Between Two Stools?
The Government’s ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Agenda

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The 7/7 London bombings and the failed 21/7 attacks of July 2005 had, and continue to have, a significant impact on British politics and society. They represented the emergence of a new phenomenon for Britain, home-grown suicide bombers willing to attack civilians. In both the bombers' willingness to die, and in the deliberate targeting of civilians, these attacks were arguably different to previous ‘terrorist’ threats to Britain, such as by various Irish republican groups between the 1970s and 1990s. The fact that the bombings and attempted attacks of July 2005 were not a one-off spasm has been shown by a number of more recent trials and convictions for terrorist conspiracies. These cases have all involved young British Muslims (some of them converts) and plans for causing explosions, and been based in a number of different towns and cities. The alienation of a small minority of young British Muslims from ‘British’ values and lifestyles that these attacks and conspiracy cases have apparently exposed has added fuel to the already heated public debates around national identity, ‘shared values’ and integration that were prompted by the 2001 violent disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford (all involving Muslim-origin young men), and the closely-related emergence of the new ‘race relations’ policy priority of community cohesion. Community cohesion’s critique of ‘parallel lives’ and a profound lack of shared values in ethnically-mixed communities has led to a strong policy focus on direct contact and integration. Implicit within the development of community cohesion policies has been a critique of past race relations policy approaches, with ‘multiculturalism’ characterised as leaving Britain ‘sleepwalking to segregation’. Increasingly, ‘multiculturalism’ has also been blamed by a number of right-of-centre think tanks, such as Policy Exchange and the Royal United Services Institute, for undermining Britain’s ability to combat terrorism, both at home and abroad. Whilst Government Ministers have avoided direct attacks on multiculturalism, their pointed, post-2001 emphasis on the new concept of community cohesion speaks volumes. The Opposition have not felt similarly constrained, with Conservative Shadow Home Secretary Dominic Grieve MP commenting that ‘we’ve actually done something terrible to ourselves in Britain’ through multiculturalism and that, ‘in this vacuum, both the BNP and Hizb-ut-Tahir rise’ (The Guardian, 27th September, 2008).

Post-2001 community cohesion recommendations for citizenship tests and ceremonies for new migrants, a stronger sense of an overarching ‘British’ identity
and a much greater focus on citizenship education for young people have all been re-energised in the wake of the 7/7 attacks. Alongside this has come a new policy initiative aimed directly at support for, and promotion of, Islamist terrorist ideologies within British society, as part of government’s overall counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST). The ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE) initiative was first announced by government in October 2006, and operationalised via Government Offices and local authorities from 2007, with continuing further expansion and development. My aim in this paper is not only to discuss the aims and content of this emerging PVE agenda, particularly in relation to its target group of Muslim young people, but to also highlight real concerns over its likely effectiveness and impact. In doing so, my intention is not to trivialise the threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups, and it is important to praise the government’s emphasis on community and education-based work as well as security-based measures. However, I am questioning whether the PVE policy agenda, as it currently stands, will be effective, or whether it will actually negatively impact on the vital goals of community cohesion and positive community relations. My fear is that PVE is neither making a helpful contribution to community cohesion, or effectively engaging with the political and doctrinal understandings that are attracting a small minority of young Muslims towards extremism.

Preventing Violent Extremism

In announcing the creation of the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund’ in February 2007, then-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Ruth Kelly said, ‘Violent extremism seeks to drive us apart. Together, we will overcome it’. The PVE Pathfinder Fund made available an initial £6 million for 2007/08 from the Safer and Stronger Communities Fund, via Government Offices to 70 local authorities whose populations included 5% or more Muslims, for action programmes aimed at Muslim communities in general, and, within those communities, at those most at risk of recruitment or ‘grooming’ by extremists, or at those ‘justifying or glorifying violent extremist ideologies and terrorism’ (‘Preventing Violent Extremism, Winning Hearts and Minds’, DCLG, 2007:7). This population calculation was based on six year old data from the 2001 Census; it has subsequently been amended for the 3 year, £45 million programme for 2008-2011 to include all local authorities with a minimum of 4,000 Muslims within their population, but this lower threshold still excludes Crawley in West Sussex, home of 3 of the 5 Muslim young men convicted over the ‘Operation Crevice’ plot to bomb the Bluewater shopping centre in Kent, and the Ministry of Sound nightclub in London.

Consistent with more general New Labour policy design, the ‘Pathfinder’ document stressed the need for locally-designed approaches whilst at the same time offering explicit objectives that all local authority funding bids should address, and have agreed by the regional Government Offices. Acutely aware of the danger that Government language, particularly if aping American-style ‘war on terror’ formulations, could further alienate and radicalise sections of Muslim communities,
the PVE documentation uses ‘we’ consistently. Indeed, the Government has also established a Research, Information and Communications Unit within the Home Office, with one of its key functions being to help the various arms of national and local government avoid ‘aggressive rhetoric’ and to use language that encourages the positive involvement of Muslim communities 5. The further PVE funding for 2008-2011 includes an expansion to cover Youth Offending Teams and Young Offenders Institutions via the Youth Justice Board, Police Forces, and Further and Higher Education Institutions, which are viewed as key recruiting grounds for Islamist extremists, and confirmed as such by the testimony of ex-activist Ed Husain, who was previously involved in Islamist group Hizb-Ut-Tahir (HUT) 7. Information –sharing and ‘tension monitoring’ are a key part of this PVE expansion, particularly the developing work with Colleges and Universities, with the hope that extremist activity can be identified and effectively countered. Underpinning this is a significant strengthening of relationships between Police Forces and educational institutions across the full age range of children and young people, with the Association of Chief Police Officers aware that there is a ‘pressing need to develop the growing relationships between the police and education sector at every level with regard to preventing violent extremism’ ('New strategy to stem flow of terror recruits', The Guardian, 28th February, 2008). The pressure from central government, via Local Area Agreements under the Common Spending Assessment, on Local Authorities, and their local partners, to be involved in hard-edged monitoring, information-sharing and ‘forums against extremism’ is significant, as this extract from the Local Government Association briefing document ‘Strategic Issues –Preventing Violent Extremism’ shows:

The selection or non-selection of National Indicator 35: Building resilience to violent extremism emerged as a contentious issue during LAA negotiations. The Home Office, via the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT), have produced a ‘heat map’ which identifies 30 areas with a high risk of producing violent extremists and are seeking a good take-up of NI: 35 across this group...The HO believe that local authorities that do not select NI: 35 are not prioritising PVE and concluding that little or no PVE work is being undertaken. To persuade local authorities to select NI: 35, the HO is applying pressure via the Police, and senior officials during LAA negotiations which has had only limited success. (LGA, April 2008:2)

The PVE policy agenda involves a number of key approaches. Alongside ‘tension monitoring’, these include the promotion of shared values and the challenging of extremist ideologies, the building of civic capacity and leadership within Muslim communities, and the strengthening of the role of faith institutions within those communities. This has led to a significant focus on educational standards in general, and citizenship education specifically, in after-school Mosque schools and Madrassahs, and capacity building training, support and movement towards charitable status for many Mosques and other Muslim community organisations. Above all, though, PVE activity to date has focussed on engagement with Muslim young people, using a variety of approaches and techniques, through youth work, schools, and arts and sports activities. These youth-focussed activities have included...
the promotion of local ‘anti-extremism’ forums and ‘Road shows’ on extremism and Islamophobia. The DCLG document, ‘Pathfinder Fund –Mapping of Project Activities 2007/08’ (DCLG, 2008), the product of a ‘light-touch’ review requested by the Prime Minister’s Office, claims that as many as 44,000 people, most of them young people, have been engaged by the PVE programme, but it also acknowledges that the monitoring and evaluation data from the programme to date is weak and unreliable.

PVE: Contradictions and Problems
Two major contradictions are immediately apparent within the PVE agenda outlined above. The first is the exclusive focus on ‘Muslim communities’, a specific ethnic/religious concern explicitly at odds with the Government’s approach to community cohesion. Secondly, and relatedly, is a consequent avoidance of ‘violent extremism’ in other ethnic communities, especially the significant growth of activity by, and popular support for, the British National Party within some white communities. Both contradictions are discussed below.

The post-2001 prioritisation of community cohesion as the government’s approach to ‘race relations’ has marked a clear break with previous policies of ‘political multiculturalism’ or anti-racism. Those policies, developed in the wake of the watershed 1981 riots and the consequent analysis of structural racial discrimination, saw an emphasis on support and funding for facilities and structures within specific ethnic communities. The hope here was that strong organisations and channels of communication within specific ethnic communities would both counter discrimination and provide safety valves for future tensions. Such approaches indeed made a contribution to significant advances in racial equality but also had a clear downside that was exposed by the 2001 disturbances: the policy focus on ethnic-specific needs and concerns had cemented physical and cultural ethnic segregation and fatally weakened cross-ethnic dialogue and contact. The community cohesion response has been to promote direct contact and communication across ethnic boundaries through youth activities, school ‘twinning’ and partnership working amongst diverse community agencies. Alongside this has come a clear Government presumption that funding for ethnic-specific agencies and facilities can now only be justified if tangible community cohesion benefits are identified. The continued acceptance of this analysis can be seen within the PVE agenda, with its priority focus on Muslim youth and women, rather than traditional ‘community leaders’. There also appears to be an acknowledgement that past policies involved public support for ethnic-specific organisations with questionable political positions, with the PVE commitment to fundamentally rebalance our engagement towards those organisations that uphold shared values and reject and condemn violent extremism (‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds’, DCLG, 2007:9). However, this new approach is arguably seeing government develop a new cohort of favoured ‘community leaders’, judging by the recent block on junior International Development Minister Shahid Malik attending the IslamExpo event.
In the light of this move to community cohesion, the Muslim-specific focus of the PVE agenda and funded-activity can only be seen as a self-defeating contradiction. The evidence from local authority programmes to date is overwhelmingly of work exclusively with groups of Muslim youth, as discussed above. Given the demographic profile of the terrorist plots outlined above, the need for such a Muslim-focused approach may seem obvious, but the community cohesion analysis suggests that ethnic segregation is actually the context for this growth in violent Islamist ideologies, a growth arguably taking place well before post-2001 developments in British foreign policy. Here, the profound physical, cultural and political ethnic segregation caused by racial discrimination, and cemented by policy concerns with specific ethnic ‘needs’, has created inward-looking mentalities within communities and a strengthening of essentialised ethnic and religious identities that has enabled minorities within those communities to move towards extremism. The DCLG describes Islamist extremism as a threat to cohesion, but arguably this extremism is an outcome of the lack of cohesion. Such an analysis is equally relevant to white working class communities, who are increasingly supporting the British National Party and other far-right groups, with the structural economic exclusion those white communities share with many Pakistani/Bangladeshi communities further fuelling this growth in ethnic-specific and defensive ‘identities’.

Additionally, analysis of the 2001 disturbances clearly identified that competition over ethnicity-based government regeneration funding, and white resentment over the (incorrect) perception that Asian communities unfairly benefitted from that funding, was a key part of the racial tension preceding the disturbances. This drove Government’s post-2001 determination to avoid ethnic-specific funding and regeneration schemes, yet PVE appears to be exactly that, a Muslim-specific funding stream that has real potential to further fuel white working class feelings of ‘unfairness’, whilst leaving some Muslim young people feeling that they have been ‘targeted’ using broad and negative generalisations about their communities.

The logical conclusion of the analysis above is that the response to extremist Islamist ideologies is not more work with groups of Muslim young people but instead programmes of integrated cohesion activity that move further and faster in altering the perceptions of young people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds by bringing them together for shared programmes of activity focussed on fun, and on shared concerns. Such programmes, if planned and implemented creatively, have much more potential to grow a meaningful and shared national ‘identity’ then any speeches by politicians. Good examples of such work already underway includes the Youth Parliament ‘Safe Space’ initiative, involving young people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds in political debate and processes relevant to young people, as well as
by the minority of Local Authorities who have insisted on genuinely integrated cohesion activities within their PVE-funded activity. The DCLG explicitly says that PVE is not the same as a wider concern for community cohesion, but Local Authorities in key areas like West Yorkshire have been clear that they struggle to see the distinction between the two policy areas.

The above analysis makes the lack of focus on other types of politically-motivated violent extremism within the PVE agenda even harder to justify. Prior to the 7/7 attacks, the most serious terrorist attacks on London in recent times had come in April 1999 from the ‘nail bomber’ David Copeland, a White Supremacist. Copeland carried out 3 bombings in 13 days, killing 3 people and injuring 139 people, many seriously. His targets were a mainly gay pub in Soho, and the multiracial areas of Brick Lane and Brixton. Copeland had quit the BNP because it was not ‘hardline’ enough for him, instead joining the National Socialist Movement (the political wing of Combat 18) in the hope that they would launch a paramilitary struggle. More recent court cases have exposed other attempts by far-right activists to create and use explosive devices, whilst the ‘Red Watch’ website is infamous for its encouragement of harassment against anti-racist campaigners. Such realities expose the myth that far-right parties are now respectable and only concerned with electoral progress, but this success at the ballot box may explain the reluctance of government to provide free publicity for such groups by publicly linking them with ‘violent extremism’, as criticism in 2006 of then –Employment Minister Margaret Hodge MP for acknowledging the rise of the BNP in east London indicates. Right-wing extremism is invoked in the Introductions to a number of the Government’s PVE documents (including an incorrect reference to ‘Mosley’s brown shirts!’) but this appears to be nothing more than a superficial nod towards even-handedness. Such apparent inconsistency, emphasised by Tony Blair’s post 7/7 call to ban Islamist groups like HUT whilst the BNP continues to grow, is not lost on Muslim young people. Awareness of the highly sensitive nature of the ‘PVE’ title, and of its explicit focus on Muslim ‘communities’ (itself a highly problematic term) has led Government to shorten the working title of the policy programme to ‘Prevent’, with the title ‘Pathfinder programme’ sometimes being used at a local level. These highly opaque titles suggest that politicians are aware of the contradictions and problems discussed above and are concerned to not further antagonise opinion within Muslim communities, but also suggest that Muslim young people and communities involved in PVE-funded activity at a local level may not always be clear of the focus and aims of this work.

**Concerns over capacity to deliver**
A second area of concern over this PVE agenda is its ability to achieve success on its own terms. That is, can the programme actually positively influence Muslim young people away from support for, or even involvement in, violent Islamist activity, through the types of activities outlined above? I suggest that there are considerable
grounds for pessimism here, as the programme is currently designed, with some of the evidence in support of this assertion coming from previous attempts to educationally influence racist white young people attracted to racial violence and far-right political involvements, as well as from the first year of the PVE programme.

An additional facet of the ‘political multiculturalism’ or anti-racism race relations policy approaches increasingly dominant post-1981 was anti-racist educational approaches operationalised in schools, colleges and youth work settings. Whilst well-intentioned, and sometimes successful with young people of particular social backgrounds, these anti-racist educational approaches involved inherent problems and unintended consequences that should act as salutary warnings for those designing PVE programmes. An immediate problem is the way young people from disadvantaged backgrounds understand and interpret any educational agenda designed and enforced by those in power and concerned with changing behaviour. Anti-racist rules and programmes introduced by schools from the 1980s onwards came up against this problem, with white working class pupils often rejecting these new anti-racist norms as part of their wider rejection of compulsory schooling that felt irrelevant to their lives and experiences. The extension of the PVE programme to Youth Offending Teams, Schools and the Police risks a similar rejection by Muslim-origin young people selected for involvement, particularly if implementation is as ‘clumsy’ as anti-racism implementation sometimes was. The most graphic example of this was the racist murder in Manchester of a young Bangladeshi man by a fellow pupil in 1986, with the independent Inquiry identifying the clumsy implementation of anti-racist policies as having strongly contributed to the context of the murder.

Central to the rejection by many white working class young people of ‘anti-racism’, as it was often implemented educationally on the ground, was the perception that these anti-racist norms were explicitly critical of the assumptions, attitudes and cultures of white working class communities by ‘outsiders’ (including middle-class white people). Here, white working class communities were often implicitly portrayed as racist and ignorant, with cultures weaker and inferior to the ethnic minority religions and cultures ‘celebrated’ by multiculturalist and anti-racist policies. This led to feelings of ‘unfairness’ amongst white working class young people, fuelled by the perception that their attitudes and behaviour were judged more harshly than similar behaviour by other ethnic communities. Such a clear focus within PVE on Muslim communities, and the associated lack of focus on racist extremism within white communities could well have the unintended consequence of hardening a defensive and antagonistic ‘Muslim’ identity amongst those involved in response to a perception that their whole identity and community lifestyle is being implicitly criticised and scrutinised. Arguably, post 9/11 popular media coverage has already had this affect, as witnessed by more overt displays of Islamic dress by many young Muslims, and PVE activity could further exacerbate this trend. Associated with the ‘white backlash’ by some white working class young people against anti-racism
was the perception that they were viewed as ‘all racist’, even though many vehemently denied that their motivations during inter-racial conflicts were actually racial. A concern with the PVE agenda would be that at least some of the practitioners involved in its delivery carried similar assumptions about Muslim young men, fuelled by some media coverage and popular prejudices concerning religiously observant young men with beards. Within this are problematic issues of targeting. Youth Offending Teams have been allocated PVE funds, yet few if any young offenders are likely to be referred to YOTs for involvement in violent extremist activity, as numbers associated with such plots are small. This suggests that PVE activity through YOTs is likely to be extended to all those seen as ‘racially motivated offenders’ even though ‘RMO’ programmes are only slowly developing within the Youth Justice system, and identification of which offenders are genuinely ‘racially motivated’, and should so be on a RMO programme, is far from straightforward. This leads to the question of whether ‘racial motivation’ can really ‘read across’ to support for ‘violent extremism’. An even more questionable alternative would be to ‘profile’ Muslim young offenders more generally for PVE activity.

This leads to a focus on those responsible for implementing the PVE educational agenda, such as youth workers, Youth Offending Team workers and teachers. There is clear evidence from research amongst youth workers in West Yorkshire that such professionals lacked confidence and felt under-prepared when attempting to implement previous anti-racist policies. Such feelings were based on the perception that they were implementing policies and rules around highly sensitive issues that they didn’t really understand, and certainly didn’t feel confident to debate and explore with young people and communities who often had strong and forthright opinions on those issues.11 These perceptions by professionals tended to lead either to total avoidance of the issues, or of a rigid, ‘party line’ implementation in tension with their professional training as educators, and which often fuelled the negative reaction from young people discussed above. Given that any educational process hoping to make genuine progress on the PVE agenda would inevitably lead to detailed discussion of Islamic teachings and doctrine, ‘Muslim’ identity and highly-emotive foreign policy issues around Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, it is likely that the large-scale and broad brush expansion of the PVE programme now underway would lead to one or both of these responses. Initial evidence suggests that ‘avoidance’ is the professional response, with the PVE educational work focussing on Muslim young people, but explicitly not engaging with why some Muslim young people are actually attracted to violent Islamist ideologies, or with the broader political issues that fuel Islamist anger. Much of the activity to date in the name of PVE is good youth work and should be supported, but it largely avoids explicit focus on the key concerns driving the PVE agenda – the ‘sharp end’ of politics and ‘extremist’ ideologies is not being discussed in most cases, as DCLG Minister Hazel Blears acknowledged in December 2008. It is clear that a significant number of Muslim young people, especially those aged 15 years and older, do want to debate and explore Muslim
identity, extremism, and Islam’s treatment in the media, and in wider geo-politics. This interest drove the growth in Muslim Students Societies on campuses, and in Islamist groups like H-U-T from the early 1990s onwards, so clarifying that enhanced ‘Muslim’ identity amongst young people predates foreign policy controversies such as Iraq. In saying this, I certainly do not intend to condemn education professionals doing sterling work with disadvantaged young people but simply to highlight the large gap between the stated aims and focus of the PVE agenda and the reality of much of its implementation.

Ironically, given the community cohesion concern over single ethnic group funding, it is largely progressive, community -based Muslim organisations that are explicitly discussing political issues and the associated attraction of Islamist ideologies with young people, and who are most likely to be aware of young people at risk of ‘radicalisation’. One such example is the Hamara Centre in Beeston, South Leeds. The ring leader of the 7/7 bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan, was a part-time youth worker within one of Hamara’s projects, and may well have developed the plot with two other local men whilst working there.Hamara are now in the forefront of developing a meaningful PVE agenda, with Muslim youth activities that enable discussion of extremism within a wider context of democratic political involvement, community cohesion direct contact with other ethnic/religious groups and analysis of Muslim identity within wider British society. Such activity suggests that Muslim young people are able and willing to clearly discuss ‘violent extremism’ and its underlying political discourse, if professionals are confident and ready to undertake such work within an explicit context of community cohesion and citizenship activity. To date, however, the bulk of PVE funding has been channelled through local authorities, with little reaching Muslim-led community/third sector organisations. This limited involvement of the community sector may well be a result of the rapid policy development and operationalisation, rather than a community cohesion-inspired reluctance to fund single ethnicity organisations, but it is severely limiting the ability of Muslim communities to lead, and be seen to lead by the wider community, on the crucial issue of tackling support for, and ideologies of, violent Islamist extremism.

Between Two Stools?
Clearly, Britain faces a serious and persistent problem of home-grown, Islamist terrorism supported by a small but extremely alienated minority of young Muslims. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the role of recent foreign policy in fanning this extremist activity, but any serious analysis of the development of the groups or ideologies arguably providing a ‘pathway’ towards such terrorism suggests that this worrying development predates 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. In this context, it has not been the intention of this article to downplay the threat or to question the need for specific policy measures that challenge support for, and pathways towards, such extremism. Indeed, I fully agree with the PVE agenda’s goal of engaging with young people in a ‘hearts and minds’ initiative that strengthens
support for, and engagement with, democratic values, processes and activity. The problem is that, as it is currently constituted, the PVE programme may not only fail to achieve tangible progress in this regard, but may also have the unintended and negative consequences of alienating targeted Muslim young people, creating resentment amongst marginalised non-Muslim young people, and contradicting ongoing attempts to develop meaningful programmes of cross-community contact in the name of community cohesion. The current review for the DCLG of how to develop a ‘whole community’ approach to PVE by Lord Kamlesh Patel of Bradford may well highlight this.

These worrying possibilities have all been apparent in the initial stages of local PVE-funded activity. It is clear that the bulk of the funded activity directed at young people, with a minority of honourable exceptions, is very much focussed on Muslim young people. This highlights inconsistencies in government discussions as to whether the problem really is just a ‘small fringe’, or something more widespread that necessitates demonstrable changes in attitudes amongst Muslims (PVE Pathfinder Fund Guidance note for Local Authorities, DGLC, 2007:7). The broad brush focus on ‘Muslims’ within PVE risks alienating parts of the significant number of Muslim young people worked with nationally under the less than straightforward title of ‘Prevent’, whilst creating resentment amongst white working class young people once again marginalised by a funding priority. The very recent DCLG policy concern with such white young people suggests that Government is acutely aware of this. At the same time, the Muslim-only focus of much PVE activity is flatly in contradiction with community cohesion, arguably ignoring the post-2001 evidence on the origins of much prejudiced and extremist thoughts and activity in such starkly segregated localities.

Whilst working in contradiction to community cohesion, and repeating the mistakes of the past that required cohesion to become a priority, the PVE agenda in its early stages has also failed to actually engage in a robust and upfront manner with the Muslim young people who want and need to discuss their understanding of faith and identity, and the real political conflicts, interpretations and events driving those understandings of faith and identity locally and globally. In this way, it risks falling between two stools and mirrors previous, and often unsuccessful, efforts to develop ‘anti-racist’ educational activity with marginalised white young people that frequently foundered on the lack of confidence and skills by the professionals being asked to implement these programmes in very challenging social situations. The successful examples of such anti-racist projects were situations where youth workers were skilled and confident enough to explore young peoples’ attitudes and prejudices openly and robustly, emphasising the positives of their lives and communities as well as challenging those prejudices through searching dialogue. Such work with young Muslims would, and does, involve very open discussion and criticism of British foreign and domestic social policy in relation to Muslims, as well as an airing of
internal community dynamics and issues that many people have a vested interest in not discussing. This approach to work with young people, alongside meaningful community cohesion and dialogue with other communities, offers the possibility of the PVE agenda avoiding falling between two stools and thus having a genuinely positive impact.

Notes

1. In December 2008, Rangzieb Ahmed, 33, from Rochdale and Habib Ahmed, 29, from Manchester were convicted at Manchester Crown Court of coordinating an Al-Qaida terror cell (The Guardian, 19th December 2008).
7. See *The Islamist* by Ed Husain (2007), London: Penguin Books
11. See *Open Talk, Open Minds* by the Commission for Racial Equality (1999), London: CRE.