Exchange: corporate governance and executive remuneration: a contingency framework

Filatotchev, Igor and Allcock, Deborah (2010) Exchange: corporate governance and executive remuneration: a contingency framework. Academy of Management Perspectives, 24 (1). pp. 20-33. ISSN 1558-9080

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Abstract

By integrating organizational and institutional theories this paper develops a contingency approach to executive remuneration and assesses the effectiveness of this corporate governance factor in different organizational and institutional contexts. Most of the executive remuneration research focuses on the principal-agent framework and assumes a universal link between executive incentives and performance outcomes, but neglects to explore how the organization’s context and its institutional environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of this governance factor. In contrast to such ‘closed systems’ approach, we discuss a framework which examines executive compensation in terms of its organizational contexts, and potential complementarities/substitution effects between different corporate governance practices both on the firm’s and national levels. We also discuss the implications for different approaches to executive compensation policy such as ‘soft-law’ or ‘hard law’.

Item Type:	Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Schools:	Huddersfield Business School Huddersfield Business School > Financial Ethics and Governance Research Group
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
Depositing User:	Graham Stone
Date Deposited:	10 Feb 2010 14:49
Last Modified:	28 Aug 2021 10:54
URI:	http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/6896

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