University of Huddersfield Repository

Joe, Sarah Chidiebere

Perspectives of Reality: The Framing of Boko Haram in Legacy and Social Media

Original Citation


This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/35308/

The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:

- The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
- A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
- The content is not changed in any way.

For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.

http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
PERSPECTIVES OF REALITY: THE FRAMING OF BOKO HARAM IN LEGACY AND SOCIAL MEDIA

SARAH CHIDIEBERE JOE

A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Huddersfield

23 September 2020
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns any copyright in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Huddersfield the right to use such copyright for any administrative, promotional, educational and/or teaching purposes.

ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, may be made only in accordance with the regulations of the University Library. Details of these regulations may be obtained from the Librarian. This page must form part of any such copies made.

iii. The ownership of any patents, designs, trademarks and any and all other intellectual property rights except for the Copyright (the “Intellectual Property Rights”) and any reproductions of copyright works, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property Rights and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property Rights and/or Reproductions.
DEDICATION

To GOD ALMIGHTY, whose love for me never falters.

&

To Nene, the best sister ever! You live on in my heart, always!

To mama & papa, thank you for being true examples of dedication and diligence.

To my siblings, thank you for your ceaseless support.

&

To #Ogbuefi, thank you for riding with me on this journey.
Firstly, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis supervisors: Prof. Cornelia Sandvoss, Dr. Lone Sorensen and Dr. Mercy Ette for their guidance and encouragement throughout the course of this programme. Thank you Prof. Sandvoss, for introducing me to social media/Twitter analysis and for making ICA2019 a reality! Thank you Dr. Sorensen, for setting in motion this study’s inquiry into the logic and affordances of social media, your professional counsel, and the amazing job opportunities! Thank you Dr. Ette, for introducing me to framing research, demonstrating a remarkable level of faith in me, providing the emotional support I needed after NENE, taking me to my first-ever international conference, and yes...for the two journal publications. You are a blessing indeed!

Secondly, I am grateful to the members of staff of the Department of Media, Journalism and Film, especially to Michael Klontzas, who introduced me to many online resources and regularly listened to me share my exciting ideas; Dr. Richard McCulloch, who always offered encouraging words; Dr. Benjamin Litherland for treating me to an amazing ICA hot chocolate; Prof. Matt Hills and Dr. Martin Cooper for feedbacks on my work; Ruth Stoker for her warm support and interest in my research; and finally, Julian Schofield and Christian Tamminen for kindly providing technical support whenever I needed it. A big thank you also to Rukhsanah Browning and Frances Bolton, the Postgraduate Administrators for their support and guidance during the course of my research.

I wish to say a special thank you to Ade and Prof. B. B. Fakae for choosing to believe in and consistently support me over the years. Finally, thank you Whyte, John, Layefa, Pastor Abiye, Ruthie, Stanley & Zi Obi, Prof. Okon and Dr. Richard for being true friends and a formidable support system. God bless you all, Amen!
LIST OF PAPERS PUBLISHED AND CONFERENCES ATTENDED


ABSTRACT

This thesis examines media framing of Boko Haram, a transnational terrorist organisation, in four Nigerian national newspapers and on Twitter. The study takes as its starting point a widely held view about a symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism and argues that media framing of terrorism is driven by a variety of critical factors. It details how external factors such as the nature of the Nigeria state, the Nigerian media ecology, and internal variables such as professional norms of journalism, the logic and affordances of media platforms produce both convergent and divergent frames. The study answers two key questions by applying an integrated methodology to a wide range of data extracted from legacy media, represented by four newspapers, and social media, represented by Twitter. A combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis was adopted for the study in order to decode and capture the nuances and depth of the framing of Boko Haram. Data analysis using Computer-assisted Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (CHCA) and Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA) revealed six conceptual tools that were used in the representation of Boko Haram on the studied platforms. These include Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, Attribution of Responsibility, Religious Polarisation, and Economic Consequences frames. This thesis argues that the framing of Boko Haram in the media reveals the polarised nature of the Nigerian press, Nigeria’s socio-political and economic realities, and popular global narratives about terrorism. It also asserts that the construction of Boko Haram is shaped by the values, routines, norms, logic, and affordances of media platforms. However, the portrayal of the group on the selected platforms fails to present a complete picture by excluding some aspects of the Boko Haram narrative. In addition, some of the representations inadvertently serve the objectives of terrorists and/or authorities that the media is there to hold responsible. Although the group has been the subject of many framing research, most studies have focused on the representation of the group in legacy media. As a result, there is a dearth of knowledge about its construction on networked platforms even though these newer platforms are important daises for political communication. This study fills this gap in the literature and responds to the paucity of integrative framing studies by examining how words and images are used in the representation of Boko Haram on the selected platforms.
# TABLE OF CONTENT

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ........................................................................................................ 2
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................. 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................................ 4
LIST OF PAPERS PUBLISHED AND CONFERENCES ATTENDED ...................................... 5
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................ 6
TABLE OF CONTENT ..................................................................................................................... 7
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... 10
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ 11
LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................... 12

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 13
  1.1 Rationale for the Study .......................................................................................................... 14
  1.2 Aim and Research Questions ............................................................................................... 20
  1.3 Context of the Study ............................................................................................................. 21
    1.3.1 The History and Evolution of Boko Haram .............................................................. 22
    1.3.2 Boko Haram and the Media ....................................................................................... 27
    1.3.3 The Nature of the Nigerian state ............................................................................... 29
    1.3.4 The Nigerian Media Ecology .................................................................................... 33
  1.4 Scope of the Study ................................................................................................................ 38
  1.5 Organisation of the Study ..................................................................................................... 39

CHAPTER TWO - TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA ........................................................................ 40
  2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 40
  2.2 Conceptualising Terrorism ................................................................................................. 40
    2.2.1 The Origin of Terrorism ............................................................................................. 43
    2.2.2 The Root Causes of Terrorism .................................................................................... 46
    2.2.3 Responses to Terrorism ............................................................................................ 51
  2.3 Media-Terrorism Symbiosis ............................................................................................... 54
    2.3.1 The Internal Logic of Legacy Media ........................................................................ 62
    2.3.2 The Logic of Social Media ....................................................................................... 67
    2.3.3 Other influences on Media Content .......................................................................... 76
  2.4 Framing ............................................................................................................................... 78
    2.4.1 Conceptualising Framing ........................................................................................... 79
    2.4.2 Framing: Terrorism and Boko Haram ....................................................................... 84
2.4.3  Gaps in the Boko Haram Framing Literature ........................................... 86
2.4.4  Types of Frames ............................................................................................ 96
2.5   Chapter Summary ............................................................................................. 97

CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY .................................................................. 99
3.1   Introduction ....................................................................................................... 99
3.2   Restatement of Research Aims and Questions ............................................... 99
3.3   Research Paradigm and Approach .................................................................. 100
3.4   Research Design ................................................................................................ 101
3.4.1  Study population and Sample Size ................................................................ 106
3.4.2  Modes of Analysis .......................................................................................... 111
3.5   Ethical considerations ....................................................................................... 118
3.6   Chapter Summary ............................................................................................. 121

CHAPTER FOUR - FRAMES IN THE SELECTED NEWSPAPERS AND ON TWITTER .... 122
4.1   Introduction ....................................................................................................... 122
4.2   Summary of the Computer-assisted Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (CHCA) ...... 122
4.2.1  Boko Haram frames in the Daily Trust’s January articles .............................. 126
4.3   Description of Frames ....................................................................................... 139
4.3.1  Social Consequences Frame ........................................................................ 139
4.3.2  War against Boko Haram Frame .................................................................. 142
4.3.3  War against Women Frame .......................................................................... 144
4.3.4  Attribution of Responsibility Frame ............................................................. 147
4.3.5  Religious Polarisation Frame ....................................................................... 149
4.3.6  Economic Consequences Frame ................................................................... 151
4.4   Chapter Summary and Discussion ................................................................... 151

CHAPTER FIVE - THE CONSTRUCTION OF ECHO FRAMES: MEDIA AND POLITICAL
CONTEXTS ............................................................................................................. 158
5.1   Introduction ....................................................................................................... 158
5.2   Contextual Events ............................................................................................. 160
5.3   The Social Consequences Frame ..................................................................... 163
5.3.1  The Media Context of the Social Consequences Frame ............................. 164
5.3.2  The Political Context of the Social Consequences Frame ......................... 178
5.4   The War against Boko Haram Frame ............................................................... 182
5.4.1  The Media Context of the War Against Boko Haram Frame .................... 183
5.4.2  The Political Context of the War against Boko Haram Frame .................. 199
5.5   The War against Women Frame ...................................................................... 204
LIST OF FIGURES

1.1 Map of Nigeria showing six geo-political zones, thirty-six states, and FCT ..........30
3.1 Number of articles and tweets retrieved per month between January and June 2017........................................................................................................................104
3.2 Total number of images retrieved from the selected newspapers and Twitter between January and June 2017 (N=1640)...................................................................................................................109
3.3 Images/Chart not included in the analysis ...................................................................110
4.1 Total number of articles/tweets in contrast to the articles/tweets used in the cluster analysis.................................................................117
4.2 Dendrogram of Daily Trust January articles from the SPSS output..........................124
4.3 Breakdown of identified frames on the selected outlets/platforms........................129
4.4 Stacked area chart of frames identified in the selected papers per month .............130
4.5 Stacked area chart of frames identified on Twitter per month...............................131
4.6 T3..........................................................................................................................134
4.7 G2........................................................................................................................136
4.8 The cumulative number of tweets per frame.........................................................137
4.9 Tweets per day from January to June 2017.........................................................139
5.1 Number of articles and tweets retrieved per month between January and June 2017........................................................................................................154
5.2 G1........................................................................................................................157
5.3 L1........................................................................................................................159
5.4 T5........................................................................................................................160
5.5 T4........................................................................................................................168
5.6 G2........................................................................................................................181
5.7 T10.........................................................................................................................181
5.8 DT2.........................................................................................................................183
5.9 L2........................................................................................................................184
5.10 L2.........................................................................................................................185
5.11 T11.........................................................................................................................186
5.12 T12.........................................................................................................................187
5.13 T27.........................................................................................................................199
5.14 G4.........................................................................................................................200
5.15 G7.........................................................................................................................201
5.16 T28.........................................................................................................................203
5.17 Tweet by the Presidency Nigeria about the release of some Chibok girls..........211
5.18 Tweets per day from January to June 2017.............................................................212
5.19 P3.........................................................................................................................218
5.20 T36........................................................................................................................219
6.1 Breakdown of identified frames on the selected outlets/platforms.......................234
6.2 T60.........................................................................................................................237
6.3 T61.........................................................................................................................239
6.4 DT3.........................................................................................................................249
6.5 DT3.........................................................................................................................250
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Determinants of terrorism</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Types of images in the selected texts</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Agglomeration Schedule for the clustered articles from the Daily Trust newspaper</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Table of means for articles used in the cluster analysis</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Sample newspaper articles and tweets from the Social Consequences cluster</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Sample newspaper articles and tweets from the War against Boko Haram cluster</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Sample newspaper articles and tweets from the War against Women cluster</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Sample newspaper articles and tweets from the Religious Polarisation cluster</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Sample tweets from the Attribution of Responsibility cluster</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Sample newspaper articles from the Economic Consequences cluster</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Frames identified per Outlet/Platform</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYM/ABBREVIATION</td>
<td>FULL FORM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADL</td>
<td>Anti-Defamation League</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France Presse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Application Programming Interface</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASC</td>
<td>Best Agenda for Social Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBOG</td>
<td>Bring Back Our Girls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Christian Association of Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Catholic Bishop Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHCA</td>
<td>Computer-assisted Cluster Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Civilian Joint Task Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRN</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTD</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Database</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTI</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internally Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISWAP</td>
<td>Islamic State’s West African Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JASWL</td>
<td>Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHF</td>
<td>Janna Health Foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCBCs</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDA</td>
<td>Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEDC</td>
<td>North-East Development Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEMA</td>
<td>National Emergency Management Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVC</td>
<td>Orphans and Vulnerable Children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFN</td>
<td>Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Social Network Site</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Study of Terrorism and Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSF</td>
<td>Victim Support Fund</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is one of the most pressing challenges of the twenty-first century owing to its prevalence in virtually every region and continent of the world. Although recent research indicates a reduction in terrorism-related deaths, in many countries of the world like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Somalia, terrorism is still considered an existential threat (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018). Other countries are also experiencing a new wave of white nationalist terrorism. For instance, a 2019 research by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) shows that between 2009 and 2019, “the far right has been responsible for 73% of domestic extremist-related fatalities” in the United States of America (Bergengruen & Hennigan, 2019, para. 2). But, in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous and largest economy, most terrorism-related deaths are attributed to a group popularly referred to as Boko Haram, a transnational terrorist organisation. Despite claims by the Nigerian government that the country has “technically won the war” against Boko Haram (BBC News, 2015, para. 1), the evidence suggests that Boko Haram is still a potent threat in Nigeria and some Lake Chad Basin Countries (LCBCs) including Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin (Egbejule, 2019).

This study is positioned within the field of framing and seeks to understand the construction of Boko Haram on legacy and social media platforms between January and June 2017. This thesis argues that the framing of Boko Haram in the media reveals the polarised nature of the Nigerian press, Nigeria’s socio-political and economic realities, and popular global narratives about terrorism. This study also asserts that the construction of Boko Haram is shaped by the values, routines, norms, logic, and affordances of media platforms. However, the portrayal of the group on the selected platforms fails to present a comprehensive picture by excluding some aspects of the Boko Haram narrative. In addition, some of the representations inadvertently serve the objectives of terrorists and/or authorities that the media
is expected to hold to account. To illustrate this argument, this study employs quantitative content analysis to identify the conceptual tools used in the construction of Boko Haram, and a qualitative content analysis to understand the process and meaning behind the representation of the group.

This chapter is subdivided into four main sections. Section 1.1 begins with the rationale for this research and a brief introduction to framing as its theoretical foundation, while section 1.2 outlines the aim and research questions of the study. Section 1.3 provides a detailed context for this research with particular focus on the history and evolution of Boko Haram, the relationship between the media and Boko Haram, the nature of the Nigerian state, and the Nigerian media ecology. Section 1.4 sets out the boundaries of this research by stating what this thesis does and does not do. This introductory chapter concludes in section 1.5 with a breakdown of other parts of the thesis.

1.1 Rationale for the Study

The where, when, and why of terrorism is one of the key challenges of the twenty-first century. This study focuses on Boko Haram, self-described as “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JASWL)” (Suleiman & Karim, 2005, p. 1) and interpreted “People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad” (Agbiboa, 2013, p. 432), as one of the many expressions of global terrorism. This investigation into Boko Haram is relevant, given that the violent onslaughts by the group have resulted in a major humanitarian crisis in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin; the death of about 27,000 persons; and the displacement of over two million people (Paquette & Alfa, 2019; Alagbe, 2018). Boko Haram is, therefore, one of the greatest threats to human security in Africa.

Although Boko Haram exerts influence in some of the LCBCs, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous and influential nation is the worst affected by the Boko Haram crisis. This is especially because seven million people in Nigeria’s northeastern states including Borno, Adamawa and
Yobe are in urgent need of life-saving aid (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA, n.d.). Apart from precipitating a large-scale insecurity concern in Nigeria, Boko Haram has become a symbol of fear (Verini, 2014) and wields significant influence in the socio-political and economic discourse of the country. For instance, the group played a critical role in the 2015 electoral victory of President Muhammadu Buhari and the ousting of the incumbent, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (Ewi, 2015; Mattfess, 2017, p. 74). In December 2015, Buhari announced that Boko Haram has been *technically defeated*, and a year later, he claimed that the group has been dislodged from its last bastion, Sambisa forest (BBC News, 2015, para.1).

This study is also necessitated by the media-terrorism symbiosis, that is, the mutually beneficial relationship that exists between the media and terrorist organisations. On the one hand, terrorists rely on the media for publicity, recruitment, fundraising, training, communication, strategising and execution of attacks (Weimann, 2006; Galily, Yarchi & Tamir, 2015, p. 999; Galily, Yarchi, Tamir & Samuel-Azran, 2016). On the other hand, the dramatic and visually stimulating nature of terrorist attacks meets the criterion for media coverage and thus, can boost readership/listenership/viewership statistics for media organisations. The strategic role of the media to terrorism is reinforced by the birthing of the Internet and Internet-enabled platforms, which like legacy/mainstream media, have now emerged as dominant vehicles for political engagement. Although media accounts do not necessarily reflect reality, they are usually crucial for shaping public understanding about terrorism. This is evidenced in the ability of the media to “order and structure political reality, allotting events greater or lesser significance according to their presence or absence on the media agenda” (McNair, 2003, pp. 51-52). By drawing attention to terrorist attacks, the media make terrorist events relevant to audiences (Borgeson & Valeri, 2008), influence individual and institutional responses (Oates,
2006), and aid in the legitimisation or delegitimisation of terror groups (Scheufele, Nisbet & Ostman, 2005).

One of the ways in which media organisations structure reality is via framing. Framing captures how media organisations in conjunction with other political actors, place salience on certain aspects of political events while de-emphasising or excluding other aspects of those events in ways that can shape public understanding. The media frames in order to “reduce the complexity of the world, and thereby render it comprehensible and meaningful” (Geise & Baden, 2014, p. 46) but also in ways that could serve particular interests. Framing is usually accomplished by drawing from ideas, stereotypes, values, and norms that culturally resonate with the audience such that conceptual tools, which are socially constructed appear natural (van Gorp, 2007). Although frames can become effective when they reflect culture (Scheufele, 2006; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009), research has shown that the potency of frames is dependent on recipients’ “personal experience, interpersonal communication, and real-world indicators” (Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2008, p. 57). This study is undertaken from the perspective of framing and seeks to understand what aspects of the Boko Haram discourse are emphasised and/or de-emphasised in the media. This is critical given that most information about Boko Haram are obtained from the media and the media have the ability to shape public knowledge and understanding about the group as well as influence government/global response to Boko Haram.

Whereas most Boko Haram framing research investigate content in mainstream/traditional media, there is a dearth of research on the construction of the group on social media platforms. This study addresses this gap by investigating Boko Haram-related content on legacy and social media platforms with a focus on selected Nigerian newspapers and Twitter. In this thesis, the term platform(s) is used in its broadest sense to refer to both legacy and social media in their capacity as dominant daises for political communication. This
cross-platform analysis stands to offer a more robust understanding of Boko Haram by providing both local and global perspectives on the representation of the group. In addition, while frames are broadly characterised as media or audience frames, this study argues for the description of the conceptual tools located on Social media/Twitter as Networked, Social or Hybrid frames, thus blurring the distinction between media and audience frames. This is because Twitter serves as a dais for a wider range of political actors who may use the platform to counter or react to narratives from established platforms. This study applies the term political actors in its broadest sense to refer to all categories of persons and groups that engage in “purposeful communication about politics” (McNair, 2003, p. 4). These include media organisations/journalists, citizen journalists, politicians, pressure groups and terrorists.

Nigerian newspapers were selected for this study for two reasons. First, in addition to the established institutional relevance of legacy media (van Dijck & Poell, 2013), newspapers are historically significant in Nigeria and are deemed important agents of development (Akinfeleye, 2003, p. 21). Newspaper content also drives discussions on other media platforms including radio and television in the country. Second, the press in Nigeria operates out of two dominant printing hubs, mirroring the country’s north-south dichotomy. This unique ecology offers an interesting dimension to framing research by revealing intra-platform differences in the representation of Boko Haram in a polarised media environment.

Twitter was selected as the platform of choice for the social media analysis of Boko Haram related content for three reasons. One, Twitter is an example of a social networking and micro-blogging platform equipped with both mass and interpersonal communication properties for distributing 280-character messages (tweets) with other people who are called followers (Chen, 2011). Two, while there are many social networking sites, Twitter is one of the fastest growing social networking platforms, with users growing from one million in June 2008 to twenty-one million a year later (Nielsen Wire, 2009). As at the first quarter of 2019,
Twitter had a monthly user base of about 326 million (Statista, 2019). These users participate in the news production process as they are able to curate news and share their opinions on issues of interest (Craft, Vos, & Wolfgang, 2015; Hermida, 2011; Jewitt, 2009). Journalists also incorporate Twitter into their standard routines (Molyneux, 2015; Gulyas, 2013) by using the platform as a source, and for the marketing and distribution/circulation of news (Paulussen & Harder, 2014; Gulyas, 2013; Broersma & Graham, 2012). These features have led to Twitter's emergence as an important vehicle for political communication (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014, p. 319). Lastly, Twitter is a global platform that affords users the opportunity to engage in both local and international conversations especially in instances where media access is limited or regulated. This underpins the platform's ability to offer “rival visions of ‘reality’” (Norris, Kem & Just, 2003, p. 5) since the platform’s agenda tends to conflate with the publics’ (Gaber, 2017, p. 603). Twitter is, therefore, relevant in many parts of the world including Nigeria, as marginalised voices have the opportunity to express their thoughts on issues of interest. Additionally, “tweets can be posted and read on the web, through SMS, or via third-party clients written for desktop computers, smartphones, and other devices” and a majority of Twitter accounts are public (Marwick & boyd, 2011, p. 116). This means that citizens with Internet access and mobile devices can utilise the platform. This feature has contributed to Twitter’s emergence as one of three most popular social media sites in Nigeria (Statcounter, 2019) as over ninety-million Nigerians have access to the Internet, while smartphone usage in the country is estimated at about forty million (Clement, 2019; Holst, 2019).

Most framing research focus on the analysis of words or the linguistic component of legacy media texts, but ignore images (Matthes, 2009). This is despite the understanding that audiences are exposed to both verbal and visual texts; visual modes of communication play significant roles in the social construction of political realities; and the rise of new media platforms that apply multi-modal forms of communication (Moriarty & Shaw, 1995; Bersak,
The neglect of visuals in many framing analyses has, therefore, resulted in a paucity of integrative framing studies, which involves the analysis of both linguistic and visual texts within a given dataset (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018). Integrative framing is possible as research has shown that both visual and textual modalities can be analysed under a single theoretical framework like framing (Geise & Baden, 2014). Even though such studies are empirically and methodologically challenging, they have the potential to enhance a comprehensive understanding of political realities, while adding to the growing body of literature on framing. This study adopts an integrative stance, by investigating how words and images are used to represent Boko Haram in the selected newspapers and on Twitter.

Apart from incorporating images in the analysis carried out in this study, another essential component is deciphering the media and political context of emergent frames. Framing is typically conducted from two main perspectives – the examination of audience frames also known as frame setting and/or the investigation of media frames (frame-building) (Vreese, 2005a, p. 52). This study focuses on the frame building perspective, which involves examining the roles of various internal and external factors in the appearance of frames. As previously stated in this section, most framing research focus on the analysis of legacy content. From a frame building perspective, these studies have involved investigating the role of professional and organisational practices such as news values, news routines (sources), and market constraints in the production of frames (Boesman, Berbers, d’Haenens & van Gorp, 2017, p. 299; van Gorp, 2010; McLeod, Kosicki & McLeod, 2000). However, this study also examines social media/Twitter frames, which warrants an enquiry into factors that could influence the emergence of frames on Twitter. Although legacy and social media jointly function as daises for political engagement and thus, have some similarities, they also have inherent differences in terms of their respective norms, processes, and practices; and these could
influence the construction of political issues on the respective platforms. In this study, understanding the media context of identified frames entails examining the possible impact of the values, routines, and norms of the selected papers; and the logic and affordances of Twitter in the construction of Boko Haram. The political context of frames entails an investigation into the environment where content about the group is produced. This specifically includes an understanding of the influence of the Nigerian state, the country’s media ecology as well as other global influences in the representation of Boko Haram.

By examining a broader range of internal and external factors that could influence frames, this research contributes to knowledge on the following: the role of sources in the framing process (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Vliegenthart & Van Zoonen, 2011), the relationship between news values and frames (Brüggemann, 2014; D’Angelo, 2002; De Vreese, 2002); and the role of power and culture in the news production process (Hardin & Whiteside, 2010, p. 314). The investigation of the media and political context of frames in this thesis also adds to the scholarship on the “differing perspectives and processes on news reporting” (Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2008, p. 53) while uncovering news frames about terrorism in radically different, yet similar media technologies and sub-cultures (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003, p. 2; van Gorp, 2007). Additionally, the adoption of an affordance lens enables this study contribute to understanding about what users can do on social media platforms like Twitter and the technological options that make such activities possible (Lee, 2010; Maier & Fadel, 2009; Norman, 2007; Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, Dougherty & Faraj, 2007).

1.2 Aim and Research Questions

The aim of this thesis is to understand how Boko Haram is constructed on legacy and social media platforms. It is based on the foregoing understandings about framing, terrorism/Boko Haram, and the relationship between terrorism and the media. This thesis
answers the following questions, which are raised in response to the gaps in Boko Haram framing research:

1. What integrative frames are employed in the representation of Boko Haram in Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter?

2. How are the frames shaped by their media and political contexts?
   a. What roles do the values, routines and norms of legacy media, and the logic and affordances of social media play in the framing of Boko Haram?
   b. What roles do the Nigerian state and its media ecology play in the framing of Boko Haram?

The first question is descriptive and is aimed at identifying media frames used in the representation of Boko Haram on the selected platforms. This is based on the premise that media frames can shape public understanding of political realities like terrorism as well as influence policy actions taken by the state against terror groups. The second set of questions are explanatory. They reflect the frame-building stance adopted in this study and are key to unpacking the possible influence of internal and external factors in the construction of Boko Haram on the selected legacy/mainstream and social media platforms.

1.3 Context of the Study

Having laid out the rationale, aim and research questions of this study, this section of the chapter sets the scene for this thesis. It begins with a detailed examination of the history and evolution of Boko Haram and adopts the position that the group is an Islamic welfarist group turned transnational terrorist organisation in the traditions of organisations like Al-Qaeda, the Islamic state/ISIS, and Al-Shabab. This aspect of the study is relevant for locating Boko Haram within the discourse of terrorism. The next subsection explains the relationship between Boko Haram and the media and is followed by a description of the nature of the Nigerian state,
the country most affected by the Boko Haram crisis. The last subsection examines the Nigerian media ecology, while justifying the focus on the Nigerian press and Twitter as the platforms of choice for this study.

1.3.1 The History and Evolution of Boko Haram

Organised violence in Nigeria dates back to the early twentieth century and specifically with the Egba uprising of 1918 – an anti-taxation protest by Abeokuta women (Chuku, 2006). But the first group-based conflict in post-colonial Nigeria, with particular emphasis on religious dominance occurred during the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s. The uprising first broke out in Kano, 1980; then Kaduna and Bulumkutu (Borno state) in 1982. It later spread to Yola (Adamawa state) in 1984, and finally to Bauchi (Bauchi state) in 1985. The riots, which spanned about five years, led to the deaths of about 10,000 people (Isichei, 1987, p. 194). Like Maitatsine, Boko Haram has applied violent techniques such as kidnapping, killing and suicide bombing, in pursuit of the following objectives: resistance to western education; noncompliance with the modern nation-state of Nigeria; the establishment of an Islamic caliphate; and the application of force to impact change (Agibboa, 2013; Adesoji, 2014; Azumah, 2015, p. 34).

The 2015 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), which relies on data generated from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response’s (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD), indicates an increase from a total of 3,329 to 32,685 terrorism-related deaths between the years 2000 and 2014. In 2014, seventy-eight percent of these deaths occurred in Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015, p. 2). In Nigeria, a majority of the terrorism-related deaths in 2014 were attributed to Boko Haram and by 2015, the group became the deadliest terrorist organisation in the world (Searcey & Santora, 2015). To date, Boko Haram has engaged the Nigerian state in an unconventional warfare for about a decade (Yusuf, 2013; Aghedo, 2014), resulting in the death of thousands, displacement of millions of people as well as other far-reaching socio-economic costs.
(Tochukwu, 2013; Adejokun, 2016; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2016; Imhonopii & Urim, 2016; McKenna, 2016). Following this, the group has been labelled a terrorist organisation by the Nigerian state, the United States of America, and international bodies like the United Nations (US State Department, 2012; BBC Africa, 2013). The designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation delegitimises the group and cuts off any economic ties between the group and other legitimate organisations in most parts of the world.

The exact origin of Boko Haram is murky. For instance, some scholars trace the genesis of the group to the 1990s, while others, motivated either by data projected by Nigerian security organisations or media reports opine that the sect started in 2002 or 2003 (Oyewole, 2013; Tonwe & Eke, 2013, p. 234; Fiore, 2014; Khan & Hamidu, 2015; Agbiboa, 2014b; Ewi, 2015; Oyewole, 2015; Regents, Mould, Vernon & Montgomery, 2016). Other authors track the genesis of Boko Haram to years of factionalisations amongst Muslims in northern Nigeria, championed by individuals and/or groups such as Maitatsine, who may have been influenced by the 1979 Iranian revolution (Last 2009; Adegbulu, 2013; Azumah, 2015, p. 37-38; Deckard, Barkindo & Jacobson, 2015; Ewi, 2015). But, Andrew Walker, a journalist with extensive research and reporting background on Boko Haram, notes in a special report to the United States Institute of Peace that Boko Haram can be linked to an extremist Islamic group founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, north-eastern Nigeria.

Before Boko Haram’s evolution into one of the deadliest terrorist organisations in the world, it operated as a social welfare group. During its early years, Boko Haram functioned as a semi-parallel state with its own governance structure including functional cabinet and religious police. By providing jobs for unemployed youths and offering educational support to members of the community including women and children, Boko Haram filled a gap created by the state and thus, was able to attract a large followership (Walker, 2012). Adegbulu (2013) notes that Muhammed Yusuf (the founder of Boko Haram), embarked on large-scale
mobilisation for membership as well as financial and material support while Madike (2011) states that Boko Haram attracted around 500,000 members who were tasked with donating one Naira (about £0.002) daily. The group’s membership consisted of “university lecturers, students, bankers, and commissioners and other officers of state, drug addicts, vagabonds, and generally lawless people” (Adesoji, 2014, p. 106); as well as northern religious and political elites (Akinola, 2015, p. 9). But, overtime in what Gray and Adeakin (2015) describe as a four-phase evolution, Boko Haram transitioned from a welfare organisation to a jihadist group with influence across some LCBCs and with ties to other known terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, ISIS and Al-Shabab.

Boko Haram’s transition from a “largely peaceful, dissident sect...engaged in a number of self-help and social organising activities” (Matfess, 2017, p. 10-11) to a transnational terrorist organisation has been attributed to various factors. The US Homeland Security Committee’s report, for instance, indicates that the rise of Boko Haram is attributable to “a feeling of alienation from the wealthier, Christian, oil-producing, southern Nigeria, pervasive poverty, rampant government corruption, heavy-handed security measures, and the belief that relations with the West are a corrupting influence” (US Homeland Security Committee Report, 2011, p. 6). For Herskovits (2012), Boko Haram’s transmutation to a jihadist group commenced when politicians began exploiting the group for electoral advantage. Some scholars identify the poor state of governance in Nigeria, which is marked by high levels of corruption by the elite and large-scale poverty, as being responsible for the rise of the group (Hansen, 2017; Rogers, 2012). For instance, Paul Rogers, an expert in global security, cites three main elements linked to the state of governance in Nigeria: “the relative economic neglect of the Moslem north, a country-wide issue of very serious divisions of wealth and poverty (in spite of the oil wealth of the Delta), and an endemic problem of corruption, especially within the political system” (Rogers, 2012, p. 2). Other authors blame Boko Haram’s mutation on identity conflict arising
from Nigeria’s multiplex religious and ethnic composition (Loimeier, 2012; Oyeniyi, 2014); modernisation strain owing to socio-economic factors like population growth and unemployment (Idowu, 2013); and government/security failures (Gray & Adeakin, 2015; Bappah, 2016).

Prior to Boko Haram’s recognition as a terrorist organisation, violent outbursts by the group were deemed a domestic problem and disregarded by the Nigerian state until late 2003 to early 2004, when the group began to directly confront state security forces. One of the earliest accounts of the sect’s scrimmages with the Police is said to have been triggered by a disagreement with a woman from Zagi-Biriri, Yanusar in Yobe State in north-eastern Nigeria, “who had challenged their fishing rights in the local pond” (Oyewole, 2013, p. 256). Investigations by the Police resulted in the expulsion of the group from Yanusar and the subsequent migration of the sect to the Kanama area of the state, where the group began their first attempts at establishing an Islamic community. It is not exactly clear whether the sect’s incineration of a police station in December 2003, was in retaliation of its expulsion by security forces, or a product of its disdain for the secular Nigerian state. But, the Nigerian military responded by killing scores of Boko Haram members, forcing them into hiding, until the group’s resurgence in 2007 (Hassan, 2010). The group’s violent onslaughts against the state intensified in 2009 and in July of the same year, a clash with state security operatives led to the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of the group (Pèreouse de Montclos, 2016, p. 884).

The summary execution of the Boko Haram leader rather than curb the spread of the organisation may have instead inspired its upsurge. Onapajo, Uzodike and Whetho (2012) argue for instance, that the killing of Yusuf and the arbitrary application of brute force against members of Boko Haram “intensified the belligerence” of the group, leading to the group’s declaration of a “holy Jihad” on Nigeria (pp. 24-25). After Yusuf’s death, the group adopted
Abubakar Shekau as its new leader (Pieri & Zenn, 2016) and transitioned into whole scale-jihadism (Onuoha, 2012). Under the leadership of Shekau, the group has carried out both small and large-scale attacks; occupied sections of the Nigerian territory; and adopted the use of suicide bombing, a primary marker of religious terrorism (Sahara Reporters, 2018; Rapoport, 2002; Piazza, 2009). The group has also received training from and pledged allegiance to like-minded terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS (Eke, 2015; Pieri & Zenn, 2016; Polonska-Kimunguyi & Gillespie, 2016). Ansaru, a Boko Haram splinter group headed by Mamman Nur and Khalid al-Barnawi has also emerged under Skekau’s watch. Unlike Boko Haram, the leaders of Ansaru do not support the targeting of Muslims who do not stand in opposition to the group (Zenn, 2016).

Boko Haram goes by other labels like Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JASWL) and Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP) (Suleiman & Karim, 2005, p. 1; Eji, 2016, p. 202). However, the popular title Boko Haram, commonly interpreted as Western education is sacrilege, reflects the group’s opposition to western principles. The label Boko Haram can also be described as a media construct which resonates “mainly because the public prefers it partly as a way of ridiculing the group and partly because it seems to fit the group’s outward ideological outlook” (Abubakar, 2012, p. 1). In addition to opposing western education, Boko Haram calls for the outright dismantling of the “modern political, social and economic institution […] and for the application of Sharia law […]” (Weeraratne, 2015, p. 612). This indicates that the group’s use of terrorist techniques is in pursuit of wider objectives and this position is reflected in this study’s conceptualisation of terrorism. This study adopts the stance that terrorism is a mediated form of violence aimed at civilians, non-combatants, and military populations with the intention of evoking fear and influencing government action and political behaviour (Wilkinson, 1977).
Boko Haram exhibits the traits of other known terrorist organisations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda as these groups claim to represent a true version of Islam, stand in opposition to western culture and seek to establish Islamic caliphates in the world. This similarity in ideology and objective locates Boko Haram within the class of fourth-wave terrorist organisations, which Rapoport (2004) asserts are driven by a religious ideology. This study argues, therefore, that Boko Haram is a welfare organisation turned transnational terrorist group in the traditions of other fourth-wave terrorist organisations such as ISIS, Al Qaeda and Al-Shabab.

1.3.2 Boko Haram and the Media

Terrorism and the media are interlocked in a mutually beneficial relationship (Dowling, 1986; Weimann, 1983; Wilkinson, 1997) and this section explores this symbiotic interconnection in the context of Boko Haram.

Legacy media outlets in Nigeria are backed by law and play the normative functions of informing, educating, and entertaining the Nigerian public as well as holding the Nigerian government accountable to citizens. In addition to print and broadcast media, the Internet and Internet-enabled platforms offer additional/alternative sources of media engagement for Nigerians. Boko Haram relies on these platforms to attract public attention to its activities, demonstrate gallantry, and communicate fear to both direct and indirect audiences (Abubakar, 2016). This trend is similar to media use by known terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda, ISIS and Al-Shabaab that have all displayed various levels of adept media use in advancing their causes (Lynch, 2006; Farwell, 2014; Greenwood, 2013).

Although Boko Haram is an outlawed organisation, the group attracts media coverage because the nature of its attacks precipitates fear and could be visually compelling, thus meeting the criteria for coverage by traditional media organisations, and visibility and proliferation on social media. Through this means, Boko Haram attains its goal of publicity, while media platforms benefit commercially as the coverage of terrorist events could enhance
readership, listenership and/or viewership. Thus, despite the group’s illegitimate status, a mutually beneficial relationship ensues between the group and the media. However, the illegitimacy/out-group status of the group means that it has limited control over the nature of its representation in the media and therefore, relies on its capacity to conform to media news values.

For instance, following the kidnap of more than 200 Chibok secondary schoolgirls in April of 2014, an event which sparked global outrage against Boko Haram, the group released two videos. The first was a 57-minute clip of Shekau, taking credit for the kidnap of the girls while the second was a 27-minute film of some of the kidnapped girls (Smith 2015). Images from the second video, which was delivered via an emissary to some Nigerian journalists and a correspondent for the Agence France Presse (AFP), were also published on many newspapers around the world thereby intensifying calls for action. The release of these videos is an example of how Boko Haram utilises the media for publicity as well as for the spread of its ideology.

Abubakar (2016) specifically identifies five Boko Haram media strategies ranging from the use of audio cassettes to digital media spaces. Boko Haram’s media engagement commenced with the use of audio cassettes and leaflets as instruments of radicalisation. The audio recordings contained sermons by Muhammed Yusuf, which were then sold to members of the public and were quite popular owing to Yusuf’s denunciation of corrupt practices in Nigeria. The second type of media strategy employed by the group entailed “mainstream media relations” (p. 206) via the airing of Yusuf’s sermons on radio and news briefings to journalists. The group’s direct interaction with journalists increased following the sect’s scrimmages with state security officers and came to an end after the death of Yusuf in 2009. Yusuf’s death forced the group to go underground and led to the third phase of media engagement—“Guerrilla media relations strategy” (p. 207). It involved “using anonymous mobile phone lines to deliver
messages to journalists, emailing materials to media houses using fake addresses, and organising teleconferences from secret locations” (p. 207). This was subsequently followed by directly dropping off the group’s materials such as leaflets and video recordings at various locations where they can be accessed by journalists and members of the public.

Lastly, Boko Haram has also taken advantage of newer media platforms like YouTube and Twitter for purposes of publicity, fundraising, and recruitment. While Boko Haram content on mainstream platforms can be easily restricted, the newer platforms are quite flexible, allowing for speedy dissemination and circulation of information, while allowing access to a larger and more diverse audience. Although YouTube and Twitter are subject to content regulation, in most instances, terrorist propaganda reaches audiences long before they are deleted owing to the logic and affordances of these newer platforms. Moreover, these platforms also serve as news sources for mainstream media, an indication that both legacy and social media are still subject to terrorist propaganda. In this study, Boko Haram-media relations is explored in terms of mediation, which captures the role of the media as channels of communication and provides a broader picture of the relationship between the media, terrorists, and other political actors.

1.3.3 The Nature of the Nigerian state
This section of the study provides background information about Nigeria and is germane to this research for two main reasons. First, the origin of Boko Haram is traceable to Nigeria and the worst affected areas in the Boko Haram conflict are located in Nigeria’s northeast. Second, the details provided in this part of the study are relevant for understanding the operational environment of the selected newspapers used in this study and the environmental context of these papers is key to the central argument of this thesis.

Although Boko Haram exerts influence in other parts of West Africa, the group carries out majority of its attacks in Nigeria, especially Nigeria’s northeast region. Nigeria officially
known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) came into being on 1 October 1960, after years of British colonial rule. The anglophone nation shares its borders with other West African countries that are affected by the Boko Haram conflict including Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin (Falola & Oyeniyi, 2015). Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy and ranks 7th in the world in terms of population with an estimated 200.96 million people (World Population Review, 2019). Politically, Nigeria operates a federal structure made up of thirty-six states, 774 local government areas and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT), located in Abuja (see Figure 1.1). But, in practice, the country runs a unitary system of government, where the centre (Abuja) has autonomous control over state resources and security agencies.

![Map of Nigeria showing six geo-political zones, thirty-six states, and the federal capital territory, Abuja (Ekong et al., 2012)](image)

Figure 1.1. Map of Nigeria showing six geo-political zones, thirty-six states, and the federal capital territory, Abuja (Ekong et al., 2012)

In spite of the so-called federal system of government, the most popular classification of Nigeria is its North-South division. This binary categorisation (North and South) dates back to the amalgamation principle of 1914, during which British colonialists forcefully integrated
different parts of the region without regard for divergences in culture, belief, and pre-existing governance structures (Graf, 1988). This has led to the reasoning that Nigeria is a British construct produced for sheer expediency (Adewale, 2011). The 1914 amalgamation principle, which did not put into consideration the diverse nature of the previously self-governing regions, has also been noted as an impediment to Nigeria’s efforts at nation-building. The balkanisation of the area to multiple regions in 1963, and further division to thirty-six states by 1996 has also not addressed the challenge (Alapiki, 2005, p. 50).

However, the idea that Nigeria maintains a prevalent north-south “geopolitical duality and bipolar Muslim and Christian religious stratification” (Adewale, 2011, p. 3) is facile, since it does not account for the country’s intricate ethnic, religious, and regional composition. For instance, there are six geo-political zones in Nigeria (see Figure 1.1) created based on the proximity of states and for political expediency rather than for similarities in belief, culture, or language (Uwazuruike, 2018, p. 29). Even though three ethnic groups – Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba – represent the major power blocs in Nigeria, records indicate that there are an estimated 250 to 619 ethnic groups in the country to which citizens are strongly affiliated (Okolie, 2003b, p. 76). Nigeria also holds the largest population of Muslims and Christians (in near equal proportion) in the world (Paden, 2015). Although a majority of citizens in the northern part of the country practice Islam, Muslims also reside in other parts of the country. Moreover, within the Islamic faith, sub-groups exist such as the Ahmadiyya, Sanusiyya, Tijanniyya and Quadiyya, and these groups are represented by umbrella organisations like the Jamaatu Nasril Islam (JNI). Similarly, Christians are found in most parts of the South and the North-Central region. There are also many sub-Christian sects like Catholics, Protestants, Evangelicals, white-garment churches like the Eternal Sacred Order of the Cherubim and Seraphim, and the Pentecostals. Some of these Christian bodies function under the aegis of
organisations such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN), and the Catholic Bishops Conference (CBC).

Apart from the Muslim and Christian religious groups, there also exist a smaller percentage of Nigerians who are considered traditionalists, due to their belief in a range of deities. Nigeria's complex composition has hindered the formation of a national identity and the prevalence of many identity markers including ethnic, religious, regional, and subethnic (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p. 7), which do not mirror the dominant north-south bipolar classification. However, ethnicity and religion are deemed most salient as they form the basis for both individual identities and assumed thinking in instances of conflict (Lewis & Bratton, 2000, p. 26; Ruby & Shah, 2007). Although religious identity is more salient in the north, findings from Afrobarometer's 15-country survey suggests that ethnicity is the most salient identity marker in Nigeria (Lewis, 2007).

Like Nigeria’s north-south division, ethnic consciousness in Nigeria is also linked to the country’s colonial history. Prior to imperialist domination and control of the area now called Nigeria, ethnic labels were non-existent. Falola and Oyeniyi (2015) aver that the labels, Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba, which are the major ethnic groups in the country, were constructed by European traders, travellers and writers, as a means of identifying the people from the Niger River area during the trans-Atlantic slave trade regime (p. 67). But overtime, ethnicity evolved into a weapon wielded by Nigerian elites and the identity marker has now become a key variable in the allocation and control of state resources (Babalola, 2015; Diamond & Platter, 1994). Typically, in a bid to attract votes during elections, politicians whip-up ethnic sentiments amongst the populace (Eke, 2015), a situation, which in the past resulted in the emergence of ethnic-based political parties and media organisations, military coups, and the 1967 – 1970 Nigerian civil war. Ethnic consciousness in Nigeria, has also been cited for
being at the core of most conflicts and agitations for self-determination (Babalola, 2014), traceable to the manner in which ethnicity is manipulated by powerful social actors.

In line with Siebert, Patterson and Schramm’s (1956) argument that the press “takes on the form and colouration of the social and political structures within which it operates” (as cited in Ette, 2000, p. 67), the Nigerian press reflects the country’s popular features. For instance, as is detailed in section 1.3.4, the ecology of the Nigerian press reflects the simplistic north-south classification owing to the prevalence of two printing/publishing hubs; and ethnicity, Nigeria’s most important identity marker, is a key feature in the discourse of the country’s media. This study argues that the representation of Boko Haram in the media is shaped by the polarised nature of the Nigerian press rather than by the mere complex geo-political reality.

1.3.4 The Nigerian Media Ecology
This section presents information about Nigeria’s media composition. It details the structure and nature of the Nigerian press and outlines the role of the Internet and Internet-enabled platforms in the country. The details outlined here are pertinent for answering the questions asked in this study as well as for justifying the particular focus on Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter.

Unlike independent broadcasting in Nigeria, which commenced in the 1990s, newspapers date back to Nigeria’s pre-independence era and have deep historical ties with the state (Olukoyun, 2004). Moreover, in contrast to Radio and Television, the information disseminated by newspapers is more detailed, and are presented in portable formats, which can be stored over a long period of time. Even though broadcast platforms offer live images, capture grisly pictures, and provide information about Boko Haram’s campaign of terror, newspapers have been selected for this study. This is because the press played significant roles in different phases of Nigeria’s development including the colonialisation/pre-
independence, nationalisation/independence, demilitarisation and democratisation epochs, and continue to do so by serving as a crucial political communication platform.

Although Nigeria’s earliest papers were established to encourage reading and knowledge acquisition, some of the papers contained anti-colonialism messages, which activated political awareness and engagement among readers. Olayiwola (1991, p. 35) sums up the strategic role of Nigeria’s pre-independence press as follows:

The press served as a medium of sustained public debate and political protest; an uncompromising advocate of administrative and political reforms, and a seething critic of the excesses of the colonial order…. The press not only stimulated the emergence of nationalist movements but also played a prominent role in the constitutional development of modern Nigeria (as cited in Yusha’u, 2009, p. 55).

Post-independence, the Nigerian press displayed “an awesome sense of responsibility to see the military … out of office … and to restore democratic rule” (Aboaba, 1979, p. 113, as cited in Ette, 2000 p. 67). They became in the words of Akinfeleye (2003), “the peoples’ army” (p. 21), battling the military until 1999, when civilian rule re-emerged. In addition to engendering public awareness and participation, Nigerian newspapers including diasporic online platforms like Sahara Reporters serve as the primary dais for debates about national and other related issues in the country. These also set the agenda on other media platforms in Nigeria. The choice of newspapers for this study is, therefore, informed by the established role and political influence of the press in the Nigerian discourse.

Over the years, the Nigerian press has taken on the nature of the country’s popular north-south dichotomy. This is evidenced in the presence of two main printing/publishing hubs. Data from the Nigerian Press Council (2016) indicates that 62% of newspapers are published in the South (Lagos-Ibadan), while 38% are produced in the North (Abuja). But, the south-west accounts for 76% of the papers published in the southern hub, resulting in the assertion that
the Nigerian "mass media is neither pluralistic nor complex; it is an institutional monopoly of the south-west" (Oyovbaire 2001, as cited in Ojo, 2003, p. 834). Two reasons account for this southern dominance. First, northern journalists were late entrants into the media industry. Whereas newspapers were already popular by the 1860s in the south, there were no newspapers in the north until the 1930s owing primarily to the region’s rejection of western education. The second reason for the southern advantage is the prevalence of higher illiteracy levels in the north compared with the south. The refusal to embrace western education during the colonial era materialised in an asymmetrical educational development in the regions, a trend which has persisted. For instance, Umar, Ismail, and Abdul-Hakim’s (2014) study show that the "northern region has higher educational inequality than the southern region" (p. 425-426). Records also indicate that of the thirteen million out-of-school children in Nigeria, eight million are from northern Nigeria (Adedigba, 2019).

Although digital technologies have led to increased access to newspapers, the dominance of the southern press has persisted online. For instance, the Alexa web ranking of top websites in Nigeria shows that southern papers such as the *Punch* and *The Nation* are among the twenty most visited websites in Nigeria with the exclusion of northern papers even among the top fifty (Alexa Internet, 2019). Uwazuruike (2018) notes that the dominance of the southern press has resulted in "distrust and polarisations among regions" (p. 31) while other scholars opine that the southern press is prejudiced on issues pertaining the north (Ojo, 2003; Yusha’u, 2015).

The structural composition of the press has led to assertions that the Nigerian media is bifurcated "along ethnic, regional, religious, and primordial lines" (Olukotun, 2008, p. 13). Ojo (2013) contends that rather than having a national outlook, the Nigerian press can be best described as *Ngbati*, *Nkeaga* or *Arewa* media, representing the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria – Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa/Fulani - respectively (p. 434). This outcome can be explained
by the complex geo-political composition of the Nigerian state as well as the importance of key identity markers like ethnicity and religion in the country as explained in section 1.3.3. Therefore, while most Nigerian newspapers such as the Vanguard, The Guardian, Punch, The Nation, Nigerian Tribune, Leadership, Daily Trust, ThisDay, PM News, Nigerian Observer, Complete Sports, Business Day, Daily Times and The Sun can be accessed in different parts of the country, ethnic/religious-based bias can have strong to moderate influence on the representation of societal events in the outlets. This study asserts that the representation of Boko Haram, a northern-based extremist organisation, may be shaped by the ethnic/religious leaning of news media organisations. To illustrate this, this study focuses on four Nigerian national newspapers, The Guardian and Punch to represent the southern hub, while the Daily Trust and Leadership newspapers stand for the northern hub.

The selected papers (The Guardian, Punch, Leadership and Daily Trust) are independently owned and as such rely on funds from their respective owners and on sale of copies or advertisement. Three of these papers are listed among the top seven newspapers with the largest circulation and 91.8% of the market share in Nigeria (Newspaper Circulation Check, 2009, p. 5, as cited in Aliagan, 2015, p. 11). Although there are many southern papers, The Guardian and the Punch are chosen for the following reasons. The Guardian is Nigeria's flagship and most elitist paper, which prides itself as “a liberal newspaper, committed to the tradition and ideals of republican democracy” (The Guardian, 2019, para. 2), while the Punch is the most widely read newspaper in the country. Even though these papers are influential in Nigeria, they can be regarded as the most powerful newspaper outlets in the south with the capacity to sway public opinion. While the Daily Trust may champion the views of the core north, that is, the northern Muslims, the Leadership may represent other minorities including Christians living in the north. However, since both papers are widely circulated in the region, they are selected in this study to represent the northern hub. The incorporation of papers from
the two dominant printing hubs account for a more robust understanding of Boko Haram by enabling the possibility of encountering a broader set of frames as well as uncovering intra-platform differences and/or similarities in the construction of the group.

Even though Nigeria has an established mass media framework, the Internet and Internet-enabled platforms serve as additional/alternative outlets for people to engage in debates about both national and global issues of interest. This means that political actors who have limited or no access to traditional media have the opportunity to voice their opinions. In addition to enabling social communication (Ngai, Tao & Moon, 2015), branding, and career development (Tang, Gu & Whiston, 2012); social media platforms allow for direct political conversations between social actors and the public. As an added advantage, users have access to a global audience, made up of news organisations, interest groups, public relations personnel, and citizen journalists, who are all visible on social media on a scale that legacy platforms cannot offer.

Data from Statcounter (2019) indicates that Facebook, Twitter, and Pinterest are the three most popular social media sites in Nigeria. Although these three platforms serve as sources of information and engagement with the media, government and other users, the platform of choice for this study is Twitter. Twitter self-identifies as “a real-time information network that connects [users] to the latest stories, ideas, opinions and news about what [they] find interesting” (Twitter.com, 2013, as cited in Wasike, 2013, p. 8). Unlike blogs, collaborative projects, and virtual social worlds, Twitter requires lesser training, skill, and cost; and offers access to an audience of over 300 million (Statista, 2019). In contrast with Facebook, the world’s leading social networking site, Twitter allows for both reciprocal and non-reciprocal relationships – users can follow people who do not follow them. This unique characteristic for Colleoni, Rozza and Arvidsson (2014), enables Twitter to function as “a ‘social’ and a ‘newsy’” (p. 319) platform with capacity to display public sphere-like and homophilic features.
However, the Internet penetration level in Nigeria is 50% compared to the 57% global average (Udodiong, 2019, para. 3), which means these newer platforms may not have the targeted reach of newspapers. Social media platforms also serve as microphones to only the “technologically literate” (Murthy, 2011, p. 786), an indication that not everyone can afford or use these platforms. Additionally, these nonmainstream platforms are subject to the “macro/political/industrial and local communicative notions of power” (KhosraviNik, 2017, p. 583) at play in traditional media since they promote echo-chambers. As Hintz (2016) argues, social media is “a confined and controlled space for semipublic interactions, under the conditions of a commercial logic” (p. 237). Bouvier and Machin (2018) also opine that while Twitter may not be dominated by elite content as in newspapers, the platform itself has to be understood as “fundamentally organised and created based on marketisation and commodification” (p. 182). This, therefore, means that even though Twitter offers global access, the platform could reinforce prevailing ideas and perspectives about social issues (Boyd & Ellison, 2007; Kwak, Lee, Park & Moon, 2010).

Against this background, this study argues that the representation of Boko Haram on Twitter may be similar and/or differ from the construction of Boko Haram in the selected papers. But together, both platforms stand to yield a more comprehensive understanding about the group. In addition to this, this study asserts that the framing of Boko Haram on the respective platforms may be influenced by a range of internal and external factors. In chapter two, these factors are examined in terms of the values, practices and norms of legacy media, the logic and affordances of social media, the nature of the Nigerian state and its media ecology, and other global influences.

1.4 Scope of the Study
This study examines the representation of Boko Haram in four Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter between January and June 2017. This research is undertaken from a frame-
building perspective and therefore, does not investigate the impact of frames on media audiences. This is primarily in response to gaps in the Boko Haram framing literature such as the absence of studies about the framing of the group on social media platforms and the dearth of integrative framing studies. The frames identified in this research can thus be further investigated in future studies from a frame-effects perspective.

This study also investigates the media and political context of identified frames. This trajectory is relevant given that media representation of political realities is shaped by myriad factors. However, this research pays particular attention on the possible influence of the internal logic of the respective platforms, the nature of the Nigerian state and the country’s media ecology.

1.5 Organisation of the Study

This thesis is presented in seven chapters. This first chapter has detailed the rationale, aim, research questions and provided the background of the study. The second chapter provides the relevant body of literature for this research and covers three main aspects. The first part is dedicated to the conceptualisation of terrorism and an examination of the main debates on the origin, root causes of and responses to terrorism. The second part explores the media-terrorism symbiosis, while the last section focuses on framing as the theoretical underpinning for this research. Chapter three outlines the methodological choices made in this study.

The findings of this research are presented in three chapters. Chapter four responds to the first research question (What integrative frames are employed in the representation of Boko Haram in Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter?). Chapters five and six present findings for the second research question (How are frames shaped by their media and political contexts?). This thesis concludes in the seventh chapter by presenting a summary of findings, original contributions of the study and directions for future research.
CHAPTER TWO - TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews aspects of the literature that are relevant for understanding the construction of Boko Haram on legacy and social media platforms. It is broadly divided into three parts. The first section conceptualises and weighs in on the debates on the origin, root causes, and responses to terrorism; and is primarily aimed at locating Boko Haram within the discourse of terrorism. The second part examines the media-terrorism symbiosis through the lens of two interrelated concepts, mediatisation and mediation. This section also examines more closely, changes in the media ecosystem. The last section pinpoints framing, one of the expressions of mediation, as the theoretical perspective of choice for this research. This part of the study also notes the gaps in Boko Haram framing research, which then provides the grounds for the questions this study answers.

2.2 Conceptualising Terrorism

Although scholars “have spilled almost as much ink as the actors of terrorism have spilled blood” (Schmid & Jongman, 2005, p. 6), no consensus has been reached on what terrorism is, and no universally accepted definition of terrorism exists (Silke, 2004; Carver & Harrie, 2017, p. 98). This is essentially because terrorism means different things to people and the characteristic features of people who get labelled as terrorists differ depending on who is making the judgment. This explains quips like one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter (Seymour, 1975) and “If it looks like a terrorist, walks like a terrorist, acts like a terrorist, fights like a terrorist, it’s a terrorist right?” (Sengupta, 2015, para. 3). Another reason for the absence of a generic definition of terrorism is that the word is applied in different contexts and is closely associated with other concepts like crime, politics, war, propaganda, and religion (Schmid, 2004a, p. 197).
Against this background, some authors have dismissed the idea of a universally accepted definition, while others contend that arriving at a generic definition is critical, especially in a post 9/11 environment. Richards (2014) notes that resolving the definition problem would be a significant breakthrough in the theoretical development of terrorism research, and by extension, produce positive outcomes for terrorism-related policies and legislation. For others, tackling the arduous task could facilitate a comprehension of the various applications and expressions of terrorism (Schmid, 2004a); curb terrorism (Schmid, 2004b); rein in the excesses of state-sponsored counterterrorism campaigns (Golder & William, 2004); and assist in the prosecution of terrorists (Hodgson & Tadros, 2013). Following this, scholars have made attempts at arriving at a common definition of terrorism. The scholarship in this area is broadly divided among authors who choose to include or exclude certain elements such as the psychological component of terrorism when defining the concept.

For instance, Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoeffer (2004) define terrorism as: “a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role” (p. 782). This interpretation of terrorism is a product of seventy-three definitions drawn from three terrorism-based journals. Whereas the trios’ definition of terrorism captures publicity as a critical objective of terrorism, the psychological facet of terrorism is excluded. Unlike Weinberg and his colleagues, Schmid and Jongman (1988) contend that “a solid conceptual core to terrorism, differentiating it from ordinary violence .... consists in the calculated production of a state of extreme fear of injury and death and, secondarily, the exploitation of this emotional reaction to manipulate behaviour” (pp. 20-21). Consequently, the authors conceptualise terrorism as an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively.
(representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat – and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperilled) victims, and main target (audiences (s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (p. 28).

Schmid and Jongman’s interpretation of terrorism is regarded as one of the earliest attempts at arriving at a widely acceptable definition of terrorism. It is a product of 109 separate definitions of terrorism and composed of twenty-two frequently used terrorism definition elements such as violence, force, fear, publicity, political, intimidation and psychological effect.

In recognition of the complex nature of terrorism and the absence of a generic definition, this study adopts Schmid and Jongman’s definition of terrorism. The duo’s definition of terrorism is relevant to this study because it captures the nature of terrorism as a form of political violence as well as the centrality of the media to the objectives of terrorism such as publicity and psychological as well as behavioural responses from audiences. From this perspective, Boko Haram’s deployment of violent techniques such as suicide bombing and kidnapping constitutes a symbolic form of politics because these attacks are geared at coercing psychological and/or behavioural responses from immediate and remote targets including its members and the government. The violent onslaughts are also designed with the intention of attracting media coverage, an indication of the critical role the media play in terrorism. The relationship between terrorism and the media is further examined in section 2.3 especially in terms of changes in the media landscape.

Having conceptualised terrorism, what follows in the next two sub-sections is a brief outline of the key debates on the origin, root causes and responses to terrorism. These aspects of the literature are relevant to locate Boko Haram within the context of terrorism as well as
provide the necessary foundation for understanding aspects of the Boko Haram narrative that are excluded or reflected in the media.

2.2.1 The Origin of Terrorism

Terrorism is an age-long problem that has had a complicated history, leading to different accounts about its evolution. For instance, Silke (2004) suggests that terrorism has been expressed in different formats for more than 2,000 years, while Munson (2008) links the concept to the eighteenth-century French Revolution. But interests in the where, why, and how of terrorism began to rise around the 1970s following the upsurge in instances of international terrorism, and academic literature especially since the 1990s have focused on two broad perspectives regarding its evolution. Whereas some scholars (Lesser et al., 1999; Zanini & Edwards, 2001; Hoffman, 2006; Neumann, 2009) make a distinction between old and new forms of terrorism, others do not (Tucker, 2001; Copeland, 2001; Crenshaw, 2008; Field, 2009).

For instance, drawing on Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s netwar concept, Zanini and Edwards (2001) describe a newer form of terrorism characterised by:

an emerging mode of conflict and crime at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war in which the protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed, small groups who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without a precise central command (p. 30).

The conflict strategies applied by these newer violent actors are thought to be styled after Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson’s (1989), fourth-generation warfare. Lind and colleagues had envisioned that as opposed to the previous three epochs of warfare where battle-lines were clearly defined, fourth-generation warfare would be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical entity (p. 23).
The emergence of these newer groups is also attributed to globalisation and innovative technologies, which makes it possible for terrorists to communicate their grievances to far-flung audiences. For instance, whereas the attack on the Israeli 1972 Olympic team by the Palestinian Black September group had an audience of about 800 million, the 9/11 attack had a global audience owing to improved media technology (Nacos, 2003a, p. 23).

Unlike the proponents of old and new forms of terrorism, other authors argue that the different expressions of terrorism are interconnected and exhibit similar features (Tucker, 2001; Copeland, 2001; Crenshaw, 2008; Field, 2009). For instance, Copeland asserts that “terrorism seems to be returning to its historical roots in many ways” (p. 102). Along similar lines, Field (2009) opines that “many of the supposedly ‘new’ developments, such as religious motivation, global objectives, indiscriminate violence and even an interest in nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, can, in fact, be observed in ‘traditional’ terrorist groups” (p. 200).

Rapoport’s work, *The four waves of modern terrorism* is a seminal piece in the debate around old and new terrorism. In fact, McAllister and Schmid (2011) describe Rapoport’s work as “one of the greatest contributions to the study of terrorism in the past two decades” (p. 228). Although Rapoport’s study does not completely account for the varied expressions of terrorism, this study argues that the author’s wave theory provides a basic template for understanding the likely mutations of terrorism over the years. It is also particularly useful for locating Boko Haram within the global discourse of terrorism.

Rapoport utilised the analogy of waves to identify four epochs in the evolution of modern terrorism while emphasising the unique features of each period. These include the “Anarchist Wave” (from the 1880s to the 1920s); the “Anti-Colonial Wave” (from the 1920s to the 1960s); the “New Left Wave” (from the 1960s to 1979); and the “Religious Wave” (from
1979 to date) (Rapoport, 2001, p. 419; 2004, p. 46-47). By Rapoport’s estimation, groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Shabab and Boko Haram who now dominate the terrorism discourse are fourth-wave or religious terrorists. This is owing to their “international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships” (p. 47). While some scholars have confirmed Rapoport’s findings (Rasler & Thompson, 2009; Weinberg & Eubank, 2010), others have criticised his work (Thompson, 2006; Kaplan, 2007; Sedgwick, 2007; Proshyn, 2015). For instance, regarding the rise of European homegrown Jihadism, Proshyn (2015) argues as follows: “the emergence, activity and life span of terrorist organisations (however powerful global influences may be) are in the first place determined by local factors, i.e. socio-political conflicts inherent in particular societies, not by global impulses” (p. 95). In the case of Europe, the author links the emergence of homegrown terrorists to the prevalence of “xenophobia, social frustration and alienation” (p. 105).

As previously explained in section 1.3, Boko Haram can be compared to groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda that seek to upturn “the existing Western-dominated world order and replace it with a jihadist vision, through subversion, terrorism and insurgency” (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 600). These groups are distinguished by their jihadist goal and not by their utilisation of terrorism, which as conceptualised in this study, is a tactic applied by violent groups in pursuit of wider objectives. Their newness, that is, their netwar feature and employment of fourth-generation warfare tactics as captured by the proponents of new terrorism can be explained in terms of the effects of globalisation and shifting technologies. The global jihadist movement according to Kilcullen (2005) consists of “a loosely aligned confederation of independent networks and movements, not a single unified organisation. Global players link and exploit local players through regional affiliates – they rarely interact directly with local players, but sponsor and support them through intermediaries” (p. 602). This accounts for the presence of both well-
structured organisations like Al Qaeda; loosely structured bodies like ISIS; and the existence of lone wolves (individual actors), who may be influenced by structured organisations, but execute attacks without recourse to any chain of command (Michael, 2014, pp. 45-46), also known as “leaderless resistance” (Kaplan, 1997, p. 80).

This study posits that Boko Haram, the transnational terrorist organisation, which has evolved into Nigeria’s greatest security concern, is part of the global jihad. This is evidenced in the known goals of the organisation: resistance to western education/culture; noncompliance with the modern nation-state of Nigeria; the establishment of an Islamic caliphate; and the application of force to impact change (Agbiboa, 2013; Adesoji, 2014; Azumah, 2015, p. 34). These objectives represent a localised version of a global drive led by groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS which seek to establish a purist Islamic community, and like these groups, Boko Haram applies terrorism as a means to achieving its goals. Locating this class of fourth-wave terrorist organisations within the discourse of terrorism is key for understanding the circumstances that fuel terrorist violence, and how to effectively resolve it. This aspect of the terrorism literature is examined in the next section.

2.2.2 The Root Causes of Terrorism
Another significant aspect of the literature on terrorism is the debates on its root causes. In line with the scientific principles of causality, an analysis of the root causes of terrorism entails a presumed existence of a cause and effect relationship between terrorism and other factors. In fact, Schmid (2005) describes it thus: the existence of a causal relationship between independent variables such as the socio-cultural, economic, and demographic composition of specific locations and dependent variables including the incidence of terrorism and/or the emergence of terrorists (p. 129). Some of the main “theoretical families that relate terrorism to, e.g., economic, political and institutional and demographic factors” (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, p, 3) are displayed in Table 2.1. These dominant root causes are
presented as global hypotheses and linked to specific factors (determinants) and benchmarks (indicators).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global hypotheses</th>
<th>Potential determinant (abbreviation)</th>
<th>Possible Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Deprivation (GH1)</td>
<td>Economic Conditions (DEV)</td>
<td>GDP p.c., poverty, inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation Strain (GH2)</td>
<td>Economic Performance (PERF) Population Dynamics (POP) Education (EDU)</td>
<td>GDP growth, unemployment, inflation Population growth, size, age structure, urbanization Literacy, school attainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Order (GH3)</td>
<td>Political Institutions (POL) Economic Institutions (ECON) Government (GOV)</td>
<td>Political rights, civil liberties Economic freedom, property rights protection Welfare policies, government spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Transformation (GH4)</td>
<td>Political Stability (STAB)</td>
<td>Regime Stability, Civil War Proxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Conflict (GH5)</td>
<td>Minorities (MIN) Religion (REL)</td>
<td>Ethnic or linguistic fractionalization Proportion of religions, religious fractionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Order (GH6)</td>
<td>Economic Integration (INT) International Politics (INTPOL)</td>
<td>FDI, terms of trade, trade openness Alliances, incidences of conflict or crisis, foreign aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion (GH7)</td>
<td>Contagion (CONT) Geography (GEO)</td>
<td>Spatial, temporal proximity to terrorism Climate, elevation, latitude</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1. Determinants of terrorism (Krieger & Meieriecks, 2011, p. 5)

Root causes in the context of terrorism have inspired much scholarly argument owing to its relevance in understanding the conditions and circumstances that facilitate terrorism, and how this knowledge can shape the formulation and implementation of effective counterterrorism policies (O’Neill, 2002b; Homer-Dixon, 2001). The literature on the subject is broadly divided into two. While some scholars like Mani (2004) underscore the futility of determining the root causes of terrorism, others provide conflicting empirical evidence in support of a causal linkage.
between terrorism and a range of socio-political, economic and demographic factors (Lai, 2007; Blomberg & Hess, 2008; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen & Klemmensen, 2006; Basuchoudhary & Shughart, 2010; Plumper & Neumayer, 2010; Freytag, Kruger, Meierrieks & Schneider, 2011).

For instance, Mani (2004) identifies two basic misconceptions in root causes analysis. First, the author argues that the nuanced nature and varied expressions of terrorism are often taken for granted in most analyses. The second misjudgment according to Mani, is centered on the presumption that “terrorism is a condition or malaise, which once diagnosed, can be effectively treated and cured” (p. 225). These reasons according to the author makes studies aimed at determining a causal relationship between certain variables and terrorism, an ineffectual enterprise. But, other scholars point to a causal linkage between terrorism and other factors. For example, tests on the economic deprivation hypothesis (GH1 in Table 1) typically question whether terrorists originate from economically poor countries or if these countries are possible targets of terrorism. While some authors affirm that countries with high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita are less prone to producing terrorists (Lai, 2007; Blomberg & Hess, 2008), others report only a limited relationship between the origin of transnational terrorism and the economic status of countries (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen & Klemmensen, 2006; Basuchoudhary & Shughart, 2010; Plumper & Neumayer, 2010; Freytag, Kruger, Meierrieks & Schneider, 2011). The cases of lone-wolf terrorists in economically rich countries in Europe and the United States of America lend further credence to the findings of the latter set of authors. For example, some of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were from the oil-rich Gulf States - Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Similarly, on the role of the political and institutional order (GH3 in Table 1) of a country and terrorism, some authors observe a higher incidence of terrorist attacks in democratic societies (Eubank & Weinberg, 2001; Blomberg, Hess & Weerapana, 2004; Blomberg & Hess, 2006,
2008). Others, however, find no empirical evidence in support of such a relationship (Koch & Cranmer, 2007; Plumper & Neumayer, 2010).

However, the above conflicting positions on the subject have not diminished the relevance of the root causes of terrorism. For instance, Edward Newman proffers a more detailed explanation about root causes in the context of terrorism, one that does not ignore the relevance of root causes but debunks any linear relationship between root causes and terrorism in general. Newman’s (2006) study is aimed at reconceptualising root causes and offering alternative pathways for examining the relationship between root causes and terrorism. Firstly, the author defines root causes as a combination of condition variables/permissive conditions (poverty, demographic factors, and urbanisation), independent variables/direct conditions (exclusion and social inequality, dispossession, alienation, and human rights abuse), and intervening variables/catalytic conditions (leadership, funding, state sponsorship, political upheaval) that could produce the dependent variable—terrorism (Newman, 2006, p. 764). Even though this characterisation of root causes does not resolve the mixed-outcomes problem, it is quite informative to the extent that it reveals the constituent elements of root causes in a more precise way.

Secondly, the author calls for the adoption of a qualitative case analysis approach, which entails a robust analysis of specific terrorist organisations. The adoption of a case-by-case approach facilitates the avoidance of statistically poor generalisations and the production of robust narratives, thereby showcasing “how root causes relate to other factors in a concrete sense” (p. 768). This case-based approach is adopted in this study owing to Boko Haram’s stature as a fourth-wave terrorist organisation and a member of a global jihadist movement alongside groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. These features set Boko Haram apart from other types of violent organisations that apply terrorism as a means to an end.
Scholars have identified a range of root causes for the emergence and sustenance of Boko Haram. Examples of these, presented in terms of their global hypotheses include economic deprivation (Adegbulu, 2013; Adesoji, 2014; Akinola, 2015), modernisation strain (Idowu, 2013), identity conflict (Loimeier, 2012; Oyeniyi, 2014), political transformation (Oyewole, 2013, p. 259; Olaniyan & Asuelime, 2014), and geographical/psychological contagion (Onapajo, Okeke-Uzodike & Whetho, 2012). For example, in his analysis of government response to religious fundamentalism in Nigeria, Adesoji (2014) contends that Boko Haram is a product of Nigeria’s fragile economy and weak security apparatus, evident in the poor management of past religious-based conflicts. For his part, Agbiboa (2014a) opines that Boko Haram’s violent campaign was a response to “state repression in Northern Nigeria, particularly the extrajudicial killing of its leader, Muhammed Yusuf, and the ongoing arbitrary arrests, torture and execution of its members”. Femi Adegbulu, on the other hand, states that Boko Haram members were “monsters created by inept and corrupt leadership which presides over a rotten system that deprives people of their means of livelihood and makes them starve in the land of plenty” (Adegbulu, 2013, p. 271).

Although research findings on the root causes of terrorism are quite inconsistent, from the perspective of Newman (2006), addressing the permissive, direct, and catalytic conditions that facilitate terrorism could provide an alternative approach to managing the Boko Haram conflict. This is especially critical given the history of Boko Haram, and the nature of and socio-economic landscape of Nigeria. Nigeria has appalling poverty, economic inequality, corruption, and illiteracy indices (Kazeem, 2018; World Population Review, 2019; UNICEF, n.d.; Adidigba, 2019), and these are key indicators of the prevalence of weak institutions and bad governance. Thus, even though root causes in the context of Boko Haram may provide only a partial understanding of the rise and sustenance of the group, some of the hypotheses projected by scholars may explain the prevalence of Boko Haram in Nigeria’s northeast. For
example, addressing extreme poverty, unemployment and illiteracy in the north could reduce
the appeal of Boko Haram to people who feel excluded and alienated. This is because as is
detailed in section 1.3.1, Boko Haram was able to attract much followership by functioning as
a state within a state, making up for the shortfalls of the government by providing jobs and
education to deprived citizens. This study argues, therefore, that an understanding of the root
causes of Boko Haram is essential to the development of effective counter-Boko Haram
policies and the media play a critical role with regards to shaping policy actions taken against
terrorist groups. This argument warrants an examination of some of the typical responses to
terrorism.

2.2.3 Responses to Terrorism

Governments react to terrorist attacks on citizens in a variety of ways. Nwankpa (2017)
broadly categorises the various approaches as “a war model and a non-war model” (p. 106).
Nwankpa’s war model involves a combination of hard, deterrent, and reactive responses, while
the non-war model entails the application of soft, conciliatory, and proactive measures. Frey
(2018) on the other hand, sums up the different approaches as soft and hard; conciliatory and
deterrent; short- and long-run; and reactive and proactive responses (p. 30). Unlike the hard
response, which entails the use of force and the imposition of instant punishment; soft
responses focus on addressing the possible root cause(s) of terrorism. Deterrent strategies
approach terrorism from the standpoint of criminal justice while conciliatory-based responses
regard some of the grievances of terrorists as legitimate and seeks to address them. Whereas
short-run responses focus on immediate problems occasioned by terrorists, long-run
approaches emphasise long-term solutions. Reactive measures take effect post terrorist
attacks, while proactive responses are pre-emptive.

Although the methods adopted to resolve violent conflicts ought to be shaped by the
specific nature of the conflict, hard responses/deterrence, which involves the combined use of
military might, intelligence, law enforcement and criminal justice have dominated the discourse of counterterrorism (Purdy, 2004). This approach has, however, not yielded the intended result. A classic case is the popular global war on terrorism (GWOT) model, which has only proven to be effective in the short run while failing to prevent the emergence of terrorists or reoccurrence of terrorist attacks. Moreover, while deterrence could in certain cases, prevent future attacks, terrorists could respond by escalating their tactics, thus imposing different types of costs on the government. Frey (2018) identifies two specific types of costs that could arise from the use of deterrence. The use of hard approaches could attract direct costs on the government including increased military/defence budget, loss of grassroots support, and the abuse of human rights. The use of force could also be advantageous to terrorist organisations in terms of promoting cohesion among terrorists, thus amounting to a negative-sum outcome, in which both parties lose. These realities have led to the combined use of hard and soft approaches, even though counterterrorism is still predominantly military-centric as evidenced in the Boko Haram case.

The Lake Chad Basin Countries (LCBCs), especially Nigeria have been in the news for about a decade as a result of the multiple security and economic challenges posed by Boko Haram. Although violent attacks by the group were previously aimed at the military/security forces and government buildings, by 2013 Boko Haram began attacking non-combatants and civilians including Christians and Muslims. Churches, mosques, and other public spaces like bus stations have also been targeted. The Nigerian government’s response to these attacks has involved a blend of hard and soft responses. The military-based response entailed the proscription of the group under Nigeria’s 2011 Terrorism Prevention Act; the declaration of a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states between May 2013 and November 2014; and the activation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) consisting of armed forces from the LCBCs (Nwankpa, 2017).
The hard approach adopted by the government with respect to Boko Haram is modelled after the GWOT in terms of its reliance on the use of military might. Like the GWOT, Nigeria’s counter-Boko Haram measures have produced mixed outcomes. On the one hand, some areas previously seized by Boko Haram have been recovered by the military. Reports also emerged in December 2016, that Boko Haram has been ousted from Sambisa forest - a former game reserve that the group had converted into a staging area (Agence France Presse, 2017a, para. 2). On the other, the military campaign against Boko Haram has not successfully quelled spates of attacks by the group but has imposed huge costs on the state. For instance, although between 2011 and 2015, Nigeria had spent about sixteen billion dollars on its war on Boko Haram, the sect’s influence continued to spread such that by 2015, Boko Haram had seized an area within the country about the size of Belgium (Winsor, 2015; Comolli, 2015). There were also recorded high incidences of human rights abuse owing to the military’s “excessive use of force, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortion, burning of houses, stealing money during raids, and extrajudicial killing of suspects” (Human Rights Watch, 2012, para. 3). In addition, despite President Buhari’s claim that Boko Haram has been technically defeated (BBC News, 2015, para.1), the group carried out about 150 attacks in 2017, fifty-nine of which were suicide bombings (Wilson, 2018). These attacks indicate an increase from the 127 assaults by the group in 2016. Even though the Nigerian military in conjunction with the MNJTF had recovered some Boko Haram occupied areas, media reports indicate that some local government areas in Borno state have been recaptured by the group (Musa, 2019). This, therefore, means that Boko Haram is still a lethal threat.

Apart from the use of force, the Nigerian government has also applied a range of soft measures in tackling Boko Haram including the employment of negotiation/dialogue and reconciliation strategies; and the establishment of the North-East Development Commission (NEDC). For example, after several failed attempts at negotiating with members of Boko
Haram under the Jonathan administration, dialogue/negotiation proved successful for the release of some of the Chibok girls after three unsuccessful attempts by the Buhari administration (Gaffey, 2016; Searcey & Stein, 2016). The Nigerian government also instituted the NEDC to among other things, receive and manage funds from allocation of the Federal Account international donors for the settlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of roads, houses and business premises of victims of insurgency as well as tackling menace of poverty, illiteracy level, ecological problems and any other related environmental or developmental challenges in the North-East states” (Government of Nigeria, 2019).

While the NEDC can be described as a positive step towards rehabilitating and developing the North-East, similar commissions in other parts of the country have not been successful, owing primarily to corruption. The soft approach also includes other counter violent extremism approaches such as the deradicalisation and reintegration of convicted and/or suspected members of Boko Haram (Clubb & Tapley, 2018). However, these have also not produced the desired results, as the Nigerian government’s efforts have been summarily described as “largely ill defined, reactionary, and ad hoc” (Eji, 2016, p. 204). This study argues that some of Nigeria’s failed soft approaches may be linked to a lack of in-depth understanding of the nature of Boko Haram and the dereliction of root causes of its existence. Nwankpa (2017) argues along these lines and notes that one alternative to countering Boko Haram could be placing a lesser emphasis on the use of arbitrary force while undertaking a robust inquiry into “the group’s sphere of influence (internal cohesion, sponsors and external connections)” (p. 106).

2.3 Media-Terrorism Symbiosis

Having explored the main debates on the origin, root causes of, and responses to terrorism, this section examines the intersection between terrorism and the media. This aspect
of the literature is important given the strategic role of the media to terrorism as previously noted in section 2.1. Here, the media-terrorism relationship is explored from the perspective of mediatisation and mediation, two theoretical concepts that embody the broader implication of the media in the social world. These media and communication processes are particularly crucial to understanding how the representation of Boko Haram may be influenced by the characteristic features of specific media platforms.

The media, a broad term representing all formal and informal agencies of information, education, and entertainment, have historically been salient for the effectiveness of terrorist campaigns (Nacos, 2000; Schmid & de Graf, 1982). This is consistent with the conceptualisation of terrorism in this study, which highlights the relevance of the media to the goals of terrorism. For instance, publicity is one of the key objectives of terrorists. Terrorism is also a form of persuasive communication, aimed at stimulating psychological reactions like fear and/or behavioural (political) responses from their target audiences. Governments for instance, can react to threats of further attacks by acquiescing to terrorists’ demands such as regime change; territorial or social control; and/or status quo maintenance (Kydd & Walter, 2006, p. 52).

Terrorists seek to communicate their grievances to the government, the elite, their members, and the public (Lewis, 2012). They, therefore, orchestrate events that meet the criteria for media coverage, thereby, establishing a symbiotic relationship with media organisations. Terrorist attacks usually embody news values like “novelty, conflict, social impact, importance, consequence and human interest” (Zhang, Shoemaker & Wang, 2013. p. 451) and as Goldenberg (1984) argues, newsworthiness increases “the more a group’s political goals deviate from prevailing social norms” (p. 234). Galtung and Ruge (1965) note that the unexpectedness or rarity of an event intensifies the likelihood of selection for coverage. By this means, terrorists are able to attain their communication goals. The media benefits as the shock
and awe quality of terrorist spectaculars attract readership, listenership and/or viewership, which are critical to the sustenance of media organisations. This convergent interest has led to the conclusion that the media and terrorism are mutually dependent (Miller, 1982; Dowling, 1986; Weimann, 1983; Schmid, 1989; Martin, 1985; Wilkinson, 1997; Chalk, 1995; Rohner & Frey, 2007). Miller (1982) for instance argues that “Terrorism and the media are entwined in an almost inexorable, symbiotic relationship. Terrorism is capable of writing any drama – no matter how horrible – to compel the media’s attention” (p. 1).

The centrality of the media in terrorism discourse has led to claims that the media advances terrorism (Laqueur 1977, Miller 1982, Picard 1986; Tan, 1989). Tan (1989) notes for instance, that by giving attention to terrorism, the media occasion, engender a culture of, enable the execution of, and facilitate the spread of terrorism. Regarding this, Margaret Thatcher, former Prime Minister of Britain, explicitly challenges the media “to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend” (Apple, 1985, para. 2). However, claims that the media causes or fuels terrorism are rather basic and according to Cottle (2006) are “invoked as part of a state propaganda war that seeks to publicly depoliticise and delegitimise the aims of insurgents” (p. 20). This is especially the case given that terrorists often challenge the legitimacy of states. Yet, communist and autocratic states have responded to the call to regulate media coverage of terrorism by imposing strict mass media censorship (Zhang, Shoemaker & Wang, 2013, p. 468), while democratic societies face a different challenge owing to the critical role of a free press in these societies. For instance, Weimann (1987) argues that terrorist attacks constitute a special type of media event that media organisations cannot ignore especially given their role as the fourth estate of the realm and mediators between citizens and the state.

The classic conceptualisation of Media events underscores the role of live television broadcasting in nation-building, with respect to restoring the “sense of occasion” (Katz, 1980,
p. 1) in a society. Media events are “national events, rituals, and ceremonies, which are broadcast live to a national audience” (Sun, 2014, p. 457). Katz and Liebes (2007) identify eight distinct attributes of Media Events: they are transmitted live and usually interfere with broadcast and viewership patterns; they are preplanned and adhere to strict script formats; they summon a large and heterogeneous audience; it is often assumed that everyone is actively watching; the style and nature of narration is reverential; the events are usually aimed at integrating members of the society; and it is hoped that the event would lead to reconciliation of factional parties (p. 158). Katz and Dayan (1985) categorise the different types of media events as Contests, Conquests, and Coronations. Contests include sporting events or competitions where winners are expected to emerge; Coronations include marriages, inaugurations, or funerals; while Conquests refer to events about “dramatic confrontations of heroes against either insuperable odds or nature” (Weimann, 1987, p.33). However, Weimann calls for a fourth category called Coercions, while arguing that terrorist events also qualify as Media Events but do not adequately fit the profile of any of the established groupings. Coercions are not fixed in nature and they are presented as jeopardising the rules. They involve a dramatic confrontation of person against person, and person against society and culture. They convey a social message that functions positively on behalf of the forces maintaining the social order by condemning violence and aggression and reinforcing existing values (p. 33).

Coercion reflects the reasoning that media organisations do not willingly participate in the production of terrorist events but are often compelled to publish these events in the interest of the public. Although the Media Events concept was applied in the context of television, its influence extends beyond the boundaries of broadcasting (Sonnevend, 2018) owing to radically shifting technologies, which make available other platforms for publishing Media Events.
The place of the media in terrorism has evolved following the rise of the Internet and Internet-enabled platforms. In the past, terrorists primarily relied on legacy media to publish their exploits and without the aid of the mainstream media, news of their activities and of the group itself would be unknown. However, today's terrorists engage in netwars by utilising social media platforms for the dissemination of their messages, hence becoming less dependent on mainstream platforms like television, radio, and newspapers.

Social media are "Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow for the creation and exchange of User Generated Content" (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 62). They include platforms like Facebook, Tinder, Snapchat, YouTube and Twitter, which have been broadly described as "social, participatory, locative, algorithmic, interactive, affective and entangled with bodies" (Carah, 2017, cited in Locke, Lawthom, & Lyons, 2018, p. 3). These features enable politicians, policymakers, non-governmental organisations, activists and terrorists to directly engage with the public, thereby circumventing traditional media (Vlatković, 2018; Hong & Nadler, 2016; Norton, 2007). For instance, Sorensen, Ford, Al-Saqaf and Bosch (2019) note that social media platforms like Twitter serve as platforms for direct government-citizen engagement.

On social media, audiences who were formerly regarded as passive receivers and distributors of news and seen as exerting lesser influence on news content compared to politicians and experts, now directly communicate their views on issues of interest. This is because social media offers daises where ordinary people can be the first to publish information, videos and/or pictures about social issues; as well as challenge established media narratives (Craft, Vos, & Wolfgang, 2015; Hermida, 2011; Jewitt, 2009). In addition, audiences are crucial to the participatory culture, which newer media platforms enable, owing to users’ ability to not only produce organic content but shape, share, reframe, and remix already existing content in innovative ways (Jenkins, Green & Ford, 2013, p. 2).
Social media platforms are also instrumental to the work of journalists as content produced and circulated on these platforms are now part of the news production process. For instance, the microblogging and social networking platform, Twitter has become a vital tool for journalists/journalism (Hedman, 2015; Hermida, 2013, 2014; Marwick & boyd, 2011; Chen, 2011). Journalists use Twitter to report the news, distribute content, carry out research, and engage with the public (Vis, 2012; Engesser & Humprecht, 2014; Broersma & Graham, 2012; Phillips, 2012). Some journalists undertake or are assigned the role of news hubs for their followers, by offering a regular flow of news updates, links, analysis and commentary and/or use Twitter privately (Artwick, 2013; Canter, 2015; Canter and Brookes, 2016; Hermida, Lewis & Zamith, 2014, Olausson, 2017; Garcia de Torres & Hermida, 2017; Djerf-Pierre, Ghersetti & Hedman, 2016).

Like other political actors, terrorist organisations have adapted to the new media climate as social media platforms have facilitated the rise of socially mediated terrorism - “the use of social and networked media to increase the impact of violent acts undertaken to further a social, political and/or religious cause with the aim of creating physical, emotional or psychological suffering that extends beyond the immediate audience” (Smith, Burke, de Leiuen & Jackson, 2016, p. 173). Although Internet-enabled social network sites (SNSs) have not replaced traditional media, they have, however, led to a significant shift in the symbiotic relationship between terrorists and the media. Regarding this, for instance, Klausen (2015) asserts that “terrorist-controlled social media now drive ‘slow media’ coverage” (p. 20). This is because the newer platforms enable terrorists to directly engage with their targeted audiences and at the same time serve as sources of information for mainstream media. This means, therefore, that mainstream platforms are susceptible to “misinformation campaigns and tactics of deception and misinformation” by terrorists (p. 20).
Klausen’s investigation of the impact of social media on the modus operandi of jihadist groups reveals that although terrorists use a variety of social media platforms, Twitter is an application of choice. This is because the application requires no extensive training and is inexpensive to use. Twitter is also suitable for both pictorial and textual elements, which can be speedily re-disseminated with ease. Although regular attempts are made at content regulation, the socially-mediated environment, which is intricately networked is terrorist-friendly because it is largely resistant to control and highly interactive, making it the ideal dais for recruitment; fundraising, training, communication, strategising and execution of attacks (Weimann, 2006; Galily, Yarchi & Tamir, 2015, p. 999; Galily, Yarchi, Tamir & Samuel-Azran, 2016).

Yet, the rise and relevance of social media platforms have not lessened the importance of legacy/traditional media. Rather, both platforms have “entered a convenient marriage” (Broersma & Graham, 2013, p. 446), by co-functioning as important platforms for political communication. This provides the grounds for this study’s investigation into the representation of Boko Haram on both legacy and social media platforms.

However, it is important to locate the media-terrorism symbiosis within the context of mediation and mediatisation - two theoretical concepts that capture the relevance of the media and its institutions in social, cultural, and political development. Mediation in this study refers to “the fundamentally, but unevenly, dialectical process in which institutionalised media of communication (the press, broadcast, radio and television, and increasingly the world wide web), are involved in the general circulation of symbols of social life” (Silverstone, 2002, p. 762). Mediation, therefore, reflects how the media is crucial to the activities of terrorist organisations like Boko Haram as captured in this study’s definition of terrorism.
Although there are many definitions of mediatisation, two main traditions to understanding the concept dominate the literature: institutionalist and social constructivist (Hepp, 2013, p. 616). In the former, mediatisation refers to a process where socio-political actors conform to “media’s rules, aims, production logics, and constraints” (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999, p. 249). In the latter, it is a process where evolutions in media technologies result in “the changing communicative construction of culture and society” (Hepp, 2013, p. 616). Whereas mediation facilitates understanding of how the media influences and is influenced by the socio-cultural environment, mediatisation is a linear process in which the media is seen as possessing an all-powerful capacity to cause socio-political change (Couldry, 2008). Although the different conceptualisations of mediatisation often result in “routine imprecision, even conflation, in the use of the term” (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014, p. 1034), there are a few commonalities. For instance, in both traditions, the media and information/communication technologies are seen as causal agents of change (p. 1034). However, while the media may be critical to changes in society, there are other factors external to the media that could also influence change.

Mediation and Mediatisation are relevant to this study to the extent that both processes reflect the broader implication of the media in society. They are also critical to understanding the media terrorism-symbiosis as well as the possible influence of platform affordances on the representation of Boko Haram in selected texts. For instance, Nacos (2003b) points out the centrality of the media to terrorism by noting how the media can “magnify and minimise, include and exclude” (p. 11). Thus, even though terrorism is a form of communication which relies on publicity to reach its target audiences, media play a critical role in society in terms of regulating narratives about terrorism. The media can inflate the gravity of terrorists’ “threats by connecting a single threat to others or by representing threats in vague, indefinite terms through speculation, linguistic imprecision or loose use of numerical, quantitative indicators of ‘terror’” (Al-Lami, Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2012, p. 239). The media can also “contain terror by making
it watchable through sanitisation, repetition and contextualisation” (p. 239). This means that as channels of communication, the media are not only relevant to terrorism/terrorists, but also to other social actors such as government officials, the military, and the public who rely on the media for news about terrorism and in the case of the government, for public support of counterterrorism measures (Bloch-Elkon & Nacos, 2014).

Moreover, since “each medium has its own characteristics, and they vary in both use and content between cultures and societies” (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 114), this study contends that the framing of Boko Haram in the selected Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter reflects the characteristics of the investigated platforms. Furthermore, this study takes into cognisance the understanding that media representation of social realities is influenced by other external factors and as such examines the possible influence of the nature of the Nigerian state and its media ecology in the framing of Boko Haram.

2.3.1 The Internal Logic of Legacy Media

Legacy/traditional media platforms such as newspapers, television and radio are in the business of producing and distributing information about issues of public interest such as terrorism. These activities are mostly carried out by professional journalists, whose activities are shaped by a “universe of tacit presuppositions’ that organise action within the field” (Benson & Neveu, 2005, p. 3) also known as values, routines and norms. This study argues that these elements, which constitute the internal logic of legacy media, play a crucial role in the construction of Boko Haram narratives.

Values

News is a product of journalism and “a thing, a social artifact that can be read, viewed, or interacted with” (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014, p.172). News is also often associated with events that possess certain news selection criteria also known as news values. Thus, while opinions may differ on what news is, journalists are more inclined to identifying similar
happenings as newsworthy (Rogers, 2004) and what is deemed newsworthy is subject to the
cognitive judgment of journalists. Research has also shown that newsworthiness is relevant to
media users, as these factors influence audiences’ information selection processes (Eilders,
2006).

Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) paper on The structure of foreign news is a seminal piece
on the subject of news values and selection. This is because it is considered one of the earliest
Galtung and Ruge (1965) identify the following twelve factors as some of the key parameters
for news selection. They include frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness,
consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, reference to elite nations, elite people,
persons, and something negative. Although these news selection factors have remained
relevant (Herbert, 2000, pp. 72-73), some scholars have pointed out a number of shortfalls in
Galtung and Ruge’s groundbreaking work (Tunstall, 1971; McQuail, 1994; Curran & Seaton,
1997). For instance, Tunstall (1997) criticised Galtung and Ruge for focusing on major
international events while failing to consider everyday happenings. Tunstall also pointed out
that the authors did not indicate how visuals may impact written text (p. 21). In response to
these criticisms, other scholars have made efforts at improving or updating Galtung and Ruge’s
news factors. For example, Harcup and O’Neil (2001) enquired whether Galtung and Ruge’s
factors were operational in three UK daily newspapers by examining both international and
domestic news events. The authors produced a set of news values including some that are
absent from Galtung and Ruge’s taxonomy. Harcup and O’Neil’s (2001) news factors include:
the power elite, celebrity, entertainment, surprise, bad news, good news, magnitude, relevance,
follow up and newspaper agenda (pp. 18-19).

Owing to the changes in the media ecology, fifteen years after their first study, Harcup
and O’Neil (2017) arrive at an updated taxonomy of news values. These include: Exclusivity,
Bad news, Conflict, Surprise, Audio-visuals, Shareability, Entertainment, Drama, Follow-up, Relevance, Magnitude, Celebrity, Good news, News organisation’s agenda (p. 1482).

Although the authors, like Galtung and Ruge (1965), admit that this list of news values is not exhaustive, the introduction of certain factors are noteworthy. For instance, shareability refers to “stories that are thought likely to generate sharing and comments via Facebook, Twitter and other forms of social media” (Harcup & O’Neil, 2017, p. 1482) and viral stories on social media can be circulated on legacy platforms (Buente, 2017). Shareability, therefore, signals how legacy platforms incorporate viral stories on alternative media platforms. It is also an indication of how journalists incorporate platforms like Twitter as sources and as such as part of their standard routines (Lasorsa, Lewis & Holton, 2012).

As is detailed in section 2.3, terrorist events are typically designed to meet certain news values and are thus selected for coverage in legacy media. However, news values do not just determine what items are covered by the media but also regulate how “news is treated, processed, and presented” (Hartley 1982 as cited in Tandoc & Oh, 2017, p. 1000). This is because, “once a news item is selected what makes it newsworthy according to the factors will be accentuated” (Galtung & Ruge, 1965, p. 71). This explains why even though Boko Haram may attract coverage they cannot determine the nature of its representation or what aspects of its activities are prioritised in the media. For example, legacy platforms may prime the human-interest element by detailing the deaths, internal displacement and humanitarian crisis occasioned by Boko Haram, while deemphasising factors relating to the emergence of the group.

Practices/Routines

News routines are repeated practices that make it easier for journalists to accomplish tasks and ensure immediacy in an uncertain world while working within production constraints (Lowrey, 2008, para 1). Routines such as the use of images to accompany written media texts,
reliance on sources and on information subsidies can on the one hand, facilitate and expedite the work of journalists, and on the other hand, constrain their actions. For instance, the incorporation of visuals/images in news texts is significant for several reasons. Images attract readers' viewers' attention, influence their reading/viewing experience (Ensenberger, 2011); facilitate the recollection of news stories (Graber, 1990); and impact the interpretation of news narratives (Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011). However, the choice of images employed in the news are influenced by a range of journalistic and organisational norms and values including ethical and governmental guidelines (Dick, 2014).

Another important news routine is the reliance on sources. Sources are those “from whom journalists’ get information and raw data for the news stories they produce” (Tandoc & Oh, 2017, p. 1000). Sources, therefore, exert considerable influence on media content as they may choose to lie or withhold relevant information from journalists (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014, p. 108; Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Gans, 1979). Research on the most popular sources cited in the news indicate that a majority of news sources are government officials and business representatives (Berkowitz & Beach, 1993; Gil, Arroyave, & Soruco, 2006; Comrie, 1999; Schudson, 2003; Armstrong & Nelson, 2005). Schudson (2003) notes for instance that “Journalism, on a day-to-day basis, is the story of the interaction of reporters and government officials, both politicians and bureaucrats” (p. 150), while Armstrong and Nelson (2005) assert that “official sources are often titled and typically male” (p. 820). News organisations also obtain pre-packaged information in the forms of press releases, press briefings, and/or acquire news from domestic and international news agencies (Gandy, 1982). Although giving visibility to particular types of sources can contribute to the credibility of media narratives, it could also result in the exclusion of alternative voices such as the non-elite and/or non-establishment sources. For instance, Soley (2008) argues that women, minority groups and other less influential members of communities are underrepresented in the news.
News routines such as the incorporation of images and reliance on particular types of sources have implication for the representation of terrorist organisations like Boko Haram who are in conflict with the state. For instance, while gory images of the dead or victims of bombing may serve the psychological and behavioural goals of Boko Haram, such images may not meet the criteria for selection and inclusion in the news owing to several reasons including unavailability, ethical considerations and/or government restrictions. In the same vein, since established sources such as the government, military and international organisations have direct access to the media and are deemed credible, they are more likely to shape the portrayal of the group in the media. Conversely, Boko Haram only has backdoor access to the media, measured by the scale of its violence and compliance to news values, and as such cannot directly shape its representation in the news.

**Norms**

Apart from values and practices, norms are also intrinsic elements of journalism. Norms are significant as they not only shape how journalists ought to behave but also influence social identity (Christensen et al. 2004; Kaplan, 2002; Mindich, 1998). Objectivity, the separation of personal opinions and presentation of “only the facts” (Schudson 2001, p. 150) is a dominant norm in many parts of the world (Skovsgaard, Albæk, Bro, & Vreese, 2013) and stems from the role of journalists within liberal democracies. In practice, it is expressed in terms of accuracy, fairness, balance, and impartiality in reporting issues of societal significance and validated by accounts provided by reliable sources (Tuchman, 1972; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). According to Tuchman, “[t]he newsmen view quotations of other people’s opinions as a form of supporting evidence. By interjecting someone else’s opinion, they believe they are removing themselves from participation in the story, and they are letting the ‘facts’ speak” (1972, p. 668). While the quest for objectivity may or may not be targeted at obtaining the truth, it is important to note that it is an ideal that is not practically achievable. Objectivity in journalism may also be seen as a means of escaping libel suits.
Factuality/objectivity in the media is often seen to be at odds with the expression of emotion or subjectivity (Chalaby, 1998; Jukes, 2017). However, Wahl-Jorgensen (2019) contends that this is not necessarily the case in actual practice. This is because in the daily practice of journalism, “knowledge of how to incorporate emotion into storytelling is a crucial professional skill, and the correct display of this skill is valued and celebrated as exemplary” (p. 37-38). Her examination of Pulitzer Prize-winning stories, for instance, revealed the application of “techniques associated with outstanding storytelling - including the use of emotion and personal stories – to uncover and call public attention to what are often large, abstract and intangible events, entities and contexts” (p. 37). The author observed that while the journalists did not directly express their emotions, “they described the feelings of groups and collectives in 43% of cases, story protagonists in 22%, and other individuals in 24%” (p. 52). It would seem, therefore, that emotionality is not just a core element of journalism but is also enabled by some of the practices that are regarded as indicators of objectivity/impartiality. This means, therefore, that both objectivity and subjectivity/emotionality may be crucial in the representation of Boko Haram in the selected texts. In fact, emotionality may be seen to play a stronger influence owing to the nature of terrorism and of Boko Haram as outlaws.

These three interrelated markers – news values, routines, and norms – are the characteristic features of the internal logic of legacy platforms (Spyridou et al., 2013; Willig, 2013). Considering their different levels of impact on media content, this study argues that these markers can influence the construction of Boko Haram, thereby shape public understanding about, and influence policy actions taken against the group.

2.3.2 The Logic of Social Media

The concept of media logic is used to describe the standards that guide the construction of social realities, instituted in and by legacy media organisations. However, the rise of alternative platforms justifies the existence of other logics such as social media logic as
respective platforms display unique characteristics (Altheide & Snow, 1979; van Dijck & Poell, 2013; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). But while platforms may differ, they also exhibit similar traits. For instance, research has shown that even though mass and social media platforms are different, they manifest some similarities as aspects of the internal logic of legacy media are reinforced in social media, while others elements are either substituted or undermined (Esser, 2014; Klinger & Svensson, 2015; Hedman, 2017). This trend can be explained in terms of the logic and affordances of social media. This study argues that like the internal logic of legacy platforms, the internal workings of social media platforms influence the construction of Boko Haram. The logic and affordances of social media can also explain why the representation of the group on Twitter may be different from or similar to their portrayal in the selected newspapers.

Van Dijck and Poell (2013) conceptualise social media logic as “the processes, principles, and practices through which these platforms process information, news, and communication, and more generally, how they channel social traffic” (p. 5). The authors illustrate this logic using four principles: “programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication” (p. 2). Closely related to these four principles of social media logic are the affordances of social media. While social media logic facilitates general understandings about the processes, principles, and practices of social media platforms, what can be carried out on respective platforms is shaped by their specific affordances.

James Gibson introduced the concept of affordances in 1979 to describe the potential actions that can be taken by an actor within an environment (Gibson, 1979). Over time, however, this concept has been applied differently by various authors. For instance, Donald Norman defines affordances as: “the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used” (Norman, 1988, p. 9). Gaver (1992) on the other hand, conceptualises affordances as
“properties of the world defined with respect to people’s (and social) interaction with it” (p. 80). Whereas Norman’s definition “is more focused on the device than the user” (Valenzuela, Correa & Gil de Zúñiga, 2018, p. 120), Gaver’s definition is borne from the understanding that properties of technology unfold from interactions between the sites and its users (p. 120). Taken together, therefore, these definitions reflect “a relational view of affordances in that the materiality of technology influences, but does not determine, the possibilities for users” (Evans, Pearce, Vitak & Treem, 2017, p. 37). This study adopts this relational stance on affordances as it highlights the mutual influence of users and platform technologies (algorithmic curation and personalisation systems) in the production, consumption, and distribution/circulation of content. This stance, therefore, takes into account Jenkins, Green and Ford’s (2013) argument regarding a participatory culture, where users are actively engaged in “shaping, sharing, reframing, and remixing media content in ways which might not have been previously imagined” (p. 2).

Although many scholars adopt the relational view of social media affordances, there is still no general acceptance regarding the use of the concept or the actual composition of social media affordances. This may explain why researchers often use different terminologies to represent a similar idea or affordance and why affordances assume different forms in the literature. For example, Persistence is a widely recognised social media affordance used to describe instances where communication “remains accessible in the same form as the original display after the actor has finished his or her presentation” (Treem & Leonardi, 2012, p. 18). It is called reviewability, recordability, archivability or permanence by other scholars (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Hancock, Toma, & Ellison, 2007; Whittaker, 2003; Ellison, Gibbs & Weber, 2015; Tokunaga, 2011). Also, Majchrzak, Faraj, Kane and Azad (2013) identified four affordances including “metavoicing, triggered attending, network-informed associating and generative role-taking” (p. 41) that are relevant within organisational settings. They defined
metavoicing “as engaging in the ongoing online knowledge conversation by reacting online to others’ presence, profiles, content and activities” (p. 41). Metavoicing according to these authors can be expressed in the various forms including retweeting a post, voting, commenting on a post and/or liking a post or profile. These expressions of metavoicing may be deemed social media affordances by other authors.

To resolve the issues relating to the complexities surrounding the affordance concept, scholars have highlighted the need to distinguish affordances from features of technology. Features have been variously described as “what users can do with technology” (Markus & Silver, 2008, p. 612), an attribute that allows “activity on the part of the user” (Smock, Ellison, Lampe & Wohn, 2011, p. 2322) and as elements of design that enable “specific types of rules and resources, or capabilities, offered by the system” (De Sanctis & Poole, 1994, p. 126). Affordances on the other hand, “are a relational construct that sit in between – but do not determine – objects and outcomes” (Evans, Pearce, Vitak & Treem, 2017, p. 41). This implies, therefore, that the built-in camera of a phone is a feature while the ability to take photos of people and places, that is, recordability, is an affordance.

Based on the foregoing, this study acknowledges the existence of other interpretations of affordances or forms of affordances as explained by other authors including Bernard (2019). As previously stated, this study adopts the relational view of affordances. It also examines particular social media affordances that dominate the literature on the subject and that are deemed relevant to this study, especially given the comparative analysis of content in two similar yet different media platforms. These include visibility, anonymity, persistence, editability and networked association (boyd, 2010; Treem & Leonard, 2012, 2013; Majchrzak, Faraj, Kane & Azad, 2013; Halpern & Gibbs, 2013; Ellison, Vltak, Gray & Lampe, 2014; Albu & Etter, 2016; Evans, Pearce, Vitak & Treem, 2017). These affordances are key for understanding the nature of platforms and are examined here in the context of van Dijck and Poell’s four principles.
of social media logic: programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication” (van Dijck & Poell, 2013, p. 2).

Programmability entails “the ability of a social media platform to trigger and steer users’ creative or communicative contributions, while users, through their interaction with these coded environments, may, in turn, influence the flow of communication and information activated by such a platform” (p. 5). Unlike legacy platforms, where selection and scheduling practices are traditionally assigned to an editor/gatekeeper, social media is a multi-gated community where users and technological mechanisms can potentially shape content (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013). For instance, on social media, information can diffuse across the network or go viral if users share or retweet such information. Nahon, Hemsley, Walker and Hussain (2011) define virality as “the process which gives any information item [...] the maximum exposure, relative to the potential audience, over a short duration, distributed by many nodes” (p. 1).

Social media platforms are also driven by the logic of datafication, which highlights how platform algorithms and personalisation systems can predict audience behaviour and preferences (van Dijck & Poell, 2013), and therefore, make certain content more visible and accessible. For instance, scholars have noted that certain news values and storytelling methods are prevalent on social media. Examples include messages that resonate with the audience, humorous and novel content, and messages which contain high quality images and videos. These types of content are more likely to go viral on social media (Kirby & Marsden, 2006; Shifman & Blondheim, 2010; Petrovic, Osborne, & Lavrenko, 2011; Uysal & Croft, 2011; Kim & Yoo, 2012; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012; Asur & Huberman, 2010; Nahon & Hemsley, 2013). Scholars have also identified some important factors that can result in the spreadability/shareability of content on social media. These include proximity, conflict, human interest (Trilling, Tolochko & Burscher, 2017); controversial and emotional content (Kim, 2015); and stories that evoke positive and negative sentiment (Berger & Milkman, 2012). Some of
these features mirror the news selection criteria and routines of legacy media because journalists and users have similar news selection measures (Eilders, 2006; Ziegele, Breiner, & Quiring, 2014). However, it is also important to note that on social media, positive content is more likely to spread easily, which stands in contrast with legacy media, where negative stories are deemed as critical news factors (Hansen, Arvidsson, Nielsen, Colleoni & Etter, 2011; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neil, 2001; Eilders, 2006). Yet, while negative sentiments are “detrimental to the virality of non-news tweets” they facilitate the spreadability of news tweets (Hansen et al., 2011). Besides resulting in the spreadability or virality of content, these social media news values are important because they can also shape what aspects of Boko Haram narratives are emphasised, de-emphasised or excluded. They could, therefore, provide the rationale for the appearance of similar constructions about Boko Haram on both legacy and social media platforms.

Programmability and datafication can be explained in terms of the affordances of visibility and persistence. Visibility refers to the relative ease with which information can be located on platforms and can be achieved via the search features on social media, which enable “finding, confronting, viewing, and consuming content” (Evans, Pearce, Vitak & Treem, 2017, p. 40). Visibility on social media is owing to the affordance of persistence, which is used to describe instances where communication “remains accessible in the same form as the original display after the actor has finished his or her presentation” (Treem & Leonard, 2012, p. 18). Erickson and Kellogg (2000) note that “persistence opens the door to a variety of new uses and practices: persistent conversations may be searched, browsed, replayed, annotated, visualised, restructured, and recontextualised, with what are likely to be profound impacts on personal, social, and institutional practices” (p. 68). These affordances enable users to steer content in particular directions and/or allow platform algorithms to predict user behaviour and
preferences and thus, could explain why certain aspects of Boko Haram narratives may be prioritised or deemphasised on social media.

Social media are given to the logic of connectivity, which highlights how platforms like Twitter facilitate human connectedness and at the same time algorithmically links “users to content, users to users, platform to users, users to advertisers, and platform to platforms” (Dijck & Poell, 2013, p. 9). This high level of interconnectivity implies that users may be exposed to a wide range of opinions about Boko Haram. However, studies indicate that social media platforms show signs of ideological polarisation (Dylko et al., 2017; Stroud, 2010) and the creation of filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011), which limits the possibility of encountering diversity of opinions. This is because platform algorithms link users to the type of content they are more likely to prefer and make these items easily accessible, thereby restricting users to a particular set of options (Rader & Gray, 2015, p. 175). Apart from the influence of algorithms, research has also shown that “individual choices played a stronger role in limiting exposure to cross-cutting content” (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015, p. 1130).

Connectivity is a product of the affordance of networked association, which refers to how technologies offer two levels of interaction. The first is called a social tie and involves establishing linkages between individuals either as friends (Facebook) or followers (Twitter, Instagram). The second is a content tie and entails linking individuals to pieces of information either via replying a post or by tagging individuals to a particular content/post. As boyd and Ellison (2007) note, “what makes social network sites unique is not that they allow individuals to meet strangers, but rather that they enable users to articulate and make visible their social networks” (p. 211). Large networks can expose users to other sources of information (Eveland & Hively, 2009) or to people with similar ideas or interests (McLeod et al., 1999). The logic of connectivity and the affordance of networked association can, therefore, account for the emergence of established narratives or stereotypes about Boko Haram/terrorism. For
example, media organisations usually characterise a terrorist as “a fanatical male, bent on destroying whatever stands in his way” (Berkowitz 2005, p. 607), while women are characterised as non-violent (Alison, 2004; Berkowitz, 2005; Gardner, 2007). Whereas male members of terrorist organisations are depicted as tough and dangerous in the media (Nacos, 2005), the representation of women foregrounds their biological categorisation/gender, appearance, family, and social status (Yarchi, 2014). This is in line with Chetty (2004) who notes that the media usually “emphasises the pain, suffering and vulnerability of women …depict women as recipients of suffering, as being acted upon by hegemonic forces which render them agentless” (p. 38). This representation of women explains why women attract eight times more coverage for carrying out comparable acts of terror (Bloom, 2011, p.7). However, terrorist organisations engage women for different reasons including reproduction, as strategic weapons of war, domestic servitude, and funding/bargaining (Oriola, 2017). Moreover, women also participate in violent groups and function as “collaborators, informers, human shields, recruiters, sexual baits in person and over the Internet, and as perpetrators of acts of destruction and death” (Berko & Erez, 2007, p. 494).

Social media platforms were initially thought to function as the new public sphere, that is, a space where former audiences and users could participate in the content production process. However, research has shown that these platforms have developed mechanisms of giving voice to influential and popular figures and as such are driven by the logic of popularity. For example, Enli and Simonsen (2018) note that journalists and politicians “constitute an elite of influencers with a certain agenda-setting power” on social media (p. 1085). Lee, Kwak, Park and Moon (2010) describe Twitter as a hierarchical dais where users with a large number of followers such as celebrities, politicians, and journalists exert more influence (p. 1082). Hemsley, Garcia-Murillo and MacInnes (2018) argue also that Twitter’s “user base is skewed toward those who disproportionately affect news coverage and by extension the public agenda”
These types of sources also wield tremendous influence in legacy media because they are an integral part of journalistic routines. This could, therefore, result in the production of echoes or pre-established narratives and stereotypes about Boko Haram. This is in line with Enli and Simonsen’s (2018) argument that “debates on social media are highly dependent on established media infrastructure” (p. 1091). The authors also note that conversations that attract “politicians and journalists in social media originate from and are relevant to ongoing debates in mainstream media” (p. 1093).

But while elite voices provide support for the objectivity norm of legacy platforms, social media combines professional and personal content, which means that the platform is open to both objective and subjective content. The presence of objective and subjective content on social media can be explained in terms of the affordances of Anonymity and Editability. Scott (1998) defines anonymity as “the degree to which a communicator perceives the message source is unknown and unspecified” (p. 387). Anonymity as a social media affordance varies across platforms “from fully anonymous to fully identified (p. 387). Whereas certain platforms require identity verification in terms of the use of real names as in Facebook, some others like Twitter allow for the use of both real and pseudo names. Some accounts on Twitter are verified, that is, “determined to be an account of public interest” by Twitter (Twitter Inc., 2020, para. 3) and are distinguished by “the blue verified badge” (para. 1). Verified accounts on Twitter usually belong to celebrities or users with ties to particular sectors such as “music, acting, fashion, government, politics, religion, journalism, media, sports, business, and other key interest areas” (para. 5). This, therefore, means that the verified status is not open to all Twitter users. Twitter also allows for pseudonymity. Even though users with real or pseudonyms can contribute both objective and subjective content, the use of fictitious names can embolden users to express their opinions as well as enable the production and spread of false and unverified information, fake news, and terrorists’ propaganda.
Editability captures the idea that on social media platforms, users can effectively construct or reconstruct messages before making them available to other users (Walther, 1993). It can be compared to Dennis, Fuller, and Valacich’s (2008) rehearsability, an affordance that facilitates the design and communication of the user’s intended message and is attained via platform features such as edit or delete, which allows for the modification/removal of content. Editability allows for the representation of the self, and therefore, the production of subjective content. This is especially because, owing to this affordance, communicators can “take into consideration the context in which their message is likely to be viewed (or later, after it was made, view the actual context in which it was viewed) and tailor their ideas accordingly” (Treem & Leonardi, 2013, p. 26). From this perspective, editability can be said to provide opportunities for self-representation or the expression of private state (Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1985) on issues of societal interests. This also means that users can provide alternative views that deviate from established narratives about and/or echo popular representations of terrorism.

The four interrelated principles (programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication) and the affordances of social media (visibility, anonymity, persistence, editability and networked association) jointly explain the internal logic of social media platforms. Considering their impact on the production, distribution, and consumption of content on social media, this study asserts that they could shape the representation of political actors and therefore, also of Boko Haram on Twitter.

2.3.3 Other influences on Media Content
Apart from the internal logic of platforms, it has also been established that media content is influenced by a range of external factors such as market competitiveness and profit maximisation. Market competitiveness and profit maximisation apply to both newspapers and Twitter as both platforms are driven by a commercial logic (Hintz, 2016; Bouvier & Machin,
The commercial logic of platforms can be attributed to reduction in circulation figures, shrinking advertisement revenue and proliferation of media outlets and platforms. To this end, media organisations produce or make visible content that appeals to audiences and users in a bid to retain their market share or attract larger audiences (Brants & de Haan, 2010; Landerer, 2013). For instance, journalists and users may emphasise the human-interest component of Boko Haram since such stories can easily resonate with audiences in the respective platforms. In addition to the commercial logic of platforms, media content is also influenced by the wider socio-political environment in which it is produced (Gans, 1979; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). This warrants an examination of the possible roles of the Nigerian state and media ecology in the construction of Boko Haram.

Even though Boko Haram exerts influence in at least four LCBCs, most of the group’s attacks have occurred in Nigeria. Boko Haram has engaged the Nigerian state in an unconventional war for about a decade and has, therefore, become a critical aspect of the country’s political, economic and security discourses. Nigeria, though a highly diverse nation, is often characterised as maintaining a North-South geo-political duality. However, this binary classification does not capture the country’s complex ethnic, religious, and regional composition, which has led to the predominance of multiple identity markers, chief amongst which is ethnicity (Lewis, 2007). Yet, in keeping with Siebert, Patterson, and Schramm’s (1956) argument, the Nigerian press embodies these dominant features, owing to the presence of two dominant printing/publishing hubs. According to the Nigerian press council (2016), more than 60% of Nigerian newspapers are published in the South (Lagos-Ibadan), while others are produced in the North (Abuja). This structural inequality has led to allegations of bias and mistrust among the regions (Uwazuruike, 2018; Yusha’u, 2015; Ojo, 2003) and can be traced to the overwhelming influence of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria. Thus, while most Nigerian newspapers are privately owned, the ethnicity and/or religious affiliation of the selected papers
may provide some explanations for the representation of Boko Haram in the selected outlets. This is because media organisations produce polarising content by taking advantage of existing political, socio-cultural, and religious divisions within the Nigerian state. Boko Haram is an extremist organisation that claims to represent a truer version of Islam and most of its attacks have taken place in Nigeria’s north, which is dominated by Muslims. This study argues, therefore, that the commercial logic of the respective platforms, the nature of the Nigerian state and media ecology may provide some explanations for the representation of Boko Haram.

2.4 Framing

Mediation as already stated in section 2.3, highlights the place of the media as channels of communication that exert influence on media content owing to institutional values, routines, norms, and technology. One of the ways this influence is expressed in via framing, that is, when journalists and users place salience on certain aspects of an issue while deemphasising or excluding others, especially in ways that will resonate with the general public. Within the field of media and communication, most scholars apply framing to analyse media content or investigate the relationship between the media and public opinion. This provides the grounds for its application in this research. As is already outlined in section 1.2, this study is undertaken from the perspective of framing and seeks to understand the construction of Boko Haram on legacy and social media platforms.

The earliest articulations of framing are traceable to the fields of psychology and sociology as seen in the works of Bateson (1955, 1972a), Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984), Goffman (1974), and Gamson and Modigliani (1987, 1989). While psychologists apply framing to understand how messages are communicated, sociologists examine the ways in which people make sense of their environment (Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar, 2016). This multi-disciplinary relevance of framing underscores the lack of understanding of the concept and this has a profound impact on framing-based studies in general. For instance, the absence
of a generic definition of framing has brought about both operational and theoretical fuzziness, obfuscating the difference between framing and other media effects theories such as agenda-setting and priming (Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar, 2016; Scheufele & Tewskbury, 2007). For some, framing is second-level agenda setting, that is, “the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is discussed” (McCombs, 1997, p. 37). However, Scheufele and Iyengar (2017) contend that framing is quite distinct from agenda setting and priming. Price and Tewksbury (1997) summarise the difference between framing on the one hand, and agenda setting and priming on the other hand as follows:

Agenda setting [sic] looks on story selection as a determinant of public perceptions of issue importance and, indirectly through priming, evaluations of political leaders. Framing focuses not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented (p. 184).

Researchers are also yet to clarify the difference between frames and framing (Woods, 2011, p. 201), and in instances where these concepts are defined, they tend to have multiple interpretations. For instance, frames could constitute an attribute of a communication text (Woods, 2007), the “internal structures of the mind” (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p.74) or both (Gitlin, 1980). These discordances in the conceptualisation of framing have, however, not diminished its relevance in scholarly research, as framing has become increasingly popular across several disciplines including media and communication (van Gorp, 2007, p. 60; David, Atun, Fille & Monterola, 2011, p. 330). The next section details how framing is applied in this study.

2.4.1 Conceptualising Framing
Several definitions of framing exist in the literature. For example, Gitlin (1980) defines framing as “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of tacit theories
about what exists, what happens and what matters” (p. 7). But in what is now deemed the “most widely accepted” (David, Atun, & Monterola, 2011, p. 330) definition of framing, Entman (1993) states that:

> to frame is to select some aspect of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52).

While Gitlin’s and Entman’s definitions have dominated framing literature (Matthes, 2009), this study follows Entman’s interpretation of framing for three main reasons. Firstly, it offers “precise operational guidelines” (p. 300) for analysing frames since it delineates the functions of frames as follows: to define, interpret, evaluate, or proffer solutions. In the words of Entman, Matthes, and Pellicano (2009), “drawing on functional specifications seems preferable because it enables analysts to draw clearer measurements and inferences that distinguish framing from themes, arguments, assertions, and other under-theorised concepts” (p. 176). Entman’s four frame elements: problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation, function as the key frame variables in this study as is detailed in chapter three. Secondly, Entman’s definition of framing captures the different aspects political actors vested in the Boko Haram discourse may choose to emphasise, deemphasise or exclude in ways that could influence public knowledge and response towards the group. This is possible because, frames typically resonate with the cognitive and cultural schemas of audiences, as these play a significant role in how knowledge is processed (Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar, 2016). Thirdly, the adoption of Entman’s definition sets this research within the realm of emphasis rather than equivalence framing (p. 10), since the focus is on deciphering aspects of the Boko Haram narrative that are prioritised. Equivalence framing entails “manipulating the presentation of logically equivalent information” (p. 8), while emphasis framing “involves manipulating the content of a communication” (p.8). Therefore, in this study framing refers to
how the selected newspapers and Tweeters define, attribute responsibility, evaluate and proffer solutions for the Boko Haram problem, in a bid to shape public understanding about or response to Boko Haram. Frames are the conceptual tools such as “words, images and symbols” (Woods, 2011, p. 201) utilised in this effort.

The popularity of framing within communication and other subfields like political communication can be attributed to two main features. First, framing is a “multiparadigmatic research program” (D’Angelo, 2002, p. 879), that can be undertaken from multiple theoretical perspectives including cognitive, constructionist, and critical. These different lenses via which framing studies can be carried out explain the ubiquity, relevance, and versatility of framing research. At the cognitive level of analysis, scholars investigate how media frames influence audience frames. Unlike cognitivists, critical researchers posit that media organisations are part of the power structure that contribute to the set of frames that dominate societal discourse. Thus, frames are a product of the power play between social, political and economic factors and these frames, over time are deemed capable of dominating societal discourses, thus becoming the main lens through which audiences perceive societal issues (Hardin & Whiteside, 2010, p. 314). D’Angelo (2002) argues that constructionists conceptualise journalists as “information processors” (p. 877), who depend on the input of frame sponsors in the news production process. This is predicated on the understanding that journalists do not function outside the audiences’ ecosystem and therefore, rely on the set of frames available to the audience. This study draws on the critical and constructionist perspectives to explore how Boko Haram is constructed on legacy and social media platforms. This is because while the media can shape public understanding about social and political issues like terrorism/Boko Haram, media content is influenced by a range of factors. In sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, these factors are discussed in terms of the values, routines, and norms of legacy media; the logic
and affordances of social media; and other external factors such as the environment where content is produced.

The second reason for the prevalence of framing within the field of media and communication is that it functions as a bridging concept (van Gorp, 2007, p. 61), which enables research along different trajectories including the location of media and/or individual frames (Druckman, 2001b; Scheufele, 1999). As Kinder and Sanders (1990) note:

Frames lead a double life: they are internal structures of the mind that help individuals to order and give meaning to the dizzying parade of events they witness as political history unfold; they are also devices embedded in political discourse, invented and employed by political elites, often with an eye on advancing their own interests or ideologies, and intended to make favourable interpretations prevail (p. 74).

The bridging capacity of framing is captured in Vreeses’ (2005) integrated process model as frame building and frame setting (p. 52). Whereas frame building research focuses on the investigation of media frames, frame setting studies examine the impact of media frames on audiences. Frame building research involves investigating how the interplay between journalistic norms and practices (news values, editorial policies, the journalists’ value system, ideological inclinations of the media organisation) and external factors such as sources; market constraints; and the social, political and cultural context in which content is produced, result in the manifestation of culturally resonating frames (Boesman, Berbers, d’Haenens & van Gorp, 2017, p. 299; van Gorp, 2010; McLeod, Kosicki & McLeod, 2000). The upshot of this process results in the frames applied in the media. Uwazuruike’s (2018) study is a useful example in this regard. The author’s investigation of 851 articles in three Nigerian newspapers reveals that Boko Haram is framed “as a political conspiracy, as prevailing, and as instilling fear” (p. 3). The author also highlights the possible role of sources and the ethnic and religious affiliation of papers in the emergence of these frames.
However, the effectiveness of frames applied in the media can be limited by the credibility of the source (Druckman, 2001a) or by “individuals’ existing issue schemas and predispositions” (Shen, 2004, p. 400). Studies that investigate the degree of congruence between media and individual frames are described as frame-setting/frame-effects research. Woods’ (2011) work is an example of terrorism framing effects research. The author carried out an exploratory experiment to test the effectiveness of three news frames - terrorism, radical Islam and nuclear - in an American federal commission’s report, on citizen’s perception of danger (p. 201). Whereas the radical Islam and nuclear frames boosted threat levels, the mere definition of a violent act as terrorism did not make any remarkable difference on threat levels. However, compared to the two other frames, the radical Islam frame “produced the greatest influence on the subjects’ perceptions of the terrorist threat. It had a significant main effect on all three indicators – risk judgement, dread and worry” (p. 210). This outcome can be explained in terms of a western trend that began around the nineteenth century, in which Muslims were portrayed as uncivilised, illiterate and violent (Said, 1978). This foregrounds media representation of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists and is traceable to the 1979-1981 Iranian hostage event (Said, 1981), which has become deeply entrenched in the post-9/11 environment (Freedman & Thussu, 2012). For instance, Woods’ (2007) large sample study shows that twenty percent of articles published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* regarding terrorism linked the problem to religion, with a particular emphasis on the Islamic faith. Similarly, Shadid and van Koningsveld (2002) argue that the characterisation of Muslims as “irrational, primitive, belligerent and dangerous” has evolved into a consistent news framing model (p. 174).

Although effect-based studies are relevant in the context of terrorism, this study is situated within the frame-building paradigm, “which can be a much messier and more chaotic process” (Fowler, Gollust, Dempsey, Lantz & Ubel, 2012, p. 172). Frame-building research is
complex because as earlier stated, it involves unearthing how the interplay between a wide range of internal and external factors yield culturally resonating frames. The changes in the media landscape and the birthing of alternative platforms that are similar, yet different from conventional platforms also adds to the complicated nature of frame-building studies. For instance, exploring social media platforms from a frame-building perspective entails uncovering how the logic and affordances of platforms leads to the construction of frames that resonate with the public. Moreover, content on social media are produced by a wide range of social actors including journalists, and legacy media audiences who may use the platform to echo, react to and/or challenge mass media narratives (Craft, Vos, & Wolfgang, 2015; Hermida, 2011; Jewitt, 2009).

To this end, social media frames have been described as networked frames. For instance, Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) adapt Entman’s framing definition and define networked framing as follows: “a process through which particular problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations, and/or treatment recommendations attain prominence through crowdsourcing practices” (p. 159). Since networked frames are produced as a result of both conventional and crowdsourcing news practices, this study argues that these types of frames blur the distinction between media (frame-building) and individual frames (framing effects) studies to some degree. This means that research projects such as this study, where the focus is on investigating both legacy and social media platforms, have to carefully navigate these complexities in a meaningful way. Therefore, this study goes beyond the identification of frames on the studied platforms to understanding how the extracted frames evince their media and political contexts.

2.4.2 Framing: Terrorism and Boko Haram
Framing has been applied within the context of terrorism and typically involves the examination of how frames about terrorist organisations, terrorist attacks, or individuals linked
with terrorist activities are produced and sustained over time; shape news content in different settings; and/or influence public knowledge (Norris, Kem & Just, 2003, p. 4, 10). As a form of political communication, terrorism inspires contests between political actors, and framing research captures how these actors fight to propagate certain views that serve their interests while excluding others in a bid to influence public thinking about terrorism-related issues. Berbers et al.'s (2016) study serve as a typical example in this regard. The authors’ examination of the portrayal of Syria fighters in Dutch and Flemish newspapers yielded a total of five frames: terrorist, victim, martyr, Don Quixote, and adventurer (p. 799) that were strategically employed by different actors in ways that served their specific interests. For instance, government representatives utilise the terrorist frame in order to justify actions taken against the fighters. Relatives of fighters on the other hand, use the victim and martyr frames while neglecting the terrorism frame. Like the relatives of fighters, government representatives also employ the victim frame but with emphasis on the need to protect the younger populations within communities, and by extension, make a case for additional financial support. But, the Dutch and Flemish extremist organisations utilise the martyr frame by depicting the Syrian fighters “as a solution to the demise of Islam due to perceived secularisation of the Ummah (international Muslim community) and Western influence” (p. 810). The authors argue that the disparities in framing could be linked to “the background and social identification of the frame advocates” (p. 798). This finding is consistent with Ryan, Carragee and Meinhofer’s (2001) argument that “frames sponsored by multiple social actors, including corporate and political elites, advocates and social movements’ turn news stories into a forum for frame contests wherein those actors struggle to define political issues from their own perspectives” (p. 176). The result from Berbers et al.’s (2016) study also indicates that similar frames can be applied towards different ends and that even terrorists engage in contests over meaning.
Scholars have also adopted framing to investigate Boko Haram or specific attacks carried out by the sect in the press and broadcast media (Okoro & Odoemelam, 2013; Ngwu, Ekwe & Chiara, 2015; Ette, 2016; Ezeah & Emmanuel, 2016; Jibrin & Jimoh 2017; Obaje, 2017). For example, Mercy Ette investigated the condensational symbols employed by the British press in framing an attack by Boko Haram – the 2011 Abuja UN House bombing. Condensational symbols are the “shorthand means by which aggregate beliefs, values, and perhaps worldviews are transmitted to those who share similar culture” (Ette, 2016, p. 453). For Johnson-Cartee (2005) condensational symbols can stir previously “stored meanings already residing within the minds of individuals sharing a given political culture” (p. 167). Ette identifies phrases like Islamic sect, Islamic extremists, and Nigerian Taliban, as condensational symbols employed by the British press in a bid to simplify and make sense of a rather complex issue for their audiences. These findings are also replicated in a study carried out by Ezeah and Emmanuel (2016), who examined the representation of Boko Haram in the BBC and Al Jazeera. The authors note that: “The BBC framing of Boko Haram insurgency took stereotypic stature of the age-long and deep-rooted narratives of western media that associate Islam with barbarism, killing, suicide-bombing, fanaticism, extremism, and terrorism by undermining the diversity of the Muslim population” (p. 41).

2.4.3 Gaps in the Boko Haram Framing Literature
Although the foregoing points to the growth and reach of framing, it also hints at some gaps in the literature. Firstly, despite the rising significance of social media platforms, most Boko Haram media framing research focus on the analysis of legacy content (see Uwazuruoke, 2018; Jibrin & Jimoh 2017; Obaje, 2017; Ette, 2016; Ezeah & Emmanuel, 2016; Ngwu, Ekwe & Chiara, 2015; Okoro & Odoemelam, 2013). This study reacts to this gap in the literature by examining the framing of Boko Haram on both legacy and social media platforms. Four Nigerian newspapers (The Guardian, Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership) and Twitter were
selected to represent the respective platforms. As previously explained, Twitter has emerged as an important dais for political engagement, while Nigerian newspapers wield significant influence in the country. Although similar, legacy and social media platforms constitute two radically different media technologies and sub-cultures. Therefore, the cross-platform analysis carried out in this study stands to provide both national and global perspectives on media representation of Boko Haram within a specified period. This study particularly investigates the representation of Boko Haram within the six-month period after the Nigerian government announced that Boko Haram has been “technically defeated” (BBC News, 2015, para.1).

Secondly, even though media texts are not limited to words but include visuals/images and sound, the prevalent practice in media and communication research is the analysis of words or the linguistic element. This is also the case with a majority of Boko Haram framing research where scholars primarily investigate words used in the media, while neglecting visuals. Although images constitute a core part of the routine of media platforms, some scholars query the extent to which images can alter the linguistic representation of an event (Benjamin, 1979 [1931]); Sontag, 1977; Barthes, 1981; Berger, 1980). For instance, Barthes & Heath’s (1977) concept of anchorage explicates how words in a given text set the boundaries of interpretation of accompanying images (p. 39). Based on this background, Griffin (2004) notes that news images primarily serve as “simple thematic cues ... uncomplicated symbolic markers”, which “prime and reinforce prevailing news narratives” and do not enhance meaning in significant ways (p. 384 & 399). Along similar lines, Zelizer (2004) contends that journalists employ wartime photographs that are “more schematic than detailed, conventionalised and simplified” (p. 115). The argument presented by these authors suggest, therefore, that visual frames may not necessarily be different from verbal/linguistic frames. However, other authors argue that like words, visuals/images constitute a core set of framing devices that can influence and/or upturn linguistic frames (Graber, 1990; Grabe & Bucy, 2009; DiFrancesco & Young,
This is mainly because images “speak a language of their own” (Anden-Papadopolous, 2008, p. 9); are evocative (Joffe, 2008); arouse both the experiential and cognitive processing systems (Leiserowitz, 2006; Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002); arrest viewers’ attention and enable news recall (Graber, 1990). These image features in addition to new media realities have led to the need to analyse images as well as other modes of communication (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017; Cvetkovic & Pantic, 2018). The role and possible impact of images is even more critical given the nature of terrorism, which tends to be quite visually compelling.

Furthermore, other authors note that while words and images have unique features, the combination of visual and verbal modalities can improve learning and boost retention (Paivio, 1991). Pentzold, Sommer, Meier and Fraas (2016) and Powell, Boomgaarden, De Swert and de Vreese (2015) reach the conclusion that images and words jointly contribute to meaning making. The reasoning that visuals co-occur with spoken/written texts and are jointly processed by audiences has, therefore, inspired calls for Integrative/Multimodal framing studies. Integrative framing entails the combined analysis of textual/linguistic and visual elements within a given dataset (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018). Geise and Baden (2014) have demonstrated that both visual and textual modalities can be analysed under a single theoretical framework like framing.

As is stated in chapter one, this study adopts an integrative stance, by investigating how words and images are used to represent Boko Haram in the selected newspapers and Twitter. It also acknowledges on the one hand, that “the photograph is a sign with its own highly complex means of signifying” (Anden-Papadopolous, 2008, p. 9) and on the other hand, that an image may be “formulaic, and tends to function as generic illustration of prevailing journalistic frame” (p. 9). This, therefore, means that images can either mirror or deviate from the textual representations of events or owing to their intricate nature, enhance the meaning of events. Therefore, while images are excluded in most Boko Haram framing studies (see
Uwazuruike, 2018; Jibrin & Jimoh, 2017; Obaje, 2017; Ette, 2016; Ezeah & Emmanuel, 2016; Ngwu, Ekwe & Chiara, 2015; Okoro & Odoemelam, 2013), this study examines texts alongside their accompanying images. This perspective informs the first research question for this study: What integrative frames are employed in the representation of Boko Haram in Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter?

Thirdly, this study examines the roles of the internal logic of legacy and social media platforms in addition to other external factors in the emergence of identified frames. Since most Boko Haram framing research has focused on legacy media, scholars adopting a frame building stance are limited to investigating only the impact of the internal logic of legacy media (values, practices and norms) as well as some external factors in the emergence of frames. While some of the Boko Haram framing studies cited above focus on the location and evaluation of frames (Obaje, 2017; Ngwu, Ekwe & Chiara, 2015; Okoro & Odoemelam, 2013), others provide possible explanation for the prevalence and/or appearance of identified frames (Uwazuruike, 2018; Ette, 2016). For instance, Okoro and Odoemelam (2013) investigated the manifest content of four Nigerian newspapers - the Guardian, Daily Sun, Vanguard, and Thisday - for the existence of ten generic frames including Response, Political, Economic, Religious, Ethnic, Powerlessness, Attribution to Responsibility, Labelling, Human interest and Conspiracy (p. 93). The authors note the prevalence of a Policy Response frame in the Guardian, Vanguard and ThisDay, while the Daily Sun primarily employ Ethnic and Religious frames. Also, apart from noting how the Daily Trust, Vanguard, and Thisday construct Boko Haram, Uwazuruike (2018) hints at the possible impact of news routines (sources) and the nature of the Nigerian state and its media ecology in the appearance of frames. Similarly, Ette’s (2016) examination of the condensational symbols employed in the representation of Boko Haram in selected British newspapers points to the likely influence of the media environment in the characterisation of the group. For instance, “the symbolic terms that journalists used in
their reports were not only easily identifiable but were specifically chosen to simplify a complex story for audiences that were perhaps uninformed about the group and its activities" (Ette, 2016, p. 451).

However, unlike the studies referred to in the above paragraph, this research in addition to legacy media, investigates the framing of Boko Haram on Twitter. On the one hand, this study recognises that newspapers belong to the realm of traditional media, where access is limited and content is subject to “very specific textual characteristics, some very specific methods of text production and consumption, and is defined by a particular set of relationships between itself and other agencies of symbolic and material power” (Richardson, 2007, p. 1). Newspaper content may also be influenced by the journalists’ value system, ideological inclinations and/or market constraints (McLeod, Kosicki & McLeod, 2000). To this end, therefore, this study examines the possible impact of the internal logic of the newspapers as well as other external factors in the emergence of identified frames. This study argues that the appearance of frames in the selected newspapers is a product of the values, routines, and norms of legacy media as well as the nature of the Nigerian state and its media ecology.

On the other hand, this study notes that while social and legacy media logic exhibits similar traits, they are also inherently different (Esser, 2014; Klinger & Svensson, 2015; Hedman, 2017). As is detailed in section 2.3.2, social media platforms like Twitter are bound by “social media logic – the norms, strategies, mechanisms, and economies – underpinning its dynamics (van Dijck & Poell, 2013, p. 2). Furthermore, what can or cannot be done on Twitter is determined by its specific affordances - “the attributes and abilities of users, the materiality of technologies, and the contexts of technology use” (Evans, Pearce, Vitak & Treem, 2017, p. 36). In addition to these, the social, cultural, and political contexts in which social media content is produced is also key for understanding the emergence of culturally resonating frames. This study, therefore, explores the possible influence of the logic and affordances of Twitter, as well
as other global tendencies in the visibility of extracted frames. The above rationalisations are
the grounds for the second research question: How are the frames shaped by their media and
political contexts?

This study is similar to Frederick, Pegoraro and Burch’s (2016) work in terms of their
examination of both legacy and social media frames. The authors’ investigation of the framing
analysis of the 2014 Sochi games in newspapers and Twitter yielded a total of three convergent
and divergent frames including the setting, the politics, and the games. The politics and games
frames are labelled convergent or echo frames because they are present in both newspapers
and Twitter, while the setting frame is called a divergent/organic frame owing to its emergence
and visibility on only Twitter (p. 803). The location of both echo and organic frames on the
studied platforms is an evidence of the similarities and differences in the logic of the respective
platforms. This hints at the likelihood of identifying similar and different frames in the
construction of Boko Haram in the selected Nigerian newspapers and Twitter.

However, this research differs from Frederick, Pegoraro and Burch’s (2016) study in
two main respects. First, while Frederick and his colleagues investigated a sports-related
event, this study is focused on terrorism, which is a far-more complicated subject. Second,
beyond the location of frames in the selected Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter, this study
examines the media and political contexts of extracted frames. For instance, as earlier
mentioned in section 1.1, exploring the possible influence of the affordances of Twitter on
emergent frames is critical to deciphering the combined functions of users, platform features
and technology in the construction of political realities (Lee, 2010; Maier & Fadel, 2009;
Norman, 2007; Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, Dougherty & Faraj, 2007). Examining the media
and political contexts of frames also enables this study to contribute to the literature on the
possible influence of news values, routines and norms; and the socio-cultural context of the

Fourthly, this study contributes to the discourse on methods utilised in the identification of frames. Added to the three mentioned lacunae in Boko Haram framing research, other issues have been raised regarding the viability of framing including: “lack of operational precision, the descriptive focus of many analyses, neglect of visuals, and insufficient reliability reporting” (Matthes, 2009, p. 349). These problems are in part owing to the methods used in the location of frames. Media frames are usually extracted via content analysis a “research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorf, 2013, p. 24). Content analysis has within its tradition, a wide range of analytical techniques, such as cluster, thematic, discourse, and interpretative analyses, which are suitable for the production of both value-free and context-dependent findings (Marsh & White, 2006, p. 22). For instance, in addition to a quantitative analysis of a 100-million-word corpus, Zappavigna (2012) also employed discourse analysis to illustrate that Twitter is used to share personal experiences and establish relationships. The multifaced nature of content analysis explains its application in the identification of frames in media texts. For example, Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) applied multiple content analysis approaches (network, content, and discourse) to investigate “broadcasting and listening practices on Twitter” (p. 138) with a focus on the 2011 Egyptian revolution.

Content analysis has also been used to investigate the framing of images. For example, Schwalbe and Dougherty's (2015) study is aimed at understanding how images are used to frame the 2006 Lebanon war in three US news magazines - The Times, Newsweek and U. S. News & World Report. Whereas the authors undertake content analysis from a quantitative perspective, O’Neil’s (2013) investigation of climate change images in the US, UK and Australian newspapers is carried out from a qualitative perspective with particular focus on
the denotative and connotative meaning of images. This broadly entails the examination of how visual elements such as light, colour, age, gender, race, facial expression, eye contact, pose, body language, and clothing “relate to our culture; structures of meaning which elucidate other, additional and implied meanings” (p. 13).

Matthes and Kohring (2008) identify five different but not mutually exclusive approaches to content analysis that dominate the framing literature. These include hermeneutic, linguistic, manual holistic, computer-assisted, and deductive approaches, which can be summed up as two main approaches – inductive and deductive (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). While these methods have contributed to the growth of framing, their inherent shortfalls are the reasons for some of the key criticisms against framing.

Deductive-based studies investigate the prevalence of already established frames in extant literature. For example, Papacharissi and de Oliveira (2008) rely on two frames – episodic and thematic – obtained from Iyengar’s (1991) study, for the comparative analysis of the coverage of terrorism in The Washington Post, New York Times, London Financial Times, and The Guardian. Similarly, Okoro and Odoemelam (2013) carry out a deductive content analysis of the framing of Boko Haram in four Nigerian newspapers using ten popular frames (response, political, economic, religious, ethnic, powerlessness, attribution to responsibility, labelling, human interest, and conspiracy frames). These frames were theoretically derived from the works of Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), Iyengar (1991) and de Vreese (2005a) (Okoro & Odoemelam, 2013, p. 87). On the one hand, the deductive approach to framing facilitates the efficient analysis of large data sets and the generalisability of findings. On the other hand, this approach places a restriction on discoverable frames and mostly results in a check-box approach since frames are already known.

The hermeneutic, linguistic, manual holistic and computer-assisted methods are different approaches to framing analysis within the inductive tradition. This is because they all
entail the examination of media content to uncover possible frames based on loosely set descriptions (Matthes, 2009). For example, the hermeneutic method is located within qualitative research traditions, where the focus is on thick description, rather than quantification. Using this approach, scholars locate frames “by providing an interpretative account of media texts linking up frames with broader cultural elements” (p. 259). This in-depth and contextual description of frames could aid theory development and contribute to the pool of existing frames. However, this method falls short on the question of reliability because the process via which frames emerge in the first instance, is largely unclear. Regarding this, Tankard (2001) warns: “there is a danger in this kind of lone-scholar analysis that the identification of a set of possible frames can be done arbitrarily” (Tankard, 2001, p. 98). This may provide one explanation for the identification of different frames even while investigating the same issue or event. Ette (2012) applied this approach to investigate the framing of Farouk Abdulmutallab - the underwear bomber in The Guardian, ThisDay, Punch and Daily Trust Nigerian newspapers between 27 December 2009 and 9 January 2010. She identified two frames - distance and denial. She argues that these frames served to limit public understanding of the botched attack, an event which led to Nigeria being labelled by the United States “as a country of interest in terrorism” (p. 12). Although the author provides a robust description of the distance and denial frames, it is not immediately clear how the said frames were extracted.

Computer-assisted framing analysis is another example of an inductive-based framing approach. It comprises a wide range of machine-dependent approaches that measure word frequencies and co-occurrence within electronic texts. Clearly, such automated processes would allow for the analysis of whole datasets, without necessarily reducing large datasets to smaller samples. Furthermore, inductive computer-assisted framing analysis allows frames to emerge organically, thereby ranking high in terms of reliability. For instance, Frederick, Pegoraro & Burch (2016) carried out the thematic framing analysis of the 2014 Sochi games.
using 2,856 newspaper articles and 497,743 tweets with the aid of Leximancer Software. Using this software enabled the researchers to process the large dataset, without recourse to any sampling procedure, a feat that would be very difficult and time consuming using other purely qualitative approaches. Their analysis yielded a total of three convergent and divergent frames in the selected texts. However, the validity of this approach is worrisome. As Hertog and McLeod (2001) notes, certain words may not appear frequently, and yet may be essential in the meaningful interpretation of texts (p. 152). Reliance on word frequency and co-occurrences could, therefore, result in the elimination of key terms, and result in loss of validity. Moreover, in most cases, the algorithms behind the functionality of some software employed in computer-assisted framing analyses are shrouded in secrecy, shifting the burden of proving validity to researchers.

The shortfalls in both approaches (inductive and deductive) have resulted in calls for the development of more effective framing analysis approaches and Matthes and Kohring (2008) responded to this by developing a statistical method (Computer-assisted Hierarchical Cluster Analysis – CHCA) that allows for the inductive extraction of frames that are reliable and valid. In addition to the effective identification of justifiable frames, the authors' approach also provides evidence for the number of frames delineated from a given dataset (David, Atun, Fille & Monterola, 2011, p. 332). This is the grounds for its application in this study. Details about this method is provided in chapter three.

However, while the statistical approach (CHCA) is effective for the identification of frames, it falls short with respect to providing a robust interpretation of the frames and is thus not effective for responding to the second set of research questions, which require thick description. As is detailed in chapter three, answers to the media and political contexts of frames is provided with the aid of Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA). This research addresses some of the criticism made regarding framing through the use of CHCA.
and MCDA. For instance, using the CHCA facilitates operational precision and reliability reporting. Findings from this integrative framing analysis go beyond a descriptive account to include a more robust interpretation of identified frames. In addition, the MCDA affords the analysis of both the linguistic and visual elements of texts on the studied platforms.

2.4.4 Types of Frames

Using the above framing pathways (inductive and deductive), scholars have discerned various types of frames. For instance, Vreese made a distinction between generic and issue-specific frames. Frames are termed generic when they “transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics, some even over time and in different cultural contexts” (Vreese, 2005a, p. 54). A prime example of this category of frames include Iyengar’s (1991) thematic and episodic frames. In contrast to a thematic frame, which provides a robust analysis of events, an episodic frame is purely descriptive and event-oriented (pp. 15-16). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) identify the following generic frames: conflict, human interest, economic consequences, morality, and responsibility. While conflict frames place emphasis on the dispute between conflicting parties, human interest frames give a human face to problems and/or individualises a problem. Responsibility frames hold certain individuals or persons accountable for causing or solving a problem, while morality frames highlight the religious element of an event or offer moral solutions. The economic consequences frame presents issues in terms of their financial implications to people or countries.

However, according to Uwazuruike (2018), the distinction between generic and issue-specific frames, that is frames that emerge from the analysis of particular issues or events, is mainly theoretical as they tend to overlap in actual practice. This is especially because both kinds of frames can be applied with respect to certain events and contexts. For example, Berbers et al. (2016) identified five frames: terrorist, victim, martyr, Don Quixote, and adventurer (p. 799) with respect to the construction of Syria Fighters in Dutch and Flemish
newspapers. While the terrorist and victim frames are quite generic owing to their frequency of application in the media, the other three frames can be regarded as issue-specific (p. 806). Both generic and issue-specific frames are likely to emerge from this cross-platform analysis of Boko Haram narratives owing to the pervasiveness of terrorism, the standardised nature of journalistic practices, and the uniqueness of Boko Haram and the Nigerian environment.

2.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature for this research. It began by describing the complexities around the use of the term terrorism owing to its political and nuanced undertones. The first part of the literature review also covered the broad debates on the origin, root causes and responses to terrorism. In this study, the conceptualisation of terrorism is taken from Schmid and Jongman (1988) who highlight the political aspect of terrorism and the role of the media in the publicity and psychological/behavioural objectives of terrorist groups. This definition is adopted because it reflects the understanding that terrorism is a type of political violence deployed in pursuit of different ends. It is also selected because it captures the centrality of the media to the publicity and psychological/behavioural goals of terrorism. Following this, Boko Haram is described as a transnational terrorist organisation and a constituent part of the global jihad in the traditions of other violent groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Al-Shabab which seek to upturn “the existing Western-dominated world order and replace it with a jihadist vision, through subversion, terrorism and insurgency” (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 600). Like these groups, Boko Haram’s application of terrorist techniques is in pursuit of other far-reaching objectives.

The second part of the literature review examined the media-terrorism symbiosis in light of shifts in the composition of the media as well as two concepts – mediation and mediatisation, processes that embody the larger implication of the media in society. This
section also explored the characteristics of media platforms as key influencers of media content.

The last section identified framing, as the theoretical framework that underpins this study. Although framing is a multifaceted theory and approach, this study is carried out from the frame-building perspective, which involves unearthing how “journalistic routines (as news values) and the interaction with external actors (as sources) lead to the construction of culturally rooted frames” (Boesman, Berbers, d’Haenens, & van Gorp, 2017, p. 299). However, owing to the changes in the media landscape, the frame-building paradigm in this study is expanded to include understanding the various factors, internal and external to the media, which may impact emergent frames. This research specifically focuses on the possible impact of the values, routines, norms of legacy media, the logic and affordances of social media as well as the nature of the Nigerian state and its media ecology on the representation of Boko Haram on the investigated platforms. This part of the literature review also identifies specific lacunae in the framing literature, which this study seeks to address as well as how these gaps influenced the research questions set out for this thesis. The next chapter describes the procedures and methods used in answering the research questions.
CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the specific methods by which the research and analyses are conducted and is subdivided into five sections. The first section reiterates the aim and research questions while the second part deals with the philosophical underpinnings of the research. The third section details the overall design of this research including specific information about study population/sampling, data collection processes and data analysis procedures. The fourth part describes the ethical considerations made in the course of the study, while the chapter concludes in the fifth section with a summary.

3.2 Restatement of Research Aims and Questions
The overall purpose of this research, as previously stated in chapter one (see section 1.2), is to understand how Boko Haram is constructed on legacy and social media platforms, with a focus on four Nigerian national newspapers and Twitter between January and June 2017. To achieve this goal, the study set out to answer the following questions:

1. What integrative frames are employed in the representation of Boko Haram in Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter?

2. How are frames shaped by their media and political contexts?
   a. What roles do the values, routines and norms of legacy media and the logic and affordances of social media play in the framing of Boko Haram?
   b. What roles do the Nigerian state and its media ecology play in the framing of Boko Haram?

This research is premised on the understanding of the media as channels of communication between political actors and the general public. Mediation, as detailed in chapter two, provides a broader explanation for the mutually beneficial relationship between
the media and political actors including politicians, journalists, the military, citizen journalists, social movements, non-governmental organisations, terrorists and audiences (Weimann, 1983; Martin, 1985; Gurevitch & Levy, 1985, p. 19; Dowling, 1986; Schmid, 1989; Wilkinson, 1997; McNair, 2003, pp. 51-52). Although political actors are critical to the news production, distribution and consumption processes, media content is shaped by a range of other internal and external factors, which jointly influence how issues are represented. Media accounts of political realities are important because they play significant roles in shaping public understanding and public policy (Entman, 2010). This provides the rationale for undertaking this study from the perspective of framing. Framing is a popular media theory, which captures how media organisations construct social realities by emphasising, de-emphasising or excluding certain aspects of a narrative in ways that could influence public knowledge and/or behaviour.

Whereas the first question can be resolved via a quantitative analysis technique, the second research question requires a more in-depth analysis, which a qualitative analysis procedure can offer. While the identification of the number of times certain elements appear within texts can lead to the determination of frames, it is equally important to understand the complexity of frames and the framing process.

3.3. Research Paradigm and Approach

This study assumes a pragmatist stance owing to the nature of the subject of enquiry and the types of research questions to be answered in this thesis. Unlike positivism and interpretivism, pragmatism “offers a method for selecting methodological mixes that can help researchers better answer many of their research questions” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 17). The pragmatic approach favours a pluralistic world view while seeking effective ways of resolving research questions/problems (Morgan, 2007, Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). Thus, by assuming a pragmatic stance, researchers can combine quantitative and qualitative research elements. The blending of approaches can be carried out at the design, data
collection and/or analysis stages, or during all stages of the research process (Sieber, 1973), with an objective of either corroborating findings and/or providing a better understanding based on enhanced description (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007, p. 123). However, since mixing methods also means incorporating opposing views, scholars have raised concerns about how the mix should be attained, while others argue that the term “mix” is not an appropriate term to use in the context of “mixed method” (Armitage & Keeble, 2007, para.16).

Armitage and Keeble (2007) introduce “Mutual Research Design” (para. 18) as a replacement for mixed methods, asserting that the term mutual, “recognises the separateness of opposing philosophies but also recognises the other attributes, characteristics and beliefs i.e. a partnership based upon a reciprocal relationship” (para. 18). However, the objective here is not to wade into the debates around the appropriate nomenclature and as such this study sticks to the popular label, mixed methods.

3.4 Research Design

This study investigates legacy and social media representations of Boko Haram narratives in four Nigerian national newspapers (The Guardian, Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership) and on Twitter between January and June 2017. Although terrorism is a global concern and the Boko Haram crisis an ongoing problem, this study specifically focuses on the six-month period following claims by the Nigerian government that Boko Haram has been “technically defeated” (BBC News, 2015, para.1).

Legacy media have over time, acquired a powerful influence by establishing their institutional relevance and by “developing a commanding discourse that guided the organisation of public space” (van Dijck & Poell, 2013, p. 3). Although the Nigerian legacy media landscape include a large collection of print and broadcast organisations, both on-and offline, this study specifically focuses on newspapers. This is because while independent broadcasting only commenced around the 1990s in Nigeria, Nigerian newspapers have been
in existence since the 1850s and thus, have deep historical ties with the state (Olukoyun, 2004). In addition, newspapers in Nigeria are seen as important agents of national development owing to the significant role of the press during the country’s decolonisation, demilitarisation, and democratisation epochs (Akinfeleye, 2003, p. 21). The press continues to drive the political discourse in the country to date. Moreover, compared with broadcast platforms, information in papers are more detailed, readily available, and are presented in portable formats that are preservable and accessible (Tanacković, Krtalić, & Lacović, 2014). These lend to easy access and availability for use in studies such as this, where detailed examination of text is required.

Furthermore, the focus on Nigeria is necessitated by two main factors. First, the origin of Boko Haram is traceable to Nigeria as is detailed in chapter one (Oyewole, 2013). Second, a majority of Boko Haram victims and casualties are from Nigeria’s north-eastern region (Kazeem, 2017). Despite the group’s influence across the LCBCs, Boko Haram has been involved in a decade-long conflict with the Nigerian state, a clash which has resulted in the death of over 27,000 persons and the displacement of about 2.6 million people (Paquette & Alfa, 2019; Alagbe, 2018; Lederer, 2017). These outcomes have made Boko Haram a subject of critical concern in Nigeria, thus meeting the criteria for regular media coverage by Nigerian newspapers.

Although there are no readership or circulation figures on Nigerian newspapers, The Guardian, Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership newspapers are popular across the country. The selected papers also provide a distinctive angle to the framing of Boko Haram. Nigeria though a multi-ethnic, multi-religion, and multi-regional country, made up of thirty-six federating units (Falola & Oyeniyi, 2015; Okolie, 2003b; Paden, 2015), is stratified along two broad regions, the North and South. While the North is made up of mostly Muslims, the South is mainly Christian. This division, which has its roots in Nigeria’s colonial heritage, serves as the ground for contests over “the control of state power, resource allocation, and citizenship”
The Nigerian press has also assumed this structure, as reflected in the existence of two main printing/publishing hubs – the dominant southern, and the more recent northern press. While *The Guardian* and *Punch* are sold in most parts of Nigeria, they are published in and very influential in the southern part of the country. Similarly, even though the *Leadership* and *Daily Trust* newspapers are available in other parts of the country, their target market is the north. Therefore, while these newspapers may not describe themselves as identifying with any particular religion or ethnic extraction, there may be moderate to strong affiliations in response to both ideological (religious) and market forces.

Closely related to the structural composition of the Nigerian press is the alleged high incidence of political/ethnic consideration in the news production process of Nigerian newspapers. For instance, Christopher and Onwuka (2013) stress that journalists in Nigeria display bias in the reportage of events, owing to affiliations with political parties or as a direct product of ownership (p. 36). This position draws support from the polarised nature of the Nigerian state as well as the overwhelming influence of ethnicity, which is the primary identity marker in the country. As a result, the Nigerian press has been instrumental in championing the political, social, and economic ambitions of persons with whom they are primordially affiliated (Uche, 1989, p. xvii). Buttressing this, Ugboaja (1980) notes that the stance adopted by newspapers in Nigeria, is shaped by, and a product of their physical location on the Nigerian map (pp. 36 & 38). Therefore, the identity cum ideological posturing of newspapers in this study is defined by the geographical location of the paper, the ethnic identity of the publisher (Uduak, 2000, p. 78); and the target market it seeks to serve (Oyovbaire, 2001). This provides justification for the categorisation of newspapers in this study. While *The Guardian* and the *Punch* represent the southern bloc, the *Daily Trust* and the *Leadership* represent the northern hub.
But as previously noted in section 2.4.3, most Boko Haram framing research have focused on the analysis of mainstream media (see Okoro & Odoemelam, 2013; Ngwu, Ekwe & Chiara, 2015; Ette, 2016; Ezeah & Emmanuel, 2016; Jibrin & Jimoh, 2017; Obaje, 2017). This is despite the growing influence of newer media platforms that enhance audience participation in the news production process, are loosely structured, boost interactivity, and allow for speedy dissemination of content. Therefore, in addition to the analysis of legacy media, this research also explores how social media is used to frame Boko Haram since these newer platforms offer additional and/or alternative “modes of witnessing, feeling and remembering violent and traumatic events” (Kuntsman, 2010, p. 2).

Facebook, Twitter, and Pinterest are three of the most popular social media platforms in Nigeria based on data from Statcounter (2019). However, this study examines only content about Boko Haram on Twitter for a number of reasons. Twitter self-identifies as “a real-time information network that connects [users] to the latest stories, ideas, opinions, and news about what [they] find interesting” (Twitter.com, 2013 as cited in Wasike, 2013, p. 8). In contrast with Facebook, which is a “friend” network, Twitter allows for both reciprocal and non-reciprocal relationships – users can follow people who do not follow them. This unique feature for researchers lends to the platforms social and “newsy” quality (Colleoni, Rozza & Arvidsson, 2014, p. 319). These characteristics in addition to the platform’s large number of active users, 330 million as at the first quarter of 2019, explains why Twitter has emerged a dominant vehicle for political communication (Colleoni, Rozza & Arvidsson, 2014).

Furthermore, Twitter functions “as a broadcast medium, marketing channel, diary, social platform, and news source” (Marwick & boyd, 2011, p. 122) making it an ideal platform for the dissemination and promotion of information and policies (Hemsley, Garcia-Murillo & Maclnnnes, 2018, p. 325). Twitter is open to both everyday people as well as political actors who have considerable influence on the coverage of news as well as public discourse.
(Chadwick, 2013; Freelon & Karpf, 2015; Russell, Guggenheim, Mo Jang, & Bae, 2014) such as the political elite and media organisations/journalists. For instance, Twitter is an “adept news breaking tool” for journalists (Wasike, 2013, p. 7) and most journalists use Twitter to locate stories and trail sources (Paulussen & Harder, 2014; Broersma & Graham, 2012). The platform is, therefore, a microphone for the “technologically literate” (Murthy, 2011, p. 786) especially in climes like Nigeria, where literacy level is low, and a majority of the population is poor (Bakare, 2015; Azeezat, 2018; Kazeem, 2018). Since the platform caters to both ordinary people and powerful political actors, it now serves as a global dais for political debates for societal issues including terrorism. Boko Haram related content on Twitter, therefore, accounts for possible views on the subject that are available on diasporic platforms like Sahara Reporters, which is not examined in this thesis. Lastly, Twitter is utilised for this study because of its open Application Programming Interface (API), which allows for the retrieval of large volumes of researchable data.

As is also pointed out in section 2.4.3, most framing studies have primarily focused on the analysis of words (Matthes, 2009), in spite of the understanding that information can be transferred via a wide range of semiotic resources and modes (Coleman & Banning, 2006, p. 313). For instance, scholars note that like words, images constitute a core set of framing devices (Graber, 1990; Grabe & Bucy, 2009; DiFrancesco & Young, 2011). Images are also made up of other semiotic modes/visual elements such as Colour (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2002); and are “polysensuous” (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 39), thus possessing more communicative potential than words (Mandel & Shaw, 1973, p. 355). This recognition of the role of news images in the social construction of political realities (Moriarty & Shaw, 1995; Bersak, 2006) has led to an increasing focus on the analysis of visuals (Griffin, 2004; Neumann & Fahmy, 2012; Schwalbe, Silcock & Keith, 2008). However, text/verbal-based analysis is still more prevalent (Makhortykh & Sydorova, 2017). Yet, like verbal-only studies, visual-only
studies are still deficient (Graber, 1987; Coleman, 2010), since “audiences are not exposed to either the verbal or the visual components of the message but rather to both words and visuals” (Dan, 2018, p. 1). This realisation has led to the need to locate integrative frames, that is, frames that are identified from the combined analysis of both linguistic and visual components within a given dataset (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018). This study adopts an integrative stance by examining how texts and their accompanying images are used to construct Boko Haram in the selected newspapers and on Twitter. This research is also carried out from a frame-building perspective and seeks to understand how the interplay between a wide range of internal and external factors account for culturally resonating frames.

Quantitative (Computer-assisted Hierarchical Cluster Analysis, CHCA) and qualitative (Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis, MCDA) methods are applied to provide answers for the research questions raised in this study. The CHCA occurred first, and was used to address the first research question, that is, what integrative frames are employed in the representation of Boko Haram on the studied platforms? The MCDA was used to answer the second research question: How are the frames shaped by their media and political contexts? Priority was given to the MCDA, since it served to improve the findings from the CHCA, as well as unearth, in a more elaborate manner, the intricacies of framing. The reasons for the application of both methods falls within Greene, Caracelli, and Graham’s (1989) complementarity and expansion rationales, that is: the need to elaborate, illustrate and clarify “results from one method with the results from the other method” (p. 259); and “extend the breadth and range of inquiry by using different methods for different inquiry components” (p. 259).

3.4.1 Study population and Sample Size

Hard copies of three of the selected papers (Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership) were obtained via subscription. The fourth paper, The Guardian, could not be accessed via subscription, and attempts at obtaining electronic copies of the paper were unsuccessful. The
dataset for The Guardian, was, therefore, directly obtained from the paper’s website – https://guardian.ng/. A keyword search using ‘B’Haram’ (the abbreviated version of Boko Haram); ‘Boko Haram’, ‘Abubakar Shekau’, ‘Darul Tawheed’, and ‘Abu Musab al-Barnawi’ (the known names of Boko Haram leaders) in the hard copy versions of the Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership and the website of The Guardian yielded a combined total of 2,578 articles. Articles mentioning the above keywords (in title or in body) were included in the sample.

Twitter data was obtained using Mozdeh Big Data Text Analysis Software¹ - a program that enables the extraction of live tweets, based on pre-specified keywords in this case: Boko Haram’, ‘B’Haram’, ‘Abubakar Shekau’, ‘Darul Tawheed’, and ‘Abu Musab al-Barnawi’. The software was installed on a personal computer and left to run uninterrupted from January 1 till August 1, 2017, in order to securely capture the specific dates and times of the dataset needed. This data collection process yielded a total of 671,410 tweets, by 121,102 unique Twitter contributors. Of the total number of tweets extracted, 304,216 were original posts, while 367,194 were retweets - an original post repeated and forwarded by another user in order to distribute news (Wasike, 2013, p. 9). Following Jang and Hart (2015), the analysis carried out in this study included retweets as they point to the perceived importance of a particular message. See Figure 3.1 for details on the articles and tweets retrieved per month from each of the selected newspapers and from Twitter.

¹ Mozdeh Big Data Text Analysis Software is available at http://mozdeh.wlv.ac.uk/
The unit of analysis for this study are the articles and tweets (in conjunction with their accompanying images). Whereas the entire population of the newspaper articles (N=2,578) was included in the analysis, a random sampling technique was applied to reduce Twitter data to (n=2,578). This was done to reduce the high volume of tweets from (N=671,410) to a number that could be effectively analysed using the CHCA while being representative. The representative sample was generated using a random sample generator (Microsoft Excel). Taken together, therefore, a concourse of 5,156 articles and tweets (including their accompanying images) were used for the analyses.

There are different types of news images including but not limited to photographs, photomontages, cartoons, caricatures, charts, graphs, maps, logos, and vignettes (Wozniak, Luck & Wessler, 2015, p. 482) and videos. The articles and tweets examined in this study included some of these. In total, 1998 images were incorporated in the investigated texts, made up mainly of photographs, videos, charts, and graphs. Although the analysis of these range of images holds great advantage given the study’s integrative framing approach, only
photographs were analysed for the following reasons. First, photographs were more frequently applied with respect to conversations about Boko Haram across both platforms. As is shown in Table 3.1, more than eighty percent of images accompanying the articles and tweets about Boko Haram were photographs, while less than two percent were charts and graphs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Image</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Photographs</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charts/Graphs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Maps, Logos)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Types of Images in the selected texts

As Figure 3.2 shows, a total of N=1640 photographs were identified in the articles and tweets: The Guardian (n=451), Punch (n=53), Leadership (n=72), Daily Trust (n=81), and Twitter (n=983).

Figure 3.2. Total number of images retrieved from the selected newspapers and Twitter between January and June 2017 (N=1,640).
Second, videos\(^2\) (see example in footnote) were excluded from the analysis since they were only utilised on Twitter and are not applicable in print version of newspapers. Although analysing video content is beneficial within the context of a multimodal analysis, incorporating them in this case would have placed a limit on the extent of comparability between platforms, that is newspapers (print version) and Twitter. Lastly, this study focused on photographs because they are much easier to define and as such are frequently applied in other studies (Matthes, 2007; O’Neil, 2013). All other types of images were excluded. See Figure 3.3 for an example image that was excluded in the analysis carried out in this thesis. This study, therefore, acknowledges the possible limits of focusing on only photographs especially given the array of images available on multimedia platforms. This shortfall, which could impact on the extent of the findings of this study and conclusions reached, can be remedied in future studies.

Figure 3.3. Example of image/chart not included in the analysis carried out in this thesis. DT3. FG to spends N121bn on North-East (Abdallah, 2017, p. 8)

---

\(^2\) Example of Boko Haram related video - https://twitter.com/BABAUNLOCK/status/880140157726412800
A typical case sampling technique (Kemper, Stringfield & Teddlie, 2003, p. 280) was applied to determine the sample size for the MCDA. This technique entailed identifying cluster members “that best illuminated the research question at hand” (p. 280). To do this, individual clusters from the CHCA were closely examined with particular focus on articles and tweets (including their accompanying images) with the highest level of homogenous elements reflecting the identified frames. Care was also taken to exclude data that did not conform to the ethical standards applied in this research. More details about the ethical considerations made in this study is presented in section 3.5.

3.4.2 Modes of Analysis

As earlier mentioned in section 3.4, this study applies a mixed methods approach including a CHCA (Quantitative content analysis) and MCDA (Qualitative content analysis). Details about these modes of analysis are provided in the subsections below.

3.4.2.1 The Computerised Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (CHCA)

A cluster analysis “groups data instances into subsets in such a manner that similar instances are grouped together, while different instances belong to different groups” (Rokack & Maimon, 2005, p. 322), and can be carried out using several methods. For example, Fraley and Raftery (1998) summed the various techniques into two – Partitioning (PCA) and Hierarchical (HCA) methods. The Partitioning approach “relocates instances by moving them from one cluster to another, starting from an initial partitioning” (p. 332), while in the hierarchical method, clusters are assembled by “recursively partitioning the instances in either a top-down or bottom-up fashion” (p. 331). There are also two types of hierarchical cluster analysis: the agglomerative (smaller clusters are grouped into larger sets); and divisive (larger clusters are split into smaller subsets) (Halkidi, Batistakis & Vazirgiannis, 2001).
This study applies the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA) approach. This is mainly because the HCA does not place a restriction on the possible number of clusters that can be identified within a dataset. It, however, offers statistical measures such as the scree plot and agglomeration table that guides but does not impose limits on the suitable number of clusters. Although the Partitioning Cluster Analysis method has the advantage of speedy execution and ease of interpretation (Dhillon & Modha, 2001), its key disadvantage – the pre-selection of the number of partitions/groups - renders it problematic for this study. Predetermining the number of clusters to be produced places a limit on the number of frames that can be identified in the study, which is not so different from criticisms against deductive framing analysis (Matthes & Kohring, 2008).

The agglomerative strand of the HCA (specifically Ward’s method), is selected because it starts out by showing each article or tweet as being unique, while tracing its membership in larger groupings via a Dendrogram – a tree-like diagram that indicates the “nested grouping of objects and similarity levels at which groupings change” (Rokack & Maimon, 2005, p. 331). Apart from the dendrogram, the HCA produces two other outputs that aid in the identification and sense-making of cluster members. The first is the agglomeration schedule, a dataset from which the possible number of clusters can be determined. The second is the table of means and standard deviation, which displays the variables within an extracted cluster.

The CHCA approach applied in this study is conducted following Matthes and Kohring (2008). The CHCA facilitates the inductive extraction of frames but in ways that enhances reliability and validity of the framing process. As the authors argue, using the CHCA, “frames are neither identified beforehand nor directly coded with a single variable” (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 264). David, Atun, Fille and Monterola (2011) assert that the CHCA enables the
Matthes and Kohring (2008) conceptualise “a frame as a certain pattern in a given text that is composed of several elements” (p. 263), which can be identified via a statistical technique – cluster analysis. The patterns examined in this study are based on Entman’s definition of frames as:

> to select some aspect of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

The four elements: problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation, were conceptualised as follows. The problem definition element consisted of Boko Haram, the impact of Boko Haram, and the political actor/actors discussing the group or events that were linked to the group. It was conceptualised under three variables: Actor, Identity, and Impact. These variables were made up of categories such as the main actor in the article, tweet or the accompanying photograph, the actor’s description of Boko Haram, and the impact of Boko Haram. The causal interpretation element responded to the question: who/what is responsible for the problem? (Entman, 1993, p. 52). In other words, who the actors claimed was responsible for the emergence or sustenance of Boko Haram. It also included the person or persons deemed responsible for specific outcomes (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). Two variables were created: Causal Attribution, to describe the parties responsible for the emergence or sustenance of Boko Haram; and Benefit Attribution to describe parties responsible for the gains against the group. The moral evaluation frame element in this study pertained to instances where Boko Haram was linked to religion or its activities described as an expression of faith. This was relevant given Boko Haram as terrorism of the fourth-wave kind - an organisation that applies terrorism as a method, driven by religious motives (Rapoport,
Religion is also a significant identity marker in Nigeria. Lastly, the treatment recommendation element spells out solutions advocated or employed in resolving the Boko Haram conflict. Also note that these variables were applied to images, and involved identifying the primary subjects in accompanying photographs, and noting how the visual icons employed in the photographs could lead to understandings about political actors, the impact of, or solutions to Boko Haram.

The above elements served as the variables in the codebook used in manual content analysis. The coding categories, which were extracted following a multiple reading process of the selected texts, were found to be largely mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and independent; with mean reliability of 0.94, and a range of 0.7 to 1.0 based on Holsti’s formula. The codebook also included other categories that were used to capture basic information about the newspapers, tweets, and photographs. Some of these categories were adopted from the US 1992 Newspaper Content Analysis: Codebook and Coding Instructions (www.cnep.ics.ul.pt, n.d.). See Appendix A for a comprehensive list of frame elements/variables description and categories. Also see Appendix B for the Codebook used in this study. Post coding, binary variables were created for each original variable using SPSS, while only variables with frequencies higher than 5% were included in the cluster analysis (Matthes and Kohring, 2008, p. 268).

Frames were determined by examining the CHCA outputs: The dendrograms, agglomeration schedules and tables of means and standard deviation. Variables with higher and lower mean scores signalled frame elements that were emphasised or de-emphasised respectively and facilitated the naming/labelling and description of frames.

3.4.2.2 The Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA)

While the CHCA was mainly used to extract frames within the dataset, the second data analysis using MCDA was employed to go beyond the snapshot view presented by the
quantitative analysis to illustrate the meaning of the findings (Gibbs, 2008). This secondary analysis involved a thick description of cluster members. It was deemed relevant given the different modes (linguistic and visual) investigated, the presence of research questions that can be best addressed via a qualitative analysis, and the overall aim of this study – understanding the construction of Boko Haram in the media.

MCDA is an offshoot of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), an interpretative, contextual and constructivist approach for analysing media content (Richardson, 2007). The MCDA “involves adopting a critical stance to examine the multi-dimensional construction of meaning, the underlying choices, assumption and biases of such constructions, and the power relations that shape them” (Gibson, Lee & Crabb, 2015, p. 273). Like the CDA, MCDA enables analysts to understand the power relations and ideologies embedded in language-in-use following the traditions of master analysts like Van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, and Ruth Wodak. Additionally, MCDA aids in the investigation of the wider range of semiotic resources utilised in media texts such as photographs, with an objective to understanding how their composite elements contribute to the recontextualisation of societal issues (Machin, 2013, p. 347). The MCDA is, therefore, critical (Berger, 2016) given the emergence of Internet-enabled platforms such as Facebook and Twitter which “tend to be highly multimodal, carrying not so much larger bodies of running text, but texts formed of shorter chunks and integrated with images, lists, and graphics” (Bouvier & Machin, 2018, p. 179).

MCDA is applied in this study to understand how frames are influenced by the internal and external factors that shape media content within the context of frame-building. Richardson (2007) suggests that the analysis of media content be done on three different, but not mutually exclusive levels: textual, discursive, and social practices. Although this approach was designed with respect to newspapers, here it has been adapted for both legacy and social media content with a focus on investigating the textual/visual, discursive and social practices applied with
respect to the construction of Boko Haram on the selected platforms. This is because, even though both platforms differ, they currently function as important daises for political communication and to that extent can shape public understanding and policies about Boko Haram. As is also vividly detailed in chapter two (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), legacy and social media platforms share similar internal and external logics. This is with particular reference to the dominance of elite sources, the role of images, and the relevance of news values even though these elites, images and news values differ in certain respects. Content on both platforms also abide by a commercial logic. Thus, like legacy media, nonmainstream platforms are subject to the “macro/political/industrial and local communicative notions of power” (KhosraviNik, 2017, p. 583) at play in traditional media. It is, however, important to emphasise that the textual/visual, discursive, and social practices layers of analysis are complementary and thus, “difficult to disentangle’ (Richardson, 2007, p. 1).

Richardson’s (2007) textual analysis involves the analysis of words used in the media, with particular focus on how people are named or referenced, the choice of words used to describe their qualities (predication), the degree of truth statements made by speakers/writers (modality), and the role of rhetorical tropes such as hyperbole, metaphor, neologism, and pun. In this study, this layer was reconceptualised as linguistic and visual level analysis. The Linguistic analysis embodied Richardson’s (2007) textual level analysis, that is, how people/actors in the Boko Haram discourse are named or referenced; the choice of words used to describe their qualities (predication); and the degree of truth statements made by speakers/writers (modality).

The Visual analysis relied on Machin’s (2007) social semiotic approach to visual communication. Machin’s work was developed from Kress and Van Leeuwen’s (1996) study, which provides a set of tools for the analysis of visual compositions (Machin, 2007, p. viii). This approach enables analysts to examine the denotative and connotative meanings of images as
well as understand how the composite elements of images function to create meaning. As Van Leeuwen (2005) argues, semiotic resources have “meaning potential” acquired from standardised and contextual applications (pp. 3-6). Following Machin’s (2007) approach, the visual analysis in this study entailed understanding the denotative (literal) and connotative (hidden) meaning of photographs. Images are specifically investigated in terms of visual elements such as Pose (the bodily position adopted by actors in a photograph); Objects carried by photo subjects or seen in the photograph; Setting (the location of the photograph); and Participants/Actors (photo subjects) (pp. 27-38). The analysis also included how political actors were represented in the images in terms of Gaze (whether actors were looking at the viewer, thereby establishing symbolic contact or not); Angle of Interaction (horizontal or vertical); Distance (camera angles—close, medium or long shot); Classification (whether actors are individualised, collectivised or excluded); and Agency (the types of roles actors play in images). Types of agentic action include: Material, Behavioural, Mental, Verbal, Relational or Existential (pp. 109-124). Images were also examined in terms of Modality, that is, how true visual representations should be taken. Analysing the modality of photographs included understanding whether images ranked high or low. Whereas high modality photographs “reflects what we would have seen had we been there” (Machin, 2007, p. 46), low modality images do not. Modality is also marked by the following: the degree of articulation of detail, articulation of background, depth, illumination, tone, and colour modulation, saturation, and differentiation (pp. 49 – 56). It is important to emphasise here that as this is not a production study, the textual (linguistic) and visual layers of analyses carried out in this study were limited to how texts appeared in the selected newspapers and on Twitter. The analysis does not, therefore, draw on issues relating to access or lack of access to key actors/images, for instance.

The analysis of the discursive practices of news organisations is an inquiry into how media texts are produced and consumed on the respective platforms. It explores “how authors
of texts draw on already existing discourses and genres to create a new text and how receivers of texts also apply available discourses and genres in the consumption and interpretation of the texts” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 69). In this study, the discursive practices layer of analysis involved investigating the impact of the internal logic of platforms, that is, the values, routines and norms of legacy media; the four principles of social media logic including “programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication” (van Dijck & Poell, 2013, p. 2); and the affordances of social media/Twitter such as visibility, anonymity, persistence, editability and networked association; in the identified of frames.

Finally, the social practices layer of analysis according to Richardson (2007) involves exploring how external influences [market, ownership, advertising, government, law, religious beliefs] shape media content. In addition to these factors, this phase of the analysis also addressed how the nature of the Nigerian state, its media ecology, and other global factors may have shaped the extracted frames.

These complementary layers of analysis provided answers for the roles of the norms, logic and affordances of the respective platforms, and the influence of the Nigerian state and media ecology in the location of frames.

3.5 Ethical considerations
Although some social scientists deem the increased regulation of research that does not involve direct involvement with human participants as unwarranted (Atkinson, 2009; Dingwall, 2008; Hammersley, 2009); ethical reviews have increasingly become the standard. Thus, while the present study does not involve direct engagement with people, the subject of study – terrorism/Boko Haram, is a complex and sensitive topic that is of both national and international interest. This calls for caution on the part of researchers who investigate issues pertaining to terrorism. This study, however, does not involve direct contact with terrorists and
this, to a great extent reduces potential harm to the researcher. However, the types of data utilised in this study warrants deep reflection on ethics.

To understand the construction of Boko Haram in the media, this study relies on two primary data sources: newspapers and Twitter. Both datasets are available in the public domain, and as such do not qualify as human data according to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, 2005). However, there are standard requirements in place such as “properly identified provenance” (Hand, 2018, p. 185), when using document sources like newspapers. Therefore, throughout this study, the selected papers have been clearly named, while excerpts from each newspaper are properly cited and referenced.

Unlike newspapers, the use and distribution of Twitter data, raises a range of ethical challenges (Fiesler & Proferes, 2018). The challenges are centered on some of the fundamental principles of research ethics including informed consent, anonymisation, the minimisation of harm, and whether social media data should be regarded as private or public (Samuel et al., 2018, p. 452; Webb et al. 2017; Townsend & Wallace, n.d.). While there has been calls for the expansion of research categories from text and human subject research to include ‘data subject research’ (Samuel et al., 2018, p. 453), researchers are yet to reach a consensus on how to address the ethical challenges of social media data use. Following this, regarding the management of Twitter data, “including the publication of specific posts” (Webb et al., 2017, p. 342), for instance, scholars have had to adopt one of two main ethical postures: a Universalist or situated stance. The Universalist approach states that where consent is not obtained and anonymity assured; research must not be published, while situationists are less rigid and put into consideration other contextual factors like the nature of the research in deciding whether or not to publish posts. This study adopts the situationist perspective.
Twitter is selected for this study because it has emerged an important vehicle for political communication. In addition, the platform’s open Application Programming Interface (API) allows for the retrieval of large volumes of researchable data. Twitter’s Terms of Service states the following:

By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same (Twitter Terms of Service, 2018, para. 9).

As Twitter data is public as reflected in the above quote, consent in this study is taken-for-granted based on users’ acceptance of the above terms of service. This is especially because, directly obtaining consent from the large number of users on Twitter will be both labourious and even invasive (Webb at al., 2017).

Anonymisation of Twitter data and protecting Tweeters from harm are also quite challenging. Although Twitter affords the use of aliases and sobriquets, which means user profiles may not be a true representation of their identity, the real identities of users may be uncovered using the platform’s Advanced Search feature. This feature grants access to users’ meta-data, rendering users susceptible to harm. However, Evans, Ginnis, and Bartlett (2015) note that compared to other social media platforms, Tweeters are less concerned about the distribution of their tweets owing to their knowledge about the nature of the platform. But as a result of the sensitive nature of this study, usernames (except where necessary), and photographs of identifiable or recognisable children have been excluded. While this does not amount to complete anonymisation, it at least makes identification of users less easy.
In addition to the above steps, throughout this study, standard measures of research integrity are applied including in-text citation, referencing and the avoidance of plagiarism.

3.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has provided relevant information about the methodological steps taken in this research. The total of 5,156 articles and tweets and their accompanying images are investigated via a mixed methods approach using quantitative (CHCA) and qualitative (MCDA) content analysis. The CHCA is instrumental for the location of frames, while the MCDA goes beyond the descriptive accounts offered by the CHCA to illustrate the meaning and implication of the findings. The adoption of a mixed methods approach is guided by the pragmatic philosophical stance taken in this research.

The next chapter presents findings from the quantitative analysis and responds to the question: What integrative frames are employed in the representation of Boko Haram in the selected Nigerian national newspapers and on Twitter?
CHAPTER FOUR - FRAMES IN THE SELECTED NEWSPAPERS AND ON TWITTER

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings for the first research question: What integrative frames are employed in the representation of Boko Haram in Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter? Integrative frames are frames that are identified from the combined analysis of words and images in media texts (Coleman, 2010, p. 235; Dan, 2018). As is explained in the methodology chapter (see section 3.4), the first research question is answered using Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) Computer-assisted Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (CHCA) approach. Although frames can be located via different methods, the CHCA is adopted because it enables the inductive location of frames in ways that contribute to the reliability and validity of framing. Taken together, the CHCA of the studied platforms enabled the identification of a total of six frames including the Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, Attribution of Responsibility, Religious Polarisation, and Economic Consequences frames. These conceptual tools are used in the construction of Boko Haram in the selected Nigerian national newspapers (The Guardian, Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership) and on Twitter between January and June 2017.

This fourth chapter is subdivided into three parts: summary and illustration of the CHCA, description of identified frames and a chapter summary.

4.2 Summary of the Computer-assisted Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (CHCA)

The integrative frames in this study are identified with the aid of Computer-assisted Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (CHCA). Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis method within the content analysis tradition, used for organising data into meaningful structures. The specific approach applied here is adapted from Matthes and Kohring (2008), who argue “that previously defined frame elements systematically group together in a specific way. This pattern
of frame elements can be identified across several texts by means of cluster analysis" (p. 258).

Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) CHCA begins with the operationalisation of the four frame elements in Entman’s (1993) definition of frames: problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation (p. 52); followed by the creation of variables for each of the frame elements. As previously stated in chapter two (see section 2.4.1), Entman’s definition of frames offers “precise operational guidelines” for conducting this type of analysis (Matthes, 2009, p. 300) since it delineates the functions of frames. Drawing on Entman’s frame parameters is preferred in this study because it enables analysts “draw clearer measurements and inferences that distinguish framing from themes, arguments, assertions, and other under-theorised concepts” (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009, p. 176). These provided the grounds for the adoption of Entman’s definition of frames in this study. The frame elements are then coded using content analysis, and subsequently “analysed for cluster or co-occurrences of frame elements in the media content” (David, Atun, Fille & Monterola, 2011, p. 332).

Figure 4.1. Total number of articles/tweets in contrast to the articles/tweets used in the cluster analysis

In this study, for articles and tweets to qualify for inclusion in the CHCA, they had to contain at least one of the frame elements, that is, problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation. This means that the method (CHCA)
shaped the analysed data and as such shaped the types of frames identified in this study. Articles and tweets where Boko Haram and the other keywords (B’Haram, Abubakar Shekau, Darul Tawheed and Abu Musab al-Barnawi) were simply mentioned were filtered out. In addition, tweets that did not contain the keywords but were added to the Twitter dataset due to technical/software glitches were precluded from the CHCA. For example, the following articles titled: FG issues warning over possible terror attacks; Governors of the year 2016: Senator Mohammad Bindow; and A fan once grabbed my boobs – Kyrian Adokiye – were not included in the analysis because they only alluded to but did not express any clear opinion about Boko Haram. These tweets were also excluded for the same reason: “RT @Nwankpa_A: With @NePcni’s @alkayy at @CanHCNigeria for launch of International Crisis Group’s reports on Boko Haram and Lake Chad Basin…”, “RT @OkugboF: @Oddy4real @thecableng including foreign media like CNN and Co that ran daily coverage of Boko Haram during GEJ”. Other tweets that did not contain the keywords but were added to the dataset due to technical/software glitches were also precluded from the CHCA. For example: “RT @julietkego: @MrFixNigeria @Papadonkee @oraekene @toyosilagos @kingysly_01 @bilsal @segalink @Piusobansa @topeatiba @4eyedmonk”, “RT @ninaandtito: @kylegriffin1 announced same day as this NYT article. https://t.co/IB3l3iTYFi”, and “RT @ElielLucero: @TASKvsTheWorld @RandyS0725 @3BlackGeeks @MTFIII @PhilDL616 @IVWall @WeaponXKP21 @CJTheArchitect Ava DuVernay di”. Thus, while the study population for this research consisted of a concourse of 5,156 articles and tweets, only 3,350 (1,777 articles; 1,573 tweets) qualified for inclusion in the cluster analysis as is depicted in Figure 4.1. Taken together, therefore, about sixty-five percent of the texts qualified for inclusion in the CHCA. This reduction can on the one hand be ascribed to the previously outlined criteria for inclusion in the CHCA – only articles and tweets that contained at least one of the frame elements (problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation) are used in
the CHCA. The number of tweets that were used in the CHCA can also be explained in terms of the types of content that are allowable on Twitter owing to the platform’s features and affordances.

From the data in Figure 4.1, it is apparent that more Boko Haram-related articles were published in the northern papers (Daily Trust and Leadership, n=1,549 of 2,578; 60%) compared to those published in the southern papers (The Guardian and Punch, n=1,029 of 2,578; about 40%). However, a larger percentage of the southern papers (The Guardian and Punch, n=840 of 1,029; 81%) qualified for inclusion in the CHCA. This is a clear indication that more attempts are made at framing Boko Haram in the southern than in the northern papers. The chart also shows that a fewer number of tweets (n=61%) adhered to the criteria for inclusion in the CHCA compared to the legacy texts (n=69%). This, therefore, means that more efforts at framing Boko Haram are made in the selected Nigerian national newspapers – the Daily Trust, Leadership, The Guardian, and Punch than on Twitter.

Post coding, the 3,350 articles and tweets that qualified for inclusion, were then analysed using SPSS-enabled cluster analysis. As is detailed in chapter three, the decision on the appropriate number of clusters/frames was reached by examining the following SPSS outputs: dendrogram - a tree-like diagram that indicates the “nested grouping of objects and similarity levels at which groupings change” (Rokack & Maimon, 2005, p. 331); agglomeration schedule - a dataset from which the possible number of clusters can be determined; and the table of means - which displays the variables within an extracted cluster/frame (see section 3.4.1). Variables with higher means indicate the frame elements that were given more salience, while the lower mean values represent frame elements that were given lesser prominence in the articles or tweets. The above steps enabled the identification of a total of six legacy and networked/hybrid frames. The frames are labelled as follows: Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, Attribution of Responsibility, Religious Polarisation,
and Economic Consequences. Each of these frames are described in more detail below. But first, an illustration of how the CHCA was applied to determine frames in one of the newspapers used in this study (Daily Trust) is presented in the next section. It is carried out using data retrieved for the month of January. The steps applied here were then replicated for the other studied outlets/platforms and for the entire six-month study period.

4.2.1 Boko Haram frames in the Daily Trust’s January articles

Of the 160 articles retrieved from the Daily Trust in the month of January (see Figure 3.1), only seventy-eight met the criterion for inclusion in the CHCA. Using SPSS, these articles were analysed for the co-occurrence of variables derived from the four frame elements, problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation. The CHCA produced three outputs. The first was the agglomeration schedule (see Table 4.1), which aided the determination of the suitable number of clusters/frames.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Cluster Combined</th>
<th>Stage Cluster First Appears</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
<td>Cluster 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.1. Agglomeration schedule for the clustered articles from the *Daily Trust* Nigerian newspaper

The Agglomeration schedule coefficient represents the amount of heterogeneity observed in the cluster analysis. Since the goal of a cluster analysis is to identify homogeneous frame elements, it is important to note how different the individual clusters are. This can be determined by observing the point where there is a remarkable difference in the coefficient value. As can be seen from Table 4.1, the point with the most significant difference in the coefficient values begins at Stage 75 (see the point marked with a blue arrow). For example, the difference in the coefficient values between stages 69 and 68 is approximately 5, while for 74 and 73, is 8. However, the difference from stage 75 begins to widen significantly. This means that the most likely meaningful solution is a three-cluster solution, as the most change in coefficient value begins at stage 75 and there are a total number of 78 cases/articles, that is, 78-75. This solution can be further delineated from the dendrogram, which is the second CHCA output. The dendrogram as is shown in Figure 4.2, presents a visual display of the
articles’ hierarchical linkage. The Figure shows how articles with higher levels of similarity in terms of the ways Boko Haram is framed with respect to problem definition, causal interpretation, benefit attribution, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation are grouped together at different levels. For example, the articles labelled DT 43, 155 and 42 (see the group of articles in cluster 1) are more similar than DT 33, 117, 29 (see the group of articles in cluster 1); and articles DT 43, 155, 42, 33, 117 and 29 are more closely linked than DT 52 and 144 (see cluster 1). This also means that all the previously mentioned DT articles contain more homogeneous elements than DT 111, 152, 25, 41 and 35 (see cluster 2) based on the distance between both sets of articles.³

³ Please note that throughout this chapter: DT= Daily Trust; L=Leadership; G=Guardian, P=Punch, T=Tweets. In addition, where hyperlinks are included as part of the tweets, they are replaced with the word “link” in the analysis since the analysis is limited to content found on Twitter.
Figure 4.2: Dendrogram of Daily Trust January articles extracted from SPSS output.
### Table 4.2: Table of means for articles used in the cluster analysis for the Daily Trust January Publication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>Problem Definition</th>
<th>Causal Attribution</th>
<th>Benefit Attribution</th>
<th>Religious Polarisation</th>
<th>TR</th>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Cluster</td>
<td>Wards’ Method</td>
<td>TR</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Economic Impact</td>
<td>Social Impact</td>
<td>Jonathan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Cluster</td>
<td>Wards’ Method</td>
<td>TR</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Economic Impact</td>
<td>Social Impact</td>
<td>Jonathan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cluster</td>
<td>Wards’ Method</td>
<td>TR</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Economic Impact</td>
<td>Social Impact</td>
<td>Jonathan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Wards’ Method</td>
<td>TR</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Economic Impact</td>
<td>Social Impact</td>
<td>Jonathan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
- TR = Treatment Recommendation
- M = Mean of variables
- N = Number of articles per cluster
- S = Standard Deviation of variables
Table 4.2 shows the last output from the CHCA – the table of means for the variables included in the cluster analysis. These variables had a frequency of at least five percent, which is the basic standard for inclusion in the CHCA using Ward’s method. Variables with higher means indicate the frame elements that are given more salience, while the lower mean values represent frame elements that are given lesser prominence in the articles.

As Table 4.2 shows, the largest cluster (see 1st cluster) consists of thirty-seven articles. Within this cluster, the variable with the highest mean value is the social impact variable \((M=0.27)\). The articles in the collection emphasise the impact of the activities/attacks by Boko Haram on the lives of victims. A closer examination of some of the cluster members supports this finding. For instance, the article coded DT 135 is a story about the five-year closure of the National Youths Service Corps (NYSC) camps due to attacks by Boko Haram. The NYSC scheme was set up in 1973 by the Nigerian government to foster unity and integration by sending university graduates to experience life in different parts of the country. Like DT 135, DT 155 and 144 also underscore the social impact of Boko Haram by detailing the plight of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the traumatic experience of child soldiers forcefully recruited by Boko Haram, respectively. This cluster of articles is labelled the Social Consequences frame since the articles mostly place salience on how Boko Haram is disrupting Nigeria’s social status quo. Although the social consequence frame is popular within the framing literature (Okoro & Odoemelam, 2013; Yousaf, 2015), in this study, it is inductively generated based on the prominence of the social impact frame element/variable in the articles in this cluster.

Table 4.2 also indicates that the second-largest cluster contains twenty-five articles (see the 2nd cluster). This collection of articles emphasise the economic impact
of Boko Haram (M=0.26) on the Nigerian state, but particularly on the country's northeastern population, where the impact of the group’s onslaughts is pervasive. This cluster is called the Economic Consequences frame. The articles detail steps taken by the Buhari administration (M=0.24) and the federal government (M=0.96) in addressing the economic cost of Boko Haram. For example, article DT 147 is a story about the amount of money - N121 billion naira (approx. £261 million) projected by the federal government for the rehabilitation of the northeast following incessant attacks by Boko Haram. Although the political actors in the Daily Trust do not hold ex-President Goodluck Jonathan (M=0.16) responsible for the emergence of the sect, Jonathan is, however, blamed for failing to contain the proliferation of Boko Haram. The Economic Consequences frame is popular within the framing literature and is usually classified as a generic-type frame (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). But here it is inductively produced owing to the emphasis on the economic impact of Boko Haram in the articles in this cluster.

The last cluster to be identified based on the CHCA contains sixteen stories as is displayed in Table 4.2 (see 3rd cluster). It is designated War against Boko Haram frame because the articles in this cluster underscore the achievements of the Nigerian military, especially their efforts at combating Boko Haram (M=0.37). In these articles, the military is portrayed as heroes and champions, while Boko Haram is depicted as the villain/enemy. A majority of the accounts included in the articles in this cluster are provided by members of the Nigerian military (M= 1.00). For instance, Lieutenant General Tukur Y. Buratai, the 26th Chief of Army Staff of Nigeria, and chief commandant of the counterattack against Boko Haram, in an interview featured in DT 75, provides a vivid description of Sambisa forest and Camp Zero. He also renders a theatrical account of the journey into Nigeria’s former game reserve, an area, which had been seized by
Boko Haram and transformed into a staging area by the group, but later reoccupied by the Nigerian military. Additionally, some of the articles in this collection hold details about the army’s strategies and achievements in the on-going war effort, while others highlight political actors’ support for Nigeria’s military-centric counter-Boko Haram strategy (M=0.50).

Based on the foregoing, the dominant frame in the *Daily Trust* newspaper for the month of January is the Social Consequence frame since it is the most frequently applied frame (n=37) in the investigated texts. Also, while more salience is placed on the social and economic impact of the group on the Nigerian state as well as the preferred solution to the Boko Haram problem, the *Daily Trust* de-emphasised other elements or variables relating to the identity or the moral evaluation of the group. Furthermore, while several parties had the opportunity to express their opinion about Boko Haram, the key actors in the discourse are the Nigerian military (1.00) and the Federal government (0.96). While the federal government highlighted the social ills of Boko Haram especially in the northeast, the military recounted gains against the insurgents and are repeatedly celebrated as victors on the pages of the paper. Even in instances of military failure such as the botched Rann bombing (airstrike against Boko Haram that resulted in the death of more than 200 IDPs), the *Daily Trust*, while sympathising with the victims of the accident, still encouraged its readers to show understanding and continued support for the military.

The steps applied in the CHCA of the *Daily Trust’s* January articles were replicated for the entire dataset. In total, with the aid of the CHCH five legacy frames were identified: Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, Economic Consequences, Religious Polarisation, and War against Women. These conceptual tools were used to construct Boko Haram in *The Guardian, Punch, Daily Trust* and
Leadership Nigerian national newspapers. The CHCA also produced five networked/Twitter frames including War against Women, War against Boko Haram, Social Consequences, Attribution of Responsibility and Religious Polarisation. These frames account for the combined sum of six frames - Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, Attribution of Responsibility, Religious Polarisation, and Economic Consequences - identified in this research.

![Figure 4.3. Breakdown of identified frames in the selected outlets/platforms](image)

The results obtained using the CHCA is summarised in Figure 4.3. Although there are similarities in the frames employed in the respective newspaper outlets, the findings indicate that the southern papers (*The Guardian* and *Punch*) applied a broader range of frames in the construction of Boko Haram than the northern papers (*Daily Trust* and *Leadership*). Whereas *The Guardian* and the *Punch* used four frames each, the *Daily Trust* applied three, while the least number of frames were employed in the *Leadership* newspaper.
As can also be delineated from Figure 4.3, the Social Consequences and the War against Women frames are the dominant frames in the selected newspapers and on Twitter, respectively. This is because these frames are visible in the highest number of articles (n=902) and tweets (n=750). The War against Boko Haram is the second most frequently applied frame on both platforms.

This study takes the development of frames overtime into account as it sets the identified frames in their media and political contexts. This is based on the
understanding that some of the events that occurred within the study period are crucial to the application and identification of the frames.

The stacked area chart in Figure 4.4 shows the overall development in the frames in the selected papers between January and June 2017. Whereas the Social Consequences and War against Boko Haram frames are visible throughout the six-month period, the Religious Polarisation frame appears in the months of January, February, and May; and the Economic Consequences frame occurs in January and June. However, the War against Women frame is only visible in the month of April.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames/Months</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Against Women</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>182</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Against Boko Haram</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Consequences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>163</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribution of Responsibility</td>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Polarisation</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures 4.5. Stacked area chart of frames on Twitter per month

As is also shown in the stacked area chart in Figure 4.5, on Twitter, the War against Boko Haram frame is visible for a cumulative period of five months, while the War against Women occurs in the months of January, February, May, and June. The
Attribution of Responsibility and Religious Polarisation frames are present in only the months of May and February, respectively.

The above trends point to the need to consider the context of the frames as the appearance of certain frames are connected to some of the Boko Haram-related media events that occurred within the period of study. The events include the 2017 New Year speech and the Rann Bombing in the month of January; as well as the anniversary of the Chibok girls, and the release of eighty-two Chibok girls in the months of April and May, respectively. These events and their significance in terms of the extracted frames are discussed in more detail in the next two chapters.

4.3 Description of Frames

Of the total of six frames identified in this study, that is, Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, Attribution of Responsibility, Religious Polarisation, and Economic Consequences, four (Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, and Religious Polarisation) are visible in the selected newspapers and on Twitter. In this study, these four co-occurring conceptual tools are called the Echo frames. The two other frames (Attribution of Responsibility and Economic Consequences) are unique to Twitter, and the Punch and Daily Trust newspapers, respectively. They are referred to as the Outlier frames. A descriptive summary of each frame is presented in sections 4.3.1 – 4.3.6.

4.3.1 Social Consequences Frame

The Social Consequences frame is the most dominant conceptual tool applied in the representation of Boko Haram in the investigated texts during the six-month period of this study, that is, January to June 2017. Political actors vested in the Boko Haram discourse apply the Social Consequences frame to underscore the negative impact of the group on the life and welfare of people in the Lake Chad Basin Countries (LCBCs), especially people in northeastern Nigeria.
The Social Consequences frame as described in this study can be compared to Neuman, Just and Crigler’s (1992) human impact frame or Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) human interest frame. The human-interest frame according to Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) “brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem […] refers to an effort to personalise the news, dramatise or ‘emotionalise’ the news, in order to capture and retain audience interest” (p. 95).

The Social Consequences frame is also classified as generic, that is, a type of conceptual tool that “transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics, some even over time and in different cultural contexts” (Vreese, 2005a, p. 54). However, in this study, it is inductively extracted using the CHCA, which enables the identification of dominant frame elements within texts. For example, the articles and tweets in the Social Consequences cluster emphasise the social impact of Boko Haram as expressed in the different details about deaths, displacements, kidnappings, bombings, rape, and a large-scale humanitarian crisis attributed to the group. This is illustrated in the below excerpt from the *Punch* newspaper:

> After eight years of its campaign, the North-east has become a massive graveyard. According to Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State, Boko Haram has killed 100,000 people and left 2.1 million others internally displaced, just as it has orphaned 52,311 children and produced 54,911 widows (P1).

In the above quote, Boko Haram is deemed responsible for the death of 100,000 people, the displacement of over two million persons, and for rendering over 100,000 children and women, orphans, and widows.

On Twitter, the broader description of the social malaise ascribed to Boko Haram is supplemented by individualised accounts of the social impact of the group on direct and indirect victims/casualties as seen in the following tweets:
The specific logic and affordances of Twitter as a political communication platform and the ways in which it shapes the nature of this frame are examined in chapters five and six of this research.

The articles and tweets in this cluster are accompanied by photographs of mostly women and children who are visually depicted as the most vulnerable victims of Boko Haram. For instance, in Figure 4.4, Boko Haram is held responsible for the absence/death of Yagana’s husband, and breadwinner of the family in the attached photograph. The image (family portrait) is of four participants—Yagana and her three sons.
The above references to people killed, displaced, orphaned, widowed, or impregnated by Boko Haram reflect how activities associated with the group affect the lives of everyday people (Yousaf, 2015; Okoro & Odoemelam, 2013). They also serve as representations of Boko Haram’s disruptive role across the LCBCs, especially Nigeria, thereby communicating the seriousness of and danger posed by the Boko Haram problem. Framing Boko Haram in terms of the group’s social impact can, therefore, trigger both psychological and emotional responses such as anger and sympathy among readers and viewers. It can also inspire calls for action among the targeted audiences of the different newspaper outlets as well as the networked audience on Twitter. Additionally, audience responses could inspire the formulation of policies and provide justification for governmental action (Bradley, Codispoty, Cuthbert & Lang, 2001; Iyer & Oldmeador, 2006).

While the CHCA has enabled the identification of the Social Consequences frame, it does not provide explanations about the specific context of the frame especially in terms of the internal logic of platforms and the possible impact of the nature of the Nigerian state and its media ecology. These aspects are examined in chapter five.

4.3.2 War against Boko Haram Frame

The War against Boko Haram frame is the second most prevalent conceptual tool utilised by political actors to make sense of Boko Haram. Political actors on both platforms employ this frame to emphasise the existence of on-going military conflict in the Lake Chad Basin region as well as report on Nigeria’s specific response to attacks by Boko Haram. For instance, most of the 1,017 articles and tweets in this collection include war-related words such as war, war on terror, war against Boko Haram, battle, victory, troop, military, arms, neutralize, killing, fight, target, capture, operation, strategy,
attack, weapon, commander, officer. Some of the articles and tweets in this collection are also accompanied by visual representations of warfare and its activities (Griffin, 2010, p. 36) such as photographs of soldiers, battle fatigues, weapons, suicide vests, gory images, parades, and victory and battle scenes. This is exemplified in Figure 4.7, which shows a group of mostly men dressed in camouflage – a combat outfit typically worn by the military but has also become a fashion statement for “coolness or badassness” (Tayo, 2016, para. 6).

Figure 4.7. G2. Boko Haram war in the North East (Abuh & Musa, 2017)

The on-going conflict described in the articles and tweets involves at least two parties. On the one hand, is Boko Haram, frequently referred to as terrorists, insurgents, the opposing force, and an enemy force that has engaged Nigeria in unconventional warfare, by employing violent techniques like killing, kidnapping, and suicide bombing for a decade. On the other hand, is the Nigerian security agents, including the Army, Air Force, Police and other military, paramilitary and security organisations, who are described as a legitimate and organised force, reacting to attacks by Boko Haram by
applying a military-centric counterinsurgency strategy. This approach to resolving the Boko Haram problem is reflective of the global struggle against persons labelled terrorists, which is mostly fought militarily by the armed forces and intelligence agencies (Oyewole, 2013).

Although the framing of Boko Haram in the context of war is a commonly adopted stance on the respective outlets/platforms, there are, however, slight nuances with respect to the newspapers’ positioning on the state of the war. This is especially with regards to the significance of the so-called Sambisa victory – a December 2016 Nigerian military campaign that had led to the ouster of Boko Haram from Sambisa. As previously mentioned in chapter two (see section 2.2.3), Sambisa is a former game reserve in Borno State that had been converted into a residence and staging area by Boko Haram. While the northern papers depict Nigeria as winning the war, the southern papers are more pessimistic about the state of the conflict and the implication of the Sambisa victory. On Twitter, however, the War against Boko Haram frame is used to emphasise the internecine outcome of the conflict as evidenced in the incidental casualties recorded by the belligerents. The difference in the application of the War against Boko Haram frame is a testament to the intra- and inter-media differences associated with framing. This finding is explored in more detail in the next chapter.

4.3.3 War against Women Frame

The War against Women frame makes a point of Boko Haram’s deployment of sexual and gender-based violence targeted at women and girls - who are identified as the principal victims of the sect. While visible in only one of the selected papers (The Guardian, n=36), this frame is the most frequently applied conceptual tool on Twitter (n=750) as shown in Figure 4.8.
The War against Women cluster holds three distinct narratives. The first pertains to narratives of Boko Haram’s abduction, kidnap, rape, and displacement of women from their homes and communities. The below extract from *The Guardian* serves as an example.

A member of Civilian JTF, Tanko Dahiru has said suspected Boko Haram gunmen, in a convoy of pickup trucks, attacked Pulka village in Borno State, kidnapping 18 girls and four women, ... the women were “forcefully bundled” into waiting pickup trucks from their makeshift huts “...They arrived in pickup vans around 6:00am and seized 14 of our young girls aged 17 and below....the abducted girls are likely to end up as brides to some of the insurgents (G4, para. 1-2, 5)

In the above quote, Boko Haram is depicted as deliberately targeting women and girls who are characterised as kidnapped, forcefully bundled, seized, and abducted.

On Twitter, this first category of War against Women narratives is expressed in terms of tweets about women and girls who had been held captive, escaped from, or used as suicide bombers by Boko Haram. Examples include “RT @Sumner_Sambo: JUST IN: Boko Haram kills two, abducts three school girls in a fresh attack on a village at Madagali Local Govt. Area of...” (T13); “UPDATE: Boko Haram Kidnap 7 Women, Kill
3”, “Boko Haram hire teenage girl for suicide mission for 40p (link) #BokoHaram #Nigerianpolice #Nigeria #Africa #AlShabab #ISIS” (T14); and “RT @nytopinion: "I felt like a living ghost," Dada, a 14 year-old abducted by Boko Haram, tells photographer Stephanie Sinclair. (link)” (T15).

The second set of narratives focus on the suffering of women and girls in IDP camps, an indication that the abuse and suffering of women extend beyond their physical interaction with members of Boko Haram. Typical tweets in this category are: “Boko Haram: Women sell sex to survive in Lake Chad –Red Cross (link)” (T17); and “Nigerian soldiers fighting Boko Haram in the North East reportedly impregnate and abandon teenagers (link)” (T18).

The last set of narratives are about the Chibok girls - a group of 276 Chibok secondary school students who were abducted from their dormitory on the night of 14 April 2014 by Boko Haram. Although Boko Haram had carried out other significant attacks in the past, including the bombing of the UN House in Abuja, the Chibok kidnap event transported the group from a local concern to global notoriety and recognition. The Nigerian government’s poor handling of the Chibok girls kidnap in 2014 triggered a Twitter campaign tagged #BringBackOurGirls (BBOG), which quickly evolved into a global movement, aimed at drawing attention to the plight of the girls. The BBOG has since its launch in 2014, become an interest/advocacy group dedicated to the release of the kidnapped Chibok girls and the security of the Nigerian state (bringbackourgirls.ng, 2014). BBOG’s activism is mainly expressed through daily protests at the Unity Fountain, Abuja, Nigeria; and “tally of the number of days since the girls had been abducted” (Matfess, 2017, p. 74). On May 7, 2017, eighty-two of the Chibok girls were released following negotiations with Boko Haram, bringing the total number of released girls to 103 (BBC News, 2017). As Figure 4.9 shows, the highest number of tweets
about Boko Haram within the study period occurred on 7 May 2017, the day the girls were released. The explanation for this surge in tweets in discussed in chapter five.

Figure 4.9. Tweets per day from January to June 2017

The War against women and Social Consequences frame are quite similar especially in terms of highlighting the negative impact of Boko Haram. However, while the Social Consequences frame captures the adverse effect of Boko Haram on a wider range of victims and casualties including children, men, and women; the War against Women emphasises Boko Haram’s gendered violence, primarily targeted at women and girls.

4.3.4 Attribution of Responsibility Frame

The fourth cluster extracted via the CHCA consists of 230 tweets, where President Buhari is lauded for his efforts at suppressing Boko Haram and is, therefore, labelled the Attribution of Responsibility frame. The Attribution of Responsibility according to Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), is “a way of attributing responsibility for [a] cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group” (p. 96). Although it is classified as a generic frame, in this study the Attribution of Responsibility frame is inductively generated. Following Matthes and Kohring (2008), two variables capture the causal interpretation frame element: causal attribution and benefit attribution (see section 3.4.2.1). The causal attribution element refers to persons or institutions deemed responsible for the emergence or sustenance of Boko Haram, while the benefit
attribution refers to those who are credited with curbing the proliferation, influence, and capacity of Boko Haram to execute attacks or acquire territories. The tweets in this cluster reflect the benefit attribution aspect since Tweeters emphasise President Buhari’s role in curbing the actions of Boko Haram. Examples of tweets in this cluster include: “#Nigeria #news - RE: #BokoHaram defeat: Saraki hails #Buhari (link)” (T44); “BREAKING: 80 Kidnapped Chibok Girls freed by Boko Haram after negotiation with Buhari’s administration Read more: (link)” (T45); “80 Kidnapped Chibok Girls Freed By Boko Haram. Buhari govt is working” (T46); “@NTAGMN The biggest success story of the Buhari administration is the degrading of Boko Haram terrorists (link) (T47).

Although the War against Boko Haram frame highlights President Buhari’s impact on the conflict with Boko Haram, the Attribution of Responsibility frame is particularly distinguished by the timing of its application, May 2017, which marks the president’s second year-in-office anniversary. The frame can, therefore, also be described as a conceptual tool utilised to evaluate the Boko Haram conflict under the Buhari administration and thus, used as a means to express support or disapproval for the Buhari administration. For instance, for some, Buhari’s gains over Boko Haram is his only achievement after two years in office – T48: “@MusadiqZ @Omojuwa The only achievement the Buhari administration can lay hold of is their attack on Boko Haram and (link)”.

But for others, it is a fulfillment of a campaign promise as seen in this tweet – T49: “Breaking: Boko Haram frees 80 more Chibok girls..... ALHAMDULILLAH... Kudos to PMB promised fulfilled”.

In this study, the Attribution of Responsibility frame is only visible on Twitter and as such is labelled an Outlier frame. This outcome is explained in terms of the logic and affordances of Twitter in chapter six of this thesis.
4.3.5 Religious Polarisation Frame

The Religious Polarisation frame like the Social Consequences is a type of generic frame. It is typically applied in media texts to interpret events or issues “in the contexts of religious or moral prescriptions” (de Vreese, 2005a, p. 56). In this study, it is utilised in the context of instances where Boko Haram is described in terms of the group’s religious affiliation. This frame is the fifth from the CHCA and is apparent in the two southern papers (The Guardian and Punch) and on Twitter.

In addition to words such as terrorists, insurgents, and fighters, which possess varying degrees of negativity, and are an indication of moral judgment, The Guardian and Punch newspapers apply a range of labels that link Boko Haram to religion. These include Islamic sect, Islamic insurgents, Islamic militants, militant Islamists, Islamists, Islamic extremists, Islamist group, Islamic fundamentalists, and jihadis, jihadist group – terms which are closely associated with Islam. This is in contrast to the Leadership and Daily Trust newspapers, where Boko Haram is mostly called criminal elements, enemies of the state, rampaging marauders, bandits, kidnappers, and criminals especially within the contexts of the War against Boko Haram and Social Consequences frames. The difference in labels applied in the southern (The Guardian and Punch) and northern papers in the framing of Boko Haram is significant given the importance of religion as a major identity marker in Nigeria (Lewis & Bratton, 2000; Ross, 2015; Ujah, Abuja Bureau Chief & Nwabughiougu, 2017). Nigeria maintains a prevalent north-south “geopolitical duality and bipolar Muslim and Christian religious stratification” (Adewale, 2011, p. 3). A majority of northern residents are Muslim, while the south is mainly occupied by Christians. This local context is necessary to interpret and understand how and why the Religious Polarisation frame is prevalent in the southern papers.
On Twitter, the Religious Polarisation frame is used to describe Boko Haram as representatives of Islam who are engaged in a war against Christians and Christianity, especially in Nigeria. Attacks by the group are also described as specifically targeted at Christians and Christian infrastructure like church buildings. Examples include “RT @DannyAkin: 900 Churches in Nigeria Destroyed by Boko Haram/ Pray for our brothers & sisters (link)” (T62); “Retweeted Political Islam (@PoliticalIslam): Christian persecution. 900 Churches in Nigeria Destroyed by... (link)” (T63); “Boko Haram destroyed over 900 churches in North - CAN - Daily Post Nigeria (link)” (T64); and “100,000 Massacred, Over 2 Million Displaced in Boko Haram's War to Eradicate Christianity (link)”, and “Islam in Nigeria: Boko Haram attempts to drive out Christians (link)” (T65).

Other tweets in this category hold information that link Boko Haram to other terrorist organisations with a similar ideological foundation. For example: “RT @Thomas_Hem1: A religion that creates groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Hamas and many others, is not a religion I would march for...” (T66); “Wake up people we r at WAR w/Al Qaeda ISIS Boko Haram Arab Muslims Islamic jihadists terrorists, readers of Quran, true infidels, anew Crusades” (T67); “@DeletrixV @auntiejude @MicahA_ Didn't know about the privilege of 5000 killed in Nigria [sic] by Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram” (T68); and “Hunt down Al-Qaeda, Taliban, ISIS, Boko-Haram, and every damn Islamic terrorist organization of course” (T69). In these tweets, Boko Haram is classified alongside other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban. Although this outcome is consistent with this study's categorisation of Boko Haram as fourth-wave terrorist organisation (see section 1.3.1), chapter five of this research provides further explanations for the appearance of this frame in only the southern papers and on Twitter.
4.3.6 Economic Consequences Frame

The sixth and last cluster from the quantitative analysis is called the Economic Consequences frame (n=99). Using this frame, political actors in the *Punch* and *Daily Trust* highlight the financial implication of Boko Haram in terms of increased military spending, infrastructure repair, sustenance of IDP camps, unemployment, and a general decline in economic activities in the worst affected states. While the *Daily Trust* specifically emphasises the economic cost of Boko Haram to the northern states, the *Punch* presents a more robust account of the financial implication of the group's activities to the country. The below excerpt from the *Punch* newspapers captures this frame:

"If I were to quantify the economic loss recorded by the state, I will put it based on the measure of our GDP of $3bn to be around $9bn, which is probably thrice our GDP," ... setbacks in agricultural production caused by the Boko Haram crisis have cut the state's monthly internally generated revenue from N1bn to less than N200m (P5, p. 42).

In the above quote, the economic cost of Boko Haram is expressed in terms of lowered GDP, drawbacks in food production and reduction in internally generated revenue.

Although the Economic Consequences frame is classified as a generic frame (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), it is inductively generated in this study. But, its presence in only two newspapers (the *Daily Trust* and *Punch*) warrants further examination. This is carried out in the sixth chapter, which is aimed at understanding the media and political context of outlier frames.

4.4 Chapter Summary and Discussion

This chapter set out to present findings for the first research question: What integrative frames were employed in the representation of Boko Haram in *The Guardian*,
Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership newspapers; and on Twitter? The answer to this question is provided via the CHCA as described in Chapter three and illustrated in Chapter four (see section 4.2.1). The dominant frames in The Guardian include the Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, Religious Polarisation and War against Women, while the Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, Economic Consequences and Religious Polarisation frames are visible in the Punch. The Daily Trust place salience on the War against Boko Haram, and the Social and Economic Consequences frames, while the Social Consequences and War against Boko Haram dominate the Boko Haram discourse in the Leadership newspaper. On Twitter, the dominant frames are War against Women, War against Boko Haram, Social Consequences, Attribution of Responsibility and Religious Polarisation. See Figure 4.3 for a summary of frames retrieved per outlet/platform. Taken together, therefore, this study identifies a total of six frames. Four of the frames (Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, and Religious Polarisation) are visible across the investigated platforms, while the two other frames (Attribution of Responsibility and Economic Consequences) are unique to Twitter and two of the Nigerian national newspapers (Punch and Daily Trust) respectively. In this study, the four frames common to both platforms are called Echo frames, while the two other frames are Outlier frames.

Some of the identified frames like the Social Consequences, Economic Consequences, Attribution of Responsibility and Religious Polarisation are quite popular in the framing literature and are classified as generic frames (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Generic frames as previously mentioned (see section 2.4.1) refer to conceptual tools that “transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics, some even over time and in different cultural contexts” (Vreese, 2005a, p. 54). However, in this study, each frame is inductively extracted based on the prominence of
some of the frame elements derived from Entman’s (1993) definition of frames, which
served as the variables in the analysis of the investigated texts. There are also slight
differences in the meaning of these frames with respect to this particular study. For
example, the Social Consequences frame broadly reflects how events of societal
significance impact the lives of everyday people (Yousaf, 2015; Okoro & Odoemelam,
2013). But in this study, the frame underscores the negative impact of Boko Haram to
the LCBCs, especially people in northeastern Nigeria. It also captures the linguistic and
visual depiction of women and children as the most vulnerable victims of the Boko Haram
problem. Although the northeast is the most affected by the Boko Haram conflict (United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), n.d.), it is critical
to point out that terrorism is a politically motivated tactic. It is also a form of violent
communication aimed at both immediate and remote targets including members of
terrorist groups and the government. Thus, while the representation of the northeast as
the key victims of the group may attract global attention, aid, and serve as the grounds
for government-backed action against Boko Haram, Boko Haram’s violent attacks
daffects a wider range of publics.

The Economic Consequences frame typically presents issues in terms of their
financial implications to people or countries. While this frame is similarly applied in this
study, there is slight distinction in the application of the frame by different papers in this
research. For instance, whereas the Daily Trust outlines the financial implication of Boko
Haram to the northeast, the Punch newspaper presents a more robust account of the
cost of Boko Haram to the Nigerian state.

The Religious Polarisation frame is also another popular media frame in the
literature. It usually emphasises the religious element of an event or offers moral
solutions (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). In this study, the Religious Polarisation frame
refers to instances where Boko Haram is described in terms of its religious affiliation, labelled representatives of Islam or its violent campaign constructed as war against Christianity. The Religious Polarisation frame is also evident in instances where Boko Haram is linked to other terrorist groups with similar ideological ties. The construction of Boko Haram in terms of its linkage to other violent groups which claim to represent Islam mirrors its description as a fourth-wave terrorist organisation in this study. However, the characterisation of Boko Haram’s campaign of violence as specifically aimed at Christians minimises the understanding that the group targets Muslims as well.

As previously noted in the literature review chapter, generic frames tend to overlap with issue-specific frames, that is frames that are a product of the analysis of specific issues or events (see section 2.4.4). The second most prevalent conceptual tool in this study, the War against Boko Haram frame, falls into this blended category. On the one hand, the War against Boko Haram can be compared to the conflict frame, a generic frame that foregrounds disputes between conflicting parties (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). This is because the War against Boko Haram frame as applied in this study highlights an on-going conflict involving at least two parties, Boko Haram and the Nigerian military. However, in addition to underscoring the conflict between these belligerents, the War against Boko Haram frame also reflects the Nigerian state’s preferred response to Boko Haram’s use of asymmetrical warfare techniques in pursuit of unorthodox goals. Boko Haram members are largely unknown, the battlefield of the on-going conflict is not clearly defined, and targets include both civilian, non-combatant and military populations. These features contribute to the complicated nature of the on-going warfare and is consistent with Lind et al.’s (1989) description of fourth-generation warfare (see section 2.2.1).
On the other hand, the War against Boko Haram frame can also be described as issue-specific, since it is based on the analysis of a particular case, the Boko Haram crisis. Nigeria’s war on Boko Haram shares some of the features of the global war on terror especially with respect to the primary focus on the use of hard/military tactics. To this extent, the War against Boko Haram frame can be compared to Reese and Lewis’ war on terror frame, which the authors argue was initiated by the Bush administration. President George Bush’s war on terror policy evolved into a “powerful organising principle” in the US media (p. 777) setting the stage for the US’ occupation of Iraq. A similar argument can thus, be made regarding the War against Boko Haram frame, owing to its prevalence on the studied outlets/platforms. However, unlike Bush’s war on terror, which was largely aimed at enemies outside the US border, the war on Boko Haram is targeted at members of the Boko Haram group, which consists of some outlawed Nigerian citizens.

The War against Women frame points to Boko Haram’s deployment of sexual and gender-based violence targeted at women and girls - who are identified as the principal victims of the sect. It is an example of an issue specific frame. Although scholars have noted the role of women in political conflicts like terrorism, and more specifically, Boko Haram’s abuse of women and girls (Zenn & Pearson, 2014; Nnam, Arua & Otu, 2018; Matfess, 2017), this study uncovers gender as a critical aspect of the discourse of Boko Haram in the selected legacy outlets and on Twitter.

The location of these frames contributes to the literature on framing analysis in two ways. Firstly, this study provides further evidence of the effectiveness of the CHCA for the extraction of frames in media texts and in various contexts. While Matthes and Kohring (2008) demonstrated the viability of the CHCA in the context of biotechnology coverage in The New York Times, here, the method is applied in the context of
terrorism/Boko Haram in legacy and social media. Secondly, this study produces evidence for the possibility of social media to offer “rival visions of ‘reality’” (Norris, Kem & Just, 2003, p. 5). Apart from the existence of an outlier frame – Attribution of Responsibility – which is absent in the selected legacy outlets, some of the echo frames are employed quite differently on Twitter. For example, the Social Consequences frame in the newspapers is used to present a broad set of social challenges attributed to Boko Haram. On Twitter, however, the frame is used to highlight both a wide range of problems caused by Boko Haram as well as individualised accounts of the social impact of the group on direct and indirect victims/casualties. Although the War against Boko Haram frame is generically applied across the selected platforms to emphasise the existence of on-going conflict, unlike the papers, where focus is on winners or losers, Tweeters characterise the conflict as mutually destructive. Finally, the identification of the War against Women frame - the least applied frame on legacy platform and the most frequently applied conceptual tool on Twitter - adds to the growing body of literature on gender and terrorism.

Having identified the frames, the next two chapters examine the specific context of each frame. This is because while the CHCA enables the location of frames, it does not provide explanations for the impact of platforms or the wider socio-political context on frames as represented in the second set of research questions: How are the frames shaped by their media and political contexts? (a) What roles do the values, routines and norms of legacy media, and the logic and affordances of social media play in the framing of Boko Haram? (b) What roles do the Nigerian state and its media ecology play in the framing of Boko Haram? In this study, answers to these questions are provided with the aid of the second data analysis procedure – Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA). As described in chapter three, the MCDA is employed to go beyond the
snapshot view presented by the quantitative analysis (CHCA) to illustrate findings (Gibbs, 2008) as well as offer possible explanations for the identified frames.
CHAPTER FIVE - THE CONSTRUCTION OF ECHO FRAMES: MEDIA AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, this study, via the CHCA, identified six frames used in the construction of Boko Haram in *The Guardian, Punch, Daily Trust*, and *Leadership* Nigerian national newspapers; and on the global social networking site, Twitter. In this chapter, the questions raised by the CHCA are addressed by setting the frames within their media and political contexts. Of the six frames identified, four (Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, and Religious Polarisation) are labelled echo frames, owing to their visibility on both of the studied platforms. The purpose of this fifth chapter is to contextualise these echo frames. As is mentioned in the methodology chapter (see section 3.4.2.2), this aspect of the analysis is carried out using a qualitative content analysis method, Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA).

The MCDA in this study involves exploring the textual, visual, discursive, and social practices of the respective platforms as expressed in the words and images used in describing Boko Haram in the selected newspapers and on Twitter. Analysing the textual practices of respective platforms involves understanding how words are used to describe political actors/people with respect to naming or referencing strategies, the qualities assigned actors (prediction), and modality (Richardson, 2007). Following Machin (2007), the visual analysis entails understanding the denotative (literal) and connotative (hidden or implied) meaning of photographs. This includes the investigation of visual elements such as Pose, Objects, Setting, and Participants, to understand how these are used to depict people, values or ideas; modality (how visual representations should be understood); as well as how social/political actors are represented in the
images in terms of gaze, angle of interaction, distance, and classification. The discursive practices layer of analysis in this study relates to the various factors that shape the production and consumption of legacy and social media content. Here, the focus is on understanding how the framing of Boko Haram may have been influenced by the norms, practices and logic of the respective platforms, and the affordances of Twitter. It specifically entails exploring the possible impact of professional journalistic practices like ethics, objectivity, news values, and gatekeeping on frames. It also demands investigating the possible role of the four principles of social media logic including “programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication” (van Dijck & Poell, 2013, p. 2) and the affordances of social media/Twitter such as visibility, anonymity, persistence, editability and networked association on emergent frames. The social practices layer of analysis investigates the external influences that shape content production on the selected platforms including the nature of the Nigerian state, the Nigerian media ecology, and other real-world indicators. Although these layers of investigation are complementary, the textual, visual and discursive practices levels of analyses directly address research question 2a: What roles do the values, routines and norms of legacy media; and the logic and affordances of social media play in the framing of Boko Haram? The social practice level of analysis deals with research question 2b: What roles do the Nigerian state and its media ecology play in the framing of Boko Haram?

This chapter is subdivided into three main parts. As explained in chapter three, this study covers the six-month period (January – June 2017) following President Buhari’s claim that Boko Haram had been technically defeated and ousted from their last bastion, Sambisa forest (BBC News, 2015, para.1). Although there were no catastrophic Boko Haram attacks within the period, other significant Boko Haram related media events occurred. The first part (section 5.2) of this chapter outlines these important
events and discusses how they may have influenced the coverage and visibility of Boko Haram on the respective platforms. In subsequent sections, these events are also shown to have impacted the construction of the group in certain respects. The second part (sections 5.3 - 5.6) of this chapter focuses on the MCDA of typical cluster members of each of the four echo frames and details the roles played by the internal and external logic of platforms in the appearance of these frames. The last part (section 5.7) is a chapter summary.

5.2 Contextual Events

The activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria and other Lake Chad Basin Countries (LCBCs) have precipitated large-scale security and humanitarian challenges. The group’s adoption of terrorist techniques such as suicide bombing, kidnapping, roadside shooting, torture, and rape has, subsequently, attracted much media coverage as evidenced in the number of articles and tweets retrieved within the period of this study. As noted in the methodology chapter, data collection procedures for this study yielded a total number of 2,578 articles and over 600,000 tweets with Boko Haram and Boko Haram-related mentions. This is even in the absence of catastrophic events for example, on the scale of 9/11 or the bombing of the UN House, Abuja. But, the period of this study is significant because it corresponds to the time following the Nigerian government’s claims about the technical defeat of Boko Haram and the ouster of the group from its major base of operation – Sambisa forest (AFP, 2017a, para. 2). Sambisa is a former game reserve that had been converted into a residence and staging area by the Boko Haram group. In December 2016, the Nigerian military recaptured the area, leading to debates in the media about the possible demise of the group and the end of the Boko Haram war. This period is further distinguished by the occurrence of four Boko Haram-related media events: The 2017 New Year speech, the Rann Bombing, the third-
year anniversary of the kidnapping of the Chibok girls, and the release of eighty-two Chibok girls. Brief details about these events are presented in the next paragraph.

January is a significant month in Nigeria and is marked by festivities. It also presents an opportunity for the country’s leadership to reach citizens with a review of its accomplishments in the previous year, and the vision for the new. President Muhammadu Buhari’s 2017 New Year message exhibited these features. Although he addressed a few other concerns, Boko Haram was at the core of his presentation. For instance, he saluted the military’s gallantry against Boko Haram in terms of the re-capture of Sambisa forest; hailed state efforts at securing the release of twenty-one Chibok girls in October 2016; and detailed the return of some Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their homelands (Nairametric, 2017, para. 3-5, 9). The president’s speech triggered debates in the media about the possible demise of the sect; the effectiveness of the country’s counterinsurgency strategies; and the general welfare of IDPs. The second event, the Rann bombing – a botched Nigerian Air Force airstrike against Boko Haram, which led to the death of more than 200 IDPs, also occurred in January. Although the military described the event as an accident, questions were raised in the media about Buhari’s counter-Boko Haram claim as well as the impact of Boko Haram on IDPs. The last two events were related to the Chibok girls. The first was the anniversary of the Chibok girls, which is marked yearly in April, while the second occurred on 7 May 2017, when eighty-two of the kidnapped Chibok secondary school girls were released following negotiations with Boko Haram. The above events are adjudged significant within the context of this study because they offer explanations for the amount of Boko Haram coverage or mentions as well as the construction of the group within the study period.
Returning (briefly) to the initial dataset for this study as shown in Figure 5.1, points A and C on the chart indicate periods with the highest number of Boko Haram newspaper publications and tweets, respectively. While more articles were published in January, with *The Guardian* newspaper accounting for the largest number of publications (26%), a majority of the Boko Haram tweets occurred in the month of May (30%). The peak points (A and C) coincide with the occurrence of some of the Boko Haram-related media events mentioned in the preceding paragraph. President Buhari’s New Year speech and the Rann bombing occurred in the month of January, while the release of the eight-two Chibok secondary schoolgirls took place in May 2017. The least number of stories featured in February (point B) while the lowest number of tweets occurred in June (point D) probably due to the absence of any major Boko Haram-related media events during these months. While the Boko Haram-related media events may explain the number of articles and tweets retrieved during the period of study, in subsequent sections, these...
events are also described as crucial to the ways in which the group is constructed on the respective platforms.

The next section explores typical examples of articles and tweets from each of the echo frames in order to understand how the textual, visual, discursive, and social practices of the respective platforms influence the emergence of frames. Archetypal cluster members used in the analysis are presented in tables and figures, while individual examples from the selected outlets/platforms are described using the following reference system: DT= Daily Trust; L=Leadership; G=Guardian, P=Punch, T=Twitter/Tweet. Also, where hyperlinks form part of the tweets, they are replaced with the word “link” in parenthesis, since the analysis is limited to content that is found on Twitter.

5.3 The Social Consequences Frame

The Social Consequences frame in this study refers to the emphasis on the negative impact of Boko Haram on the lives of people living in the LCBCs, but especially residents of northeast Nigeria (see section 4.3.1). While the CHCA provides an overview of the Social Consequences frame, the MCDA enables a robust interpretation of the frame by detailing its media and political contexts, that is, some internal and external factors that are crucial to the development of the frame. This is done by examining the textual, visual, discursive, and social practices of the studied platforms as expressed in selected articles and tweets from the Social Consequences cluster (see Table 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline/Tweet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>6 January 2017</td>
<td>NEMA’s effort in managing humanitarian crisis in the Northeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DT1</td>
<td>31 March 2017</td>
<td>2 million face hunger in Borno – UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>16 March 2017</td>
<td>Let facts prevail in Amnesty, Army clash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1</td>
<td>5 February 2017</td>
<td>Insurgency: Adamawa OVCs find warmth in foster care programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4</td>
<td>4 June 2017</td>
<td>At Least 21 People killed in Boko Haram Terrorist Attacks, Villages Completely Destroyed: Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T5</td>
<td>4 March 2017</td>
<td>UN Delegation Views Boko Haram Effects in Lake Chad Basin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1. Newspaper articles and tweets from the Social Consequences cluster
5.3.1 The Media Context of the Social Consequences Frame

The Social Consequences frame as earlier noted places Boko Haram at the centre of the disruptions in Nigeria’s social fabric. This study argues that the prevalence of the frame on the investigated platforms is a product of emotionality, a key element of the internal logic of the selected newspapers and Twitter and this is evidenced in the textual, visual, and discursive practices of the respective platforms. The textual analysis of the articles and tweets in the Social Consequences cluster reveals the frequent use of words such as death, humanitarian crisis, hunger, and malnutrition. These issues are described as affecting people, who are portrayed as victims as is seen in their qualification as killed, displaced, orphaned, and/or widowed. In addition, although references are generally made to various categories of people as victims, women and children are distinguished through words and images as the most vulnerable population. The articles and tweets in Table 5.1 illustrate the use of the Social Consequences frame.

The article in DT1 resounds UNICEF’s warning about an impending food shortage in Borno state. But the food shortage, which is attributed to Boko Haram “is expected to affect 450,000 children under the age of five” (p. 4). The emphasis on the social impact of Boko Haram on particular victims is also seen in P1 where a source is quoted as follows: “Boko Haram has killed 100,000 people and left 2.1 million others internally displaced, just as it has orphaned 52,311 children and produced 54,911 widows” (p. 18). While words such as people or others are quite generic, orphaned children and widows refer to a particular class of people (children who have lost their parents and women who have lost their husbands). This distinction sets women and children apart as special victims, a feature which is replicated in the photographs accompanying this collection of articles and tweets.

The articles and tweets in the Social Consequences cluster include two main types of images: documentary and symbolic. Documentary images generally refer to
images that reflect actual events and can be regarded as truthful (Barthes & Heath, 1977; Sontag, 2004), while symbolic images depict an idea or concept (Machin, 2007). Examples of these images are found in G1, L1, and T5. G1 is a press release written by Sani Datti (a staffer in the Press and Media Relations unit of Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency, NEMA) and published in The Guardian newspaper. The writer highlights NEMA’s role, and names Boko Haram as the source of what he labels a ‘humanitarian crisis’ in Nigeria’s northeast (G1, para. 1). Similarly, L1 is a feature piece about how three humanitarian organisations - Janna Health Foundation (JHF), Victim Support Fund (VSF), and Best Agenda for Social Change (BASC), partner to provide homes for 150 children who were orphaned and rendered vulnerable by Boko Haram. The tweet: “UN Delegation Views Boko Haram Effects in Lake Chad Basin” (T5) also reflects the negative impact of Boko Haram in the LCBCs.

Figure 5.2. G1. NEMA’s efforts in managing humanitarian crisis in the Northeast (Datti, 2017)

The images in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are included in the articles in G1 and L1, respectively. These photographs qualify as documentary photographs for two reasons.
First, they are used to depict the actual happenings referred to in the article, that is, the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Nigeria. Second, they rank high in terms of modality, which indicates “how real a representation should be taken to be” (Machin, 2007, p. 46).

The main participants in Figure 5.2 (G1) are children, whose gaze offers, rather than demand the viewer’s attention, an indication of the lower status of the participants in comparison to the average viewer. The status of the photo subjects is reinforced by the low angle of interaction, and a long shot (camera distance), which establishes a social distance between the subjects and the viewers. The children are sitting in rows, forming long queues, which suggests some form of orderliness and structure. They are also shown holding pink disposable plates, an indication that they are waiting to collect food - sitting on the floor with plates in hand, in the Nigerian context, is a posture associated with begging. A majority of the children also have shaved heads, which is common in rural settings in Nigeria, an act done to prevent the growth and spread of head lice and nits. But, in the context of the photograph, the shaved heads of the children signal the poor state of human affairs in the region and sharply contrasts with the leafy trees in the background, which points to a thriving flora. Judging by the degree of articulation of the key participants [children] – visible faces and skin, detailed background, and the maintenance of natural colours of clothing, trees, plates, and earth; Figure 5.2 possesses a high modality status. However, there are pieces of evidence of modification for impact judging by the out-of-focus adults by the side and behind the children; and the partially cropped-off official to the right of the viewer. As Sontag (1977) points out, "the picture may distort, but there is always a presumption that something exists, or did exist, which is like what’s in the picture" (p. 5). In this case, the framing out of the other participants in the photograph, makes the children the primary subject of focus in the image, thus highlighting a particular aspect of reality that corresponds with
the Social Consequences frame. That is, the characterisation of the Boko Haram problem as a children's crisis.

Figure 5.3. L1. Insurgency: Adamawa OVCs find warmth in foster care programme (Hammangabdo, 2017, p. 62)

The participants (babies, children, women, and men) in Figure 5.3 are shown sitting in rows, in a crowded room. While some of the women can be identified as Muslims, judging by their use of chadors (a type of veil worn by women of the Islamic faith), other women, and men who are mainly seated at the back, can be identified as northerners based on their outfits. This image like Figure 5.2 also ranks high in terms of modality because it represents a section of what the viewer would have seen if physically present. There also seems to be some ordering in the sitting arrangement of the men and women. Women are mostly seated in the front rows, some holding babies, while the men are seated behind the women, suggesting a form of hierarchy, and making the women and children the primary participants in the photograph. This indicates, therefore, that women and children are the most vulnerable populations in the Boko Haram crisis.
Apart from functioning as actual evidence, images of women and children are used in the articles and tweets in the Social Consequences cluster to symbolise an idea or concept (Machin, 2007, p. 35) as seen in Figure 5.4. Unlike G1 and L1, the image in T5 occupies a larger portion of the tweet. Although there are no obvious restrictions on the size of images that can be incorporated in a tweet, the platform restricts the number of words to a maximum of 280 characters. This is an indication that images are critical to the construction of meaning on Twitter. The subject of focus in the photograph is a naked child, who looks ill and malnourished, a conclusion reached based on the subject's overall thin figure compared to the size of the head and the use of nasogastric intubation (tubes inserted to aid feeding). The presence of, and the type of outfit (white coat and gloves) worn by the partially cropped off second subject as well as the presence of objects like a bed, indicate the setting is a medical facility. However, as can be seen in the text accompanying the image, this photograph primarily functions as a visual depiction of the effect of the Boko Haram crisis. This conclusion is in line with the slightly decontextualised background, off-frame gaze, and use of a medium shot, which
functions to present an image that illustrates the negative consequence of Boko Haram and not necessarily a piece of documentary evidence. But, like the documentary photograph, the symbolic image in Figure 5.4 contributes to the materialisation of the Social Consequences frame.

Although different, the documentary and symbolic images just like the words employed in this cluster, jointly serve to communicate the negative impact of Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and the LCBCs. This explains the prominence of the social impact element in the CHCA (see section 4.3.1). However, what stands out in both types of images is the visual emphasis on women and children. This trend is consistent with the media representation of women and children during a crisis and is traceable to western representation of children as innocent and women as vulnerable (Berkowitz, 2005; Gardner, 2007; Rosen, 2014, p.133). Such images are usually deployed as compelling exhibits, to raise awareness about the sufferings of many, evoke the emotion of viewers, attract aid funds, and possibly alter government policies on a range of subjects. For instance, in writing the story about Aylan Kurdi - the Syrian boy, whose body was found on a beach in Turkey in September 2015 – Adam Withnall’s headline read: “If these extraordinarily powerful images of a dead Syrian child washed up on a beach don’t change Europe’s attitude to refugees, what will?” (Withnall, 2015, headline).

Zarzycka’s (2016) investigation of the persuasive campaign strategies employed by the international NGO, Save The Children, points to the affective potency of photographs of children’s faces. According to the author, “the face of a child in need is a visual trope that is at the forefront of the politics of spectacle in emergency news and aid initiatives” (p. 29). The author’s study demonstrates the successful use of such imagery by the NGO in configuring “financial help as an affective, rather than economic,
relationship between the donor and the beneficiary” (p. 30). Other authors have also noted that the images of women and children function as cultural icons that are capable of capturing the broader meaning, enhancing the factuality of narratives by political actors and reflecting communicated messages (Fahmy, 2010; Messaris & Abraham, 2001, p. 220). Thus, even though children are not the subject of the articles in G1 and L1 or the tweet in T5, their images are visually emphasised owing to their place as potent carriers of meaning to convey the message about the devastating impact of Boko Haram. Both types of images are, therefore, instrumental for communicating the Boko Haram problem as urgent and dangerous, thereby, capable of triggering strong emotional responses from audiences. However, this primary focus on women and children minimises the fact that Boko Haram attacks the military, non-combatants, and civilians and as such does not discriminate among targets. Besides, the group’s deployment of terrorist techniques is in pursuit of other far-reaching goals including the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria.

Even though the words and images employed in this cluster of articles and tweets are emotionally charged, images trigger rapid emotional responses and are more quickly processed than words (Schwalbe & Dougherty, 2015, p. 142), “hold strategic power and create particular objects of knowledge” (Weber & Barker-Ruchti, 2012, p. 24). Photographs also reflect social realities in ways that can be preserved in the collective memory of a people (Bersak, 2006). This, therefore, means that the Social Consequences frame is strengthened by the inclusion of these images in the articles and tweets. In addition, according to Coleman (2010), “far more valuable than the images of places and things are pictures of people” (p. 249). Coleman’s argument in the above quote further explains the use of a particular set of images - photographs of
women and children – in the Social Consequences framing of Boko Haram on the respective platforms due to their capacity to stimulate emotional responses.

Emotionality is a critical element of the discursive practices of the studied platforms. As illustrated above, the Boko Haram narratives in the articles and tweets in this cluster reference instances of death, displacement, famine, and a large-scale humanitarian crisis, and are accompanied by visually compelling and emotion-stimulating images of women and children. With respect to the selected legacy outlets, these types of stories merit coverage owing to their news value (human interest/bad news), which is a discursive practice of media organisations. For instance, several authors identify bad news as a crucial news selection criterion for newspapers since it attracts readership and advertisement dollars (Eilders, 2006; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001). In addition, as is detailed in chapter two, in the practice of journalism, “knowledge of how to incorporate emotion into storytelling is a crucial professional skill, and the correct display of this skill is valued and celebrated as exemplary” (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019, p. 37-38). This, therefore, provides an explanation for the high incidence of the Social Consequences frame as well as the specific ways in which the frame manifests itself in the selected newspapers (n=902).

In the same vein, human interest/bad news stories also gain traction on social media owing to their emotive quality. Even though research has shown that positive content tends to be more frequently shared on social media (Berger & Milkman, 2012), Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan (2013) observe that "emotionally-charged Twitter messages tend to be retweeted more often and more quickly compared to neutral ones" (p. 217). This means that emotionally stimulating content about Boko Haram victims, can quickly become viral on Twitter, and social media logic is "built on the logic of virality" (Klinger, 2013, p. 722).
Virality on Twitter can be explained in terms of three other elements: programmability, datafication and networked association. Programmability refers to “the ability of a social media platform to trigger and steer users’ creative or communicative contributions, while users, through their interaction with these coded environments, may, in turn, influence the flow of communication and information activated by such a platform” (p. 5). Programmability, in this case, highlights how platform algorithms and/or users via the retweet, mention or share functions can influence the spread of tweets about the social impact of Boko Haram. The spread/virality of such emotion-triggering content could then increase traffic and by extension attract advertisement dollars since Twitter is also given to datafication. The logic of datafication entails Twitter’s capacity to quantify data on a real-time basis, mine data for online metrics, and put said data to use in various ways including predicting user behaviour and attracting advertisers. In addition to these, Twitter also affords networked association by enabling the establishment of social and/or content ties between a large network of followers. As noted in chapter two, these large networks can expose users to different sources of information (Eveland & Hively, 2009) and to people with similar ideas or interests (McLeod et al. 1999) thereby, facilitating the potential spread of emotive content about Boko Haram. This study argues that the above three features do not only account for visibility of Boko Haram content on Twitter, but also shape aspects of the discourse that are emphasised. This, for example, explains the inclusion of symbolic photographs of suffering children as these types of images possess an emotive quality that resonates with users who play a crucial role in the visibility and virality of Twitter content. As Zarzycka (2016) argues, “images of children’s faces work on both affective and ethical levels, appealing to compassion and to a discourse of universal human rights” (p. 29).
The critical role of emotionality in the emergence of the Social Consequences frame is enabled by two seeming contrasting norms of the studied platforms, that is, objectivity and subjectivity. Objectivity in journalistic practice is not necessarily a pursuit for the truth but instead is expressed in terms of relying on the account of persons that are deemed credible. This gives an appearance of impartiality and at the same time enables “facts speak” (Tuchman, 1972, p. 668). Objectivity in the studied texts is exemplified using the below excerpts from G1, DT1, P1, and L1.

G1: According to a Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) developed by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in collaboration with NEMA as a means of collecting and disseminating data on IDPs, about 389,281 persons were displaced in 2013; 868,335 in 2014; 1,846,999 in 2015 and 1,822,541 as at October 2016 (G1, para. 3).

DT1: According to a nutrition specialist, and convener of the training, Walton Beckley, “it is expected that 450,000 children under the age of five may suffer from severe malnutrition across the three Northeast states in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in 2017” (DT1, p. 4).

P1: After eight years of its campaign, the North-east has become a massive graveyard. According to Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State, Boko Haram has killed 100,000 people and left 2.1 million others internally displaced, just as it has orphaned 52,311 children and produced 54,911 widows (P1, p. 18).

L1: One of these emergencies, besides food and shelter, has been finding a home for the regions orphaned and vulnerable, who were so termed after they lost their parents in the violence or their parents cannot be accounted for…. The holistic goal of the project, he [Dr. Abdullahi Belel – Chairman, Janna Health Foundation] explained, was to integrate the orphans – who are mostly below 12 years – back into the society (L1, p. 62).

The above extracts include information about displaced persons, malnutrition or persons orphaned or killed by Boko Haram, provided by an international organisation (G1), a nutrition expert (DT1), a governor/political office holder (P1), and the Chair of a Non-governmental organisation (NGO) (L1). As mentioned in chapter one, these types of sources possess “situational credibility, perceived sincerity, and rhetorical skill” (King, 1987, p. 10) and are routinely accepted in legacy media. This is because they are thought to be in possession of statistical evidence or expert-backed facts that journalists
can incorporate in their presentation of stories in a bid to enhance credibility or believability.

Although the objectivity norm presupposes a rigorous pursuit for the truth, this is not necessarily the case in the context of journalism since news stories are socially constructed as evidenced in the use of intertextual elements in the above extracts. For instance, the statistical evidence provided by the IOM regarding the number of displaced persons: 389,281, 868,335, 1,846,999, and 1,822,541 in 2013, 2014, and 2015 and by October 2016 respectively (G1, para. 3) is incorporated via the use of indirect quote. Also, Walton Beckley’s statement in DT1 is included in the form of a direct quote: “It is expected that 450,000 children...” (p. 4). Direct and indirect quotes are forms of intertextuality that serve to distance the writer/journalist from the stories, give an impression of neutrality/impartiality and thus boosting the acceptability of the narratives presented about Boko Haram. This type of representation can, therefore, impact public opinion about Boko Haram and shape policy actions formulated with respect to the group. However, not all established media sources are deemed reliable in the Nigerian context. For example, on the one hand, the information provided by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) may be accepted on face value, due to the organisation's affiliation to the UN, a renowned international body. On the other hand, the account rendered by the Governor and the Chair of the NGO may be regarded as biased. This is because political office holders in Nigeria are not trusted and most NGOs are seen as elite outlets designed to siphon resources for personal gain.

Apart from the socially constructed nature of news stories, the drive for objectivity in this case is also limited by the nature of terrorism. While accounts provided by politicians, journalists and/or celebrities are routinely accepted in the media due to
their status as legitimate state actors, others are rejected or excluded. For instance, even though Boko Haram is capable of attracting media coverage in keeping with the media-terrorism symbiosis (Miller, 1982), the group’s outsider status as a terrorist organisation places it in direct opposition to legitimate actors or legacy-approved sources. This means that the group has no control over the manner of coverage it garners owing to conflicting interests with other state or media interests such as patriotism and national interest. The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate sources also exposes power differentials in society and explains the othering of Boko Haram by those with the authority to label and sanction the group as a terrorist organisation.

Therefore, while objectivity suggests truth and the absence of bias, legacy media accounts may not necessarily be described as such since they rely on sources with direct and indirect vested interest in the Boko Haram discourse. In fact, the Social Consequences frame can be understood as a weapon of power deliberately employed by authoritative sources to promote understanding about who/what is responsible for the upset in Nigeria’s social order. This is because, the broad characterisation of Boko Haram as the disrupters of Nigeria’s social status quo, deemphasises the knowledge that a majority of Boko Haram members are Nigerians (Adesoji, 2014, p. 106), while the root cause of Boko Haram can be traced to some of many social/structural flaws in society (Adegbulu, 2013).

The above extracts illustrate on the one hand, how objectivity is expressed in legacy media and on the other, highlights the relevance of emotionality in representation of issues in legacy platforms. Although the journalists themselves do not directly express their emotion, they rely on others such as non-governmental organisations to
communicate the gruesome impact of Boko Haram on persons who are categorised as victims. As earlier argued in chapter two, emotionality is a critical element of journalism and is often enabled by some of the practices that provide evidence for objectivity/impartiality.

Figure 5.5. T4

Unlike legacy media where there is a drive for factuality, social media platforms are open to both objective and subjective content arising from intersubjective interpretation of societal events. This is because, on the one hand, like newspapers, Twitter is utilised by persons who can influence the news such as journalists and politicians which explains the possible appearance of content produced by sources that are deemed credible by legacy media standards and therefore, credible. On the other
hand, however, platforms like Twitter are open to everyday users/followers as the constellation of Twitter users include politicians, citizen journalist, professional journalists, and audiences who use the platform to express themselves and their personal and professional thoughts on issues of interest. This explains why subjectivity is a core element of networked logic (Welbers & Opgenhaffen, 2019). For instance, T4 (Figure 5.5) is a tweet in which Boko Haram is held responsible for the death of about twenty-one people and attacks on villages. This tweet originated from – theroot.com and is an example of Twitter serving as a platform for the redistribution of already existing content owing to, in this case, the awe and shock quality of the story (Wasike, 2013). However, the story as described in the headline and partial lead is modified in the status message to include a subjective element: completely, which reflects the Tweeter’s reconstruction of an already existing message. The inclusion of the adverb completely, in this context, suggests the villages were not just destroyed as reflected in the headline and partial lead, but utterly wrecked by Boko Haram. The modification of the message is an instance of the Tweeter’s own recontextualisation of the event, an example of exaggeration, extremisation and/or expression of the self; made possible by Twitter’s affordance of editability and anonymity.

Editability/modification captures the idea that on Twitter, users can construct or reconstruct messages before making them available to other users (Walther, 1993). As is described in section 2.3.2, this affordance also “allows communicators to take into consideration the context in which their message is likely to be viewed (or later, after it was made, view the actual context in which it was viewed) and tailor their ideas accordingly” (Treem & Leonardi, 2013, p. 26). Subjectivity on Twitter is also enabled by the platform’s affordance of anonymity. Unlike Facebook where identity verification is a priority, on Twitter, pseudonymity is tolerated. As is detailed in chapter two, the use of
fictitious names could on the one hand, allow users to freely express their thoughts on subjects of interest. On the other hand, the use of sobriquets could allow for the production and spread of false information, fake news, and emotionally provoking content. Even though subjectivity may place a restriction on the effectiveness of the Social Consequences frame since users tend to filter their sources more carefully, as a prevalent norm on Twitter, subjectivity still contributes to the appearance of the frame on the platform.

Although objectivity and subjectivity are crucial norms in the respective platforms, the echo status of the Social Consequences frame is owing to the relevance of emotionality. This is primarily because narratives about the sufferings of victims and the portrayal of women and children as endangered and vulnerable gain traction on both platforms owing to their human-interest value. Moreover, audience response to these types of representation can provide justification for any counteraction taken by the state against Boko Haram or compel some other forms of government action or calls for aid as reflected in this quote from G1: “The Agency encourages corporate and individual donors to provide support to the northeast region by delivering humanitarian aid directly to affected states” (para. 10).

5.3.2 The Political Context of the Social Consequences Frame
Frames are typically designed to emphasise, deemphasise or exclude certain aspects of media narratives in ways that could potentially shape public opinion and policy (Entman, 1993, p. 53; 2004, p. 5). With respect to the Social Consequences frame, the emphasis is on the social ills attributed to Boko Haram. However, the examination of the socio-political environment within which the frame is produced reveals that some of the social issues attributed to Boko Haram predates the group and may be linked to other deeply entrenched societal flaws.
Nigeria is on the one hand, described in the literature as resource-rich, owing to large oil and gas reserves (Pasquali, 2015). On the other hand, Adebajo (2008) designates Nigeria "a colossal collection of impoverished masses, a crumbling tower of Babel built on the rickety foundations of oil rents collected and squandered by its leaders" (p. 2). This is because even though the country is a global supplier of oil and gas (Mail & Guardian African Writer, 2015), the billions received in petro- and gas-dollars have not been effectively utilised due to poor leadership, the prevalence of weak institutions and corruption. In fact, the call by National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) on donors in G1 to directly send aid to the states points to some of these challenges. This request, on the one hand, may have been motivated by claims of mismanagement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) funds. For instance, the Nigerian Senate had in 2016, investigated the possible misappropriation of around £23 million - funds meant for the upkeep of IDPs (Olugbode, 2016). Misuse of IDP funds in 2017, had also led to the sacking of the Secretary of the Government of the Federation, Mr. Babachir Lawal (Inyang, 2017). On the other, the emphasis on directly sending monies to the affected state may be motivated by NEMA's own failure. For example, in April 2018, NEMA was called to question when 6,779 metric tons of rice meant for IDPs, donated by the Chinese government, was left to moulder in the organisation's warehouse (Sahara Reporters, 2018).

Moreover, calls for aid also have other deeper consequences. According to Seo (2017), "aid is never as simple as one country providing resources for another – rather, it is often a highly complex political manoeuvre with a multitude of intertwined purposes resulting in varying degrees of impact and potentially harmful consequences" (para. 1). Aid can, therefore, be a political and economic tool for manipulating receiver nations, and lack of coordination and effective management can result in the misappropriation of
funds, creating disparities between aid and actual impact. Aid can also trigger lackadaisical attitudes among the governments of receiver nations. For example, the northeast as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency has attracted the attention of both global and national aid organisations including those mentioned in L1. However, while some of these bodies have alleviated the living conditions of residents, many have not. For instance, in a *Daily Trust* article, the former governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima accused many of the 126 NGOs operating in the northeast of misappropriating funds meant for the disadvantaged people in his state (Sawab, 2017). Besides, NGOs have had a complicated history in Nigeria since its proliferation from the late 1980s. For Daniel Jordan Smith (2010), “the NGO arena and what Nigerians call ‘new breed churches’ are fertile grounds for corruption” (p. 243).

Therefore, while the Social Consequences framing of Boko Haram on the respective platforms is consistent with the realities of the impact of the group in especially Nigeria’s northeast (Paquette & Alfa, 2019; Alagbe, 2018; Lederer, 2017), it is important to note some of the other issues that are excluded from this frame. For instance, as earlier described, the Social Consequences frame features the linguistic and visual portrayal of women and children as the primary victims of Boko Haram. However, the literature indicates that Nigeria has poor human development index (World Population Review, 2019); is one of the world’s most dangerous places for women to live (Punch, 2018); and the poverty capital of the world (Kazeem, 2018). Although Nigeria has been adversely affected by Boko Haram, the country is also known for some other issues that negatively impact children. Nigeria has over thirteen million out-of-school children (Azeezat, 2018) as a result of at least two socio-cultural/religious practices: the Almajiri heritage and early girl-child marriage. Both problems are more prevalent in northern Nigeria, the area most affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.
The Almajiri system in the past entailed a practice in which boys and girls between six and fifteen years were sent off by their parents to Koranic schools to receive Islamic education from trained scholars and acquire basic reading and writing skills (Abdurraham & Canham, 1978). But the Almajiri sociocultural and religious practice has been rendered ineffective following years of both parental and societal negligence of children, an exponential rise in population, and increasing poverty rates (Khan & Cheri, 2016). The custom has also prevailed even in the absence of qualified Islamic teachers and conducive learning conditions, resulting in the conversion of Almajiris to street children, utilised for labour and begging by their benefactors (Jari, 2015, para. 6). In the words of Msughter (2017):

> These bowl-carrying children have now become so ubiquitous in almost all nooks and corners of the northern states…. For the parents, the Almajiri system provides an outlet, and a drainage for the excess children at home. For the authorities, it is a relief that they do not have to budget for about seven million Almajiri children's education and welfare. As for the elite, they don't care as long as their own children are not involved. (para. 4).

The state of affairs of these abused children renders them susceptible to manipulation by violent state actors. For instance, Awofeso, Ritchie, and Degeling (2003) note that Almajiris have been involved in different religious riots since 1993, while Gommet and Esomchi (2017) underscore the role of street children in the 1980 Maitatsine riots, Yandaba (political thugs) and the Boko Haram conflict. Moreover, in an interview with Voice of America's Chika Oduah, Falmata Abubakar (the mother of Abubakar Shekau) stated that her son, who is the leader of the Boko Haram group, was once an Almajiri (Oduah, 2018).

Like the Almajiri socio-cultural practice, early girl-child marriage is another issue plaguing northern Nigeria. Despite Nigeria's adoption of the 2003 UNICEF Child’s Right
Act, which proscribes the marriage of children below 18 years, the country still has “the third highest absolute number of child brides in the world – 3,538,000 – and the 11th highest prevalence rate of child marriage globally” (girlsnotbrides.org, 2017). A majority of these marriages occur in the North (Ewherido, 2016). Although the Child’s Right law is operational at the federal level, a constitutional loophole allows northern states that have not passed the law to condone child marriage, which usually results in early-childbirth complications such as Obstetric Fistula (OF) (Amodu, Salami & Richter, 2017). OF “is a complication of childbirth that results from prolonged obstructed labor” (p. e258).

The resultant incontinence, shame and social isolation associated with the ailment leads to the abandonment and rejection of most of the girls by their male partners. The above issues [the Almajiri heritage and early girl-child marriage] suggest that in the north, child endangerment may be a product of other socio-economic, cultural, religious, and political factors and thus, cannot be singularly linked to Boko Haram. In fact, the neglect of impressionable minors may have actually played a major role in the emergence and sustenance of the sect.

Therefore, while the representation of Boko Haram in terms of its social impact may reflect the on-ground realities, other aspects related to the role of the state in the emergence and sustenance of the group are not prioritised in the selected newspapers and on Twitter. This is in part owing to the commercial benefits that negative coverage and sentiments attract on the studied platforms.

5.4 The War against Boko Haram Frame

The War against Boko Haram frame is the second of the four echo frames identified in this study. This frame reflects the emphasis on the ongoing conflict between Boko Haram and countries in the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria. It also foregrounds Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy in response to attacks by Boko Haram.
Although the description of Boko Haram in terms of war is a common feature in the selected newspapers and on Twitter, the CHCA (see section 4.3.2) also highlights slight differences in terms of the application of the frame across the outlets/platforms. While Tweeters detail the internecine nature of the conflict, the papers place salience on the significance of the Sambisa victory and whether or not Nigeria is winning the war. Whereas the quantitative analysis (CHCA) is instrumental to the location of this frame, the MCDA of selected articles and tweets is required for uncovering the media and political contexts of the War against Boko Haram frame. Findings from the MCDA are illustrated below using the archetypal cluster members listed in Table 5.2 and Figures 5.6 – 5.12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline/Tweet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>17 March 2017</td>
<td>Five soldiers killed, three missing in Boko Haram attack – Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DT2</td>
<td>1 January 2017</td>
<td>The great Sambisa victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2</td>
<td>12 February 2017</td>
<td>Nigerian military and the cost of anti-terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>4 January 2017</td>
<td>Boko Haram war over in North East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>1 February 2017</td>
<td>Questions about Boko Haram fight-back after spate of attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T6</td>
<td>3 April 2017</td>
<td>RT @todayng: Troops kill 57 Boko Haram members in Borno battle – (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T7</td>
<td>4 March 2017</td>
<td>Nigerian Army Loses 31 Soldiers To Boko Haram Insurgency In February 2017 (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T8</td>
<td>11 February 2017</td>
<td>RT @africanews: Nigeria: Military kills over 30 Boko Haram insurgents, loses 7 soldiers in Borno (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T9</td>
<td>4 February 2017</td>
<td>See What Army Recovered After Engaging 35 Boko Haram Terrorists In Heavy Gun Battle (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T10</td>
<td>12 June 2017</td>
<td>Nigerian army kills Boko Haram leader, frees nine kids (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T11</td>
<td>1 January 2017</td>
<td>They say the war is over with boko haram….BUT today this are Nigeria soldiers killed about 7 hours ago Buhari keep lying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T12</td>
<td>16 February 2017</td>
<td>SO TOUCHING! See what young soldier fighting Boko Haram did with his bullets (PHOTOS) (link)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2. Newspaper articles and tweets from the War against Boko Haram cluster

5.4.1 The Media Context of the War Against Boko Haram Frame
Political actors such as journalists/media organisations, politicians and even terrorists usually make certain information more prevalent than others and construct events in ways that direct audiences’ attention to a particular aspect in order to influence public knowledge, behaviour and/or action. In the case of the War against Boko Haram
frame, the focus is on the battle between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state/LCBCs as well as the human cost of this conflict. This study argues that the emergence of the War against Boko Haram frame can be attributed to two important news values on the studied platforms, conflict and human interest. The literature indicates that conflict and human-interest stories and tweets can attract readership and visibility as well as advertisement dollars on the studied platforms (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Eilders, 2006; Harcup & O'Neil, 2017).

To establish the existence of the ongoing hostility, political actors on the respective platforms employ words that are associated with conflict. For instance, a majority of the 1,017 articles and tweets in this cluster include words like war, battle, victory, troop, military, arms, neutralise, kill, fight, target, capture, operation, strategy, attack, weapon, commander. These words indicate binary opposition between at least two belligerents, the Nigerian military and Boko Haram while excluding the complex nature of terrorism. The textual analysis also reveals the presence of naming/reference strategies, which are used to describe and qualify the belligerents. For example, in T6-T9, the Nigerian military is named Troops, Soldiers, Military, and Nigerian Army, while Boko Haram is called insurgents and terrorists. Although the terms insurgents and terrorists do not have universally accepted definitions, they both possess inherent negative predicational values/qualities. For example, as terrorists/insurgents, Boko Haram is classified as a group that seeks publicity in pursuit of other goals, and “use violence to produce various psychological effects – demoralising their enemies, demonstrating their movement’s strength, gaining public sympathy, and creating fear and chaos” (Paletz & Schmid, 1992, p. 2). In contrast, the military/army is generally regarded as a “sophisticated and competent arm of the state” (Ibeanu, cited in Emenyeonu, 1997, p. 39), designated to defend a country from all forms of aggression.
The military institution is also thought to possess a puritanical nature, a product of the bureaucratic structure of military organisations, which strictly adheres to a centralised command structure, hierarchy, discipline, internal communication, and esprit de corps (Finer, 1976, p. 5). These popular understandings about terrorists and the military means those labelled terrorists/insurgents are perceived negatively, while members of the military/army are typically respected and revered.

A similar trend is also observed in the papers. For instance, in P2 (a news story about a Boko Haram attack during which five soldiers were killed and three others declared missing), one of the parties in the conflict is referred to as follows: Nigerian Army, soldiers, lieutenant; while the other is labelled terrorist. Also, in DT2 (an editorial on the Sambisa victory) Boko Haram members are called insurgents and terrorists. The authors of DT2 also identify particular individuals and institutions that played critical roles in the Sambisa victory and some of them are collectivised and labelled the “biological fathers of the great victory” (DT2, p. 3). These include President Buhari, General Buratai (the chief of army staff), General Olonishakin (the chief of defence staff), Air Vice Marshal Sadiq Abubakar (the chief of air staff) and Major General Leo Irabor (the theatre commander of Operation Lafiya Dole). These “biological fathers of the great victory” (DT2, p. 3) are particularly distinguished by their military affiliation because even though President Buhari is now a civilian president, he is also an ex-military general. President Buhari and General Buratai are however, singularised in the article owing to their unique contribution to the Sambisa victory. In the words of the editors:

President Buhari, whose quietly effective leadership as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and his prudent mobilisation and deployment of national resources even in the midst of a debilitating economic recession turned the military around from a demoralised force only two years ago back into its professional and very effective fighting self. Much praise must also go to Chief of Army Staff Lt. General Tukur Buratai, whose extremely capable and committed leadership from the front .... (DT2, p. 3).
The words President, Chief, and Lieutenant General in the above excerpt are examples of referential strategies that underscore the status and prestige associated with the position the duo [Buhari and Buratai] occupy. In addition, Buhari and Buratai are assigned the following positive predicational strategies: effective leadership, prudent, professional, extremely capable, committed, and leadership from the front, which qualifies them as in-group members as these traits focus on the effect of their actions and capabilities. In contrast, Boko Haram’s characterisation as murderous insurgents, cowards, and boasters in the editorial illustrates its out-group status and morally evaluates it negatively.

However, in keeping with the objective of framing, which is to emphasise certain aspects of a story, while de-emphasising or excluding others; the above descriptions reflect only a part of the narrative about the belligerents. Even though Boko Haram is now a known terrorist organisation, the literature (see section 1.3.1) indicates the group began as a “largely peaceful, dissident sect...engaged in a number of self-help and social organising activities” in response to the shortfalls of the state (Matfess, 2017, p. 10-11). The group’s adoption of a welfarist agenda in its early years and under its late founder, Mohammed Yusuf, attracted a large followership of about 280,000 members within and outside Nigeria (Adegbulu, 2013, p. 266). Members of the group include “university lecturers, students, bankers, and commissioners and other officers of state, drug addicts, vagabonds, and generally lawless people” (Adesoji, 2014, p. 106); and northern religious and political elites (Akinola, 2015, p. 9). But, overtime in what Gray and Adeakin (2015) describe as a four-phase evolution, Boko Haram transitioned from a missionary organisation to a jihadist group and by 2015, the deadliest terrorist organisation in the world (Searcey & Santora, 2015). The reasons for the transformation
have been linked to a number of factors including government and security failures (Gray & Adeakin, 2015; Bappah, 2016).

Similarly, while the Nigerian military is positively depicted on the respective platforms, members of this institution are not always accorded lofty traits in Nigeria, due to their complicated history. On the one hand, the Nigerian military is lauded for their role in ensuring Nigeria remained united after the 1967-1970 civil war (Abdulrahman, 2014). Toyin (2015) also notes that the military intervention in Nigeria produced a new set of “elites who contributed a lot to the economic, social and political development of the country” (p. 194). Moreover, the Nigerian military is regarded by other nations and the United Nations (UN) as an important partner on the African front, with respect to their shared views on the rejection of military coups; putting an end to civil wars; and the establishment of peace and stability in war-torn regions. Towards these ends, the country is a significant contributor to the UNs’ peace keeping efforts (Campbell, 2013, p. xix).

But on the other hand, on the premise of restoring “an ethical, stable and democratic political system” (Agbese, 1996, p. 87), successive military administrations in Nigeria staged coups, countercoups, and palace coups. As a result, within the course of thirty-three years (1966-1999), Nigerians had experienced six successful, three attempted, five conspiracies to execute, and two political allegations of coup plots (Toyin, 2015, p. 197). The military, however, did not offer better governance standards and according to the Crisis Group (2016), these years of absolute rule had a negative impact on the military’s “professionalism, operational effectiveness and accountability” (para. 2). Agbiboa (2012) argues that the military administrations, which held the reins of leadership for about thirty years, “bequeathed to Nigeria a culture of corruption” (p. 331). In addition, the literature (see section 2.2.3) indicates that security agents in Nigeria have
engaged in the “excessive use of force, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortion, burning of houses, stealing money during raids, and extrajudicial killings of suspects” (Human Rights Watch, 2012, para. 3) in the campaign against Boko Haram. Pèrouse de Montclos (2016) also notes that Nigerian state security forces are responsible for about half the fatalities in the Boko Haram conflict between 2006 and 2016. The above historical contexts of the belligerents are key to understanding how their characterisation on the respective platforms could influence the judgement of readers/viewers including policy makers. For example, Boko Haram as terrorists and opponents of the Nigerian army in the context of war, provides justification for the use of extreme force against members of the group. The depiction of the key actors in the War against Boko Haram frame could also be related to the habitual repetition of long-established media narratives. This argument is further developed in section 5.4.2.

In addition to words that emphasise the conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian military, the articles and tweets in the War against Boko Haram cluster also include images. As is explained in chapter two, the incorporation of images is a routine media practice. The importance of images is traceable to the iconicity, indexicality and implicitness of visuals (Fahmy, 2010; Messaris & Abraham, 2001, p. 220). That is, the capacity of images to capture broader meanings, enhance the factuality of narratives and reflect communicated messages in a more precise manner. The images in the War against Boko Haram cluster are significant for two reasons. First, they reflect the textual description of Boko Haram and the Nigerian military in the selected newspapers and Twitter. Second, they highlight the differences in the discursive practices of the studied platforms.
The articles and tweets in this cluster consists of two main types of images categorised here as conventional and non-conventional. Conventional images include photographs of soldiers/people dressed in military gear, battle fatigues or suicide vests - “carrying the weapons of war and portraying the hardness of heart and a gung-ho attitude” (Cross, 2009, p. 872). They also comprise of pictures depicting victory, parades, battle scenes, and grisly photographs of those killed or mortally injured. Non-conventional photographs include selfies of soldiers. This second group of war images reflect the shifts in the visual representation of contemporary war occasioned by the rise of digital technologies (Silvestri, 2014). These are illustrated using Figures 5.6 – 5.12.

Figure 5.6. G2. Boko Haram war over in North East (Abuh & Musa, 2017)
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 are examples of conventional war images and are included in G2 and T10, respectively. The images consist of groups of soldiers (mostly men) dressed in camouflage and wielding weapons of war (guns, battle fatigues). The camouflage outfit is typically worn by the military but has also become a fashion statement (Tayo, 2016, para. 6). While combat uniforms may be freely worn by civilians in certain cultures, Sections 110, 111 and 251 of the Nigerian Criminal Code Act forbids non-members of the military from wearing the outfit. Thus, even though the battle fatigues and guns suggest that the men in the photographs are soldiers, the ill-fitting outfits; rolled-up trousers that reveal dusty legs and feet; and open-toe sandals depict the men in Figure 5.6 as ill-prepared, ill-equipped, disorganised and thus, illegitimate. Their use of masks to prevent identification also adds to their outlawed status. In fact, this band of men can be identified as Boko Haram members, owing to the presence of the partially cropped-off black flag, which bears an Arabic inscription. The flag is an emblem that is associated with ISIS, and thus, points to Boko Haram’s allegiance to the
organisation as earlier indicated in sections 1.1 and 1.3 of this study (Eke, 2015; Pieri & Zenn, 2016; Polonska-Kimunguyi & Gillespie, 2016).

In contrast, the soldiers in Figure 5.7 though dressed in camouflage, are shown in formation, while their parted lips indicate they are singing or chanting. Their pose also suggests they are marching - a kind of military parade and a warning signal to rivals regarding their readiness to act upon provocation. This is unlike the men in 5.6 who are shown sitting, an indication of lack of preparedness to engage in battle. The exposed faces of the soldiers in Figure 5.7 in addition to their location (urban setting) depicts their legitimate status, and within the context of the tweet, members of the Nigerian army. The visual depictions of the Nigerian army as legitimate/in-group members and Boko Haram as illegitimate/out-group members is consistent with the naming/referential and predicational strategies textually assigned to both groups.

Besides reflecting the textual labels and qualities assigned to the belligerents, the types of images employed within the War against Boko Haram cluster highlight the use of images as an important discursive practice on the respective platforms. But, while Tweeters employ both conventional and non-conventional images, the papers use only conventional images with the exclusion of actual battle scenes and grisly images, that is, bloodied bodies. These are instantiated using the photographs in Figures 5.8 – 5.10.
Figures 5.8 – 5.10 are examples of the conventional images (photographs of soldiers/people in military outfits or battle fatigues) used in the selected newspapers. The portraiture of a soldier (Figure 5.8) is included in DT2. The photo subject is identified as Chief of Army Staff Tukur Yusuf Buratai in the caption, while his dress code and rigid pose is associated with the military. Buratai’s hat, coat, ornaments attached to the coat, and the partially cropped off flag in the background; are all objects associated with a very high-ranking Nigerian military official of his stature. The colour of the flag, his facial skin and uniform seem slightly modified to enhance luminosity, differentiation, and saturation, depicting a powerful and imposing persona. Additionally, his demanding gaze and the close-up shot, jointly serve to command and arrest the attention of the viewer.

The above portrayal of Buratai mirrors his description in the article as an “extremely capable officer who leads from the front” (DT2, p. 3). It also sets him apart from Boko Haram commanders, who are described as either captured or out there
boasting, and thus, visually absent. Although Buratai is individualised in the photograph, he can be seen as the face of the “biological fathers of the great [Sambisa] victory” (DT2, p. 3), owing to their shared military background.

Figure 5.9. L2. Nigerian military and the cost of anti-terror (Agba, 2017, p. 23)

Figure 5.10. L2. Nigerian military and the cost of anti-terror (Agba, 2017, p. 24)

Whereas Boko Haram, the opposing force in the conflict is not visually captured in L2, the article is accompanied by five images (see Figures 5.9 – 5.10), captioned Buhari, Olonishakin, Buratai, Abubakar, and Ibas, respectively. The use of only last names in the caption, combined with the close-up shots, suggests that the author/editor
seeks to establish a moderate social distance between the readers and the photo subjects. President Buhari is dressed in civilian (northern) outfit while the military heads are shown in official attire. Although the five participants are bound by a common patriarchal military background, Buhari and Olonishakin, as in the text, are given more visual salience in terms of the larger sizes of their portraits. However, unlike Buhari whose shoulder is slightly slouched, Olonishakin like his other colleagues, adopts the formal, rigid, and strict pose associated with the military. Also, in contrast with the military chiefs, whose lips are closed, a hint at the military’s strict command and control tradition, the president’s lips are slightly open, an indication that the photograph was taken while he was speaking. This depiction points to Buhari’s material agency and textual reference as capable and effective. However, Boko Haram, the opposing force in this war, is not represented visually, which justifies their characterisation as captured or dislodged in the article. The images in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 are similar to Figure 5.8 in three ways: particular individuals are singularised; Boko Haram is visually excluded; and the overall depiction of the military parallels their textual characterisation in the article.
They say the war is over with *boko haram*...... BUT today this are nigeria soldiers killed about 7 hours ago Buhari keep lying.

SO TOUCHING! See what young soldier fighting *Boko Haram* did with his bullets (PHOTOS) [naij.com/1088887-young-...](naij.com/1088887-young-...)

Figure 5.11. T11

Figure 5.12. T12
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 are examples of images that are absent in the selected newspapers but present on Twitter. While Figure 5.11 is an example of a conventional war image, Figure 5.12 is a non-conventional war photograph.

Figures 5.11 shows bodies of the dead. The victims are shown dressed in bloodied camouflage/combat outfit, lying on the floor, surrounded by onlookers who are partially cropped off the photo. Although the Tweeter identifies these victims as members of the Nigerian army, as earlier stated, the combat uniform is worn by both in- and out-group members. However, the presence of civilian on-lookers suggests that the victims are more likely members of Boko Haram. Figure 5.12 comprises of two photo inserts. The image to the left is a selfie of a casually dressed soldier in the popular “duck face” pose also known as the “classic pouted lips pose” on social media (Rudolfo, 2015, para. 5). The soldier also has two fingers raised in a victory sign. The picture on the right of the viewer is a crafted message “miss home”, made using magazines (ammunition storage and feeding device) and bullets. While both items are weapons of war, they are in this photo transformed into an artistic piece, carrying an emotional message that reveals the softer and youthful side of the soldier. The message in addition to the angle of interaction (close-up) shot, also serves to humanise the soldier while cloaking his status as someone who is licensed to kill.

The availability of particular types of images on Twitter and their absence in the selected papers can be understood in terms of the discursive practices that are prevalent on the respective platforms. Three main reasons can be adduced for the absence of grisly photographs in the selected outlets. First, newspapers are bound by certain professional ethical codes of conduct. The exclusion of gory images within this context
may be as a result of their offensive and/or inflammatory nature. This finding is consistent with Ojebuyi and Salawu’s (2018) observation that Nigerian newspapers “exercised ethical restraint by choosing images with nuanced configurations that are less likely to amplify moral panic or intensify horrid feelings” (p. 1). Second, newspapers are subject to government control. Pictorial depictions of war impact citizen’s reaction to war (Graber, 1987; 1990); perception about defeat or victory (Dauber, 2001; Aday, Cluverius & Livindston, 2005); and knowledge about the costs of warfare (Pfau et al. 2006). Since the dominant government narrative about the war is that Boko Haram has been technically defeated, images like Figure 5.11 may not serve the government’s interest. The newspapers may, therefore, be restricted from publishing these types of images owing to the sensitive nature of Boko Haram. In addition, terrorism as carried out by Boko Haram is a subject of national interest and as such is subject to much scrutiny. Lastly, the absence of some types of war images in the papers may be as a result of lack of access to war zones and poor funding (Uwazuruike, 2018).

Unlike newspapers, Twitter can be resistant to editorial control/regulation (Klausen, 2015; Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013), a consequence of the platform’s logic and affordances such as programmability, datafication and networked association. Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) note for instance, that in contrast with traditional gatekeeping practices, “which applied to the daily news practices of elite newsrooms engaged in an agenda setting process with passive audiences”, networked gatekeeping allows users to determine both the nature and flow of content (p. 142). This, therefore, means that on Twitter, users are part of the decision-making processes formerly reserved for elite/conventional sources. Thus, while the selected newspapers mainly utilise conventional photographs such as images of popular political figures like the president and the military chiefs, Tweeters employ both conventional and non-conventional
images including selfies of ordinary soldiers as seen in Figure 5.12. The presence of selfies on Twitter can be attributed to the nature of the platform, one that allows individuals to express themselves in relation to others within their networks (Colleoni, Rozza & Arvidsson, 2014, p. 319; Welbers & Opgenhaffen, 2019).

Moreover, the inclusion of visually compelling and emotionally stimulating images such as Figure 5.11, is part of the routine of Twitter since such images can quickly spread across the network and Twitter is given to virality. As previously outlined in chapter two, in addition to messages that resonate with the audience and novel content, images also gain traction on Twitter (Kirby & Marsden, 2006; Shifman & Blondheim, 2010; Petrovic, Osborne, & Lavrenko, 2011; Uysal & Croft, 2011; Kim & Yoo, 2012; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012; Asur & Huberman, 2010; Nahon & Hemsley, 2013). Thus, even though images contribute to the development of the War against Boko Haram frame on the studied platforms, they play far more important roles on Twitter since the images employed on this platform provide a more robust representation of the ongoing conflict.

As earlier mentioned, the articles and tweets in the War against Boko Haram cluster emphasise the Boko Haram conflict, and conflict is as an important news selection/visibility parameter on the studied platforms (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95; Bartholomé, Lecheler, & de Vreese, 2015; Harcup & O’Neil, 2017). While conflict stories can attract readership and advertisements in legacy outlets, stories and images about war can easily go viral on Twitter (Elders, 2006; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001). This explains the popularity of the War against Boko Haram frame in the selected newspapers and on Twitter. In addition to conflict, the unconventional war images such as gory photographs of the dead possess a human-interest value that
Tweeters can easily resonate with. These images can trigger emotional responses from users as well as provide a more realistic representation of the war on Boko Haram in ways that are absent in the selected newspapers. As also stated in the literature review chapter, news values such as conflict and human-interest not only guide news selection or lend to visibility but are also key for determining aspects of the discourse that are emphasised. This study argues that the conflict and human-interest news values are critical to the emergence of the War against Boko Haram frame in the selected newspapers and on Twitter.

5.4.2 The Political Context of the War against Boko Haram Frame

Having explored the textual, visual, and discursive practices expressed in selected cluster members, this section focuses on the social practices level of analysis and serves to locate the War against Boko Haram frame within a wider political context.

The War against Boko Haram frame as earlier described reflects the emphasis on the conflict between Boko Haram and the LCBCs, especially Nigeria. The country has been engaged in a decade-long conflict with the group resulting in the loss of thousands of lives (Lederer, 2017). This frame, therefore, foregrounds Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy in response to attacks by the group and as the preferred solution to the Boko Haram problem. The idea that Nigeria is at war with Boko Haram can be traced to a statement made by former President Goodluck Jonathan. Following many Boko Haram attacks aimed at both civilian and military targets, ex-President Jonathan said: “it would appear that there is a systematic effort by insurgents and terrorists to destabilise the Nigerian state and test our collective resolve…. These actions amount to a declaration of war….” (Fox News, 2013, para. 5 & 9). This statement set in motion the understanding that Nigeria is under attack and has joined the band of nations engaged in the war against terrorism. Jonathan also embraced the popular war on
terrorism model, which “tends to portray the struggle against terrorism in military terms as being of an enemy-centric war, where the armed forces of a state are primarily in charge of developing and executing a counterterrorism strategy” (Oyewole, 2013, p. 254). This was subsequently followed by increased military spending and training. To this extent, Jonathan’s declaration can be compared to Bush’s war on terror, a policy directive initiated by the Bush administration after the 9/11 attacks. The War against Boko Haram frame can, therefore, be compared to Reese and Lewis’ (2009) war on terror frame – the policy response to 9/11, which was internalised, reified, and naturalised by the American press. The presence of the War against Boko Haram frame on the respective platforms is an indication that like the war on terror frame, it has been adopted without question by political actors in the selected newspapers and on Twitter.

But the so-called war on Boko Haram is quite different from America’s war on terror. While America’s enemies were portrayed as existing outside her borders; the founder, known leaders, alleged sponsors and some members of Boko Haram are Nigerians, meaning this supposed war against Boko Haram could also be interpreted as a civil war. But, the characterisation of this conflict as a war against Boko Haram fits into the global terrorism narrative, makes Nigeria relevant in terms of the global war against terror (Oyewole, 2013), and sets the stage for financial support from the West. For instance, the UK has pledged about £40 million over a four-year period, while the EU has assisted the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with €50 million (AFP, 2016). This war also means increased defence spending in Nigeria and the perpetuation of military dominance in Nigeria – the military is the most powerful elite/political class in the county. For instance, in 2018, President Buhari approved the release of one billion dollars for the purchase of weapons to fight Boko Haram (Ugwuanyi, 2018). However, much of the funds dedicated to fighting Boko Haram have been misappropriated by the Nigerian military and
other political elites. According to a media report, anti-Boko Haram funds “have disappeared through kickbacks, payments to "ghost soldiers" who don’t exist, or via no-bid contracts resulting in inflated spending that benefits politically-connected contractors... $15 billion was lost on fraudulent arms procurement deals alone” (Solomon, 2017, paras. 3 & 4).

Like the war on terror, which has yielded only limited success, Nigeria’s military-based response to Boko Haram has also not been entirely successful. At the basic level, shortfalls in counterterrorism can be linked to the complex nature of terrorism in terms of its lack of a universal definition, its evolution and diverse manifestations (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefer, 2004; Merari, 1993; Tilly, 2004) and the mixed findings on the root causes of terrorism (Kreiger & Meierrieks, 2011). In addition to these issues, Nigeria’s failed military campaign against Boko Haram has been attributed to the erosion of military professionalism under civilian rule from 1999; the poor handling of the conflict by top military officers; and a lack of decisive leadership (Bappah, 2016, p. 146). It is also important to point out that the use of brute force is Nigeria’s typical reaction to most expressions of economic and political conflicts within the country, an approach which has been highly criticised (Boele, Fabig & Wheeler, 2001; Ugochukwu, 2013).

The echo status of the War against Boko Haram frame means it is visible in the selected newspapers and Twitter. However, in chapter four (see section 4.3.2), the CHCA highlighted two variations in the application of the frame. The first relates to an inter-platform distinction. While Tweeters emphasise the internecine nature of the conflict, the papers place salience on who is winning or losing the war. For example, in DT2 and L2, the military and President Buhari are hailed as heroes who have defeated Boko Haram. In contrast to this, Tweeters note the government’s claim about the demise of Boko Haram is untrue and the tweet “They say the war is over with boko
haram….BUT today this are Nigeria soldiers killed about 7 hours ago Buhari keep lying (SIC)” (T11), illustrates this. This inter-platform difference on the state of the conflict can be explained by the capacity of Twitter to yield counter-establishment frames or offer “rival visions of ‘reality’” (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003, p. 5), enabled by the logic and affordances of the platform. For example, Twitter gives voice to a wide range of users who can express their personal and professional thoughts on issues of interest. The platform also offers alternative “modes of witnessing” societal events (Kuntsman, 2010, p. 2).

The second type of variance observed in the application of the War against Boko Haram frame occurred between the selected newspapers. While the northern papers (Daily Trust and Leadership) endorse the government’s claim about the defeat of Boko Haram, the southern papers (The Guardian and Punch) query the president’s claim about the possible end of Boko Haram. The extant literature on the factors that could lead to the demise of terrorist organisations offers a possible explanation for the positions adopted by the papers. For example, the ouster of Boko Haram members from their stronghold could be described as a short-run or reactive counterinsurgency/terrorism approach that could either lead to the elective/temporary decline or imposed/permanent decline of the group (Becker, 2017, p. 215). However, the nature of the Nigerian media ecology offers a more plausible reasoning for the stances adopted by the papers.

President Buhari’s New Year message on January 1, 2017 (one of the Boko Haram-related media events identified in this study – see section 5.2) includes a tribute to the military that he claimed had ousted Boko Haram from Sambisa forest. This event inspired media debates about the possible end of the Boko Haram war, leading to conversations about the demise of the group. While the president and the military chiefs
are celebrated for vanquishing Boko Haram in the northern papers (Daily Trust and Leadership), The Guardian and the Punch describe the Sambisa victory as an isolated success, one that could have unintended consequences including instigating reprisal attacks by the group. This is illustrated below.

For example, in the Daily Trust, the president and the military chiefs are labelled the “biological fathers of the great victory” (DT2, p.3). This is similar to this excerpt in the Leadership: “President Buhari’s government deserved praise for making the most strategic choice of the present crop of tested, highly committed and patriotic military leaders who brought Boko Haram to its knees” (L2, p. 23). These statements indicate that for the northern papers, the Nigerian army is winning the conflict with Boko Haram, a defeated foe. In contrast, G3, which is published by The Guardian, is an appraisal of two claims made by the Nigerian government regarding the state of Nigeria’s war on Boko Haram. In the words of the author: “In December 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari said the Islamist militants were “technically defeated”. Twelve months later, he said troops had run them out of their final enclave” (G3, para. 2). But, the author notes that “Throughout January, however, there were repeated attacks in Nigeria as well as in neighbouring Niger and Cameroon, raising questions about the extent of the claims of success” (para. 4). In addition, the writer draws on the account of security experts to reach the conclusion that “the rebel fighters have merely been dispersed throughout the remote region around Lake Chad and are biding their time to regroup” (para. 13). G3 can be compared to P2, which includes excerpts from a video published by Boko Haram, where the group issued “fresh threats, saying it would not rest until caliphates were established in six African countries namely Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Mali and Benin Republic” (p. 10). Thus, unlike the northern papers, for The Guardian and the
Punch (southern papers), the Boko Haram war is not over, and the military is not winning the war.

Although political actors can adopt similar frames and apply them differently within a given context, (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Berbers et al., 2016), the difference in opinions about the state of the war on Boko Haram, which occurred along the regional affiliations of the selected papers is quite instructive. This is owing to the polarised nature of the Nigerian media/press ecology. The Nigerian press as noted in chapter one is bifurcated “along ethnic, regional, religious, and primordial lines” (Olukotun, 2008, p. 13). This is evidenced in the presence of two dominant printing/publishing hubs – the Lagos-Ibadan, and the Abuja axes. Since the president and a majority of the military chiefs are from the north (Bayewu, 2016), the position of the northern papers on the Boko Haram war may have been influenced by their ethnic affiliation, location on the Nigerian map and/or their role as the northern voice. The papers may also have been acting as a megaphone for the state by providing evidence that suggests the president’s claims about the technical defeat of Boko Haram is true. Like the northern papers, the southern papers may also be acting in their capacity as the voice of the south. As representatives of the north and south, the papers stand to commercially benefit from their construction of the Boko Haram conflict, especially owing to the nature of the Nigerian state where ethnicity is a significant identity marker.

5.5 The War against Women Frame
The War against Women is the third echo frame identified in this study. Political actors on the respective platforms use the frame to underscore Boko Haram’s deployment of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls as is outlined in section 4.3.3. This cluster of 786 tweets and articles contains stories that describe women as targets of abduction, rape, and forced marriage by Boko Haram. The articles
and tweets also present details about the psychological trauma experienced by Boko Haram survivors, the social exclusion of former Boko Haram brides, and the sufferings of women in IDP camps. Additionally, the War against Women frame is reflected in the narratives about the Chibok girls - a group of 276 secondary schoolgirls, who were kidnapped by Boko Haram in April 2014. Eighty-two of these girls were released in May 2017, an event earlier identified as a Boko Haram-related media event in section 5.2. The War against Women frame is the most frequently applied frame on Twitter but clearly distinguishable in only one newspaper – The Guardian.

Having identified the War against Women frame as one of the interpretative packages used in the construction of Boko Haram on the studied platforms, this section explores the political and media context of the frame. In this section, this study credits the visibility of the frame on the investigated platforms to two discursive practices: the role of sources/users and news values (bad news, celebrity, exclusivity, good news, shareability, follow up, drama, audio-visual, and news organisation’s agenda). Exclusivity, good news and shareability are particularly important within the context of Twitter. This is as a result of the platform’s affordances of persistence, visibility, and networked association. The bad news and news organisation’s agenda news values pertain to The Guardian as these are critical to the internal logic of the paper. These findings are exemplified using the War against Women cluster members in Tables 5.3 - and Figures 5.13 - 5.16. This phase of the study provides answers to the question on how the War against Women frame evinces the norms, practices, logic of the respective platforms and the affordances of Twitter as well as how the frame reflects the Nigerian state and its media ecology.
Table 5.3. Newspaper articles and tweets from the War against Women cluster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline/Tweet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>2 April 2017</td>
<td>Boko Haram abducts 22 girls, women in Borno.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5</td>
<td>8 April 2017</td>
<td>Five wounded in Maiduguri suicide bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6</td>
<td>12 April 2017</td>
<td>Rise in Boko Haram child suicide bombers 'alarming', says UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T13</td>
<td>11 January 2017</td>
<td>RT @Sumner_Sambo: JUST IN: Boko Haram kills two, abducts three school girls in a fresh attack on a village at Madagali Local Govt Area of...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T14</td>
<td>25 January 2017</td>
<td>UPDATE: Boko Haram Kidnap 7 Women, Kill 3 (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T19</td>
<td>2 June 2017</td>
<td>Boko Haram also forces girls into &quot;marriage&quot; without ceremony with Boko Haram fighters. The girls are repeatedly raped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T20</td>
<td>6 January 2017</td>
<td>RT @USATODAY: Rakiya Abubakar, one of the schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram, was found with a 6-month-old child: (link) #BokoHaram #Nigerianpolice #Nigeria #Africa #AIShabab #ISIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T21</td>
<td>12 January 2017</td>
<td>RT @UNICEF: Boko Haram have used 117 children in 'suicide' attacks since 2014. More than 80% were girls. (link) #ENDviolen...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T22</td>
<td>5 May 2017</td>
<td>Dressed for death: the women Boko Haram sent to blow themselves up (link) #BokoHaram #Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T23</td>
<td>24 February 2017</td>
<td>How Boko Haram Sex Slaves Turn Sex Workers In Europe (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T24</td>
<td>8 May 2017</td>
<td>RT @AFP: 82 of the over 200 Nigerian schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram in 2014 arrive in Abuja, after a prisoner swap deal (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T25</td>
<td>6 January 2017</td>
<td>RT @GlobalRepCentre: We're working w/ Nigerian journalists reporting PTSD in girls kidnapped by Boko Haram. Support here: (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T26</td>
<td>24 May 2017</td>
<td>RT @bits.of.borno: 'Anywhere you would go, you had to listen to people whispering about you. She's a Boko haram wife. She was brought in f...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T27</td>
<td>28 January 2017</td>
<td>Young women who were captives of Boko Haram speak.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.1 The Media Context of the War against Women Frame

Although terrorist organisations attack civilians, non-combatants and the military, the narratives in this cluster single out women as specific and special targets of Boko Haram’s violent onslaughts. This representation is achieved on both platforms by the textual emphasis on the gender of victims as seen in G4 - G6, T13 - T14, and T19 - T22. For instance, in G4, a story published in the event of a Boko Haram attack in Pulka, a village in Borno state, Nigeria, women/girls are described as being kidnapped, abducted, forcibly bundled, seized, and likely to end up as brides to insurgents. Similarly, on Twitter, women/girls are depicted as forcibly married off (T19), impregnated (T20), weaponised (T21; T22), turned into slaves (T23), and/or swapped in exchange for imprisoned members/commodified (T24). These predicational strategies suggest the victimhood, passivity and the vulnerability of women and girls. The victimisation of women also extends beyond their physical interaction with Boko Haram as seen in the
textual accounts about the impact of Boko Haram on the mental health (post-traumatic stress disorder) of kidnapped girls (T25) and the social stigma associated with the label *Boko Haram wife* (T26).

The textual characterisation of women and girls mirrors their visual representation on the respective platforms. For example, the tweet in T27 (Figure 5.13) contains information about some former Boko Haram captives, who owing to their free status, can now speak, thereby functioning as verbal agents, that is, persons represented as saying something (Machin, 2007). On the one hand, the veils (Chador) worn by the girls depicts them as Muslims. But on the other hand, the near-zero degree of articulation (dark background and lighting) and veils, which cover sections of their head, face, and body indicate deliberate attempts by the photographer to shield the identities of the photo subjects. In addition, the medium shot signals the establishment of a moderate social distance between the participants and viewers, while the horizontal angle of interaction and off-frame gaze calls for a more detached involvement. This means that viewers function as spectators invited into the minds of the photo subjects. Thus, while the women/girls in the photograph are textually described as verbal agents, their visual depiction points to their function as exhibits, incorporated in the tweet to demonstrate the vulnerability of women beyond their physical contact with Boko Haram. This is because, while the women can tell their story, their shared Boko Haram experience is still having a major impact on their social life, thus placing a limit on their power of expression.
Young women who were captives of Boko Haram speak. Photographs by @stephsinclair in @nytopinion nyti.ms/2kF83VJ

10:19 AM - 28 Jan 2017

Figure 5.13. T27

A member of Civilian JTF, Tanko Dahiru has said suspected Boko Haram gunmen, in a convoy of pickup trucks, attacked Pulka village in Borno State, kidnapping 18 girls and four women, without killing or injuring any person.

PHOTO: AFP

Figure 5.14. G4. Boko Haram abducts 22 girls, women in Borno (Musa, 2017).
In contrast to the women and girls, Boko Haram is depicted as made up of dangerous men as can be seen from one of the most frequently used visual depiction of Boko Haram on both platforms – Figure 5.14. This image is included in G4 and shows a group of about fourteen men, in an unidentified location. Thirteen of the participants are shown in masks, which cover a large portion of their faces. However, this band of men can be identified as members of Boko Haram owing to the presence of the Boko Haram/ISIS black flag held by two of the photo subjects, and Shekau (the Boko Haram leader and fourteenth subject in the photo). Shekau is individualised in the photo by his outfit (camouflage) and placement in the photograph, while his unveiled face signals a fearless attitude. His slightly parted lips suggest that he is speaking to the mounted camera placed to his left. The pose of the participants in the photograph, in addition to objects like guns depicts the group as combat-ready and dangerous.

The visual analysis also points to the repeated inclusion of the photographs of the Chibok girls as culturally resonating symbols in the framing of Boko Haram as anti-women on the investigated platforms. The images of the Chibok girls are classified in this study as follows: Abduction images (pictures of the girls in their abducted state and within Boko Haram-controlled environment), and Advocacy images (photographs of individuals and groups raising awareness about the girls). The most pronounced structural feature within these images is the subject/participant – the Chibok girls – who are denotatively depicted as in Figure 5.15, and/or connotatively represented with the aid of visual symbols as in Figure 5.16.
Figure 5.15 is a screenshot taken from a video released by Boko Haram and incorporated in G7. Apart from the girls standing or sitting in the background, one girl is shown speaking into a microphone held by someone else, an indication that she is in a controlled environment, and suggests the words spoken may not necessarily be hers. The person holding the microphone though partially cropped off is shown wearing an outlawed outfit - the camouflage. The use of the combat outfit signals Boko Haram’s status as a rebel group, acting in defiance of state laws. The group’s illegitimacy is also expressed by their capturing of the Chibok girls and holding them against their will.

The girls are shown wearing Chadors, a veil worn by women of the Islamic faith. But beyond this denotative meaning, the chador is also a symbolic object, intersecting discourses of power, identity, gender, and religion (Milani, 1992, p. 21). This is because even though Islamic veils have been characterised “as a signifier of Islam’s oppression of women” (Chan-Malik, 2011, p. 121), it has also been used as an icon of resistance against “anti-religious and despotic” leaders (Pliskin, 2009, p. 125). Golnaraghi and Dye
(2016) confirm this by arguing that at the core of the inconsistencies in western constructions of the veil-wearing Muslim woman, is the veil as a form of oppression/submission and the veil as empowerment/resistance (p. 137). However, in the context of Figure 5.15, all or nearly all of the Chibok girls are Christians (Harris, 2014), meaning they may have been compelled to wear the chador in conformance with Boko Haram’s standards for how women should dress. As Matfess (2017) points out, “female covering is an important marker of membership in the group” (p. 116), while the monochromatic veils by a majority of the girls in Figure 5.15 marks them as married (p. 117) - an indication that the insurgents may have carried out their threat of marrying off the kidnapped girls (Lere, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2014). This depiction of the Chibok girls in a Boko Haram-controlled environment highlights their status as victims and Boko Haram as kidnappers.

Figure 5.16 embodies the three visual themes that engender effective political activism found in Kharroub and Bas’ (2016) analysis of Twitter images of the 2011
Egyptian revolution. These include: “crowds, protest activities, and symbols of unity” (p. 1979). According to the authors:

Images of crowds participating in protests indicate a resource and signify the power of the people; when there are many people taking part in the movement, efficacy increases as the belief in the movement’s potential for success increases. Similarly, images of people protesting (people holding signs, marching, chanting slogans, etc.) can enable people to overcome their fear and feel empowered to join the movement. Images of unifying symbols ... invoke a sense of community by making salient the collective inclusive identity and hence increase identification with the movement and efficacy beliefs, where efficacy increases the likelihood to participate in the movement (p. 1979).

In Figure 5.16, the crowd of people are dressed in red-themed outfits, which collectivises them as a group, while the slogans on their banners and T-shirt inscription - #Bringbackourgirls, identifies the group as members of the Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) movement. The crowd size speaks to the membership strength of the BBOG as well as solidarity for the Chibok girls. Their pose [marching and chanting/singing, due to parted lips] indicates this is a protest, while the branded banners, raised hands and/or clenched fists, indicates strength, defiance, and resistance. Although the Chibok girls are not visually present, the BBOG movement, as well as the other visual elements in the photograph, are associated with the girls. #BringBackOurGirls is a 2014 Twitter campaign launched in reaction to the Nigerian government’s poor handling of the Chibok kidnap. The group has since evolved into a global interest/advocacy group dedicated to the release of the kidnapped Chibok girls and the security of the Nigerian state (bringbackourgirls.ng, 2014). BBOG’s activism is mainly expressed through daily
protests at the Unity Fountain, Abuja, Nigeria; and “tally of the number of days since the girls had been abducted” (Matfess, 2017, p. 74).

The advocacy image in Figure 5.16 is particularly relevant within the context of Twitter. Although social media have been criticised for promoting “‘desktop’ activism, where citizens try to change the world with mouse clicks while engaging very little with ‘on the ground’ social movements”, Twitter in particular, has emerged as an important vehicle for political communication. This is owing to the platform’s affordances and “features of always-on persistence, light-weight scripting, open infrastructural base, and portable back-end interface” (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013, p. 139). These for instance, enable activists like the BBOG movement to draw attention to their causes by directly engaging with the public while circumventing legacy outlets. Twitter’s 280-character limit translates to brevity and comprehensibility of content, and lends to virality, visibility and editability of tweets. Although character restriction may result in the inability to provide detailed information, Twitter allows for the inclusion of hyperlinks, which means social movements can direct users to other platforms where longer forms of texts can be presented (Buente, 2017). Apart from words, Twitter allows for the inclusion of images and the literature indicates that visuals play more critical roles in the construction of meaning (Mandel & Shaw, 1973, p. 355; Powell, Boomgaard, de Swert & de Vreese, 2015). In fact, Powell Boomgaard, de Swert and de Vreese (2015) argue that “images generate stronger framing effects on opinions and behavioural intentions than text” (p. 997). Moreover, the inclusion of high-quality images on Twitter also increases the likelihood of spreadability of content on the platform (Kirby & Marsden, 2006; Shifman & Blondheim, 2010; Petrovic, Osborne, & Lavrenko, 2011; Uysal & Croft, 2011; Kim & Yoo, 2012; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012; Asur & Huberman, 2010; Nahon & Hemsley, 2013).
The utilisation of photographs of the Chibok girls in the selected newspapers and on Twitter can be understood in terms of the significance of the kidnap of the girls in the discourse of Boko Haram. Although Boko Haram had been known to cause mayhem around the Lake Chad Basin, the 2014 abduction event placed the group on the global map as a vicious terrorist group and kidnappers of vulnerable girls. The incident also “helped establish a narrative of Jonathan [Nigeria’s president at the time] as ineffective, uncaring, and incompetent…. helped usher General Buhari into the Nigerian presidency, following electoral delays related to instability in the north-east” (Matfess, 2017, p. 74). Whereas the Jonathan administration was quite indifferent in managing the abduction, Shekau took advantage of the global attention the kidnap summoned to gain notoriety. The Chibok kidnap event is, therefore, a major milestone in the history of Boko Haram as previously noted in section 4.3.3. However, the repeated reference to the girls in this cluster, points to their hypervisibility in the discourse of Boko Haram and this is owing to their culturally resonating quality as overtime, “the Chibok girls have become part of the insurgency’s identity, narrative and internal organisation” (Matfess, 2017, p. 81). This also explains why the Chibok girls receive more attention and coverage compared to other kidnapped victims. The girls can, thus, be described as objects of “irregular gaze or fascination” (Sjoberg, 2018, p. 298).

The above textual and visual portrayal of women and girls is consistent with media practices. As Chetty (2004) notes, the media typically “emphasises the pain, suffering, and vulnerability of women … depicts women as recipients of suffering, as being acted upon by hegemonic forces which render them agentless” (Chetty, 2004, p. 38). This type of representation serves to transport the emotion and experiences of the victims to a larger audience. This characterisation of survivors can also trigger psychological and emotional responses from viewers thereby galvanising support for
actions taken against Boko Haram (Bradley, Codispoty, Cuthbert & Lang, 2001; Iyer & Oldmeador, 2006). However, the representation of women as casualties and sufferers overlooks other realities. Like most violent groups, Boko Haram relies on women to execute different functions: “collaborators, informers, human shields, recruiters, sexual baits in person and over the Internet, and as perpetrators of acts of destruction and death” (Berko & Erez, 2007, p. 494). This means that women play functional roles and are key to the group’s operations. The Chibok girls can also be seen as being critical for the group’s strategic goals (Berko & Erez, 2007). This is because, the BBOG campaign on the one hand, made the Chibok girls a global concern and on the other, set the stage for the subsequent branding and commodification of the girls by Boko Haram, Nigeria, and international organisations (Matfess, 2017). For instance, Boko Haram leveraged on the status of the girls as one of the world’s most valuable hostages for securing the release of five of its members, and possibly obtaining ransom payments worth millions of dollars from the Nigerian government (Parkinson & Hinshaw, 2017). Both achievements are of strategic importance to Boko Haram because violent groups need funding and membership for the continuation of their campaigns. The stereotypic portrayal of women as reflected on the investigated platforms, serves to highlight “male invulnerability and male insensitivity” (p. 38), while excluding women’s other roles as wilful perpetrators or fighters (Berko & Erez, 2007). This is especially because women are not just passive subjects or “pawns” (Zenn & Pearson, 2014, p. 47) who are “brainwashed, manipulated or indoctrinated” (Nnam, Arua & Otu, 2018, p. 35) by violent groups. The representation of women and girls in this cluster, therefore, aids Boko Haram’s cause as well as contributes to the framing of Boko Haram as anti-women.

The emergent frame, War against Women can, therefore, be attributed to some of the discursive practices of the studied platforms including the role of sources/users.
and the impact of news values. This is because these critical features of the internal logic of platforms can influence aspects of political narratives that are highlighted or minimised. For example, accounts about Boko Haram’s sexual and gender-based violence in The Guardian are provided by established sources that are deemed as credible in legacy media. These include international organisations, security agents, politicians, and celebrities as is seen in G6. For example, G6 includes the below extract:

Since 2014, 117 children — the “vast majority” of them girls — have been used to carry out attacks in public places across Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon, said the report by the United Nations children’s agency UNICEF. Four children were used to carry out bomb attacks in 2014, 56 in 2015, 30 in 2016 and 27 in the first three months of 2017, reported UNICEF (G6, para. 4&5).

The above statement, which is credited to UNICEF emphasises the use of mainly girls in Boko Haram’s suicide campaigns. As an international agency dedicated to the welfare of children globally, UNICEF is regarded as an authentic source that provides factual information/statistical evidence. In addition, most of Boko Haram’s anti-women narratives in The Guardian are made available by male sources as instantiated in G4. The story in G4 is written by a male in-house staff of The Guardian, Njadvara Musa, who relies on the account of three male sources for the construction of the article. They include a member of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Tanko Dahiru; the village head of Pulka, and a villager, Umaru Hodo. The three sources provide the security-based information – the CJTF is a member of the security architecture in Borno State and a strategic partner in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency campaign; and eyewitness accounts (village head and one villager), which serve to boost the authenticity of the story. This points to a form of ‘hierarchy of credibility’ (Kuehn, 2018, p. 405), where the CJTF officer is deemed more credible than the other sources, owing to his supposed access to...
confidential or restricted information (Greenberg and Hier, 2009; Papacharissi & De Fatima Oliveira, 2008). However, while the stories are about women, female sources are rendered voiceless as they are not included in the narratives. The frequent reference to women in The Guardian’s War against Women cluster echoes the earlier argument about the hypervisibility of women, while their absence as sources signals the invisibility of women in narratives about them.

The hypervisibility and invisibility of women is also apparent on Twitter. Although the tweets in this cluster include direct and indirect accounts by women, they are mostly represented as passive victims as is seen in their textual and visual depiction on the platform. For example, T26 is a retweet referencing a statement made by someone who is recounting her personal experience about the social exclusion and isolation associated with the label, Boko Haram wife. Although the individual could via Twitter share her experience, which reflects her verbal agency, she is still depicted as a victim. This is an indication that the victimhood and passivity of women in The Guardian and on Twitter is a common trend.

The above characterisations of women/girls and Boko Haram can be traced to a traditional media trend that portrays women as non-violent and peaceful; and terrorists as male-dominated and dangerous (Nacos, 2005). While masculinity is associated with violence, power, and abuse of women; women are thought to possess an intrinsic universal human value as mothers, leading to their depiction as vulnerable victims and hence, the need for protection during conflicts (Alison, 2004; Berkowitz, 2005; Gardner, 2007; Machin, 2007).

The replication of this type of gendered representation on Twitter is an indication that this traditional media trend has seeped into social media. This can be explained by two discursive practices that apply to Twitter: the logic of popularity and datafication.
The logic of popularity captures how social media use is now “skewed toward those who disproportionately affect news coverage, and by extension the public agenda” (Hemsley, Garcia-Murillo & MacInnes, 2018, p. 324) despite the platform’s early egalitarian objective. For instance, the logic of popularity in the context of this frame, means that mass media stereotypes about women can be applied on Twitter since the platform is mainly utilised by political actors that have the strongest voices on legacy platforms. Datafication on the other hand, reflects the ability of social media platforms to quantify real-time data as well as deploy said data for various uses including extracting trending topics. The logic of datafication explains the possible spread of received and conventional ideas about women, as prominent actors in the Twitter environment have a larger network of followers compared to ordinary users. This is owing to Twitter’s follow feature, which enables non-reciprocal linkages, that is, users can follow people who do not follow them (Colleoni, Rozza and Arvidsson (2014).

The appearance of the War against Women frame is also associated with the occurrence of two of the Boko Haram-related events mentioned in section 5.2. These include the third-year anniversary of the kidnap of the Chibok girls in April 2017 and the release of eighty-two of the girls following negotiations with the sect in May 2017. These events offered opportunities for political actors to revisit the Chibok abduction, raise concerns about the welfare of the girls (those already released and those still in captivity), and generally weigh in on the plight of women and girls in the Boko Haram conflict. Both events qualify for coverage as a result of the following news values: celebrity, exclusivity, good news, shareability, follow up, drama, audio-visual, and news organisation’s agenda (Harcup & O’Neil, 2017, p. 1482). Four of these (celebrity, follow up, drama and audio-visual) are relevant on both platforms. First, the celebrity feature pertains to stories about famous people, a status which fits the profile of the Chibok girls.
For instance, Matfess (2017) argues that the activism around the Chibok girls fetishises as well as dehumanises them, “as they are elevated to near-mythic status” (p. 80). Second, stories about the Chibok girls have been part of the news since 2014 and thus, the anniversary and the release of eighty-two Chibok girls are follow-up events. As running stories, they constitute a form of external intertextuality (Richardson, 2017) relevant for the construction of Boko Haram-related articles and tweets. Moreover, accounts about the girls usually include audio-visual material, which contributes to their overall appeal.

In addition to the above four news selection criteria, three other news values are worth mentioning with respect to Twitter. These include exclusivity, good news, and shareability. News about the released Chibok girls was first disseminated on Twitter. In addition to being “a ‘social’ and a ‘newsy’” (Colleoni, Rozza & Arvidsson, 2014, p. 319) platform where users can produce and distribute content, Twitter is an “adept news breaking tool” for both journalists and ordinary users (Wasike, 2013, p. 7). News about the release of the girls first broke on Twitter on 6 May 2017, that is, the same day the girls were freed. The exclusive, and positive nature of the news about the released girls, accounts for its shareability and virality as positive and emotionally stimulating content are more frequently distributed on Twitter (Berger & Milkman, 2012; Klinger, 2013). These features explain the surge in Boko Haram-related tweets around the 6 – 8 May 2017 (see the point marked with a red arrow in Figure 5.18), which covers the period following the release of the girls. As is also explained in section 2.3.1, shareable stories on social media can be picked up by legacy outlets (Buente, 2017), enabling Twitter to serve as a news source for other media organisations. For instance, CNN referenced the tweet in Figure 5.17 in its first story about the release of the girls on the 7th of May 2017, a day after the girls were released (Busari & McCleary, 2017).
Thus, the emergence of the War against Women frame on Twitter can, be ascribed to the platform’s affordance of persistence, visibility, and network association. Persistence in the literature is conceptualised as reviewability, recordability, archivability or permanence (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Hancock, Toma, & Ellison, 2007; Whittaker, 2003; Ellison, Gibbs & Weber, 2015; Tokunaga, 2011). It captures the idea that tweets can remain “accessible in the same form as the original display after the actor has finished his or her presentation” (Treem & Leonardi, 2012, p. 18). This is evidenced for instance, in the frequent reference to the hashtag around the Chibok girls as seen in Figures 5.16 and 5.17. Moreover, stories about the girls are quite popular on Twitter and, therefore, aids the visibility of content about the girls. Visibility also referred to as searchability, describes the relative ease with which information can be located on a platform. Twitter search and advanced search features enable users to locate keywords, hashtags and/or customise results to particular periods or people. A classic example in this context is #bringbackourgirls, which is a frequent addressivity marker used in tweets.
about the Chibok girls. Twitter also affords network association, by allowing for both social and content ties across its vast network. But politicians and celebrities on Twitter have larger networks of followers and can, therefore, influence the quick spread of information. For instance, the #Bringbackourgirls campaign was endorsed by almost every politician and celebrity of note, from Michelle Obama to Sean Combs (P. Diddy) (Spottswoode, 2014). The #BBOG campaign on Twitter in 2014 also ranked higher than other news making events such as the “Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 (#PrayForMH370), the sunken South Korean ferry MV Sewol (#PrayForSouthKorea), and a squabble between two American pop music celebrities (#WhatJZSaidToSolange)” (p. 2481). This explains the virality of news about the release of the Chibok girls on Twitter as shown in Figure 5.18.

In addition to celebrity, follow up, drama and audio-visual features, two other news values are relevant for The Guardian: bad news and the organisation’s agenda. As of April 2017, a larger number of the girls were still in captivity, which fits the profile of a bad news story. Bad news refers to “stories with particularly negative overtones such as death, injury, defeat and loss” (Harcup & O’Neil, 2017, p. 1482). The War against Women frame is particularly visible in The Guardian’s April publication, a period that marks the anniversary of the Chibok kidnap. The second news value is the news organisation’s agenda: “stories that set or fit the news organisation’s own agenda, whether ideological, commercial or as part of a specific campaign” (p. 1482). This is examined in more detail in the next section with regards to the ecology of the Nigerian press.

Taken together, therefore, the emergence of the War against Women frame on the respective platforms is attributable to the influence of sources/users and news values and these are key components of the logic of both platforms. On the one hand, the
platforms deprive women of agency and voice even though they are instrumental to the construction of Boko Haram using the War against Women frame. On the other, the visibility of the frame on the platforms is owing to the news value of the narratives. Whereas news values like bad news and news organisation’s agenda are more relevant to The Guardian, exclusivity, good news and shareability are more significant on Twitter owing to the platform’s logic and affordances.

5.5.2 The Political Context of the War against Women Frame

Although the War against Women frame emphasises Boko Haram’s anti-women posture in the selected newspapers and on Twitter, it is important to note that prejudice against women is both a Nigerian and global challenge. For example, a 2018 study by Thompson Reuters Foundation, ranks Nigeria as one of the world’s most menacing countries for women. The 548 specialists surveyed on issues pertaining to women, scored Nigeria “sixth for (cultural) practices that were harmful to women, like acid attacks, female genital mutilation, child marriage, forced marriage, stoning, physical abuse or mutilation as a form of punishment/retribution and female infanticide” (Punch, 2018, para. 6). The country was also graded fourth on different forms of sexual violence and human trafficking (paras. 5 & 6). These issues may have informed Oriola’s (2017) argument that Boko Haram’s deployment of sexual and gender-based violence is “an extension of the “repertoire of violence” ingrained in the sociopolitical and cultural milieu” of the group’s core area of operation (p. 99). In addition, data from UN Women (2018) has revealed “that 35 percent of women worldwide have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or sexual violence by a non-partner (not including sexual harassment) at some point in their lives” (para. 1). This, therefore, indicates that violence against women is both a Nigerian and world problem and not just a Boko Haram challenge. World-wide
discrimination against women is at the heart of the current wave of feminism as expressed in the #MeToo movement – a global advocacy against sexual harassment and assault. These global concerns about the plight of women may have, therefore, contributed to the framing of Boko Haram as anti-women in both *The Guardian* newspaper and on Twitter.

While the War against Women frame is present in *The Guardian*, it is not clearly distinguishable in the other papers. Two reasons account for this. First, the characterisation of women and girls as victims is subsumed in the Social Consequences frame. The Social Consequences frame as is detailed in section 5.3, is the largest echo frame and is present in all the papers examined in this study. The frame underscores the negative social impact of Boko Haram on men, women, and children; and is expressed in terms of death, malnutrition, rape and displacement of citizens from their homes and communities. The appearance of the War against Women frame in *The Guardian* is associated with the paper’s agenda. *The Guardian* as described in section 1.3.4, is an elitist and liberal newspaper, which exerts much influence in southern Nigeria. As the voice of the south, the negative portrayal of Boko Haram, which the paper considers a northern problem (see section 5.6.2) works to the paper’s commercial benefit especially owing to the influence of ethnicity and religion in the paper’s area of operation – Nigeria. But, this seeming bias on the part of *The Guardian* may be backed by understandings about the nature of Nigeria’s north, which is both conservative and patricentric (Makama, 2013). Makama also notes that the religious and socio-cultural practices prevalent in the area are deemed discriminatory towards women. In addition, Okeke (2013) argues that in Nigeria’s north, more than fifty percent of girls are expected to be married by age 16 and have children within their first year of marriage. These
accounts about discriminatory practices against women especially in Nigeria’s north contribute to the appearance of the War against Women frame in *The Guardian*.

5.6 Religious Polarisation

The Religious Polarisation frame is the last echo frame identified using the CHCA. As is described in section 4.3.5, the Religious Polarisation frame is a popular conceptual tool used to describe events “in the context of morals, social prescriptions and religious tenets” (An & Gower, 2009, p. 108). However, in this study, the Religious Polarisation frame, which is visible in only the southern papers (*The Guardian* and *Punch*) and on Twitter, is used to describe the salience placed on religion as a driving force behind Boko Haram. The collection of articles (n=47 in the southern papers) and tweets (n=57) in this cluster hold two broad narratives: Boko Haram as representatives of Islam and Boko Haram as anti-Christians/Christianity. This study argues that the Religious Polarisation frame is a product of two news values including conflict and human-interest, and the sensitivity of both Twitter and the southern newspapers to ideologically polarising content. These MCDA-based findings are instantiated using the archetypal cluster members listed in Table 5.4 and Figures 5.19 - 5.20.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline/Tweet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>6 May 2017</td>
<td>US, UK say Boko Haram plans to kidnap foreign aid workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9</td>
<td>13 May 2017</td>
<td>Guard killed in suicide attack in Maiduguri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>9 February 2017</td>
<td>DSS quizzes ex-CBN dep gov, CAN leaders on B’Haram video. We’re studying interrogation of Christian elders, says CAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>2 January 2017</td>
<td>Buhari’s silence, endorsement of Kaduna killings says CAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T36</td>
<td>22 February 2017</td>
<td>900 churches in Nigeria destroyed by Boko Haram STOP radical Muslims persecuting Christians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T37</td>
<td>16 February 2017</td>
<td>100,000 Massacred, Over 2 Million Displaced in Boko Haram’s War to Eradicate Christianity (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T38</td>
<td>9 February 2017</td>
<td>Islam in Nigeria: Boko Haram attempts to drive out Christians (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T39</td>
<td>1 February 2017</td>
<td>Wake up people we r at WAR w/Al Qaeda ISIS Boko Haram Arab Muslims Islamic jihadists terrorists, readers of Quran, true infidels, anew Crusades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T40</td>
<td>1 February 2017</td>
<td>@warkolm @pole_zoo @PaulineHansonOz and that’s the exact same religion as ISIS, Al Qaeda, Taliban, Boko Haram, Al Shabab, Hamas etc #danger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T41</td>
<td>5 February 2017</td>
<td>As the influence of islam creates groups like isis, taliban, boko haram, al shabab, al quieda &amp; people like anjem choudhery (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T42</td>
<td>1 February 2017</td>
<td>@feddoso @NickBaumann Al Qaeda (Islamic Jihad), ISIS, Boko Haram different flavors of the same putrid ice cream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T43</td>
<td>20 February 2017</td>
<td>RT @Thomas_Hern1: A religion that creates groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Hamas and many others, is not a religion I would march fo…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4. Newspaper articles and tweets from the Religious Polarisation cluster

5.6.1 The Media Context of the Religious Polarisation Frame

The textual analysis of the articles and tweets in the Religious Polarisation frame/cluster reveals the presence of naming/referencing and predicational strategies applied with respect to Boko Haram including Islamic sect, Islamic insurgents, Islamic militants, militant Islamists, Islamists, Islamic extremists, Islamist group, Islamic fundamentalists, jihadists, and jihadist group. For instance, in G8, G9, P3, and T36, Boko Haram is labelled Islamist militants, Islamists, an Islamic sect, and radical Muslims, respectively. Political actors also compare Boko Haram to other groups like Al Qaeda, ISIS, Al Shabab as seen in T39 - T43. In addition, violent onsluaths by the group are
marked as mainly targeted at Christians. For example, in P3 and P4, Boko Haram is described as unleashing carnage and destruction against churches in Nigeria, while T36 underscores the destruction of 900 churches, and T37 notes that Boko Haram is engaged in a war against Christianity. The above naming/referential and predicational strategies on the one hand conflates Boko Haram with Islamic faith and on the other hand, depicts Christians as specific targets of Boko Haram.

Figure 5.19. P3. DSS quizzes ex-CBN dep gov, CAN leaders on B’Haram video. We’re studying interrogation of Christian elders, says CAN (Olokor, 2017, p. 9)
The textual characterisation of Boko Haram as Islamic and anti-Christianity in the above articles and tweets corresponds to the visual representation of the group. For instance, T36 includes an image (see Figure 5.20). The photograph shows a partially razed structure, with rubble scattered on the floor. Although nothing on or about the structure identifies it as a church, its description as such in the tweet serves to draw attention to the damage of Christian houses of worship by Boko Haram. G8, a news story about Boko Haram’s intention to kidnap foreigners in northeast Nigeria, is accompanied by the photograph in Figure 5.19, which shows two participants dressed in paramilitary gear, with guns slung across their shoulders. Behind the photo subjects is a parked vehicle, which is partly cropped off the photograph. While one of the participants can be identified as Abubakar Shekau, the second participant’s face is covered by a flag, which shields his identity. The black flag bears two emblems. The
The above textual and visual representations of Boko Haram as Islamic and anti-Christianity are important given their significance in the construction of the group on the respective platforms. As is detailed in the preceding paragraphs of this section, the naming/referencing and predicational strategies applied in the articles and tweets in this cluster characterise Boko Haram as Islamic. They also suggest that the group's activities are inspired by the Islamic faith, a stance which morally evaluates Islam negatively. This type of representation, therefore, serves to categorise Boko Haram in the same social classification as other ordinary, non-violent Muslims in Nigeria and
elsewhere, thereby extending the negative representation of the group to other Muslim organisations. However, even though Boko Haram can be compared to other known terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS owing to their shared drive for a global jihad, a distinction can be made between these jihadist groups and other sub-groups within Islam. For instance, while groups like, the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria, the Izala movement, and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria have called for the institution of Islamic governance in sections of Nigeria, they typically do not employ violent techniques in pursuit of these goals. Also, unlike the more liberal Sufism practised by a majority of Muslims in Nigeria, Boko Haram advocates the Salafist-jihadist tradition based on a puritanical version of Islam (Akinola, 2015). Boko Haram can, therefore, be said to constitute only a small portion compared to the majority of moderate Muslims living in Nigeria and other parts of the world and not the entire Muslim community as suggested by the Religious Polarisation framing of the group on the studied platforms.

The characterisation of Boko Haram as an Islamic group engaged in a war against Christians suggests that Muslims are at war with Christians, the largest religious group in the world (Pew Research Center, 2017). However, the literature on attacks by Boko Haram points out that both Muslim and Christian populations have been targeted by the group (Akpan, Ekanem & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014). In fact, Boko Haram has specifically targeted Muslims praying in mosques even during Ramadan - a holy month, dedicated to fasting and prayer by Muslims around the world (Duell, 2015). This indicates that attacks by Boko Haram have not necessarily been discriminatory as suggested by the Religious Polarisation framing of Boko Haram. But the representation of Boko Haram as anti-Christianity serves to ingrain the Muslim-Christian dichotomy prevalent in climes like Nigeria, which holds the largest population of Muslims and Christians in near equal proportion (Paden, 2015). The Muslim-Christian distinction is
sustained owing to the place of religion, a critical identity marker in Nigeria, which forms the basis for individual identity and assumed thinking during conflict and is critical for the determination of power, resource allocation and citizenship in the country (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005).

The Religious Polarisation frame can be understood in terms of some features including news values and the tendency of both Twitter and the southern papers to promote ideologically polarising content. Articles and tweets about the murder of Christians and the destruction of churches as seen in P3, T36 and T37 are both emotion- and conflict-ridden. For example, one tweet reads as follows: “100,000 Massacred, Over 2 Million Displaced in Boko Haram's War to Eradicate Christianity (link)” (T37) while P3 includes the below quote:

the church in Nigeria since 2009 has been subjected to a systematic genocide and persecution through the instrumentality of the Islamic fundamentalist sect, Boko Haram, leading to the killing of thousands of Christians and destruction of hundreds of churches, and over 50,000 houses (p. 12).

In the above tweet and article, the Boko Haram crisis is represented as a particular type of conflict that is specifically aimed at decimating Christians and Christian infrastructure. With respect to the selected newspapers, these types of stories attract increased readership, viewership and advertisement owing to their human interest and conflict value (Eilders, 2006; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001). In addition to the human-interest and conflict news values, the tweets in this cluster can evoke negative sentiments among users; and these three news values are critical in the context of Twitter (Trilling, Tolochko & Burscher, 2017; Kim, 2015; Berger & Milkman, 2012; Hansen et al., 2011).
The Religious Polarisation frame in southern papers (*The Guardian* and *Punch*) and on Twitter can also be explained in terms of the tendency of both platforms to allow ideologically polarising content. Polarisation prevents the emergence of contrasting opinions as well as the negative representation of persons or groups regarded as the other, in this case, Muslims (Bishop, 2008, p. 14; Gentzkow, 2016, p. 13). Polarising tendencies in the southern papers is linked to the nature of the Nigerian media ecology as is explained in more detail in section 5.6.2. On Twitter, however, polarisation is associated with the platform’s logic of programmability and connectivity, and the affordance of networked association. Networked association facilitates the likelihood of encountering people with similar ideas while Twitter’s algorithmic curation enables the creation of echo chambers and/or filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011; Rader & Gray, 2015).

For instance, Rader and Gray (2015) note, these algorithms serve to

> to connect people with information they are likely to want to consume, by making some items easier to access than other items, resulting in a personalised stream of content [that fails to offer] users a set of alternatives to choose from (p. 175).

In addition to the impact of the internal logic of Twitter, ideological polarisation on the platform is enabled by other factors that are rooted in psychology and behavioural economics such as “selective exposure behaviours, confirmation bias and availability bias” (Spohr, 2017, p. 150). These explain why users are more likely to engage and spread content that is consistent with their pre-existing beliefs (Frey, 1986; Klapper, 1960; Stroud, 2008; Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015, p. 1130). As earlier stated, Christians constitute the largest religious group in the world (Pew Research Center, 2017) and make up about half the population of Nigeria. By the above argument, tweets about the attacks against Christians are more likely to resonate with Christians and
Christians are more likely to spread such content. This statement: “Islam in Nigeria: Boko Haram attempts to drive out Christians (link)” (T38), offers an example of a tweet that could easily resonate with Christians in Nigeria and around the world as Boko Haram claims to be representatives of Islam.

5.6.2 The Political Context of the Religious Polarisation Frame

The framing of Boko Haram as anti-Christians, and a product of Islam in the southern newspapers and on Twitter may be a product of three other external factors: the known objectives of the Boko Haram group, the stereotypical depiction of Muslims as terrorists, and the ethnoreligious posture of the southern papers – a product of the nature of the Nigerian media ecology. The literature points to the following as the ultimate goals of Boko Haram: resistance to western education; noncompliance with the modern nation-state of Nigeria; the establishment of an Islamic caliphate; and the application of force to impact change (Agbibo, 2013; Adesoji, 2014; Azumah, 2015, p. 34). As is outlined in section 1.3, these aspirations are similar to those of other fourth-wave terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Al Shabaab, and their various affiliates that seek to establish a global Islamic community. Like these groups, Boko Haram applies terrorism, not necessarily as an end, but as a tactic of warfare employed in pursuit of a jihadist vision (Kilcullen, 2005). This is consistent with this study’s conceptualisation of terrorism as a politically motivated tactic involving the use or threat of violence, with the intension of triggering psychological and/or behavioural responses (see section 2.2). According to Taheri (1987), apostles of Islamic terrorism stand in opposition to other ideologies and perpetrate violence as an act of holy war, which will come to an end in the face of complete victory against unbelievers. They consider killing people regarded as infidels, a service to god, a most worthy cause for individuals, and a principal component of [Islamic] state policy (pp. 7-8). The framing of
Boko Haram in terms of Religious Polarisation by both journalists and users, may, therefore, be a result of this broader understanding about the known objectives of the group.

The second reason for the emergence of the Religious Polarisation frame in the southern papers and on Twitter can be attributed to a western trend that portrays Muslims as uncivilised, illiterate and violent, which commenced around the nineteenth century (Said, 1978). This led to the popular media representation of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists, following the 1979-1981 Iranian hostage event, a trend, which has become even more entrenched in the post 9/11 environment (Freedman & Thussu, 2012). The stereotypical representation of Muslims as terrorists is in part due to the religion’s susceptibility to fundamentalist beliefs and fundamentalism could result in out-group animus and racial discrimination (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996; Johnson, Rowatt & LaBouff, 2012, p. 154; Wright, 2016). Religious fundamentalism according to Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) is:

The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by the forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity (p. 118).

For instance, Carver and Harrie (2007) illustrate how a repetitive reference to a religion serves as a basis for Othering and this could explain the Muslim-Christian divide inherent in the Religious Polarisation framing of Boko Haram. Stereotypical accounts about Muslims and the predisposition of Islam to fundamentalism is the possible reasoning behind Shadid and van Koningsveld’s (2002) finding that the characterisation of Muslims as “irrational, primitive, belligerent and dangerous” has evolved into a consistent news
The pervasiveness of this type of representation may have contributed to the visibility of the Religious Polarisation frame in the southern papers (The Guardian and Punch) and on Twitter.

Whereas the Religious Polarisation frame in the studied legacy and social media texts is traceable to the known objectives of Boko Haram and the stereotypical depiction of Muslims as terrorists, the presence of the frame in only two of the papers examined in this research is linked to the ecology of the Nigerian media. Ojo (2013) for instance, notes that the press in Nigeria does not have a national outlook, while Olukotun (2008) describes the Nigerian press as bifurcated “along ethnic, regional, religious, and primordial lines” (p. 13). This, therefore, means that the application of the Religious Polarisation frame in the southern papers could be a product of their ethno-religious affiliation with Nigeria’s south as the south is predominantly Christian. Describing Boko Haram as Islamic and anti-Christian defines Boko Haram as a northern problem and Nigeria’s north is made up of a majority of Muslims. This distinction enshrines the Muslim-Christian binary in Nigeria and could also result in hostilities between the regions. But as is outlined in section 1.3.3, Nigeria’s north-south and Muslim-Christian bipolar classifications are false dichotomies that do not reflect the intensely complex nature of the Nigeria state. However, the Nigerian press has adopted this structure. Although there are two main printing/publishing hubs in Nigeria - the Lagos-Ibadan, and the Abuja axes - a majority of the papers are published in the southern hub (Lagos) (Oyovbaire 2001). Driving the Religious Polarisation narrative, therefore, serves to both commercially benefit the southern papers and enshrine their age-long hegemony.

5.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter has examined how the four echo frames (Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, and Religious Polarisation) are shaped
by some internal and external factors, expressed here in terms of their media and political contexts. It particularly focused on the impact of the following: news values, routines and norms of legacy media; the logic and affordances of social media; and the nature of the Nigerian state and its media ecology in the construction of Boko Haram using the echo frames. Answers to these were illustrated via the MCDA of some cluster members and entailed exploring the textual, visual, discursive, and social practices of the respective platforms as expressed in the words and images used in the representation of Boko Haram.

The Social Consequences frame in this study underscores the negative impact of Boko Haram to the LCBCs, especially people in northeast Nigeria expressed in the forms of killings, death, famine, and a large-scale humanitarian crisis in the investigated texts (see sections 4.3.1 and 5.3). This representation replicates extant literature about the group (Okpaga, Chijioke & Eme, 2012; Hickie, Abbott & Clarke, 2017, para. 18) and is thus, consistent with the explanation for the widespread application of this frame on all the investigated outlets/platforms. However, the in-depth examination of particular cluster members points to other factors that may account for the prevalence of this frame in the selected Nigerian national newspapers and on Twitter. These include bad news and human-interest as critical news selection and spreadability criteria on the examined platforms; objectivity - an important legacy norm; and subjectivity – a core element of network logic. While objectivity and subjectivity are contrasting norms that guide content production on legacy and social media platforms respectively, this study argues that the echo status of the Social Consequences frame is a product of emotionality, a critical component of the internal logic of the selected newspapers and Twitter. This is because emotion-laden content inspires readership in the legacy outlets, drives traffic on Twitter and attracts advertisement dollars on both platforms. Emotionality on the examined
platforms is evidenced in the frequent reference to death, displacement, and malnutrition, as well as the textual and visual portrayal of women and children as primary victims of Boko Haram. This provides an explanation for the popularity of the Social Consequences frame in the selected Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter.

Although the Social Consequences frame typically emphasises the negative impact of groups or events and in this case, the negative social impact on the LCBCs and Nigeria's northeast in particular, this study identifies aspects of the narrative that are excluded from this construction of Boko Haram. For instance, while Boko Haram is deemed responsible for many of Nigeria's social ills, some of the problems attributed to the group predates its existence and can be traced to deeply entrenched societal flaws.

The War against Boko Haram frame refers to the emphasis on the ongoing conflict between Boko Haram and the countries in the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria. It also captures Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy and preferred response to attacks by Boko Haram (see sections 4.3.2 and 5.4). The investigation of the War against Boko Haram cluster members shows the presence of conflict-related words and the use of naming/reference and predicational strategies that highlight the illegitimate and legitimate statuses of the belligerents in the ongoing conflict in the Nigerian state. The images accompanying the articles and tweets in this cluster is similar to the textual description of both sets of actors and provide evidence of the inclusion of visuals as a critical part of the routines of both platforms. The images in this collection also reflect the differences in the discursive practices of the selected newspapers and Twitter. Whereas Tweeters utilise both conventional and non-conventional war photographs, some types of conventional images (grisly and actual battle scenes photos) are absent in the selected outlets. Reasons for the lack of gory images in the selected newspapers
is traceable to the papers’ susceptibility to both institutional and professional control, while their visibility on Twitter is owing to the logic and affordances of the platform.

This study argues that the echo status of the War against Boko Haram frame can be attributed to the conflict and human-interest values of the articles and tweets about the group. While conflict is a significant news selection/visibility parameter on the studied platforms (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95; Bartholomé, Lecheler, & de Vreese, 2015; Harcup & O’Neil, 2017), the grisly images available on Twitter can trigger emotional responses owing to the logic and affordances of the platform.

The frame’s visibility in the selected Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter is also explained in terms of its similarity to Reese and Lewis’ (2009) war on terror frame – the policy response to 9/11, which was internalised, reified and naturalised by the American press. This finding, therefore, provides further evidence that the frames employed in the media can be as a result of how similar events in the past were represented. The analysis also reveals that the inter-platform variances in the War against Boko Haram is a product of Twitter’s ability to produce alternative perspectives on social issues as a result of the logic and affordances of the platform.

The intra-platform distinction in the framing of Boko Haram in terms of war is linked to the bifurcated nature of the Nigerian press ecology. On the one hand, the Daily Trust and Leadership’s (northern papers) position on the war on Boko Haram may be informed by their ethnic affiliation with the north. On the other hand, in questioning the president’s claim regarding the end of the Boko Haram war, The Guardian and Punch (southern papers) are deemed as acting in their capacity as voices of the south. But as representatives of these seeming polar regions, these papers stand to benefit commercially, owing to the critical role of ethnicity in the Nigerian state.
The War against Women frame underscores Boko Haram's deployment of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls (see section 4.3.3 and 5.5). This frame is visible on Twitter and in *The Guardian* newspaper. At the textual level, the MCDA of sample articles and tweets in this cluster reveals the emphasis on the gender of victims as well as predicational cues that highlight the victimhood, passivity and the vulnerability of women and girls. But in contrast to women, members of Boko Haram are portrayed as male and dangerous. Although this outcome is consistent with the representations of both groups in legacy media (Nacos, 2005), the replication of this trend on Twitter is explained in terms of the logic of popularity. Like legacy media, Twitter is tilted in favour of political actors that have significant influence in the media (Hemsley, Garcia-Murillo & Maclnnes, 2018, p. 324).

The analysis also provides evidence for the hypervisibility of images of the Chibok girls, categorised here as abduction images (pictures of the girls in their abducted state and within Boko Haram-controlled environment), and advocacy images (photographs of individuals and groups raising awareness about the girls). The popularity of these images in this cluster is credited to the significance of the girls in the discourse of Boko Haram - “the Chibok girls have become part of the insurgency's identity, narrative and internal organisation” (Mattfess, 2017, p. 81).

Two main discursive practices are identified as playing significant roles in the emergence of this frame. The first relates to the role of sources/users as both platforms are given to the logic of popularity. The second discursive practice pertains to the news value of Boko Haram-related media events: the third-year anniversary of the Chibok kidnap (April 2017) and the release of eighty-two of the kidnapped Chibok girls (May 2017). Both events qualify for coverage as a result of the following news values: bad
news, celebrity, exclusivity, good news, shareability, follow up, drama, audio-visual, and news organisation’s agenda (Harcup & O’Neil (2017, p. 1482).

Lastly, the appearance of the War against Women frame on the studied platforms is further attributed to growing world-wide concerns about the plight of women. This is because violence against women and girls is not only a Boko Haram problem, but a Nigerian and world problem.

The Religious Polarisation frame describes the emphasis on religion in the context of Boko Haram. It is employed in the southern papers (The Guardian and Punch) and on Twitter (see section 4.3.5 and 5.6). The Religious Polarisation frame evinces the use of naming and referencing textual strategies that depicts Boko Haram as Islamic, characterises attacks by the group as anti-Christians/Christianity, thereby, negatively evaluating not only Boko Haram but also Islam more generally. These features are also portrayed visually through the inclusion of photographs showing destroyed Christian architecture and the presence of visual elements that link Boko Haram to Islam and other fourth-wave terrorist organisations.

This study argues that the Religious Polarisation frame is driven by two news values: conflict and human-interest. The frame is also shaped by the vulnerability of both Twitter and the southern newspapers to ideologically polarising content. In addition, the Religious Polarisation frame is explained by external factors such as the known objectives of the Boko Haram group, the stereotypical depiction of Muslims as terrorists, and the ethnoreligious posture of The Guardian and Punch newspapers.

Taken together, the analysis carried out in this chapter demonstrates the similarities and differences between framing in the selected newspapers and on Twitter. For example, while users played a significant role in the emergence of frames on Twitter owing to the logic and affordances of the platform, elite sources including religious
leaders wield significant influence in the selected newspapers owing to their critical role in the news production process. Also, while images contributed to the development of the frames on the studied platforms, the war photographs on Twitter lent more credence to the War against Boko Haram frame. The analysis also pointed to the relevance of emotionality enabled by objectivity and subjectivity, two critical but seemingly contrasting norms in the legacy and social media platforms. Furthermore, while the human-interest news value accounts for the echo status of the Social Consequence and War against Women frames, the appearance of the War against Boko Haram and Religious Polarisation frames on the studied platforms is owing to the conflict news value. But, the human-interest news value is also relevant to the visibility of the War against Boko Haram and Religious Polarisation frames on Twitter.

The next chapter examines the media and political context of the outlier frames, that is, frames that are present only on Twitter or in any of the investigated papers.
CHAPTER SIX - THE CONSTRUCTION OF OUTLIER FRAMES:
MEDIA AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS

6.1 Introduction

This, like the previous chapter responds to the second research questions: (2)

How are the frames shaped by their media and political contexts? (2a) What roles do the values, routines, and norms of legacy media, and the logic and affordances of social media play in the framing of Boko Haram? (2b) What roles do the Nigerian state and its media ecology play in the framing of Boko Haram? Although six frames are identified using the Computer-assisted Cluster Analysis (CHCA) (see chapter 4), four are visible on both platforms and are labelled echo frames while two frames are unique to each of the studied platforms and are called Outlier frames. These two, the Attribution of Responsibility and the Economic Consequences frames are visible on Twitter and two of the selected Nigerian national newspapers - the Punch and the Daily Trust, respectively. As can be seen from Figure 6.1 and distinguished by yellow arrows, the Attribution of Responsibility cluster is made up of 203 tweets, while the Economic Consequences cluster consists of ninety-nine articles (n=74 Punch; n=25 Daily Trust). While the echo frames are influenced by similarities in the logic of the studied platforms, this study argues that the outlier frames are products of features that are unique to social and legacy media, respectively.
This chapter is sub-divided into three main parts. The first and second sections presents findings from the MCDA of typical cluster members of each of the outlier frames, while section 6.4 is a chapter summary.

### 6.2 The Attribution of Responsibility Frame

The Attribution of Responsibility frame is one of the two outlier frames identified in this study. This frame in the literature typically represents "a way of attributing responsibility for [a] cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group" (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 96). In this study, the Attribution of Responsibility frame is inductively generated and clearly visible on Twitter. It refers to the salience placed on President Buhari’s role in curbing the proliferation, influence, and capacity of Boko Haram to execute attacks or occupy territories in Nigeria and/or the Lake Chad Basin area.
While the CHCA provides a snapshot view of the Attribution of Responsibility frame (see section 4.3.4), the MCDA of purposefully selected tweets provides an in-depth interpretation of the frame while detailing its media and political context. Findings are illustrated using the tweets in Table 6.1 and Figures 6.2 – 6.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Tweet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T44</td>
<td>4 May 2017</td>
<td>#Nigeria #news - RE: #BokoHaram defeat Saraki hails #Buhari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T45</td>
<td>6 May 2017</td>
<td>BREAKING: 80 Kidnapped Chibok Girls freed by Boko Haram after</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>negotiation with Buhari's administration Read more (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T46</td>
<td>6 May 2017</td>
<td>80 Kidnapped Chibok Girls Freed By Boko Haram. Buhari govt is working.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T47</td>
<td>29 May 2017</td>
<td>@NTAGMN The biggest success story of the Buhari administration is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the degrading of Boko Haram terrorists.Â Not yet (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T48</td>
<td>5 May 2017</td>
<td>@MusadiqZ @Omojuwa The only achievement the Buhari administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>can lay hold of is their attack on Boko Haram and (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T49</td>
<td>6 May 2017</td>
<td>Breaking: Boko Haram frees 80 more Chibok girls..... ALHAMDULILLAH...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kudos to PMB promised fulfilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T50</td>
<td>11 May 2017</td>
<td>RT @BashirAhmaad: Under President Muhammadu Buhari more than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000,000 persons displaced by Boko Haram have returned to their</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>homes. #Secur...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T51</td>
<td>11 May 2017</td>
<td>RT @pmnewsnigeria: Northern Elders lauds Buhari for securing the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North from Boko Haram (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T52</td>
<td>6 May 2017</td>
<td>But Boko haram is not holding any territory in Nigeria, so Sai Buhari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>! (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T53</td>
<td>19 May 2017</td>
<td>President Buhari has gone after Boko Haram without condition and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>without fear. He has pushed them back, saving... (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T54</td>
<td>2 May 2017</td>
<td>@re noonokri @Telegraph @CNN PMB took immediate actions to curtail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the menace of boko haram while GEJ fold his hands (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T55</td>
<td>30 May 2017</td>
<td>Jonathan and Dasuki almost cancelled 2015 election using Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>as excuse, today PMB has crushed that anti-democracy excuse!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T56</td>
<td>30 May 2017</td>
<td>If not President Muhammadu Buhari Boko Haram could have declared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria Islamic state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T57</td>
<td>31 May 2017</td>
<td>@pmnewsnigeria @scarfizal Count yourselves lucky Buhari didn't allow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boko Haram to drive you ungrateful lots out (link)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T58</td>
<td>6 May 2017</td>
<td>One good thing Buhari's done is weaken Boko Haram.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T59</td>
<td>6 May 2017</td>
<td>80 Chibok Girls released by Boko Haram.. PMB till 2023 then. Sai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>baba!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T60</td>
<td>29 May 2017</td>
<td>The bringer of peace, The slayer of Boko Haram, The antidote of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption and The savior of our Father land. Happy Democracy day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T61</td>
<td>18 May 2017</td>
<td>In 2 years under President Buhari, 106 Chibok girls and 11,894 other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boko Haram hostages have been freed by the Nigerian army – Min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Defence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1. Tweets from the Attribution of Responsibility cluster
6.2.1 The Media Context of the Attribution of Responsibility Frame

The tweets in this collection total 203 and include accounts where Tweeters credit President Buhari for the following: shielding northern Nigeria from Boko Haram and preventing the group from acquiring Nigerian territories (T50), the defeat of Boko Haram (T44), and the release of some of the Chibok girls (T46). In T46, T59, and T49, the release of the Chibok girls is the materialisation of a campaign-promise, an indication of Buhari’s hard work, and grounds for Buhari’s re-election for another four years. These activities for which Buhari is eulogised are represented as anti-Boko Haram.

The textual analysis shows the presence of positive naming/referential strategies for President Buhari. For example, in one tweet, President Buhari is called “The bringer of peace, The slayer of Boko Haram, The antidote of Corruption and The savior of our Father land” (T60). Whereas Buhari is called peacemaker, hero and champion, ex-President Jonathan and Boko Haram are portrayed as docile and defeated. The following tweets serve as examples: “PMB took immediate actions to curtail the menace of boko haram while GEJ fold his hands (link)” (T54), and “#BokoHaram defeat: Saraki hails #Buhari (link)” (T44). The positive naming/referential strategies applied with reference to Buhari, therefore, sets him apart from other actors in the Boko Haram discourse such as ex-President Jonathan and Boko Haram, who are assigned negative labels.

The naming/referential strategies is reflected in the predicational qualities assigned the above actors. For example, “Breaking: Boko Haram frees 80 more Chibok girls….. ALHAMDULILLAH… Kudos to PMB promised fulfilled” (T49) and “President Buhari has gone after Boko Haram without condition and without fear. He has pushed them back, saving… (link)” (T53). The successful release of eighty-two Chibok girls for the tweeter in T49 distinguishes Buhari as honourable, while in T53, his attitude to the
Boko Haram problem, that is, “without condition and without fear” in T53 can be interpreted as courageous. Whereas Buhari is assigned positive qualities, ex-President Jonathan and Boko Haram are characterised as lethargic (T54, T55) and subdued (T44, T52) respectively. For example, “PMB took immediate actions to curtail the menace of boko haram while GEJ fold his hands (link)” (T54) and “But Boko haram is not holding any territory in Nigeria, so Sai Buhari ! (link)” (T44).

The tweets in this cluster are accompanied by two types of images: photographs of President Buhari, who is depicted as the material agent responsible for the achievements against Boko Haram, and pictures of the Chibok girls, who are represented as evidence of Buhari’s success. For example, T60 includes two photographs of the president in different settings. In the photograph to the left of the viewer, Buhari is shown sitting in an office, wearing a white traditional outfit. The colour
white is frequently associated with purity and is consistent with the textual description of Buhari as “The bringer of peace, The antidote of Corruption, and The savior of our Father land” (T60). The president is shown sitting on a chair, writing on a desk, while assuming a posture that depicts him as actively working and taking his job seriously. The objects in the photograph such as the coat of arms and flag are unique to Nigeria or the Father land referred to in the text. The image also includes another flag – the Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces flag – which reflects the president’s powerful stature as the head of the Nigerian Army and thus, the Commander who has conquered Boko Haram. This interpretation is in keeping with the textual portrayal of the president as “The slayer of Boko Haram” (T60).

The second insert to the right of the viewer is a medium shot of the president standing in front of a green podium. On the podium is a black microphone and sheets of white paper. President Buhari is again, shown in an all-white traditional outfit as in the adjacent photo. The setting of the photograph suggests Buhari is addressing a large group of persons, who are decontextualised, making the president the main participant in the photo, and thus, signalling his influence and dominance. In addition, the horizontal angle of interaction in conjunction with his off-frame gaze portrays the president as focused and serious-minded. It is also a signal to viewers to pay close attention to the president. This visual depiction of the president is consistent with his textual portrayal as honourable, a peacemaker and hero.
In 2 years under President Buhari, 106 Chibok girls and 11,894 other Boko Haram hostages have been freed by the Nigerian army — Min. Defence

Figure 6.3. T61

The tweet in T61 is accompanied by the photograph in Figure 6.3, which shows a group of people sitting in rows. While the women, who look emaciated owing to their exposed clavicles, are dressed in very colourful print fabrics and sitting in the front rows, the back rows are occupied by men, who can be culturally categorised as northerners based on their outfit. Some other people are seen standing to the right of the viewer, but partly cropped-off the image. The young women in the photograph can be identified as some of the freed Chibok secondary schoolgirls as can be inferred from the tweet. Within the context of the tweet, the girls also function as testaments of Buhari’s success, while their rendering as existential agents in the photograph characterises them as trophies of Buhari’s victory against Boko Haram.
The above images are significant for a number of reasons. First, the visual depiction of President Buhari mirrors his textual representation, thereby lending more support for the likely acceptability of the Attribution of Responsibility frame. Second, the use of images of the Chibok girls in this context, highlights their significance in the discourse of Boko Haram as well as the Buhari presidency. Lastly, both types of images constitute some of the most important visual repertoires of narratives about Boko Haram, since images of people can be easily recalled (Graber, 1990) and are “far more valuable than the images of places and things” (Coleman, 2010, p. 249). These capture the significance of images as part of the routines of Twitter owing to their relevance in the construction of social realities on the platform. But, more importantly, the above visuals in conjunction with the textual representation of Buhari and Boko Haram, contribute to the production of the Attribution of Responsibility frame as they can influence audiences/users understanding about and behaviour towards these actors (Powell, Boomgaarden, de Swert & de Vreese, 2015).

The visibility of the Attribution of Responsibility frame can be explained in terms of some discursive practices on Twitter such as the logic of connectivity and the affordances of anonymity and networked association. For instance, the following tweets can be described as opinion-based statements reflecting the personal views of the Tweeters: “The only achievement the Buhari administration can lay hold of is their attack on Boko Haram and (link)” (T48); “Jonathan and Dasuki almost cancelled 2015 election using Boko Haram as excuse, today PMB has crushed that anti-democracy excuse!” (T55); “If not President Muhammadu Buhari Boko Haram could have declared Nigeria Islamic state” (T56); “Count yourselves lucky Buhari didn't allow Boko Haram to drive you ungrateful lots out” (T57); and “One good thing Buhari’s done is weaken Boko Haram” (T58). This is in keeping with the nature of Twitter as a platform that allows for
the expression of personal thoughts and feelings on subjects of interest, (Welbers & Opgenhaffen, 2019). The propensity for the expression of the self on Twitter can be attributed to the platform’s affordance of anonymity, that is, “the degree to which a communicator perceives the message source is unknown and unspecified” (Scott, 1998, p. 387; Halpern & Gibbs, 2013; Evans, Pearce, Vitak & Treem, 2017). Unlike Facebook where identity verification is a necessity, Twitter allows for pseudonymity or the use of fakesters, which could then facilitate assertiveness.

Subjectivity on Twitter is also enabled by the logic of connectivity and the affordance of networked association. On the one hand, the platform facilitates human interaction and at the same time algorithmically links “users to content, users to users, platform to users, users to advertisers, and platforms to platforms” (van Dijck & Poell, 2013, p.9). On the other, the affordance of networked association enables social ties between followers, and content ties to particular types of information. While the logic of connectivity explains how already existing content from other platforms can be replicated on Twitter as evidenced in the inclusion of hyperlinks in T44, T45, T47, and T51; network association means such content can be easily and speedily distributed across the Twitter network via the retweet feature. For instance, “RT @BashirAhmaad: Under President Muhammadu Buhari more than 1,000,000 persons displaced by Boko Haram have returned to their homes. #Secur...” (T50); and “RT @pmnewsnigeria: Northern Elders lauds Buhari for securing the North from Boko Haram” (T51) are examples of Tweeter’s redistributing someone’s comment or opinion. Although the symbol RT is not an official Twitter command, it is often included to show instances where a Tweeter is quoting someone’s content (Twitter Inc., 2020). Social ties with likeminded people facilitate the expression of opinions that followers will agree with and thereby like, mention, or retweet and thus, boost virality and self-confirmation.
The Attribution of Responsibility frame is only visible in the month of May (see Figure 4.5) and is associated with two real-time events that occurred within that period. The first event is the release of eighty-two Chibok girls, which happened on the 6th of May 2017 as seen in “80 Kidnapped Chibok Girls Freed By Boko Haram. Buhari govt is working” (T46) and “Breaking: Boko Haram frees 80 more Chibok girls..... ALHAMDULILLAH... Kudos to PMB promised fulfilled” (T49). The release of the girls merit visibility on Twitter because it meets the following news values: exclusivity, good news and shareability (Harcup & O’Neil, 2017). As can be seen in T49, news about the girls as of 6 May 2017 was a novel event and in addition, tweets about the Chibok girls easily resonate with Tweeters owing to their relevance in the Boko Haram discourse (Fessy, 2015). The literature indicates that stories with these qualities can easily spread on social media (Kirby & Marsden, 2006; Shifman & Blondheim, 2010; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012; Asur & Huberman, 2010; Nahon & Hemsley, 2013).

The second significant event in the context of the Attribution of Responsibility frame is President Buhari’s second year-in-office anniversary, which was marked on May 29, 2017, a few days after the release of eighty-two of the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls. Boko Haram and the Chibok girls played significant roles in President Buhari’s 2015 electoral victory, when an incumbent President Jonathan suffered electoral defeat. For many, Buhari gained traction during the election campaign due to his promise to curb the political violence that Boko Haram had unleashed on Nigeria. At the time of the campaign, Boko Haram was in possession of fourteen local government areas in the northeastern part of the country, while attacks by the group had resulted in the displacement of more than two million people. As a former army general and a Muslim, Buhari was perceived to be capable of waging a successful war on Boko Haram. Furthermore, as some scholars have asserted, the mismanagement of the Chibok girls
crisis by the former administration was also instrumental to Buhari’s electoral victory in 2015 (Ewi, 2015; Mattfess, 2017, p. 74). This implies that achievements in these areas can be assessed favourably on the president’s second year scorecard, and, therefore, explains the application of the Attribution of Responsibility frame by Tweeters. However, in line with the goals of framing, the Attribution of Responsibility frame only represents a certain aspect of the narrative, while excluding others and some of these de-emphasised or exempted aspects are discussed in the next section.

6.2.2 The Political Context of the Attribution of Responsibility Frame

The Nigerian military under Buhari’s headship, in partnership with the other regional and international forces, has been able to recover some of the lands forcefully occupied by Boko Haram. Counterassaults by the military have also led to the liberation of Boko Haram captives (Al Jazeera, 2018). However, other evidence suggests that Boko Haram is still active based on the following. As of July 2017, Boko Haram had successfully launched forty-three assaults, resulting in the death of about two hundred civilians (Kazeem, 2017, para. 3). In addition, according to Sahara Reporters (2018), “the Buhari administration’s claim that it has “technically defeated” the terrorists and they no longer occupy any territory in the country is false” (para. 1 & 2). Furthermore, Wilson (2018) reached a conclusion that Boko Haram was still a lethal force based on the group’s ability to carry out about 150 attacks in 2017, 59 of which were suicide bombings; an increase from the 127 assaults by the group in 2016.

Although the representation of ex-President Jonathan in some of the tweets reflects findings in the literature about counterinsurgency efforts under his watch, the polarisation of the Buhari-Jonathan administrations is not consistent with other realities. Bappah (2016) notes for instance, that “he [Jonathan] and his aides downplayed the seriousness of the crisis while the insurgency continued to gain ground” (p. 153). Agbiboa (2014b) also stated that under Jonathan, Boko Haram unleashed several
deadly attacks against the state and captured sections of Nigeria’s territory. For other scholars like Ewi (2015), Boko Haram was instrumental to Jonathan’s unpopularity in the period preceding the 2015 elections and provided grounds for his defeat by Buhari. But, the Jonathan administration had also made some attempts to resolve the conflict including the declaration of a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (Akintola, 2015); creating an army infantry division comprising 8,000 troops (Omonobi, 2013); and initiating several attempts to negotiate with the group (Agbiboa, 2014a). However, none of these were successful, especially amid claims that the countermeasures were “half-hearted, reactionary and marred by corruption” (Bappah, 2016, p. 152).

Yet, the success or failure of both presidents needs to be weighed against other realities. For instance, Boko Haram had in the past called for the installation of a Muslim northerner as president in the stead of Jonathan, who is a Christian from southern Nigeria (Oyewole, 2013, p. 259). While Buhari’s profile as “an austere former general who once ruled with an iron hand” (Nossiter, 2015, para. 1) probably played a role in his 2015 victory, it is also important to note that he is a northern Muslim, a criterion which meets Boko Haram’s standard for leadership in Nigeria. Furthermore, although some of the tweets credit Buhari with the successful outcome of negotiations that led to release of the Chibok girls, media reports indicate that the bargaining involved other parties: Mustapha Zanna, the lawyer of Muhammed Yusuf (the founder of Boko Haram); the Swiss government and the Red Cross (Maclean & Ross, 2017). Therefore, while some of the tweets can be deemed factual, others cannot be substantiated as they represent those instances where individuals voice their opinions on issues of interest or re-echo existing discourses, and these practices are allowable on Twitter. While Twitter is open to objective content, subjectivity is critical to networked logic (Welbers & Opgenhaffen,
2019), which also accounts for the platform’s susceptibility to false and misleading content (Sphor, 2017).

Whereas the Attribution of Responsibility frame is discernible on Twitter within a particular period, it is absent in the selected newspapers. Two reasons account for this. First, the absence of the Attribution of Responsibility frame in the selected newspapers can be linked to a key feature of their internal logic – news values. Unlike Twitter where good news or positive stories such as tweets about the defeat of Boko Haram could lead to virality (Berger & Milkman, 2012), on legacy platforms, negative/bad news stories attract more coverage (Eilders, 2006; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001).

The second reason is the existence of another more dominant frame – the War against Boko Haram. This frame in part and especially in the northern papers, eulogises Buhari and the military chiefs for defeating Boko Haram. As is discussed in the previous chapter (see section 5.4), the War against Boko Haram inspires contests among political actors on the studied platforms, with the southern papers querying the veracity of the president’s claims and Tweeters emphasising the ruinous nature of the conflict. These divergent views are on the one hand, linked to the nature of the Nigerian media ecology and on the other, the ability of Tweeters to yield counter-establishment narratives about the Boko Haram war. Unlike the Nigerian press, which is dominated by elite voices, especially of Nigerian extraction, Twitter is a global network that affords human connectedness and algorithm-enabled linkages owing to the platform’s affordance of networked association, and logic of programmability and datafication. However, unlike the War against Boko Haram, which specifically highlights Buhari’s role in terms of Nigeria’s war against terrorism (in the northern papers), the Attribution of Responsibility frame captures a broader range of actions that can be interpreted as counter-Boko
Haram, including the supposed defeat of the group, the release of some of the Chibok girls, the return of IDPs, and the security of Nigeria’s north. As is also illustrated in the section 6.2.1, the Attribution of Responsibility frame is influenced by some events that occurred in May 2017.

6.3 The Economic Consequences Frame
The Economic Consequences frame is a popular conceptual tool employed to place salience on the financial implication of social issues on individuals, groups, or countries in the media (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). In this study, this frame refers to the emphasis on the financial implication of the Boko Haram crisis on the northeast and the Nigerian state in general (see section 4.3.6). The economic cost of Boko Haram in this collection of articles is expressed in terms of increased military spending, infrastructure repair, welfare for those in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps, unemployment, and a general decline in economic activities in the worst affected states.

The Economic Consequences is the second of this study’s Outlier frames and is visible in the Punch (southern newspaper) and the Daily Trust (northern newspaper). Although the frame is applied as a common interpretative tool in both papers, the CHCA points to a slight variation in the application of the frame (see section 4.3.6). While the Daily Trust primarily underscores the economic cost of Boko Haram to the northeast, the Punch accentuates the financial implication of Boko Haram on the entire country. Whereas the quantitative analysis (CHCA) is instrumental to the location of this frame, the MCDA of selected articles from this cluster reveals the possible impact of legacy routines and news values in the emergence of the frame. The analysis also points to the polarised nature of the Nigerian media ecology as being responsible for the difference in the application of the frame in the Daily Trust and Punch newspapers.
Findings from the MCDA are illustrated using the archetypal cluster members listed in Table 6.2 and Figures 6.6 – 6.8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DT3</td>
<td>29 January 2017</td>
<td>FG to spend N121bn on North-East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DT4</td>
<td>2 January 2017</td>
<td>Fall of Sambisa: Borno resumes road construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>7 January 2017</td>
<td>FG begins Yola inland cargo port construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>8 January 2017</td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>2 June 2017</td>
<td>Chaos as House rejects S'East developmental bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>6 June 2017</td>
<td>Beyond restructuring or secession: My fear for Nigeria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2. Newspaper articles from the Economic Consequences cluster

6.3.1 The Media Context of the Economic Consequences Frame

The articles displayed in Table 6.2 represent instances where Boko Haram is described in terms of its economic impact on the northeast and the entire Nigerian state. The economic costs of Boko Haram are expressed as follows: decline in economic investment and reduction in internally generated revenue in Adamawa state (DT3); destruction of properties worth $6.7b in Borno state (P5); increased military spending in Nigeria (P6, P7, P8); intra-regional conflict (P7); and corruption due to the mismanagement of IDP funds (P8). To establish the financial impact of Boko Haram, political actors in both papers employ words that are associated with the economy and/or finance. For instance, most of the articles in this collection include words like economy, economic, loss, GDP, setback, damage, money, revenue, spend, percent, budget, cut, capital, and destruction.

The textual analysis also reveals the use of words that distance Boko Haram as outsiders responsible for the economic destabilisation of the northeast. For example, in P5, the former Secretary to the Adamawa state government, Umar Bindir blames Boko Haram for the state’s “setbacks in agriculture production” and reduction in “monthly internally generated revenue from N1bn to less than N200m” (P5, p. 42). The below excerpt from DT3 contains statements credited to Kashim Shettima, the former governor...
of Borno state and Abdullahi Bego, the spokesperson for the former governor of Yobe state.

In the North-East alone, destructions worth $9.6b were inflicted on us, from Borno to Adamawa, Yobe, Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi, ... Borno State suffered destructions worth $6.7billion.... N7.42 billion worth of private property was also destroyed during the insurgency in the state (DT3, p. 7).

The above quote highlights the financial costs of properties worth billions of dollars destroyed by Boko Haram, while the phrase inflicted on us, indicates a type of othering, and the existence of a Them. Within this context, Us, as mutually exclusive from the Them, refers to the in-group and consists of the governor and other residents of the northeast. That is, those bearing the consequences of the economic upheaval caused by Boko Haram. Members of Boko Haram are, therefore, the Them/Out-group insinuated in the quote. The othering of Boko Haram is also visible in instances where the group is deemed responsible for delays in road construction and other infrastructure projects in the northeast. For instance, according to Alhaji Adamu Lawan, the Borno state commissioner for Works and Transport, eight roads leading to some communities were put on hold “following persistent Boko Haram attacks in the state that crippled all economic activities in the state” (DT4, p. 28). However, the othering of Boko Haram in these articles overlooks other understandings about the group as the Us referred to may also comprise of some of the Them inferred in DT3 but is not represented as such in the Daily Trust. This is because scholars trace the origin of the sect to Nigeria’s north (Oyewole, 2013, p. 256), while some of the group’s alleged sponsors are part of the northern political/religious elite (Akinola, 2015, p. 9). Boko Haram members also consist of "university lecturers, students, bankers, and commissioners and other officers of state,"
drug addicts, vagabonds, and generally lawless people” (Adesoji, 2014, p. 106), drawn initially from the northeast and subsequently, the LCBCs (Adegbulu, 2013). Although some of the members of the group are known, a majority are unknown and may be living among other northeastern residents or even in other parts of the country.

Apart from the above textual elements, the articles in this cluster incorporate different types of visuals including charts, maps and documentary images that is, photographs that reflect actual events and can be regarded as truthful (Barthes & Heath, 1977; Sontag, 2004). For example, the article in DT3 is accompanied by different images including the photographs in Figures 6.4 and 6.5.

Figure 6.4. DT3. FG to spends N121bn on North-East (Abdallah, 2017, p. 8)
Figure 6.4 shows two male participants (one is partially cropped-off, leaving one primary participant). The main photo subject is dressed in a casual northern traditional attire and is shown standing on the remains of a recently (based on the smoke rising from the rubble) burnt down building. The main participant stands with his back to the camera, which suggests an invitation for viewers to co-witness the wreckage caused by Boko Haram. Figure 6.7 shows a pile of damaged desks in front of a partly razed classroom building. These images, therefore, serve as evidence in support of the claims made against the material agent, Boko Haram, who is deemed responsible for the destruction of houses, classrooms, health centres/hospital, and police stations in DT3. Like the words employed in the articles, Figures 6.6 and 6.7 also depict the Economic Consequences frame and thus, a particular aspect of the Boko Haram narrative.

The Economic Consequences frame is an outcome of two discursive practices that are relevant to legacy platforms: reliance on official sources and news values. Legacy platforms depend on accounts from authoritative sources for the appearance of
objective/balanced evaluation of social issues. This explains why the accounts and statistical evidence in the articles in this cluster are provided by state governors (DT3), state officials (P5), members of the Federal House of Representatives – Nigeria’s lower legislature (P7), and military chiefs (P6). For instance, DT3 and P5 include intertextual components in the form of direct quotes from statements made by Abdullahi Bego, a spokesperson for the Yobe State governor and Umar Bindir, the Adamawa State governor, respectively. In the words of Bego, “N7.42 billion worth of private property was also destroyed during the insurgency in the state. They include 43,209 rooms of various types, 5,162 assorted vehicles, 109,267 livestock” (DT3, p. 7). Bindir is cited as follows: “If I were to quantify the economic loss recorded by the state, I will put it based on the measure of our GDP of $3bn to be around $9bn, which is probably thrice our GDP” (p. 42). The information provided by these sources point to the financial burden of acts by Boko Haram and serves to distance the region from Boko Haram and its members. These sources, therefore, contribute to the development of the Economic Consequences frame. As is noted in section 2.3.1, media representations of social events are socially constructed by media organisations and other political actors (Kuehn, 2018; King, 1987). Media sources, who are mainly drawn from the ranks of the elite (Berkowitz & Beach, 1993; Gil, Arroyave, & Soruco, 2006; Comrie, 1999; Schudson, 2003; Armstrong & Nelson, 2005), wield substantial influence on media content since they constitute a critical aspect of media routines. However, sources may choose to withhold the truth or emphasise only certain aspects of narratives and in this case, Bindir and Bego chose to highlight the economic cost of Boko Haram while excluding the role of the state in the emergence and sustenance of the group, thereby providing an incomplete picture about Boko Haram.
The second discursive practice pertains to news values: bad news and proximity. Stories about the destruction of or delays in the construction of state infrastructure qualify as negative news events that qualify for coverage as seen in DT3 and P5. For example, the former governor of Borno state, Kashim Shettima in a statement to federal lawmakers listed some Yobe state properties destroyed by Boko Haram including "609 classrooms, 83 clinics, hospitals, health centres, 219 water facilities, 45 courts, police stations, barracks, 19 electricity installations and fertiliser plants and 123 offices, residential buildings and shops" (DT3, p. 7). Like bad news, proximity is also an important news selection factor on legacy platforms (Martin, 1988). This explains why the papers focus on the economic impact of Boko Haram as it pertains to Nigeria even though Boko Haram attacks occur in other parts of Africa, especially Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. However, while the Punch details the wider impact of the economic consequence of attacks by Boko Haram to the country, the Daily Trust prioritises the economic cost of Boko Haram to the northeast. This outcome is discussed in terms of the nature of the Nigerian state and its media ecology in the next section.

6.3.2 The Political Context of the Economic Consequences Frame

This section of the study argues that while the Economic Consequences frame mirrors some aspects of Nigeria's reality, Boko Haram cannot necessarily be deemed responsible for all Nigeria's or the northeast's economic woes. This study also asserts that the Economic Consequences frame reflects the divides in the Nigerian media ecology.

Although the literature indicates that the Boko Haram crisis have brought about reduced commercial activities, rendered affected areas less attractive to investors and diminished the state of infrastructure in Nigeria, especially the northeast (Awortu, 2015; Awojobi, 2014), some of these problems, pre-date Boko Haram. Since the 1970s,
Nigeria has operated a mono-cultural economy, which has had negative impact on other formerly thriving Gross Domestic Product (GDP) boosting sectors like agriculture (Gary & Karl, 2003, pp. 21-23; The Economist, 2016a). Attempts at diversifying the Nigerian economy have also proved abortive for many reasons including the lack of effective “investment, trade and industrial policies; dynamic growth performance; macroeconomic stability; a competitive exchange rate and expansionary but responsible fiscal policy as well as institutional variables such as good governance and absence of conflict and corruption” (Usman, 2015, para. 3). Besides, the mismanagement of state resources by the country’s elites (civilian and military) has also been a recurrent theme. Moreover, apart from Boko Haram, Nigeria’s north is also plagued by other insecurity concerns arising from Fulani cattle herders whose attacks on civilians have destabilised sections of the north (Mikailu, 2016). Other issues such as climate change, have also had devastating impact on food production in the country (Dahiru & Tanko, 2018). This, therefore, means that the Boko Haram problem may have only escalated the economic challenges in the northeast, rather than being the root-cause of Nigeria’s economic challenges.

An important feature of the Economic Consequences cluster is the difference in the application of the frame in the Daily Trust, which is a northern paper and the Punch, a southern paper. As earlier stated, the Daily Trust placed salience on the economic impact of Boko Haram on the northeast, while the Punch presented a more robust analysis of the financial implication of Boko Haram on the Nigerian state. For example, in DT3, the writer argues that the budgeted sum for the developmental projects in the northeast is insufficient compared to the scale of destruction carried out by Boko Haram. The author, however, fails to consider other forms of intervention dedicated to the northeast such as “three percent of the federation’s value added tax” (Umoru, 2016,
para. 2) dedicated to the reconstruction of the northeast; other local and international aid funds; the overall state of the Nigerian economy and/or the country’s very complex revenue sharing formula. In fact, concerns over the amount of resources dedicated to the northeast triggered debates in the National Assembly (Nigeria’s legislative arm), with members from the southeastern part of the country clamoring for similar interventions (P7). But unlike the northern paper (*Daily Trust*), the *Punch* newspaper emphasised the financial implication of Boko Haram to not just the northeast but as it affects other critical sectors of the Nigerian economy including the military (P6), and the incidence of corruption due to the mismanagement of IDP funds (P8). The difference in focus can be attributed to the dichotomous nature of the Nigerian press and *Daily Trust*’s role as the voice of the north as detailed in section 1.3.4.

While visible in the legacy texts, the Economic Consequences frame is absent on Twitter. This is because economy-angled stories are often laden with statistical details, charts and graphs, and research has shown that these types of information are less easy to comprehend (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). Although Twitter allows for the inclusion of images, it is primarily a textual platform (Marwick & boyd, 2011, p. 116) used for the exchange of short bursts of information and therefore, carries complex forms of evidence less effectively.

6.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter has examined how the two outlier frames (Attribution of Responsibility and Economic Consequences) are shaped by their media and political contexts and by so doing answers two key questions: What roles do the values, routines and norms of legacy media; and the logic and affordances of social media play in the framing of Boko Haram? What roles do the Nigerian state and its media ecology play in
The Attribution of Responsibility frame is distinguishable on Twitter and refers to the salience placed on President Buhari’s role in curbing the proliferation, influence, and capacity of Boko Haram to execute attacks or occupy territories in Nigeria and/or the Lake Chad Basin area. The MCDA of Attribution of Responsibility cluster members, shows evidence of the use of positive naming/referential and predicational strategies that distinguish Buhari from other important actors in the Boko Haram discourse. In addition to these, the tweets in this cluster include images of people: President Buhari and the Chibok girls. While the depiction of Buhari echoes his textual representation, the Chibok girls function as evidence of Buhari’s gains against Boko Haram. There is also evidence of the impact of some discursive features of Twitter including the logic of connectivity and the affordances of anonymity and network association in the emergence of the Attribution of Responsibility frame. Lastly, the appearance of the Attribution of Responsibility frame is ascribed to the news value of two real-time events that occurred in the month of May – the release of eighty-two Chibok girls and President Buhari’s second year-in-office anniversary. However, while there is an emphasis on Buhari’s successes against Boko Haram, other evidence indicates that Boko Haram is still a virile force in Nigerian and other Lake Chad Basin Countries (LCBCs).

The Economic Consequences frame refers to the emphasis on the financial implication of the Boko Haram crisis on the northeast and the Nigerian state in general. The MCDA of the Economic Consequences cluster reveals the presence of words that are related to economy/finance and other words/phrases that distance Boko Haram as the culprit of the economic woes in Nigeria’s northeast. The articles in this cluster incorporate different types of images such as charts, maps, and documentary
photographs, which mainly serve evidentiary purposes. The frame is explained in terms of two discursive practices – the role of sources and two news values – proximity and bad news. Lastly, the MCDA indicates that Boko Haram may have only contributed to the country’s economic challenges, rather than being its primary cause. This means, therefore, that the Economic Consequences framing of Boko Haram reduces the complexity of reality by attributing responsibility for economic challenges to Boko Haram alone.

Whereas the CHCA in chapter four, enabled the identification and brief description of the Outlier frames, this chapter has provided broader context for the frames by facilitating an in-depth understanding about the media and political contexts of the frames.

The next chapter ties together the key findings of this research as are presented in chapters four, five and six of this study.
CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

This research has examined the construction of Boko Haram between January and June 2017 in legacy and social media represented by four Nigerian national newspapers, The Guardian, Punch, Daily Trust and Leadership, and Twitter respectively. The study was undertaken from the perspective of framing and set out to answer two key questions: (1) What integrative frames are employed in the representation of Boko Haram in Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter? (2) How are frames shaped by their media and political contexts? (2a) What roles do the values, routines and norms of legacy media, and the logic and affordances of social media play in the framing of Boko Haram? (2b) What roles do the Nigerian state and its media ecology play in the framing of Boko Haram?

The first question was answered by analysing 5,156 newspaper articles and tweets via a quantitative content analysis method - Computer-assisted Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (CHCA). The CHCA is an inductive-based framing analysis method and was carried out following Matthes and Kohring (2008) who argue that pre-defined frame elements can be located across datasets with the aid of cluster analysis (p. 258). The frame elements were taken from Entman’s conceptualisation of frames and included problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The second set of research questions were answered via a qualitative content analysis method - Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA). The MCDA enabled the examination of the textual, visual, discursive, and social practices of the respective platforms as expressed in words and images used in the representation of Boko Haram on the studied platforms. In addition to illustrating
the findings from the CHCA, the MCDA facilitated the robust interpretation of identified frames by detailing how frames were influenced by their media and political contexts.

This thesis concludes that the construction of Boko Haram on the investigated platforms reflects Nigeria's socio-political and economic realities, its fragmented press as well as the prevalent global understandings about terrorism. It also posits that the representation of the group is shaped by the logic and affordances of legacy and social media platforms and in the end fails to provide a comprehensive picture about Boko Haram. Finally, this thesis asserts that the construction of Boko Haram on the studied platforms unwittingly serves the goals of terrorists and/or the government, which the media ought to hold accountable to the public.

7.2 The Construction of Boko Haram in The Guardian, Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership; and on Twitter

In response to the first research question, this study inductively located six conceptual tools that were used in the construction of Boko Haram in the selected newspapers and on Twitter. These included the Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women, Religious Polarisation, Attribution of Responsibility, and Economic Consequences frames. The identification of these conceptual tools is an indication that the examination of legacy and social media platforms is critical to the understanding of political realities since they can jointly offer a more robust picture of societal problems. Additionally, the successful location of these frames provides more evidence in support of the effectiveness of CHCA as a viable frame analysis approach.

In answering the second research question, this study noted the combined functions of legacy values, norms, and routines; Twitter logic and affordances and other external factors including the nature of the Nigerian state and its media ecology in the emergence of the identified frames. This aspect of the study's findings contributes to the literature on framing in five significant ways. First, they provide important insights into the role of
a broader range of factors including legacy media norms, routines, and values, and social media logic and affordances in the appearance of legacy and social media frames, respectively. While affordances are key for understanding the dynamic relationship between what users can do on social media platforms like Twitter as well as the technological options that make such activities possible, this study outlines the relationship between Twitter affordances and frames. Second, they illustrate the role of images in the construction of social realities, thereby justifying the calls for integrative framing analysis. Third, the findings demonstrate the role of both established and non-established sources as critical partners in the frame construction process, thus, extending knowledge about the place of sources in the news/frame production process. Fourth, the findings illustrate the difference between news frames and news values by noting how frames identified in media texts may be shaped by the news value of media narratives. This responds to the calls for identifying the difference between news frames and news values. Fifth, by illustrating how frames reflect their socio-political environment, the findings enhance understanding about the role of power and culture in the news production process.

As explained in chapter four, the six frames identified in this study can be described as belonging to a broad classification of frames in the framing literature such as Vreese's generic and issue-specific frames (see section 2.4.4). While generic frames "transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics, some even over time and in different cultural contexts" (Vreese, 2005a, p. 54), issue-specific frames emerge from the analysis of particular events. Four of the frames identified in this study, that is, the Social Consequences, Economic Consequences, Attribution of Responsibility and Religious Polarisation frames, can be classified as generic-type frames, which have been identified by other framing scholars. The Religious Polarisation
frame in this study, for example, can be compared to Okoro and Odoemelam’s (2013) ethnic and religious frames, which the authors discerned from their investigation of the representation of Boko Haram in four Nigerian newspapers – The Guardian, Daily Sun, Vanguard, and Thisday. It is also similar to Ette’s (2016) and Ezeh and Emmanuel’s (2016) results. For instance, Ette (2016) identified certain condensational symbols - “phrases that through repeated use evoke shared meanings and understanding of terrorism” (p. 453) that were applied by the British press in reference to Boko Haram. Examples of such phrases included Islamic sect, Islamist militants, Islamic group, which the author argues, associated Boko Haram with Islam. This finding is also replicated in Ezeh and Emmanuel’s (2016) investigation of the framing of Boko Haram by the BBC and Al Jazeera. The authors argue that the BBC’s framing of “Boko Haram insurgency took stereotypic stature of the age-long and deep-rooted narratives of western media that associate Islam with barbarism, killing, suicide-bombing, fanaticism, extremism, and terrorism by undermining the diversity of Muslim population (SIC)” (p. 41).

The War against Women frame highlights Boko Haram’s deployment of sexual and gender-based violence targeted at women and girls - who are identified as the principal victims of the sect. It is an example of an issue-specific frame since it emerged from this analysis of the construction of Boko Haram in selected legacy and social media platforms. Although other scholars have highlighted gender in the context of Boko Haram (Matfess, 2017; Oriola, 2017; Zenn & Pearson, 2014; Nnam, Arua & Otu, 2018) and more broadly in the terrorism literature (Berko & Erez, 2007), this study unveils gender as a critical aspect of the discourse of Boko Haram on the selected legacy and social media platforms.

As is also outlined in the literature, generic frames can overlap with issue-specific frames (Uwazuruike, 2018). This is as seen in this study’s War against Boko
Haram frame, which on the one hand can be compared to the conflict frame, a type of generic frame that emphasises disputes between parties (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). On the other hand, this frame can be described as issue-specific considering it materialised from the analysis of the Boko Haram case. Nigeria’s response to the Boko Haram problem is similar to the global war on terror in terms of being prosecuted largely militarily. However, unlike President Bush’s war on terror which was targeted at enemies external to the US, Nigeria’s war against Boko Haram is aimed at some known Nigerian citizens and to that extent can be classified as a civil war. Yet, the visibility of the War against Boko Haram on all the studied outlets/platforms means it can be compared to Reese and Lewis’ (2009) war on terror frame. The war on terror policy was initiated by the Bush administration but later evolved into a “powerful organising principle” in the US media (p. 777).

The simultaneous appearance of generic and issue-specific frames in this study is consistent with other findings in the terrorism framing literature. For instance, Berbers et al. (2016) extracted both generic and issue-specific type frames in their analysis of the construction of Syria fighters in Dutch and Flemish newspapers. The visibility of these types of frames in this study can be attributed to three main factors. The first is the ubiquitous nature of terrorism. Although terrorism was once regarded as a distant and remote problem, today it is a present challenge owing to its manifestation in most parts of the world. The second reason is that much of media/journalistic practices are standardised. As Benson and Neveu (2005) argue, journalistic activities are influenced by a ‘universe of tacit presuppositions’ that organise action within the field” (p. 3). While platforms like Twitter serve as alternative platforms for media engagement, research has shown that these platforms replicate some of the elements of the internal logic of legacy platforms such as news values (Esser, 2014; Klinger & Svensson, 2015; Hedman, 2017).
Lastly, although Boko Haram exhibits the features of other fourth-wave terrorist organisations, they are also quite unique owing to the highly polarised nature of their main country of operation - Nigeria. Based on the above, this study argues that the application of generic type frames in this study is a product of the pervasiveness of terrorism and established media routines, while the issue-specific frames are prompted by the unique nature of Boko Haram as well as its primary operational base, Nigeria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outlets/Platforms</th>
<th>Identified Frames</th>
<th>ECHO FRAMES</th>
<th>OUTLIER FRAMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Consequences</td>
<td>War against Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td></td>
<td>n=239</td>
<td>n=324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td></td>
<td>n=262</td>
<td>n=160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td></td>
<td>n=170</td>
<td>n=91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td>n=211</td>
<td>n=219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td>n=259</td>
<td>n=223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1. Frames identified per Outlet/Platform

As can be delineated from Table 7.1, four of the frames (Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, War against Women and Religious Polarisation) are visible on both platforms, while the two others, the Economic Consequences and Attribution of Responsibility frames, are unique to some newspapers and Twitter respectively. In this study, the former set of conceptual tools are called Echo frames, while the latter are referred to as Outlier frames. This study holds the view that the emergence of the Echo frames is a product of the similarities in the logic of the studied platforms, while the appearance of Outlier frames reflect the differences in the practices and affordances of the selected newspapers and Twitter respectively.
The presence of Echo and Outlier frames in the construction of Boko Haram on the respective platforms mirror findings in the framing literature. For instance, Frederick, Pegoraro, and Burch (2016) identified three echo/convergent and organic/divergent frames (the Setting, the Politics, and the Games) in their analysis of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games in selected newspapers and on Twitter. While the Politics and Games frames were present in both newspapers and Twitter, their analysis revealed that the Setting frame was only utilised by Tweeters (p. 803). However, in this study, in addition to the identification of echo and outlier frames, the analysis captured the nuances in the application of some of the frames on the respective platforms. The identification of Echo and Outlier frames, in addition to the slight variations in the application of these frames, provide evidence in support of understandings about the internal and external workings of legacy and networked platforms. For instance, while the presence of Echo frames are instances where Twitter reinforced legacy media logic, the nuances in the application of the Echo frames and the appearance of an Outlier frame on Twitter represent occasions where networked platforms substitute and undermine legacy logic respectively.

For instance, the Social Consequences and War against Women frames in the selected newspapers and on Twitter underpin the human cost of Boko Haram and the group’s deployment of sexual and gender-based violence specifically targeted at women and girls, respectively. Although legacy and networked media norms such as objectivity and subjectivity, enabled the emergence of these frames, the articles and the tweets in these clusters primarily gained traction owing to their emotive quality. This is because emotionality is a critical discursive practice of legacy and networked media that can enhance readership and visibility, and these translate into economic capital on both platforms. The collection of articles and tweets in the Social Consequences and War
against Women clusters frequently reference instances of death, displacement, humanitarian crisis, kidnapping and rape owing to the activities of Boko Haram. While the repeated reference to women and girls in the War against Women cluster is an indication of their hypervisibility, their invisibility in the discourse of Boko Haram is evidenced in their non-inclusion as sources in The Guardian and their lack of material agency on Twitter. The articles and tweets in both clusters are accompanied by images that replicate the textual accounts. These include documentary and symbolic photographs of women and children in the case of the Social Consequences frame, and images of the Chibok girls in the War against Women cluster. The pictures of suffering women and children contribute to the emergence of the Social Consequences frame because they are established cultural icons that are effective for communicating the urgency of and danger posed by Boko Haram and as such capable of stimulating strong emotional responses from audiences and users. The photographs of the Chibok girls are instrumental to the appearance of the War against Women frame as the girls are critical to the discourse and identity of Boko Haram and thus, can easily resonate with readers and users.

The materialisation of the War against Boko Haram and Religious Polarisation frames is traceable to conflict, a significant news value that attracts readership, visibility and shareability and thus, is of commercial value to the selected newspapers and Twitter. Whereas the War against Boko Haram frame underscores Nigeria's military-based response to the Boko Haram crisis, the Religious Polarisation frame is used to characterise the group as Islamic and anti-Christianity. The articles and tweets in the War against Boko Haram cluster are accompanied by conventional and non-conventional war images including photographs of soldiers, battle fatigues and weapons, while the Religious Polarisation cluster comprises pictures of destroyed churches.
These images in conjunction with the conflict-related words employed in these clusters establish a binary opposition between on the one hand, the military and terrorists/Boko Haram, and Islam and Christianity on the other, thereby, contributing to the development of the frames, respectively.

In addition, the appearance of the Religious Polarisation frame in only the southern papers (The Guardian and Punch) and on Twitter is associated with the susceptibility of both platforms to ideologically polarising content. The othering of Boko Haram on Twitter is enabled by the platform’s logic of programmability and connectivity, and the affordance of networked association. The southern papers’ characterisation of Boko Haram as anti-Christianity reflects their ideological posture and location on the Nigeria map and this is owing to the polarised nature of both the Nigerian state and its media ecology. The Guardian and Punch’s portrayal of Boko Haram with respect to the Religious Polarisation frame is also traceable to their understanding of the known goals of Boko Haram as well as the clichéd representation of Muslims as terrorists. The Echo frames as earlier stated reflect instances where Boko Haram is represented using similar conceptual tools on the studied platforms. They, therefore, are instances where legacy media values are reinforced on Twitter. The Echo frames are also an indication that both legacy and networked platforms can project similar versions of political realities.

Even though the Echo frames appear in the selected newspapers and Twitter, the analysis captures the slight nuances in the application of some of these frames on the respective outlets/platforms. The subtle differences in the application of the Echo frames on the studied platforms reflect Nigeria’s bifurcated press and the capacity of legacy and networked platforms to offer different versions of reality. For instance, the Social Consequences frame in the newspapers is used to provide a broad picture of the social ills attributed to Boko Haram based on accounts of credible media sources. But
in addition to this, on Twitter, where the constellation of users comprises both established media sources and ordinary people, the Social Consequences cluster includes personalised accounts about the social impact of the group on victims and casualties of the conflict.

Also, while the War against Boko Haram frame is generically applied across the platforms, the northern papers (*Daily Trust* and *Leadership*) endorse the government's declaration about winning the war on Boko Haram, while the southern papers (*The Guardian* and *Punch*) query the veracity of the government's claims. Whereas the northern papers describe the ousting of Boko Haram from Sambisa as a possible end to the Boko Haram crisis, the southern papers characterise the military campaign at Sambisa as an isolated victory, one that could inspire future attacks by the group. Although these interpretations are consistent with the literature on the demise of terrorist organisations, the commercial logic of legacy outlets offers another explanation. The northern papers' pro-government posture benefits the papers commercially especially since the President, a majority of his cabinet members and some military chiefs are from the north. Similarly, *The Guardian* and *Punch* are adjudged to be functioning in their capacity as some of the most influential voices of the South, a position that secures their age-long hegemony. This is because the Nigerian mass media is “an institutional monopoly of the south-west” (Oyovbaire 2001, as cited in Ojo, 2003, p. 834).

However, while the newspapers focus on who is winning or losing the war on Boko Haram, Tweeters place salience on the internecine nature of the conflict and this is owing to the logic and affordances of the platform. Even though Twitter is dominated by people with significant societal influence such as politicians and journalists, the platform still functions as a dais where ordinary people can tell their stories and, in some cases, challenge established narratives and routines. For instance, whereas the
representation of Boko Haram in terms of war in the papers includes only conventional images such as portraits of the military chiefs and President Buhari, Tweeters utilise both conventional and non-conventional images. Although these images contribute to the appearance of the War against Boko Haram frame and is an indication of their relevance on the studied platforms, they also reflect the differences in the specific ways in which the frame was constructed on the respective platforms. For instance, the conventional images on Twitter comprise of gory and battle scene photographs that are absent in the selected papers. Unlike the newspapers, Twitter is not subject to editorial, government and ethical restrictions. Besides, by design, inflammatory content thrives on Twitter owing to its logic and affordances of programmability, datafication and networked association. The images on Twitter, therefore, offer a more robust representation of the war against Boko Haram by depicting the human cost of war in a way the papers do not.

Also, while the War against Women frame is only delineated in The Guardian, it is the most frequently applied frame on Twitter, a consequence of the platform’s logic of popularity and affordance of persistence, visibility, and network association. The Chibok girls are objects of “irregular gaze or fascination” (Sjoberg, 2018, p.298) in the context of Boko Haram and have thus, acquired a mythic stature. Stories about the kidnapped girls were made popular on Twitter using the addressivity marker - #bringbackourgirls and the Bring Back Our Girls campaign has evolved into a global movement. Stories about the girls are, therefore, available on Twitter and can be easily accessed and referenced on the platform by people who have large network of followers. The logic and affordances of Twitter are, therefore, critical to not just the appearance of the frame, but also its emergence as the most frequently applied conceptual tool in the framing of Boko Haram. The differences in the application and manifestation of the Echo frames...
in the selected newspapers and on Twitter reflect occasions where legacy values, norms and practices are substituted by the logic and affordances of networked platforms.

The second set of frames identified in this research are the Outlier frames, that is, the two frames (Attribution of Responsibility and Economic Consequences) that are unique to Twitter and some of the selected newspapers - *Daily Trust and Punch* (see Table 7.1). This study asserts that the Outlier frames emerged as a result of the unique features of the platforms where they feature. The absence of the Economic Consequences and Attribution of Responsibility frames in the newspapers and Twitter respectively, is attributed to the differences in the values and practices of the respective platforms.

Whereas the Attribution of Responsibility frame is distinguishable on Twitter and used to highlight President Buhari’s role in reining in Boko Haram, the Economic Consequences frame appears only in the *Daily Trust and Punch* newspapers and emphasises the economic cost of the group. As is argued in section 6.2.1, the tweets in the Attribution of Responsibility cluster merit visibility on Twitter because of their news value, and news values can determine aspects of narratives that are emphasised. For instance, tweets about the release of eighty-two Chibok secondary school girls who were kidnapped by Boko Haram in April 2014 gained traction on Twitter owing to the following news values: exclusivity, good news and shareability (Harcup & O’Neil, 2017). Unlike legacy platforms where negative/bad news stories tend to attract more coverage (Eilders, 2006; Galtung & Ruge 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001), on Twitter, good news or stories that evoke positive sentiments thrive (Berger & Milkman, 2010). This is as a result of Twitter’s logic of connectivity and the affordances of anonymity and network association.
Although news values such as proximity and bad news are critical to the manifestation of the Economic Consequences frame in the *Daily Trust* and *Punch* newspapers, the absence of this frame on Twitter is linked to their bad news quality. This is in addition to the specific ways in which economy-angled stories are presented in legacy media. These stories often include statistical details, charts, and graphs, which are less easy to understand. Unlike legacy media where bad news is a critical news selection factor, Twitter tends to promote positive content (Hansen, Arvidsson, Nielsen, Colleoni & Etter, 2011; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neil, 2001; Eilders, 2006).

Additionally, even though Twitter allows for the use of images, it is mainly a text-based platform, that is used for the production and distribution of a limited number of characters (280 or fewer) and thus, not suited for more complex forms of information. Whereas the appearance of the Economic Consequences frame in the newspapers reflect legacy news values and practices, the visibility of the Attribution of Responsibility frame on only Twitter marks how networked platforms undermine legacy media, by providing other aspects of political realities not captured by traditional media.

Although the collection of frames identified on the studied platforms offer a more robust understanding of the construction of Boko Haram, this study reaches the conclusion that they still fail to provide a complete picture of the group. By underscoring only certain aspects of Boko Haram narratives, the media left out other aspects that are crucial to opinion and policy formation about the group. As can be seen from Table 7.1, Tweeters employed the following conceptual tools: War against Women, War against Boko Haram, Social Consequences, Attribution of Responsibility and Religious Polarisation frames. On the other hand, the Social Consequences, War against Boko Haram, Economic Consequences and Religious Polarisation and War against Women frames were found in the selected newspapers. On the whole, therefore, the
construction of Boko Haram in the selected newspapers and on Twitter within the study period focused on the impact or the problematisation of Boko Haram (Social Consequences, Economic Consequences and War against Women frames), response/solution to the Boko Haram problem (War against Boko Haram), benefit attribution (Attribution of Responsibility) and the identity of the group (Religious Polarisation). Although these lenses represent aspects of the narrative that the media deemed relevant to project, they however, do not present a comprehensive picture of the Boko Haram problem especially when weighed against other realities. In fact, the representation of Boko Haram in the media via these conceptual tools serves to benefit the government, which the media are there to hold to account, and promotes the cause of terrorists.

For instance, on the one hand, the Social Consequences frame gives a human face to the Boko Haram problem and provides justification for governmental action against the group, can lead to the group’s loss of grassroots support, as well as attract local and international aid funds. On the other hand, the Social Consequences framing of Boko Haram is advantageous to the group as terrorist organisations in addition to other objectives, seek to communicate fear and compel other psychological and behavioural responses from their target audiences. Emotional responses can result in empathy towards victims and, therefore stimulate calls for actions that will benefit the organisation in response to the fear of becoming a target of the group. Similarly, the War against Boko Haram frame on the one hand, makes Nigeria relevant in the global discourse about terrorism and thus provides the rationale for international funding in support of the popular military-based counterterrorism drive despite the shortfalls of the approach. On the other hand, however, the prosecution of the Boko Haram war has attracted huge defence budgets, which in the case of Nigeria has not been effectively
managed. It has also triggered other far-reaching costs including promoting cohesion among Boko Haram members as evidenced in their sustained attacks on the Nigerian state and other Lake Chad Basin Countries (LCBC) as well as the gross abuse of human rights. Although the emphasis on Boko Haram’s gendered violence against women could sustain the global call for the protection of women and girls, it also makes women targets of choice for Boko Haram, especially in view of the functional and strategic roles of women to the organisation. The Religious Polarisation frame highlights the plight of Christians but at the same time labels Boko Haram as an Islamic group. The depiction of Boko Haram as anti-Christianity in a polarised environment like Nigeria only serves to fuel more conflict. The Religious Polarisation frame, is, therefore, advantageous to Boko Haram, a group that seeks to upturn the modern state of Nigeria as well as institutionalise an extreme version of Islam globally. This study concludes, therefore, that the representation of Boko Haram on the studied platforms inadvertently serves the objectives of terrorists and/or the Nigerian government.

An example of an aspect of the narrative that is minimised or excluded in the framing of Boko Haram on the studied platforms is the causal attribution element, which is used to describe factors responsible for the rise or sustenance of the group. An emphasis on the causal attribution frame element could have instantiated discussions about the root causes of Boko Haram, that is, the permissive, direct, and catalytic conditions that facilitate the group (Newman, 2006, p. 764). Scholars have identified the following as possible root causes of Boko Haram: economic deprivation, modernisation strain, identity conflict, political transformation, and contagion (Adegbulu, 2013; Adesoji, 2014; Akinola, 2015; Idowu, 2013; Loimeier, 2012; Oyeniyi, 2014; Oyewole, 2013, p. 259; Olaniyan & Asuelime, 2014; Onapajo, Okeke-Uzodike & Whetho, 2012).
Debates about the root causes of Boko Haram have a number of implications. One, it could have provided a deeper understanding about the relationship between terrorism as perpetuated by Boko Haram and Nigeria’s socio-political and economic challenges as well as the role of Nigeria’s political elite in the emergence and sustenance of the group. Even though Boko Haram is now labelled a transnational terrorist organisation, it is important to note that the organisation was formerly a social welfare group that provided jobs for the unemployed and education for women and children thereby making up for the state’s negligence. This explains the group’s founder’s (Muhammed Yusuf) successful mobilisation drive within and even outside Nigeria in Boko Haram’s early years. Boko Haram’s evolution from a self-help group to a notorious violent organisation has been traced to a number of factors including Nigeria’s socio-economic inequalities, weak governance, endemic corruption, the complex composition of the Nigerian state and government/security failures (Loimeier, 2012; Oyeniyi, 2014; Gray & Adeakin, 2015; Bappah, 2016; Hansen, 2017; Rogers, 2012). These issues, which scholars have also pinpointed as the root causes of Boko Haram have remained unaddressed and are not captured in the representation of Boko Haram on the respective platforms.

While the Social and Economic Consequences frames suggest that Boko Haram is responsible for many of Nigeria’s socio-economic problems, many of these problems predate the group. For example, Nigeria ranks low in terms of poverty, economic inequality, corruption, and illiteracy. These problems have been identified as some of the reasons behind the emergence and proliferation of Boko Haram. Also, while Boko Haram is characterised as anti-women, discrimination against women is both a Nigerian and global challenge. These suggest, therefore, that Boko Haram is a symptom and a manifestation of deeply rooted societal flaws and not necessarily the cause of
these problems. Moreover, by holding Boko Haram solely accountable for the death and displacement of people living in the worst affected areas of the crisis, the media shield the government by failing to highlight their sworn responsibility to protect and defend the Nigerian territory.

Two, acknowledging root causes of Boko Haram could lead to the development of more effective counter-terrorism measures, especially since the current strategies are not yielding lasting results. Whereas the endorsement of President Buhari’s efforts and the representation of the Boko Haram conflict as war justifies the continuous application of military-based counter-terrorism methods, deterrent approaches are hardly effective in the long-run. This, therefore, calls for improved methods and strategies, other than the glorification of war as more effective long-term solutions to Boko Haram and more broadly, global terrorism. These include the emphasis on robust education and resolving other Boko Haram enablers including corruption, endemic poverty, and unemployment. Functional education can for instance provide counter-Boko Haram ideologies and expose the group for its hidden political objectives and power struggle with the elite, while disabling its supposed claims to stand for purist Islam. The media have the power to lead the fight against Boko Haram because at crucial points in history, they can provide informational building blocks that enable citizens to construct more objective realities. This study elucidates how legacy and social media fall short of providing that lead through the ways in which they frame Boko Haram.

7.3 Original Contributions of the Study

This research makes the following original methodological and theoretical/empirical contributions. One, this study developed a way to apply CHCA to Twitter data. Whereas Matthes and Kohring (2008) applied CHCA to investigate biotechnology coverage in The New York Times, this study employed the CHCA in the
context of terrorism in four Nigerian newspapers and Twitter. In addition, while Matthes and Kohring (2008) focused on the analysis of words, this study investigated words and images used in the representation of a terrorist organisation. The identification of six integrative legacy and networked frames “that make conceptual and operational sense” (Matthes and Kohring, 2008, p. 344) is a testament to the effectiveness and reach of the CHCA. These frames can be applied in future frame effects studies. Two, while Matthes and Kohring (2008) relied on a pre-existing codebook, the application of the CHCA in this research required the development of a customised codebook, which can also be utilised in other Boko Haram or terrorism-related framing studies. The third contribution pertains to the MCDA. The MCDA as applied in this study, is a fusion of Richardson’s (2007) three-stage approach for the analysis of newspaper content and Machin’s (2007) social semiotic approach to visual communication. The emergent analytical approach is used for the analysis of newspaper articles and tweets in addition to their accompanying images. This method can be applied in other integrative framing projects.

Four, while most Boko Haram framing research focuses on the analysis of legacy media texts, there is a dearth of studies about the construction of the group on social media. This study addressed this gap by investigating the representation of Boko Haram on Twitter. Five, this research contributes to knowledge about the symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism by analysing the various influences on frame building. Six, this study reacts to the paucity of integrative framing studies (Matthes, 2009), thereby contributing to understanding about the combined functions of linguistic and visual elements in the construction of political realities. Lastly, this research offers important insights into the influence of the logic and affordances of media platforms in the emergence of frames thereby uncovering a wider range of factors that influence media frames.
7.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research

As is detailed in Section 1.4, this study investigated the representation of Boko Haram in four Nigerian national newspapers - The Guardian, Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership; and on Twitter between January and June 2017. Although this effort has yielded some key original contributions as is detailed in the previous section, there is a lot more that can be gained by further research into terrorism/Boko Haram as well as the influence of media logic and affordances in the framing of violent conflicts like terrorism in polarised settings. As terrorism is increasingly evolving and prevalent, there is still a need to continuously search for more lasting solutions to the problems it brings about especially given the significant role the media plays in society. Researchers could, therefore, examine the representation of other expressions of terrorism in other parts of the world while the literature on the framing of Boko Haram could be expanded by investigations into the representation of the group on Nigerian broadcast platforms (radio and television); Nigerian blogs such as Linda Ikeji Blog and Elanhub; Nigerian Diasporic media outlets like Sahara Reporters; and online newspapers like Premium Times and The Cable. Scholars may also choose to examine the representation of Boko Haram on other social media platforms such as Facebook, the world’s largest SNS and the most popular SNS in Nigeria. Focus on these areas could offer deeper insight into the representation of Boko Haram and/or terrorism by yielding other visions of realities that could challenge popular or prevailing opinions about the group. This is because unlike offline papers, which are immersed in Nigerian politics and are plagued by poor funding and excessive ownership and government interference, Nigerian online newspapers are more independent and showcase their investigative skills more freely, thereby presenting other aspects of realities not captured by their offline counterparts. Similarly, a platform like Facebook given its unique ‘friend’ feature, is likely to unearth other aspects of the Boko Haram narrative that may not be apparent on Twitter. In addition,
researchers interested in this area could compare possible changes in the representation of the group by investigating other periods. Examining other time frames could enable understanding on how media frames could remain static or change over time.

Furthermore, this research leans more towards the frame-building perspective and as such does not investigate audience frames/frame setting. The convergent and divergent frames identified here can be tested from a frame effects standpoint. This is critical given the current wave of participatory culture and the increasing significance of social media, which as is detailed in this study, is challenging the frame building, and setting divide.

In addition to identifying frames in the selected legacy and social media platforms, this study also probed the possible influence of the internal logic and affordances of platforms in the application of frames. Whereas this study examined specific types of affordances including visibility, anonymity, persistence, editability and networked association, researchers could explore how the different forms or expressions of affordances such as retweets, likes and comments shape media frames (see Section 2.3.2). This is important given the different definitions and interpretations of affordances. Further research on the influence of social media affordances could be instrumental to the growth and evolution of framing.

Mozdeh Big Data Text Analysis Software enabled the retrieval of the large volume of Twitter data used for this study. However, only a small fraction of the retrieved dataset was utilised in this study owing to the data analysis methods employed. Entire or larger samples of Twitter data could be investigated with the aid of computer software tools like Leximancer as exemplified by Frederick, Pegoraro, and Burch (2016).
This study was undertaken in part to address the dearth of integrative framing analysis by examining how both words and images were used to represent Boko Haram in the studied platforms. In this study, however, only photographs were examined even though other forms of images including videos, charts and graphs were employed in the coverage of the group. Further research from the standpoint of integrative framing could look into how terrorist organisations like Boko Haram are depicted in videos. Unlike photographs, which are still images that capture a particular moment, videos are motion images, which provide more detailed perspective to the moment/s captured. Videos are also more engaging and explanatory than static images. Therefore, research into written texts in conjunction with moving images is sure to provide another angle and/or more understanding regarding the representation of terrorism in the media. These as repeatedly stated in this thesis is owing to the role of the media in shaping public opinion and policy.
Appendix A: Frame elements/Variables description/categories/codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable No.</th>
<th>Variable title</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V1</td>
<td>PD - ACTOR</td>
<td>The Federal Government</td>
<td>The federal government of Nigeria is made up of the Executive arm of the state composed of the president and all appointed cabinet members (ministers of different parastatals) who operate at the federal level (there are three levels – Federal, State &amp; Local).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Nigerian Military</td>
<td>The Nigerian Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Police + Other security agencies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>Groups advocating for Boko Haram victims such as the Bring Back our Girls (BBOG) movement and other non-governmental organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>Leader (s) and members of Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>An individual/group primarily identified as an academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2</td>
<td>PD – IDENTITY</td>
<td>Who are BH?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Figures</td>
<td>Persons who are identified as representing or are members of a political party.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-political figure</td>
<td>Persons representing either ethnic- or religious-based organisations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Organisations</td>
<td>Organisations with membership beyond the shores of Nigeria, including NGOs and relief organisations like the Red Cross.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Individuals who have been affected by the BH onslaught including those killed, harmed, injured, or displaced as a result of attacks by Boko Haram.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>All actors that so not belong in any of the above categories.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V3</th>
<th>PD – IMPACT</th>
<th>What is the impact of BH on the Nigeria/Nigerians?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Not indicated in the article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic-related implications of BH (monetary/financial costs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Social implications of BH (humanitarian).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Religious implications (faith).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>All others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>CI – CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION</td>
<td>Who/What is responsible for the emergence or sustenance of Boko Haram?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Not indicated in the article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politicians/Bad governance</td>
<td>Political actors in general or their activities (governance is particularly challenging Nigeria).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jonathan/Past administration</td>
<td>The immediate past president of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan/his executives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Progressives Congress</td>
<td>The party-in-power (took over reins of leadership in March 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>All others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V5</th>
<th>CI – BENEFIT ATTRIBUTION</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Not indicated in the article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Buhari</td>
<td>Nigeria’s president - Muhammadu Buhari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Nigerian Armed Forces</td>
<td>The Nigerian Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Police + Other security agencies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition Forces</td>
<td>The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJFT) – military operatives from Benin, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria charged with decimating Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Vigilance</td>
<td>The Civilian Joint Task Force – domestic militants constituted to assist expel Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>All others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V6</th>
<th>ME – MORAL EVALUATION</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Not indicated in the article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Boko Haram is an expression of Islamic faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the activities of Boko Haram an expression of their faith?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Boko Haram is not an expression of the Islamic faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR - TREATMENT RECOMMENDATION</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Not indicated in the article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the solution to the Boko Haram menace?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgency (Military)</td>
<td>Military-based counterinsurgency approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgency (Negotiation)</td>
<td>Soft counterinsurgency approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution of the Nigerian state</td>
<td>The complete disintegration of the Nigerian state into regions/states/ethnic groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Use of systematic instructions, enlightenment campaigns, knowledge and skills acquisition, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>All others.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B: Content analysis coding scheme for this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable No.</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V1</td>
<td>Coder ID Number (identification parameter for coders aiding the determination of inter-coder reliability)</td>
<td>Code I</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Code II</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2</td>
<td>Newspaper/Twitter (media platforms analysed)</td>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V3</td>
<td>Month (of publication)</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>Sequence (unique id numbers for items investigated. E.g. First article examined from The Guardian = G1)</td>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>DT1 – DTx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>G1 – Gx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>L1 – Lx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>P1 – Px</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>T1 – Tx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V5</td>
<td>Article type or Tweet (including Retweet)</td>
<td>News</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>News (analysis)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Column/Opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tweet</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V6</td>
<td>Source (origin of article/tweet)</td>
<td>Staff writer/paper's own sources</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unattributed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local wire</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other News Service</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other Media sources</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizen journalist</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V7</td>
<td>Main actor in the article/tweet</td>
<td>The FG</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interest group</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political figure</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-political figure</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International organisation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V8</td>
<td>Main actor gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V9</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ubiquitous being</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic fundamentalist</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorist/Insurgent</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V10</td>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V11 Causal Attribution</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V11 Causal Attribution</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politicians/bad governance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jonathan/past administration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ruling Party (All Progressives Congress (APC))</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V12 Benefit Attribution</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Buhari</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Vigilantes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V13 Moral Evaluation</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V14 Treatment recommendation</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency (military)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency (Negotiation)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissolution of the Nigerian state</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V15 Photo (presence or absence of photo)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V16 Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V17 Main actor in photo</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political figure</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-political figure</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V18 Photo (Impact)</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V19 Photo (Causal Attribution)</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politicians/bad governance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jonathan/past administration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ruling Party (All Progressives Congress (APC))</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V20 Photo (Benefit Attribution)</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Buhari</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Vigilantes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V21</td>
<td>Photo (Moral Evaluation)</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V22</th>
<th>Photo (Treatment Recommendation)</th>
<th>Not specified</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency (military)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency (Negotiation)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dissolution of the Nigerian state</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


Accessed 11 May 2019


Ette, M. (2012). ‘Nigeria as a country of interest in terrorism’: Newspaper framing of Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber. Doi:10.1386/jams.4.1.45_1


Finer, S. E. (1976). The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics (2nd, enlarged.). Harmondsworth: Penguin


Gary, I. & Karl, T. L. (2003). Bottom of the barrel: Africa’s oil boom and the poor. Catholic Relief Services. Retrieved from http://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QadwnpMHntSOPkXdrTBQFh2I5QQmCDBZ12yrAhW9kCYIA5_b7cYVhnYxTG06jqg508-kPw_QFnnUrQx0A2duUITH7x3XBO1pH_DeqUZmomBV0m1b68VwVnJx84-K7auShKDn4dTwowxe4nQn2hSBhKXI0719K3OHWwu0Hil-y295uq5K3BT18nj3KFDPjMUmgjTLMww7vNlgoYve1Dzv16LIXHoGXG0JDSAq1fCtmQv81oEgwjrbkhfHA2a6_Mb Accessed 26 August 2016


Hand, D. J. (2018). Aspects of data ethics in a changing world: Where are we now? Big Data, 6(3), 176-190


307


Leiserowitz, A. (2006). Climate change risk perception and policy preferences: The role of affect, imagery, and values. *Climate Change, 77*(1), 45-72


312


Accessed 22 September 2016


The Economist (2016a, January 30). Hope the Naira falls; Nigeria’s economy. The Economist


Tokunaga, R. S. (2011). Social networking site or social surveillance site? Understanding the use of interpersonal electronic surveillance in romantic relationships. Computers in Human Behavior, 27(2), 705–713. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2010.08.014


Tucker, D. (2001). What is new about the new terrorism and how dangerous is it?” Terrorism and Political Violence, 14(3), 1-14


Wasike, B. S. (2013). Framing news in 140 characters: How social media editors frame the news and interact with audiences via twitter. *Global Media Journal, 6*(1), 5-23


PRIMARY DATA REFERENCES (NEWSPAPERS)

Aluko, O. (2017 March 17). Five soldiers killed, three missing in Boko Haram attack – Army. Punch
Olokor, F. (2017, January 2). Buhari’s silence, endorsement of Kaduna killings says CAN. The Punch
Onwuka, A. (2017, June 8). Beyond restructuring or secession: My fear for Nigeria. Punch
The Editor, (2017, January 1). The great Sambisa victory. Daily Trust