How Uncertainty and Moral Utilitarian Ratios Predict Rationality

Moral dilemmas involving a choice between saving the lives of 1 versus 5 have long been debated
through utilitarian (e.g., Bentham, 1789) and deontological theories of moral choice (Kant, 1965). According to Greene et al.’s (2001) dual process moral utilitarian theory, moral
involvement predicts utilitarian rationality in decision-making. Accordingly, Greene et al. proposed that emotional activations interfere with cognitive (rational) decision mechanisms. For
example, personal involvement in moral scenarios (push a stranger) induces irrationality and decision time in choice. However, more psychological factors (e.g., utility ratios)
have been found to predict rationality in personal dilemmas (Nakamura, 2012). Furthermore, theorists (Kusev et al. 2016) argued that elimination of moral uncertainty also predicts utilitarian responses. In one experiment we aimed to explore
how (and whether) utility ratios, uncertainty, type of dilemma and involvement predict moral utilitarian choice. The results revealed that eliminated uncertainty and high utility ratios
induced utilitarian (rational) decision preferences