adoption spreading to the next village? For example, if we are in Village A, after one year, is what these people have adopted spreading to village B? So that is how we will measure our success.”*

The DRR advisor provided several exemplars based on the described characteristics of transformation. On the characteristic of ‘ownership’, he gave an example of a community that had a transport problem because *“there was a river that was so tricky, and from the river, it was so hilly and vehicles could not pass there or they would fail to climb and roll back causing accidents. People suffered. The community members said, “We cannot tarmac a road, but we can demonstrate what we can do.” So they raised funds, got some cement, brought sand by themselves and just cemented a small portion of that river road. Again, when the Government saw what the community had done, they came and worked on the whole road.”*

The foregoing example is attributed to INGO3’s CMDRR approaches through which target communities are enabled via training to identify community risks, take own initiative to address them (ownership) and also lobby for additional external support.

In summary, the analysis showed that INGO3 focuses only at the local level when measuring DRR success, and ‘community transformation’ is the primary indicator used to assess success and or failure. For INGO3, transformation can be summed up as community empowerment to undertake possible DRR activities to a degree where results attract non-target communities to replicate the same activities. A great way to measure DRR success. INGO3’s approach to measuring DRR success is rooted in the organisation’s CMDRR which has a strong element of CCB4DRR.

#### **5.5.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?**

The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out **where** or **at what level** both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question were



re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR seriously, reduced hazard impacts, and lastly, things that need to be stopped. Data analysis assigned INGO3's response to 4 of the 9 broad categories, namely: **more child-led DRR, professional disciplines to take DRR seriously, DRR comprehension and integration, and things that need to be stopped.** The analysis is presented in that order.

Asked 'what specific changes or improvements INGO3 would like to see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country', the DRR advisor stated,

*"I would like to see DRR included in schools as part of the school curriculum, so that from childhood it goes up to all levels."* The DRR advisor went on to specify some of the desired changes consequent to a DRR culture that would emerge among professionals once they have interfaced with DRR through their early childhood school curriculum. He stated,

*I would like, for instance, the engineering professionals to use DRR language. For example, when people are building houses, the engineers usually come in to do all the planning and architectural work. They apply for certificates but it's usually more of a formality and less about ensuring safety. So we can reduce the risk of disasters immensely if for example, engineers, architects and all the government authorities, for example when they are approving construction, use a language that really makes the owners or people involved to know that the reason they are doing all these things is to reduce the risk that that could be associated with this construction.*

Another area identified by INGO3 for much-needed change was the need for government and its DRR partners to have a much better understanding of DRR, especially during planning processes. The DRR advisor stated,

*And above all, I would like to see Disaster Risk Reduction in organisations and government treated as a long term thing. Because I think part of the failure of most disaster risk activities have been time; whereby you are told to implement a disaster risk programme in six months. And from experience, I realized it*

*doesn't work in a short time because people need to understand it, people need to apply it, adopt it and then it can spread to other areas. So, in terms of programming, I would like to see DRR treated from long-term perspectives.*

By inference and experience, INGO3 was suggesting that all DRR stakeholders in the country ought to '**stop treating DRR like it is a quick fix**' thing. And while INGO3 lamented the treatment of DRR as a quick fix, the DRR advisor pointed out the need to integrate DRR into all types of programming, whether short-term or long-term programmes. Driving the point home, the DRR advisor emphasised, *"I want to repeat this that it is very important to **think of DRR whenever we are doing community development or disaster response**. Let us embed DRR in it, even if it is a short-term food assistance project."*

To explain the desire for DRR integration even into short term programme interventions, INGO3 cited a case where during the 2006 drought, churches and mosques in Marsabit were distributing scarce relief food aid only to their respective followers. Being a conflict-sensitive faith-based organisation that embraced the '**do no harm**' principle and **conflict sensitive programming** approaches (Anderson, 1999), INGO3 broke ranks with this conflict insensitive approach when the organisation started a food assistance program in the same area. *"When we went there, we said the food is for all drought-affected people."* While INGO3's food rations were being stored in a church and the church compound served as a distribution point, the organisation ensured inclusion by training community members to identify food assistance beneficiaries based on need alone, and not on religion. With a beam, the DRR advisor narrated,

*Muslim women and Christian women went in the same queue and got the same quantity of food. But that was not the end of the story. They went to their mosques and told Imams, "Christians have shared with us their food, same quality and same quantity. Next time we get food from our brothers in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, we want the Christians also to come to the mosque and get food." And God answered their desire, they got food. They went to church and called Christians and said, "We are not going to eat our food alone, we want you*

*to also come and share with us.” And that immensely reduced religious conflicts in Marsabit.*

In a place laden with perpetual resource-based conflicts, this was a good exemplar of how DRR can be integrated even into very short-term people-centred projects.

In summary, the analysis revealed that when DRR is very successful in the country, INGO3 would like to see positive changes both at the local and national level. The inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum and DRR integration in both short-term and long-term community-focused programmes seek to see changes at the local level. The desire to stop treating DRR as a short-term quick fix is both local because that’s where the implementation happens, but it’s also at the national level because that’s where government and partners would need to jointly embrace the desired change during related planning processes.

### **5.5.7 Comments on ‘upper Vs local DRR support’**

For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured interview guide asked the following question, “What would be your comments on growing literature that seems to suggest there’s inadequate support to community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?”

With a bit of anger in his voice, the DRR advisor agreeably responded, **“there is more talk about the community but little action.”** To explain further, the DRR advisor cited the example of many researchers and writers that have written extensively about conflicts in the Horn of Africa, but whose writings contribute very little to possible solutions.

*So for example on conflict, conflict is a disaster, but what is the solution? The solution is peace, but you go and write books, write a book on conflict and entitle it ‘Conflict in the Horn of Africa’.... Your book with the title ‘Conflict in the Horn of Africa’ will sell a lot. So many people will buy it. They will refer to it because the*

*word 'conflict' wakes up people immediately.... if we really want to manage conflict we do not even need to study about conflict. We need to go back and say how was it when things were working well?... What made this thing to work?... what we call the peace pillars... The peace pillars are at the community level... I may not have answered that question adequately, **but as I mentioned, there is more talk and less action.***

INGO3's opinion is corroborated by GNDR (2009) whose frontline views report about progress towards implementation of HFA carry a revealing commentary by Bishop Donald Mtetemela, a renowned Tanzanian development worker. Reflecting on HFA, Bishop Mtetemela had commented, "The people I work with every day see many clouds – international initiatives and plans, but very little rain – actual change at the frontline." The GNDR report was published under the title "**Clouds but little rain**" explaining that "It's an image that sums up the challenge of turning the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA) into practical, sustainable activity at the frontline where people at-risk live, eat and work. This is the challenge that must be met if a substantial reduction in disaster losses is to be achieved."

Later on, in a review of critical gaps and challenges for the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, Oxley (2015) captures and lists HFA's flawed phenomenon of "**clouds but little rain**" as number 2 out of 11 gaps and challenges which SF4DRR missed to prioritise. Oxley explains that the term "**clouds but little rain**" denotes the growing implementation gap between high-level talk and policies and local action.

In summary, INGO3's views agree with findings from the literature on the big gap between high-level rhetoric and poor support for local level action.

#### **5.5.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this research may be used.**

Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading as follows: "There's ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of

community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would INGO3 be willing to use this kind of evidence?”

INGO3 positively responded, *“Yes we would be willing to use that kind of evidence.”* And INGO3 further explained how such evidence would be used. *“First of all, to evaluate our own past DRR work...so after that, we will also help our partners to evaluate their work. And because we are also in Government forums, we would use that evidence to shape the direction of County Government priorities. But above all, we would use it to shape our own priorities.”*

INGO3 is, therefore, another willing DRR actor in Kenya that finds value in using findings from this research to inform both its programming options and influencing agenda with county governments.

#### 5.5.9 Overall comments

**DRR priorities:** In summary and as brief as the response was, the analysis showed that INGO3 is supporting CMDR including child-led DRR in rural schools. CMDRR is a great contributor to CCB4DRR.

**Criteria for selecting priorities:** In summary, INGO3 revealed that that national/NDMA and country government DRR priorities, security and access to communities, funding availability, internal capacities, organisational global priorities and the need to disaster-proof on-going programmes form the criteria used to determine INGO3’s DRR priorities. When compared and contrasted with INGO1 and INGO2’s DRR priorities’ selection criteria, INGO3’s selection criteria doesn’t immediately reveal anything that speaks to how community DRR needs (including the need for CCB4DRR) influence INGO3’s DRR priorities. However, the researcher noted that INGO3’s commitment to CMDRR must be where community DRR priorities come to the front, only that that INGO3 didn’t bring this up.

**Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks:** In summary, the DRR advisor acknowledged to be having limited knowledge and utilisation of HFA and SF4DRR, **and**

**these two frameworks, therefore, didn't seem to have had any direct influence on INGO3's DRR priorities.** To some extent, this points to a gap between what the Kenya DRR Platform exists for and what it is delivering especially in the area of creating awareness on globally agreed priorities and creating a sustainable movement to localise and implement these priorities.

**DRR Funding:** In summary, similar to findings from studies undertaken by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013), INGO3 is spending more on disaster response and far less on resilience-building DRR, though it was encouraging to note that much of the DRR funding goes to CMDRR which is strong on CCB4DRR. Thus while CMDRR (and CCB4DRR) is a high priority, it's a low ranking priority when viewed from how much of the INGO3's budget is dedicated to DRR.

**Ways of measuring success:** In summary, the analysis showed that INGO3 focuses only at the the local level when measuring DRR success, and 'community transformation' is the primary indicator used to assess success and or failure. For INGO3, transformation can be summed up as community empowerment to undertake possible DRR activities to a degree where results attract non-target communities to replicate the same activities. A great way to measure DRR success. INGO3's approach to measuring DRR success is rooted in the organisation's CMDRR which has a strong element of CCB4DRR.

**Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country:** In summary, the analysis revealed that when DRR is very successful in the country, INGO3 would like to see positive changes both at the local and national level. The inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum and DRR integration in both short-term and long-term community-focused programmes seek to see changes at the local level. The desire to stop treating DRR as a short-term quick fix is both local because that's where the implementation happens, but it's also at the national level because that's where government and partners would need to jointly embrace the desired change during related planning processes.




Figure 5. 5 A Mind Map of INGO3 Findings

## 5.6 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 4 – Don1

With an annual development and humanitarian grant contribution of more than US\$ 90 million to the government of Kenya, Don1 is a European donor that falls under the large types of donors in the country.

### 5.6.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?

During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include ‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of Don1’s response to the question revealed that the agency’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under the ‘**government-focused priorities**’ broad category. The ensuing presentation of analysis and discussion uncovers the details.

#### ***National and Local Level Government-focused DRR priorities***

Within her government-focused priorities, Don1 presented two sub-areas of focus, and these are ‘**funding and tech support to NDMA**’ and ‘**supporting county drought mitigation projects through NDMA**’. On funding and tech support to NDMA, Don1 explained,

*Don 1 in Kenya is engaged in development work through what we call X Development Fund (pseudonym). Then we are engaged in humanitarian operations...There is also the private sector engagement... We also have issues to do with promoting trade...DRR activities done by the Kenya delegation are mainly through our support to the National Drought Management Authority.*

Probed to specify what the agency’s actual DRR priorities are in the country, Don 1 specified,



*It is a blanket DRR because our main outlet is the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA). We are building its capacity as an institution in terms of paying salaries, improving their knowledge management handling and so forth. We are also now supporting disaster response and preparedness activities at county level government...The NDMA has offices in the County Governments, which is one of the outlets...At the county level, we have the county steering groups which meet regularly. They come up with what they call County Integrated Development Plans, and they normally prioritise projects they feel should be supported; projects which can help mitigate drought-related disasters. Then those projects are funded by Don1 through the NDMA.*

Don1 added,

*But of late, with this current drought, we have gone into hunger cash transfers. We are contributing to the Hunger Safety Net Project with the Government which is basically response and preparedness activities through NDMA.*

In summary, all of Don1's current DRR support to Kenya focuses on strengthening the National Drought Management Agency through funding its administrative structures and providing technical support. While there was mention of support to county drought mitigation projects through NDMA, Don1 clearly stated their support to County government projects *'is basically preparedness and response,'* including through the hunger safety net project. **Don1 did not reveal any prioritisation of CMDRR nor CCB4DRR.** Don1's current DRR priorities in the country, therefore, fit the picture painted by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) whose studies lament the global trend of **spending heavily** on disaster preparedness and response **while investing far less** in resilience-building DRR.

### **5.6.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?**

While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised under 'externally looking', 'internally looking' and 'not involved' criteria; analysis

revealed that Don1's response falls under the 'not involved' category, meaning Don1 does not get involved in deciding which particular DRR priorities to support in the country.

### **'Not Involved' in selecting priorities**

Asked whether there are any criteria Don1 uses to inform its choice of DRR priorities in the country, Don1's research participant explained,

*The way we operate, like I told you earlier is that we give NDMA the resources and they are the ones who prioritise in terms of the micro projects. For instance, if we have given NDMA money, and there are DRR needs in Marsabit (one of the drought-prone counties), NDMA through their Marsabit office and their county steering groups will look at what needs to be prioritised at that level through the money. Maybe they will see that livestock and value chain is what needs to be invested in, so they will do that. And then after some time they may see water is the issue and they invest in water. So we have given them that flexibility.*




Figure 5. 6 NDMA: funding allocation in an emergency year

Asked whether there is any form of guidance Don1 gives to NDMA to somewhat inform some of their decisions, Don1 responded,

*There are no guidelines we give them per se on how they are going to use those resources. But overall, we may say this is for Hunger Safety Net, this is for response and preparedness and it goes that way. So from there, they write regular reports to us and we carry out regular audits.*

In a related separate interview, NDMA was asked, “If you were to draw a virtual pie chart representing the different NDMA priorities in a normal year, what would be the approximate per cent funding allocation to the different NDMA priorities?” In response, NDMA stated,

*We have been in emergency mode for almost two years now, but I think the biggest percent now goes to response. Maybe a half, like fifty per cent. Of course, this is not the tradition. This is in terms of a particular bad year. Then we also have preparedness taking about 30%. We have other things like monitoring and evaluation and information taking another 15%. These are operational costs, not salaries and the rest. The rest could be about 5% on coordination. And this is in a bad year, like where we are this year. But under normal circumstance co-ordination would have the biggest (ref to Fig 5.6).*

Asked how much the allocations would look like in a normal year, NDMA explained,

*Coordination in a normal year could even be like 20%, but response now comes to another 20%. In a normal year, we should be doing more preparedness which could go for 40%. Then we would have information going for another 20% (ref to Fig 5.7).*




Figure 5. 7 NDMA: Funding allocation in a normal year

In summary, Don1 entirely devolves to NDMA the responsibility to decide which DRR priorities will be supported using resources allocated by Don1. Analysis of NDMA data showed that much of the funding goes to both preparedness and response during both bad and good years. Concerning the funding channelled to NMDA, Don1 had commented, “So what happens with this money and how it operates, is that when we do

*not have emergencies we have mitigation measures ongoing.*” There’s no doubt from this analysis that while NDMA engages in mitigation interventions, this is far less prominent based on how funding is distributed among the agency’s priorities. One would, therefore, be right to conclude that for both Don1 and NDMA, prioritising and supporting CCB4DRR isn’t anywhere high on their respective agendas.

### **5.6.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks**

In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic compilation and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment reports. Are you aware of these reports?” To this question, the Don1 research participant responded, “No”.

Subsequently, the researcher explained to Don 1 the existence of HFA’s successor framework, the SF4DRR. Asked whether the Don1 research participant was aware of SF4DRR, the participant stated, *“We have heard of it especially in the UN circles, but it is not something which we use as a Framework of reference.”*


It is clear and concerning that this donor participant did not have a working knowledge of both FHA and SF4DRR, knowledge of which would be useful in determining the framework’s usefulness to the country’s DRR agenda, and then knowing how Don1’s work needs to either influence or be influenced by any on-going global DRR framework. The issue of Don1 not having sufficient working knowledge of global DRR frameworks seems to point to inefficiencies in the government department/ ministry responsible for creating adequate awareness around the frameworks, promoting their use and ensuring accurate national reporting on progress being made.

#### 5.6.4 Funding for CCB4DRR

Studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013) revealed that abysmal development assistance funding goes to DRR and whatever goes to DRR is also biased towards preparedness for effective response leaving only droppings if any going to investing in resilience-building DRR. With those studies' intimation, this research considered it essential to examine the state of overall DRR funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.

Asked about how much of the organisation's disaster management funding goes to DRR and then to CCB4DRR, Don1's research participant responded, "So let us put 30 million divided by 425million times 100, and you will get the percentage." Earlier on,

Don1 had revealed that the agency makes multi-year development aid funding to Kenya, and the year 2017 was part of a five-year €425Million funding cycle.



Don1 explained that out of the five-year €425Million,

Figure 5. 8 Don 1: 5 year development aid funding to Kenya (as of 2017)

€30Million is what is channelled through the NDMA as dedicated disaster risk management (DRM) funding. And when asked to explain the rationale behind Don1 committing all her DRR funding through NDMA, Don1 explained,

*We believe that NDMA being a fully-fledged Government of Kenya entity will continue to exist with or without donor support. Thus, empowering such institutions remains more feasible to tackle DRR long term issues in view of sustainability.*

As analysed and presented in **Figures 5.8 and 5.9**, Don1's dedicated DRM funding amounts to 7% of its overall 5-year aid funding to Kenya. Out of the €30million dedicated

to DRM through NDMA, €10million which is 2.4% of Don1’s overall aid funding to Kenya is what can be accounted for as dedicated to resilience-building, thus as actual DRR funding. And it is in the resilience-building elements of DRM that we find life-changing CCB4DRR.

These calculations corroborate with aforementioned findings by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013) who revealed abysmal development assistance funding goes to




Figure 5. 9 Don1: How €30M DRM fund to NDMA is allocated

DRR and whatever goes to DRR is also biased towards preparedness for effective response leaving barely anything to invest in DRR for resilience.

In summary, 2.4% of Don1’s overall aid funding to Kenya seems to be the only amount going to resilience-building DRR where CCB4DRR is espoused. As long as more resources are committed to preparedness and response and less to mitigation, it remains evident that CCB4DRR is not yet a high support priority by both Don1 and NDMA.

### 5.6.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?

For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 2 broad categories, and the two categories were:

- i. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and
- ii. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.

And for Don1, the analysis revealed four indicators by which the organisation measures DRR success. The four indicators include *‘no disaster-related deaths’*,

***‘reduced loss of livelihood assets’, ‘community/ beneficiary transformation’ and ‘accurate and appropriate EWS’.*** The first three indicators fall under the broad category of ‘measures focused at local level DRR successes’, while the last indicator (‘accurate and appropriate EWS’) belongs to the broad category of ‘measures focused at national-level DRR success.’

Asked how as an agency Don1 measures the effectiveness and success of its contribution to the country’s DRR agenda, the Don1 research participant stated,

*I think the first one is if we hear there are no deaths related to emergencies, I think that is very important. You know previously there used to be reports of millions of people who have died and all that. If we hear there is no much loss in terms of assets like livestock and such livelihood assets; that reflects some good success which has been happening. For DRR, also when we talk about early warning, appropriate early warning mechanisms are in place, that is also quite a success, and that has been very effective. In Kenya, we now have a very effective early warning mechanism, which is more or less very accurate. A few years back our biggest problem and used to be an early warning but now it is no longer the problem. The problem now is response because they are giving proper alerts before emergencies... when we do our monitoring, we want to see how actual beneficiaries and their lives have been transformed, if they have.*

While Don1’s funding to drought management in Kenya is channelled through NDMA, and much of this funding goes to preparedness and response will less going to actual drought mitigation activities; it was a pleasant surprise to note that Don1 still expects to see reduced loss of livelihood assets and community transformation as measures of DRR success in the country. There is, therefore, a mismatch between Don1’s expected DRR results and where her investments are being made.

### 5.6.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?

The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out **where** or **at what level** both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR seriously, reduced hazard impacts, and lastly, things that need to be stopped. Data analysis assigned Don1's response to 3 of the 9 broad categories, namely: **improved coordination, better resource allocation, and better DRR governance**. The analysis is presented in that order.

Asked 'what specific changes or improvements Don1 would like to see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country', the interviewee started by pointing out required changes in overall DRM coordination. He narrated, *"If currently you go to any meeting and you ask them 'what were the challenges with this current drought response?' they would tell you 'coordination'. Everybody tells you coordination. There was still no proper coordination. We had everybody doing their own thing and everybody was citing coordination...That remains a challenge because you know, Don1 will respond in our own way, World Bank would respond in their own way, etc. The day we will have a scenario where all these stakeholders come together and jointly plan, that will be the game changer."*

After the explanation on coordination, Don1 pointed out a combination of required DRR governance and resource allocation changes. *"We would like to see **total government ownership and total government empowerment** in the sense that the government can be able to **respond to drought and to mitigate drought without external assistance**. That would be the thing we would like to see even in terms of **budgetary allocations**; that everything is in their hands. That is what we would like to see."*



In summary and in comparison, section 5.6.5 showed that Don1 uses local/grassroots -level indicators to measure DRR success, while in this section, analysis has shown that Don1's desired changes (consequent to her engagement and contribution to the country's DRR agenda) are all focused at the higher (national) level. Being a donor, these desired changes may be partly explained by recent changes in Kenya's economic status. Kenya's Vision 2030 aspires to have double-digit growth rates and attain middle-income country status by 2030. Indeed, on **30 September 2014**, Kenya effectively joined the ranks of middle-income countries, sixteen years ahead of schedule (UNDP, 2018)! The country's new economic status (in which aid is being reduced) may therefore partly explain Don1's quest to see a Kenya that is taking ownership of her DRM (and DRR) agenda, coordinating better, and allocating adequate resources to the country's drought risk management agenda. One would hope that when these desired changes become a reality, this would subsequently translate into better prioritisation and support to the empowering CCB4DRR.

#### **5.6.7 Comments on 'upper Vs local DRR support'**

For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured interview guide asked the following question, "What would be your comments on growing literature that seems to suggest there's inadequate support to community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?"

Absorbed by the question, Don1 first disagreed with the statement and argued, *No, I think that statement is wrong. Or rather, it can give a very wrong impression in the sense that even though they support for example to the regional or the national level, that is the avenue which is being used to eventually get to the grassroots...There is no way from Don1's Capital City you would expect them to come in with trucks carrying millions going straight to the communities on the ground and starting operations there. No, it doesn't work, even Governments don't allow that. So there are structures which we cannot ignore, and unfortunately, that is how it is.*

After the researcher's further explanation to help Don1 understand the statement, Don1's participant eventually conceded but with a suggestion, *"I think the wording there should be: 'the results at local level are not as effective as they are supposed to be'"*. And he continued, *"I will agree with you to a certain extent but there are reasons for these poor results."* When asked to explain the reasons, Don1 continued,

*I think these are very old reasons. First and foremost like what I told you, these resources are supposed to cascade down more often than not. For example, Don1 is going to support INGOX (pseudonym) to carry out activities in Samburu. Some of the resources will have to go to INGOX's overhead costs including operational costs, staffs salaries etc. This is part of the development cost and we can't change that.*

The researcher flipped the question around and stated: 'For Kenya, if we are going to see desired DRR results we must do 1,2,3,4 things along the 15-year timeline of the Sendai Framework for Action. From where you sit, do you think local DRR action would feature prominently on the list of must-do things? Don1 responded, *"Unfortunately it wouldn't, and unfortunately it wouldn't."* Asked why it wouldn't, Don1 explained, *"it features, but it has been swallowed by the bigger picture."*

In summary, when Don1 argued that *"I think the wording there should be: 'the results at local level are not as effective as they are supposed to be'"*, and later indicated that local DRR action wouldn't, unfortunately, feature prominently among key 'must dos' if Kenya was selecting key DRR priorities towards achieving desired DRR results in the country, these statements revealed that overall, Don1 agreed with the statement.

#### **5.6.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this research may be used.**

Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading as follows: "There's ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would INGO3 be willing to use this kind of evidence?"

Don1 positively responded, “Yes. When asked to explain ways in which the agency would be willing to use this kind of evidence, Don1 explained, “*For the NDMA case, we would tell NDMA they will need to prioritise that (referring to CCB4DRR).*” Don1 continued to explain, “*For greater programming purposes, that is something we would take into account. We would share that information with our partners and tell them to prioritise that (CCB4DRR) because it is evidence-based. We would, therefore, tell them we would like to see projects which have CCB4DRR as a priority.*”

Don1, therefore, showed willingness to use the evidence for influencing purposes with its funded partners.

### 5.6.9 Overall comments

**DRR priorities:** In summary, all of Don1’s current DRR support to Kenya focuses on strengthening the National Drought Management Agency through funding its administrative structures and providing technical support. While there was mention of support to county drought mitigation projects through NDMA, Don1 clearly stated their support to County government projects ‘*is basically preparedness and response,*’ including through the hunger safety net project. **Don1 did not reveal any prioritisation of CMDRR nor CCB4DRR.** Don1’s current DRR priorities in the country, therefore, fit the picture painted by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) whose studies lament the global trend of **spending heavily** on disaster preparedness and response **while investing far less** in resilience-building DRR

**Criteria for selecting priorities:** In summary, Don1 entirely devolves to NDMA the responsibility to decide which DRR priorities will be supported using resources allocated by Don1. Analysis of NDMA data showed that much of the funding goes to both preparedness and response during both bad and good years. Concerning the funding channelled to NDMA, Don1 had commented, “*So what happens with this money and how it operates, is that when we do not have emergencies we have mitigation measures ongoing.*” There’s no doubt from this analysis that while NDMA engages in mitigation interventions, this is far less prominent based on how funding is distributed among the agency’s priorities. One would, therefore, be right to conclude that for both Don1 and

NDMA, prioritising and supporting CCB4DRR isn't anywhere high on their respective agendas.

**Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks:** It was obvious and concerning that this donor participant did not have working knowledge of both FHA and SF4DRR, knowledge of which would be useful in determining the framework's usefulness to the country's DRR agenda, and then knowing how Don1's work needs to either influence or be influenced by any on-going global DRR framework. The issue of Don1 not having sufficient working knowledge of global DRR frameworks seems to point to inefficiencies in the government department/ ministry responsible for creating adequate awareness around the frameworks, promoting their use and ensuring accurate national reporting on progress being made.

**DRR Funding:** In summary, 2.4% of Don1's overall aid funding to Kenya seems to be the only amount going to resilience-building DRR where CCB4DRR is espoused. As long as more resources are committed to preparedness and response and less to mitigation, it remains evident that CCB4DRR is not yet a high support priority by both Don1 and NDMA.

**Ways of measuring success:** While Don1's funding to drought management in Kenya is channelled through NDMA, and much of this funding goes to preparedness and response will less going to actual drought mitigation activities; it was a pleasant surprise to note that Don1 still expects to see reduced loss of livelihood assets and community transformation as measures of DRR success in the country. There is, therefore, a mismatch between Don1's expected DRR results and where her investments are being made.

**Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country:** In summary and in comparison, section 5.6.5 showed that Don1 uses local/ grassroots -level indicators to measure DRR success, while in this section, analysis has shown that Don1's desired changes (as a result of highly effective DRR in the country) are all focused at the higher level--the national level. Being a donor, these desired changes may be partly explained by recent changes in Kenya's economic status. Kenya's Vision 2030 aspires to have double-digit growth rates and attain middle-income country status by 2030. Indeed,

on **30 September 2014**, Kenya effectively joined the ranks of middle-income countries, sixteen years ahead of schedule (UNDP, 2018)! The country's new economic status (in which aid is being reduced) may therefore partly explain Don1's quest to see a Kenya that is taking ownership of its DRM (and DRR) agenda, coordinating better, and allocating adequate resources to the country's drought risk management agenda. One would hope that when these desired changes become a reality, this would subsequently translate into better prioritisation and support to the empowering CCB4DRR.




Figure 5. 10 A Mind Map of Don1 Findings

## 5.7 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 5 –Don2

Don2 is one of the Far East donors with strong use of technical volunteers deployed to its overseas development missions.

### 5.7.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?

During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include ‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of Don2’s response to the question revealed that the agency’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under three of the four broad categories, namely: ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘government-focused priorities’, and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. The ensuing presentation of analysis and discussion follows the same sequence, and therefore starts with ‘community-focused DRR priorities’.

#### ***Community-focused DRR priorities***

Within her community-focused priorities, Don2 presented two sub-areas of focus, and these are ‘**community managed DRR (CMDRR)**’, and ‘**building local level partner capacity**’. On community managed DRR, Don2 explained,

*Back in 2011, Don2 decided to support Northern Kenya, specifically Marsabit and Turkana counties. We had a project known as ECORAD. ECORAD is **Enhancing Community Resilience Against Drought in Marsabit and Turkana**...So we did it Marsabit, where we worked with communities. The project had about four outputs, which were **sustainable natural resource management**, under this, we focused on water resources, how and where these communities are sourcing their water from. We also mapped out these water resources. We had the **livestock value chain** where we were working with communities in developing market facilities, supporting the associations of livestock keepers and of course supporting communities in terms of pasture management.*

### ***Government-focused DRR priorities***

Still describing the different areas of focus for their ECORAD project, Don2 further stated,

*And then there is an output on **capacity development of government officers** both at the local level and even at the national level. By that time, Kenya had not really fully devolved and therefore we did not have counties as such.*

### ***Cross-cutting DRR priorities***

Don2 further indicated that “Normally what happens with Don2 is that before we commit any resources into a programme, **we conduct a study** which will inform future interventions. So ECORAD is a project in the sense that we are supporting communities, but it is also a study on our part to understand the issues and identify where there are gaps for future interventions.”

As a result of their DRR-related studies to inform future programming, Don2 cheerfully partly stated that “...we needed to understand the Turkanas, and using the CMDRR tool borrowed from EU, we were able to work with communities to understand their needs... We also had a study on water resource potential in Turkana and based on that study, Don2 made a decision to put in more resources and focus only on Turkana County...Currently, as I am talking to you, we have a new phase of ECORAD that is focusing only on Turkana County.”

Intrigued by Don2’s mention of using CMDRR tools to study the needs of the Turkana community, the researcher asked Don1, ‘what is CMDRR?’ And Don2 explained,

*CMDRR is a community development tool where you are working with communities to allow them an opportunity to decide what is good for themselves. So you sit down with communities, and for example if there is drought and they are suffering from many challenges you work out the solutions with them. The end product of that would be a community action plan, which states that these are the areas that we will need your support, and these are the things that we can do ourselves. So that was the product, we got the community action plans,*



*and based on those action plans we were able to identify what we could do based on the available resources.*

In concert with Don2's foregoing definition of CMDRR, McKnight and Kretzmann (1997, pp. 2, 17) assert that development must start from within the community, for communities cannot be developed from the top down, or from the outside in. They further argue that communities have never been built upon their deficiencies; rather, community development has always depended upon mobilizing the capacities and assets of a people and a place. This is a notion supported by Chambers (1998, p. 289) who in his seminal work '**whose reality counts?**' remarks that the "*the challenge is to enable poor and marginalized people to analyse their conditions and identify their priorities in ways which freely express their realities, and generate proposals that are doable, credible and persuasive...*"

In yet another of his works, Chambers (1995, p. 199) observes that "*much of the challenge is to give up power. It is to enjoy handing over the initiative to others, enabling them to do more and to do it more in their way, for their objectives.*"

Apart from conducting community-focused research to inform future DRR interventions, the analysis further shows that Don2 is engaged in a wide range of DRR related cross-cutting research.

*We are supporting the forest sector in different parts of the country...We are working with both Kenya Forest Service and Kenya Forest Research Institute (KEFRI) to conduct some research...we will be supporting Prosopis management. Prosopis is a plant that has been proven to work very well in maintaining groundwater, and besides that, it is also an opportunity for income generation for communities"*

In summary, the analysis showed that Don2 has very strong prioritisation and support to community capacity building for DRR through her approach of using CMDRR. Don2 is engaged in CMDRR to the level where her technical staffs get directly involved in working with communities in CMDRR. Don2 was the only donor interviewed that indicated doing own grassroots studies to inform own DRR programming. Don2, therefore, exhibited very strong prioritisation and support for local DRR action.

### 5.7.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?

While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised under ‘externally looking’, ‘internally looking’ and ‘not involved’ criteria; analysis revealed that Don2 uses externally and internally looking criteria to select its DRR priorities.

#### ***Externally Looking Selection Criteria***

Analysis showed that part of Don2’s externally looking selection criteria for her DRR support priorities includes ‘**seeking to align with national government data and priorities**’, ‘**seeking complementarity with peer agencies initiatives**’ and ‘**using evidence gleaned from in-country studies, surveys, assessments and gaps analysis**’.

On **seeking to align with national government data and priorities**, Don2 explained,

*According to our systems, we require the Government Ministry to make a proposal to Don2 and say these are the areas we think you can support...The Government makes a proposal to Don2 but it doesn’t come directly to Don2. It goes to the embassy of Don2. Once the proposal has been received by our embassy, we will have further consultation in what is known as policy dialogue forum where Don2 and the embassy would meet the national treasury and the specific sector that prepared the proposal...We look at it, have some consultations, and agree that our resources can allow us to do this much... then this is forwarded through our hierarchy for approval.*

On **seeking complementarity with peer agencies**, Don2 explained,

*“We have other development partners doing different things. So we work within that framework knowing very well that there is another development partner who is supporting this area and we complement. The idea is to complement not to compete against with others.”*

By this, Don2 meant the agency also considers what is already being done/ or being supported by peer agencies, and therefore tries to find out whether there are existing gaps which Don2 could work on to complement and therefore increase the effectiveness of what's already being done by peer DRR stakeholders in a given area.

**On using evidence gleaned from in-country studies, surveys, assessments and gaps analysis** to inform the selection of agency DRR priorities, Don2 explained,

*“Normally, what happens with Don2 is that before we commit any resources into a programme, we conduct a study which will inform future interventions.”* And Don2 further explained with an example. *“We also had a study on water resource potential in Turkana, and based on that study, Don2 made a decision to put in more resources and focus only on Turkana County. Currently, as I am talking, we have a new phase of ECORAD [Enhancing Community Resilience Against Drought] that is focusing only on Turkana County.*

As part of using evidence from assessments and gaps analysis, Don2 also emphasised the use of CMDRR methodologies to come with community prioritised DRR actions. Don2 explained,

*CMDRR is a Community development tool where you are working with communities to allow them an opportunity to decide what is good for themselves. So you sit down with communities, and for example, if there is drought and they are suffering from many challenges, you work out the solutions with them. The end product of that would be a community action plan, which states that these are the areas that we will need your support, and these are the things that we can do ourselves.*

Don2 is one of the most visible donors in the country and brings with it great DRR expertise into supported countries. The donor also has an approach of using volunteers from the home country to directly work with Don2's supported communities. Part of Don2's DRR rigour is found in its perpetual in-country DRR needs assessments/ surveys and gaps analysis. Don2 further explained,

*Needs surveys, like I told you, is a process and more or less a continuous process. So what is required from this office, is once in a while, like in three months, we*

*submit it to our headquarters. However, the process itself is ongoing. And right now, as I am speaking, we are in consultation with Kenya school of agriculture with the view of supporting them in the near future. This is part of our needs survey consultation. The thing about needs survey consultation is that it doesn't have to result in a project. It is sort of just sourcing for information. We collect as much information as possible and then we go to a stage where we identify which are the neediest areas. We are basically prioritizing. And then in a span of say three months, we will forward this to our headquarters. It is more or less a continuous process.*

### ***Internally looking Selection Criteria***

Analysis showed that part of Don2's internally looking selection criteria for her DRR support priorities includes guidance from Don2's country assistance strategy paper, seeking to align with agency comparative advantage, the lesson from previous projects and security considerations.

Don2 explained,

*After every three years, Don2 has what is known as the country assistance strategy...it basically identifies the sectors that Don2 is ready to support. It identifies the resources available and the expertise available from Don2. What informs this country assistance strategy is the needs survey...Throughout our stay in the country, we interact with government side and identify support needs by continuously consulting with them...So our country strategy for Kenya, for example, is based on the needs that were identified during the needs surveys.*

This explanation helps shows the link between Don2's continuous in-country DRR needs assessments, how evidence therefrom informs the development of Don2's three-year cycle country assistance support strategy, and then how the country assistance support strategy becomes the bedrock upon which all other DRR priorities are built with the 3-year strategy support cycle. The most impressive thing about Don2 is the way their country support assistance strategy developed. It is deeply rooted in continuous needs assessments and own agency studies.

While explaining factors influencing how Don2 decided which DRR priorities to support in Kenya, Don2 further highlighted,

*Different countries have different needs, some of them are common, and others are not common. So you look at the needs and then you look at where you have a comparative advantage.*

Don2 also indicated how security is a key consideration when deciding which geographical area to prioritise, and different geographical areas have varied DRR support needs.

*Turkana is one area where the effects of drought are most felt, and that is agreeable across the board. That aside, we have other factors that Don2 also considers. You know, for many years we have not been in Northern Kenya, mainly because of security issues. So looking at those factors, security factors, in particular, we would not go to other counties. Turkana became a bit convenient because it is not very insecure. So we also look at such factors because we are sending to the place expatriates (meaning staffs and volunteers from Don2's home country) and we need to take care of their safety.*

And lastly, Don2 indicated the agency evaluates her community resilience-building DRR projects, draws lessons and decides what has shown good results that need to be scaled up. *"We are using our earlier approaches and studies to upscale and geographically work within wider areas."*

In summary, Don2 has robust criteria for selecting her in-country DRR priorities. While she liaises with NDMA to determine priority geographic areas, Don2 conducts own grassroots studies, engages in continuous needs surveys to determine where to focus DRR investments, and builds on lessons from previous resilience-building DRR projects to inform on-going DRR priorities. This is, therefore, a highly engaged donor agency that works well at both national and community level.

### 5.7.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks

In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic compilations and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment reports. Are you aware of these reports?”

To the above question, Don2 responded,

*Personally, I have not been privy to the details, but I know there are those documents. Like I informed you, there is a person who is responsible for this sector and she is the one who has been pursuing this line of discussion. There are those documents, and as an office, we are definitely aware of it, but as a person, I have not had time to interact with the documents myself.*

When the researcher inquired about the specific title or designation of the person who would know more about HFA, Don2’s research participant explained,

*We have an officer responsible for climate change, we call it climate change sector. Her title is Project Formulation Advisor. She is responsible for this and I am sure if she was available she would give you detailed information on this Hyogo framework. I am aware that during the process before the end of the Hyogo framework and the new Sendai Framework, Don2 as an organization was actively involved in the processes. In fact, we interacted with the Government of Kenya in supporting them to come up with a position and even facilitated their travel to Japan. I am aware that we had discussions at various forums where the government of Kenya participated, and Don2 supported and facilitated the processes. I am aware of all these, but I may not have the details.*

Unfortunately, subsequent efforts to reach the mentioned Project Formulation Advisor were not successful. However, when Don2's participant was asked: ***“Do you think the Hyogo framework and the Sendai Framework have any influence on what Don2 does in Kenya or not?” Don 2 revealed,***

*It has a lot of influence. Like I mentioned to you, at this level (meaning Don2's department of agricultural, to which this participant belonged) a lot of our discussions with the government of Kenya side are informed by documents that are available, for instance, the strategy for agriculture, policy documents, etc. At a higher level, the Sendai Framework informs the discussions at that level. So yes, the Sendai framework informs our decisions and a lot of consultations that happen.*

In summary, Don2 is one of the donors that supported the Kenya government delegation to participate in the Sendai Conference that culminated into the 2015 fifteen-year SF4DRR. While the participant was not the lead DRR person for the agency and had not had ample time to interact with the SF4DRR documents, it was still impressive to note he was aware of processes that led to SF4DRR and make a link of how SF4DRR documents form part of the body of documents referenced even by his department when interacting with the government's Ministry of Agriculture.

#### **5.7.4 Funding for CCB4DRR**

As already indicated in preceding case studies and the Literature Review Chapter, studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) revealed a concerning truth where a tiny portion of development assistance funding trickles down to DRR, and the trickle to DRR itself is more biased toward disaster preparedness and response and not to resilience-building DRR activities. Nudged by revelations from these studies, this research considered it essential to examine the state of overall DRR funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.

Asked about how much of the agency's disaster management funding goes to DRR, Don2's research participant responded,

*“We have not specifically identified and separated that this is the fund that goes to DRR. Unfortunately, that is an exercise that may take some time, but we can do that.”*

As already mentioned, efforts to reach Don2’s Project Formulation Advisor were not successful. Consequently, the inquiry on how much of Don2’s funding goes to DRR and to CCB4DRR was therefore not brought to conclusion, and nor was there any literature with this kind of data to help make informed conclusions.

Asked whether there are any resources dedicated to community capacity building for DRR, Don2 quickly pointed out,

*Yes, of course we do! You remember, I mentioned the CMDRR. It is exactly that. Although I may not exactly tell you that this is the proportion of the budget that went into that component (CMDRR) because that’s a component that cuts across other components. For example, when we are establishing a water facility in a certain site, we will work with these communities to understand their challenges, and then we will support the community to come up with a management committee that will manage the facility. So when we are interacting with communities using the CMDRR, we will work with the communities at different levels and at the same time develop the water facility. The point I am trying to put across is that CMDRR or community development support goes alongside other components of our projects. They work together and this is why it may be difficult to say specifically this proportion of the budget was for CMDRR and this percentage for water facility development. They are all put together.*

When asked to use a scale of 1-10 (where 10 is the highest score) and provide a score that represents the extent to which Don2 prioritises community capacity building for disaster risk reduction, Don2 explained,

*If I am talking about the specific project in DRR, then community capacity development has a very important place. However, I will hesitate to look at the importance of community capacity development in terms of budget allocation. For example, if you are developing a water facility here, you know infrastructure takes a lot of money and you say only 5% will go into capacity development of*



*the community, which may give you an impression that community capacity development is not that important. But that is not the case, because you cannot do it the other way round where you put 95% into developing committees and associations and working with communities and then use 5% to develop an infrastructure. It wouldn't make sense. So I would hesitate to prioritise in that manner. But there is no doubt that community capacity development is an essential part of DRR, without which even all this investment may account for nothing.*

And to drive home the point of not equating the proportion of budget support to CCB4DRR to the overall DRR budget, Don 2 shared the following example,

*And we have so many examples of such things happening in northern Kenya and specifically in Turkana because communities there are pastoralists. We have had cases where somebody has come and put up a very good facility, a water point, but for the whole year, nobody uses it because the community has moved to Uganda to look for pasture. So if you had worked with the community you would know when they go to Uganda and which routes they pass. So if you must do that intervention, you would know that I need to put it along with their routes, and the routes are also identified in terms of seasons. Some routes may not be used until a certain season. So that is how important working with communities is. If you look at it in terms of budget, it will give you a totally different picture but still, it is very important.*

And to emphasize Don2's different ways of working compared to peer agencies, Don2 asserted,

*For Don2, working with the communities has always been very important, not just for DRR, but virtually in all our activities. For many years, we would have very many development partners working at very high levels, the national level, but on the ground, you do not see them. **For Don2, it is the other way round. You would find our interaction at the higher level only limited to those important things that must be done at the higher level while most of our interaction goes to the grass root level and is informed by what the communities themselves***

***have prioritised.*** So you must interact with communities to identify what their needs are. For many years, Don2 has prioritized community capacity development, so no doubt, it is a very important area for us.

Asked to explain how Don2's community engagement is organised and managed, Don2 explained,

*It is very interesting because the way you are describing an implementing agency is exactly what Don2 is. We are on the ground working directly with communities while at the same time we are a donor agency in the sense that we have resources which are sourced from the Don2 public to Kenya.*

Don 2 continued to explain how actual implementation on the ground looks like.

*As I am speaking right now we have experts, Don2 experts (from Don2 home country) on the ground working with the communities. The CMDRR I am talking about is conducted by the Don2 experts on the ground. So we are implementing, but that does not mean that we do not outsource some activities. Because particularly for CMDRR, getting an expert from Don2 country to come and engage communities in Turkana may pose a lot of challenges not only to the expert, but also he/she may miss out on quite a number of things because you need a person who understands the community better. So we have a number of local partners whom we are working with specifically on CMDRR. When it comes to infrastructure development, we would contract some local firms to do quite a number of works. So yes, we contract some work and at the same time we also implement, so it is both ways.*

In summary, while Don2 was not able to share ready figures of how much of her development funding to Kenya goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, the agency provided a plausible argument cautioning against judging the place of CCB4DRR in the big scheme of DRR especially for agencies that support of a lot of DRR infrastructural development. The argument is based on the fact that infrastructural DRR projects are capital intensive and even the smallest % funding support to CCB4DRR around these projects translates into adequate funding for CCB4DRR purposes. However, there's agreement the % proportion of development assistance funding that translates into resilience building

DRR is very key. It's from this % proportion that either CCB4DRR is and or is not supported. And because Don2 is engaged in working directly with target communities using CMDRR approaches, there is no doubt she is one of the donors with the highest prioritisation and support to local DRR action including CCB4DRR in the country.

### 5.7.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?

For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 2 broad categories, namely:

- iii. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and
- iv. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.

And for Don2, the analysis revealed that the organisation uses two indicators to measure DRR success. The two indicators include **'community & local government feedback and recommendations on project outcomes'** and **'Don2's willingness to replicate or scale up a project.'** The two indicators fall under the broad category of "measures focused on local-level DRR success".

Asked how as an agency Don2 measures the effectiveness and success of its contribution to the country's DRR agenda, Don2's research representative stated,

*If you look at the report of the last phase of ECORAD, we allowed beneficiary communities and the government to measure 'how do you think this was effective?' and the outcome, of course, was that they think that it was very effective and they wanted ECORAD spread firstly across the beneficiary counties and then to other counties. So as an organisation, we feel it has been very effective and in fact, that explains why we are using our earlier approaches and studies to upscale and geographically work within wider areas. So yes, we think it has been very effective and there is even a need to continue with the same approach.*

In summary, because Don2 has direct engagement with communities in implementing DRR actions, she focuses her attention on community and local government feedback to assess the extent to which implemented projects are deemed to have been successful. This approach is supported by Robert Chambers's community development thesis of 'whose reality counts?: putting the last first' (Chambers, 1995). In this work, Chambers fervently argues that if the poor and weak are not to see efforts of the so-called development agencies and their global summits as a celebration of hypocrisy, signifying not sustainable well-being for them but sustainable privilege for us (the so-called development agencies), **the key is to enable them to express their reality, to put that reality first and to make it count.** And Chambers further asserts, 'to do that demands altruism, insight, vision and guts.' Going by Chambers caution, it was encouraging to note Don2's insight and guts by prioritising 'beneficiary community feedback' a top indicator when assessing the extent to which her DRR efforts are either a success or a failure.

#### **5.7.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?**

The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out **where** or **at what level** both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR seriously, reduced hazard impacts, and lastly, things that need to be stopped. Data analysis assigned Don2's response to 6 of the 9 categories, namely: **better resource allocation, improved coordination, better DRR comprehension and integration, reduced hazard impacts, improved DRR governance and things that need to be stopped.** The analysis and discussion try to follow that order.

#### ***Improved Coordination for Improved Resource Allocation***

Asked ‘what specific changes or improvements Don2 would like to see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country’, Don2’s response started with an appreciative approach by highlighting what’s already in place: *“The changes started much earlier. The country has been working to reform the support that addresses drought issues, specifically setting up institutions like NDMA, and coming up with a common strategy for every partner which even Don2 subscribes to, the EDE (Ending Drought Emergencies). That in itself is a very good step in the right direction.”*

And following this appreciation, Don2 launched into areas whose improvements have the potential to result in greater DRR effectiveness in the country. And improved resource allocation was top on Don2’s list. *“In terms of making DRR work in this country, there is definitely a need for more resources. There is need to invest more and allocate resources better because some of the challenges that this country has faced for a very long time is that you will find many development partners working in one specific area at the expense of others, clearly telling you that there is very little coordination happening. Of course, the government has already reformed that; they have set up the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) that tries to coordinate all the interventions and together with support from development partners, NDMA is really working very well.*

Don2 believes that better Disaster Risk Management (DRM) coordination in the country will lead to better DRR resource allocation. **The focus here is therefore on better DRM coordination for better resource allocation.** This is expected to happen through better stakeholder coordination for proportionate geographic targeting--- leading to the eventual spread of aid agencies across the most vulnerable geographical areas, as opposed to situations where some areas get over-served with others remaining grossly underserved by aid agencies.

### ***Improved Coordination for Harmonisation of Implementation Approaches***

In addition to the desired need for improved stakeholder coordination whose objective is eventual better resource allocation across geographical areas, **Don2 also pointed out the need for improved coordination with the objective of harmonising**

**different stakeholder implementation approaches.** Don 2 explained:

*Lack of coordination has meant that every development partner comes up with their own ideas, with their own methodologies and with their own tools. So that every time one development partner comes to a certain village, they come with their own idea of community development and setting up structures that are only suitable to their way of working.*

And citing an example, Don2 further explained the challenges of using different approaches:

*And there are those development partners who for one reason or the other chose to give handouts whether material or monetary. For Don2's case, we have had an issue with that. **We do not think handouts really enhance resilience.** It is not sustainable. You need to involve the people. The people need to work through the intervention so that they see their product. Because if you just bring the handout whether it is food or money, they may not understand how to address their issues. With coordination, the little resources available would be used more effectively.*

Don2 would, therefore, like to see better coordination of stakeholder approaches leading to weeding out ideas and approaches that undermine resilience building.

### ***Better DRR Comprehension and Integration***

Under this broad category of 'Better DRR Comprehension and Integration', Don2 asserted, *"And then, of course, there is a need to balance between short, mid-term and long-term interventions. You will find in as much as everybody wants to have those long term interventions for sustainability purposes, once in a while we are caught off-guard, then there is a need for emergency support which really tells you that all the work that has been done before may not be good enough. **Every time there is a need for emergency and you see that communities and institutions are not resilient, it tells you that the work that was done before needs some strengthening** and you need to put in some more resources on doing it better."*

In the foregoing assertion, Don2 highlighted the desired need to see key stakeholder improve their comprehension of DRR concepts leading to increased integration of 'resilience-building DRR' into every aspect of development programming. This is a concept Boshier (2013, p. 242) describes as '**built-in resilience.**' Boshier suggests that built-in resilience is a quality of anything to keep adapting to existing and emergent threats.

### ***Reduced Hazard Impacts***

Data under this broad category was arranged under three sub-categories, one of them being 'reduced impacts of drought'. Within this parameter, Don2 explained, *"There is still a need to elevate the position of drought challenges so that it is prioritised at the highest level and addressed at the global level. Once that is done, it means more resources will come to address the issues of drought."*

### ***Improved DRR governance***

Still expounding on specific changes and or improvements Don2 would like to see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country, Don2 pointed out,

*Of course, there are other challenges. Like devolution is still very new in the country, and there are those teething problems, for instance, counties think that they need to hold on to resources, thinking they need to be the ones to safeguard their own resources. They are not so happy when they see every resource going through national government and then straight to communities. They want that money to be channelled through the county government, which is understandable because that is the whole idea about devolution. But then again, there are institutions which have already been put in place, and in my opinion, they need to be respected, we need to respect the systems, even as we strengthen the county government system.*

Because Don2 is one of the donor agencies that support the NDMA, and NDMA has devolved branches at County Level, Don2 is eager to see NDMA implement through its county-level branches without being caught into actual county government bureaucracies that tend to silt and trap already limited funds at that level.

### ***Things that need to be stopped***

As already mentioned above, Don2 had lamented: *“And there are those development partners who for one reason or the other chose to give handouts whether material or monetary. For Don2’s case, we have had an issue with that. We do not think handouts really enhance resilience. It is not sustainable. You need to involve the people. The people need to work*

*“We do not think handouts really enhance resilience. It is not sustainable. You need to involve the people. The people need to work through the intervention so that they see their product.”*

*---Don1---*

*through the intervention so that they see the product.* By inference and practice, Don2 was suggesting that these stakeholders should ‘stop giving out handouts for they undercut the spirit behind community resilience building.’

Also, by inference, Don2 was suggesting ‘stop allowing the country government from silting and trapping already meagre resources at the county government level’.

In summary, Don2 identified 6 areas where she would like to see change when DRR has been successful in the country. Coordination was top on the list with duo objectives of resulting in better resource allocation to the most deserving communities and leading to increased adoption of harmonised resilience-building DRR approaches when working with communities. Don2’s desired changes reflect community resilience building thinking and have all the hallmarks of CCB4DRR. This is, for instance, the more reason Don2 decried the practice of doling out handouts on the part of some DRM stakeholders.

### **5.7.7 Comments on ‘upper Vs local DRR support’**

For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured interview guide asked the following question, “What would be your comments on growing literature that seems to suggest there’s inadequate support to community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?”



Responding to the question, Don2's research participant affirmatively stated,

*It is very true, and it boils down to prioritization. Government institutions have not been there (meaning they previously didn't exist). Now they exist at higher levels at the expense of where support is most needed. So, if you go to the community, you don't feel the institutions, they are not there...For many years, we would have very many development stakeholders working at very high levels, the national level, but on the ground, you do not see them. For Don2, it is the other way around.*

In summary, Don2's comments agree with findings from the literature on the big gap between high-level rhetoric and poor support for local level action.

#### **5.7.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this research may be used.**

Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading as follows: "There's ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would Don2 be willing to use this kind of evidence?"

Don1 positively responded, *"That is very true, and this is what I was saying a few minutes ago, that for a very long time, many development partners ignored or did not prioritise community engagement. These agencies would come in and for instance say, 'this is what is needed, you need a livestock market here, so let's start putting up the infrastructure'. Only to realise two years down the line, nobody has ever used that infrastructure. Why? Because you did not consult the community."*

When asked to explain ways in which the agency would be willing to use this kind of evidence, Don2 explained, *"This research will help to affirm and strengthen our on-going support to local DRR action through our CMDRR approaches."*

There's, therefore, willingness on the part of Don2 to use findings from this research.

### 5.7.9 Overall comments

**DRR priorities:** In summary, the analysis showed that Don2 has very strong prioritisation and support to community capacity building for DRR through her approach of using CMDRR. Don2 is engaged in CMDRR to the level where her technical staffs get directly involved in working with communities in CMDRR. Don2 was the only donor interviewed that indicated doing own grassroots studies to inform own DRR programming. Don2, therefore, exhibited very strong prioritisation and support for local DRR action.

**Criteria for selecting priorities:** In summary, Don2 has robust criteria for selecting her in-country DRR priorities. While she liaises with NDMA to determine priority geographic areas, Don2 conducts own grassroots studies, engages in continuous needs surveys to determine where to focus DRR investments, and builds on lessons from previous resilience-building DRR projects to inform on-going DRR priorities. This is, therefore, a highly engaged donor agency that works well at both national and community level.

**Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks:** In summary, Don2 is one of the donors that supported the Kenya government delegation to participate in the Sendai Conference that culminated into the 2015 fifteen-year SF4DRR. While the participant was not the lead DRR person for the agency and had not had ample time to interact with the SF4DRR documents, it was still impressive to note he was aware of processes that led to SF4DRR and make a link of how SF4DRR documents form part of the body of documents referenced even by his department when interacting with the government's Ministry of Agriculture.

**DRR Funding:** In summary, while Don2 was not able to share ready figures of how much of her development funding to Kenya goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, the agency provided a plausible argument cautioning against judging the place of CCB4DRR in the big scheme of DRR especially for agencies that support of a lot of DRR infrastructural development. The argument is based on the fact that infrastructural DRR projects are

capital intensive and even the smallest % funding support to CCB4DRR around these projects translates into adequate funding for CCB4DRR purposes. However, there's agreement the % proportion of development assistance funding that translates into resilience building DRR is very key. It's from this % proportion that either CCB4DRR is and or is not supported. And because Don2 is engaged in working directly with target communities using CMDRR approaches, there is no doubt she is one of the donors with the highest prioritisation and support to local DRR action including CCB4DRR in the country.

**Ways of measuring success:** In summary, because Don2 has direct engagement with communities in implementing DRR actions, she focuses her attention on community and local government feedback to assess the extent to which implemented projects are deemed to have been successful. This approach is supported by Robert Chambers's community development thesis of 'whose reality counts?: putting the last first' (Chambers, 1995). In this work, Chambers fervently argues that if the poor and weak are not to see efforts of the so-called development agencies and their global summits as a celebration of hypocrisy, signifying not sustainable well-being for them but sustainable privilege for us (the so-called development agencies), **the key is to enable them to express their reality, to put that reality first and to make it count.** And Chambers further asserts, *'to do that demands altruism, insight, vision and guts.'* Going by Chambers caution, it was encouraging to note Don2's insight and guts by prioritising 'beneficiary community feedback' a top indicator when assessing the extent to which her DRR efforts are either a success or a failure.

**Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country:** In summary, Don2 identified 6 areas where she would like to see change when DRR has been successful in the country. Coordination was top on the list with duo objectives of resulting in better resource allocation to the most deserving communities and leading to increased adoption of harmonised resilience-building DRR approaches when working with communities. Don2's desired changes reflect community resilience building thinking and have all the hallmarks of CCB4DRR. This is, for instance, the more reason Don2 descried the practice of dolling out handouts on the part of some DRM stakeholders.

Fig 5.11 (below) presents a mind map of Don2's overall findings.




Figure 5. 11 A Mind Map of Don2 Findings

## 5.8 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 6 – Don3

With a published expenditure of about US\$ 27million for the Kenya Country Programme in 2017, Don3 aims to address poverty, inequality and exclusion in an integrated and area-based approach supporting communities and government to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

### 5.8.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?

During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include ‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of Don3’s interview data triangulated with document reviews on the question revealed that the agency’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under two of the four broad categories, namely: **‘government-focused priorities’** and **‘community-focused priorities.’** Because Don3’s response to the question indicated a strong weave between support to both government institutions and local communities, the ensuing presentation of analysis and discussion has kept to the same woven format.

#### ***Government-focused and Community focused DRR Priorities***

Responding to the question: ‘which DRR priorities is Don3 presently supporting in Kenya?’ the DRR Advisor explained,

***We are looking at issues of capacity building and we are working at two levels: at the institutional level, that is with the government and institutions that are mandated for DRR. And then we are also working at the community level. Therefore a number of the things that we do will either be at the institutional or community level but some will cut across. Capacity building for example that looks at issues of preparedness targets both the institution and the community. So we are not only looking at Community-Based DRR but we are also looking at***

*what the capacity of Government is, to help the country be prepared and to respond in the event of disasters.*

The following excerpt from Don3's 2014-2018 Kenya Country Program Document corroborates with Don3's DRR Advisor's response to the question:

*Don3 aims to build the capacities of institutions, communities and vulnerable people, particularly women, to increase their resilience and reduce the risks and impacts of disasters, recurrent conflicts, violence and shocks, including from climate change.*

Asked to explain the rationale behind Don3's decision to engage with both government institutions and also directly with communities, the DRR advisor asserted,

*When it comes to disaster risk reduction, there is the responsibility that can only be undertaken at the upstream level-- the institutions and all these instruments that you need to effectively undertake your DRR. But then there is also work that needs to happen at the community level so it is really looking at how effective your work and your programming is going to be. I think this is what has informed the two levels of engagement.*

Don3 expounded further on institutional capacity building as follows:

*At Don3, we work a lot with the government. Government is our key implementing partner as well as our entry point. **When we talk of capacity building, we are looking at institutional frameworks, the legal frameworks that need to be in place as well as technical skills** other than just the knowledge.*

Having explained the agency's areas of capacity building focus for line government departments, Don3 highlighted areas of focus for community capacity building.

*For our community engagement, we prioritise two things, transfer of knowledge and giving the community skills. Under this, **we have used the concept of community-based DRR** through trainings that are designed for Community*

*based DRR. But then, **we are also looking at how we can increase their resilience to the various risks that they are exposed to.***

On support to community resilience building, Don3 continued to explain key areas of focus:

*This is when we actually do projects, community-based projects. So that if we are looking at issues of how we can enhance their capacity or their resilience to drought, then we are looking at projects that help them to minimize the impact of drought. If it is in the area of livestock, do they have sufficient water? Are they able to manage diseases or prevent diseases? If it comes to issues and aspects of food security, can they look at production systems that are not overly reliant on rainfall? That is what we are looking at. For some, we also look at alternative forms of livelihoods. If the predominant source of livelihood is very much exposed, then what else can they do? **So there is the aspect of resilience building and moving them away from the exposure** as well as just giving them the knowledge.*

Expounding on the big picture of Don3's capacity building content to communities, the DRR advisor further explained,

*Our capacity building involves training, and sometimes it involves the necessary equipment or tools. It is not just training but the whole package that enables the community to do what they need to do and as well as initiating tangible projects around the community...We have had very specific capacity building in terms of the concept of community-based disaster risk reduction...we also do capacity building specific to build certain skills and knowledge in technical areas that enhances their resilience. So that goes with the tangible projects that we are undertaking. For instance, if we are doing irrigation farming, we do capacity building around the farming; if we are working with pastoralists on livestock production then we undertake capacity building that enables them to do that particular thing.*

Don3 started her response to the question on the agency's current DRR support priorities by stating '**We are looking at issues of capacity building and we are working at two levels...**' and equally closed her remarks on the questions by stating,



*One thing that I would say about capacity building is **we have attached a lot of importance to building capacity**, so you will find every component of work we do within the community there will always be an aspect of capacity building.*

In summary, Don3 has woven a strong DRR tapestry that provides technical support to government DRR departments while at the same time working directly with local communities using CMDRR approaches and where required supporting the implementation of resilience-building DRR projects. Analysis showed that Don3 is unquestionably another donor agency with a very strong commitment to working directly at the local community level. Because of her very strong commitment to community capacity building and the use of CMDRR approaches, it was evident that CCB4DRR is very high on her agenda.

### **5.8.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?**

While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised under ‘externally looking’, ‘internally looking’ and ‘not involved’ criteria; analysis revealed that Don3’s response falls under ‘externally looking’ and ‘internally looking’ criteria.

#### ***Externally looking selection criteria***

Explaining factors influencing how Don3 selects their DRR priorities, the DRR advisor reflected,

*It is a whole process...Government is our key implementing partner as well as our entry point. So when it comes to prioritisation on the larger geographic area, for example, the county, we prioritise together with the Government and we look at the level of exposure or impact of a certain disaster, the support that is already being issued, whether it is sufficient or whether there are gaps. That is how we*

*look at it in a bigger picture so that we are able to narrow down to the geographic area.*

Don3 further explained the next steps in the selection criteria process once larger target geographic areas have been jointly agreed through consultations with the government.

*Once we get to that area, we begin to work with the communities so as to pick the specific area. They are able to identify which is the specific community within this area that has been selected that we need to go to. It is an engagement that we get into, a kind of back and forth on 'what are the issues?' Who is most vulnerable? Who has not received any support? We work with the help of the local levels... We look at key gaps and how we may be able to support these very key gaps.*

#### ***Internally looking selection criteria***

In addition to the externally looking priorities selection criteria, Don3 also uses an internally looking priorities selection criteria. However, the analysis found that both the externally looking and internally looking criteria inform each other and are therefore mutually dependent. Don3 explained,

*We work under the bigger framework. We have our Country Programme Document (which is our strategy) that defines our priority areas---areas that we want to engage in. It sets our larger strategic direction and informs what we get engaged in and what we don't get engaged in. The Country Programme Document is aligned to the Government's medium-term plans... Once we have these broad areas defined, then we develop specific projects through which we address some of these components.*

With regard to what informs Don3's strategic choices within the Country Programme Document, Don3 explained,

*When we talk about the various priorities that need to be addressed within the country, we also look at "what are the key gaps?" Some assessments have been done that also help to identify key areas that need to be looked at. We did a rapid*

*assessment, I think in 2012 to identify the key gaps within DRR, and also conducted key players mapping. This helped to define some of the areas that we wanted to engage ourselves in. And we ask ourselves, “If we really want to see success in the area of DRR, how can we be able to support on these very key gaps that have been identified?”*

After indicating how overall DRR priorities are underpinned by the County Programme Document which sets the primary implementation framework, Don 3 highlighted how the finer details are arrived at:

*There is a common understanding that we are not able to do the entire spectrum. So it depends on our comparative advantage in terms of what we are able to undertake and the capacities that we have as Don3.*

In summary, Don3’s DRR priorities selection criteria include conducting gaps analysis to inform the Country Programme Strategy Document, collaborating with government to determine geographic areas of focus, working with counties to agree on priority local geographic areas and then working with target communities using CMDRR approaches to identify respective community DRR priorities. The priorities’ selection criteria are further guided by introspection to determine both available capacities and comparative advantage. Overall, it was worth noting that part of Don3’s priorities selection criteria includes working directly with prioritised communities to come up with community-selected DRR priorities using CMDRR approaches. Local level consultations are therefore part of the criteria used to determine Don3’s DRR priorities.

### **5.8.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks**

In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic

compilations and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment reports. Are you aware of these reports?”

In the affirmative, Don3 responded, *“Yes. I am aware of the Kenya reports that were always done at that time by the Ministry of State for Special programmes.”* And while Don3 acknowledged awareness of the then Country HFA progress reports, the DRR advisor also acknowledges, *“...in as much as the report gave the progress of what was happening, some of which we also provided input, the reports didn’t influence what we did...we used different mechanisms to identify some of the things that we needed to do.”*

It emerges therefore that while Don3 contributed to the then required country HFA progress reporting, consequential National HFA reports didn’t influence Don3’s priorities. It appears the government department responsible for these reports was more extractive to key stakeholders without making a deliberate effort to close the feedback loop with key stakeholders. Part of the feedback loop would have included identifying spaces for sharing the reports and using such spaces to highlight critical areas for great DRR value addition.

Asked whether Do3’s DRR advisor was conversant with the SF4DRR, the advisor responded with a very strong “yes” and almost in bullet point format proceeded to explain Don3’s uptake for SF4DRR:

*We are doing a lot as far as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is concerned.*

- ✓ *We participated and supported the government in preparation toward the Sendai Framework and we also sponsored government officials to participate in the conference.*
- ✓ *Soon after the conference, we supported the government together with other partners to begin to think “how do we roll out the Sendai Framework in Kenya?”*
- ✓ *And we worked with the other partners on an action plan on the implementation of the Sendai framework, which is still a draft because what we did we did not finish. We expected that the government was going to finalise and roll it out as an official document, but it is still the*

*document that is currently guiding some of the work that the national platform is doing.*

*So that is at the national level. Bringing it down to the counties:*

- ✓ *We have been working to roll out the Sendai framework. One is to raise awareness on this framework that it exists, that this is the content and that this is how we can begin to take it forward and that is what we are doing as Don3.*
- ✓ *We have worked with some specific counties and they actually have county action plans on how they can roll out the Sendai framework.*
- ✓ *So when we look at even the work we are doing now, it is to try and align ourselves on the priority areas of Sendai Framework.*
- ✓ *SF4DRR is one of the key things that we commit ourselves to... and supporting how it gets rolled out at the national and at the local level.*

In summary, Don3 is very much aware of SF4DRR and is a donor that is blazing the trail in supporting the government in the implementation of the framework. **At the national level**, Don3 has supported the government to come up with a draft SF4DRR action plan to guide the work of the national platform. **At County level**, Don3 has supported select counties to come up with County Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plans based on the SSF4DRR with budgetary allocation for the implementation of Climate Change/Disaster Risk Reduction interventions into key sectors focusing on Health, Water, and Infrastructure. Don3 has therefore done exceptional work in supporting the central government and county government institutions to understand SF4DRR and break it down into workable action plans. **And in-house**, Don3 has aligned itself to SF4DRR global priorities.

A review across Gaillard and Mercer (2013); Robertua (2013); UNISDR (2013a); UNISDR (2013b); Benicchio (2012); Djalante et al. (2012); Izumi and Shaw (2012); van Riet and van Niekerk (2012) ; Hagelsteen and Becker (2012); Scott and Tarazona (2011); J Twigg and Bottomley (2011); Kent (2011); Pelling (2007a); UNDP (2004) ; Walter (2004); Walter (2002); and Walter (2001) revealed consensus among these authors that while there continues to be a growing interest and focus on DRR,

**poor local capacity for DRR remains a major impediment to making required progress.**

The literature review had therefore observed the urgent need to address the gap between global DRR agendas, national level policies and strategies and local level risk reduction activities. It was very inspiring to note Don3's strategic decision to prioritize and support engagement with county governments around SF4DRR.

#### **5.8.4 Funding for CCB4DRR**

As already indicated in preceding case studies and the Literature Review Chapter, studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) revealed a concerning truth where a tiny portion of development assistance funding trickles down to DRR, and the trickle to DRR itself is more biased toward disaster preparedness and response and not to resilience-building DRR activities. Nudged by revelations from these studies, this research considered it essential to examine the state of overall DRR funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.

Asked about how much of the agency's disaster management funding goes to DRR, Don3's DRR advisor responded, *"That is a hard question...Honestly, I don't know what percentage...I do not have it now, it is information that I could look out for you."* (Unfortunately, follow up efforts to access this data did not yield results). In the absence of DRR-related funding data, Don3 still emphasised, *"One thing that I would say about capacity building is we have attached a lot of importance to building capacity, so you will find every component of work we do within the community there will always be an aspect of capacity building. So that for everything you would have transferred the necessary knowledge and the necessary skills because we are looking at in the longer term what would be beneficial to these people. So capacity building normally is a very central component of any of our projects."*

While Don3 didn't provide data on dedicated DRR funding, the researcher accessed a 2016 online report with a section dedicated to Don3's 2016 Kenya Programmatic Footprint. Under this section, DRR is included in the budget line including "environment, natural resource management, climate change, resilience and DRR" as

presented in **Fig.5.12**. This cumulative line item that includes DRR accounted for 32% of Don3 overall budget in 2016. It just remains unclear how much of this 32% is dedicated to DRR.

The clue to how much of the 32% went to DRR in that year may be found in one of Don3’s comments while reflecting on how much of Don3’s budget may actually be going to resilience-building DRR: *“You know DRR funding is not as large, particularly when it is almost coming from the same pot as humanitarian.”* Don3’s comment on how much of overall DRM funding goes to DRR is reflective of aforementioned study findings by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) who




Figure 5. 12 Don3's 2016 Kenya Programmatic Footprint Report

pointed out that a tiny portion of development assistance funding trickles down to DRR, and the little that trickles down to DRR is itself more biased toward disaster preparedness and response and not to resilience-building DRR activities.

While Don3 didn’t avail data in regard to how much of her funding goes to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her country programme document is explicit in providing direct support to communities toward building resilience and reducing risks to shocks. And Don3 emphasised the overall importance laid on capacity building in every Don3 community undertaking. In addition, it was comforting to find DRR listed in the cumulative budget

line item that accounts for 32% though it was not clear how much of the 32% actually went to DRR.

#### 5.8.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?

For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 2 broad categories, and the two categories were:

- iii. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and
- iv. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.

And for Don3, the analysis revealed two indicators by which the agency measures DRR success. The two indicators include **“immediate outputs”** and **“long-term outcomes.”**

Asked how as an agency Don3 measures the effectiveness and success of her contribution to the country’s DRR agenda, Don3’s DRR advisor responded,

*You can measure success depending on how you want to define it. One, **if it is a project, “have I delivered what I needed to deliver?”** That is one way in which you can measure your success. Two, and I think also which is what we are trying to look at is, **“in the longer term, are we seeing the necessary changes that we intended?”** ...And of course, then you know there are also contributions from other people. We are very particular when it comes to the results, the outcomes at a higher level. **Even in terms of our reporting, we will always be looking at “what are the changes that are coming out?”***

As part of the analysis, Don3’s response to the question was triangulated to her DRR priority areas which are mainly ‘government institutional CB4DRR’ and ‘community CB4DRR using CMDRR approaches.’ Don3’s measure of DRR success, therefore, looks at intended outcomes both at the national and community level. And community-level outcomes are expected from supported CMDRR activities.

In summary, the analysis showed that Don3 uses two indicators for measuring DRR success. These are ‘immediate project outputs’ and ‘long term outcomes or



required long-term changes.’ And based on her DRR priority areas which are mainly ‘government institutional CB4DRR’ and ‘community CB4DRR using CMDRR approaches’, it becomes clear that in addition to looking at long-term national-level results, Don3 also looks at long-term results from her CMDRR engagements.

#### **5.8.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?**

As already indicated in preceding case studies, the purpose behind this question was to indirectly find out **where** or **at what level** both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR seriously, reduced hazard impacts, and lastly, things that need to be stopped. Data analysis assigned Don3’s response to 3 of the 9 categories, namely: ‘**reduced hazard impacts**’, ‘**better DRR comprehension and integration**’ and ‘**better resource allocation**’. The analysis is presented in that order.

##### ***Reduced hazard impacts***

Asked ‘what specific changes or improvements Don3 would like to see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country’, the DRR advisor pointed out three areas starting with reduced hazard impacts.

*The moment DRR is effective, **one of the changes that we need to see is a reduction in the negative impact of disasters.** Be it economic, or break it down into the loss of lives and property. That is really what we want to see. Take drought, for example, I don’t think it is going to go anywhere, but we want to see less impact and fewer people being impacted by this.*

##### ***Better DRR comprehension and integration***

After explaining the desired need to see reduced hazard impacts, Don3 highlighted the need for better DRR comprehension and integration in the country.

*The moment we start seeing effective DRR, the other thing we are going to see is a change in the way we are doing our development...I will speak for Kenya, I will not speak for other countries. Not many people understand DRR. And a lot of people think DRR and humanitarian response are the same thing. Many people think it is the same thing...I think we are still very limited in the understanding of DRR and how to translate it into the practical things...Government is supposed to do DRR through different sectors: through agriculture, through livestock, water, etc. DRR should find its way down through most of the ministries, the technical line ministries. I think that is where there is a bit of a break, where we actually understand that you can re-configure your development to DRR so that whatever way you implement development you are actually reducing risks or you are already mitigating. I think that is really where the link breaks and so that even when you say allocate resources, I think because of that limited understanding of DRR, people do not even know how to allocate resources because we could do our normal work but in a way that is actually disaster risk reduction. So I think that is where the big break is.*

“Because of that limited understanding of DRR, people do not even know how to allocate resources.”

---Don3---



Figure 5. 13 Don3's analysis of causal links between DRR comprehension, DRR integration, DRR resourcing and overall DRR results

Don3’s reflections on the need for better DRR comprehension and integration corroborate with views from other expert sources including UNISDR (2011a) who emphasize that disaster risk reduction is an obligation for all, Amaratunga et al. (2018) who assert that a multi-stakeholder engagement is a key to for instance making a city resilient to disasters and a system needs to be properly established to involve all stakeholders to create disaster resilient cities; and Stein et al. (2018) who argue that prevention needs to be permanent, intentional, and everyone’s business, and would do

well to follow some of the lessons learned from disaster risk reduction such as the need for multi-stakeholder and multilevel engagement.

A related interview with NDMA further confirmed Don3's observations. The NDMA official asserted, *"Some organisations are either ignorant or do not even know what it takes to implement DRR... DRR is still a very fresh thing in our country and one may not easily understand what the programmable aspects of DRR are...Everybody wants to say as long as you are writing and using the word 'resilience' in there, it is okay."* This is the dilemma of meaningless buzzword epidemics within the development sector.

### ***Better resource allocation***

While explaining the need for better DRR comprehension and integration, Don3 identified a causal link between the level of DRR understanding and a level of resources allocation to DRR. The DRR advisor stated, *"I think because of that limited understanding of DRR, people do not even know how to allocate resources because we could do our normal work but in a way that is actually disaster risk reduction."*

Don3's desired changes are typical of a DRR stakeholder with a greater understanding of the country's present DRR architecture. Her comments on people's limited comprehension of the DRR concept leading to inadequate DRR integration into various development aspects, which in itself reduces the potential to, therefore, reconfigure development to DRR, thus resulting into poor resources allocated to DRR couldn't have delivered the analysis any better.

### **5.8.7 Comments on 'upper Vs local DRR support'**

For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured interview guide asked the following question, "What would be your comments on growing literature that seems to suggest there's inadequate support to community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?"

With no hesitation, Don3's DRR advisor responded, *"To a great extent, I would agree with that statement."* To clarify the comment, the DRR advisor further explained,

*I think the number of players thin out as we get down to the community.*

*Whatever is discussed, very*

*good frameworks and*

*directions are given globally*

*and regionally, but how that*

*is cascaded down is not very*

*clear. I think deliberate effort*

*to link right to the local level is still missing, something misses there. And I think*

*it is just because of the number of players. Resources that are available at the*

*local level for you to translate what is happening globally and regionally are also*

*very limited. This is a phenomenon GNDR (2009) summarised as "Clouds But*

*Little Rain," an image representative of lots of high level (global, regional, and*

*national) hype but with minimal local action and actual change.*

When asked to identify some of the root causes for the disconnect between upper (global, regional and notational) level DRR engagements and local/community level DRR engagements, Don3 explained,

*The greatest responsibility to translate what is happening at the global and at the higher level to the local lies with the government. I will not speak for other countries. I think we are still very limited in the understanding of DRR and how to translate it into practical things.*

In summary, Don3 agrees there's a missing link between upstream (global, regional and national) DRR engagements and downstream (local/community level) DRR engagements. And Don3 identified 'weak government comprehension of DRR' as a root cause for the missing link because without good DRR comprehension, the government remains unable to cascade all the upstream thinking to the local level. This partly explains the reason why one of Don3's DRR priorities in the country is institutional CB4DRR.

"I think deliberate effort to link right to the local level is still missing."

--Don3--

### 5.8.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this research may be used.

Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading as follows: “There’s ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would INGO3 be willing to use this kind of evidence?”

Don3 positively responded, *“If there is that evidence, why not? I think one of the challenges we have had is not being able to address the real issues. You actually mistarget in terms of identifying what the problem is so that you can be able to put in place the most appropriate intervention. And that is one statement that identifies some of the key problems, therefore, you are able to put in place the necessary.”*

When asked to explain ways in which the agency would be willing to use this kind of evidence, Don3 explained, *“To inform the work that we do in terms of targeting because it (meaning the research) identifies for you the areas around which you can design your programmes and allocate your resources. So I think it would inform a lot in terms of “how do you target the resources that you have?”*

Don3 is, therefore, another case donor that showed a willingness to use the evidence to especially improve how it targets its limited resources around various DRR gaps.

### 5.8.9 Overall comments

**DRR priorities:** In summary, Don3 has woven a strong DRR tapestry that provides technical support to government DRR departments while at the same time working directly with local communities using CMDRR approaches and where required supporting the implementation of resilience-building DRR projects. Analysis showed that Don3 is unquestionably another donor agency with a strong commitment to working directly at the local community level. Because of her very strong commitment to community capacity building and the use of CMDRR approaches, it was evident that CCB4DRR is very high on her agenda.

**Criteria for selecting priorities:** In summary, Don3's DRR priorities selection criteria includes conducting gaps analysis to inform the Country Programme Strategy Document, collaborating with government to determine geographic areas of focus, working with counties to agree on priority local geographic areas and then working with target communities using CMDRR approaches to identify respective community DRR priorities. The priorities selection criteria are further guided by introspection to determine both available capacities and comparative advantage. Overall, it was worth noting that part of Don3's priorities selection criteria includes working directly with prioritised communities to come up with community-selected DRR priorities using CMDRR approaches. Local level consultations are therefore part of the criteria used to determine Don3's DRR priorities.

**Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks:** In summary, Don3 is very much aware of SF4DRR, and is a donor that is blazing the trail in supporting the government in the implementation of the framework. **At the national level,** Don3 has supported the government to come up with a draft SF4DRR action plan to guide the work of the national platform. **At County level,** Don3 has supported select counties to come up with County Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plans based on the SSF4DRR with budgetary allocation for the implementation of Climate Change/Disaster Risk Reduction interventions into key sectors focusing on Health, Water, and Infrastructure. Don3 has therefore done exceptional work in supporting the central government and county government institutions to understand SF4DRR and break it down into workable action plans. **And in-house,** Don3 has aligned itself to SF4DRR global priorities.

A review across Gaillard and Mercer (2013); Robertua (2013); UNISDR (2013a); UNISDR (2013b); Benicchio (2012); Djalante et al. (2012); Izumi and Shaw (2012); van Riet and van Niekerk (2012) ; Hagelsteen and Becker (2012); Scott and Tarazona (2011); J Twigg and Bottomley (2011); Kent (2011); Pelling (2007a); UNDP (2004) ; Walter (2004); Walter (2002); and Walter (2001) revealed consensus among these authors that while there continues to be a growing interest and focus on DRR, **poor local capacity for DRR remains a major impediment to making required progress.** The literature review had therefore observed the urgent need to address the gap between global DRR agendas, national level policies and strategies and local level risk

reduction activities. It was very inspiring to note Don3's strategic decision to prioritize and support engagement with county governments around SF4DRR.

**DRR Funding:** While Don3 didn't avail data in regard to how much of her funding goes to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her country programme document is explicit in providing direct support to communities toward building resilience and reducing risks to shocks. And Don3 emphasised the overall importance laid on capacity building in every Don3 community undertaking.

**Ways of measuring success:** In summary, the analysis showed that Don3 uses two indicators for measuring DRR success. These are 'immediate project outputs' and 'long term outcomes or required long-term changes.' And based on her DRR priority areas which are mainly 'government institutional CB4DRR' and 'community CB4DRR using CMDRR approaches', it becomes clear that in addition to looking at long-term national-level results, Don3 also looks at long-term results from her CMDRR engagements.

**Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country:** Don3's desired changes are typical of a DRR stakeholder with a greater understanding of the country's present DRR architecture. Her comments on people's limited comprehension of the DRR concept leading to inadequate DRR integration into various development aspects, which in itself reduces the potential to, therefore, reconfigure development to DRR, thus resulting into poor resources allocated to DRR couldn't have delivered the analysis any better.

Fig. 5.14 below presents a mind map of Don3's Findings.




Figure 5. 14 A Mind Map of Don3 Findings



## 5.9 Analysis and Discussion of Factors and or Good Practice Concepts that Enabled OMO's Outstanding CCB4DRR Success

### Factors Responsible for OMO's Rare Successful CCB4DRR

A number of factors, which for this research will be referred to as 'good practice concepts' were found to have enabled OMO's rare, and therefore, outstanding CCB4DRR success. And according to Amaratunga et al. (2018), a sound or good practice can be considered as anything that has been tried and shown to work in some way—whether fully or in part, but with at least some evidence of effectiveness—and that may have implications for practice at any level elsewhere. OMO's good practice concepts (and or success enablers) were identified through the review and analysis of a number of sources. These sources included interviews with key informants (Bishop Dr Masika-founder and leader of OMO, OMO participants, learning tours groups to OMO, and government officials), published literature, and social media content on OMO.

The interview with Bishop Dr Masika (founder and leader of Yatta's OMO) which provides a thick and rich description of how OMO was founded and processes OMO went through before it would become probably the region's most renowned and visited CCB4DRR success story, is reproduced in its entirety with the permission of Bishop Masika, and presented as **Annexe 5**. The interview (Annexe 5) is therefore an excellent companion to the following analysis.

#### 5.9.1.1 Success Factor # 1: Made time to accurately diagnose community issues and DID NOT paratroop into the community with ready-made up solutions.

As noted in the background section to this case study, Yatta plateau had until 2009 suffered from severe food insecurity and *Mwolyo* had become deeply entrenched into people's minds. To address Yatta's *Mwolyo* phenomenon, therefore, required a

much deeper understanding of what the real issues were, lest one massaged the surface and ended up creating even more challenges for the community. In the words of Masika, *“you cannot change people's mindsets by an SMS. You have to sit with them, sitting with leaders, sitting with women, and feeling with them.”* This is the reason Masika (and his wife Agnes) left Nairobi---Kenya’s capital city—and stayed among the Yatta people with the sole intention of getting to understand what the root causes of people’s problems were. Among many other things, they *“wanted to understand how people think and why”*, explains Masika.

This in-depth immersion in the community made him (and his wife) acutely aware of key community challenges, their root causes, possible remedies, which interventions would do well to come first, and which approaches were best suited to the context. This dedicated stay among the Yatta community led to a number of anthropological findings that accurately informed the OMO response. Masika, therefore, became adequately informed and equipped for the challenge. And in all honesty, it appears this is where most well-intentioned community development agencies get it wrong. In the ‘the tyranny of the urgent’ (Hummel, 1994) where there’s a lot more to be done but very little time to even grasp how to best do it, many community development agencies (and their donors) find themselves misdiagnosing issues.

Simply put, the wrong diagnosis leads to wrong treatments and vice versa. While the death of one Yatta twin mother galvanised the urgency to find solutions for Yatta’s historical hunger and death episodes, Masika chose the important path of making time to quietly settle among the Yatta people and keenly diagnose the root of the problem. As will be reported in the ensuing narrative, **making time to accurately diagnose Yatta’s community developmental challenges** was a critical factor in laying the foundation for OMO’s eventual overwhelming success.

5.9.1.2 Success Factor # 2: Choice of interventions/ first things first.

Consequent to his deep immersion into the Yatta community, Masika came up with findings that informed the choice of interventions that were very dear to people's hearts. For instance, he was confronted with the sad reality of people especially women having to trek up to 20km to and fro remaining water points during the dry season. Relatedly, Masika remarks on one of his findings, *"the locals have a saying that the crops in Ukambani wither, and all they need is 'one rain' locally known as 'mwono umwe' to survive."* Commenting on factors behind Yatta's great OMO success, one government (NDMA) official easily observed, ***"The choice of interventions were very close to the people's hearts. The place is one of the driest, and the need for water was enormous. Starting by addressing the water issue and then linking it with food production was like fighting something you can see."*** Meaning, there were countless households willing to actively answer the rallying call to address the water issue.

OMO therefore began by laying emphasis on sustainable household water harvesting aimed at reducing distances travelled to water points and removing the dependency on *mwono umwe* for crop production. Addressing the water issue was, therefore, a top dream and priority by many, and Masika didn't have to spend too much energy convincing Yatta households to buy into his water harvesting ideas. OMO therefore strategically started with addressing the water issue, the prime need for every Yatta resident, as the first programmatic activity. And in the first year alone, more than 1,000 household water dams were excavated. To date, thanks to OMO, there are more than 4,000 functional household water dams in Yatta alone. Starting with interventions that had the potential

**Box 4: The First Miracle**

Seven months after we started, at the height of the dry spell, the people of Yatta witnessed the first miracle. While villages in the greater eastern region waited for rains to start planting, the people of Yatta were ready to harvest—and it was going to be one of the biggest harvest ever seen.

Agnes tells me that one lady, when she saw what was going on, asked her what they could do with the food. I am not a man of deep emotions, but a question like that drew my tears.

*Excerpt from Masika (2016, p. 141)*

Figure 2: The First Miracle

to translate into the fastest effects and impacts on OMO participants helped to steadily win many other households over to OMO. In a dry and thirsty land, it didn't need to take any convincing for people without ponds to quickly envy neighbours that had plenty of water during the dry season. The unthinkable but increasing scene of household dams full of water must have been a great advert that turned many sceptics around.

**5.9.1.3 Success Factor # 3: Starting from the simplest and smallest resources available.**

While explaining factors behind OMO's big success, a government (NDMA) official reflected, *"Water is the biggest problem in all of Yatta areas, and the choice of OMO technologies did not need big investments. People were starting from the simplest investments. Like, if they wanted to do a small pond, they would do it from their own resources or from their own energy."* One of OMO's first digressions from traditional development interventions was to reject crippling material interventions and lay emphasis on the need for a household to start small using just what they had---own tools and own labour. This meant that almost every household could get on board the OMO programme by developing their own small dam. And that is how in the first year of OMO, Yatta could boast of more than 1,000 functional household water dams---the first miracle of great proportions. These were the first steps walking away from *mwolyo* on rainy seasons.

In his seminal work on "Mindset Change for Community Transformation", Masika (2016, p. 73) recommends that African communities need to be helped to help themselves, for *"they need to explore resources and opportunities in their backyards before they invite external aid"*. Masika's recommendation resonates with McKnight and Kretzmann (1997) who remind us that history shows significant community development only takes place when local community people are committed to investing themselves and their resources in the effort. They are categorical that development must start from within the community, for communities cannot be developed from the top down, or from the outside in, p.2. They further argue that ***communities have never been built upon their deficiencies; rather, community development has always depended upon mobilizing the capacities and assets of a people and a place***, p.17.

McKnight and Kretzmann's arguments are corroborated by Eade (2007, p. 633) when she laments, *"The sad reality is that most development aid has precious little to do with building the capacities of 'The Poor' to transform their societies. Not even the best-intentioned NGOs are exempt from the tendency of the Development Industry to ignore, misinterpret, displace, supplant, or undermine the capacities that people already have."* Eade's lamentations are further corroborated by Moyo (2009) who in her seminal work titled "Dead Aid" firmly asserts that aid to the developing world, left the way it is, is the very disease of which it pretends to be the cure.

The ability to, therefore, mobilise Yatta participants to start small and use their own simple resources to develop household water dams was one of the critical ingredients behind OMO's eventual great success. Once the people noted how much they had accomplished with very little, they simply became unstoppable.

#### 5.9.1.4 Success Factor # 4: Mobilisation for a peer-to-peer collaborative spirit

Related to starting by using the simplest and smallest resources available toward community development, is the concept of **'pulling together'** or **'building a peer-to-peer collaborative spirit'**. How could

an emaciated population only surviving on random sympathetic handouts even think of taking on the arduous challenge of digging water pans? Masika (2016, pp. 81, 140) explains, *"On the day we introduced the concept of water pans, I could tell most women gathered were sceptical. First of all, there was the fear of disturbing ancestors. A taboo*

We have disabused the community of the notion that digging water pans could invite a curse because the deeper ground is home to ancestors and they don't like to be disturbed (Masika, 2016, p. 95).

It is during the DRR trainings that participants also realised if you don't help your neighbour solve his problem, that problem will affect you.

Source: interview with INGO3

*nobody was ready to mess up with. Then there was the fact nobody was strong enough to start digging a hole big enough to hold even a gallon of water, leave alone a deep water pan. We, however, explained how it would work. Basing our approach on the concept of the merry-go-round, which they were already familiar with, we introduced the concept of donated labour. On a given day, women were to come together and dig a water pan in one home, then they would go to the next home the next day. This process played out until many homes one by one established their water dams. Those baby steps led to bigger steps as we all embarked on more grandiose ideas.”*

There’s no doubt if it wasn’t for good mobilisation for the merry-go-round practice, the idea of digging water pans at the peak of a killer drought would not have seen the light of day. Yet everything hinged on community ability to harvest rainwater, and this wouldn’t have been possible unless the same communities prepared during the dry season. Thus

#### **Box 5: Testimony from Tanzania**

"The Mbuyuni farmers returned from Yatta with a new vision, and they began digging up a storm—120 water pans are underway. As in Makindube, they are forming small, powerful groups—27 so far—that will help them grow and sell their vegetables, save for their children’s future, and support one another. Their work has inspired their neighbours to dig their own pans. One mother of seven even began digging a water pan with her bare hands". Details of the cross-country trip from Tanzania to Yatta can be accessed via this

link: [http://test2.christianimpactmission.org/?page\\_id=21](http://test2.christianimpactmission.org/?page_id=21)

Figure 3: Testimony from Tanzania

**good community mobilisation on one hand and mobilisation for an African approach of working together via a practice commonly known as merry-go-round, on the other hand,** were twin success factors in accomplishing the first OMO challenge. And testimonies abound of how the Yatta merry-go-round success has been replicated by various groups upon completing learning tours to Yatta’s OMO.

#### **5.9.1.5 Success Factor # 5: Leadership**

Even from the preceding four success factors, one could decipher that great leadership is interwoven in the tapestry of OMO’s enormous success. During the analysis of OMO’s success factors, various leadership aspects stood out including leading from the front, visionary leadership and consistency in OMO’s leadership.

### **Leading from the front.**

Asked “why is it that we have never been able to do and achieve the kind of things OMO did and with almost no injection of external resources?” the (NDMA) government official reflected, *“I would say leadership is very important...Everything needs leadership and I think Masika has been able to lead from the front. And you know when you are leading a flock, you are leading everything. When you tell them to stop, they stop. You are there and you will see who has sat down. If you find one who has sat down, you lift him up and move together. That is one thing Masika has actually been able to do.”*

“Everything needs leadership and I think Masika has been able to lead from the front.”

Source: Interview with a Kenya Government Official

The analogy of a traditional shepherd going ahead of the flock as his sheep willingly and trustingly follow him couldn't have captured the essence of leading from the front any better. Masika stayed with the community, won their hearts over to OMO, showed Yatta participants what to do and was willing to make his hands dirty. When asked, “What is the most important resource or support that CIM provided to OMO?” Masika explained, *“I think leadership is the greatest thing and also the spirit of the movement. The other thing is building the momentum because a movement is controlled by the momentum, and you will have to give leadership so that the train does not move off the rails.”*

Leading from the front helped to keep the OMO train on its rails and was, therefore, one of the critical factors responsible for OMO's great success.

### **Visionary leadership**

Asked whether OMO started with an exit strategy, with laughter, Masika remarks that *“I think that question has a mindset of NGOs, which is a ‘mbokisi’* (the OMO word referring to the ill-informed habit of thinking within the box or boundaries---an issue he had unpacked during the training session for a delegation of visiting participants that

this researcher also attended). *I think the exit is when you have proper empowerment of the people...as a movement, we have no exit because we are moving to the next, from one item to another. Immediately you develop a sense of arrival, people will exit themselves. Mine is to keep them realizing that we have not arrived, so we do not need to exit. But the fact that it is a movement, it is an idea, a philosophy, they will continue moving from glory to glory, from one thing to another.*"

Still, on the subject of an exit strategy, Masika emphasised *"They are not exiting but improving, diversifying and coming up with their own innovations...In Yatta, we are looking at developing industrial villages, agricultural villages, and commercial villages. We have not gotten everything...We would like to see families doing cottage industries. People have already started in their own way... I think everything is a process and the movement is going on. If OMO was a project, we should have exited a long time ago. Because if it was about water, when you have water, you can exit. **Whatever people develop, we would like them to make it bigger and better. We do not want them to exit but to be resilient, because it is about people, not projects.**"*

After dwelling among the Yatta people and getting to understand real people issues, Masika emerged with a vision which he was able to effectively cast before the people and rally their hearts and minds towards breaking free from dependence on food aid among many other dependencies. According to 21<sup>st</sup>-century leadership guru, J. C. Maxwell (2002), vision is everything for a leader, *"The greater the vision, the more winners it has the potential to attract."* vision leads the leader, and vision draws on your past and on the history of the people around you. In addition, Maxwell asserts that *"one of the most valuable benefits of a vision is that it acts as a magnet—attracting, challenging, and uniting people. The greater the vision, the more winners it has the potential to attract."*

(J. C. Maxwell, 2002)

Masika's ability to accurately diagnose Yatta's development challenges, develop and effectively share an emancipation strategy in which people were able to imagine themselves surrounded by water pans and visualise themselves living on all-year-round bumper harvests and not on *Mwolyo*, was another pivotal OMO success factor.

### **Consistency in OMO Leadership**



Discussions with various DRR stakeholders in Kenya coupled with related DRR literature review revealed that high staff turnover among DRR implementing agencies is one of the main challenges to institutional capacity building for DRR. Much of the time, DRR mainstreaming skills within a single INGO or local NGO are resident in only one staff. And when this individual leaves, all the institutional DRR visioning and memory tends to move on with them. Fortunately, this has not been the case with CIM leadership for OMO. Masika has been at the helm of OMO since inception to date. This means OMO greatly benefited from consistent visionary leadership. **Having a consistent visionary and locally accepted OMO leader is partly responsible for OMO's great success.**

Masika has been at the helm of OMO since inception to date.

#### 5.9.1.6 Success Factor # 6: Community trust in religious leadership

An interview with a senior government official from the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) ascribed part of OMO's success to general community trust in religious leadership. *"One success that Masika has gained and it is the same thing that happened in the place called Ngangani, is that the audience that is there was first and foremost in the church. **One thing that we have is trust in the religious people in those particular areas.** The guy who was in Ngangani is a Reverend. He and Masika are people who have church congregations around these areas. And over time, because they have worked with these people through various programmes that are there, the people have tended to trust them. I remember the Reverend in Ngangani once confiding in me while I was still working in the area and said, "Jimmy (a pseudonym to maintain confidentiality), my people approached me saying I preach very well, and they have asked me, yes you preach very well here and you are telling us about heaven. But what are we going to be eating before we get to heaven."---*recollected the Kenya Government Official.

While on one hand Masika’s approaches were initially frowned at by various religious leaders in the Yatta area, on the other hand, the regular church goer’s usual trust in church leadership was going to eventually pay off for OMO. When Masika’s incredible mobilisation skills sold the vision and steadily won over various church leadership to OMO, the ground had been laid for a mass OMO uprising by mobilising communities through their different church leadership. The more reason Masika quips, *“If you have a programme that is patronized by Anglican or Catholic churches, they will be the insurance. And they offer better social insurance than the other one.”* **Masika’s excellent mobilization skills coupled with the local population’s affinity to trust religious leaders were twin factors partly responsible for OMO’s great success.**

*“If you have a programme that is patronized by Anglican or Catholic churches, they will be the insurance.”*

(Interview with Dr Masika)

#### 5.9.1.7

#### Success Factor # 7: The role played by community change agents/ and or exposure champions

The idea of the role played by community change agents/ and or exposure champions in OMO’s great success first came to the fore during an interview with Masika. Responding to the question concerning the rationale behind CIM’s decision to support East Pokot before circulating the entire Yatta neighbourhood, Masika had in part response firmly pointed out, *“We are not going to deal with the poor of the poorest.”* And when asked to explain this further, Masika argued, *“The reason for that is because when you empower many people, they are going to empower their poor. In Africa, the poor belong to clans and they belong to families, and they know them better than me. And the poor are poor because they have some deficits or weakness that we may not be able to solve in a short capacity building programme. But there are people who will build them. More so, Africans also learn more through seeing,*

*“When people are poor it is because they are poor in experiences, they are poor in examples, and they are poor in role models.”*

Source: Interview with Masika

*and when people are poor it is because they are poor in experiences, they are poor in examples, and they are poor in role models."*

In his seminal work titled 'Mindset Change for Community Transformation', Masika (2016) reveals how the CIM development model stands on three pillars, and in order of priority lists them as: exposure, training or gaining knowledge, and crisis. Masika asserts that taking deliberate steps to expose individuals and a community to new models of reality ignites in them a sense of desire for change. Masika argues that *"they reason if someone else could do it, so could they"* (p.95) A browse through CIM's Facebook wall reveals that the concept of DRR Change Agents/ Resilience Champions has been a critical factor in driving forward the OMO disaster risk reduction agenda by filling the gap of the usually missing community resilience role models. And because of the concept's success, CIM has made it a primary practice in OMO's satellite outreaches in other parts of the country. The concept of "resilience champions" is best demonstrated by Gideon Lenyanet from East Pokot, Baringo, one of OMO's distant satellite outreaches in the country. Gideon was a re-known cattle rustler who with support from CIM has agreed to abandon cattle rustling in favour of alternative livelihoods in the form of agriculture. Having observed Gideon's drastic lifestyle change, one East Pokot military officer commented, ***"If young boys can be agents of change, this place can be in peace."***

Being a learned fellow with a background in higher education management, there's no doubt Masika borrowed from the 80/20 Rule to inform the Resilience Champions practice. According to Tracy (2019), the 80/20 rule also called the *"Pareto Principle"*, was named after its founder, the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, back in 1895. He noticed that people in society seemed to divide naturally into what he called ***"the vital few,"*** or the top 20% in terms of money and influence, and ***"the trivial many,"*** or the bottom 80%.

He later discovered that virtually all economic activity was subject to this Pareto Principle as well. For example, this rule says that 20% of your activities will

account for 80% of your results. 20% of your customers will account for 80% of your sales. 20% of your products or services will account for 80% of your profits. 20% of your tasks will account for 80% of the value of what you do, and so on. When Masika argued against working with the poorest of the poor, 'the trivial many' and emphasised the practice of role models, 'the vital few', he was, in essence, orchestrating the Pareto Principle, and with overwhelming results.

**20% of your activities will account for 80 percent of your results.**

Vilfredo Pareto/ Pareto Principle

**The orchestration of the Pareto Principle through the practice of resilience champions with the sole purpose of establishing resilience role models was, therefore, another prime factor in driving OMO toward its record success.**

#### 5.9.1.8

#### **Success Factor # 8: Addressing traditional fatalistic mindsets through the empowered world view model**

A Kenyan blog titled "Juju hotbeds: Regions you are most likely to be bewitched in Kenya" reads in part, *"Welcome to Kenya, one of the most religious countries in the world where people carry bibles and pray all the time, but still keep a talisman from a*

witchdoctor for additional security. From acute medical problems to domestic strife, crime, unemployment, court cases, politics, cheating spouses, jobs and school exams, the *mganga* (Swahili name for witchdoctor) is Mr Fit It. But which communities are most feared for witchcraft? The Kamba community is often stereotyped as the mother of all witchcraft..." And the Yatta community, which makes up OMO's target population, is part of the greater Ukambani, home for the Kamba people.

In a related blog, Rath (2013) recounts, "When I first arrived in Nairobi, I saw the signs but didn't know what they meant. Once I started understanding Swahili, I learned that the profusion of ads, nailed to fences, stuck on poles and printed on A3 paper, were for *waganga* (witchdoctors) offering assistance mainly in matters of business, money, love and infertility. In just about every suburb of Nairobi, you'll find at least one ad, hand-painted, on a little plate, nailed high up on a pole. For an average of around 6000 shillings (US\$ 60), you can get to see one of these *mgangas*..."

Coincidentally, Africa's famed scholar on African Religion and Philosophy, Prof John Mbiti, is a Kenyan from the Kamba peoples. In his seminal work on Africa Religions and Philosophy, Mbiti (1990) remarks that "***Africans are notoriously religious***", and asserts that traditional concepts still form the essential background of many peoples even when this differs from individual to individual and from place to place. Mbiti argues that even if educated Africans do not subscribe to all the religious and philosophical practices and ideas, "*the majority of our people with little or no formal education still hold on to their traditional corpus of belief and practices. Anyone familiar with village gossip cannot question this fact, and those who have eyes will also notice evidence of it in towns and cities,*" (ref to Fig.5.17).



Figure 5. 15 A roadside advert for witchdoctor services in Nairobi Kenya. Kitui is a location in Ukambani, home for Kamba peoples.

Little wonder therefore that when Masika and his wife decided to quietly settle among the Kamba people of Yatta, theirs was a daunting discovery of how much the Yatta

community was deeply stooped into harmful traditional beliefs and practices. For instance, Masika (2016) reveals how the Kamba people feared to dig water pans because of the traditional view that *“the deeper ground belongs to ancestors and they don’t like to be disturbed”* (p.95); how community songs and stories reverberated with themes of punishment including lightning strikes, dying of mysterious illnesses and going mad---all for defying the gods, ancestors or culture (p.100); the farming cycle from land preparation to harvesting was firmly controlled by sorcerers and magicians and sacrifices had to be offered to ancestors before every planting season (p.122); drought, crop failure and other calamities were seen as punishment from the gods. Masika remarks how *“this was the prevailing mindset, reinforced by a cold worldview of fear and despair—that we had to mobilise the community against. We had to raise an army of transformed men and women who would take back Yatta from forces that drank the blood of their children at infancy and killed mothers as they gave birth”* (P.123).

And how did OMO *“mobilise men and women who would take back Yatta”*? According to Masika (2016), this was done by addressing the individual’s **Traditional Worldview and Mindset (TWM)** through the **Transformed Empowered World View and Mindset (TEWM)**. TWM is stooped into a constellation of foregoing crippling beliefs and practices and is a worldview that imprisons the individual in fear and despair. Masika (2016) argues that in TWM, individuals and communities have grasshopper mindsets in which they view themselves as weak, vulnerable and as victims of circumstances. Masika

“The farming cycle from land preparation to harvesting was firmly controlled by sorcerers and magicians and sacrifices had to be offered to ancestors before every planting season.” --(Masika, 2016)

“What a community believes about itself is a significant factor in addressing development.”

(Masika, 2016)

also points out that *“this mindset about identity is further reinforced by development actors who portray people as weak, poor, disadvantaged and vulnerable”* (p.86).

In order to break the crippling TWM grip on Yatta, CIM leveraged OMO by introducing and advancing the TEWM among OMO participants. In the TEWM approach, individuals and communities have an exalted and realistic view of themselves and are reluctant to allow

circumstances that they are under to define them. TEWN is an empowering force that appeals to people’s identity in a loving and caring God.

By embracing the myth-busting and tradition-breaking TEWM through which individuals and communities started seeing themselves as objects of God’s unfathomable love, mercy and grace, countless traditional detrimental beliefs and practices were slowly but steadily turned around. They include but are not limited to the following: embracing the concept that God is for them and not against them; they had God-given power to dominate and rule over their environment (not vice versa); their destiny was in their hands and not in the hands of sorcerers, magicians and nature; they didn’t have to compete with each other duped by the notion of scarce resources, rather, they needed to collaborate in harnessing resources in their environment (e.g. collaborate to dig water pans and break dependency on the rainy season---for *“crops need water not just rain”*); women were equal to men in the development agenda and therefore women needed to occupy their rightful place of equality with men along the community development process. This mindset change is probably best captured in the words of Joseph, a Yatta participant: *“Today, when the rest of the country is praying for rain, in Yatta we pray for other things.”* And Masika rightly but sadly observes, *“There’s no dry land in Africa, just dry minds.”*

“Your mindset is your collection of thoughts and beliefs that shape your thought habits. And your thought habits affect how you think, what you feel, and what you do. Your mind-set impacts how you make sense of the world, and how you make sense of you. **Your mindset is a big deal.”**

Source: (Meier, n.d)

Pinkett and O'Bryant (2003), Moore (2001); Page and Czuba (1999) and Pastor (1996) all agree that the foundation of community empowerment lies ultimately in the empowerment of the individual. Still, on empowerment, Smith (1997, p. 120) asserts that *“to empower is to give power, to open up, to release the potential of people”*.

**"We can't change governments, but we can change individuals."**

Source: interview with Masika

**There's no doubt, for a people hitherto sentenced to a life of fear and despair at the hands of intimidating gods and witchdoctors, the introduction, advancement, and steady adoption of the TEWM module by OMO participants was one of the most significant factors responsible for mentally re-orienting and propelling OMO participants to the right development path.**

#### 5.9.1.9

#### Success Factor # 9: The law of timing

In his seminal work titled *“The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership”*, J. C. Maxwell (2007) presents and describes law number 19 as *“The Law of Timing”* and asserts that *“When to lead is as important as what to do and where to go.”* Maxwell further points out that great leaders always understand and exploit the law of timing. He further argues that Every time a leader makes a move, there are always only four possible outcomes: **1. the wrong action at the wrong time leads to disaster; 2. the right action at the wrong time brings resistance; 3. the wrong action at the right time is a mistake; and 4. the right action at the right time results in success.**

**“TIMING IS EVERYTHING”**

(J. C. Maxwell, 2007)

And in regard to timing, Low (2016) explains that the strategic phrase *“Never let a good crisis go to waste”* is attributed to Winston Churchill, former British Premier in reference to the conditions post the Second World War that allowed for the formation of the United Nations. Similarly, Masika (2016, pp. 96-97) explains that *“sometimes the only option available for embracing a mindset change is when we run out of options*



*through a crisis.*” Reflecting on OMO’s success, Masika further argues that *“In their low moments, people are more open to interrogating their circumstances and are more inclined to accept newer approaches they would readily reject were storms not threatening.”* This is the reason the CIM development model stands on three pillars: exposure, training or gaining knowledge, and crisis.

**It becomes obvious therefore that OMO’s great success is partly rooted in the facts that OMO being a combination of “right actions” was launched at the “right time.” The time when most Yatta residents were more than willing to embrace changes they would readily reject were it not for the dire situation that threatened to decimate them in 2009.**

#### 5.9.1.10

#### Success Factor 10: Embracing Transformative Community Development Approaches

Knowingly or naively, there are community development approaches that either engender or endanger well-intentioned community developments outcomes. And this is probably best captured by Mahomed and Peters (2016) who in the introduction to their co-authored work titled *“The Story Behind the Well: A case study of successful community development in Makutano, Kenya ”* recollect that:

*Development is the story behind the well . . . you can have a community that wants a well to get better water, and most development agencies are happy to just help a community sink a well, get a water pump and say ‘Hurray, we have clean water, we have done our job’ . . . **We were arguing that just getting the well is not enough – because that isn’t the development. The development, we were arguing, is the story behind the well;** it’s how you get the well that’s very important. Did you build local capacities? Did you change attitudes? Did you help the community to think differently? Did you help them to see that you are not going to be there to repair the well?”* (p.4).

Mohamed and Peters' reflections are in total sync with Masika's views on community development approaches. As already presented in the interview with Masika, he asserts that projects, the likes of helping a community to sink a well, *"do not constitute development. That is facility development which cannot run itself. OMO focuses on human development. Developing the person, developing a person's world view and changing the individual's mindset. So we deal with the person because development is about people."* The story behind the well is, therefore, more about approaches---the software side of things. And a deep dive into OMO's adopted community development dynamics shows that a number of engendering community development approaches are at the core of OMO's grand success. These engendering approaches and or good practices include: addressing gender inequalities; shunning handouts; and modelling, monitoring and mentoring.

### ***Addressing gender inequalities***

According to Masika (2016), there are huge gender inequalities among the Kamba peoples of Kenya. For instance, during the pre-OMO era, *"Yatta women and men lived like strangers"*, and culturally, *"women were regarded lower than male children"*. But all the while, more women and far fewer men were engaged in productive agricultural activities. Men generally spent much of their time in bars, worse still, drinking their heads off using proceeds from meagre harvests eked out by women's sweat. Men were, therefore, more of seed/sperm carriers, observes Masika. Masika further observes that *"In Yatta, women accepted the status quo in which they could neither inherit property nor make any key decisions once a husband was dead."*

"In Yatta, women accepted the status quo in which they could neither inherit property nor make any key decisions once a husband was dead...CIM got into the picture and fought this cultural baggage."

(Masika, 2016)

And due to the ravage caused by the 2006-2008 drought, *“the community’s men had gone to other towns in search of a better life---most never to return”* (p.81).

In the words of Masika, *“CIM got into the picture and fought this cultural baggage.”* Masika (2016) asserts that there is a strong impact of gender and culture on community development, and if a development programme is to succeed, it has to take into account the prevailing cultural ways of people in relation to matters of gender. And because many men had left Yatta for towns, at the beginning of OMO, there was a strong passion to locate and lure men back to their homes. This component of OMO, code-named “Operation Men Back” was led by Agnes, Masika’s wife.

OMO and its Operation Men Back campaign were launched at a time when the memories and wounds of Kenya’s bloody 2007/2008 post-election violence were still fresh in people’s minds. However, one common good seemed to have emerged out of this horrific elections episode---a coalition government brokered by a Panel of Eminent African Personalities led by former UN Secretary-General, Dr Kofi Annan. In the coalition government, the pre-election ruling party retained the presidency, while unlike before, the leader of the opposition took up the newly created position of Prime Minister. There was, therefore, no ‘winner takes it all’ type of government, and this soothed the hearts and minds on masses on both sides of the political divide.

And Masika (2016) explains that in an effort to address Yatta’s gender inequalities, CIM and particularly his wife Agnes thought things through and came up with a gender in development model patterned after the country’s then coalition government. As part of the Transformed Empowered Worldview Mindset, CIM presents and advances a transformed and empowering *‘family government structure’* in which *“the husband is the President, the wife is the Prime Minister, children are Cabinet Secretaries and workers are the Civil Servants...”* We had to guide women and men into a place of comfort on gender matters, help them to

“The husband is the President, the wife is the Prime Minister, children are Cabinet Secretaries and workers are the Civil Servants.”

(Masika, 2016)

*engender a worldview of inclusivity in and out of the home. Our efforts have born fruit and the community has greatly benefited...I dare say that had we not brought men into the picture, ownership of the reform programme in Yatta would have been an exclusively women affair—it would have failed” (p.129, 171).*

And how would leaving men out of OMO have led to programme failure? Even when men were absent, there were still scores of things women couldn't do and assets women couldn't dare create because the remit of those decisions and access to productive assets like land, hitherto exclusively belonged to the male domain. **Addressing Yatta's gender inequalities at the household level through the TEWM that promotes and advances the adoption of the transformed and empowering family government structure, therefore, stands out as one of OMO's critical success factors.**

### ***Shunning handouts***

It was Anderson (1999) who exposed that while many aid agencies seek to be neutral or nonpartisan toward the losers and winners of wars, the impact of their aid is not neutral in conflict settings. Anderson further revealed that aid can reinforce, exacerbate, and prolong the conflict; while on the other hand, it can also help to reduce tensions and strengthen people's capacities to disengage from fighting and find peaceful options for solving problems. Similarly, there's growing literature decrying the negative effects of aid on recipient countries and poorly timed and managed handouts on communities.

For instance, in her gripping work titled “Dead Aid”, Moyo (2009) challenges and debunks the mindset that seems to suggest *“aid, whatever its form, is a good thing.”* Moyo argues that Paul Kagame, president of the Republic of Rwanda, is right to lament that *“While more than US\$300 billion in aid has apparently been disbursed to our continent since 1970, there is little to show for it in terms of economic growth and human development.”* *“Why do the majority of sub-Saharan countries flounder in a seemingly never-ending cycle of corruption, disease, poverty, and aid-dependency’, despite the fact that their countries have received more than US\$300 billion in development assistance since 1970,”* asks Moyo. The answer she gives is that African countries are poor precisely

because of all that aid. Moyo points out that *“Between 1970 and 1998, when aid flows to Africa were at their peak, the poverty rate in Africa actually rose from 11 per cent to a staggering 66 per cent.”*

In ‘Aid Dependency: The Damage of Donation’, Stanford (2015) posits that what causes dependency is when aid is used, intentionally or not, as a long-term strategy that consequently inhibits development, progress, or reform. And Stanford shows that food aid is particularly criticised for this. *“While OMO was preceded by food assistance, giving out of food rations was however not an end in itself. We refused to be merely donors. Relief, as it is, can never be sustainable. Counteracting dependency needs to be any development practitioner’s primary goal.*

*“Dependency in the community must be reduced by every action you take... A donor agency should try to avoid giving the community anything for nothing. That is what encourages dependency.”*

Masika

*Dependency in the community must be reduced by every action you take... A donor agency should try to avoid giving the community anything for nothing. That is what encourages dependency,”* explained Masika.

Because OMO was all about building a people’s resilience to enhance self-reliance and kick out dependency on handouts, Masika (2016) shows that during the early days of OMO, one of CIM’s role was to balance the need for strategic external resources with the long-term goal of eradicating all forms of donor dependency.

**CIM’s ability to mobilise OMO participants to embark on OMO activities without *“promising to do for them what citizens ought to do for themselves”* is one critical factor which showed Yatta residents the incredible development potential within them.** And like a wildfire, once they noted how much they had achieved in the first 6 months---a landscape awash with overflowing water pans and a harvest they could only hitherto dream of--- they simply became unstoppable. Commenting on his leadership team’s first field learning visit to Yatta’s OMO in 2012, Tim Andrews, the then Country

Director of World Vision Tanzania, writes: ***“we came away from that encounter with a renewed understanding that the foundation of transformational development has very little to do with the transfer of external resources, capacity building and technologies into impoverished communities. It had a lot to do with mindset change at the individual level. The result was a community with the belief it had the resources and the will to drive its own development agenda”*** (Masika, 2016, p. 14).

### ***In-situ training, modelling, and mentoring***

A read across CIM literature, interviews with Dr Masika and interactions with OMO participants reveal **that in-situ training, modelling and mentoring** were some of the most notable transformative good practices employed by CIM which contributed to OMO’s grand success. Before the advent of OMO, Masika had successfully developed a water dam and practiced the one-acre rule strategy himself. And following his view that *‘Africans learn more by seeing’*, CIM went ahead to establish a model demonstration one-acre productive farm from which OMO participants could gain insights and be inspired. This model one-acre demonstration farm is still being used for trainings.

“Yes, Africans learn more through seeing...I did the one acre demonstration first.”

Masika

On the subject of training for skills transfer, Masika (2016, p. 223) observes that in the Traditional World View and Mindset (TWM) approach, the training and mentoring process takes place in the world of the teacher. *“It pulls the student away from where the action should be taking place. A common phenomenon is the scenario where NGOs run training programmes in big hotels yet targeting communities.”* But in CIM’s promoted Transformed Empowered World View and Mindset (TEWM) approach,

And because we know change is a process, after training, we mentor to ensure maximum adoption.

Source: interview with Masika

*“training and other programmes are field-based, with immediate application of principles being taught. Action-Centered learning is designed to add value to the community and build a sense of ownership.”*

By adopting the TEWM, trainings were and continue to be delivered in the form of learning laboratories. Reflecting on Yatta’s **mentoring for transformation** experience, Masika (2016, p. 222) explains, *“It seeks to build on the ‘donot-just-tell-me-but-show-me’ principle. It seeks to not only tell you but to explain and demonstrate how it works, inspiring protégés for a lifelong impact.”* There’s no doubt, the combination of modelling and in-situ trainings that served and continue to serve as learning laboratories, played a crucial role in enhancing learning, leading to maximum adoption of OMO taught practices. **It is the maximum adoption of OMO’s taught practices that partly led to OMO’s grand success. Thanks therefore to CIM’s combination of modelling, in-situ trainings and mentoring.**

The following section summarizes findings for each institutional and CCB4DRR case study.

## **5.10 Summary Findings Per Institutional Case Study and CCB4DRR Case Study.**

In preparation for the cross-case analysis in section 5.11, this section presents summary findings per institutional and CCB4DRR case study.

The process of coming up with key findings included assessing whether there's any coherence or storyline between an individual case DRR priorities, the criteria used to arrive at these priorities, ways through which an individual case donor or INGO measures DRR success in the country, and specific changes the individual donor or INGO working on DRR in Kenya wants to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country.

Or put differently, is there a coherent link between an agency's current DRR priorities, the criteria used to select these priorities, the agency's way of measuring DRR success, and things the agency would want to see improved as a result of highly effective DRR engagements in the country? And what is the place or status of CCB4DRR along this winding route? The summary of key findings is therefore presented case study by case study.



### 5.10.1 Summary of key findings for INGO1




Figure 6. 1 Summary findings for INGO1 (indicating key linkages)

#### 5.10.1.1 Synopsis of INGO1 Findings

As indicated by the green arrows in Fig 6.1, there is a direct link and or a storyline between INGO1's current DRR priorities, her ways of measuring DRR success, and her desired changes in the country consequent to the agency's highly effective engagement in the country's DRR agenda. For instance, CCB4DRR, which is one of her five DRR priorities in the country is directly linked with the way INGO1 measures DRR success by focusing on household coping ability during shocks and household continued commitments to DRR practices. This is also directly linked to her desired change for improved community capacity building aimed at helping communities manage risks in their environment. Child-led DRR, which is one of the critical outcomes of targeted CCB4DRR, features prominently among INGO1's DRR priorities, her ways of measuring DRR success and desired changes consequent to highly effective DRR engagements in the country.

There's, therefore, enough evidence pointing to the fact that **CCB4DRR is high on INGO1's agenda**, right from selecting which DRR priorities to support, all the way through ways of measuring DRR success and the kind of changes INGO1 would like to see as a result of her effective contribution to the country's DRR agenda. There's especially a very strong co-relation between INGO1's DRR priorities and what she would like to see as a result of executing these priorities. However, it is noted INGO1's DRR advisor lamented the disconnect between the organization's DRR priorities and the level of funding committed to the same priorities.

### 5.10.2 Summary of key findings for INGO2




Figure 6. 2: Summary findings for INGO2 (indicating key linkages)

### 5.10.2.1 Synopsis of INGO2 Findings

A look at Fig. 6.2 reveals direct links and or a storyline between INGO2's current DRR priorities, her level of funding commitment to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her ways of measuring DRR success, and the desired changes she would like to see in the country consequent to the agency's highly effective engagement in the country's DRR agenda. For instance, her 'CMDRR' and 'community capacity to lobby' priorities are directly linked to the desired end picture of 'better resource allocation to community DRR action plans'. And because one of INGO2's desired changes is to see better resource allocation to community DRR action plans, she reported the highest funding commitment to DRR (up to 50% of total budgets) and to CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds).

The quest to go beyond handouts and build the resilience of communities which INGO2 has responded to during disaster situations is one the criteria INGO2 uses to determine her DRR priorities. This is directly linked to her level of funding commitment to DRR and CCB4DRR. And of the 6 cases covered by this research, only one case, that is INGO2, was conscious of how much of her DRM resources were focused on resilience-building DRR and related CCB4DRR. Her 'advocacy and influencing' priority is linked to the way she measures DRR success by way of looking at 'results from policy influencing'; which is also reflected in her desired changes including better resource allocation to community DRR action plans, and reduction in # of national DRM departments.

Overall, there's very strong evidence pointing to the fact that CCB4DRR is high on INGO2's agenda right from the point of determining which DRR priorities to support, the criteria used to arrive at these priorities, funding commitments to DRR and CCB4DRR and the types of changes INGO2 would like to see as a result of effectively engaging in the country's DRR agenda.

### 5.10.3 Summary of key findings for INGO3




Figure 6. 3 Summary findings for INGO3 (indicating key linkages)

### 5.10.3.1 Synopsis of INGO3 Findings

A review of Fig. 6.3 reveals a direct link between INGO3's priorities and her desired changes consequent to INGO3's highly effective engagement in the country's DRR agenda; and a strong link between her DRR priorities and funding for CCB4DRR. For instance, not only is 'child-led DRR' a top DRR priority, but the inclusion of DRR in school curriculum is one of her desired changes in the country. Secondly, not only is CMDRR a top INGO3 DRR priority, but also much of INGO3's limited DRR funding goes to CMDRR and its CCB4DRR elements. Other than these two direct links between the indicated variables, there seem to be weak links between remaining variables. While CMDRR is one of INGO3's top 2 DRR priorities, it emerges as a low-ranking priority when viewed from how much of INGO3's budget is dedicated to DRR. When selected priorities remain poorly resourced, we run the danger of sliding into the rim of rhetoric and less execution, a condition analysts have rightly likened to the natural phenomenon of having 'clouds but little rain'.

### 5.10.4 Summary of key findings for Don1




Figure 6. 4 Summary findings for Don1 (indicating key linkages)

#### 5.10.4.1 Synopsis of Don1 Findings

A review of Fig. 6.4 reveals a direct link between Don1's DRR priorities and funding for CCB4DRR and a direct link between Don1's criteria for selecting DRR priorities and level of funding for CCB4DRR. For instance, funding and technical support to NDMA are one of Don1's top priorities, and because she has entirely devolved the selection of DRM/DRR priorities entirely to the NDMA, she doesn't have control over how much of allocated funds go to which element of DRM. Unfortunately, analysis of NDMA data confirmed that much of the funding to NDMA goes to support disaster preparedness and response during both bad and good years. It emerged therefore that prioritizing and supporting CCB4DRR isn't anywhere high on both NDMA and Don1's agendas.



### 5.10.5 Summary of key findings for Don2




Figure 6. 5 : Summary findings for Don2 (indicating key linkages)

#### 5.10.5.1 Synopsis of Don2 Findings

A review of Fig. 6.5 reveals direct links and or a storyline between Don2's current DRR priorities and her funding commitment to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her ways of measuring DRR success, and the desired changes she would like to see in the country consequent to the agency's highly effective engagement in the country's DRR agenda. For instance, Don2's DRR priorities including CMDRR, capacity development of local government, and local level partner CB4DRR---are all linked to her way of measuring DRR success through community and local government feedback on her supported projects.

While Don2 was not able to share ready figures of how much of her development funding to Kenya goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, the analysis showed that Don2 is engaged in working directly with target communities using CMDRR approaches. She is one of the donors with the highest prioritisation and support to local DRR action including CCB4DRR in the country and local partner CB4DRR. In addition, Don2's DRR priority of capacity development of government offices (at both local and national levels) is directly linked to her desired change for improved coordination for better resource distribution to different geographic areas and for harmonization of implementation approaches. Overall, Don2 stands out tall for being a donor that works directly with communities using CMDRR approaches and for being a donor with a strong commitment to local level partner CB4DRR.

### 5.10.6 Summary of key findings for Don3




Figure 6. 6: Summary findings for Don3 (indicating key linkages)

### 5.10.6.1 Synopsis of Don3 Findings


A review of Fig. 6.6 unveils direct links and or a storyline between Don3's current DRR priorities and her funding commitment to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her ways of measuring DRR success, and the desired changes she would like to see in the country consequent to the agency's highly effective engagement in the country's DRR agenda. For instance, while Don3 didn't avail data in regard to how much of her funding goes to both DRR and CCB4DRR, she is blazing the trail in supporting the government of Kenya in the implementation of the SF4DRR. At the national level, Don3 supported the government to come up with a draft SF4DRR action plan, while at the local level, Don3 has exceptionally supported select counties to evolve county DRR action plans based on the SF4DRR and provided budgetary support to target activities.

There is a strong storyline between Don3's triangle of current DRR priorities, the way she measures DRR success and her desired changes consequent to effective engagement with the country's DRR agenda. For instance, with her two DRR priorities being 'institutional CB4DRR' and "direct support to CMDRR projects', Don3 measures DRR success through a results framework process that seeks to answer the question "Are we seeing the necessary intended changes?" And her desired changes consequent to the agency's highly effective DRR engagement in the country are a direct reflection of intended results from her DRR priorities. For instance, her 'institutional CB4DRR' priority is directly linked to the desired change (or result) for improved comprehension of DRR leading to increased resource allocation to DRR; and improved comprehension of DRR would lead to government reconfiguring development programming into DRR. Don3's 'direct support to CMDRR projects' priority is also directly linked to her desired change (or result) for the 'reduction in negative impacts of disasters.'

Overall, Don3's stellar work in supporting especially select high disaster risk county governments to develop DRR action plans based on the SF4DRR and providing budgetary support to these action plans coupled with her direct support to CMDRR projects **make her an outstanding donor case with strong support to local DRR action** including CCB4RR in the country.

**5.10.7 A summary of factors and or good practice concepts behind OMO's unusual success. (The direct inverse of these factors/ concepts appears to be partly responsible for poor to failed DRR results in many other different parts of the country).**

Figure 6. 7: A summary of OMO’s key success factors



## 5.11 Cross-Case Analysis Between Institutional Case Studies

This section compares and contrasts findings from the six INGO and Donor case studies. Because detailed findings on each of the six institutional case studies are already presented in sections 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8; only summary findings are presented in this section. To enable ease of comparing and contrasting findings, the cross-case analysis is presented in table format (**refer to Table 5.1**). The table is arranged as follows: starts by indicating a key area of investigation, e.g. INGO and Donor DRR Priorities in Kenya; this is followed by findings under this particular area of investigation from each of the 6 institutional case studies; and then each area of investigation ends with a summary narrative highlighting major similarities and differences in findings.

**Table 5.1: Cross-Case Analysis Findings**

**What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?**

Broad Categories	INGO1	INGO2	INGO3	DON1	DON2	DON3
1. Government-focused priorities	-institutional CB4DRR -advocacy and influencing	-advocacy and influencing		-funding + technical support to NDMA -support to county government drought mitigation projects	-capacity development of government offices (at both local and national levels)	- institutional CB4DRR
2. Community-focused priorities	-CCB4DRR -Partner CB4DRR -Child-led DRR	-CMDRR -community capacity to lobby -access to timely EW information	-CMDRR -Child-led DRR		-CMDRR -Local level partner CB4DRR	-Direct support to CMDRR projects
3. Intra-agency focused priorities	-A lot of staff CB4DRR					
4. Cross-cutting priorities		-Empirical research			-DRR studies to inform own programming	

**A summary of key similarities and differences in DRR priorities:** Four out of the six cases, namely INGO1, Don1, Don2 and Don3 have a strong focus on strengthening government capacity for DRR; and all the 3 donor cases have strengthening government capacity for DRR as a key priority. Apart from Don1, the rest of the remaining five cases have community focused DRR priorities, and all the five have community managed DRR as a top priority. Only Don1 doesn't have community focused priorities for she directs all her support to strengthening the NDMA. INGO2 is unique in that while her DRR priorities fall under three different broad categories, all her priorities still zoom-in on community-issues. It's only INGO2 and Don2 that conduct DRR-related studies to inform either their influencing agendas or their community-based programming options. INGO1 is also unique for being the case study that puts a lot of emphasis on more staffs CB4DRR aimed at ensuring adequate in-house DRR implementation capacity in all her program areas.



### How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?

Broad Categories	INGO1	INGO2	INGO3	DON1	DON2	DON3
1. Externally looking criteria	-priorities agreed by global DRR frameworks -government DRR priorities	-building the resilience of communities INGO2 has responded to in disaster situations. Going beyond handouts.	-NDMA/ government priorities -county government priorities -Priorities set by alliances -security determines where to work		-aligning with government priorities -complementarity with peer agencies -agency research and assessment reports	-consults with government
1. Internally looking criteria		-global agency DRR priorities.	-internal capacity -global agency DRR priorities		-agency strategy paper -agency comparative technical advantage -lessons from previous projects	-agency strategy paper -agency comparative technical advantage -agency current capacities
2. Not involved in determining priorities				-not involved in selecting priorities		

**A summary of key similarities and differences on how donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya determine respective DRR support priorities:** Four out of the six case studies, namely INGO1, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 refer to government priorities to inform respective DRR priorities. INGO2, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 use either their global or country strategy papers to inform DRR priorities in Kenya. INGO2 registered a unique difference for being the only case that highlighted working on the nexus to bridge the lifesaving handouts phase with resilience-building DRR actions for target communities as a criterion for deciding her DRR priorities. Don2 also registered the unique difference for being the only case that highlighted doing own research, conducting studies and assessments as part of her process to decide DRR priorities in the country. And Don1 registered the outstanding difference of being the only case that devolves responsibility to select DRR priorities to the NDMA---the lead government agency for drought management in the country.

### Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks

Broad Categories	INGO1	INGO2	INGO3	DON1	DON2	DON3
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No categories	Has great knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks. Her advocacy and influencing agenda toward better DRR governance in the country is grounded on global DRR frameworks	The DRR advisor exhibited some level of awareness of HFA and SF4DRR but did not have what would be considered ample working knowledge of the two successive frameworks.	The DRR Advisor acknowledged having limited knowledge and utilization of HFA and SF4DRR.	It was obvious and concerning that this donor participant did not have a working knowledge of both HF and SF4DRR.	While Don2's participant in this research wasn't the lead DRR staff, he still knew much about processes that led to SF4DRR and knows that SF4DRR is one of the documents referenced when Don2 is interacting with the Kenya government.	Don3 is very much aware of SF4DRR and is blazing the trail in supporting the government of Kenya in the implementation of the framework. At National level, Don3 supported the government to come up with a draft SF4DRR action plan, while at the local level, Don3 has supported select counties to evolve county DRR action plans based on the Sf4DRR.
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**A summary of key similarities and differences in the knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks:** Of the six cases, its INGO1 and Don3 that exhibited greater knowledge and application of the SF4DRR, and of these two cases, its Don3 that had done a lot of work to ground SF4DRR in the country. INGO2, INGO3 and Don1 didn't have a working knowledge of both HFA and its successor SF4DRR. While Don2's participant wasn't the agency's lead DRR staff, he still knew much about the SF4DRR. The deficiencies of INGO1, INGO3 and Don1 in knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks seems to be rooted in a weak National DRR Platform. If it had been functioning normally, it would have already created adequate awareness about SF4DRR leading to increased knowledge and uptake.

### Funding for CCB4DRR

Broad Categories	INGO1	INGO2	INGO3	DON1	DON2	DON3
No categories	INGO1 uses an integrated approach to mainstreaming DRR, thus was unable to indicate the approximate budget to DRR. However, the advisor indicated a commitment to ensuring that for the future, 5-7% of long-term non-grant funding for community	Up to 50% of total budgets are dedicated to DRR and 15-20% of these DRR funds support CCB4DRR	INGO3 is spending more on disaster response and far less on resilience-building DRR, though it was encouraging to note that much of the DRR funding goes to CMDRR which is strong on CCB4DRR. Thus while CMDRR (and	Don1 entirely devolves to NDMA the responsibility to decide which DRR priorities will be supported using resources allocated by Don1. Analysis of NDMA data showed that much of the funding goes to preparedness and response during both	While Don2 was not able to share ready figures of how much of her development funding to Kenya goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, the analysis showed that Don2 is engaged in working directly with target communities using CMDRR	While Don3 didn't avail data in regard to how much of her funding goes to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her country programme document is explicit in providing direct support to communities toward building resilience and reducing risks to shocks. And Don3

	development goes to supporting resilience-building DRR activities.		CCB4DRR) is a high DRR priority, it's a low ranking priority when viewed from how much of the INGO3's budget is dedicated to DRR.	bad and good years. Thus, for both Don1 and NDMA, prioritizing and supporting CCB4DRR isn't anywhere high on their respective agendas.	approaches. There is no doubt she is one of the donors with the highest prioritisation and support to local DRR action including CCB4DRR in the country.	emphasised the overall importance laid on capacity building in every Don3 community undertaking.
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**A summary of key similarities and differences on funding for CCB4DRR:** of the 3 INGO cases, INGO2 reported the highest funding commitment to DRR (up to 50% of total budgets) and to CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds). She was also the only agency that knew roughly how much of her total funding goes to resilience-building DRR. Don1 didn't have a clue since she devolves budget allocation responsibilities to the NDMA. Both Don2 and Don3 didn't have ready estimates to share, but they are working directly with communities using CMDRR approaches, and this guarantees attention to CCB4DRR. Still, on funding CCB4DRR, Don2 shared a plausible argument cautioning against judging the place of CCB4DRR in the big scheme of DRR especially for agencies that support a lot of DRR infrastructural development. The argument is based on the fact that infrastructural DRR projects are capital intensive and even the smallest % funding support to CCB4DRR around these projects translates into adequate funding for CCB4DRR purposes. Overall, of the 6 cases covered by this research, only one case, that is INGO2, was conscious of how much of her DRM resources were focused on resilience-building DRR and related CCB4DRR.

### How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?

Broad Categories	INGO1	INGO2	INGO3	DON1	DON2	DON3
1. Measures focused at local level DRR success	-household coping ability during shocks -continued households' commitment to DRR practices -performance of child-led DRR	-community capacity to lobby upstream -Community capacity to attract external resources -Results from policy influencing	-Community transformation (adoption, application and ownership)	-no disaster-related deaths -reduced loss of livelihood assets -community/beneficiary transformation	-community and local government feedback on agency-supported projects -Don2's willingness to replicate or scale up a project	Are we seeing the necessary intended changes?
2. Measures focused at national level DRR success						Are we seeing the necessary intended changes

**A summary of key similarities and differences from how institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya:** it emerges that all the six cases put critical emphasis at the local or community level when looking for ways of measuring DRR success. And they rightly do so because that is exactly where life changing DRR traction ought to be taking place. However, while all the six cases have their eyes on local level ways of measuring DRR success, INGO2's approach to measuring DRR success brings out the issue of empowerment. INGO2 looks at community capacity to take matters into their hands and lobby upstream and attract those resources that may not be inherent within their community. And among the 3 donor cases,

Don2's methods of measuring DRR success by considering community and local government feedback on supported projects stand out tallest. It is in sync with Robert Chambers' thesis of 'whose reality counts'.

**What specific changes would institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya like to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?**

Broad Categories	INGO1	INGO2	INGO3	DON1	DON2	DON3
1. Better resource allocation	-government allocating adequate DRR funding to various government departments	-better resource allocation to community DRR action plans		-government allocating adequate resources to DRM and reducing dependency on external aid		-improved comprehension of DRR leading to increased resource allocation to DRR
2. Better DRR comprehension and integration			-approach DRR from a longer-term perspective -think DRR during both short and long term programmes/projects		-adopt the 'built-in-resilience' practice for every type of intervention	-reconfigure development programming into DRR.
3. Improved coordination				-improved stakeholder coordination leading to joint DRM planning.	-improved coordination for better resource distribution to different geographic areas and for harmonization of implementation approaches	
4. Improved DRM governance	-finalize the DRR policy to help streamline risk governance  -reduced # of government disaster management agencies	-harmonization of DRR instruments (frameworks, strategies, policies etc.) -reduction in # of national DRM departments		-total government ownership of the DRM agenda including resourcing that agenda	-county government bureaucracies not affecting resource flows to local level DRR action.	

5. Improved community capacity	-improved community capacity building aimed at helping communities manage risks in their environment					
6. More child-led DRR	-More children and youths in DRM		-DRR included in the school curriculum			
7. Professional disciplines taking DRR seriously			-all professional disciplines, for instance, engineers take DRR seriously			
8. Reduced hazard impacts						-reduction in negative impacts of disasters.
9. Things that need to be stopped	-move from disaster response focus to resilience building -from rhetoric to executing for results	-stop processes that are only extractive to communities. Have a feedback loop. -stop spreading scarce resources thin. Be more focused.	-stop treating or approaching DRR from a quick fix perspective.	-stop depending on external assistance to respond to and mitigate drought conditions.	-stop giving out misdiagnosed handouts for they undercut the spirit behind community resilience building.	

**A summary of key similarities and differences in the changes both institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya would like to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country:** INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don3 would like to see improved resource allocation to DRM/ and DRR action in the country. However, NGO2 goes ahead to highlight that this improved resource allocation should be more aimed at supporting community DRR action plans. INGO3, Don2 and Don3 all want to see better DRR comprehension in the country, with both Don2 and Don3 expecting to see development re-configured into DRR and the result being development programming with 'built-in-resilience'. Don1 and Don2 would like to see

improved DRR stakeholder coordination leading to joint planning and better geographic resource allocation. INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don2 all want to see improved DRM governance in the country, with INGO1 and INGO2 specifically expecting to see a reduction in the # of government DRM departments. INGO1 and INGO3 share the common vision of seeing an increase in child and youth led DRR through the inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum. INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don1 and Don2 all highlighted different things that needed to be stopped around various aspects of DRM in the country, with no uniformity but a rich variety in what was highlighted. Probably because of its long history in community development programming, INGO1 was alone in wanting to see improved community capacity building aimed at communities taking more charge of risk management in respective environments. INGO3 was also alone in highlighting the expectation to see all professional disciplines in the country embracing DRR with key emphasis laid on civil engineers. Don1 also stood alone in voicing out the expectation to see less and less negative disaster impacts in the country.

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Table 5. 1: Cross-Case Analysis Findings

## 5.12 Summary and link

This chapter presented background information to case studies, analysis and discussion of findings for each individual case study, and cross-case analysis of the six institutional donor and INGO case studies. Chapter six presents a summary discussion of these findings supported with literature.

# CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY DISCUSSION OF AMALGAMATED KEY FINDINGS

## 6.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 presented the analysis and discussion of findings per case study and ended with the cross-case analysis of institutional case findings. While Chapter 5 presented and discussed findings case study by case study including linking findings to literature, the chapter strategically left the discussion of amalgamated findings to Chapter 6. This chapter, therefore, aims to present a summary discussion of amalgamated key findings---a process that includes linking key findings to literature and other studies while at the same time bringing into the discussion the researcher's critical thinking. This is in sync with Merriam and Tisdell (2015) who argue that *"findings are the outcome of the inquiry---what you, the investigator, learned or came to understand about the phenomenon."* In this chapter, therefore, the researcher presents a summary discussion of what he came to understand about the research phenomenon.

Concerning structure, the discussion of findings is presented following the same format of themes used to present findings---case study by case study in Chapter 5. For ease of discussion, a summary of key similarities and differences is first presented per theme, and then a discussion linking amalgamated findings to literature and the researcher's synthesis follows. It should be noted here that the drawing of conclusions about the aims and objectives of the thesis is dedicated to Chapter 7 where findings are presented and evaluated in response to the research questions and objectives proposed at the beginning of this thesis.

### **6.1.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?**

For the six institutional case donors and INGOs, analysis showed that four out of the six cases, namely INGO1, Don1, Don2 and Don3 have a strong focus on strengthening government capacity for DRR; and all the three donor cases have strengthening government capacity for DRR as a key priority. Apart from Don1, the rest of the remaining five cases have community focused DRR priorities, and all the five have community managed DRR (CMDRR) as a top priority. Only Don1 doesn't have community focused priorities for she directs all her support to strengthening the NDMA. INGO2 is unique in that while her DRR priorities fall under three different broad categories, all her priorities still zoom-in on community-issues. It's only INGO2 and Don2 that conduct DRR-related studies to inform either their influencing agendas or their community-based programming options. INGO1 is also unique for being the case study that puts a lot of emphasis on more staffs CB4DRR aimed at ensuring adequate in-house DRR implementation capacity in all her program areas.

Of the five cases that had community focused DRR priorities, INGO3 was unique for being the only case that reported very strong embedment of DRR in her ongoing development initiatives. INGO3 had explained that *"we realized if we do not embed DRR in our on-going food security programming, then we are going to lose the results to droughts."* This rationale is commended by Schipper and Pelling (2006) when they point to a poor assumption where scores of development practitioners think that DRR is already incorporated into 'pro-poor development' leading to awful manifestations of what UNDP (2004) and Yodmani (2001) call 'unresolved development problems.'

INGO1 was also unique for being the INGO case that intentionally worked very closely with government offices at the local level aiming at build their capacity for DRR, but with the covert agenda aimed at ensuring the same local government offices eventually release funds to support community-generated DRR action plans in target INGO1 program areas. This is,



therefore, advocacy and influencing aimed at improving disaster risk governance in the country as asserted by Wahlström (2015) when she points out that that the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction requires strong commitment and political leadership both at national and local levels. Wahlstrom reasons that this is essential to ensure stronger risk governance and capable institutions that can take the lead and mobilize and motivate stakeholders.

And in conformity with Howard's affirmation that '*we cannot teach what we don't know*' (Howard, 2014), INGO1's was the only case that presented the 'internally-looking DRR priority' of training more staffs in DRR aimed at ensuring the organisation has adequate DRR implementation capacity in all her program areas. By the time of doing an interview INGO1, the organisation had 64 field-based staffs trained in CMDRR.

Don1 was also unique for clearly stating that "*our support to County Government Projects is basically preparedness and response.*" **Don1 did not reveal any prioritisation of CMDRR nor CCB4DRR.** Don1's current DRR priorities in the country, therefore, fit the picture painted by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) whose studies lament the global trend of spending heavily on disaster preparedness and response while investing far less in resilience-building DRR.

Still on uniqueness, INGO2 was the only case that had '**promotion of community access to practical early warning information**' as one of her community focused DRR priorities. This was a lesson INGO learned from the 2010/2011 Horn of Africa food crisis where evaluations revealed that while there was adequate EW information on the severity of the crisis by as early as March 2010, the situation remained unrecognised, and there was no early action leading to avoidable catastrophic malnutrition levels and mortality (Kim & Guha-Sapir, 2012). The more reason Basher (2006, p. 2171) recommends adopting the 'end-to-end' concept to EWS where information is communicated to all key stakeholders and is acted on with a built-in monitoring and feedback mechanisms. For the 2011 Horn of Africa drought

crisis, it is action on existing EWS that had largely been the missing link in closing the EWS loop. And INGO1 has made it a priority to close the EWS loop by ensuring supported program areas in Northern Kenya are helped to receive, understand and supported to act on early warning information.

And as indicated above, apart from Don1, the remaining five institutional cases have community focused DRR priorities---with CMDRR as a top priority. For this discussion, we will borrow Don2's description of CMDRR. Don2 had explained that "CMDRR is a community development tool where you are working with communities to allow them an opportunity to decide what is good for themselves. You sit down with communities, and for example if there is drought and they are suffering from many challenges you work out the solutions with them. The end product of that process would be a community action plan, which states that these are the areas that we will need your support, and these are the things that we can do ourselves..."

Don2's foregoing definition of CMDRR is in sync with McKnight and Kretzmann (1997, pp. 2, 17) who argue that development must start from within the community, for communities cannot be developed from the top down, or from the outside in. They further argue that communities have never been built upon their deficiencies; rather, community development has always depended upon mobilizing the capacities and assets of a people and a place. This is a notion supported by Chambers (1998, p. 289) who in his seminal work '**whose reality counts?**' remarks that the "the challenge is to enable poor and marginalized people to analyze their conditions and identify their priorities in ways which freely express their realities, and generate proposals that are doable, credible and persuasive..." In yet another of his works, Chambers (1995, p. 199) observes that "much of the challenge is to give up power. It is to enjoy handing over the initiative to others, enabling them to do more and to do it more in their way, for their objectives." This research therefore commends the effort of the five institutional cases that have CMDRR as a top DRR priority because through CMDRR, they are able to empower at-risk communities to do more towards reducing potential disaster risks.

Of the four cases, namely INGO1, Don1, Don2 and Don3 that were identified to have a strong focus on strengthening government capacity for DRR, it was only Don3 that had very strong commitment to working with select high risk County Governments in developing respective SF4DRR implementation plans including supporting these plans with seed funding. In an interview, Don3 has in part indicated that “resources that are available at the local level for you to translate what is happening globally and regionally are very limited.” This is a phenomenon GNDR (2009) summarized as “Clouds But Little Rain,” an imagery representative of lots of high level (global, regional, and national) hype but with minimal local action and actual change.

A review across Gaillard and Mercer (2013); Robertua (2013); UNISDR (2013a); UNISDR (2013b); Benicchio (2012); Djalante et al. (2012); Izumi and Shaw (2012); van Riet and van Niekerk (2012) ; Hagelsteen and Becker (2012); Scott and Tarazona (2011); J Twigg and Bottomley (2011); Kent (2011); Pelling (2007a); UNDP (2004) ; Walter (2004); Walter (2002); and Walter (2001) revealed consensus among these authors that while there continues to be a growing interest and focus on DRR, **poor local capacity for DRR remains a major impediment to making required progress.** The literature review had therefore observed the urgent need to address the gap between global DRR agendas, national level policies and strategies and local level risk reduction activities. It was therefore very inspiring to note Don3’s strategic decision to prioritize and support engagement with county governments around SF4DRR.

### **6.1.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?**

Concerning the criteria used to arrive at respective DRR support priorities in the country, analysis showed that four out of the six institutional case studies, namely INGO1, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 refer to government priorities to inform respective DRR priorities. INGO2, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 use either their global or country strategy papers to inform DRR priorities in Kenya. INGO2 registered a unique difference for being the only case that

highlighted working on the nexus to bridge the lifesaving handouts phase with resilience-building DRR actions for target communities as a criterion for deciding her DRR priorities. Don2 also registered the unique difference for being the only case that highlighted doing own research, conducting studies and assessments as part of her process to decide DRR priorities in the country. And Don1 registered the outstanding difference of being the only case that devolves responsibility to select DRR priorities to the NDMA---the lead government agency for drought management in the country.

For the five cases (INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don2 and Don3) that use ‘externally looking criteria’ to determine their DRR support priorities, theirs is a commendable approach to working with communities and echoes Robert Chambers’ observations in his seminal work titled **“whose reality counts”**. In this seminal work, Chambers (1998) asserts that the realities and priorities of poor people often differ from those imagined for them by professionals and policymakers. Chambers observes and recommends that the challenge is, therefore, to enable poor and marginalised people to analyse their conditions and identify their priorities in ways which freely express their realities and generate proposals that are doable, credible and persuasive to policymakers.

### **6.1.3 Funding for CCB4DRR**

It was Matthew B (2015) who asserted that institutional budgets are a great indicator of respective institutional values and priorities. And regarding funding support for CCB4DRR, analysis showed that of the three INGO cases, INGO2 reported the highest funding commitment to DRR (up to 50% of total budgets) and to CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds). She was also the only agency that knew roughly how much of her total funding goes to resilience-building DRR. Don1 didn’t have a clue since she devolves budget allocation responsibilities to the NDMA. Both Don2 and Don3 didn’t have ready estimates to share, but they are working directly with communities using CMDRR approaches, and this guarantees attention to CCB4DRR. Still, on funding CCB4DRR, Don2 shared a plausible argument cautioning against judging the place of CCB4DRR in the big scheme of DRR especially for agencies that support a

lot of DRR infrastructural development. The argument is based on the fact that infrastructural DRR projects are capital intensive and even the smallest % funding support to CCB4DRR around these projects translates into adequate funding for CCB4DRR purposes. Overall, of the six institutional cases covered by this research, only one case, that is INGO2, was conscious of how much of her DRM resources were focused on resilience-building DRR and related CCB4DRR.

While INGO1 (one of the largest INGOs in the country) has a good practice of supporting communities in its program areas to come up with DRR action plans; her DRR respondent reported a mismatch between community DRR action plans and resource allocation to supporting their execution. Matter of fact, the respondent reported a lot of organizational leadership rhetoric on DRR and resilience building compared to how much of that talk translates into committing required resources to community DRR and resilience building initiatives. And then, we have Don1 that didn't have any clue as to how much of its funding to the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) goes to DRR, let a lot to CCB4DRR. Don1 doesn't give any criteria on how funding allocation to NDMA should be utilised. And when the researcher followed up with NDMA on the utilization of committed donor funds, it became clear the biggest percent of received funding in normal (non- high emergency) years goes to preparedness and response, and to response during high emergency years. Relatedly, INGO3 indicated about 90% of her DRM funding goes to emergency responses and the remaining 10% to DRR (through CMDRR approaches).

The foregoing revelations confirm with findings from studies by Kellett and Caravani (2013) who reported that financing for disaster risk reduction makes up a tiny fraction of overall investments in development aid. Related studies by Watson et al. (2015) also revealed that development assistance for DRR supports a range of actions but is biased towards enhancing preparedness for effective response and building back better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction leaving only 8% of development assistance to DRR going to investing in DRR for resilience. And studies by Kelman (2013) reported that every \$1 invested in preventive DRR saves \$7 (and sometimes more). This means that if all the Kenya DRR actors focused on investing more in resilience-building DRR, the principle of '\$1 invested in

preventive DRR saves at least \$7' would gradually result into seeing less and less need for emergency response funding.

If we were to combine the details of section 6.1.1 (agency DRR priorities) and section 6.1.3 (agency funding for DRR which is a very good indication/ measure of support for DRR) and present these in table form, the results would be what we have in **Table 6.1**

Institutional Case Study	Level of CCB4DRR prioritisation (whereby 'prioritisation' means CCB4DRR is either directly or indirectly reflected within agency strategy papers or work plans)	Level of support to CCB4DRR (where in this case 'support' refers to funding allocation)	CCB4DRR results from a combination of both prioritisation and support.
INGO1	High	Low	Low
INGO2	High	High	High
INGO3	High	Low	Low
Don1	Low	None	Lowest
Don2	High	High	High
Don3	High	High	High

Table 6.1: Level of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation and support for CCB4DRR

And the interpretation of **Table 6.1** reveals that of the six institutional case studies, only INGO2, Don2 and Don3 have high CCB4DRR results from a combination of their CCB4DRR prioritisation and funding allocation to CCB4DRR. INGO1 and INGO3 have low CCB4DRR results because while the two have high CCB4DRR prioritisation, this has been let down by their low funding allocation for CCB4DRR. And Don1 has the lowest or no CCB4DRR results because this donor doesn't have any prioritisation nor funding allocation for CCB4DRR. The interpretation of **Table 6.1** therefore shows that it is one thing to have CCB4DRR indicated as a priority for an agency, and yet another for the same agency to support this priority with required resource allocation, especially funding commitments. This therefore shows that while CCB4DRR is generally a high priority among the majority of institutional donors and INGOs participating in this research, only half the same institutional cases were providing reasonably high funding support to CCB4DRR.

#### 6.1.4 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?

The purpose behind research questions 3 & 4 (which were: How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya? and What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?) were covertly aimed at assessing whether institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in the country understand the importance of prioritising and supporting CCB4DRR. The questions were meant to ultimately indirectly find out **where** or **at what level (national level or local level)** both case donors and INGOs focused when measuring DRR success and also where they wanted to see desired changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country.

In response to research question # 4 (how do institutional donors and INGOs in Kenya measure DRR success?), it emerged from the analysis that all the six cases put critical emphasis at the local or community level when looking for ways of measuring DRR success. And they rightly do so because that is exactly where life changing DRR traction ought to be taking place. **13 out of the 14 reported ways of measuring DRR success were all focused at the local level (ref to table 5.1).** However, while all the six cases have their eyes on local level ways of measuring DRR success, it is INGO2's approach to measuring DRR success that strongly brings out the issue of empowerment. INGO2 presented strong emphasis of measuring DRR success at the community level, and much of the yardstick looks at whether target communities have the capacity to take DRR matters into their own hands, lobby, attract resources and hold key stakeholders more accountable. Even her measure of DRR success that looks at policy results at national level seeks to identify results from community-focused influencing agendas. And as argued by Eade (2007, p. 632) who in her seminal work "**Capacity Building: Who Builds Whose Capacity?**" points out that the role of an engaged outsider in CCB is to support the capacity of local people to determine their own values and priorities, to organize themselves to act upon and sustain these for the common good; INGO2 is using the right yardstick in measuring DRR success. It is all about peoplepower. And like reasoned by Lao Tzu's assertion

that *“when the best leader’s job is done, the people say ‘we did it ourselves’”* (Gill, 2002, p. 315), it was impressive to note that INGO2 has passed the baton on to her target communities.

Analysis also showed that close to INGO2, INGO3 focuses only at the local level when measuring DRR success, and ‘community transformation’ is the primary indicator used to assess success and or failure of her CMDRR activities (which have a strong element of CCB4DRR). According to INGO3’s explanation, transformation can be summed up as community empowerment to undertake possible DRR activities to a degree where the results attract non-target communities to replicate the same activities. Replication by non-target project communities is definitely another great way to measure DRR success because no one would be willing to replicate what they don’t think is working.

Don2 is also unique in that because she has direct engagement with communities in implementing DRR actions, she focuses her attention on community and local government feedback to assess the extent to which implemented projects are deemed to have been successful. This is an approach supported by Robert Chamber's community development thesis of **‘whose reality counts?: putting the last first’** (Chambers, 1995). In this work, Chambers fervently argues that if the poor and weak are not to see efforts of the so-called development agencies and their global summits as a celebration of hypocrisy, signifying not sustainable well-being for them but sustainable privilege for us (the so-called development agencies), **the key is to enable them to express their reality, to put that reality first and to make it count.** And Chambers further asserts, ‘to do that demands altruism, insight, vision and guts.’ Going by Chambers caution, it was encouraging to note Don2’s insight and guts by prioritising ‘beneficiary community feedback’ as a top indicator when assessing the extent to which her DRR efforts are either a success or a failure. Thus, among the three institutional donor cases, Don2’s method of measuring DRR success by considering community and local government feedback on supported projects stood out tallest.



### 6.1.5 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?

Concerning the changes both institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya would like to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country: analysis showed that INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don3 would like to see **improved resource allocation to DRM/ and DRR action in the country**. However, INGO2 goes ahead to prescribe that this improved resource allocation should be more aimed at **supporting community DRR action plans**.

Still on the desire for improved resource allocation, INGO2 further specifies the desire to see changes leading to **adequate DRR resource allocation to local NGOs and actors compared to the level of especially financial resources presently allocated to INGOs and UN agencies**. INGO2's quest for better resource allocation to local NGOs that play the crucial role of first responders is strongly validated by Craig (2007) and Duncan and Thomas (2000) who in their respective works on CCB assert that CCB involves development work which strengthens the ability of community-based organizations and groups to build their structures, systems, people and skills. They, therefore, recommend that where there are organisations within target communities, building the capacity of such organisations should be considered part of CCB.

INGO3, Don2 and Don3 all want to see **better DRR comprehension in the country**, with both Don2 and Don3 expecting to see development re-configured into DRR and the result being development programming with 'built-in-resilience'. Don1 and Don2 would like to see improved DRR stakeholder coordination leading to joint planning and better geographic resource allocation.

INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don2 all want to see **improved DRM governance** in the country, with INGO1 and INGO2 specifically expecting to see a reduction in the number of government DRM departments. Still on the desire for improved DRM governance, INGO1 had

lamented how country's Disaster Management Policy has remained in draft form (therefore not passed or enacted) by subsequent governments leaving the country to just focus on response instead of focusing resilience-building DRR. INGO1 also singled out corruption in government DRM departments as one of the critical factors delaying the finalisation and adoption of Kenya's National DRM Policy leaving the country *"romancing response activities"* because it is easy to abuse response funds compared to resilience-building funding. And because such lamentations reportedly abound across many aid agencies, D. Alexander and Davis (2012, p. 3) conclude that *"in the modern world, aid, relief and development are big business. The agencies that provide them have often been accused of perpetuating situations of inequality, aid dependency and injustice."*

The view of a Kenya that romanticises response was shared by Mondoh (2013) in his HFA Progress Report on Kenya when he observed the challenge of the prevalence of a **'response oriented mindset'** among humanitarian agencies and institutions, government, donor agencies and communities. Mondoh's report asserted *"There has been too much concentration at allocating resources to response programs but little towards long term risk reduction"*. And as reasoned by Fawcett et al. (2011), Kellett and Caravani (2013), Kelman (2013), and Mondoh (2013), INGO1 wants to see a country-wide shift from focusing on disaster response to resilience-focused DRR.

And going by recommendations by Back et al. (2009) and Benson and Bugge (2007) who assert that engaging children directly in the design and delivery of DRR activities can have very many benefits, both INGO1 and INGO3 share the common vision of seeing an increase in child and youth led DRR through the inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum.

INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don1 and Don2 all highlighted different things that needed to be stopped around various aspects of DRM in the country, with no uniformity but a rich variety in what was highlighted. And probably because of her long history in community development programming, INGO1 was alone in wanting to see improved community capacity building

aimed at communities taking more charge of risk management in respective environments. INGO3 was also alone in highlighting the expectation to see all professional disciplines in the country embracing DRR with key emphasis laid on civil engineers. Don1 also stood alone in voicing out the expectation to see less and less negative disaster impacts in the country.

INGO2 was again unique for being the only institutional case that desires to see changes in the way early warning information is shared with at risk communities. INGO2 would like to see **a stop to early warning processes that only extract** information from communities and see them replaced with those that **provide value-addition feedback loops to communities**. This desired change is in concert with views by D. Alexander and Davis (2012) who assert that one of the ‘elephants in the room’ in official publications and international gatherings convened to discuss DRR is the **‘human right to hazard information’**. Alexander and Davis argue that in scores of countries around the world, the right of access to knowledge of the risks that citizens face, are persistently denied.

#### **6.1.6 Analysis and Discussion of Factors and or Good Practice Concepts that Enabled OMO’s Outstanding CCB4DRR Success**

It should be noted here that because Chapter 5 presented data analysis and discussion of cases studies case by case, and there was only one CCB4DRR project case study analysed by this research (out of the intended three), this chapter could only therefore provide the amalgamated discussion of the six institutional case studies. There’s therefore no additional discussion required on the only analysed CCB4DRR project case study, Yatta’s OMO. The same discussion presented in Chapter 5 suffices to be brought here, but in the interest of not simply adding more pages to the thesis, the researcher finds it prudent not to reproduce the discussion, but to refer the reader to Chapter 5 for the complete discussion of the only CCB4DRR project case study.

## Summary and link:

This chapter presented the discussion of amalgamated institutional case study findings; and didn't include the discussion of the only CCB4DRR project case study since there was only one CCB4DRR case making it impossible to do an amalgamated discussion on CCB4DRR case study projects. Chapter 7 presents research conclusions.

# CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS

## 7.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 of this thesis provided an introduction to the thesis followed by a detailed literature review in Chapter 2. Thereafter, Chapter 3 presented a detailed research methodology in which ‘case study research strategy’ was adopted for the research. Chapter 4 presented a conceptual framework providing a theoretical overview of intended research, key concepts and contexts of the research, and what data were going to be collected and analysed. Subsequently, Chapter 5 presented detailed data analysis and discussion of case study findings, while Chapter 6 presented a summary discussion of amalgamated key findings. It is within the foregoing context that this chapter is dedicated to drawing conclusions about the aims and objectives of the thesis. In this chapter, therefore, findings are presented and evaluated in response to the research questions and objectives proposed at the beginning of this thesis.

Accordingly, this chapter is structured as follows:

- Firstly, for ease of reference, the research aim, research questions and research objectives are all reproduced.
- Secondly, the findings of research objectives are presented
- Thirdly, the implications to theory and practice are discussed
- Fourthly, limitations of the study are identified
- Finally, related potential research themes are suggested

## **7.2 Research Aim, Research Questions and Research Objectives**

### **7.2.1 Research Aim:**

The aim of the research was to explore and investigate the state of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) in Kenya, and to identify and analyse good practice concepts behind highly successful CCB4DRR initiatives in the country. And the study was guided by the following research questions and objectives:

### **7.2.2 Key Research Questions**

- i. What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya?
- ii. How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya determine DRR support priorities?
- iii. How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?
- iv. What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?
- v. What are the critical factors and or good practice concepts responsible for successful community DRR action where this has been achieved in the country?

### **7.2.3 Key Research Objectives (mirroring the research questions)**

- i. Explore current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities.
- ii. Establish how individual institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support.
- iii. Assess whether institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR understand the importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR (by analysing their current DRR priorities, analysing how they measure DRR success and the changes they want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country).

- iv. Identify highly successful cases of community capacity building for DRR in Kenya and analyse factors and or good practice concepts responsible for this success.
- v. Develop a conceptual framework through which institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR would determine where to prioritise DRR support.

## **7.3 Findings of Research Objectives**

This section summarizes key findings for each of the research objectives.

### **7.3.1 Objective 1: Explore current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities**

The first objective was to explore DRR priorities currently being supported by selected case institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in the country. This was mainly explored through face to face interviews with designated DRR focal persons at respective institutions, and the interviews were complemented by case organization document reviews. During data analysis, findings under this objective were organized into four broad categories, namely: government- focused priorities, community-focused priorities, intra-agency focused priorities, and cross-cutting priorities.

Starting with key similarities, four out of the six cases, namely INGO1, Don1, Don2 and Don3 have a strong focus on strengthening government capacity for DRR; and all the 3 donor cases have strengthening government capacity for DRR as a key priority. Five out of the six cases including INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 have community-focused DRR priorities, and all these five have community managed DRR as one of their community-focused priorities. Only Don1 doesn't have community-focused DRR priorities for she directs all her support to strengthening the NDMA.

In regard to key differences and uniqueness, INGO2 was found to be unique in that while her DRR priorities fall under three different broad categories (government-focused priorities, community-focused priorities, and cross-cutting priorities), all her priorities still zoom-in on community-issues. It is only INGO2 and Don2 that conduct DRR-related studies to inform either their influencing agendas or their community-

based programming options. INGO1 is also unique for being the case study that puts a lot of emphasis on more staffs CB4DRR aimed at ensuring adequate in-house DRR implementation capacity in all her program areas.

### **7.3.2 Objective 2: Establish how individual institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support.**

The second objective was to establish how individual case institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support. The objective, therefore, sought to find out the criteria used to arrive at respective agency DRR priorities, and this was investigated through face-to-face interviews with designated DRR focal persons at respective institutions. During data analysis, findings for 'Objective 2' from all the six INGO and donor cases were organized into three criteria categories, namely: externally looking criteria, internally looking criteria, and not involved in determining priorities.

Data analysis revealed that four out of the six case studies, namely INGO1, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 refer to government priorities to inform respective DRR priorities. It was noted that INGO cases refer to government priorities by way of reference to available government reports, while donor cases engage in direct discussions with target government departments/ ministries and or agencies. INGO2, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 use either their global or country strategy papers to inform DRR priorities in Kenya.

INGO2 registered a unique difference for being the only case that adopted the criteria of working on the nexus to bridge the lifesaving handouts phase with resilience-building DRR actions among target disaster-affected communities. Don2 also registered the unique difference for being the only case that highlighted doing own research, conducting studies and assessments as part of the process to decide DRR priorities in the country. And Don1 registered the outstanding difference of being the only case that devolves the entire responsibility of selecting DRR priorities to the NDMA---the lead government agency for drought management in the country.



These findings, therefore, revealed that the majority of the cases (5 out of 6, including Don1 that devolves the responsibility to determine DRM priorities to the government) determine their DRR priorities firstly by seeking to align with government priorities. This further reinforces the reason why findings under 'Objective 1' indicated that four out of the six cases, namely INGO1, Don1, Don2 and Don3 have 'strengthening government capacity for DRR' as one of their top DRR priorities. There's, therefore, a big and respectful stakeholder expectation on the host government to lead the way in deciding top DRR priorities. And in the words of Don3, *"I think we are still very limited in the understanding of DRR and how to translate it into the practical things"*. This again explains the rationale behind finding all three donor cases prioritizing institutional CB4DRR.

**7.3.3 Objective 3: Assess whether institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya understand the importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR (by analysing their current DRR priorities, how they measure DRR success and the changes they want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country).**

The purpose behind Objective 2 was to ultimately indirectly find out whether the six case INGOs and donors focused more at upper (national) or lower (local/community) country levels when measuring DRR success, and at what country level the same INGOs and donors wanted to see changes as a result of their meaningful contribution to the country's DRR agenda. If the six case INGOs and donors were to be found majorly focusing their means of measuring DRR success at grass root and or local level where much of the DRR action is supposed to happen, as well as wanting to see most of the DRR changes in the country happening at local/ grassroots level, it would covertly allude to the fact that they somewhat understand the need and importance of supporting local DRR action including CCB4DRR.

**In regard to measuring DRR success**, all responses from the 6 case INGO and donors were re-arranged into two broad categories, namely: measures focused at local-level DRR success, and measures focused at national-level DRR success. Data analysis

showed that 13 out of the 14 reported ways of measuring DRR success were all focused at the local level (ref to table 5.1), and their ways or measuring DRR success is also reflective of their respective DRR priorities. Even Don1 that devolves all the responsibility for selecting DRM priorities to the NDMA still zooms in to the local level when measuring DRR success. It emerged therefore that all the six INGO and donor cases put critical emphasis at the local and or community level when looking for ways of measuring DRR success.

**And concerning where or at what level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country,** responses to this query were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR seriously, reduced hazard impacts, and lastly, things that need to be stopped. A detailed analysis of responses to the query revealed a good mix between wanting to see changes at the upper (national) and lower (local/community) levels. For instance, INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don3 would like to see improved resource allocation to DRM/ and DRR action in the country, and this is both at the upper and lower levels. However, NGO2 pointedly indicated that this improved resource allocation should be more aimed at supporting community DRR action plans.

INGO3, Don2 and Don3 all want to see better DRR comprehension in the country, with both Don2 and Don3 expecting to see development re-configured into DRR and the result being development programming with 'built-in-resilience'. Reconfiguring development would be more at the upper level, with actual programmatic implementation happening at the lower level. Don1 and Don2 would like to see improved DRR stakeholder coordination leading to joint planning and better geographic resource allocation. Again, this is coordination at the upper level leading to better local level results. INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don2 all want to see improved DRM governance in the country, with INGO1 and INGO2 specifically expecting to see a reduction in the # of government DRM departments. INGO1 and INGO3 share the common vision of seeing an increase in child and youth-led DRR through the inclusion of DRR in the school

curriculum. The inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum would be at the upper level while seeing an increase in the number of youth and child-led DRR would be at the lower level.

INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don1 and Don2 all highlighted different things that needed to be stopped around various aspects of DRM in the country, with no uniformity but a rich variety in what was highlighted. Probably because of its long history in community development programming, INGO1 was alone in wanting to see improved community capacity building aimed at communities taking more charge of risk management in respective environments. INGO3 was also alone in highlighting the expectation to see all professional disciplines in the country embracing DRR with key emphasis laid on civil engineers. Don1 also stood alone in voicing out the expectation to see less and less negative disaster impacts in the country.

**To conclude this section, the researcher sought to find out whether there's a CCB4DRR link and or storyline between case INGO and donor DRR priorities, their ways of measuring DRR success and the changes they would like to see as a result of effectively engaging with country's DRR agenda.**

How many of the case INGO and donor DRR priorities were found to be focused at the lower and or community level? A review of Table 5.1 shows that 12 out of the 21 aggregate DRR priorities are direct community-focused DRR priorities, and 2 out of the 21 aggregate DRR priorities are indirect community-focused DRR priorities comprised mainly of empirical research aimed at informing local DRR programming. Thus in total, 14 out of the 21 aggregate DRR priorities for the 6 case INGOs and donors are all community-focused DRR priorities. Data analysis further revealed that 13 out of the 14 reported ways of measuring DRR success were all focused at the local level (ref to table 5.1). And concerning where or at what level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country, a detailed analysis of responses to the query revealed a good mix between wanting to see changes at the upper (national) and lower (local/community) levels.

With 14 out of the 21 aggregate DRR priorities for the 6 case INGOs and donors being categorized as community-focused DRR priorities, with 13 out of the 14 reported ways of measuring DRR success found to be focused at the local level, and with analysis revealing an even split between upper (national) and lower (local/community) levels concerning the country level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country, it is an informed verdict to pronounce that the six case INGOs and donors generally understand the importance of supporting local DRR action, but are at varying degrees of supporting CCB4DRR. This is partly assessed through budget allocations to both DRR and CCB4DRR and the importance different case INGOs and donors attached to staff CB4DRR, without which, it is impossible to simultaneously provide adequate support to multiple target communities. And like already discussed through factors responsible for OMO's great success, it is one thing to understand the importance of prioritizing and supporting community capacity building for DRR, and yet another to know how practically get it right.

#### **7.3.4 Objective 4: Identify highly successful cases of community capacity building for DRR and analyse factors and or good practice concepts responsible for this success.**

While Objective 4 sought to identify successful cases of community capacity building for DRR in the country and analyse factors responsible for this success, the objective encountered contextual challenges. As indicated in section 5.9, sporadic mass protests which followed the annulment of Kenya's August 2018 presidential election results made travel to various parts of the country increasingly risky. Access to almost all the-had-been identified locations with successful cases of CCB4DRR was compromised leaving only Yatta's OMO accessible. Fortunately, Yatta's OMO had been identified as probably the most successful CCB4DRR case in the country, thus provided the best case study through which to analyse factors behind its unique CCB4DRR success.

OMO's success factors were explored through interviews with various interest groups including OMO's leadership, OMO participants, visiting groups to OMO, the NDMA coupled with document reviews and social media analysis. And as summarised

in Fig. 6.7, ten differentiating factors were identified to be responsible for OMO's great success. The ten differentiating success factors (not necessarily in their order of importance) include: CIM, which is the local NGO that provided leadership to OMO made time to accurately diagnose community issues and DID NOT parachute into the community with ready-made up solutions; this was followed by appropriate choice and sequencing of interventions, following the first things first principle (Covey (1989)). The 3<sup>rd</sup> success factor was CIM's ability to make OMO participants realise the need to start from the simplest and smallest resources available. The 4<sup>th</sup> success factor shows that that CIM prioritised and mobilised for a peer-to-peer collaborative spirit, locally known as a merry-go-round. This was especially instrumental in sinking household water dams at a time when people were weak and hungry.

Leadership was identified to be one of OMOs critical success factors. Specifically, the analysis showed that Masika was leading from the front, provided visionary leadership, and his stay at the helm of OMO from inception to the time of this research had helped to assure consistent leadership. And with good consistent leadership came continued community trust in OMO's leadership and buy-in into OMO's vision for her participants. Relatedly, community trust in religious leadership was also identified as yet another success factor. Being a religious leader, the Yatta community inherently trusted in the person of Masika. Other critical success factors included the role played by community change agents/ and or exposure champions; CIM's ability to address traditional fatalistic mindsets through the empowered world view model; applying the law of timing; and embracing transformative community development approaches including but not limited to 'addressing gender inequalities', 'shunning handouts', and employing the combined good practice of 'in-situ training, modelling, and mentoring.'

**7.1.1 Objective 5: Develop a conceptual framework through which DRR stakeholders in the country including institutional donors and INGOs could determine how and where to prioritise DRR support.**

The purpose behind this conceptual framework is rooted in the need to have a simple guiding tool aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the country understand which

critical pieces of information are required for them to be able to make informed DRR choices in the country. The need for this framework is further informed by findings from this research. Some of the findings reveal how a number of the interviewed case INGOs and donors didn't, for instance, have good working knowledge of the Sendai Framework for DRR (SF4DRR), didn't have prior working knowledge of the phased out HFA, nor did they have any working knowledge of the country's previous HFA progress reports.

While Fig. 7.1 (below) was the conceptual framework undergirding this research, Fig. 7.2 presents a proposed integrated framework aimed at informing the selection of agency in-country DRR priorities and to strengthen CCB4DRR outcomes. And as can be noted, the integrated framework borrows from the conceptual framework undergirding this research, and then refines it into a framework that aims to present aid individual agencies with a 360-degree lens to use when selecting their DRR priorities. And for agencies that choose priorities that require CCB4DRR before they can achieve desired results, the integrated framework presents guidance to consider lessons and good practice concepts which have enabled highly successful CCB4DRR initiatives in various contexts.

The process of developing this integrated framework took a multi-phase approach. In phase one, a draft framework was developed building on discussed research findings. In phase two, the draft framework was shared and discussed with key DRR stakeholders in the country (Kenya). In phase three, comments and feedback from phase two were used to make first refinements to the framework. In phase four, the framework was presented to practicing academics at Huddersfield University and the University of Northumbria (with a lot of field practice experience) and they recommended changes that would make it a globally useful tool. Their recommendations helped to develop this final version, which will also continue to see further refinement based on field experiences and user feedback.

The framework is presented in the form of key questions per critical area of consideration, and answers to posed questions should help the interested DRR party widen the selection lens, and therefore avoid bind-sided priorities. For instance, it is

possible to collaborate with peer agencies when one knows who is doing what and where. And similarly, it is not possible to have advocacy and influencing priorities unless the party knows what the actual advocacy and influencing gaps or issues are.

In regard to the process of selecting agency DRR priorities, the integrated framework (**Fig.7.2**) enables the interested DRR stakeholder to consider six areas that should influence agency DRR priorities. The six areas in a cascading order include: 1. taking a look at prevailing global level DRR considerations; 2. Considering regionally agreed DRR and CCA priorities; 3. Reviewing national level DRR and CCA priorities; 4. Forming a mental picture of what the agency would want to see as the end state (results) when they have made their DRR contribution, and then work backward from this picture. For instance, you can't have a desire to harvest apples, but plant oranges. 5. Then the agency is encouraged to consider available complementarities and synergies with peer actors. 6. And lastly, the framework presents guidance encouraging the agency to undertake an in-house assessment of key internal areas that are important in working toward the desired end state (desired DRR results). And for agencies that would eventually include priorities that would need to be implemented at community level, the framework presented guidance on the need to consider good practice CCB4DRR concepts, especially those that have worked in related contexts.




Figure 7. 1 Conceptual framework undergirding this research






Figure 7. 2 An integrated framework to inform the selection of agency in-country DRR priorities and also strengthen CCB4DRR outcomes

## 7.4 Evaluating the results

### 7.4.1 Validity and Reliability

Following expert advice by Merriam and Tisdell (2015), the study employed **triangulation** as a strategy to shore up internal validity. And triangulation took two forms. Firstly, **multiple methods of data collection** including interviews, observations and document reviews enabled triangulation. Secondly, the adoption of **multiple-case study design** allowed for **multiple sources of information** thus enabling triangulation of information aimed at reducing the risks of chance associations while allowing for better assessment of the generality of emerging explanations. Findings are therefore not of a single method nor of a single source.

While the study employed multiple methods of data collection, interviews were the main means through which **data was extracted from its original sources** aimed at helping the researcher understand the perspectives of those involved in the phenomenon of interest. The utilization of interview data that are more direct and less dependent on inference helped to increase the findings reliability.

As indicated in the methodology section, this research adopted a case study research strategy and collected evidence from multiple cases with the guidance of a **case study interview protocol**. The purpose behind the protocol was to provide the case study researcher with uniform sets of procedures on how to consistently prepare for, collect and analyse data from multiple cases, and write and present the research report using approaches that enrich reliability. The protocol, therefore, helped to minimise variations by laying out specific guidelines for each stage of the case study.

**Member check and or respondent validation** was another strategy the study employed to increase the reliability of findings. This was especially done when during the process of transcribing recorded interviews into transcripts, some of the interview responses did not either seem to make sense or seemed to present multiple meanings. There was, therefore, need to refer back to participants in an effort to reduce the possibility of misinterpreting the intended meaning. Member check was also employed

during analysis to assess whether emerging themes resonated with target case study participants.

To further augment reliability and in keeping with the recommended practice of commencing data analysis early in the data collection process (Forman & Damschroder, 2007; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015), immediately after every interview, the researcher **wrote memos summarising key reflections, observations, impressions, hunches and things to pursue** during subsequent interviews. After-interview memos were always quickly followed by transcribing audio interview recordings into full MS Word transcripts and thereafter comparing transcripts with audio recordings, a process that eventually aided the researcher to make direct quotations from interviews during data presentation, thus **increasing the reliability and validity of findings.**

Following expert emphasis from Baxter and Jack (2008) Yin (2003) and ) on the importance of creating and using a **case study database** to effectively organise raw data with the purpose of enabling independent inspection thus improving reliability; the researcher **used NVivo software (Version 11 Plus)** to create a **case study database**, organise and **apply codes** to segments of data deemed relevant to answering the research questions.

#### **7.4.2 Researcher Positionality**

According to Foote and Bartell (2011) and Savin-Baden and Major (2013), the term positionality both describes an individual's worldview and the position they have chosen to adopt in relation to a specific research task. Holmes (2014) and (Sikes, 2004) argue that the individual's worldview or 'where the researcher is coming from' concerns ontological assumptions (the nature of social reality), while epistemological assumptions (the nature of knowledge) concerns assumptions about human nature and agency. And Chiseri-Strater (1996) observes that some aspects of positionality are culturally ascribed or fixed, for example, gender, race, nationality; whilst others such as personal life history and experiences are subjective and contextual. Based on the

foregoing scholarly descriptions, the following paragraphs are an indication of the researcher's positionality.

The researcher is a male black African, born and raised in Uganda, Kenya's neighbouring country and has worked in the humanitarian industry since 1994. Much of the researcher's professional humanitarian career has included working in management and leadership positions around multiple Eastern, Southern and Northern Africa countries with extensive travel outside Africa for numerous Disaster Risk Management engagements. During the period 2006 to 2019, the researcher was based in Nairobi-Kenya, and held various Disaster Risk Management Positions ranging from Senior Emergencies Officer for Africa with Christian Aid, Humanitarian Advisor for Africa with World Vision, Humanitarian Advisor for East Africa with World Vision, Regional Director for Humanitarian & Emergency Affairs with World Vision (Africa East Region), and Regional Head of Disaster Risk Management with Plan International (Region of Eastern and Southern Africa).

During the aforementioned disaster risk management positions, the researcher worked with organizations that were very strong in both DRR integration and programming and some that didn't necessarily have DRR as a top priority even when DRR seemed to be well woven into the fabric of their strategic document's narrative. There are times when during the tenure of some of the aforementioned positions the researcher had to challenge organization leadership on overall commitments to DRR, specifically on the organization commitment to CCB4DRR. Even during the employ of organizations with seeming global commitments to DRR, there was always a mismatch between the level of high-level rhetoric and grass-roots evidence of sustainable DRR results. The researcher's many years of field experience in which overall commitment to DRR especially CCB4DRR were not adequately prioritized greatly informed the need for the study's investigation, and the investigation was not value free.

## 7.5 Contributions to theory

There are multiple ways the study contributed to theory, and the following are brief highlights to this effect. The study provided insights into DRR priorities, ways of measuring DRR success and the status of CCB4DRR in the broad-spectrum. In summary, the study revealed that 14 out of the 21 aggregate DRR priorities for the 6 case INGOs and donors are categorized under community-focused DRR priorities, while 13 out of the 14 reported ways of measuring DRR success were found to be focused at the local level. And concerning the country level at which both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country, the analysis showed an even split between upper (national) and lower (local/community) levels focus. This led to an informed verdict pronouncing that the six case INGOs and donors generally understand the importance of supporting local DRR action.

One of the study's greatest contribution to theory is the identification of factors behind one of the region's most successful DRR initiatives—Yatta's OMO. OMO's compendium of success factors exposed the fact that it is one thing to understand the importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR, and it is yet another to know how to practically get it right. The how of implementing these priorities as witnessed in the factors behind OMO's great success are as equally important as the section criteria behind the priorities themselves.

The study also pointed out that donors who prefer channelling much of their DRM support through government agencies should provide informed guidelines on how allocated resources should be prioritized, rather than leaving this responsibility entirely to government agencies. Without donor engagement in setting DRM priorities, much of allocated resources continue to be spent on disaster preparedness and response without meaningful resources intentionally getting allocated to resilience-building DRR. Findings from this study also re-affirmed previous studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) who pointed out the global trend of **spending heavily** on disaster preparedness and response **while investing far less** in resilience-building DRR.

## 7.6 Contributions to practice

Some of the aforementioned contributions to theory are also contributions to practice. These include the study's identified need for donors to provide informed guidelines on how funds allocated to government DRM agencies should be prioritized between different DRM activities keeping in mind the need to invest much more in resilience-building DRR.

Factors behind OMO's enormous success are replicable especially within Kenya and have the potential to inform similar programmes in the wider African context without necessarily taking a cut and paste approach from OMO's lessons. But perhaps the study's greatest contribution to practice has been the development of a proposed conceptual framework aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the country understand which critical pieces of information are required for one to be able to make informed in-country DRR choices.

## 7.7 Limitations of the study

While the study adopted a multiple case study strategy and this enabled cross-case analysis of findings, it is highly probable that this being a single-researcher investigation, the study missed the opportunity and benefits of multiple-researcher ideas triangulation, especially during data analysis. In addition, while Yatta's OMO provided a rich case study through which to analyse factors behind its successful CCB4DRR, if security had allowed, it would have been better to conduct multiple case studies of successful CCB4DRR and compare and contrast factors behind respective successes.

## 7.8 Further research

Firstly, while the study developed a conceptual framework to help DRR stakeholders in the country understand which critical pieces of information are required for one to be able to make informed in-country DRR choices, the framework needs to

be tested by multiple stakeholders in the actual process of determining their priorities. This will help to confirm the framework's actual fit for purpose as well as highlighting areas for further improvement.

Secondly, as highlighted in the limitations section of the study, only Yatta's OMO was accessed and deeply investigated to analyse factors behind its great CCB4DRR success. It will be important to conduct more related multiple case studies of successful CCB4DRR in Kenya and compare and contrast factors behind respective successes with the country. In addition, similar studies should be conducted at least in Kenya's neighbouring countries to facilitate comparing and contrasting findings across countries. This will inform possible generalisability of findings across contexts.

## **7.9 Plans for Publishing**

The researcher has intentions to publish peer-reviewed papers from the study's findings with emphasis on:

- a. Factors behind Yatta's Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO). This is because OMO is one of the most successful CCB4DRR initiatives in Kenya and the Horn of Africa region at large. However, the critical factors responsible for OMO's big success still remain hidden from many of the interested stakeholders.
- b. The researcher will also publish a paper summarizing key findings of the study highlighting the general state of CCB4DRR in Kenya. The paper will present the proposed conceptual framework aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the country understand which critical pieces of information are required for one to be able to make informed in-country DRR choices.

## APPENDICES

### **Annexe 1: School Earthquake Safety Initiative** (an excerpt from Pandey and Okazaki (2005, pp. 6-7))

The United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) is, currently, promoting School Earthquake Safety Initiative through a project “Reducing Vulnerability of School Children to Earthquakes” jointly with UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) in Asia-Pacific region. The project aims to make schools safe against earthquakes and build disaster- resilient communities through self-help, cooperation and education. The project includes retrofitting of school building in a participatory way with the involvement of local communities, local governments and resource institutions, trainings on safer construction practices to technicians, disaster education in school and communities. These activities are carried out in Fiji Islands, India, Indonesia and Uzbekistan as demonstration cases which will be disseminated throughout the respective geographical regions.

There are three major aspects of the community empowerment in earthquake disaster risk management through this initiative:

**Seismic safety of school buildings:** The projects includes seismic vulnerability analysis of some selected schools in a project city of each country and retrofitting of some of them which cover prominent construction typology in the region. This leads to development of country specific guidelines on the earthquake safe construction which incorporates solutions to the practical problems experienced school retrofitting.

**Capacity building of communities:** Retrofitting of schools in communities serves as a demonstration of proper earthquake technology to them. Masons in the communities get on-job training during the retrofitting of schools. In addition, technicians in each project cities get trainings on earthquake design and construction of houses. Consideration is given to the local practice, material availability, indigenous knowledge and affordability in trainings on earthquake technology.



**Disaster education and awareness:** The project includes development and wide distribution of educational booklets, posters and guidebook on teachers training and students' drills for earthquake disaster preparedness and response. The guidebooks get verification and updated through trainings and mock drills. The projects also develop an interactive educational tool for awareness raising on earthquake disaster and simple seismic risk assessment of buildings aiming to motivate households for planning seismic upgrading of their houses.

It was learned from earlier programs of UNCRD that the process of making safer schools can be used as an entry points to the communities at risk to facilitate implementation of a training and capacity-building programme for earthquake disaster mitigation technology besides its prime objective of ensuring the safety of school children against future earthquakes. It is achieved by demonstrating how schools can be used as community centers for earthquake disaster prevention and mitigation. Locally applicable and affordable earthquake-safer construction technology is transferred to these communities

## Annexe 2: Research Briefing Pack

March 30, 2017

To Whom It May Concern

### **RE: REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR DATA COLLECTION**

This is to confirm that the bearer of this letter, Mr Stuart Katwikirize, is a post-graduate student undertaking a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree studies at the School of Art, Design and Architecture, [University of Huddersfield](#), United Kingdom under my supervision. His research is titled “Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction: Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya.” The research, therefore, aims at exploring and gauging current institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to ‘supporting community capacity building for disaster risk reduction’ (DRR) in Kenya. Research findings will be used to contribute to the development of a conceptual model through which key DRR stakeholders in the country including institutional donors and INGOs could determine how and where to prioritise DRR support.

In accord with the above and on behalf of the University of Huddersfield, I am writing to kindly request that you grant Mr Katwikirize necessary permission and support to approach key departments/personnel in your organisation for this study’s data collection.

I am confident that the study will not disrupt your working environment in any way, and any data collected will remain confidential. I am also happy to report that in compliance with global research ethics, Mr Katwikirize has been granted the ethical approval for this research from the University of Huddersfield. More details on the study are provided in the accompanying information pack.

Thank you

Yours sincerely,

Prof. Dilanthi Amaratunga  
Director, Global Disaster Resilience Centre

School of Art, Design and Architecture  
University of Huddersfield  
United Kingdom  
Tel : +44(0)161 295 4471  
Email : [r.d.g.amaratunga@salford.ac.uk](mailto:r.d.g.amaratunga@salford.ac.uk)

**University of Huddersfield**  
**School of Art, Design and Architecture**

**PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET**

**Research Project Title: [Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction \(DRR\): Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya](#)**

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide, it is important for you to understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. I take this opportunity to thank you for taking the time to read this.

**What is the purpose of the project?**

The research project, whose details are provided in the 'research brief' below, is a module contributing to the attainment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy with the University of Huddersfield, United Kingdom.

**Why have I been chosen?**

Your organisation/agency/community was purposively selected based on known level of engagement and contribution to DRR in Kenya. And individually, you were put forward by your organisation/agency/community as a key resource person on the research subject.

**Do I have to take part?**

While we encourage you to take part in the study, participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you do not have to feel obliged to take part. Refusal will involve no penalty whatsoever and you may withdraw from the study at any stage without giving an explanation to the researcher.

**What do I have to do?**

You will be invited to take part in a pre-scheduled interview. The interview will not take more than one hour. And at a later date, we will also request to have a much shorter interview not exceeding 35 minutes. Part of your participation may include helping the researcher to access related research documents in your organisation/agency.

**Are there any disadvantages to taking part?**

There should be no foreseeable disadvantages to your participation. If you are unhappy or have further questions at any stage in the process, please address your concerns initially to the researcher if this is appropriate. Alternatively, please contact Prof Dilanthi Amaratunga at the School of Art, Design and Architecture, University of Huddersfield, United Kingdom. Full contacts are given below.

**Will all my details be kept confidential?**

All information which is collected will be strictly confidential and anonymised before the data is presented in any work, in compliance with the Data Protection Act and ethical research guidelines and principles.

**What will happen to the results of the research study?**

The results of the study will be used to develop a conceptual model through which intuitional donors and INGOs supporting the DRR agenda in Kenya could determine how and where to prioritise respective DRR support. A written copy of the report will be made available to interested research participants.

**What happens to the data collected?**

Like indicated above, all data will be kept confidentially, there will be no attribution in the report. Only the researcher and supervisory university staffs will have access to this confidential data.

**Will I be paid for participating in the research?**

This research encourages free participation. However, the time and responses provided will be considered a great contribution to developing a decision-making tool aimed at streamlining support provided to different layers of DRR in Kenya, and possibly beyond.

**Where will the research be conducted?**

Where possible, scheduled interviews will be conducted on selected donor/INGOs premises. In the event that this may not be possible, alternative locations will be mutually agreed between the researcher and the participant.

**Criminal Records check (if applicable)**

There are no vulnerable persons, e.g. children solicited to participate in this research. Consequently, it is not considered necessary to undertake criminal record checks on the researcher.

**Who has reviewed and approved the study, and who can be contacted for further information?**

The study was reviewed and approved by the University's Research Ethics and Integrity Committee (UREIC), and Prof Dilanthi Amaratunga can be contacted for details. Contact details are provided here below.

Professor Dilanthi Amaratunga  
Director, Global Disaster Resilience Centre  
School of Art, Design and Architecture  
**University of Huddersfield, UK**  
Tel: +44 (0)845 155 6666  
Email: [d.amaratunga@hud.ac.uk](mailto:d.amaratunga@hud.ac.uk)

**Name & Contact Details of Researcher:**

Stuart Katwikirize  
Global Disaster Resilience Centre  
School of Art, Design and Architecture  
The University of Huddersfield, UK.  
Tel: +254733825050  
Email: [stuart.katwikirize@hud.ac.uk](mailto:stuart.katwikirize@hud.ac.uk); [katwikirize@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:katwikirize@yahoo.co.uk)

## RESEARCH BRIEF

### Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction:

#### Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya

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#### Research Overview

This research aims to explore and gauge current institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to ‘supporting community capacity building for disaster risk reduction’ (DRR) in Kenya. The revealed level of support to community capacity building for disaster risk reduction will be compared and contrasted to support provided to other DRR priorities in the country. Eventual findings will be used to develop a conceptual model through which institutional donors and INGOs supporting Kenya’s DRR agenda could determine how and where to prioritise respective DRR support.

#### Case Study Selection

Initially, this research is expected to cover a minimum of three institutional donors, three INGOs and three supported community DRR projects. Nevertheless, depending on the availability of resources including time and funding, the number of donor cases could be increased from 3 to 5, and the number of INGO cases also increased from 3 to 5.

#### Case Study Objectives

1. Explore current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities.
2. Establish how individual institutional donors and INGOs supporting DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support.
3. Assess the importance institutional donors and INGOs attach to prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR.
4. Identify successful cases of community capacity building for DRR and analyse factors responsible for this success.
5. Identify and analyse factors limiting greater community capacity building for DRR in Kenya.
6. Develop a conceptual model through which institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR would determine where to prioritise DRR support.

## Data Collection

This being an exploratory and interpretive case study research, open-ended interviews will be the main form of data collection. Access to related DRR documents, both manual and electronic, from participating donors and INGOs will provide secondary sources of information. Such documents include policy and strategy papers, plans, project documents, reports, etc.

In compliance with good research practice, interviewees will be availed a copy of the interview questions and guidelines prior to the interview. The main interview will last for a maximum of 1 hour. A later and much shorter interview lasting, not more than 35 minutes will be requested to help clarify emerging questions from the first interview and also provide an opportunity to ask questions that may have emerged as a result of interaction with other donors and INGOs participating in this research.

## Benefits to You and Your Organisation

The research will develop a conceptual model through which key stakeholders including intuitional donors and INGOs supporting Kenya’s DRR agenda could determine how and where to prioritise respective DRR support. This will strengthen an evidence-based approach to deciding how and where to provide required DRR support. All interview materials will be kept strictly confidential and made available only to members of the supervisory staff of the University.

Contact Details	
<p><b>Researcher:</b></p> <p>Stuart Katwikirize</p> <p>Global Disaster Resilience Centre</p> <p>School of Art, Design and Architecture</p> <p><b>University of Huddersfield, UK</b></p> <p>Tel: +254733825050</p> <p>Email: <a href="mailto:stuart.katwikirize@hud.ac.uk">stuart.katwikirize@hud.ac.uk</a>; <a href="mailto:katwikirize@yahoo.co.uk">katwikirize@yahoo.co.uk</a></p>	<p><b>Supervisor:</b></p> <p>Professor Dilanthi Amaratunga</p> <p>Director, Global Disaster Resilience Centre</p> <p>School of Art, Design and Architecture</p> <p><b>University of Huddersfield, UK</b></p> <p>Tel: +44 (0)845 155 6666</p> <p>Email: <a href="mailto:d.amaratunga@hud.ac.uk">d.amaratunga@hud.ac.uk</a></p>



**University of Huddersfield  
School of Art, Design and Architecture**

**Participant Consent Form**

**Title of Research Study: Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction: Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya**

**Name of Researcher:** Stuart Katwikirize

**Participant Identifier Number:**

I confirm that I have read and understood the participant Information sheet related to this research, and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.

I understand that all my responses will be anonymised.

I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses.

I agree to take part in the above study

**Name of Participant:** .....

**Signature of Participant:** .....

**Date:** .....

**Name of Researcher:**

**Signature of Researcher:**

**Date:**

## Researcher Consent Form

This form is to be used when consent is sought from those responsible for an organisation or institution for research to be carried out with participants within that organisation or institution. This may include schools, colleges or youth work facilities.

**Title of Research Study:** Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction: Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya

**Name of Researcher:** Stuart Katwikirize

**Organisations:** Donors and INGOs supporting DRR initiatives in Kenya

**i) The aim/ purpose of the research study:** This research aims to explore and gauge current institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to 'supporting community capacity building for disaster risk reduction' (DRR) in Kenya. The revealed level of support to community capacity building for disaster risk reduction will be compared and contrasted to support provided to other DRR priorities in the country. Eventual findings will be used to develop a conceptual model through which institutional donors and INGOs supporting Kenya's DRR agenda could determine how and where to prioritise respective DRR support.

**ii) The data collection methods to be used:** This being an exploratory and interpretive case study research, open-ended interviews will be the main form of data collection. Access to related DRR documents, both manual and electronic, from participating donors and INGOs will provide secondary sources of information. Such documents include policy and strategy papers, plans, project documents, reports, etc. In compliance with good research practice, interviewees will be availed a copy of the interview questions and guidelines prior to the interview. The main interview will last for a maximum of 1 hour. A later and much shorter interview lasting, not more than 35

minutes will be requested to help clarify emerging questions from the first interview and also provide an opportunity to ask questions that may have emerged as a result of interaction with other donors and INGOs participating in this research.

**iii) Which groups will be selected for this study?** Donors and INGOs known for their significant contribution to the DRR agenda in the country are purposively sampled for this study.

I confirm that I give permission for this research to be carried out and that permission from all participants will be gained in line within my organisation's policy.

**Name and position of senior manager:**

**Signature of senior manager:**

**Date:**

**Name of Researcher:**

**Signature of Researcher:**

**Date:**

### Annexe 3: Sample Interview Guide

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR INGOs/ Donors		
Aspect of Inquiry	Question	Triangulated Sources of Information
1. Current DRR support priorities	Is your agency/org presently engaged in DRR and humanitarian work in Kenya? If yes, which DRR priorities is your agency/org presently supporting in the country?	Publications/ documents
2. Shelf life of priorities	When were these priorities selected and do they have a timeframe? <b>This can be expressed in terms of months or years.</b>	
3. Timeline for reviewing priorities	Is there a pre-determined timeline or frequency for reviewing these priorities?	
4. Selection criteria	Being a government of Kenya development partner, how do you as an agency/org decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?	Publications/ documents
5. Use of global DRR frameworks:	<b>Statement:</b> During the implementation of the HFA, there was periodic compilation and sharing of Regional and Country Platform DRR Assessment reports.	

<p>HFA and Kenya Platform assessment reports; and SFDRR</p>	<p><b>Questions: Are you aware of these reports?</b></p> <p>Please tell me whether and how these reports may have had any influence on your agency's DRR support priorities in the country.</p> <p><b>Questions: Are you conversant with the new Sendai Framework for DRR?</b></p> <p><b>If yes: What plans do you have to either use or implement the SFDRR?</b></p>	
<p>6. % funding toward capacity building for local DRR action</p>	<p>How much % of your agency Disaster Management support resources including funds are designated toward DRR?</p> <p>And how much of the DRR funding/budget is dedicated toward supporting community capacity building for DRR? <b>A rough break down may be helpful.</b></p>	
<p>7. Measuring success</p>	<p>How does your agency measure the effectiveness and success of its contribution to the country's DRR agenda?</p>	
<p>8. Desired change</p>	<p>What specific changes or improvements would you like to see in this country as a result of highly effective DRR work in this country?</p>	
<p>9. Evidence-based prioritisation</p>	<p>There's ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater DRR progression in many countries including Kenya.</p> <p>Would your agency be willing to use this kind of evidence?</p>	

	If yes, what are some of the ways in which your agency may be willing to use this kind of evidence?	
10. Agency's history with local DRR action	<p><b>Has your agency been engaged in community capacity building for DRR?</b></p> <p><b>If Yes:</b> Describe for me your agency's recent history in supporting local/ community DRR action in this country if any.</p> <p><b>Statement:</b> I am asking because I am interested in identifying case studies of communities that have received capacity building support.</p>	
11. Upper versus local level DRR focus	What would be your comments on growing literature that seems to suggest there's inadequate support to community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?	

## Annexe 4: Interview Transcript

### 1. Current DRR Support Priorities

00:10

*Interviewer: Is DON3 currently engaged in any DRR or humanitarian work in Kenya*

00:18

**Interviewee:** Yes we do DRR work. It depends on how you want to define Humanitarian, but we do not do response; we do the longer term DRR.

00:35

*Interviewer: Which DRR priorities is DON3 presently supporting in Kenya?*

00:46

**Interviewee:** We are looking at issues of capacity building. We are working at two levels; at the institutional level that is with the government and the institutions that are mandated for DRR. And then we are also working at the community level. Therefore a number of the things that we do will either be at the institutional or community level but some will cut across. Capacity building for example that looks at issues of preparedness targets both the institution and the community. So we are not only looking at Community based DRR but we are also looking at what the capacity of Government is, to help the country be prepared and to respond in the event of disasters. When we talk of capacity building, we are looking at institutional frameworks, the legal frameworks that need to be in place as well as technical skills other than just the knowledge.

02:02

*Interviewer: Could you say a little bit more on your Community engagement for DRR*

02:07

**Interviewee:** For our community engagement, we prioritise two things, transfer of knowledge and giving the community skills. Under this, we have used the concept of community-based DRR through the trainings that are designed for Community based DRR. But then we are also looking at how we can increase their resilience to the various risks that they are exposed to. That is when we actually do projects, community- based projects. So that if we are looking at issues of how we can enhance their capacity or their resilience to drought, then we are looking at projects that help them to minimize the impact of drought. If it is in the area of livestock do they have sufficient water? Are they able to manage diseases or prevent diseases? If it comes to issues and aspects of food security can they look at production systems that are not overly reliant on rainfall? That is what we are looking at. For some we also look at alternative forms of livelihoods, if the predominant source of livelihood is very exposed then what else can they do? So there is the aspect of resilience building and moving them away from the exposure as well as just giving them the knowledge.

03:43

*Interviewer: How do you go about selecting which communities to work with on DRR?*

03:54

**Interviewee:** It is a whole process. At DON3 we work a lot with the government. Government is our key implementing partner as well as our entry point. So when it comes to prioritising on the larger geographic area, the counties, for example, we prioritise together with the Government and we look at the level of exposure or impact of a certain disaster, the support that is already being issued or whether there is any support, whether it is sufficient or whether there are gaps. That is how we look at it (in a bigger picture) so that we are able to narrow down to the geographic area. Once we get to that area, we begin to work with the communities so as to pick the specific area. They are able to identify which is the specific community within this area that has been selected that we need to go to. It is an engagement that we get into, a kind of back and forth on what are the issues? Who are vulnerable? Who has not received any support? But that we work with the help of the local levels.



## 2. Shelf Life of Priorities

05:10

*Interviewer: I will come back to that question later. Do you have a time frame in which these priorities will be supported? Or said differently, when were these priorities selected and do they have a timeframe for revisiting or reviewing?*

05:44

**Interviewee:** We work under the bigger framework, we have our Country programme document that defines our priority areas and areas that we want to engage in. The way our Country Programme Document (which is our strategy) has been set out, is that it is informed by the UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework), which is then aligned to the Government's medium-term plans. So what we are doing really fits into the focus and the objectives of the Government. Once we have these broad areas defined, then we develop specific projects through which we address some of these components. The projects will then be defined in terms of what components or what specific activities we are going to undertake with which communities within what specific period of time.

## 3. Timeline for Reviewing DRR Priorities

*The following narrative is a continuation of the above paragraph, and it covers the question on the timeline for review of priorities.*

And the length of time is also informed by the source of funding. Some of the funding is DON3 internal funding, some of the funding is given to us by donors that also come with some agreed on specifications; like we have funding available between this time and this time, so that is the period within which we implement that project. Within the projects, we normally have annual reviews. If it's a three-year project, for example, it will have an annual review but depending on the design also it will have a midterm review through which you are then able to recast if you need to recast any of the work that you are doing there. But the continuous monitoring that goes on fits back into the project in case you need to redesign or redefine some of the components. I would say it

a continuous process, but also midterm really gives us an opportunity if it is a longer-term project. There are some funds that we have that are short term, as short as one year. With that, you are unable to make major changes but you can make minimal and necessary changes in the course of the year because that is a shorter project.

08:15

*Interviewer: When did you decide to start supporting Communities and when did you decide to start working with institutions like Government? Has it been like this?*

**Interviewee:** It has always been like this, I think it is also because of the mandate and what you are trying to achieve. When it comes to disaster risk reduction, there is the responsibility that can only be undertaken at the upstream level- the institutions and all these instruments that you need to effectively undertake your DRR. But then there is also work that needs to happen at the community level so it is really looking at how effective your work and your programming is going to be. I think this is what has informed the two levels of engagement.

09:08

#### 4. Selection Criteria

*Interviewer: You may have answered this earlier but I will still go ahead and ask, as the Government of Kenya devolvement partner, how do you as DON3 decide which DRR priorities to support in this country?*

09:28

**Interviewee:** I think there is a common understanding that we cannot be able to do the entire spectrum. So it depends on our comparative advantage in terms of what we are able to undertake and the capacities that we have as DON3. It also depends on our larger strategic direction. I think that really informs what we get engaged in and what we don't get engaged in. When we talk about our mandate, for example, DON3 is not a humanitarian agency per se and that is why we don't get involved in response per se. I think there is a bigger picture that informs what we can do and what we cannot do. But in the last recent years when the UN within Kenya took on the "Delivering as One",

where we are largely working in a lot of coordination and cooperation with other agencies, there is really the understanding that there are other UN agencies that are better placed. For example, we know that a particular component will be taken up by say WFP if it is food distribution. So if within a humanitarian setting, there is that which we do; early recovery, for example, how do we begin to help the communities to get back to their feet? But the actual response is something that we do not do by mandate. So it is informed by the larger picture in terms of strategic directions and in terms of comparative advantage. Then when we talk about the various priorities that need to be addressed within the country, we also look at what are the key gaps? And if we really want to see success in the area of DRR how can we be able to support these very key gaps that have been identified.

**12:04**

*Interviewer: How do you get those gaps for instance?*

12:09

**Interviewee:** Some are glaring, for example in Kenya we do not have a policy framework for DRR and we know that this is very critical in terms of defining the responsibilities of Government, in terms of defining allocation of resources, in terms of defining who is going to do what, when? And some of them really stand out and when you also look at them, issues of policy also fit squarely in areas of interests of DON3 so we take on those for example. But I think some assessments have been done that also help to identify what are some of the key areas that need to be looked at. We (DON3 Kenya) did a rapid assessment, I think in 2012 to identify the key gaps within DRR and also just to look at who are the players and that also helped to define some of the areas that we wanted to engage ourselves in.

13:35

#### 5. Knowledge of and Use of Global DRR Frameworks

*Interviewer: During the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there was periodic compilation and sharing of regional and country platform DRR assessment reports. Are you aware of these reports?*

14:09

**Interviewee:** Yes. I am aware of the Kenya reports that were always done at the time by the Ministry of State for Special Programmes.

14:40

*Interviewer: Are you able to tell me whether and how these reports may have had any influence on DON3's prioritization of DRR activities in Kenya or not?*

14:56

**Interviewee:** The Reports? I wouldn't say so. The reports didn't influence what we did. I wouldn't say the report had, I think we used different mechanisms to identify some of the things that we needed to do. And of course, special programmes and the other key partners and we heavily supported the National Platform for DRR. So in as much as the report gave the progress of what was happening, some of that which we also did input, I wouldn't say that was what we used to determine how to move forward. I wouldn't say so.

15:55

*Interviewer: Are you conversant with the new Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction?*

16:01

**Interviewee:** Yes

16:03

*Interviewer: What plans do you have to either use or implement the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction? Or is it actually going to have any influence on the things that DON3 does in Kenya?*

16:18

**Interviewee:** We are doing a lot as far as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is concerned. We participated and supported the government in preparation toward the Sendai Framework and we also sponsored government officials to participate in the conference. Soon after the conference, we supported the government together with other partners to begin to think about how do we roll out the Sendai Framework in Kenya. And we worked with the other partners on an action plan on the implementation of the Sendai framework, which is still a draft because what we did we did not finish, we expected that government was going to finalise and roll it out as an official document, but it is still the document that is currently guiding some of the work that the national platform is doing. So that is at the national level. Bringing it down to the counties is we have been working to roll out the Sendai framework. One is to raise awareness on this framework that it exists, that this is the content and that this is how we can begin to take it forward and that is what we are doing as DON3. We have worked with some specific counties and they actually have county action plans on how they can roll out the Sendai framework. We have some very specific funding that we got from DFID that helps us to roll out the Sendai Framework. So when we look at even the work we are doing now it is to try and align ourselves on the priority areas of Sendai Framework. So it is some of the key things that we commit ourselves to as DON3 that when we talk about some of these global frameworks, how do they get rolled out at the national and at the local level. So that is what we are doing about Sendai.

18:54

*Interviewer: You talked about the Country programme document, is there any possibility that I can access that document? Is it available to the public?*

19:02

**Interviewee:** It is available, I think it is even in our website if I am not wrong, it is a public document.

19:13

6. % Funding Toward Capacity Building for Local DRR Action

*Interviewer: How much percentage of your agency disaster management support resources including funds are designated towards DRR?*

19:33

**Interviewee:** That is a hard question,

19:35

*Interviewer: You could give me a rough estimation it doesn't have to be exact*

19:41

**Interviewee:** Honestly I don't know what percentage

19:46

*Interviewer: If you look at 2017 for instance, if you don't have it now could you check it out later?*

20:00

**Interviewee:** I do not have it now, it is information that I could look out for you, but maybe one of the things that I could also mention is that we have two main sources of funding. We have our core funding which DON3 funds, and we also have funding that we receive from other donors. The DON3 funding would be within our control to allocate, and this is normally allocated when it comes to prioritizing all areas, we almost prioritise the same because it is a focus area for DON3. But when it comes to other donor funding, it is also influenced by the area of focus or interest of that particular donor which may be out of our control. So taking that information and maybe wanting to extrapolate to then say these are the priority areas may actually be slightly misleading because then also a donor comes and says we want to support work in Environment or we want to support work in peacebuilding or we want to support work in this and this. You know DRR funding is not as large, particularly when it is almost coming from the same pot as the humanitarian funding.

21:26

*Interviewer: So if you can kindly follow up and give me the one for DON3 exclusive and forget about others which are influenced externally, that would be great. I was going to say how much funding or budget is*

*dedicated to supporting community capacity building for DRR. You have your big DON3 budget, the first question was how much of that is allocated to DRR? The 2<sup>nd</sup> question is how much or what % of the allocation to DRR is also is allocated to community capacity building for DRR?*

22:26

**Interviewee:** One thing that I would say about capacity building is we have attached a lot of importance to building capacity, so you will find every component of work we do within the community there will always be an aspect of capacity building. So that for everything you would have transferred the necessary knowledge and the necessary skills because we are looking at in the longer term what would be beneficial to these people. So capacity building normally is a very central component of any of our projects.

23:15

7. How Success is Measured

*Interviewer: How does DON3 measure the successes and effectiveness of its contribution to the country's DRR agenda?*

23:24

**Interviewee:** That is a tough one. Because you can measure success at two levels, but depending on how you want to define it. One, if it's a project, have I delivered what I needed to deliver? That is one way in which you can measure success. Two, and I think also which is what we are trying to look at is, in the longer term are we seeing the necessary changes that we intended? And of course, then you know there is also a contribution from other people. We are very particular when it comes to the results, the outcomes at the higher level and even in terms of our reporting then we will always be looking at what are the changes that are coming out.

24:25

8. Desired Changes

*Interviewer: What specific changes or improvements would you like to see in this country as a result of highly effective work in Kenya?*

24:29

**Interviewee:** The moment DRR is effective, one of the changes that we need to see is a reduction on the negative impact of disasters. Be it economic, or break it down into the loss of lives and property. That is really what we want to see. Take drought, for example, I don't think it is going to go anywhere, but we want to see less impact and fewer people being impacted by this. The moment we start seeing effective DRR, the other thing we are going to see is a change in the way we are doing our development and a change in the allocation of our resources as a country.

**26:00**

9. Evidence-Based Prioritisation

*Interviewer: I will read for you a statement. There's ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realizing greater DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would DON3 Kenya be willing to use this kind of evidence?*

26:55

**Interviewee:** If there is that evidence, why not? I think one of the challenges we have had is not being able to address the real issues. You actually mistarget in terms of identifying what the problem is so that you can be able to put in place the most appropriate intervention. And that is one statement that identifies some of the key problems, therefore, you are able to put in place the necessary.

27:37

*Interviewer: If yes, what are some of the way in which your agency would be willing to use some of this evidence?*

27:45

**Interviewee:** To inform the work that we do in terms of targeting because it identifies for you the areas around which you can design your programmes and allocate your resources. So I think it would inform a lot in terms of "how do you target the resources that you have".

28:11



10. Agency History with local DRR Action

*Interviewer: Two more questions and then we will be done, some of these questions you have already talked about but I would draw more insight from what your response will be again. Has DON3 been engaged in Community Capacity building in DRR in Kenya?*

28:31

**Interviewee:** We have

28:33

*Interviewer: Describe for me your agency's history in supporting local/ community DRR action in this country if any, at least what you know?*

28:46

**Interviewee:** I think I partly talked about it in terms of targeting part of our DRR resources to the community level in two key areas, one has been capacity building. Our capacity building involves training, and sometimes it involves the necessary equipment or tools. It is not just training but the whole package that enables the community to do what they need to do and as well as initiating tangible projects around the community. We have had very specific capacity building in terms of the concept of community-based disaster risk reduction and we have done this with IIRR- the training institution. I remember we once collaborated with them and we ran these trainings a couple of times largely in Turkana, Tana River and in Garissa, these are the specific places where we have done community-based DRR. But we also do capacity building specific to build certain skills that enhance their resilience. So that goes with the tangible projects that we are undertaking. For instance, if we are doing irrigation farming, we do capacity building around the farming; if we are working with pastoralists on livestock production then we do capacity building that enables them to do that particular thing. So there is the general understanding and the knowledge of DRR that we have done through community-based DRR, but then there are also these skills and knowledge in a specific technical area.

31:24

*Interviewer: Are you able to tell me those geographical areas you talked about and the particular time periods when you did that?*

31:41

**Interviewee:** We did Turkana and Garissa I think it was 2012-2013, Tana River I think it was 2013-2014 is when we did that, that is community-based DRR, but the other trainings that go with community projects, those ones are continuous because we have been with these communities since 2012 and that was when I came to DON3.

32:22

*Interviewer: Again could you summarise for me how you select these communities and what informs your selection?*

32:30

**Interviewee:** We begin from Government at the point where we are saying we would like to support certain communities, we want to support some DRR projects. Like at the moment, with this drought, we have been in discussion with Government and specifically with NDMA and asking which are the areas that you would like us to focus on. One of the reasons why we engage with government is because we believe they have the bigger picture in terms of the areas that are not adequately covered, the areas that have huge needs, once those bigger geographical counties have been identified, we move to those counties and work with the local leadership in that county. The County Governments have come in place now, so we engage with the county governments, going lower they have the ward administrators, the local community opinion leaders and the chiefs they help us now to identify the specific spots and who are going to be the beneficiaries. We try to really get a consultative process that at the end of the day it is those that are really viewed to be the most deserving in that situation.

We also try to take care of issues of gender. We have women included, the marginalized groups and the disadvantaged, just trying to see that our beneficiaries are all-inclusive and a proper representation. One of the things that we have also done is we realize that when we talk about resilience building, it is a long term thing, it is a process and by the time you really are able to move particular communities or individuals or groups of

people from point A to where we can say these ones can now be able to stand on their own, and so we are walking with communities over a period of time on the minimum we are actually looking at 3 years. By the time we begin to engage with a particular community, even if it was a short term funding like one year, we have a commitment that we will continue to mobilise resources so that we walk with this community so that we do not just come to give them an irrigation scheme and we are gone. We realise that to be able to build the knowledge, for some of them it requires a change in their mindset. So we walk with them over a period of time.

35:22

*Interviewer: Is there any one particular community (because I am interested in following up and documenting) at least one community supported DRR project that stands out and would be worth looking into usually looking at the success factors what makes it work and what doesn't make it work for instance.*

35:49

**Interviewee:** Anywhere in this country?

35:51

*Interviewer: Yes anywhere in this country supported by DON3?*

35:54

**Interviewee:** We have a couple of groups in Tana River that I would point you to. We have a group that is doing honey production, we have a group that is doing farming and keeping dairy goats, I think those are good groups that you can look at. There you would look at two or three groups. I would also point you to Turkana, we have the fishing community, we have a community that is doing farming-irrigation and an interesting one that is looking at livestock product value chain, and they are running a tannery.

36:41

*Interviewer: How long has that been in existence?*

36:47

**Interviewee:** They are doing a community tannery, we started working with them in 2012/2013.

37:05

11. Comments on Upper Vs Local Level DRR Focus

*Interviewer: What would be your comments on growing literature that seems to suggest there's inadequate support to community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?*

37:43

**Interviewee:** To a great extent I would agree with that statement.

37:48

*Interviewer: And what would be your overall comment on that?*

37:53

**Interviewee:** I think the number of players thin out as we get down to the community. Whatever is discussed, very good frameworks and directions are given globally and regionally, but how that is cascaded down is not very clear. I think deliberate effort to link right to the local level is still missing, something misses there. And I think it is just because of the number of players. Resources that are available at the local level for you to translate what is happening globally and regionally are also very limited.

38:45

*Interviewer: Do you think it is lack of prioritization, or it is lack of awareness? Something must be causing this because sometimes people don't know and because of ignorance then we may not give due diligence to something. What causes that divergence within us?*

**Interviewee:** I think the greatest responsibility to translate what is happening at the global and at the higher level to the local, lies with the government and I will speak for Kenya, I will not speak for other countries. I think we are still very limited in the understanding of DRR and how to translate it into practical things. I think we are still

limited as a country. Government is supposed to do DRR through different sectors: through agriculture, through livestock, water, etc. DRR should find its way down through most of the ministries, the technical line ministries. I think that is where there is a bit of a break, where we actually understand that you can re-configure your development to DRR so that whatever way you do development, you are actually reducing risks or you are already mitigating. I think that is really where the link breaks so that even when you say allocate resources, I think because of that limited understanding of DRR, people do not even know how to allocate resources because we could do our normal work but in a way that is actually disaster risk reduction. So I think that is where the big break is. Resources also very interesting are not easily forthcoming for disaster risk reduction. So the donor community to put money on the table for DRR is not easy, thus for those that have the will, they could be limited in terms of resources.

41:09

*Interviewer: Do you have any other overall comments on the subject we have been talking about, any questions for me?*

41:15

**Interviewee:** No at this point, I am looking forward to reading the report. I think the subject of DRR is very interesting and not many people understand DRR. And a lot of people think DRR and humanitarian response are the same thing. Many people think it is the same thing. But for those of us in DRR we know it is not the same thing and because of that lack of understanding, we have not given it the attention and priority that is needed.

## Annexe 5: Interview with Bishop Dr Masika

### Part 1: How OMO Started

**Researcher: Which of these two came first, Christian Impact Ministries or OMO?**

**Masika:** Christian Impact Ministries came a long time ago, it is 41 years old. It started as an outreach in 1976. We got together as young professionals to give back to society because we felt we were among the few who were privileged to go through the education system and we were Christians. But OMO started in 2009.

#### Text Box 2: What is CIM?

CIM is a non-denominational, non-governmental Christian development agency whose core mandate has been to develop models and training tools for holistic community transformation. The CIM training and resource centre mainly caters for individuals, families, NGOs, government agencies and corporates with a vision of transforming their lives and communities. The CIM Resource Centre in Yatta offers a wide range of trainings from farm techniques and technologies all the way to community transformation as practiced in CIM's Operation Mwolyo Out program (OMO).

Source: [www.christianimpactministries.org](http://www.christianimpactministries.org)

**Researcher: Could you take me through a step by step process of why and how OMO started and what has been done to date?**

**Masika:** That is a long question that requires a long answer. OMO was started because of the need in the country. There was a drought in East and Central Africa, more so in the Horn of Africa between 2006 and 2009. During this time, the media gave information that the people of Yatta were eating dogs and donkeys because there was nothing to eat. In Kenya, in 2008/2009 there were a number of interventions like the one by Red Cross and Safaricom's Kenyans for Kenyans. That is when I decided to embark on a Yatta intervention branded Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO). *Mwolyo* means relief. OMO started as an outreach to the Yatta community in 2009.

**Researcher: Since launching Operation Mwolyo Out, what has been done until today?**

**Masika:** It is a model which begins with mindset change. It involves mobilizing the individual to realise his worth, his potential and his abilities and how to interact with

the environment for his benefit and also to preserve the environment. The second thing is about natural resources, for example, water. Harnessing and harvesting water so that it can be used. The water issue is used to mitigate the resistant drought in the region so that you are sure that whatever you plant, you will harvest. The empowerment is to help overcome crop failure. Then there are conservation methods which include how to reclaim land, how to conserve and use land sustainably.

After that we have gender programmes because we have realized that gender is a force, it's an institution that if harmonized would solve most of the family problems. We have a problem where capacity building initiatives either focus more on women, or men or youth, but there is no synchronization or harmonization. For us, we instituted it as a government. So we come up with the principles of good governance, then gender mainstreaming in the family. Then the clarification of roles in relation to the programme because the programme has an economic angle to it. So gender is a major issue. Of course, we have realized that gender is greatly influenced by culture, and it is also influenced by government policies. But the major one to us is culture. So we always analyse the anthropological assessment on some of the areas where culture is a hindrance, then we use appropriate participatory transformation approaches. We help people to converse on their challenges and hindrances and on how to overcome them. We have the economic bit on how to do agriculture in a smart way which involves using the one-acre strategy, and how to become food secure and financially secure.

**Researcher: Briefly on gender, what was broken on the gender side of things that needed to be fixed and what were some of the symptoms of the breakage?**

**Masika:** That is analysed in detail in the book "*Family Governance*." But in the cultural positioning especially for Yatta, the man is left to do nothing. He is almost just a seed or sperm carrier. So we wanted to help the man realise that in the new system of the programme, where we do dam digging, he has to be a part of it and he can't just be a spectator. He was to put in the forefront. His wife was helping him in both farming and marketing. So the man became a part of the farming and marketing systems.

**Researcher: In your perspective, have OMO's objectives already been achieved or they are yet to be achieved? Or put differently, is OMO still ongoing as an initiative or it has achieved its objectives and phased out?**

**Masika:** OMO is still going on because it is a process. It was not only aimed at Yatta, but it was also aimed at Africa and what others call 'third world countries.' So we were able to a great extent succeed in Yatta in the first year of the programme and the success is still being propelled forward. OMO is not a project, it is a development movement, and it is not an event either. It is a movement and a process because when you get the model, you will realise that it has 10 pillars. Even if you succeed to

the 10th pillar, you will still have details on each pillar and you realise that it is a process. It is a process because it was not aimed for Yatta alone. Yatta was only a starting point.

**Researcher: What are the different activities conducted under OMO and what is the importance of each of them? A good example would be the Silangas/ or dams.**

**Masika:** One of the greatest things is the concept of systematic value chain approach. The synchronization, the integration because we are against project-based development where an organization deals with water and another deals with food security but the two do not meet. You find another one dealing with marketing, and whatever you are marketing you have not even dealt with the basic issues. **So our main niche is the synchronization and bringing in the**

**Box 3: OMO's Ten Point Plan/ Transformation Pillars:**

1. Community mobilisation
2. One acre rule (domestic climate change adaptation model)
3. Gender in development
4. Integration in development
5. Market linkage
6. Value addition and village commercialisation
7. Investment
8. Agri-nutrition
9. Environmental concerns
10. Advocacy

Source: [www.christianimpactmission.org](http://www.christianimpactmission.org)

Figure 4: OMO's Ten Point Plan/ Transformation Pillars

**CIM Technology Transfers to Yatta Includes:**

Zai pits, moist beds, zero tillage, aquaponics, organic farming, and drip irrigation



**concept of value chain approach** because we have water. But how do you use that water economically so that it takes you across? And how do you use that water in commensurate to your acreage? How do you cut your acreage in commensurate to the amount of water? That rationalization and helping people is what is important.

**Researcher: What types of support did you as Bishop Masika or Christian Impact Ministries provide the Yatta-OMO participants?**

**Masika:** First of all, it is the mobilization. These people have been here, the resources have been here, and it was mobilization that was needed. After mobilization training by myself and others, the next bit was empowerment. **One of the elements is, we do not encourage items and materials to be given to people. Our theory is that you can begin your business without cash-capital because human is the invaluable capital.** If you are an agricultural entrepreneur, most people have land, they have bulls or cows that they use for ploughing. Then of course with your labour, you can even work for your neighbour and get money to buy the seeds. **So we encourage people to use their own ingenuity, and that is how we build people to realise their potential.** It is not much of what we give. The other bit is when we help you, you discover others are moving so you join the movement. Sometimes you don't even know when you joined the movement because you find you have joined. For example, you find that people have dams, some people may not tell you when they dug their dams because they found themselves in the middle. Their cousins, uncles, brothers--all had dams, so they joined them and also dug their own dams. They may not even be able to tell you when they joined because it is a process and it is a mass movement in development.

**Researcher: What is the most important resource or support that CIM provided to OMO during the beginning of OMO? The number one thing, what would that be?**

**Masika:** I think leadership is the greatest thing, and also the spirit of the movement. The other thing is building the momentum because a movement is controlled by the momentum **and you will have to give leadership so that the train does not move outside the rails.**

**Researcher: Could you say a bit more about that leadership?**

**Masika:** We developed structures at that initial stage. A few people started to dig dams using a form of merry go round; that was leadership, 10 people or six people would get together and do the merry go round digging, for each other. Then we brought in the idea of clusters then zones which were like what people call villages to build a bigger village. As leaders, we knew we would need this leadership because we would do common marketing. So if people have water and grow crops, the buyers would come to us. **We would offer that leadership in terms of what to do, how to do it and when to do it and coming out with structures and systems and giving motivation to the people and giving them hope, trainings, just the same way you attended that session today.** I think after that session you become somebody.

At the initial stage, there were very many participatory evaluation meetings for individuals and villages. That again gave direction. Right now, they do not need much of me in Yatta because we have liberalized some of the markets. We realized if we go for the bigger companies and we grow French beans or bullet chillies, they are usually at low prices, but new young companies which do not have a name would pay more. So we have liberalized most of the production because they know us, and they know that if you come here you will get what you want. I did not want to provide Mwolyo so that they (Yatta-OMO participants) depend on me. I wanted to empower them so that they depend on themselves. But if there is a new initiative, I still get them together but without a new initiative, I don't have reason to bring them together. For example, recently we organized through some of the members to get the excavators and they came. When the people saw the excavators they used them to deepen their small dams because they have money. This needed some level of leadership.

**Researcher: Did OMO start with an exit strategy? If yes, what was or is in that strategy and how was the strategy managed?**

**Masika:** I think that question has a mindset of NGOs, it is a bogus question *[at which statement we both break out laughing]*. In everything, there must be an exit. For example when we talk about growing French beans, what is the exit? It is the market! So that is an exit. But how does sustainability look like for these people? It is when

people are able to provide water which was the main problem here for their families, are able to provide food, they are able to survive when it doesn't rain, have dairy cattle, and are able to start new ventures. I think the exit is when you have proper empowerment of the people. When the project is people based, as a movement we have no exit because we are always moving to the next thing, from one item to another. Immediately you develop a sense of arrival, people will exit themselves. Mine is to keep them realizing that we have not arrived, so we do not need to exit. But the fact that it is movement, it is an idea, a philosophy, they will continue moving from glory to glory, from one thing to another.

And some of the things people are doing, we never taught them. So you can imagine they are not exiting but improving, diversifying and coming up with their own innovations. For example, as we were talking about the initial stage, you need to have good habitation. When you get time to move around, you will see people have done that in their homes. Someone began with a small dam, the dam became bigger, the farm also became bigger, they improved their houses, and they are continuing.

But at the end of the day, in Yatta, we are looking at developing industrial villages, agricultural villages, and commercial villages. We have not gotten everything. For example, we make bread out of sweet potato and the farmers grow sweet potato, which is one product. We grow, process and package honey. But our intention is to diversify more and more and then we have in every village not only a collection centre but also a processing centre. We have one here and we also want to see every village have one. We would like to see families **doing cottage industries**. People have already started in their own way. There are those with dairy cows that were not there. We have been able to sell the milk, but we are moving to the next level where we want to process that milk as farmers increase. I think everything is a process and the movement is going on. If it was a project, we should have exited a long time ago. Because if it was about water, when you have water, you can exit. Whatever people develop, we would like them to make it bigger and better. **We do not want them to exit but to be resilient, because it is about the people, not projects.**

**Researcher: Are there any households that are in OMO's catchment area that did not join OMO? And in case they are there, why didn't they join?**

**Masika:** There is quite a number. But even though they did not join, we achieved our objective. One of the reasons why some did not join could be that **some of the households were made up of elderly people** who wouldn't be able to engage in strategic activities like digging dams. But many of these elderly households already had family members taking care of them and these family members dug the dams. So the elderly households were now getting water from family members with dams. There are **others that would not see where we were going at the initial stage**. So quite a number would oppose **because there was nothing we were giving them**. Yet organisations like World Vision and Plan International who are just in Matuu here were giving water tanks, goats, cows and we were giving out nothing. So some people here did not join.

Some of the people in areas where these organisations are working were given even free cows and goats, but they died and ours have grown. Those who were not given cows but probably had one cow now have about eight cows. On the contrary, the ones who were given cows, the cows died because they belonged to the organization. At the initial stage, they could not understand why I was not looking for resources to give to them. They would not understand why when I would call them for seminars and they come from as far as 30kms, I would not give them transport whereas other agencies were giving out transport allowances. So **when OMO was starting, there was that kind of opposition**. So a few could buy it, but when you succeed in a big way, the critical mass will help you in developing a movement. So most of them have been swept and joined. They no longer oppose me because it is a movement. But they see their neighbours, cousins and other relatives.

**Researcher: Were there any other development agencies working with Yatta Communities before CIM came in to launch OMO?**

**Masika:** Yes, there were quite a number. There was a church-based organization, and another CBO, then there was World Vision although I don't like mentioning organisations.

**Researcher: No, it is okay, by then I was working with World Vision as the Regional Director for Humanitarian Affairs.**

**Masika:** There was World Vision here in Matuu and Plan International.

**Researcher: Where was Plan International at that time?**

**Masika:** I don't know where they do their programmes because they are still in Matuu, but I haven't met them where they work. They once brought sponsored people to come here from the other side of Matuu, but they were not very active here. World Vision had not reached here, but they work around Matuu. There wasn't much of the NGOs but there was an organization that used to come around and **dig dams for people and they also paid some money**. They would give people food and then they would dig dams for those people. That happened around the same time we started, but of course, because of the approach, they couldn't reach many people. And because theirs was a project, it ended. [At which point we both burst out in laughter]. Because when the funding ends, that is when the project ends. They exit because they were riding on funds.

**Researcher: Are there any households that were in OMO that have not been able to break from a life of expectancy, a life of dependency on external aid? If they are there, what are some of the reasons for that?**

**Masika:** I would say to a great extent many have changed. But of course, there could be a few odd pockets here and there. But when you move around, you will find that the strategic activities are so many that even if you do not do one thing, you may do the other. In other words, you cannot deny that you are not a member of OMO. Currently, we are not registering anyone because it is a movement. So we do not need to register people. One only needs to realise that people are coming out of poverty and food insecurity and they also join. **Initially, part of my role was to identify and develop role models who were agents of change**, and they would help to positively influence their people. I discovered the power of African social networks. When you have a role model from one location, the wife may be coming from another village and their son also married from yet another community. If those people have not started, they will be influenced by the role models' actions. That's how I sparked the mobilization. If you did not like my face or colour, you would at least like the face of your mother or brother.

**End of Part 1 (The Beginning of OMO)**

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## Part 2: OMO's Gains, Success Factors, Expansion and Challenges

**Researcher:** There are very many INGOs, local NGOs and government departments working with communities in disaster-prone areas but have not been able to realise the kind of OMO results in Yatta. What are the critical factors responsible for OMO's great success? Factors other practitioners around the country need to know if they were to follow the Yatta transformation model.

**Masika:** Development has been misunderstood by universities, international donors and international NGOs. Development in Africa is hinged on a wrong premise that Africans are poor, Africans are needy, and Africans need to be helped with material assistance.

*[Phone interruption, as Masika had to reach for his ringing phone and reject the call]*

**Researcher:** We were looking at factors responsible for OMO's great success. Factors which other practitioners around the country need to know if they were to follow the Yatta transformation model.

**Masika:** Sorry for beginning from the opposite and I hope I am not hurting anyone.

According to CIM, development agencies have gotten it wrong. First of all development in Africa is based on a wrong world view and a wrong mindset that Africa is poor, Africa is needy, and therefore Africa needs to be helped. That is a mistake. **Our brothers who are trying to help us have succeeded in developing a far worse problem than the one they came to fight.** With the premise that Africa is poor, Africa is lacking, Africa is needy, Africa is ignorant, Africa is powerless, donors decide on donations and make us apply for them within their frameworks. So 'needy' Africans apply according to donor requirements, and if they succeed, they implement according to foreign requirements which do not put into consideration the people and situations they are in. **In trying to do a good thing, many have developed a dependency syndrome in Africa. And that is**

**why in our programmes we call it ‘Operation Mwolyo Out,’ operation relief out so that, first and foremost, we deal with the mind.**

Secondly, the donor world has come with projects and many of the development agencies are merely heavy on service delivery because they cannot do anything beyond service delivery. For instance, they may say "our work is to do boreholes, we will come and build boreholes if it is toilets, we will come and build toilets for people, and if it is schools we will build schools." **That does not constitute development. That is facility development which cannot run itself. OMO focuses on human development. Developing the person, developing a person’s world view and changing the individual's mindset. So we deal with the person because development is about people.** For most government institutions and international agencies, their focus is mainly on service delivery---facility establishment. And that is why Africans are becoming poorer and poorer and most of the institutions are dying. **You can find all that in this book, "Mindset Change". We need people to speak to donors.**

**Researcher: The next question is almost similar to the last one, but it is more of a filter. What are the differentiating factors that helped OMO achieve great success where many other programmes don’t seem to be achieving much?**

**Masika:** People’s participation, maximum people’s participation, maximum focus on people’s mindset change, attitude change. That is our niche and that is what has helped our programme because as you saw during the class, we have gone outside Yatta. *[I was privileged to have participated in some of the training sessions for visiting groups to Yatta, where Masika was one of the trainers].*

**Researcher: When you look at the factors you have just talked about, are they rare or absent in many other resilience-building programmes in the country?**

**Masika:** To a great extent, the government provides services. NGOs are to provide service and as well as capacity building. **But the facilitators are usually ignorant of people’s mindsets and world views.** When you are learned, just like you and I are, you may come to help build people’s capacity based on what you think they need. And failure to do research on what they know, their yesterday experiences and value system

means that whatever you do, whatever capacity you build, you are building on shaky ground and it will crumble. And it has crumbled.

**Researcher: To what extent did the church contribute to OMO's success story?**

**Masika:** Our training curriculum is based on the development of Biblical world view, because the African communities are notoriously religious and what they do is based on religious values. Almost everything in Africa was attached to religion and ancestors. Africans believe in animation, things are going to be animated by ancestors, success moved by ancestors. Our main success turns out to be what many donors do not want to hear. They don't want to hear about the church. But those donors are just arrogant because the development in the west was based on Biblical world view. Now they want to tell Africans that we can do without religion. **Religion has been left out in capacity building, yet, it is a key pillar in capacity building. Religion is a very strategic tool in mindset change, and change of community livelihoods, lifestyle and life skills.**

For example, the things I discussed with the visiting groups while you listened would be taken seriously because people value their religions. Now that these people have a Christian kind of affiliation, when we talked about the need and potential to subdue their environment, that is a term they know and it is a requirement by their faith whether one is Muslim as stated in the Qur'an or is a Christian. Even if you are Hindu and I strike a Hindu principle on changing and transforming the environment, they will take it seriously and it will go beyond the capacity building session. Because Africans are religious, I have brought in capacity building based on the Biblical World View. So we call our training 'Empowered Biblical World View' or sometimes we just call it 'Empowered World View' to avoid leaving out people who may not want to hear about the Bible.

**Researcher: What's the name of the Professor you quoted during the training session? The authority on African religions.**

**Masika:** That is Professor John Mbiti. He was a Professor at Makerere University. He later went to Ghana and Germany and is a famous fellow. His books are top reads in most universities around the world today. He is an authority on African Religions and Philosophy.



**Researcher: Has Yatta's success been able to influence any changes in adjacent communities?**

**Masika:** Yes, significantly. We have the next community on the other side of Matuu, a place called Masinga, and they have adopted what we are doing.

**Researcher: Is Masinga part of Yatta?**

**Masika:** It is not part of this Yatta, it is part of the greater Yatta. We have taken this to Kitui and it has had great impact. We have taken this programme to Makueni County, which is the next county and they have adopted the entire model for the county. Because of OMO's impact, the foreword for one of my related books was written by two people, Prof. Kivutha Kibwana the Governor of Makueni and Tim Andrews the Country Director of World Vision Tanzania. If you google World Vision Tanzania, you will find a lot of the Biblical World View.

**Researcher: Are there any major challenges OMO faced since inception? And if they are there, what were they and how did you overcome them?**

**Masika:** When we started, we had political challenges because the political elite had used the unfortunate state of communities, which is poverty, to propel themselves to positions. In this community, 'Mwolyo'---relief or dependency--- used to be the stair many leaders used to ascend to authority. So I had a challenge from them. Secondly, when I began, there were Christians who thought I was confusing religion because religion should be set apart from development and development should be left out there for secular organisations. I tried to bring development in the church and that attracted a lot of opposition. It was actually church leaders. Lay people did not have a problem because they are needy and they thought this person has come with an answer. But pastors were fearing that it might be contaminated. So they were trying to protect their faith. But when success came, it came in a big way and that helped end much of the resistance.

**Researcher: Was the resistance from church leadership or from average church members?**

**Masika:** Being a leader in the church it was called resistance because I am an elder in religion and so they had the cold feet to adapt. Some church leaders would speak and discourage people. And then politicians were actively dissuading people because this fellow was becoming popular and destroying their stronghold.

**Researcher: Has Yatta's transformation success in any way influenced the work and objectives of CIM?**

**Masika:** Yes. Before Yatta's OMO, we were very narrow in our focus. But after our success, OMO was easily accepted and celebrated that we had six pillars to community transformation. They included the spiritual, social and political dimensions--but our own political way, not national politics---you will read that from the book. Then the environmental dimension, technological dimension and the economic dimension. Hitherto, all the six dimensions were not easily accepted to be integrated into a religious system. But when we succeeded, that became the image and brand of CIM.

**Researcher: I have seen information where CIM is engagement in East Pokot. Why did CIM decide to support East Pokot before circulating the entire Yatta neighbourhood?**

**Masika:** Yatta is well served because our main concern was people lacked five things which were a major problem. One was water. Now, at least every homestead has water. They told me there was no food, now every homestead has food. They did not have a source of income, now at least every home has a reason to have a source of income. And they told me children were not going to school, but at least every child can now go to school because the government has intervened and every family is also able to take their children to school. The other problem is a social problem, witchcraft, which was dealt with by the church.

We used to hear that people are dying. But if today someone is dying of hunger it is because they are foolish since they possibly have a neighbour who has something. Initially, people were dying because nobody had anything. Right now, I do not need to bother with Yatta because Yatta should bother with itself. **Like now we are looking for workers but we do not get them because everyone is busy making money from their farm.** So if anybody doesn't have an income, we need him. He needs to do some work in his uncle's *shamba* (farm), his cousin's *shamba*, and he will be given money. You will

not die when your grandmother has food, your sister has food, your cousin has food, for you can go do some work and be assisted. That is *Mwolyo*/ dependency but as you do that, you can help yourself. According to our objectives, you do not need everybody to be exporting. You need about 70% and this 70% will take care of their poor people. Although it is not part of your question, **we are not going to deal with the poor of the poorest.**

**Researcher: That's interesting. What is the reason for that?**

**Masika:** The reason for that is because when you empower many people, they are going to empower their poor. In Africa, the poor belong to clans and they belong to families, and they know them better than me. And the poor are poor because they have some deficits or weakness that we may not be able to solve in a short capacity building programme. But there are people who will build them. More so, Africans also learn more through seeing, and when people are poor it is because they are poor in experiences, they are poor in examples, and they are poor in role models.

**Masika:** I didn't answer the second part of the question you asked.

**Researcher: Yes, I had asked for reasons behind the decision to support distant East Pokot before circulating the entire Yatta catchment area.**

**Masika:** For East Pokot, we developed courage and confidence that our model is unique and qualifies to solve many serious household problems. We were motivated by our love for humanity, but most significantly, we were motivated by the fact that we achieved great success in Yatta. We wanted to take it to the next level. The Pokot have been a marginalized community. They have been deprived of development and infrastructure, are highly barbaric, they are war-like, and have been terrorizing their region. They have been a thorn in the flesh of the Kenyan Government. They are neighbours with the Karamojong of Uganda and they also steal from Uganda. They have been a terror and their military prowess is unmatched because they had the advantage of buying the best ammunition from Uganda during Idi Amin's time. They also buy arms from Sudan and Somalia. That's why they have been a threat to the Government. We wanted to go with the mindset change, the empowered Biblical world view to see

whether it would work. We were confident it would work and within the shortest time, it has worked wonders.

**Researcher: When did you start with East Pokot?**

**Masika:** We started in 2014 but it took two years. **According to our model, you study the people first to understand them. If you are going to work for people with people, you study and understand them.** So we wanted to understand who are the Pokot, their thinking pattern, their mental worldview, their culture, livelihoods, lifestyle and life skills. We wanted to understand who is this Pokot? Of course, we took some interventions like treating animals, and in the name of treating their animals, we wanted to understand them. In the name of taking medical camps, we wanted to understand them. In the name of helping some students to go to schools in neighbouring counties, we are trying to learn. Taking clothes and food was a way of gaining entry into the community. So we entered in 2014 and it's in August 2016 when we began to train them through engaging them in our model and philosophy on mindset change and economic empowerment. And in less than six months, we started seeing positive changes and getting overwhelming reports on what they are doing to change their own way of living.

**Researcher: Are there people who are not evangelical Christians that participate in OMO?**

**Masika:** CIM has been accepted even by Muslims in a big way. We have trained Imams and we have trained Catholics. Yesterday we had the Minister for Agriculture from Wajir, and he is planning to bring his people who are 100% Muslims for training. Most of the groups that come here from Tanzania are about 70% of Muslims. The Biblical World View which is the Empowered World View is accepted by many. We have been training CARITAS (a Catholic relief, development and social service organisation). In fact, most of the Kenyan groups that have been coming here for training are predominantly Catholic because they are involved with CARITAS. We have several groups that are sponsored by the Catholics and now have more Muslims that commend our approach.

**Researcher: Was there any earlier known drought mitigation success story in Yatta's neighbouring areas that may have inspired you as Dr Masika to launch OMO?**

**Masika:** No. I was rebelling against existing ones. We had formed an organization in this area to cover Yatta, but I soon realized everybody was focusing on how we can give relief and how to get donors. I didn't see any model I could work with. I had to start and write from zero.

**Researcher:** In my research discussion with one NDMA official that happens to come from this area (Ukambani), he talked about an earlier related successful Ngangani initiative.

**Masika:** Yes, that is one of the projects I had talked about, but it ended because it was being funded.

**Researcher:** Did the Ngangani initiative have any influence on OMO?

**Masika:** We actually differed in approach.

**Researcher:** Could you tell me more about that?

**Masika:** I don't exactly remember when Ngangani projects started, but I remember in the first year of OMO, they were digging a few dams for people who could pay some money. They could bring people to dig for them. A number of teachers and other working-class benefitted, but they can't be many. For me, that was not something to copy. It was something fighting my idea and I was fighting it especially because it was so near. They had resources and I did not have resources. Actually, that could have throat cut me because they did a lot of work on that stream called Kinyongo. They helped them to do sand dams. They are among the usual NGO approaches all over the world. Our organization is a departure from what most other NGOs are doing.

I do not know who was funding it, but there must have been a number of donors, and I think they were together with the government, which should be the NDMA. Samaritan Purse was also helping them. I don't know which of the two was helping the sinking of sand dams. I think it was a food for work project. I remember the food got spoiled because of poor storage and that must have helped to kill that initiative. They were well spread in Machakos and they kind of disappeared. Actually, those are the groups I said were among the first challengers to our program because they were giving people food and other things, and we were giving anything to the people. Although we

could raise food from friendly churches, it was not systematic, it was not promised, while theirs was "you work and I give you". For me, it was based on 'in case I get a friend---and of course, I got many friends", but it was not pre-determined.

**Researcher: You said Africans learn more by seeing. Did you have to first demonstrate a model of the one-acre rule strategy?**

**Masika:** Yes, Africans learn more through seeing. Other than mindset change, the next step was water harvesting, so I did the water harvesting.

**Researcher: Were you the first one to do that?**

**Masika:** I was among the first ones to do that. Actually, I think I was the first because I did the first dam in 1990 and people used to come from all over to steal my water. Then I made the second one at the same time the NACODEM started doing the Kinyongo dam on Kinyongo River.

I did the one-acre demonstration first because I wrote the model in 2005 and World Vision Kenya helped me a great deal to restructure the ideas. They did it so well until it became too good for me because I didn't even understand some of the terminologies then. It was a radical departure, a paradigm shift from the normal way of doing development. It was a radical one. And we went with World Vision to launch it in Sikhulu which was part of their Area Development Programme but it could not work because there was no budget for it. And again World Vision being a big organization, things are not done the way I wanted. Later on, I came to launch it here. I had been looking for a place to launch it and I found this place. Now that I had a home and a farm here.

**Researcher: At this location?**

**Masika:** Yes, this place was mine but I donated it to Christian Impact Ministries and moved closer to the tarmac, near the dam. That is where my home is, that is where I will go to after I finish with you.

**Researcher: I have read where it says "Christian Impact Ministries' community transformation trainings are centred on three modules, namely community mobilization, resource mobilization, and modelling and mentoring. Could you explain why your community transformation trainings are centred on the three modules?**

**Masika:** First of all, in resource mobilization the first resource is human. So we mobilise the human. For the human, there are resources within him and resources without him---resources in the environment. We want to help the individual relate to the resources within him or herself and within the environment. And because we know change is a process, after training, we mentor to ensure maximum adoption. Mobilization is where we move people from A to B and we help them in the process. We ensure that they also mobilise others because we believe in the critical mass.

**Researcher: Take me through a step by step process of how OMO connected with markets.**

**Masika:** First of all it is changing the people's mindset on how to do agriculture. And to a great extent, our agriculture is hinged on the one-acre rule strategy. So one of the main pillars of this strategy is marketing or market linkage. Much of our agriculture is about market linkage. Otherwise, it will not help in wealth creation because if you have tomatoes with no market, they will rot. And as you saw during the class, the process of marketing begins with the mindset change, then water harvesting because we are focusing on the best marketing strategy which is contractual farming. And as you heard during the class, we can't do contractual farming if we do not have an assured water resource. In other words, market linkage is not just about selling, but a whole value chain including water harvesting and getting people to become producers. I hope you got it right?

**Researcher: Thank you. I got it right and have a follow-up question. What does OMO do to meet quality requirements for market production?**

**Masika:** First of all, we have trainings on GAP--- (Good Agricultural Practice). But on quality control, most of the serious export organisations have their quality control specialists. When we started, we never knew about GAP trainings and the like and so we got their agronomist to come and train us on GAP and quality control. The GAP training is very detailed. It has international standards. Once we were trained on that, then the agronomists helped us to maintain the required standards. That was the strategy we used.

**Researcher: Having provided leadership to connect to markets, how do you organize participants for this market production?**

**Masika:** Well, there are structures already, and you heard me tell these people that if you want to do market-led agriculture, you need to think in terms of how to develop the village economy and how to get out growers. The cooperatives have failed in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and people do not want to hear that word---the word 'cooperatives'. What you do is to use different terminology to bring the same results; because when you have producers or growers, what are you talking about? You are basically talking about cooperatives! When you have the growers and the village, they will be able to sell together. Our model is based on the household and the village.

**Researcher: During the class, you gave an example of two friends, a Luo and a Kikuyu that failed to meet the required tonnage the exporting company wanted. If a company says we will only deal with you if you are able to provide this much produce for export, what do you do to ensure you meet the required tonnage?**

**Masika:** Form a committee for that product and then the committee will deal with those issues. Of course, the committee will be trained by the agronomists of that company. When I do my bit, I help to form a committee and then hand it over to them.

**Researcher: What are some of the challenges you have faced around the market led production, and how have you dealt with them?**

**Masika:** With contracts, for example, those for French beans, sometimes the market goes down and concerned exporters will begin to play small games. But with time, we have known the small games. I think you heard me mention in class that when you study market trends in Europe, you get to know when they are producing and when it's so cold that they can't produce. The solution is to, therefore, produce more when they don't have much in stock.

**Researcher: How much does an average participating OMO household earn in a year?**

**Masika:** Thank you for the word 'average'. While the household's mindset is on earning, the first thing this is food security. Because if you were buying food you would be paying a lot of money, and remember, most households wouldn't be having this



money. If you are able to feed your family, for instance, if you have seven bags of maize and four bags of beans, you would have saved, only that you would not have put it in the bank. After food security comes high-value crops. Every household is expected to have something to sell. There are those who are selling daily depending on the size of their dam, but I have never seriously thought about how much they earn in a year. In my own assessment, let me say if you are able to get Ksh 10000 a month [equivalent to USD100, for 1USD=Ksh 100], sometimes more and sometimes less depending on the smallest size; then another gets 20000, I think because of the poorer ones since the average has to do with those who do not get much, they are able to save up to Ksh 100,000 [equivalent to USD1000] a year in addition to feeding their families. So it is more.

**Researcher: And for those getting the highest, how much would they be earning per year?**

**Masika:** There are those who would get more than 1 million to 2 million Kenya shillings [USD 10,000 to USD 20,000].

**Researcher: I have three questions on the bakery. Who owns it, how is it managed and how does it benefit OMO participants?**

**Masika:** OMO farmers grow sweet potatoes and CIM buys them to make the bread. CIM owns the bakery in trust for OMO because we realised we cannot entrust community people to do some of the professional things yet. That is where quite a number of organisations have failed. Even county governments who have come here they go and place things under the care of people who do not understand. You would rather get a professional person to manage the bakery. The bakery is a source of income for CIM to facilitate outreach extensions to places like Pokot. The bakery is in itself an encouragement to farmers. If the bakery exists then the farmers exist.

**Researcher: What is the frequency at which farmers are paid?**

**Masika:** They are paid within a week, sometimes we pay after one day, and other sometimes we pay there and then. But we do not like to encourage that because some community members would know there is money and they could come to steal. So we

prefer to confuse them because some evil person could cause trouble when we are making payments.

**This is likely to be the last question. Is there any insurance involved in any of the OMO processes?**

**Masika:** CIM is the insurance for OMO, depending on which dictionary you read. [At which point we both burst out laughing]. CIM is the insurance of OMO. What do I mean? When we were starting OMO, CIM would provide capital for skills that needed to be paid for, and if there was a problem, CIM would come in to help out OMO. I know your question wasn't looking for that, but CIM has to a great extent been acting as insurance. And actually, if you have a programme that is patronized by Anglican or Catholic churches, they will be the insurance. And they offer better social insurance than the other one.

**Researcher: The reason I brought up the subject of insurance is because today, as part of risk management, sometimes farmers are mobilised to pay a premium for their crop, and if for some reason the crop fails, then the insurance can be able to come through.**

**Masika:** That one we do not have.

**Researcher: Is it something you think may be necessary?**

**Masika:** No. It is not necessary because the water is the insurance. I want you to get out of your box. When you are depending on rain, there will be risks. But when you have water, you have already taken out the risk. [With a chuckle he asks] Are you getting it?

**Researcher: I am sold on to the approach.**

**Masika:** So we have our risk insurance through CIM. The main risk for our agriculture would have been water but we are not depending on rain which is erratic. Actually, the risks are almost reduced to zero.

**Researcher: Lastly, could you kindly say a bit more about how CIM is insurance for OMO?**

**Masika:** You see CIM is the mother of OMO, and CIM is a strong religious organisation. So CIM would not like to see the son die. However, it would not like to have over patronage in a manner that brings *Mwolyo*/ dependency. So one of the things is to ensure that no Mwolyo elements emerge. That is how we insure. It is not more of giving. We try to manage in such a way that we do not give because the more you give the more dependency you create.

**End of Interview with Masika**

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## Annexe 6: Quick Field Memo Following an Interview

INGO2: its clear INGO2 has strong community-based approach to DRR, rooted in their anti-poverty approaches. INGO2 isn't a direct implementing agency, they work with local partners and this includes building their partner capacities. It was one of the agencies supporting the grand bargain that called for increased funding to local agencies as an effort to ensure more support trickles down to communities by cutting heavy expenditures in between. They are exceptional in that they work with communities to assess risks and then agree with communities which DRR priorities to support. They also use these community-generated priorities for advocacy engagement with other key stakeholders at all levels. I felt they have a lot more to share with others in terms of taking a bottom-up approach knowing the biggest problem to local DRR has been top-down approaches. Commenting on increasing literature that seems to suggest there's inadequate support to global, regional, and national level DRR activities and yet inadequate support to local/ community level DRR, LadyX (synonym) said: "we look at where change is more effective, and that is at the local level." She then referenced the very reason why INGO2 supported the Grand Bargain during the 2016 WHS. INGO2 had also done a study that fed into the Grand Bargain. It was impressive to note that about 50% of all INGO2's funding is dedicated to DRR, and about 20% of this DRR funding is dedicated to CCB4DRR. Both INGO2 and INGO1 referenced Country Integrated Development Plans, which calls for a read of at least three of these plans to assess the place of DRR and CCB4DRR in these plans. An informal after interview discussion with MrX (synonym) and another staff member showed that a number of organizations including CAFOD, CODAID and others had done restructures in 2016, and this affected the DRR portfolios of these organisations. It will be important to follow up this lead because if it's true, it will affect these organization's ability to make a continued contribution to the country's DRR agenda.

Things to up with INGO2:

- Ask for the new-2016 resilience framework
- Ask for the PPA project document and the project evaluation report.
- Ask for any document that details or outlines some of the community DRR engagements, and how INGO2 follows through.
- Try and get at least 3 country integrated development plans, and assess the place of DRR and CCB4DRR within them.
- Ask for the research/ study report whose findings fed into the WHS and informed the call for the Grand Bargain.

## Annexe 7: 2017 List of Study Groups to Yatta's OMO

**Note:** the names of visiting groups were directly transcribed from OMO's visitor's book, and the researcher, therefore, didn't know full meanings behind the acronyms.

NO	NAME OF GROUP	DATES	TYPE OF VISIT	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS
		<b>January</b>		
1	WORLD VISION -KENYA TAITA TAVETA	15-18TH	Exposure	16
2	MARY'S TEAM NRB	20th	Exposure	15
		<b>February</b>		
3	MAKUENI COUNTY (Farmers)	6th-11th	Exposure	336
4	HOMABAY (SOHI KARACHUONYO)	8th-11th		11
5	WORLD VISION NORTHERN SUDAN	8th-12th		10
6	PCEA PARKLANDS WOMEN	11th	Exposure	38
7	NAIROBI TEAM	11th	Exposure	8
8	MAKUENI COUNTY (Farmer T.O.T's)	13th-18th		53
9	FARM CONCERN KITUI	24th	Exposure	34
10	ALL SAINTS CATHEDRAL	25th	Exposure	26
11	ST PAUL'S CATHEDRAL	27TH	Exposure	43
12	MAKUENI COUNTY (STAFF TOT'S)	26TH -28TH		41
13	TECHNOSERVE Marakwet	27th-1st		62 662
		<b>March</b>		
14	TECHNOSERVE Nyeri	1st-3rd		54
15	TECHNOSERVE Nyandarua	6th -8th		62
16	FARM CONCERN: Ethiopia delegates	8th -9th		7
17	PURPOSE CENTRE CHURCH	11th	Exposure	10
18	MILDRED'S	11th	Exposure	5
19	TECHNOSERVE Bomet 1	13th-15th		53
20	TECHNOSERVE Bomet 2	15th-17th		59
21	HEIFER INT'L			2
22	DAYSTAR UNIVERSITY	22nd	Exposure	27
23	DAYSTAR UNIVERSITY	23rd	Exposure	20
24	CITAM EMBAKASI	25th	Exposure	26
25	MAKUENI-KITUI ADULT LEARNERS	29th	Exposure	31
26	ST PAUL UNIVERSITY	31st	Exposure	7 363
	MAKUENI COUNTY	28th-31st	Mentoring Prog.	
		<b>April</b>		
27	NAIROBI CHAPEL	3rd -7th	Exposure	39

28	NAIROBI TEAM (Mary's)	7th -8th	Weekend Exposure		23
29	ASDSP KILIFI COUNTY	20th	Exposure	10**	
30	WANGARI MATHAI INSTITUTE	21st	Exposure		14
31	CFF NYANDARUA (IDPS)	24th	Exposure	19	105
		<b>May</b>			
32	MBEERE COUNTY	10th	Exposure		10
33	KENHA	12-13th			25
34	NANYUKI PASTORS	19th	Exposure		11
35	EGERTON UNIVERSITY	19th	Exposure		41
36	CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA	26th	Exposure		18
37	BISHOP'S FRIENDS	27th	Exposure		9
38	MAKUENI COUNTY (VDC'S)	30th, 31st	Exposure	53,58	225
	KWALE MILDRED	10th-12th	Mentorship Prog		
	SOHI KARACHUONYO	19th-21st	Mentorship Prog		
		<b>June</b>			
39	MAKUENI COUNTY VDC'S	1st, 2nd, 5th, 8th,	Exposure	56,65,48,60,57	
40	WORLD VISION TANZANIA	5th-9th			24
41	AFL	5th-9th			17
42	MAKUENI COUNTY VDC'S	13th-16th	Exposure	55,53,56,53	
43	CITAM EMBAKASI Men's Fellowship	17th			45
44	CIM POKOT	20th-24th	Mentorship Prog	50	639
	NYANDARUA	9th/10th			
		<b>July</b>			
45	NCK KANYONYO	11th-13th			31
46	MAKINDU TEAM	18th	Exposure		19
47	LAIKIPIA TEAM (DP's)	17th-21st			52
48	IAS-INTL THARAKA NITHI	<b>31st-4th Aug</b>			29
		<b>September</b>			
49	CHRISCO VOTA	4th	Exposure		11
50	UON FAO/KITUA	6th			7
51	ADS NAKURU	4th-8th			51
52	KILUNGU DCC	8th	Exposure		35
53	MESPT HOLA	12th-16th			26
54	MAJOR NZEVEKA TEAM-KITUI COUNTY	13th	Exposure		15
55	KALAMA WOMEN GROUP	16th	Exposure		28
56	NAIROBI CHAPEL	16th	Exposure		14
57	KALANZONI PASTORS	23rd	Exposure		15
58	KTTC	27th	Exposure		47
59	ADS MKE	28th	Exposure		50
60	CRSEMBU	29th	Exposure	65	364
		<b>October</b>			

61	RODGERS ODIMA TEAM	3rd	Exposure		4
62	MAKUENI PASTORS	5th	Exposure		51
63	AFL/BOMET	9th-13th			24
64	DAYSTAR UNIVERSITY	11th	Exposure		12
65	MIGWANI-NYAA'S TEAM	12th	Exposure		45
66	MATHINGAU MC Academy	13th	Exposure		32
67	NCKK Kitui	16th-19th	Exposure		35
68	NJOGU'S NAIROBI	18th	Exposure		12
69	KASARANI DCC Pastor couples	19th-21st			18
70	CBMC NAIROBI CHAPEL	20th	Exposure		16
71	KENHA	21st	Exposure	21	270
		<b>November</b>			
72	FISH YATTA	1st	Fish farming Initiative		10
73	ENOCK NYANZA	18th	Exposure		7
74	AFL-BOMET.TAITA TAVETA,SSP	20th -24th			30
75	FASTENOPHER	21st	Donor		3
76	BOMET MCA'S, TIATY MP WIFE	22nd	Engagement Discussion		8
77	KU-ACTIL	23rd			35
78	WWGC KITENGELA	Exposure	11	104	
		<b>December</b>			
79	KIKIMA HDC	1st	Exposure		8
80	MILDRED'S	1st	Exposure		4
81	ALL SAINTS CATHEDRAL	2nd	Exposure		31
82	PELUM KENYA	6th-7th			30
83	BUNGOMA	6th	Exposure		4
84	WAJIR MINISTER	6th	Exposure	2	79
					2793



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