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The Last Britons? Young Muslims and national identity

Paul Thomas, School of Education and Professional Development, University of Huddersfield: d.p.thomas@hud.ac.uk

Abstract
Current policy agendas around Community Cohesion (Cantle, 2001) and ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (DCLG, 2007a) have arguably viewed Muslim communities as disconnected from, and even antagonistic to, ‘British’ identity, a feeling exacerbated by popular media discourse around the 7/7 London bombings, subsequent terror plots, and Muslim community opposition to what ‘Britain’ is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. This all suggests a heightened, supranational ‘Muslim’ identity incompatible with ‘British’ affiliation, a situation apparently made possible by naive, liberal ‘multiculturalist’ policies (Phillips, 2005; Prins and Salisbury, 2008). This paper draws on empirical research amongst young people in Oldham and Rochdale to argue that, in fact, Muslim young people, whilst indeed sharing a heightened religious identity, do not see this ‘Muslim’ identity as incompatible with ‘Britishness’. Britishness is actually seen by these young people as more positive and inclusive than ‘English’ identity, something viewed as the preserve of White people. This is a problematic situation in a context where the White young people surveyed view ‘English’ identity as more relevant and appropriate than ‘British’, an understandable development in the context of the devolution and associated growths in national identity in Wales and Scotland. Are we now in the situation where young non-white English people are the ‘last Britons’, accepting this British national identity in ways that their parental generation never did just as this identity is consigned to history?

Introduction
Over the past few years, the ‘identity’, loyalty and affiliations of British Muslims, particularly the younger generations, has come under repeated scrutiny. The serious urban disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the summer of 2001 all involved Pakistani and Bangladeshi young men clashing with the police, and at times with White racists. The resulting governmental inquiries (Cantle, 2001; Denham, 2001) suggested that such disturbances and the ethnic segregation and tension they revealed were symptomatic of wider national realities. The analysis here was that profound physical and cultural ethnic segregation had led to ‘parallel lives’ (Ritchie, 2001) and a lack of shared identities or values. Within this Community Cohesion analysis and policy prescription (LGA, 2002; Home Office, 2005) was an explicit suggestion that the Asian communities under scrutiny lacked a commitment to or engagement with national institutions or identities (Cantle, 2001). One clear result was a renewed debate around ‘Britishness’ and the need to promote it, something given added urgency by the international and domestic terrorist atrocities of 9/11 and the 7/7 London bombings of July 2005. The latter events, suicide bombings carried out by young British Muslims, seemed to confirm all the fears held in some political quarters about the profound alienation from ‘Britishness’ amongst a significant portion of such young British Muslims. A number of subsequent terror plots and convictions, all similarly involving young Muslims, suggests support of this perspective, and has led the Government to launch the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ initiative (DCLG, 2007a; Thomas, 2009), a ‘hearts and minds’ educational approach aimed explicitly at young Muslims within the wider ‘CONTEST’ counter-
terrorism strategy. These developments all suggest that there is a profound problem with ‘British’ identity amongst young Muslims, which is, bluntly, that they are not British enough, and that a significant proportion of young British Muslims are actively hostile to British identity, values and policies. Such a position claims that misguided policies of ‘multiculturalism’ have allowed separate and oppositional ethnic/religious identities to strengthen and cement at the expense of over-arching and collective national identities, so weakening the country (Prins and Salisbury, 2008). This paper explores such claims, drawing on empirical evidence from field research amongst young people in the Oldham and Rochdale areas of Greater Manchester, to discuss whether there are really any grounds for suggesting that young Muslims do not feel British.

Not British Enough?
The 2001 disturbances have proved to be a watershed for policy approaches to ‘race relations’ (Solomos, 2003). Community Cohesion has emerged from obscurity to rapidly become the clear priority for policy (Home Office, 2005). A number of themes can be detected within Community Cohesion, the most important of them being the damaging effects of physical and cultural ethnic segregation (Cantle, 2001). The implicit suggestions that ‘segregation’ is in itself damaging and that it is getting worse are highly contested (Finney and Simpson, 2009; Flint and Robinson, 2008), but it is beyond dispute that there is significant ethnic segregation in many of Britain’s towns and cities, and that young people experience this as a real and negative constriction on their lives (Back, 1996; Thomas, 2003). The result of this is a lack of shared understandings, values and experiences, with communities having little meaningful contact with each other, and the result being separate ‘identities’ and priorities.

Consistent with wider New Labour social policy (Levitas, 2005), a communitarianist analysis is applied here by government, with agency blamed for accepting and so deepening these ‘parallel lives’, and government unable to overcome this segregation without the active involvement and will of individuals and communities. Inherent to this Community Cohesion analysis is the belief that past ‘race relations’ priorities, especially those post-1981 developments popularly understood as ‘anti-racism’ or equal opportunities, have had the unintended consequence of making this situation worse by emphasising and prioritising ‘difference’ rather than commonality. Here, the post-1981 acceptance of the reality and force of structural racism and racial inequality led policy makers at the national and local level to focus on equality and ‘appropriate’ facilities and provision for each separate ethnic group, rather than on common needs and issues. Clearly, the availability of ethnic monitoring data detailing the position of and outcomes for each separate ethnic group supported such developments. For advocates of Community Cohesion, this policy direction cast aside the parallel priority of early ‘race relations’ approaches, that of ‘promoting good relations’ between different groups: ‘equality’ for each group was prioritised over unity and commonality (Cantle, 2005). Whilst some would see this as an unintended consequence of policy, others saw it as a deliberate divide and rule tactic of encouraging ethnic separatism, with echoes of colonial rule. The result was that the focus on each separate ethnic community, its needs and facilities, undermined cross-ethnic alliances against racial inequality, and inspired a clear growth in separate ethno-religious identities, rather than over-arching national, or the solidarity-based identities of ‘Black’ or ‘Asian’ (Kundnani, 2007). This narrative provides an explanation for the apparent growth in ‘Muslim’ identity amongst
Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities that is in conflict, from some perspectives (Prins and Salisbury, 2008) with a ‘British’ identity.

Arguably, the Community Cohesion reports (Cantle, 2001; Denham, 2001) and the accompanying political discourse (Travis, 2001) echoed such a perspective through some of their language and focus, such as Cantle’s call:

*for the minority, largely non-white community, to develop a greater acceptance of, and engagement with, the principal national institutions.*

(Cantle, 2001:19)

and in its focus on the universal use of English, and focus on equal rights and opportunities for women (Cantle, 2001: 5.1.11 and 5.1.13 respectively), and on ‘cultural practices’ (Denham, 2001:20), a term that only ever seems to be applied to ethnic minority groups (Alexander, 2004). Accompanied by suggestions of ‘self segregation’ (Ouseley, 2001), some critics saw this Community Cohesion discourse as representing the suggestion that ethnic minorities, especially Muslim communities had chosen isolation and separate identities, with the answer being an enforced assimilationism (Kalra, 2002;Alexander, 2004). The fact that Britain’s leading ‘official’ Equality advocate declared Britain to be ‘sleep-walking to segregation’ and that ‘multiculturalism’ was to blame (Phillips, 2005) seemed to make this perspective of dangerous, separate identities and the need to overcome them official.

Accompanying the development of this Community Cohesion perspective and its operationalisation (Home Office, 2005;2007) has been a continued government concern with ‘Britishness’ and the need to promote it, the very debating of which could be seen to suggest that some British citizens are currently not ‘British enough’(Kundnani,2007).

This political concern with the ‘separate identity’ of Muslim communities has been given a much sharper focus by the terrorist bombings and failed attempts of July 2005 and by subsequent plots and convictions. The political response has included the Preventing Violent Extremism initiative aimed at Muslim communities generally, and at young Muslims in particular. Whilst small numbers only of Muslim young people have been involved in these plots, the PVE policy agenda focuses squarely on Muslim communities as a whole, with Government insisting on PVE activity in all Local Authority areas having a Muslim population of 4,000 people or more (Thomas, 2009). Within those communities, the programme is aimed at those most at risk of recruitment or ‘grooming’ by extremists, or at those ‘justifying or glorifying violent extremist ideologies and terrorism’ (DCLGa, 2007:7). Whilst many of the PVE documents go out of their way to talk about a ‘minority of extremists’ and to highlight the government’s work with the Muslim ‘mainstream’, other language and approaches appear to contradict this: *The key measure of success will be demonstrable changes in attitudes among Muslims, and wider communities they are part of, locally and nationally* (DCLG, 2007c:7). The fact that the government’s initial, ‘light touch’ evaluation of the first year of PVE activity (DCLG, 2008) talks proudly of working with almost 44,000 people, the large majority of them young Muslims, suggests a much broader concern with and focus on the ‘identity’ of young British Muslims.
Empirical Data
The policy developments and discourse outlined above suggest an urgent need to know more about how Muslim young people view 'Britishness', and how this relates both to other forms of identity relevant to them, and to how other young people feel about national identity. The evidence base is limited here, with previous research amongst young adults, admittedly in an area with a limited Muslim population, suggesting that young people of all ethnic and social backgrounds are indifferent, or even hostile, to national identity (Fenton, 2007). Other surveys amongst adults have suggested stronger support for ‘Britishness’ rather than ‘Englishness’ amongst non-White ethnic minorities, but were too small-scale to make firm judgements (CRE, 2005). As a response to this need, the School of Education and Professional Development, University of Huddersfield initiated the Youth Identity Research Project, with the aim of carrying out investigating young peoples’ experiences and understandings of ‘Identity’, cohesion and ethnic segregation.

The case study area for this Project was Oldham and Rochdale, Greater Manchester, building on longstanding links between the University and these neighbouring areas. Both Oldham and Rochdale have significant Muslim populations from a Pakistani and Bangladeshi background, with this inward migration in the 1960s and 1970s being due to the textile industry. The decimation of this industry (with jobs, ironically, often moving to South Asia) has left significant social exclusion and poverty for all ethnic communities in the area, and both towns face significant ethnic segregation, using the ‘index of dissimilarity’, and racial tension. The project employed an action research approach, working in partnership with youth work agencies to train youth workers in research approaches and to devise a range of qualitative research approaches appropriate for the wide range of abilities of young people aged 13-19 years old engaged by such projects and clubs. These approaches included individual and group interviews, word and sentence association exercises, questionnaires, and an ‘Identity ranking’ exercise, whereby young people were asked to rank in order of importance to them forms of identity, such as ‘religion’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘British’, ‘English’, and local/town identity. In total, over 800 young people took part in one form or other of research activity and generating significant amount of data of various types, much of which is still be analysed. For the purpose of this article, the data focussed on is that resulting from the ‘Identity ranking’ exercise, and the section of the questionnaire relating to the issue of ‘proud to be British?’, plus some of the qualitative material stemming the word association and sentence completion exercises focus on ‘British?’ and ‘English people are...?’

In utilising the existing relationship between youth workers and young people, the Youth Identity Project hoped to maximise the openness and honesty of young people, whilst aware of the dangers of conformity and compliance in any group-based research process (Albrecht et al, 1993). Youth Work’s historic focus on disadvantaged young people has been sharpened by the ‘social exclusion’ focus of the current New Labour Government (Mizen, 2004), meaning that any Youth Work-based research process will over-represent socially excluded young people and communities. This might be seen to ‘skew’ any data, but arguably issues of alienation from national identity, or attraction to aggressive and oppositional counter identities, whether Islamic or White racial supremacist, are precisely related to young people and communities who have ‘lost’ from the economic re-structuring of post-industrial globalisation (May, 1999). The key findings relevant to the issue of ‘British’
identity and Muslim young people are reported below, with the following ‘Discussion’ section examining the meaning of this data.

Clear differences emerged in the type of identity seen as important by young people. Virtually all of the Pakistani/Bangladeshi-origin young people involved in the research saw their Muslim religion as the form of identity most important to them but, for the large majority of them, this Islamic identity is not incompatible with British national identity – the overwhelming majority of young Muslims were happy to identify themselves as ‘British Muslim’ or ‘British Asian’. The fact that a smaller number of Asian young people were prepared to say that they are ‘Proud to be British’ can be related to their concern with, and criticisms of, domestic racism and British foreign policy positions. The emphasis of Asian young people on ‘British’ rather than ‘English’ national identity was in clear contrast to the views of White young people, who clearly favoured ‘English’ identity.

The importance of ‘Muslim’ Identity
Islam/faith was seen as the most important form of identity for all Asian young people taking part (consistent with other research nationally, and in strong contrast to all other ethnic/faith backgrounds). This clearly gave a lot of Muslim young people a strong and positive sense of identity: Pakistani Muslim... I’m a very strong believer in all religious rules (AYP, Rochdale); British Muslim – I’m very religious (AYP, Rochdale)

Respondents were asked to rank eight possible labels that for the sources of their identity: British, English, their local town, their ethnicity, their status as a Northerner, their religion, their local area within the town, or their status as a European. One of the clearest distinctions between the different identified ethnic groups was the significance of religion as a source of identity. Self-ascribed ethnic categories were grouped together to facilitate meaningful comparison, and responses ranking identity factors 1 or 2 were also aggregated to allow for those with a shared religious/national identity to emerge. The findings are given below in the Table:

Table: Significance of religious and national identity for different groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-ascribed ethnicity</th>
<th>Rank Religion 1 or 2 (%)</th>
<th>Rank English 1 or 2 (%)</th>
<th>Rank British 1 or 2 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British, English, White, White English, White Christian, British (N=57)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Pakistani, British Muslim, Pakistani Kashmiri, Pakistani, British Asian, Bangladeshi/Bengali, British Bengali, British Asian (N=54)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African, Black British, Mixed Race, Other (N=16)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This finding represents a qualification to the positive responses given to the finding that the Muslim sample was proud to be British, in that it is clear that for this group, unlike their counterparts, religious identity trumps national identity.

‘Britishness’ and Englishness

For the majority of Muslim young people, this primary faith-based identity was compatible with being ‘British’ (contrary to alarmist suggestions of anti-Britishness amongst Muslim young people): British: Me (AYP: Rochdale). 63% of those self-identifying as ‘Muslim’ definitely agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to say that I am British’ (less than the 80% of the ‘non-Muslim’ group), and only 10% definitely disagreed, indicating that misgivings about foreign policy frequently expressed in the group discussions did not have an alienating effect on the majority of Muslim young people:

British mean live with different people
British means loving your country
British means being loyal to England and not being a terrorist and blowing it up
British means you can be multi-cultured yet keep your identity
(Asian young people, Rochdale)

For Asian young people Britishness is more positive than Englishness: I suppose because British is more inclusive, that’s how people can relate to that more than just the St George flag (AYP, Rochdale). This could be a function of Britishness being associated with ideas about inclusive citizenship, as expressed in this word association

British means you live in Britain, abiding laws, treating each other respectfully, a citizen of Britain, having rights in Britain

By contrast, Englishness appeared to be more associated with socio-cultural traits: the last respondent identified English people as: sometimes racist, to blame for the war on Iraq, good at football, good cricketers, to blame for street crime, and in the following example, ‘Englishness’ is seen more negatively, as it is viewed as being about ‘being White’.

English people are the opposite of us
English people are White people
(Asian Young People, Rochdale)

This is clearly problematic, as most White young people see ‘English’ as a more important identity than ‘British’, as is indicated in the Table above. This focus on ‘Englishness’ amongst White young people may well reflect the challenges to past notions of ‘Britishness’ posed by devolution, European Integration and inward migration.

Impact of Foreign Affairs

Despite their acceptance of ‘British’ national identity, the British involvement in western military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and domestic media and political
discussion of them, has had a clear impact on some Asian young people view national identity:

British means attacking other countries
Muslim people are targeted, victimised
English people are to blame for the war in Iraq
(Asian Young People, Rochdale)

The impact of Islamaphobia and anti-Muslim sentiments related to these international political events amongst some sections of British politics and the media have also impacted on some Muslim young people, with a number of very thoughtful, or even plaintive, comments:

Muslim people are not terrorists
Muslim people are misled by extremists as well as world leaders
(Asian young people, Rochdale)

Problematic ‘Muslim’ Identity
It is clear from the data above that the strong ‘Muslim’ identity amongst Pakistani and Bangladeshi-origin young people surveyed in Oldham and Rochdale is not viewed as in conflict with British identity, and that British identity remains strong, and relatively unproblematic, for these young people, despite the real and ongoing geo-political events taking place. However, this also gave a minority of young British Muslims a basis to negatively judge the morals and lifestyles of non-Muslims. The extreme negativity and prejudices towards White people from some Asian young people was often expressed in judgemental moral or religious terms, suggesting that the religious identity seen by all Muslim young people was being used by a minority to judge and label others in highly disrespectful ways, with terms such as ‘drunkenness’ and ‘godless’ being utilised, as this excerpt from the exercise completed by one youth group in Rochdale shows:

White people: Shameless, not believing in God, no respect for other people

Such prejudices were particularly exposed by the ‘Word Association/Sentence Completion’ exercises, with responses suggesting that racist language and stereotypes are part of ‘everyday’ life for some young people of all ethnic backgrounds. Here, the evidence would support the view of the Community Cohesion reports (Cantle, 2001; Ritchie, 2001) that within largely segregated communities who have at best superficial links with individuals of a different background, overt prejudices and negative language can become part of the open and ‘taken for granted’ way of acting and thinking.

A strong ‘Muslim’ sense of Identity meant that the perceived position of Muslims nationally and internationally and emotive political issues, such as the Iraq and Afghanistan military involvements played a significant role in the way Asian young people viewed ‘British’ and ‘English’ identity, as well as the way they understood themselves. This suggests that more overt work and discussions with older Muslim young people about their identity and its links to political issues like 7/7 and the Iraq war could be positive as those issues are already at the front of young people’s minds. Nationally, most educational work within the PVE/Prevent agenda has
avoided such overt engagement with such contentious topics (Thomas, 2009), what DCLG Minister Hazel Blears characterised in December 2008 as the ‘sharp end’ of the PVE agenda. This evidence suggests that some Muslim young people want and need to engage in Citizenship/Political education-based dialogue around these issues, as they are already discussing them. It also suggests that inter-faith work amongst young people may be a positive vehicle for Cohesion. The strength of ‘Muslim’ identity amongst Asian-origin young people surveyed, and the level of their concern about international political events needs to be also understood in terms of how non-Muslim communities have understood such events through political and media discourse and ‘projected’ feelings and prejudices about them: the word association exercise with ‘Muslim’ produced responses which identified religious markers (headscarves, beards, funny clothes, Quran), disapproval of religious observance (too strong in their faith), and references to terrorism and the language of redtop newspapers (bombs, ragheads). These were in addition to more timeworn references to cultural traits and the size of the population. The strength and regularity of such prejudiced comments from some White young people highlighted the ‘taken for granted’ status of such opinions within some White communities, and the influence of racist campaigning organisations in these areas (Copsey, 2008).

Discussion

At first sight, the case study evidence discussed above from Oldham and Rochdale might seem to support the right-of-centre thesis that there is indeed a problem with Muslim young people and national identity. The overwhelming importance put on ‘religion’ by the Asian young people surveyed leaves no doubt about the fact the ‘Muslims’ is first and foremost what they see themselves as. The strength and consistency of this religious identity explains the deeply-felt concern in Britain’s South Asian communities with Britain’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with the West’s failure to rein in Israel’s illegal excesses in Gaza and on the West Bank – these are understood as attacks on fellow Muslims and upon Muslim countries. This is, of course, very interesting in itself, because this association and concern with Palestine (itself a misnomer, as a significant number of Palestinians are Christian) and other Muslim countries was not evident amongst Britain’s Asian communities in the 1970s and early 1980s, with the ‘Satanic Verses’ controversy of 1989 arguably proving to be a turning point (Abbas, 2005). That is not the focus of this paper, but the suggestion that Britain’s Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities feel strong and deep attachments to co-religionists in other countries, and that they side with those co-religionists against the policies and values of their own nation is the conclusion drawn by some commentators (Policy Exchange, 2007; Prins and Salisbury, 2008). That view is significantly refuted by this evidence, with Muslim young people in exactly the sort of tense, ethnically-segregated and socially excluded northern towns seen as capable of producing violent Islamist extremists being entirely comfortable with describing themselves as ‘British’. The overwhelming focus on religious identity does beg the question of how important national ‘British’ identity is to these young Muslims in relation to their ‘religious’ identity, and there clearly needs to be more detailed research activity around the relative strengths of these ‘identities’. Also, the judgemental nature of some comments about non-Muslims and the language sometimes used to express it, suggests that this ‘Muslim’ identity is as a much a ‘cultural’ identity as an authentically ‘religious’ one. Nevertheless, the very
significant support amongst these young Muslims, despite their very real concerns about international political events, for the statement ‘I’m proud to be British’ suggests that the political and media discourse questioning the national loyalties of young British Muslims are badly misplaced.

Contrary to much of the academic discourse around the meaning of Community Cohesion, empirical evidence into how Community Cohesion is actually being understood and operationalised through work with young people in towns like Oldham suggests that it is not presaged on assimilationism. Instead, it accepts the reality and positive strength of different identities and works with them to create the conditions for meaningful direct contact and dialogue that could be laying the conditions for positive and common over-arching identities (Thomas, 2007). This understandings of the government’s Community Cohesion agenda places it in the context of New Labour’s efforts to create de-centred and inter-sectional forms of identity through a ‘human rights’ framework (McGhee, 2006). Here, ‘hot’ forms of exclusive ethnic, class and religious identities that are inevitably going to be in tension with each other in an increasingly fluid and multicultural society need to be replaced by ‘cooler’, weaker forms of identity. From this perspective, respect and equality between religious and ethnic identities cannot be viewed as progress if those identities are intolerant of gay and lesbian lifestyles, or of gender equality. This political approach can be seen as a significant departure from previous but recent debates on ‘multiculturalism’ which stressed the perspective of a ‘community of communities’ (CFMEB, 2000). In contrast, this new focus necessitates a weakening of such essentialised ethnic identities and the development of multiple identities, the precondition for ‘hybridity’ (Hall, 2000). The fact that the young Muslims surveyed are comfortable with a ‘British’ identity alongside their ‘religious’ affiliation might be seen as a tentative but positive development in this direction. However, Government policy itself here is contradictory, with the PVE agenda developing as a single ethnic group focus, itself in flat contradiction to the stated priority of Community Cohesion, but one which also essentialises and privileges ‘Muslim’ identity of Britain’s Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, rather than focussing on the other forms of identity and need represented in such communities (Thomas, 2009). Here, the government’s continued fixation on dialogue with ‘religious’ representatives of ‘Muslims’ (albeit of the right, pliant sort: Younge, 2009), rather than with the hundreds of Pakistani and Bangladeshi-origin elected local councillors, MPs, and senior public servants who also happen to be Muslims seems to perpetuate ‘hot’ and essentialised forms of identity at odds with other aspects of social policy. Arguably, this uncritical acceptance of religious claims emboldens the religious-based judgementalism of some young Muslims surveyed, which included clear challenges to notions of gender equality.

The other key issue worthy of comment from the initial research findings reported here is the contrast between the ‘British’ rather than ‘English’ affiliation of Muslim young people, a preference in significant contrast to those of White young people. This finding supports the findings of previous, small-scale research amongst ethnic minority adults (CRE, 2005), and the associated positive comments about the Union Jack contradict research which suggested a preference for the English Cross of St. George flag amongst young Pakistanis (Bagguley and Hussain, 2005), a finding possibly skewed by the field research being carried out soon after the 2002 World Cup when England flags bedecked the entire country. This finding has led to this
paper’s slightly provocative title. Whilst the idea of young Muslims being the ‘last Britons’ somewhat overplays the current reality, there is clearly a genuine issue of young Muslims embracing British identity (despite very real political tensions and arguments) just as White young people desert this identity in favour of ‘Englishness’. Significantly, previous research (CRE, 2005) has identified that non-White ethnic minorities in Scotland and Wales are largely comfortable with that form of identity, but the data from England was consistent with our own findings that ‘English’ is not an identity that non-White ethnic minorities, especially Muslims/Asians, are entirely comfortable with. Here, there is an urgent need to debate and develop more inclusive, modern and dynamic understandings of ‘Englishness’ that can be confidently embraced by ethnic minorities and which challenges residual, racially-exclusive understandings of the type peddled by the far-right BNP (Bragg, 2007; Copsey, 2008). One real ground for optimism here is provided by the experience of the travelling army that supports the England football team at all major tournaments, with the 2006 World Cup in Germany seeing large numbers of Asian and Black fans wearing the white shirt with pride (Perryman, 2008).

Conclusion

Much of the political and media discourse of the past few years around the real and pressing challenges of cohesion and violent political extremism has contained an undertow that questions the national loyalties and affiliations of Britain’s Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities. The explicit suggestion from some quarters is that their ‘Muslim’ identity inevitably puts them in conflict with ‘British values’ (whatever they are) and British national interests. The case study evidence reported here from field research amongst young people in Oldham and Rochdale confirms the strength and primacy of Muslim ‘identity’, but suggests that young Muslims do not see this as in contradiction with ‘Britishness’, and that most are ‘proud to be British’. This provides significant grounds for optimism, and possibly suggests further progress towards de-centred and intersectional forms of ‘identity’. However, the clear contrast between the ‘national’ affiliations of Muslim and White young people surveyed raises the difficulty of developing a shared national identity that all can be comfortable with in rapidly changing political conditions. This suggests the need for a focus on a more open, dynamic and non-racial understanding of ‘Englishness’ that can be embraced by young people of all ethnic backgrounds.

Dr. Paul Thomas (Senior Lecturer in Youth and Community Work)
School of Education and Professional Development,
University of Huddersfield
HD1 3DH
Tel: 01484 478267
Email: d.p.thomas@hud.ac.uk
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