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Reporting British Muslims: The Re-Emergence of Folk Devils and Moral Panics in Post-7/7 Britain (2005-2007)

Irfan Azhar Raja

A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

15 July, 2016

The University of Huddersfield
Dedication:

This PhD Thesis is dedicated to my most respected teachers, the late Mrs. Andrews (also known as Maan Jee, which means The Mother) at Presentation Convent School, Wah, and the late Hafiz Zain-ul-Abidin who taught me the Quran. I would also like to dedicate it to my beloved parents Raja Azhar Mehmood Khan and Mrs. Rehana Gul. Lastly, I dedicate it to Fatima, known as Gulloo, who is a special child, and to my beloved daughter Maryam Khan.
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Abstract:

On 7 July 2005, Britain suffered its first ever suicide attack. Four young British-born Muslims, apparently well-educated and from integrated backgrounds, killed their fellow citizens, including other Muslims. The incident raised the vision that British Muslims would be seen as the ‘enemy within’ and a ‘fifth column’ in British society. To examine how this view emerged, this thesis investigates the representation of British Muslims in two major British broadsheets, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*, over a two-year period (7 July 2005-8 July 2007). A corpus of 274 news items, including editorials, comments, interviews, and news reports on the London bombings, has been collected and analysed using the inductive approach based upon thematic analysis. The thesis asks a significant question: How did these broadsheets present British Muslims in the wake of the London bombings? This thesis aims to present a narrative of how the London bombings (hereafter 7/7) emerged in these broadsheets based on their reaction to an interpretation and perception of the 7/7 event.

This research indicates that the two broadsheets shared a similar cultural approach in combating Islamist terrorism, by encouraging the embracing of British values, although their different political orientations led to them differing attitudes over the precise manner in which this should be achieved. *The Guardian* was more concerned about individual liberty and human rights, while *The Daily Telegraph* emphasised the adaptation of tough legislation to combat terrorism. Given modern Britain’s secular moral fibre, the supremacy of British values dominated the debates on British Muslims which somehow reflected a manifestation of a systematic campaign to redefine Islam as a religion that fits into secular Western society, validating terms such as ‘Moderate Muslim’, ‘Islamic terrorists’, ‘Islamic extremists’, ‘Islamic militants’ and ‘Islamic terrorism’. Although both newspapers argue that radicalisation is a foreign-imported
dilemma that has its roots in “Islamic ideology”, they differ in their attitudes on how to deal with it.

This thesis uses Cohen’s (1972) text, which suggests that the media often portray certain groups within society as “deviant” and “folk devils” and blames them for crimes. This research into the reactions of two broadsheets permits a contemporary discussion of the London bombings and British Muslims in the light of Cohen’s concept. It aims to locate the presence of a nexus of the four Ps - political parties, pressure groups, the press, and public bodies - that influence reporting and shape the debates (Ost, 2002; Chas, 2006, p.75). It is evident that the reporting of the two broadsheets blends three significant components: the views of self-proclaimed Islamic scholars, experts and hate preachers; the use of out-of-context verses of the Quran; and the use of political language to represent British Muslims. Arguably, the press transformed the 7/7 event, suggesting that it was driven by religious theology rather than being a politically motivated act.
1.1-Introduction:

The London bombings on 7 July 2005 have emerged as one of the biggest crises in the history of British Muslims. On that morning Londoners were celebrating their victory over Paris, Madrid and New York in their bid to host the Olympic Games for the third time. At 8:45, during the rush hour, four young British-born-and-bred Muslim suicide bombers killed 52 innocent civilians along with themselves and injured over 700, including Muslims. Shockingly, Hasib Hussain became Britain’s youngest suicide bomber and murderer of many victims including a teenage Muslim girl, Shahara Islam (The Guardian, 15 July 2005). The incident generated shockwaves globally but within Britain it became the cause of increasing societal tensions and an extraordinary rise in anti-Muslim sentiments among the British public.

Two weeks after the Thursday 7 July attacks, the British security agencies fortunately disrupted four more attempted bomb attacks on Thursday 21 July 2005 and saved hundreds of lives. These two deplorable incidents provided some right-wing commentators and politicians with an excuse to spark hatred of British Muslims, whom they began to see as problematic ‘others’ and eventually a ‘threat’ and ‘security risk’ to British society (Shaw, 2012, p.510-515; Poole, 2002, p.84 and 2011, p.54). Furthermore, calls for the integration of young Muslims to prevent their radicalisation became louder at government and public levels (see Ratcliffe and Scholder, 2013).

Despite calls for unity and condemnation of the bombings by Muslim and non-Muslim organisations alike, anti-Muslim feelings rose rapidly across Britain, and ordinary people began to see Islam as the source of problems. Several opinion polls conducted before and after the 7/7 attack affirmed that anti-Muslim feelings had increased; for instance, ‘TNS Global’ and Kent University findings published in The Yorkshire Post on 8
September 2006 reveal that 77 per cent of 1,100 people admitted to holding a negative view of Islam. Regrettably, this trend has continued, obviously because of a series of terror incidents such as the attempted Glasgow bombing in 2007, attempted bombings in Exeter in 2008, and the murder of Lee Rigby on 22 May 2013. Following the latter incident, the ‘Tell Mama’ study revealed that there had been ‘582 anti-Muslim cases from March 2012 to March 2013’ (*The Guardian*, 26 December, 2013).

These shocking trends further escalated after a Ukrainian student, Pavlo Lapshyn, killed Mohammed Saleem, detonating bombs close to mosques in Wolverhampton and Tipton and admitting that he wanted to start a “racial war” (*Birmingham Mail*, 21 October 2013). Recent studies note that anti-Muslim hate crimes have been rising progressively since the 7/7 attack (Copsey *et al.*, 2013; Awan, 2014). Further, since the Woolwich incident, 43 mosques at different locations in Britain have been vandalised and attacked and been the subject of attempted bombings (*Tell Mama*, 2013).

At worst, eleven years on, the anti-Muslim bigotry and racial profiling remains a challenge to British society. Although this thesis only covers the two-year period after the London bombings, to observe the presence of anti-Muslim sentiments it also considers the latest developments. According to the *Huffington Post’s* tenth anniversary special edition, anti-Muslim feelings are at a record high.

A Jack Sommers report in the *Huffington Post*, published on 3 July 2015, reveals that “More than half of Britons now regard Muslims as a threat to the UK, far more than in the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 bombings a decade ago”. It further notes that “56% of people think Islam is a “major” or “some” threat to Western liberal democracy - a notable rise from just 46% of people who said the same thing in a poll taken the day after the attacks on London’s transport network on July 7, 2005” (*Huffington Post*, 3 July 2015), although this may have been fuelled by events in the Middle East.

Some sections of the press and polity see the acts of 7/7 as a reaction of religious ideology, whilst others view them as a response to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq. Without making any conclusions, it is important to note that three of the four bombers were of Kashmiri origin, which has been a disputed territory between India and Pakistan since 1947, as a result of British policy at that time. Similarly, the bombers did not talk about Palestine, another long-standing unresolved issue that is also closely linked with British politics. The atrocities of 7/7 cannot be justified; whatever the
reasons for them, but some sections of the press are misrepresenting British Muslims (see Amel et al., 2007).

This thesis recognises that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph explanations of the 7/7 event consider the driving force behind the London bombings to have been mainly a religious ideology. This may be because the British Prime Minister Tony Blair took the view that the bombings occurred because of an “evil ideology”. On the other hand, the perpetrators’ possible associations with al-Qaeda suggest that it may have been a religiously motivated action because al-Qaeda and its associates often use religion as a pretext for their attacks. Besides, the coverage of 7/7 also suggests a fundamental difference in the interpretations of these newspapers with regard to their views on Britain’s foreign policy and its link with 7/7. Evidently, The Guardian described the incident as a reaction to British foreign policy and to an anti-Islamic campaign conducted by the British government. Despite these diverse views and regardless of whether it was a political or a religious act of terror, one thing is obvious: British Muslims are equally the victims of this attack. Clearly, the attackers did not differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims but in fact attacked Edgware Road, which is predominantly an Arab Muslim neighbourhood.

Indeed, the 7/7 and 21/7 incidents have gravely damaged British Muslims’ reputation and questioned their loyalty to British society. However, even before the London bombings, British Muslims were already struggling to overcome the stigma of being seen as ‘extremists’ and ‘fundamentalists’ because of the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the Rushdie affair (1989), which pushed them into marginalised spaces of the multicultural society and caused them to be viewed as ‘outsiders’ and ‘others’ (Sides and Gross, 2014, p.5; Downing and Husband, 2005; Karim, 2000, p.111).

Despite all its difficulties and, to some extent, a bad press, Islam still flourishes in Britain, and Muslims have not experienced any bans on veils or minarets, unlike in neighbouring European countries. Moreover, the British media did not publish the infamous cartoons of the Prophet of Islam that first appeared in a Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 2005. Notably, the European press had republished those controversial cartoons in solidarity with the Danish newspaper, suggesting that it was exercising its right to freedom. But despite all these positive signs, since the 7/7 attacks a number of studies have shown that the demonising of Islam and British
Muslims has been a continuous phenomenon, particularly in the British media. This thesis will discuss and provide evidence of the emergence of the problem, the way it has developed, newspapers’ responses to and interpretations of the phenomenon, and the way it tends to broaden misunderstandings on both sides.

1.2-Significance of this Thesis:

Since 9/11 and 7/7, many texts have been written to discuss the fundamental problems, such as an increase in extremism and radicalisation among young Muslims (Greene, 2013, p.167; Kundnani, 2015). Most of these studies begin with the notion that they (extremists/radicals) misinterpret sacred text (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Price, 2012; Stern, 2003 and 2015). On the other hand, most press reports usually employ out-of-context verses of the Quran to establish or prove links with extremism and radicalism among British Muslims. This thesis will primarily focus on the interpretations of 7/7 in two British broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph; however, it is also important to examine the development of misunderstandings that may contribute to misrepresentations of Muslims. An example of this is an article by Jason Burke in which he quotes two verses from the Quran: “There shall be no compulsion in religion” and “Slay the unbeliever ... wherever you find him” (The Guardian, 17 July 2005).

Most sections of the press frequently use these two verses of the Quran out of context and half-finished to prove the assertion that Islam sanctions violence and terrorism. The fact of the matter is that the complete verse simply offers a different meaning: “since the revelation has through explanation, clarification, and repetition, clearly distinguished the path of guidance from the path of misguidance, it is now up to people to choose the one or the other path” (see Mir, 2008, p.54; Esposito, 2015, p.1069). This indicates the ignorance of most sections of the press and their reporters and how they often avoid incorporating theological concepts and frameworks of religious teachings.

The Quran, like the Bible, is one of the most misunderstood sacred theological references in the contemporary period. Arguably, there is still a gap that needs to be filled in this field of study. Given the abundance of different Christian denominations, the Bible also has various interpretations. Similarly, the Quran has been interpreted differently by different Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, particularly in the contemporary period. Thus, the problem lies not in the sacred text but in the precise interpretation of its meaning. Therefore, one might say that there is still a gap in the
field of agreed interpretations of both the holy Quran and the Bible, which needs to be filled.

On 7 July 2005, sound-bites, images, discussions, debates, and commentaries were channelled through television screens, whilst on-air talk shows on the radio and newspaper websites attempted to link ‘Islam’ and “Muslims” with acts of “terrorism”, all of which, in fact, resembled the media coverage of the tragic events of the New York and Madrid bombings. Most importantly, the schools, colleges, mosques, markets and streets of Leeds were associated with terror because the perpetrators had lived in these places.

This thesis suggests that the suffix “ism” has become a synonym for Islam, which has become a serious matter. Similarly, words ending in “istan” denote the origin of radicalisation; for example, “Londonistan” during the 1990s and “Walthamstan” in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks are suggestive of radicalisation. Moreover, this particular suffix deliberately refers to Afghanistan and Pakistan and the notion that radicalisation in Europe has its roots in Muslim countries. Of course, a tiny proportion of Muslims themselves provide Western media and politicians with a reason to discuss and debate their religion and place in secular societies.

(i)-Original Contributions:

The literature covering Islam and Muslims is extensive and well-established, covering a range of relevant discourses such as Orientalism (a mainly Western way of representing ‘other’ or its perception of people in distant lands such as the Middle East), terrorism, religious ideology and jihad. This thesis examines one aspect of this literature, formal and informal terrorism, and investigates it within the context of the London bombings of 7/7 in 2005.

Apart from the formal literature available on Islam and Muslims, there are also rich sources of alternative references and publications on social networking sites and platforms. In addition, leading sources and popular discourses were essential parts of the literature-searching process, as manifested in the literature review and other sections of this thesis.

Within this broad discourse, this thesis examines the 7/7 event, which is associated with British Muslims in general and Islam in particular. Hence, in view of inevitable time
constraints it has not been possible to review every single theoretical piece written in discourses of Orientalism and terrorism.

Admittedly, overall the 7/7 topic has been discussed in books and articles but there has been little or no attempt to assess press reaction at the time. Moreover, the discourse of terrorism related to the topic has not yet moved into informal publications such as newspapers and social networking sites. In turn, within the reviewed literature there is little on this topic with a special focus on the relationship between British Muslims and terrorism (the 7/7 incident) that examined the views expressed in broadsheet newspapers. Yet, it is also important to note that there was emerging discourse on terrorism is evident in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph in the immediate wake of the 7/7 bombings. The terrorism discourse in the newspapers is informal because it largely consists of contributions by non-specialists on Islam and the associated phenomenon of terrorism.

This thesis also includes a proportional breakdown of articles examined within a specified period (8 July 2005-7 July 2007) to examine the themes of terrorism. The method of analysis in this thesis (inductive reasoning which is essentially an analysis based upon an examination of the evidence drawn from data) has emerged out of the discussions and debates of newspapers. Therefore, while this terrorism discourse may be well established in the formal field of study (academia), it is not obvious in the informal field of study (newspapers). This thesis seeks to remedy that omission and contributes to our existing knowledge.

(ii)-Reliability and Validity:

Most accounts of the 7/7 incident are personal narratives of the event (Debnam, 2007; North, 2007; Tulloch, 2006). There are considerable accounts of the 7/7 attacks in academic research (Ahmed, 2006; Black, 2005; Rai, 2006; Kollesrstrom, 2012). Yet, the British press's depiction of the 7/7 event and the resulting focus on the representation of British Muslims is evidently limited (see Crockett, 2008; Dunning, 2014; Kabir, 2010). Keeping this gap in mind, this thesis has adopted a different method of inquiry, using inductive thematic analysis of two broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph (8 July 2005-7 July 2007). The aim is to focus on the representation of British Muslims resulting from the 7/7 event but mainly from these newspapers' perspectives in their interpretation and presentation of the event. More specifically, the coding scheme,
which is applied to a total of 274 articles including editorials, features, comments and
news reports, represents the strength of the data. Thus the timeframe, approach and
unique set of combined newspapers dictate the key themes in the dataset.

A number of aspects of this thesis make it valid and reliable, including the way in which
the data was collected, analysed and presented, the uniqueness of its time period, the
rationale for the selection of newspapers and the justification of the applied
methodology. Considering the technical difficulties of the initial data collection
procedure, such as the authenticity and accuracy of collected items and repetitive
occurrences of articles in the same data, this thesis used three search engines - Lexis-
Nexis, ProQuest and micro-film records. Each type of journalism, be it an editorial or a
comment piece, is tested for its accuracy. To achieve this also integrated the
broadsheets’ websites and double-checked that each article collected matched the
original text in that newspaper. Hence, it traced a few examples of news items that were
published twice in the same newspaper using different headlines. It is also assumed that
this is a procedure that can be repeated by others. Further, it anticipates that other
researchers may be able to use the same procedure for similar work. Therefore, the
above-mentioned fundamentals make this thesis research process reliable, as can be
seen in more detail in the methods chapter.

(iii)-The Initial Idea:

This thesis project is an extension of my research MA dissertation in International
Journalism, which focused on British Muslims in Bradford and Leeds in the aftermath of
the London bombings. Using in-depth interviews with first- and second-generation
British Muslims (South Asian Muslims), I examined the impacts of the bombings on the
lives of these British Muslims. Thus, my MA dissertation allowed me to probe the
sentiments of British Muslims and views on the bombings and, in particular, to record
the difference in attitudes of two generations of Muslims on the same issue (7/7).

This project gave me the opportunity to become involved in the local Leeds branch of
the National Union of Journalists. There, I met Michelle Stanistreet, elected vice-
president of the NUJ, who visited the Leeds branch as part of her ‘thank you’ tour of
England and Wales in 2006. While talking about the role of the British press in peace
and war and, in particular, its influence in multicultural Britain, she provided me with a
copy of a page called Daily Fatwa (which was purposely designed for publication by the
Stanistreet, along with her colleagues, stopped it before the original copy could be sent to the printing press (please see the attached copy under heading 1.7- The Polemic Media of this chapter). I learned that, on the one hand, there is considerable criticism of the British press for its failure to deal with the issues of ethnic minority portrayals but, on other hand its members are devoted to quality journalism.

1.3-Initiating the Debate:

This thesis mainly offers a narrative of three “M’s”: Media (the British press), Muslims (British Muslims including European Muslims), and the Middle East (a region where Orientalism studies originate and the centre of present political activities). These are significant components of an equation that is interlinked and hence it provides an understanding of the representation of British Muslims in the British media. Nadia Abu El-Haj (2013) writes that the American “political present has become ever more fundamentally entangled with ‘radical Islam’ and the ‘war on it’, the Middle East having emerged as its most central locale” (Abu El-Haj, 2013, p.75). Britain and America have played a part in the destabilising of the Middle East and large parts of the Muslim world, thus bringing these three ‘Ms’ into play.

Lockman (2004) states that, after the Second World War, American academics and officials became involved in studying foreign policy issues, especially the Middle East, because of its massive resources and strategic importance (Lockman, 2004, p.121). Although this thesis examines the 7/7 event reporting in two newspapers, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, it occasionally also incorporates current and relevant illustrations of the representations of British Muslims to comprehend different interpretations of the press.

As a starting point, it considers a few common assumptions. Some sections of the British media often misrepresent Islam and Muslims by assuming that British Islamists want to impose Sharia Law and destroy Britain’s secular values. It is also assumed that young British Muslims are more inclined to radicalisation and extremism compared to other faith groups in British society, and that in recent years a few young British Muslims have joined Jihadists abroad, particularly in the Middle East. Of course there is no denying these problems within Muslim communities but this whole issue seems to be a matter of coincidence since the media report events that are current occurrences.
Nevertheless, evidence shows that the media often consider some events more newsworthy than others even though they may have similar significance; for example, the 11th of September 2001 attacks received worldwide media attention compared to the 9 September 1973 incident when jets attacked Chile’s presidential palace, or even everyday terrorist attacks in the Middle East and elsewhere. Of course, beheading is barbaric; it has long been practised in Europe and is now a visible act by so-called Islamic militants such as ISIS. Throughout the last decade, the British media have focused on the beheadings of Western journalists or people who were ‘worthy victims’ but they covered up a number of beheadings in other countries including Saudi Arabia, where Britain safeguards its economic interests (The Guardian, 31 August 2014). It is fair to say that the British press has said very little about the economic and political interests of Britain and the USA.

This scenario illustrates the words of British journalist Alfred Harmsworth: “When a dog bites a man that is not news, because it happens so often. But if a man bites a dog, that is news” (Ivancheva, 2011). Some commentators view this dictum as referring to an unusual and infrequent event that becomes newsworthy. Often British cities that have sizeable Muslim populations such as Birmingham, Rotherham, Leeds and Bradford have been given inappropriate labels. A few examples of such labels include: “failing schools”; “Sharia Bradfordistan”; “Londonistan” and “Totally Muslim City” (see Boyd, 2015; Leiken, 2012; Shrama, 2006; The Guardian, 1 December 2015 and 11 January 2015). There are of course reasons for this, such as the London bombers’ origins in Yorkshire towns and cities such as Leeds and Dewsbury.

These cities have been associated with social disturbances, social ghettos, the Rushdie Affair, violence, grooming, forced marriages, child sex abuse, benefit frauds and social housing problems even though similar sorts of problems also exist in other British cities such as Doncaster and inner city boroughs such as Southall in London. An example of the misrepresentation of Bradford would be the title of a recent British TV Channel 4 documentary “Make Bradford British” (2012). This seems to imply that Bradford is not British when it is clearly British.

Such portrayals began with an infamous ITV comedy series Mind Your Language, which presented a Muslim character, Ali Nadeem from Lahore, initially as a benefit cheat and as intolerant of his fellow student Ranjeet Singh who initially refuses to sit next to him.
because Ranjeet is Sikh. The next scene shows them being hostile to each other on the basis of their religious beliefs. Ali labels him ‘infidel!’ and Ranjeet threatens him in turn with a Kirpan (knife), saying “I will disrespect your holy messenger (Prophet Muhammad, P.B.U.H) with this (knife)”, at which point Mr. Brown (the teacher) jumps in and asks Ranjeet how he feels about Roman Catholics? He replies, “Oh! I treat them like my brothers” and then he turns around whilst looking at Ali and says, “You are here to learn English, not to start a holy war” (ITV, 1977). This trend still continues in films, documentaries, dramas, sitcoms and media, such as Yasmeen (2004), Citizen Khan (2012), and Four Lions (2010), which show Muslims as a problem.

Unfortunately, to an extent, this unpopular trend still continues because disrespecting Muslims’ prophet (P.B.U.H) is not covered by blasphemy laws in many western countries in the same way they cover Jews and Sikhs. Notably, Britain has demolished its ancient laws of blasphemy whilst the Irish constitution prohibits on insulting religion (see The Daily Telegraph, 10 May 2008; The Guardian, 11 April 2016).

Nicolas Walter (1990) acknowledges that blasphemy is a fundamental part of Christianity as well as Judaism because of the “very nature” of these religions (Walter, 1990, p.10). Walter writes that the Jewish God is considered so scared that “it was blasphemous not only to deny his uniqueness or insult his nature but even to say or write his name (Yahweh or Jehovah)” (Walter, 1990, p.10). According to Joss Marsh (1998), the term ‘blasphemy’ cannot be explained by a single theory because it is a multidimensional concept that has different meanings in different contexts and cultures (Marsh, 1998, p.7). In brief, Marsh states that “Blasphemy is the speaking of the unspeakable” (Marsh, 1998, p.7).

During different periods of the history of England blasphemy was seen as a crime and serious offence declared in the state laws. A few examples include the ‘Act of 1414’, the ‘Act of 1515’, the ‘Blasphemy Act of 1698’, and ‘The Mosaic law’ that forbid “showing disrespect for God, doubting his powers, even disobeying his commandments” (Nash, 1999, p.21-26). Further, England has prosecuted several writers and journalists for blasphemy such as Nicolas Atwood (1617), John Taylor (1676), Thomas Emlyn (1703) and Peter Annet 1763) (Walter, 1990, p.29-34). Other writers such as David Nash (1999) also provide accounts of those writers, poets and other individuals who faced trials under the blasphemy laws in England (Nash, 1999, p.167-191). However, in the
more open and secular society that Britain has now become, such punishments no longer exist.

In modern Britain, The Rushdie Affair (1989) is a significant example of disrespect for Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) which caused disturbing protests across Britain and abroad. This incident also inspired contemporary scholars to discuss the very nature of blasphemy laws in modern Britain. Some British scholars demanded the renewal of blasphemy laws to protect British Muslims. For example, Richard Webster (1990) suggests that “Islam is now in danger of becoming the most important of all the West’s modern apocalyptic enemies” because of the fall of the “evil empire of the Soviet Union” (Webster, 1990, p.148). Webster sees the Rushdie Affair as a test example of anti-Islam feelings and thinks that because of this incident “thousands of British Muslims will continue to live under the shadow of an ancient religious hatred” (Webster, 1990, p.148). Andrew Anthony brands the incident a “Cultural War” (The Observer, 11 January 2009). Since then, the British city of Bradford has received several labels and the word “Fatwa” has become a synonym for outdated theology.

The incident, known as the Rushdie Affair (1989), opened a Pandora’s Box of questions about British Muslims and their cultural and religious identity. Perhaps an editorial in The Observer best described British Muslims’ situation: “The Rushdie affair became a rallying cause for Muslim consciousness. It was the point at which British Muslims became politicised and hitched their faith to a violent star.” (The Observer, 28 May 2006)

Subsequently, the key debate appears to have revolved around modernity and Islam, particularly the perception that Islam does not allow freedom of expression or endorse democracy. In debates on Islam and Muslims, the media along with the polity too often miss the notions of freedom and liberty.

Also, to an extent, both the press and politicians fail to differentiate between questioning matters of interest and disrespecting sacred texts when discussing Islam and its teachings. Other popular debates have centred on the veil (2006) and Sharia (2008) and currently these are reforming Muslims, their identity and place in secular Europe, radicalisation and extremism (Bryan, 2014; Jackson, 2009; Ramadan, 2008). Mostly, the media reporting is based on information from various sources, including politicians, clergy and government officials, and such debates have an impact on the overall representation of Muslims. Clinton Bennett (2005) offers an account of current
debates, starting with some important questions: Can democracy flourish in Muslim society? Are Islam and the West on a collision course? In many ways these disturbing questions seem crucial for an understanding of Islam and Muslims, their representation in the media and the conflict between West and the Rest (Muslim world).

One of the reasons why British Muslims are the subject of problematic media portrayals is the fact that the media report events occurring in the Muslim world that involve social unrest, civil wars and other related issues. Thus, a picture of Muslims emerges in the media that suggests that the roots of social problems within Muslim societies are perhaps a result of their religion. It is argued that such an approach tends to overlook political aspects of the social issues. Moreover, the press reporting of social issues often seems to focus more on religion and is less inclined to discuss political and economic factors responsible for social ills among Muslim and non-Muslim societies.

Given the political turmoil and social unrest in a few Muslim-dominated countries such as Libya, Syria and Somalia, where rebels, radicals and extremists often use religion as an excuse for their actions, the press reporting is sometimes arguably less investigative and more dependent on official sources to highlight the problematic image of some Muslims as violent extremists and rebels. However, it is evident that sections of the British press have revealed hypocritical standards in both their own government and Muslim countries’ governments. For example, The Guardian and a few other British newspapers have campaigned against US-led intrusions (in Vietnam and the Iraq to repel Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Muslim-populated Kuwait).

In addition, sections of the British press also mentioned the toppling of a democratically-elected government of Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran in 1953 in which the American and British governments had admitted their involvement (The Guardian, 19 August 2013). On other hand, the British press also reported how Saudi Arabia and Iran intervene in the internal matters of other Muslim countries such as Egypt. Overall, however, it is evident that most media reporting often raises concerns about dictatorships and autocratic rule in Muslim countries but in comparison pays little attention to the role of Western governments.

Besides, Said’s inquiry is based on case-studies such as the Iranian revolution (1979) and media representation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Party in which the media provided one-sided information under “Us” and “Them” and “Ours” and “Theirs”
labels; this is the central focus of Said’s previous studies on Muslims. Although Said wrote his book more than three decades ago, it seems highly relevant today and also suggests that little has changed in the media mindset, which has always represented the Muslim Brotherhood as a problematic party, even though it won through fair elections; it was denounced as a terrorist organisation by the military leadership in 2014. As Said concludes, “the canonical, orthodox coverage of Islam... in the academy, in the government, and in the media is all interrelated and has been more diffused, has seemed more persuasive and influential, in the West than any other “coverage” or interpretation” (Said, 1979, p.161).

Undeniably, Britain has experienced a sequence of terror incidents following the 7/7 attacks including the failed 21/7 terror plot, the failed bombing attempt at Glasgow Airport (2007), and Lee Rigby’s brutal murder in 2013. Moreover, according to The Guardian report, which was published on 7 July 2015, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the London bombings, a senior British counter-terrorism police officer revealed that fifty deadly terror plots of “different scales and sizes” have been stopped that involved young British Muslims. Worryingly, in these years several British-born and converted Muslims have joined Jihadists abroad. These events have provided the British media with the opportunity to discuss and debate security issues significant for British people’s safety. To be fair, it is the media’s responsibility to raise concerns on security and other issues essential to maintaining harmony within society.

Yet, as well as this necessary role played by the British media, their purpose should also be to reflect on a number of other questions of our times. Why have young British Muslims become so angry in contemporary Britain? What makes them different from their parents’ generation? Why have a few Muslim converts become radicalised? Are these issues the product of religious events? Or is it the political, socio-economic structure that turns young people towards radicalisation? Has Britain’s relationship with Muslims changed? And, finally, what is the role of the media in the current circumstances and what should it be?

These fundamental questions are the essence of a fair debate on British Muslims and their representation in the British media. Notably, there are several key factors that play a significant role in the manufacturing of news, such as socio-economic factors, business and political interests of news organisations, and governments and political parties’
influence. Another important point is that there is more reporting of events and less journalism, which limits the ability of the press to produce a more balanced view of any particular event.

This thesis reflects upon the narrative of the 7/7 event and the resulting representations of British Muslims in two of the main British broadsheet newspapers, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, over a period of two years (8 July 2005 - 7 July 2007). In subsequent sections, it will explain how these newspapers interpreted the event, why they constructed issues such as terrorism and radicalisation among young British Muslims in a particular manner, and how they arrived at specific views of 7/7 and British Muslims.

1.4-British Press Power and its Impact on Society:

Being the oldest and most advanced press organisation in the world, the role, power, and impact of the British press is widely discussed and debated in media studies (Fyfe, 1949; Conboy, 2010; Temple, 2008). On its first day of publication on 6 July 1828, The Spectator wrote, “The principal object of a newspaper is to convey intelligence” (cited in Harris, 1946, p.3). Hence, the current debate is about how the press uses its leverage in transforming a multicultural society. Roy Greenslade wrote in The Guardian, on 14 December 2010, that “The power of the British press is not an illusion, and it is obviously not a thing of the past”.

Marshall McLuhan's famous phrase ‘The Medium is the Message’ (1964) suggests the importance of the medium through which a message travels to the receiver. In other words, it acknowledges the significance of a medium in producing an influential message. It is also congruent with the slogan of the French weekly pictorial magazine Paris Match: the weight of words, the shock of photos that indicate how words and photos shape and channel a message. Tuchman (1978) wrote that the “news is a window on the World” and a ‘frame’ that helped Americans not only to know themselves and others in distant lands but to understand lifestyles, institutional systems, and peoples (Tuchman, 1978, p.1).

Long before the invention of digital means of communication the traditional press was a popular and powerful tool of manipulation. Walter Lippmann (1921) refers to news media as the “Manufacturing of Consent”, a notion later endorsed and revised by Noam
Chomsky who considers it an “Engineering of Consent” (cited in Barsamian, 1992, p.5). George Orwell (in his novel 1984) states that it is “Thought Control”, and to Chomsky “media are corporations that have a market: other businesses that advertise through media. The media are selling their advertisers a product, namely readers and audiences.” (sic) (Barsamian, 1992, p.1)

Drawing on several media studies his viewpoint is factual as in both peacetime and wartime the media’s role has been recognised. Along with the British broadsheets, which represent serious and quality journalism, some tabloids also claim their influence on British society, such as the famous headline in The Sun: “It’s the Sun Wot Won It” (The Sun, 11 April 1992). In the current era, Charlotte Crockett (2008) provides two examples of the media’s influence in instigating civil war in Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda. During the former, Slobodan Milošević used television to propagate his nationalist campaign whilst, during the latter, Radio Milles Collines was used to spread hatred in Rwanda (Crockett, 2008, p.6).

Correspondingly, sections of the British media misled the public about the Iraq War, which was fought in response to a presumed threat of weapons of mass destruction that in reality was fictitious. They were reporting on statements made in Parliament at the time and have since been very bitter at being misled. Intellectuals have various opinions on the media’s role in the Iraq War as the media were surely reporting the statements of the US President and the British Prime Minister. Some therefore feel that it was the latter two, rather than the media, who were doing the deceiving. Of course, these examples do not discredit the media’s constructive role; for example, they provided successful opposition in the case of the Vietnam War.

Despite this leverage, some of the British press coverage of British Muslims in the post-7/7 period has raised further concerns about their identity and place in British society. Several scholars also point out that the magnification of events in the media reporting suggests that “Muslims” are presented as “New Folk Devils”, like the Jews and the Irish in earlier times, and their beliefs and cultural norms are associated with modern-day “Moral Panics” (Archer, 2009; Shain, 2011; Sian, 2012). Current examples of such panics include linking the veil with security and oppression and associating mosques with the spreading ideology of radicalisation which in turn abruptly constructs a negative image of British Muslims. Evidence also shows that the media are not alone in
shaping people’s opinions of certain political and social issues; in fact, this is also
achieved by a nexus of corporate power comprising five “P’s”: politicians, pressure
groups, peers, press and police (see Ost, 2002; Chas, 2006, p.75).

1.5-Problem and Reaction:
What happened on 7 July 2005 was appalling and indeed condemnable by every religion
and civilised society. Worryingly, the subsequent reaction to an extent put the whole
Muslim community under surveillance, new terrors laws were introduced, police stop-
and-search procedures increased and calls for detention without charge became louder
in a country that prides itself on human rights and individual liberties (HMIC, 2013;
Gies, 2014; The Daily Telegraph, 2014). Despite some of these unpleasant laws, it is fair
to say that, had a Christian group been responsible for a spate of bombings in a Muslim
state, that group would probably have been targeted in a similar manner. However,
given the British ‘tolerance’ and press coverage of past acts of terrorism, the reaction to
7/7 was slightly unusual (see Barnett and Reynolds, 2009). Because of the pluralistic
nature of British society, sections of the press have different views on different issues;
hence, not all broadsheet newspapers are the same.

Consequently, the distrust of Muslims among the British public has become a matter of
concern. Relevantly, a BBC survey published on 25 September 2013 found that a
quarter of young British people ‘don’t trust Muslims’. This is more worrying because
these young people are growing up with negative perceptions of their fellow British
Muslims. Moreover, ‘Stop and Search’ is seen as a discriminatory practice among many
young Muslims although they have been recorded as cooperative with the police
(Wilson, 2002; Field, 2011).

The then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said, ‘The rules of the game have changed’,
and latterly the British government has introduced several measures and new laws to
deal with the threat of home-grown terrorism including, as Phillips Lewis (2007) notes,
“introducing wide ranging discretionary powers to deport non-nationals believed to be
promoting or glorifying terrorism” (Phillips, 2007, p.6). The threat of home-grown
extremism existed long before the events of 7/7. After the Rushdie Affair, for example,
the British parliament passed several acts to deal with anticipated problems: Terrorism
Act (2000); Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001); Prevention of Terrorism Act
(2005); Terrorism Act (2006); and Counter Terrorism Bill (2008).
Nevertheless, from an intellectual point of view, one might wonder why the ‘rules of the game have changed’: is it because of the actions of a few Muslims? Undeniably, Britain did not experience terror, violence and extremism for the first time on 7/7; in fact, it has a long history of shootings, killings, bomb blasts, violence and terror. These events include the following: The Hungerford massacre, 19 August 1987; The Dunblane School Massacre, 13 March 1996; The Cumbria shootings, 2 June 2010; The Angry Brigade bomb attacks during the 1970s; and the IRA terrorists’ activities. All of these resulted in the imposition of restrictions.

Despite these examples, Cole and Cole (2009) and Philips (2012) believe that the growing radicalisation and extremism among British Muslims is a consequence of ‘Islam’ and has less to do with British society or Britain’s foreign policy; other scholars, such as Curtis (2012), Rees (2006) and Rogers (2008) reject this thesis. Recently, Teresa May and David Cameron have vowed to make more changes to the legal and judicial systems to deal with “Jihadists” and are assuming that this problem will last for generations (The Daily Telegraph, 14 September 2014). This echoes George Bush’s allusion to “Crusades”, referring to the eleventh-century conflict between Christianity and Islam that lasted over 100 years. Since the start of the War on Terror, Muslim lands have faced continuing political unrest and chaos.

In addition, radicalisation and extremism have increased from the threat of al-Qaeda to al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and now Isis and different new terrorist groups in Pakistan. In Britain, English and Black converts’ participation in the 7/7 attack, the failed Exeter bombing of 22 May 2008 and the London beheading of a non-combatant soldier suggest that something is wrong within the political system. In John Pilger’s view, “Britain remains powerful but in a subsidiary role to the United States and the two act imperially to benefit their economic empires, Britain retaining its status as a world power” (Pilger, 2003, p.5).

This is probably true of many nations, including several Muslim nations. In the post-colonial period, in an effort to retain its status as an influential power in the world, Britain has been directly and indirectly involved in supporting foreign operations and invasions, especially in Muslim lands. Indeed, every nation has set of priorities that often reflect a contradictory stance on issues such as human rights and liberties. Relevantly, for some scholars British government foreign policy, particularly in the
Middle East, is somewhat self-contradictory (Abbas, 2007; Rai, 2006; White, 2012). Opposing views suggest that the British government may see such actions as necessary to defend liberal values in an international conflict. Now, let us consider the case of Britain’s War on Iraq, which later turned out to be a misleading and violent act (according to Bruke, 2004, p.287-89; Gates, 2014; and Tumber and Palmer, 2006, p.139-141).

A series of books and research papers published on the representation of Islam and Muslims in the media before and after the 7/7 attack suggests that it is discriminatory and biased (Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Petley and Richardson, 2011). In the last decade several studies have raised questions over the recurring biased coverage of Islam and Muslims and the role of the media in turning certain events into Muslim problems such as the Norway bombing. Even before the occurrence of the 7/7 attack, Muslims did not have a particularly positive image in the British media. Ron Geaves (2010) offers a chronological record of Abdullah Quilliam’s life, achievements and services for the Queen of England. However, despite all these narratives, Quilliam, after opening his first mosque in 1895 in Liverpool, became the victim of ‘Islamophobic vandalism’ and the hostile crowd shouted slogans such as ‘down with Turks’, ‘remember Armenia’, and ‘to hell with the Muhammadans’ (Geaves, 2010, p.65-66).

Then came the 7/7 incident, as a result of which the image of Muslims received further negative portrayal in the media. Subsequently, the Veil issue in Britain (2006), the Sharia debate (2008), Phil Woolas’ in-breeding controversy (2008), Bishop Michael Nazir Ali’s “No-Go Area” remarks (2008), Jack Straw’s ‘easy meat’ (grooming) debate (2011), British universities being declared “hotbeds of Islamic extremism” (2011), the Woolwich murder of a British soldier (2013), and the Rotherham sexual abuse case (2014) are a few examples of Muslims’ constant derogatory portrayal in the press reporting. Of course, history shows that tragic events become the source of increased problems of social segregation, racial discrimination and interfaith relations.

Winder (2005) notes that being an immigrant in another land is not simple: “People have seldom been treated according to their wishes, demands or merits. Furthermore fear, suspicion and animosity have always escorted mingling peoples who meet strangers” (Winder, 2005, p.18-19). His thoughts are similar to those of many other scholars such as Anderson (1991), Parekh (2000) and Solomos (2003) who believe that
ethnic minorities often become subject to racial discrimination, economic deprivation and institutional disparity.

Notably, several other scholars support a similar notion in relation to ethnic minorities’ representation and place in a multi-ethnic society, such as Allen (2005), Cottle (2004) and Wykes (2001). Perhaps representation and cohesion are the two most important disciplines in which ethnic minorities are seen in the media and public sphere, particularly Muslims (Poole and Richardson, 2006; Modood, 2007). Logically, looking at these citations in the media, one might conclude that Muslims are contributors to the news stories in a way, since the London bombers and the Woolwich terrorists claimed to be Muslims. Poole’s (2002) investigation into the reporting of Islam in the post-9/11 period reveals an important factor, which is the increasing use of problematic phrases such as “home-grown extremists”, “radical Muslims”, “Muslim rebels”, “Muslim and Islamic terrorists”, “The Islamic community” or similar labels suggesting that “any Muslim” could be “a potential terrorist” (Poole, 2002, p. 4-42).

Apart from Poole’s work, around a dozen major analytical studies have traced similar impressions of Muslims in the British media (Said, 1997; Morey and Yaqin, 2010, 2012; Rane et al., 2014). Arguably, most of the British media’s reporting of Islam and Muslims is of a hostile nature; consequently, Muslims are widely seen as fundamentalists, extremists, troublemakers, backwards, incompatible, dangerous, security risks, others, outsiders, and violent. Poole and Richardson note: “Islam and the activities of certain Muslims are newsworthy subjects” (Poole and Richardson, 2006, p.1). Clearly, the media have a responsibility to report events and perpetrators fairly, but broadening them to include all Muslims is unfair.

In addition, Omaar views this situation as a turning point in ‘Muslim’ reporting and assumes that the “Coverage of issues continues to focus on what divides us rather than what unites us” (Omaar, 2006, p.234). He gives the example of a middle-aged white woman’s remark following the Forest Gate incident in 2006 that ended in the shooting of an innocent Muslim. She said, “I live on Lansdowne Road, not far from where the two young boys live. Now, the newspapers make out that I live in some sort of ghetto. I don’t!” (ibid, p.236)

Based on recent studies in the same field it is obvious that the representation of Muslims in the media following 9/11 and 7/7 has become more biased and
inflammatory. Although this thesis inquires into British Muslims’ representation in broadsheets, it also finds it useful to illustrate an insight of British tabloids, which provides a glimpse of British Muslims’ portrayal in the British press. One of the debates on British Muslims concerns their growing population, which is seen as a threat.

According to ‘PEW Research’, by the year 2030, it is estimated that the world’s total population will have reached around 8.3 billion and Muslims will constitute 26.4 per cent of the aggregate total (Pew Research, 2010). In Britain, the Muslim population is expected to rise from 2.9 million at present to 5.6 million in 2030. Several recent studies have discussed the growing size of the Muslim population (Lewis, 2002, p.14-15 and 2007, p.18-19).

Today, Islam is Britain’s second biggest religion with over 1,000,000 English Muslims who are actively involved in debating and shaping the future of Islam in Britain (Daily Mail, 5 January 2011; Kose, 2010). An investigative report based on Kevin Brice’s study published in The Economist on 29 September 2013 shows ‘that around 5,200 Britons turn to Islam every year, and that the total number of converts is about 100,000’. Various other sources also confirm these statistics (The BBC, 22 May, 2013; The Guardian, 11 October 2013).

However, evidence shows that, among the British public, be they Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus and Sikhs, faith is constantly in a crisis situation. An ICM poll What World thinks of God (2004) conducted for the BBC found that Britain has become one of the most secular nations in the world (BBC, 26 February 2004). Among those embracing secularism are a few cases of British Muslims young children who are no longer being raised in the faith or reverts turning away from Islam (The Observer, 17 May 2015). Nevertheless, among these new converts are scholars and professionals who have begun to record their experiences and accounts of life, thus providing different narratives and reinterpretations of Islam. These narratives also discuss issues such as the veil and women’s status and place in Islam (Anway, 1996, p.145-196; Bushill and Matthews, 2008, p.127-171; Zebiri, 2008, p.250).

This increase in the number of Muslims raises fears and worries among secular Western governments, giving way to widespread perceptions such as ‘Eurabia’, ‘Islamisation’, or Muslims ‘taking over Britain and Europe’ (Bawer, 2006, p.171 and 2010, p.30-84; Caldwell, 2009, p.174; Wilders, 2012). Evidently the growing use of the phrase ‘Eurabia’
appears frequently in all media spheres but some studies dismiss this notion of fear and hostility on the basis of statistical analysis (De Vries, et al., 2006; Mishra, 2009; Moten, 2012).

In an article in *The Guardian* published on 11 February 2011, Esposito and Lalwani argue that this perception is a ‘product of hysteria’ since France will not become an “Islamic Republic” by 2048 nor will Germany be a “Muslim State” by 2050; in reality, “Commentators seem more focused on ringing false alarm bells than on presenting facts. The reality is that there is no takeover, but that there is a danger of intolerance that threatens the very fabric of British and European society”.

Conjointly, Ramadan (2002) also dismisses the fabricated propagation that Islam is placing secular Europe at risk, claiming instead that “the practice of Islam, by its very nature, exemplifies the community’ (Ramadan, 2002, p.162). In sum, the discrimination against and hatred of Muslims has increased mainly because of the 7/7 attack and related events. Notably, several campaigning organisations such as “Hope Not Hate” and “Stop the War Coalition” have emerged to confront destructive thinking about Islam and Muslims.

### 1.6 The Notion of Representation in the Context of British Muslims:

According to several theorists such as Pitkin (1967) and Vieira and Runciman (2008), the concept of “representation” is comprehensive, multifaceted and intricate in both its meaning and application. Pitkin thinks it is elusive because “it may sometimes be one thing, sometimes the other,” and it can also be “used in various senses in different connections” (Pitkin, 1967, p.5). Moreover, Pitkin also considers it an “essentially modern concept mainly in the case of human beings” (ibid, p.5).

These authors also recognise the wide-ranging presence of different forms of representations in various situations and levels. For instance, governments, individuals, and social and religious groups all have their representatives as ambassadors, lawyers, activists and clergymen who, to a certain extent, have a degree of responsibility as agents (Vieira and Runciman, 2008, p.68).

Morey and Yaqin (2011) show that a notable characteristic of Muslims’ representation is the fact that it is grounded to a great extent in the much vaunted “clash of civilisation” thesis or “the Muslim World versus the West”, “Muslim Other”, “the West”, “Save the
Muslim women”, “Our civilisation under threat”, “Muslim issues”, “Threatening”, “Dangerous”, “Hostile”, and other notions which they term “structures of representation”, all of which have emerged with renewed force since 9/11.

Both the media and Muslims, especially in their relationship, have become attention-grabbing subjects for academic inquiry, suggesting that both receive criticism and sympathy, which generates a visible divide among scholars. Perhaps the media and Muslims will diverge in the near future. For example, the media may become more technologically advanced while, conversely, Muslims may turn out to be non-newsworthy.

This has happened in the past with almost every single community living in Britain, such as Jews, Scots, Irish, Caribbean people, Ghurkhas, Gypsies and, now, Muslims. At some point, every community has come under scrutiny and in other instances they have left space for others. Equally, Muslims, Jews, Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Buddhists are representatives of their religions just as journalists are representatives of their media organisations.

This also implies that individuals or groups, be they religious, social, or political groups, do have a certain moral responsibility to their religion, government and society. The representation in the British media revolves around the power and status of those who appear in the news, as Gans illustrates: “News from Russia and China is considered almost entirely with those governments’ problems and failures...political unrest in communist countries is news, whereas similar kinds of unrest in other countries is not” (Gans, 2004, p.33).

Mick (2008) suggests that, in Britain, newspapers often proclaim that they cater for the needs of the General public. Indeed, the Sun newspaper frequently uses words such as “us”, denoting itself and its readers, “who are represented as sharing the same preferences and opinion” (Mick, 2008, p.193). For critics such as Hargeaves and Thomas (2002, p.80), this assertion is factually untrue because they find that “much of the news is not relevant to me”, i.e. an ordinary citizen (cited in Mick, 2008, p.194).

Factually, the history of the British press as reviewed by Mick reveals that a few powerful proprietors of the press have exercised incredible influence in the public sphere (ibid., p. 28). Several other media critics have similar opinions (Curran, 2002,
In addition, Gillian Doyle (2002) provides several references to acknowledge the assumption that media owners influence the news-making process. On the positive side she also provides the example of The Guardian, which is owned by the Scott Trust and is therefore relatively more independent in its editorial policies (Doyle, 2002, p.19). To an extent, the role of an editor in a newspaper remains significant and influential.

Given the media representations of British Muslims at large, it is evident that British Muslims are often tagged with racial stereotypes, extremism, terrorism, and violence. One obvious reason is that those past and present-day perpetrators of horrible acts of terrorism were members of the British Muslim community. However despite this bonding, it is logically inaccurate to relate these to the entire British Muslim community. Of course, there can be no denying the problem of radicalisation among young British Muslims, some of whom have been involved in terrorism.

But the point is that, in some cases, the media coverage exhibits duplicity in representing people of different or similar faiths for committing similar acts and crimes. For example, the IRA was all over the newspapers in the years of ‘The Troubles’, but there was a bias in the media coverage because the Catholic IRA, who murdered about 3,000 people, received more attention than the Protestant paramilitaries who murdered about 3,500. Similarly, in some parts of the Muslim world such as Syria, acts committed by Shia and Sunnis are seen differently in some sections of the media. In brief, the IRA terrorists and “Islamist” terrorists’ profiles are generally exposed while acts of violence and terrorism by Christians, Jews and Hindus are given a lower profile; for example, the “Saffron terror” in August 2010 in India and a series of shooting incidents in America have been presented as different from the acts of Muslim suspects (see Kumar, 2012; Huffington Post 14 August 2014).

1.7-The Polemic Media: A Few Illustrations of British Journalism.

The British media are divided into three main categories that mirror their political orientations: left-wing, right-wing and the centre. However, a few writers, such as Janet Daley, believe that there is not much of a left-wing presence in the British media (The Daily Telegraph, 10 October 2015). Nevertheless, British media organisations also have unique business models; for example, The Guardian is run by the ‘Scott Trust’ and the BBC is funded by a licence fee rather than advertising, thus making these organisations
less dependent on other forms of financial support. Yet, evidence shows that even these models are not completely free of government influence. There are three important aspects of British media: firstly, they are polemic; secondly, they are constantly evolving in political, technological, economic, and sociological terms; and, thirdly, the British media’s attitudes to minority groups are not uniform (Van Dijk, 1991).

After all, the media have clients such as institutions, governments, businesses and pressure groups and they also have end users in the shape of readers, viewers and audiences. It is therefore argued that, despite all these recorded in-discrepancies in media studies, it would be unfair to blame ‘the media’ for every problem around us because the alternative flow of information and radical thoughts is also channelled through and emerges from the same media, such as pictures and stories of torture and human rights abuses in Abu-Ghraib, Bagram Airfield and Guantanamo Bay.

It is also appropriate to look back at the recent history of British media portrayals of various political and social groups to understand the media system. However, before making any concrete argument, it is also fair to acknowledge that the media themselves are polemic and express different attitudes to numerous issues and event. Evidence shows that Jews were presented and framed in the media in a similar way to present-day Muslims. The established notions of Jews controlling money and business and influencing the media can be equated to Muslims bringing Sharia and conquering Europe, if not by force then by population, and their hatred of Jews and vice versa.

Evidently, the history of Britain shows that not only the media but also politicians and even to an extent the government law enforcement agencies have collectively singled out, inflated and presented one particular group as problematic, be they Jews, Scots, Irish, Caribbean people, Gypsies, Ghurkhas, Tamils or Muslims (Campbell, 1995; Cottle, 2000; Jones, 2012).

Going back to the 1960s and 1970s, a number of studies have witnessed the ill-treatment of Caribbean people and Tamils. Even before that, Irish and Scots had experienced a bad press that created hatred of these groups and identified them as “others”. Now, Romanians and Bulgarians are being presented in a similar way on the assumption that they are taking jobs and exploiting the British benefits system. Further extending this to the British themselves, it is well-documented in studies that the working class has always been demonised but then the working-class press (which is
geared towards working-class readers) has demonised aristocrats, bankers, and the like.

The framing and portrayal of mods and rockers, hippies, gipsies, chavs, coalminers and even political groups on the right and left saw them presented as troublemakers, problematic, others and dangerous. None of these groups remains forever in the news as “bad guys”; for example, Jews are fairly represented nowadays. It is worth looking at the demonising of the working classes in Britain and their present relationship with Muslims.

This state of affairs reflects that the ruling elites often identify a group within a society as “other”. They then frame and present such groups as security risks, disintegrated and sometimes as a threat to liberal values of society at large. In this way, governments often use such groups as an “enemy within” and a political means of controlling the public. Moreover, such groups might be used to reassure the public that their (the people’s) safety is being safeguarded by ‘Us’, the government. A classic example would be the ‘mods’ and ‘rockers’ during the mid-1960s and 1970s. Similarly, a trade union may be a threat because traditionally it has been aiming to take over the state and make it serve the interests of ordinary people (the working class).

Given the British Muslims’ media portrayal, is it perhaps worth asking what purpose their portrayal serves for the state and its institutions. Is demonising a form of racism? Despite the negative representations of Islam and British Muslims that have been evident since the publication of an “iconic photograph” of Bradford Muslims in relation to *The Satanic Verses*, there are also signs of positive reporting of Muslims. Stephen Pritchard’s opinion column in *The Observer* published on 27 September 2015 suggests that, despite the broadsheets’ focus on war and violence-related stories overseas in relation to Islam, there is also evidence of some positive coverage of Muslim women’s veils (*The Observer*, 27 September, 2015).

Pritchard’s analysis shows that the key argument suggesting “oppression of women” has shifted “to difficulties surrounding communication with the veil wearer” (ibid). Another illustration is *The Guardian*’s coverage of the Iraq War and its criticism of British foreign policy which it argues is associated with the London Bombings. In this way, *The Guardian* in fact supported British Muslims’ longstanding complaint that the British government’s involvement in Iraq and other Muslim countries is fuelling
discomfort among British Muslims. In a series of editorials, news articles, comment pieces and cartoons, *The Guardian* has maintained its stance that the British government's foreign policy is damaging and a cause of alienation among young British Muslims. In the following cartoon, Steve Bell sketches the British involvement in the Iraq War which has had a damaging impact on both Muslim and non-Muslim British citizens and also on the "counter terrorism campaign".

![Image 1: Cartoon by Steve Bell](image)

*Image 1*: In this image, cartoonist Steve Bell was raising concerns over British government involvement in the Iraq War and its link with the London bombings (*The Guardian*, 19 July 2005).

Moreover, on Friday 4 March 2011, *The Guardian* reported that *Daily Star* reporter Richard Peppiatt had resigned over the paper’s fabrication of stories relating to Muslims. At the peak of the veil debate, after it was banned in France, thus putting the Muslim faith under scrutiny, the *London Evening Standard* published an article on 11 December 2012 suggesting that it is not something that worries ordinary British people. Likewise, in the 2011 UK riots, three young Muslims were racially murdered; at this point, a Muslim father, Tariq Jahan, urged people to forgive the racist murderers of his son and strengthen community cohesion. Jahan received positive press coverage
overall, even in the tabloids, which called him the ‘riot Hero’. Later, however, he was sentenced to 12 months in jail after being found guilty of causing a road accident. The relevance of these illustrations shows that the media reporting mainly depends on circumstances, the roles of people as actors, and their importance and place in society; thus, it might be impartial, accurate or unfair.

![Image 2: An Unpublished copy of (The Daily Star 18 October 2006), courtesy Michelle Strainstreet, general secretary National Union of Journalist UK.](image)

Now, on the negative side, an illustration of unethical and irresponsible tabloid journalism is visible in above unpublished copy of The Daily Star that showed its anti-Muslim mindset that has increased particularly since 7/7. The paper designed a scurrilous front page on 18 October 2006, bearing the main headline the ‘Daily Fatwa: How Britain’s fave newspaper would look under Muslim rule’ while beneath readers were asked ‘Do you prefer your usual Daily Star?’ (Call Yes: 09010311521- No: 09010311522).
The newspaper included a picture of a covered woman on the left-hand side with the caption ‘Page 3 Burka Babes Picture Special’ and the word CENSORED in bold while on the right-hand side was a box entitled Inside Today carrying announcements such as No News, No Pic, No Fun, No Goss, No Sport, No Nothing. All of this suggested that Islam disapproves of any sort of entertainment and that it would ban all these activities.

Further to the right in the middle of the newspaper’s front page under the main headline was a picture of the Muslim cleric Abu Hamza with the caption ‘WIN Hooks just like Hamza’s’. Next to it, another box carrying a picture of Osama bin Laden and a heading ‘Free Beard For Every Bomber’ adjoined a third box ‘Burn a flag & WIN a Corsa’. Another heading was ‘Sharia Law...You can’t live with it, but you can live without it’. This front page underlines two important aspects of the tabloids’ coverage of Islam and Muslims. First, it speaks for all tabloids that consider Sharia, Burkha, Fatwa, and other related material comical but do not employ a scholarly manner to debate these issues that they view as problematic. Some may argue that this is the style of tabloid journalism which focuses on ‘S’ stories including Sex, Scandals, Sports, Soap and Scoops.

In the same way, Frederick James writes, “... Sex outside marriage carries a penalty of stoning to death or flogging...some extremists want the world to be turned into a single Islamic state. Some of those radicals are living in tolerant Britain” (The Daily Star, 2006). Here James misses a fundamental point that sex outside marriage is considered an undesirable and sinful act not only in Islam but also in almost all other religions. However, in secular societies such as Britain such trends are probably fairly common practice in the eyes of most tabloids, mid-market, free and a few broadsheet newspapers. Others point out that the Christian and Muslim religions may dislike it but it is not against the law and is apparently common practice. Most people in Britain do not think it sinful in the way that they thought it was, say, 50 years ago. In addition, recent estimates suggest that a majority of sexual relationships in Britain now take place outside marriage (The Observer, 28 September 2014).

The above illustration is indicative of a widespread idea that tabloids usually spread sensationalism and cause discomfort and distortion among members of society who sometimes becomes visible in their stories. This impression of tabloids may not be surprising because this is what a tabloid press is about; i.e. a less serious form of journalism. Despite these thoughts, a notable point here is that The Daily Star has been
stopped by British journalists who have themselves sent a message that a ‘blanket approach’ to describe everyone in British journalism is unfair and unwise. These tabloid newspapers declined to offer any apology for misrepresenting the issues in relation to Islam. For instance, in the above illustration the portrayal of a beard-man and Burkha women misinform the ordinary reader about these concepts. Hence, all this suggests that the recurring irresponsible reporting is a serious issue. However, at the same time, the role of Daily Star journalists also shows that, while the newspaper tried to cause controversy, it was white non-Muslim journalists who stopped it.

1.8-The British Press Representation of British Muslims before 7/7:

For several scholars and media critics the British press representations of British Muslims have been problematic over the last three decades. Indeed, one of the key reasons for Muslims’ problematic press image is the lack of understanding of their faith and culture. Rageh Omaar (2006) argues that “The image that you have been given of us British Muslims is only half of us” (Rageh Omaar, 2006, p.19). Prior to the occurrence of the 7/7 incident, the media representations of British Muslims were evidently problematic even though they were not seen as a serious threat to internal security. The recorded history of Britain shows that after, World Wars I and II, a considerable number of migrants came to the UK from former British colonies in Africa and Asia. Some of these came to fight for Britain and later decided to stay behind whilst others were economic workers who were brought to rebuild the war-torn cotton industry and others, particularly in the North of England. Hence, Britain became a destination for people of different backgrounds, nationalities and religions.

During the 1960s, migrant populations continued to increase, a trend that caused some panic and led to race riots including the Notting Hill race riots (1958), the Dewsbury riots (1989), the Bradford riots (2001), the Chapeltown riots in Leeds (1981, 1987 and 2001), the Oldham riots in 2001, and the Birmingham riots in 2005. The riots occurred for a wide range of reasons including poverty, unequal opportunities and racial tensions among various communities, including Caribbean and Asian ones. It is evident that during the 1950s and 1960s “Muslims and other ‘immigrants’ were described as ‘aliens’ suggesting ‘otherness’ that is based on difference such as ‘colour, accent and general demeanour of ‘immigrants’”; this became ‘the source of fear expressed so vividly’ in
Enoch Powell’s controversial ‘rivers of blood’ speech in 1968 (Sardar and Ahmad, 2012, p.2).

For these authors, the ‘call for assimilation’ thus “gave way to integration in the 1970s, which in turn was replaced by multicultural pluralism in the 1980s, leading to the celebration of difference and diversity under New Labour in the 1990s” (ibid., p.12). They conclude that “Muslims are generally seen as law abiding, docile folks”, during the 1950s and 1960s, and “it was their colour and ethnicity that were a problem” (ibid). These scholarly references demonstrate that, overall, British Muslims were seen as positive contributors in the making of a post-war society.

Obviously, with the passage of time, British society began to adopt and absorb social and cultural changes that made it more of a modern secular society. At this stage, many people in the host community began to see religion as a problematic and somewhat old-fashioned phenomenon that contradicted their modern thinking. Jorgen S. Nielsen (2004) notes that, in the 1970s, immigrants’ origins, their religion and its place in secular Europe appear in various writings (Nielsen, 2004, p. vii). Later, “the second half of the 1980s has, in consequence, seen a substantial increase in the number of publications dealing specially with the aspect of the Muslim presence in Western Europe” (ibid., p. viii).

This may have been a concern due to a series of terrorist and violent incidents involving Muslims that occurred during 1980s and 1990s. The media reported these events in which coincidently a few Muslims were acting badly. Apart from the media, such discussion of Muslims also appeared in the literature. According to Gillat-Ray (2010, p. xiii), Muslims were referred to as ‘Potential Violent Extremists” but all this happened because those involved in the taking of American hostages in 1980 in Lebanon, the hijacking of a TWA flight in 1985, the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and a bomb attack in Lebanon in 1983 that killed 240 US Marines were Muslim (ibid).

In addition, since 1979, the taking of American hostages by Iranian students in the US Embassy in Tehran and eleven other incidents of extremism against American and Western governments have been carried out by extremists claiming to be Muslims (PBS, 2014). These unfortunate incidents associated Muslims in general with violent acts. As a result of the reporting of terrorist and violent extremist incidents, Muslims in different
parts of the world became the subject of academic inquiry. There are two obvious reasons for the Muslims’ bad press and their relationship with horrific incidents. Firstly, those perpetrators used Islam as an excuse for their acts and, secondly, some opportunists in the media and politics suggested that Islam teaches violence.

This situation then became a prime reason for a substantial increase in writings on Islam. Nielsen notes that the mentioning of Muslims increased massively during the 1990s (Nielsen, 2004, p. xi). Similarly, in his lecture “Media and Islam War or Peace” (2012), Zakir Naik discloses that the Plain Truth magazine article, which was published in February 1984, in its 50th anniversary issue, has taken quotes from the “World Almanac and Book of Facts 1935, and the Reader's Digest Almanac and Year Book 1983”, finding that during the period 1934-1984 the mentioning of Islam increased by 235 per cent (Naik, 2012). Lori Peek (2011) notes that “more than twenty books on the ‘Islamic Menace’ were published in a one-year period following the 9/11 attacks” (Peek, 2011, p.6). Moreover, Gillat-Ray refers to Reddre (2009, p.140) who assumes that the large number of books published in the last few years discuss ‘Islamic Terrorism’.

Given these media and scholarly commentaries on Islam, it is evident that discussions and debates on Islam predominate in comparison to other religious groups’ representations and references. Past records of the media reporting of troublesome events show that the perpetrators’ actions were mostly associated with their beliefs. As discussed earlier, even though only a tiny minority of Catholics and Protestants were involved in terrorism, a whole sect of Christianity, i.e. Catholics, came under scrutiny. In the same manner, the acts of a few Muslim extremists and terrorists brought Islam into discussions and debates occurring in the media and academia.

According to Edward Said (1997), “After 1983, Muslims declaring their faith in Islam were everywhere in the news” (Said, 1997, p. iii). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, one can see a rise in public concern relating to ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ as a global movement that was ‘characterised by terrorist methods, anti-western rhetoric, and anti-modern, anti-liberal’, which brought ‘The Muslim Community’ into the spotlight (Vertovec, 2002, p.23).

Van Dijk (1991) uses this to examine the British tabloid press, which provided a massive amount of time and space to protesting parents, many of whom were Muslims, and in turn allocated little space to informing people about the outcome of Honeyford’s
writings that dismiss the working of multiculturalism in schools (Van Dijk, 1991, p.101). Another event, the Rushdie Affair (1985), produced an overwhelmingly negative portrayal of British Muslims. Vertovec states that ‘The Rushdie Affair’ (1989) “transformed Muslims from a law-abiding, compliant community into a volatile group” further worsening the situation in 2001 which “introduced a new dimension: Muslims now came to be widely seen as the danger within” (Vertovec, 2002, p.23). In addition, Poole (2011) argues that “The Rushdie affair was the catalyst for the struggles around identity that are currently being played out across Europe” (Poole, 2011, p.51).

Sections of the British press published pictures of protesters in cities throughout Britain, particularly in Bradford, where demonstrators burnt the book outside a police station, an incident that later became a label and a trademark of Bradford Muslims. Perhaps, for some sections of the British media, the action of Bradford Muslims was complicit. A number of scholars see the Rushdie Affair as a notable event in British history, casting suspicion on all British Muslims (Allen 2005; Modood 2010, 2012; Saeed 2007). Given the history of the media coverage of protests in Britain from the “Jarrow Crusade against poverty in 1936” to British students protesting against the rise in tuition fees in 2010 and 2012, it is evident that most sections of the press focus on the negative features of protests, rendering them sensitive and violent in their descriptions.

With regard to The Satanic Verses, whilst displaying outrage many British Muslim protestors in Bradford and other cities had forgotten the idealistic teachings of their Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) who had forgiven his worst enemies even on the battlefields, particularly on the occasion of the conquest of Makkah (Gülen, 2006; McCullough et al., 2000). Commentators across the world have different opinions on this incident; even Imran Khan, a Pakistani cricketer turned politician, famous for his liberal views, denounced the book as an “immeasurable hurt” to Muslims (The Guardian, 26 March 2012).

However, it is evident that sections of the press and politicians had portrayed the protestors as violent and a security risk to Britain based on their actions. Dominic Casiani’s explanation of the six stages of “How social media changed protest” broadcast on the BBC is perhaps the best example of the mainstream attitude and reporting of protests (9 December 2010). Besides, for some Western authors who supported
Rushdie against the actions of Muslim protestors, it was an attempt to curb free speech to which many of them adhered (see *Vanity Fair*, 29 April 2014).

Notably, for several scholars free speech in the contemporary period has become contested in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries because of its practices in different situations. This thesis will explain this concept in the following chapters but a few examples will be provided here to give an idea of how free speech has now become a controversial concept. The world has witnessed worse forms of press restriction in Iran during the tenth Iranian presidential elections whilst the same media outlets also misrepresented the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Raja, 2013, p.251-253).

Similarly, rather poorer forms of press freedom are evident in relation to the Israeli government in different periods during its assaults on the Gaza strip (Bayoumi, 2010; Nossek and Limor, 2011). Moreover, in the West, which cherishes freedom of expression, several journalists and academics have lost their jobs in the last few years for their criticism of the Israeli government, including Helen Thomas (2010) and Steven Salaita (2014). The same is true of the freedom of expression practices in some Muslim countries including Azerbaijan and Egypt. Of course these are just a few of the many examples of restricted freedom of expression in the media, while there were also occasions on which the press coverage was deemed to be irresponsible and controversial, such as the publication of photos of a semi-clad Duchess of Cambridge over which the media faced trials.

These situations allow scholars to assert that the exaggerated use of the word ‘Muslim’ in the media resembles the British media’s attitude to Jewish, Irish, Scottish, Caribbean, and Roma communities in previous decades. Modood writes that “…Muslims often remark that if in such articles either the words ‘Jew’ or ‘black’ were substituted for the word ‘Muslim’ the newspaper in question would be attacked as racist, and indeed risk legal proceedings (cited in Larsson, 2005, p. 38; Modood, 2002, p.126-127). A number of other scholars (Allen, 2010; Esposito and Lean, 2012; Malik, 2008) also endorse Modood’s notion of Muslims in the press.

In addition, McGhee (2005) believes that in the post-9/11 period in Britain there has been a shift in the “focus of bigotry from race to religion” (McGhee, 2005, p.91). After the occurrence of 9/11, scholars such as Peek have reviewed the representation of Islam and Muslims and concluded that “The Islamic faith has long been misunderstood,
misrepresented, and viewed with suspicion in the United States and throughout much of the Western World” (Peek, 2011, p.5).

An increasing number of academic studies claim that ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ came into the media spotlight in the aftermath of the New York Bombings (Brown 2010; Saeed 2007, p.443; Klausen 2009). Evidence shows that anti-Muslim feelings of hostility had existed long before the present-day problems of extremism, violence, fundamentalism and terrorism for which most sections of the Western media regularly blame ‘Islam’. Said writes, “...The idea that Islam is medieval and dangerous, as well as hostile and threatening to ‘us’, for example, has acquired a place both in culture and in polity that is very well defined…” (Said, 1997, p. iii)

This situation seems to have been steadily worsening since 2000. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed refers to Richardson’s thesis (2004) and argues that “The most significant shift in the coverage of British Muslims post 9/11 was in the association with terrorism” (Ahmed, 2012, p.27). According to Ali (2008), there is evidence of the increasing use of words such as ‘Islamic’ and ‘Islamist’ in “conjunction with the term ‘threat’” and also that “by combining the words ‘Islamic’ and ‘terrorism’ (a crime), the religion aspect has been signified as the chief factor of influence”; hence “associating ‘Islam’ with ‘terrorism’ suggests to readers that ‘Islam’ is the root cause of the problems” (Ali, 2008, p.22-33).

Such hostile reporting fuels damaged feelings among the British Muslims, who think that they have been demonised, marginalised, disintegrated, singled out, rendered outsiders and labelled a threat to the larger community. Several scholars note that the media present Muslims as ‘Others’ (Pintak, 2006, p.190; Hellyer, 2009, p.160). The worrying aspect is that ‘Islam’ has become a synonym for social ills in the media, polity, policy-making institutions and other public spheres. In the current circumstances the representation of Islam and Muslims revolves around a ‘climate of threat, fear and misunderstanding’ whereas most sections of the British press view Islam as a ‘threat to the western interests’ and its modern way of life (see Poole and Richardson, 2006; Elgamri, 2010, p.39).

This is reinforced by media campaigns such as The Sun’s cartoon published on 12 of April 2009 with the distorted headline, “Exposing Islam. University of Bombs,
Explosives, and Terrorism”, together with the caption “Isn’t Britain wonderful, giving us visas and the opportunity to improve our education?”

**Image 3:** Source (*The Sun*, 12 April 2009; Cartoonist, Tom Johnston).

This cartoon demonstrates the media’s contextualising of Islam and Muslims and the extent to which their representation has increased in recent times. Collectively, the media coverage has refreshed the 9/11 tragedy, during which American, European and other media organisations around the world have linked ‘Islam’ with terrorism and presented it as a violent and out-dated religion which has threatened secular values and Western societies’ way of life. Several recent studies have detected the growing connection of ‘Islam’ with terrorism in the media (Flood *et al.*, 2012, p.177; Miller, 2006, p.47).

Francois Debrix’s (2008) work is an interesting example of how the press takes note of official lines in covering ‘terror’ which has now been reserved for ‘Muslims’ in the post-9/11 and 7/7 era in particular. Promptly, the question arises of whether the British media have also linked other religions with terrorism.
Consider, for example, incidents such as the bombing of the King David hotel on 22 July 1946, the Oklahoma City bombings on 19 April 1995, the Norway massacre on 22 July 2011, the destruction of Babri mosque on 6 December 1992 by Hindu fundamentalists who were involved in a series of assassinations including Mohandas Karamchand Ghandi and attacks on Sikhs, and the Sikh involvement in the assassinations of Indira Gandhi in (1984) and her son Rajiv Gandhi on 21 May 1991. In none of these cases were entire religions blamed for the acts of their followers.

These illustrations are evidence that Islam and Muslims have received disproportionate coverage in the media compared to other religions. It is evident that the actions of a few violent extremists and terrorists who declared themselves to be Muslims predominate in the media files in comparison to those non-Muslim perpetrators mentioned above. Legitimately, the discussion of terrorism at present is mostly about so-called “Islamic” militants and radicals. Why, then, does Islam get a bad press? Is it because of the inhuman acts of those perpetrators in their avowal of their Islamic beliefs? Alternatively, is it because of British Muslims’ failure to demonstrate the true nature of Islam?

The most reputable surveys show that there are a disproportionate number of British Muslims in prison; for instance, the London Evening Standard report published on 28 March 2014 reveals that “27% of London’s prisoners are Muslim” although the nature of the crimes and punishments may be questionable. This means that, evidently, ethnic minorities including British Muslims receive harsh punishments for certain crimes in comparison to other members of British society (see The Guardian, 26 November 2011 and Ministry of Justice Report, October 2011).

Arguably, the fact that the remaining 73 per cent of prisoners in London are non-Muslim suggests that societal problems are not the result of people’s religious affiliations. But, in fact, the causes of wrongdoings in society have roots in economic, political, social and cultural settings. Therefore, it is unfair to link the Islamic faith with these British Muslims’ bad behaviour, assuming that their faith is responsible for their immoral acts.

Deepa Kumar (2012), at the beginning of her book, writes about how she encountered a colleague of hers on the first day after the ‘Twin Towers’ tragedy, who asked her whether she was happy about the incident. Although Kumar herself is neither Muslim nor Arab, she was forced to apologise. But she reminded him of “Timothy McVeigh and
the other Christian fundamentalists who had similarly murdered innocent people” and asked him whether he considered that “all Christians were responsible” for their acts (Kumar, 2012, p.1).

Following such incidents, the media did not hold all Christians responsible, nor did they view them as terrorists and fundamentalists. However, in the case of Muslims the apportioning of blame was selective. Here, a few questions arise: Do the media reports link ‘Muslims’ as a plural entity with troubles? Does the problem lie at the heart of the religion and its followers or inside the community? Surely, the comparison here doesn’t mean advocating one particular religion or set of people but, rather, pointing out the disparity in the media reporting that still largely exits in many ways (see Ameli et al., 2007; Moore et al., 2008; and Sian et al., 2012).

With reference to Britain and its neighbouring Western countries, it has been evident for several decades, and today, that violent and fundamentalist groups and organisations have had a long history of terrorising people through a series of bombings, poisonings, assassinations, kidnapping and torture. The members of these groups, including the Angry Brigade and the IRA in Britain, ETA in Spain, the Red Army Faction in Germany and many other organisations worldwide, are not Muslims. Robert Pape’s (2006) study is a complete guide to understanding the long history of religious and other groups of terrorists. Certainly, the purpose of including this citation is to highlight the disparity in media reporting that ties ‘Islam’ as a religion with terrorism while failing to expose several other terrorist organisations, groups and even governments.

1.9-The British Press Representation of British Muslims after 7/7:

Given the earlier explanations, it has been established that, after the 7/7 attack, the representation of British Muslims worsened to an extent that is recognisable in several studies. It important to note that, throughout history, when certain groups have been framed in a particular manner, i.e. as a threat, the end result has been more than simple discrimination; rather, it has resulted in genocide and expulsion. An example includes “The Bosnian Genocide’ during 1995 at the hands of Serbian forces at Srebrenica and Žepa. Evidently, the Muslim and Christian communities in this part of the world had lived together for centuries and were considerably well-integrated.
In that sense, it is worrying to see British Muslims collectively presented as a problem that symbolised the Jews in the recent past. Rachel North, a survivor of 7/7 and the author of ‘Out of the Tunnel’ (2007) said, “As a vicar’s daughter and a former theology student, I am asked about evil. I think the bombers were not born evil: it is because they fell into a trap of hate and despair and alienation…” (Rai, 2006).

Recalling the media coverage, it in fact recalls the discourses of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), Stanley Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972) and Stuart Hall’s The West and the Rest (1992) because of the way in which ‘Islam’ as a religion and ‘Muslims’ as its followers were tagged with terrorism. Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse (2006) suggest re-examining the “precise link between Islam and Terrorism...in order to understand” whether it happens because of “integration failure, identity crisis, and political and religious motives” (Laurence and Justin, 2006, p.245).

Reviewing various authors about the representation of British Muslims in the wake of 7/7, it appears that terrorism is a key reason for British Muslims’ bad press. The fundamental idea emerging from these scholarly references is that British Muslims have been framed in a specific manner that presents them as an internal security risk. In a way such representation is disproportionate given that only a few Muslims were involved in a major terror attack in Britain. In fact, so far non-Muslims have carried out far more terror attacks in Europe and America than Muslims have (see Hewitt, 2008; Global Research, 1 May 2013).

Bernard Lewis writes that “At no point do the basic texts of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder” while he dismisses such linkage of ‘Islam’ as a religion with terrorism (Lewis, 2003, p.30-33). In short, as a result of this terrifying event growing radicalisation and extremism have become a serious matter. Numerous notable studies have discussed the rising level of extremism in Britain after the London bombings (for example, Herrala, 2008; Cole and Cole, 2009; Curtis, 2012).

In the post-7/7 period some sections of the media continue to display what Said described as a ‘blanket approach’ toward British Muslims. Take, for example, the cases of the police shooting of a young Brazilian man, Jean Charles de Menezes, on 22 July 2005, the Forest Gate police raid and shooting on 2 June 2006, the Anti-Terror police raids on Liverpool John Moores University on the basis of ‘suspicion’ in 2009, and the
case of a ‘suspected’ Ph.D. student, Rizwan Sabir, at Nottingham University where his supervisor, Rod Thornton, also faced discrimination and suspension from his job.

In the case of Jean Charles de Menezes, the media exposed the police mistake and The Guardian in particular was explicit about the action taken by the police. The BBC also interviewed people who said that the man had been shot without offering resistance. The above example of the John Moores University students demonstrates that suspicion can damage one’s career and affect one’s personal life. This happened in the case of these students who were found not guilty in court. Later on, The Guardian and BBC investigative units, upon interviewing a number of people in remote villages in Pakistan and a few locations in Manchester, concluded that, because of the ‘terrorism’ tag, these youngsters have no future.

Poole asserts that the 7/7 “perpetrators are seen as products of a fanatical strain of Islam” because news reporting renders “any Muslim a potential terrorist” (Poole, 2002, p.4). Indeed, the way the media reporting focuses on the event suggests that perhaps the entire community is under the media spotlight (ibid). She detects the use of phrases such as “Muslim rebels”, “radical Muslims” and “Muslims and Islamic terrorists” (Poole, 2002, p.8).

At the outset, it is a valid and challenging strategy to probe the broadsheets’ reporting of the 7/7 event to determine whether the press has moved away from its attitude to reporting terrorism incidents. The broadsheet press narrative of 7/7 also helps to reveal any pertinent shift in the patterns of reporting on British Muslims and sheds light on whether or not the press can bind a fragmented society afflicted by terrorism.

1.10-Chapters Overview:

Based on previous and more recent studies, this thesis assumes that since the 7/7 terror attacks the media representations of British Muslims are still categorised as mistrusted. Given the current circumstances, it is essential to ask this fundamental question: In what ways did the British press represent British Muslims in the wake of 7/7 and what has been their impact? In the subsequent chapters, consideration of this question is intertwined with logical explanations of the 7/7 press reporting. The thesis also provides evidence that the press is not alone in producing a misleading, distorting
or unconstructive image of British Muslims but in fact works with the four “P’s” (press, politicians, police and public bodies) as described earlier in this chapter.

In brief, this thesis comprises three sections and nine chapters; these are knotted together through theoretical concepts and philosophies and are chronologically arranged. The second chapter sets the scene by presenting The Guardian’s and The Daily Telegraph’s immediate responses to the event and how these newspapers reported it the following day. The literature review, chapter three, presents the structure of the debate and the views of major thinkers in the field of media and the representations of Islam and Muslims. Admittedly, the study of Islam and Muslims in the context of terrorism is a vast field of academic inquiry in the contemporary period; therefore, the literature review takes into account mainstream theoretical frameworks but also consults different traditional and contemporary approaches in the following sections of this thesis.

The methodology chapter provides details of established conceptual approaches, data collection techniques, the coding scheme and the rationale for using inductive reasoning and thematic analysis. An inductive reasoning begins with a specific set of observations and is considered free of the researcher’s personal influence. Next, the discussion and analysis section, comprising chapters five, six and seven, details the emergence of three key themes in the dataset. Furthermore, these themes are reflective of contextual debates as well as the original findings of the dataset. In the third section, chapter eight provides a justification of the theoretical framework of moral panic and its relevance, significance and criticism. Finally, the last chapter sets out the conclusions and implications of the findings for news organisations and news production values. This thesis intends to argue that news events such as 7/7 are often reported in a way that suggest that news is a somewhat “constructed reality”. Moreover, the media reporting is reflective of a power nexus including politicians, police and public bodies.

The incident of the London Bombings on 7 July 2005 took 52 innocent lives and is considered one of the saddest moments in the history of multicultural Britain. Three of the four perpetrators, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain, were born and raised in Britain and had cherished all their privileges and opportunities, like their fellow British citizens, such as education, health, wellbeing and work. The fourth bomber, Germaine Lindsay, had been born in Jamaica and was a Christian convert to Islam.

Instantly, the event gained global attention, and only a few days later international media teams landed in Leeds in the North of England to cover the story. In search of thrilling stories, journalists and reporters of leading media organisations visited every street in the Beeston area, which became known as a “hotbed of terrorism”. Several narratives of those suicide bombers emerged along with the reasons for the attacks. Some viewed the incident as a reaction to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq whilst other rushed to associate it with Islamic ideology.

It became a watershed moment for British Muslims, who were starting to be seen as a potential threat and ‘enemy within’. A decade has passed but 7/7 remains a significant topic of academic inquiry that authors are still investigating in the search for answers to a series of questions: What was the driving force behind the London bombers? Were they reacting to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq or were they inspired by a religious ideology? This chapter sets the scene for broader discussions surrounding the press reporting of British Muslims with reference to 7/7. It contextualises and explains The Guardian’s and The Daily Telegraph’s interpretations of the event. It argues that the media reporting of the London bombings shows that the news is a “constructed reality” and that it makes certain similar events more newsworthy than others. The following sections present an analysis of the 7/7 reporting to provide a basis for the subsequent chapters.
2.1-The Making of the Term ‘7/7’:

The term ‘7/7’ is a shortened form of the 7 July 2005 London Bombings, sometimes also referred to as ‘Seven-Seven’ and ‘July seventh’ (Truth Campaign, 2005). The London bombings quickly became known as 7/7, just as the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001 became known as 9/11, marking it as a memorable event in history (see Seidler, 2007). On a deeper level, I would suggest that the term ‘7/7’ signifies Britain and America’s shared victimhood. Further, the similar numeric emblems reflect the American and British alliance established to fight a global ‘war on terror’.

Britain has long been a target of terrorists, extremists and trouble-makers in different periods of its history. In particular, the month of July carries extraordinary importance because soon after 7/7 came the 21/7 plot. Previously, on 22 July 1946, Irgun terrorists blew up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing 91 people and injuring 46 (Hoffman, 2011, p.261-264). In addition, the Bradford riots occurred on 7 July 2001. The term had previously been used to describe the second Sino-Japanese War (1937/1945) - the “Incident of July 7” - suggesting that certain events are more newsworthy, significant and political than others.

Long before the 9/11 attacks, on Tuesday 11 September 1973, Chile’s Presidential Palace was bombed, resulting in the “suicide of President Salvador Allende and ultimately the death or disappearance of over three thousand people” and producing a turning point in the Cold War (Gómez-Barris, 2010, p.235; Stern, 2006, p.29). Arguably, both names - 9/11 and 7/7 - indicate the power and influence of America and Britain as leading nations of the world. These resemblances are unique and display the political alliance between these two nations, presenting them as victims and providing them with reasons to expand their political leverage. According to Igor Primoratz (2013), 9/11 was described as the “Worst case of terrorism ever” whilst 7/7 is described as a “worst-case terrorism scenario” (Howie, 2012; Walker, 2011). Describing all terrorism as morally wrong, Primoratz also recalled the night of July 27-8, 1943, when the RAF operation “Firestorm Raid” on Hamburg killed 40,000 civilians (Primoratz, 2013).

From a philosophical viewpoint, this shows the difference between an occasion when a powerful nation comes under attack, when it is described as the “worst”, and when others are attacked, when it is either ignored or presented as self-defence. This raises a fundamental question about the value of human life and whether all lives are equal.
John McGowan (2012) writes: “The standard of progress, of civilization, not only justifies violence but offers a metric by which to determine which lives are ‘more precious’ than others” (McGowan, 2012, p.53). For argument’s sake, if British foreign policy is to be blamed for these attacks, they would surely have happened much earlier because the perpetrators of 7/7 were born to parents of Kashmiri origin, a disputed territory whose inhabitants have been prevented from exercising their right to self-determination since 1948.

Surely, the Kashmir issue has direct links with British foreign policy and politics; hence, one may ask why the perpetrators used the Iraq connection rather than Kashmir. And what is the manifestation of these two expressions, 9/11 and 7/7? Are they describing an unending conflict? After closely reviewing the 7/7 event and its overall effects on British society, Steve Hewitt (2008) concludes that,

While 7/7 demonstrated the danger of terrorism to the UK, the refusal of the government to hold a proper independent inquiry is damaging to British counter-terrorism. Successful counter-terrorism in a democratic society requires trust and confidence in the efficacy of security forces because public cooperation is essential (Hewitt, 2008, p.106).

Undoubtedly, on 7 July London witnessed the worst form of “terror” since the IRA campaign that had shaken Londoners for years. It will be remembered as one of the saddest moments in the history of multicultural Britain and remains a significant event because of its timing, global transmission and newsworthiness (Aitchison, 2006; Borenstein, 2009). In the BBC Radio 4 documentary “The Summer that Changed London” (2010) Mehdi Hasan argued that it “had a much greater impact on Muslim/non-Muslim relations in this country than the 11 September attacks in the United States”.

Drawing upon the above narratives of 7/7, a leading debate appears to centre on the bombings’ long-term impact on British Muslims, particularly Londoners, who had witnessed long terror campaigns by the IRA. Another significant aspect in most writings concerns how an incident not only changed the political landscape of Britain’s capital but also acts as a reminder that the British government should perhaps revisit its foreign policy.
Considering major polls conducted by ‘YouGov’ and ‘Gallup Survey’ and newspaper articles, Hasan described the impact of 7/7 on British Muslims as causing “fear, anxiety and bad press” (New Statesman, 9 July 2010). Consequently, it became a watershed moment for British Muslims who started to be seen as a potential threat and the enemy within. Ever since the events of 7/7, scores of newspaper and journal articles, radio and television commentaries, live talk shows and academic literature have discussed the reasons for them and the implications for and long-term effects on British society. There is an increasing amount of discussion of the media’s role in defining and shaping any event. Van Dijk (1988) says that “An event thus analysed is represented as a model in episodic memory. Such a model features the dominant actions or events, participants, time and location, circumstances, relevant objects, or instruments of action, organised in a hierarchical structure” (Van Dijk, 1987b and 1988, p.111).

Later on, Van Dijk (2006) explains the event using several illustrations such as 9/11, which is used as an ‘emotional event’, the term’s constant repetition reminding the public of the existence of “Us” (good, innocent) and “Them” (evil, guilty) (Van Dijk, 2006, p.370). To him, whether any event is newsworthy depends on the system of news values of journalists and their organisations; if the event satisfies the settled criteria, it becomes a high-value event (Van Dijk, 1988, p.111). This view is also shared by McNair (2006, p. 39-68).

These authors’ explanations reveal significant aspects of the news process in which media report, construct and present certain events as more emotional, significant and newsworthy than other events of similar magnitude such as the terrorist attacks. These authors’ viewpoint seems to be true particularly when comparing similar terrorist attacks in one country with the other. Looking at the media coverage of the Paris terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015 and the Beirut terrorist attack on 15 November 2015, it is evident that Paris received far greater coverage to the extent that mainstream Western newspapers published editorials and Facebook offered a France flag profile picture but disregarded a Lebanon flag profile picture (see Metro, 15 November 2015).

Van Dijk (1977) finds a close link between the identification and description of any event and believes that the representation of an event also depends on the conventional means of language through which we present and view it (Van Dijk, 1977, p.169). Thus, the descriptions of the same event, 7/7, in The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian have
notable differences from the initial reporting although the presentation style had a few similarities. Another important feature that emerged from the reporting is the use of different words and phrases and the selection of quotes from similar press briefings and speeches of high-ranking politicians, particularly Prime Minister Blair’s statements.

2.2-A Typical Day and the Press Reporting:

On that fateful day, 7 July, Londoners were contented as their city had been selected for the 2012 summer Olympic Games after overcoming Moscow, New York City, Madrid, and Paris, which were also bidding for the same honour. In addition, the UK was hosting the G8 summit of the world’s most powerful industrial nations at Gleneagles. At this historic moment, the atrocities of 7 July sent shockwaves worldwide, especially since Britain appeared to have been stabbed in the back. Worryingly, the perpetrators were not outsiders but British Muslims born and raised in Yorkshire.

Within seconds, the incident received massive media coverage worldwide, not only on TV screens and radio but also in newspapers, websites and blogs, including social networking sites and chat forums, facilitated by ordinary people on the spot with camera phones and other forms of communication. Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reacted promptly by providing minute-by-minute updates to their readers, viewers, and listeners on their websites using new media technologies such as video, blogs and podcasts. This section provides a description of the way the press headlines and leading contents of the instant reports determined the main topic. At the same time, it also offers an analysis of fragments of the same news stories to ascertain the ways in which the two newspapers reported the incident and portrayed Islam and Muslims.

It also scrutinises the follow-up commentaries on 8 July in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, beginning with their front pages. The front page holds a distinctive position in a newspaper and is reserved for a lead story (Fowler, 1991, p.71). Front-page headlines also have an extraordinary effect in shaping public opinion of the event (Page et al., 1987). Ideally, the comparison of front-page headlines and leads should also reflect the overall pattern of the story and its importance in the newspaper. Furthermore, for a schematic analysis of newspaper text, the headline is one of the “most obvious initial categories of news” (Van Dijk, 1983, p.242).

The Guardian’s front page carried Ian McEwan’s column in G2 that read: “How could we have forgotten that this was always going to happen? We have been savagely woken
from a pleasant dream”. Underneath the title are three bullet points: “at least 38 dead; 700 injured; Al-Qaida cell claims responsibility”; meanwhile, the main headline reads ‘London’s day of terror’ coupled with a picture of a ripped open double-decker bus.

Overall, the story runs to twenty pages of coverage including the sports page which carries a piece headed “Gruesome timing” featuring London’s winning Olympic bid. The reporting includes statements, news, comments and photographs of victims on various pages and a picture of a blackened body on a stretcher. On page three, The Guardian published an iconic photograph of a woman (see Image 4) whose face was covered by a white protective mask being helped by an unknown white male; this image latterly appeared in all the major British newspapers including on the front page of The Daily Telegraph.

Image 4: This iconic image corresponds to media selectivity: “Ideal victims” and “Newsworthiness” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2005, also see Chris Greer, 2007, p.22).
This shows how different newspapers with dissimilar editorial policies published the same picture and made it into an icon. So, who decides and controls the editor? Is it newspapers themselves or external powers? It emerged in most academic studies that the man caught up in the Edgware Road blast giving a kind hand to the woman was Paul Dadge, who became an iconic figure in the British media (Lerenzo-Dus and Bryan, 2011, p. 281). Importantly, the appearance of his iconic picture spontaneously in all newspapers including *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Guardian* testifies to the notion of news values (Fuller, 1996; Bell, 1991; Hartley, 2013).

Of course there is nothing wrong with the press publishing pictures of injured people. However, the point is that the same iconic picture in almost all newspapers’ front and inner pages suggests that perhaps the victims were all non-Muslims and white people. Certainly, the injured and dead men and women were of various races and religions including Muslims. Thus, arguably, this iconic picture sends a powerful emotional message to readers of both broadsheets that non-Muslims and whites were the prime targets. Another example of news values appears in both newspapers using similar iconic pictures of Paul Dadge and the word “terror” in their main headlines and “Attack on London” (*The Guardian*) and “Terrorism in London” (*The Daily Telegraph*) in their banners, reflecting their attitude towards the issues.

In comparison, The Daily Telegraph’s main headline read: ‘Al-Qa’eda brings terror to the heart of London’. It carries an iconic picture of an injured white woman in a protective white mask being helped by a white security man or an unknown member of a rescue team.
Other than this, a notable feature of the reporting became visible in the traditional rivalry between these two newspapers. Later on, in one of its leading reports about 7/7 The Guardian ran a story about The Daily Telegraph, showing how it elevated David Cameron in importance in the 7/7 event and, thus, showed less patriotism, as can be seen in the headline and clip below: ‘Big news: the Telegraph’s ‘Cameron, PM’ headline in perspective: Britain’s biggest-selling broadsheet greeted Conservatives’ return to government with a two-inch-high shout of joy. So how far out of the ordinary is that?’

In this illustration, The Guardian compared The Daily Telegraph’s front pages on 7/7 and other significant occasions. It shows that David Cameron received a two-inch headline that was larger than the headline for 7/7 when the whole nation grieved. It further
states: “Cameron is bigger than the 7 July 2005 London bombings, back towards the beginning of headline inflation at the paper” (The Guardian, 12 May, 2010). Thus, the images that The Guardian uses in this article also display the importance of headlines in the newspapers (Jackson, 1942, p.75; Casey Ronan, 2014).

One key difference in both headlines is in the spellings used for “Al-Qa’eda” and “Al-Qaida”, a terrorist organisation that was also supposedly behind all major attacks such as 9/11 and the Madrid train bombings. There were also differences in key information, such as 37 dead vs. 38 dead and 700 vs. 300 injured. It is inevitable that the figures will keep changing in these situations but it also shows the newspaper reporters’ competence in acquiring up-to-date information.

In the Arabic language, as in other languages, words change their meanings according to the pronunciation of the same letters. For example, in the two different spellings the first suggests “principle” while the second means “foundation”. Hence, one refers to “ideology” that indirectly linked Islam with terror. Again, these possible spelling
mistakes suggest that newspapers editors’ ability and knowledge of significant subjects can lead to the misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims. In comparison, the word “foundation” is less suggestive in the sense that any organisation has a foundation/base which might consist of its key aims, monetary policies and so forth. Another important feature that emerged from the reporting is the use of different words and phrases and the selection of quotes from similar press briefings and speeches of high-ranking politicians, particularly Prime Minister Blair’s statements.

2.3- The Guardian’s Reporting of that Particular Moment on the 7th of July:

Soon after the terrible explosions on 7 July, The Guardian began to report the incident on its website (The Guardian, 2005). The first news item emerged at around 11.03am and then continued until 9:54pm bringing minute-by-minute updates to its readers and listeners worldwide. During approximately ten hours of news transmission on the event, The Guardian focused mainly on eyewitness accounts, emergency team activities, casualties, victims, hospitals and ambulance services, and security developments after the incident, particularly further threats.

In other words, it concentrated on aspects of the event such as rage, hope, causation, calm and tolerance within the communities and human values in terms of victims including the dead and injured and the safety of the members of the rescue teams. This particular incident was significant because of its timeline; for example, just the day before 7 July, London had won the Olympic bid, and on the day of the event London’s anti-terrorist “A Team” was busy at the G-8 summit in Gleneagles in Scotland (The Guardian, 7 July, 2005). At this time of anguish and resentment it is important to note that The Guardian not only adopted a healing strategy but also tried to avoid spreading any sort of anger or incitement even in the words of sources such as political or ordinary people on the ground. For instance, at 4:35 pm it cautioned British Muslims by publishing a headline “Muslims urged to stay indoors” (ibid).

2.4- The Daily Telegraph’s Reporting of that Particular Moment on the 7th July:

Throughout that particular day, The Daily Telegraph provided minute-by-minute coverage (The Daily Telegraph, 2005). In total, it published 38 news clips that covered the whole day’s activities and developments from 8:51am to 9:08pm on its website. It is feasible to divide the reporting into sets in order to examine the headlines and leaders
that form a major category in the summary and help to identify topics (Van Dijk, 1997). These classifications of news items also enable us to recognise the sources from which the newspaper derived its news.

Normally, newspapers’ reports come from their own reporters but at this particular event most reports originated from government officials, politicians, clergymen and activists, possibly because the unexpected attack on the heart of London shook the government and the entire community including businesses and the public. Given Van Dijk’s (1977) assumption, the headlines are not simple sentences but in fact represent information in “fact ordering and sequence ordering”, which means that sentences denote facts and therefore a “sequence of sentences would denote sequence of facts” (Van Dijk, 1977, p. 103).

• ‘Terrorism has hit Europe once again’ at 9:20 am on 07 July 2005

In this story *The Daily Telegraph* cited Tony Blair and George Bush, thereby reflecting the importance of the alliance in terms of *The Daily Telegraph*’s own political orientation. In the leading paragraph it stated: “Tony Blair condemned the “barbaric attacks”… “whatever they [the terrorists] do it is our determination that they will never succeed in destroying what we hold dear in this country and other civilised nations in the world” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 7 July 2005). It also cited George W Bush: “The contrast could not be clearer about the intentions and hearts of those who care about human rights and liberty…The war on terror goes on. I was impressed with the resolve of the people here. We will spread the ideology of hope and compassion.” (ibid.)

At this moment, *The Daily Telegraph* carefully chose its words and stressed those sentences within the broader words of the Prime Minister and other high-ranking officials. For example, the term “civilised nation” itself clearly draws a line between “The West” (as Civilised) and “The Rest” (as Uncivilised and Barbaric)” (Said, 1997; Hall, 1987). Notably, the Bush and Blair nexus was a prominent feature in *The Daily Telegraph* reporting in comparison to *The Guardian*, which avoided this connection.

• “Blair: ‘they will never succeed’” (12:19pm).

• “The Prime Minister says it is ‘reasonably clear’ that the explosions were the result of terrorism” (12.10pm.)
• “Mr. Blair reads a joint statement from G8 leaders saying it was ‘not an attack on one nation but on all nations’” (1.07pm).

• “At Downing Street, Mr Blair promises the ‘most intense police and security service action to make sure we bring those responsible to justice’” (5.33pm).

• “Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary, says attacks bear the hallmarks of al-Qa’eda” (7.39pm).

2.5-The Next Day Reporting of the London Bombings in The Daily Telegraph:

On its website archives, The Daily Telegraph published 75 news clippings underneath News banner, 47 of which were closely linked with the 7/7 event (The Daily Telegraph, 2005). In other words, in order to obtain the percentage of the news relating to the 7/7 event, I apply the mathematical equation (75-47=28); 28 were irrelevant and therefore (47/75=0.626*100=63%). For the purpose of a thematic analysis of all news clippings (headlines and leads), this forms one of the most important categories (Summary) in the semantics of Van Dijk’s model, as already demonstrated above in this chapter. The key topics reported in The Daily Telegraph on 8th of July 2005 included the following:

• Prime Minister Tony Blair  (seven headlines with one indirect)

• Faith Leaders (Pope and Archbishop of Canterbury)

• Muslim leaders (two indirect references in the headlines)

• Government Officials (Home Secretary and Lord Mayor of London)

• Al-Qaeda (three direct references and one indirect reference in headlines)

• Terror/terrorist/terrorism (3/3/1), all direct mentions.

• Bombers/Bombing (six altogether in this topic)

• Security/Law enforcement agencies (no direct reference in headlines)

• Radical groups  (no direct reference in headlines)

• Links (Madrid and New York attacks)

The remaining headlines and leads carry various important topics such as security situation, emergency services, hospitals, London Transport, banks, future strategies, the level of threat of a similar kind, radical organisations and their networking on British soil, possible links to international terrorist organisations and political events; these
constituted the fundamental aspects of the reporting. Most importantly, the solidarity and reassurance messages to Britain from its counterparts in Europe were notable features of the reporting. In this regard, considerable space was allocated to G8 leaders, American and European dignitaries who pledged to fight against terrorism together. Almost all material relating to foreign dignitaries, officials and local notables and the strength, power and distinguished status of Britain became prominent aspects of the reports.

Distinctively, most main headlines followed sub-headings in *The Daily Telegraph*, especially in the mentions of Blair: “Britain will not be cowed by terrorists, vows Blair; Islamist terrorists were blamed for the London blasts by Tony Blair last night. He insisted that Britain would not be “cowed” by the worst terrorist atrocities in the capital; Blair flies back from a suddenly subdued Gleneagles; G8 not derailed by terror, says Blair; and we cannot stop these attacks, says Blair”. Each article carried Blair’s intention and promise to bring those responsible to justice and showed how he received support from his close ally George W. Bush on the issue that they saw as an attack to undermine their commitment to the fight against terror, for which they held al-Qaeda responsible. This was perhaps to be expected as, in times of crisis, nations usually look to their leaders. Consider a few lines from one of these articles:

Those responsible have no respect for human life. We are united in our resolve to confront and defeat this terrorism that is not an attack on one nation but on all nations and on civilised people everywhere. We will not allow violence to change our society or our values.”; Mr Blair promised “the most intense police and security service action to make sure that we bring those responsible to justice”; and Two days after London bombs killed 49 and injured 700, Tony Blair has said that “all the surveillance in the world” cannot prevent determined terrorists from attacking Britain (*The Daily Telegraph*, 8 July 2005).

Such an assessment indicates that, despite the government’s pledge to adopt the best security measures to avoid further attacks, they were unable to guarantee their ability to halt any determined terrorists targeting Britain again. In other words, the terrorism threat would remain and public safety would remain the government’s priority. In
comparison to *The Guardian*, these citations indicate that both the government and *The Daily Telegraph* were ignoring the Iraq connection and were perhaps ‘on the same page’. Another important feature of *The Daily Telegraph*’s reporting the next day suggests an over-mentioning of al-Qaeda:

Al-Qa’eda link hides multitude of suspects. Who was responsible? Reports that a group linked to al-Qa’eda was claiming responsibility for the London bombings tells us very little. There are many fundamentalist organisations that fly under Osama bin Laden’s flag of convenience and some of them have bases or offshoots in London; Al Qa’eda brings terror to the heart of London (Front Page Headline on 8 July 2005).

This article quotes Jack Straw, stating that the explosions “bore all the hallmarks” of al-Qa’eda. Another article states: *Hydra-like terror cells a problem for MI5 war on al-Qa’eda*. This quote suggests that it is certain that al-Qa’eda was responsible for the 7/7 attacks. This terrorist organisation has posed a tough challenge to security agencies because it not only has the tendency to further develop but it also operates secretly. The activities of such organisations are rather hard to predict, particularly when they function and exist in the form of multiple units.

### 2.6-The Next Day Reporting of the London Bombings in *The Guardian*:

The next day, follow-up coverage in *The Guardian* determined the social and political attitude of the British government, media and the general public to the incident. More importantly, it also suggested *The Guardian*’s own political standpoint on the event; i.e. it was the outcome of the government’s foreign policy. For example, it published a news clip: “Group linked to al-Qaida cites UK’s Iraq actions” (*The Guardian*, 8 July 2005). Overall, *The Guardian* published a total of 73 news items together with 69 stories related to 7/7 including a double-page spread on pages four and five that could be found at its website (*The Guardian*, 8 July 2005).

Hence, the total number of stories might be calculated as follows: 69/75=92*100=92%). Like *The Daily Telegraph*, the main themes appearing in the *Guardian* were terrorism, security threat, and the government’s action in dealing with the problem. Alongside these broad themes, it also discussed and shaped the debate around a range of topics including the following: “From Olympic jubilation to bafflement and horror: First the
shock and then a strange, quiet kind of chaos took over London streets”; “Stay off work if you can: Met's plea as tube restoration gets under way”; “Companies shut down early as post and deliveries are hit: Banks close and Royal Mail unable to move vans.

“Tens of thousands of workers were sent home early last night as shops and businesses across the capital closed - or failed to open at all - after the terrorist attacks”; “Emergency plan and call surge hit phones...”; “As a mark of respect, the shows won't go on: Theatre, pop concerts and Olympic bid celebrations called off, but war anniversary events will go ahead”; “Emergency powers help tackle chaos: Ministers take charge of response teams”; “Hospitals clear decks for victims: Major incident alert declared”; “Blair’s careful plans end in painful dilemma”; and “Met chief tells of readiness for attacks ... minutes later, the news broke: London anti-terror is ‘envy of world’”. In all these reports the key message is visible in terms of the following main themes and topics: backlash, consequences, government failure to detect and stop the attack, and in particular its foreign policy.

The above reporting describes a panic situation in which government agencies; public and private organisations were all trying to restore the situation and were determined to prevent any further incidents. Normally, in tense situations such as 7/7, the public needs support and reassurance that the aftershocks and reactions will not worsen the circumstances. Evidently, this is what The Guardian accomplished through its reporting that was largely aimed at calming the state of affairs.

2.7-Conclusion:

According to the reporting of both broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, on the 7/7 event, it emerged that the British way of life and its internal security were now at risk. Moreover, the terrorism threat in the form of al-Qaeda would continue to exist in the years to come because of the operational nature of this terrorist organisation. Nevertheless, both newspapers rarely mentioned the emergence of al-Qaeda and its leadership connections with some Western governments, particularly the United States of America. Probably because of the overplaying of the al-Qaeda leadership and the perpetrators' own religious interpretations and views, the overall event became more religious than political in its formulation. In addition, both newspapers' reporting embraced the expression '7/7' which rendered the event
significant, emotional and historic. Both broadsheets clearly stated that it was an attack on all liberal and democratic societies, not just Britain.

Overall, the particular moment of 7/7 and the subsequent reactions to and interpretations of the London Bombing incident in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph mirror Stanley Cohen’s (1972) concept of “Folk Devils and Moral Panics”, which basically argues that certain groups are defined and presented as threats to societal norms and interests. The overall reporting illustrations include warnings of further attacks and an iconic photo of a masked woman that is perhaps indirectly suggestive of a chemical or biological attack. Furthermore, the statements of politicians, particularly Blair and Bush, show that this home-grown security threat will be prolonged. Evidently, certain topics such as British foreign policy, the Iraq war, radicalisation, terrorist networks, al-Qaeda and the security system receive more space and attention.

Moreover, the interpretation of the event in terms of identifying the groups or organisations responsible for the attack suggests that The Guardian was more cautious about its professional ethics. Considering The Guardian's reporting, it also appears to have used several examples to demonstrate that its competitor The Daily Telegraph was less patriotic. In short, the initial reporting shows the distinct policies of the two newspapers; for example, The Guardian emphasised the Iraq connection and quoted several academics, politicians, activists and peers to validate its point. On the other hand, The Daily Telegraph insisted that the incident was a result of religious ideology and problems among British Muslims such as extremism and radicalisation. Both broadsheets raised questions over the security failure that further added to public fears of terrorists.
Chapter 3: Literature Review:

3.1-Introduction:

Ever since the *Satanic Verses* (1989) issue, British Muslims in particular have been the centre of attention in the British media, possibly because a number of national and international cases of terrorism and violence that have occurred in the past two decades have involved a few Muslims. At present, most of the literature on the representation of Muslims focuses upon a number of themes such as identity, integration, radicalisation, extremism, Islamophobia and terrorism. In addition, the existing literature on Muslims enquires into the reasons why terrorism is constructed as “Islamic” and whether Muslims’ representation in the context of 7/7 is equal to that of Catholics?

This aim of this chapter is to provide a narrative of established discourses surrounding Muslims and the way this thesis has placed itself within these established discourses. This chapter reviews earlier and recent studies relating to the representations of Islam and Muslims. It also shows the structure of past and recent debates on the topic. It incorporates the views of three main thinkers - Edward Said, Stuart Hall and Stanley Cohen - whose ideas are appropriate to and essential for an examination of Muslims’ representation in the media. Said’s study, *Orientalism* (1978), mainly focuses on the “Orient” as a distant land in the Middle East that is predominantly Muslim. It is evident that Said’s work is still relevant to the study of the representation of Muslims in the media. In addition, the news discourse is a central element for an understanding of the representation of Islam and Muslims.

One of the essential features of the news discourse is that it discusses the factors that lead to the production of racist news. Therefore, this thesis examines the process of news production, consumption and dissemination. Lastly, it intends to integrate Cohen’s concept of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’ and its relationship with the media representations of Muslims, particularly in the wake of 7/7, and also whether the media are responsible for stigmatising and stereotyping Muslims.

Obviously, prejudice against Muslims is a well-established fact but it was not as serious as it became in 1996 after the Runnymede Trust report suggested the expression ‘Islamophobia’ in Britain, which became a widely recognised term. During the 1980s
and 1990s, a number of events, some of which were discussed earlier, such as the Iranian revolution (1979) and The Gulf War (1991), led to an increase in problematic images of Muslims in the media as well as a rise in harassment, verbal abuse and hatred of Muslims in some sections of society. This situation raised concerns among a number of British Muslim campaigning organisations such as “MuslimWise” and “An-Nisa Society” that eventually brought the term ‘Islamophobia’ into the mainstream (see Richardson, 2012).

The following year, Said published his study on the media portrayal of Islam and Muslims, which provided a basis for understanding Islam and Muslims’ media representation. Forty years ago, the issues were rooted in the cultural clash; now they are rooted in radicalisation and terrorism. Moreover, at that time, the conflict did not involve a security threat although the divide between the secular West and the Islamic world was apparent in various writings. Muslims were far behind in terms of science and technology and the essence of democracy but now the world has changed considerably. Since then, a number of important studies have been published including those by Baker et al. (2013), Poole and Richardson (2004), and Petley and Richardson (2011).

Indeed, media study is a complex and sometimes sensitive subject of inquiry. Thus, on the one hand, in talk about the media in public places, private discussions or even in academic debates we often hear such views as ‘The media are biased’, ‘They misinform and misguide people’, ‘They fabricate stories’, ‘The media sensationalise issues’, ‘I don’t trust the media’, ‘They are a government mouthpiece’, ‘Media are controlled by political and business elites’, ‘The media give more time to celebrities’, and ‘Minorities are excluded from mainstream media’ (Philo et al., 1982; Rosenblum, 1993; Seymour-Ure, 1996).

Conversely, discussions and debates on Muslims generate somewhat similar clichés: ‘Muslims are violent’, ‘they are backwards’, ‘they don’t pay tax’, ‘they are not law-abiding citizens’, ‘they live in ghettos and don’t want to integrate’, ‘they are a migraine’, ‘they want to bring Sharia to Britain’, and so forth. The following sections discuss and debate the topic integrating established theoretical concepts relating to the media and representations of Muslims and Islam.
It is also important to note that, within the field of media, from early historians to modern-day critics and theorists, media studies remain an important field of inquiry. Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm’s *Four Theories of the Press* (1956) offer a critical analysis that informs us of the historic roots and workings of the press in different political and social structures such as the following: The authoritarian theory; libertarian theory; social responsibility theory; and the Soviet communist theory (Siebert *et al.*, 1956, p.1-7).

Other popular traditions of media representation include the widely documented framing theory (Bateson, 1955; Fairhurst and Sarr, 1996; Goffman, 1974) and Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s *Propaganda Model* (1988) which discusses the systematic bias in the news construction. However, this thesis considers news discourse, *Orientalism* and the concepts of folk devils and moral panics.

### 3.2-News Discourse: Discrimination and Racism:

News media have become a significant component of our daily information diet; for example, 24/7 news bulletins, be they early morning breakfast or evening dinner ‘news’, are a special dish on our information menu. Hence, the role and significance of the media in social, cultural, economic and political spheres is unavoidable (Curran, 2002; Freedman, 2008; Tunstall, 1983). Overall, media studies present a complex picture suggesting that the media both inform and misinform the public.

Wickham Steed (1938) writes that “Newspapers exist to get and give news. How they get it. It is an intricate story. What they do with it when they have got it is another story” (Steed, 1938, p.23). In an early study Lippmann (1921) argues, “Every newspaper when it reaches the reader is the result of a whole series of selections as to what items shall be printed... There are no objective standards here. There are conventions” (Lipmann, 1921, p.328).

Almost a century later, similar issues lie at the heart of academic debates about the media. This does not mean that media have not developed since then; rather, the way in which news is produced still follows somewhat similar practices to those highlighted by Lippman in the last century. Indeed, the power and influence of news in the age of advanced technology is far greater and is capable of promoting peace and harmony and informing people; at the same time, it fuels differences and becomes a cause of conflict.
Evidence shows that news also contributes to racism, which has long been recognised. A number of studies have found that media attitudes to ethnic minorities have reached the point of racism (Allen and Seaton, 1999; Entman, 1992; Spencer, 2014). Don Heider (2014) raises the point that racism is perhaps felt in the news more because newsrooms are less multi-ethnic and are dominated, in his view, by white journalists who talk about others.

This state of affairs makes “News” a complex and multi-layered phenomenon. Almost all major media studies agree that “News” is a product of social, political, economic and cultural factors. The production of “News” entails institutional polices that also sustain political and governmental bodies, pressure groups and other organisational pressures and controls. For Montgomery, the “News” means “New information of most recent events,” and it “constructs a taken-for-granted world of others, of ‘them’, of people whom we do not expect to encounter as part of our daily life, in places where we are not. But they are second-order realities,” (Montgomery, 2007, p.4-5).

He cites Hall (1981, p.234) who argues that “Journalists speak of the news as if events select themselves...yet [of] millions of events which occur every day in the world, only a tiny proportion ever become visible as ‘potential news stories’: and of this proportion, only a small fraction are actually produced as the day’s news in the news media” (cited in Montgomery, 2007, p.5). He refers to Galtung and Ruge (1965a and 1965b), who state that “negative events tend to unfold more quickly than positive events and that the meaning of negative events is more emotionally charged, more clear-cut, less ambiguous” (ibid, p.8). Montgomery gives the examples of 9/11, the Iraq War, and other related incidents to argue that the news media spent more time on these incidents and paid less attention to positive events (ibid, p.8).

A contrasting study was carried out by Machin and Mayr (2008) to investigate The Leicester Mercury, a newspaper which promoted community cohesion in Leicester by practising specific polices such as avoiding “sensitive” issues. This study is important because it presents a constructive role of The Leicester Mercury in bringing together people of different races, faiths and ethnicities. These authors explain that this newspaper’s editorial policy of promoting mutual respect and understanding in a multi-ethnic city might provide a useful example to promote community cohesion in other
British towns and cities. This example is significant in the current period because studies that accuse the media of fomenting conflict and divide among communities outnumber those that find positive elements.

Drawing on both earlier and recent studies, this thesis acknowledges that the way in which the British press represents British Muslims and Islam has become Islamophobic; indeed, scholars coined a new term, “Islamophobia”, back in the 1990s (*Runnymede Trust, 1997*) to describe anti-Muslim or anti-Islam hatred. Evidence shows that white people are the dominant group within the British media and have more editorial power and influence in the process of news production (Ainley, 1998; Cottle, 2000). Although Muslims are the second largest group after Christians in Britain, they are still underrepresented in the media and, hence, ignorance of Islam continues to be a major source of bad press.

Van Dijk (1993) assumes “racism as a form of dominance” and believes that white people are the dominant group in the West, possessing social, economic and political power (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 21). He emphasises the “discursive reproduction” of racism and the role of text and talk in this process. He argues that “genres” and “communicative events”, such as “everyday conversation, institutional dialogues, news reports, editorials, advertisements, novels, films, text books, lessons, laws, political propaganda…”, all play a vital role in the reproduction of racism (ibid, p. 28).

Drawing on 65 previous studies, Van Dijk demonstrates that the way the British press represents ethnic minorities is mostly negative (ibid., p. 241). On the same subject, Machin and Mayr’s study incorporates various research projects such as those by Hartman and Husband (1974), Murdock (1984), McLaughlin (1999) and Van Dijk (1999) and also finds that ethnic minorities “were mainly represented in association with crime, violence, social welfare and problematic immigration” (Machin and Mayr, 2008, p.91).

Overall, news remains a focal point of discussion in this thesis because of its eminent role in eliminating social problems as well as being a source of social conflicts. Wodak, (2011) considers previous studies (Fairclough, 1989; Chilton, 2004; Wodak, 2009) and finds that the way in which specific terms and words are used to describe certain sets of people, for example ‘asylum seeker’, ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’, shows an interchangeable relationship which falls into a single category of “foreign” or “other”; hence, in this way
“fear of foreigners is constructed; they are then perceived as dangerous, and are blamed for many problems” (Wodak, 2011, p.223).

Language is a powerful and significant component of the news construction. It produces an extraordinary effect on the representation of individuals, groups and communities in many ways. It is relevant to include an example of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph coverage of the Madrid bombings which occurred on 11 March 2004 and shocked the European continent. The reporting of these bombings demonstrates the way in which these broadsheets have reported terrorism. One of the best studies on this topic is that by Roberto A. Valdeo’n (2007) who has established a corpus based on 150 articles to examine the use of two key phrases, “terrorist” and “separatist”, by investigating the Madrid Bombings (3/11) in the American and British media including The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. Valdeo’n’s study specifically focuses on the representation of two organisations in Britain and Spain, namely the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and ETA (the Basque Militant Group). Valdeo’n finds that when the media follow the government version they use terms such as “terrorista” for ETA and “terrorist” for the IRA in Britain (Veldeo’n, 2007, 109). Further, Valdeo’n states that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph use the term “Separatist” but avoid “Terrorist” when describing the Spanish militant group ETA (Veldeo’n, 2007, 106-109).

Although, both organisations were presented as troubled groups related with political issues but not directly associated with religion. But in context to Muslim involvement the language of the newspaper changes linking Islam instead of the perpetrators to the terrorists attacks such as The Guardian headline “The worst Islamist attack in European history” (see The Guardian, 31 October 2007). The media and Muslims have become interdependent in recent years for many reasons. In fact, the media require “news” and ‘Muslims’ are its current contributor of news worldwide providing the media with excuses and reasons to report their matters. Since 7/7, extremism, violence, terrorism, protest, and a number of other issues have enabled the media to establish a continuous link between “Muslims” and “Islam” (Kumar, 2013; Kundnani, 2014).

In fact, the media identify, exaggerate, misinform and then finally transform events and issues into a panic-like situation, as Stanley Cohen (1972) observes in his study using the example of white English youths, “Mods and Rockers”, during the 1960s. More specifically, a recent study by Morey and Yaqin (2011) suggests that overall, “Muslims”
are largely seen as “Strangers” in media platforms although there is no full-scale “Anti-Islamic” agenda (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p.37). They outline a few illustrations of constructiveness in the portrayal of Islam and Muslims in certain documentaries and films such as *Don’t Panic, I’m Islamic* (2005), *Battle for Islam* (2005), *The Muslim Reformation* (2006) and *What Muslims Want* (2006); in many other examples, they dismiss the ‘claim’ that Muslims may have an utterly negative media representation (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 56). In addition, Flood *et al.*, (2012), in contrast to other media members, give credit and continue to acknowledge the constructive and sensible reportage of the BBC in regard to its coverage of extremism, the war on terror and terrorism issues, especially after 7/7 (Flood *et al.*, 2012, p.245).

### 3.3-News Production: Tamasha (Drama).

Thussu (2007) calls News *Tamasha* [Urdu/Hindi word meaning Drama] (Thussu, 2007, p. 110-161). In the same rich vein, James Carey explains that “[N]ews is not information but drama. It does not describe the world but portrays an arena of dramatic forces and actions...” (cited in Martin, 2004, p.7). The *Oxford English Dictionary* describes ‘news’ as “informal information not previously known to someone.” The word ‘news’ in fact echoes something new and for this reason it not only informs but also transforms people’s thinking on certain issues, events and characters.

Thussu (2007) considers ‘news’ to be a “commodity” (Thussu, 2007, p.110). Endorsing Thussu’s point of view, Hamilton (2004, p.7) also describes ‘news’ as a “commodity” and thinks it is not a “mirror image of reality” (Hamilton, 2004, p.21). Perhaps because of its increasing use in reference to certain groups, communities, and characters, Thussu refers to this practice as a “cultural commodity” and argues for a rethinking of the European way of news manufacture (Thussu, 2007, p.110-161). His point is also visible in Doppelt’s (1994, p.113) work. Above all, Harold Jackson states that “News is a commodity: it is packaged, seasoned, and retailed just as much as baked beans. Some like it spicy, some bland, but virtually everyone wants it hot” (Jackson, 1978, p.192).

According to William Randolph Hearst, “News is what someone wants to stop you printing; the rest is ads” (cited in Franklin, 1997, p.47), and for Patterson (1998), “News is constructed and framed” (Patterson, 1998, p.17). In addition, Cook (1998) assumes that “‘news’ is a ‘co-production’ of the media and the government” (Cook, 1998, p.3). Besides, Tuchman (1978) writes, “News is a window on the World. Through its frame,
Americans learn of themselves and others...” (Tuchman, 1978, p.1) But he also acknowledges that “the news frame may be considered as problematic” (Tuchman, 1978, p.1).

These authors’ various descriptions of news show that it is not just simple information; to some extent, it serves the purpose of a producer. In the media world, events of a similar nature occurring in different places attract dissimilar coverage. Susan Moeller (2009) examines coverage of four terrorist attacks - Madrid (11 March 2004); Taba (7 October 2004); London (7 July 2005) and Amman (9 November 2005) - in the British and American media including The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. Moeller aims to examine how similar events (terrorism) are characterised as different. Her comparison discloses that these attacks, although similar in their nature and in their impact on human lives, have received contrasting coverage in the American and the British media. She finds that the London attacks have received far more coverage than the Madrid bombings. Similarly, the Madrid bombings were reported extensively in comparison to those in Amman; in turn, those in Amman received more media attention than those in Taba (Egypt) (Moeller, 2009, p. 121).

She notes that The Guardian published 79 articles on the Madrid bombings in comparison to The Daily Telegraph’s 63 articles on the same subject (Moeller, 2009, p. 121). Certainly, the attack on mainland Britain received far greater coverage in these newspapers (The Guardian 122 articles; The Daily Telegraph 196 articles) (Moeller, 2009, p. 122). In addition, the same pattern of news coverage became visible in regard to the terrorist attacks in Amman (Jordan) and Taba (Egypt) (The Guardian 15 and 9; The Daily Telegraph 14 and 6) (Moeller, 2009, p. 122). This illustrates how the media make certain news events newsworthy and significant while at the same time playing down other events of a similar nature.

Scholars continue to debate the significance, place and work of news in society and therefore see it differently; for instance, Murphy (1978) assumes that “The news is created and manufactured, not found” (Murphy, 1978, p.177). In comparison to this interpretation, Burden (2008, p.19) sees ‘news’ as the “News of the Screws”; thus, these assertions suggest that “news” is a complex and rather multi-layered phenomenon. Martin (2004) carried out a survey on ‘Self-censorship’ with journalists and found that
five per cent of them admitted that the “News that would hurt the financial interests of a news organisation often or sometimes goes unreported” (Martin, 2004, p. 44).

Perhaps this is the norm in practice because of the complex nature of “news” production that sometimes suggests injustice, particularly when it comes to representing certain unprivileged groups in society. Mark D. Alleyne (1997) reviews the existence and practices of “justice” within the production of international news, particularly in accordance with the UN-agreed “New Economic Order” and “New World Information and Communication Order” resolutions in the 1970s, which stressed the need for equality and the maintenance of justice in news production. Alleyne traces elements of stereotypes of certain people and regions in the “news” production (Alleyne, 1997, p.58). Alleyne’s assumption is mostly true because if the principle of equality in “news” production is not practised, the news will be nothing more than Thussu’s expression “Tamasha” or “Drama”. Another reason for the presence of such practices in “News” production is pointed out by Martin Mayer (1993): “there are incidents and people who become newsworthy, very briefly, because they are accidentally within the cone illuminated” (Mayer, 1993, p.68).

This fact is first recognised in the work of an early media scholar, Walter Lippmann, who called it the “searchlight” of “News” (cited in Mayer, 1993, p.68). As a result of this, the “news” mostly, if not always, fails to reflect facts; as Weaver (1994) notes, in real life people witness and interpret events using their own perceptions and, hence, it is often difficult to maintain “objectivity” and “facts” in order. He finds that “often facts are unclear or their significance is ambiguous” (Weaver, 1994, p. 82). A brief example of what Weaver describes here is the British journalist John Pilger’s documentary “A War on Democracy” (2007) in which Pilger showed how different American media organisations such as CNN used the same footage of a protest from different angles to suggest that pro-Chávez protestors opened fire on the anti-Chávez protestors. Pilger concluded that the opposite was true and the media had in fact fabricated the evidence to suit their agenda.

To conclude, the competition between different media organisations in search of breaking news has somewhat damaged the essence of news. For instance, the media organisations often ask journalists to produce stories within certain timeframes, which
badly affects the quality of news (see Davies, 2009). Nick Davies (2011) gave the example of the BBC guidelines that on the one hand emphasise objectivity and on other hand push journalists to produce stories. Hence, one may say that, with the rise of commercialism in the news production, new has become no less than what Thussu described above: “Tamasha”.

3.4-The Language of News:

Language is a key tool in news production; for instance, headlines transform the entire meaning of news instantly. The use of a few powerful words is enough to display the policy and attitude of those involved in the process of news production to certain communities and issues. For example, words and phrases such as fraud, fundamentalists, terrorist, extremist, and opportunist in fact spell out the whole story.

Fowler (1991) explains this rhetoric in terms of M.A.K. Halliday's functional model which assumes that 'language performs functions in a specific practical sense...being used distinctively to write headlines' (Fowler, 1991, p. 69). He states that language has three important functions at three levels: ‘for the expression of content’, ‘as interpersonal function’ and ‘textual function’, which explains the experience, attitude and ability of an individual to generate messages using language skills (Fowler, 1991, p.69).

As an example, Fowler uses the 1986 American bombing of Libya, selecting The Guardian headlines published between 14 and 19 April 1986. These include “US threaten new attacks against Libya”, “Britons lie low in Beirut as hostages die”, “Hunt on for Heathrow terrorist”, “Arab held in bomb hunt” and “Heartaches and dangers facing the foreigners in Beirut”, and he finds “violent acts which were widely assumed to have been undertaken in retaliation against Britain’s part in the bombings” (ibid., p.114).

In these stories, most of the conversation relates to Muslims and there are fewer mentions of the government action. Drawing on eleven major studies on news (such as Bell 1991; Fairclough 1995; Ungerer 2000) that examine the construction, role and impact of language in the process of news manufacturing, Harrison (2006) assumes that all these ingredients are essential to construct, disseminate and consume news; therefore, Harrison says that “We all need and rely upon news; we have to invest trust in those who tell it to us” (Harrison, 2006, p.2).
This positive beginning further strengthens the thought that ‘News’ has an impact on our day-to-day lives. Tuchman (1978) sees ‘news’ as knowledge and assumes that ‘news reports are the only mass medium shaping an understanding of the everyday world...[and] may be of a limited force in swaying public opinions and attitudes” (Tuchman, 1978, p.3). Other important studies relating to news construction (including Scannell 1991; Cameron 1996; and Scollon 1998) offer mixed opinions of news. Shaw argues that “when words are used ‘recklessly’ and ‘uncaringly’ they can easily translate into ‘fighting’ or ‘hate’ words, or worse still, ‘words of mass destruction’” (Shaw, 2012, p. 510).

Obviously, as a result of such representation in the media, “discursive stereotypes and clichés portraying Muslims as ‘inferior’, ‘uncivilised’, ‘violent’, and ‘destructive’ constitute ‘fighting’ and ‘hate’” (ibid., p.511). That is why many such as Grabe and Zhou (2003) consider Thussu’s assertion to have become meaningful, because the news displays little responsibility for the effect on society and rather seems to think it is just a drama. Shirazi (2010) suggests that all this is a “politics of Image” that rotates around two key themes: “the reality and representation” (Shirazi, 2010, p.1).

A typical pattern of such ‘Drama’ is visible in the following irresponsible ‘news’ stories. For example, one of the most popular and frequently appearing topics in the press is ‘grooming’, which often refers to Muslims alone. Joseph Harker wrote an investigative article in The Guardian on 22 July 2012 under the heading, “This is how racism takes root: The different ways the media covered two cases of men grooming children for sex show how shockingly easy it is to demonise a whole community” (The Guardian, 2012). Accordingly it emerged that there are in fact more non-Muslim men than Muslims involved in this heinous crime. The Jimmy Savile case shows that the press also covers sex crimes committed by other members of society.

Sections of the British press, particularly The Guardian, published several articles to discuss the issue and its relationship with Muslims. In one of its articles, Vikram Dodd refers to a study (2011) conducted by the ‘Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre’ that examines “2,379 potential offenders caught grooming girls since 2008. Of 940 suspects whose race could be identified, 26% were Asian, 38% were white and 32% were recorded as unknown. Asians are roughly 7% of the population” (The Guardian, 14 May 2013). Moreover, Muslim sex offenders such as Rochdale sex gang
ringleader Shabir Ahmed are facing deportation and the loss of their citizenship but no one has suggested the same punishment for other members of society (see BBC, 16 February 2016).

Baker (2010) cites ten leading studies, especially Akbarzadeh and Smith (2005, p.4) and McEnery (2005) and Partington (2006), that indicate the presence of anti-Muslim bias in the news. Furthermore, Baker’s corpus suggests that British Muslims receive a negative media portrayal, with the most common words appearing in the tabloids being ‘terrorists’, ‘bombers’, ‘killers’, and ‘suicide attackers’ (Baker, 2010, p.13-25). Wodak continues by discussing the role of language and its relationship with different influential people, such as politicians, editors and others, who use language as a tool to safeguard their interests.

She points out that in the modern age “we no longer communicate only in ‘traditional’ written or spoken genres, but also using new ones, such as text messages, email, tweets and Facebook posts”, which has turned communication into a globalised act (ibid, p.216). McCarthy and Carter (1994) find that language is complex and not straightforwardly “transparent and neutral”; rather, it “is a site in which beliefs, values, and points of view are produced, encoded, and contested” (McCarthy and Carter, 1994, p.155).

In British society, the north-south divide and the difference between the forms of language used in various British newspapers reflect the fact that “cultural values” and “ideologies” are explained in the forms of writings, such as in newspaper headlines. To illustrate this, these authors refer to three different newspapers: The Guardian (an independent liberal paper that is considered “quality press”) versus the Daily Express or The Sun or Daily Telegraph; these newspapers have different values, beliefs and of course language (ibid, p.156), since they obviously have different readers.

From this discussion, ‘power’ also emerges as another important aspect of language discourse that significantly affects the production of news. Fairclough (1989) offers a descriptive account of language and its relationship with authority and power, particularly in contemporary Britain. He considers the significant role of language in the “production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power” and its contributions to the “domination of some people by others” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 1). To validate his point, Fairclough argues that language is not only a “primary medium of social control
and power” but has also “grown dramatically in terms of the uses it is required to serve...” (ibid, p.3).

This shows that “the ideological nature of language” has made it one of the key “themes of modern social science” (ibid). Despite its indisputable importance, Fairclough also finds that, in many studies, the notion of “ideology”, which is closely linked to language and power, is missing (ibid, p.2). Fairclough assumes that since the “producers exercise power over consumers in that they have sole producing rights and can therefore determine what is included and excluded and how events are represented...journalists work under editorial control” (ibid, p.50). Additionally, Fairclough finds that, “In the British media, the balance of sources and perspectives and ideology is overwhelmingly in favour of existing power holders...”; for this reason “the media operate as a means for the expression and reproduction of the power of the dominant class and bloc” (ibid, p.51).

Earlier, this thesis established that there is a predominant narrative of three capital ‘M’s’: the Muslims, Media and the Middle East. Certainly, the Middle East has always been a focal point of academic and media attention, mainly because of the Western powers’ political and economic interests. The political, social and cultural landscape of the oil-rich Middle East has been changed enormously in the past few decades. Yet, to an extent, its image in the Western media, Hollywood films and literature is still stereotypical (see Said, 1997; Shaheen, 2008 and 2015). In a way, this depressing reminder prompts us to ask about the reasons behind the stereotypical representations of the Middle East and its people and whether they denote a never-ending conflict between the West and the Rest (the Middle East). The next section discusses the relevance of Edward Said’s (1978) *Orientalism* study in the contemporary period. Notably, it is considered essential for an understanding of Muslims’ representation and has been used successfully by many academics since its publication.

**3.5-Terrorism Discourse:**

In the context of the Middle East, terrorism is a recurring theme in the media reporting probably because of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Saudi-Yemen clash, the crisis in Iraq and Syria and terrorist groups operating in the region, such as the ISIS. Besides, the Western powers’ political and economic interests and their direct military involvement in the region have led to an increase in the media presence. Given the
contemporary political settings in the Middle East it is therefore essential to include the existing terrorism discourse and ask some crucial questions: Is terrorism solely a Muslim problem? What role do the media play in covering these conflicts and when and how did the relatively new phrase “Islamic Terrorism” emerge? Has any other religion been portrayed like Islam before?

(i) Defining and Understanding Terrorism:

Several notable studies observe that terrorism is a contested concept; hence, a single definitive description is virtually impossible to produce (Alali and Byrd, 1957, p.19-101; Miller, 1982, p.14; Paletz and Vinson, 1992, p.1-5). Wardlaw notes that there is no single agreed definition of terrorism (Wardlaw, 1989, p.3). The complexity of the debate is confirmed by Wardlaw’s acknowledgement that all debates on terrorism will come up with dissimilar views (Jaehing, 1982, p.106; Schlesinger et al., 1998, p.110).

Richard W. Schaffert’s (1992) study traces more than a hundred existing descriptions of terrorism; however, these have not received an agreed universal recognition (Schaffert, 1992, p.1). It has long been challenging to define “Terrorism” as Walter Laqueur finds that, from 1936 to 1982, 103 definitions of terrorism emerged (cited in Murphy, 1989, p.3). Since then it has been explained from Western states’ perspective (FBI, 2014).

In Britain, the security agency website defines it as “The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public, or a section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause; and it involves or causes serious violence against a person…” (MI5, 2015) Currently, terrorism is one of the most widely discussed and examined topics in academia and the media. Reports on terrorism often suggest that it is one of the most serious issues facing Britain.

John F. Murphy (1989) considers the distinctive nature of the terms “terror” and “terrorism” and their use in the media. In more detail, he suggests that the word “terror” was first used during the French Revolution while “terrorism” refers to “actions of private individuals or groups” and was used in Brussels in 1930 during a conference (Murphy, 1989, p.3). These descriptions of terrorism “have been used by politicians as labels to pin on their enemies” and for this reason it has lost its meaning(s) (ibid). Terrorism appears in a range of violent activities that include state terrorism, religious
terrorism, separatist terrorism, political issues-related terrorism. For instance, suicide bombers often target unarmed civilians and, sometimes, military installations.

In addition, a judge decides on its legal position, saying that “The world community should stop using the term ‘terrorism’ entirely” (ibid, p.3). In the same vein, Marc Redfield (2009) highlights that the political use of the words “terror” and “terrorism” emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century (cited in Redfield, 2009, p.72). Geoffrey Nunberg states that both phrases, “terror” and “terrorism”, are ‘vague and politically manipulated” (ibid, p.71). According to Whittaker (2009), the concept of terrorism dates back to the 1920s and was known as “The Troubles” (Whittaker, 2009, p.61). The majority of terrorism discussions reflect that it is power-driven and serves the interests of ruling powerful elites who benefit from it.

In brief, it is often said that “one nation’s terrorists are another's freedom fighters”. Rudolf Ondrich (2014) writes: “The media portrays terrorism as only being committed by enemy groups. Terrorist acts committed by the United States and its allies are not considered to be ‘real terrorism’ and claims of terrorist acts are summarily dismissed by the media” (Ondrich, 2014, p.1). Arguably, it distracts attention from corruption committed by those in power, or terrorist organisations such as warlords’ private armies use it as a mechanism to control people. Typically, governments put huge budgets aside to provide for their people’s security, create Special Forces to defend them against presumed attacks and establish departments to deal with terrorism. All this is particularly visible in Britain, where £30 million is spent on counter-terrorism each year.

In the light of the conceptual framework of E. V. Walter (1964), the sociology of terrorism is a process that involves “the act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction, and the social effects”; he calls this a system of terror where “it is confined to a special class or group within a society” (cited in Wilkinson, 1974, p.35). Of course, this is a complex and lengthy discussion because, on the one hand, terrorism is perpetrated by non-state actors and, on the other hand, it consists of a “system of state terror, colonial terror, police terror...special forms of repressive terrorism” (ibid, p.43).

(ii)-The Big Debate: "Newness" in Terrorism.

Although the literature on terrorism shows that it is ancient practice, in the current scenario ‘newness’ refers to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Hence, it is presented as a new

In addition, Matthew J. Morgan (2004) describes it as “The Origins of the New Terrorism” whilst Spencer (2006) believes that “new” terrorists are those who want to acquire deadly biological and chemical weapons with which to attack the West and America. Europe has experienced a few terrorism incidents such as Madrid (2004), the London bombings (2005) and Paris (2015) that involved Muslim perpetrators; this makes terrorism new because none of the members of Muslim communities in Europe had ever attacked the countries of their birth.

Obviously, these authors, including Wolfsfeld, are referring to Muslims of Arab origin, such as those who carried out the New York bombings. However, from a philosophical point of view, if the “newness” is attached to the notion of biological, chemical and deadly weapons, then the Americans had used such weapons long ago in Japan; hence, does it make sense to say that it started on 6 August 1945?

Similarly, on 7 July 2010, *The Guardian* remembers the occasion as follows: “London bombings: the day the anti-terrorism rules changed”. Keeping in mind the value of life, some fundamental questions arise here: Is terrorism the biggest challenge facing the world? Who benefits from terrorism? Why did the rules change on that particular day when the world has witnessed worse forms of terrorism long before that day?

Of course, terrorism is inhuman and condemnable, just like war and the dropping of nuclear bombs. But, for a philosophical discussion, it seems that a notable feature in current terrorism debates is the notion of “newness” that relates it to Islam, possibly because those perpetrators confess in their video messages, be they the 7/7 bombers or other al-Qaeda-related individuals, that they are perhaps doing it for Islam.

The contemporary discourse of terrorism suggests that the “new” wave is a particular problem of “Islam”, which is also well-established in many studies (Amanat, 2001, p.23; Hill, 2001, p.81; Chaliand and Blin, 2007, p.95). Googling “New Terrorism” produced 376,000, 000 results (on 21/05/2014), which means that a vast variety of
commentaries has arisen from different sources that discuss the concept of “newness” within the broader field of terrorism.

Much of this scholarship explains the attacks on New York and the commencement of an era of the “new” conflict, the “War on terror” resulting from it. Afterwards, the Madrid and London bombings further strengthened the perspective of “new terrorism”. Several studies assume that terrorism has been redefined and reconstructed through the prism of the powerful West that frequently links modern terrorism to “Islam” (Silverman, 2004, p.148; Gabriel, 2006, p.124; Palmer and Palmer, 2004, p.194).

The “newness” is a wide-ranging phenomenon and offers various perspectives. For instance, Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) assumes that the use of the typical notion “in the name of God” makes it an “Islamic terrorism” (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p.185). Other scholars such as Stern (2003) follow the same argument. However, Wilkinson (2003) understands it as a “weapon” that is used by states, as well as by disfranchised groups and individuals, as a political and religious tool (Wilkinson, 2003, p.106-121). Crenshaw (2003) assumes that, ever since the Iranian revolution of 1979 and a series of other events such as the 1993 bombings of the World Trade Centre, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings, and the attack on American military installations in Saudi Arabia (1995), the American administration has felt threatened (Crenshaw, 2003, p.161).

Some of these incidents had links with the Middle East, predominantly a Muslim region, which may be a reason for the increasing level of discussion of “Islam” in the media and public spheres. During this period, terror related to al-Qaeda has damaged the reputation of Islam because radicals frequently use their versions of verses of the Qur’an. However, the “newness” often brings about the construction of “Islamic Terrorism” (Arquilla, et al., 1999, p.39).

During the mid-1990s the word “Islam” was excessively associated with terror and, hence, a new era of terrorism began (Crenshaw, 2003, p.165). Importantly, this thesis views the “new era” of terrorism as a shift from fear of a nuclear attack by the Cold War enemy, Russia, to a “supposed” nuclear attack from a new enemy, the Muslims. A number of defence sources see “newness” in terms of weaponry and a new way of targeting the West by radicals such as Al-Qaeda members (National Commission, 2004).
On the other hand, several British scholars offer a different analysis of terrorism. For example, Paul Rogers believes that the rise of terrorism is perhaps linked with the imperial ambitions and global dominance of America that is referred to as “a new American century” and that became prominent in the late 1990s in US politics as a result of lobbying by powerful interest groups (Rogers, 2008, p.5). After studying the post-9/11 situation, Douglas Little (2013) argues that the “Red Threat” seems to have been replaced by the “Green Threat” in the West (Little, 2013, p.71). Morgan (2004) reviews work by a range of scholars who relate “newness” to nuclear, biological and chemical attacks. For Morgan, it is presented as a “third wave of vulnerability” followed by a “fourth wave” of terrorism which focuses on “the break-up of empires, decolonialization, and anti-Westernism” (sic) (Morgan, 2004, p. 29-30).

The “newness” could possibly be viewed in either way, i.e., as political or religious rivalry. I would argue that, since Muslims are not politically well established, the “secular” West has singled out “Islam” as its rival religion mainly because of its growth. Currently, data from different sources confirm that more people in Britain are claiming not to have any religion (National Statistics, 2013). This idea has some credence, especially when one reviews the historical records of empires, particularly the Roman Empire. Niall Ferguson (2001) finds the presence of a rivalry between the state and religion; for instance, the corruption of the Roman Empire allowed it to view a radical form of Christianity as a resilient force (Ferguson, 2001, p.123). Edward Gibbon (2000) argues that whenever empires were confronted with religions they branded them as “new” political opponents (cited in Ferguson, 2001, p.120-22).

The emergence of Islamic revival movements in different parts of the Muslim world gave birth to the idea of “Islamism” or “Political Islam”. In the West, scholars began to describe various movements in Muslim lands aiming to establish society according to Islamic teachings. According to Philippe Miguax (2007), initially the term “Islamism” was coined to explain political Islam. It has received more publicity as it is used to describe fundamentalism which is an outcome of interpretations of religious ideology with its roots in Sharia (Migaux, 2007, p.259). Henceforth, “Islamism” progressively appears in the forms of “radical Islamism”, “militant Islamism” and “activist Islamism” to describe violence used by radical groups to attain their goal (ibid).
Migaux concludes that other similar phrases such as “Islamist terrorism” or “jihadist terrorism” also became popular mainly because of the new wave of terrorism that began on 9/11 (ibid., p.259). Parallel to “Islamic” radical groups, Christian radicals such as *The Lord’s Resistance Army* in Uganda and *Christian Anti-Balaka Militia* in Rwanda are a few examples of the use of sacred religious texts as an excuse for violence by misguided individuals. In this regard, in the last few decades the practising of the old phenomenon of “Suicide terrorism” has perhaps been triggered by the increasing media attention (Géré, 2007, p.363; Pape, 2003, p.345).

In most of these cases, “terrorism” has overtly referred to “Islamic” acts ever since the war against terrorism began on September 11 (Hill, 2001, p.84). More importantly, Hill believes that modern “terrorism thrives on myth” (ibid, p.83). Thus Hill, like Pape (2003), in fact dismisses the linkage of religion with “terrorism”. However, in contrast to these scholars Walter Laqueur (1999) writes that “religion has always been a main feature of terrorism; the Sicari, the Assassins, and the Indian secret societies practicing thuguee were religious sects”, which is the prime reason for the use of words such as “zealot”, “assassin” and “thug” (Laqueur, 1999, p. 127).

Certainly, a tiny minority of those perpetrators misinterpret their religious teachings to attain their political goals; in the current scenario a few al-Qaeda and ISIS members often claim that they are fulfilling the commandments of their religion. But a vast majority of Muslims discredits them and their misunderstanding and misinterpretation of religious teachings. However, Laqueur also admits that thirty years ago “global terrorism was predominantly secular in inspiration and in orientation, right wing, left wing, or nationalist extremist” and that “Islam in modern history has not engaged in acts of mass violence on a Hitlerian or the Pol Pot scale” (ibid., p. 128). It is only recently that the “popular Western perception equates radical Islam with terrorism” (ibid, p. 129).

Several other scholars hold similar thoughts about Western perceptions of Islamic terrorism (Dalacoura, 2011, p.33; Martin, 2012, p.162; Heath and Zahedi, 2011, p. 104). The vast majority of academic studies assume that the notion of “newness” relating to “terrorism” is not a simple phenomenon to describe because there are those who believe that a new kind of threat ranging from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to modern warfare such as drone attacks is a reality. On the one hand it is aimed at
states and people, and on the other it is directed by states against anarchist organisations and individuals. Therefore, perpetrators of terrorism hold different sets of political and religious motives, goals and affiliations.

Often, misguided and disfranchised individuals commit criminal acts, such as the murder of Lee Rigby, an unarmed British soldier, in 2012 and the Norwegian (2011) attacks. In both cases the perpetrators thought they were serving their presumed God. To legitimate and validate their barbaric actions they find excuses, be they political or religious. Truly, terrorism has become more apparent in scholarly discussions in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7 (Clark, 2001; Martin et al., 2004). The use of terrorism is politically driven when those involved in terrorist activities globally assume that their actions are against Western governments because these governments support oppressive and brutal regimes in the Middle East.

Leonard Weinberg (2005) writes that the idea of “new terrorism” in fact suggests the attempts by governments to divert people’s attention from basic economic, political and social issues, particularly in the West (Weinberg, 2005, p.1). Interestingly, Weinberg notes that a single significant event, 9/11, became a source of the use of the phrase “new terrorism” and its linkage with “Islam” and “Muslims” (ibid, p.41). Weinberg states that the new wave of “terrorism” has “most obviously” been stimulated by religion [Islam] and that “Muslims claiming inspiration from Islamic ideas have been responsible for much of new terrorism” globally (ibid, p.43). In his recent publication, Weinberg (2013) reaffirms his stance on “Islamic Terrorism” exemplified by “the relationship between Terrorism and the Arab Spring” (Weinberg, 2013, p.63).

Recent evidence shows that Weinberg’s illustration is weak because the connection between the Arab Spring and terrorism was rooted not in religion but in political goals as different Western and regional governments supported their chosen sectarian groups to curb unfavoured groups. This whole situation suggested that the Arab Spring was perhaps an example of Islamic terrorism. In a series of articles The Guardian’s writers such as Seumas Milne disclosed that “American forces bomb one set of rebels while backing another in Syria” (see The Guardian, 3 June 2015).

3.6-Orientalism in the Words of Said:

Although almost three decades have passed, Said’s Orientalism is still considered a well-established, widely acknowledged and the most cited text in a sizable number of
inquiries into the representation of people in distant lands. Having been translated into 36 languages across the world, his work stimulates considerable discussions and debates and still functions in media and communication studies.

In 1995, Said included an afterword and in 2003 a preface in the same volume. These deal with the criticisms of Orientalism and also provide an explanation of his thoughts on the same subject in the wake of 9/11, the War on Terror and the Iraqi invasion. Thus, he attempts to make it an up-to-date, valid and relevant guidebook that reveals different ways in which the West views, studies and positions people in faraway places, particularly in the Middle East, the birthplace of Said before he settled in the United States.

He acknowledges that the terms ‘Orient’ and the ‘West’ are both human inventions to describe the “other” and that this description and interpretation of “other” could be either positive or negative. In other words, for him, an identification of “Otherness” consists of various labels such as “fear, hatred, disgust, resurgent self-pride, and arrogance” (Said, 2003, p. xiii). Hence, these attributes not only portray and represent sets of people but perhaps also create a distinction between the non-Westerner and the “Westerner”; that is to say, “Orientalism” is a way of thinking that is “based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the occident’” (ibid., p.2). For him “Orient” and “occident” are “two forms of humanity”; one might also say “East” and “West” or “Europe” and “Asia” (ibid, 115).

Said employs the term “orient” to describe the Middle East because the majority of the population is Muslim; hence, the “orient” in his study could be seen as “Muslims” whilst the term “Occident” refers to “Westerners”. Another important factor to consider is that Said dismisses the perception that the “‘Orient’ was essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality” (ibid, p.5). In fact, he believes that “Orientalism” is “a Western style for dominating, restricting, and having authority over the orient” (ibid, p.3).

In brief, for Said, “Orient” is connected to Europe as a place where Europeans, in particular Britain and France, set up their richest and greatest colonies; it was therefore the “source of its civilisations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of the deepest and most recurring images of the other” (ibid., p.3). At present, especially in
regard to Muslims, “Orientalism” as Said predicts “is a shift from the British and French to American hegemony” (ibid, p.25). More precisely, it is something like “inferiority” versus “strength” or “East” versus “West” (ibid, p. 201). Resulting from such a description, “the orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western Empire” (ibid, p. 202). For that reason it is a “product of certain political forces and activities” and also “a school of interpretation whose material happens to be Orient, its civilisations, peoples, and localities” (ibid, p.203).

At this point it is essential to review Said’s concept of “Orientalism” once again in order to broaden our understanding of current circumstances as well as the recent past events and conflicts. Notably, by ‘Orient’ Said doesn’t necessarily mean just ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’; he means that “the Orient” is a “constituted entity, and the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically ‘different’ inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space”. This is why he now assumes that “Orientalism” has been “successfully accommodated to the new imperialism… the continuing imperial design to dominate Asia” (ibid, p.322).

Typical of such a scenario is the sequence of events that have occurred in the recent past such as the defeat of the Soviet Union, the West’s non-Muslim and communist enemy, in Afghanistan. Since then, different nations have been seen as threats to and enemies of the West or perhaps its imperial ambitions. Currently, in the aftermath of 9/11, the resulting War on Terror, and the 7/7 attack in Britain, Muslims appear as a case-study of “modern Orientalism”. Hence, the underlying notion emerging from Said’s work is the “otherness” on the basis of “difference” that allows the powerful “West” at present to define and identity “others” who are constantly changing. As Said argues, “each age and society re-creates its ‘others’” through an “interpretative process which involves” and “identifies different ‘others,’ whether they are outsiders and refugees, or apostates and infidels” (ibid, p.332).

Finally, to sum up the idea of “Orientalism” and its relevance to Muslims in the given circumstances, a key example is the invasion and destruction of a country in a faraway place “in the name of freedom” that is presented by all sorts of “polemicists, politicians,
evangelical, and right-wing radio hosts” using the “same unverifiable fictions and vast generalisations” to show “America” against “the foreign devil” on the assumption that they (Muslims) are “not like us” and don’t appreciate “our values”; hence, they are a threat and should change or become like us (ibid, p. xv). This particular event allows him to say that the Western “enlightening and civilising [of] ‘Others’ has brought nothing but destruction” (ibid, p. xvi).

Evidence indicates that most of such misleading and inaccurate representations of Islam and Muslims in fact come from the media. The best illustration of this can be seen in Said’s work (1981), which provides an incredible volume of proof that most media citations of Islam are “peculiarly traumatic news” in the present-day West, which tells readers, audiences and listeners that Islam is perhaps a “menace to the West” (also cited by Majaj, 2000, p.324; Parsons, 1999, p.60). To Said, this happens because different modes of communication including television, radio and newspapers follow “certain rules and conventions to get things across intelligibly”. Therefore, reality often does not fully appear in news; rather, news stories reflect reduced reality (Said, 1981, p.45). Hence, the “picture of Islam (and of anything else, for that matter) is likely to be quite uniform, in some ways reductive, [sic] and monochromatic” (ibid., p.45).

3.7-Critique of Orientalism:

Crockett (2005) writes that the term “Orientalism” is now considered a limited tradition in relation to the study of the Orient. Therefore, on the occasion of the 29th International Congress of Orientalists in 1973 it was decided that the field of study should be regard as Oriental studies or area studies (Crockett, 2005, p.19). Stuart Hall argued that “Orientalism” was Foucauldian in inspiration more than in method’ (cited in Abu El-Haj, 2013, p.70). Although “Orientalism” deals with people in distant lands, some of them such as Muslims are now established communities in Europe (ibid, p. 19). Therefore it is more valid now; however, the fundamental question is whether it is applicable to British Muslims or perhaps white converts.

One key objection to the “Orientalism” discourse is that it presents closed narratives of the ‘Other’ and, therefore, often offers misleading opinions. In this regard, K. Humayun Ansari’s (2013) study begins by asking whether it is time for “Re-thinking Orientalism” He states that the British historical imagination of the Muslim world is a blend of hostile,
sympathetic, and admiring accounts of Islam and Muslims. He enlists several Orientalist scholars such as T.W. Arnold and E.G. Browne, who argue that “European and Muslim cultures had interacted in the past in mutually influential and beneficial ways” and therefore they offer an idea of global community (Ansari, 2013, p.11).

In contrast to this were William Muir and others who undervalued Islam and misrepresented Muslims (ibid). However, Ansari also acknowledges Said’s viewpoint that “all knowledge is a product of its age” and that his critique helps scholars to “become more acutely and self-critically aware of the existence of multiple perspectives and the need to consider them in historical analysis” (ibid, p.16-17). Likewise, Daniel Martin Varisco (2007) enlists those intellectuals who see Said as courageous and admire his scholarship yet pinpoint faults in his thesis and disagree with him on certain issues; these include Aijaz Ahmed and Fred Halliday. In comparison, Martin Kramer and a few others call him “a left-wing culprit”, because Said’s work blames the West for the problems in the Middle East (Varisco, 2007, p. xiii-xv). Said received hostility from the pro-Israeli and right-wing press who branded him a “professor of terror” and criticised him for his stance on Palestine and American policies in the Middle East, although they did not see him as a secular Westerner (The Guardian, 26 September 2003).

In his novel, Alam al-din (1882), Ali Basha Mubarak described the Orientalist as an “advocate of the East in the West” (cited in Varisco, 2007, p.151). But for many who are engaged in modern debates, Mubarak’s work, Alam al-din, is a fiction because mythologies, language and characters of the Orient have significantly changed (Tegeldin, 2011; Selim, 2004). Despite considerable criticism, “Orientalism” provides a foreign perspective of culture and enhances one’s knowledge and ideas of others in numerous ways. Varisco states that his main disagreement with Said is that his use of “power and ideology” with which the West describes its Orient is actually “unidirectional”, which means that it is limited to the Middle East. Varisco provides illustrations such as Chinese representation and construction of the ‘Western Other’ (ibid, p.152).

Using several critical narratives, Driss Habti (2010) also denunciates Said for blending Michel Foucault’s and Antonio Gramsci’s concepts and illustrates this by citing Dennis Porter’s allegation that Said’s “Orientalism” shows “a continuous history of oppressive representational practices from the eighteenth century through to the present day” that
display a “homogeneity of colonial discourse” (Habti, 2010, p.22-24). Habti also uses an example of Occidentalism discourse as a reverse of “Orientalism” that produces a stereotypical and dehumanising representation of the West (ibid, p.85).

However, Occidentalism is a recent field of study through which non-Westerners construct Europe (Jouhki, 2006; Venn, 2000). Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit (2005) highlight the Occidentalism discourse as the main cause of increasing hostility to and hatred of the West in the Middle East and claim that the birth of al-Qaeda and other radical organisations is actually a result of this thesis.

On balance, the Orientalism discourse begins by acknowledging the legacy of Said’s theocratic interpretations of the Orient and his representation of the ‘Other’ (Iskander and Rustom, 2010; V. Spanos, 2009; Vickery, 2013). In contrast, those who disagree with Said on a number of issues, such as his secular thinking and views on humanism, include Herron (1996), Courville (2010) and Sardar (1999).

Sardar’s (1999) key differences with Said begin with the grievance that his work is built upon various disciplinary boundaries such as Islamic studies, linguistics, history and philosophy in which Said borrowed from Tibawi, Alatas, Abdel-Malik, Talal Asad, Ramila Thapar and others but did not give credit to any them (Sardar, 1999, p.65). A series of objections include the accusation that the achievement of Orientals are ignored by this study whilst evidence shows that the two civilisations have a shared essence recorded in great books; “Orientalism” still relies heavily on medieval images of Islam and, hence, it looks like “discarding old-fashioned clothes in favour of more modern attire” (ibid, p.58). Furthermore, Sardar cites a number of scholars who, like him, note that the idea of ‘humanism’ is vague because it “offers no alternative to the discourse it critiques”. Here, Sardar states that there should be an option other than a “secular humanism and its high culture” (ibid, p.73-74).

Similarly, Said blames religion as the prime cause of conflict and human suffering but at the same time ignores the secular ideologies behind Marxism, Stalinism, Maoism, Pol Pot nationalism, modernity and other notions that have helped produce violence far greater than any religious wars in recent memory (ibid., p.75). In fact, Sardar points out that “Humanism came to Europe from Islam in the twelfth century along with the vast corpus of Muslim scholarship” that Said refuses to credit (ibid).
However, Mathieu Courville (2010) advocates Said’s stance on secularism and dismisses his critics such as William D. Hart, Bernard Lewis and Martin Kramer, which shows that Said’s authority on “Orientalism” discourse remains resilient. Several other critics such as Varisco see “Orientalism” as limited in scope and also “unidirectional”. However, despite differences on several issues with Said, Varisco acknowledges that critics want to “strengthen” rather than “jettison” Said’s achievements because Said in fact provides them with a reason to discuss and debate a strand of scholarship (ibid). In addition, Sardar refers to Maryam Jameelah’s work which is based on six main orientalists and concludes that “Orientalism is not a dispassionate, objective study of Islam and its culture by the erudite faithful in the best tradition of scholarship” (ibid, p.56).

3.8- Orientalism: Relevance in Contemporary Debates on Islam and Muslims.

The contemporary debates on Islam and Muslims are largely based on Western models of society, culture and citizenry within these broad themes, including way of life, beliefs, and science as well as systems of governance, knowledge, thoughts and values. Altogether, these notions sketch the chain of debates; for instance, democracy is attached to system of governance which gives an edge to the West in many ways over its opponent the Orient at this moment of history. Said’s viewpoint that ‘Orientalism is a system of thoughts’ is perfectly in tune with the present-day Orientalist perspective that employs different phrases to achieve its imperial ambitions in a polite manner. For instance, for Zillah Eisenstein, “Terrorism is equated with ‘jihad’ which is equated with holy wars and death” (Eisenstein, 2004, p.154).

This enables America and the West to naturally define ‘jihad’ from their own standpoint which incorporates their political mission. Possibly, other countries also interpret their position from their own standards. Eisenstein illustrates with reference to the US president’s mentioning “of the war as Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice; the antiterrorism bill was renamed the Patriot Bill” (ibid). Said mentions that, “the scope of Orientalism exactly matched the scope of empire”. This brings the crisis in history which is still on-going. Considering American and Western imperial ambitions, Said’s idea is still valid and it helps Orientalists to redefine circumstances that suit their aims. In the same vein, the current debate on women and their role in society has been transformed according to the wishes of the West at large which uses it as a pretext to demonise Islam and at same time establish Western hegemony and legacy.
In recent years, the West has covered up its wars using the popular notions of freedom, justice and liberation of women. The Western governments’ recent wars and their support for dictators and radical groups in some parts of the Muslim world have affected their fine tradition of Western democracy. There are many different types of democracy and rarely have wars involving Western powers ever been fought for any vision of democracy. Consequently, some scholars have begun to raise questions over the well-marketed idea that democracy is the essence of Western governance.

Robertson says, “We should put democratic West in inverted commas” (Robertson, 2014). Robertson’s ideas have probably always been right. In addition, Eisenstein illustrates that the West often misleads individuals about the idea of democracy because it “was founded on slavery”, and given the practice of Caribbean slavery including sexual slavery, rapes, killings and other forms of dehumanisation that still continue today, the “Western Enlightenment theory as democratic” lost its real meanings (ibid, p.74-84). However, it is important to note that there is not one single system of democracy but, rather, many types that all urge different things. For example, there is the British parliamentary democracy, which allows a significant minority to control politics, a proportional representation system in the Netherlands, which allows all voters to return parties according to the proportion of the vote they receive, or other forms, all of which have different strengthens and weaknesses and different structures and relationships.

The Western debate on women in the contemporary period is a fine example of redesigning the “Orientalism” discourse to attract public attention to the idea that the West is actively liberating Muslim women from oppression and male captivity. At best, Eisenstein summarises the debate by saying that the Americans skilfully used the feminism theory to “successfully call world attention to the Taliban’s horrific treatment of Afghan women”, and for this purpose the discourse on the burqa and women’s rights campaigns were sold to the public as if they were aimed at the ‘protection’ of women, thus encouraging Western people to sympathise with the women and endorse war (ibid, 148-152).

Furthermore, she states that the Quran has women-friendly teachings but unfortunately these are ignored at the international level even though half a billion Muslim women in the world “re-appropriate the veil for access rather than seclusion; diversify diversity
the meaning of dress codes to express their freedom”; now, when things are worsening as a result of the invasion, Laura Bush is silent (ibid, 153-167). Evidence shows that Laura Bush’s justification of the invasion of Afghanistan by suggesting that it was aimed at improving the lives of Afghan women was duplicitous (see The Guardian, 20 September 2002; The Guardian, 12 February 2004). A long list of Western scholars who criticise Laura Bush for misusing feminist ideas to justify the invasion of Afghanistan include Friedman (2005, p.29), Green (2015, p.133), Greenberg (2014) and Sheehi (2011).

The English Orientalists, Stanley Lane-Pool and Evelyn Baring, who took the title of Earl of Cromer, wrote extensively on Egyptians without having knowledge of their language; Cromer became famous as an authority on Egyptians and said that “Islam keeps women subjugated” (cited in Lockman, 2004, p.93-94). This Orientalist approach shows what Eisenstein describes as a “state of mind, a set of privileged cultural values” (ibid, p.74). It means that everything that the West does is for ‘good’ and it has a legitimate right to intervene; therefore the debate on Drones attacks is wrapped up in humanitarian assistance (Benjamin, 2013; Gardner, 2013).

The next example, from a Time Magazine cover page story, best sums up the Orientalist’s mind which for Sabine Schiffer (2010), is an illustration of ‘selectively mentioning and omitting, emphasising and de-emphasising facts’, suggesting that the framing of Muslim women is used to escalate the war in Afghanistan which is hugely opposed by the ordinary European people (Schiffer, 2010, p.2). She argues that these frames indicate that, in the Western discourse, “humanitarian intervention in the Muslim world” is a legitimate case and that ‘Islam is a threat’ to our freedom (ibid). Abu-Lughod (2002) states that the war on terror is intended to save Muslim women and, in the words of Lockman, it shows the politics of “Orientalism”.

In comparison to Said’s critics, a large body of texts recognises his concept and admits that it is even more applicable in modern times (see Jakimów, 2012; Lennon, 2004; Paschyn, 2014). These writings trace the image of Islam that the West purposely distorted and altered during different periods of history. This strengthens Said’s point of view, although he himself was secular and more of a Westerner. But years ago he senses that the “present crisis dramatizes the disparity between texts and reality” (Said, 1978, p.109).
Abu el-Haj finds that Orientalism dates back to ancient Greece and supports Said’s idea that the Orient is how Europe imagines the East and reflects the fact that “Europe is powerful and articulate; Asia is defeated and distant” (ibid, 63). Similarly, Zachary Lockman points out the image of Ottoman Turks, who were “often depicted as cruel, violent and fanatical, in ways that drew on long-prevalent caricatures of Islam” (Lockman, 2004, 42). Most writings of the past portray Turks as cruel, murderous and corrupt and as rapists (see Barbour, 2003; Macfie, 2007; Crinson, 2013). In addition, Said exposes the “sources of Orientalism” that Orientalists use to sketch the image of ‘other’, such as a “Lustful Turk” (ibid).

For Lockman, the ‘Orient’ is a special field of humanities that refers to the study of languages, cultures, histories and religions of a particular ‘Orient’, which emerged as “Orientalism”. Lockman finds that Europeans use a French term “the Levant” which means “land where the sun rises” and is located predominantly in Muslim Asia; he considers that “Islam was central” to this new branch of knowledge (Lockman, 2004, p.44). Lockman’s analysis shows that Ottoman Turks (Muslims) and their society was presented in Europe as backward while they were seen as “boorish, ignorant, dishonourable, immoral, ineffectual, corrupt and irrational”; thus, the original image of the Ottoman state “as an efficient, just, virtuous and tolerant meritocracy faded away, to be replaced by a depiction of that state as corrupt, oppressive and brutal” (ibid., p. 45-46).

This shows that the “Orientalism” discourse is used to reconstruct and reframe others using terms and phrases that fulfil the purpose. Decades have passed but the Muslim image in the West has changed little; that image is of “Sleazy” men who have desires for white girls, whom Jack Straw describes as “easy meat” (2011). Perhaps the fair complexion is only known to Europe and in the rest of the world people are ugly and non-white. Marilyn Nassr (2008) studies the image of Arabs and Islam in French textbooks that consist of tales of the pre-Islamic period such as the Paranoiac origin representing Arabs as mythical characters (Nassr, 2008, p. 225). However, she traces a positive change among a few young writers who portray Arabs no differently from those who hold references to the Middle Ages and colonial periods (ibid, p.230).

Nassr points out that Muslim Spain was more prosperous than Europe but Arab scientists and writers are rarely mentioned (ibid, p.232). Undeniably, early medieval
Muslim scientists laid the foundations of scientific inquiry that opened a pathway for Europe’s modern inventions and discoveries (Al-Khalili, 2012; Lyons, 2010; Morgan, 2008). Conversely, these studies evidently support Said’s claim that “Orientalism” is a ‘product of circumstances’ that may improve or worsen but will not remain constant (Said, 2003, p.2).

Said’s explanation above makes sense because it is evident that Jews, Christians and Muslims have collaborated with each other during certain periods of history in Europe to develop trade and intellectual accomplishment (see Glick, 2005, p.4; Vanoli, 2015, p.30). On the other hand, it is also evident that, for whatever reasons, Islamic history has been distorted. For example, Norman Daniel (1960) procured historic accounts of the distortion of Islamic belief, ideas and history, which starts off with the “formula of St. John of Damascus”, i.e. to denounce everything in which a Muslim believes including his thoughts about the Christ that are true even according to Christianity (Daniel, 1960, p.3). Firstly, in a systematic manner the image of Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) as a true messenger of Allah (God) was replaced with a “feudal”, “incompetent” and pre-Islamic period, Jahiliyah, which was interpreted as the Islamic era (ibid, p.241). Then, “the Scriptural picture of the wild men of the desert, sprung from Ismael, [which] fitted neatly into the idea of a civilized Christendom” was spread far and wide (ibid).

Several Western scholars challenge the closed-mindedness of the Western religious elites and disclose malicious attempts to vilify Islam. For example, Robinson (1999) examines the historical records and writes that Peter the Venerable, the Abbot of Cluny (d.1156), endorsed Latin translations of Quran and other Arabic texts to safeguard the Church, and thus, “Mediaeval biographies of Muhammad (P.B.U.H)...depicted him as an opportunist, an imposter, a lecher and a warmonger” (Robinson, 1999, p.4). However, for R. W. Southern, it is a matter of ignorance of Islam in the Western world, which has failed to understand it, even before the eleventh century. The West “knew nothing of Islam as a religion. For them, “Islam was only one of a large number of enemies threatening Christendom from every direction” (Southern, 1960, p.14). Another point that authorises Orientalism’s relevance to the contemporary period is the fact that after 11 September both Britain and America have continued their “illegal and unsanctioned imperial” ambitions, suggesting that the idea of a “clash of civilizations” is never-ending.
Poole’s (2002) study concludes that, although decades have passed, the media’s way of representing Muslims is somewhat similar; on the other hand, Muslims have emerged as a powerful lobbying group, which is having an overall effect on Muslims’ representation (Poole, 2002, p. 253). Later on, she provides another comprehensive text on the same subject of the Muslim presence in the media in 2006 and again finds that, since 9/11 and 7/7, there has been a climate of ‘fear’, ‘threat’, and ‘misunderstanding’ about Islam and Muslims. This is evident in the media reporting which is mostly about “terrorism”, “violence”, and the “War on Terror”, indicating that “Muslim Otherness” is still well and truly alive (Poole and Richardson, 2006).

Another significant work on Islam using Said’s concept of “Orientalism” comes from Sayyid (2003), who calls “Islamic fundamentalism” a type of “Orientalism” and suggests that “representations of the Orient are based on textual exegesis rather than modern Oriental realities” and perhaps that is why “the oriental is unchanging, uniform and incapable of describing itself” (Sayyid, 2003, p. 31-51). Given the circumstances, he calls Muslim representation “Weak Orientalism” (ibid, p.39). Furthermore, he provides an example of representations of the “white man” as “European” or “English” and argues that, in the same way, the representation of “Muslims” tends to appear in media settings such as “Saudi” or any other “horrific” form of representation that is reserved for Islam. This takes us back to Said’s view of “Orientalism” as a “product of circumstances”, and in present political circumstances the representation of Islam is weak. Sayyid calls it “little Islam” (ibid), meaning that it is in a reduced shape in media settings.

Most importantly, Lockman endorses Said’s idea of “Orientalism” and notes that a number of leading scholars reject criticism of Said’s work for several reasons, such as “the question of terrorism” which is reserved for Muslims and tagged with Islam (Lockman, 2004, p.223). Given the present circumstances and the representation of Muslims through the prism of the “War on Terror”, Lockman’s study offers a historical discourse of ‘terrorism’ that reflects how, during the colonial period, government officials used phrases such as “disturbances”, “riots”, and “troubles” to present themselves as peacekeepers or helpers whilst Muslims were the ‘bad guys’ (ibid, p. 228-229). For Nadia Abu El-Haj, Said’s main concern is the problem of representation and the way human beings distinguish between themselves and others (Abu El-Haj, 2013, p.58).
3.9- The Current State of Affairs: The Re-Emergence of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’.

In the current circumstances, the media portrayals of Islam and the Muslims echo Cohen’s concept of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’ (1972), in which he discussed how the British media identified and symbolised an existing subculture, ‘the Mods and Rockers’, in British society. Cohen’s analysis brings out three key elements of the media reporting relating to ‘the Mods and Rockers’: ‘Exaggeration and distortion’, ‘prediction’, and ‘symbolisation’.

Cohen finds that the media overstated the situation by offering distorted facts and figures, images and sound bites recorded with local people and youths, and used words such as ‘warriors’, ‘invade’, ‘young Hooligans’, ‘stabbing’, ‘stoning’, and ‘terror on the beaches’. Furthermore, Cohen’s analysis finds that the media reporting predicted the reoccurrence of similar events in the future unless the authorities dealt with ‘the Mods and Rockers’ severely. Thus, the media also use words such as ‘terror’, ‘invade’, and ‘stabbing’ to link this particular event with unknown future events. The following diagram shows the formulation of Cohen’s concept and the related government response.

**Diagram 3.1:** The Formulation of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’.

The above diagram explains Cohen’s concept in the form of a classic formulation of moral panic that shows how the media skilfully fabricate certain events and present them to the general public in a way that creates panic and increases fear. In the next phase, the media publish surveys, opinion polls, and distorted facts and figures relating to such an event or problem and then transform them into a campaign involving various political and activist groups; consequently, the authorities are pressed into tougher action against certain groups of people that they think cause problems for society at large.

In regard to examining the representation of Islam in the media, Cohen’s model seems more reliable, valid, and relevant because it doesn’t concede the sole power of the media in identifying certain groups of people as threats; rather, the media mobilise politicians, pressure groups, the general public and government officials to form a concrete and agreed opinion that certain groups of people are sources of moral panic and folk devils in society and that we should do something about them. Welch (2005) points out that “Moral panics lead to production of and persecution of folk devils” (Welch, 2005, p.120). In the past two decades, ‘The Question of the New Muslim’ has received currency as a result of the hostile media coverage of Islam and Muslims. There have been several significant studies in the past few years such as those by Alexander et al. (2013) and Ameli et al. (2007).

Several sociologists, criminologists and anthropologists have applied Cohen’s idea to examine various case-studies across a wide range of subjects such as the social construction of deviance which includes youth subcultures, muggings, school violence, single mothers, drugs, crime, pornography, child abuse, welfare issues, refugees, asylum seekers, gypsies, and, most relevant to my own study, the wearing of the veil, Sharia law, and terrorism. Around twenty major studies employ Cohen’s concept of “Folk Devils and Moral Panics” including Acton (1994), Ben-Yehuda (1990), Hayle (2013) and Massey and Singh (2012).

It is worth noting that Cohen’s concept of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’ has been used in several leading studies in association with Islam and British Muslims in particular, possibly because a series of events since the 1980s in which British Muslims have been connected with violence and social disturbances. In 1989, Muslims in the city of Bradford in the north of England protested and raised their concerns over Salman
Rushdie’s controversial book *The Satanic Verses* (1988) which sparked anger among British Muslims in other cities across the UK. To an extent, the British press coverage of these protests displayed elements of what Cohen described as “Folk Devils and Moral Panics” (see Morgan and Poynting *et al.*, 2012; Shain, 2011).

Other scholars such as Massey and Tatla (2012), who studied the media representation of British Muslims in the wake of the Bradford riots of 7 July 2011, find that British Muslims became the “folk devils” in the press coverage that associated them with violence and a threat to society at large. Massey and Tatla reviewed a number of scholarly studies (Abbas, 2007; Allen, 2004; Alexander, 2000 and 2004; Amin, 2003; Kundnani, 2007) and pointed out that media coverage of the Bradford riots argued that the issue was not “Nationality” but in fact “religion”, meaning Islam (Massey and Tatla, 2012, p. 163). Similarly, Morgan and Poynting argue that the “Muslim ‘other’ has become a ‘folk devil’ of our time” (Morgan and Poynting, 2012, p.1). In the same vein, Messey (2012) points out that the problematic labels attached to Muslims, such as failing to ‘integrate’ and being singled out as ‘criminally blameworthy’, present them as ‘modern folk devils’ (Messey, 2012, p.1). In brief, the riots of 2001 gave rise to Islamophobia and anti-Muslim feelings among society, which fuelled a “fear of Islam” (Massey and Tatla, 2012, p. 173).

Many other scholars, such as Salgado-Pottier (2008), assume that British Muslims are ‘modern’ “folk devils”. Frost (2007) also finds that Muslims “are ‘folk devils; of the twenty-first century” (Frost, 2007, p.570) whereas, for Alexander (2000, p.15), “Muslims have then, ironically, become the new ‘black’ with all the associations of cultural alienation, deprivation and danger that come with this position” (cited in Salgado-Pottier, 2008). In addition, Shooman and Spielhaus (2010) assume that moral panic stems from the hostility of a group of people who are presented as a ‘threat’ to society and are continuously exaggerated in the media (Shooman and Spielhaus, 2010, p.200). Hence, to them “the concept of moral panic describes states of collective hysteria” (ibid, p.200).

Given the British Muslims’ media representations, Shooman and Spielhaus’s argument seems valid because in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 British Muslims were represented as a group that has become a threat to British society. Swedenburg (2010) writes of the “… public fears in Britain that Muslims in the country not only possess an alien culture, but
also pose a serious security threat... the general public that has been enabled by all the successive 'moral panics' surrounding Muslims” (Swedenburg, 2010, p.298).

In her book review of *Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic in the West*, Katherine Brown (2014) shows that the contributors to this edited volume find a common theme, “Islamophobia”, in connection with the media portrayals of Muslims (Brown, 2014, p.866). Brown pointed out that sections of the press reports reflected the presence of “Folk Devils” using a portrayal of an allegedly radical hate preacher Abu Hamza (ibid, p.865). Brown related her own previous study with this edited volume and pointed out that although the media’s scapegoating and stereotypical attitudes have badly affected British Muslim communities, they have not been “silent and passive”; rather, British Muslims “have protested, sought protective legislation, created their own media networks, and demanded participation in political systems” (Brown, 2010; 2014, p.866).

One of the notable features of Cohen’s concept is that he does not simply hold the media responsible for being a driving force behind the panic but, rather, sees them as one of the driving forces behind the fear and perceived threat of certain groups of people in society. Through a narrow lens, it appears that politicians, pressure groups, press and the public all play their part collectively in declaring certain groups ‘folk devils’, with their actions or perhaps way of life being seen as causing ‘moral panic’ (see Critcher, 2003). Consider a short paragraph from Said’s work: “The media, the government, the geopolitical strategists, and - although they are marginal to the culture at large - the academic experts on Islam are all in concert: Islam is a threat to Western civilisation” (Said, 1997, p.144).

Although this research only analyses broadsheets (quality press) to discuss the representation of Muslims, it takes into account a few randomly selected front pages from tabloids: “Muslims Tell British: Go To Hell!” and “Now Muslims Get Their Own Laws in Britain”; front-page incitement (*Daily Express*, 4 November 2010 and 30 April 2007); “Muslim-Only Public Loos” (*Daily Star*, 15 July 2010); “Britain Goes Halal” (*Daily Mail*, 19 September 2010). These randomly selected newspaper front-page images and headlines clearly display a uniformity in using the word “Muslims” in its plural form, suggesting that the media adopt a collective approach to representing Muslims as
problematic “Others” and aliens in the larger society. One could say that many newspapers make the same representations for other groups, such as trade unions.

The previous examples are just a few of the hundreds if not thousands that perhaps remind us of Said’s view: “Accuracy was never a virtue of media” (Said, 1997, p.109). In short, these descriptions also validate the view of Cohen, who uses white British youngsters, the “Mods and Rockers”, as a case-study to show how the British press presents and exaggerates issues and sometimes even constructs and produces events that become panics. It is evident that the British media often demonise working-class, immigrant communities, ‘chavs’ and all those they identify as outsiders. Philo et al. (1982) conclude that certain stories do not qualify to appear in headlines simply because they do not fit the newspaper’s framework and ideological perspective on certain issues (Philo et al., 1982, 134). This may not be an exclusive parade of the overall media but it could possibly be applied to large media groups in the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds that are owned by wealthy businessman and states in many countries.

Forty years on, the press is testament to the fact that Cohen’s analysis of the ‘media aggregating and misleading published facts’ was correct. Let us consider a case in point. The _Independent_ published an investigative report by Robin Stummer on 4 April 2004 that included an interview with David Cooke, a Brighton-based ‘Mod Ephemera’, who said: “There are famous photographs taken in Brighton where the photographer paid the lads a few shillings...Quite a few people know that photographs were set up in Brighton” (_The Independent_, 4 April 2004). This sort of distortion in the media reports on Mods and Rockers is also traceable in a documentary, ‘In the Living Memory’, broadcast on Radio 4 in 2004. On other hand, some scholars may point out that this description appears as “self-evident”; however, situations always change.

### 3.10-Criticism of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’:

Despite its relevance, validity and considerable visibility in the field of sociology and criminology studies, a growing number of studies also suggest that we rethink the concept of ‘folk devils and moral panics’ in present times. Sociologist Salman Sayyid stated that it is ‘old-fashioned’ because it was coined to describe the bad behaviour of a few young boys (Sayyid, 2013). Sheldon Ungar (2001) also considers that, since the concept of ‘folk devils’ is typically identified with the evil doings of an individual or
group of individuals who, according to Cohen’s definition, “encompass not only ‘persons or groups of persons’ but also ‘conditions’ and ‘episodes’”, it is therefore irrelevant now (Ungar, 2001, p.272).

Ungar provides the example of ‘elite panic over Swine Flu in USA’, which to him doesn’t ‘fall under the folk devils rubric’ (Ungar, 2001, p.272); he embraces the changing nature of society and hence recommends Beck’s (1992) concept of ‘risk society’, rather than ‘moral panic’, because he thinks that ‘society anxiety’ has emerged alongside ‘moral panics’ as a result of advanced industrialisation and scientific development in the past four decades. In the same vein, Angela McRobbie and Sarah L. Thornton object to the concepts of “high rate of turnover and the increasing tendency to label all kinds of media events as ‘moral panics’”; therefore, the concept needs to be reconsidered in terms of its ‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’ (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995, p.560).

McRobbie’s point of view has been widely recognised. She states that “we live in postmodern moral panics, when the moral panics can no longer proceed unchallenged and cannot therefore be used to justify new measures of social control” (cited in Hunt, 1997, p.644). Moreover, Hunt extends her point that “folk devils hardly changed from Cohen’s original model” ibid. These are significant assumptions because Cohen’s “folk devils” were originally neither outsiders in the sense of “foreign” nor racial “others” but were in fact representatives of a subculture within a wider Westernised society.

Another significant point to remember is that Cohen’s idea was founded on labelling theory, which mainly deals with youth subcultures. Applying these points in the context of Britain, McRobbie’s suggestion is valid; i.e. the “folk devils” phenomenon has hardly changed because new “folk devils” have emerged from another subculture, the inner cities of the North of England. These are mainly “Asian British-born Muslims” often linked with “riots”, “crimes” and, in the aftermath of the 7/7 incident, “radicalisation”, “extremism” and “terrorism”; these are far more dangerous crimes than those with which previous “folk devils” have been tagged.

For Rayen Salgado-Pottier (2008), this new development suggests a change in the “folk devil” phenomenon from “ethnicity” to present-day “race”, which means that “Muslims” come into view as the new “Blacks” (Salgado-Pottier, 2008, p.4; Alexander, 2000, p.15). Based on other scholars’ citations, Salgado-Pottier asserts that each generation is different from the previous one, thus changing the “youth deviance” from “mods” and
“ punks” to black youths who posed a threat to the peaceful ‘British way of life’ by involving themselves in “mugging” (Salgado-Pottier, 2008, p.3). Now, if we further extend this point to the contemporary period and apply it to the same British society, “Muslim youths” have now replaced “black”; hence, the panic has also changed from bad to worse because of the nature of the threat to British society.

Tina Patel (2013) states that the new panic, i.e. the “terror panic” heralded by a dangerous new “folk devil”, the “Islamic terrorist”, is worse than the previous ones (Patel, 2013, p.34). In the same vein, Felix Odartey-Wellington describes the moral panic over “Islamic terrorism” as “racial profiling” which emerges from the arrests of terror suspects, mainly "Muslims"; he calls this an “operation thread” pushed jointly by the media and security agents (Felix Odartey-Wellington, 2009, p.25-28). However, it seems unrealistic to consider “Islamic terrorism” a moral panic given the contested and controversial nature of the term itself; moreover, the initial description of “folk devils” in terms of culture and actions hardly matches up with Muslims. Notably, Cohen does not extend his concept to Irish troublemakers, who are often related to present-day British-born Muslim radicals.

One of the criticisms of Cohen’s work, according to J. C. Davis (1986), is that Cohen’s idea is not “about real deviance, or about real activities subsequently classified as deviant, but about manufacturing of the chimera of the existence of those activities” (cited in Hunt, 1997, p.633). However, in the preface of Cohen’s 1980 edition, Cohen himself writes that he is self-conscious about some missing features of his work; indeed, Hunt writes that Cohen “is guilty of a certain timelessness, an unveiling of a set of consequences insulated from history and politics” (ibid., p.633).

Further, in Cohen’s third edition (2002) he states that he is ‘reviewing uses and criticisms of the concept over the last thirty years’; hence, this edition shows the validity and relevance of the concept after viewing the media events that occurred during this time period. McRobbie and Thornton suggest that the term has lost its meanings and that it is time to revise “the process of constructing a moral panic” because “folk devils were less marginalised than they once were [and] they not only find themselves vociferously and articulately supported in the same mass media that castigates them, but their interests are also defended by their own niche and macro media” (McRobbie and Thornton 1995, p.559).
In the current circumstances, McRobbie and Thornton’s point seems valid, particularly with the increase in terrorists’ usage of online blogs, video messaging and social networking sites, not to mention their growing presence in the mainstream media. On the other hand, Bill Thompson and Andy Williams (2013) question the concept of moral panic, which they consider irrational to the extent that every event is identified as a moral panic. Thompson and Williams say that a “large number of panics, descriptive and generic, have no justification whatsoever (sic)” (Thompson and Williams, 2013, p.9). They conclude that “Mods and Rockers proved that media did not have the effects ascribed to it” (Thompson and Williams, 2013, p.242). However, Cohen argues that “The mass media, in fact, devote a great deal of space to deviance, sensational crimes, scandals, bizarre happenings and strange goings on” (Cohen, 1973, p.17). Now, almost 40 years have passed and even today the front pages of the red-top tabloids endorse Cohen’s assumption. In addition, during those years Cohen mentions ‘over-reporting’ and ‘misleading headlines’ which are still prevalent in the tabloids and other sections of the media (Cohen, 1973, p.32).

Various case-studies have investigated a wide range of subjects related to the social construction of deviance, including youth subcultures, muggings, school violence, single mothers, drugs, crime, pornography, child abuse, welfare issues, refugees, asylum seekers, gypsies, and, most relevant to my own study, the wearing of the veil, Sharia law and terrorism. Some of the significant studies in this long list include those by Ben-Yehuda (1990) Hayle (2013), Jenkins (1992a, 1998b) and Pearson (1995). Equally, there are a number of rival scholarly voices who have contrasting opinions of ‘folk devils and moral panics’, such as Garland (2008), Davis (1986) and Springhall (1994).

In sum, those who criticise Cohen’s concept argue that it is a controversial sociological concept that is primarily based on a sensationalist media response to a problem that emerged from a youth subculture (see Heir et al., 2011; Hall et al., 1978; Hall, 2012). Despite these criticisms, scholars continue to apply Cohen's ideas to modern-day social problems and the way the media act in response to them. Evidently, in regard to Muslim issues, media coverage of a number of events suggests that Muslims have now become the new folk devils, like Irish Catholics (Greenslade, 2014; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Nickels et al., 2011).

3.11-Strengths and Weaknesses of the idea of Folk Devils and Moral Panics:
Yvonne Jewkes (2015) argues that the rise of social media has brought huge change to the landscape of crime news. Of course, in the most recent terrorist events, especially the 7/7 incident, eye witnesses captured the shocking footage on their mobile phone cameras. Jewkes also considers these new developments in the field of media and extends her study, which is based on the Boston Marathon Bombing of 15 April 2013 and the murder of a British non-combatant soldier, Lee Rigby, in Woolwich, London (2013). She relates these crimes to Cohen’s concept and concludes that, despite some “fundamental flaws”, Cohen’s idea is still valid and useful because it reflects “genuine public anxieties” (Jewkes, 2015). Kirsten Drotner (1999) suggests that one of the drawbacks of Cohen’s concept is that “it is rooted in conflict of interest - at community and societal levels - and the presence of power differentials which leave some groups vulnerable to such attacks” (Drotner, 1999, p.597). Further, Drotner states that, based on the “mods and rockers” case-study, the mass media and the press may build a negative image of a certain group, which leads to the stigmatising of a particular community or faith group (ibid).

Another weakness of Cohen’s concept is that it focuses heavily on the press sources in the creation of a moral panic, thereby limiting the roles of other factors in the creation of the panic and suggesting that the “press itself orchestrates public opinion” (Drotner, 1999, p.598). One of its strengths may be that growing concerns over one particular youth group’s activities, such as British Muslim youths’ radicalisation, will improve the “possibility of policy reform in the present time which can properly avert a tragic and dangerous future” (see Justen, 2011).

3.12- Justification of Adapting Cohen’s Concept, ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’:

Since its inception over forty years ago, Cohen’s concept of “folk devils and moral panics” has been continually applied to locate its significance and connection with several issues classed as “moral panics”, such as drugs, crimes, pornography, child abuse, welfare issues, refugees, asylum seekers and gypsies (see Ainley, 2005; Cree, Clapton and Smith, 2016; Morgan and Poynting et al., 2013; Pearson, 1983). Given the rapid developments in the media universe as well as in academia, it seems pertinent to apply this concept to discern its relevance, in regard to terror events, particularly this thesis’s examination of the 7/7 event. At the time of its inception, the concept was particularly associated with the press, which was accused of creating moral panics,
especially in the case of “mods and rockers”. Although this thesis examines press reporting, to capture developments in social and economic fields it asserts that there were eye witnesses to the 7/7 incident with mobile phone cameras, whilst social networking sites, blogs and other modern forms of communication were peddling fictions. Even since this concept was developed, scholars have suggested that the media and press power and influence are undoubtedly present, but they alone are not sufficient to create moral panics. This is therefore a valid reason to test the original idea in the contemporary period in terms of its developments and relevance.

3.13- Relevance and Usefulness of “Folk Devils and Moral Panics”:

In the context of the London bombings and the resulting representations of British Muslims, the concept of folk devils and moral panics clearly fits the circumstances of the aftermath. Of course, despite convincing influence, the media alone seem less capable of creating panic. Realistically, this is a significant point that is observable in the 7/7 reporting because almost every panic begins with situations and events in which the media are an agency raising concern. For example, Muslim women’s traditional veil was known to British society long before the London bombings but it suddenly became a panic because of the 7/7 incident and the reaction to it. This was evident in Jack Straw’s column in the Blackburn-based Lancashire Telegraph in the first week of October 2006. This column led to a heated debate in Britain that reached the point where The Daily Telegraph backed the idea of proposing a ban on it, as in France (At Home in Europe Project, 2015; Kabir, 2010, p.148, The Daily Telegraph, 13 and 15 September 2013; 18 January 2016). The point is that the press played the role of a courier by facilitating and allocating a space to a well-known politician who initiated a debate that sparked resentment among the wider public. Thus, the process of turning the veil into an immense panic itself testifies to the relevance and usefulness of the notion of ‘folk devils and moral panics’. However, it is equally evident that in some situations it is the press that starts off campaigns leading to panics.

3.14-‘The West’ and ‘the Rest’:

Another important discourse relating to ethnic minorities’ representation is Stuart Hall’s series of studies (conducted in 1972, 1985, 1989 and 1992). These establish the foundation of ethnic minorities’ representation, particularly the thesis “The West and
the Rest: Discourse and Power” (1985), which broadens our understanding of the concept: “The discourse as a ‘system of representation’ represents the world as divided according to a simple dichotomy - the West/the Rest. That is what makes the discourse of ‘the West and the Rest’ so destructive... [it] constructs an over-simplified conception of ‘difference’” (Hall, 1992, p. 280).

To Hall (1992, p. 277), “[The West] is actually an idea, a concept” which shows certain traits such as ‘modern’, ‘advanced’, and so on. In reality, however, he is not quite so convinced by this idea for a number of reasons which he illustrates in his lengthy writings. For instance, Hall borrows from the historian John Roberts, saying that “Europeans have long been unsure about where Europe ‘ends’ in the East” (ibid., p. 149). Therefore, Hall suggests that “the West and the Rest became two sides of a single coin” (ibid, p278).

Although still engaging in conflict, somehow on many fronts their mutual cooperation has opened up a gateway to human discovery and development in several fields. Hence, each needs the other; for instance, the growing Asian economies have opened doors for Europeans migrants to the Middle East, China and India. The term ‘the West’ often appears in books, newspaper columns, and everyday discussions and debates surrounding present-day issues. In many parts of the world, being ‘Western’ means being successful, bright and open-minded.

Thus, the notion of linking ‘modernism’ echoes the words of the historian John Roberts: “Europeans have long been unsure about where Europe ‘ends’ in the East” (Roberts, 1985, p 149). However, in the academic world, this discourse is considered one of concrete authority on a scale that is useful for measuring both the image of the ‘others’ in the Western mind as well as the West’s relationship with the rest of the world.

Stuart Hall’s thesis is applicable to and relevant in the field of cultural studies. In particular, in dealing with the problem of the portrayal of Muslims in the British press and its effects in Britain and outside the Muslim world, one may assume that this thesis will help us to understand the original problem. Hall’s book, West and the Rest: Discourse and Power, begins with the assertion that the “ideas of ‘East’ and ‘West’ have never been free of myth and fantasy, and even to his day they are not primarily ideas about place and geography” (Hall, 1985).
Without a doubt, Western advancements in the fields of science, its modern values, and its democratic traditions since World Wars I and II have inspired many in the world, who have begun to associate it with modernism and accomplishment. Hall suggests that ‘many societies aspire to become western,’ (Hall, 1985, p.276). Hall states that, “by “Western”, we mean the type of society that is developed, industrialised, urbanised, capitalist, secular, and modern... such societies arose at a particular historical period - roughly, during the sixteenth century after the breakup of feudalism” (ibid, p.277). Hall continues by explaining that we [the entire population of the world] have come to a point where, regardless of geographical locations or other faiths, people link the above-mentioned characteristics with ‘the West’, which then suggests that the term ‘the West’ is ‘therefore identical to that of the word ‘modern’” (ibid., p.277).

Hall concludes that “‘The West’ is ‘an idea’ and a ‘concept’ that has four major components including the characterisation and classification of societies into various groups such as ‘Western’ and ‘non-Westerner’ (ibid, p.278). Next is the ‘image’ or ‘set of images’ that explains the idea of the West, for example ‘Western’=urban=developed or ‘non-Western’=non-industrial=rural=agricultural=underdeveloped” (ibid).

The third component suggests that “it provides a standard or model of comparison”; fourthly, it offers ‘certain criteria of evolution’, for example “the West=developed=good=desirable”, that also delivers some “kind of knowledge about the subject and a certain attitude” that shows it is an ideology (ibid). The discussion on the ‘West and the Rest’ thesis reaches a point where Hall mentions that “The West and the Rest became two sides of a single coin” (ibid).

Based on his concept, further probing into this subject indicates that his predictions are evident in the changing world where ‘the West’ as an idea is weak in many ways. For example, on the economic front the West is losing its grip because the world’s four leading economies are now America, China, Japan and India. This is reflected in an article ‘The risk of a Eurozone break-up,’ published in The Guardian on 2 April 2013. For some analysts, it is also losing authority in science, the arts, education and technology (see Mahbubani, 2009; Shenkar, 2006).

With regard to the field of education, Steve Johnson wrote a report called “Investment: Asia is ahead in continuing education” published on 18 June, 2012, in The Financial
Returning to Hall’s thesis, it is worth considering his view that the weaknesses of ‘the West’ as a concept might be seen as “unified and homogenous, essentially one place, with one view about other cultures and one way of speaking about them”. Of course, this is not the case because “The West” has always experienced several internal differences among European nations (Hall, 1985, p. 280). Examples supporting Hall’s argument include the debates on growing pro-self-rule movements inside Europe, such as Scotland and Catalonia, which may give rise to nationalist thoughts within a ‘united Europe’; hence, the idea of the West is not perpetual. Perhaps for this very reason Hall also considers “The West and the Rest” discourse to be “destructive because it draws crude and simplistic distinctions and constructs an over-simplified conception of ‘difference’” (ibid).

Roger Scruton (2002) summarises: “The difference between the West and the rest is that Western societies are governed by politics; the rest are ruled by power” (Scruton, 2002, p. 7). Scruton’s inquiry mostly deals with Islam and the war on terror, which to him originates from the idea of ‘freedom’ because the Western view of the war on terror lies in defending its liberty and freedom. His key theme in this discussion relating to ‘the West and the rest’ is religion.

Scruton argues that, in the West, religion has now been replaced by secular thought whilst in the Muslim world religion still holds a key position in social life. He states that the Ottomans used the millet system which means ‘nation’, ‘a creed community’ or ‘sect’; they “included Christians and Muslims, Jews, Druze and Alawites, the last two groups originating from the different sects of Islam” (ibid, p. 26). On the contrary, the modern Western notion of multiculturalism differs from Scruton’s example of the Ottomans in many ways, such as banning minarets and veils and implementing other anti-Muslim policies. On the whole, the thesis “The West and the Rest” is a little problematic although it is relevant to Muslims and in some cases other ethnic minorities’ representation in the media and polity.

Accordingly, Bonnett (2004) finds that the use of terms such as “the West” and “Westerner”, from the early writings of Toynbee (1923) to Said (1978), are perhaps uneasy and “a strange and ungainly label” that frequently appear in the daily news (Bonnett, 2004, p. 1). He objects to the use of the term “the West” and thinks that, in the
post-9/11 and 7/7 world, the ‘radical Islamists’ and ‘Al-Qa’idah’ use ‘anti-Westernism’ as a key excuse for violence against the West. He calls the rise of anti-West feelings a “clash of utopias” and also includes “communist regimes” in Russia and China, which also contributed to and promoted anti-Westernism (ibid, p.144).

This review raises some key issues - for instance whether the clash between ‘the West’ (Secular) and ‘the Rest’ (Islam) is based on religion. Arguably, the media’s representation of Muslims in the current scenario is largely based on the narrative of terrorists and violent extremists but in fact they have distorted and self-constructed the image of Islam as the complete opposite of Islamic teachings. Moreover, most Muslim countries are of a secular nature, such as Turkey and Syria, whereas Saudi Arabia and Iran clearly have political and religious autocracies that use their leverage to mould Islamic rulings.

This is somewhat similar in ‘the West’ which is largely presented as secular whilst Christianity is still an official religion, such as in Britain and Orthodox Russia. Even in Ireland - a supposedly secular nation - abortion remains illegal for religious reasons despite growing pressure to give women control over their own bodies (The Guardian, 11 February 2016). On other hand, a Muslim country, Bosnia, imposed a ban on the wearing of hijabs in court and the Tajikistan government forces thousands of Muslim males to shave off their beards (Arab News, 8 February 2016; Al-Jazeera, 21 January 2016). Essentially, both sides blame religion for their social and cultural problems and stress that the clash between ‘the rest’ and the West’ lies in religion, which is arguably a fragile description.

In brief, this chapter identifies a set of questions and themes that it aims to discuss in the following theme chapters. The set of questions and themes arising include the following: the reasons behind the construction of an "Islamic terrorism"; the representation of Muslims as a “threat” to the secular West under the premise of Orientalism; and whether the media are the only driving force behind moral panics. It has also sought to reveal whether terrorism is religiously driven or is a politically motivated idea. Briefly, in examining the responses of two newspapers, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, to the events of 7/7, one has to address a number of questions. To what extent were these papers reflecting the Orientalism of the past? To what extent
were they driving the debate and the moral crisis of the time? To what extent do they reflect the different attitudes towards religion and secular matters?
Chapter 4: Methodology:

Given that the representation of British Muslims in sections of the print and broadcast media has been a contentious problem for the last few decades, and that the British-born Muslim suicide bombers' connection with the 7/7 incident has further worsened British Muslims' media representation, it is essential to trace how this came about. In recent years, the 7/7 incident debate has received considerable academic attention fuelled mainly by the power of the press in British society. Accordingly, this thesis aims to examine British Muslims' representation in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph following the landmark cultural, political and ideological event of the London bombings.

This thesis seeks to explore the following key research question - in what ways did the British press represent British Muslims in the wake of 7/7? To answer this fundamental question, I have applied a discourse analysis approach to analyse the representation of British Muslims in the wake of the 7/7 incident in two British broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, within a specified period (8 of July 2005 to 7 of July 2007). Additionally, I intend to discover whether or not British Muslims' media representation became stereotypical, biased, constructive or sympathetic within this specified period.

There are four key components to this chapter. Firstly, it explains the reliability, relevance and validity of the method applied to investigate, for instance, the pattern of news reporting about British Muslims. Secondly, it describes the data collection procedure including a timeframe, selection of articles, and the database search engines that were used to collect the data. Thirdly, it seeks to explain the sampling procedure and rationale behind the choice of two broadsheet newspapers (The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian) and their significance in British society. Fourthly, it provides details of a systematic process that included a coding scheme and the emergence of three major themes in the data.


Before starting to collect the data, I thoroughly reviewed various research methods and their relevance and validity in different academic disciplines. These include quantitative (content analysis) and qualitative (discourse analysis) methods. These traditions are well-known and widely practised in academia. However, I reviewed these methods keeping in view the significance, sensitivity and contemporary developments in the field.
of media representations of British Muslims. In particular, I focused on well-established research techniques that have been applied to study the representation of ethnic minorities. Two significant methods that are widely used in the field of social sciences are discourse analysis and thematic analysis. (Discourse analysis examines the language within a text or speech whereas thematic analysis observes different patterns or themes within specified data). These two methods have somewhat similar ways of sorting and categorising qualitative data but they do so at different levels (see Parker, 2005).

(i) Discourse Analysis:

Marianne W Jørgensen and Louise J Phillips (2002) view discourse as “a form of social action that plays a part in producing the social world - including knowledge, identities and social relations - and thereby in maintaining specific social patterns” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p.5). Evidently, from a sociological viewpoint ‘Discourse Analysis’ is a broader tent that includes academic, media, corporate, political, race and ethnic minority discourses (see Gill, 2008; 2000). Van Dijk finds that, since the 1970s, “discourse analysis” has become the explicit method for studying the effect of the media because of the “explication of qualitative data” in comparison to content analysis, which mainly focuses on quantitative data. It has been used effectively in numerous studies for various purposes, including those on racism (Van Dijk, 1993), the representation of Muslims (Richardson, 2006) and anti-immigration (Wodak and Reisigl, 1999).

It examines the way in which language is used within written or oral text such as newspaper articles or speeches and lectures and is “beyond the sentence” that is words, phrases, grammar, and “meaning (semantics), and the order of words in sentences (syntax)” (see Tannen, 2012). More briefly, discourse analysis goes beyond the simple examination of text and provides clear and systematic explanations of “structures, strategies or processes of text or talk in terms of theoretical notions developed in many branches of the field” (see Van Dijk, 1985; 1993). It functions in all types of communications and discourses that shape the world. It is a process that examines “what and how people communicate” and covers a wide range of diverse topics such as health and security. Essentially, discourse analysis reviews various “building-blocks inside communication” and understands the way in which each operates (Schneider, 6 May 2013). A discourse analysis of a particular event may include collecting and listening to all speeches or statements related to specific event or topic and then
examining the ways in which language reflects “cultural and social contexts” of speeches and statements. As such, discourse analysis indicates the intentions and motives behind using certain specific phrases and language. An example includes the British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s statements and speeches in the wake of the 7/7 event in which he constantly used the words “Us” and “Them” and stated his determination to “defeat the terrorists” and defend the “British way of life” (see Croft and Moore, 2010; Holland, 2012; Quist, 2009, p.53).

Van Dijk (1985) believes that discourse analysis has shown encouraging results in interrogating issues such as power and dominance in the media (Van Dijk, 1985, p.280). He provides examples of the critical series of “bad news” studies carried out by Glasgow University Media Group (1976 and 1993) to trace linguistic differences in the press reporting on various issues such as miners’ strikes and the Falklands War (ibid). These studies were different from previous traditional media studies that often used content analytical approaches to expose biased, stereotypical and racist descriptions in texts, graphics and images (ibid). In addition, early media studies mainly focused on convenient observations at basic levels of structures that produced biased and binary portrayals such as “Us and Them, Ours and Theirs, and “actions and characteristics” in representations of communists (ibid). However, despite the considerable use of discourse analysis in the field of sociology, this thesis avoids using it mainly because it is complex.

(i-a)-Strengths and Weaknesses of Discourse Analysis:

Discourse analysis has both difficulties and social relevance, particularly in relation to text and language in the media (Dressler, 1981; Howarth, 2000; Fowler, 1991). One weakness of discourse analysis is that it cannot be completely legitimate and applicable, since it is always changing and conflicting with other discourses; hence, there is no right or wrong discourse (see Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Parker, 1993; Rodrigo, 2012). Van Dijk (1997) calls discourse a type of “action” that is neither restrictive nor perpetual but in fact continuously changing. According to Paul Gee (1999), “New discourses emerge and old ones die all the time” mainly because people persistently create new, modify old and regularly contest discourses (Gee, 1999, p.21). It attaches particular importance to language, which has different meanings in different places and contexts. Therefore, the use of language varies in different events, places and societies;
for example, in Hall’s work (2006), “freedom fighters/terrorists” are two complex terminologies that have different meanings for each side. Moreover, discourse analysis is too optimistic as some critics say that those who write assume that they can change the world.

Despite all these relevancies, inductive thematic analysis does have some advantage over simple content analysis, which simply counts words, phrases and different levels of manifestation in the text (Parker, 2005, p.99). Additionally, thematic analysis is more observant, fostering the belief that certain words, phrases and themes “really mean the same thing in a close enough way for them to be grouped together” (ibid). For this particular inquiry into the representation of British Muslims in the British press, I chose Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis method (2006) which helps to identify, examine and record patterns in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.79). In comparison to textual analysis, which is also reliable, it is a more convenient approach. However, textual analysis tells us how the media use language and specific phrases to influence the reader. I am more interested in the way the press represented British Muslims with reference to the 7/7 event.

(ii) Specified Method: Thematic Analysis:

Thematic analysis is a comparatively simple and flexible categorising approach for any qualitative data analysis. It is a generic technique that allows a researcher to re-examine, make notes and sort out the data in the form of key concepts or themes. At the start, an analyst develops fundamental themes that help to rationalise the data into key ideas. In other words, an initial broad reading and rereading of the data enables a researcher to observe various patterns and detect developing themes within it (see Harvard University Online manual, 2008). For Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke (2006), a theme “captures something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.82).

Further, these authors define thematic analysis as “identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes a data set in (rich) detail. However, frequently it goes further than this, and interprets various aspects of the research topic” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.79). Thus, thematic analysis is an analytical approach through which a researcher can “discover patterns and develop
themes”, and it is therefore applicable to several kinds of qualitative data when one has different goals in mind (see Harvard University Online manual, 2008).

A number of studies find thematic analysis the most suitable tool for qualitative data analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Flick, 2009; Wood et al., 2009). Numerous scholars note that thematic analysis is reliable within the broader theoretical framework of discourse analysis (see Adeyanju, 2013; Braun and Clarke, 2006; Van Dijk, 1987 and 1988). In brief, thematic analysis is an established scholarly tradition which helps to examine the hidden meanings in the text. Other leading scholars who have used this method include Cottle (2000), Hopkins (2011), Hussain and Bagguley (2012) and Sobolewska and Ali (2012), mostly in examining the media representation of ethnic minorities including British Muslims in the aftermath of 7/7. The fact that many scholars have used this technique shows that it is well-recognised.

(iii)-Emergence of Themes:

A notable feature of this study is that it does not begin with a prior notion of themes in mind. Instead, it prefers to choose an inductive approach, which is a spontaneous way of identifying themes based on constant comparison and careful reading of selected articles and reports (see Zhang and Wildemuth, 2005). Therefore, it is essential to have knowledge of previous studies (deductive reasoning); it is assumed that an inductive approach avoids any personal influence over the selection of themes (Adeyanju, 2013, p.31). The procedure involves reviewing the text repetitively and recognising certain ideas, themes and categories within the text.

This thesis will mainly use inductive reasoning as it is assumed that this approach is most suitable for answering the research question. An inductive reasoning approach enables a researcher to perform a vigilant examination and persistent assessment of the data which than automatically produce themes and categories (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2005, p.2). Moreover, the researcher has no personal influence over or any pre-set notions concerning the selection of topics and themes within the data. That is because reading and rereading the text within the data naturally produce themes.

More importantly, this study fully embraces the fact that it genuinely contextualises the data and evaluates the judgements of both newspapers about British Muslims and Islam. In short, these are the underlying reasons why I chose the thematic analysis approach to probe into the representation of Muslims in The Guardian and The Daily...
Telegraph. However, like other methods, it also has both pros and cons. On the one hand it is suitable for large datasets, simple, flexible, and easy to read and decode. On the other hand, it is based on the researcher’s own interpretations, which weakens it. Additionally it may lack clarity and guidelines, and if it is not applied in accordance with the theoretical framework it may have little interpretative power (see Braun and Clarke, 2006).

(iv)-Justification of Using Inductive Reasoning:

Sociologists use three types of reasoning or arguments; these are deductive, inductive and conductive reasoning. However, the first two are widely recognised traditions. Deductive reasoning is based on a theory and examines it in terms of the evidence that supports or opposes that theory. The result may be that the evidence does not support the theory. In contrast, in inductive reasoning one gathers the evidence or data together and then comes to a conclusion based upon where that evidence points. For historians, inductive reasoning is a comparative historical analysis of the evidence which leads one to a particular conclusion. Conductive reasoning is grounded on Carl Wellman’s theory of “Ethical reasoning” (1971) which is based on “guesswork” that “draws a tentative conclusion” that could be modified in the future (Walton, 2006, p. 143). Conductive reasoning is not as common as deductive and inductive reasoning because it is a “case-based” reasoning which relies on “presumed facts”; hence, there is an uncertainty factor involved in it (ibid, 143).

Of these three types, this thesis chose inductive reasoning on various grounds. A significant feature of inductive reasoning or argument is that it simply sees, observes and concludes based upon observed patterns. The main reason why this thesis uses inductive reasoning is the fact that it also correlates with thematic analysis in which initial themes emerge spontaneously as a result of the researcher reading the whole text. A significant advantage of inductive reasoning is that a researcher relies profoundly on observable patterns which than produce concurrent contents in the data set, such as themes. Moreover, inductive reasoning ensures that a researcher has little discernible influence over findings generated from the analysis of data, as observable patterns automatically produce the subsequent number or theme missing from the dataset.
In addition, the purpose of selecting inductive reasoning in this thesis is the fact that its patterns are also encouraged by the popular Western view of Muslim people as being “violent”, “backwards”, and “the enemy within”. Arguably, these patterns also support the identification of certain labels attached to Muslims, as explained in the *Orientalism* study. Moreover, in this thesis the core themes emerged directly from the data by inductive reasoning and not from existing literature or any theory (see Adeyanju, 2013, p.31).

My own research intends to discover whether or not British Muslims’ representation in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* remained positive, neutral or negative at various instances in different types of journalism or whether it changed on the 7/7 anniversaries. Notably, this thesis analysis is not “theory-driven”. Rather, it has gathered its data in the form of published text in two newspapers, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*; therefore, it has used inductive reasoning.

Inductive reasoning is a procedure in which a researcher observes or recognises sets of patterns that demonstrate what has happened or what is possibly going to happen. In other words, an inductive argument means to notice a particular pattern and then draw a conclusion based upon that pattern (see McCall, 13 May 2013). McCall uses the Fibonacci sequence: that is, 1+1=2, 1+2=3, and 2+3=5, hence 3+5=8 (see McCall, 13 May 2013). Therefore, the missing number is 8, a solution that emerged from the addition of each number to the previous number. A related example of these patterns might be observed in the sequence of terrorist attacks on cultural capitals such as 9/11 (New York), 3/11 (Madrid), and 7/7 (London). Noticeably, the method of and reasons behind these attacks show a similar set of patterns, such as the perpetrators declaring their faith as Muslims; being suicide bombers; and acting in the name of Islam and al-Qaeda respectively. Hence, these patterns suggest the possibility of further terrorist attacks elsewhere in the name of Islam by perpetrators of any radical organisation, be it al-Qaeda or a similar radical group.

In brief, the inductive reasoning model provides the opportunity to identify themes from generated data and it is thus a preferred and valid technique in the social sciences. Many scholars endorse inductive reasoning mainly because the argument or logic derives from the data on a particular event or situation and because it reaches a logical conclusion (Babbie, 2013, p.24; Priest, 2010, p.9; Wimmer and Dominick, 2014, p140).
However, despite such strengths it also has disadvantages such as the time-consuming nature of analysing a large amount of data (Honiden, 2015; Mayfield, 2013; Toplis, 2010). Nevertheless, this provides an opportunity for an in-depth database study of the reactions of two newspapers to the events of 2005.

4.2-Thematic Coding Scheme:
Thematic coding is a procedure within qualitative analysis that involves categorising and making notes of different pieces of text; these might be passages or paragraphs connected by a common theme or idea. It allows the researcher to index the whole text into different categories and is hence useful for establishing a “framework of thematic ideas about it” (see Gibbs, 2007). I have carried out thematic analysis in accordance with the guiding standards set by Braun and Clarke (2006) using full texts of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting of the 7/7 event that brought British Muslims to global media attention. In comparison to other studies on thematic analysis, these authors offer a systematic framework and rational course of actions to identify, interpret and examine themes; this framework is reliable as well as suitable. The framework for conducting a thematic analysis consists of six phases (see Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.14-23) as follows:

Phase One: Becoming Familiar with the Data.
Braun and Clarke recommend that, before engaging in analysis, the researcher must have a prior knowledge of the data. Further, they advise the researcher to immerse (himself/herself) in the data deeply in order to become familiar with “the depth and breadth of the contents” (ibid, p.16). Considering these recommendations, I firstly collected and printed out copies of the full texts of each type of journalism in both newspapers. I read them repeatedly to familiarise myself with certain phrases, words, topics, emergence of debates and discussions in comment and editorial pieces, features and news reports. This long process involves personal input as I marked and underlined specific phrases, making notes of references, key sources of information, analytical concepts, facts and figures, and studies in the articles, and highlighting emerging significant themes. Next, I placed all the data in two different log books using Microsoft Word documents, calling them The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian in a systematic manner. This organised form of data enabled me to trace and verify records of any
required type of journalism, article, web-link, word count, author and source of information easily and quickly (see Appendix A).

Phase Two: Generating Initial Codes.

After the researcher has familiarised him/herself with the nature and type of data and set up an initial list of ideas, Braun and Clarke suggest that he/she identify initial semantic or latent codes. Semantic means a signifier such as a word, phrase, symbol, sign or a list of ideas, whereas latent refers to patterns or assumptions. Essentially, coding entails splitting up the key text into small units for the purpose of analysis, explaining what each unit in the text is about. It is a process through which certain attributes are tagged or assigned to specific units of text, which might be a sentence, a phrase or a paragraph (see Bryman, 2006). After familiarising myself with the data, I set up a code sheet consisting of a total of 34 key codes with each set carrying further sub-codes. Such a list of codes is often referred to as ‘code framing’ because one paragraph may be tagged with a single code or with multiple codes; for example, I assigned specific phrases such as ‘Nigerian Taliban’, ‘Porn-loving Saudi Arabia’ to different paragraphs and assigned them to different sub-codes.

For example, my code sheet C-14 describes ‘Islamophobia in post-7/7 Britain’ with sub-code (i) fear of Islam. It is important to note that, throughout this process, the codebook was regularly refined. This entails rereading the same text to ensure that every single code that emerged is recorded correctly. Each type of journalism (news report, comment, and feature) was divided into paragraphs and sentences and then assembled as a code, keeping in view the context. Notably, “indexing”, “categories”, “codes” and “themes” are identical words and phrases that link different portions of the text as representative of that text (see Bryman, 2006; 2008). A sample of a coded editorial can be viewed in Appendix-B.

Phase Three: Searching for Themes.

The initial “coded and collated” data need to be condensed, i.e. regrouped under different codes. This eliminates repetition and binds together similar codes (Bryman, 2008). Keeping in mind Braun and Clarke’s guideline for this phase, I merged sub-codes to form sub-themes, which also help me to condense the data. I made a separate code sheet (or thematic map) in which I noted 62 sub-themes and their descriptions. Finally,
the mixing of sub-codes produces sub-themes or ‘provisional themes’ (see Adeyanju, 2013). These can be viewed in Appendix-C.

Phase Four: Reviewing Themes.

According to Braun and Clarke, once initial themes or “candidate themes” have emerged they should be refined and compared with the original data to verify that they have been backed up. This is done because “Data within themes should cohere together meaningfully, while there should be clear and identifiable distinctions between themes” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.20). In brief, the main purpose of this phase is to ensure that each main theme that emerges is consistent and supported by evidence.

Having reviewed the sub-themes, I merged The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph coding sheets into one unit on Microsoft Excel. Next, 62 sub-themes or sub-codes were organised and each code frequency was measured carefully using the ‘sort and filter’ option. For example, (STC-42; ‘Muslim terrorism/Islamic terrorism’...) appeared 92 times, which was the highest frequency level. The second most frequent code (STC-10; ‘Britain foreign policy in Iraq...’) appeared 75 times in total, etc.

These codes were then remixed according to their resemblances and identical contextual meanings. For example, codes 11, 12 and 30, which are about terror networks, cells and the radicalisation process, have similarities and were therefore merged into one group and assigned a blue colour. The next largest group, marked red, carries identical codes relating to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and the reasons for British Muslims’ alienation. Similarly, the third largest group, marked green, contains codes that describe British core values and way of life (see Appendix-D- i & ii). The following diagram shows the total share of the three main themes, which are defined and named in the following phase five.
Diagram: 4.1-Merging identical sub-themes and codes to produce three main themes.

Phase Five: Defining and Naming Themes.

For Braun and Clarke, the phase “define and refine” means finding the real meanings of themes and what they are about, as well as “determining what aspect of the data each theme captures”. Finally, sub-themes in the three main groups were carefully examined to facilitate detection of three main themes in the dataset. Each main theme is given a specific name; moreover, to substantiate that the sub-themes are interconnected and linked, these are divided into three different sets under codes 1, 2 and 3, denoting each main theme set.

Theme 1: Home-grown ‘Islamists terrorism’ Threat

Theme 2: Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq risks its Internal Security

Theme 3: British Muslims are Incompatible with the British Way of Life

Phase Six: Producing a Report.

The production of a report indicates and validates the narrative in the dataset. It shows that themes are coherent, rational and non-repetitive.

4.3-Justification of Newspapers’ Selection:

The purpose of this study is to examine how the broadsheet quality press in Britain reported on the Muslim community in Britain and the world in a period of Islamophobia during the three years between 2005 and 2007. It is not possible, in a study of this type, to do more than examine the way in which two major national newspapers presented
the question of Muslims’ representation resulting from the 7/7 event. As a result, this research will focus on two main broadsheet newspapers - The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph - in order to examine the coverage and approach of the British broadsheet press. It is imperative to clarify here that, because of the word limitations of a doctorate thesis, I essentially restricted myself to a limited comparison of these broadsheets rather than expanding my research by, for instance, including tabloids or more mainstream newspapers.

One justification for this is that these British broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, including their Sunday equivalent editions, are the oldest newspapers in the world, originating in 1791 and 1855 respectively, and they hold contrasting political views. Evidence shows that these newspapers also have a considerable online readership overseas. Several scholars note that The Guardian is a liberal, left-wing paper that is often critical of government policies and right-wing parties (see KhosraviNik, 2009; Mancini and Hallin,). In contrast, The Daily Telegraph holds conservative views and mostly supports the Establishment (Goddard et al., 2008). In the light of these views, this thesis assumes that it would be worth examining coverage of the 7/7 event in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph to determine whether these newspapers retained their political and editorial orientations in reporting the 7/7 event. This is significant because the 7/7 incident was largely associated with the British government’s foreign policy in Iraq.

Evidently, The Guardian opposed whilst The Daily Telegraph defended the British government’s foreign policy relating to the Middle East, particularly on Iraq (see Berenger, 2004; Brown, 2006, p.106; Temple, 2008, p.88). To date, this contrast has remained a potent element in their editorials as The Guardian assumes that 7/7 was a reaction to such policies, whilst The Daily Telegraph denies such connections. Said and Poole find that The Guardian’s secular values sometimes contradict Islamic values, for example, with regard to women’s veils which it sees as a barrier to women’s liberty. However, The Guardian never campaigned to ban the veil, in contrast to The Daily Telegraph (18 September 2013). This is because the purpose of The Guardian is not to support or reject Islamic views but to reflect upon the status of a situation for its readership, which comprises a vast number of secular-minded people along with left-wing liberals and professional elites of different faiths.
Although The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph have different political views, both offer a platform for scholars, commentators and politicians of contrasting opinions. For example, the left-wing and liberal Guardian and its sister paper The Observer provide a space for two Jewish political analysts and columnists, Jonathan Freedland and Nick Cohen, who hold different views on British Muslims and are also known for their different progressive and conservative thoughts. Likewise, in its present set-up The Daily Telegraph is widely known as a right-wing newspaper but it nevertheless often provides space to journalists and authors who do not agree with its stance on different issues, such as James Kirkup, who is accused of being a ‘soft’ voice for British Muslims.

Considering the British press reaction to an opinion on the 7/7 incident, the selection of newspapers is based on three principal considerations. First, both publications are known for their serious journalism and are referred to as the ‘quality press’ or ‘mid-market’ newspapers (Brownile, 2013, p.17; Cole and Harcup, 2009, p.31). Further to this, both newspapers optimistically proclaim in their editorial polices the significance of investigative journalism, which means that their reporting reflects balanced and impartial views of issues. Additionally, a range of views free of editorial constraint, such as news sources, are printed strictly without interpretation.

Secondly, these newspapers catch the attention of a considerably well-informed middle class, and they present contrasting progressive and conservative views according to the needs of their readers. The third key reason for probing the 7/7 reporting in these broadsheets is the manifestation of the terrorism discourse, and the extent to which it stirs up anti-Muslim bias on the basis of Islamic beliefs. One reason for choosing The Guardian is that it has raised its profile as an international newspaper (Conboy and Steel, 2015).

It became the third most-read paper online in March 2014, when its online traffic reached 102.3 million monthly. In comparison, The Daily Telegraph (telegraph.co.uk) has also adopted a brand new ‘digital strategy’, declaring digital contents to be its backbone. It has increased its “monthly browsers nearly 21% to 72.2 million and average daily browsers by 12.6% to 3.6 million” (The Guardian, 8 July, 2014). Both newspapers are therefore papers which, given their broadsheet and digital presence, help to shape the opinion of informed British middle-class readers. Also, to date, no other research has been carried out into the broadsheets’ reporting of Islam and British Muslims using the 7/7 event as a case-study, apart from Crockett’s (2008) study which
examined *The Sun* and *Daily Mirror* reporting of 7/7. In addition, a 7/7 victim and academic John Tulloch offered a narrative of the event that is more of a personal account. Considering this shortage of research, the intention of this thesis is to fill this cavernous gap by examining the (elite) press reporting of the 7/7 event, which was a big political debate in all forms of the media.

**4.4 Research Timeframe:**

The 7/7 incident opened up a Pandora’s Box of perceived problems relating to British Muslims, such as extremism, terrorism, jihad, mosque ideologies, faith schools, veils, and human and women’s rights. In these debates the press emerged as a powerful actor in shaping public opinion on all these issues. More importantly, this incident became one of the most powerful media events of the twenty-first century. The bombings received widespread coverage in all forms of the media to an extent that involved scholars, policy-makers, politicians, media experts and members of the public. Everyone began to express their feelings and the event became a national debate.

Notably, before this incident, British Muslims had never been involved in such deadly acts against innocent and unarmed civilians. To some extent, as a result of the 7/7 incident the loyalty of British Muslims was questioned, as was their place in a multicultural Britain. It is significant to examine the press coverage of the 7/7 incident to find out how it represented British Muslims during the peak time of resentment (7/7) and in normal circumstances when nothing much is happening. Furthermore, the press coverage will help determine the attitude of the media as well as that of British society towards British Muslims during the first and second anniversaries of the 7/7 incident, which fall within my research period, and it will tell us whether the press view of British Muslims remained the same or improved.

Hence, one distinctive feature of this research is the timeframe, which is dictated by the event itself. The selection of this particular time period allowed me to plot the rise and fall in newspapers’ momentum relating to the coverage of 7/7. Notably, within the selected time period, two other significant failed terrorist attempts occurred: on 21 July 2005 there was a failed bombing attempt in London and on 30 June 2007 there was a failed attack on Glasgow airport. These two incidents helped me to determine the reactions of the two newspapers and establish their approach to the 7/7 event and related issues such as extremism and terrorism. Another key development that
occurred during this period was the change in the Labour Party leadership which passed from Tony Blair to Gordon Brown; this was a significant event that is worth examining to determine whether there were any changes in government policies relating to terrorism, radicalisation and community cohesion.

4.5- The Data Collection and Sampling Procedure: Methodological and Theoretical Explanations.

The key aim of a sampling procedure is to effectively organise a large amount of data in order to draw a representative sample. The dataset consists of news reports, comments and debates, editorials, investigative reports and features relating to the 7/7 event in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph over a period of two years (8 July 2005 to 7 July 2007). Two separate log books were kept for each newspaper, and carefully placed prints of all the stories were kept in chronological order covering the 7/7 incident starting on 8 July 2005 and ending on 7 July 2007.

Notably, scholars, journalists and politicians used various different terms to describe the London Bombings such as ‘The 7 July attacks’, ‘July 7’, ‘July Seventh’, and the ‘7/7’; this would produce a varying sample of published articles relating to the 7/7 incident using various search engines such as ‘Lexis-Nexis’. Hence, considering such complexities I have decided to make use of two terms, ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, to identify types of journalism in the data because the incident itself was referred to both as a terrorism event and as an example of home-grown extremists etc.

First of all, this thesis uses the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ database search engine and applies the following phrases and connotations, ‘Islam, Muslims, 7/7, terrorism and extremism and jihad’, to collect stories relating to 7/7. I also used other search engines such as ‘ProQuest’ and ‘microfilm records’ to ensure that every major development in terms of coverage of the 7/7 incident was captured in the dataset. For example, the first week of July 2005 generated a large number of news reports, opinion pieces, interviews, special investigative reports, editorials, columns, comment & debates, and analysis, including letters to editors. The key reasons for using the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ search engine are its reliability and the fact that it has been successfully tested in several notable studies relating to the media portrayal of British Muslims (Allen, 2012; Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2011).
Moore et al. (2008) describe research terms as ‘news hooks’ in their study; hence, in this thesis the following terms or ‘news hooks’ are used as mentioned above: “Islam, Muslims, 7/7, terror, terrorism, extremism and jihad”. I employed and named these phrases or terms as “news hooks” (see Moore et al., 2008, p.22). These ‘news hooks’ helped me to identify the predominant topics and themes within the reporting; they are also functional in pinpointing the ways in which these two different newspapers labelled the 7/7 incident. It is important to clarify that, by applying different “hooks” or terms such as “extremism” and “radicalisation” with connotations such as ‘or’, ‘and’, etc, the total number of stories fluctuates. A practical illustration of using these different terms and phrases in the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ search engine is evident in the print screenshot:

Print Screenshot 4.1: This show the ‘Lexis-Nexis ‘database search engine used to obtain data.
Another significant aspect of the data collection procedure is the variation in the total number of stories appearing in the search engines using different ‘hooks’, jointly or separately. For example, searching for “Islam”, “Muslims”, and “Jihad” revealed 189 stories in The Daily Telegraph for the year 2005 and 181 stories in the subsequent year of 2006. In comparison, ‘Lexis-Nexis’ shows that The Guardian published a total of 257 stories in 2005 and 221 in 2006 when I used the above terms. In the year 2007, when I searched for the terms “Islam, Muslims, extremism or 7/7, and radicalisation” I found that The Guardian produced 41 items while The Daily Telegraph published 29 news items.

Since 7/7 occurred after 9/11, it was labelled an act of ‘terrorism’ that paved the way for the war on terror. Therefore, I decided to add a different version of “Terror” because “Terrorism” and “War on Terror” have been viewed differently in academia. Similarly, the use of “war on terror” produced 134 stories in The Daily Telegraph for the year 2005 and 213 in 2006 compared to 356 stories in 2005 and 371 in 2006 in The Guardian. Overall, these different connotations collectively produced a bulky dataset comprising different types of journalism items amounting to 1,992 in total; thus, \( N = 1,992 \), where the capital ‘N’ stands for the total number of articles in the aggregate dataset.

The above illustrations of the data explain the overall data collection procedure. However, the data sample collected in this thesis is based on the following phrases or hooks as already explained above: “Islam, Muslims, 7/7, terror, terrorism, extremism and jihad”. Notably, the data sample for this thesis varied in number because of the use of the above-mentioned specific phrases or hooks that were used in search engines to collect original data. Overall, news stories related to British Muslims were much higher in volume because they included international links, but when the term ‘7/7’ is used as a ‘hook’ the search engine limits the volume of articles.

Indeed, to illustrate the point let us consider two examples of Guardian editorials from the dataset that demonstrate that both newspapers published series of articles, comments and opinion pieces, editorials, books reviews and interviews discussing British Muslims in regard to the 7/7 incident. However, because this thesis has used specific ‘hooks’ and phrases to trace the articles related to the 7/7 event only, the database search engine did not retrieve those articles. To overcome this problem I carefully reviewed the collated articles to ensure that these articles fall into my required
category for the 7/7 event reporting based on phrases described above. In some articles there was no trace of the phrases that I used to collect data, whilst in a few other articles writers refer only briefly to the event, such as “Muslim”, “7/7” (mentioning a film, drama, videogame). Examples include The Guardian editorials of 23 August 2005 and 9 December 2005, which are somewhat relevant to the London bombings but do not contain phrases used by this thesis to collect the data.

Finally, considering the 7/7 event as an outcome of extremism and its association with jihadist elements in British society, it was decided to apply phrases and connotations such as “Islam, Muslim and jihad” or “7/7 and extremism” which generated 97 stories in the Daily Telegraph and 223 stories in The Guardian. Notably, I made use of the options “high” and “Duplicate Option-On High Similarity” in the ‘LexisNexis’ search engine, which displays duplicate versions, thus helping to minimise the chances of missing any additional information or source in a particular story. Moreover, using the “high” and “Duplicate Option-On High Similarity” options together may affect the net result; i.e. the total number of stories may vary in a selected period.

This is expected to occur because the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ search engine looked for the required words or phrases, in my case “Hooks”, in editorials, letters to editors, columns and readers’ comments, and in other places inside the newspapers apart from the main stories. To minimise possible confusion, I divided the data on a yearly and monthly basis, which allowed me to record either the escalation or decline in my set of newspapers in a specified period. This also helped me to determine the relationship between the British broadsheets’ press coverage of Islam and Muslims and the international political events.

(i)-Discarded and Duplicate Articles:

A large number of articles related to Muslim issues such as Shia and Sunni conflicts, suicide bombings, ethnic differences and violent clashes in the Middle East and elsewhere in Muslim lands outside Britain were discarded because they were not directly relevant to the reporting of British opinion about the 2005 bombings. In addition, stories containing brief references to Islam and Muslims in Britain that had no direct link with the 7/7 event were purposely ignored because they might have distracted the focus of attention from the 7/7 event. However, journalistic items such as investigative reports carrying information about the 7/7 perpetrators’ visits to religious
schools in Pakistan and the Middle East were incorporated. Overall, items such as letters to editors and book reviews were discarded along with those articles that carried only one or two phrases in a sentence or paragraph or were used as a context to explain issues that fall outside the topic of this thesis. The following table shows an illustration of a discarded article that falls outside this thesis dataset criterion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>The Guardian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Press Coverage</strong></td>
<td>News report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headline</strong></td>
<td>George Galloway has the most amazing ability to see the best in everyone - even homicidal dictators like Saddam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Author</strong></td>
<td>Andrew Anthony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Source</strong></td>
<td>DISCARDED EXAMPLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>28 October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.4.1: This table shows an illustration of a discarded article that falls outside this thesis dataset criteria.

Furthermore, careful inspections of the data helped to locate duplicate articles such as Jason Burke's comment piece published in The Guardian on 17 July 2005 entitled: “The violence that lies in every ideology: Like most beliefs, Islam is a religion of peace that has to accept that it can also breed terror”. The same article appears again in The Guardian on 22 July 2005 under the title: “Ideology's violent face” (see Appendix-D). In addition, reports of other foreign trips by radical and extremist elements within the British Muslim community were included because the issue is directly linked with the radicalisation of young British Muslims. A small number of articles such as comedy, drama and non-serious news clips were also excluded from the sample because these were irrelevant to the topic selected.
Thus, these practices produce the following overall data sample: *The Guardian* 187 articles and *The Daily Telegraph* 87 articles = 274

Here, I assign a capital ‘N’ to denote the total number of types of journalism or articles; hence $N=274$. Essentially, it is significant to understand and draw distinctions between these categories. For instance, a news report displays basic facts and information on a particular event but a feature story carries analysis and direct quotes from officials and dignitaries and investigates the matter thoroughly. The following tables show the yearly summary of types of journalism items in *The Guardian*:

**4.5.1- Types of Press Coverage in *The Guardian*/*Observer*:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Press Coverage</th>
<th>Year 2005</th>
<th>Year 2006</th>
<th>Year 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments/Debates/Features</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Stories/news reports/news clips/features/focus/investigative reports/</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial Press Review</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal views</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special reports G2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feature/G2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special reports</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.4.2: Total Number of Types of Journalism in *The Guardian*/*The Observer***

Total Number of News Items: $N=187$

**4.5.2-Types of Press Coverage in *The Daily Telegraph*/*Sunday Telegraph*:**
### The Daily Telegraph/The Sunday Telegraph:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Press Coverage</th>
<th>Year 2005</th>
<th>Year 2006</th>
<th>Year 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News reports/news clips/ investigative news reports/</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal views</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.4.3:** Total Number of Types of Journalism in *The Daily Telegraph/The Sunday Telegraph*

Total Number of News Items: N = 87

#### 4.5.3-Item Analysed:

Total types of journalism in both newspapers amount to 187+87 = 274.

#### 4.5.4-Items Collected in the original dataset but discarded as irrelevant:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>The Daily Telegraph</em> (Types of Journalism)</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reviews: Books/Films/Personal/Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters to Editors/Feedback/email replies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table: 4.4.4:** This table shows the total number of types of journalism collected but discarded as irrelevant in *The Daily Telegraph*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>The Guardian</em> (Types of Journalism)</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reviews: Books/Films/Personal/Interviews</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters to Editors/Feedback/email replies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table: 5.4.5.:** This table shows the total number of types of journalism collected but discarded as irrelevant in *The Guardian*.

Total items discarded in both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* = 33

**4.5.5-Defining Key Types of Journalism:**

(i)-Editorials:

The editorial is the most important section of any newspaper as it reflects the views of the newspaper or its ownership on a particular political or non-political issue. It is mostly written in concise form by the editor and sets out organisational policies on current issues. Large newspapers often have editorial boards that decide the significance and relevance of a particular issue. In brief, the editorial mirrors the newspaper's political orientation, preferences and understanding of national and international subject matters.

(ii)-Comments:

The “comment” section contains debates and analysis often written by scholars, professional columnists, commentators, politicians and representatives of various religious and non-religious groups, activists, campaigners, and government and public officials.

The layout, structure and criteria of the comment section vary across newspapers. In *The Guardian*, “Comment is free” is reserved for comment and debate. The word “free” signifies the values and traditions for which *The Guardian* is best known. It originated in a famous speech by *The Guardian’s* first editor, Charles Prestwich Scott, in which he said: “Comment is free, but facts are sacred... The voice of opponents no less than that of friends has a right to be heard”. *The Guardian* website states: “We publish a plurality of voices, but our centre of gravity as a progressive, liberal, left-leaning newspaper is clear”.

Meanwhile, the comment section of *The Daily Telegraph* is very different to *The Guardian*. It is known as ‘Personal View’ and it includes commentary on British politics, political leaders’ conduct, and Britain’s relations with the rest of the world. It is often written by its team of writers. It also appears in the form of feature analysis by its opinion writers, commentators, and political and non-political figures. In comparison, *The Guardian* comment section reflects upon debates and discussions of international
and national politics and religion and also includes a comment cartoon that sums up the matter in caricature format.

(iii)-News Reports:

George Snell states: “reporting is a commodity but journalism is not” (The Guardian, 10 December 2009). In simplistic terms, Roy Greenslade asserts that journalism is investigative, in-depth analysis and thoughtful explanation of events, which is more than simple news. Furthermore, reporting has now become a “commodity by the web” because people obtain their news free online whilst journalism is practised by professional journalists based in newspapers.

Recent developments on the Internet have given rise to a new phenomenon, “citizen journalists”, which means that ordinary people present on the spot with their cameras, mobile phones and laptops create their own news. Alan Rusbridger “sees our journalists and readers as equal partners” (The Guardian, 27 July 2009). In other words, the traditional model of journalism is no longer in control of news delivery (ibid). In brief, a news report tells the reader about the five w's (who, where, what, when and why) and how an event occurs.

(iv)-Features:

A feature is slightly different from a news story, which carries facts and figures and presents a comprehensive account of an event. A feature includes sound bites from various sources, analysis, interviews, opinion polls, background information, predicted developments, and relevant studies. In other words, it is a follow-up of any event which focuses on human interests and also carries opinions.

(v)- Investigative Reports:

Newspaper staff members comprising teams of journalists or foreign-based correspondents furnish these reports which include follow-ups with insightful details of events. In other words, they are more than just basic facts and they may take months to be completed. They include historical contexts of an issue or event (such as the 7/7 incident), views and opinions of politicians, public, private and government officials, database document records, surveys, studies, experts’ interviews, anniversaries and personal research.

4.6-Editorial Policies of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph:
British journalism is legally bound by ethics and guidelines initially set by the PCC (Press Complaints Commission) and later IPSO (The Independent Press Organisation) in the wake of the Leveson Inquiry in 2012 which resulted in the closure of the PCC. Following the telephone hacking scandal, the Leveson Inquiry was set up to investigate the cultural practices and ethics of the British press to determine its role in the scandal (see Appendix for details). Thus, reporters and journalists are officially required to work under defined parameters by their own organisations as well as regulatory bodies. However, quality and freedom of expression are two of the most valued aspects of powerful, centuries-old British journalism.

For instance, The Guardian added a new feature “anonymous contribution” to its professional practice in 2011. Similarly, The Daily Telegraph’s editorial policy incorporated twenty-five changes during the period January 1991-February 2015. For example, since the Leveson Inquiry (2012) it has reduced the number of editors on the Code Committee. In particular, after the change in The Daily Telegraph’s ownership in 2004, its new owner Sir David Barclay said that in future it may no longer be the “house newspaper” of the Conservatives. A brief description of editorial policies is essential here because these are closely linked with the key findings and argument developed in the theme sections.

(i)-The Guardian’s Editorial Policy:

At the heart of The Guardian’s editorial policy is a reference to its famous editor: “Our most important currency is trust. This is as true today as when CP Scott marked the centenary of the founding of the Guardian with his famous essay on journalism in 1921”. It is important to note that The Guardian has not signed up to the new regularity body IPSO because it thinks it is “just not independent enough” (see The Guardian, 4 September 2014). It continues to view the PCC (Press Complaints Commission) code of practice as valid even though the Commission has closed down, and it sticks with its own ‘Professional practice’ and ‘Personal behaviour and conflicts of interest’ codes, which have twenty-eight clauses (see Appendix-E). There is particular emphasis on accuracy, fairness and freedom of expression: “The voice of opponents no less than of friends has a right to be heard . . . It is well to be frank; it is even better to be fair” (CP Scott, 1921).

(ii)-The Daily Telegraph’s Editorial Policy:
For a long time, *The Daily Telegraph* has proudly presented its values and has been trusted for its news accuracy. Following the Leveson Inquiry, IPSO (The Independent Press Standards Organisation) was set up as a regulatory body for the United Kingdom press. On 8 September 2014, it offered a new Editors’ Codebook (2014) with which the members of the press including *The Daily Telegraph* agreed to comply. Every journalist of the members’ organisation is bound to follow the reviewed Editors’ Code of practice at all times. It includes 16 clauses relating to different disciplines of journalistic activities such as “accuracy, privacy, the protection of children and vulnerable groups, the need to avoid harassment, limitations on the use of subterfuge and clandestine devices - but also the Preamble and the Public Interest exceptions” (The Editors’ Codebook, 2014). The most significant aspect is “the ‘spirit of the Code’ - that should balance freedom of the individual and freedom of expression, and should be interpreted not just to the letter but also in the spirit” (for details, see Appendix- F) - *The Daily Telegraph*, IPSO).

(iii)-Differences between the Editorial Polices and Guidelines of *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*:

There are a few key differences between the guidelines of the two broadsheets. Firstly, *The Guardian* guidelines (2011) still equate to the PCC standards. More importantly, its guidelines include separate sections on professional practices, personal behaviour and conflict of interests; for example, *The Guardian* has a permanent staff member for corrections whilst *The Daily Telegraph* does not offer this service and it is not part of its editorial guidelines. Furthermore, there are several sub-clauses in *The Guardian* guidelines that are not part of *The Daily Telegraph* guidelines; for example, *The Guardian* states that “Direct quotations should not be changed to alter their context or meaning” (see Appendix (G) for more details).

4.7-Ethical Considerations and Research Challenges:

The data collection procedure involves a few complexities such as verification of headlines and sub-headlines, accuracy of articles’ structure, and repetitiveness. After the final dataset had been collected using three search engines - Lexis-Nexis, ProQuest and micro-films records - each newspaper article was then tested for its accuracy, layout and structure to ensure that it fitted the required parameters of my dataset. For this purpose, I visited both newspapers’ websites and online archives over a period of
four months because of the restrictions on accessing and downloading all the articles online. The following are a few examples of differences in the headlines within the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ search engine and original published newspaper articles. In *The Guardian* comment section, Tania Branigan wrote an article on 4 October 2006 entitled “Johnson makes gaffes on all fronts”, but the 'Lexis-Nexis' headline read: “Bad day for shadow minister: Johnson makes gaffes on all fronts”.

Similarly, Jason Burke’s article published on 24 December 2006 as “Channel tunnel is terror target” appeared in the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ headline as: “Al-Qaeda targets Channel tunnel for holiday carnage”. Such differences were also noticed in *The Daily Telegraph* headlines, which were different from the Lexis-Nexis headlines. The original headline on *The Daily Telegraph* mobile website appeared on January 17 2007 as “Fireman 'confronted bomber on Tube’ but the 'Lexis-Nexis' headline says: "Fireman 'confronted bomber on Tube’ as passengers fled. Muslim tried to offer an excuse after attack on crowded train failed, court told”.

4.8-Data Analysis:

Data analysis has already been explained. For each piece of data in the shape of editorials, news reports, comments, features and personal views, I have extracted the main theme/themes from that piece of data. The following screenshot of the themes’ extraction shows the process.

Theme Codes/Themes Extracted

![Screenshot of themes extraction](image.png)

**Print Screenshot 4.2:** This screenshot shows the process of themes extraction.
On the basis of those themes, I have analysed the whole dataset. Below is a sample analysis of *The Daily Telegraph* sub-theme (STC-10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme Code</th>
<th>STC-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>Britain's foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan radicalised London bombers and created a feeling of anger among the younger generation of British Muslims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.4.6:** This table shows a sample of analysis of *The Telegraph* sub-theme (STC-10).

The above sub-theme was mentioned 14 times in *The Guardian* over a two-year period, once in an editorial, nine times in news reports, twice in personal views, once in a comment and once in an interview. The following screenshot shows the above analysed data.

**Print Screenshot 4.3:** Stage 1. In the screenshot above, TOP (D) shows type of press; headline; author; code and theme.

In the next step, all the data were inserted into the Microsoft Excel program, which offers a ‘sort and filter’ option. This feature is useful for analysing any piece of data as required. This filter helps to locate aggregate data related to a single code, and it enables
me to select and analyse any code to show the data related to that single code or set of codes.

**Print Screenshot 4.4:** Stage two. (The red arrow guides towards one specific code recurrence in the whole dataset).

Further, through this filter, it is easy to select and analyse any type of story and retrieve the data on a particular story exclusively.

**Print Screenshot 4.5:** Stage three. (Here the arrow shows a specific item of journalism, such as an editorial, which can be traced in one specific theme in either of the broadsheets).
Furthermore, it shows that the whole dataset is verifiable and authentic, and it can be analysed in graphs and tables. In order to provide a snapshot of the step-by-step process that involves collecting, organising and familiarising myself with various concepts, phrases and themes within the data and coding, I have used an appendix section. The decision to use an appendix space is intended to give the reader the best perspective on the thematic coding scheme and overall data analysis.
Chapter 5 (Theme 1): Home-Grown Islamist Terrorism Threat

5.1-Introduction:
This chapter provides both a narrative and an analysis of the emergence of the home-grown Islamist terrorism threat posed by a few British-born Muslims who were allegedly radicalised by al-Qaeda as presented by two leading British newspapers. The reporting of the London bombings in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph acknowledges terrorism as a sensitive and complicated phenomenon that has been reconstructed and redefined as “political terrorism” and “religious terrorism”. The political uses of terrorism tie in with the perpetrators’ political ideology that has its roots in Wahhabism. To this day, there is still no single widely agreed definition of terrorism, and neither The Guardian nor The Daily Telegraph offers their own specific, concrete description of terrorism. This reflects the subtlety of the terrorism discourse, yet both broadsheets use the phrase “Islamic terrorism” in their editorials which reflect their political orientations and stances on different issues, including terrorism.

Arguably, by linking Islam with terrorism, i.e. “Islamic terrorism”, both broadsheets would appear to agree that the act of terrorism (7/7) was in fact Islamic. But it was surely perpetrated by a few British Muslims rather than being an ‘Islamic’ act, since these broadsheets were aware that there are and have been other terrorists from different religions and with different causes. However, these newspapers may have had their own justifications, presumably because the perpetrators of 7/7 and the following failed terror plot of 21/7 happened to be followers of the Islamic faith who used their own interpretations of sacred texts to validate their brutal actions. I would suggest that the use of an exclusive expression “Islamic terrorism” limits the debate on terrorism, which makes it problematic and divisive. In this way terrorism has been reconstructed and redefined as a “religious terrorism”. Of course, there is an apparent difference between ‘Islamic’ and ‘Islamist’ because the former is an adjective pertaining to the religion of Islam while the latter is a follower of a self-designed ideology of radicalism and extremism.

However, there is no denying the existence of contrasting views in the media and polity. Certainly, these newspapers are not alone in reconstructing the terrorism debate from a new perspective, but this reconstruction has in fact been conducted by a nexus of politicians, pressure groups, police and press, as would be the case in most countries.
Furthermore, to an extent, both broadsheets overstated the home-grown terrorism threat even though it comes from different sources of information. A considerable portion of the aggregate reporting on 7/7 arguably misinforms and scares ordinary people into believing that British radical Muslims aim to take over Britain and Europe and set up Sharia Law, which is “Barbaric”, “Mediaeval” and anti-Western, which is far from the case for the vast majority of Muslims in Britain.

Current debates on terrorism include the role of the media, particularly in the West, where a section of the media has supported government vows to combat terrorism. For example, sections of the British press and polity often use the word “barbaric” to narrate attacks on the West but avoid using the same word to describe their military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. This has raised concerns among scholars and critics, who think that the media have in some ways favoured the elite’s viewpoint, thus compromising their neutral position (see Bilandzic, 2013; Dracos and Gofas, 2006; Martin 2012). This is a central point in the terrorism debate, with suggestions that the media are power-driven and usually accommodate the state’s viewpoint; hence, they are likely to be biased. This chapter presents and discusses the terrorism theme that emerges from the dataset from both press reporting and academic perspectives.

Section I: Original Data and Findings Emerging from The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Reporting of, Response to and Presentation of the 7/7 Event:

5.2-The Dataset: Explanation of “Home-grown Islamist Terrorism Threat” Theme.

The dataset on The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian reflects their attitude to the home-grown Islamist terrorist threat. The evidence is divided into twenty sub-themes as shown in the following diagram which provides details of these along with their percentage shares, roles and influence in the formulation of the main theme of the ‘home-grown Islamist terrorism threat’. The colour scheme in the diagram assigns a different colour to each sub-theme and demonstrates its share in the formulation of the main ‘home-grown Islamist terrorism threat’ theme.
Diagram 5.1 Formulation of the theme “Home-grown Islamists Terrorism threat”.

The dataset is organised, consulted and applied in the following discussions based on these sub-themes. The percentages reflect a share of each sub-theme in the making of a main theme, the “Home-grown Islamist terrorism threat”. For example sub-theme/code 12 (“UK-based sleeper cells/networks have links to al-Qaeda and religious schools in Pakistan that espouse fundamentalism ‘Home-grown terrorism’) is represented in a burgundy colour, accounting for an area of 15 per cent of the above figure. This sub-theme denotes home-grown radicals who have developed links with foreign-based extremists and radicals such as al-Qaeda. Similarly, the sub-theme/code 42 (“Muslim terrorism/Islamic terrorism/Islamist terrorism threat continues to next generation in the form of nuclear, biological attacks etc”) represented in sky-blue covers an area of around 22 per cent. Furthermore, sub-theme/code 2 (“Terrorists’ ideology e.g. ‘Wahhabism’ etc. is to destroy and replace Western democratic values with their interpretations of ‘Islamic law’”) represented in blue occupies a 13% area or share in the main theme, which is “Home-grown Islamist terrorism threat”. The following table explains the structure of a main theme in more detail, including the colour scheme and percentage share of each sub-theme/code.

Table 5.1: The Construction of a Main Theme: “Home-grown Islamist Terrorism threat.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Colour Scheme</th>
<th>Percentage Share</th>
<th>Sub-Theme/Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sky-blue</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>STC 42, “Muslim/Islamic/Islamist terrorism threat continues to next generation in the form of nuclear, biological attacks etc”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maroon carnelian colour</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>STC 12, “UK-based sleeper cells/networks have links to al-Qaeda and religious schools in Pakistan that espouse fundamentalism” (Home-grown terrorism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Blue colour</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>STC 2, “Terrorists’ ideology e.g. ‘Wahhabism’ etc. is to destroy and replace Western democratic values with their interpretations of ‘Islamic law’”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Purple Iris</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>(STC 30, “Radical Islamist individuals, groups and organisations (such as al-Qaeda; Hizub-ut-Tahrir, al-Muhajurin etc.) anti-West activities inside Britain and abroad”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Orange tangerine</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>STC 43, “Terrorists are common enemy for British Muslims and non-Muslims, so community bonding could defeat terrorism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pink Parfait</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>STC 7, “Islamists’ real intention is to expand caliphate founded on Sharia Law; ayatollahs and imams”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Green Pear</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>STC 27, “Islam link with terrorism, extremism, radicalisation, women’s issues, etc. (Closed-minded views)”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Maroon lava</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>STC 26, “Islam preaches peace and harmony and has no link with terrorism etc. (Open-minded view)”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Light pink</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>STC 48, “Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged Terrorists reflect home-grown radicals’ involvement in attacking their country of birth”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Very light blue</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>STC 16, “The Terrorism Bill’s proposal to increase suspects’ detention period for up to 90 days will”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Color</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>STC Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Blue Arctic</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>STC 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Blue Sapphire</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>STC 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Light green</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>STC 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Purple violet</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>STC 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ginger</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>STC 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Apricot orange</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>STC 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Blue indigo</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>STC 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>(Thin-line) in Green Seaweed</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>STC 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Blue cerulean</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>STC 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Thin-line in next to blue</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>STC 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following sub-section provides a detailed account of the data that emerged from the reporting, interpretation and attitudes of both broadsheets to the 7/7 event. It
encompasses the emergence of key phrases to denote terrorism, the development of the home-grown Islamist terrorism threat, religious ideology discourse, radicalisation in Britain, and debates and discussions on the ways to combat terrorism. In addition, it occasionally presents original findings and references from both broadsheets to describe the above-mentioned concepts and debates.

5.3: The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Categorisation of Terrorism:

This section shows the emergence of terrorism terms and phrases that these broadsheets applied to describe the 7/7 incident. Initially, however, the two newspapers held different views on the organisation responsible for the attacks, i.e. al-Qaeda, as has already been described in the context chapter. Later, on 10 July 2005, The Guardian explained four key theories to describe the perpetrators: “The home-grown bombers”, “The foreign professionals”, “Iraqi bleedback” and “Forget the categories”; these were based on assumptions relating to each theory. According to the dataset, both broadsheets used three main phrases in connection with the London bombings, as follows:

(i) "Islamic Terrorism":

The database shows that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph used the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ in their editorials, thereby reflecting their view of the terrorism issue. Out of 13 editorials in total, The Guardian used the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ twice (2/13*100 = 15.38%). Similarly, The Daily Telegraph used the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ twice in eight editorials (2/8*100 = 25%). The Daily Telegraph also used terms such as ‘Muslim extremism’ and ‘Islamic extremists’ fifteen times in headlines and the leads of 87 articles, amounting to 15/87*100 = 17.24 per cent of its total articles, whilst The Guardian also used terms such as ‘Muslim terrorism’ (4/187*100 = 2.1 per cent), ‘Islamic extremism’, ‘Islamic militants’, ‘Islamic theology’, ‘Islamic extremists’ and ‘Islamic radicalism’ (21/187*100 = 11.2 per cent) in its articles’ headlines and leads.

Within the database, in a total of 21 editorials overall, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph refer to 7/7 as "Islamic terrorism” (4/21*100=19.04%) in comparison to “Islamist terrorism” (1/21*100=4.76 or approximately 5%). Apart from the editorials, a few writers in these newspapers also used the term “Islamic terrorism” to denote 7/7, twice in The Daily Telegraph news reports and once in its comment piece. In the database, about nine per cent of the reporting (24/274*100 = 8.75% or approximately
9% linked Islam with terrorism, thus presenting a closed view of Islam, compared to around six per cent of reporting (16/274*100 = 5.83%, that is nearly 6%) that had an open view of Islam. More specifically, both newspapers used “Islamic terrorism” twice each in comparison to “Islamist terrorism” which was cited in The Guardian editorials just once and did not appear at all in The Daily Telegraph editorials within the database.

According to The Daily Telegraph report published on 11 December 2006, “The Foreign Office has advised Government ministers, ambassadors and officials to avoid the phrase ‘war on terror’, and similar belligerent terms, as they risk angering British Muslims and generating tensions in the wider Islamic world”. Later on, David Cameron experienced this personally when he spent some time with a British Muslim family in Birmingham to learn how British Muslims view post 7/7 British society. Among many things, Cameron learned that many Muslims were “deeply offended by the use of the word ‘Islamic’ or ‘Islamist’ to describe the terrorist threat we face today” (The Guardian, 13 May 2007).

On the day after the 9/11 anniversary on 10 September 2006, Muhammad Abdul Bari pointed out to David Harrison of The Daily Telegraph that, “When the IRA was blowing people up, the entire Catholic population of Britain was not demonised, so why is it happening to the Muslim community?” The point here is surely that the IRA campaign and, indeed, the Protestant bombings and killings were seen as a problem based on the issue of the future of Northern Ireland and not on religious communities. Drawing on Britain’s experience of IRA bombings, Karen Armstrong, in her comment piece entitled “The Label of Catholic terror was never used about IRA”, stated that politicians and the media should avoid using “Muslim terrorism” and “Islamic terrorism” because the 7/7 bombers had “violate[d] essential Islamic principles” (The Guardian, 11 July 2005).

Armstrong made three significant points. First, the Qur’an and Bible both insist on forgiveness, love and peace, and, like many Muslims, Jews and Christians have also failed to live up to these standards. Second, “We rarely, if ever, called the IRA bombings ‘Catholic’ terrorism because we knew enough to realise that this was not essentially a religious campaign...This is obviously the case with Zionist fundamentalism in Israel and the fervently patriotic Christian right in the US” (ibid.). Third, it is imperative that Western governments also avoid using the words ‘Islamic terrorism’ to describe the threat of radicalisation in Europe because it may increase the risk of radicalisation and
limit efforts to reach out to the Muslim population (also see The Daily Telegraph, 12 April 2006).

(ii) - "Islamist terrorism":

In the days following the 7/7 attacks both broadsheets also applied the term “Islamist terrorism” to describe the attacks. This thesis traced the presence of the term 'Islamist’ in several different ways including “Islamist terrorism”, “Islamist terrorist”, “Islamist ideology”, “Islamist preachers”, “Islamist extremist” and “Islamist flag”. Overall, the phrase “Islamist” appears 80 times (80/274*100=29.19%) in both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph in all their types of journalism including comments, features, editorials and special investigative news reports. Here it is important to note that the expression “Islamist” mostly appears in connection with radical individuals, groups and organisations, and is used to describe affiliates of various international radical and extremist organisations such al-Qaeda.

Notably, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph used the term “Islamist terrorism” only nine times in their all types of journalism (9/274*100=3.28% approximately). The editorial citation of “Islamist Terrorism” appears as follows: The Guardian share comprises (1/13*100=7.69 or 8% approximately) in comparison to The Daily Telegraph, which did not cite the term “Islamist terrorism” in its editorials. Overall, The Daily Telegraph reporting used the expression only twice, in a news report and in a comment. In contrast, The Guardian used the term “Islamist terrorism” eight times in its other types of journalism, including news reports and comments.

The word “Islamist” appears as a synonym for ‘violent ideology’ ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and Hizbut-Tahrir to Al-Muhajiroun in Britain. Notably, the word “Islamist” also denotes hate preachers, radical and extremists such as Abu-Hamza al-Masri, and Omar Bakri Muhammad who have been accused of making hate speeches. In The Daily Telegraph report of 7 July 2007, the British writer Charles Moore branded Baroness Sayeeda Warsi an “Islamist” because she supports terrorism in Kashmir. In other words, the description “Islamist” suggests that individuals and groups who seek to achieve political goals by using or endorsing violent means are “Islamists”.

(iii) - “Home-grown Terrorism”:

‘Home-grown terrorism’ is a relatively new term used to describe young European-born Muslims who take up a violent ideology to attack their country of birth. Despite the
growing use of the term ‘home-grown’ in various disciplines, the database shows that \textit{The Guardian} uses the term ‘home-grown’ fifteen times in its dataset \((15/187 \times 100 = 8.02\%)\) compared to \textit{The Telegraph} which uses it on only four occasions in its comments \((4/87 \times 100 = 4.59\%\) or nearly 5\%). I note that in the database \textit{The Guardian} opinion writers Madeleine Bunting and David Clark used this phrase on 16 and 25 August 2006. \textit{The Guardian} also discussed a theory of ‘The home-grown bombers’ to describe the London bombings on 10 July 2005.

\textbf{5.4-Islamists’ Terrorism Threat May Continue to the Next Generations:}

Given the three phrases applied to describe terrorism, both \textit{The Guardian} and \textit{The Daily Telegraph} showed concerns in their features, news reports, editorials and interviews that the “Islamist terrorism threat” may continue for generations. Overall, thirty-four per cent \((92/274 \times 100 = 34\%)\) of reports published between 8 July 2005 and 7 July 2007 in \textit{The Guardian} and \textit{The Daily Telegraph} raised concerns about the terrorism threat. It is significant to note that this single highest reoccurring sub-theme within the dataset evaluated that the terror threat posed to Britain is not short-term but will in fact last until the next generations. Relating to home-grown radicalisation, which emerges in the dataset, I merged two sub-themes \((63+39 = 102/274 \times 100 = 37.22\%)\) formed from reports raising concerns over the threat of home-grown radicals, i.e. networks and cells linked to al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organisations.

From the dataset, one of these two sub-themes reflects young British-born Muslims who have turned to radicalisation whilst visiting the countries of their parents. Notably, the terrorism threat also includes the wide-ranging assumption that radicals intend to take over Britain and replace its secular system with Sharia law. Another aspect of the terrorism threat referred to the “Islamic” caliphate that British radicals intend to establish. Several articles appeared in both broadsheets, asserting radical Islamists’ mission to establish a caliphate in the UK. Overall, the dataset shows that the threat to establish a caliphate appeared in around eight per cent of reports, editorials and features \((21/274 \times 100 = 7.66\%)\).

Threats continued to build up as, from time to time, politicians, police and security officers, press and representatives of public organisations raised concerns that Britain is likely to come under terrorist attack at any moment. On 24 August 2006, \textit{The Daily Telegraph} quoted Phil Woolas, the minister for community cohesion, who stated that
“the war against Islamic terrorism was likely to last a generation”. Similarly, Home Secretary John Reid warned that the danger of a terrorist attack is “very high indeed” and that “the struggle against Muslim terrorism will last at least 30 years” (The Daily Telegraph, 11 December 2006). Reid equated “Muslim terrorism” with IRA terrorism, which also lasted 30 years (ibid).

Several other contributors occasionally cited politicians, government security and police officers and members of public organisations that provided different figures on radicals and extremists inside Britain. Commenting on the intensity of the threat, Patience Wheatcroft warned that “There are an estimated 1,500 plotters now at work attempting to wreak havoc in Britain” and that “Those would-be jihadists who want to see Britain quaking under Sharia law will surely think again when they realise the scale of the fight-back now underway” (The Daily Telegraph, 22 October 2006).

From the beginning to end, the terrorism threat was associated with the religious ideology that the British authorities and radicals frequently propagated in their speeches and video messages. According to The Daily Telegraph editorial, “The Islamist rationale lies in medieval theology...It has grown with every clash involving Islamist militancy since - in Sudan and Somalia, Pakistan and the Philippines, and countless countries and regions in between (The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2005). In several articles and reports The Daily Telegraph carried the same argument, albeit by different commentators, that the British “Islamists” intended to replace secular values with Sharia law, which would happen under a caliphate. The core message was that “Western values” and “way of life” are under threat and that they [Muslims] want to take revenge; “That is what we are up against” (The Daily Telegraph, 27 November 2006).

The caliphate threat continued to appear in The Daily Telegraph reporting in subsequent years. It cited and referred to former members of radical groups such as Hizbut-Tahrir to strengthen its argument that the caliphate threat was genuine. Ed Husain disclosed that during his time at college and university he learned, whilst a member of Hizbut-Tahrir, that the purpose of caliphate is to remove “all Arab governments that were not sufficiently ‘Islamic’ and were liable to removal; entire populations would submit to the army of the caliph, or face extinction” (The Daily Telegraph, 2 May 2007). Ed Husain said that the caliph will be based in the Middle East, from where he will instruct and use British Muslims against Britain (ibid).
The fear of a caliphate was a prominent feature of both broadsheets’ reporting. It is evident that most Muslim countries’ regimes even today are secular in their beliefs, be it Syria, Turkey, Egypt or Jordan. Different sources mentioned the caliphate threat. For example, on 6 May 2007, *The Guardian* investigative report disclosed that “Al-Muhajiroun, an obscure Islamist organisation, has booked the London Arena in Docklands for a conference dedicated to ‘the struggle for Khilafah’, the creation of an Islamic state”.

In the past, several Western countries including Britain and America have successfully used the fear tactic to control or to divert public attention from their controversial wars. Among other commentators, Karen Armstrong highlighted this point: “Extremists and unscrupulous politicians have purloined the word for their own purposes, but the real meaning of jihad is not ‘holy war’ but ‘struggle’ or ‘effort’” that bound Muslims “to make a massive attempt on all fronts - social, economic, intellectual, ethical and spiritual - to put the will of God into practice” (*The Guardian*, 11 July 2005).

This is a well-established thesis that has been promoted in the media, films, arts, books, dramas and theatre. Jonathan Freedland provided an example of a TV thriller in which the hero Jack Bauer has only 24 hours to “prevent terrorists detonating a nuclear bomb over Los Angeles” (*The Guardian*, 24 August 2005). Freedland further stated that, like this fiction, in real life people are ready to sacrifice their liberties in order to be safe and secure. He illustrates an ICM poll conducted by *The Guardian*: “Having seen the all-too-real threat of the July bombings, 73% are ready to pay the price, ready to let our protectors do whatever has to be done” (ibid).

In particular, *The Daily Telegraph* published surveys using sensitive headlines such as, “Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want sharia law in UK” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 19 February 2006). However, it did not explain the structure of the survey and how this 40% figure emerged in its follow-up. In addition, Con Coughlin reminded readers that “Islamist” radical groups such as Iranian-backed Shia militias and Hizbollah wished for a caliphate that would be a threat to Britain from Southern Iraq to Lebanon (*The Daily Telegraph*, 3 August 2006). The caliphate threat was presented more or less like the “weapons of mass destruction” threat from a constructed enemy in a distant land, the Middle East, which equates to Said’s *Orientalism* concept. In brief, both newspapers raised their own concerns alongside the politicians, police and public and private organisations’
representatives who constantly reminded us that the terrorism threat will continue in the years to come.

5.5-The ‘Religious Ideology’ Discourse: “Islamist” Ideology.

Both broadsheets in all forms of journalism more or less identified “Islamist” ideology as the root cause of terrorism problems, although they were writing in the context of 7/7 as opposed to episodes in the past. To an extent, both newspapers’ editorials also reflected this view as opposed to the various other contributions. According to the dataset, ‘ideology’ refers to the “Islamist” and “radical” interpretation of religion and to their mission, which is to establish a caliphate under Sharia law. This sets the scene for discussions on British Muslims, Islam as a religion and its link with terrorism in the form of an ‘ideology’ that is often misinterpreted by Islamist terrorists and radicals. The code/sub-theme for ideology appears 55 times in both broadsheets (55/274*100 = 20.7% or nearly 21%). Hence, on the whole, around 21 per cent of the total coverage in various types of journalism across both broadsheets talks about ideology.

Overall, the sub-theme ‘ideology’ ranked fourth after Islamists’ terrorism threat, Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq, and “Britishness”. Both broadsheets mainly focused on three different types of ideologies that were presented as root causes of the terrorism threat. These ideologies were different branches of the same tree but were placed in three separate boxes including Wahabbi, al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies.

Notably, a total of 46/274*100=16.78 or nearly 17% of reporting in all types of journalism, including editorials of both broadsheets, set out the opinions of a few British radicals and hate-mongers such as Abu-Hamza, Anjem Choudary, Omar Bakri Muhammad and Abu Qatada. Immediately after the bombings, Prime Minister Blair used the term “Evil ideology” to describe the 7/7 bombers. On this argument, The Daily Telegraph agreed with Blair and wrote in its editorial that the 7/7 bombers acted “in the name of a perverted conception of Islam... the name of an ideology whose adherents hate Western democracy and liberalism” and “They wish to replace it with a theocracy, governed by religious leaders who interpret Islamic law in medieval fashion (The Daily Telegraph, 10 July 2005).

(i)-Wahhabi Ideology:

Within the dataset the sub-theme “Terrorists; ideology e.g. ‘Wahhabism’ etc. is to destroy and replace Western democratic values with their interpretations of ‘Islamic law’”

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appears 55 times in both broadsheets’ various types of journalism, including their editorials (55/274*100=20.07%). It is thus the third highest reoccurring sub-theme within the construction of a main theme “Home-grown Islamist Terrorism Threat”. Notably, a larger portion of 20.07% citation of ‘Wahhabism’ appears in comment pieces, news reports and interviews, indicating that the terminology was used by various commentators and writers in both broadsheets. It is important to note that The Guardian (46/187*100=25%) was more concerned about ‘Wahhabism’ in comparison to The Daily Telegraph (9/87*100=10.34%) in terms of overall reporting. However, it is noted that The Guardian mentions ‘Wahhabism’ three times in its editorials while The Daily Telegraph talked about it only twice.

‘Wahhabism’ was mostly linked with al-Qaeda and its associates and Saudi Arabia. The ‘ideology’ debate showed that most writers and commentators in both broadsheets regularly presented controversial figures, especially former radicals, as their main sources of citation and expert opinion. Thus, controversial and self-styled scholars shaped ideology discussions such as the former member of Hizbut-Tahrir, Ed Husain, who appeared in The Daily Telegraph as an expert on Islam. Ed Husain blamed Saudi Arabia for backing ‘Wahhabism’, which he considered the “root cause of the theology of terror, we will not be able to defeat it” (The Daily Telegraph, 2 May 2007). In comparison, The Guardian also presented an ex-member of a radical group Al-Muhajiroun, Hassan Butt, as an expert in radical ideology who argued that “the real engine of our violence” lies in ‘Islamic theology’ that is centuries old and it needs to change (The Guardian, 1 July 2007).

These two authors advocated the adoption of a new version of ‘modern Islam’ that is compatible with the West. Hassan pointed out that Muslims cannot ignore the fact that there are passages in the Qur’an that demand the killing of unbelievers. Upon this, neither newspaper expanded the debate and incorporated Islamic scholars’ opinions on the historic context of those verses of the Quran nearly fourteen centuries ago. But, The Guardian columnist Seumas Milne raised these issues in the comment section:

Rarely a TV debate goes by without Ed Husain, one-time member of Hizbut-Tahrir and now a British neocon pinup boy, or Hassan Butt, formerly of the banned al-Muhajiroun group, insisting that this is all about people with identity
crises who are “hell-bent on destroying the west”,
denouncing Ken Livingstone for engaging in dialogue with
Islamists... (The Guardian, 5 July 2007).

Milne further notes that, like Ed Husain and Hassan Butt, there are neocon politicians
such as the Tory Michael Gove and New Labour’s Denis MacShane who often loudly
proclaim that all “Islamists”, from the liberal-minded Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan to
al-Qaeda terrorists, should not be engaged with (The Guardian, 5 July 2007). This
argument is valid in the sense that, on the one hand, selected members of radical
organisations are presented as moderate and reformist whilst, on the other hand,
genuine scholars such as Tariq Ramadan have been demonised.

Evidence emerged in The Observer’s letters-to-the-editor page on 20 May 2007, when
Taji Musfata, a media representative of Hizbut-Tahrir, rejected Ed Husain’s claim to
have been a Hizbut-Tahrir member. Ed Husain has received considerable coverage as an
expert and learned scholar on Islam in both broadsheets. Most of the articles in these
broadsheets on terrorism and the ideology discussion involved the selective use of
sources such as controversial hate preachers, ex-Muslims and ex-members of banned or
working radical groups and organisations such as Hizbut-Tahrir etc.

The Saudi factor was a prominent feature in the “Islamic” caliphate discourse.
Furthermore, these newspapers’ writers pointed out that British mosques are being
funded by Saudi money. In other words Saudi Arabia is backing and promoting the idea
of Wahhabism in Britain. Evidently, despite the view that the London bombers were
unconnected with mosques, some of The Daily Telegraph writers constantly labelled
British mosques as places that inculcate extremism and Wahhabism ideology in young
British Muslims who are radicalised in the mosques.

Two commentators in The Daily Telegraph, Mark Steyn and Denis MacShane, pointed to
Saudi funding of British mosques. On 12 July 2005, Steyn wrote that Britain should even
force its allies to cut off ties with Saudi Arabia “like General Musharraf shutting down
his section of the Saudi-Pakistani-LondonistanWahhabist pipeline”. The anti-Saudi
campaign through the prism of Wahhabi ideology continued in The Daily Telegraph
comment pieces, features and editorials. MacShane wrote that “The struggle is not
between religion and secularism, nor between the West and Islam...Bush-Blair and the
Taliban or Iraqi insurgents. It is the ideologisation...of religion that needs confronting” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 17 July 2006).

The anti-Saudi feeling was a predominant feature in *The Guardian* reporting, and a few of its contributors even used phrases such as “Wahabbi terror”, “Sunni Terror” and “Porn-loving Saudi Arabia” which suggested that the ideology is a product of the Saudi Arabian-backed Wahabbism idea (*The Guardian*, 10 July 2005). On the other hand, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* did not mention Shia ideology, which can be seen at work in Syria, Yemen and the Gulf states where Iran and Saudi Arabia are locked in a struggle for regional hegemony.

**(ii)-Muslim Brotherhood Ideology:**
According to *The Daily Telegraph* writers and commentators, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology (Sunni Islamism) was responsible for the act of terrorism in Britain. These writers pointed out that those members of various home-grown radical groups, such as Hizbut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun, who intend to bring Sharia law to Britain, are in fact inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology that has also set out to bring back the caliphate. Most writers and commentators of *The Daily Telegraph* present this popular view that the Muslim Brotherhood ideology (radical Islamism) is a driving force behind British Islamists.

One of its contributors, Patrick Bishop, wrote that although the London bombers were modern in their appearance, they were in reality inspired by the ideology of al-Qaeda which is “nearly 14 centuries old”, and “the nature of the violence suggests that they were driven by the ideology that propels Islamic terrorism from Leeds to Lahore” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 14 July 2005). The notion that the Muslim Brotherhood ideology had inspired the London bombers was constantly raised in all forms of journalistic pieces by various writers. For example, Dudley Edwards associated all the troubles and issues in Britain, from the Salman Rushdie Affair to the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) cartoon controversy protest and Muslim women’s veil, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology (*The Daily Telegraph*, 3 February 2007).

In contrast, *The Guardian* emphasised that Britain should engage in a dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood. It provided a platform for Muslim Brotherhood members during their election campaign in Egypt and, until recently, in its editorials it condemned Morsi’s sentence. Further, it considered that a Muslim Brotherhood government would
have been better than one led by military dictators (see *The Guardian*, 23 November 2005; 12 July 2006 and 22 April 2015). Madeleine Bunting wrote that the Muslim Brotherhood is a global entity that has different roles in different places and countries. For example, in Egypt it has won fair and independent elections (*The Guardian*, 16 August 2006). Like a few other liberal-minded commentators of *The Guardian*, Bunting also suggested in her four comment pieces that the British government should make contact with all strands of Muslims including the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid).

Another *Guardian* writer, Jonathan Freedland, also endorsed a dialogue (*The Guardian*, 3 August 2005). In contrast, Michael Gove, often described as a strong critic of the Muslim Brotherhood, clarified in his article of 23 August 2006 in *The Guardian* that, although Bunting calls his book “Paranoid”, he supports a “more robust relationship with Islam”, by which he means “moderates” in these organisations. Although *The Guardian* recognised that ideology played a significant role in the radicalisation of young British Muslims, it assumed that cutting off contact with those misguided individuals would be even more disastrous (see *The Guardian*, 16 July 2005). Given Britain's past experience of IRA terrorism, *The Guardian*'s suggestion in the above illustrations makes perfect sense since peace talks with the IRA were ultimately successful.

In comparison, *The Daily Telegraph* comment pieces and editorials indicated a rather tough approach towards the Muslim Brotherhood but it did recognise that Qutb was radicalised in prison where he was brutally tortured and beaten (see *The Daily Telegraph*, 14 July 2005). Patrick Bishop wrote that Qutb’s work was aimed at undemocratic Arab regimes that were oppressing Muslims, which is why his work was banned in all Arab countries because it didn’t serve the interests of political elites (ibid).

Bishop further notes that those inspired by Qutb’s work, like many "Islamic terrorists", believe that “democracy and human rights raised a barrier between man and God... This belief that all truth is contained in the Koran means that the terrorists have no political agenda with which the West can engage”; therefore, for many “young men from Britain to Bahrain, it is a vision that outshines anything the modern world can offer” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 14 July 2005).

The above narrative in *The Daily Telegraph* reflects the view that secularism clashes with Islamic teachings. In other words Islam is “outdated” and it restrains its [radical]
followers from engaging with the modern world. The message is that authorities must not engage with the British “Islamists”. However, evidence shows that the modern world’s interventions and attempts to force others to buy into its modernity contradict the very notions of modern Western values.

5.6-Al-Qaeda: Home-grown “Cells” and “Networks”.

A sub-theme, the UK-based sleeper cells/networks linked to al-Qaeda and religious schools in Pakistan that espouse fundamentalism, occurs 63 times in the database (63/274*100 = 22.99% which is nearly 23%) of the total reporting relating to home-grown threats in the form of sleeper cells and networks. The aggregate reporting in both broadsheets helps to identify a sub-theme reflecting UK-based “sleeper cells” and “networks” that have connections with al-Qaeda and other radical groups, including a few religious schools in Pakistan that espouse radicalism.

Immediately after the London bombings, The Daily Telegraph rushed to hold al-Qaeda responsible for these attacks, arguing that it had sympathisers inside Britain. In contrast, The Guardian offered a measured response and avoided fabricating such connections. According to The Daily Telegraph report on 7 July 2005, al-Qaeda was behind the attacks, but the next day, 8 July 2005, it published another report, “Al-Qa’eda link hides multitude of suspects”, in which it questioned reports suggesting that al-Qaeda was behind the London bombings. It wrote: “Who was responsible? There are many fundamentalist organisations that fly under Osama bin Laden’s flag of convenience and some of them have bases or off-shoots in London...” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2005).

In contrast, The Guardian published a lengthy investigative piece referring to a number of sources and claims that the irrational fear of al-Qaeda had been over-reported. It also stated in the same article: “Leak reveals official story of London bombings: Al-Qaeda not linked, says government: Gang used internet to plan 7/7 attack” (The Observer, 9 April 2006). Later on, based on an unpublished ISC report, The Guardian disclosed that “The police have not uncovered any evidence of direct links to al-Qaeda or a fifth man” but the report acknowledged that “they were inspired by Osama bin Laden’s ideology” (The Guardian, 11 May 2006).

However, it was evident in a few news reports that writers in these two broadsheets held similar views on home-grown radicals; i.e. they are al-Qaeda sympathisers and are
ready to kill their fellow citizens (*The Observer*, 30 July 2006; *The Daily Telegraph*, 2 May 2007). Both newspapers raised similar concerns about how educated, middle-class, relatively Westernised young men had been trapped in al-Qaeda's philosophy.

The term “cells” refers to a small number of individuals who may have been inspired by al-Qaeda ideology using the Internet. British intelligence sources described them as a “very small number of inner-core al-Qaeda people” with 30 or so members in Britain (*The Guardian*, 11 July 2005). However, it appeared that “Al-Qaeda is not an organisation with a central authority, in the way that the IRA was. The small groups of fanatics who decide to plant bombs...No central command structure has to approve an operation. In the case of 7/7, it seems likely that Khan, the ringleader, acted without explicit approval from anyone” (*The Sunday Telegraph*, 14 May 2006).

5.7- The Terrorism Debate within *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*: Interpretations and Responses.

In the aftermath of 7/7, both broadsheets discussed and debated the terrorism problem from different perspectives and included diverse views and arguments within their comments and debates sections, news, investigative reports, features and personal views columns. The following four sub-themes are combined to initiate a broader debate on the aftermath of terrorism: the necessity of introducing tough laws; introduction of a ‘glorification of terrorism’ Act; a terrorism Bill that provides the police with extra powers to hold terror suspects for 90 days without trial; and, considering the British history of terrorism, the need to draft new laws and adopt measures to combat the threat.

As mentioned above, these sub-themes account for a total share of 25.18 per cent of aggregate reporting. The significant point here is that, of these sub-themes, the most recurring sub-theme was: “Terrorists are the common enemy for British Muslims and non-Muslims, so community bonding could defeat terrorism”; this appeared 29 times (29/274*100 = 10.58 - approximately 11% of the news). This shows that those powerful elites (press, politicians, police, peers and public bodies) play important roles in the process of news manufacturing and drafting policies, considered British Muslims as allies in dealing with the terrorism problem.

Moreover, both broadsheets suggested that moderate Muslims should come forward and play their part to tackle terrorism (*The Daily Telegraph*, 20 July 2006).
review of The Guardian explains the idea in a headline: “It is a battle for the heart of Islam”: “Moderate Muslims are urged to tackle proponents of extremism” (The Guardian, 18 July 2005). It also cited its sister-paper The Observer’s editorial of 17 July 2005 that stated: “Most Muslims are stunned that a deluded minority of its youth has been so corrupted by extremists that they are ready to die for an essentially fascistic cause. [But] real and lasting solutions have to come from Muslim communities” (ibid).

In contrast, a contributor to The Daily Telegraph, Niall Ferguson, wrote that the British government considered 7/7 an act by a “criminal minority” and, therefore, neither Islam nor the wider Muslim community should be blamed for it. However, he continues: “Quite so. The trouble is that this criminal minority considers that it is acting on the basis of Islam. And it seems to be hatching its schemes right under the noses of the wider Muslim community” (cited in The Guardian, 18 July 2005).

Examining the causes of terrorism, The Guardian stated in an editorial that the Muslim community is deprived and underdeveloped and that, “While the response to Islamism must cover many different bases, one essential part of the strategy must be recognising this connection, and then addressing the pressing problems of poverty that blight so many Muslim lives” (The Guardian, 27 June 2006). In contrast, The Daily Telegraph disagreed with this notion that poverty is one of the root causes of terrorism in Britain. Rather, in its editorial “Attack is the best defence against terror” (The Daily Telegraph, 10 July 2005), it pointed out that poverty has no link with terrorism. It further wrote: “The reality is that we cannot address the “causes” of terrorism...The only defence we have is to penetrate and destroy the terrorist organisations themselves: to identify, arrest and imprison the terrorists and their leaders” (ibid.). However, David Davis proposed that, to eliminate terrorism, one might simply say: “...I respect your religion, you respect mine, and we all respect our laws. That means that we respect the universality of our laws, with no special treatment for any one group” (The Daily Telegraph, 15 Oct 2006).

Both broadsheets discussed various options for countering terrorism. For example, The Observer editorial of 17 July 2005 asked the following questions: “Should imams be registered with the Home Office, perhaps? Should the state fund an Islamic college to provide a new generation of British imams? Similarly, David Davis posed a few questions in The Daily Telegraph: “Are we going to find the compromises to preserve the
freedoms, the tolerance...[of a] vital and creative society in history? Or are we going to allow the splintering of loyalties, the division of communities that will corrode the foundations of that society?” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 15 October 2006). Furthermore, both broadsheets discussed and debated anti-terror laws and policies, terrorist suspect trials, deportation, and options for banning radical groups in Britain. At this point, the two newspapers were evidently at odds with each other on different ways to combat terrorism.

(i) *The Guardian Perspective on Counter-Terrorism:*

Soon after the 7/7 bombings, Tony Blair pledged that the “rules of the game have changed”. This phrase became a warning symbol of the British government reaction to 7/7 and also demonstrated its strategy for dealing with terrorism. Subsequently, Blair introduced a ‘12-point plan’ leading to new legislative measures to combat terrorism. At this point, community bonding and engagement with British Muslims emerged as a central focus of *The Guardian* reporting. Hence, it initiated a debate around these two themes and published a series of articles suggesting that British Muslims’ confidence and cooperation would be a winning tool to combat terrorism. *The Guardian* raised Muslim concerns, grievances and their motivation to engage within wider society to fight terrorism. The net percentage of stories in the above table demonstrates that *The Guardian* attached significant importance to Muslim issues. Notably, these figures do not include editorials that show *The Guardian’s* firm position on the anti-terror Bill, particularly its provisions such as ‘glorification’ of terrorism, ‘detentions’, and ‘stop and search’ practices.

Generally, the human factor emerged as a prominent feature in *The Guardian* reporting, showing concern over British government proposals for tougher anti-terror laws. Here, it challenged the government and insisted that its new legislative measures were counter-productive, arguing that fundamental human rights must be considered a priority. In its series of editorials such as “Worse than disease” (6 August 2005); “Use existing laws” (9 August 2005); “Liberty is our defence” (23 August 2005); “Three months is too long” (13 October 2005); “No torture please we’re British” (9 December 2005); and “Stop and rethink” (28 May 2007), *The Guardian* showed both its opposition to and disappointment with the government’s attitude and policies in battling terrorism.
In much of its content, including investigative and general news reports, *The Guardian* continued to criticise the government’s terrorism legislation. In a number of articles and news reports, it discussed the delicate nature of terrorism, particularly the notion of British core values, government institutional responses, and hasty policies to tackle terrorism, resulting in the notorious killing of Jean Charles de Menezes and the Forest Gate shooting in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Furthermore, *The Guardian* urged Gordon Brown to reject Blair’s strict policies and harsh tactics, which it viewed as ‘draconian’ and inappropriate for dealing with terrorism.

In series of comment pieces *The Guardian* commentators Karen Armstrong, Martin Kettle, Madeleine Bunting, Oliver McTernan, Geoffrey Wheatcroft and few others offered several useful suggestions for combating terrorism such as promoting the role of mosques in eliminating radicalisation, appointing English-speaking imams in British mosques and acknowledging the need to address British Muslims’ grievances (*The Guardian*, 19 July 2005; 16 February 2006; 9 July 2007). Several other commentators criticised government plans to introduce tough anti-terror laws and the detention of suspects without trial, and they stressed that the government should learn from the past experience of dealing with IRA terrorism. They also noted that extremists, traitors and fundamentalists in Europe such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who had killed thousands of Muslims, were also the “enemy within” (see *The Guardian*, 11 July 2005; 30 July 2005; 31 July 2005).

The ways of combating the terrorism threat formed an extensive debate in *The Guardian* that required plenty of space to include and comment upon every single article and news item. Essentially, *The Guardian’s* reporting suggested that not all radicals and extremists were born with such philosophies but had in fact become radicals due to ill-treatment. Two of its commentators, Armstrong and Kettle, argued that violence can be beaten, not by practising tough laws but through wisdom and patience (see *The Guardian*, 10 July 2005; 19 July 2005). Notably, Armstrong assumes that “militant religiosity is often the product of social, economic and political factors” and reminded us of the story of Sayyid Qutb who suffered brutal treatment in prison at the hands of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s government (ibid).

In the same vein, another scholar, Soumaya Ghannoushi, also assumed that Bush and Blair had adopted the wrong approach to dealing with Islam which in turn made
matters worse. Ghannoushi wrote that “London and Washington must decide which Islam they want: a peaceful, democratic Islam, crucial to any pursuit of global stability, or the anarchical and destructive Islam of al-Qaida and its ilk” (The Guardian, 5 October 2005). Ghannoushi stressed that the Western leaders should learn lessons of history: “After all, it was Europe's colonialist adventures that drove the esoteric spiritualist Mahdis of Sudan, Sanussis of Libya and Qadiris of Algeria out of seclusion and on to the road of militancy and jihadism.” (ibid)

To balance the debate on combating terrorism, The Guardian also included some commentators and historians from the right whose views do not accord with its editorial policies. For example, Max Hastings, a right-wing historian, noted that there had been “acute tensions” between Islam and the West that were “founded upon Arab envy and frustration, [and] even if the state of Israel did not exist” there would have been a clash (The Guardian, 3 September 2005). Hastings noted that it was the British army action in Derry that provided the Irish militants with a cause with which to recruit youngsters for years to come (ibid). Based on Liddell’s published diary facts, Hastings mentioned Kim Philby and Anthony Blunt, who double-crossed their British officers and leaked the country's secret information to the Soviets; thus, “If one wishes to fear an enemy within, the treachery of Philby, Blunt and their friends seems to be a more alarming example than that of Khan...and other British Muslims... communist agents, those pillars of London social life.” (ibid) These series of illustrations within The Guardian comment section shaped the debate in a way that suggested that British Muslims must not be singled out as lesser citizens; in fact they must be listened to and engaged with to win the battle against terrorism. In brief, The Guardian reminded those in power, through its editorials such as “Terror vote: Muslim reaction: ‘The Laws will increase tensions” (16 February 2006), that it is a joint effort and not a ‘Muslim problem’ alone.

(ii)-The Daily Telegraph Perspective on Counter-Terrorism:

The Daily Telegraph reporting mainly reflected official descriptions of terrorism using selected sources. But it also included contrasting opinions and the views of those challenging the government position on anti-terror laws and policies for tackling the terrorism problem. Notably, on similar subjects and occasions The Daily Telegraph headlines appeared to contrast sharply with those of The Guardian, suggesting that it
backed Blair’s policies. For example: “Blair calls on Muslims to root out extremists” (The Daily Telegraph, 5 July 2006) vs. “Blair says Muslim leaders must do more” (The Guardian, 5 July 2006). In these headlines, the words “Muslims” and “Muslim leaders” show the sense of responsibility that varies within the Muslim community at different levels. A year later, The Daily Telegraph’s editorial headline stated: ‘Muslims have to join this battle’; hence, it continued to emphasise ‘Muslims’, like Blair’s approach. Again, its headlines such as “7/7 staged by the State, say quarter of Muslims” (5 June 2007) and “Muslims must do their duty and fight terrorist barbarians” (4 July 2007) showed that it placed more responsibility on Muslims rather than using words that supported joint efforts at combating terrorism.

On the first anniversary of 7/7, in its editorial (7/7/2006) The Daily Telegraph was reluctant to draw a distinction between the 7/7 murderers and their religion; thus, it described the incident as an ‘Islamic terrorist assault’ but also recognised the security flaws and the government’s refusal to held a public inquiry, which raised further questions. Consider The Daily Telegraph’s view (editorial) on the second anniversary (8 July 2007) which included Gordon Brown and Admiral Sir Alan West’s suggestion to avoid using the terms “Islamic terrorists” and “Muslim terrorism”. They suggested describing terrorists as “criminals” instead of ‘identifying them with their religious affiliations’. The above illustrations evidently show that The Daily Telegraph’s perceptions of the 7/7 event did not change throughout the entire period (8 July 2005 - 7 July 2007).

From day one The Daily Telegraph insisted that the bombers were inspired by a religious ideology, and therefore the 7/7 act of terrorism was in fact “Islamic terrorism” in its view. But the bombers’ video messages made it clear that they were complaining about the Iraq war and Muslims’ suffering because of the war, which seems to be more of a political issue. As mentioned earlier at the beginning of this chapter, The Daily Telegraph continued to use the term “Islamic terrorism” in its editorials, thus reflecting its own attitude to and understanding of the terrorism issue. Upon this, The Daily Telegraph wrote in its editorial that it disagreed with those in power, saying that they should not be ‘fooled by the change in language’ and arguing that “the reality is that the threat comes from a perverted version of Islam. It is not Hindus or Buddhists or Polish immigrants to Britain who are trying to plant bombs here: it is men who claim to be
Muslims” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2007). It also insisted that the Muslim Council of Britain “combat the anti-Western, anti-secular ideology peddled by the fanatics.” (ibid)

On Muslims’ sentiments, The Daily Telegraph allowed the expression of Muslim views, albeit within a narrow margin. For example, Ali Miraj’s analysis, “Muslim anger must be recognized” offered reasons for Muslims’ discontent in post-7/7 Britain. He cited a series of incidents such as the Forest Gate raid fuelled by suspicion, fearful and exaggerated surveys, false perceptions of Muslims ‘killing Kafirs and Jews’, a bad press and even government duplicity in its approach to Muslim issues, all of which indicated that a ‘hearts and minds’ thesis is more of a political narrative than a practical manuscript. As a Muslim himself, Miraj admitted that Muslims and their self-proclaimed leaders ‘must do more to combat intolerance in their midst’. However, “That task is made more difficult when, despite all the mass protests against the war in Iraq, the Government is seen not to have listened” (The Daily Telegraph, 13 August 2006).

On the anniversary of 7/7, terror trials and even on 9/11 anniversaries, The Daily Telegraph published a series of news reports, comments and opinions, and review strategies and policies to combat terrorism. In its editorial “Attack is the best defence against terror”, The Daily Telegraph supported Blair’s proposal for anti-terror legislation. It also discredited the Law Lords’ decision to reject, on human rights grounds, Blair’s anti-terror laws and detentions without charge (The Daily Telegraph, 10 July 2005).

On the causes of terrorism, most of its reporting sanctioned the government point of view rather than British Muslims’ standpoint. The support for anti-terror laws was itself a denial of secular British values that The Daily Telegraph cherished in its pages. It continued to support Blair’s policies for combating terrorism in its editorials whilst occasionally providing space to alternative voices that opposed the government anti-terror laws.

On the whole, The Daily Telegraph, unlike The Guardian, was less supportive of the idea that the government should engage with the British Muslim community as part of combating the threat of terrorism. Moreover, The Daily Telegraph suggested that the 7/7 bombers’ grievances were wrong, and in order to stop future terrorist threats it was best to disregard the bombers’ political complaints; rather, Britain should be adopting strict measures. This included introducing new terrorism laws and making
strict interpretations of old laws. It criticised the British government in its editorial of 3 September 2006, “Five years on, this war must intensify”, for being soft on the use of the Terrorism Act 2006 and its provisions such as the outlawing of ‘glorification’ and the prosecution of hate preachers who want to kill non-Muslims. Within its features (13 August 2006 and 17 October 2006) The Daily Telegraph pushed the government to be tougher and show no mercy to hate preachers and radicals.

Throughout, The Daily Telegraph continued to state that British radicals’ grievances against the West are wrong. In its editorial The Daily Telegraph wrote, “One side points to the disarmament of Libya and the democratisation of Lebanon and Afghanistan; the other to the increase in Islamic terrorism. But if fish do indeed need water, the answer is to drain it – in other words, to bring down the dictatorships across the Muslim world that export the terrorists” (The Daily Telegraph, 11 September 2006). Similarly, in the context of the 7/7 bombings The Daily Telegraph disagreed with the government idea of avoiding the use of terms such as “Islamic terrorists” and “Muslim terrorism” in order to combat terrorism because this may alienate the British Muslim community. Rather, it wrote that “The reality is that the threat comes from a perverted version of Islam. It is not Hindus or Buddhists or Polish immigrants to Britain who are trying to plant bombs here: it is men who claim to be Muslims” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2007).

In summary, both broadsheets raised genuine concerns over the terrorism threat to Britain resulting from growing radicalisation that is allegedly rooted in the self-interpreted ideology of radicals. However the two broadsheets’ reporting reflected different approaches to dealing with these threats. For example, The Guardian believed that British Muslims should be taken on board as a wider community and not just fractions of selected Muslims to deal with these threats. Moreover, it advocated a softer method of treating suspects and, if necessary, the option of dialogue would be most suitable. In comparison The Daily Telegraph adopted a conservative approach in which it supported the government’s tough laws to tackle radicals and the terrorism threat and also believed that “Sufi Islam” should be taken on board.

**Section II: Narrative of Contextual Debates, Critical Analysis and Commentary on Islamist Terrorism Threat:**

This section explains the emergence and development of terrorism threat in both newspapers reflecting upon the reporting of the 7/7 event. Also, it provides details of
the growing phenomena of radicalisation and religious ideology. Arguably, reconstructions of terrorism as “Islamic” suggest that the terrorism is exclusively a Muslims problem and that state is a victim and is defending itself.


(i) Categorisation of Terrorism in the Context of 7/7: Contextual Explanation of “Islamic”, “Islamist” and “Home-grown”.

Evidently, there is no single agreed definition and explanation of terrorism. This makes it a complex and complicated phenomenon and a contested and problematic term. Different scholars, media experts and government officials hold different views on terrorism even though those targeting innocent civilians around the world have their own explanations of terrorism. Karen Armstrong wrote: “Rhetoric is a powerful weapon in any conflict” (The Guardian, 11 July 2005). Such complexity was also evident in both broadsheets’ reporting that offered a reasonable discussion inviting various scholars, journalists, politicians, government and public bodies’ representatives to find a more acceptable form of terrorism expression to denote the London bombings. This took place in the comments, features, interviews, personal views and debates sections of these broadsheets. Notably, all contributors to these discussions, including a few British Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain, agreed that the London bombings were acts of terrorism.

In recent years, the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ has been used excessively to describe acts of terrorism. In the context of the 7/7 event both newspapers described it as an act of “Islamic terrorism” mainly because those perpetrators were Muslims inspired by al-Qaeda ideology. It is imperative that the use of the word ‘Islamic’ in association with society, politics, economics, science, culture, arts and business, for example “Islamic society” and “Islamic banking”, should indicate that these fields are abiding by ‘Islamic’ principles, ideologies and values. In other words, the word ‘Islamic’ in conjunction with all aspects of life is a mandate for that particular concept and tangible or intangible commodity, be it society, education or economics, to be considered under ‘Islamic’ jurisdiction (see Göle, 2000; Halstead, 2004; Kahf, 2003).

The 7/7 bombers were largely characterised as “Islamic” and “Islamist” terrorists rather than simple fanatics, angry disintegrated individuals, or mentally disturbed young men,
as was the case with non-Muslim extremists and terrorists. The aggregate reporting evidenced that the discourse on “Islamic terrorism” largely omitted mainstream scholars, particularly Muslim opinions. Here, one might note that Islam as a religion is centuries old; hence, what have the 21st century press and polity now found to link all terrorism to “Islam”? Moreover, for argument’s sake, if terrorism is purely an “Islamic” problem, why are the terrorist activities of members of other religions not reported as “Judaist terrorism”, “Christian terrorism”, “Hindu terrorism”, or “Buddhist terrorism”.

Although *The Guardian* writers debated the legal position of citing “Islamic terrorism”, none of *The Daily Telegraph* writers or editorials offered a discussion on the expression “Islamic terrorism” and whether or not it is a valid or problematic concept. Several Western scholars such as Shmuel Bar (2004) raise questions about linking the word ‘Islamic’ with terrorism. He has written that “to treat Islamic terrorism as the consequence of political and socioeconomic factors alone would not do justice to the significance of the religious culture in which this phenomenon is rooted and nurtured” (Bar, 2004, p.28).

Notably, both broadsheets used the expression “Islamic terrorism” in their editorials to describe the 7/7 event and the bombers. Here, it should be noted that an editorial of a newspaper in fact reflects that newspaper’s policy and stance on any particular issue. Therefore, one might say that both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* viewed 7/7 as an act of “Islamic terrorism” rather “Islamist Terrorism”. I would argue that the conjunction of the word ‘Islamic’ with terrorism, indicating a religious phenomenon, limits its meaning; more importantly, it damages all those efforts to engage with British Muslims, who think they have been seen as “disloyal” and the “enemy within” because of this term. Later on, the document “Prevent Strategy” (2011) published by the Home Office disclosed that the government had advised its officials to avoid linking ‘Islam’ with terrorism. The purpose was to engage with British Muslims, assuring them that not all Muslims are considered a threat or bad.

Given that the terrorism threat is an on-going phenomenon which may well continue to the next generations, presenting it as solely “Islamic” limits the discourse to Islam. Furthermore, the expression suggests that the followers of the religion of Islam are potential terrorists because it is their religion that endorses terrorism. Jackson notes that “Political and academic discourses of ‘Islamic terrorism’ are unhelpful, not least
because they are highly politicized, intellectually contestable, damaging to community relations and practically counter-productive in the struggle to control subaltern violence in the long run” (Jackson, 2007, p.395).

The second term is “Islamist terrorism”, which is often used to describe the terror activities of radical organisations or groups such as al-Qaeda and al-Muhajirun. Both broadsheets also used the term “Islamist” terrorism to denote the London bombings. In fact, it helps to make a distinction between ordinary British Muslims and the 7/7 bombers. In this sense, in comparison to “Islamic terrorism” the expression “Islamist terrorism” is a little safer but at the same it is also problematic, since the word “Islamist” suggests the political thoughts and philosophy of any radical Muslim whilst the expression “Islamic” indicates a form of Islam. Moreover, both broadsheets’ writers and commentators used the expression “Islamist” to describe radicals and hate-mongers such as Abu-Hamza al-Masri, a former imam of Finsbury mosque, who preached violence and hatred of non-Muslims and Muslims who hold opposing views to his radical ideology.

The use of the word “Islamist” gives the impression that scholars who have opposing views are radical Islamists, even if they are reformists. For example, during the colonial era, several reform movements began in Egypt, Arabia, Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent with the main aim of gaining freedom from British rule. The leaders of these movements included Sheikh Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, and Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, whose teachings are often misinterpreted and presented as pathways to violent actions by the modern “Islamists”. In turn, such misinterpretation of the mainstream Islamic scholars and reformists by a few Muslim radicals suggests that perhaps it is Islamic teachings that sanction violence and hatred of non-Muslims (see Zainal Abidin, 2012, p.65-66; Daniel, 1960, 2009).

Similar to The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, in most writings the phrase “Islamist” refers to Muslim extremists and radicals who are often inspired by the ideology of terrorist organisations, such as the 7/7 bombers who were allegedly al-Qaeda affiliates. Moreover, government documents such as the “Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005” (2006, p.8) also use the term “Islamist terrorism” to describe the terrorism threat facing Britain. Notably, the word “Islamist” denotes a few Muslim radicals and extremists in Britain such as the 7/7
bombers but not ordinary Muslims. Both broadsheets used the adjective “Islamist” in different types of journalism to make a distinction between ordinary Muslims and those who are violent. Andrew Sullivan sums it up as follows: “The distinction between Christian and Christianist echoes the distinction we make between Muslim and Islamist. Muslims are those who follow Islam. Islamists are those who want to wield Islam as a political force and conflate state and mosque” (Time, 7 May 2006; also cited in Martin and Bazegar, 2010, p.171).

Subsequently, prior to the London bombings the term “home-grown terrorism” was used to describe the terrorism threat posed by European radical and extremist organisations including the IRA and ETA. However, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph also occasionally used the term “home-grown terrorism” to illustrate the 7/7 bombings in all forms of journalism including editorials. In contrast to the “Islamic” and “Islamist” terrorism, it is arguably a soft expression because it does not accuse any form of religion, be it Christianity or Islam.

Given Britain’s past experience of the IRA and other extremist groups, the phenomenon of ‘home-grown’ is better understood. But to many scholars it is also problematic for various reasons. For example, Chris Rumford (2013) states that, because the London bombers were “highly and globally networked”, the use of the term ‘home-grown’ prevents us from seeing this important link (Rumford, 2013, p.98). It is important to understand the distinction between these phrases. One may be mindful of the fact that “Islamic” is an adjective that describes things that have direct connections with Islam (religion) such as laws, teachings and values. In contrast, the word “Islamist” designates “a particular political style and worldview, one that is authoritarian and moralizing. Some Islamists are not violent; others are very much so” (Cook, The National Interest, 10 December 2015).

Cook further writes: “To term something “radical Islamic violence” condemns a religion and leaves one with the erroneous impression that the competing modern interpretations of Islam that specifically refute violent Islamism’s worldview do not exist.” (Ibid) In the case of the 7/7 bombings both newspapers refer to 7/7 as “Islamist terrorism”, meaning an act committed by radicals and extremists who have their own interpretations and explanations of the crime they have committed. But “Islamic terrorism” is directed more at a religion than at those perpetrators who were not
committed Muslims because, by doing so, they have already violated the teachings of Islam. In sum, the usage of “Islamist” and “Islamic” makes the discourse on terrorism problematic and limits it to Islam whilst at the same time a number of other terrorist groups and organisations are operating globally. These overstated expressions also imply that perhaps the threat comes solely from the followers of Islam and will continue to do so.

(ii) Will the “Islamist Terrorism Threat” Continue in the Next Decades?

On 6 July 2005, the day before the catastrophic London bombings, the British intelligence agencies told politicians that there is “no imminent threat” and therefore Britain lowered its threat level. The next day, the tragic incident shook the whole world because of Britain’s leading role in the G8 Gleneagles summit (July 6-8) in Scotland. Jason Burke wrote in The Guardian that, from the 7/7 incident to the present day in the form of Isis, the terrorism threat is on-going (The Guardian, 6 July 2015).

Following the 7/7 incident and the 21/7 failed bombing attempts, the home-grown radicalism threat has re-emerged in the form of a few jihadists who are willing to go abroad to join radical groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, which is seeking to establish its own version of ‘Islamic law’. A notable feature of the threat of an Islamic caliphate is that the press have constantly published images of perpetrators carrying signs of the caliphate such as Kalima (Shahada, declaring a faith in the oneness of Allah SWT) and black flags etc.

In this way, the threat continues to develop and take on different shapes, be they British radicals and extremists or foreign-based radical groups who are trying to engage with young British Muslims to fulfil their pernicious aims. Both broadsheets’ reporting suggests predictions that the purpose of British and European radicals is to expand the Sharia Law which, in the newspapers’ opinion is a “barbaric” and “seventh-century” phenomenon that is a threat to the modern British way of life. It is evident that a considerable amount of reporting focused upon the radical organisations, their members’ speeches, video messages and activities which in turn developed a scenario that radical Islamists are on their way to capture the British capital and declare a caliphate.

Both newspapers cited British radical organisations and their leaders, particularly Hizbut-Tahrir leader Anjem Choudary, who publically expressed his views on
establishing a caliphate. The discourse of the caliphate received more attraction in both broadsheets during the cartoon controversy protest in the first week of February 2006. These trends are also visible in some books such as ML Stewart’s *The United Kingdom of Islam* (2012) in which he predicts that London will come under Sharia law. Take, for instance, this extract from the opening of the book:

Declaration by the Radical Islamic Party... London and its surrounds are now officially under Islamic Sharia law. If you and your family wish to remain within these zones, you are at liberty to do so, but strict compliance to ... Any person witnessed committing acts of resistance, theft or religiously motivated crimes will face death (Stewart, 2012).

Stewart further suggests that by the year 2039 London will have a Muslim governor called “Mohammad Kazik” who will be known as the “Holy Governor of the Islamic State of England” and that the “*The flag of Islam will fly over Downing Street, and Queen Elizabeth will wear the burqa.* Abu Waleed, Radical Preacher, London 2008...” (Stewart, 2012) In a similar manner, Ed Husain, a former member of Hizbut-Tahrir, wrote that the organisation promoted the notion in universities that “British Muslims were a community whose allegiance lay not with Queen and country, but to a coming caliph in the Middle East. This caliph would instruct us to act as agents of the caliphate in Britain...” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2 May 2007) Further, he believed that Hizbut-Tahrir wanted to “open a ‘home front’ by assisting the expansionist state.” (ibid)

In contrast, although *The Guardian* continued to raised concerns over the terrorism threat, in dealing with this threat it showed a softer approach that was based on individual liberty and freedom. Perhaps because of its liberal approach, in a series of comment pieces, articles and editorials *The Guardian* disagreed with the government’s ban on Hizbut-Tahrir. In its editorial *The Guardian* wrote that banning Hizbut-Tahrir would be “an unwise step. Hizb ut-Tahrir has some deeply objectionable views, not least on Palestine and Israel. Yet it appears committed to non-violence in the UK and seems far more interested in politics than direct action.” (*The Guardian*, 6 August 2005) Notably, it has continued to advocate that Hizbut-Tahrir should not be banned (see *The Guardian*, 4 February 2015; 13 February 2015).
To a great extent, both newspapers misunderstood the concept of Sharia Law which was simply presented as a concept that endorses the cutting-off of hands for stealing and severe punishments for adultery. Of course, these sorts of punishments are applicable only when the governing and administering system is designed according to the Islamic constitution, which is the Qur’an and Sunnah. Most importantly, the Islamic government is responsible for the basic needs of individuals and it cannot simply punish individuals for stealing if it is unable to provide them with sustenance. It is also fair to note that The Guardian attempted to explain the concept of a caliphate from an Islamic perspective even though it holds a contrasting view of caliphates.

In an opinion piece “Bringing back the caliphate”, it allowed the Muslim Council of Britain’s Inayat Bunglawala to explain the concept in the words of el-Affendi: “This entails a concept of an international order based more on coexisting communities than on territorially-based mutually-exclusive nation-states. The European Community and the United States of America reflect some of the characteristics of the model we have in mind.” (The Guardian, 16 July 2007) In contrast, none of The Daily Telegraph articles explains the concept of caliphate in detail. Moreover, The Guardian at one stage opposed government plans to ban the radical organisation Hizbut-Tahrir whose members talk of the caliphate in public. Evidently, it is fair to say that the ‘Islamist terrorism threat’ may remain for a long time but perhaps in other forms and not in the shape of al-Qaeda or ISIS.

These examples recall several films that were aimed at preparing people for a nuclear strike by exaggerating the threat. In 1983, during the cold war period, the BBC film Threads portrayed a fantasy in which Sheffield came under nuclear attack. Today, the threat has become more serious as The Daily Telegraph cited UN head of ‘International Atomic Energy Agency’, Yukiya Amano, who warns of the possibility of “Nuclear Terrorism” (see The Daily Telegraph, 25 March 2016). Occasionally, both newspapers cited surveys and studies and included opinions and statements of various terrorism experts, government officials and their own columnists and writers to point out that the terrorism threat is on-going. The period examined by this thesis is confined to 8 July 2005- 7 July 2007. However, to explain the previous point it includes a recent example from “PEW Research” on global threats published on 14 July 2015, in which 66% of British people now see ISIS as a new threat compared to 68% of Americans and
77.5% of Spanish people; this puts ISIS ahead of any other issues, including global warming (PEW, 2015).

George Bush and Tony Blair repeatedly assured us that their war on terror was not against Islam but against ‘Islamism’, which is the political face of ‘Radical Islam’. Today, however, Blair warns that this threat not only exists but also continues to challenge the West in different forms (see *The Guardian* reports on 23 April 2014 and 15 January 2015). In the opinion of the scholar Shmuel Bar (2004), “Western leaders such as George W Bush and Tony Blair have reiterated time and again that the war against terrorism has nothing to do with Islam. It is a war against evil” (Bar, 2004, p.27).

In one news report on 11 December 2006, *The Daily Telegraph* used the loaded phrase ‘Muslim terrorism’ to raise further concerns, particularly when it was uttered by the Home Secretary, who was suggesting that the terrorism threat may well continue for the next 30 to 50 years. Using the example of Ireland, John Reid strengthened his argument by suggesting that the timeline of the terror threat stretches over 30 years, which is slightly more than a generation. Such assumptions by British politicians raise a point about the accuracy and length of the terror threat timeline. How can security officials, policy-makers and politicians be so sure that the terrorism threat emanating from Muslims will be on-going? Perhaps one of the reasons for assuming that this threat will continue for generations is the growth of radical and terrorist groups from al-Qaeda to Al-Shabab, Boko Haram and ISIS.

Several articles appeared in both broadsheets in which government officials and politicians repeatedly proclaim that the war against terrorism will continue for generations. In other words, the government officials seem to be suggesting that efforts to stop this conflict, such as by entering into a dialogue with terrorists or considering their grievances, are out of the question. More worryingly, the terrorists have shown no sign of halting their activities.

This is why, on various occasions, the fear of terrorist attack, be it presumed or real, became visible in reports mainly based on official security warnings. The consideration of public safety and government security measures seems a fair justification of this. Obviously this view was developed in both broadsheets based on the opinions of security officials and terrorism experts who calculated the threat level and duration considering various factors such as radical networks, cells, and home-grown radical groups and organisations.
Previously, the press showed a similar approach that is also reflected in the 7/7 reporting that Islamist radicals intend to acquire deadly weapons to attack Britain and other European capitals. From time to time, both broadsheets published surveys conducted by various research organisations commissioned by public, private or government bodies; these surveys suggested that British Muslims desire Sharia Law. Such reporting misrepresents British Muslims; hence, the press does not construct and spread such thoughts independently but in fact channels the opinions of powerful elites (a nexus of press, politicians, police and public bodies etc). Furthermore, this reminds us of Cohen’s theory of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panic’, which is discussed elsewhere in this thesis.

(iii) Radicalisation and Religious Ideology:

In the light of original evidence that emerged in the shape of data, it appeared that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph showed serious concern over the growing radicalisation in Britain. In a number of articles, editorials, comments and special investigative news reports, both newspapers discussed and debated the government’s course of action to curb radicalisation. In this regard, both quoted government officials, police and politicians who frequently warned the public of the presence of these home-grown “cells” and “networks”, providing government and policy-making institutions with a clear challenge to deal with the terrorism threat. Here, the term “networks” indicates organisations and individuals closely affiliated to al-Qaeda or their allies, such as the banned group al-Muhjrin in Britain.

With reference to the New York and Madrid attacks, both broadsheets pointed out that al-Qaeda is a common enemy of the ruling elites as well as ordinary people on both sides of the Atlantic. In doing so, these broadsheets suggested that Britain should find allies to deal with home-grown radicals and extremists, which might eliminate the threat. In the light of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting within a certain period in the wake of the 7/7 incident, it is hard to capture a definitive and collective view of these newspapers because the debate mostly takes place in comments and reporting but rarely in editorials. The point is that these broadsheets have allowed a range of opinions within their different types of journalism, and the views of those writers, experts and commentators do not necessarily accord with those of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. As already indicated, both newspapers allocated a
reasonable amount of space for the reporting of radical organisations by their correspondents in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These newspapers published several news reports, features, opinion columns, investigative reports and editorials with a range of different opinions.

At one stage the government was intending to ban local groups of sympathisers’ such as Hizbut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun; this proposal was supported by The Daily Telegraph but as the data indicate, The Guardian opposed it, suggesting that it was against the British values of freedom and liberty, particularly when Hizbut-Tahrir had condemned the attacks. Beyond the database of this thesis, much has been written on al-Qaeda in the last ten years. Almost all inquiries relating to al-Qaeda seemingly agree on two points. First, it remains a threat but certainly not as big a threat as Western governments often proclaim. Secondly, it is possible that it will eventually disappear because of its involvement in Muslim countries where it is failing to achieve support.

Alongside the radicalisation debate, both broadsheets discussed religious ideology and provided a platform for different writers, journalists, politicians, and religious and community leaders to express their views in comment pieces, personal views and interviews, as a ‘free press’ often does. These discussions and debates associated ideology with Islam and in turn established a link between terrorism and Islam. In the dataset of this thesis, an open view of Islam appeared in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph as follows: like Christianity and Judaism, the fundamental teachings of Islam endorse peace and humanity and reject violence, killing or the harming of innocent people of any faith. Some critics also point out that the religious teaching of Christianity did not stop major life-threatening conflict between Catholics and Protestants. This may also be true of the conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims for centuries. The key reason for these clashes and conflicts is the race for hegemony among these groups that seek to achieve their political goals using religion as a pretext.

Both newspapers suggested that the London bombing was seen as an attack committed “in the name of Islam” (see The Guardian, 8 July 2005). It is worth noting that both these newspapers were citing government officials, politicians, public figures and their own writers who took a similar view that the bombers had reacted in the name of Islam although there were political ambitions behind their attack. Thus began a religious ideology debate that became a focal point in both broadsheets mainly because of a
growing perception that the bombers had reacted ‘in the name of Islam’, a view that
associated them with al-Qaeda. Initially, The Guardian avoided linking al-Qaeda with
7/7. While The Daily Telegraph rushed to assert that al-Qaeda was behind the 7/7
bombing.

Most of the reporting on terrorism identified religious ideology as the root cause of
terrorism because both 9/11 and 7/7 were linked to the al-Qaeda network which
brought forward the concept of religious ideology. A particular reason for this
perception is the explicit use of the notion “in the name of God” in the texts, news
reports, academic books, public and private discussions and the words of terrorists who
use it to justify their inhuman acts. At first, Tony Blair denounced the 7/7 bombings
thus by referring to an “Evil Ideology” (Deller, 2013, p.119; Boynton, 2011, p.189). The
impression of ‘evil ideology’ became a tag in every reference to radicals and terrorists,
including the failed plotters of 21/7.

As the debate expanded, The Guardian offered several articles on al-Qaeda and its
ideology by its writer Jason Burke who is an expert on al-Qaeda. It also gave space to
former members of Hizbut-Tahrir and al-Muhajirun who expressed their views on
radical organisations and their ideology. Hence, Ed Husain and Hassan Butt were
frequently referred to in radicalisation and religious ideology discussions. However, The
Guardian had a different perspective, as Ed Husain wanted the government to ban the
organisation of which he was once a member but The Guardian opposed this idea. It is
essential to acknowledge that these two self-proclaimed scholars failed to present the
contexts of those verses in the Qur’an relating to the killing of non-believers, which is
their own interpretation. Moreover, Ed Husain failed to present a balanced view
because he failed to mention ‘Shia ideology’ such as that espoused by Hezbollah, which
is backed by Iran. In this way, a close view of Islam linked in the form of ‘Wahhabi
ideology’ appeared in the reporting of both newspapers. This occurred because both
broadsheets disregarded the well-established and known Islamic scholars’
commentaries on this subject.

Thus, the selection of the commentators Ed Husain and Hassan Butt as scholars of Islam
is significant if we are to understand the debates that cause confusion about Islam
among readers and audiences. I would argue that, by presenting ex-members of radical
organisations as Islamic scholars, both The Guardian and The Telegraph in fact created
doubts in the minds of their educated and comparatively better informed readerships. Many British Muslims, readers of these newspapers, do not consider Husain and Butt as scholars or experts on Islam but, rather, as infamous ex-radicals who are self-styled scholars. Thus, both broadsheets contributed to building a rather pessimistic image of Islam. One might say at this point that the inclusion of these ex-members of radical organisations also demonstrates the broadsheets’ rivalry. Here, The Guardian writer Milne’s viewpoint is considerable and valid because these two individuals are not considered experts on a sensitive subject (religious ideology) that has emerged as a serious and significant topic of debate. Of course, this does not mean that the views of Husain and Butt should not have appeared in the press but they should not have been identified as experts as this damages the essence of a fair debate.

These individuals’ inflammatory speeches, personal opinions and inaccurate commentaries formulated the key argument that Islam is inherently violent and endorses jihad against non-believers. Occasionally, these arguments were wrapped up in ideologies of resistance movement leaders, and finally everything was associated with the Qur’an to attest that all forms of terrorism are perpetrated because of an ideology that has religious roots. Already-cited examples include: “There shall be no compulsion in religion” and “Slay the unbeliever...wherever you find him” (The Guardian, 22 July 2005). Similarly, The Daily Telegraph editorial, which carried a selected verse from the Qur’an, displayed a lack of investigation and out-of-context reporting, “The murders of July 7 2005... ("capture them and besiege them and prepare for an ambush from every angle")...” (The Daily Telegraph, 3 September 2006). Undeniably, those suicide bombers misinterpreted it but The Daily Telegraph’s reference was also invalid and out of context.

Most of the discussions and debate on ideology in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reflect a limited view and understanding of it. Notably, it is presented as a religious phenomenon that gives terrorists an opportunity to interpret sacred text (Quran) based on the ideologies of reformists who were not Imams, jurists or religious scholars, such as Qutb, but resistance movement leaders. In this way, ideology is attached to religious teachings and, like terrorists, most sections of the press also misinterpret the idea and instead relate them to political problems in the contemporary period when it became an
issue of Islam. Problems may well arise because some political groupings invoke their own interpretation of religious values.

Overall, the terrorism narrative suggests that it is a product of religious ideology that has its roots in Islamic theology. This provides an engine for young British-born Muslims who become radicalised and appear ready to kill their fellow countrymen. In short, both broadsheets pointed out in their different types of journalism that ideology has three major types, al-Qaeda, Wahabbi and Muslim Brotherhood ideology, which allegedly promote violence. Other commentators such as Kenan Malik agree with Ed Husain that the 7/7 bombers were inspired by the Wahabbi ideology. However, some commentators and scholars have provided evidence that the London bombers were more secular and had been banned from their local mosques (see Egerton, 2011; Fulcher and Scott, 2011).

Notably, the vast majority of British Muslims also believe that those perpetrating acts of terrorism, such as the 7/7 bombers, often misrepresent Islamic views by their actions. Immediately after the bombings The Daily Telegraph contributor Anthony King commented on British Muslims’ attitude to terrorism using a YouGov survey and wrote that “88 per cent of British Muslims clearly have no intention of trying to justify the bus and Tube murders” (The Daily Telegraph, 23 July 2005). In Britain, the expression “Islamist ideology” is widely used in context to describe various radical and extremist individuals, groups and organisations that propagate anti-Western feelings and incite hatred of non-Muslims.

In a sense both broadsheets have clearly drawn a distinction between ordinary law-abiding British Muslims and a tiny fraction of radicals who pose a threat to Britain’s security and promote hatred and intolerance. But then, such hate-mongers and controversial figures such as Anjem Choudary and Abu-Hamza were routinely presented as ‘Islamic scholars” and experts as though they represent all British Muslims. Besides, right-wing and controversial figures such as Ed Husain, as explained earlier, also appeared frequently in discussions on radicalisation and ‘Islamist terrorism’ as experts and authorities. Thus, the ordinary reader receives a pessimistic image of Islam arguably because of a few controversial figures who are not considered authorities on Islam.

This is how British Muslims and Islam came to appear in discussions on various platforms including the media, mainly because of the established perception that
religious ideology motivates people to embrace violent means. Immediately after the 7/7 attack, Meghnad Desai (2007) closely reviewed it in August 2005: “It is not Islam as a religion or even the life style or culture of Muslims in Britain but an ideology, Global Islamism, whose nature has to be grasped if we were to fight terrorism...an anti-Western agenda”, which was a common strategy for dealing with communist Russia (Desai, 2007, p. vii). The ideology that is now being constantly linked with Islam is actually “the political use of religion which is labelled as Islamism.” (ibid) Reflecting upon these newspapers’ reporting of 7/7, it is evident that much of the debate focused on the Islamist interpretation of religion (ideology) that associates British-born radicals with foreign-based radical organisations including the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda. In other words, they are associated with the ideologies of these organisations that are mainly based on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutab’s writings and philosophies.

5.9- **The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Views on Tackling Terrorism:**

This section provides details on how the two broadsheets discussed and debated counter-terrorism. They took a keen interest in government re-designed policies and legislation to combat terrorism in Britain in the wake of 7/7. Both discussed the reasons behind the tragic terror act, including alienation and poverty within the Muslim community, growing radicalisation and extremism among young British Muslims, British government involvement in foreign countries, particularly Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, and the Israel/Palestine issue; clearly, the arrival of terrorism in Britain was rooted in religious ideology. Further to this, they discussed whether the 7/7 event was a politically motivated act that may have had its roots in revenge against Britain because of her invasions of Muslim lands and support for Israel or whether it was “Islamic”.

This debate took place within editorials and comment pieces in which both newspapers included terrorism experts’ opinions, including British university academics; they also allowed some Muslim voices although renowned Muslim academic Tariq Ramadan received an ‘extremist’ tag. In a series of editorials *The Guardian* explicitly disagreed with the government on several aspects of terrorism such as laws to detain and deport suspects. The leading concerns raised by *The Guardian* were in defence of public liberty.
and human rights in the battle against radicals and extremists to curb the terrorism threat.

The key theme in *The Guardian* editorials in the context of combating terrorism was the “human factor” that it had vocally supported and advocated. It was at this moment that British Muslims experienced considerable sympathy and support from *The Guardian*. Another notable feature of the debate on tackling terrorism that was evident in *The Guardian* reporting was its distinction between faith and its followers, such as Islam and Muslims. Maintaining its secular position, it had many issues with Islamic teachings including the veil but it also believed that it should be up to those women to decide whether they want to retain the veil. Another key point of *The Guardian* reporting was its view that the government should engage with the British Muslim community to defeat terrorism and that community bonding is the way forward in tackling the terrorism threat.

*The Guardian* also offered a mixture of opinions in comment pieces and analysis sections in which writers and commentators of various backgrounds focused on terrorism and the way Britain should respond to it. With reference to the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes and the Forest Gate shooting incidents, a few writers showed concerns over the role of the police. Many of the debates on terrorism carried criticisms by *The Guardian* contributors who thought that Prime Minister Blair had himself dishonoured the democratic rights of a free country and international laws by forcibly overthrowing Saddam Hussein; hence glorifying terrorism was an indication of the government’s own view and was contested (*The Guardian*, 13 April 2006; 15 February 2006).

In contrast, *The Daily Telegraph* editorials indicated that it backed the British government policies to modify terrorism legislation and take up strict measures such as the ‘glorification of terrorism’ Bill and the introduction of new suspect detention periods of up to 90 days without charge. It also supported the official line that the Iraq war had not radicalised young British-born Muslim Bombers and that there was no connection between the Iraq war and radicalisation in Britain. Two of *The Daily Telegraph* editorials are significant for gauging its attitude to the terrorism threat: ‘Islam Vs. Islam’ (11 September 2006) and ‘Muslims have to join this battle’ (8 July
The timings of these editorials are significant; one was on the anniversary of 9/11 whilst the other was published on the 7/7 anniversary.

In these editorials *The Daily Telegraph* dismissed the argument of those who claim that the Twin Towers and the London bombings occurred because of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and that West should not interfere in Muslim countries. It constantly maintained that the post-7/7 terrorism threat in Britain is a Muslim problem because other communities are not planting bombs but the London bombers had Muslim backgrounds.

On the whole, both broadsheets have attempted to answer the following questions: Did 7/7 occur because of the poverty and sense of alienation among young British Muslims? Is there something in Islam (ideology) that has inspired them to kill their fellow beings including Muslims? Can community bonding and an improved sense of belonging be a solution to eliminate future terrorist threats? Can a better policing and security system help save Britain from such threats? Or might English-speaking imams in British mosques help young British Muslims to stay away from radicals and their damaging interpretation of Islam?

These are debates that must have been discussed among Muslims. Long before 7/7, *The Guardian* published editorials, *Towards a British Islam* (1 April 2004) and *Nationalising Islam* (10 December 2004), in which it suggested that Britain must have English-speaking imams in the mosques because this would help engage the young British-born Muslims. Both broadsheets remained convinced that community bonding is a solution to combat terrorism but they also assumed commonly that it is a Muslim problem and that they have to tackle it. Furthermore, both broadsheets suggested that moderate Muslims should come forward and play their part in tackling terrorism. However, at this point both broadsheets appeared to become slightly hostile to Islam as they insisted on using the controversial term “moderate”; this was these newspapers’ interpretation but in reality there is no such thing as “moderate Islam”. Islamic teachings are for all times and not just for one particular group, nation, region or specific period. Moreover, the Islamic concepts of *Ijema* and *Ijtehad* explain Islam’s capacity to absorb modern changes in society; hence, in this sense it is already a modern religion. In terrorism debates the principal discussions take place from a Western viewpoint that endorses Edward Said’s
concept of *Orientalism* which suggests that the powerful West views and represents others from its own perspective.

In the terrorism debate, both broadsheets’ overall reporting clearly indicates that these newspapers and most of their contributors, including the reporters, have little knowledge of Islam. Although both, particularly *The Guardian*, attempted to offer a few Western scholars who are considered experts on Islam, it is noticeable that these broadsheets used out-of-context verses from the Qur’an in their editorials and general reporting. Arguably, there is nothing in “Islam” that preaches violence or killings, and the Quran is very clear on this subject (for example, Al-Quran, 5:32). The Quran also says that “...take not life, which God has made sacred, except by way of justice and law: thus does He command you, that you may learn wisdom” (Al-Quran, 6:151). In addition, a number of *Hadiths* also stress the sanctity of human life; for example, Prophet Muhammad said, “Do not kill any old person, any child or any women”, when explaining the ethics of war (see Bukhari, Volume 004, Book 052, Hadith Numbers 257 and 258).

But one might also consider that during different periods of history various scholars continued to interpret religious texts in the cases of Christianity, Judaism and Islam which led to different views. This is because both the Bible and the Qur’an are open to different interpretations. In fact, there is not one agreed, pure and perfect meaning of scholarly interpretations and narrations. Rohan Gunaratna (2002) offers a specific example of an out-of-context exercise mostly found in the media and polity: “Let there be no compulsion [or coercion] in the religion [Islam]. The right direction is distinctly clear from the error” (Gunaratna, 2002, p.85). There is a growing body of scholarly text on this verse and the nature of its revelation as well as its misinterpretation; for example, Assad (1980, p.256-257) and Haleem (1999, p.69) explain the context of this verse in great detail.

Both newspapers may have their own valid reasons to interpret and present the 7/7 incident in a way they considered accurate and convincing. However, from the overall coverage of the London bombings it is evident that the press is able not only to simply report an event but also to shape people’s opinions and perceptions of an event, as has already been discussed in the literature review chapter. Most academic studies believe that the media are a part of a larger power structure, often misrepresenting events and twisting facts, thus demonstrating that they sometimes ‘cover up’ events (Rampton and
Stauber, 2003, p.9; Montgomery, 2005, p.239; Jenson, 2005, p.122). In the context of terrorism reporting, however, for Dennett (2004) the misreporting of Muslims is done through ‘economic motivation’, and in this way people in power use the present confrontation between Islam and the West as an excuse to pursue their political agendas, such as the “Oil” resources of the Middle East (Dennett, 2004, p.61-79).

As the debate on counter-terrorism developed, *The Guardian’s* writers emphasised three points: First, Britain should learn from its past experience and adopt restrained counter-terrorism options that accord with its British values. Secondly, it should not repeat past mistakes such as establishing links with radicals; in other words, Britain should avoid duplicity. Thirdly, Britain should engage with British Muslims, particularly moderates, and their society must not be divided. Several writers and commentators of *The Guardian* have raised concerns over the British government’s different relationships with radicals and terrorist groups.

*The Guardian* continues to discuss and debate a range of possible options for countering the terrorism threat in the wake of the 7/7 incident. In its editorials, comment pieces and articles, Britain’s past experience of dealing with the IRA as well as home-grown terrorists has been discussed. The commentators and writers also talk about current challenges and ways to tackle the new terrorism threat of British-born Muslims. Geoffrey Wheatcroft talked about two radicals, Gerry Adams and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to prove the West’s duplicity or, in the words of George Orwell, its “double speak”. Wheatcroft questions the different treatment of two radicals of different faiths with similar objectives, i.e. to drive British troops out of their territories, namely Ulster and Iraq.

At this point, one might ask whether terrorism has any religion. Since none of the world’s religions endorse terrorism, to label it Islamic, Christian, Buddhist, Jewish or secularist would be unfair. Equally, the response to terrorism in most states is not necessarily very different, be they Christian, Jewish, Buddhist or Islamic states. In fact it is a mindset that is based on social, cultural, political and economic factors. Arguably, terrorism is a political commodity that is designed to achieve political objectives, not religious ones. The act of the London bombings has political origins attached to Britain’s invasion of Iraq and not to any hostile policy such as banning Islam in Britain. However, several scholars also believe that quite a lot of terrorism is designed to establish

Evidently, there are complaints of dual standards on both sides. For example, Bush called Iran and Iraq the “Axis of Evil” and accused them of promoting state terrorism, whilst the Iranian leader the Ayatollah used a derogatory term to describe America as the “Great Satan”, meaning “Evil”. Coincidently, both used “in the name of God” to justify their brutal actions that killed innocent people on both sides of the Atlantic. But the press portrayed the London bombings as an act of “Islamic terrorism” linking it with Islam. In contrast, the actions of Bush and Blair, despite massive opposition from the public, were presented as “self defense” and “right to restore democracy”. Bush said that “God told him to launch the Iraq campaign” while Tony Blair “is reconciled to the prospect that God and history will eventually judge his decision to go to war with Iraq” (The Guardian, 2006). Hence, were they both doing service to God’s creation? Did God really ask them to inflict brutality on innocent people? If so, why were they not concerned about other people’s God, who may have asked them to do the same?

Of course, terrorism is inhuman and condemnable but, for a philosophical discussion, it seems that a notable feature in current terrorism debates is the notion of “newness” that relates it to Islam. The contemporary discourse of terrorism suggests that the “new” wave is a particular problem of “Islam”, which is also well-established in many studies (Amanat, 2001, p.23; Hill, 2001, p.81; Chaliand and Blin, 2007, p.95). Much of this scholarship explains the attacks on New York and the commencement of an era of the “new” conflict, with the “War on terror” resulting from it. Afterwards, the Madrid and London bombings further strengthened the perspective of “new terrorism”. Several studies assume that terrorism has been redefined and reconstructed through the prism of the powerful West that frequently links modern terrorism to “Islam” (Silverman, 2004, p.148; Gabriel, 2006, p.124; Palmer and Palmer, 2004, p.194).

5.10-Differences and Similarities in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Reporting on the “Islamist Terrorism Threat”:

At the beginning of all the major debates on terrorism, Tony Blair and government officials, including security and police officers, appear to have been the main sources of information. However, Blair became the focal point of reference in comment pieces, features, editorials and news reports. In contrast to The Daily Telegraph reporting,
which was mainly supportive of Blair's counter-terrorism policies and his views on the problem of terrorism, the writers and commentators of The Guardian criticised Blair's policies in Iraq, which radicalised young British Muslims, in their seven comment and debate pieces. However, in its editorials The Guardian continued to use the term “Islamic terrorism”; it thus resembled The Daily Telegraph, which also used this term in its editorials, which are indicative of a newspaper's political stance and attitudes. The writers of these opinion pieces argued that the 7/7 incident occurred because of his policies in Iraq and the Middle East and his unconditional support for America in its war on terror.

In contrast, The Daily Telegraph continued to refer to the American way of handing terror suspects and dealing with the threat of terrorism. It also published editorials and comment pieces suggesting that the government should be tough on terror suspects. Furthermore, The Daily Telegraph supported the debate on new terrorism legislation in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, including detention without charge for up to 90 days. At this point, the traditional rivalry between these two broadsheets reached its peak. On the one hand, The Guardian praised the Law Lords for rejecting government plans to introduce new measures such as the ‘glorification’ of terrorism. On the other side, The Daily Telegraph wrote that peers may regret their decision to reject terrorism legislation on the grounds that it is a violation of human rights.

A narrative of the 7/7 terrorist attack published in both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph also reflects the difference in the representation of the bombers in comparison to IRA terrorists, particularly in The Daily Telegraph. However, evidence shows that the Irish troublemakers were not attacked on grounds of religion or for being Catholic or Protestant. In fact, it is important to note that more people were murdered by Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland than by Catholic ‘terrorists’ (see Ciment, 2015; Martin, 2011, 2012; Wilkinson, 2015).

In many ways the response to the 7/7 bombings carried out by al-Qaeda-inspired British Muslims compared to IRA bombings was clearly different. The first and foremost difference in the media representation of ideology is that 7/7 was linked to Islam (religion) whilst the IRA's campaign was presented as a land dispute, the Ireland Question, and was therefore considered political. Equally, both the IRA and the London 7/7 bombers had a common goal of removing British troops from their lands, as the al-
Qaeda-inspired London bombers repeatedly complained about Britain's military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is also important to acknowledge that, since the start of the terrorism debate at different stages between 8 July 2005 and 7 July 2007, such as the failed 21/7 attack and the unsuccessful Glasgow airport terminal bomb plot, British Muslims have in some ways been directly involved in these incidents, which perhaps gives The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph the opportunity to view their religion as part of the problem. However, it is also important to note that the 7/7 bombers resembled past traitors and 'enemy within' factions in their actions and lifestyles which were more of a secular nature, although they were still heavily associated with 'ideologies' of Islamic theology. However, The Guardian allows alternative opinions in its comments section, including those of David Cameron who wrote that his interaction with British Muslims reveals that “Islamic terrorism” is an emotive phrase. The overall discussion in The Guardian suggested that a well-integrated society that guarantees equally opportunities to all its members might bind them together. This sort of society eliminates alienation and provides a shield against the threat of terrorism. On the one hand, The Guardian advocated human rights and assurance of British values during the terror trials and plots. However, it failed to disassociate the word “Islamic” from troublemakers, i.e. terrorists and extremists; secondly, it believed that mosques have played a crucial role in the radicalisation of young British Muslims. At this point its stance resembled the conservative approach promoted in The Daily Telegraph; for instance, it ran a 'Muslim extremism' banner from 17-23 September 2005 and published four articles including “British imams to tackle radicals in mosques” on 23 September 2005.

On the whole, The Guardian maintained a balanced approach to the Muslim debate. Several commentators in The Guardian, including in its editorials, continued to object to new government legislation on terrorism on the grounds that it harms young British Muslims and the community as whole. Throughout 2006, The Daily Telegraph articles, such as those of 5 and 16 February 2006, suggested that outlawing the “glorification” of terrorism would weaken the government’s efforts to fight terrorism. In these articles it included a range of opposition voices from political parties; however, within the debate Muslim voices were provided with a very limited space in which to present their viewpoint. Most of the Daily Telegraph’s writers and commentators continued to
endorse Blair’s policies. In the anti-terrorism debate throughout 2007, Ed Husain was presented as an expert on the terrorism discourse, for example, in his articles published on 7 July 2007 and 2 May 2007.

The key differences in the reporting of the two broadsheets appeared on two main occasions: first, when the British government decided to introduce new laws to deal with the threat of terrorism, and, secondly, when the government resolved to strip foreign dual nationals of their British citizenship and hand them over to other countries to stand trial on terrorism charges. On this matter, The Guardian raised the point that Britain should consider the human rights records of those countries before deporting alleged terrorists and hate-mongers to these less democratic states in the Middle East. It wrote editorials such as ‘No torture, please, we’re British’ (9 December 2005) and argued that foreign suspects held without charge should not be deported to places where they may be tortured.

In summary, The Guardian offered several comment and opinion pieces in which its writers discussed Britain’s past experience of dealing with home-grown or ‘enemy within’ factions who fell into the hands of Britain’s enemies abroad, such as the 7/7 bombers. Despite its moderately sympathetic and balanced reporting of British Muslims, it viewed their religion as the main cause of the terrorism problem probably because The Guardian proclaims itself as the custodian of secular values. It also used the term “Islamic terrorism” in its editorials, again revealing its view of the 7/7 incident, although it openly denounced the government’s claim that the 7/7 incident had no links with Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq.

5.11-Conclusion:

The narrative of the 7/7 reporting during a two-year period (8 July 2005 - 7 July 2007) in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reflects a shared view that the London bombings were an act of terrorism. Notably, both broadsheets allowed alternative opinions and varied voices in all their types of journalism. However the descriptions of terrorism based upon the editorials of these broadsheets suggest that it was an “Islamic terrorism” that has roots in a religious ideology which endorses violence and hatred. More specifically, both newspapers used the term “Islamic terrorism” in their editorials more than “Islamist” and “home-grown” terrorism, which further strengthened the hypothesis that Islam was directly associated with the 7/7 bombings. Although both
broadsheets were reporting on hate-preachers and a few radical Muslims’ activities in a few mosques, their overstating of a few extremist views helped to develop a narrative that Islam as a religion is perhaps problematic rather than expressing their views on same-sex marriages, women's liberty and other Western norms, which in turn builds up an image of Islam as a religion that is negative and hostile to the present-day West.

Both broadsheets set aside considerable space for discussions and debates on the ways to combat the terrorism threat, which they believe will continue in the coming decades. Although a considerable portion of reporting in all types of journalism acknowledged that the terrorism threat might be defeated through community bonding, it also held the wider British Muslim community responsible for the 7/7 bombings, presumably because the London bombings, the failed 21/7 attack, and the failed Glasgow bombing were committed by a few British Muslims. Both newspapers consulted representatives of British Muslims, such as the MCB, but there was still a slight sense of ignorance of a few verses of the Quran which were cited without considering their historical context.

On tackling the terrorism threat, the two newspapers adopted different stances. For example, *The Guardian* challenged government policies such as the arrests and deportations of suspects, while *The Daily Telegraph* proposed the adoption of tougher legislation including deportation and other harsh ways of dealing with suspected terrorists and radicals. Although the two newspapers agreed that community bonding is a solution to combat future terrorist threats, they placed responsibility solely on the wider Muslim community, which developed an impression that terrorism is perhaps to be considered solely a Muslim problem.
Chapter 6 (Theme 2): Britain’s Foreign Policy in Iraq Risks its Internal Security.

6.1-Introduction:

The narrative of the security theme has two central components. The first relates to the government law enforcement organisations such as the police and secret agencies (MI5 and MI6) working together or in separate units to tackle the terrorism threat. This set-up equates to Michel Foucault’s notion of “Panopticism”, built upon Jeremy Bentham’s idea of the “Panopticon”, an observational post or watchtower in the centre of a building (prison) to enhance security through surveillance. Foucault states that it is in this mode that governments watch ordinary people secretly. In the present circumstances, governments monitor ordinary people’s emails, text messages, tweets and even their movements using various apps and other sophisticated technologies such as the ‘Dishfire’ program (The Guardian, 22 January 2014).

The second aspect of the security theme suggests that Muslims have securitised themselves mainly because of the terrain of unknown fears that include the following: being misjudged; being excessively watched and in some cases misinterpreted and ill-reported; being detained without charge; and being stopped and searched on suspicion. Illustrations of these scenarios include numerous cases of identity checks that ended up in police shootings, leaving Muslims even more suspected, terrorised and securitised. Examples include the police shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005 and the Forest Gate Shooting on 2 June 2006, which appears to have been a serious error. This situation has probably allowed British Muslims to build a fence around themselves and assume that they have perhaps been persecuted.

This situation echoes George Orwell’s idea (in his novel 1984) of a “Big Brother Society” in which powerful elites use different methods of control by employing various tactics such as physical restrictions, surveillance, propaganda, and the degradation of language. In this way, ruling elites generate fear of the unknown to control people’s thinking and limit their ability to question issues that matter to society and individuals. This chapter will discuss government and public models of security based on The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting, as well as sub-themes under the broader tenet of security. The government model is designed to protect public life, possessions and the infrastructure of the country against public disorder and the bombing of innocent members of the public.
It consists of anti-terror laws, networks of agencies, policing and the surveillance system. In contrast, the public model is rather self-conscious, suggesting that perhaps the government is spying on members of the public by using laws and security settings to watch, manipulate and interfere in their privacy. This raises concerns because people think that their privacy and civil liberties are under attack. The two models run parallel to each other. On the one hand the government adopts measures and laws aiming to securitise people. On the other hand it engages in activities that weaken its counter-terrorism ambitions, such as surveillance, spying and private space-monitoring.

The immediate reaction to an interpretation of the London bombings in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* reflect two key points. First, these were acts of “Islamic terrorism” rooted in “Islamic ideology” that posed a new internal security challenge to Britain since the IRA troubles. Second, the 7/7 bombings showed the negligence and failure of the British security institutions and indicated that there were gaps in their operational system that that needed to be reviewed. Both broadsheets stated that security institutions’ fundamental task is to safeguard the general public against any possible threat. Furthermore, these institutions are meant to stop terrorist acts given that they have already been warned and, hence, the bombings reflect their “scandalous error”.

Both broadsheets openly condemned the anti-Muslim backlash resulting from 7/7 but also increasingly presented the British Muslims as a suspect community and a new security challenge, mainly because the bombers were part of them. Hence, because of this problematic representation of British Muslims, a narrative gradually developed that supported the view that British Muslims are a security risk. Arguably, it became evident that even a liberal press in Britain has, to some extent, a noticeably systemic bias against Islam. Perhaps such prejudice arises from “Islamist” radicals’ misinterpretations of Islam. It was further argued that the West is not only a victim and is on the receiving end of the current wave of radicalisation but is also a contributor to radicalisation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the coverage of the 7/7 bombings in both broadsheets in the context of Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and the increasing internal security challenge.

**Section I: The Explanations of the Dataset and Original Findings:**

6.2-The Dataset:
The following figure shows the formulation of a main theme that emerges through the combining of similar codes and sub-themes. Three sub-themes are major contributors to the main theme, STC-10, which deals with Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq, and STC 38 and STC 47, which deal with the backlash against British Muslims resulting from the 7/7 incident and their grievances. Here, the abbreviation ‘STC’ refers to sub-theme code, which is also explained earlier in the methods chapter and can be seen in the figure below. These are followed by two sub-theme codes that described how the London bombers were radicalised during their visits to Pakistan, and how Islamist grievances against the West are irrational and wrong, which is mainly the government and The Daily Telegraph understanding of the 7/7 event. Moreover, the security failure and public inquiry demands were the central focus of The Daily Telegraph, while The Guardian mainly highlights foreign policy in Iraq and its adverse effects on British society. The following figure explains the formulation of the main theme which comprises twenty-three sub-theme codes in different colours and their respective shares in the main theme.

![Pie chart with sub-theme codes and their shares](image)

Figure 6.1: The above figure explains the narrative of Britain’s foreign policy in the two broadsheets. As explained earlier, ‘STC’ refers to the sub-theme codes that can be seen in this figure.
Table 6.1: The Construction of a Main Theme: “Britain's Foreign Policy in Iraq”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Colour Scheme</th>
<th>Percentage share</th>
<th>STC/ Sub-theme Code</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Blue Azure</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>STC 10, “Britain's foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan radicalised the London bombers and created a feeling of anger among the younger generation of British Muslims”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Purple amethyst</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>STC 38, “British Muslims have set of grievances and resentment e.g. Government’s double standards over faith schools and labelling them as “enemy within’, disloyal’, ‘anti-Semitic’, etc.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Green shamrock</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>STC 28, “British Muslims’ anger and resentment is a result of Western hypocritical and hostile policies in the Middle East and elsewhere in Islamic world”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Light blue</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>STC 47, “Backlash of 7/7: Muslims’ feeling of being persecuted, stop and search, suspect arrest, families of 7/7 bombers harassment, veil attacks, derogatory links e.g. Beeston, etc.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Red cherry</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>STC 11, “Many young British-born Muslims became radicalised during their visits to Pakistan, a country of their parents that exports terrorism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Purple heather</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>STC 8, “Islamist grievances against the West are irrational and wrong”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Red ruby</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>STC 23, “The 7/7 event reflects security agencies’ failure”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Blue lapis</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>STC 35, “Critics says that Britain should not participate in American-led “pre-emptive wars” and distance itself from “war on terror”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Blue Cerulean</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>STC 22, “7/7 bombers were known to MI5”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Blue sapphire</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>STC 31, “Britain foreign office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such</td>
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<td>Orange</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Carrot</td>
<td>STC 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Violet</td>
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<td>Pear</td>
<td>STC 15</td>
</tr>
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<td>Arctic</td>
<td>STC 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Orchid</td>
<td>STC 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Apricot</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Lavender</td>
<td>STC 60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light blue</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Skyblue</td>
<td>STC 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Olive</td>
<td>STC 37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Orange     | 1%    | Yam        | STC 36                        | “Most Islamist terrorists were well-
<table>
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<th>Skin tone</th>
<th>Color</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Thin-line mauve purple</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
<td>STC 17, “MI5/Police operations to prevent Islamist terrorism threat at home and abroad, i.e. suspect arrests, investigations, bravery etc,”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Thin-line green fern</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
<td>STC 61, “Public (7/7 victims) complaints about the compensation process”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Thin-line light orange</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
<td>STC 34, “Britain’s military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were based on construction and peace-keeping mission that aimed to destroy al-Qaeda and radical Islam”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.3-Britain’s Foreign Policy: Iraq War, Radicalisation and Internal Security.

Following the 7/7 bombings Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq became one of the key debates within *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* editorials, comment pieces, and investigative and special news reports. The dataset shows that the sub-theme code “STC 10, “Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan radicalised London bombers and created a feeling of anger among the younger generation of British Muslims” appeared to be the key point of discussion in both broadsheets; it accounts for a share of 22% in the formulation of the second main theme. In contrast, sub-theme code STC 3, “Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq cannot be blamed for the London Bombings” contributes around a 3% share in the formulation of the second main theme, “security”.

In more detail, around \( \frac{75}{274} \times 100 = 27.37\% \) of the reporting in the database debated whether foreign policy in Iraq had radicalised the London bombers while only \( \frac{3}{274} \times 100 = 1.09\% \) of the reporting denied the link between the Iraq War and the London bombings. Importantly, the foreign policy debate in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* reporting clearly showed their differing views on this subject. Here it is equally important to note that, out of 75 stories that carry sub-theme code 10 as mentioned above, *The Guardian* alone published 61 stories in all its forms of journalism including editorials, which suggests that it had given much more importance to foreign policy discourse in its reporting. In comparison, *The Daily Telegraph* published 14
articles with nine news reports and only two comment pieces, suggesting that it had overlooked Britain’s foreign policy as a topic of debate.

Immediately after the attacks, *The Guardian* pointed out that Britain’s intervention in Iraq and the Middle East had radicalised the London bombers. This pattern of dissimilar political orientation remains a distinctive feature of the 7/7 reporting in these broadsheets. In other words, Britain’s foreign policy initiated a rivalry between *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* that continued throughout the following years (2005-2007) covered in the dataset. The following table provides details of the reporting on Britain’s foreign policy in these broadsheets:

**Table 6.2: *The Guardian*’s discussion of Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Guardian (Types of Journalism)</th>
<th>8 July 2005-7 July 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments &amp; debate</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative news reports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus: Investigate reports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News reports</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special reports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 Special report</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.3: *The Daily Telegraph*’s discussion of Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Daily Telegraph (Types of Journalism)</th>
<th>8 July 2005-7 July 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News reports</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Views</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, more than a quarter of the discourse, i.e. 27.37 per cent of the total reporting space in the dataset discussed the role of Britain’s foreign policy in the growing radicalisation and disaffection among young British Muslims. Moreover, The Guardian’s contribution to this debate is 22.26% in comparison to The Daily Telegraph’s share of 5.1%, which means that The Guardian has placed more importance on foreign policy debate. The thread of The Guardian’s reporting suggests that Britain’s foreign policy is a prime source of “alienation” and “radicalisation” among British Muslims. In his pre-recorded video message that was made public after the 7/7 attack, British-born Sidique Khan blames Britain’s foreign policy as follows:

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible...Until we feel security, you will be our target. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight (The Guardian, 2 September 2005).

Foreign policy was a key sub-theme code within the recurring theme of internal security. Britain’s foreign policy appeared to be a big debate in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph within all forms of journalism. Notably, it made up a quarter of the overall reporting in the main theme “Britain’s Foreign Policy in Iraq Risks its Internal Security”. Moreover, this single most important code, “Britain’s foreign policy”, indicated the political orientations and policies of these broadsheets that became a prominent feature in their reporting. In its editorial The Guardian argued that growing radicalisation is happening “in some parts of British Islam, partly because of the British government’s support for the Iraq war” and that “The evidence of such radicalisation was so obvious by 2005 that it is hard not to conclude that the security failure was both negligent and inexcusable (The Guardian, 12 May 2006). In another editorial The Guardian wrote that “Anger about the Iraq war is doubtless relevant, as, in a smaller way, are recent events at Forest Gate” (The Guardian, 27 June 2006).

One of The Guardian writers, historian Brian Brivati, posed a question: “Would 7/7 have happened, and would it have been more or less deadly, if we had not liberated
Afghanistan and Iraq?" (The Guardian, 12 July 2005). Brivati wrote that “The invasion of Iraq acted as a deterrent to states that were nurturing a new generation of loosely affiliated ‘network terrorists’” (ibid). David Clark referred to a Guardian/ICM poll that suggested that “72% of the British people agree that our foreign policy has made us less secure, while only 1% accept the government’s assurance that it has made us safer” (The Guardian, 25 August 2006). Further, Clark argued that Britain’s erroneous policy in Iraq had helped to “create an enormous terrorist threat that didn’t previously exist” (ibid). Another writer in The Guardian, Alexander Chancellor, argued that Britain is under American influence which is why it went to war and the “government’s unquestioning support of the United States in all its foreign adventures” has “upset British Muslims” (The Guardian, 2 September 2006).

In contrast, The Daily Telegraph discussed two contrasting popular views on Iraq in its editorial: first, that “The attack on the Twin Towers predated the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and that Osama bin Laden was complaining about the garrisoning of Saudi Arabia, not about US support for Israel”; and, second, that “The invasion of Iraq has radicalised Muslims around the world and created a link between Iraq and al-Qa’eda where none existed before” (The Daily Telegraph, 11 September 2006). In an editorial The Daily Telegraph wrote: “This fight is not principally about Israel: it is an internal dispute within the Islamic world, which will continue to spill over until the region discovers liberal democracy. Five years on, we are no nearer to that goal” (The Daily Telegraph, 11 September 2006). For example, on 17 June 2007 it published a lengthy article under the headline, “No compromise with those creating terrorism”, incorporating several columnists and studies that basically attack Islam. Notably, in a series of articles published after the 7/7 incident, The Guardian reiterated its stance on Britain’s foreign policy, which it saw as dangerous and responsible for the rise in Muslim extremism. Furthermore, in most articles it embraced the idea that Britain is perhaps paying the price for the American adventures mainly in Muslim lands in the wake of 9/11. It continued to stress that Britain foreign policy does not match its image and values in the world.

Overall, both newspapers published reports accounting for 12.043 per cent of the total reporting, of which The Guardian’s share was 10.21% in discussing and debating Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and its connection with the 7/7 event. Notably, The
Guardian supported the view that British Muslims’ anger and resentment is a result of Western hypocritical and hostile policies in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world. Seumas Milne pointed out that “it is an insult to the dead to mislead people about the crucial factors fuelling this deadly rage in Muslim communities across the world” (The Guardian, 13 July 2005). Milne insisted that the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan proceeded on the basis of false arguments that al-Qaeda and its supporters simply hate Western freedoms and the Western way of life and that their “Islamist ideology” aims to conquer the whole world; he pointed out that those arguments were fabricated to justify the Iraq war. (ibid)

The key point in The Guardian reporting suggests that Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq has put British people’s safety at risk at home and abroad. Given Britain’s political and economic interests and its role in the Middle East, most of The Guardian’s commentators, like Milne, rejected Blair’s argument that attacks on the West such as 9/11 predated the Iraq war and therefore cannot be linked with problems in Britain. Milne wrote that, prior to 7/7, Muslims’ anger had been directed against America because of its anti-Muslim policies in the Middle East but Britain only became a target of Muslim radicals after “Blair backed Bush’s war on terror. Afghanistan made a terror attack on Britain a likelihood; Iraq made it a certainty” (The Guardian, 13 July 2005).

On the other hand, like the British government The Daily Telegraph also rejected the arguments that Britain’s Iraq policy was damaging. Within the dataset, around 5.83 per cent of the reporting, mainly referring to Blair and other official sources, reflects the same view that Islamist grievances against the West are irrational and wrong. It also dismissed Islamist grievances, saying that their actual mission is to spread their ideology throughout the world and that even if the West resolves their complaints they will not halt their operations: “…The real project is the extension of the Islamic territory across the globe, and the establishment of a worldwide “caliphate” founded on Sharia (The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2005).

According to The Daily Telegraph Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq cannot be blamed for the London Bombings, which appeared as a sub-theme with 3.28 per cent of the reporting, mainly in The Daily Telegraph. Furthermore, The Daily Telegraph distanced itself from the belief that Britain should not participate in American-led “pre-emptive wars” and should distance itself from the “war on terror”, which appeared in The
Guardian with 8.21 per cent of the reporting. Under the broader theme of security, both newspapers discussed and debated British foreign policy and the Iraq War and their interconnectivity. Obviously, each newspaper took a clear position on these critically important issues which showed their political orientation.

Despite all this, The Daily Telegraph continued to support Blair’s stance and published articles presuming that British Muslim grievances were wrong and unacceptable and that Iraq was a major threat to British security regardless. It defended its stance, asserting that British foreign policy in Iraq and its interfering role in Muslim countries in particular are intended to establish good and diminish evil, a popular American political line. One of The Daily Telegraph commentators Alasdair Palmer wrote a lengthy article under the headline, “No compromise with those creating terrorism”, incorporating several columnists and studies that essentially attack Islam (The Daily Telegraph, 17 June 2007). Palmer wrote that “British foreign policy, which has been blamed for the creation of home-grown Islamic terrorists, has had very little to do with it” and “...a conflict within the culture of an immigrant group can lead to the radicalisation of the next generation.” (ibid) Foreign policy appears as a key component within the recurring theme of security. For many critics it remains a main cause of extremism and terrorism aimed at the British government.

Notably, in its post-7/7 reporting The Guardian reiterated its stance on Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq. Its series of articles asserted that Britain’s Iraq policy was responsible for increasing radicalisation and extremism among young British Muslims. Furthermore, The Guardian stated that Britain is perhaps paying the price for American adventures mainly in the Muslim lands in the wake of 9/11. Throughout The Guardian’s reporting, including comment and opinion pieces, investigative stories, debates, and front-page coverage, particularly on the 7/7 anniversaries, the terrorism that occurred on the two Thursdays (7/7 and the 21/7 failed attempt) was seen as a reaction to Britain’s role in the controversial Iraq War. Milne found that most sections of the British press and politicians had united to dismiss the argument that the Iraq War had radicalised the 7/7 bombers. He wrote: “The pro-war Times and Telegraph have led the field, with neoconservative commentators and politicians hammering home the Blair-Bush message that terror is simply the product of an evil ideology” (The Guardian, 5 July 2007). The article further disclosed the government’s propaganda tactics of labelling
scholars and journalists who oppose “Britain’s violent role in the Muslim world” as somehow soft on terrorism (ibid).

6.4-The London Bombings: Anti-Muslim Backlash and Britain’s Internal Security.

Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph carefully recorded the anti-Muslim backlash in Britain and across the globe following the London bombings. Within the dataset a sub-theme code STC 47, “Backlash of the 7/7: Muslims feeling of being persecuting, stop and search, suspect arrest, families of 7/7 bombers harassment, veil attacks, derogatory links e.g. Beeston, etc” appeared 32 times meaning that $32/274*100=11.67$ or nearly 12% of the reporting consisted of the warning and condemnation of the backlash in any form on British Muslims. But, at the same time, the views of the contributors of these newspapers along with government officials and newspaper editorials clearly suggest that it is primarily British Muslims’ responsibility to put their house in order (The Guardian, 18 July 2005).

Both newspapers in all forms of journalism considered that British Muslims have a set of grievances including resentment over the government’s double standards on Islamic faith schools and that a large part of the British press report them as “bad guys”, “enemy within”, “disloyal’, and “anti-Semitic”. Here, once again, The Guardian considered the British Muslims to be the victims of unfair treatment by the British media and government, which demonised them in the wake of 7/7. The sub-theme code in both broadsheets that talks about British Muslims’ set of grievances while discussing internal security and the terrorism threat facing Britain accounts for 14% of the reporting (14% - 2.5%=11.75%); hence The Guardian devoted more space to the Muslims’ grievances. Overall, it is evident that, within this main theme, the two newspapers talk of British Muslims’ grievances in 34% of their reporting.

Immediately after the London bombings a series of violent incidents occurred throughout England, particularly in Leeds and London. Freedland notes a visible rise in anti-Muslim attacks as “Police recorded 300 hate crime incidents in less than a week, including the killing of a man in Nottingham after anti-Muslim abuse...by August the feared backlash had receded” (The Guardian, 7 July 2006). The dataset shows that The Guardian alone contributed an 84.37 per cent share of the total reporting on the backlash. Of this 84.37 per cent, 56.25 per cent appeared in the form of journalism, i.e. investigative work describing the difficulties faced by the bombers’ family members and
the residents of the Beeston area of Leeds and Dewsbury where the bombers lived, and British Muslims’ overall experience in the wake of the bombings, such as stop and search and the bad press. The remaining 28.12 per cent of The Guardian’s coverage of the backlash consisted of news reporting. The following tables show the differences in the reporting by The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. It is also important to note that most of these comment pieces and reports have more than one theme, which suggests a broader view of topics in the discussion.

Table 6.4 - The Guardian (7/7 Backlash)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Journalism (The Guardian)</th>
<th>Sub-theme: 47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment Pieces</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News reports</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Views</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative reports</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5: The Daily Telegraph (7/7 Backlash)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Journalism (The Daily Telegraph)</th>
<th>Sub-theme: 47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News reports</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, the backlash that took place in public differed from that which occurred within the government, which reviewed its anti-terrorism policy and introduced new laws to combat the terrorism threat. However, The Guardian criticised the government’s legislative framework that aimed to enhance counter-terrorism, particularly legislation prohibiting the “glorification of terrorism”. In its editorial of 27 May 2007, The Guardian equates Blair’s argument for increasing police powers with American Vice President
Dick Cheney’s infamous One Per cent Doctrine; i.e. “if there’s even a 1% probability of the unimaginable coming to pass, act as if it is a certainty”.

Thus, by combining three sub-theme-codes within the main security theme (STC, 28, 38 and 47) relating to the anti-British Muslim backlash, grievances and resentment at the British government policies, The Guardian initiated an important debate. Evidently, in its 45 comments and debate pieces The Guardian highlighted the problems of British Muslims and challenges in the wake of 7/7. In an editorial, The Guardian argued that, “On existing evidence, therefore, stop and search not only fails to achieve its objective in battling terrorism; it is counterproductive, driving a wedge between the forces of law and order and a community they need to keep tabs on (The Guardian, 28 May 2007).

Within these comments it provided space to the bombers’ family members to express their feelings and explain what went wrong with their cousins and brothers who had been living normal lives like ordinary British Muslims. Furthermore, what has pushed those young British Muslims to become suicide bombers and how have their actions affected the lives of their loved ones? (See The Guardian, 19 May 2007) Here The Guardian considered and presented the views of the 7/7 bombers’ family members to display three important features of British Muslims’ lives after the incident: Shock, grievance, and resentment. All three elements became prominent features of The Guardian discussion of the backlash and the after-effects of the horrific events.

In one of The Guardian editorials, it wrote: “The picture painted by official statistics is damning. Muslims live in more crowded housing than people of any other faith. They are more likely to lack qualifications, and, at any given age, they report more health problems...” (The Guardian, 27 June 2006; see also 14 October 2006).

In contrast, The Daily Telegraph published only three comment pieces in which commentators voiced their opinion on British Muslims’ feelings, resentment, fears and possible measures to overcome troubles related to the 7/7 bombing. In his personal view, “Muslim anger must be recognized” Ali Miraj, a Conservative Party member expressed the situation of ordinary British Muslims as “... Muslims across the world as a consequence of the foreign policies of the West (primarily the US) is palpable”. There is no doubt that all British Muslims... must do more to combat intolerance in their midst (The Daily Telegraph, 13 August, 2006). In its personal views and interviews sections,
The Daily Telegraph also included the views of high-profile Muslims such as Prince Hassan of Jordan and Britain’s Muslim celebrity Yousaf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens) to explain how 7/7 has changed the perception of Muslim communities across the world.

Importantly, The Guardian’s coverage of this matter echoed two points: the structure and the presentation of the debate that reflected its campaigning stance over British Muslims’ problems, albeit from liberal-minded commentators. Consider, for example, a few headlines that concentrated on the healing process and making matters better: “The heavy mob will get us nowhere: Muslim communities must be treated as allies, not enemies” (The Guardian, 14 July 2005); “Throwing mud at Muslims: branding moderates as extremists will have disastrous consequences” (The Guardian, 22 July 2005); and “How not to have a debate: Ministers need to listen more to Muslims and avoid grandstanding to the scared majority” (The Guardian, 9 October 2006). The sequence of comment pieces shaped the debate in an ascending order of topics, i.e. problem, reaction and solution.

The dataset shows that The Guardian raised concerns over human rights issues such as deportations, refusal to grant asylum, and trials of suspects in other countries that are undemocratic. In an editorial The Guardian wrote: “Giving police arbitrary powers to stop whoever they want, without even the fig leaf of “reasonable suspicion” they currently require, could poison community relations and so choke off crucial sources of intelligence” (The Guardian, 27 May 2007). In the same editorial The Guardian suggests that, under section 44 of the ‘Terrorism Act 2000’, police already hold stop-and-search powers.

In comparison, The Daily Telegraph showed little interest in criticising the government over its tough-laws policy following the 7/7 incident; in fact, it pushed the government to follow the American and French models to deport terror suspects and endorse their trials in any other country. Evidently, The Guardian adopted an opposing view on human rights and government legislative measures in response to the bombings. On the occasion of the first anniversary of 7/7, The Guardian sent its reporter to the Beeston area of Leeds, which had been described in The Daily Telegraph as a “hotbed of Islamic extremism”. Roger Ratcliffe found that the international media and British security agencies had invaded the Beeston area in the wake of the 7/7 incident, and that it had subsequently been associated with all sorts of troubles (The Guardian, 3 July 2006).
Obviously the reason for their interest was to provide coverage of the 7/7 event, produce follow-up reports and, for the security personnel, to investigate and perhaps prevent further attacks.

In turn, the whole Beeston community has received bigoted labels. One of The Daily Telegraph writers even accused the ‘Hamara Centre’ of preaching extremism (see The Daily Telegraph, 15 July 2005). According to The Guardian press review of 18 July 2005, Niall Ferguson’s article published in The Sunday Telegraph on 17 July 2005 revealed that the government-funded ‘Hamara Access Point’ was preaching extremism in the name of Islam even though the British government said that 7/7 was the work of a “criminal minority” that “should not be blamed on Islam or the wider Muslim community”. Ferguson wrote: “A campaign has for some time been under way to convert young European Muslims ... Whatever their stated purpose, such centres are evidently being used as jihadist recruiting stations ...” (The Guardian, 18 July 2005).

Ratcliffe provided the example of BBC reporter Emily Buchanan’s experience in Beeston six months after the 7/7 incident where she talked to young British Muslims (The Guardian, 3 July 2006). Buchanan witnessed terrible changes in the same area that had been “a peaceful, isolated community, proud of its low crime rate” until the incident brought it into the international media limelight (ibid). Things became worse when the “media cavalry” designated Dewsbury, Beeston and Leeds as terrorist-harbouring places.

Evidence shows that people in these areas and British Muslims in particular began to be seen as the “enemy within”, “suspect” and “disloyal” to the extent that the families of the London bombers were raided even while they were grieving. Even some well-established professionals who happen to be white Muslims encountered such depressing experiences. A British music star, the Muslim convert Yusuf Islam, formerly Cat Stevens, had some bad experiences; in particular, he was misreported in the press and refused entry into America (The Daily Telegraph, 29 April 2007). After the 7/7 incident The Daily Telegraph asked him about his experience: “Does he feel he has been a victim of Islamophobia?” “Yes, exactly. What happened on the plane; Islamophobia affects me directly because Islam is my name, Yusuf Islam”.

The backlash against British Muslims continued to appear in different forms in the press. At worst, the government initially planned to close down mosques that spread
extremism. Although hate preachers such as the controversial self-proclaimed scholar Abu-Hamza had continued to present a self-interpreted distorted image of Islam to Westerners for several years at Finsbury Park mosque in London, there was little evidence of government intervention. Soon after the bombings, the mosques, rather than the hate preachers, came under scrutiny.

While The Guardian discussed the scale of the backlash, one of its commentators, Seumas Milne, argued that Blair’s policies were wrong and had put the British public at risk, resulting in 7/7 and a hatred of British Muslims as its side effect; Milne wrote, “What they did was not “home grown”, but driven by a worldwide anger at US-led domination and occupation of Muslim countries (The Guardian, 13 July 2005). In the opposing camp Martin Kettle dismissed the claim that the whole Muslim community was demonised after the 7/7 bombings (The Guardian, 7 July 2007). The notable aspect of the 7/7 backlash is that it was predominantly different from the backlash to the New York and Madrid bombings in the sense that Londoners showed strength and unity and did not allow the incident to stay with them as a bad memory, preferring to move on.

6.5-British Security Institutions and Islamist Radical Organisation Connections:

Both broadsheets raised this point, as $9/274 \times 100 = 3.28\%$ of their reportage on the reaction to the bombings dealt with how the British Foreign Office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, in a few reports (around 1.09 per cent) it also appeared that Britain had provided financial assistance to radicals and Islamists and had developed relationships with their organisations to achieve political ambitions. Furthermore, both broadsheets also pointed out in their investigative reporting that the 7/7 bombers were already known to MI5, a strand that accounts for $14/274 \times 100 = 5.10\%$ of the reporting. It is evident that both broadsheets discussed and debated the role and responsibility of security institutions in assessing and dealing with the internal security threat in three sub-theme codes: STC 22, “7/7 bombers were known to MI5”; STC 23, “The 7/7 event reflects security agencies failure”; and STC 31, “Britain’s foreign office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as Muslim Brotherhood”. In other words, both broadsheets allocated a considerable section of the reporting to debate security institutions’ policies, strategies and achievements.
The debate on radicalisation mainly focused on religion as the prime reason behind the growing radicalisation in British society. Both broadsheets in editorials and other forms of journalism largely agreed on this perception that the London bombers and many other young British Muslims were radicalised during their visits to Pakistan. However, there was no concrete evidence on this matter to indicate that the bombers were actually radicalised there.

Further, a large part of reporting, which is sub-theme code STC 11, “Many young British-born Muslims became radicalised during their visits to Pakistan a country of their parents that exports terrorism”, suggests that religious schools in Pakistan brainwashed these British youngsters like the London bombers. In its editorial The Guardian wrote: “It is also essential to underline that even where communities are alienated ... the overwhelming majority - in Britain and across Europe - are opposed to Islamist violence in all circumstances” (The Guardian, 27 June 2006). For Karen Armstrong, “The chief problem for most Muslims is not "the west" per se, but the suffering of Muslims in Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, Iraq and Palestine…” (The Guardian, 8 July 2006).

Another point discussed in The Guardian was the inhuman treatment of those suspected radicals under sub-theme code STC 56, “British security institutions’ inhuman treatment and torture of suspects, deportations, refusal of asylum, trials in other countries etc. raises concern over human rights issues”. This shows that The Guardian reinforced its stance on human rights and criticised the British government over its laws and policies that contradict Western values. It also believed that this was a cause of growing radicalisation.

In the wake of 7/7, both broadsheets discussed and debated the roots of radicalisation in Britain. The contacts between Britain’s security agencies and radicals go back to 1990 during which time radicals from around the world visited London without encountering many security hurdles. Mark Steyn (12 July 2005), Alasdair Palmer (14 May 2006) and Con Coughlin (12 May 2006) raised the “Londonistan” issue that linked London with “Islamic” radicals' notorious activities, accusing the British institutions of being soft on “Islamic extremists” to the extent that the security agencies stopped using the word ‘terrorists’ to describe them. Further, these Daily Telegraph writers suggested that “Islamic extremists” had used London as a base for their activities to attack the Paris Metro (1995) and the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.
According to The Daily Telegraph report, “Why France lived in fear of ‘Londonistan’”, published on 13 October 2001, the “French counter-terrorism experts refer to the capital as ‘Londonistan’ because of the number of wanted extremists who have sought and found safe haven there”. It continued to connect Finsbury Park Mosque with radicals and “Londonistan” in its reports; perhaps mostly using controversial sources such as Ed Husain (see The Daily Telegraph, 2 May 2007).

Conspicuously, a Hizbut-Tahrir spokesman rejected Ed Husain’s claims that he was a member of the organisation. In contrast, in one of its investigative reports, “‘Londonistan’ no longer rings true: Once Britain used to be a safe haven for Islamic radicals, but all that changed with the emergence of the al-Qaeda threat”, published on 17 July 2005, The Observer discredits American and French secret agencies’ allegations and insists that they exaggerated and mistranslated British traditional tolerance and gave it the wrong angle, portraying London as “Beirut-on-Thames” or “Londonistan”, “a safe haven for dissident Islamic groups of varying degrees of extremism from across the Muslim world”.

In the same report, The Observer learned that both France and America had suggested that Britain should be hard on Muslims, stating that “This bombing should mark the end of the open borders notion. Britain should adopt the French model of assimilation, where you hammer away at everyone until they think they are French.” (ibid) In an article mentioned above, The Daily Telegraph writes: “It was here that the Paris Metro bombings in 1995 were masterminded, and most of the key figures responsible for planning the 9/11 attacks had strong ties with the British capital” (The Daily Telegraph 12 May 2006).

Consider The Guardian report, “Newspapers warn of threat to America from ‘Londonistan’”, published on 12 July 2005, in which it explained how the mainstream American media established links between terrorist plots and London and claimed that terrorist activities around the world have close ties with London-based radicals. In other words, the British government appears to be softer on Muslim radicals who have threatened Europe and America. Furthermore, it provided references to various leading American newspapers that used phrases such as “feeding ground for hate”, “crossroads for would-be terrorists” and “openly preach jihad” to describe the UK as a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism that threatens global security. In the same article the newspaper
quoted Peter Bergen, a fellow of The New America Foundation, who said that British Muslims pose “one of the greatest terrorist threats to the United States.” (ibid) Furthermore, most sections of the American media criticised the British government for being too lenient with Muslims while George Bush used the bomb attacks on London as renewed justification for the war on terror (The Guardian, 12 July 2005). In keeping with its own right-wing ideology, The Daily Telegraph on 7 July quoted the likeminded Professor Anthony Glees who estimated that there are “...up to 200,000 potential martyrs, at universities at home and abroad, who are susceptible to recruitment”. “There are huge reservoirs to draw on,” he warns, “a potentially terrifying fact that the police and intelligence agencies must now ponder” (The Daily Telegraph, 2007).

In the wake of the 7/7 incident, London Mayor Livingstone stated: “We let Islamic terrorists raise funds in the UK, and fund their terrorism abroad from the UK. We let them broadcast their terrorism-inciting poison from the UK”. Indeed, the evidence shows that Livingstone’s argument is correct and this duplicity of the British government has led to British Muslim youth radicalisation.

This has to be seen as “part of the background which led to 7/7” (The Sunday Telegraph, 14 May, 2006). Martin Bright and Jonathan Freedland criticised the British government’s relationships with Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who in their opinion “blesses suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, denounces homosexuality, and defends the physical disciplining of women by their husbands” (see The Guardian, 12 July 2006; 30 July 2006).

In view of the fact that the security organisations knew of al-Qaeda’s presence inside Britain, this failure raised concerns and generated criticism. More importantly, it gave an indication of whether al-Qaeda radicals and law enforcement organisations have had a working relationship. In the context of security arrangements and the role of law enforcement agencies, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph published a series of articles discussing the relationship between radical organisations and individuals in law enforcement departments.

In The Daily Telegraph editorial, it quoted MI5 head, Eliza Manningham Buller, who warned that “There were at least 30 plots involving more than 100 dedicated terrorists... most of the active terrorists are foreign, rather than home-grown...they are bigoted, racist and utterly ruthless in their dedication to commit mass murder “in the
name of God” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 8 July 2007). Perhaps it is this notion “in the name of God” that has became a reason for the formulation and increasing use of the term “Islamic terrorism”. Furthermore, the description of the London bombers as “Islamist” radicals signified Islam as a problematic religion even though radicals have clearly violated its principal teachings.

Polly Toynbee also wrote in *The Guardian* that the London bombers reacted “in the name of God” and were ready to kill innocent people (*The Guardian*, 22 July 2005). Toynbee also mentioned all other major religions and the way a tiny fraction of extremists within Christianity, Judaism, Sikhism and Buddhism all killed innocent people “in the name of God” (*The Guardian*, 22 July 2005). Another important point here is that Bush and Blair also used “in the name of God” logic to invade Iraq (*The Guardian*, 7 October 2005). Other writers in *The Guardian* also discussed the problem of radicalisation in connection with all major religions, not just Islam, such as George Monbiot who wrote: “We also know that few religious governments have committed atrocities on the scale of Hitler’s, Mao’s or Stalin”’s” (*The Guardian*, 11 October 2005). The point is that on one hand the secular West viewed and linked the London bombings to Islam. But, on the other hand, it ignored the political elites who also used religion to justify their invasion of Iraq. Hence, what is the difference between Bush and Blair and those 7/7 perpetrators who also used their version of religion to kill innocent people?

According to *The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee* (ISC) report published in *The Observer* on 7 May 2006 under the headline “7/7 ringleader ‘had direct link with terror cell’”, the perpetrators “carried out a cheap and simple plot to bomb London using techniques they had found on the internet” and their “ringleader” Sidique Khan and the “Terrorist cell had been under surveillance by the security services”. Meanwhile, *The Observer* wrote: “The ISC has found there was a direct link between the bombers’ ringleader Sidique Khan... tube train at Edgware Road, and a terrorist cell that had been under surveillance by the security services” (ibid).

On this matter, *The Observer* has shown serious concerns; the newspaper consulted several leading academics in the field of terrorism and security and suggested that those security organisations should take responsibility for the incident. Like *The Guardian*’s approach, *The Daily Telegraph* adopts a somewhat similar attitude that is visible in several articles. For example, on 12 May 2006 it wrote: “MI5 knew the identities of two
of the London bombers a full two years before they launched their suicide attacks on the capital’s transport system last July, killing 52 innocent people” (The Daily Telegraph, 12 May 2006).

In fact both newspapers were concerned about the performance of MI5 given that it is a mainstream institution responsible for safeguarding Britain’s interests at home and abroad. Thus, any sort of failure in MI5’s operating system sends an encouraging message to Britain’s opponents. However, the discussion on the security agencies’ operating systems in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reflected a division among their writers and columnists as well as other sources of references such as the academics and media experts who talked about security institutions’ role and their responsibilities in tackling terrorism.

According to global media reports, several countries including Saudi Arabia warned Britain well in advance of the attack, as noted in The Daily Telegraph report published on 21 June 2006. The Malaysia Sun wrote: “US warned UK over London bombers”; Gulf News said: “Britain knew about July 7 bombers”; The Australian said: “London bomber banned from US”. In the same vein, The Daily Telegraph printed an article under the headline “The Times, MI5 and a case of mistaken identity: American book claiming that the security services could have prevented London Bombings is called into question”. It goes on to describe the issue in the light of Ron Suskind’s study, which is seen as controversial in Britain. The study claims that the British secret agencies had contacts with Islamic radicals. Consider a short passage from The Daily Telegraph: “This ‘revelation’ had serious implications...security service had failed properly to keep tabs on a man who went on to perpetrate Britain’s worst terrorist atrocity; it also meant they had been lying about what they knew” (The Daily Telegraph, 21 June 2006).

6.6-Descriptions of British Radicals (7/7 and 21/7 Bombers):

The portrayals of the 7/7 terrorists and the failed 21/7 bomb plotters in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph are largely based on descriptions supplied by their family members, neighbours, work colleagues and close friends. These newspapers discuss the bombers’ mindsets, beliefs, family backgrounds, religious affiliations, childhoods and way of life. Most importantly, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph narratives of the bombers reflect an attempt to find answers to the following questions: what motivated
the bombers to attack their own country of birth; how had they become radicalised; what was the role of their religious beliefs; were they brainwashed?

Another leading reference that was associated with the bombers’ portrayals was the idea that they “hated the British way of life”. These two notions of “ideology” and “the British way of life” were the main tags applied to the bombers’ and radicals’ profiles in both newspapers. Therefore, a notion prevails in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting that they did not cherish liberal values and wanted to promote a medieval way of life. At this point, these two sub-themes show that 20.07% of the total reporting posits religious “ideology” as a prime cause of radicalisation.

The significant component of the coverage exhibits the process through which bombers became radicalised. One hypothesis is that most of the young British-born Muslims become radicalised in Pakistan. This appears 29 times in the dataset, making this sub-theme “Many young British-born Muslims became radicalised during their visits to Pakistan, a country of their parents that exports terrorism” (29/274*100 = 10.58%). Still, it is a popular tradition in some British-Pakistani families to visit their parent country occasionally. Overall, 27.37% of the reporting in both newspapers, mainly in The Guardian, states that the London bombers became radicalised because of the Iraq War which was part of Britain’s foreign policy.

Also, a very small number of stories relate to young British Muslims being radicalised in British universities. A sub-theme-code (STC 37) describes the issue as, “Many young British Muslim students turned to radicalisation at the universities that are centres of “Islamist extremism”; “Islamic McCarthyism” and “fertile recruiting grounds” of extremists”. It appears in both broadsheets reporting as follows: (5/274*100=1.82% or nearly 2%). More specifically, the two newspapers’ shares are The Guardian (2/187*100=1.06%) and The Daily Telegraph (3/87*100=3.44%).

One view was that radicalisation derives from a cultural background and those British-born perpetrators hated Western values and instead glorified their extreme ideologies. Audrey Gillan reviewed the causes of radicalisation among young British Muslims and found that both Hasib Hussain, who became a suicide bomber, and his victim Shahara Islam were second-generation Asian Muslims living in close-knit and well-connected families (The Guardian, 14 July 2005). Moreover, Gillan found that religion had little
influence on radicalised youngsters who were more inclined to a secular way of life. (ibid)


Soon after the 7/7 bombings, both broadsheets focused their attention on possible ways of preventing any further attacks. These broadsheets suggested that the main challenge was now to find a way forward to deal with the serious problem of internal security. According to these newspapers reporting, the 7/7 experience indicated that the British security services had misunderstood the terrorist risk. The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph took on this new challenge from different perspectives and both discussed and debated the nature and causes of the security challenge in their all forms of journalism. The dataset shows that a sub-theme code STC 35, “Critics says that Britain should not participate in American-led “pre-emptive wars” and distance itself from the ‘war on terror’”, accounted for 13/274*100=4.74 or nearly 5% of reporting, demonstrating one of the causes of the 7/7 attacks. For these broadsheets, another reason for the attack was sub-theme Code 31, “Britain’s foreign office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as Muslim Brotherhood”, which made up 3.28% of the overall reporting on security.

Further to this, both newspapers also examined possible measures to eliminate the challenge of radicalisation among young British Muslims and improving security conditions inside Britain. On this matter, some of the contributors in The Guardian argued that public privacy and liberty should not be compromised. In contrast, a few of The Daily Telegraph writers pointed out that Britain had to sacrifice some of its liberty to improve security. On 5 July 2006, The Daily Telegraph quoted Blair who emphasised the need for British Muslims “to root out extremists”. The opening passage explained: “Moderate Muslims should do more to challenge extremists within their communities and tell those with ‘grievances' against the West that they are wrong...”.

In the same article The Daily Telegraph also provided a space to the spokesman of the Muslim Council of Britain, Inayat Bunglawala, who recognised that Muslims have an essential duty to join the government’s battle against extremist ideas. But he also pointed out that “Many Muslims across the UK believe that the UK's participation in the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq and the resulting carnage have been a key
contributory factor in the radicalisation of some young Muslims”. Although the paper allocated little space to consider the point of view of Muslims on the first anniversary of the 7/7 attack, it continued to argue that the Muslims’ grievance about Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and the Middle East is wrong.

Notably, *The Daily Telegraph* also believed that the terms “Islamic terrorists” and “Muslim Terrorism” were legitimate and that the government should not be swayed by Muslim reaction. Consider its article, “Muslims have to join this battle” published on 8 July 2007 on the occasion of the second anniversary of 7/7, in which it stated: “Admiral Sir Alan West ... to oversee security in Britain has made a comprehensive assessment of terrorist threats currently facing us...” In the next paragraph it wrote: “It is important, however, for no one in authority to be fooled by the change in language: the reality is that the threat comes from a perceived version of Islam. It is not Hindus or Buddhists or Polish immigrants to Britain who are trying to plant bombs here; it is men who claim to be Muslims”; therefore, it believed that it is Muslims’ responsibility to work alongside the security agencies to combat extremism.

Considerable discussion has been devoted to the government security apparatus and its future strategies for combating any possible risk of further attacks. In addition, a large part of the debate calls on Muslims to accept responsibility for the perpetrators and to securitise inner communities where potential extremists are hiding. A long paragraph in a *The Guardian* article entitled ‘Face up to failures’ published on 12 May 2006 summarised all this nicely: “How should a strong open society respond to these failures?...The obvious way of conducting such a review is to strengthen the role of parliament ...That would not solve all the problems, but it would be a good start”. Meanwhile, for *The Daily Telegraph* a way forward to avoid further incidents was to renew the intelligence system, which needs to be under the control of a public representative body, meaning politicians (see *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 May 2006). Both newspapers reporting reflected a patriotic and serious attitude and approach to dealing with the internal security problem.

**6.8-Government Security Model: Public Concerns and Possible Measures.**

Evidence shows that the government model of securitising the public has a number of serious issues including lack of collaboration between security agencies, methods of arresting suspects, and government claims that its security failure occurred because of a
lack of funding and staffing. According to *The Sunday Telegraph* news report, “The security service has 1,000 fewer officers countering terror plots than there are bureaucrats implementing Gordon Brown’s tax credit system. Are we really taking the threat seriously?” (*The Sunday Telegraph* 14 May 2006)

Furthermore, it questioned the security system, stating that “MI5’s failure to recognise the threat posed by Islamic terrorism at the end of the 1990s is the best explanation of its inability to prevent the bombings on July 7, 2005” (ibid). Essentially, in this article *The Daily Telegraph*, although a supporter of the government’s Iraq policy, criticised its security systems. In the same vein, *The Guardian* also questioned the government model of securitising the public. On 8 July 2005 *The Guardian* stated that “Hundreds of suspects, many of them young Muslim men, have been arrested and the police claim to have broken up several terrorist cells and networks. The government has invested millions in extra security officers and intelligence systems”. The next, long paragraph deserves to be quoted here for two reasons: on the one hand it recognises the government’s efforts to tackle extremism and terrorism but on the other it sticks to its belief that it is “Islamic terrorism”. It stated: “After the 2001 attacks on America, a wide-ranging review of how Islamist terrorism is tackled in the UK was undertaken...institutions and legislative changes were made; MI5 has already begun a recruitment campaign to increase its size by 50% to 3,000 staff by 2008” (*The Guardian*, 8 July 2005).

Both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* published a number of articles and comment pieces in which these newspapers discussed the operating systems of security institutions, their budgeting and their professional standards, and they accused them of working with some radical organisations. In short, both newspapers not only questioned the British security system but also highlighted flaws in its operating mechanism. Now let us take two reports of *The Daily Telegraph*, “MI5 must pay for a scandalous error” published on 12 May 2006 and “The Times, MI5 and a case of mistaken identity: American book claiming that the security service could have prevented London bombings is called into question”, which appeared on 21 June 2006 criticising the government.

According to *The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee* (ISC) report published in *The Observer* on 7 May 2006 under the headline “7/7 ringleader ‘had direct
link with terror cell”’, the perpetrators “carried out a cheap and simple plot to bomb London using techniques they had found on the internet” and their “ringleader” Sidique Khan and the “Terrorist cell had been under surveillance by the security services”. Meanwhile, The Observer wrote: “The ISC has found there was a direct link between the bombers’ ringleader” Sidique Khan... tube train at Edgware Road, and a terrorist cell that had been under surveillance by the security services.” (ibid) To sum up, The Daily Telegraph articles disclosed that MI5 and Special Branch were watching the suspects and it was already known that the attack might occur at any moment. On 8 July 2005, it noted: “Only a few weeks ago, the state of terrorist alert was lowered from ‘severe general’, the second highest, to ‘substantial’, which means the threat remained but it was not known where it was coming from or against whom it was targeted”.

6.9-Demands for a Public Inquiry into the London Bombings:

After the London bombings, some politicians, sections of the press, public bodies, pressure groups, victims and the relatives of the 7/7 victims, including those of the four suicide bombers, raised concerns over official accounts of the bombings. The demands by both Muslims and non-Muslims of diverse professional and political backgrounds for an independent inquiry were evident in both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph comment pieces, interviews, investigative reports and editorials, particularly on the occasions of the 7/7 anniversaries. The dataset reveals that 2.1% of the reporting shows British Muslims’ representatives demanding an independent inquiry. In comparison, 3.28% of the reporting in the dataset discloses that non-Muslims in Britain, including politicians, commentators, campaigners and public organisations’ heads, asked the British government to hold an independent public inquiry into the incident. Notably, the calls from non-Muslims for a 7/7 inquiry outnumbered those of British Muslims.

Evidently, the overall reporting shows a public consensus on the unanswered questions relating to the 7/7 incident. One of the key points raised was that the bombers were known to the security agencies prior to the incident. On 30 April 2007, The Daily Telegraph also reported in its news section that “Conservatives and Liberal Democrats demanded a full inquiry into why the security agencies failed to use this knowledge to prevent the 7/7 attacks” (The Daily Telegraph, 30 April 2007).

Despite a warning of an al-Qaeda attack from the Saudi secret agency, the British security institutions did not adopt precautionary measures and even lowered the
terrorism threat before the attacks. In their editorials, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* pointed out discrepancies in the official account of the London bombings and suggested that those responsible for the security failure must resign and that there is no excuse for failure. Both newspapers questioned the official accounts of the London bombings in their editorials and other forms of journalism including opinions, comments and investigative reports. *The Guardian* editorial offered an analysis of Home Office and Commons Intelligence and Security Committee reports on the 7/7 incident. It considered both reports conscientious and significant and accepted that they tried to find answers to “how and why” (*The Guardian*, 12 May 2006). It concluded that “Each report leaves important questions hanging in the air. Each report tells a story of serious official failure.” (ibid)

In the same vein, *The Daily Telegraph* also continued to question the government narrative of the 7/7 incident and supported the idea of a full public inquiry. In an editorial *The Daily Telegraph* criticised the Government for its refusal to “order a public inquiry into the deadliest attack on the capital since the Second World War” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 7 July 2006). It is important to note that, prior to the 7/7 attacks, *The Daily Telegraph* supported the same government on the Iraq war that was based on assumptions of the existence of “weapons of mass destruction” that turned out to be false. Both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* criticised Blair’s instant refusal to conduct an independent public inquiry on the grounds that it would undermine security institutions and his defence of the British security institutions.

*The Guardian* also proposed that the public’s representative, parliament, should have more powers to scrutinise the intelligence agencies. Overall reporting on calls for a public inquiry unveils a few important facts; for example, Muslims are more inclined to believe in conspiracy theories in comparison to their non-Muslim fellow British citizens. In one of its reports *The Daily Telegraph* wrote: “A quarter of Britain’s two million Muslims believe Government agents staged the July 7 suicide bombings” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 5 June 2007).

On the other hand, Honingsbaum’s article provided details of those non-Muslims who were fascinated by conspiracy theories (*The Guardian*, 27 June 2006). Further, Honingsbaum included the views of bloggers, campaigners, and some of the prominent victims such as Rachel North who were distrustful of official reports and raised their
concerns over distorted facts that did not match the ground realities; hence, they all supported the idea of an independent inquiry. (ibid) Honingsbaum found that, “Ever since the Kennedy assassination, people's faith in the official narratives surrounding seismic political events has been steadily eroding”. In addition, he unveiled some claims of 9/11 conspiracy theorists who think that “7/7, like the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, were all part of a cunning scheme to further the pro-Iraq war agenda of the Bush/Blair governments and the 'New World Order'”. Moreover, *The Guardian* quoted Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman, who said: “There can be no excuse for any lack of communication between the bodies responsible for public safety... question marks persist about the events leading up to the July 7 attacks, the case for a full public inquiry will remain strong” (*The Guardian*, 13 May 2006).

In a report, Martin Bright quoted Mark Oaten, who insisted that the government should clearly explain the link between extremism among British Muslims and anger about Iraq and that for "the government to deny a link between the war in Iraq and dismay among the Muslim community is ridiculous. But to try to cover it up, when senior civil servants have recognised the seriousness of the resentment is even worse' (sic) (*The Observer*, 28 August 2005).

In the next paragraphs of the same editorial, the writer then rejected claims that avoiding interfering in the Muslim lands would make the state of affairs any better. Further, *The Daily Telegraph* suggested that the West should bring down the dictatorships across the Muslim world that exports terrorists. “This has not yet been tried” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 11 September 2006). Interestingly, both newspapers had similar stances on the need to conduct an independent public inquiry despite the fact that *The Daily Telegraph* was evidently pro-government on its Iraq War policy.

**Section II: Narrative of Contextual Debates, Critical Analysis and Commentary on Britain’s Foreign Policy in Iraq that Risks its Internal Security.**

This section offers detailed discussions of the security topic including the concerns raised and discussed, the alternative evidence presented and the way both newspapers reflected upon the event. Given the current state of our knowledge it also describes the
narrative of what they reflected upon and what they missed out in their discussions and
debates on security. In addition, this section examines our understanding of the debates
on this topic. Arguably, the British government established connections with the
“Islamist” radicals and its refusal to hold an independent inquiry of the 7/7 has
weakened its position on public safety and its resolve to fight terrorism.

6.10-British Foreign Policy Debate: Narrative of The Guardian and The Daily
Telegraph Views on Iraq War and Britain’s Foreign Policy.

This part provides a detailed narrative of the contextual debate on “Britain’s foreign
policy” and the way both broadsheets interpret and present it. This debate takes place
in all forms of journalism in both broadsheets, which offered different perspectives on
this issue. Obviously The Guardian in its all forms of journalism refused to believe the
government line of argument that its foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly the
Iraq War, had any connection with the 7/7 incident and the problem of growing
radicalisation among young British Muslims. Its series of articles asserted that Britain’s
Iraq policy was responsible for increasing radicalisation and extremism among young
British Muslims. Under the broader theme of security, both newspapers discussed and
debated British foreign policy and the Iraq War and their interconnectivity. Obviously,
both newspapers took a clear position on these critically important issues. For example,
The Guardian strongly opposed the Iraq War and Britain’s alliance with America in its
war on terror. It reminded the nation that the London bombings had a connection with
British foreign policy and that ordinary British people’s lives were in danger because of
the Blair government’s unwise foreign policies.

In contrast, The Daily Telegraph supported the British government stance on “weapons
of mass destruction”, which later turned out to be misleading and a key factor in the rise
of radicalisation in Britain. Despite all this, The Daily Telegraph continued to support
Blair’s stance and published articles presuming that British Muslim grievances are
wrong and unacceptable and that Iraq was a major threat to British security regardless.
Hence, it defended its stance and wrote that British foreign policy in Iraq and its
interfering role in Muslim countries in particular were intended to establish good and
diminish evil, a popular American political line. Evidently, The Daily Telegraph clearly
supported and endorsed the government’s view on its Middle East policy including the
British government stance on the Iraq War. Even before the 7/7 attacks The Guardian
had opposed the British government’s decision to go to war with Saddam Hussein on the assumption that he possessed “weapons of mass destruction” (see Fahmy and Kim, 2008; Kumar, 2006).

In contrast, The Daily Telegraph had supported the British government intervention in Iraq on the basis that Saddam Hussein’s “weapons of mass destruction” posed a threat to Britain’s security (see Goddart et al., 2008; Kaufmann, 2004). One of the key points of “Britain’s foreign policy” debate is that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph retained their prior positions on this issue that they had taken long before the 7/7 incident. Throughout, The Guardian continued the same line of argument in its editorials while most of its contributors and writers pointed out that the Iraq War had indubitable connections with radicalisation in Britain. Evidently, one might say that The Guardian argument seems to be valid and sound particularly because Britain had never experienced any forms of terror threats from British Muslims before it invaded Iraq. Even though Britain had left the Kashmir issue unresolved, British-born Muslims of Kashmiri origin had apparently never blamed Britain nor attacked it for that unreasonable decision.

In contrast, The Daily Telegraph editorial dismissed the notion that the 7/7 event was a reaction to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and the Middle East, as the attacks on New York occurred before America and Britain invaded Iraq. This is an incomplete narrative of Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East, because evidence shows that the American and Western governments have long been offering unconditional support to Israel, which has been a cause of growing resentment among some Muslims. Long lists of scholarly studies have raised this point that Israeli actions in Gaza are fuelling radicalisation among Muslim youth in particular (see Hafez, 2013, p.96; Jangharia, 2010, p.283). Of course there is also increasing resentment among Muslims about the West’s support for Muslim dictators and Kings in the Middle East (The Guardian, 31 August 2014).

Here The Daily Telegraph support for the government line of argument that the London bombings had nothing to do with its policy in the Middle East was weak in comparison to The Guardian’s point of view and evidence, although in Britain another cause of radicalisation among Muslim youth is alienation (The Guardian, 19 September 2014). However, it is fair to say that The Daily Telegraph proposal for Western governments to
stop supporting Muslim dictators seems an ideal, especially considering the West's model of democracy but it misses two significant points. First, evidently it is a well-documented fact that the West had been a long-standing ally of several dictatorships and monarchies that it has planted and supported over the last few decades in the Middle East region and other parts of the Muslim world (see Blum, 2000 and 2014).

For example, prior to the Iraq War Saddam Hussein had been a close ally of the West and was also was a recipient of the West's smart weaponry. As The Guardian wrote in its investigative report, “A chemical plant which the US says is a key component in Iraq’s chemical warfare arsenal was secretly built by Britain in 1985 behind the backs of the Americans, the Guardian can disclose” (The Guardian, 6 March 2003). Moreover, several critics point out that, even before the invasion of Iraq, the same Saddam Hussein was supported and given weapons by the same people in the West (Howe, 2011; Phythian, 1996; Smith, 2013).

Further, it is also evident now that The Daily Telegraph argument was weak particularly in the present situation in Syria and Libya where the same Western-sponsored dictators had ruined the lives of ordinary people. According to The Daily Telegraph editorial, the West has been helping Muslim countries to achieve democracy and America and its allies in Afghanistan have helped remove the Taliban regime. But again, one might ask who created and supported the Taliban in the first place? To validate the point it is important to include an investigative report published long before 7/7 in which Jason Burke wrote: “Mujahideen trained and funded by the US are among its deadliest foes” (The Guardian published 17 January 1999). For many critics, 7/7 remains the major cause of extremism and terrorism aimed at the British government. As The Observer wrote on 28 August 2005: “Leak shows Blair told of Iraq war terror link: Top official warned in 2004 of British Muslim anger. Secret document said UK seen as ‘crusader state’”.

Several academics, politicians and activists have also criticised British foreign policy, albeit in a peaceful way. Relevantly, looking at the present situation and also considering the future of the Middle East, Clark’s prediction seems genuinely true when he assessed the effects of Britain foreign policy: “We ended up backing the Shia brand of Islamic fundamentalism against its Sunni equivalent” (The Guardian, 25 August 2006). In a more conciliatory tone Clarke suggests that “There is now a strong public appetite
for a change of foreign-policy direction, and Labour will need to tap into that if it is to recover the authority to govern.” (ibid)

Several scholarly studies noted that young British Muslims were unhappy with Britain’s role in Muslim lands, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq (see Kundnani, 2015; McConnachie and Tudge, 2013; Thomas, 2012). Burke wrote a chapter called *Iraq and London* on the London bombings, in which he discusses the context, causes and security failings of the 7/7 incident. He suggests that the British public was misinformed on the Iraq issue and that both governments have consistently used the “new international bogeyman of bin Laden to mask responsibility of their own policies in fermenting unrest and eventually violence. The British government, whose foreign policy was deeply controversial, was at pains to deny any link between the bombing and the war in Iraq despite the conviction of their own secret services” (ibid, p.271-291).

In brief, the debate on Britain's foreign policy also showed that ordinary white British people were more concerned about Britain’s policy in Iraq and Middle East, as is evident in the number of protest marches across European capitals including a historic ‘million march’ in London. Those protestors did not accept the official line that Britain's foreign policy in Iraq and Middle East was planned to protect them. Later on, when the 7/7 incident was presented as an outcome of “Islamic ideology” in sections of the press including *The Daily Telegraph*, the public at large rejected the idea that the government’s foreign policy was not linked to the event. Even prior to the London bombings, around 30 million people had gathered to take part in anti-war protests in 600 cities across Europe and Asia, including a historic gathering of 750,000 people in London (BBC, 16 February 2003).

Logically, Amitav Acharya (2004) offers some statistical findings: “Anti-war rallies have marked cities around the world: 30,000 people protested in Washington DC on January 18; at least 750,000 people in London on February 15; one million in Rome; 660,000 in Madrid; 500,000 in Berlin; 100,000 in Paris...” (Acharya, 2004, p.96) Evidently, the large number of non-Muslims participating in these rallies across Europe reflects the anti-government sentiments in Europe where people believe that their countries’ foreign policies are designed to endorse war and achieve political goals.
These protests constitute evidence that Western democratic values reflect elements of duplicity in practice and often favour people in power who share Western political agendas. Ideally, the foreign policy of any nation should put the human factor first before any political and economic interests, but it often works in reverse. Most nations’ foreign policies are more reflective of their political objectives than their moral obligations. Several critics also view Britain’s foreign policy as damaging and contradictory to its democratic values (see Ralph, 2014; Ahmed and Sonn, 2010).

Notably, Blair and other high-ranking government officials dismissed the argument that the Iraq war radicalised the London bombers. Against the government’s denial of Iraq connections, a long list of scholars have offered critiques of Britain’s foreign policy including Dardis (2006, p.416), Goddard, Robinson and Parry (2008, p.22), and Keegan (2004). John Pilger (2003), one of the mainstream critics of British foreign policy, thinks that it is contradictory to British values and “unsafe” and “immoral” for the world. For example, Pilger says:

> Its illegal wars; its support for war ‘against terrorism’ that is acting as pretext for a new phrase of global intervention and the American imperial power; its support for repressive elites and state terrorism; its arms exports that help sustain repressive governments...the state propaganda - mislabelled ‘spin’ (Pilger, 2003, p.1).

It is noted that *The Daily Telegraph* continues to associate Islam and a few young British Muslim radicals of a South Asian background with the security problem in all its types of journalism. However, several critics and scholars do not agree with its approach. For example, Laqueur (1999) finds that, in the beginning, “Kashmiri Muslims were rather secular in outlook”, which is perhaps why “Gandhi once called Kashmir an island of secularism on the Indian subcontinent” (Laqueur, 1999, p. 151).

Looking at the involvement of British Muslims in violent and appalling acts such as the London bombings, it is surprising that most people link them with Iraq and the fact that they were angry at Muslim suffering; meanwhile, Kashmir has experienced oppression and atrocities for more than half a century, the root causes of which are linked to the British Raj. The debate on foreign policy particularly in *The Daily Telegraph* reflects the
viewpoint of the government that rejects “Islamist” grievances against the West. Further, its editorials are evidence that it largely supported the government view that Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq had no connection with the London bombings and that the driving forces behind 7/7 remain “Islamic ideology”.

In contrast, The Guardian stressed that Britain’s democratic values are the “best defence against terrorism” and maintained its stance that foreign policy had radicalised the London bombers. Commentators and writers on both newspapers acknowledged the fact that Britain’s foreign policy has elements of what George Orwell called ‘Double Speak’. Some might say that duplicity is hardly unusual, common in all countries, and often reflective of different shades of opinion. In pluralistic contemporary societies, as in other societies, there are many different shades of opinions, including in Muslim societies. People in all societies hold different opinions; therefore, saying one thing and doing another is quite common. Sometimes, it simply means “I changed my mind” and is often not seen as bad practice. However, this type of hypocrisy can only really exist in a society where one view prevails.

The Guardian also strongly opposed the Iraq War and Britain’s alliance with America in its war on terror. It reminded the nation that the London bombings had a connection with British foreign policy and that ordinary British people’s lives were in danger because of the Blair government’s unwise foreign policies. In contrast, The Daily Telegraph supported the British government stance on weapons of mass destruction, which later turned out to be misleading and a key factor in the rise of radicalisation in Britain. In the context of this debate, it is important to include The Guardian writer Milne’s strong viewpoint based on evidence that shows that Britain had supplied weapons and diplomatic support to Saddam Hussein against the Kurds and to al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Libya and Afghanistan (see Hipler, 2016; Kelly, 2013). Moreover, Milne’s argument is strengthened by the fact that the Iraq war was launched on the basis of an incorrect assumption that Iraq had biological and chemical weapons that it intended to use against the West.

Both newspapers quoted and presented politicians, government officials, religious leaders and other dignitaries who either criticised or defended the government stance on Iraq and its view that the 7/7 bombings had nothing to do with it. Further radicalisation has roots in perpetrated ideology which Blair called “Evil Ideology”. Now,
the post-Iraq War situation affirms two fundamental setbacks: the economic instability across the Middle East region and the spread of terrorism all over the Middle East as well as in France and other European countries. There is no doubt that The Guardian’s warnings on the long-term consequences of Britain’s damaging foreign policy in the Middle East were accurate predictions. Of course, no one can deny that when Bush and Blair invaded Iraq on the false assumption of “weapons of mass destruction”, the present-day militant groups such as al-Shabaab and Isis had not been born, and Libya, Syria, Turkey and Pakistan were not prime targets of terrorism.

It is noted that The Guardian built upon its argument in a series of articles in by British and American experts, scholars, politicians, scientists, diplomats and journalists who were all closely involved with the Middle East. This list includes Scott Ritter, Rowan Williams, Noam Chomsky, Ron Paul and Tony Benn (see The Guardian, 31 October 2004; 22 June 2005). On might say that when sections of the press and a handful of top politicians were selling their false notions of a chemical and biological weaponry threat to Britain and the West, their arch enemies the Russians and the North Koreans already possessed all those deadly weapons that have the potential to cause severe damage in Europe and beyond. Indeed, the economic losses and, in particular, the human suffering of those who became permanently disabled and homeless, are other disastrous effects of the Blair government’s policy that was criticised by its Labour MPs such as Robin Cook and David Kidney (The Guardian, 17 March 2003; 18 April 2005). A notable feature of The Guardian is its a firm stance on Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and the middle East. This did not change with the passage of time but in fact strengthened as different events unfolded such as 7/7 and the present Syrian crisis. Of course, it allowed alternative opinions such as those of Douglas Murray, David Aaronovitch, Michael Ignatieff and several other politicians, writers and scholars (See The Guardian, 31 October 2006 and 27 January 2007). Throughout this research, The Guardian’s key concern was “humanity”, and its concern and criticism turned out to be accurate because the new Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn admitted that “He will apologise for ‘deception’ in run-up to 2003 invasion and to Iraqi people for suffering” (The Guardian, 21 August 2015). Before and after the Iraq War The Guardian continued to present evidence and remind its readers that their leader had misused their votes and that the war was not about a threat but about political and economic hegemony (The Guardian, 20 March 2014; 16 June 2014; 21 August 2015).
Mainly, the two newspapers asked whether Britain's government foreign policy in Iraq was responsible for the rise in radicalisation among young British-born Muslims or was it an al-Qaeda ideology. This point remained the central focus of both newspapers' reporting on 7/7 throughout the period of study (8 July 2005-7 July 2007). These newspapers have not changed their contrasting stances on British foreign policy in Iraq and the Middle East. Long before the London bombings and the Iraq War, the British people, the government and the media were divided over whether Britain should take part in the Iraq War, which was fought on the false assumption that Iraq had “weapons of mass destruction” and that these weapons were dangerous and a threat to the West.

Foreign policy was a key point in both newspapers reporting of 7/7 and it had engaged them in a big debate even before 7/7 when they had adopted utterly different positions: for and against participating in the Iraq War. The overall descriptive reporting of terrorists and radicals included the views of different writers, commentators, editors, journalists and other contributors to *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*. Initial reporting suggested that the bombers ‘hated the British way of life’ because of their anti-Western ideology which led them to attack their country of birth. The notion of ideology dominated the descriptive coverage of the bombers in both newspapers. It suggested that the bombers believed that they had to kill non-Muslims (Kafirs) and Muslims who disagreed with their version of Islam. On the other hand, both newspapers reported that the terrorists had also denounced the fine values of their religion and were even involved in the killing of their fellow Muslims. Bearing in mind Islamic teachings, this is true and a fair comment. The notion of religious “ideology” was the main tag attached to the bombers’ portrayals in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* reporting.

**6.11-Radicalisation: A Challenge that Risks Britain’s Internal Security.**

The debate on radicalisation mainly focused up religion as a prime cause of the growing radicalisation in British society. Of course, these newspapers also covered several other causes of radicalisation, such as the British government’s contacts with radical groups and its support of a few radical organisations in the past. These newspapers also discussed how London was a “safe haven” for the radicals during Afghanistan’s war with Russia. Apart from these causes of radicalisation, both newspapers also pointed out the possible measures to overcome this problem. The debate took place from different
political positions and arguments. For example, Melanie Phillips believed that after the Rushdie affair “Islam in Britain” manifestly became violent (*The Guardian*, 28 May 2006). In contrast, Karen Armstrong dismissed the notion that religion is a driving force behind radicalisation (see *The Guardian*, 8 July 2006 and 18 September, 2006). Other writers who also dismissed the concept that religion produces radicalisation include Giles Fraser and Ann Aly (*The Guardian*, 14 January 2015 and 27 June 2015).

(i) *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* Narratives of “Londonistan”:

The term “Londonistan” refers to networks of “Islamist” radicals in London that developed during the Cold War period in the 1980s. It was first coined by the French Intelligence Agencies, which allegedly labelled London a hub of terrorist activities (Foley, 2013, p.287; Phillips, 2006, p.19). During the 1980s the Cold War against Communist Russia reached its peak when Taliban fighters received massive financial support and weaponry from America, Britain and Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, the nexus of secret agencies and radical Muslim leaders was successful in recruiting illiterate, naive, angry individuals mainly from Pakistan and other Muslim countries including wealthy Arabia, where the war was sold as a “holy” cause; hence, an army of young people arrived in Afghanistan and Pakistan to take part in the so-called “jihad”. At that time, Britain and the rest of Europe tolerated these radicals, such as asylum seekers, in their various guises, and wounded Afghan *mujhadeens* became frequent visitors to European capitals, including London, for medical treatment and fund-raising missions. Arguably, in the word “Londonistan” the connotation “istan” reflects Pakistan and Afghanistan connections who, according to *The Daily Telegraph* articles, were exporters of radicalisation and terrorism to Britain. Unlike *The Guardian* it did not publish editorials, comment pieces and investigative reports to find out how London had become “Londonistan” in an advanced country whose security system is one of the best in the world. Surely, the authorities knew that radical factions visited London because at that time, as discussed earlier, the Afghan Taliban was fighting the West’s war with Russia.

*The Guardian* continued to disclose American ambitions of getting Britain to be tougher on its Muslim population: “Elements of the American media were quick to point the finger at Britain’s long-standing ‘compact’ with Islamic radicals. *The New York Times* suggested that Britain was paying the price for our ultra-liberal stance on political
refugees from the Islamic world”. In contrast to The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph appeared rather reluctant to reject the American and French allegations and their use of the term “Londonistan”. It published several articles on this issue. For example, Philip Johnston wrote in The Daily Telegraph that, “For many years before September 11, 2001, Britain’s capital was known derisively throughout the world as Londonistan...extremist groups that had set down roots, publishing tracts and newsletters and providing financial and propaganda support to overseas activists such as Hamas” (see The Daily Telegraph, 13 October 2001; 17 January 2012).

Basically, The Daily Telegraph established London’s links with all major terrorist events while academic studies and The Guardian’s reporting highlighted that some of these claims were fictitious. Notably, The Guardian’s reporting takes a different perspective which is largely neutral and investigative. It raises important points such as the Americans’ use of the notion of “Londonistan” to further tighten their border controls and crack down on British Muslims’ easy entry into America. In The Guardian’s opinion this sort of coverage suggested that America was making a case for applying sanctions on British citizens travelling to America, as noted above. It writes: “…the reality that Islamic militant groups in Britain ... represent a growing threat to the United States that will continue...British capital as an outpost of the Muslim diaspora, that London is now commonly referred to as “Londonistan”.

In reality, none of the 9/11 perpetrators had had proven links with London and no British Muslims were found guilty of attacks in France but newspapers establish such links to spread fear of Islam and Muslims. In particular, The Daily Telegraph published some controversial studies and surveys that suggested that a large population of British Muslims want Sharia and that they are sympathetic to the 7/7 bombers (see The Daily Telegraph, 23 July 2005; 19 February 2006; 5 June 2007). Such reporting linking a majority of the British Muslims with radicalisation and Sharia extremism in turn developed a view that Britain is a soft haven for radicals. At that point the authorities started spying on Muslim students across British universities. The Daily Telegraph was of course reflecting upon an event and the people responsible for it but the question remained: Why did British security institutions tolerate and allow hate preachers and radicals to poison young British Muslims’ minds?
This attitude has remained a prominent feature of The Daily Telegraph’s reporting since then. For example, it published a story, “University campuses are ‘hotbeds of Islamic extremism’: Islamic fundamentalism is being allowed to flourish at universities, endangering national security, MPs and peers say” (The Daily Telegraph, 27 April 2011). Again, The Daily Telegraph’s references above contain serious errors and lack validity. The figures presented in the Glees study attracted a storm of criticism in British academia. For example, the vice chancellor of Essex University, Alasdair Smith, called it a “Ragbag” on January 26 2006, while the Institute of Race Relations published a report headed “Document on student extremism seriously flawed” (10 April 2008), discrediting the information. Other scholars who criticised the Glees report include Major and Moran (2009). The figures were mentioned in Glees’ report “When Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British Campuses” which he wrote with his student Chris Pope in 2005.

In the words of Hewitt, “The 1990s and even earlier were significant for another reason: the evolution of London and the UK into a fabled safe haven for international terrorism” (Hewitt, 2008, p.62). Hewitt notes that French Intelligence described this influx of troublesome people as “Londonistan” (ibid). In this regard, Hewitt explicitly links this infiltration with the British government’s “irresponsible policy” of allowing so-called “Islamic” extremist “networks to flourish in Britain”; more precisely, he describes it as “payback time” for ill-planning (ibid, p.63). Notably, during the same period radicals such as Abu-Hamza, Abu-Qatada Muhammad al-Massari and Omar Bakri Muhammad entered Britain and radical organisations such as al-Muhajiroun were founded (ibid, p.62). It seems that the term “Londonistan” was used to suggest that Britain is falling into the hands of Islamist radicals and that the government should review its policy on British radicals.

(ii) Britain’s Security Institutions and Islamist Radical Organisation Connections: Reasons and Measures to overcome Radicalisation.

Both broadsheets published several stories that mentioned that the British foreign office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Many scholars and journalists argued that Britain’s security organisations could have prevented the London bombings. In view of the fact that the security organisations knew of al-Qaeda’s presence inside Britain, the failure raises
concerns and generates criticism. More importantly it gives an indication of whether al-Qaeda radicals and law enforcement organisations have a working relationship. In the context of security arrangements and the role of law enforcement agencies, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph published a series of articles that discussed the relationship between radical organisations and individuals in law enforcement departments. On this matter, both newspapers had serious concerns; they consulted several leading academics in the field of terrorism and security and suggested that those security organisations should take responsibility for the incident. Like The Guardian’s approach, The Daily Telegraph adopted a somewhat similar attitude that is visible in several articles (see The Daily Telegraph, 12 May 2006).

Arguably, one of the causes of growing radicalisation in Europe is the fact that, on the one hand, the West is facing and fighting the dilemma of radicalisation. On the other hand, it is also manifest that the West has created and supported radical factions within the Muslim world mainly to attain its political goals and safeguard its economic interests. Take, for example, the Taliban, which fought the West’s war on communism: soon after the war had finished they became opponents. Both newspapers, particularly The Guardian’s writers and contributors, discussed the controversial role of the West which to them is a significant reason for increasing radicalisation. A noted feature of the debate in these broadsheets on the growing radicalisation was the double standards of government authorities and the press itself to an extent in presenting radicals and extremists with Muslim backgrounds and those who were of other religious groups. Here, it seems relevant to point out that, as with many other radical groups and organisations, the over-citing of al-Qaeda suggests that it is a scapegoat that is more of a fantasy than a reality.

For time to time, this rhetoric is used as a fear-mongering machine to obtain political control. However, to an extent both broadsheets also highlighted British government relationships with radical groups within Muslim countries, such as the Taliban. On the one hand, it had created and supported the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and its Foreign Office had close ties with radicals. It also wages war on both the Taliban and al-Qaeda groups. It should be acknowledged that both parties pursued their own interests and supported each other; for example, the Taliban had received British and US military and financial support to fight the common enemy of Britain and America, communist Russia. This is
still the case today as friends have become rivals in the changing global political, economic and social landscape in which various countries have restructured their foreign policies. After years of conflict, the Taliban and America are now engaging in dialogue in Qatar, while Iran has reviewed its foreign policy and is reopening the British embassy in Tehran after nearly twenty years (see *The Guardian*, 20 August 2015).

In the long battle against terrorism, the treatment of terrorists of different and the same religions is a recurring theme that shows, on the one hand, the government’s apparent willingness to talk with terrorists to enhance peace and public safety. On the other hand, the same governments intervene and support terrorists to gain their political and economic objectives. In recent times, Libya, Iraq and Syria are the best examples of double standards of Western and Middle East Muslim governments that support terrorist organisations (see Mahan and Griest, 2013; L. Nacos, 2015). Evidently, the British government is also providing financial and military aid to radical groups that it thinks might safeguard its political and economic interests in the Middle East (see Curtis, 2010; 2012; Pilger, 2003; 2016).

This casts doubt on the British government’s resolve to counter terrorism both at home and abroad. In *The Guardian* opinion piece, Nick Cohen presented evidence of high-ranking British government officials’ contacts with radicals in Egypt and their willingness and determination to push the government to engage with “The radical Islamists in the Muslim Brotherhood. Its motto is: ‘Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Koran is our constitution. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope’”. (*The Guardian*, 24 June 2007) Nevertheless, a growing body of scholarship is challenging this delicate notion that most terrorist, violent and criminally-minded individuals establish links with their religions to justify their actions (Buzan 2006; Esposito, 2007; Pratt, 2010). Those who challenge this disproportionate attitude strongly oppose ‘Terrorist’ conduct by all means but at the same time point out that reserving one specific word for one religion does not help.

In the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 some scholars pointed out that radicalisation in its present form is increasingly presented as a religious factor. It is this link that brings Islam into the spotlight even though its radical views and actions contradict its beliefs. Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) assumes that the use of the typical notion “in the name of God” makes it an “Islamic terrorism” (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p.185). But then, one might also
say that one God is the same in all major religions including Judaism and Christianity. The question that arises here is why “Islamic terrorism” is exclusively used to describe the acts of that tiny fraction of Muslim terrorists while there are followers of other faiths who are also involved in terrorism. Parallel to “Islamic” radical groups, Christian radicals such as The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and Christian Anti-Balaka Militia in Rwanda are also a few examples of the use of sacred religious texts as an excuse for violence by misguided individuals. In this regard, in the last few decades the practising of the old phenomenon of “Suicide terrorism” has been triggered possibly because of increasing media attention (Géré, 2007, p.363; Pape, 2003, p.345).

It is relevant to point out that, as with many other radical groups and organisations, the over-citing of al-Qaeda suggests that it is a scapegoat that is more of a fantasy than a reality. For time to time, this rhetoric is used as a fear-mongering machine to obtain political control. One of The Guardian foreign correspondents Jason Burke, who is an expert on Al-Qaeda and has contributed a series of analysis articles on al-Qaeda and radicalisation, has noted that, in the beginning, bin Laden was not hostile to America, nor was he anti-Western. In fact, his mission was to topple “corrupt and hypocritical regimes in the Muslim world. All around him the volunteers...saw their primary objective as...struggle against their own governments” (Buke, 2007, pp.75-85).

Several other critics and scholars embrace a similar logic to that of Burke, believing that although al-Qaeda remains a threat to Europe, it has diverse mindsets, policies and priorities. Notably, these are two different phenomena, particularly in the context of contemporary Britain. Kundnani (2015) notes that the term “radicalisation” became popular in the post-9/11 period while “extremists” often refers to those who disagree with political ideas; for instance extremism in the British context means “opposition to British values” (Kundnani, 2015, p.28). One of the reasons for the increasing radicalisation is the fact that many Muslims are unhappy with the interference by Western governments in their political issues and the waging of wars on Muslim countries and unconditional support of Israel.

The interference in Muslim lands is seen as part of the political process that is often presented in the Western press as the West’s aim to restore or bring democracy. However, the other side of the picture shows that it is the West that overthrew democratically elected governments in many Muslim countries such as Iran, Lebanon
and Egypt (The Guardian, 19 August 2013). Brian Brivati also thinks that “The operation of often western-backed elites has turned many in the Islamic world towards forms of fundamentalism, and a hard core towards theocratic fascism. Democratising those states must form an essential part of the left-of-centre political project for the region” (The Guardian, 12 July 2005).

The debate on radicalisation within both broadsheets evidently reflected their own political orientations, which are secular beliefs. Perhaps because of this belief, these newspapers had failed to disconnect religion from radicalisation which in its present form is presented as “Islamic”. To be fair, The Guardian contributors also discussed and debated radicalisation within other religions but again it appears to think that secularism is better and that radicalisation is a religious problem. Furthermore, The Guardian also thinks that secularism is a solution to radicalisation and extremism in Europe although its liberal writers such as Karen Armstrong often argued that religious extremism and radicalisation is a myth (The Guardian, 25 September 2014; 16 June 2015; 29 June 2015).

Similarly, The Daily Telegraph also largely failed to recognise within all its forms of journalism that many American school shooters and several other extremists and killers in Europe are evidently secular in their beliefs whilst many were also religious-minded individuals. On other hand, obviously, The Daily Telegraph’s reaction to the security institutions’ failure over the 7/7 bombing was exaggerated and also reflective of double standards because it did not criticise the same institutions with the same passion when British secret agencies put forward a case for the Iraq War on incorrect assumptions of “weapons of mass destruction”.


Both newspapers have offered, as we have seen, several articles in which these broadsheets and their commentators, writers and government and public figures describe the possible ways of making the security system more effective, as follows:

(i) Better Policing and Intelligence Sharing:

In the wake of the 7/7 and 21/7 incidents, the security forces have detected more terror plots which have increased the radicalisation and terrorism threat. This in turn allows
security institutions, particularly police forces, to escalate their operations beyond the normal situation with the aim of securing public safety. Whilst operating in tense situations, the police have made a few disastrous mistakes, such as the shooting of an innocent Brazilian (22 July 2005) and the Forest Gate raid (2 June 2006) in which police ended up shooting the wrong Muslim suspect. These incidents raise further questions about the operations of British security institutions, which were already facing criticism for their failure to prevent the 7/7 bombings.

In the wake of 7/7 both broadsheets were very vocal in their criticism of the security institutions, which they viewed as a failure. Both pointed out that British foreign office contact with some radical organisations is an ill-advised practice that may make things worse. On this matter, evidently, *The Guardian* went a bit further to disclose double standards in government policy to deal with radicalisation because it mentioned that, on the one hand, Britain was giving aid to radicals to gain its political objectives whilst at the same time it declared radical groups as its enemy. Later, it became apparent in Paris and in other attacks that it was right to raise concerns over the government contacts with hardliners in Iraq since they have now turned against the West.

(ii) Community Bonding.

Soon after the London bombings *The Guardian* took the initiative to encourage the building of contacts with the British Muslim community. It published a series of comment and debate pieces that provided a space to various commentators and writers highlighting the need to make contact with British Muslims. According to *The Guardian*, a Foreign Office document “Building Bridges” reveals that the government does not see the Muslim community as a threat (see *The Guardian*, 28 August 2005). The Foreign Office document “Building Bridges with Mainstream Islam” (2003) begins with the lines: “We do not see the Muslim community as a threat. Muslims have always made, and continue to make, a valuable contribution to society”. In contrast, a Home Office document ‘Young Muslims and Extremism’ (2004) reveals the British government’s intention to promote a working relationship with the British Muslim community. John Gieve ties up the draft of this document on 6 April 2004 that discloses the British government’s aim to build an alliance with Moderate Muslims to tackle domestic extremism. It also recognises that “a sense of isolation and disaffection within parts of the Muslim community is leading to acts of terrorism” (Home Office, 2004). The draft
document acknowledges the contributions of British Muslims to British society and also considers them an ally and not a threat.

In its editorial in the wake of the De Menezes killing at the hands of British police, *The Guardian* described this event as not “fatal” but said that this killing of an innocent man had increased the risks of damaging community confidence. It wrote: “The danger is that the Muslim community, still reeling from Iraq, could be further alienated if tactics deployed are felt to be arbitrary or disproportionate. This would pose security risks: intelligence must come from within that community... to build networks of contacts” (*The Guardian*, 6 July 2006). Further, *The Guardian* endorsed David Omand’s proposal that security institutions should take more staff from ethnic minorities and stressed that “Direct contact with minority communities is needed.” (ibid) Overall, *The Guardian* columnists and commentators were more inclined to support the idea of stronger community bonding to combat radicalisation.

(iii) - Backlash: Muslim Sentiment.

The narrative of the ‘British Muslims’ cause’ was the significant feature of *The Guardian* reporting on the security theme. The reporting occurred in all forms of journalism that discussed and debated the reaction to the London bombings and its impact on British Muslims. The key difference between *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* reporting on the anti-Muslim backlash appeared in their attitude and response to government proposals for new anti-terror laws and human rights issues, resulting in the police receiving more powers for stop and search and holding suspects without trial. On this topic *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* published five reports that reflect the viewpoint of British Muslim organisations, which see Blair’s anti-terrorism laws as undemocratic and unjust. The main reason is that Blair’s proposal to extend police powers to hold a suspect for 90 days without charge appeared unjust, particularly when in the past Britain had perpetrated a miscarriage of justice when it imprisoned some Irishmen in the Birmingham pub bombings case.

For these reasons some British Muslim organisations raised their concerns and fears that the new laws may demonise the whole Muslim community because many terror suspects may eventually be found not guilty. However, it is fair to say that the cases of miscarriages of justice are not unique to Britain but in fact occur in other Muslim and non-Muslim countries such as India and Iran where ethnic minorities such as Christians
and Muslims have been victims of the justice system. Similarly, *The Guardian* focused on government plans to modify its terrorism policy, in contrast to *The Daily Telegraph*, which supported the government view. Similarly, *The Guardian*’s reporting, including its editorials, showed concern over the British security institutions’ complicity in inhuman treatment and torture of suspects. Sadly, torture practices are fairly common in almost all countries, albeit to varying degrees.

In five editorials *The Guardian* reminded the government that although the British nation had a collective demand to combat terrorism, we must not lose our values, which are human rights, liberty and equality. In fact, it raised concerns of a possible backlash resulting from the 7/7 atrocities. It continued to remind people in power that fighting terrorism must not single out the British Muslim community; instead, they should be contacted, listened to and trusted. An interesting point raised in the debate on British Muslims’ feelings was the fact that *The Guardian* sent its investigative reporter, a Muslim woman, to the Beeston area of Leeds where the bombers came from to find out how and why young Muslims feel alienated and angry, what can be done to bring back these youngsters into mainstream social life and, most importantly, how the media has played its part in reporting Beeston (see *The Guardian*, 24 July 2005; 18 June 2006).

This sort of coverage resembles campaigning journalism, which is what a quality press is supposed to do. Here, *The Guardian* writer raised a key issue of hostile and negative media and the way they has damaged the Beeston community. In these comments and editorials on this particular issue of “Muslim feelings”, *The Guardian* affirmed that it practises and considers its core values of humanism and liberty as vital important. Although it has clashed several times with some of the views of British Muslims, such as on the veil, because of its secular nature, it has maintained its position that wearing the veil is basically a woman’s choice and not an enforced action. Here it also drew a line between radicals and ordinary Muslims and their faith. On Friday, a special day for Muslims, *The Guardian* (1 November 2006) published two episodes of a lengthy feature that explained the life of a British Muslim: “Criticised for their beliefs, clothing and attitudes; accused of not being British enough; reviled as the enemy within - not a day passes without Muslims being attacked in the media. So how does it feel to be Muslim in Britain today?” (*The Guardian*, 1 November 2006). Thus, at the same time within its comment pieces, *The Guardian* continued to inform the public on what Islam is about.
and how the media have caused panic about Islam and demonised its followers, British Muslims, in the wake of 7/7 (see The Guardian, 10 June 2007). In brief, to be fair, The Guardian’s attitude to British Muslims was visibly sympathetic and it has maintained that they are victims of the actions of a few “lone-wolf terrorists” which every society experiences in some ways.

Interestingly, the key theme that ran in an editorial and six news reports on the backlash in The Daily Telegraph showed the presence of two core arguments: 7/7 is a “Muslim problem” and “Muslims should do more”. In other words, British Muslims must accept that those bombers were from their community and it is their responsibility to resolve this problem, which also reflects the wider government stance. Reversing this argument, one might ask all Christians to accept responsibility for the actions of Blair and Bush which have ruined an entire nation. Thus, contemplating the terrible actions of Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot, should we blame their faith and community groups?

In other words, The Daily Telegraph suggested that British Muslims should spy on their fellow Muslims, as the paper concluded: “We agree with Sir Alan: we must all be snitches now” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2007). Here “We” is emphasised to include The Daily Telegraph and all those who have the same ideology and approach to this issue. The question here is whether it is worth encouraging everyone to spy on their fellow citizens. And if it is, what will be the consequences? Eventually, it may damage the process of integration and in turn promote an individual-based society with no sense of community. This point is made not to discredit government efforts to tackle the terrorism threat and protect the general public, including ordinary Muslims, but to object to the way in which this threat is being handled; for instance, the government’s Prevent and Contest strategies for counter-terrorism have raised concerns in terms of partiality.

Government officials and politicians repeatedly emphasised that it is the responsibility of British Muslims to crack down on extremism. For example, Madeleine Bunting, writing in The Guardian on 10 October 2005, quotes Paul Goggins, the then minister for Faith and Community Cohesion, stating: “It is Muslims’ responsibility to deal with extremism. The government will help, but basically it’s down to Muslims to sort themselves out. One can hear the faux-innocent pleading of ‘It’s nothing to do with us,
However, Bunting wrote: “If that wasn't a tall enough order in a country whose foreign policy incenses the Muslim community, Goggins says he'd like Muslims to speak with a more 'united voice': the internecine factionalism of minority community politics is confusing. The irony of course is that when Muslims do speak with one voice - on British foreign policy - Goggins and his government colleagues refuse to listen.” (ibid)

Evidently, following the 7/7 attacks British Muslims as well as those resembling Muslims experienced some forms of racism that made their lives unpleasant at that particular time. Racial attacks on some bearded Sikhs and the shooting of a Brazilian electrician on suspicion of being a Muslim suicide bomber reflect the confusion and fears among the British public and law enforcement agencies just as much as the killing and bombing of innocent people in London. Although the response of Londoners to terrorism was visibly different from those of New Yorkers and Madrilenians, spying on Muslim students in the universities, stop and search, and a bad press are noticeable illustrations of the security forces' response.

On the whole, the impact of the 7/7 incident resulted in a rise in racial tensions, especially in inner-city communities in Leeds, Dewsbury and Bradford. The anger was unleashed on British Muslims because they had become a reason to limit public freedoms and increase stop-and-search procedures at airports and other public places. Had there been another bombing, greater emphasis would surely have been placed on violence to prevent another and to reassure the public. Prior to the London bombings, these practices were unpopular but the 7/7 incident indicated a risk to national security.

There was some reporting of hate crimes and anti-social behaviour at local levels in the national press, including The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. These incidents were also monitored and recorded at local and national levels by different institutions and organisations including leading British universities. Given the current state of our knowledge and unfolding of several political events it is evident that part of the reporting was a factual analysis; i.e. a well-knitted community could help defuse radicalisation and improve security conditions in the wake of the 7/7 bombings. More than a decade has passed since these newspapers suggested that the idea of community bonding could unite Britain, and we have seen the proof of it in the recent European referendum that has divided Britain. Reflecting upon the reasons for and further
consequences of radicalisation in the future, The Guardian's argument to appoint English-speaking imams in British mosques was surely an intelligent piece of advice that has proved in later years that these British-born imams can help boost contacts with young British Muslims. Moreover, these newspapers' reflection on British Muslims’ community problems such as the non-existence of a widely recognised leadership that can represent and negotiate on behalf of British Muslims was a mirror of a just complaint.

At the time of fury, The Guardian avoided sensitive and damaging headlines and focused upon genuine problems of the British Muslim community such as a bad press and concern over growing disrespect for the Muslim faith for which it criticised its competitor newspapers including The Daily Telegraph. This was campaigning journalism aimed at a healing process in the wake of the bombings that detached Muslims from mainstream Britain to a great extent. In contrast, The Daily Telegraph did not reflect upon British Muslims’ problem so much but presented a closed view of Muslim sentiments.

What The Daily Telegraph missed was the fact that Britain has to pay the price for joining America in its war on terror in the years to come. We see now that the war on terror thesis has critically failed and that the economic and political losses are far more then what Britain might have gained from her unconditional support for the Americans. Now, The Guardian's analysis of the American policies and, in particular, its war on terror has become a true reflection of the reality that the war on terror has failed to address the causes and done more harm than any benefits it might have accrued. Among the long list of scholars who have studied the phenomena of the war on terror and radicalisation,(Abrahams (2006), Ayoob (2013), Daalder (2016) and Reese and Lewis (2009) affirm the view of The Guardian that the American policies have made our world more insecure.

On the whole, The Guardian was evidently right to argue that the 7/7 event was mainly a reaction to British foreign policy in Iraq and the Middle East in many ways, such as the bombers’ conviction in their video messages that they were unhappy over the sufferings of Iraq at the hands of a democratically elected British government. Although The Guardian did not reject the notion of “Islamist” radicalisation in Britain, it argued that it is linked with the terrain of events in the Middle East where the British government is interfering to secure its political and economic interests, which was a fair reflection of
the event. Moreover, radicalisation did not develop overnight; British Muslims’ bad experiences such as poverty, inequality in jobs and alienation were also important factors.

*The Daily Telegraph* did provide a factual narrative of events but overall its argument that radicalisation is purely a religious phenomenon in the aftermath of 7/7 was inaccurate and showed its conservative approach. Hence, this demonstrates that *The Daily Telegraph* is unbalanced and biased; it may be right from its own point of view but it ignored other factors in the discussions on security. In sum, within all these debates and discussions on Britain’s foreign policy and internal security, a hypothesis developed that supports Stuart Hall’s “West and the Rest” discourse which has already been discussed earlier in this thesis. The powerful and technologically advanced West is less concerned about its Muslim population but is more worried about their faith (Islam) which it sees as a challenge and a driving force behind radicalisation which has posed a security challenge.

6.13-Conclusion:

The overall response to the 7/7 incident in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* reflects a range of mixed feelings, particularly on Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East. In relation to security, there are two opposing views on Britain’s foreign policy. They are that the British government’s point of view is that the Iraq War had nothing to do with the 7/7 event, while academic figures on the left argue that the British government has risked public safety by intervening in the Middle East. The use of the term “Londonistan” in the context of security has further strengthened the perception that Muslims are a potential security threat that will endure for generations. In addition, the press reporting and mentioning of national and international extremist organisations such as al-Qaeda cells, al-Muhajirin, Hizbut-Tahrir, al-Shabaab and ISIS suggests that the threat is moving around and is long-lasting. In turn, the net coverage raises concerns about Muslims’ loyalty and urges the government to take necessary actions to ensure public safety.

Equally, both broadsheets raised concerns about new terror laws, surveillance, detentions without charge, increasing use of stop and search and mishandling of suspects. In particular, *The Guardian* was prominent in pointing out that such cases of mishandling could damage Britain’s human rights commitments. It is evident that the
securitising of Britain may also affect its liberal democratic values. However, it is understood that the threat of bombing necessitates the diminution of some civil rights in the name of security. That is because in the age of information both sides have equal excess to technical tools such as contact modes, emails and messages. Therefore security institutions may have to access information channels through radical websites and mobiles or scan emails.

In brief, reflecting upon the comments of the two newspapers that explained their perspective on the 7/7 event, it is apparent that these newspapers showed a reasonably good understanding of the security situation and offered some worthwhile ideas such as “community bonding”; on the whole, however, these newspapers’ reporting also reflected elements of exaggeration and distortion of the facts and narratives on security. This shows that the press does not produce and transform events alone; in fact, to an extent, it facilitates the particular idea of an event or story. Thus it works with other key players such as politicians, police, public and private bodies, thus indicating the presence of Stanley Cohen’s idea of “folk devils and moral panics”. Finally, even though both newspapers showed quite similar attitudes to improving the internal security situation, they differed hugely in their opinions on the cost of securitising the public, which is individual liberty.
Chapter 7 (Theme 3): British Muslims are Incompatible with British Way of Life:

7.1-Introduction:

The portrayal of the present Orient that emerged in post-7/7 reporting shows a shift in representation with terms such as “radical”, “suicide bomber”, “disloyal”, and “enemy within” at home in comparison with the previous Orient in faraway places in Asia, which was characterised as “backward”, “illiterate”, “old-fashioned” and “other” but not as “dangerous” and “radical other” like the present one. Unsurprisingly, the reaction to an interpretation of the London Bombings in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reflect a new “Other” that is comparatively more challenging as this Orient is the radical and extremist “Insider” who has been born and raised in the West and is evidently more adapted to the Western way of life.

Within a few hours of the London Bombings, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that “We shall prevail”, sending a strong message to those British suicide bombers and their associates. Further, Blair stated: “Today’s bombings will not weaken in any way our resolve to uphold the most deeply-held principles of our society and to defeat those who would impose their fanaticism and extremism on all of us” (The Guardian, 7 July 2005). At that sad moment, the G8 leaders also joined Blair to show their solidarity and their resolution that terrorism would be defeated.

President George W. Bush also said: “It’s a war on terror for us all...we will not yield to these people. We will find them, we will bring them to justice...we will spread an ideology of hope and compassion that will overwhelm their ideology of hate” (The Guardian, 7 July 2005). Initially, Blair recognised the distinction between suicide bombers and British Muslims as two separate elements of the same Muslim community. Hence, the obvious division was between “Us” (the British public including British Muslims) and “Them” (terrorists/Islamists). Gradually, the narrative was built up in both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, suggesting a serious challenge ahead to defend the “British way of life” endangered by four British-born Muslim suicide bombers.

Gradually, the familiar rhetoric of “Our society” and “Our values” appeared in these newspapers, further deepening the division between “Us” (non-Muslims, whites, secularists and Europeans) and “Them” (Muslims/British-born Asians/Arabs/non-
secular and non-Europeans). This binary division demonstrates that Edward Said’s seminal work *Orientalism* (1978) is still valid and applicable. Said’s work deals with the representation of people (*Orients*) and societies in faraway places in the East, mainly the Middle East which is already explained in the literature review.

One might say that the Western elites, including the press itself and politicians in particular, are wilfully ignorant of Islam, although the evidence suggests that this operates both ways as it is also true of some Islamic countries in their dealings with the Christian religion. Consequently, the whole debate on British Muslims and their ability to integrate into a secular British society is presented from the British perspective. A key reason for this is the fact that self-styled scholars, controversial figures and hate preachers receive more attention and space in debates focusing on British Muslims.

As a result, most discussions in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* on modernity reflect a very limited understanding of the cultural and religious tradition of Muslims. At the same time, it is fair to say that some sections of the press in Muslim countries are just as lacking in their understanding of the Christian and Western values of societies to which some Muslims have moved. This chapter argues that the press redefined and reconstructed the “British way of life” narrative, which was presented as though it were under serious risk because of the actions of four British-born bombers. It further argues that the notion of the “British way of life” was reframed to cover up the failure of the government’s foreign policy in Iraq and to regain public support that it had largely lost because of its foreign policy.

The 7/7 incident also provided a reason for policy-makers, press and politicians to ask British Muslims to be more adaptive of secular values given that the bombers had failed to demonstrate the essence of their religious and cultural norms. Nevertheless, the alarm communicated by the press in reaction to the bombings, which were likely to increase the social divide, was legitimate and accurate. The following sections of this chapter provide details of the discussions and debates presented in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* on British Muslims’ ability to integrate and their compatibility with the British way of life.

**Section I: The Original Dataset and Findings:**
This section is designed to provide details of the database that emerged in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* reporting of the 7/7 bombings. It comprises the response to, interpretation and representation of the event in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* reporting in the context of the British way of life.

### 7.2-The Dataset:

![Figure 7.1](image)

**Figure 7.1:** The above figure shows 19 sub-themes and their share in the making of a main theme “British Muslims are Incompatible with the British Way of Life”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Colour</th>
<th>Percentage share</th>
<th>Sub-Theme-Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sky-blue</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>STC 46, “Britishness is our culture; our British values must be adopted”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Blue Lapis</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>STC 39, “British Muslims have created social ghettos and live parallel lives rooted in their cultural and religious beliefs/ideologies such as separate schools, veils; this leads to radicalisation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>STC</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>STC 32</td>
<td>“British Government promotes the idea of British Islam/Modern Islam/moderates (Sufi Islam, Council of Imams etc) to counter Islamic radicalism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>STC 49</td>
<td>“Engaging with Muslims includes government initiatives such as road shows, reaching out in the community, combating Islamophobia, listening to Muslims’ leadership etc.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>STC 41</td>
<td>“Hate preachers, Abu Hamza, Finsbury Mosque promote anti-Western feelings and radicalisation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>STC 44</td>
<td>“British Muslims do not endorse 'Freedom of Speech' and criticism of their religion, for example Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) cartoons”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>STC 52</td>
<td>“British Muslims are victims, for example bad press etc.” (Sympathetic view)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>STC 24</td>
<td>“British mosques’ link with 7/7 bombers, meeting points, promoting extremism and radicalisation, problematic labels, non-English speaking Imams, etc. (closed views)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>STC 6</td>
<td>“British Islamists, Sheikh Omar Bakri and his associates like al-Qaradawi, Abu Izzadeen, are anti-Western hate preachers who must be denounced and banned”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light sky-blue</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>STC 29</td>
<td>“Hate preacher Anjem Chaudhary’s statements etc”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Cerulean</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>STC 54</td>
<td>“Problems within the Muslim community, for instance widely acknowledged leadership, Imams and mosques, sectarian divide etc.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple violet</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>STC 62</td>
<td>“Jack Straw veil controversy fuels Islamophobia in British society”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row</td>
<td>Color</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>STC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>STC 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>STC 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>STC 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>STC 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>STC 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Pink</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>STC 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>STC 59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dataset reveals that the debate finally reached a point where both newspapers began to write about “modern Islam” and “moderate Muslims”, suggesting that ordinary Muslims are incompatible with the British way of life. Overstating the notion of “modern Islam” indicates that the secular West sees traditional Islam as a threat and therefore desires to alter it to make it fit into the contemporary Western lifestyle. In some ways, the West imposes its secular values on Muslims living in Europe, including Britain. Of course, the reverse is true when Europeans move to some Muslim countries such as the Gulf States or Iran, where some Western cultural norms conflict with Islamic traditions; for example, Public Displays of Affection are restricted.

Both *The Guardian’s* and *The Daily Telegraph’s* coverage of the main event of 7/7 and the following events such as 21/7, the veil debate and the cartoon controversies were interpreted and presented as a problematic outcome of religion. In this sense, despite
wide-ranging opinions and arguments expressed in all forms of reporting, including comments, features, news reports and editorials, the central theme remains the same: it is the religion (Islam) that restricts integration in a secular society? Reflecting upon these two newspapers’ views, it emerged that their explanation of “modernity” suggests that British Muslims must adopt certain aspects of modern Western society, which is secular. To them this is modern thinking, for British Muslims should approve the modernisation of mosques where Imams must speak English, women must be allowed to pray in the mosques, and faith schools must introduce courses that include secular education.

7.3- Are British Muslims failing Modernity?

The narratives of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, which are largely based on the views of these newspapers’ contributors, writers and editors, suggest that the British government should work together with “Moderate Muslims” to counter terrorism, radicalisation and extremism. In all the different types of journalism, 46 carry the two sub-theme codes along these lines: (STC 32, “British Government promotes the idea of British Islam/Modern Islam/moderates (Sufi Islam, Council of Imams etc) to counter Islamic radicalism”) and (STC 49, “Engaging with Muslims includes government initiatives such as road shows, reaching out in the community, combating Islamophobia, listening to Muslims’ leadership etc.”). These account for a total share of 46/274*100=16.78 (or nearly 17%) while The Guardian’s contribution to the discussion on encouraging the British government to engage with moderate Muslims accounts for 12.40%.

Further, these newspapers’ descriptions of “moderate Muslims” suggest Muslims who do not disapprove of secular traditions and values such as same-sex marriages, dress codes, and ways of life. The best illustrations of moderate and conservative Muslims to have emerged from the dataset are the portrayals by al-Qaradawi, Ramadan, Ed Husain and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. For example, al-Qaradawi is extremist, fanatical and fundamentalist because he opposes same-sex marriage and supports the Palestinians (see The Daily Telegraph, 19 July and 20 July 2005).

Nearly three months after the London bombings a Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published distasteful caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) on 30 September 2005. The incident left British Muslims deeply upset and caused anger among Muslims
worldwide, eventually resulting in violent protests and riots. The situation was taken seriously by Muslim countries, which activated their diplomatic missions to resolve the issue. The coverage of the incident in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* opened a debate on modernity and freedom of speech and the extent to which British Muslims are compatible with these ideas.

(i) Freedom of Speech:

Following the 7/7 incident, several newspapers around the world, especially in Europe, reprinted the cartoons to show solidarity with the Danish newspaper and to defend ‘freedom of speech’ and the values of ‘press freedom’. Notably, the British press and broadcast media declined to reprint the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) satirical caricature as part of a solidarity campaign with their European counterparts who had offended Islam and Muslims. One exception was the Cardiff University student newspaper, which published the cartoons, although its 10,000 copies were soon withdrawn (*The Daily Telegraph*, 8 February 2006). This incident indicates that Britain’s response to the distasteful cartoons was considerate in comparison to its European neighbours.

On 3 February 2006, the British foreign secretary Jack Straw praised the British media for being considerate and responsible in a sensitive situation. Straw said, “There is freedom of speech, we all respect that, but there is not any obligation to insult or to be gratuitously inflammatory… republication of these cartoons has been unnecessary, it has been insensitive,…disrespectful” (*The Guardian*, 3 February 2006). Despite the British media and government’s solidarity with British Muslims in condemnation of the cartoon, a handful of members of the radical organisation Hizbut-Tahrir and the banned group Al-Ghurabaa organised a protest with placards declaring “Behead the one who insults the prophet” and “free speech go to hell”. This demonstration, which constituted threatening behaviour, unsurprisingly initiated a debate on freedom of expression in both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*.

Thus *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* writers and commentators questioned British Muslims’ place and role in mainstream society, which holds secular values including individual liberty and freedoms. To an extent, these newspapers also reflected on the statements of British Muslim leaders who challenge the nature of these values such as freedom of expression; this is a natural defensive reaction. The following table
shows the total number of articles published in *The Daily Telegraph* based on two sub-themes, “moderate Muslims” and “freedom of expression”, in Britain (8 July 2005-7 July 2007).

**Table: 7.1:** Data on the cartoon controversy in *The Daily Telegraph*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of journalism (<em>The Daily Telegraph</em>)</th>
<th>Codes: 32/44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News reports</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above figures from the dataset show that *The Daily Telegraph* provided around nearly 21% (18/87*100 = 20.68) of its total reporting space to debate the needs of “Modern Islam”, “Moderate Muslims” and “freedom of expression” based on the cartoon controversy. Notably, these articles are also referred to elsewhere in this thesis because each has more than one sub-theme. These indicate *The Daily Telegraph*’s belief that, in view of the cartoon protests and the rise of radical groups, the British government should redesign its previous policy of talking to radical organisations and groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. It criticises the Foreign Office for its long-standing contacts with radical groups and suggests that radical groups be replaced by moderate Muslims such as the newly-launched Sufi Muslim Council (SMC).

Further, it argued that Britain should be tough on hate preachers and those organisations that promote radicalisation, including the Muslim Brotherhood and its associate organisation the Muslim Council of Britain, some of whose members adhere to Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Notably, this theme remained constant in *The Daily Telegraph* comment section and news reporting of British government rethinks and policy overhauls in favour of moderate Muslims. Similarly, on ‘freedom of expression’ *The Daily Telegraph*’s key argument in its editorial was that ‘freedoms’ of all sorts are foundation stones of British democracy that had been won in lengthy struggles and must be protected. At this point the reporting shows a divide between Muslims and
non-Muslims, with the assumption that British Muslims do not endorse freedom of expression; hence, an “Us and Them” narrative emerged.

In two of its news reports based on the views of Prof. Frank Stewart and Matthias Küntzel, *The Daily Telegraph* criticised the BBC and the University of Leeds for failing to robustly defend the value of freedom of speech. Most of these items indicate that British Muslims are too sensitive and less open to freedom of speech, and they must acknowledge that this is an essential norm of modern British society in which they have chosen to live. Overall, the reporting in all items reflects that *The Daily Telegraph* was critical of radical Muslim groups and hate preachers. However, with reference to the cartoon controversy protest it speculates that British Muslims do not cherish the value of freedom of expression; this indicates a biased view linking the entire British Muslim community to one incident in which a couple of hundred protestors belonging to a banned group participated.

However, the paper also provided space to Ali Miraj (Board Member of the Conservative Party Policy), whose views to some extent echo those of British Muslims who have some genuine grievances and feel disappointed by the coverage of these issues. In sum, *The Daily Telegraph*’s coverage includes the views of the Conservative party here and elsewhere in the data. In its editorial on 5 February 2006, *The Daily Telegraph* argued that the protestors against the cartoon controversy had devalued the notion of ‘freedom’, which is a ‘hard-won liberty’ and central to British democracy. *The Daily Telegraph* also reminded its readers that it had not published the cartoons and considered those caricatures as “vulgar and fatuously insulting” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 5 February 2006).

In the same editorial, *The Daily Telegraph* also criticised Jack Straw and the Labour government for showing a soft response to the protestors and inadequately defending ‘press freedom’ (*The Daily Telegraph*, 5 February 2006). It wrote: “The Government’s response is especially feeble when compared to Margaret Thatcher’s behaviour during the Rushdie Affair” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 5 February 2006). It is also important to mention here that *The Daily Telegraph* used derogatory language in comparison to *The Guardian* to describe Muslim scholars such as al-Qaradawi; it believes that he is against same-sex marriages and that some of his views are anti-feminist, which conflicts with the Western point of view. However, one might also point out that some of the recent
comments of Donald Trump indicate that some Western males are just as likely to be anti-feminist as anyone else. Surely, it is a given that all societies will, in some respects, be divided on such issues, the Christian religion having long been divided on both issues. In addition, The Daily Telegraph portrays Oxford Muslim Professor Tariq Ramadan as “an extremist”, “bad” and “dangerous”, in line with the right-wing press (see The Daily Telegraph 14 July 2005: The Sun 9 July 2005). This may be due to The Daily Telegraph’s disapproval of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in 1928 by Ramadan’s grandfather Hassan al-Banna.

In the debates relating to Islam and British Muslims, The Daily Telegraph’s and The Guardian’s reporting differs in the treatment of politicians, writers, religious leaders and writers based on their faith and ethnicity. An example of such treatment within the dataset is the writing of Jonathan Freedland, who calls Israeli actions in Gaza “morally indefensible” in his article “we need to engage with all strands of Muslims”, published on 12 July 2006 in The Guardian. However, when the Muslim politician Sayeeda Warsi quit the Tory-led coalition government over her stance on the Israeli attack on Gaza, which she too called “morally indefensible”, she was immediately subjected to media criticism, with The Daily Telegraph writers branding her an “extremist” and “Islamist” because she condemned the Indian army atrocities in the disputed territory of Kashmir (see The Daily Telegraph, 22 February 2015). Thus, one might say that this distinguishes The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph in their treatment of this issue because Freedland, ironically, is Jewish.

In short, with regard to the cartoon controversy The Daily Telegraph’s reporting suggests an important point; i.e. the British government stance on freedom of expression is less defensive in comparison to its European neighbours. Hence, the British government showed that it was afraid of British Muslims’ anger, and its priority therefore was not to protect freedom of expression. Perhaps playing down the possibility of racial conflict will endanger these freedoms. However, the bad behaviour of a few members of an extremist sect, Al-Ghurabaa, shows that British Muslims are at a disadvantage because they are unfamiliar with the notions of freedom and liberty. Yet they live in a society which has certain concepts of freedom and liberty which they have to live by. Surely, they are very aware of the different views of the society in which they came to live.
The cartoon controversy debate takes a different shape in *The Guardian’s* comments, news reports, special reports and editorials because it also allowed a few Muslim writers to express their views on freedom of expression. On the positive side, the cartoon controversy promoted community bonding because mainstream Muslim communities reject violence as a means of protest. *The Guardian* reporters disclosed on 11 February 2006 that the demonstration was organised “by an Islamist sect whose supporters have repeatedly been linked to violence and terrorism. Al-Ghurabaa, the organisation which takes credit for the protest, is essentially the same organisation as al-Muhajiroun” (*The Guardian*, 11 February 2006). The following table shows the overall types of reporting published in *The Guardian* that discussed the cartoon controversy, which in turn opened up debates on freedom of speech, modern Islam and moderate Muslims.

**Table: 7.2:** Data on the cartoon controversy in *The Guardian*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Reporting (<em>The Guardian</em>)</th>
<th>Codes: 32/44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Reports</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Reports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the cartoon controversy, *The Guardian* editorial expressed its “displeasure” and “condemnation” of the attitude of those few fanatical protestors, particularly one dressed like a “bomber” and an “al-Qaeda lover”. It says that the “British tolerant way of life” should be defended even if white fascists have to be confronted. *The Guardian* also advised security agencies such as the police to ensure that an “exaggerated sense of victimhood” among Muslims after 7/7 does not gain strength in response to these fanatics. Notably, *The Guardian* also defended freedom of expression and included views such as “redefining its boundaries”, which appeared in *The Daily Telegraph* as well. The cartoon protests added further weight to *The Guardian’s* view that moderate Muslims
should take the lead; this is particularly prominent in its editorial and comment section in which it argues that the battle against extremism cannot be won without moderate Muslims.

The ‘moderate Muslims’ and ‘freedom of speech’ debates in *The Guardian* include a mixture of views but fail to identify the criteria for defining a moderate Muslim. Thus, the impression developed that British Muslims have to distance themselves from traditional Islam, which provides a justification for extremist views that lead to terrorism. Overall, its news reports were different from its comment section because the news reports were mostly based on official views while the comment section debate on ‘freedom’ and ‘moderate Muslims’ was more balanced, even though it failed to define the latter. Furthermore, *The Guardian* used its editorial position to record its concerns over the British government’s laidback attitude on the day of the protest, which threatened public order because one of the protestors was dressed like a suicide bomber. Its editorial stated that those protestors who had threatened the public with their outrageous behaviour must not be spared and should be brought to justice. Here, *The Guardian* editorial demonstrates a sense of justice, “...Ours is a tolerant way of life; we must be robust in defending it against its enemies (*The Guardian*, 6 February 2006).

Another important point was raised by *The Guardian*: “There must be no witch-hunt to feed further the ugly and exaggerated sense of victimhood surging through the otherwise legitimate protest against the cartoons’ gratuitous insult” (*The Guardian*, 6 February 2006). But it emerged two days later that Omar Khayam, who had threatened public order by dressing in a suicide bombers jacket, was on parole after serving part of his sentence for drugs offences (see *The Guardian*, 8 February 2006). The key point here is that, following the actions of a few individuals, both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* started debates on multiculturalism, integration and on British Muslims and their ability to live by Western values in a secular society. A considerable portion of the debate on freedom of expression, in fact, presented British Muslims through the lens of those protestors who were less inclined to cherish Western values. On this debate, the dataset shows that the two broadsheets reserved 7.29% of their reporting space to highlight British Muslims’ inability to accept criticism of their religion.

In contrast, only 1.09% of the reporting space was given to the point of view that freedom of expression by all means is an exquisite value but it should have limits to
avoid causing offence to people of all faiths and disciplines. This ratio is reflective of these newspapers’ news production mechanism in which British Muslims have little say in matters related to them, although The Guardian did ask some British Muslims for their opinions. However, one should also consider that it is the production team and the owners who dictate policy in response to their perceived audience.

Here, the contemporary West contrasts with Islam because Islam strictly forbids the caricaturing of messengers and prophets of God, including Prophet Jesus, whilst this is not the case in secular Western societies. On the cartoon controversy The Guardian published a series of news reports, comment pieces and an editorial in February 2006 to offer alternative views on freedom of expression. On 12 February 2006, one of The Guardian commentators Fareena Alam pointed out contradictions in the use of the notion of freedom of speech because the same newspaper had “rejected cartoons lampooning Jesus” in deference to its readers’ sentiments. She argued: “Freedom of speech is not absolute. It has to be in service of something, like peace or social justice. How have these cartoons, and the hypocritical defence of them, served these ideals?” (The Guardian, 12 February 2006). In addition, Karen Armstrong wrote that freedom of expression was long practised in the Muslim world before it was won as a “liberty” in the West. She gives the example of the seventeenth-century Muslim Iranian philosopher Mulla Sadra who resisted the Iranian mullahs’ campaigns to limit “freedom of expression” (The Guardian, 21 July 2007).

(ii) Modernity: “Modern Islam”, “Moderate Muslims” and “British Islam”.

The following table shows the composition of the modernity debate in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph during the period July 2005-July 2007.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of journalism (Moderate Muslims/Modern Islam)</th>
<th>July 2005- 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments &amp; debate</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News reports</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of journalism (Moderate Muslims/Modern Islam)</th>
<th>July 2005-2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comment &amp; personal views</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News reports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
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In the views of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, the idea of modernity means that members of different communities, particularly British Muslims, have to incorporate British values. Notably, within the dataset the notion of modernity with regard to British Muslims is mostly concerned with their supposed disadvantages or shortcomings in integrating into modern British society. On 18 July 2005, after the London bombings, The Guardian offered editorial press reviews of the mainstream British press entitled: ‘It is a battle for the heart of Islam’: Moderate Muslims were urged to tackle proponents of extremism, suggesting that something in Islam drove the London bombers and needed to be changed. It referred to the Scotsman’s editorial of 16 July 2005: “Moderate Muslims are at long last beginning to recoil at the jihadist reign of terror ... The only way to isolate [such] extremism definitively is for moderate Islam to go on the offensive” (The Guardian, 18 July 2005).

Furthermore, on 17 July 2005 The Observer offered a few suggestions in its editorial. For example, British Muslims must denounce the Imams trained in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan who cannot speak English and establish links with British-born Muslims (The Observer, 17 July 2005). It suggested that British Muslims must inform the authorities of any issues such as hatred and bigotry expressed by such preachers (ibid). More importantly, it wrote: “Should imams be registered with the Home Office, perhaps? Should the state fund an Islamic college to provide a new generation of British imams? These are debates that must be had among Muslims” (The Observer, 17 July 2005).

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the 7/7 incident, The Daily Telegraph editorial suggested that it is significant to endorse the idea that, “whether new arrivals
or settled citizens, residents in Britain have a duty to accept the values of tolerance, individual liberty and the separation of religion from politics that define our society” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2007). Here, the underlying message is that the best possible way to become part of mainstream society is to adopt the modern values of a secular society. Although much of the talk of modernity in both newspapers emphasised secular values, a number of articles by politicians and commentators also acknowledged fundamental values of other cultures and faith communities.

David Cameron spent two days with a British Muslim family in Birmingham in May 2007 in order to enhance his understanding of the lifestyle of British Muslims. Cameron’s host family had three children, who were enrolled with Jewish and Christian children in a neighbouring Jewish faith school (The Guardian, 13 May 2007). Cameron recognised that the idea of modernity is mainly presented from Britain’s point of view, which mainly focuses on its achievements; for example, he learnt that modern Britain faces several problems such as “family breakdown, drugs, crime and incivility” that are seen as normal experience. (ibid)

According to The Guardian, Cameron discovered that “Many British Asians see a society that hardly inspires them to integrate. Indeed, they see aspects of modern Britain which are a threat to the values they hold dear - values which we should all hold dear” (ibid). However, this is hardly surprising in a Western secular society much as the reverse situation operates in other societies including Muslim and non-Muslim. Cameron concluded that integration is a two-way street: “If we want to remind ourselves of British values - hospitality, tolerance and generosity to name just three - there are plenty of British Muslims ready to show us what those things really mean” (The Guardian, 13 May 2007).

Similarly, in an interview with The Daily Telegraph, the Chairman of the Muslim Council of Britain Abdul Bari suggested that there is a positive side of “arranged marriages and espousing”, which endorse strong family values (The Daily Telegraph, 2006), although arranged marriages challenge the British value of individual choice. In an editorial, The Daily Telegraph endorsed the launch of a new organisation, the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC), which it regarded as the “voice of a moderate Islam” and a representative body of the “silent majority of Muslims”. On the one hand, it criticised the Muslim Council of Britain for being both conservative and radical (The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2006). On
the other hand, it approved of a new think-tank that it assumed will represent the “silent majority” of Muslims and provide “solutions to problems faced by the Muslim community” (ibid).

Naima Bouteldia pointed out that the British media portrayal of the Muslim scholars Ramadan and al-Qaradawi as “extremists” was unreasonable and contradicted freedom of thought (The Guardian, 21 July 2005). For some, this surely reflects freedom of thought even though it may be wrong. Bouteldia wrote that although al-Qaradawi condemned the London bombings, sections of the British media urged the government to ban him from entering Britain (ibid.) Bouteldia disclosed that the British media have a similar attitude to Ramadan; he denounced the London bombers as “criminals” and rejected their justifications for the bombings, be they ideological or political, but he was still presented as an “extremist Islamic scholar” (Ibid). Bouteldia found that Ramadan is not alone in his support for the Palestinians, as there are millions of non-Muslims across Europe who also support their cause; Ramadan has “never supported suicide bombings. He has no links with any terrorist group and is not banned by France” (ibid).

Another key point in the debate on modernity was raised by one of The Guardian’s commentators. Faisal Bodi disclosed that a report of an American think tank “the RAND Corporation” compiled by Cheryl Benard revealed that the United Nations’ “interests lay in making a long-term alliance with secularists and modernists. Such a policy would encourage an Islamic reformation of the sort that transformed Christianity and ushered in Europe’s Enlightenment” (The Guardian, 18 July 2006).

This policy-oriented document indicates that the Western world’s view of Islam is based on its political objectives or the political objectives of some Muslim groups.

7.4- Barriers to Integration and Cohesion in British Society:

Drawing on the dataset, this section presents the discussions and debates that took place in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph considering the post-7/7 challenge of building a cohesive society. Both newspapers discussed and debated problems and issues that are considered the main barriers to integration and cohesion. These newspapers provided a mixed narrative of problems, opportunities and possibilities in the making of a cohesive society from the British government's and British Muslims' perspectives. A list of barriers to the process of integration that contradict the notion of a secular society includes hate preachers, the role and place of mosques, veils, social
ghettos and problems with the British Muslim community such as the absence of a widely-recognised Muslim leadership.

The dataset shows that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting designated five radical hate preachers who are “Islamists” and anti-Western: Abu-Hamza al-Masri, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, Anjem Choudhary, a reverted Muslim Abu Izzadeen, and the Middle East-based Islamic scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Overall, within the dataset the two newspapers’ aggregate reporting on these “hate preachers” has a 17% share in the formulation of the third main theme. According to these figures, 20% of The Daily Telegraph’s reporting space was devoted to hate preachers and controversial figures who have no support in the wider British Muslim community. In comparison, The Guardian provided 4% less reporting space to hate preachers and controversial figures.

Another important debate taking place in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph suggested that British Muslims are less integrated into mainstream society. Overall, 11% of the aggregate reporting in this theme indicated that British Muslims are living parallel lives. The segregation of Muslims has roots in their cultural traditions and religious beliefs. This resulted in social ghettos which led to disaffection and alienation of young British Muslims. Some commentators and journalists in these newspapers also pointed out that the second generation of British Muslims is less integrated. A number of labels were attached to British Muslims such as “disloyal”, “enemy within”, “backward”, “uneducated”, and “anti-Semitic”.

In the main, these negative connotations in the representation of British Muslims were either directly or indirectly related to the 7/7 bombings. This trend in reporting continued until the end of the research period covered by this thesis. Based on the Channel 4 survey of 500 Muslims, The Daily Telegraph published a report on 5 June 2007 entitled: “7/7 bombs staged, say one in four Muslims”. It wrote: “A quarter of Britain’s two million Muslims believe Government agents staged the July 7 suicide bombings, a new survey has found” (The Daily Telegraph, 5 June 2007). Although the newspaper did not disclose details of this survey’s demographic selection process, it claimed that Muslims are habitually disloyal and live in denial (ibid.) It stated: “A poll for The Daily Telegraph shortly after the 9/11 attacks found a large proportion of Muslims that refused to accept they were carried out by members of their faith.” (Ibid)
Thus, based upon the opinions of 500 Muslims surveyed by Channel 4, The Daily Telegraph calculated a ratio and then related it to the entire British Muslim population, claiming that more one in four did not believe that 7/7 was carried out by British Muslims. Jonathan Freedland provided several illustrations to explain that British Muslims are tagged with negative connotations, often resulting from irresponsible reporting. Freedland wrote:

The Times splashed on “Suspect in terror hunt used veil to evade arrest”...Daily Express: “Veil should be banned say 98%”. Nearly all those who rang the Express agreed that “a restriction would help to safeguard racial harmony and improve communication”...the Sunday Telegraph led on “Tories accuse Muslims of ‘creating apartheid by shutting themselves off’ (The Guardian, 18 October 2006).

On the positive side, six out of ten comment pieces published in The Guardian discussing this sub-theme presented British Muslims as victims and favoured their perspective on several issues such as their under-representation in the police. The Guardian’s commentators also questioned negative media assumptions that British Muslims are anti-Semitic and anti-Western. In other forms of journalism, including news reports, interviews, personal views, editorials and special G2 reports on this sub-theme, The Guardian presented Muslims’ viewpoint as positive. Relating to the social ghettos sub-theme, The Daily Telegraph published six comment pieces that all linked British Muslims with issues such as Sharia law, veils, honour killings, extremism, terrorism, radicalism, integration and cohesion etc. The most important barriers mentioned in both newspapers appeared to be Muslim women’s veils and British mosques.

(i) The Politics of the Veil:

Muslim women's veils are one of most significant topics discussed in the dataset of this time period (8 July 2005 to 7 July 2007). It is important to note that the veil is still a recurring theme in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph and is frequently linked to modernity, liberty, women's oppression and social cohesion, and to terrorism in its worst form. After the 7/7 event, which changed the political and social landscape of Britain, the role of mosques, hate preachers, young British Muslims lured into
radicalisation and extremism, and the future of the multicultural society dominated discussions in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*.

At the time of the London bombings, Muslim women’s veils were not an issue in secular British society. At that time, no one considered the veil an object of women’s oppression. However, in the first week of October 2006, the Labour Minister Jack Straw wrote an article entitled ‘I felt uneasy talking to someone I couldn’t see’ in his local newspaper *The Lancashire Telegraph*, which prompted a heated debate on Muslim women’s veils. At the time, Straw was referring to women’s face veil, also known as “Niqab”, which he saw as having “implications of separateness”.

Straw’s comments may well have been taken out of context, as several writers and politicians point out in discussions, but the seriousness of the debate reached a climax after Trevor Phillips, the Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, warned that the veil would be the cause of riots (see *The Guardian*, 23 October 2006). In its editorial *The Guardian* wrote: “Jack Straw’s comments on the wearing of the niqab appeared to unveil characteristics of British society that might be better kept under wraps” (*The Guardian*, 14 October 2006).

Just three weeks after the start of the veil debate, on 1 November 2006, *The Guardian* published a two-part investigative G2 report that brought together diverse voices of British Muslims from a variety of backgrounds, from a gay rights campaigner to a niqab-wearing teacher, who were asked “So how does it feel to be Muslim in Britain today?” on one particular Friday. The results appeared in *The Guardian’s* bold headline as follows: “Criticised for their beliefs, clothing and attitudes; accused of not being British enough; reviled as the enemy within - not a day passes without Muslims being attacked in the media” (*The Guardian*, 1 November 2006).

Notably, until this point there was a sense of confusion about the veil among members of British society including some journalists of the mainstream press. On 24 November 2005, *The Guardian* published a “Clarification: Imperial College London has asked us to point out that its dress code extends only to a ban on veils, hooded tops and other garments that obscure the wearer’s face”. This clarification appeared because *The Guardian* reporter had misunderstood the veil concept which, according to the college authorities, was as follows: “Employees and students should refrain from wearing
clothing which obscures the face, such as a full or half veil, or hooded tops or scarves worn across the face" (*The Guardian*, 24 November 2005).

The dataset shows that *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* associated the veil issue with integration, multiculturalism and moderate Muslims; more pessimistically, it was related to separate faith schools, social ghettos, radicalisation and terrorism. The combination of these topics reflects two sub-themes (62 and 39) within the dataset that combine to produce fifteen per cent of the coverage. The following table shows *The Guardian’s* reporting on the veil in various types of journalism.

**Table 7.5: The Guardian’s reporting on the veil.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>The Guardian (Types of Journalism)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Oct 2006- July 2007</strong></th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment &amp; debate</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New reports</td>
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<td>Special reports</td>
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<td>Investigative reports (Focus)</td>
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<td>Features</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
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**Table 7.6: The Daily Telegraph’s reporting on the veil.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>The Daily Telegraph (Types of Journalism)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Oct 2006-July 2007</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal views</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News reports</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On 6 October 2006, *The Daily Telegraph* began the debate with a question: “*Your view: An obstacle to integration?*”, suggesting the importance of the debate. It inspired Muslim and non-Muslim voices, from imams and bishops, politicians and working-class professionals to law experts and ordinary citizens, to debate the veil. In two consecutive personal views published on 15 and 17 October 2006, *The Daily Telegraph* gave a platform to two of Britain’s leading politicians, Denis MacShane (Labour MP for Rotherham) and David Davis (Shadow Home Secretary).

MacShane saw the veil debate through the political spectrum of “Islamism” but not Islam as a religion and he therefore concluded that it is the ideology of radicals that Britain needs to confront (*The Daily Telegraph*, 17 October 2006). However, Davis suggests that “the actual question of the small minority of Muslim women who wear the niqab is not really the issue at all. It is both unimportant and intrinsically personal, not a matter for the state” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 15 October 2006).

Almost all the writers and commentators of *The Daily Telegraph* suggested that the main barrier to British Muslims’ integration lay in their acceptance of core British values. To this end, *The Guardian* also emphasised in its editorial that “Muslims too have a part to play in improving integration” (*The Guardian*, 14 October 2006). Up to July 2007, *The Daily Telegraph* debate on the veil suggested that it leads to separation and violence in society and that British Muslims are less adoptive of the core British values. David Harrison wrote a lengthy article, in which he referred to Patrick Sookhdeo, who suggests that Britain should also ban Muslim women’s veil (*The Daily Telegraph*, 8 October 2006). Earlier, on 6 October 2006, *The Daily Telegraph* published an article entitled: “what the Koran says about the veil”, quoting a verse from the Quran: “O Prophet, tell your wives and daughters and the believing women to draw their outer garments around them when they go out or are among men”. However, several scholars also include the next line of this verse which is; “That is better, in order that they may be understood to be Muslims and not annoyed” (Quran, 33:59) (see Kheirabadi, 2004, p.77; Morgan, 2010, p.196).
A Daily Telegraph campaign that falls outside the thesis timeframe but produces a better understanding of the issue has a number of headlines: “French burka ban descends into farce” (The Daily Telegraph, 17 June, 2011); “Italy drafts law to ban burka…An Italian parliamentary commission has approved a draft law banning women from wearing veils that cover their faces in public” (The Daily Telegraph, 3 August, 2011); “Netherlands to ban the burka…Holland is to become the latest European country to ban the burka, despite the fact that fewer than 100 Dutch women are thought to wear the face-covering Islamic dress” (The Daily Telegraph, 15 September, 2011); “France’s burka ban is a victory for tolerance: Britain’s politicians take fright at the idea - but Sarkozy’s brave step is both popular and right, says William Langley” (The Daily Telegraph, 11 April, 2011); “We’re not far off a British burqa ban”(The Daily Telegraph, 11 April, 2011].

However, the two key questions that arose from the veil debate were its timing and its association with the 7/7 event although, as Alam argues, none of the London bombers was wearing a veil. However, the alleged 21 July bomber Yassin Omar tried to escape in a burka because he feared the police might shoot him. Several commentators, pressure groups and community organisation representatives appeared to be ignorant of the scholarly references, such as the position of the Quran on the veil. However, some may point out that these commentators are interpreting its use within a Western democratic society and therefore may not need to be informed although that may not be the case in a religiously-based society.

Even before the start of the veil debate some commentators and writers of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph pointed out that the British Muslim community is facing widely-acknowledged leadership problems and that the Muslim Council of Britain does not necessarily represent all Muslims. Nevertheless, both newspapers used MCB representatives as the most frequently consulted sources in the veil debate. In brief, the ‘face veil’ was seen as a shield behind which a suspect might hide, although few criminals have used it to flee (see The Daily Telegraph, 20 December 2006). In general, for The Guardian however, it was regarded as a discarded tradition that is incompatible with modern secular traditions, leading to separation. On a fair note, “In the wake of the veil debate, mainstream Britain seems mature enough to respect people’s freedoms while rejecting any bar on cultural criticism. Thus the suggestion of banning the veil attracts little backing.” (The Guardian, 14 October 2006) Notably, the debate on the veil
continues and returns repeatedly in that it connects Muslim women to terrorism and extremism, such as the British schoolgirls who went to join British ISIS jihadis in Syria (see The Daily Telegraph, 20 February 2015).

This thesis adds that, in a Western society that values and cherishes ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’, the veil issue describes two fundamental points: First, the West has become secular and the ‘Islamic’ veil is incompatible with its ‘modern’ secular traditions. Second, the West is evidently sensitive to the ‘Islamic veil’, which shows that the secular West is fearful of Islam (Islamophobic) but does not feel the same about other religions. However, it is undeniable that Christian Nuns, orthodox Jews and Sikhs in the West still follow their religious and cultural practice of covering their heads. Thus, an exclusive debate on Muslim women’s veils shows that Islam is singled out and that the rise of Islamophobia is a real phenomenon (Al-Saji, 2010; Bullock, 2010; Zempi, 2014). Evidently, The Guardian supported and ran a campaign for Muslim women’s right to choose the veil but simultaneously its advocacy of a secularist approach and its branding of the veil as an outdated tradition tells us that it is not against Muslims but is slightly sensitive to a religion (Islam).

(ii) British Mosques:

Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph mainly presented British mosques negatively. These newspapers associated mosques with growing extremism and radicalism and suggested that mosques are ideological warehouses that export violence and hatred. Overall, both newspapers offered mixed portrayals of British mosques in two sub-theme codes: (STC 24, “British mosques’ link with 7/7 bombers, meeting point, promoting extremism and radicalisation, problematic labels, non-English speaking imams, etc. (close-minded view”) and (STC 25, “Mosques are promoting community cohesion etc. (Open-minded Views)”. Despite the two newspapers’ varied sets of opinions on mosques, the negative portrayals of mosques outnumbered the balanced views. The notion of mosques as places of community cohesion, which is an open-minded view of Islam, accounts for only 1.09% of the reporting space in comparison to approximately 9% of the reporting space that links mosques with the 7/7 incident. In turn, much of the reporting on mosques in this dataset reflects closed views of Islam.

On the positive side, both newspapers recognised that extremists were in fact banned from their local mosque committees on various grounds, including clashes with elders
and imams. They also accepted that mosques promote community cohesion by providing a space to different groups of Muslims such as Arabs, Asians, Africans and white Muslims. Additionally, both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* learned that mosques have been visited by government officials and other non-Muslim members of the community to foster social cohesion. Soon after the London bombings, most sections of the media including these two newspapers linked a few local mosques in Leeds and London with the bombers, suggesting that they had visited these places which turned them into suicide bombers. Since then, the government has described Leeds Makkah Mosque and Cambridge Mosque as ‘role models’, suggesting that these two mosques are modern.

The dataset shows that most of the reporting associated mosques with the London bombers and other suspects, describing them as meeting places which they use to promote their ideology. The notable difference between the two newspapers was their position on and view of British Muslims’ place in society. In its editorial *The Guardian* wrote that “Britain also has one of the largest Muslim populations in Europe. This is not a problem, as we have been inclined to see it, but an asset” (*The Guardian*, 17 July 2005). But it also pointed out that “Real and lasting solutions have to come from Muslim communities themselves and need to be practical and immediate.” (ibid) In contrast, *The Daily Telegraph* adopted a rather strict viewpoint of British Muslims and their religious places such as faith schools, where it believed segregation and anti-Western thoughts prevail.

Obviously, these interpretations also include the views of writers, commentators, government spokespersons and the general public, which began to see mosques as a problem. After the bombings, Tablighi Jamaat, a religious group of preachers, came under the spotlight mainly because the London bombers had been seen attending its gatherings. Jamie Doward wrote: “Tablighi Jamaat [is] an evangelical Islamic group which each year sends hundreds of young British Muslims to fundamentalist religious schools in Pakistan” (*The Observer*, 4 November 2006).

In the wake of the 7/7 bombing, *The Guardian’s* and *The Daily Telegraph’s* interpretations of modernising British mosques emerged from a public and media debate suggesting that English-speaking local imams might better understand the needs of young British-born Muslims. According to Lord Nazir Ahmed, Britain has only 300
“homegrown” imams out of 2,000 who mainly deliver sermons in Arabic or Urdu (see The Guardian, 22 September 2005). It is often evident that ordinary imams are unqualified to pass verdicts on sensitive matters relating to religion.

Prior to the London bombings, on 10 December 2004 The Guardian published an editorial entitled ‘Nationalising Islam’ which underlines the Western idea of Islam in the contemporary West which is facing radical and extremist Muslim threats. This editorial highlighted the French government’s intention “for imams to undergo university training in civil law, history, language and culture [which] is an important moment for Europe’s faltering attempts to try to engage with its Muslim citizens”. Further, it suggested that France takes its secular values as a “hallowed principle” that led to a controversial ban on wearing hijabs in schools and making mosques modern places not necessarily “to create a mosquée de France”.

7.5- Engaging with the British Muslim Community:

The sub-theme “engaging with British Muslims” appeared 23 times in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph in their aggregate reporting on this topic. Of these, 8.39% of the reporting in this main theme supports the idea of establishing contacts with British Muslims. A total of 23 articles emerged in all forms of journalism including editorials, comment and debates, and news reports of both newspapers. Of these 23 types of journalism items, The Guardian alone published 22 articles urging policy-makers to strengthen interactions with British Muslims. This was indicative of The Guardian’s thinking on this subject although one of the editorials and a news story were based on Blair’s view that Muslims must accept that they have to play their role in tackling extremism. Overall, The Guardian’s contribution to the collective reporting was 12% in comparison to The Daily Telegraph’s 1.1% share in favour of engagement with British Muslims.

However, it appeared that the absence of a central authority and a common Muslim representative body that might represent Muslims across Britain is a major hurdle to building a mutual consensus among Muslims regarding their problems. Michael Clarke thought that the Muslim Council of Britain and the Muslims Association of Britain are two mainstream British Muslim representative bodies in the eyes of the government, but in reality these organisations do not represent all Muslims (The Guardian, 25 August 2005).
Clarke noted that these organisations’ leaders “look as if they were given more credence by the government than by parts of their own communities.” (ibid) Therefore, for Clarke the best way to reach British Muslims is through local leaders who can help engage with disaffected youth inside communities. (ibid) Clarke’s view is important, as the dataset detects that one of the serious problems within the British Muslim community is the division based upon the religious sects, the Brelwis and Whabbis, rather like Catholics and Protestants.

Many of these suggestions show that some of the grievances and concerns of British Muslims are genuine. On the other hand, this narrative also proves that, despite the problematic circumstances associated with British Muslims, they do receive considerable positive media coverage. On the level of engagement, British Muslims lack a widely recognised leadership that can negotiate with the government. Another commentator, Madeleine Bunting, raised the same issue of recognised representation of British Muslims at the national level whilst attending The Guardian forum on British Muslims’ community in London (The Guardian, 21 November 2005). She pointed out that it fosters engagement and helps to reach inner communities that are largely unrepresented in politics and policy matters. (ibid)

Bunting attended a gathering of 100 influential Muslims of different backgrounds who worked in seven different groups advising the government on matters relating to British Muslims (The Guardian, 18 July 2005). She found a mixture of proposals, feelings and expectations among the participants who raised the same issue of a nationally recognised Muslim leadership. (ibid) However, The Guardian’s commentators were divided in their views on the representative body of British Muslims. For example, Clarke argued that the Muslim Council of Britain does not represent all British Muslims. Given Muslims’ media representation, he emphasises that “A legitimate and much-needed debate among British Muslims about a distinctive expression of Islam in a non-Muslim country has been hijacked and poisonously distorted.” (ibid) To solve this problem, Bunting called upon journalists to be careful when reporting Islam and feared the start of a new era of “McCarthyism.” (ibid) Bunting further stated that, “if we are not to be complicit, we need to be scrupulously responsible and conscientious in unravelling the complexity of Islam in its many spiritual and political interpretations in recent decades.” (ibid)
At this point, questions arise concerning the editorial view of *The Guardian* as opposed to the opinions expressed by individuals in *The Guardian*. The overall discussion shows that the media were divided on debates relating to British Muslims. Most importantly, *The Guardian’s* self-critical approach also testifies to the polemic structure of the media. Despite some positive representations of British Muslims, *The Guardian* continued to tag the phrase “Islamic” with criminals and radicals. However, it also continued to highlight Muslims’ genuine problems and raised a voice for their solutions (see *The Guardian*, 10 October 2005 and 16 August 2006).

Overall, the reporting on this debate signals a mixture of thoughts and arguments in *The Guardian*, which published several comment pieces and articles. In comparison, *The Daily Telegraph* published just one personal view, by Labour MP Denis MacShane in which he emphasised the need for the British government to engage with the new generation of young British Muslims (*The Daily Telegraph*, 17 October 2006). MacShane said that such moderate Muslims must be contacted “before it is too late. From Margaret Thatcher, until very recently Tony Blair, political leaders have been in denial. It is time to wake up.” (ibid) In other words, MacShane suggested that the British government needs to rethink its policy of engaging with its young people, particularly British Muslims. (ibid)

However, Bunting found that Martin Bright strongly opposed the government’s motives to enter into a dialogue or any sort of contact with any British Muslim organisation that is inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood (*The Guardian*, 16 August 2006). Bunting is right because such thinking contradicts the British value of “tolerance” that has been ignored whilst suggesting that the government should not talk to any organisation even though the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in many places is political. A notable feature of the reporting on engaging in debate is that *The Guardian* has shown a more sympathetic attitude to British Muslims, suggesting that they have became victims in the wake of 7/7 of stop and search, suspicion and a bad press. In this regard, another sub-theme shows that British Muslims are victims. *The Guardian’s* share of reporting on this issue appears to be 11% in comparison to *The Daily Telegraph’s* zero per cent.

7.6- Re-emergence of “Britishness” Post-7/7:

According to the dataset, overall, “Britishness” was a recurring sub-theme that appears in 39 types of reports and journalism articles in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*,

273
accounting for a total combined share of 14.23%. It is significant that, of the 14.23% of reporting space, more than half of it was in the comment and debate section, making it an open public debate. The following table shows the types of journalism in both broadsheets that discuss and debate the idea of “Britishness”. Notably, of a total of 39 items of all types reflecting different types of journalistic comment, *The Daily Telegraph* has only published two comment pieces, meaning that *The Guardian* has contributed about 95% of the reporting on the “Britishness” debate.

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Interviews</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 Special reports</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment &amp; debate</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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**Table 7.7:** The “Britishness” debate in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*.

On 7 July 2004, exactly a year before the tragic incident of the London Bombings, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, delivered an annual lecture at the British Council. The next day, Brown’s long lecture appeared in *The Guardian*. He referred to two British writers, David Goodhart and Melanie Phillips. Based on these writers’ ideas, Brown suggested that “Britishness” is the best response to eliminate “conflict between the need for social cohesion and diversity” and “cultural difference”. In other words Brown argued that “Britishness” in the form of “shared values” might help build a cohesive society (*The Guardian*, 7 July 2004).

A year later, British-born Muslim suicide bombers who were moderately integrated into British society shook the foundations of a multicultural Britain. The London bombings plunged Britain into a nationwide debate on “Britishness” mainly because of the British-born-and-bred Muslim suicide bombers who had turned to violence. Obviously, the press reaction to the killing and maiming of innocent people was both careful and measured, insisting that the British way of life must be protected.
On 27 June 2007, Gordon Brown, the new Prime Minister, was preparing to mark the second anniversary of the 7/7 event which had brought British Muslims’ identity under scrutiny and jeopardised the idea of a multicultural society. Brown pledged a revised idea of “Britishness”, a belief that he argued would help to bind together British society, which was largely seen as “culturally separated”. In the words of David Cameron, the revised concept of “Britishness” emphasised “loyalty”, “citizenship” and “national day” celebrations, aiming to promote a strong sense of nationhood and reduce the separation in the post-7/7 society (The Observer, 10 June 2007). Given the complex nature of Britishness as a concept, the terms “loyalty”, “citizenship” and “national day” may well be redefined as the concept of “Britishness” develops.

Three days later, The Guardian offered a policy-oriented editorial that raised three key points: identification of the problem, understanding the militants’ minds, and the solution to terrorism. It suggested that British democratic values might be the best shield against the “Islamic terrorism threat”, which has its roots in “cultural, political, economic, historical and religious factors that stretch back centuries in the Islamic world’s relationship with the West” (The Guardian, 30 June 2007). In the same vein, The Daily Telegraph editorial also dismissed the myriad loudmouthed complaints that terrorists often voice in the media to justify their violent atrocities (The Daily Telegraph, 27 July 2005). It further stated: “To blame the invasion of Iraq, or the occupation of the West Bank, or poverty, or racism, or Western decadence, is both intellectually and morally wrong” (ibid.). It argued that it is more logical to ask “why modern Britain is breeding so many anti-British fanatics.” (ibid) In summation, The Daily Telegraph then suggested that “Many countries try to codify their values in law... hence, in Britain we should install “non-negotiable components of our identity” (The Daily Telegraph, 27 July 2005).

Within the dataset I noticed that the idea of “Britishness” returned because of the British Islamists’ extremism threat. Since post-7/7 society is seen as less integrated, both newspapers reflected on what it currently means to be British. In particular, The Guardian asked a similar question, “What does it mean to be British”, on three different occasions (31 July 2005; 10 June 2007; and 9 June 2014). There were pressures on all sides to redefine “Britishness” to meet the changing circumstances.
Section II: Contextual Debates, Critical Analysis and Commentary:

This section provides a narrative of 7/7 reporting in the context of interpretations, debates and critical analysis featuring the ‘British way of life’ in both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. It also explains the key points that both newspapers raised and discussed on this topic and how they differed in terms of the evidence they presented. Arguably, this section provides evidence that Islam is inherently modern because it is designed by the creator for all races and all times, and it is not misogynistic, contrary to the way it has been portrayed.

7.7 - The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph View of “Britishness” in Post-7/7 Britain:

The idea of “Britishness” appears to ebb and flow with every upheaval, be it political, social or economic. In some situations it may function well; for example “Britishness” as a theme was developed strongly in the recent Scottish referendum and it clearly overcame the idea of Scottish independence. The meaning of “Britishness” has been a long debate raised first by immigration in the 1940s and more recently by the rise of the Scottish Nationalists. However, the actions of the Muslim bombers simply added to the debate. It is important to note that the idea of “Britishness” is not a mere set of values but is in fact a complex notion. Some historians such as Keith Burgess see “Britishness” as something that is relatively fixed while other scholars such as Paul Ward (2004) argue that Britishness is constantly being redefined and is now what it was a century ago. Core values may be put forward, although they are often more the views of a particular generation than the whole of society; thus, it is not static but forever changing as British society develops and changes.

The 7/7 incident opened a Pandora’s Box of questions such as the bombers’ loyalty to their country of birth. In turn, an infamous stereotypical perception of British Muslims as an “enemy within” returned to discussions and debates. But if, on one side, British Muslims were labelled an “enemy within”, there were also critics of Britain’s foreign policy and its role in Iraq, which paved the way for the bombers’ radicalisation (see The Guardian, 20 August 2006). For whatever reasons, the incident prompted many scholars, policy-makers, government officials, politicians and commentators to search for a mechanism that might bring different faith communities, particularly British
Muslims, together on one platform. In other words, the sense of nationhood or a society with shared values became much stronger than before.

The editorial views of *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* showed their optimism about the British core values that can build loyalty and patriotism. It could be argued that “tolerance” suggests that we (British) take pride in tolerating “other people’s” misconduct, shortcomings, cultural traditions, and religious beliefs and ideas, thereby indicating that the “other” is a constructed bad person. The other side of “tolerance” also suggests that we (British) are perhaps morally superior. However, the events of 7/7 have been neither forgotten nor tolerated, as demonstrated by the anniversaries of the last ten years. The point here is not to forget the sufferings of the 7/7 victims but to argue that this concept is not simple as it focuses on particular sets of people who are supposedly “others”, be they good or bad.

This debate is very complex because each declared British value is in some way part of many other cultures and traditions worldwide and therefore may not be considered a unique distinction. Because of the changing nature of British society, British values are constantly changing. Nevertheless, it is hard to put these values into practice; for example, forgiveness is an esteemed virtue in Christianity and Islam but some British-born Muslims fail to demonstrate it or practise it. It is an ideal element of both religions but it is often not practised by their followers.

The central idea of “Britishness” that emphasises a “shared identity” is not problematic, nor does it sound like failure. Indeed, it includes other cultures’ and faith communities’ core values to demonstrate that British society is based on commonly held values. However, some critics such as Gary Younge consider the idea of “Britishness” to be weak in a sense because it signals that the new focus of attention is the British Muslim community in the post-7/7 period, a focus that had previously shifted from asylum seekers to Gypsies and eastern Europeans (*The Guardian*, 28 May 2007). Younge means that the idea of “Britishness” returns with every disturbance related to different sets of people or communities. He argues that the fear of the “other” is a driving force behind ideas that fulfil political objectives as it provides an “Other.” (ibid)

There are always areas where actions do not match the ideals. For example, bombing innocent civilians is prohibited in religion, yet those Muslims perpetrated it. Similarly, bombing citizens in Northern Ireland did not equate with Christian values but it was
done. The point here is that hypocrisy is not exclusive to the West, the British or the Americans; to a certain extent it is global practice. George Monbiot admits that Britain has “a superb record of political liberalism and intellectual inquiry, giving us a public sphere open to ideas, religions and philosophy from across the world... This is true, but these values are not peculiar to Britain” alone, and it also “has an appalling record of imperialism...” (The Guardian, 9 August 2005).

Prior to Gordon Brown’s administration, Tony Blair was also enthusiastic about the strength of British values for promoting social cohesion and building an integrated society. In March 2000 Blair disclosed his vision of “Britishness”, which was criticised in January 2002 following government proposals that members of ethnic minorities should learn the English language. Bair said: “Modernisation is the key. It has driven everything this government has done...To fail to modernise would be fundamentally to fail Britain. But we modernise according to our core values as a country” (The Guardian, 28 March 2000). Between August 2002 and November 2005, there were further proposals to compel immigrants to take lessons and pass a “citizenship test” that was designed to provide newcomers with knowledge of the British culture, traditions, history and national pride, which are British values (see The Guardian, 9 July 2007).

In contrast, The Daily Telegraph editorial “Ten core values of the British identity” argued that the implementation of these British values could potentially prevent another terrorist attack and therefore the government should act upon its advice (The Daily Telegraph, 27 July 2005). This list includes “The English-speaking world” and “The British character” but, as Monbiot wrote, “These non-negotiable demands are not so different to those of the terrorists...” (The Guardian, 9 August 2005).

In addition, British society has itself been evolving since World War II; for example, it has moved away from a joint family structure to an individualistic society. A case in point is the UK riots of 2011; these were seen by many as a new challenge to the ‘British way of life’ which some critics viewed as a “broken society” and “moral decline” (The Guardian, 15 August 2011; The Daily Telegraph, 14 August 2011). The overwhelming focus on the accomplishment of ‘British values’ and ‘modernity’ suggested that these are ideals for society at large. In other words, Islam is an incompatible, outdated and backward religion that is a cause of social problems. In fact, the concept of Umma itself
bears witness that Arabs, Africans, Asians and European Muslims of varied cultures can live by incorporating Islamic teachings while retaining their different cultures.

However, the overall reporting reflected that perhaps the “British way of life’ idea is ideal and that British Muslims are on the losing end because they have very little to offer in return. Marginally, The Guardian mentioned British Muslims’ cultural values which it believed are based on Islamic laws but it largely ignored the essence of original Islamic teachings and societies that were built upon those values in Medina and Toledo. In comparison The Daily Telegraph discussion was mainly focused on Blair’s ideas and concepts of Britishness in the post-7/7 Britain, which were complex in their implications. For example, on the one hand Blair proposed tough laws to fight the terrorism threat while, on the other hand, restrictions on civil liberties contradict the values of freedom and human rights.

7.8- Barriers to Integration and Cohesion in British Society:

(i) The Veil Debate:

The veil debate appears in a diverse and unique pattern in The Guardian and The Telegraph, reflecting signs of a divided society along different argumentative lines. The veil debate is significant because it brought together high-profile politicians, community and religious organisations’ leaders, senior political commentators and editors to discuss the sensitive nature of a highly relevant issue in British society. In the wake of 7/7, the veil, which had never bothered the British public, suddenly became a source of fear and a sign of separation in the multicultural British society. Moreover, it became a security issue when the Imperial College of London, for security reasons, proposed a ban on all sorts of hoodies and the wearing of hijabs (The Guardian, 24 November 2005).

Possibly, given the terror threats at that particular time, such measures might have been taken elsewhere in the world to improve security and public safety. Prior to the London bombings, two Egyptian veiled women targeted a tourist bus in Cairo (1 May 2005). Surely the point here is that the bombings rendered the veil an issue. The case also indicates that the media on their own may not be powerful enough to shape public opinion but they are in fact part of an elite system that includes politicians and other actors such as public and religious organisations.
Before the 7/7 bombings, the British press discussed veil issues after the Rushdie Affair (1989), which was related to integration and obviously not security. Christian Joppke (2009) noted that in 1989 Altrincham Girls School in Manchester had tried to ‘exclude two Muslim siblings who had refused to take off their headscarves in class’ (Joppke, 2009, p.81). The veil issue reached its climax in 2006 when Jack Straw asked a Muslim woman teacher to remove her veil while attending his office. This sparked anger and anxiety among British-born Muslims. Only a tiny proportion of the British Muslim population wear the veil, which is both a religious and a cultural practice; however, it is not solely restricted to Muslims, as followers of other faiths also attach importance to it.

The veil debate strengthens the idea that, even in peaceful situations, people’s opinions on and attitudes to subjects that have never posed any concerns radically change. Overall, The Daily Telegraph missed the fundamental theological points that are central to the veil debate, and without considering the whole context an ordinary person may not be able to understand the issue. For fairness and accuracy, it is important to mention here that there are four madhabs (scholarly interpretations/theological concepts) in Islam, not three. Secondly, the Quran offers two chapters (AL-Talaq 65 and An-Nisa 4) that discuss women’s roles, rights and their duties equally with men in society.

These chapters provide details on issues such as women’s rights in property and remarrying and divorce, and they provide moral justifications and reasons relating to a series of topics such as a woman’s right to a family and education, and her right to expenses as a wife. Another key point that is missed in this debate is that the Quran also urges men to lower their gazes for moral reasons (see 24:30-31, An-Nur). The veil debate also lacks a discussion on veils in other faiths. This is essential because it suggests that modesty is valued not only in Islam but in all other faiths, including by Sikh women. In this sense, there was a contents and reference bias in the veil debate, suggesting that “Islam” is a key issue in secular society.

Baran and Tuohy (2011) point out that, during the pre-Islamic period, in the “Arabia of 570, women had few legal or social rights. Polygamy was practiced without limit; women could not receive inheritances or testify in legal proceedings; and infant girls were killed openly” (Baran and Tuohy, 2011, p. 38). These authors quote seven verses (2:187; 3:195; 9:71, 4:126; 4:129; 4:34; and 2:36) from the Quran and also Hadiths to
argue that Islam actually not only improves matters for women but acknowledges equality in many ways compared to other religions (ibid, 2011, p.40-41). They refer to the story of the Garden of Eden and quote the Quran verse 2, chapter 36, which says that Adam and Eve were both tempted by Satan, meaning that Islam rejects the sins of women alone. (ibid) The entire discussion on the veil appears to be a matter of politics since other major world religions approve of the veil. For example, in the book of Deuteronomy, Chapter 22, verse 5, I, Timothy, Chapter 2, verse 9, Rigveda Books 8 and 10, and Hymns, 33/85, volumes 19/30, modesty in clothing is mentioned (Zakir Naik, lecture, 2010).

In contrast, The Guardian defended individual freedom from veil-wearing women’s perspective even though it upheld secular values that contradict Islamic modesty at some points. Another point in The Guardian debate on the veil was that it criticised sections of the British media including The Daily Telegraph for their proposal to ban the veil. It continued to provide more details on face veils even after the heated debate had passed. Mona Chalabi investigated when several professional bodies including the General Medical Council and the National Union of Teachers told her that “They didn’t collect numbers on niqab wearing professionals and that to the best of their knowledge there had never been a case where niqab was mentioned as an issue” (The Guardian, 20 September 2013). But this is just an expression of opinion and not the editorial view of The Guardian, which has a different position on the veil issue although it did recognise that the veil is a personal choice in a liberal society. Notably, The Guardian’s reporting in various forms continued to reveal such a biased attitude within the British press to British Muslims.

The crux of the discussion is that the veil is incompatible with the norms of secular society. It has now become a security threat and should be abolished since it creates a barrier to integration. In sum, it is a piece of fabric that has turned into a political debate which ignores the fact that all other [orthodox] followers of different religions cover their heads, from Sikhs to Hindus and from Christian nuns to Jews to Buddhists. However, the press reports tell a completely different story, claiming that Muslim women have been singled out and demonised under the pretext of the veil.

(ii)- British Mosques:
Both newspapers interpreted and presented British mosques as places that harbour imams who teach British-born children that Western culture and values are not Islamic. Moreover, British mosques are places where hatemongers preach ideologies that are anti-Western and are hubs for the spreading of extremism, fundamentalism, radicalisation and violence in society. Furthermore, those 7/7 bombers were radicalised in religious schools in Pakistan. Now, two crucial aspects of the reporting on mosques were “Islamic ideology” and “anti-Western values”. Despite considerable differences in the interpretation, presentation and argumentation in the reporting of the two broadsheets, on this point they held similar views of mosques.

Additionally, British mosques were presented as places where children are chastised, women and non-Muslims are unwelcome, segregation takes place, and imams deliver sermons in other languages which lead to divisions in society. Moreover, mosques should modernise in order to absorb British cultural values, review their curriculum, and welcome women and other people of all orientations. In brief, both newspapers raised significant points about how modern British mosques might engage with young British-born Muslims and help find solutions to problems such as extremism, radicalisation and fundamentalism. They also discussed how the idea of modern mosques could boost contacts between inner Muslim communities of Arab, African and European origins. The Guardian in particular raised a few questions about how the idea of modernity might transform post-7/7 British society and how it might help combat terrorism and security threats. How might mosques best serve inner communities and enhance community cohesion? What is the link between mosques and radicalisation and extremism and violence in the society? How might English-speaking Imams help improve the situation? And, above all, what is the place of Islamic religious schools and curriculum in British society?

Despite a number of differences between the two newspapers’ reporting on mosques, they have shared a common belief that mosques are promoting anti-Western thinking that is damaging and a risk to British society as a whole; in other words, the rare becomes the common. These newspapers also referred to British television programmes such as Panorama and Channel 4’s under cover Dispatches that raised further concerns and caused hostile feelings among the British public to an extent that they blocked and declined the idea of building a new Tablighi Jamaat mosque in London,
which is largely considered a peaceful movement and is sometimes cherished on
government levels in many non-Muslim countries.

Both newspapers failed to acknowledge the difference between a mosque (place of
worship) and those self-proclaimed hardliners whose interpreted ideology causes
damage to British society. Of course, it is evident that brutal actions by radicals of other
faith groups have not inspired a discussion of their holy places such as churches,
temples and Gurdawaras (The Guardian, 27 June 2015). Because of this fragmentary
reporting, the public at large, who had no contact with their local mosques, became
afraid of these places to the extent that, in certain areas, local people blocked and
deprecated the idea of building new mosques, such as in London (see The Daily Telegraph,
25 September 2006).

It is worth mentioning that Tablighi Jamaat operates in a completely different manner
and is in fact a non-political missionary movement that mainly focuses on elevating
individual spirituality and character-building. It aims to remind fellow Muslims of their
moral and religious duties and responsibilities towards their fellow human beings and
society. Several scholars have shed light on its activities in different societies across the
world and consider it a movement that promotes harmony and peace (see Carasik,
2013; Pieri, 2015). Doward’s report also mentions that “two of the 7/7 bombers,
Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, attended Tablighi Jamaat mosques”
and that, according to counter-terrorism sources, “it is more likely that radicalised
young Muslims are attracted to Tablighi Jamaat than the other way round.” (ibid)

Throughout, both newspapers established links between the bombers and religious
schools even though it was evident in The Guardian investigative reporting that those
bombers were also considerably Westernised in their ideas and lifestyles to the extent
that some had girlfriends; this is not permissible in Islam, which forbids any sort of
Logically speaking, it was not Western values and democracy that moved Blair and Bush
to invade Iraq, neither was it the particular teachings of the Quran that encouraged the
London bombers to take their violent and inhuman action. Arguably, both actions
transgressed the fine traditions of Christianity and Islam because, as discussed earlier,
both sets of protagonists had made their own interpretations and had acted in “the
name of God”. It was further noted in the above-mentioned reports that al-Qaeda was
not involved in 7/7, which tells us that the London bombing was more of a political complaint, even though the bombers’ means of complaining was appalling and wrong. (ibid)

The impact of the distorted image of British and foreign mosques and the relatively negative representation of religious school (madrassas) in Pakistan which, according to these newspapers, had radicalised the 7/7 bombers resulted in calls to regulate these places or otherwise ban them. But one might say that Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Bush, Blair and secular dictators in the Muslim world, who never attended religious schools and were considerably modern and highly educated, have killed millions around the world. Several scholars have acknowledged that these dictators and rulers have no link with churches and mosques (see McKim, 2008, p.287; Nwaneri, 2012, p.85; Price, 2012, p.xxi).

To be fair, these newspapers were reporting factual events and incidences; for example, Abu-Hamza and a few other radical hate-preachers have used mosques to spread their own interpretations of religion, which has also affected the British Muslim community. Both newspapers continuously pointed out that the alleged bombers and suspects used mosques as meeting points where they were introduced to one another, distributed pamphlets carrying radicalised material, and recruited and radicalised young British Muslims.

The Guardian is surely right to suggest the need to appoint English-speaking imams in British mosques, as they are better able to reach out to young British Muslims. Furthermore, there is a need to increase contacts between Muslim and non-Muslim communities and arrange exchange visits to mosques. This is currently happening at Leeds Grand and Leeds Makkah mosque, which has been named the model mosque in the UK. In comparison to The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian’s coverage of mosques was more balanced because it acknowledged, albeit marginally, that mosques can play a role in strengthening social cohesion and integration. It was right to point out that British mosques are run by elderly men of the first generation who have fewer contacts with young British Muslims including women.

Several Muslim and non-Muslim writers have also pointed out the problem of elderly control in mosques; some youngsters perhaps do not attend the mosques because these elderly people hold conservative views that do not appeal to young people (Dyke, 2009;
Maksood, 2005). In brief, both newspapers’ examinations of the 7/7 event suggest that these newspapers and their contributors believe that British Muslims need to be modern in their thinking and approach to life; they should incorporate Western ideas that should also be visible in British mosques in particular. On this point, both newspapers offer limited discussions and, of course, the ideas of Western modernity, which is mainly about the adoption of secular values, are contradictory and complex in a globalised world that has different cultural and structural dimensions of modernity (Eisenstadt, 2010, p.2; Shipeng, 2008, p.74).

7.9- Are British Muslims Failing Modernity?

The idea of “moderate Islam” in post-7/7 Britain means finding a way to adjust to the fight against the terrorism threat, which is often believed to have originated from the ideology of religion. For The Daily Telegraph, the idea of ‘moderate Islam’ is Sufi Islam that will “counter Islamic radicalization in Britain” which it explained in the words of Haras Rafiq, one of the two co-founders of ‘The Sufi Muslim Council’ (SMC) of Britain which aimed at giving a “voice to the silent majority” (The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2006). In the same editorial it acknowledged that the Sufi Muslim Council has proved “that it speaks for the moderate, silent majority of British Muslims.” (ibid) Several scholars assume that the growing talk of “moderate Islam” relates to attempts to counter the radical ideology that is supposedly behind terrorism (see Charny, 2007; Cole, 2006; Muedini, 2015).

However, The Daily Telegraph neither expanded on Sufism nor explained it in its comments or editorial sections to enhance ordinary readers’ and its own understanding of Sufi Islam. Historically, it is a well-documented fact that Sufism (Tasawwuf), which means the “inner, mystical, or psycho-spiritual dimension of Islam”, has been popular in the sub-continent during Muslim rule. In brief, it could be described as “an aspect or dimension of Islam” while its followers’ ways of practising Islam or “Orders” (Tariqas) are very similar to those of Sunnis and Shias; yet, it is not considered “a sect of Islam” like these two divisions (see BBC, 8 September 2009). In contrast, a news report in The Guardian presented the views of the Muslim Council of Britain which dismissed the “Sufi Council of Britain’s” claim that “up to 80% of Britain’s 2 million Muslims come from the Sufi tradition, which is a mystical and personal interpretation of Islam and largely apolitical” (The Guardian, 19 July 2006). Obviously, the “silent majority” is a complex
cliché which not only lacks authentic evidence of “moderate Muslim” numbers but also fails to offer an agreed and logical definition of a “moderate Muslim”.

One of the problems for these newspapers was how to reach out to the inner British Muslim communities that are not represented in the mainstream Muslim organisations. The reason is that none of the mainstream British Muslim organisations, think-tanks and other groups such as the mosque committees have contacts with the wider community to hear their opinions on the selection of official bodies responsible for running the affairs of these organisations. In fact, some of these organisations and think-tanks are seen as controversial because they endorse administration “political agendas” and shape public opinion accordingly (Kundnani, 2008). These are evidently backed by government institutions even though the government claims that it offers its support to combat extremism within the Muslim community. Hence, the contested political procedure has resulted in many political and religious representative bodies of British Muslims being seen as controversial, which in turn suggests a serious problem with “British Muslim representation”.

It would appear that the ideas of “moderate Islam” and “moderate Muslims” are weak concepts that contradict and undermine the basic Western value of individual liberty. I would also say that Islam is a complete way of life that is based on divine principles and values that are designed for mankind’s benefit and are universally applicable. The real problem is not religion but a few radical individuals who occasionally misinterpret sacred teachings for their own interests. To critics, this may give non-religious people the impression that, if mainstream religions such as Christianity and Islam can render their followers absolute and extreme, British society is justified in seeking to protect what it considers its own values of moderation, freedom and toleration.

Simply put, religion can guide us towards what is better for us. For example, we all know that cigarettes cause cancer and therefore kill; this is even mentioned on the packs but it has not stopped millions from dying as a result of smoking and it may not stop current smokers. A widely quoted verse from the Quran says: “There is no compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear from error: Whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah heareth and knoweth all things” (2:256); the Quran also says: “Say, ‘the truth is from your Lord’: Let him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject (it)” (18:29) (see Ruzgar, 2005, p.159).
The discourse on moderate and progressive Muslims within *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* reflects that modern Muslims are compatible with the secular West and, hence, ‘modern Islam’ according to these newspapers is an option in post-7/7 challenges. For *The Daily Telegraph*, modern Islam is “Sufi Islam” and for *The Guardian* it is “British Islam” a reformed face compatible with secular Britain. Notably, *The Guardian* ran a long debate on modernity and Islam which is still continuing (see *The Guardian*, 16 July 2005; 5 October 2005; 16 March 2015 and 17 May 2015). However, in contrast to *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* narrative of ‘modern Muslims’, scholars have varied views on modern Muslims and modern Islam. For example, Rabasa et al. (2007) suggest that they are more ‘liberal-minded’ and hostile to the concept of “Islamic State”, which means that “liberal Muslims” approve of democratic government according to Islamic teachings but not a “dynasty”, such as the Saudi government (Rabasa et al., 2007, p.72). Other Muslims are “Islamists” with political agendas to pursue, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Rabasa et al., 2007, p.75).

The next category, “Moderate Muslims”, is difficult to define because scholars are largely divided on their description. According to Daniel (Ghasem) Akbari (2013), “Moderate Muslims” are quite similar to the Taliban who are fighting against the Americans because they want to liberate Afghanistan and set up a democracy (Akbari, 2013, p.51). Akbari also believes that “Moderate Muslims” in the West endorse the Afghan Taliban’s polices and prefer to support Islamic values rather than liberty and freedom; hence, “The difference is that moderates prefer to be supporters rather than perpetrators” (Akbari, 2013, p.51-52). Akbari’s narrative of “Moderate Muslims” is a limited and rather confused description that is reflective of American understanding; it talks only of “liberty and freedom” and fails to provide a scholarly discussion of “Islamic values”. The concept of Islamic values is not limited to a few morals and standards; in fact, it offers a complete guide to life based on Quran and Hadith principles. Here, Hadith denotes the sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) on, for example, ways of eating, sleeping and conversing. Evidence shows that in Muslim societies women were participating in elections before European women in Switzerland and France were allowed to vote (see Mazrui, 1997). Evidently, despite a different approach to Islamic values *The Guardian* also published the views of a Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan before the occurrence of the 7/7 event; he said that “Islam is not a culture but a body of
principles and universal values... Islam allows Muslims to adopt aspects of the culture they find themselves in, as long as it does not oppose any clear prohibition specified by their religion” (The Guardian, 21 January 2005).

John L. Esposito’s narrative of “Moderate Muslims” is quite comprehensive and addresses the complexities involved in the discourse. Esposito acknowledges that it is a problematic term because there are no agreed criteria upon which we can decide who is a moderate Muslim, Christian, Jew or “a moderate Republican or Democrat” (Esposito, 2011, p.147). Esposito raises a few significant questions in regard to the concept of “moderate”. For example, “Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism and separation of Church and state? Or can a moderate believe in a state where no religion is privileged and rights of all (believer and non-believer) are protected?” (ibid) Further, Esposito asks whether “someone who promotes the equality of women and men but also opposes the wearing of hijab” can be a moderate Muslim. (ibid) In brief, Esposito claims that, in the West, “moderate” is often used to describe “so-called progressive or liberal Muslims and excludes conservatives or traditionalists as well as fundamentalists” (ibid, 2011, p.147-148).

Thus, one might say that the idea of a “moderate Muslim” in fact promotes exclusion, particularly of opponents. Esposito also writes that authoritarian regimes in Muslim countries define “moderate” as someone who does not oppose their government's policies (Esposito, 2011, p.147). Esposito states that Muslims living in the West are not opponents of Western values or way of life but, rather, “What we do, our policies and actions, not from our way of life” (The Guardian, 7 July 2006). Baker et al. (2013) also suggest that “moderate Muslims” is a loaded term but they find that, for the British press, “moderate Muslim” means a good Muslim; for example, Yusuf Islam, the musician formerly known as Cat Stevens, is a moderate face of British Muslims (Baker et al., 2013, p.165).

(i)- Freedom of Speech:

Both newspapers raised concerns in their editorials, news reports, comments and feature sections that British Muslims are over-sensitive in their views on freedom of speech in secular societies. These newspapers’ observations of British Muslims’ view of freedom of speech are based on a series of events such as the Rushdie Affair (1989) and the cartoon controversies (2005-2015). In regard to the cartoon controversy, a few
radical organisations and groups held protests in the first week of February 2006 which provided both broadsheets with a reason to discuss freedom of expression largely based upon the behaviour of those participants that was unacceptably aggressive and threatening. But the cartoon controversy upset the British and global Muslim community, which was sensitive to ‘freedom of speech’ in the context of the constant derogatory images of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) and not to the concept itself, as it is used in news reporting, scholarly writings, political discussions and debates.

On the cartoon controversy and the resulting freedom of expression debate, The Guardian writer Karen Armstrong presented an analysis based upon the history of Muslims and pointed out that Muslim societies had long been practising it (The Guardian, 21 July 2007). Armstrong notes the paradox that one of Mulla Sadra’s most famous admirers was Ayatollah Khomeini, author of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie (ibid). In fact, long before Mulla Sadra in the Mughal’s Court, particularly Akbar, freedom of expression was a cherished value (Rai, 2010; Phillips and Gritzner, 2003, p.40).

However, blasphemy has had little resonance in British society and there have been few examples of this in British law since the case of George Jacob Holyoake in the mid-nineteenth century. Undoubtedly, those cartoon protestors themselves violated fine Islamic teachings by their intimidating and rude behaviour particularly to their fellow citizens and their country of birth, where the cartoons had been condemned in the press and by the government.

Indeed, the behaviour of the protesters paved the way for discussions and debates in which various writers and commentators including these newspapers’ editorials began to view British Muslims as over-sensitive, backwards and incompatible with British values, including freedom of speech. There is always a trade-off in Britain between the freedom of expression and restrictions such as the blasphemy laws. The law is much more willing to take action on issues of racism than it is about blasphemy. Interestingly, Britain has a “Zero tolerance” policy on racism but insulting religious figures is not seen as an act of racism (see Hart, 2014; Kundnani, 2007; Mitchell, 2014).

On this occasion, Anjem Choudhary, an organiser of the demonstration, refused to denounce the possibility of another attack on the scale of 7/7. Here, Choudhary’s extreme views are out of step with Islam’s basic teaching, which is tolerance, even
though, more importantly, Britain did not wage war on British Muslims; hence, to state that another attack is possible reflects his self-styled discriminatory position. Moreover, his threatening and inflammatory speech fuelled anger and further strengthened the stereotypical perception that British Muslims hate freedom of expression and are anti-Western and anti-democratic. Given that the terrorism incident of July 7 resulted in the deaths of innocent people, these newspapers’ response to the protesters, particularly Choudhary, is valid.

On the cartoon issue, The Daily Telegraph’s editorial viewpoint is quite considerate but somewhat disappointing in the sense that it gave a handful of radicals extraordinary coverage. It would appear that this pattern of reporting in both newspapers suggests that controversial and self-styled scholars receive more attention in press debates and discussions. More importantly, in this way ordinary people have less opportunity to gain a true and real insight into religious matters. The point is that such a selective representation pattern of self-styled scholars and hate preachers causes confusion and misguides ordinary readers on important issues and debates. This also shows that radicals use media support to shape public opinions and debates and build an image of the entire community. However, it is also important to note that radical editors, government officials and representatives of right-wing organisations also influence the press. In other words, there may not be anything surprising about this as the press has to include a variety of opinions, even those with which it disagrees.

The press operates on different levels; for instance, on issues contradicting secular traditions, Muslim scholars and their non-Muslim friends receive press criticism. This includes criticism of Jack Straw, Ken Livingstone and Rowan Williams for their sympathetic views on the ‘Prophet Muhammad cartoons’, ‘Yousaf al-Qaradawi’s visit to the UK’, and ‘Sharia’. It appears that those Muslims and their sympathisers who question the Israel-Palestine issue, Western policies and secular traditions and disagree with same-sex marriages were often presented by The Daily Telegraph as anti-Semitic, anti-West, extremists and Islamists, such as London Mayor Ken Livingstone (see The Daily Telegraph, 15 September 2005).

Similarly, the criteria applied to progressive Muslim scholars or politicians’ press representation were different from those applied to their non-Muslim counterparts, who received more positive coverage. The criteria for politicians in debates change
according to the news values and public interests. There is a need for modernity in all walks of life including in Muslim schools and mosques. This means more open thinking and a readiness to accept secular traditions in their original sense. There exists a strong assumption among most commentators and writers of *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* that faith is a major barrier to integration.

As illustrated earlier, the press portrayal of progressive Muslim politicians and scholars shows that debates on British Muslims are often framed from a powerful Western point of view which is somewhat surprising in a Western country that advocates equality and openness, which should be reflected in debates that also include voices of inner communities in particular. This sense of duplicity is not visible in academic writings as Jytte Klausen (2009) point outs that Europe is familiar with blasphemy laws, and even in countries where such laws do not exist “The media often refrain from printing things that are perceived as objectionable to religious people” (Klausen, 2009, p.87).

Klausen talks of double standards in regard to blasphemy laws: “Advocates of the double-standard view argued that Christian sensitivities are readily recognized whereas Muslims’ feelings are ignored and derided” (ibid., p.87) He also cites the example of the same *Jyllands-Posten* paper that published the Prophet Muhammad caricatures but that “…a few years earlier had refused to publish defamatory cartoons portraying Jesus on the grounds that the images would offend readers.” (ibid, p.87) However, some may point out that Klausen has obviously led a sheltered life because the media often challenge the blasphemy laws of the Church of England. Moreover, some may also say that the Irish comedian Dave Allen, who often dressed up as a drunken Pope falling over, may have been insulting to many Christians and their religious values.

Evidently, there are dual standards on both sides; on the one hand the West advocates “freedom of expression” and on the other it limits and misuses it for political gain, which is the politics of most regions of the world. Similarly, those radical protesters neglect the teachings and exemplary character of their Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) who has been sent as Rahmatul Alameen (blessing for mankind) and whose mercy and forgiveness touched his enemies (see Armstrong 2001; 2007: Brown, 2014). A key difference between *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* is that each has its own version of freedom of expression. For example, *The Guardian* published an interview with Sheikh
Qardawi at the height of a debate in which several British politicians and newspapers including *The Daily Telegraph* campaigned to ban him from the UK for his radical views.

In short, one might say that freedom of expression is a delicate and sensitive phenomenon because, obviously, in a pluralistic society such as Britain it may not be easy to protect freedom of expression at all times given that there will always be some people or groups likely to be offended by language or images used in press reporting. The freedom of expression thesis is problematic because it is difficult to identify who will decide the limits on what can be said and what cannot, considering people’s faith, beliefs and ideas in a pluralistic society.

(ii) Modernity: “Modern Islam”, “Moderate Muslims” and "British Islam".

Both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* emphasise that the threat of “Islamic terrorism” and growing radicalisation among British Muslims might be countered by forging an alliance with moderate Muslims. The broader discussions surrounding the idea of “modern Islam” and “moderate Muslims” in these newspapers engage policy-makers, politicians and pressure groups, particularly liberal and secular-minded individuals together with some British Muslims. The mindset here is to work with the “moderate Muslims” since, if all that remains is Fundamentalism, there will be an increasing possibility of serious conflict that may result in more terrorism attacks. These contributors to the debate insist that the government should form an alliance with moderate Muslims to defeat terrorism and build a more cohesive society.

*The Guardian* suggested that one possibility was to modernise British mosques, with the government encouraging appointments of British-born English-speaking Imams and ensuring that young British Muslims have a voice in mosque committees and affairs. In other words, the concept of modern British Islam mainly suggests those moderate Muslims who abide by secular British values, such as the acceptance of same-sex marriages and proposals for women-only mosques.

Despite clear differences on a range of issues such as combating terrorism and radicalisation, however, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* shared a common understanding of “modern Islam” and “moderate Muslims” in all types of journalism, particularly in their editorials, with only limited scope for alternative opinion. The shared perception is that British mosques should adopt modernity in terms of English-speaking imams, provide more space to young British Muslims and seek to play an
important role in combating extremism and radicalisation among British Muslims. In their editorials and reporting, groups and individuals who approve of secular values were presented as modern Muslims, while those who hold contradictory views on sensitive issues such as same-sex marriages were portrayed as extremists, radicals and anti-Westerners.

For Edward Said, the Muslim world and the West have failed to understand each other despite both recognising the need for knowledge and understanding. For Muslims ‘Seek Knowledge even you have to travel as far as to China’ is a prophetic teaching; meanwhile, in Europe since the Greek period the thirst for knowledge has remained a popular tradition (Said, 1997, p.144). Further, Said states that in the present arena regardless of technological advancements the two sides seem ignorant of each other’s cultures, which has fuelled the view of Islam as a threat to Europe and America. (ibid) Said believes the media is largely responsible for the fact that most people in America and West only link ‘unpleasant news’ such as individual acts of violence and extremism to Islam (Said, 1997, p.144).

John Esposito assumes that, “For many, Islam was seen as incompatible with modernity, in particular with democratization and modernization” (Esposito, 2003, p.3). Considering the significance of the editorial, it is fair to say that The Daily Telegraph adheres to the “moderate Muslims” thesis with little understanding of Islam and the character of a true believer (Muslim) according to the Quran and Sunnah (see Appendix-J). Another important factor that is missing in the notions of “moderate Muslims” and “modern Islam” is an understanding of the basic concepts that make Islam compatible with races, eras and regions.

Evidence shows that “Moderate” and “Progressive Muslims” are those who are more compatible with the secular traditions such as tolerance of homosexuality and abortion. But some may say that, since Western society is diverse, pluralistic and protean, it is not surprising that people hold such views. Evidently, Orthodox Jews and Christians disagree with a few elements of modern Western societies, such as same-sex marriages, while they follow certain dress codes, such as nuns. A Sikh’s beard is an important part of his faith; similarly, the wearing of a headscarf in many cultures and faiths is also essential practice. Evidently, a number of Christians and Jews in Europe and America are anti-abortionist. Moreover, a considerable number of orthodox Christians, Jews,
Buddhists and Sikhs and other members of faith communities disapprove of same-sex marriages, sex outside marriage and abortion; in other words, they hold similar views to those of Muslims (see Menocal, 2002; PewResearch Surveys, 18 June 2014 and 2 July 2015; Peters, 2004). There is nothing surprising about this in pluralistic societies, as such differences are seen as individual freedoms and are not the source of serious clashes.

Given the cultural variations within Muslim countries and regions, there are incompatible features among various Muslim nations, tribes and groups; for example, the ‘way of life’ of a Baloch, Pashtun, Punjabi and Sindhi are completely different, yet they follow the same religion. Similarly, there are variations in Western cultures and regions; for example, Yorkshire people’s traditions differ from those of Scots. But there is less talk of these variations in The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian, perhaps suggesting that the “British way of life” is a uniform entity. Most talks on “British way of life” were largely based on the Western point of view. For example, “Justice” was a common theme in all sacred texts including the Quran before the birth of secularism (see Al-Hajj, 22:10; Ar-Rum, 30:29; Al-Anfal, 8:51). More importantly, the 99 names of Allah SWT (God) Al-Haq (The Truth) and Al-Adl (The Utterly Just) signify the essentiality of Justice. Hence, justice is a cherished and shared value of all faiths.

Similarly, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph did not discuss the theological concepts in Islam in regard to modernity, i.e. al-Ijma and al-Ijtihad and al-Qiyas, which exist in addition to Quran and Sunnah teachings. However, some might say that these newspapers rarely make even the slightest reference to the theology of Christianity and that newspapers’ role is to report events and reflect upon varied views. In fact the roles of the media are varied in circumstances and societies. They should not only report, inform and brief people about certain issues be it terrorism and security but should also enhance their knowledge of those issues facing society by offering investigative and quality journalism. Many media scholars and critics agree that the role of the media should be constructive, endorsing knowledge building, community cohesion, and educating society and so forth (see Saunders and Goddard, 2002; Baran and Davis 2012).

Based on the above underlying concepts, Islamic scholars, Jurists, muftis and Ulamas offer solutions to issues in the contemporary period. Several scholars have discussed
and debated these theological concepts, rulings and comparative views on modern-day issues with regard to Islam (see Esposito and J. DeLong-Bas, 2001; Mutahari, 2014; Ramadan, 2009). Furthermore, the discussion on modernity and moderate Muslims largely includes the views of those that are neither representatives of Islam nor publically recognised as scholars of Islam. In view of the wider definition of the terms ‘modernity’ and the ‘traditional’, Andrew Rippin attempts to un-knot the complication involved in understanding both concepts, ‘modernity’ and ‘traditional’, which are referred to as Europe and Islam in scholarly texts. Rippin writes that ‘modernity is that which has created fundamental changes in behaviour and belief about economics, politics, social organisation and intellectual discourse...modern era enlightened, secular, rational, disenchanted, (i.e. the loss of magic), scientific” (Rippin, 1993, p.12-13). In contrast to the idea of modernity there is a concept of ‘traditional’ or ‘Traditionalists’ which is often linked to Islam and Muslims and is lesser in value (ibid, p.29).

From Rippin’s point of view, it is important to see ‘modernity’ as a worldwide phenomenon, not an exclusively ‘Western’ one. There are also a few problematic characteristics of ‘modernity’ involving ‘colonial, imperialist, missionary, Western invasion’ which are commonly seen in the Muslim world (ibid, p.14). Further, he explores and studies mainstream Islamic scholars in different periods of times and reaches the conclusion that ‘modernity’ is not restricted in Islam; in fact, Al-Gazali (1058-1111), Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-87), Shah Wali Ullah (1702-62), Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (1839-97), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-98), Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) were all reformers, which suggests that the essence of modification already exists in Islam and it can be understood by these terms ‘Mujaddid’or ‘Ijtihad’[2] (ibid, p.31). In brief, on modernity both newspapers’ views were largely based on secular thoughts even though Britain in principle is a pluralist society in which a number of religions and faith communities live side by side.

7.10- Engaging with the British Muslim Community: Problems and Grievances.

Both newspapers discussed and debated post-7/7 British society in the context of British Muslims’ social cohesion and integration within wider society. Most of the reporting talked about problems within the British Muslim community; for instance, they have created social ghettos and live parallel lives rooted in their cultural and
religious beliefs/ideologies such as separate schools, veils, thus leading to radicalisation. Moreover, these newspapers, particularly The Daily Telegraph, pointed out that British Muslims do not endorse ‘Freedom of Speech’ and criticism of their religion, which make them less integrated in mainstream British society. But The Guardian commentators and reporters presented the Muslim view, with regard to the cartoon protests, that freedom-of-speech boundaries should be drawn in order to avoid confusion and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims (The Guardian, 5 February 2006, 12 February 2006).

On this topic, the narrative basically suggests that British Muslims are backward and incompatible with secular and Western traditions which endorse liberty and freedom. Subsequently, the key debate appears to have revolved around modernity and Islam, particularly the perception that Islam does not allow freedom or endorse democracy. In debates on Islam and Muslims, the media along with the polity too often omit the notions of freedom and liberty. Moreover, to an extent, both fail to differentiate between questioning matters of interest and disrespecting sacred texts such as the Quran and hadiths when discussing Islam and its teachings. There are several verses in the Quran that invite and encourage man to ponder upon the life around him (Al-Imran, 190; Ghashiyyah, 17 and 20; Ibrahim, 32 and 34). Other popular debates have centred on the veil (2006) and Sharia (2008) and currently these are reforming Muslims, their identity and place in secular Europe, radicalisation and extremism (Bryan, 2014; Jackson, 2009; Ramadan, 2008).

One of the serious problems within the British Muslim community is the division based upon the religious sects Brelwis and Whabbis, like Catholics and Protestants. The absence of a central authority and a common Muslim representative body that could represent Muslims across Britain is a major hurdle to building a mutual census among Muslims over their problems. Indeed, there are problems within the British Muslim community, just like other communities.

For instance, there is the an absence of a widely acknowledged leadership that is representative of wider Muslims community, a lack of English-speaking imams, and the presence of a sectarian divide, all of which were mentioned in these two newspapers. While discussing and debating the barriers to integration and social cohesion in post-7/7 British society, The Guardian in particular was evidently focused upon human rights
and civil liberties in all the discussions and debates aimed at challenging extremism and radicalisation. Moreover, it acknowledged in comments sections that the government should select, promote and engage with like-minded British Muslims (see *The Guardian*, 18 November 2005).

In a series of comments, debates and opinion pieces *The Guardian* provided space to academics, politicians, commentators and writers of different political orientations who encouraged the government to engage with British Muslims in various ways. It acknowledged that British Muslims are in many ways forced to embrace aspects of secular society that alienate them. Further, in response to Blair’s 12-point proposal to combat terrorism, *The Guardian* editorial suggested that the government should not close down mosques or interfere in the religious matters of Muslims as this may alienate them (*The Guardian*, 6 August 2005). Some commentators offered useful suggestions for engaging with British Muslims that may also help to curb the problems of extremism and radicalisation (see *The Guardian*, 10 July 2005).

Indeed, reflecting upon the post-7/7 situation *The Guardian* was right to suggest that religious freedom should be respected and that the government should refrain from interfering in British Muslims’ faith. Earlier, it had been a loudly-voiced grievance of Muslims that Western governments interfered in their faith and political matters. Of course the significance of such an approach was to restore British Muslims’ confidence and strengthen their beliefs in British core values, which are freedom, equality and tolerance.

One commentator, Timothy Garton Ash, said that the best way to restore British Muslims’ confidence and resolve their grievances is to support genuine democratisation in the Middle East (*The Guardian*, 3 August 2006). This means that Britain should not back dictators and monarchs. In other words, Britain can win the confidence of Muslims by sharing the fruits of democracy. Further, the government must not adopt any policy to silence them by force because they may take up alternative tools that would harm society (*The Guardian*, 10 July 2005). Other commentators argued that the best way to reach young British people is to hear their grievances (*The Guardian*, 21 November 2005). Indeed, open dialogue suggests individual liberty over the issues they are facing, which is the essence of a democratic society like Britain.
Several commentators in *The Guardian* approved of government plans to combat Islamophobia, train imams, create a national curriculum to engage with British Muslims, and hold road shows with influential Muslims. The third generation of young British Muslims is passionate to take up new roles within the community and is thirsting for education; hence, the government must take this opportunity and engage with such youth. Besides, many scholars suggest that improved community cohesion and integration are the best options to combat extremism and radicalisation in society (see Husband and Alam, 2011; Harris and Briggs, 2010; Kundanani, 2015). Post-7/7 British society faced a serious security challenge and divisions; hence, in this situation *The Guardian’s* suggestions were significant and wise because radicalisation, extremism and anti-social behaviour can be tackled at grass-roots levels and, for this, community support is essential.

On the other hand, there is an urgent need to enhance political engagement and acknowledge and protect British Muslims, like other faith communities. Britain should engage with its own Muslims as well as those in the outside world by embracing and sharing the fruits of democracy. Further, instead of investing in the next generation of weapons against an unknown threat, the UK should invest in its Muslim communities. One way of restoring Muslims’ confidence and solving their grievances is to support democratisation in the Middle East (*The Guardian*, 12 August 2006).

There is a need for more civil liberties and for enhancing political engagement and acknowledgement of Muslims, like other communities. More importantly, *The Guardian* states that if young people’s grievances are not heard but, rather, forcibly silenced, they will take up alternative tools. *The Guardian* also suggested that the third generation of young Muslims is passionate about taking up new roles within the community and thirsting for education. Denouncing Islamist scholars such as Al-Qaradawi will affect Muslim-non-Muslim relationships and limit Britain’s role in the Muslim world because of the Sheikh’s following among influential and ordinary Muslims.

To some extent, it is evident that British Muslims are in many ways forced to embrace aspects of a secular society. However, Timothy Garton Ash, Karen Armstrong, Seumas Milne and Jonathan Freedland have written a series of comment pieces suggesting that the British government should improve its relationship with British Muslim communities. This shows the visionary approach of *The Guardian* which suggests that
the best way to tackle extremism and achieve a more cohesive society is to consider British Muslims as active partners in pursuing these objectives.


A reflection on the overall discussion in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* clearly indicates that the emergence of a new binary division between “The Non-Muslim Britain and West” and “The British Muslims or the Islamic world which is also ‘The Rest’” is in fact based on the London Bombings narrative, which further suggests that this clash will continue. Suddenly, British Muslims’ religious and cultural beliefs and norms, such as veils and mosques, became a source of suspicion, fear and threats. Admittedly, some of the concerns raised in the newspapers were genuine in that the 7/7 incident has made everyday life less safe and has shaken public confidence.

On the macro level, the West seems concerned that its secular values are under threat even though considerable evidence shows that the suicide bombers were well-integrated into the Westernised lifestyle rather than being conservative-minded people. Politicians and press made comparisons between an ideology of “hope and compassion” (the West/Britain) and an ideology of “hate” (Bombers/Islamic...), showing that the West has a defined doctrine that it is supreme and superior. In sum, the issues and debates surrounding freedom of speech, cartoon protests, mosques’ role in society, the veil, the need for moderate Muslims, and modernity arose because both broadsheets interpreted and presented the London bombings as an act that damaged every aspect of society; to an extent, this is a fair interpretation and description of events that might have been worse had, for example, the British press decided to publish the cartoon of the prophet.

This research comprehends that the modern “British way of life” has a great deal to offer in the creation of a multicultural society that can prevail over problems such as extremism and radicalisation. Specifically, *The Guardian* built upon its argument for the adaptation of the ‘British way of life’ featuring its core values such as ‘humanity’ and ‘tolerance’ which it believed might facilitate the creation of a more integrated society. But our current level of knowledge tells us that the “British way of life” with all its benefits is still imperfect. The point is that in a multicultural society every community has something valuable to offer, a notion that was missing from both newspapers’ reporting on 7/7.
For the editors, writers, commentators and other contributors of these broadsheets, Islam is incompatible with the Western culture and values, while only a few Muslim contributors disagreed with this thesis. It is evident that the concepts of social benefits, policing, charities, health and safety and minorities’ rights all concur with Islamic teachings. Further, the concept of Sharia is not all about punishments and individual restrictions; in fact, these are secondary aspects that may not come into practice since, if the needs and wants of all people become the state’s responsibility, there may well be a reduction in crime committed as a result of poverty. This is where these two newspapers were incorrect because they concentrated mainly on parts of verses from the Quran that fitted into their context of the story but they omitted the explanations and historical contexts of those verses because they contradicted the claims these newspapers were making about jihad and radicalisation. The same could be said for those quoting excerpts from the Bible. Thus, it is largely to do with interpretation.

7.12-Conclusion:

The reactions and interpretations of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph regarding the bombing incorporated a blend of assessments with specific emphasis on the concern that the British-born suicide bombers had threatened “The British way of life”. Initially, this assumption gained currency because Prime Minister Blair attached significant importance to the belief that the London bombers hated the British way of life and that the threat of extremists placed “our values” in great danger. Further, politicians and public representatives used norms such as “human life”, “civilised people”, “our society”, “our values”, justice”, “hope” and compassion” in their speeches, all of which have symbolic meanings.

Both newspapers extended these ideas by providing space to various politically-oriented writers, contributors and regular columnists who shaped the debate. Although Blair initially made a clear distinction between “Us” (British people including Muslims) and “Them” (terrorist/extremists), the “Us” and “Them” rhetoric gradually changed in both newspapers. He began to urge Muslims exclusively to tackle extremism, suggesting that it was their problem and that they were all responsible, thereby designating them as new “Others” who are not only incompatible with the British way of life but are also ‘dangerous insiders’.
In addition, many other issues were exclusively linked to British Muslims, such as the veil debate and the cartoon controversy that brought the ‘freedom of speech’ rhetoric into the spotlight, suggesting that British Muslims are over-sensitive to the Western freedom of expression norm. Most writers, columnists and contributors continued to attach certain specific attributes to the ‘British way of life’ while both broadsheets’ editorials gave the term “Islamic” negative connotations such as extremism, radicalism, terrorism and fundamentalism, building an impression that this divide is between “good” [West-Britain] and “evil” [Muslims-British Muslims].

Most of the reporting in *The Guardian* indicated polemic views on the veil, including Muslim women’s voices, while *The Daily Telegraph* invited guest politicians including Conservative and Labour MPs to shed light on the veil from their constituencies’ perspectives. Overall, the veil appeared as a form of oppression rather than choice and was categorised under the “Civilised” vs. “Backwardness” rhetoric. Moreover, the overall reporting indicated that this on-going clash has different meanings in different situations and regions. Repeatedly, it reappeared with different impressions but the same old belief that the “Orient” other is incompatible with the West. The London Bombings brought it back in its worst form, i.e. the new home-grown “Orient” who is inherently “violent” and “dangerous” has now become “radicalised other” and a “traitor”.

The reporting encompassing ‘Modernity’ and ‘Britishness’ indicated a consensus that British Muslims should adopt some aspects of modern British values because their Islamic values are incompatible with the British life, which is more secular. In fairness, *The Guardian* was suggesting that British Muslims and other groups should retain their identities; however, in a modern society all groups and all religions must intersect with one another. However, there has been a great deal of one-sided discussion on Islamic values. These were not discussed, nor were any well-known Islamic scholars such as Grand Moftis and Ullamahs consulted in these debates. Although, to some extent, British Muslims have received a sympathetic representation, a closed view of Islam still prevails because little space was allocated for a balanced debate. Given the political orientation of these two newspapers, i.e. generally left- and right-wing, which can still survive in a multicultural society, similarly two different cultures can also live together side by side. In the end, both the ‘British way of life’ and the ‘Islamic values’ have more
in common to celebrate than certain differences that can be negotiated and compromised.
Chapter 8- Reflection on Findings: The Re-Emergence of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’.

8.1- Introduction:

The findings resulting from the thematic analysis of *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* reports on 7/7 refresh Cohen’s concept of ‘folk devils and moral panics’. Fifty years ago, a clash between British youth subcultures, Mods and Rockers, on Easter Monday on Brighton beach was branded a ‘moral panic’ in the British media, which identified these groups as folk devils and a threat to British society because of their behaviour. Cohen examines their media portrayals and claims that the British media exaggerated and distorted the incident. Later on Cohen adds a new introduction ‘Symbols of Trouble’, in his 1980s edition that follows second edition published in 1987. Finally, Cohen offers third edition that was published in 2002, in which he offers ‘reviewing uses and criticisms of the concept over the last thirty years.

His assessment has proved factually accurate, as evidenced by *The Independent’s* investigative report, published on 4 April 2004: “Forty years ago pictures of Mods and Rockers shocked polite society. But were they staged by the press?” According to David Cooke, “There are famous photographs taken in Brighton where the photographer paid the lads a few shillings”, and finally those misrepresented “became hippies or freaks and wandered off to India, like I did”. Based on this historic illustration, a question arises about the future of young British Muslims, who often complain of being under-reported. Although it was a section of the same media that showed us what their colleagues had done and how it affected these young white people, Cohen finds that the media made the event appear much worse than it actually was. He stated that “headlines appeared to be ‘self-descriptive’ and consisted of distorting words and phrases such as ‘Wild Ones invade seaside - 97 arrests’; ‘Wild Ones rampage in High Street’; ‘Battle of Brighton and Day of Terror by Scooter Groups’” (Cohen, 1972; 1980, p.30-33).

To a large extent, the 7/7 coverage was reminiscent of that applied to the Mods and Rockers in terms of the use of language, phrases and factual distortion, which put the whole Muslim community under surveillance and labelled them as “New folk devils” (Massey, 2012). Earlier on, according to Alexander (2000, 2004) the Bradford Asian youth were branded as “the New Asian Folk Devils” (cited in Massey, 2012, p.3). The
press worsened the situation because it stirred up feelings of fear, suspicion and hatred of Muslims in general. Ever since its first inception, several sociologist, criminologists and anthologists have applied Cohen’s (1972) idea of ‘moral panic and folk devils’ to examine various case studies across a wide range of subjects such as those most relevant to my own study, the wearing of the veil, sharia law, and terrorism (see Ilic, 2016; O’Brien, 2016; Jefferson, 2011 and Welch, 2005).

Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph identified and presented the London bombers as “Islamists” driven by “misinterpretations of Islamic theology” and “poisonous ideology” that raised their profile as “al-Qaeda fanatics”, “Islamic radicals” and “Islamic terrorists”, even though they were more Westernised, educated and modern. Worryingly, such perceptions correlate to the entire British Muslim community, which became a “suspect community” and an “enemy within”, somewhat like the Irish Catholics (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; Spalek and Lambert, 2008). The “Suspect Communities” thesis has drawn attention from British scholars; for instance, Pantaziz and Pemberton (2009 and 2011) insist that it is real but Greer (2010) rejects their analysis, stating that his findings are based on conceptual, logical and empirical grounds. Nevertheless, the current scholarly debates corroborate the fact that Muslims do have a damaging media representation, like the Irish.

We now return to the initial reporting, which sets the scene for broader debates and discussions around key topics including radicalisation, al-Qaeda cells, and law and order, subsequently producing three major themes: “security”, “terrorism” and “otherness”. Within these themes both newspapers specifically focus on “morals” and “Western values” and thus present the “West” as “good” and the rest, i.e. “Muslims”, as “evil”. This construction of “evil” Muslims connected with terrorism and radicalisation shows that the West holds superior values: freedom, justice, democracy, human rights, liberty, and equality. But the attackers [and the Muslims] presumably hate secular Western values; therefore, they are “cowards”, “dishonest”, “immoral” and “devils”. More importantly they (Muslims) use “evil ideology” that sanctions the killing of “Kafirs” or “non-believers”. Hence, the Western governments (non-believers) invade and occupy Muslim lands mainly because they are defending themselves. This idea was so widely publicised that it caused a moral panic among non-Muslims, who began to fear Muslims more than ever before.
Hayle (2013) explains this as the sociology of “evil” and argues that the media and other stakeholders use the label “evil” to mislead the general public about specific groups that they identify as opposite and hence see as a threat and as problematic ‘others’ (Hayle, 2013, p.1126). To be precise, it is a feeling developed to prepare the public for the idea those certain groups or individuals in society are a threat to the social order. Historically, panics have often led to the persecution of problematic ‘others’, such as the burning of witches in fourteenth-century Britain, known as witchcraft panic (see Banks, 2013; Goodare, 1998 and 2013; Walker, 2011). The next sections of this chapter will demonstrate the relationship between the 7/7 reporting and Cohen’s model, starting with the British Muslims’ religion and their beliefs and practices that cause moral panics.

**Deviance/Folk-Devil** (British-born Muslim suicide bombers)

**Moral Panic** ("Islamic Terrorism" 7/7)

**Context and Backgrounds**
- London Bombers ethnic roots (Mirpuri’s Kashmiri)
- Cultural Issues (Otherness)...Muslims hold different cultural values
- Assumption that bombers “hate western values”

**The Inventory (Media)**
- (The 7/7 Equates “Islamic Terrorism”)

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(The 7/7 Equates “Islamic Terrorism”)

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**Exaggeration and Distortion** (Over-reporting for example misleading headlines for example, (“disturbance” presented as a “riot”)

(Establishing Fabricated Links e.g. Mosques, Universities hotbeds of extremism)

**Prediction**

(More Attacks/Terror Plots/A-Qaed
Cells/Networks/Future Terrorism/Featuring Politicians, Law Enforcement ad Police Officers Press Conferences etc.)

**Symbolization**

(Symbolic Language, words phrases and event descriptions such as 9/11 and Madrid...("Muslim Extremist", “Muslim Terrorist”, “Muslim hate preacher”)

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**Reaction I (Opinion and Attitude Themes)**

**Orientation** (London Underground attack, disaster...); **Images** (July Symbolic labels and images such as “Bombers”, “Evils”, “Cowards”); **Causation**

(Signs and symptoms e.g. a problem originates from 1980s "Londonistan“ global problem of “Islamic Terrorism” etc.)

**Differential Reaction** (The Politicians, Faith and Communities Leadership and Public Responses vs. Press response etc.)

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**Reaction II (The Rescue Remedy Phases)**

**Sensitization** (creating hysteria using representation such as words, “dangerous”, “extremists” who “want to bring Sharia law”, police raids and arrests...The Socialital Control Cultural (Actions Groups police and pressure groups emphasising that British values under Threat/Attack)

**The Exploitative Culture** (Relative Issues, radicalisation in the Muslim community, veil, Sharia etc. calls for more tough laws e.g. detentions without charge, controlling a problem

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**The Warning and Impact**

Emergency services in action COBRA,

Closure of schools and further travel warnings,

More people start cycling to work than taking tube or buses,

Backlash...“Muslim must root out extremism problem”

Effects on Social Integration and Community Relations
Figure 8.1: Stanley Cohen’s Model of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’ (Stages in the creation of Folk Devils and Moral Panics).

The above model provides a possible structure of the emergence of the British Muslims as new “folk devils” and “moral panics” relating to them based on their faith. Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph claimed that Muslim religious schools and mosques spread radicalisation. For instance, on 24 July 2005, The Daily Telegraph stated that religious schools “espouse a fundamentalist and sometimes violent form of Islam”, while on 8 July 2007 it claimed that “radicals recruit youngsters outside mosques”. Likewise, The Guardian also discredited mosques and religious schools although occasionally, for instance on 5 November 2006, The Observer stressed that the London bombers had attended Tablighi Jamaat, which radicalised Muslims. Contrary to the media understanding, academic studies view this as a revivalist and peaceful movement that propagates character-building and self-purification following true Islamic teachings (see Ali, 2006; Siddiqui, 2012). The next section will show the construction of moral panic in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting of the 7/7 incident, which works in six stages according to Cohen’s concept that has been cited in several leading studies including Donna Killingbeck’s (2001). It also provides evidence that Cohen’s concept within the reporting of both newspapers helped situate the presence of the nexus of the four Ps: political parties, pressure groups, the press, and public bodies (Chas, 2006, p.75).

8.2- Explanation of Stages in the creation of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’.

There are five stages in the creation of ‘folk devils and moral panics’ that are as follow:

(i)-Exaggeration and Distortion:

Most articles, opinions, comment pieces and editorials were based on selective surveys and studies that limited the debate in terms of theoretical and empirical data. Inevitably, the facts and figures were distorted even though they were largely based on outside sources; however, since the press was selective, it produced distorted opinions. Within hours, The Daily Telegraph had advocated tougher laws to deal with terrorism, suggesting that the incident had deeply threatened security and that urgent renewal of
legislation was essential. In its article, “Bombings may open the door for tougher anti-terrorism laws” published on 8 July 2007, it referred to the New York and Madrid attacks and urged the government to adopt resilient regulations to crack down on jihadists and extremists. A passage from the same report stated: “carnage in London will make a tougher response more likely than ...to reduce the standard of proof in terrorism cases and to hold pre-emptive trials with secret evidence heard before vetted counsel. These have been denounced by civil liberties groups but the mood for tougher laws may now be difficult to resist...” On 1 January 2010, The Daily Telegraph wrote that, within a month of the 7/7 incident, the Blair government had announced a “12-point anti-terror plan” with the aim of suggesting that the “rules of the game are changing”. In subsequent years, the British government introduced “The Terrorism Act 2006” and “The Counter Terrorism Act 2008”, which extended police powers and prohibited the “glorification of terrorism”, thus limiting people’s liberty and causing fear of a continuous problem, which is terrorism (Wolfendale, 2007; McGovern and Tobin, 2009).

Several newspaper articles were aimed at persuading the government that there was a serious problem of social disorder and that greater control would be a solution. In doing so, The Daily Telegraph in particular published a series of articles as discussed earlier which present distorted facts and figures on different issues such as university students lured into extremism, which exaggerated the problem. Politicians and security heads such as Sir John Stevens, ex-Metropolitan Police chief, disclosed to the News of the World that he believed that “up to 3,000 British-born or British-based people had passed through Osama bin Laden's training camps. Of these, he believed that there were now about 200 committed “home-grown terrorists willing and able to slaughter innocents for their perverted view of Islam” (The Guardian, 11 July 2005).

Further, in reference to a senior intelligence source, The Guardian made it clear that [they] are not sure of the figures; however, based on senior intelligence sources it argued that in Britain there may be a “very small number of inner-core al-Qaida people”, perhaps around “30 or so members, with several hundred who have been to training camps or have fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia or Chechnya” (The Guardian, 11 July 2005). It continued by referring to a Foreign Office draft report “Young Muslims and Extremism” (2004) which stated that “Britain might now be harbouring thousands of al-
Qaida sympathisers” (ibid). This is how politicians, pressure groups and the police continue to use the press to exaggerate the situation by presenting distorted and unreliable facts via all channels, including a quality-press newspaper such as The Guardian.

Now consider another example from The Observer, which ran a lengthy article, ‘Channel tunnel is terror target’, on 24 December 2006, quoting police commissioner Ian Blair: “It is a far graver threat in terms of civilians than either the Cold War or the Second World War;... ‘It’s a much graver threat than that posed by Irish Republican terrorism”. According to the same article, “Eliza Manningham-Buller, director-general of MI5, recently disclosed that UK intelligence services are monitoring more than 200 networks and 1,600 individuals in Britain...investigators had identified nearly 30 plots ‘that often have links back to al-Qaeda in Pakistan, and through those links al-Qaeda gives guidance and training to its largely British foot soldiers here”. With various pieces of misinformation and distortion of facts and figures, such as on the Iraq War and current threats, Western secret agencies and their officials’ statements have always been of concern to critics (Curtis, 2003 and 2012; M. Aid, 2009; Monbiot, 2001).

Earlier, The Guardian itself published an investigative report, “The making of the terror myth”, on 15 October 2004, which referred to a BBC2 three-part documentary The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear (2004), suggesting that the issues were being overplayed. This report was referred to in several leading studies on terrorism such as Bauman (2013) and Mukherji (2005). Take another passage from The Guardian which revealed that “About 50 Islamic extremist cells are ‘active’ in the UK, with about 300 extremists under constant surveillance... About 1,500 Britons are known to the police and security services as possible terror suspects, many registered on a database of radicalised individuals regarded as peripheral but susceptible to al-Qaeda’s message of terror...” (The Guardian, 1 July 2007). Several scholars note that the press overstated the facts and figures relating to the 7/7 event (Davies, 2011; Hussain and Baggulay 2012; Petley and Richardson, 2013).

As a result of the negative media portrayal of Islam and Muslims, particularly those stories linking Islam with terrorism, public opinion changed profoundly. Additionally, The Daily Telegraph published surveys conducted with its own readers or in specific
locations and then related the results to the Muslim population at large, such as “Islam poses a threat to the West, say 53pc in poll” published on 25 August 2005. It also claimed that “More than half of respondents felt that Islam posed a threat...A growing number of people fear that the country faces ‘a Muslim problem’ and more than half of the respondents to the YouGov survey said that Islam posed a threat to Western liberal democracy”. It is important to note that these figures mentioned in the above illustrations lack precision. Surely they also reflect a yes and no answer and given that the actions of bombers who were Muslim so this may not be surprising.

Furthermore, in these citations the newspapers failed to quote the methods used by researchers and journalists to calculate the ratios. For example, The Daily Telegraph report published on 7 July 2007 carries the following data: “Professor Glees estimates that there are up to 200,000 potential martyrs, at universities at home and abroad, who are susceptible to recruitment. There are huge reservoirs to draw on, a potentially terrifying fact that the police and intelligence agencies must now ponder” (The Daily Telegraph, 7 July 2007).

In his book Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security (2012), Stuart Croft raises concerns over the "securitising of the Muslim other" and their new identity as “radical others” with particular reference to Anthony Glees' study, as mentioned above. Croft argues that Glees' core themes of “campus radicalisation” and “Saudi and Muslim” sources for funding UK universities are in fact overplayed in terms of numbers (Croft, 2012, p.236-239). Similarly, Dennis Hayes also challenges Glees' work in a series of debates conducted under the topic of extremism in universities, organised by ‘debating matters’ during 2010. Notably, a series of tragic consequences resulted from the press, politicians, pressure groups and police overstating the facts. The misidentified shootings of a Brazilian man on 22 July 2005 and another man at Forest Gate on 2 June 2006, the increasing number of stop and search incidents, and the high rate of hate crimes and number of individuals held on suspicion are a few notable examples of the immediate panic.

According to a BBC report on 4 August 2005, “There were 269 religious hate crimes in the three weeks after 7 July, compared with 40 in the same period of 2004”. Since then, social settings have dramatically changed in Britain as The Guardian report noted:
'London bombings: the day the anti-terrorism rules changed: The controversial Terrorism Act 2006 passed after the 7 July bombings leads to increased arrests and convictions’. It consists of revealing data that show the upsetting effects on the lives of Muslims in London resulting from the 7/7 attack. In its article published on 7 July 2010, *The Guardian* stated, “There were about 280 arrests for alleged terrorism offences in 2005/6, and although around 190 of those people were released without charge, the numbers of people charged and convicted also rose...Conviction rates on terrorism charges soared briefly after the bombings” (*The Guardian*, 7 July 2010). Furthermore, the same report disclosed that, after the 7/7 incident, there were complaints of collusion in torture at home and abroad, and “After the allegations of British collusion in torture began to emerge, in 2008, there were fresh complaints from a number of young British Muslims...During the year that followed the attacks, police compiled 13,300 witness statements and viewed 6,000 hours of CCTV footage” (*The Guardian*, 7 July 2010).

In addition, newspapers suggested that business in London, from the stock exchange to hotels and the tourist industry, suffered record high losses, and tourists from neighbouring European countries may not return. Consider a few headlines from *The Guardian* published on 8 July 2005: ‘World markets shaken by terrorism fears'; 'High street was already struggling and now shoppers will think twice'; 'City puts emergency plans into action and Tourist industry braced for downturn'. These indicate the elements of over-reporting; while realities on the ground showed that the event was exaggerated. Even now, it has been admitted at a high level that the threat was overstated. For example, *The Guardian* reported: ‘Islamist terror threat to west blown out of proportion - former MI6 chief Richard Dearlove says extremists are now focused on Middle East and giving them publicity in the west is counter-productive’; this was published on 7 July 2014 on the occasion of the 7/7 anniversary.

**(ii)-Prediction:**

In this phase, the press speculates, publishes reports, articles, comment pieces, statements and interviews, and builds assumptions that similar events will occur in the near future. The 7/7 discussion circles around al-Qaeda networks, terror plots, police raids, suspect arrests, court trials and presumed terror threats that are presented as a
never-ending phenomenon. Within this period, new phrases such as “Bomb factory”, “Fertiliser Bombs” and “Hydrogen Peroxide Bombs” appeared in the press, adding to speculation that home-grown terrorists, presumably British Muslims, are the “enemy within” and are capable of making bombs at home. In addition, both newspapers ran articles quoting hate preachers, terrorists and government officials speculating on further atrocities with contact intervals. In particular, the London bombers’ pre-recorded message that was first aired by Al-Jazeera Channel was re-broadcast and the extracts were printed in The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian with different emphases.

The video message became a prominent feature of terrorism reporting in The Daily Telegraph, which it published on numerous occasions between 2005 and 2007 and even continues to do so today. For instance, its headline on 2 September 2005 read: “We are at war: I am a soldier”, in fact, the chosen words give a warning of further attacks. The Guardian also picked up the same headline, though it emphasised a particular extract: “I’m sure by now the media has painted a suitable picture of me, this predictable propaganda machine will naturally try to put a spin on it to suit the government and to scare the masses into conforming to their power- and wealth-obsessed agendas”. In addition, it raises concerns about the British press including The Daily Telegraph, which gave front-page coverage to the video message that The Guardian called a “Piercing headline”. It also highlights the bid in a message in which “Khan directly links Tony Blair’s foreign policy to the bombings he and three others carried out in the capital and that he promises that Britain will suffer more suicide attacks” (The Guardian, 2 September 2005).

In subsequent weeks and months, several incidents occurred that provided sound footings for the media and other actors who substantiated their predictions based on the 7/7 event. These events include a police raid on University College Hospital in search of a suspect and the arrest of an Asian man on 21 July 2005 in London. Notably, the suspects were released without charge, prompting Professor Jim Ryan to dismiss the police claims and argue that the raids were based on an “absolute rumour” (BBC, 2005). According to The Guardian report published on 7 November 2013, since the 7/7 incident UK security agencies have disrupted 34 terror plots. On 21 July 2005, police disrupted four attempted bombings in London, causing fear and further strengthening the prediction of more panic attacks. In relation to this incident, The Guardian headline
was: “Panic as London is hit again; 3 tube stations and bus hit; Police: attacks intended to kill; Armed police enter hospital”. The article quotes the Mayor of London: “Those who remember the terrorist campaigns of the 1970s, 80s and 90s will remember there were bombing attacks often just weeks apart” (*The Guardian*, 21 July 2005).

In the same vein, *The Daily Telegraph* attached importance to stories that came mostly from either security institutions or terrorist organisations: “Police flood trains with 6,000 officers. Armed police patrol a London Underground station”, published on 29 July 2005, suggesting that a long-lasting threat exists. Similarly, in some instances, *The Guardian* also published reports citing various key figures who predicted more terrible events resembling 7/7. On 3 December 2006, *The Observer* quoted Sir Ian Blair who warns of “the threat of another terrorist attempt’ and believes that it is “ever present”, particularly at Christmas. He continues: “it is a far graver threat in terms of civilians than either the Cold War or the Second World War…it’s a much graver threat than that posed by Irish Republican terrorism”. In the same article, the newspaper claimed that “American security sources told *The Observer* that the threat was ‘sky high’”.

Such predictions continued to emerge in both newspapers at regular intervals, quoting government officials and other sources. On the occasion of the failed Glasgow Airport bombing attempt on 30 June 2007, both newspapers speculated on further terror attacks mainly based on politicians’, police and peers’ warnings and quotations. Take, for example, two passages from articles in *The Guardian* published on 1 July 2007 and 8 July 2007: “The attack was seemingly inept but it wreaked huge disruption for weekend travellers. Some 35,000 passengers were expected to pass through Glasgow Airport…immediately closed and all flights were suspended...There was a knock-on effect on flights around the country and several airports moved to step up security” (*The Guardian*, 1 July 2007) and “Currently almost 100 terror suspects are awaiting trial in UK courts in about 40 separate cases and the number will rise... the ‘UK is a centre of intense activity’ and that there is a ‘very real possibility’ that al-Qaeda and groups linked to it are planning a nuclear attack” (*The Guardian*, 8 July 2007).

These paragraphs from two articles suggest that, using the press space, security chiefs and other officials were inciting panics. Although there is no denying that a problem existed, as the earlier illustration proved, most of the time the facts were exaggerated and distorted. Similarly, *The Daily Telegraph’s* reporting of the incident on 30 June 2007
also predicted more attacks in future: “The Prime Minister Gordon Brown has called on the British public to remain vigilant and warned of tough decisions ahead following an apparent suicide bomb attack on Glasgow airport, which came just one day after two car bombs were located in London” (The Daily Telegraph, 30 June 2007). Later on, occasions such as the anniversaries of 9/11 and Madrid were reported with the view that similar events would hit Western capitals at short intervals.

(iii)-Symbolisation:

Cohen suggests that “the mass communication of stereotypes depends on the symbolic power of words and images. Neutral words such as place-names can be made to symbolize complex ideas and emotions; for example, Pearl Harbour, Hiroshima, Dallas” (Cohen, 2002, p.27). The appellation of the event as ‘7/7’ and the selection of cohesive and iconic photographs of the wrecked number 30 bus, a masked women being escorted away in Edgware Road, and Professor John Tulloch with his face covered in blood published in the British media echo Cohen’s idea of symbolisation in practice. These iconic pictures and the name ‘7/7’ became symbolic of the London bombings. One might say that these pictures were correct representations of the event but it is also evident that wounded British Muslims were not pictured in either newspaper.

In addition, the press published images of the perpetrators in Arab gowns and used labels such as “Beeston Crew”, “London Bombers”, “Suicide Bombers”, “ringleader”, “terrorist gang”, “bomb factory” and “bomber’s daughter”, all of which are descriptive and explanatory. The places where they lived and their associations emerged as icons of hate and as ‘devil’ places. For example, The Daily Telegraph linked Hamara Centre with al-Qaeda and other extremist ideologies, as explained earlier (see The Daily Telegraph, 15 and 17 July 2005). This trend in The Daily Telegraph’s reporting continued to the extent that, on a few occasions, The Guardian objected to The Daily Telegraph’s symbolising of British universities as centres of radicalisation and extremism, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

Consider the next day’s reporting of the 7/7 incident which carried headlines and labels such as “Attack on London” and “Day of Terror”, indicating that London (as a capital) was perhaps being attacked by a foreign nation. On the other hand, the incident was expounded with reference to the New York Bombings (9/11) and the Madrid Bombings,
creating further suspicion and hatred of Muslims. For some, however, it may not be surprising as it was a few Muslims who carried out the attacks.

Consider, for example, The Daily Telegraph story "Memories are stirred as Madrid shares the pain", while the opening sentences read: “Atocha station is Madrid’s Ground Zero, its equivalent of the hole where the Twin Towers stood, just as March 11 was Spain’s September 11...Yesterday a sense of solidarity with London was evident in Madrid" (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2005). Obviously, this sort of reporting fuels fear and hatred of “devils”, who are identified as “Muslims”, and creates further divisions in a multicultural society.

Now take a paragraph from a report published on 8 July 2005, in The Guardian, “Madrid’s vanished horror: The bombings poisoned the political atmosphere and deepened the social divide”, which states:

Explosions on jam-packed trains during rush hours with no prior warning, horrific results in terms of deaths, maimings and injuries, chaos and panic in a major European capital city... resemblances between the 3/11 terrorist attacks in Madrid and the 7/7 attacks in London are so obvious that comment appears superfluous (The Guardian, 8 July 2005).

Hence, it invokes emotional and physical solidarity with Madrid. To an extent it may not be surprising, given that the killing of innocent people was mourned. Whether or not these headlines are part of the demonisation of Muslim groups, they are also part of the memorialisation of the victims. However, the headline also carried a warning of a different political scenario as well as a social divide, meaning the breakdown of a society. In the months following 7/7, the term “Londonistan” received significant attention and space in both newspapers’ comment sections as well as in their reporting. That is, they described “London” as a symbolic place that nurtures “Islamic terror”, referring to various studies such as that by Melanie Phillips. These reports and articles take into account French accusations that the Paris Metro attack in 1995 was planned in London, which is why they coined the term “Londonistan”. In this way, misleading and evidently weak headlines and reports were produced to create an unambiguously negative portrayal of Islam and Muslims.
(iv)- Reaction:

The reaction category mainly consists of opinion and attitude themes that are further classified into three categories: orientation, images and causation. These combine to form press, government, politician and public reaction to a sudden event that disturbs the overall social structure of a society. Following the 7/7 incident, one of the key features of the press reporting was its initiative to stir up public feelings and push the government to take firm actions. Of course, the immediate reactions of the newspapers were to press the government to introduce tough laws and ban disreputable organisations, even though the press itself had once given them massive coverage, such as al-Muhajiroun leader Anjem Choudhary. Consider two short paragraphs from reports published in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph on 22 July 2006 and 3 September 2006. The Guardian highlights:

Earlier this year the Guardian identified two groups which appeared to be essentially the same as al-Muhajiroun. They were al-Ghurabaa, and al-Firqat un-Naajiyah, or the Saved Sect, which is also to be banned... Other groups may not be on the list now, but will be kept under review (The Guardian, 22 July 2006).

In the main photograph in this article, the caption read: “Muslim demonstration organised by Anjem Choudhary, former righthand man to the al-Ghurabaa founder. Photograph: David Levene/Guardian”. Here, the “Muslim demonstration” with the rowdy behaviour of a handful of members of a banned radical group was linked with the whole Muslim community. Hence, the event was used to blame and stereotype the British Muslim community and presented them as an “enemy within”. Some may argue that surely, it is presented accurately but perceived by the readers in a different way according to their bias; one could have a similar presentation of Christian extremist body-like those of the Waco tragedy in America. That does not mean that all Christian groups are going to fight authority and commit suicide.

In contrast, in its coverage of a series of protests since the 7/7 incident, such as British students’ protests against tuition fee rises, and British National Party and anti-BNP protests, The Guardian did not use the connotation “Christian protestors”. However, one
may also presume that all students and BNP people may not be practising Christians. Thus, the use of the term "Muslim demonstration" suggests a negative and biased view of Muslims to readers. On the other hand, *The Daily Telegraph* recorded the cartoon protest in six of its news reports published between 2 February 2006 and 9 February 2006 using cynical headlines and connotations such as these damaging phrases: “Flame of Islamic fury”; “Incitement to murder”, “Bomber”; and “100,000 Muslims to vent anger in London at cartoon protest”. Further, in one of its reports *The Daily Telegraph* stated:

To its credit, the Government shows no signs of capitulation. But to its detriment, it is signally failing to take on the preachers of hate in Britain... The Government’s failure to act against preachers of this kind of poison merely perpetuates and encourages them... It was the failure to act decisively against the preachers of hate that helped to incubate Islamic terrorism in Britain... (*The Daily Telegraph*, 3 September 2006).

On a broader level, it is noted that the long-term effects of the 7/7 reporting appeared in the initiation of debates on religious identities and their role and place in ordinary people’s lives, assuming that it was religion that misguided the London bombers. This particular thinking opened up debates such as those on the veil and Sharia in 2006 and 2008, which lasted for months and became a focal point in academia and the mass media. Hence, this paved the way for the press, politicians, pressure groups and peers to discuss and debate the religion and beliefs of one deviant group according to their own perceptions. These situations led to the start of the veil controversy that later spread throughout Europe and resulted in the Burka ban in France in 2011 and the veil ban in 2009. In Britain, *The Daily Telegraph* published poll results such as “Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want sharia law in UK” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 19 February 2006) and “Islam poses a threat to the West, say 53pc in poll” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 25 August 2006). This trend continued in the period that falls outside this thesis, such as “We too should ban the burka” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 13 April 2011) and “We’re not far off a British burqa ban” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 14 April 2011). In February 2008, the British media largely misrepresented the Sharia debate, which ended up in controversy and ultimately caused a moral panic (Bano, 2008; Wilson, 2010). Importantly, according to the
statistics such statements about Burka-wearing women in Britain were not true (see The Guardian, 20 September 2013).

Obviously, all these debates stemmed from 7/7, an event that was presented as a moral panic. For instance, the veil was never seen as an issue before the London bombings. The same year, 2006, saw several new pieces of legislation such as the “Identity Card Act 2006” and “The Terrorism Act 2006”. In the same year, for the first time in Britain’s history its reputed educational institutions were linked with radicalisation. It is also important to remember that Europe killed thousands of suspected witches as the result of a panic (Briggs, 1998; Levack 2006; Roper, 2006). In brief, overall the government introduced precautionary measures at airports, railway stations, hospitals and other public places, surveillance dramatically increased, and stops and searches after 7/7 reached record high levels. For example, The Guardian revealed the following on 17 August 2005; “Unpublished figures from July 7 to August 10 showed that the transport police carried out 6,747 stops under anti-terrorism laws, with the majority in London” (see Statewatch, 2005).

(v)-Warnings:

The warning phase ascertains that a similar event may occur again and that it may be worse. The 7/7 incident is regarded as a disaster because it happened without any prior warning, as in the case of IRA bombings. Therefore, the press attempted to persuade the general public that they should be prepared for any sudden threat. Both newspapers cited American and Canadian security sources on several occasions to validate that the threat of another attack was genuine. In an article The Daily Telegraph wrote that, “Ever since the September 11 atrocities in America in 2001, there have been warnings that an attack on London was ‘inevitable’. There have been predictions of chemical or biological attacks and exercises have been carried out on the Underground to try to counter them” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2005). The same article further suggested that “Today’s Islamist terrorist could be a foreigner or home-grown but he will be of an ethnic and religious background that makes infiltration difficult by white police agents and requires better intelligence from the community in which he lives” (ibid.) In other words, it proposed a scenario in which every Muslim should spy on their fellow Muslims at home, in public and in the workplace. In the same vein, The Guardian also published
articles suggesting that a similar event may recur based on warnings by terrorists and police; however, it rejected the idea of people spying on one another.

Based on views in neighbouring European nations, The Guardian ran a detailed article published on 28 July 2005 under the headline: “Fearful Europe steps up security: Vulnerable countries act quickly to bring in new powers” The news report stated:

The Italian senate yesterday approved a bill to give the armed forces powers normally reserved for the police, allowing soldiers to search suspects and vehicles. It was the latest in a series of measures endorsed since July 7 in a country that fears it could be the next terror target. A poll published this week by the daily Corriere della Sera found 85% of Italians fear a terror attack within weeks or months (The Guardian, 28 July 2005).

The same article stated that France, Belgium, Germany, and Eastern European nations such as Poland had passed Bills to increase police and security officials’ power to arrest without charge and that these countries had increased their surveillance measures. Furthermore, these countries believed that they may be hit within weeks or months. This sort of warning features regularly in both newspapers on the occasion of the 7/7 anniversary and on major occasions such as Christmas, Royal Weddings, Papal visits and the Olympic Games when police, press, and politicians talk of possible terrorist attacks coming mainly from Muslims. However, given what has happened, to some extent this approach is perhaps not surprising. Soon after the 7/7 bombings, the press, politicians, pressure groups and police and security officials joined forces to raise concerns about a perceived threat to the social order. Evidently, this was politicised as the entire Muslim community came under surveillance and were seen as potential suspects, further strengthening the already well established “Us and them” divide.

This “suspicion” and otherness consequently developed into a scenario in which fear prevails. In addition, the construction of the notion of “evil” leads to hostility towards and concern about a particular group (Muslims) who became new “folk devils” in the sense that they pose a threat to a peaceful society. The “Good” vs. “Evil” dichotomy appears to be the core message that creates a moral panic by labelling one group
(Muslims) as radical extremists and a potential threat. Moreover, politicians stress the link between a religious “ideology” and the London bombings. In this way, the religion of Islam as a whole is seen as a threat to the secular West. In addition, foreign links were instantly established and facts and figures were left unchecked. This rushed reporting causes fear and suggests that the perceived threat of terrorism is perpetual.

Moreover, both newspapers published interviews with politicians, government officials, and members of victims’ families on the 7/7 anniversaries, suggesting that the significance of the event is also a reminder that it will never be forgotten. Van Dijk refers to six major media studies (including Galtung and Ruge, 1965, and van Dijk, 1983d) and writes that “Much of the news is not so much about happenings or events, but about what other people, typically the powerful and the elite, say or write” (Van Dijk, 1987, p.41). On the whole, his notion of news is correct because it is based on evidence that shows that big organisations, political groups and parties and other elite institutions including government and non-government organisations use the media to deliver their message (ibid). In this way, dominant sources routinely gain access to news production (Fishman, 1980; Tuchman, 1979; Van Dijk, 1987).

Arguably, post-7/7 there has emerged a new kind of “folk devil”, a “suicide bomber” who is inspired by an “evil ideology”, meaning interpretations of Islamic teachings that eventually became “Islamic terrorism”. Evidently, some politicians, police, pressure groups and sections of the press identify some radical young British-born Muslims as security threats. Realistically however, a high level of terrorist actions and threats and actions by radical groups will fuel the situation. In turn, pejorative expressions such as “Londonistan” and “Walthamstan” associated the capital and its inner area with Asian British-born Muslims’ radicalisation. All the stages found in the work of Cohen begin to create moral panics relating to British Muslims’ beliefs and traditions. A significant aspect of Cohen’s concept that is further developed in later scholarly work is the emphasis upon a nexus of powerful elites that unite to push these ideas, including the press.

In the step-wise process, Prime Minister Blair started off by saying that the “Rules of the games have changed”; subsequently, pressure groups, police and politicians began demanding tougher laws such as increasing police powers to stop and search and the
detention of terror suspects without charge for 90 days. Further, the Blair government introduced a 12-point anti-terror plan including “Consultation on a new power to close a place of worship used as a centre for fomenting extremism” and “Review of citizenship ceremonies” and “banning Hizbut Tahrir...” (The Guardian, 5 August 2005). MI5 and police chiefs appeared more frequently in the news, stating that they had stopped more terror attacks; this was true in the case of 21/7 and the failed attempt at Glasgow airport in 2007.

In the light of these developments, some British mosques were linked with extremism, particularly the peaceful reform movement Tablighi Jamaat mosque in Dewsbury because one of the bombers was from Dewsbury and he had been seen praying there. But that does not mean that if anyone who prays in Tablighi Jamaat mosque would be their member. In the context of mosques, there began a debate on whether there should be British Imams, whether young people should have greater roles on committees, and whether there should be separate mosques for women. In particular, The Daily Telegraph published a survey and studies describing how young British-born Muslim students are being radicalised in mosques and universities. It used negative phrases such as “hotbed of Islamic extremism” that further increase fear and hatred of British Muslims. In a number of articles, The Daily Telegraph refers to Professor Anthony Glees’ studies that claim that 20 British institutions are recruitment centres for young British Muslim students who are targets of hate preachers and extremists (see The Daily Telegraph, 13 August 2006; 17 October 2006 and 8 July 2007). It is important to note that this report was inaccurate which has been already discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Even now The Daily Telegraph has not changed its stance that extremism and radicalisation among British Muslims students take place in British universities (see The Daily Telegraph, 13 April 2008; 3 January 2010; 6 June 2011, 22 and 23 August 2014; 17 September 2015 and 6 January 2016).

In contrast, The Guardian disclosed: “Universities urged to spy on Muslims”, suggesting that The Daily Telegraph was panicking over the issues. This is a crucial point because, on the basis of Glees’ claims, The Daily Telegraph created a panic of growing radicalism and extremism in British universities. To indicate how Cohen’s concept might best be situated in this thesis, one might consider a Guardian story on 3 December 2008 which, although it falls outside the research period, is highly relevant. Cambridge University
scholar June Edmunds’ research shows that the matter was exaggerated on the basis of “flimsy” findings by Glees that British universities are “hotbeds of Islamic radicalism” (*The Guardian*, 3 December 2008). This example further strengthens the idea of Cohen and his successors: in every society panics come and go, and they are created by a nexus of a few powerful elites. Hence, it is evident that Cohen’s concept is truly relevant to British Muslims’ representation stemming from the tragic 7/7 event.

In brief, based on a thematic analysis of inclusive reporting on 7/7, this thesis concludes that both newspapers mainly use political language to essentialise, demonise and sensationalise the 7/7 event. All these elements were employed to cause a moral panic that works in a coordinated manner. The nexus of four key players - the press, politicians, pressure groups and police - essentialise the event as a Muslim problem. In addition, policy-oriented research institutions published reports and surveys that overemphasised the perceived notion of the threat of another attack. These references then received massive attention in newspapers in all types of journalism such as news reports, columns and comment pieces. However, on the ‘Muslim problem’ the attitude and approach of *The Guardian* was clearly different from *The Daily Telegraph* because it also published follow-up investigative reports and challenged some aspects of distorted reporting, for example on Muslim students becoming radicalised in the universities (see *The Guardian*, 8 November 2005). Thus, in comparison to *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Guardian* was less inclined to accept elites’ (the nexus of four Ps as explained above) views on the subject.

Arguably, the three categories of language used by these broadsheets to deal with British Muslims and Islam - essentialism, demonisation, and sensationalism - can be better understood from the following Venn diagram. For example, where essentialism and demonisation overlap, the press presents particular individuals such as terrorists (7/7 bombers) as “evil doers”, and where essentialism and sensationalism overlap, the press coverage portrays the 7/7 event as demonstrating the “shocking true nature” of the actors involved. Finally, the space where the three circles overlap is a central cosmos for the press reporting on “Islamic extremism”, “Islamic radicalisation” and “Islamic terrorism”.

At this point, one finds these broadsheets’ purported loyalty to Enlightenment values, although they actually demonstrate their scant allegiance to Enlightenment rationalism.
Venn diagram 8.1: Key Categories in the 7/7 reporting of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph.

Consequently, Muslims have become visible as new “Folk Devils” while the press interpretation of terrorism as a product of religious ideology raises further concerns about the Islamic faith, ultimately leading to a moral panic. Most importantly, political and non-political events have occurred regularly, allowing the panic to continue in one way or the other. For example, the veil controversy leads to hate preachers, the al-Qaeda network and failed bomb plotters, all of which combine to sustain the security threat. On the whole, it is evident that news-gathering sources play an important role in defining and reshaping the debates about the British Muslim question that is at the centre of the 7/7 reporting. Both broadsheets rephrased political statements to signify a uniform approach to and common mindset on the 7/7 incident among all key players, including political elites, the press itself, pressure groups and police and security institutions. Besides, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph decoded policy and general
statements via key figures, particularly in their headlines, to present their own points of view on issues such as the veil.

In sum, the two newspapers clearly differed in their approach and attitude to the 7/7 event. The essential difference between these newspapers was that *The Guardian* continued to challenge bias and distorted reporting by the press including, *The Daily Telegraph*, on British Muslims’ issues in its investigative reports, features and editorials. This includes *The Daily Telegraph* stories of British Muslim students becoming radicalised in the British universities, the cartoon controversy, and coverage of protestors and arrests of suspects. A classic example is *The Guardian* article published on 8 July 2005 under the headline:

700 arrests; 17 convictions that reveal that more than 700 people have been arrested under the Terrorism Act since September 11, but half have been released without charge and only 17 convicted. Only three of the convictions relate to allegations of Islamist extremism (*The Guardian*, 8 July 2005).

In short, *The Guardian* continued to publish follow-up stories and investigative reports that evidently challenged its competitor press, politicians and public bodies in some cases; this approach, in comparison to *The Daily Telegraph*, limits its role in creating the panic of “new folk devils”, the British Muslims.
Chapter 9- Conclusion:

The evidence suggests that both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* have dealt with all terrorism in a condemnatory manner, be it the IRA and Protestant Paramilitary bombings and killings in the United Kingdom or the events of 7/7. However, both newspapers have been much more conscious, in their contrasting ways, of the religious element in the events of 7/7 in a way that was never evident in the case of the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland. Indeed, their emphasis up “Islamic terrorism” and “Muslim bombers” has taken the treatment of terrorism to a new and different level of religious association and created a new ‘folk-devil’ of the Muslims in Britain.

This thesis began by asking a fundamental question: How did *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* present British Muslims in the wake of the 7/7 bombings? A thematic analysis of the reporting on 7/7 in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* over a period of two years (8 July 2005-7 July 2007) indicated a blend of opinions, accusations, suggestions, and complaints from the three main parties involved in discussions and debates over the incident: the press, the authorities and British Muslims.

Clearly, the 7/7 event stemmed from a political manifestation in that case it was based on grievances against the British government's policy in Iraq. Arguably, the press interpreted and presented the event as a religious problem because it looked at it through the prism of the 7/7 bombers self-interpreted version of religious ideology that is named as an “evil ideology”. It is argued that this clash is mainly between “radical Islamists” and Western political elites who have political vested interests in the Middle East, predominantly a Muslim region. In this regard, the Western elites evidently have contacts with radicals whom they have supported on numerous occasions, including the Taliban fighters and Middle East-based extremist groups in Libya and Syria. Thus, this clash has produced a terrorism threat that may well persist for years to come.

The two broadsheets began with a number of assumptions, thoughts and arguments; for example, al-Qaeda was behind the London bombings, the 7/7 bombers were radicalised in mosques and madrassas (Islamic religious schools) in Pakistan, and it was an “evil ideology” that brainwashed a few young British-born Muslims and caused them to attack their country of birth. With the passage of time, as these newspapers further probed into the 7/7 events, some of these initial assumptions changed, a few remained
the same and various opinions further strengthened while certain initial thoughts disappeared, such as the call for an independent inquiry into the 7/7 event.

Gradually, the security narrative developed strong opinions in both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*, which was pushing the government to hold an independent public inquiry into the 7/7 incident. In particular, *The Guardian* believed that there were many unanswered questions in the government narrative of the bombings. Initially, such demands came from politicians and representatives of public and religious bodies but then the bombers' victims and relatives of the deceased joined this call, which was an eminently reasonable request. However, the demands for an independent inquiry into the 7/7 event slowly died down, surprisingly even in *The Guardian*, which had shown huge interest in following up investigative reports related to the 7/7 event.

In regard to explanations of ideology,

In regard to explanations of ideology that is rooted in Wahhabism which allegedly endorses violence both *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* allocated plenty of space to discuss the attack's religious aspects and connections which were related exclusively to Islam, but they spent very little time examining the ideology that encouraged state actors to embark upon arguably the most controversial war of all time based on the false assumptions about the existence of WMD. However, both newspapers, particularly *The Guardian*, acknowledged that the “Islamist” radical ideology is the terrorists’ own interpretation of Islam just as previous terrorists have misinterpreted their religious beliefs, such as the Catholics.

The use of the words “radical Muslims” separates them from the rest of the British Muslim community. In this way, in fact, both newspapers made it clear that they were condemning only those 7/7 perpetrators and indeed not the entire Muslim community. Further, the phrase “Islamist” refers to just a few British radical Muslims’ political motives, including the possible establishment of a caliphate. However, these newspapers both used the words “Islamic” and “Islamic terrorism” to describe those bombers and other British radicals who describe concepts and values related to the religion of Islam. Arguably, to an extent this shows that these newspapers were targeting Islam and accused it of promoting the present form of terrorism.

On radicalisation and terrorism, both newspapers, particularly *The Daily Telegraph*, accused the religion more than it questioned the political landscape and the role of state in the growth of radicalisation.
Another significant point is that radicalisation among a few British Muslims was frequently presented as an outcome of religious “ideology” although there may have been other factors that were often discussed and raised in academic studies. Surprisingly, little space was allocated to balancing the debate on ideology, which was predominantly on “Islamic ideology”, although to an extent both newspapers admitted that it is an “evil ideology” of radical fragments in society. At the same time, the notion of “in the name of God” in association with Bush and Blair was discussed in The Guardian comment pieces and news items but not in The Daily Telegraph, which suggested that news is not simply information but is in fact “constructed and framed” and a product of “the media and the government” (see Patterson, 1998, p.17; Cook, 1998, p.3).

In the ideology debate the focus of attention was mainly on “Muslim radicals” and “Muslim extremists” but neither newspaper investigated and discussed the ideology behind the Western elites led by Bush and Blair who also acted “in the name of God”. In other words they were also doing their God’s duty to invade Iraq for whatever reason. To be fair, The Guardian differentiated between radical fractions within the British Muslim community and ordinary Muslims. Although The Daily Telegraph reporting occasionally indicated that not all Muslims are radicals, it argued that radicalisation and extremism are predominantly a Muslim problem in Britain.

Thus, Islam as a religion emerged as a “victim” in the sense that a few self-appointed, self-styled individuals, be they radicals, hate-preachers or controversial so-called experts on Islam, interpreted it, discussed and debated it, and finally represented it in a way they considered correct. Finally, these aforementioned individuals proposed a “modernised” Islam as a way of addressing contemporary problems of society including radicalisation and terrorism. Unfortunately, in doing so, these individuals in particular and, to an extent, the press itself occasionally quoted a few verses from the Quran without explaining their significance, historical context, meaning and relevance to present-day situations. This misleading and biased approach to a sacred text without scholarly consultation and checks indicated a constructed myth. However, some may say that the same would be true of the newspaper analysis of Christian religion which these broadsheets would be very unlikely to examine.
Until the start of this thesis, previous studies’ description of an ‘Orient’ showed rather consistent identicalness in his character that was inheritably “violent”, “dangerous”, “other”, and sort of an “enemy within” originally at distance land be it the Middle East or in Asia. But the 7/7 event interpretations within both newspapers have transformed our previous ‘Orient’ with a new one that is different in many ways. Today, our Orient is a part of inner communities who is reasonably well-educated, modern, open in a sense of believing in mix-cultural marriage, revert Muslim, born and bred Asian which is a shock and new challenge. Hence our Orient is not traditional but “home-grown” and “Islamist radical” who is at same time Asian, white English and Black. This is another reminder of an identical moral panic that is also based upon youth-cultural behaviour but in its changing face that is radicalisation. So the strength of this thesis is based upon indicating a new Orient within a specified period of time in both newspapers and also the hypothesis that newness in terrorism in post-7/7 media settings in Islamic.

Undoubtedly, terrorism in its all forms and in all regions should be denounced, as both broadsheets did. But as they did so, it occasionally appeared as though these broadsheets did not appreciate that Islamic terrorism should be treated like other forms of terrorism and should not be associated with a particular religious group. The two broadsheets offered different perspectives on the 7/7 event and its connections with the Iraq War. Consequently, the overall debate on terrorism in both broadsheets’ types of journalism clearly showed that press coverage works like a “thermometer”: it shoots up during incidents of terrorism and extremism and cools down to normal when nothing is happening that involves British Muslims or Muslims at the international level. Such style of coverage has been indicated before by Edward Said’s notion of “latent stereotypes”.

In addition, the reporting of both newspapers on the fight against terrorism revealed a straightforward difference in their opinions on the methods and approaches to deal with terrorism. In explaining the ways of fighting the challenge of terrorism, the editorial position of The Guardian remained largely the same throughout in its all forms of journalism including comment pieces, features and special investigative reports. It argued that individual freedom and liberty cannot be sacrificed because of the terrorism threat as there may be alternative ways of dealing with it. Briefly, in ten editorials during the period 8 July 2005-7 July 2007, The Guardian conveyed a message of four main themes: liberty, freedom, humanity and community bonding. These are also
proclaimed symbolic features of *The Guardian’s* own values and ethics upon which its journalism is based.

In contrast, eight of *The Daily Telegraph’s* editorials delivered a measured message wrapped up in four points: terrorism is all in the name of Islam; terrorists and fanatics must be defeated with tough laws, boldness and courageous policies; it would be mistake to believe that “fundamentalist-inspired terrorism can be stopped” even if the West accepts that it was “caused” by the Iraq war; and terrorism is a problem for radical Muslims and, therefore, the best option is to engage with moderate Muslims and eliminate any contacts with radicals. Further, in its editorials *The Daily Telegraph* argued that terrorists aspire to impose their version of laws upon us (British society). There is “no common ground between their vision of the future and ours” and, therefore, Britain must not compromise or negotiate with them.

On the reasons behind the 7/7 attack, both newspapers maintained their same initial stance throughout. Although the coverage of the 7/7 incident in both broadsheets suggests that there were several different reasons for the attacks, a key factor remained Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq even though the two newspapers had different views on this matter. Eleven years on, *The Guardian* still maintains that the driving force behind the London Bombers’ radicalisation was Britain’s controversial role in Iraq. Further, it has insisted in its editorials and comment pieces that one day British politicians who allied themselves with the Americans and invaded Iraq upon a false assumption of the existence of “weapons of mass destruction” will regret it.

In contrast, *The Daily Telegraph* supported the view of the then British government headed by Blair who joined Bush in his wars on Iraq and Afghanistan as part of military campaigns in the “war on terror”. The crux of the terrorism debate in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* indicated that the current face of terrorism is a product of religious ideology that has roots in the Wahhabi version of Islam dating back to eighteenth-century Arabia.

In other words, the representations of British Muslims were somewhat associated with their faith and culture. In the wake of the 7/7 event, it is fair to say that British Muslims do have a problematic press representation. However, it is also honest to bring up the press view that British Muslims are lacking a nationwide community representation that might be consulted and negotiated with on matters important to British Muslims.
For these newspapers, urging British Muslims to adopt certain aspects of “Britishness” as a man-made model is like endorsing it as a perfect idea.

However, in reality British society has witnessed social problems such as riots, anti-social behaviour and racism, and these continuing challenges suggest that “Britishness” or “the British way of life” is not watertight but evolving. Both newspapers criticised Saudi Arabia for funding a few British mosques and viewed it as “intervening” and a cause of the increasing radicalisation in Britain. But at the same time, they were cautious about “intervening” in British Muslims’ faith, arguing that it was more like a “British Islam”.

The representations of British Muslims during this two-year period in the reporting of both broadsheets scarcely improved from their existing image as “illiterate”, “violent”, “dangerous others” from pre-7/7 Britain to “radicalised others”, “traitors”, “internal security threat” and “incompatible” during and after the failed 21/7 plot and following the failed Glasgow airport terminal attacks on 30 June 2007. The two broadsheets offered different reflections on the events of 7/7 although they both raised issues about the conflict between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’ and the concept of “Orientalism”.

Thus, the contemporary “Orient”, i.e. the “British Muslims” residing within Europe who were previously described as inherently “old-fashioned”, “backward”, “dangerous”, “violent”, and a “threat”, has became the “enemy within” and has posed an “internal security risk”. Manifestly, the well-known notion of “otherness” is routinely visible in the aftermath of the 7/7 reporting and in debates and discussions surrounding Muslims’ place, functioning and future in multicultural British society.

Perceptibly, religion was a dominant feature of the “British way of life” notion which brought the old “Us” and “Them” rhetoric. Nevertheless, this binary division which is based upon religion was slightly different in that it was the self-interpreted “evil ideology” of the radicals that presented a new challenge to the British way of life. On this point, both broadsheets suggested that “modern Islam” and “moderate Muslims” are the solution to curb this threat.

However, modernity had different meanings and manifestations in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph; for the former it meant “secular nature” and for the latter it was “Sufi Islam”. At this particular moment, the reporting on the 7/7 bombing also indicated
the presence of Hall’s hypothesis of “the West” and “the Rest” which described “the West” as “scientifically advanced”, “powerful”, “modern”, “civilized”, “democratic”, and “secular” in comparison to “the Rest” which is “under-developed”, “backward” and “conservative”.

This thesis clearly identifies the presence of Cohen’s concept of ‘folk devils and moral panics’ as indicators of British Muslims’ representation in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. The crux of the 7/7 reporting demonstrated the presence of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panic’ concepts and its salient features: exaggeration, symbolisation, reaction and warning in a systemic manner. In a way both newspapers spent fewer efforts in investigating beneath the surface to find whether or not those surveys, opinion polls, studies, statements and quotes those were incorporated were authentic and reliable. Further, self-styled and self-appointed individuals were presented as experts and scholars on Islam.

Furthermore, the moral panics occur as a result of a nexus of powerful elites, i.e. the four “P’s” (press, politicians, pressure groups and police). Several scholars have enriched Cohen’s ideas; for example, Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1994), Arnold Hunt (1997), and Ronald Burns and Charles Crawford (1999) identified a nexus of politicians, press and pressure groups that work together to create moral panics. Later on, Chas Critcher (2006; 2008) reminded us that Cohen identifies four sets of agents as crucial to the development of a moral panic: the mass media, moral entrepreneurs, the control culture and the public (Critcher, 2008, p.1129). In the end, it is the “sociology of evil” that identifies and props up ‘moral panics and folk devils’ and, to Cohen, “More moral panics will be generated and other, as yet nameless, folk devils will be created” (Cohen, 1987, p.204).

Conclusively, British Muslims emerged as new “Folk Devils” because they have threatened the peaceful way of life of the British people and risked their safety. The distorted image of Islam signalled the manifestation of a closed view that Islam is a threat and a security risk to the West. This potentially negative description may be harmful to a society that is struggling to deal with disenfranchised British Muslim youths who are becoming radicals and extremists.

At that very moment, both newspapers were operating in a tense, shocking and challenging environment in which the chances of an occurrence of human error in such
a situation was possible, and this may have contributed to the production of a rather 
distorted image of British Muslims and Islam. Perhaps equivalent events in the Muslim 
world would have produced similar reactions on the grounds of the perpetrators’ 
religious affiliations. However, these quality broadsheets have a manifest code of ethics 
and, above all, reporting on another terrorism event was a test of their fairness and the 
professional essence for which they stand. However, our expectations of the press as a 
mirror of reality and a messiah are weak because, as noted, it reports events and issues 
in association with other players including the press itself, politicians, pressure groups, 
the police and public bodies.

During the two-year research period, some significant changes took place within The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting. Both newspapers shifted their priorities 
and focus of attention from the immediate reaction to the event, which was a call for 
tougher laws and increased security to prevent further terror attacks, to the anti-
Muslim backlash and government proposals for new terror laws to counter terrorism. 
Also, both newspapers changed their positions on a number of matters while 
maintaining the same stance on issues that occurred during the coverage, such as 
terrorism legislation, cartoons, the veil and Britishness.

At first, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph both criticised British security 
institutions for their failure to stop the dreadful event of the London Bombings. The 
newspapers branded this failure an “intelligence blunder” and a “scandalous error” and 
blamed the British security institutions for their failure to prevent the 7/7 incident. 
However, following the 21/7 incident, both changed their view of the security 
institutions because the police and MI5 had managed to foil terror plots, particularly the 
21/7 plot, for which these newspapers recognised and admired the security 
institutions’ efforts. In The Daily Telegraph’s reporting in particular, a direct link 
between Islam and terrorism was established using the banner of “evil ideology”. There 
was no change in The Daily Telegraph’s view that terrorism is a product of religious 
ideology. Although The Guardian continued to refer to 7/7 as “Islamic terrorism”, it also 
incorporated some opposing views of Muslim representatives who stated that Islam has 
nothing to do with terrorism.

On a series of issues, including the response to 7/7, the two newspapers emerged as 
bitter rivals, demonstrating the intellectual divide within British society, quite apart
from their opposing political views of the event. Hence, a scenario developed that brought the two newspapers face to face, suggesting that they were fighting a battle of ideas. An example is *The Guardian’s* portrayal of the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, as liberal, open-minded and logical. In comparison, *The Daily Telegraph* considered him a friend and associate of “homophobic Islamic preacher al-Qaradawi” (15 September, 2005; 4 March 2006).

Significantly, the findings of this thesis reveal the comprehensive presence of the “folk devils and moral panics” concept in the post-7/7 press coverage of British Muslims, as explained in detail earlier. It is pertinent to revisit the history of moral panics and consider their long-lasting impacts on British society. Evidently, the “mods” and “rockers” did not ultimately bear the burden of stigmas and stereotypes with which they were generally tagged by the British press. Some of them mutated into self-exiled hippies or ‘freaks’ in India whilst the vast majority did not. The moral panic raised by the bombings in 2005 and the post-7/7 press coverage of British Muslims raised differing interpretations within the broadsheet press largely read by the middle classes of Britain.

On the one hand *The Guardian* emphasised the liberal values of its readers by seeking social integration as a solution to the problems raised by the bombings within British society. Its editorial policy was to view the events as a product of the Iraq war, although it offered a platform for many writers and commentators who held differing opinions. *The Daily Telegraph* took a more institutional and establishment approach which suggested that the issue was more one of religion and an association with Islamic or Muslim groups. The fact is that these newspapers were reporting to different types of audiences and in the process often skewed their reporting, editorials and commentary to their perceived readership.

As a result, events and explanations were often distorted and rendered inaccurate by commission and omission. However, this is probably true of most reporting in Western democracies, just as it is for newspaper reporting in Eastern and Islamic nations, where it is directed, cramped and confined by religious imperatives. In the end, the failure of the British broadsheet press to appreciate the finer points of the ‘Muslim Terrorist’ debate was a product of the need to respond to the horrific events of 2005 in ways which perhaps met the expectations of their readership.
Given that the terrorism threat may well continue, it would be useful, in the interests of a wider global public audience and readership, were the press to also incorporate the views of mainstream recognised religious authorities and liaise with well-established religious institutions such as Al-Azhar in Egypt, Darul Uloom in Pakistan, Darul Uloom Al-Arabiya Al-Islamiyyah in the UK, Darul Uloom Deoband in India and various Islamic studies departments in major UK universities. Since both newspapers admitted that community bonding is essential to counter terrorism, it seems highly desirable to avoid misperceptions and misunderstandings of British Muslims or other faith groups that might lead to confrontations.

In the end The Guardian’s proposal to enter into dialogue with radicals and all strands of British Muslims could potentially bring together some common aspects of Islamic and British values such as respect for law, charity and humanity. More specifically, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph suggested that a strong sense of “community bonding” would be the best way to combat radicalisation and terrorism. However, this stance hides the fact that they held very different views on why the bombings occurred and how Muslims in British society should be treated.
Appendix- A (i): Examples of familiarisation with data initial notes, marking, concepts etc.
Appendix- A (ii): Familiarising the data.
Appendix- A (iii): Familiarising the data.

The Daily Telegraph (LONDON)
May 2, 2007 Wednesday

What exactly was it that made this man hate us?

BYLINE: Jan Moir on Wednesday
SECTION: FEATURES; Comment; Pg. 19
LENGTH: 719 words

This photograph of Omar Khyam tells us a lot about the 25-year-old leader of the jihadi “fertiliser bomb plot”. Already in police custody, and perhaps knowing that he would spend the rest of his life behind bars, Khyam’s expression shows none of the regret and shame we might look for, or even hope to see. Instead, his eyes smoulder with loathing and his lips rise in a hot sneer of disgust. It is a face full of suppressed rage; a rage that is focused against Britain and its people, against you and me. What did we do to Omar Khyam, to make him hate us so? Why are he and his fellow would-be murderers so hell-bent on the destruction of hundreds of innocent British people? British people, it might be added, in some ways just like them?

It has become horribly clear over recent years that a number of British-born Muslims, many of them from comfortable middle-class backgrounds, have somehow evolved into terrorists determined to perpetrate mass murder on their fellow citizens. The perplexing, spiritual journey that takes these young men from suburban contentment and cricket teas to al-Qaeda hate camps in some dirt-hole in the Pakistan/Afghanistan region is a difficult one to comprehend. Particularly now.

For Khyam grew up in integrated, happy affluence in Surrey, where he was the captain of his school cricket team, and the only Asian boy in a local football team. He was included and embraced in life, not excluded and ostracised because of his colour or religion. His back story smashes the cosy, old theory that radicalisation

compatriots. Until

al-Qaeda starting pouring propaganda into the little fissure in his soul, he was an ordinary boy from a good background. Not a psychopathic loner, like Cho Seung-hui, the misfit who killed 32 fellow pupils and staff at Virginia Tech before turning his gun on himself.

Perhaps the most unsettling thing to emerge from the terror trial that ended this week is that Khyam was once just another bloke from the burbs, and that there are plenty more like him out there, full of hate and rage.
Appendix B (i). Example of thematic coding process

<table>
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<th>Newspaper</th>
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</thead>
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<td>7/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headline</td>
<td>We need a public inquiry so we can come to terms with what happened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Simon Jenkins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description/affiliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of source</td>
<td>7/7 victims and their families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>May 15 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>612 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link</td>
<td><a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3310132/The">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3310132/The</a> need for a public inquiry so we can come to terms with what happened.html</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme/Codes</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of the relatives and survivors of the 7/7 bomb attack survivors said the Government should hold a public inquiry to help them to come to terms with what happened:

Paul Judge, who was present helping an injured victim wearing a surgical mask and there were still many unanswered questions.

Mr. Haddon, a former office from Cambridgeshire in the West Midlands said, “I will do whatever I can to campaign for a public inquiry.”

I would like to see a new inquiry to ensure that the inquiry that will be held will only happen if the Government thinks it won’t be held accountable for what happened.

Michael Haining, who was hit away from the Aldwych train blast, said he was worried that ‘blinded angry young men’ could do the same thing again.
Appendix-B- (ii). Example of thematic coding process:

The failures were particular and general. Two of the 7/7 gang, Khan and Tameer, were known to the security services. Both had visited Pakistan for extended periods in the months before their suicide mission. Khan, in particular, was already of considerable interest to MI5. It is MI5’s job to collate, to sift, to match and to interpret information of this kind. Potently, the service failed to do that in these cases. This seems not to have been purely a matter of inadequate resources. It was also an operational failure, and thus a failure for which management must take responsibility. The new home secretary, [John Reid], gave no indication yesterday that this has happened.

The ISC report makes some sensible practical criticisms of the intelligence failure. But it provides few effective answers to wider questions. No one should imagine that intelligence can prevent every terrorist act. That is unrealistic. But intelligence should be held accountable for its failures nevertheless. How else can a society learn from mistakes? A significant part of the failure on 7/7 stemmed from a perception that “home-grown” suicide bombings were relatively unlikely in Europe (not surprisingly, this assessment has now been revised). But this stemmed in turn from an inability to recognize the speed of radicalisation that was taking place in some parts of British Islam, partly because of the British government’s support for the Iraq war. The evidence of such radicalisation was so obvious by 2005 that it is hard not to conclude that the security failure was both negligent and inexcusable.

How should a strong open society respond to these failures? The twin pillars of the answer are transparency and a willingness to change in response to new information.
Appendix-B-(iii)-A selected sample of initial coding sheet of *The Telegraph/The Guardian*:

**Code-1- The British Terrorists Mindset, beliefs and family backgrounds:**

Sub-code i) They hate our way of life (British)

ii) They hate their country of birth (enemy within)...

**Code-2-The role of Religious Ideology in extremism and terrorism**

Sub-code-(i) “Wahhabi terrorism”/Catholic “terrorism”

ii) 7/7 bombers acted on the name of Islam (a perverted ideology)...

**Code-3- Causes of the 7/7: Security negligence or failure?**

Sub-code- (i) MI5 knew London bombers identities and previous crime records before the attacks

ii) MI5 and police could not be blamed for the 7/7 security failure

**Code-4- Terrorism Threats to Britain’s Inland Security.**

Sub-code-(i) Radicalism Islamists gets foreign support/Islamic terrorism threat

ii) Foreign links/actors foreign visits e.g Pakistan, Gulf and France

iii) Police and security and law enforcement agencies are working to prevent terrorism threat...

**Code-5- British Muslims: accusations, grievances and their problems.**

Sub-code (i) British Muslims have created social ghettos

ii) Considering Muslims viewpoint (sympathetic view)

**Code-6- British Security Institutions (MI5/Police): Responsibilities and Failures:**

Sub-code(i) Networks/Cells (e.g. al-Qaeda) linked to the 7/7

ii) Londonistan: Islamist extremist had trouble-free movement in London...

**Code-7- Britain’s Role in American led-wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Caused Radicalization among British Muslims:**

i) Britain role in Afghanistan and Iraq boosts feeling of anger among British Muslims

ii) Western policies and interventions has created chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan...
**Code-8-Islamaits want to Establish Sharia Law and Caliphate**

Sub-code (i) Islamists want to replace Sharia law with the existing British law

ii) Militants ambitions are to take over Britain

iii) Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology of establishing a caliphate

v) AL-Qaeda wants to establish an empire (caliphate)

**Code-9- Britain's role in the Middle East and its impact on British Muslims**

Sub-code (i) Israel-Palestine Conflict

ii) Critics says that Britain's Iraq War policy (weapons of mass destruction) was controversial and a human disaster

iii) London Bombers would had done this any way so it is not a reaction of Iraq policy

**Code-10- US and Them Rhetoric**

i) British way of life vs. Muslims way of life (British values)

ii) Open society vs. closed society..

**Code-11- Demand for an Independent Public Inquiry of the 7/7 Event:**

i) 7/7 victims and their family members call for an independent inquiry...

**Code-12- British Government Counter-Terrorism Policy and its Impact on British Muslims.**

Sub-code (i) Winning hearts and Minds, (home and abroad) appointing more Muslims overseas to engage with the Muslim world...

**Code-13- Community Bonding: British Muslims and Non-Muslims Share Common Values:**

Sub-code (i) Common/shared values/understandings/of British life

ii) Collective efforts could protect and strengthen disaffected British Muslims and non-Muslims youth from being fall into extremism...

**Code-14- Islamophobia in post-7/7 Britain:**

Sub-code-(i) Fear of Islam, for example growing Muslim population
ii) Hatred and panic of Islam using caricatures, films, books. Novel, anti-Quran campaigns etc.

**Code-15- Press Portrayal of Beeston (Leeds) linking with 7/7 Bombers:**

Sub-code-(i) Hotbed of Islamic terrorism.

ii) Beeston name equals to terror making it hard for people to get jobs...

**Code-16- Government Policies of Combating Extremism and Terrorism: British Muslims Participation and Concerns.**

Sub-code-(i) Integration and Cohesion (integration is two way street)...

**Code-17- Human Rights Act: Britain’s Commitment and Violations in Post 7/7 Period.**

Sub-code-(i) Human rights issues such as assurance that suspect/detainees will not be tortured.

ii) Detention powers allow holding foreign suspect for 90 days without charge raises concerns over human rights

iii) Stop and search and spying raise questions on privacy and civil liberty in post-7/7 Britain...

**Code-18- London Bombers Description in British Press:**

Sub-Code (i) Suicide bombers

ii) Radicalization of Young Muslims

**Code-19- Terror Plots/Terror Networks:**

Sub-Code (i) July 21 bomb plot/ Suicide bombers

ii) Doctors/noble profession

**Code-20- Moderate Muslims and the Idea of British Islam:**

Sub-code (i) Moderate Muslims can play leading role in combating extremism and radicalization...

**Code-21- Hate Preachers:**

i) Abu-Hamza/ Finsbury mosque radicalized youngsters and spread hatred of Britain
ii) Anjem Chaudhary (hate preacher) views on British government anti-Muslim polices...

**Code-22- British Press Portrayal of ‘Islam’:**

Sub-code (i) ‘Islamism’ (‘totalitarian’ threat that destroy western democracy etc.)

ii) Political Islam...

**Code-23- Histrocial Context of Terrorism in Britain:**

Sub-code (i) Combating militant Irish republicanism...

**Code-24- Islamists/Radicals Mindset and their Interpretations of Religion:**

Sub code (i) They live in seventh century (autocracy rule)...

**Code-25-Post-7/7 British Society**

Sub code (i) The idea of multiculturalism is weakening.

ii) Londoners show strength after bombings

iii) The idea of Britishness takes new shape...

**Code-26- Blair vs. Brown: Power Struggle, Policies and Strategies:**

i) Tony Blair: as (hard working, defends Britain’s interests at home and abroad, deporting of hate preachers,...(Positive)

ii) Gordon Brown: representation in the press as (expectation of foreign policy revivalist, Future Challenges... (Positive)

**Code-27- Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged Terrorists (21 July 2005).**

Sub-code (i) Suspects

ii) Evidence presented in the court (CCTV footage/videos/photos/documents etc.)

**Code-28- Terrorism Legislation: Recommendations, Criticism and Proposals:**

Sub code (i) “Glorification” of Terrorism meaning (Encouraging terrorism)/ incite to murder, etc.

ii) Muslims view of new anti-terror laws, 90 days detentions as unjust.

**Code-29- Freedom of Speech:**

Sub-code (i) British Muslims do not endorse criticism of their religion (close-minded)
ii) Considering the British Muslims sentiments British press did not publish cartoons,

**Code-30- Reporting British Muslims:**

Sub-code (i) Newspaper corrections without offering an apology (misrepresenting facts and figures)

ii) Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H) cartoon controversy and British media role (positive)...

**Code-31- Spokesperson as a News Source of information on British Muslims issues:**

Sub code (i) Government officials

ii) Academics critical of Muslims (Closed views of Islam and Muslims)...

**Code-32- Role of the British Mosques in post-7/7 Britain:**

Sub code (i) Mosques promoting extremism and radicalization

(ii) London bombers attended mosques in London and Leeds Beeston area...

**Code-33- Debates and Interviews relating to British Muslims:**

Sub-code (i) Muslim scholar views regarding Muslim issues (positive aspects)

ii) Non-Muslim scholar views regarding Muslim issues (positive aspects)...

**Code 34- Engaging with the British Muslim community:**

Sub-code (i) Britain should engage with British Muslim by embracing and sharing fruits of democracy
Appendix-C

Thematic Map or Codebook for Sub-Themes/Codes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code No</th>
<th>Sub-Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-1)</strong></td>
<td>“London bombings provide British Government with a reason to revisit the terrorism legislation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-2)</strong></td>
<td>“Terrorists’ ideology e.g. ‘Wahhabism’ etc. is to destroy and replace Western democratic values with their interpretations of ‘Islamic law’”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-3)</strong></td>
<td>“Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq cannot be blamed for the London Bombings”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-4)</strong></td>
<td>“Islamist extremists and white imperialist racists are two identical troublemakers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-5)</strong></td>
<td>“Islam and terrorism cannot be separated”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-6)</strong></td>
<td>“British Islamists, Sheikh Omar Bakri and his associates such as al-Qaradawi and Abu Izzadeen, are anti-Western hate preachers who must be denounced and banned”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-7)</strong></td>
<td>“Islamists’ real intention is to expand caliphate founded by Sharia Law, ayatollahs and imams”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-8)</strong></td>
<td>“Islamist grievances against the West are irrational and wrong”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-9)</strong></td>
<td>“Britain had provided financial assistance to radicals and Islamists and had developed relationships with their organisations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-10)</strong></td>
<td>“Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan radicalised the London bombers and created a feeling of anger among the younger generation of British Muslims”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(STC-11)</strong></td>
<td>“Many young British-born Muslims became radicalised during their visits to Pakistan, the country of their parents, which exports terrorism”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(STC-12) “UK-based sleeper cells/networks have links to al-Qaeda and religious schools in Pakistan that espouse fundamentalism” (Home-grown terrorism)

(STC-13) “Political process is the best strategy to counter terrorism in Iraq and beyond”

(STC-14) "Britain needs tough laws to deal with modern Islamists’ terrorism threat, which is global”

(STC-15) “British Muslim organisations view Tony Blair’s anti-terrorism laws as undemocratic, unjust and aimed at demonising the whole Muslim community”

(STC-16) "The Terrorism Bill proposes to increase suspects’ detention period for up to 90 days, which will weaken Britain’s commitment to the Human Rights Convention”

(STC-17) ”MI5/Police operations to prevent the Islamist terrorism threat at home and abroad, i.e. suspect arrests, investigations, bravery etc”

(STC-18) “British Muslims demand a public inquiry into the 7/7 event”

(STC-19) “Blair and his Government officials blame British Muslims and their leaders for not doing enough to combat terrorism and suggest that it is Muslims’ problem”

(STC-20) "Londoners showed strength after bombings”

(STC-21) “Non-Muslims, including politicians and 7/7 victims, demand a public inquiry into the 7/7 event”

(STC-22) “7/7 bombers were known to MI5”

(STC-23) “The 7/7 event reflects security agencies’ failure”

(STC-24) "British mosques linked with 7/7 bombers, meeting points, promoting extremism and radicalisation, problematic labels, non-English-speaking imams, etc. (close-minded view)"

(STC-25) “Mosques are promoting community cohesion, etc. (Open-minded view)”

(STC-26) “Islam preaches peace and harmony and has no link with terrorism, etc. (Open-minded view)”

(STC-27) “Islam is linked with terrorism, extremism, radicalisation, women’s issues, etc. (Closed-minded view)”
(STC-28) “British Muslims’ anger and resentment is a result of Western hypocritical and hostile policies in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world”

(STC-29) “Hate preacher Anjem Chaudhary’s statements, etc”

(STC-30) “Radical Islamist individuals, groups and organisations such as al-Qaeda; HizubutTahrir, al-Muhajurin etc inspire anti-Western activities inside Britain and abroad”

(STC-31) “British Foreign Office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood”

(STC-32) “British Government promotes the idea of British Islam/Modern Islam/moderates (Sufi Islam, Council of Imams etc) to counter Islamic radicalism”

(STC-33) “Radical Islam and Militant Muslims are also a challenge to Muslim regimes; therefore, the West must make an alliance with modern Muslims”

(STC-34) “Britain's military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were based on construction and a peace-keeping mission that aimed to destroy al-Qaeda and radical Islam”

(STC-35) “Critics say that Britain should not participate in American-led ‘pre-emptive wars’ and should distance itself from the ‘war on terror’”

(STC-36) “Most Islamist terrorists were well-educated, social, integrated, football lovers who belong to wealthy families”

(STC-37) “Many young British Muslim students turned to radicalisation at the universities, which are centres of ‘Islamist extremism’, ‘Islamic McCarthyism’ and ‘fertile recruiting grounds’ for extremists”

(STC-38) “British Muslims have a set of grievances and resentment that include Government’s double standards, non-Muslim extremists, ignoring Muslims’ sufferings, interfering in Muslims’ religion, supporting dictators, faith schools, being labelled as the ‘enemy within’, disloyal’, ‘anti-Semitic’, bad press etc.”

(STC-39) “British Muslims have created social ghettos and live segregated and parallel lives rooted in their cultural and religious beliefs/ideologies, such as separate schools, veils, which lead to radicalisation”
(STC-40) “Representing Livingstone as hate preacher Qaradawi friend who hates gays, Jews, etc. closed views, anti-Semitic”

(STC-41) “Hate preachers, Abu Hamza, Finsbury Park Mosque promote anti-Western feelings and radicalisation”

(STC-42) “Muslim terrorism/Islamic terrorism threat continues to the next generation in the form of nuclear, biological attacks etc”

(STC-43) “Terrorists are the common enemy for British Muslims and non-Muslims, so community bonding could defeat terrorism”

(STC-44) “British Muslims do not endorse ‘Freedom of Speech’ and criticism of their religion, for example the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) cartoons”

(STC-45) “British politicians and law lords divided over ‘glorification of terrorism’ legislation”

(STC-46) “Britishness is our culture; our British values must be adopted”

(STC-47) “Backlash to the 7/7 incident: Muslims’ feelings of being persecuted, stop and search, suspect arrests, resembling Jewish treatment, families of 7/7 bombers being harassed, veil attacks, derogatory links, e.g. Beeston, etc.”

(STC-48) “Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged Terrorists reflect the fact that home-grown radicals are involved in attacking their country of birth”

(STC-49) “Engaging with Muslims includes government initiatives such as road shows, reaching out in the community, combating Islamophobia, listening to Muslims’ leadership etc.”

(STC-50) “Mistaken Identity issue in post-7/7 Britain such as non-Muslim arrests, shootings etc.”

(STC-51) “Blair government has shown double standards in tackling terrorism, i.e. ‘Islamic militancy’ vs. IRA”

(STC-52) “British Muslims are victims, for example bad press etc.” (Sympathetic view)

(STC-53) “History shows that every country, region and era has had its own terrorists and extremist groups who used their religious ideologies to create mayhem, including Jews, Christians, Buddhists and Hindus”
(STC 54) “Problems within the Muslim community, for instance widely acknowledged leadership, imams and mosques, sectarian divide etc.”

(STC-55) “Beeston/Leeds areas’ media portrayal and links to troubles, bad labels”

(STC-56) “British security institutions’ inhuman treatment and torture of suspects, deportations, refusal of asylum, trials in other countries raising concerns over human rights issues”

(STC-57) “Blair government’s strict measures relating to anti-terror laws, banning extremist websites, and repressing opposing voices are unwise and undemocratic”.

(STC-58) “Government select, promote and engage with like-minded British Muslims”

(STC-59) “Freedom of speech boundaries should be drawn in order to avoid confusion and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims”

(STC-60) “Events such as the burning of the Quran, and disrespecting Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) increases Islamophobia and hatred of Muslims and Islam, thereby increasing resentment among British Muslims”

(STC-61) “Public (7/7 victims) complaints about the compensation process”

(STC-62) “Jack Straw veil controversy fuels Islamophobia in British society”
Appendix- D-(i): Process of mixing identical sub-themes and codes, leading to the emergence of three main themes.
Appendix-D-(ii): The process of mixing sub-themes to produce three main themes. These are interconnected within the data and are as follows: “Home-grown ‘Islamist terrorism’ Threat”; “Britain’s foreign policy risks its Internal Security”; and “British Muslims are incompatible with British Way of Life”. The following bar chart shows the three main themes in this data in sequence.
Appendix E: Example of Duplicate Articles: Jason Burke's article published twice in *The Guardian*.

(i)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Headline</td>
<td><em>The Violence that lies in every ideology</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Author Description/ Affiliation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Headline</td>
<td><em>Ideology's violent face</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Author Description/ Affiliation</td>
<td>Jason Burke (South Asia Editor/Foreign Correspondent)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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Appendix E-(ii)- Example of Discarded articles

King of Hearts HAMPSTEAD THEATRE FIRST NIGHT
Satirist-in-chief puts the boot in - and misses

BYLINE: Charles Spencer
SECTION: FEATURES; THE ARTS; Pg. 26
LENGTH: 611 words

BACK in 2001 at Hampstead, Alistair Beaton hilariously nailed the spin-obsessed absurdities of the New Labour "project" with his excellent comedy, Feelgood.

Since then he has seemed determined to assume the title of satirist-in-chief to the nation, churning out dramas that have put the boot into Tony Blair, David Blunkett, Iraq and the war against terror among much else. But he has never matched the scalpel-like sharpness and originality of Feelgood.

Indeed Beaton now seems to take the view that coarse exaggeration, filthy language and absurd over-simplification are the keys to satirical comedy and watching his recent work one has the dismaying impression that he finds his own over-obvious scripts far funnier than anyone else.

The good news is that King of Hearts, in which Beaton is again paired with that most discriminating of new-play directors, Max Stafford-Clark, marks a partial return to form: The bad news is that it is very partial indeed, and there is a great deal here that smacks of a playwright flogging a dead horse.

The concept is at least intriguing. More than 30 years ago, Royce Ryton scored a West End hit with a somewhat arthritic play about Edward VIII and the abdication crisis. Beaton seems to be attempting to write a present-day equivalent, though with a farcical, jocular tone that often becomes merely wearisome.

The Prince of Wales has become king, only to suffer a terrible riding accident just a few months into his reign. He is only being kept alive on a life support machine at Sandringham, and it seems certain that the elder of his two sons, called Prince Richard but looking a lot like Prince William in Ben Righton's performance, will succeed him.

He seems a fine upstanding chap, unlike his alcoholic younger brother, with a strong sense of duty, but then he announces some startling news. Not only has he been having secret flings with a young Muslim woman but he wants to marry her.

There is some sport to be had in the dismayed reaction of the supposedly go-ahead Prime Minister - yet another of Beaton's demolition jobs on Tony Blair's lack of principle - but wouldn't the play be sharper, funnier and more topical if a figure resembling Gordon Brown were Prime Minister?

The Tory Leader of the Opposition - played as a rather cherishable old buffer by Jeff Rawle though Beaton naturally can't resist presenting him as a married man with a taste for furtive homosexual encounters - spies an opportunity.
Appendix (F): The Telegraph’s Editor’s Code of Practice.
Appendix-{G}- The Guardian’s Editorial Code can be seen at:

https://www.theguardian.com/info/2015/aug/05/the-guardians-editorial-code
Appendix: (i) Leveson Inquiry


(ii) Leveson inquiry can be found at:


(iii)(Editor's Code of Practice-IPSO-Independent Press Standards Organisation)

(https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/cop.html)
Appendix- A (i): Examples of familiarisation with data initial notes, marking, concepts etc.

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON)
July 26, 2005, Tuesday

Signs of change in Iraq

SECTION: Features; Comment Pg. 023
LENGTH: 364 words

Iraq seems to have an inexhaustible supply of explosives and young men ready to blow themselves up in the name of jihad. A fresh wave of suicide bombings has accompanied the creation of the new Shia-led government and the drafting of a constitution.

As we mourn those killed by terrorist bombs in London, we should remember the people of Baghdad, who suffer the equivalent of the 7/7 bombings daily. One can only admire the fortitude of those in the new Iraq who do not give in to despair.

Iraqis still volunteer in large numbers to join the Iraqi armed forces despite repeated bomb attacks on recruitment centres. And yesterday Sunni members of the constitutional drafting committee announced their return to the discussion table after walking out last week in protest at the assassination by insurgents of two fellow Sunni members.

These are important signals that the strengthening of the country's security forces must go hand-in-hand with the building of new political institutions.

The historic dominance of Sunni Arabs, who make up about a fifth of the population, was broken by the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Their resentment...
Appendix- A (ii): Familiarising the data.
Appendix - A (iii): Familiarising the data.

The Daily Telegraph (LONDON)  
May 2, 2007 Wednesday

What exactly was it that made this man hate us?

BYLINE: Jan Moir on Wednesday

SECTION: FEATURES; Comment; Pg. 19

LENGTH: 739 words

This photograph of Omar Khayyam tells us a lot about the 25-year-old leader of the "freezer bomb plot". Already in police custody, and perhaps knowing that he would spend the rest of his life behind bars, Khayyam’s expression shows none of the regret and shame we might look for, or even hope to see. Instead, his eyes smoulder with loathing and his lips rise in a hot sneer of disgust. It is a face full of suppressed rage; a rage that is focused against Britain and its people, against you and me. What did we do to Omar Khayyam, to make him hate us so? Why are he and his fellow terrorists so hell-bent on the destruction of hundreds of innocent British people? British people, it might be added, in some ways just like them?

It has become horribly clear over recent years that a number of British-born Muslims, many of them from comfortable middle-class backgrounds, have somehow evolved into terrorists determined to perpetrate mass murder on their fellow citizens. The perplexing, spiritual journey that takes these young men from suburban contentment and cricket tours to al-Qaeda hate camps in some dirt hole in the Pakistan/Afghanistan region is a difficult one to comprehend. Particularly now.

For Khayyam grew up in integrated, happy affluence in Surrey, where he was the captain of his school cricket team, and the only Asian boy in a local football team. He was included and embraced in life, not excluded and estranged because of his colour or religion. His back story smashes the cosy, old theory that radicalisation compatriots. Until

al-Qaeda starting pouring propaganda into the little fissure in his soul, he was an ordinary boy from a good background. Not a psychopathic loner, like Cho Seung-hui, the misfit who killed 32 fellow pupils and staff at Virginia Tech before turning his gun on himself.

Perhaps the most unsettling thing to emerge from the terror trial that ended this week is that Khayyam was once just another bloke from the burbs, and that there are plenty more like him out there, full of hate and rage.
Appendix B (i). Example of thematic coding process

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<th>Newspaper</th>
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<tr>
<td>Type of Press Coverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headline</td>
<td>We need a public inquiry so we can come to terms with it all and move on</td>
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<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Simon Jenkins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>7/7 victims and their families never</td>
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| Link           | http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/mainstories/13133962.html# 
|               | http://www.public inquiry observers consortium.co.uk/what-happened |

Themes/Acad | [TCC] |
<table>
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<tr>
<td>This Problem including perpetrators</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>public inquiry for a public inquiry into the 7/7 event</td>
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</table>

Half of the líderes and survivors of the 7/7 bombings wonder and the Government should hold a public inquiry to help them come to terms with what happened.

Paul Dingle, who was pictured helping an injured victim wearing a surgical mask, said there were still many unanswered questions.

Mr Dingle, a former journalist from Greater London, said: "I will do whatever I can to campaign for a public inquiry."

"I would hope that now we have a new Home Secretary he will consider an inquiry. I don't personally feel that case will only happen if the Government thinks it isn't be held accountable for what happened."

Weil, people who were left by the side of the road were left, and we were worried that. "Some angry young men" could be the same thing again.

Comment 1: 21/10

Comment 2: 21/10

Comment 3: 21/10

Comment 4: 21/10
Appendix-B- (ii). Example of thematic coding process:

The failures were particular and general. Two of the 7/7 gang, Khan and Taneer, were known to the security services. Both had visited Pakistan for extended periods in the months before their suicide mission. Khan, in particular, was already of considerable interest to MI5. It is MI5's job to collate, to sift, to match and to interpret information of this kind. Patently, the service failed to do that in these cases. This seems not to have been purely a matter of inadequate resources. It was also an operational failure, and thus a failure for which management must take responsibility. The new Home Secretary, John Reid, gave no indication yesterday that this has happened.

The ISC report makes some sensible practical criticisms of the intelligence failure. But it provides few effective answers to wider questions. No one should imagine that intelligence can prevent every terrorist act. That is unrealistic. But intelligence should be held accountable for its failures nevertheless. How can a society learn from mistakes?

A significant part of the failure on 7/7 stemmed from a perception that 'home-grown' suicide bombings were relatively unlikely in Europe (not surprisingly this assessment has now been revised). But this stemmed in turn from an inability to recognize the speed of radicalization that was taking place in some parts of British Islam, partly because of the British government's support for the Iraq war. The evidence of such radicalization was so obvious by 2005 that it is hard not to conclude that the security failure was both negligent and inexcusable.

How should a strong open society respond to these failures? The twin pillars of the answer are to recognize the scale of the problem and to accept the need for strong accountability.

Appendix-B-(iii)-A selected sample of initial coding sheet of *The Telegraph/The Guardian*:

**Code-1- The British Terrorists Mindset, beliefs and family backgrounds:**

Sub-code i) They hate our way of life (British)

ii) They hate their country of birth (enemy within)...

**Code-2- The role of Religious Ideology in extremism and terrorism**

Sub-code-(i) “Wahhabi terrorism”/Catholic “terrorism”

ii) 7/7 bombers acted on the name of Islam (a perverted ideology)...

**Code-3- Causes of the 7/7: Security negligence or failure?**

Sub-code- (i) MI5 knew London bombers identities and previous crime records before the attacks

ii) MI5 and police could not be blamed for the 7/7 security failure

**Code-4- Terrorism Threats to Britain’s Inland Security.**

Sub-code-(i) Radicalism Islamists gets foreign support/Islamic terrorism threat

ii) Foreign links/actors foreign visits e.g Pakistan, Gulf and France

iii) Police and security and law enforcement agencies are working to prevent terrorism threat...

**Code-5- British Muslims: accusations, grievances and their problems.**

Sub-code (i) British Muslims have created social ghettos

ii) Considering Muslims viewpoint (sympathetic view)

**Code-6- British Security Institutions (MI5/Police): Responsibilities and Failures:**

Sub-code(i) Networks/Cells (e.g. al-Qaeda) linked to the 7/7

ii) Londonistan: Islamist extremist had trouble-free movement in London...
**Code-7- Britain’s Role in American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Caused Radicalization among British Muslims:**

i) Britain role in Afghanistan and Iraq boosts feeling of anger among British Muslims

ii) Western policies and interventions has created chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan...

**Code-8- Islamists want to Establish Sharia Law and Caliphate**

Sub-code (i) Islamists want to replace Sharia law with the existing British law

ii) Militants ambitions are to take over Britain

iii) Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology of establishing a caliphate

v) AL-Qaeda wants to establish an empire (caliphate)

**Code-9- Britain’s role in the Middle East and its Impact on British Muslims**

Sub-code (i) Israel-Palestine Conflict

ii) Critics says that Britain’s Iraq War policy (weapons of mass destruction) was controversial and a human disaster

iii) London Bombers would had done this any way so it is not a reaction of Iraq policy

**Code-10- US and Them Rhetoric**

i) British way of life vs. Muslims way of life (British values)

ii) Open society vs. closed society..

**Code-11- Demand for an Independent Public Inquiry of the 7/7 Event:**

i) 7/7 victims and their family members call for an independent inquiry...

**Code-12- British Government Counter-Terrorism Policy and its Impact on British Muslims.**

Sub-code (i) Winning hearts and Minds, (home and abroad) appointing more Muslims overseas to engage with the Muslim world...

**Code-13- Community Bonding: British Muslims and Non-Muslims Share Common Values:**

Sub-code (i) Common/shared values/understandings/of British life
ii) Collective efforts could protect and strengthen disaffected British Muslims and non-Muslims youth from being fall into extremism...

**Code-14- Islamophobia in post-7/7 Britain:**

Sub-code-(i) Fear of Islam, for example growing Muslim population

ii) Hatred and panic of Islam using caricatures, films, books. Novel, anti-Quran campaigns etc.

**Code-15- Press Portrayal of Beeston (Leeds) linking with 7/7 Bombers:**

Sub-code-(i) Hotbed of Islamic terrorism.

ii) Beeston name equals to terror making it hard for people to get jobs...

**Code-16- Government Policies of Combating Extremism and Terrorism: British Muslims Participation and Concerns.**

Sub-code-(i) Integration and Cohesion (integration is two way street)...

**Code-17- Human Rights Act: Britain’s Commitment and Violations in Post 7/7 Period.**

Sub-code-(i) Human rights issues such as assurance that suspect/detainees will not be tortured.

ii) Detention powers allow holding foreign suspect for 90 days without charge raises concerns over human rights

iii) Stop and search and spying raise questions on privacy and civil liberty in post-7/7 Britain...

**Code-18- London Bombers Description in British Press:**

Sub-Code (i) Suicide bombers

ii) Radicalization of Young Muslims

**Code-19- Terror Plots/Terror Networks:**

Sub-Code (i) July 21 bomb plot/ Suicide bombers

ii) Doctors/noble profession

**Code-20-Moderate Muslims and the Idea of British Islam:**
Sub-code (i) Moderate Muslims can play leading role in combating extremism and radicalization...

**Code-21- Hate Preachers:**

i) Abu-Hamza/ Finsbury mosque radicalized youngsters and spread hatred of Britain

ii) Anjem Chaudhary (hate preacher) views on British government anti-Muslim polices...

**Code-22- British Press Portrayal of ‘Islam’:**

Sub-code (i) ‘Islamism’ (‘totalitarian’ threat that destroy western democracy etc.)

ii) Political Islam...

**Code-23-Histrocial Context of Terrorism in Britain:**

Sub-code (i) Combating militant Irish republicanism...

**Code-24- Islamists/Radicals Mindset and their Interpretations of Religion:**

Sub code (i) They live in seventh century (autocracy rule)...

**Code-25-Post-7/7 British Society**

Sub code (i) The idea of multiculturalism is weakening.

ii) Londoners show strength after bombings

iii) The idea of Britishness takes new shape...

**Code-26- Blair vs. Brown: Power Struggle, Policies and Strategies:**

i) Tony Blair: as (hard working, defends Britain’s interests at home and abroad, deporting of hate preachers,...(Positive)

ii) Gordon Brown: representation in the press as (expectation of foreign policy revivalist, Future Challenges... (positive)

**Code-27- Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged Terrorists (21 July 2005).**

Sub-code (i) Suspects

ii) Evidence presented in the court (CCTV footage/videos/photos/documents etc.)

**Code-28- Terrorism Legislation: Recommendations, Criticism and Proposals:**
Sub code (i) “Glorification” of Terrorism meaning (Encouraging terrorism)/ incite to murder, etc.

ii) Muslims view of new anti-terror laws, 90 days detentions as unjust

**Code-29 - Freedom of Speech:**

Sub-code (i) British Muslims do not endorse criticism of their religion (close-minded)

ii) Considering the British Muslims sentiments British press did not publish cartoons,

**Code-30 - Reporting British Muslims:**

Sub-code (i) Newspaper corrections without offering an apology (misrepresenting facts and figures)

ii) Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H) cartoon controversy and British media role (positive)...

**Code- 31- Spokesperson as a News Source of information on British Muslims issues:**

Sub code (i) Government officials

ii) Academics critical of Muslims (Closed views of Islam and Muslims)...

**Code-32- Role of the British Mosques in post-7/7 Britain:**

Sub code (i) Mosques promoting extremism and radicalization

(ii) London bombers attended mosques in London and Leeds Beeston area...

**Code- 33- Debates and Interviews relating to British Muslims:**

Sub-code (i) Muslim scholar views regarding Muslim issues (positive aspects)

ii) Non-Muslim scholar views regarding Muslim issues (positive aspects)...

**Code 34- Engaging with the British Muslim community:**

Sub-code (i) Britain should engage with British Muslim by embracing and sharing fruits of democracy
Appendix-C

Thematic Map or Codebook for Sub-Themes/Codes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code No</th>
<th>Sub-Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(STC-1)</td>
<td>“London bombings provide British Government with a reason to revisit the terrorism legislation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(STC-2)</td>
<td>“Terrorists’ ideology e.g. ‘Wahhabism’ etc. is to destroy and replace Western democratic values with their interpretations of ‘Islamic law’”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(STC-3)</td>
<td>“Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq cannot be blamed for the London Bombings”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(STC-4)</td>
<td>“Islamist extremists and white imperialist racists are two identical troublemakers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(STC-5)</td>
<td>“Islam and terrorism cannot be separated”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(STC-6)</td>
<td>“British Islamists, Sheikh Omar Bakri and his associates such as al-Qaradawi and Abu Izzadeen, are anti-Western hate preachers who must be denounced and banned”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(STC-7)</td>
<td>“Islamists’ real intention is to expand caliphate founded by Sharia Law, ayatollahs and imams”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(STC-8)</td>
<td>“Islamist grievances against the West are irrational and wrong”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(STC-9)</td>
<td>“Britain had provided financial assistance to radicals and Islamists and had developed relationships with their organisations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(STC-10)</td>
<td>“Britain's foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan radicalised the London bombers and created a feeling of anger among the younger generation of British Muslims”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(STC-11) “Many young British-born Muslims became radicalised during their visits to Pakistan, the country of their parents, which exports terrorism”

(STC-12) “UK-based sleeper cells/networks have links to al-Qaeda and religious schools in Pakistan that espouse fundamentalism” (Home-grown terrorism)

(STC-13) “Political process is the best strategy to counter terrorism in Iraq and beyond”

(STC-14) “Britain needs tough laws to deal with modern Islamists’ terrorism threat, which is global”

(STC-15) “British Muslim organisations view Tony Blair’s anti-terrorism laws as undemocratic, unjust and aimed at demonising the whole Muslim community”

(STC-16) “The Terrorism Bill proposes to increase suspects’ detention period for up to 90 days, which will weaken Britain’s commitment to the Human Rights Convention”

(STC-17) “MI5/Police operations to prevent the Islamist terrorism threat at home and abroad, i.e. suspect arrests, investigations, bravery etc”

(STC-18) “British Muslims demand a public inquiry into the 7/7 event”

(STC-19) “Blair and his Government officials blame British Muslims and their leaders for not doing enough to combat terrorism and suggest that it is Muslims’ problem”

(STC-20) “Londoners showed strength after bombings”

(STC-21) “Non-Muslims, including politicians and 7/7 victims, demand a public inquiry into the 7/7 event”

(STC-22) “7/7 bombers were known to MI5”

(STC-23) “The 7/7 event reflects security agencies’ failure”

(STC-24) “British mosques linked with 7/7 bombers, meeting points, promoting extremism and radicalisation, problematic labels, non-English-speaking imams, etc. (close-minded view)”

(STC-25) “Mosques are promoting community cohesion, etc. (Open-minded view)”

(STC-26) “Islam preaches peace and harmony and has no link with terrorism, etc. (Open-minded view)”
(STC-27) “Islam is linked with terrorism, extremism, radicalisation, women’s issues, etc. (Closed-minded view)”

(STC-28) “British Muslims’ anger and resentment is a result of Western hypocritical and hostile policies in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world”

(STC-29) “Hate preacher Anjem Chaudhary’s statements, etc”

(STC-30) “Radical Islamist individuals, groups and organisations such as al-Qaeda; HizbutTahrir, al-Muhajurin etc inspire anti-Western activities inside Britain and abroad”

(STC-31) “British Foreign Office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood”

(STC-32) “British Government promotes the idea of British Islam/Modern Islam/moderates (Sufi Islam, Council of Imams etc) to counter Islamic radicalism”

(STC-33) “Radical Islam and Militant Muslims are also a challenge to Muslim regimes; therefore, the West must make an alliance with modern Muslims”

(STC-34) “Britain’s military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were based on construction and a peace-keeping mission that aimed to destroy al-Qaeda and radical Islam”

(STC-35) “Critics say that Britain should not participate in American-led ‘pre-emptive wars’ and should distance itself from the ‘war on terror’”

(STC-36) “Most Islamist terrorists were well-educated, social, integrated, football lovers who belong to wealthy families”

(STC-37) “Many young British Muslim students turned to radicalisation at the universities, which are centres of ‘Islamist extremism’, ‘Islamic McCarthyism’ and ‘fertile recruiting grounds’ for extremists”

(STC-38) “British Muslims have a set of grievances and resentment that include Government’s double standards, non-Muslim extremists, ignoring Muslims’ sufferings, interfering in Muslims’ religion, supporting dictators, faith schools, being labelled as the ‘enemy within’, disloyal’, ‘anti-Semitic’, bad press etc.”
“British Muslims have created social ghettos and live segregated and parallel lives rooted in their cultural and religious beliefs/ideologies, such as separate schools, veils, which lead to radicalisation”

“Representing Livingstone as hate preacher Qaradawi friend who hates gays, Jews, etc. closed views, anti-Semitic”

“Hate preachers, Abu Hamza, Finsbury Park Mosque promote anti-Western feelings and radicalisation”

“Muslim terrorism/Islamic terrorism threat continues to the next generation in the form of nuclear, biological attacks etc”

“Terrorists are the common enemy for British Muslims and non-Muslims, so community bonding could defeat terrorism”

“British Muslims do not endorse ‘Freedom of Speech’ and criticism of their religion, for example the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) cartoons”

“British politicians and law lords divided over ‘glorification of terrorism’ legislation”

“Britishness is our culture; our British values must be adopted”

“Backlash to the 7/7 incident: Muslims’ feelings of being persecuted, stop and search, suspect arrests, resembling Jewish treatment, families of 7/7 bombers being harassed, veil attacks, derogatory links, e.g. Beeston, etc.”

“Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged Terrorists reflect the fact that home-grown radicals are involved in attacking their country of birth”

“Engaging with Muslims includes government initiatives such as road shows, reaching out in the community, combating Islamophobia, listening to Muslims’ leadership etc.”

“Mistaken Identity issue in post-7/7 Britain such as non-Muslim arrests, shootings etc.”

“Blair government has shown double standards in tackling terrorism, i. e. ‘Islamic militancy’ vs. IRA”

“British Muslims are victims, for example bad press etc.” (Sympathetic view)
“History shows that every country, region and era has had its own terrorists and extremist groups who used their religious ideologies to create mayhem, including Jews, Christians, Buddhists and Hindus”

“Problems within the Muslim community, for instance widely acknowledged leadership, imams and mosques, sectarian divide etc.”

“Beeston/Leeds areas’ media portrayal and links to troubles, bad labels”

“British security institutions’ inhuman treatment and torture of suspects, deportations, refusal of asylum, trials in other countries raising concerns over human rights issues”

“Blair government’s strict measures relating to anti-terror laws, banning extremist websites, and repressing opposing voices are unwise and undemocratic”.

“Government select, promote and engage with like-minded British Muslims”

“Freedom of speech boundaries should be drawn in order to avoid confusion and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims”

“Events such as the burning of the Quran, and disrespecting Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) increases Islamophobia and hatred of Muslims and Islam, thereby increasing resentment among British Muslims”

“Public (7/7 victims) complaints about the compensation process”

“Jack Straw veil controversy fuels Islamophobia in British society”
Appendix- D-(i): Process of mixing identical sub-themes and codes, leading to the emergence of three main themes.
Appendix-D-(ii): The process of mixing sub-themes to produce three main themes. These are interconnected within the data and are as follows: “Home-grown ‘Islamist terrorism’ Threat”; “Britain’s foreign policy risks its Internal Security”; and “British Muslims are incompatible with British Way of Life”. The following bar chart shows the three main themes in this data in sequence.
Appendix E: Example of Duplicate Articles: Jason Burke’s article published twice in *The Guardian*.

(i)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th><em>The Guardian</em></th>
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<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headline</td>
<td><em>The Violence that lies in every ideology</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Jason Burke (South Asia Editor/Foreign Correspondent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Source</td>
<td>Duplicate/also published on 22 July</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>17 July 2005</td>
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<td>Length</td>
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(ii)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
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<tr>
<td>Type of Press Coverage</td>
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<td><strong>Length</strong></td>
<td>1,141 words</td>
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Appendix E-(ii) Example of Discarded articles

Feature Article

King of Hearts HAMPSTEAD THEATRE FIRST NIGHT
Satirist-in-chief puts the boot in - and misses

BYLINE: Charles Spencer
SECTION: FEATURES; THE ARTS; Pg. 26
LENGTH: 611 words

BACK in 2001 at Hampstead, Alastair Beaton hilariously nailed the spin-obsessed absurdities of the New Labour "project" with his excellent comedy, Feelgood.

Since then he has seemed determined to assume the title of satirist-in-chief to the nation, churning out dramas that have put the boot into Tony Blair, David Blunkett, Iraq and the war against terror among much else. But he has never matched the scalpel-like sharpness and originality of Feelgood.

Indeed Beaton now seems to take the view that coarse exaggeration, filthy language and absurd oversimplification are the keys to satirical comedy and watching his recent work one has the dismaying impression that he finds his own even-obvious-sarcasm far funnier than anyone else.

The good news is that King of Hearts, in which Beaton is again paired with that most discriminating of new play directors, Max Stafford-Clark, marks a partial return to form. The bad news is that it is a very partial indeed, and there is a great deal here that smacks of a playwright copying a dead horse.

The concept is at least intriguing. More than 30 years ago, Royce Ryton scored a West End hit with a somewhat arthritic play about Edward VIII and the abdication crisis. Beaton seems to be attempting to write a present-day equivalent, though with a farcical, jocular tone that often becomes merely wearisome.

The Prince of Wales has become king, only to suffer a terrible riding accident just a few months into his reign. He is only being kept alive on a life-support machine at Sandringham, and it seems certain that the elder of his two sons, called Prince Richard but looking a lot like Prince William in Ben Righton’s performance, will succeed him.

He seems a fine upstanding chap, unlike his alcoholic younger brother, with a strong sense of duty, but then he announces some startling news. Not only has he been having secret affairs with a young Muslim woman but he wants to marry her.

There is some sport to be had in the dismaying reaction of the supposedly go-ahead Prime Minister - yet another of Beaton’s demolition jobs on Tony Blair’s lack of principle - but wouldn’t the play be sharper, funnier and more topical if a figure resembling Gordon Brown were Prime Minister?

The Tory Leader of the Opposition - played as a rather chewable old buffer by Jeff Dean - through Beaton naturally can’t resist presenting him as a married man with a taste for furtive homosexual encounters - spics an opportunity.
Appendix (F): The Telegraph’s Editor’s Code of Practice.
Appendix-(G)- *The Guardian’s* Editorial Code can be seen at:

https://www.theguardian.com/info/2015/aug/05/the-guardians-editorial-code
Appendix: (i) Leveson Inquiry


(ii) Leveson inquiry can be found at:


(iii)(Editor's Code of Practice-IPSO-Independent Press Standards Organisation)

(https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/cop.html)
Appendix - (J): Understanding of ‘Sunnah’:

Sunnah is the second most important source of authority reflecting the practical teachings of the Quran. It is the way the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) lived his life and set examples for mankind based upon his noble character, which the Quran describes as follows: “Indeed, in the messenger of Allah a ‘good example (uswatun hasana / أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ)’ has been set for the one who seeks Allah and the Last Day and thinks constantly about Allah.” (Qur’an 33:21). It also says: “There has been a good example (uswatun hasana / أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ) set for you by Ibrahim and those with him…” (Qur’an 60:4). It was his great moral character that raised his profile in the Quran and, hence, Muslims and non-Muslims were asked to follow him as a role model (Hart, 1978, p.3): “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and do not invalidate your deeds” (47:37).

In short, to understand the Quran and Sunnah, one needs to study Prophet Muhammad's (P.B.U.H) life in Makkah and Medina, which consisted of Ibadat (Worship) and Muamalat (interactions/dealings with others in a society). That is why it has been said that Islam is a complete way of life, meaning that it includes guidance and laws to deal with everyday affairs in life. Crucially, Sharia, which is mistranslated and misunderstood in Europe, is a way of life led by Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H); not only is it compatible with contemporary Britain but also most of Britain’s laws are compatible with the Sharia. For instance, the concepts of equal opportunities, justice, self-respect, morals and manners, health and safety rules, customers’ rights, social system, everyday affairs such as right-hand driving, eating habits, charity systems, and other forms of governance are all part of Sharia teachings (Askari, 2014).