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'Leave Them No Space': Checkmating Political Dissent in the Policing of Two UK International Summits

Kris Christmann

A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2017
Acknowledgements

I am extremely grateful to both of my supervisors, Professor Jim McAuley and Dr Shaun McDaid for their time, thoughtful guidance and support throughout. Their patience and good humour is much appreciated and allowed me to reach the final furlong.

The other individuals that made this research possible I shall not name, but include countless activists in London and South Wales that I shared time with, stood beside whilst we faced violent police repression or intrusive surveillance, sat with in convergence centres, and marched with, often to nowhere of any importance.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Animal Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANPR</td>
<td>Automatic Number Plate Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia Summit Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed Circuit Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Investigations (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Detective Chief Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Detective Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIY</td>
<td>Do it yourself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECtHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIT</td>
<td>Forward Intelligence Team (UK Police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>The Group of Seven (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, Canada and US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>The Group of Eight (G7 plus Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>The Group of Twenty (The world's 20 largest national economies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPR</td>
<td>General Data Protection Legislation (EU, 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>Home Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Inspectorate of the Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HO</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICO</td>
<td>Information Commissioners Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Independent Police Complaints Commission</td>
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<td>IPP</td>
<td>Internationally Protected Persons</td>
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<td>ISU</td>
<td>Integrated Security Units</td>
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<td>ITAC</td>
<td>Integrated Threat Assessment Centre</td>
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<td>JCHR</td>
<td>Joint Committee on Human Rights</td>
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<td>LARC</td>
<td>London Action Resource Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI5</td>
<td>Security Service (domestic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI6</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service (foreign)</td>
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WHO  World Health Organisation
WTO  World Trade Organisation
Abstract

This study examines how the state, through its main agencies, responds to and controls horizontally planned transgressive ‘alter-globalisation’ protest movements organised against two international summit meetings in the UK (being the 2009 G20 summit protest in London and the 2014 NATO in Wales, although I draw briefly on the 2013 G8 summit). These dissenting groups set out to challenge the state and the established political order and increasingly employ direct action and civil disobedience to make their protests seen and heard by global elites. Analytically, I take a critical human rights based approach as well using the strategic and tactical perspectives of Jaspers (2015) and Scholl (2012) viewing counter-summit movements and the authorities as ‘players’ in a strategic relational interaction with each other to gain advantage over the opponent. Methodologically, I use an ethnographic approach embedding myself within anti-globalisation protest groups as well as drawing opportunistically on a range of other primary and secondary data sources. My findings reveal that the state and its coercive arm, the police, do much to modify, delimit, and repress protest action. There has now been a transformation in summit policing (and public order policing more generally). The broad components of recent policing innovation includes the following key strategies: (1) careful selection and fortification of summit sites and establishing ‘no protest zones’ (2) the intensive (overt and covert) use of police surveillance practices to intimidate protestors, reduce anonymity at protest spaces and increase transparency and real time intelligence gathering; (3) the disruption and/or smashing of protestor critical infrastructure, including (but not limited to) convergence centres; (4) using non-lethal weapons against unarmed protestors to incapacitate them, enacted clandestinely as a method of dispensing ‘street justice’ and increasing the costs of participation, officially allowing police to control and retake any protest spaces; and (5) pre-emptive legal repression (including legal tools such as, banning orders, permits, and mass pre-emptive arrests, etc.) all of which distracts activist leaders and aids demobilisation. These tactics are strategically adapted to the prevailing conditions imposed by each particular summit, and interact dynamically, although not always incrementally, to protestor’s own tactical repertoires.
1. Introduction: Incapacitating Political Protest

Why study the social control of political activism and dissent at international summit meetings? Summits are by their very nature rare events in the life of any nation. Typically, they bring together a small number of political, military or economic elites for a few short days. Security operations are mounted to keep dignitaries and other internationally protected persons (IPPs) safe and to prevent terrorist attack or violent ‘trouble makers’ from disrupting the smooth running of the summit. Selected members from the world's media are permitted restricted access to the site and they are provided with media briefings which are scrutinised and relayed to the wider public. Peaceful demonstrations far away from the summit site are usually permitted although with heavy restrictions. Once the summit closes, delegates leave and life returns to normal. This encapsulates the official account of proceedings, but as an account, it is woefully inadequate and misleading.

Visit any summit event and one is presented with an arresting set of images. Heavily fortified summit sites, phalanx's of heavily armed police with non-lethal (and lethal weapons) exclusion zones in what had been open public space, and intensive overt and covert surveillance practices by state agencies. At the same time almost any international summit of any importance has seen mass protests and counter summits, some of which have resulted in high levels of violent conflict between the police and protestors.

Necessarily any analysis needs to consider the actions of that key coercive agency of the state, the police, in protest policing. The value of studying protest policing is that it forces one to think outside of the fashionable and supposedly benign 'community policing' paradigm and to consider the significance of protest policing in an age of transgressive anti-globalisation movements that challenge the state and the established political order. What does policing look like under these circumstances is a keener test, in part because it is not limited to state agencies interventions on the street during protest actions but now extends to lengthy preparatory operations encompassing an increasingly wide range of state and non-state actors. Such events provide a near unique laboratory to study contemporary transformations in disciplinary institutions.

England and Wales has had an extensive history of what is termed 'public order policing', or the policing of large, and from the authority's perspective, potentially rebellious crowds. This stretches in contemporary terms from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament marches in the 1960s and the anti-Vietnam war marches to the inner city disturbances in the 1970s and 1980s, to a host of industrial disputes, notably the bitter year-long miner's strike of 1984-85 and the later Wapping dispute (1986-87), as well as the anti-Poll Tax demonstration in Trafalgar Square in 1990. The 1980s in particular were a time of neoliberal economic restructuring, and in respect to urban disorders,
embedded institutional police racism and deteriorating police and minority community relations. The lessons learned from these now symbolic ‘public order events’ was not that heavy handed policing can provoke violent protest and is consequently counter-productive when dealing with public grievances and social division, but rather its opposite, a turn to a more paramilitary policing response. During this time major changes occurred in how demonstrations were policed, both in terms of the police's strategy and tactics, and the utilisation of more weaponry, armour and other offensive equipment. Changes that were at odds with the supposed tradition of British policing, rooted in its Peelain principles; where the police operate with the consent of the community, do not impose order on an unwilling populace, and use only the minimal force to achieve compliance. Writing in the late 1980's, Uglow (1988:38-9) summarised this new policing landscape:

"The weakening of local influence ... the strengthening of police autonomy and national political control ... special squads ... the re-equipping of the force with a modern arsenal and riot control equipment, and the willingness to deploy them ...[ increased] resources ... deeper level of surveillance."

Despite a period of ‘normalisation’ in police protestor confrontations, public order policing policy has continued to evolve and now encompasses a wider range of specialist policing units and security actors who employ deeply contentious overt and covert methods of control and coercion. In large part this has been a result of policy development by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) a non-statutory, non-elected body delegated by the state to make these decisions.

Britain, and its colonies from where these tactics emanate, also has a darker history of what has been termed ‘political policing’ (Broduer, 2007) conducted by a raft of secretive state agencies working in hand with and alongside clandestine specialist policing units. It is a history which reveals widespread and protracted surveillance, coercion and deception, sanctioned at the highest echelons of government, and deployed against a wide range of individuals and organisations. Its function has been to frustrate, disrupt and eliminate dissent which challenges political and economic elites and the status quo in Britain (Connor, 2018a/b). This political policing continues apace, more recently under the latest legitimating guise of ‘counter-extremism’, the tactics of which are based upon counter-insurgency doctrine. Indeed, the Police's National Intelligence Model (NIM)\(^1\) emphasises pre-emptive 'disruption' and 'network demolition' (Swain, 2013) and is being increasingly deployed as a mode in the governing logic of policing. As with much public order and security policy, boundaries for coercion and disciplinary control are removed from public view, consultation and

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\(^1\) NIM is a co-ordinated strategy on the collection, analysis and use of intelligence and is produced by the National Criminal Intelligence Service, being a Home Office Policing body and part of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (Swain, 2013).
oversight. These larger questions between the role of the police organisation, its practices and the functioning of democracy animate this study and have only received, at best, uneven scholarly attention (Manning, 2010:39-40).

1.2 Research Aims and Objectives

The purpose of this study is to examine how the state, through its main agencies, responds to and controls contentious political protest taking place at international summits in the UK. My focus is upon those ‘transgressive’ protest groups and organisations who refuse to enter into ‘negotiations’ with the police, and by doing so challenge the limits of what some scholars view as the now dominant ‘negotiated management model’ of policing protest. I am centrally concerned with how the control of this political activism is achieved, through what means it is achieved, and what the impacts are for protestors and social movement activism more generally.

The often made accusation from the perspective of protestors, as well as much criminological scholarship, is that police efforts at controlling such protests is better conceived as a form of ‘political repression’. The subject of political repression is one that is charged with emotion, and one that appears no doubt somehow out of kilter to many who live in a Western liberal democracy. It is a truism that all states attempt to control political dissent by restricting freedom of expression and organisation, including Western liberal democracies whom also advocate the principles of human rights, the rule of law and due process, and (a highly qualified) right to protest. This leaves open the question of when does this form of social control become recognisable as political repression? Here I build on others work (Marx, 1979; Boykoff’s, 2006; Earl, 2011, 2003; Starr et al 2011) and explore mechanisms of repression, if it is taking new forms, and how such threats affect political opportunity structures. I examine these questions from the perspective and at the level of the protestors group, and study whether this leads to social movement suppression and demobilisation.

Whilst there is now a growing body of research about how the state and its agencies have reacted to transgressive social movements, particularly at protest and demonstration events, we understand far less about the ways in which activists have provoked, absorbed, and resisted social control and repression, and how these proactive processes differ across various cohorts of social movement actors. The overarching question here is whether policing has entered a new era of increased repression? Restated, the primary intent of this study is to provide a synthesis of findings across a range of data sources to come to a determination about the nature and form of state repression and its effects on protestors and protest movements, thus this thesis offers a combination of political theory, policing studies and social movement analysis.
This concern with state repression matters because the consequences of political repression can be profound in constraining, subverting, delimiting and ultimately disempowering political protest (Opp & Roehl, 1990, Starr, Fernandez & Scholl, 2011). At the same time the study of repression and the threat of repression on social movements has been under explored in the social sciences (Boykoff, 2006) although there is a growing body of 'repression research' emerging (for instance, Earl, 2003, 2011). Goldstein's magisterial study of political repression in America (from 1870 to the present - here the late 1970's) similarly argued that social scientists have neglected the role of government through its coercive apparatus in suppressing dissent and enforcing orthodoxy, particularly at times when radical criticism of the existing order threatens established power. This issue is of particular relevance within the UK, where the political and security apparatus of the state has been undergoing incremental change and developing new policies and practices to crack down on the activities of campaigning groups (the activities of several of these former secretive police units are now the subject of an official inquiry - the 'Pitchford Inquiry').

At this point it might also be helpful to say something about what I am not doing. Throughout my focus has been on the interactional dynamics between the authorities and the dissenters on the ground (in 'meat-space') and I have not examined, except in passing, the online ('virtual-space') environment in any depth. Not because this is not valid, quite the opposite, as information technologies provide an especially fertile site for policing activity, one which offers near unparalleled surveillance opportunities not previously feasible. Online state surveillance also reflects the more general impetus by the authorities away from 'reactive policing' to pro-active and 'pre-emptive policing' strategies and 'risk management' approaches, the parameters of which have been significantly enabled and enshrined in wide-reaching legislative tools (notably the controversial Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 'RIPA') (Akedeniz et al., 2001). There is also considerable evidence in the UK and other Western states that social movement organisations and actors’ online activity is the subject of intense police interest (both 'open access' and invasive intercept surveillance) (see for instance, Scholl, 2012, also evidenced in official sources, HMIC, 2009).

1.3 Analytic Approach

In addressing these questions my analytical strategy is two-fold. Firstly, I take a critical human rights based approach to political dissent, one which takes seriously the liberal claim that the states coercive arm acts not only to maintain social order but also to protect the rights of activists seeking political, economic and social change. I hold that the litmus test of this dual mandate will lie in its facticity, here, the extent to which political dissent can mobilise, take place and make itself heard in
the charged atmosphere of an international summit meeting by the world's political and economic elites. This requires evaluating the way that state power is exercised against protest movements directly before, during and directly after protest events. In doing so I catalogue the various forms of state action employed at the case study sites, ranging from the use of direct violence, harassment, intimidation, spatial ‘zoning’ control and legal repression through to more covert measures (principally surveillance, infiltration, agents-provocateurs and the destabilisation of activist groups). I also examine indirect methods, which include the control of information and the manipulation of the mass media.

In order to understand what occurs on the ground at street level between protestors and authorities I also take an analytical approach which borrows from both the strategic and tactical perspectives of Jaspers (2015) and Scholl (2012). This is to view counter-summit movements and the authorities as ‘players’ in a strategic interaction, one where protest groups innovate tactically to achieve their goals, and state agencies respond with countering moves, provoking in turn another cycle of tactical innovation. The resulting ‘repertoires of action’ (Tilly, 1986:4) are played out in a number of different structured arenas between these two principle players (most usually at the street level between protest groups and the police) but in reality subsume a more diverse number of sovereign and non-sovereign sub-players. These prominent players can be meaningfully grouped into forming three core clusters; the social movements engaged in the conflict and their allies (constituting a range of players); their adversaries (which includes an increasingly complex matrix of state agencies as well as national and local government and corporate interests); and the principle audiences for each other’s actions (the media, interest groups, experts and intellectuals, bystanders and wider publics). Players engage in strategic action with ‘some goal in mind’ be they individuals (‘simple players’) or groups of individuals (‘compound players’) whereas ‘aggregate players’ such as the media can actively intervene and shape political battles (Jaspers, 2015:109). This last point is especially pertinent to the media reporting of the G20 policing operation ‘Glencoe’ (discussed in Chapter 4; 4.5.1, and Chapter 7; 7.2.1).

Seeing the actions of both protestors and authorities through this relational approach explains why each act and react as they do on the ground. It helps to explain the co-evolution of the respective targeting strategies and strategic shifts in protestor and authority actions which have evolved at summit protest events. This is the case both during the lifespan of a particular individual summit protest as well as over the course of the longer protest cycle, from the earlier protestor summit success with direct action tactics in Seattle and elsewhere, through to their eventual eclipse by the authorities own extensive counter-moves (discussed in chapter 2, below). Viewing protest and its policing in tandem also provides important insights which may otherwise be lost if the players were
viewed singly. It reveals how strategic decision making and strategic action unfold together between the key players and in different settings in what Ellefsen (2018: 752) calls a type of 'strategic dance', one of action, reaction and interaction. It focuses on how opposing groups attempt to outwit and out manoeuvre each other, how they can ‘push and pull’ each other in unpredictable ways and to unforeseen outcomes. A process which has shaped and re-shaped the summit protest landscape, resulting in different opportunities for successive campaigns (Tilley, 2008). Such a perspective acts to highlight the significance of strategy, not only for social movements but also for the authorities, and I will argue later that it also acts to problematise the claim that the authorities do indeed pursue the dual mandate that they make claim to.

Strategic interaction unfolds within different arenas, each governed by formal and informal rules, all of which are open to being bent or reinterpreted, as well as ignored or broken (Jaspers, 2015:9-10). These arenas can be directly observed and allow for empirically founded claims as they contain people who are in the middle of 'doing something', people developing lines of activity by seeing how others respond, adjusting their actions to mesh with what others have done and likely will do (Jaspers, 2015:29). Consequently, such players are continually presented with a number of choices in adapting their capabilities and positions to each arena, and in doing so each player is also presented with a number of strategic decisions, dilemmas, choices and 'tricky trade-offs' (Ekblom, 2003) in accomplishing their respective objectives to win advantage. As Jasper's (2015: 22) notes, these costs, benefits and risks for players emerge and shift during engagements, with opposing players adapting to each other's moves, with each presenting a moving target for the other. What follows, whether the mass phalanx's of heavily equipped riot police typical of summit 'policing operations' move in to violently disperse protestors (with perhaps the occasional arrest) or to kettle them for many hours, or to hold back in reserve, depends upon how this tactical battle is played out on the streets.

Taking a strategic perspective of players and arenas also puts the focus on the organisation of struggle, how people cooperate in struggle and the tactics and repertoires they use rather than giving primacy to the ideas or the frames that they hold. It also refracts and reflects the antagonistic nature of politics, one which foregrounds what Tilly (1995) and Scholl (2012) call ‘transgressive contention’. Social movements do far more than making political claims, they reflect a 'prefigurative politics' where activists forge connections, build networks and construct a self-identity that can transform the lives of their participants (Meyer, 2004:166). In doing so they offer vehicles to mobilise discontent, to organise, contest and resist circumstances which activists view as being unacceptable, but in ways that differ from the more institutional activism of mainstream interest group politics. These groups are usually characterised as being 'outsiders' (Tarrow, 2005)
and therefore distinct from normal institutionalised politics which occurs through the machinery of political representation (political parties, elected leaders, voting, petitions, lobbying, etc.).

The methodological compliment to this analytical approach has seen me adopt a mixed methods design to undertake the study. It carries the advantage of keeping a flexible design, whilst being capable of advancing theoretical understanding (Hesse-Biber, 2010). This approach also allowed me to integrate a wide range of different data sources, including the analysis of official documents and official complaints data with the rich data from the ethnographic and observational elements of the study. Doing so ensures the findings are grounded in the experiences of protestors.

In undertaking this work one should also pay one's intellectual debts. I follow in the footprints of other critical scholars working in areas such as political policing, (Brodeur, 2010; Neocleous, 2000, 2014; Bunyan, 1983; Scraton, 1985, 1999, 2002, Turk, 1982); in social movement research (della Porta, 2006; Jaspers, 2015; Scholl, 2012; Starr et al 2011) in socio-legal studies (Ashworth & Zedner, 2014; Mead, 2010) and in philosophy (principally Foucault, 1977, 1979).

1.4 Plan of the Thesis

This thesis is contained within eleven chapters, seven of which are empirical. Chapter Two outlines the substantive empirical and theoretical literature concerning how the state and its agencies control and restrain political activism and dissent at international summit protests. In the early sections of the review I dedicate considerable attention to theoretical debates, but justified empirically, in order to situate and understand how a 'relatively autonomous' state, and its coercive arm, the police, can function as a means of repression and social control. This requires considering a number of inter-related issues; the notion of 'constabulary independence' and the role of police governance arrangements, law as a constraining force on 'policing policy', and the role of 'political policing', leading to a discussion of the dual function of policing in maintaining a specific order. The second substantive section of the review provides a comparative historical analysis of anti-summit protests, my focus is principally in the UK, but I also draw on some of the experiences in other similar Western democracies hosting international summits (in North America and Western Europe). In doing so I aim to highlight the wider trends in the evolution of police and state strategies to control protest movements and some of the consequences that these strategies have for the continued exercise of fundamental democratic freedoms and civil rights.

Chapter Three outlines and defends my methodological approach. I indicate the contribution that a mixed methods design brings to the findings of the study as well as providing a critical reflection on this approach. I also discuss the unique difficulties and benefits of undertaking this type of research.
in the field. In doing so I address some of the main ethical questions raised in respect to conducting aspects of covert research, as well as how my methodological approach has impacted answering my research questions.

I then move on to discuss the first case study in Chapter 4, the 2009 G20 protests taking place in central London. I dedicate four chapters (Chapter 4 – 7) to this summit due to the complexity and significance of the event and the considerable amount of data that it generated. The first of these chapters uses participant observation to examine protestors and the authority's preparations for the summit. Chapter 5 then reports on the main ethnographic data, bringing together observations of the G20 protests events and the tactical interactions between the two key players, and how the authorities suppressed political dissent during several of these decisive encounters. The level of police violence and other forms of repression resulted in a considerable number of protestors injuries and lead to a large number of official complaints. Chapter 6 considers these aspects of the policing operation, principally by interrogating IPCC data, and goes on to show how the complaints process failed to hold the police to account. What proved more troubling for the authorities was the disturbing images of heavy handed police tactics being used against protestors. This resulted in widespread public criticism and led to a raft of inquiries into the policing operation. Chapter 7 critically examines this dimension of the aftermath of the G20 protest. Here I draw upon a combination of academic scholarship, medical expertise, Freedom of Information requests and discourse analysis to problematise such inquiries, and argue that they are best viewed as state attempts to rebuild tarnished police legitimacy.

The second case study concerning the NATO summit in Wales is examined in the next three chapters. Chapter 8 looks at both the authorities and protestors different preparations for the summit and in particular, why the chosen location of this part of Wales played such a critical role for the authorities. Chapter 9 builds on these insights and explores some of the inventive pre-emptive methods that the authorities used to undermine dissent and propagate pro-NATO values and beliefs amongst local people and the wider region. This chapter also examines how the political economy of the summit is similarly constructed as a core element in this propaganda exercise, one used to disguise the exorbitant costs of hosting the event. Chapter 10 picks up on some of these themes and reports on the main ethnographic account of the protest events taking place over the summit period. This includes the respective tactical interactions between police and protestors, and how the dominance of the authorities spatial control and pre-emptive strategy outmanoeuvred and drained the protest players own efforts to build a critical Anti-NATO mass. My observational study also reveals some of the debilitating impacts that police and security agencies infiltration practices has had on protestors' ability to plan, organise and mobilise mass dissent.
The final concluding chapter of the thesis draws out the key themes of this study in responding to my research aims and objectives. I also provide an account of the achievements that I believe this thesis has made and point to some fruitful areas for future research arising from this study. Finally, I provide a Technical Appendix which supplies contextual details for the evidence collected which is referenced throughout this study. This includes itemised research tools and materials used in the data collection process.
2. Literature Review: Protest, control and policing - trends and patterns

2.1 Introduction

Over the past several decades there has been a proliferation of horizontally planned 'alter-globalisation' protest movements that bring together loosely organised heterogeneous groups to undertake innovative direct action on the streets in Western Europe and North America. Whilst they are diverse, a central organising theme to this civic dissatisfaction centres on aspects of neoliberalism, notably the increasing financialisation and globalisation of the economy as well as the perceived democratic and legitimacy deficits of global governance, itself seen as overshadowing elected governments (Fisher et al, 2005). These movements act to emphasise the gap between the political elite and the people, not only at the international institutional level where there is no sufficient participatory democratic element available to restrain or veto official action, but also at the national level where institutional arrangements reduce citizens to voting for one or two competing elites without being able to take any other decisions. These calcified mechanisms and institutions (including the courts) that once made reform and democracy possible are increasingly being abandoned in favour of more radical alternatives. A number of critical observers have more eloquently termed these arrangements an 'elective aristocracy' (Ankersmit) 'incomplete democracy' (Arblaster, 1987) 'elite-managed democracy' (Wollin, 2008) or 'thin democracy' (Barber, 1990).

The resulting outpourings of public anger and frustration can be seen within a wider framework of internal challenges faced by nation states. Observing political developments in Western Europe from the 1970's to the mid-1980's, Offe (1985:817) has argued that we are witnessing a 'fusion', blurring the boundaries between political concerns and modes of action from citizens private (moral and economic) ones. As public policies create more direct and visible impacts on people, so people then try to win more immediate and comprehensive control over political elites, generating a cycle "incompatible with the maintenance of the institutional order of the polity" (Offe, 1985:817).

It is these 'counter-publics' (Dhawan, 2015) which place new energised actors onto the political stage, a mass of people who are hostile to conventional forms of politics and the 'liberal economic consensus' and want to reshape the terms of the state-civil society relation. When mobilised in the form of concurrent anti-summit protests they present a generalised challenge to existing structures of power and provide an opportunity to express a wide range of political and economic grievances. In this sense 'alterglobalisation' movements can be thought of as 'carriers of conflicts' who sit

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outside of and distinct from normal institutionalised politics which occurs through the machinery of political representation (political parties, elected leaders, voting, petitions, lobbying etc) (Tarrow, 2005). This is to draw upon Tilly’s (1978:52-54) influential schema of social movements as 'challengers' to polity members as opposed to more established interest groups which have access to the polity or have gained its acceptance (Gamson, 1975:28-37). Challengers, by default, are least able to win advantages or gain concessions, and find themselves expending far more resources in their claim making (Tilly, 1978). Indeed, alterglobalisation movements shun existing bureaucratic structures and are inspired by the conviction that forms of representative democracy are too weak to defend social justice and pluralism, rather it is seen as a blockage to democracy. A more radical vision is often demanded and practised in the form of direct participatory democracy. Whilst such efforts at popular sovereignty operate only at the margins of society, they can be seen as constituting 'laboratories for democracy' (Wainwright, 2003).

These efforts to oppose and resist some features of political economy and globalisation has seen a range of ‘transgressive’ protest groups adopting unconventional means in order to try and make visible challenges to, and expressive claims on, international institutions and individual states, and then relay this to a wider audience. These resistance efforts can take many forms, including demonstrations, pickets, boycotts, as well as more controversially, direct action and civil disobedience. For at least some of these protest players there are times when there is a duty not to obey the law, a duty to disobey in resisting conditions of injustice, even in near legitimate Western states such as the UK. This is what Delmas (2017) refers to as ‘principled lawbreaking’ or ‘uncivil disobedience’ (covert, evasive, violent or offensive acts of lawbreaking) one that also puts the challengers on the edges of political legitimacy. This is why large social movement protests at international summits can capture our attention. They challenge the dominant social and political order by "revealing the stakes to announce that a fundamental problem exists in a given area" (Melucci, 1985:797). They also provide moments where tactical innovations break with trust in prior, often highly ritualised protest behaviour. Predictable conventions such as walking in a long slow police escorted march to an agreed rallying point are relinquished in favour of more 'explosively visible' actions, as witnessed in Seattle and Genoa, what Peterson (2002; 2004) has described as 'dispersed political behaviour'. Tarrow (1995:110-111) argues that such ‘moments of madness’ carry a broader long-term influence by creating new opportunities and models for others to emulate in challenging the dominant social and political status quo. This is to see popular resistance and protest having been ‘transformed’, resulting in greater disruptive potential to the respective authority players, and in doing so, making those protestor bodies more vulnerable to state coercion and violence.
A number of more conservative analysts from the 1970s onwards view these developments in the changing dynamics of political life as dangerous, regarding their cumulative impact as eroding political authority, if not the capacity to govern\(^3\) (Offe, 1985:818). This is because social movements carry the potential to threaten the dominant state-enforced social relations by fracturing, undermining or denaturalising them, irrespective of whether the protest group expresses explicit 'revolutionary' or 'subversive' aims or not. State legitimating symbols, emblems and sentiments and their signifying practices that unite diverse individuals can be mocked or attacked, radical rhetoric can be expressed, authority, even coercive authority, can be openly challenged on masse.

How such challenges have been responded to by an array of state actors at several international summits is the subject of this study, but as Marenin stressed as far back as 1982 in discussing the role and function of police players more generally; police actions must be investigated to adjudicate the point at which they indicate domination or suppression, not assumed \textit{a priori} from the simple existence of police agency. That said, it needs to be recognised that a host of state actors \textit{actively} manage dissent, they do not simply respond to mass public demonstrations in a disinterested fashion. This is true even of the justifying discourse in which these state actions are couched, what is termed 'threats to public order', 'politically motivated disorder' or 'subversion'.

State and state-allied players are in a position to either facilitate or damage social movements. This is because states are able to draw upon an extraordinary level of resources and have ample incentives to inhibit, block or destroy what Connor (2018) has recently termed 'deep dissent' (from a US perspective see Marx, 1979). The core interlockers in controlling and indeed suppressing this type of social opposition are the police. Typically, this will take the form of mobile police patrols as well as mass deployments at the scene of the public assembly, combining uniformed officers and phalanx's of heavily armoured riot police with an array of less than lethal and lethal weaponry, held in 'reserve' or as a prominent 'show of force'. This constitutes only one, if not the most visible layer of the state's protective armoury. Less well known are the more sophisticated secret intelligence and police agencies and their tactics of surveillance, infiltration and disruption towards a very broad net of political activism, mainly on the left (for instance, in the UK, see Bunyan, 1983; Connor 2018a/b; Gill, 1994, Lubbers, 2102, Smith & Chamberlain, 2015) (discussed in more depth in section 2.24 below).

What is termed 'public order policing' in Western liberal democracies is always presented by states and the police themselves (and some academics), in neutral, if not idealistic terms, for instance

Lint’s (2005:180) formulation as the use of police authority and capacity to "establish an equilibrium between governmental and societal, collective and individual, rights and interests in a mass demonstration of grievance". The idea that the police act primarily as value neutral protectors of that vague referent ‘public safety' sits uneasily with the reality of their activities in monitoring, infiltrating and disrupting a wide range of political activity (Bunyan, 1983; Connor, 2018a/b; Gill, 1994; Lubbers, 2102; NETPOL, 2009, 2011; Smith & Chamberlain, 2015, Vitale, 2017). This raises at least two interlinked issues, the function of the police as an organisation and the relationship between the police and the state more generally. I turn to this relationship between the state players by first examining the unique position the police hold constitutionally, and then their relationship to the wider state, next I examine the 'dual nature' of policing, before discussing the wider research literature examining the international dynamics between authority player’s and social movements activism, and how this has developed over recent decades.

2.2 "Who's Calling the Shots?"

2.21 The Relative Autonomy of the Police

The police are the personalisation of state authority, the contact point between the citizen and government as well as the means by which democratic procedures are ensured. Whilst the police are the arm of the executive branch of the government, they simultaneously claim autonomy from it, within England and Wales, under the doctrine of 'constabulary independence'. This is justified by the orthodoxy that in order to enforce the law in an impartial manner Chief Constables must be independent of any political pressures that might otherwise be brought to bear upon them by partisan interference. Such an assertion flies in the face of modern history though. Up to about 1930 the Home Secretary issued detailed instructions in how law enforcement was conducted to the capital’s metropolitan police force for the first hundred years of their existence (Lustgarten, 1986) with what would now be construed as 'political interference' going unchallenged. By contrast, the borough forces were directed by local watch committees who exercised a high degree of local democratic control (Williams, 2003) only changing to an 'independent constabulary' at the time of the 1930s depression. The timing of this shift is significant and not mere happenchance. Jones et al’s (1994:12) analysis of policing policy argues that it was a direct response by governing elites to working-class enfranchisement, trade union militancy and fear about socialism taking hold, all of which meant it was considered too dangerous to leave the police under local control (Jones et al., 1996:12). Some fifty years later in the 1980s, which similarly saw periods of widespread urban unrest and trade union activism, the autonomy of the police to decide for themselves matters of
operational policy was further reinforced by a series legal judgments. These acted to extended and embed constabulary independence still further, quashing attempts by the then Labour-controlled metropolitan Police Authorities to restrain increasingly authoritarian and paramilitary policing operations to deal with growing political and economic strife. The upshot of these judgements was to further blur the lines between 'operational' and 'policy' matters, and in practice allowed Chief Constables to "exert strong control over general policy matters as well as individual cases of law enforcement" (Jones et al., 1994:14-15). Indeed, Jones et al's (1994:7) recounts how up until the early 1980s chief officers even resisted conceding the existence of 'policing policy' at all, insisting on the fiction that the police merely 'enforced the law' without 'fear or favour'.

Whilst these denials reflect the desire of senior officers to defend their autonomy, there is, and indeed must be, such a thing as policing policy. As Jones et al (1994:6-7) argue, policy (both formal and informal) can be reliably deduced from a pattern of behaviour, and what determines the pattern of policing within broad limits can be called 'policing policy'. Policing policy, or the style of policing does much to determine policing strategy when interacting with protest groups. Indeed, Manning (2010) argues that a great deal of police policy is verbal (not written down) and hence informal in nature, exacerbating the challenges of police governance. The permissively wide parameters of action which result from being able to largely decide how policing is undertaken, its operational practicalities and what (and whom) are targeted for which type of police attention carries very significant implications, particularly in the sphere of 'political policing' and raises a host

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4 In particular Denning's judgement in R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex p Blackburn which extended the doctrine of constabulary independence beyond a police officer's discretion in individual cases. A later landmark decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Northumbria Police Authority ([1988] 2 WLR 590) further weakened the role of Police Authorities in respect to exercising budgetary powers over their police forces, here in respect to preventing the said force from purchasing centrally from the Home Office supplies of CS Gas and plastic bullets whilst the force was not permitted by their Police Authorities to purchase them (in anticipation that they would use these weapons against local people). The judicial review found in favour of the Home Secretary on the basis of the statutory power in preserving 'the Queen's Peace' by supplying 'common services' and 'promoting police efficiency' (Jones et al, 1994:16-17). Jones et al (ibid) argues that the decisive issue in the judgement concerns the potential of 'public disorder' transcending local force boundaries and hence sits outside of the local Police Authority's judgements. This is in contradistinction to Reiner's (1992:240) argument that the case evidences the 'impotence of local Police Authorities .. making them a fig leaf of local influence.' Whilst technically Jones reading of the judgement is the more accurate, the direction of travel remains the same, the increasing marginalisation of any meaningful local control over policing.

5 Policing policy is a sensitive matter for good reason, as the Policy Studies Institute authors themselves discovered when they wanted to include in their study the policing of major 'public order events' (such as the miners' strike during 1984/5 and the inner-city 'riots' in 1985) rightly considered an 'obvious' and fast-moving area of policing policy due to the far reaching implications recent changes were having for the exercise of protest and dissent. Tellingly, ACPO never granted approval for this element of the proposed study, effectively blocking it (Jones et al., 1994:10).

6 For instance, an historical example (before 1980) would be disbelieving women's allegations that they had been raped despite no-one inside or outside the police force stipulating that such cases should be conducted in this manner (Chambers & Millar, 1983, cited in Jones et al. 1994:6).
of civil liberties concerns. Bringing the discussion right up to date, one area (of many) being the police's development and deployment of technologies which involve intrusive real-time mass dataveillance, for example, the current trailing by the Metropolitan Police of facial recognition software at some busy intersections in the capital through an extensive CCTV network (Deardon, 2018; Big Brother Watch, 2018). As with earlier technological developments like automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) systems (and here as a prelude to its eventual national roll-out) a ‘new penology’ of generalised suspicion prevails, one which has in effect, in this instance, ended ‘location privacy’ (Haines, 2009:53). Large groups of people are monitored and tracked for ‘social sorting’ (Lyons, 2003) purposes, one where everyone is treated as a suspect for state interest, reversing the common law assumption of innocent until proven guilty. This police initiated practice is a particular cause for concern for activists because police controlled surveillance systems collect information on individuals on the basis of a series of police constructed categories which are several steps removed from the institutions more legitimate interest in the activities of ‘known offenders’. For instance, ‘association with a known offender’ (for ANPR see Haines, 2009:53) or more expansively still, simply being a ‘person of interest’ to the police, or a ‘potential offender’ (see Swain, 2013), Information Reports on ‘nominal records’ (Purshouse, 2015:242) or at the EU level the creation of a cross-border information exchange database for suspected ‘trouble-makers’ or alleged ‘violent trouble-makers’ being directed at political protesters (Bunyan/Statewatch, 2009). All of these ‘categories of suspicion’ enshrine value judgements and “vague categorisations of supposed criminality presented in intelligence reports and officer training, which are then presented as evidence and grounds for detention” (Monaghan & Walby, 2012:12).

Each of these eminently pliable pseudo-criminal official labels can capture political activists as a legitimate target of police interest, investigation and interference. This is but one feature of the UKs

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7 In an important sense each individual ANPR contact constitutes an ‘investigation’ as each and every vehicle is formally and systematically examined and assessed in light of information held on a number of aligned databases, where upon a response is provoked above and beyond the logging and archiving of the vehicles time and place (and hence journey).

8 Police ‘Information Reports’ refer to attendees and incidents of interest to the police (such as persons attending a peaceful demonstration) here particular individuals (‘nominals’ is the policing term) details (date of birth, address, information about presence at an event, including activities, associates and appearance [re police photographs]) are collected and retained on the National Special Branch Information System. This practice came to wider public prominence when a 93 year old peace activist (Mr Catt) in Brighton, following a s. 7 DPA request discovered that he appeared on a number of Information Reports (including being categorised as a ‘domestic extremist’) and claimed his Art. 8 ECHR rights had been violated, with the finding of the court dismissing the police’s later appeal claim that deleting such files placed too heavy an administrative burden upon them (Purshouse, 2015:242). Whilst many of the records mentioning Mr Catt were deleted, reduced from 60 (logged from 2005 to 2010) to 2, the judgement that the state should not keep records on a ‘citizen’s lawful activities’ unless it is in ‘the public interest to do so’, in effect retains considerable latitude for the police to continue just such practices, notwithstanding the issue of who decides what constitutes the ‘public interest’. Even following this critical judgement, records remained of Mr Catt.
'intelligence-led policing' model, which collects and collates large volumes of personal data from a host of sources, constructs profiles and assigns categories of risk and worth, all at a distance (and often without the subject's notice) using sophisticated network analysis (Swain, 2013). These decisions and developments are exercised by the police and are one of many examples of police policy in action – here one which operates in an expansive but 'grey area' of legality. The 'lawfulness' of this and many other police activities can only be determined through lengthy and extremely costly legal challenge through the courts, a remedy beyond the reach of practically every citizen.

This brings us to the present institutional arrangements for police democratic governance throughout England and Wales. These comprise the Home Secretary, City Mayors (notably in London), Police and Crime Commissioner's (PCC's)9 (introduced in 2012, replacing the old Police Authorities) and various forums such as 'police-community consultative committees'. The introduction of PCC's were supposed to be a 'radical departure' that addressed the widely perceived democratic deficit in policing oversight, in part by determining police priorities in consultation with the Chief Constable (Stenson & Silverstone, 2014:435). It remains the case that despite this refreshed tripartite arrangement now including a directly elected 'local'10 incumbent (the PCC) the significant democratic deficit of the past remains unaltered. As was the case with the old Police Authorities, none of these bodies has any legal entitlement to direct a Chief Constable in their policing responsibilities. Indeed, constabulary independence is specifically designed to preclude any such type of democratic control (Oliver, 1987). Consequently, all operational policing decisions are made by the Chief Constable. As Loader (1996:10) notes, the only democratic element in the current institutional arrangements involves Chief Constables 'retrospectively accounting' (Brogen et al., 1988:152) to the other democratically constituted bodies (by issuing reports etc.).11 The style of accountability has been described by Marshall (1978) as 'explanatory and cooperative' in contrast to 'subordinate and obedient', with elected institutions being unable to issue direct orders, rather they are limited to requesting information and asking for explanations which are then, potentially at least for what the authorities consider to be 'non-sensitive' matters, open to public discussion.

Despite this formal impotence by the elected bodies, police forces maintain the somewhat rhetorical claim that they 'police by consent', although what this means is rarely spelt out in any detail. If it is supposed to carry a contractual meaning, then there are two dimensions to consider;

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9 PCC's are elected in forty of the forty three territorial police forces in England and Wales, with elected mayors being classed as constituting the PCC in both London and Greater Manchester, whereas the 'Court of Common Council' substitutes for the PCC for the City of London Police, being one of many anachronisms proffered upon the city mile.

10 Considering the sheer size of PCC jurisdictions it would appear highly improbable that the PCC could deal with what most people would define as a 'local issue'.

11 Even here it is a matter of judgement by the Chief Constable of a force to issue a report.
legal and political (Morgan, 1989:218) each of which is found wanting. In respect to legal consent, the police are established, governed, regulated and empowered by statute. They are required to enforce the law of the land which is approved by an elected Parliament. However, the difficulty lies in that laws do not determine key aspects of policing policy, and neither, directly, do elected politicians (Morgan, 1989:218; Jones et al, 1994:29). In fact, the law provides little if any guidance to how policing is conducted (i.e. what priorities the police should pursue, what methods they use or which of the many legal options to select) (Morgan, 1989:218; Jones et al, 1994:29). So whilst the police have a duty to enforce the law, it has long been recognised that in practice this only sets broad limits on the possible patterns of policing. In addition, a wider number of offences (such as 'obstructing a police officer in the execution of their duty') is framed deliberately vaguely in order to provide the police with a flexible resource to achieve some other objective (maintaining 'social order') (Jones et al, 1994:7).

Legal rules alone then are insufficient to regulate police practice. As Loader (1996:10) notes, when individual constables exercise their discretionary judgement in encounters with the public, they "are placed in a position akin to that of chief officers." At the organisational level, the police are "stewards of delegated and independently exercised general policy responsibilities", relegating political consent to being realised, if at all, through "a delicately balanced mystery of influence brought to bear by politicians locally and nationally on what officers decide and on ex post facto accounting by the police" (Morgan, 1989:218). As Morgan notes, this state of affairs is only possible because of the near unique political arrangements for the governance of the police, with consent being used in a social (i.e. the attitudes of the public towards police legitimacy and their ensuing cooperative or non-cooperative behaviour in assisting them, or not, and/or deference towards them) as well as a contractual sense. Neither is there any requirement for the police to abide by the wishes or recommendations of forums such as consultative committees, indeed, some scholars argue they are used by the police to provide a 'sheen of legitimacy' on police actions, leaving the real decision-making process unaffected (Bull & Stratta, 1995; Jones et al, 1994:23).

This is not to suggest that there are no occasions in which the law can exact a controlling influence on police officers, only that such circumstances rarely obtain (Grimshaw and Jefferson, 1987:15-18; Loader, 1996:9) as there needs to be a clear legal provision to be enforced, as well as an "objective and honest application of a rule or standard of conduct" (Lustgarten, 1986:164). Such conditions are very far removed from political protest situations where officers are able to exercise very considerable discretion in defining the legality of protestors behaviour (Jefferson, 1990).
2.22 Parking Tickets, Public Order and Class Repression

Standard Marxist accounts see the police ostensibly as 'servants of the state', who uncritically carry out its directives. Such a perspective views the role of the police as a purely repressive and a political force aimed at silencing actual (or potential) challenges to the established order. Policing is thus one of many 'defence mechanisms' (along with other structures in the criminal justice system and false class consciousness) which satisfies the continuance of the state, and in doing so, the reproduction of the established economic order (Marenin, 1982:241). The most visible vanguard of which is an increasingly 'tooled up' paramilitary 'public order' police force prepared to use violence in the interests of maintaining and reproducing the formal structures of capitalism (O'Connor, 1975 in Marenin, 1982).

At first blush constabulary independence would appear to fly in the face of this formulation, as does the long recognised difficulty that not all policing is repressive, here the many social service functions of policing (i.e. preventing domestic violence or drunk driving etc.). Nevertheless, the content and scope of this claim to independence from political control and direction in respect to public order policing is much contested, no more so than because there are degrees of 'control' as there are degrees of 'independence'. The claim to independence becomes more tenuous still when considering political surveillance and the subsequent deceptive and clandestine action of 'political policing' or what Brodeur (1983, 2011) has termed 'high policing' as opposed to 'low policing' (routine, domestic police functions such as traffic stops etc.) conducted by a number of highly secretive police agencies that belong to the 'intelligence community' (see Table 1, below for an outline of these).

Writing from a Canadian perspective, Brodeur (1983; 2007:27-29) identifies four features of high policing: 1) having the primary mandate of protecting the state apparatus and the existing political institutions; 2) being 'absorbent' by casting a wide net to gather information into intelligence (not necessarily directed at building a criminal case as in actionable 'criminal intelligence' but for threat assessments and as a need-to-know 'intelligence product'); 3) conflating legislative, judiciary, executive or administrative powers; now resurgent in the post-9/11 era, and, 4) the widespread use of informants as the primary surveillance tool (this despite having a 'massive arsenal' of technological tools available). Five further characteristics were added to this formulation which took into account new developments in the field, being: utilising known criminals, secrecy, deceit and extra-legal measures in these effort as well as viewing the state as a victim (Brodeur, 2007, 2011).

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12 This in part explains why such agencies exercise considerable resistance to the use of such intelligence in open public court proceedings, lest this absorbent nature be revealed.
Whilst high policing is not new (it dates back to at least 1880 and the early Special Branch) (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009:90) its distinctive actions of intelligence collection, disruption and apprehension (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009:91) result in a 'skewed policing', one tilted towards preserving the dominant political regime rather than protecting the individual citizen (Brodeur and Leman–Langlois, 2006:179). That said, these high policing practices operate on a continuum, and O'Reilly and Ellison (2006:647) argue, do not exclusively operate in favour of the state. By way of similar qualification, Brodeur (2007:34-35) stresses that neither are they necessarily contradictory with democracy - despite the tendency to conflate powers which are required to be separate. For Brodeur, the fulcrum point rests on the distinction made between protecting a nations constitutional and institutional framework from that of perpetuating a particular regime which might otherwise be rejected. Such a distinction allows us to hold onto some meaningful demarcation between a 'policed society' to one more closely resembling an authoritarian 'police state'. Nevertheless, trying to maintain any hard and fast division here is difficult, not the least because of the broadening of the high policing mandate, amplified in modern Western liberal states by its concern with the domestic activities of ordinary citizens (rather than external threats) and the increasingly systematic, organised and specialised nature of its agencies. As Marx (2014:2067) has recently argued, whether high policing is construed neutrally as the policing of politics, or more contentiously as political surveillance and regime protection, the goals and means of high policing remain a 'pillar of social control'. This point leads to a helpful distinction made by Marenin (1982:258-9) between two types of order that the state has an investment in; a general order ("the capacity of the state to guarantee public tranquillity and safety") and more problematically, a specific order ("the use of state power to promote particular interests" [...] i.e. "domination by the state"). Clearly states can legitimately pursue an interest in the general order against challengers, be they ruled or ruling groups, although its irreducible minimum can be constituted in a number of different ways. Sparks (1980, cited in Marenin, 1982:259) puts the required distinction aptly;

"between prohibitions aimed at protecting the essential conditions of organized existence, without which group life would be impossible, and prohibitions necessary for particular forms of social existence, e.g., those dependent on a particular economic system."

This raises several questions, firstly, whether protecting the institutions of the state (of which the police are an integral part) equates to also protecting broader civil society rather than that of entrenched privilege; and secondly, a broader issue concerning the scope and future orientated focus of possible sources of presumed threat to what is expansively termed as 'national security'. These are vital questions and raise many important practical ramifications, not least because what national security means is defined in the way that the state chooses, resulting in state organisations
operating in a self-serving tautological vacuum (Lustgarten & Leigh, 1994). This matters because we are left with methods appropriate to external threats impinging upon the domestic arena. The other difficulty here is that the representatives of the state will typically place national security issues above issues of citizens individual or group freedoms (Lustgarten & Leigh, 1994:326). This brings the state back in to prominence in a manner far removed from other institutional actors such as the Labour municipalities and their lost battle for police accountability during the 1980s.

One of the other central difficulties with high policing as a method and a practice is that its remit secretes itself far beyond the (broadly defined) domain of 'national security' into a myriad of social control settings, ones that attend to, anticipate and orchestrate a wide range of domestic contexts, action and persons perceived as 'internal threats'. In doing so high policing methods are capable (intentionally or otherwise) of sapping democracy by incapacitating all manner of dissent.

2.23 The Relative Autonomy of the State

Despite its centrality to political thinking, the state defies simple definition (Hay & Lister, 2006:2) and can be construed in a number of different ways; by its constellation of different institutions, its internal operations, declared aims and functions, its coercive capacities, its legal form, or its place within the broader international system, to name some of its key dimensions. Jessop (1990:341) offers a 'broad cluster' definition with these generic features in mind:

"the core of the state apparatus comprises a distinct ensemble of institutions and organisations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of their common interest or general will." [my emphasis].

The state is thus a specific form of macro-political organisation. As Jessop notes, what differentiates a state from mere political domination or violent oppression is the somewhat rhetorical claim to be pursuing the common interest or general will of the people. This assertion of a general interest is however 'illusory' (Jessop, 1990:342) as "any attempt to define them occurs on a strategically selective terrain and involves the differential articulation and aggregation of interest, opinions and values." Hence the general will is always 'asymmetrical', privileging some interests while marginalising others. These are not just theoretical questions but also empirical ones, notably the degree to which this partiality of state practice reflects the situationally motivated strategic concerns of the state, both to the changing role of social movements in regard to organised political power and the state as an object towards which social struggles are directed.

Contemporary neo-Marxists raise doubts as to the extent that state institutions can ever mediate social conflicts that arise between corporate interest and popular legitimacy (for instance, Miliband,
They argue that there is an inbuilt bias which favours capitalist interests, one built into the policy-making process and protected by having occupants in key positions within the state apparatus (Hay et al. 2006:45). Poulantzas (1973) following Marx, also regarded the state as structurally integral to capitalism, but not a simple instrument in the hand of capitalists, rather he stressed the relative autonomy of state institutions. Indeed, there is a more recent contemporary convergence between Marxist and elitist theories of the state which posits the existence of a reasonably cohesive 'ruling class' who have shared interests in Britain (Scott, 1991 in Hay et al. 2006:46). This is not to deny that the state has some autonomy from dominant classes, only that the existing regime of accumulation places structural constraints on state agency (Hay et al. 2006:47).

Policing is necessarily embedded in these socio-historical contexts irrespective of the claims to independence and carries a dual function, one of 'parking tickets and class repression' to cite Marenin's famous formation:

"The police, a priori, are neither repressive nor deserving of support as defenders of a universal consensus on the public good. What the police defend depends on the concrete situation in which they work and the degree of control, through ideology or power, by the state over them."

This is to view the state as both relatively autonomous but also functioning as a web of interlinked and aligned sub-players, of which the police form its chief coercive component, such that the state acts both as an opponent to as well as a judge of protestors who strategise to gain influence on the polity (Jaspers, 2015:11). This is to grasp the broader relationship between the state and social movements and the extent to which the key state players pursue the same goals; the police, officials and government. A recent example illustrates aptly just such a relationship, despite long held official denials. South Yorkshire Police (SYP) had long claimed they were providing fair and impartial policing of protests in Sheffield against the needless felling of thousands of roadside trees by Sheffield City Council (SCC) and their highways contractor Amy. However, SYP had secretly devised a joint 'media strategy' (between them, Amy and SCC) whilst deploying scores of officers (called 'operation Quito') to quash the growing protests, including using a range of legal repression

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13 Scott's (1991, cited in Hay et al., 2006:46) work at the interface of elite and critical theory concludes in answering the question as to 'who rules Britain?'; "Britain is ruled by a capitalist class whose economic dominance is sustained by the operations of the state and whose members are disproportionately represented in the power elite which rules the state apparatus. That is to say, Britain does have a ruling class."

14 Sheffield City Council had originally claimed up to 5,000 roadside trees were earmarked for removal and that they were not targeting healthy trees, only dead or 'dangerous' trees (a point much disputed by residents who had formed themselves into a non-party political action group 'Sheffield Tree Action Groups' (STAG https://savesheffieldtrees.org.uk/) whereas later a secret document revealed that the number could actually be as high as 17,500, accounting for half of the cities trees (Noor, 2019b; STAG, https://savesheffieldtrees.org.uk/key-facts/).

15 As the expose by Yorkshire Post revealed, citing a confidential media strategy document and covert tape, of Superintendent McCurry 'COMMS is key. Really, really key because I don't want things to get messy."
aimed at activist leaders. This tactic sucks vast amounts of time and money from a cause, as the protest organisation is diverted into fighting lengthy legal proceedings in order to support activists and those that rely upon them. This is but one recent example of co-ordinated, here local state action, against a growing local protest movement, despite the repeated claims of police impartiality (similarly echoed falsely by the South Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner).

Neo-Marxist theorists such as Neocleous argue that the central role of the police is to 'fabricate order' which includes the use of repression (although not simply the repression of the lower classes) and to hide the fact that society contains profound insecurities. For instance, market system stability is parasitic on the economic insecurity of an impoverished class of economic actors (Marenin, 1982) accelerated by increased labour market flexibility which transfers greater risk and insecurity onto a growing frustrated and angry 'precariat' class (Standing, 2011). This necessarily shapes the police's primary role, which is the emergency maintenance of order achieved through their monopoly of force (Reiner, 2013) with crime control (and prevention) constituting only a minority of police work (Bittner, 1990; Brodeur, 2010; HMIC, 2012; Manning 2010; Karn, 2013). As Stenning (2007:184) concludes in reviewing international experiences (including that of the UK) on this question of political independence of the police, "governments have been reluctant to concede to police any right to complete immunity from political influence or direction with the respect to the handling of major public order challenges, such as political demonstrations."

Bayley's (1982) analysis of the organisation of actual police work similarly draws out its political nature, with its primary function lying in "the suppression of collective unrest and the regulation of populations, what might be called 'state centred policing'." So far from being a neutral term, securing order implies the state's "interest in suppressing mass dissent that threatens insurrection" but in order to maintain the veneer of legitimacy this needs to be conducted "under the guise of neutrally enforcing the law and keeping the peace" (Waddington, 1999: 65). This is particularly the case in moments of perceived crisis, where the police act as the agents of 'specific domination' rather than as guarantors of a 'general order' (Dixon, 2013). Although the case of Sheffield STAG indicates that even local, small scale agitation by respectable 'middle-class' residents can just as easily result in repression and suppression.

Policing then carries contradictory 'expressive' and 'repressive' functions, being the maintenance of general order and the 'dirty work' of real policing, one which needs to be hidden by presenting a semblance of impartiality (Cohen, 1997; cited in Jeffery et al, 2015:120). This is to challenge

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16 South Yorkshire Police held seven tree protestors on false grounds who were later given a £24,300 out-of-court settlement by the force. (Noor, 2019a).
conventional ideas about the role and function of the police (its law enforcement, crime prevention and ‘service’ functions) and to understand policing in a wider role, one closely orientated to the ordering of society. In this the police do not act alone, and political policing brings into view a wider state apparatus, all of which act as a force of governmental social control which is far from being neutral (Black, 1976).

2.24 Bringing Other Players In; Political Policing and the Secret State

Some near four decades after Marenin’s earlier formulation of this dual function of policing, we now understand far more about the work of the political police than we have before. In part, due to the ‘spy-cops' scandals and the ensuing public inquiry which has allowed some limited insights into the various agencies work (notably that of the now disbanded Special Demonstration Squad, SDS and NPOIU’s surveillance net). The undercover policing units are but one aspect of an entire state apparatus, Table 1 (below) identifies the key institutions and their activities.

Whilst this secretive covert world is almost totally removed from both public knowledge and accountability and not so constrained by the need for popular support as say is the highly visible uniformed policing or public order policing, there is still much that remains unknown about its

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17 The Pitchford Inquiry is due to report in 2023 (https://www.ucpi.org.uk/) (a timeline which has been described by Matting as ‘ambitious’) and is examining 40 years of undercover policing operations, now headed by the presiding judge John Matting (after Pitchford's unexpected death). However, the Inquiry has been plagued by conflict between those spied on and those tasked with undertaking the inquiry, notably on the much contested remit of the inquiry (victims want a wide remit whereas the Metropolitan Police want to restrict the inquiry to a very narrow one), and the level of secrecy of proceedings (for instance victims being denied knowing undercover officers cover names and names of targeted groups, which would allow others who were spied upon to come forward and give their version of events rather than being reliant on the police’s version - a principle accepted by the authorities for not withholding the identities of alleged perpetrators of sexual offences such as rape) as well as Matting holding some hearings in secret and considering anonymity for undercover officers. These developments, and Matting’s background as an establishment figure (being a judge in the controversial Investigatory Powers Tribunals, a court which has been described as ‘Kafkaesque’ by critics, dealing with state surveillance cases and alleged abuses of state power) all of which are held in secret. The combination of Matting’s decisions and background have led victim groups and their lawyers to walk out of the Inquiry court as a vote of no confidence in the inquiry.

18 In 2018 the high street cosmetics chain ‘Lush’ ran a poster campaign displayed in the windows of each of their 104 shops called ‘Paid to Lie #spycops’ in order to highlight the misconduct of undercover police officers who had infiltrated political groups. The posters depicted a model dressed as both an activist and a police officer with the slogans ‘Paid to Lie’ and ‘Police have crossed the line’. This rare example of a corporate enterprise highlighting alleged police wrong-doing came to an end less than a week before it started, with Lush citing “intimidation of our shop staff from ex-police officers and unhelpful tweets from those in high office” (Evans, 2018). It is unclear whether this was a co-ordinated campaign with active involvement by the police or not.

19 This includes not just external accountability but also internal (to the organisation itself, for instance the HMIC’s first ever inspection of undercover policing in England and Wales discovered that there were 1,229 undercover officers operating across the country, whereas the official ‘national undercover index’ lists 568 officers (46.2%), less than half of the true number, and consequently “renders the database unsuitable to the
Table 1: Elements of the British Political Policing and Secret State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Extant</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Intelligence Type</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Branch&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1883 - Present</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Human intelligence, signals intelligence</td>
<td>Police investigation and arrest, counter-subversion, counter-espionage, public order policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Extremism Tactical Co-ordination Unit (NETCU) now rebranded as the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) The Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit (WETCU)</td>
<td>2004 - 2011</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Human intelligence</td>
<td>Public order policing ('politically motivated disorder') counter-extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) now rebranded within the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU)</td>
<td>1999 - 2011</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Human intelligence</td>
<td>Public order policing ('politically motivated disorder') counter-extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Now: National Police Chief's Council (NPCC)</td>
<td>1948-2015</td>
<td>Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Human intelligence, signals intelligence</td>
<td>Coordination of national policy across all police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI5 (Security Service)</td>
<td>1909 - present</td>
<td>The UK and British imperial territories, as of 1992 Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Human intelligence, signals intelligence</td>
<td>Counter-subversion Counter-espionage, Counter-sabotage, Strategic deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service)</td>
<td>1909 - present</td>
<td>Non-British overseas territories</td>
<td>Human intelligence, signals intelligence</td>
<td>Counter-espionage, espionage, strategic deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)</td>
<td>1921 - present</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Signals intelligence</td>
<td>Counter-espionage, strategic deception, cyber warfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

operations, technology and methods. That said, past and more recent history attests to the way that the British police have regularly engaged in the surveillance, disruption and subversion of domestic political movements (Bunyan, 1983; Connor, 2018a/b; Gill, 1994; Lubbers, 2102; NETPOL, 2014:125) and "in no way" can it be "termed 'comprehensive'' (HMIC, 2014:124).

<sup>20</sup> This table is partially based on 'Elements of the British Secret State' in O'Connor (2018a:4).

<sup>21</sup> Most police forces maintain a Special Branch, although this picture has been complicated of late with the development of 'regional counter-terrorism units' (NCTPN) which number twelve including 'counter-terrorism command'. The Metropolitan Police's own Special Branch (previously the largest in the country) in 2006 was merged with the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorism Branch (S43) and re-branded to form 'Counter-terrorism Command' (SO15).
2009, 2011; Smith & Chamberlain, 2015, Vitale, 2017:199; see Monaghan & Walby 2012 for a Canadian perspective; Boykoff, 2006 for a US perspective). The class element in the police role remains pertinent, as witnessed in the history of industrial disputes and political demonstrations, as well as recent causes celebres (such as the fabrication of official accounts in the 1989 Hillsborough tragedy (Reiner, 2007; 2013; Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012). The year-long miner’s strike in 1984-5, was on the back of a decade of intensifying political conflict in Britain and represented a crisis moment for the British state. According to Milne (2004) the state employed a dual strategy (one secret and one overt) in order to achieve its intended goal of defeating the miners; “The government unleashed the full force of the state: a militarised police occupation of the coalfields, a commandeered and manipulated criminal justice system, mass sackings and jailing – and the use of MI5, GCHQ, the NSA and Special Branch to bug, infiltrate, smear leaders." During the strike, Special Branch had at least one agent (‘silver fox’) operating inside the NUM, Connor (2018a:20) cites a senior South Yorkshire police officer as to its purpose and utility:

“That information we got from Special Branch [from Silver Fox] I think beat the strike, there’s no doubt about that. And without that information I don’t think we could have managed it.”

It has also been alleged in parliament that MI5 had an agent (the NUM’s chief executive from 1983-1989, Roger Windsor) who had been tasked with ‘disrupting and undermining’ the NUM’s activities (Connor, 2018a:21). This was not merely to spy on the NUM but also to use a series of ‘dirty tricks’ (including false allegations, slush funds, forgeries, agents provocateurs and multiple secretly sponsored legal actions) to break the union (Milne, 2014). The massive policing operation which was launched, including a co-ordination system in respect to the creation of the National Policing centre (NPC) had no statutory basis, and as (Wallington, 1985:147) notes, left its relationship to the government unclear, despite the then Home Secretary taking ministerial responsibility for it. Excessive use of force was the other method that the strike was crushed by the police, with orchestrated pitched battles using baton charges (on foot and by horse mounted officers) and mass beatings at the decisive 'battle of Orgreave' in South Yorkshire in 1984.22 As Wallington’s (1985:159) notes, "the police were the agency by which the strike was contained and eventually broken." The extraordinary level of resourcing co-ordinated through a system of 'mutual aid' between police forces in England and Wales (established by the National Reporting Centre at Scotland Yard) enabled the police to make the operational decision on 'preserving order' by choose curtailing the striking miner’s activities, including lawful activities.

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22 In its coverage of this decisive event, the BBC admitted that it had reversed the order of footage to falsely depict that the miner’s had provoked the police into baton charging the striking crowd (O’Connor, 2018:20).
Further examples of state agencies and the political police working in harmony to achieve political ends concerns 'The Consulting Association' who maintained an illegal blacklist of over three thousand workers deemed to be 'troublemakers' (for instance those who raised health and safety concerns, or who were considered to have left-wing political affiliations) who as a result were repeatedly denied work (Smith & Chamberlain, 2015; Smith, 2019). The political police, including Special Branches nationally,\(^2\) and the security services supplied information to the Association, and the undercover police officer Mark Jenner infiltrated the construction union UCATT and gathered intelligence on over three hundred individuals, although the full extent of the police's collusion with the blacklist remains unclear.

Trade Unions were not the only target of political policing. Police undercover units from at least the 1960s and 1970s targeted and infiltrated peace organisations, universities, environmental, animal rights and political groups, and later, family justice campaigns, in order to pressurise members for information, surveil and disrupt their activities.

Deep inter-agency collaboration at international summits is also reported from a Canadian perspective by Monaghan & Walby (2012) who show how arrangements for convening 'mega-events' (the G8 and G20 summits and the Winter Olympics) led to the establishment of Integrated Security Units (ISUs) and an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC). The result was the 'unprecedented'\(^24\) fusing of major federal agencies (local /municipal), regional /provincial and national police (RCMP) and the Canadian intelligence Services (CSIS) and the Canadian military) into multi-agency domestic security units.\(^25\) This brought about transformations within the 'knowledge network' which blurred more conventional threat categories such as distant 'terrorist threats' towards those engaging in political dissent which the ITAC reconceived as 'multiple-issue extremism' MIE). As Monaghan & Walby (2012:148) note, this 'reimagined' threat category was used strategically against activists to "rationalise domestic spying campaigns" and to target grassroots social movements.

Within the UK, one of the most comprehensive and recent overviews of British political policing is Connor's (2018a/b) two companion reports which analyse its structural and political-economic logic. What it reveals is how the extensive undercover infiltration of political and campaigning groups was

\(^2\) The Metropolitan Police's Special Branch even had 'Industrial Unit' that specifically monitored union activists (Smith, 2019).

\(^24\) When interviewed, a senior military commander of Canadian Forces (CF) Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Koch, the senior planner in the ISU remarked: "The Games have created an evolutionary change in the Canadian Forces (CF) and RCMP in terms of how we work together. The results are permanent adaptations of collaborative and institutional policy and procedures that set the conditions for future domestic security events" (Thomas, 2010 cited in Monaghan & Walby (2012:148).

\(^25\) This formation is similar to intelligence 'fusion centres' in the USA.
both sanctioned and funded at the 'highest levels' of the Metropolitan Police and Home Office, continuing for over 40 years. These were not 'rouge' squads but rather:

"part of a vast, long-running anti-subversion apparatus in Britain: for over 100 years, significant time, resources and organisational effort has been put into monitoring, containing and disrupting political actors challenging the status quo. The scale was industrial – over 1,000 organisations were caught in the SDS's and NPOIU's surveillance net alone." (Connor, 2018b:2)

As Connor (2018b:2-3) notes, the official discourse used to maintain legitimacy by claiming to be an impartial arbiter of the social order, neutrally enforcing public order or protecting parliamentary democracy from internal threats of dangerous subversive elements "fail to account for the breadth of the surveillance, its consistent patterns, and the statements of secret state officials themselves." Moreover, the state's own justifying official discourse, such as 'subversion,' which accounts for a substantial component of MI5's and Special Branches raison d'être has no concept in constitutional law, and the term lacks any generally understood meaning in political and legal theory, rather in constitutional law an 'abuse of liberty' requires a criminal offence to be committed (such as for instance, a breach of the peace or an act of violence, riot or incitement to do so) (Spjut (1979:254).

This leaves us with only a publicly stated definition of subversion, here (and somewhat reluctantly in parliament) supplied by the then Home Secretary in back in 1978, by which the Home Office still monitors subversive activities:

"Subversive activities are generally regarded as those which threaten the safety or well-being of the state, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means." (947 H.C. Debs., ser.5, col.618, 6 April 1978, cited in Spjut (1979:254).

Whilst Rees was not blind to the lack of legal substance such a construction carries, and conceded at the time that whilst definitions were "not sufficient" it would "be wrong to argue about definitions", as he knew what he meant when he had duties to perform in connection with subversion (Spjut, 1979:254). This leaves us with a somewhat curious self-justifying tautology, a fictional term which has no legal standing, but one which mobilises a considerable part26 of the secret state's surveillance and monitoring operations. The ex-MI5 agent Annie Machon's (2005:44) expose of the British intelligence services demonstrates quite how elastic the operationalisation of subversion was for MI5. One did not need to belong to a denoted 'subversive organisation' in order to have an MI5 file as a subversive, rather in the view of MI5, having or having had 'sympathies' with these or other

26 Machon, (2005:36) the ex-MI5 agent, contests to just this, that MI5 devoted 'significant resources to subversive groups' from the 1940s to 1993, whereupon subversion was downgraded as an agency priority, but still remains an area of activity.
groups was sufficient to be worthy of MI5 investigation. Similarly, at the organisational level, MI5 investigated ‘legitimate non-subversive organisations’ (such as Trade Unions, CND, the NCCL and the Greenham Common Women) on the basis that it was investigating ‘subversive penetration of these groups’ (Machon, 2005:46), illustrating the elasticity of the concept and the versatility by which MI5 evaded its own rules. Indeed, by the 1980s MI5 reportedly stored one million personal files, with the ‘vast majority’ [...] being ‘permanent files on subversives’ (Connor, 2018a:18).

As a number of commentators have concluded, through their operation these agencies present a threat to liberal constitutional government (Spjut (1979:254; Evans & Mason, 2015). These activities have continued apace, also under the guise of the equally vague ‘domestic extremist’ label, as highlighted by numerous cases of political surveillance directed at environmental campaigners (including Green MPs and other representatives) and peace campaigners which have come to the public’s attention. Such cases illustrate how the police act to construct classifications of ‘legitimate protestors’ qua a host of ‘illegitimate’ ones, not on the basis of wrong-doing, but on the basis of their own epistemology, a policy which citizens are unable to directly challenge. These are not mere semantic niceties, effectively applying such a label can bring forth a range of police actions.

One such mode of operation in the political policing tool-kit is disruption, rather than the more traditional ‘prosecution-directed mode’ (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004) (i.e. identification of a suspect, arrest and prosecution, which would require building a case to satisfy a criminal evidence standard).

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27 MI5 also had a file called ‘Subversion in contemporary music’ which included music groups such as Crass, UB40, and the Sex Pistols (Machon, 2005:45).
28 This included extensive records with MI5 gathering 10 ‘thick volumes’ on both the Greenham Common Women and CND (Machon, 2005:46).
29 The extent of this surveillance included elected members of parliament, with Special Branch officers conducting extensive covert spying operations on a string of Labour politicians, according to the former SDS undercover police officer turned whistle-blower Peter Francis, with the Special Branch files often being “very extensive” in which they typically described the subject’s political beliefs, personal background (such as parents, school and finances) and demonstrations they attended, with some containing “some personal and private matters” (Evans & Mason, 2015) possibly a reference to information that could be used to discredit or besmirch their public reputation, indeed the ex-MI5 agent Machon (2005:55) recalls how MI5 kept “deeply embarrassing personal material on influential figures.” Francis reported that his superiors in Special Branch were “certainly very grateful” if he passed on information involving MPs (Evans & Mason, 2015).
30 Examples include in 2013 that the District Green Councillor Ian Driver had been spied upon for over two years by the Metropolitan Police, resulting in 22 entries due to his involvement in campaigning to stop live animal exports in Ramsgate (Barnes, 2013). Similarly, a Green party politician (the peer Jenny Jones) was tracked and monitored over an 11-year period, recording her political activities (including recording a tweet she sent about police tactics at a pro-cycling protest and details of presentations she gave at public meetings where she spoke on issues such as police violence and Conservative party cuts to public expenditure), Jones had been placed on a ‘domestic extremist’ database (Evans & Bowcott, 2014).
This tactic is built into the Police’s National Intelligence Model (NIM)\textsuperscript{31} which identifies a ‘control strategy’ (for ‘intelligence, prevention and enforcement’) and emphasises pre-emptive ‘disruption’ and ‘network demolition’ (Swain, 2013). Disrupting a network (or market) is an eminently more pragmatic objective, and according to research (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004:2; Innes et al, 2017) is being increasingly deployed as a mode in the governing logic of policing.\textsuperscript{32} This ‘disruptive turn’ is a mode of ‘preventative behaviour management’ is also increasingly being used under the banner of the Prevent strand of the UK’s counter-terrorism policy to overtly disrupt and dismantle infrastructure (Innes et al, 2017:256).

Reviewing the past and present activities of this state apparatus, Connor’s (2018a:2) firm conclusion is that far from being a noble enterprise to protect the nation and its people, the secret state's concern is with dissent (be it in the guise of counter-subversion, counter-extremism or public order policing) and to "bind, constrain and delimit the acceptable parameters of political dissent." In doing so the real purpose of political policing is to:

\begin{quote}
protect the dominant hierarchical social relations which order British political and social life; social relations of racism, patriarchy and class. The secret state protects these social relations from ‘deep dissent’: ‘dissent that seriously or fundamentally challenges the existing apportionment of wealth and power in society’
\end{quote}

One critical area to appreciate is the interconnectedness of the state apparatus despite their respective claims to ‘independence’. For instance, there was significant state collusion in the criminal justice system concerning the work of SDS officers. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) withheld vital evidence in the trials of environmental protestors whose organisation had been infiltrated by the SDS undercover officer Mark Kennedy. This resulted in an attempt to pervert the course of justice and ensuing that the undercover officers who had formed sexual relationships with eight women ‘targets’ would not be prosecuted, ruling that prosecutions would not be in the ‘public interest’ (UndecoverInfo, 2015).

As Davies (2010:29) notes, there has been little effort in understanding how intelligence agencies (MI5, SIS GCHQ) form part of the wider functioning of processes and mechanisms in the machinery of government despite the ‘palpable impact’ of such institutions. What we do know is they "interact continuously by feeding intelligence horizontally to working level officials in the policy departments as well as vertically to senior civil servants and political decision makers", an ‘interagency joinery’

\textsuperscript{31} NIM is a co-ordinated strategy on the collection, analysis and use of intelligence and is produced by the National Criminal Intelligence Service, being a Home Office Policing body and part of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (Swain, 2013).

\textsuperscript{32} The authors note that the number of ‘disruptions’ is a ‘key performance indicator’ for the National Crime Squad’s ‘National Service Plan’ (1999/2000). Indeed, the Plan calls for a five percent increase in the number of ‘criminal organised disruptions’ (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004:2).
where the "overt and covert aspects interlock and interweave" Davies (2010:42). Indeed, the establishment of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and accompanying legislation has increasingly allowed the involvement of the security services to take part in investigations 'in support of the prevention and detection of serious crime'. Whilst it is envisaged that this will primarily be an intelligence gathering function, it could lead to a more active investigatory role, a development viewed with alarm by some owing to the "largely unaccountable nature of secret service activity (Maquire & John, 1996: 318).

Thus far I have discussed the irreducibly political nature of policing, the relationship between different state players, and some of the tactics and strategies they employ to control and repress political dissent. The issues raised thus far are important because the ongoing changes in policing and security involve principled changes to the relationship between the citizen and the state (Loader & Walker, 2007) and any explanation of the state's response to summit protests needs to account for the range of ways authorities (police) inhibit these political challenges.

2.3 Transnational protest: the story of a movement

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a growing trend of protests and activists targeting meetings of international governmental organisations (IGOs) including financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as multilateral regimes such as the Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20). Much of the work of these organisations had been undertaken in relative seclusion but this dramatically changed in 1999. An eruption of mass demonstrations drawing a new (and largely unwelcome) public scrutiny to their work. A number of prominent scholars now argue that the authorities are confronted with a significantly different form of protest from recent past, with new type of more militant activists challenging the established elites. Indeed, this represents a 'new paradigm' of activism, (Hurt, 2014) 'globalisation from below' (della Porta & Diani, 2006:2) or the arrival of a 'global civil society' (Wapner, 1996, Schechter, 1999, Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; also, Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Florini 2001; Gaventa 2001; Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002; Glasius, Kaldor, and Anheier 2002; Naughton 2001; Said and Desai 2003; Sassen 2002 in Fisher et al, 2005).

Whilst these claims have been the subject of some debate amongst social movement scholars, there are some distinctive features which constitute a shift in activist's organisation, strategy and tactics. Activists are more networked internationally, uniting an otherwise highly diverse group of actors and progressive movements (Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith 2001; Smith, Smith and Johnston 2002; Tarrow 2002); the pivotal role that new communication technologies and social media increasingly play in transmitting ideas and organising disparate
groups, and the resulting emergence of the 'horizontally networked activist' (Almeida and Lichbach 2003; Langman and Morris 2003 in Fisher et al, 2005; Myers & Schaefer, 2004; Rheingold 2002); and the increasing detachment of this form of protest from more conventional institutional politics (della Porta, 2011:163). This has resulted in a distinctive raft of new 'transgressive' protest tactics and strategies in challenging the established hegemonic elites, including being prepared to use direct action methods and civil disobedience (for instance, della Porta, 2006; Smith 2001). These developments have resulted in transnational organisations experiencing a period of sustained, large-scale and well-organised protests loosely based on social justice issues (della Porta & Tarrow, 2004:223-4). These developments have generated a more potent and generalised global challenge to the neo-liberal orthodoxy as the only possible path to development (Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein 1989; Brecher, Costello, and Smith 2000; Walton and Seddon 1994; Fox and Brown 1998; Pianta 2001b; Wieviorka 2003; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter, H., 2005; Wood 2004; Tarrow 2005 in Della Porta & Diana, 2006). These developments have primarily taken place in Europe (including the UK) and North America due to the simple fact of this being the location where the majority of these conferences and meetings take place.

This is not to suggest that this discourse of a 'global justice movement' unites spatially dispersed protestors into unitary homogenous actors, far from it. The forms this dissent takes is also highly varied and in this sense the global justice movement is more of an 'imagined political identity', one often enacted in a performative space which brings together a multitude of grassroots groups and organisations. It is the manifestation of this movement though which carries the potential for a generalised global challenge to business and usual. As della Porta and Dani (2006:2) caution, what is referred to as the 'global justice movement' should not be considered as a unitary homogeneous grouping. The anti-globalisation initiatives are heterogeneous and address a wide range of issues, ranging from opposing child labour exploitation to climate change, from opposition to military interventions by Western powers to human rights abuses. What constitutes a social movement then is a matter of some debate (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; Oliver 1989). One widely accepted definition views social movements actors as "engaged in political and/or cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change. By conflict we mean an oppositional relationship between actors who seek control of the same stake - be it political, economic, or cultural power - and in the process make negative claims on each other- i.e., demands which, if realised, would damage the interests of the other actors" (della Porta and Diani, 2006:21).
2.3.1 Seattle and the Spectre of Global Dissent

Whilst international summits are the most visible sites attracting 'alterglobalisation' protest, it wasn't until what became known as the 'Battle in Seattle' in 1999 that they became widely reported by the international mass media. The Seattle protest has been described as the 'coming out party for the global justice movement in the USA' (Noakes and Gillham, 2007:335). What is so notable about World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle is that through a series of direct-action demonstrations the anti-globalisation movement succeeded in forcing the WTO to cancel the opening day of the summit. This remarkable ‘tactical win' was achieved by an estimated 14,000 to 30,000\(^{33}\) activists forming a 'human chain' to encircle the downtown stadium (aimed at symbolising 'chains of debt' in support of international efforts at debt relief for the third world) in doing so the protestors prevented most of the delegates from attending the lavish opening event (Smith, 2001:1). The Seattle police respond with a considerable degree of violence, with 'non-lethal' weapons as well as mass indiscriminate arrests in an effort to take back complete control of the downtown streets (Noakes and Gillham, 2007:336).

Such was the significance and impact of the protestors efforts in disrupting the summit and the scale and intensity of the authority’s response, Seattle is seen as a 'turning point' for street-based 'contentious politics', at least within North America (della Porta, Andretta, M., Mosca, L. and Reiter, H, 2006: 1). Describing the events as 'five days which shook the world' (Cockburn, Sekula, and St. Clair, 2000:1) the significance of Seattle lies in its symbolism in the minds of activists. Indeed, summit demonstrations can be thought of as either before or after Seattle. What followed in future waves of protest was the adoption of a more transgressive model of activism by the global justice movement in Europe and throughout North America (Hurl, 2014:2). This development has been characterised as the brief "flowering of a new radical movement" (Cockburn, Sekula, and St. Clair, 2000:1).

Seattle had an equally momentous impact on the authorities, who conceived it as “parallel to Pearl Harbor to some degree” (Fisher, cited in Cockburn et al., 2001). In an effort to prevent any reoccurrence the police ‘retrained and retooled’ (Gainer, 2001), embracing an increasing paramilitarism in police tactics and equipment (McPhail et al, 1998; Kraska and Kaeppler, 1997; Wood, 2014; 2015) although this was already well established in the UK from the 1980’s onward after a series of inner-city disturbances (cf. Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1980; Scratton, 1985). Nevertheless, Seattle had set the trend and established a new base line for future summit protest

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\(^{33}\) The lower estimate refers to the Police estimate of protestor numbers whereas the higher estimate refers to activists own estimate (Smith, 2001).
actions in both North American and Europe, where the new direct action tactics were used to good effect (cf. Wood, 2014; Neale 2002; Kahn 2000).

The significance of Seattle also lies in the reversal of a long term trend from the 1960's onwards, away from oppressive and coercive policing of protests to one of more negotiated management style, embracing a greater level tolerance by the authorities to demonstrations (cf. McPhail & McCarthy, 2003; King & Waddington, 2005). Prior to Seattle, the police’s use of 'negotiated management' techniques had been increasingly refined as a strategy for public order policing, starting in the 1980s, although this ebbed and flowed and important national differences remained (della Porta & Reiter, 1998, 2006:14). On this view negotiated management is a more partnership and consultative based process, where prior to a protest police and protestors negotiate and agree on the route and conduct of a demonstration and liaise throughout the period of protest via open channels with specialist police officers (IPO's) on the ground. Table 2 (below) sets out the main dimensions of these three protest policing strategies (escalated force, negotiated management, and selective incapacitation) which are presented as ideal types, and Table 3 (below) the different styles of policing interactions with protestors.

### Table 2: Protest Policing Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Escalated Force</th>
<th>Negotiated Management</th>
<th>Selective Incapacitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toleration of disruption</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Selective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Selective &amp; one-way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of arrests</td>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>Last resort</td>
<td>Selective &amp; proactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Last resort</td>
<td>Selective &amp; less lethal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Extensive and real time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Extensive, cross agencies and media conscious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling space</td>
<td>Localised and reactive</td>
<td>Localised and proactive</td>
<td>Selective, extensive, and proactive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 Based upon della Porta & Atak’s Protest Policing Strategies Table (2015:124).
Table 3: Styles of Policing Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of Interaction</th>
<th>Policing Style</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of force</td>
<td>Brutal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of prohibited behaviours</td>
<td>Repressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of repressed groups</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for law</td>
<td>Illegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of intervention</td>
<td>Reactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Confrontational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consensual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptability</td>
<td>Rigid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of the game</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Artisanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The logic of the negotiated management approach is that both parties gain advantages (i.e. Baker, 2014; Gorringe, et al, 2012; Gorringe & Rosie, 2013) no more so than the police guaranteeing the right to peaceful demonstration. If the police do use force (for instance kettling or more violently, baton charges into the crowd) it should be restricted to those deemed to be 'violent groups' who are separated from the wider protest and stopped without endangering others safety (della Porta & Reiter, 2006:14). Such negotiated management approaches are favoured precisely because they are seen as less coercive than the older escalated force model and more tolerant of protestors minor legal breaches (Waddington, 2011) as well as curtailing indiscriminate and intrusive information gathering practices. This is often contrasted with the more traditional style of ‘escalated force’, which is more hostile to protests, frequently coercive, particularly when faced with innovative protest tactics and transgressions, as well as being legalistically punitive, and can involve police recourse to illegal methods (della Porta & Reiter, 1998:4; Starr et al, 2011; Scholl, 2012). Selective incapacitation, as the name suggests, targets police labelled ‘transgressive’ protestors who are not willing to enter into negotiations with the police or to comply with their wishes, but in practice tends to effect all protestors in the surrounding area (della Porta & Atak, 2015:124). The approach is an incremental resort to “surveillance and information sharing, proactive policing, and the elaborate control of space” (Gillham and Noakes, 2007: 350). Selective incapacitation employs measures which often extends the scope of police players and entails involving other authority players in these efforts, this can range from imposing stricter border controls preventing entry by activists to extra-legal regulations to prevent protest actions and/or detain activists (della Porta & Atak, 2015:125).

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35 Based upon della Porta & Atak’s Styles of Policing Table (2015:121).
These protest policing strategies can be thought across a number of dimensions (see Table 3) although those presented are not exhaustive, and are presented as ideal types. Neither are they mutually exclusive, as they can be employed in combination depending on how they are selectively applied to different protest groups (della Porta, 1998). What strategy is used and how it is used is also dependent on police first-hand knowledge and experience of the particular protest group, as well as what police may consider to be 'episodes of failure'. As is the case with protestors, each encounter provides a learning process, and can contribute to tactical innovation, for authority players promoted through manuals, trainings, and conferences (national and international (della Porta & Atak, 2015:123; Wood, 2015).

2.4 Police Violence and Wrongdoing
Any analysis and theorising of policing will also need to extend to police wrongdoing, for our purposes here, police excessive use of force, illegality and malpractice. This brings into sight the relationship between the formal rules of the law and the working rules of police conduct. In other words, how police culture and situational exigencies and organisational sanctions transform the law in the books to the law on the street. As Reiner notes, there are two broad schools of thought here. Integrationists focus on the importance of police subculture and see legal rules as having little effect on actual police practice, and hence from this sceptical perspective legal rules are largely presentational and act to justify conduct (Manning, 1979, Fielding, 1989, Reiner, 2010:209). This is not to say that formal rules have no impact, formal controls do limit rank and file autonomy, but the more difficult question is to what extent, when, and in what way?

Grimshaw & Jefferson's (1987) earlier ethnographic case study of English (London) unit beat policing offers one of the most detailed and theoretically rich frameworks for understanding police work. The authors reject many of the prevailing theories such as 'sociological liberalism' and 'class functionalism' as inadequate as they fail to explain the empirical reality of much policing. Similarly, approaches which view police behaviour as a result of occupational subculture and in-group norms, or the product of policy making (through formal command and control structures), or as a consequence of legal rules and the wider interaction between environment and police organisation are also seen as deficient. They offer a structural model which they view as more faithful to actual routine uniform police work, one which retains three elements, being; law, work and democracy. Each requires some explanation in turn. The authors note that the police have considerable discretionary powers, and that depending on the situation, the higher the discretion the less constraining will be the law, and vice versa. Therefore those tasks where the legal structure is "limited or permissive will allow work related values to prevail" (in contrast to a precisely articulated legal structure, for instance within a custody suite) (Grimshaw & Jefferson's (1987:26). Moreover,
these tasks cut across the police management and rank and file divide and the task related value systems will similarly follow. Again, much police scholarship has recognised the disjunction between 'law-in-books' and 'law-in-action' on the streets or the 'ways and means act' (Collinson, 1995) in achieving police aims and objectives. This question is, even more, pressing in what is defined as 'public order' situations. Police scholars such as Reiner (2010:10-11) acknowledge that there is often 'noble-cause' corruption and rule-bending, of which police culture widely tolerates such malpractices, including physical violence, "Police lawlessness has always been rife." Reviewing British police oral history provides some important clues here, for instance the former Met Commissioner Sir Robert Mark's autobiographical account of youthful 'indirections' as a pre-war Manchester constable breaking a drunken navvy's leg with an illegal truncheon, as well as documenting 1940's the meteing out of brutal summary justice to anyone who assaulted the police (Mark, 1978:28-9).

Whether the trend for police deviance has declined or is much the same is unknown, the largely a 'dark figure', one which would in part reflect changing mores and attitudes regards what constitutes intolerable police behaviour. However, it is important to recognise that within the UK, the last several decades have seen a vast expansion of police powers and a dilution of previous Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) safeguards over their abuse (Reiner, 2010:211). Whilst this is concerning, the problem of police malpractice is most acute at times of moral conflict and change in society. The emergence of the alterglobalisaiton movement is one such time. Furthermore, many of these protestors constitute 'police property', they are regarded as alien and disreputable and in such cases the constraining influence of communal morality which otherwise acts as a check on police subcultural notions of justice and desert becomes inadequate. This at least is one plank in explaining the scenes that unfolded in Seattle, Washington and Genoa.

2.5 The Multifaceted Nature of Dissent
Much of the work on the social control of summit protests has concentrated on the policing operations at the event. Whilst this is a critical dimension in the authorities' control of dissent because the quest for 'public order' can entirely jeopardise political liberties and neutralise protest activity, it remains only one dimension of social control. Starr et al's (2011) study of anti-global ('alterglobalisation') movements alerts us to the wider continuum of dissent of which active protest constitutes only its most public, visible and rare manifestation (i.e. the act of going on a demonstration). This is to recognise dissent as a process and the importance of the wider social climate of associations that nurture and sustain it, what the authors term the 'submerged resources', such as social networks and "cultures of resistance'. Accordingly; "Dissent is a large and diffuse arena of contemplation, talk and action" (Starr et al, 2011:14). On this account dissent is a
process that has collective dimensions, it can also take many forms, including writing graffiti or a blog post as well as facing off riot police on a demonstration. This is to offer a broader account of dissent, and a model of concentric zones of political involvement set within these wider structures of resistance (see Figure 1 below). Elaborating the model, ‘resistance’ is defined as dissent involving some kind of transgressive act. When this is scaled up into collective action it becomes a social movement, which can express varying degrees of organisation and mobilisation. The more organised social movements can launch and sustain ‘contentious campaigns’ and mobilise other networks, wherein which the final expression, ‘protest’ may emerge from campaigns or projects or in some other more independent manner.

Figure 1: Contextualised Diagram of Dissent: Showing Concentric Zones of Political Involvement

Starr et al (2011) concede that ‘alterglobalisation’ is new in degree rather than kind, with its transnational scope, non-hierarchical structure and ability to draw in wide diverse networks conjoined with employing tactics of direct action and civil disobedience as the most distinctive features. Prominent here is a tactical repertoire which reflects a ‘Do-It-Yourself’ (DIY) cultural form which rejects mediation by representatives in favour of people self-organising in an autonomous manner. The claim Starr et al (2011:18) make is that for dissent to be expressed and for it to develop requires different kinds of social spaces. Logically, then, the protection of protest requires protecting these multifaceted social movements and networks if the wider diffusion of contention and modularisation of collective action is to be realised (see also Tarrow, 2005; 1995; Tilly, 1995; McAdam, 1995).

36 Starr et al. (2011:15).
This also means there are many opportunities to disrupt and redirect them for authority players who are intent in doing so. This last point is critical when considering the rather brittle nature of this form of dissent, with Seattle a case in point. For instance, Murphy and Pfaff’s (2014) empirical analysis of the Seattle protests cautions against overstating the role of a transnational dimension to social movement activism. What was decisive for success, at least in the case of Seattle, is better captured by Tarrow’s (2002) notion of a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’.

This is to emphasise the relational (over cognitive) links to one’s own society and to bring to the fore the importance of local activist constituencies as the key building blocks for large-scale mobilisation. Murphy and Pfaff (2005:169) found that whilst there was an international component, and one they consider constituting a genuine shift in the social movement field, the ‘critical factor’ lay with the role of pre-existing local activist communities and domestic movements. Seattle demonstrates that “the basis of collective action in social movements remains primarily local, and that the key to large-scale transnational action is appealing to domestic interests” (2004:153). In fact, transitional social movements may actually require extensive domestic support which cannot be provided by looser transnational advocacy networks. The clashes that occurred on the downtown streets were only one small visible part of a far larger but submerged campaign, one that was reliant upon the resources, institutional access and personnel of local movements and NGOs. A loose coalition of SMOs and national NGOs worked together to frame social justice issues to common concerns, and in doing so they facilitated greater cooperation between what were otherwise diverse organisations and activist groups. To a lesser extent, those operating on a regional level were successfully harnessed to wider transnational causes.

Peterson’s analysis of summit protests in Gothenburg in June 2001 and Copenhagen in December 2002 also found that on closer inspection the ‘rainbow coalition’ of protests groups were deeply divided, combining protestors who were opposed to the EU and challenging the Swedish state as well as new protestors in an emerging global justice movement. The distinguishing feature was the lack of a traditional organisational structure to these different groupings and its reliance on the internet to organise and mobilise protests (Peterson, 2006:45).

Seattle saw direct action with street blockades by protestors to frustrate the intentions of the WTO Ministerial meeting. Both direct action and civil disobedience are controversial as they contain a central tension between legitimacy and legality. This is a complex discussion which involves the problematic character of political obligation, namely why anyone has a duty to obey the law, and the related problem of when political authority is legitimate (re the challenge of philosophical anarchism in respect of advocates such as Wolff, 1970). Civil disobedience is a technique for
challenging unjust laws or government policy, and whilst it can violate the law, it is often a symbolic gesture where advocates justify such measures on moral grounds (rather than selfish ones). Blackstone (1971-6) adds two other defining criteria; that activists do not seek to avoid apprehension or punishment and that the civil disobedience is non-violent. Hence civil disobedience falls far short of rebellion or revolution advocating the overthrow of political authority because it presupposes the concept of ‘legitimate political authority’\(^\text{37}\) (Wolff, 1998; 1969). Lord Hoffman’s discussion of civil disobedience adds to the sincerity of the belief a corresponding sense of proportion by protestors to avoid excessive damage or inconvenience on behalf of the protestor. Direct action, on the other hand, can be ‘symbolically disruptive’ (Fenwick & Phillipson in Mead, 2010:11) with only a short duration or impact, or is easily remedied. This is in contrast to direct action which causes significant disruption with the attendant risk that a group succeeds in its aims outside of the democratic process. Wenz (1974) puts forward the notion of ‘civil disruption’ to describe the US ‘campus unrest’ in the 1970’s and the Chicago riots of 1968. He views this as a category of political activism midway between civil disobedience and revolution. Civil disruption has been used by environmental campaign groups such as ‘Extinction Rebellion’, seeing activists on mass blockades of major road junctions and thoroughfares with ‘sit-down’ (or more often ‘lie-down’) protests to block public transport hubs in major cities in order to gain media attention and thereby publicity to showcase their environmental cause. This last tactic is an adaptive response to authority players use of strategic incapacitation, notably using police kettles (police cordons tightly and forcibly containing the group of protestors in one location for hours until fatigue, hunger and the other demands of life result in protestors being willing to give up and go home upon release - in theory at least). By occupying a strategic central location to maximise disruption to the normal rhythms of the city, the authorities kettling becomes redundant as the protestors are already where they want to be, and being kept there merely aids their strategy. Moreover, removal from a lie-down protest is designed as a labour intensive challenge for the police\(^\text{38}\) (but only if the police abide by their own procedures of which there is no guarantee) and hence deterrent, as it takes four officers to remove each prone protestor (one to each limb) and then each must be carried to police vehicles, ferried to be processed at police cells, and detained, of which there is a finite capacity.

However, as several studies of UK public order law testify, domestic law and Strasbourg decisions under ECHR have proved to be nearly totally intolerant of any disruptive or obstructive forms of

\(^{37}\) Although see Blackstone for the difficulty in distinguishing the two when civil disobedience involves violence (1971:5).
\(^{38}\) Smaller number of protestors using elaborate bolting and locking devices to objects (be it street furniture or imported vehicles to the scene) or being glued to other objects requires time consuming and careful removal, again draining police resources.
protest, less so civil disobedience (Mead, 2010; Thornton QC. et al 2010). Despite almost complete legal intolerance of the tactic, disruption is important for effective dissent as it raises costs of ‘elite projects’ and hegemonic norms (Star et al., 2010). Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that it is only and precisely through disruption that social movements can win, the mechanism of raising costs to a point where it then becomes in the interests of the elites to comply with dissenters. Clearly, the changing nature and form that protest takes is an important one as it raises questions of whether social movements subvert or supplement what has traditionally been thought of as the democratic process.

After Seattle, policing of International summits became increasingly militarised, securitised and confrontational. There was a shift in emphasis to repressive hard line approaches in dealing with these new transgressive protestor tactics. For instance, the Italian police’s response in the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa was notoriously brutal, non-selective and at times illegal. The Italian police fired over 6,200 tear gas grenades over 2 days, ignoring their own circular from the national police chief to exercise maximum caution and care in using truncheons or teargas (Hearing 8 August 2001). More excessive than this was firing over 20 pistol live ammunition rounds, one of which killed an unarmed demonstrator Carlo Giuliani (Report III, 145). Police also used repeated baton charges into the crowd including peaceful demonstrators, and more worryingly, armoured vehicles were driven at high speed against the crowd on the instructions of senior police officers present at the scene (della Porta & Reiter, 2006;). Estimates of the numbers of injured at the hands of the police were over 1000 (Gubitosa, 2003:177). Perhaps the most infamous incident was the police’s attack the Diaz Pertini school building where ninety-three young demonstrators were sleeping. First-hand reports recount sustained sadistic and systematic brutality with police officers viciously beating practically every occupant39 (Davies, 2008; Berra, 2011). Sixty-two were hospitalised,40 the remaining protestors joined some 222 held at the Bolzaneto detention centre and were subjected to a regime later described by public prosecutors as ‘torture’, including being forced to stand in stress positions, being beaten, humiliated,41 kept in freezing conditions with little or no food as well as being denied their legal rights (Davies, 2008). Attempts by senior police officers at charging the occupants of Diaz Pertini with aggressive resistance to arrest and conspiracy to cause destruction were all dismissed by Italian courts.

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39 A small number of protestors managed to flee the building
40 The prognosis ran from between 5 days to indeterminate (della Porta & Reiter (2006:21)
41 Davies (2008) reports that those detained men or women with dreadlocks were forced to have their hair roughly cut off to the scalp. Another protestor, Marco Bistacchia, was taken to an office, stripped naked, and forced to get down on all fours and told to bark like a dog and to shout “Viva la polizia Italiana!”. There were other complaints by several women about being threatened with rape. Furthermore, one (unnamed) police officer told the Italian newspaper La Repubblica that he had seen brother officers urinating on prisoners and beating them for refusing to sing Faccetta Nera, a Mussoliniera, a fascist song.
At Genoa, summit space also became increasingly securitised, with a series of spatial exclusionary zones introduced on a RAG basis by the police as a strategy to counteract previous protestor tactics. The summit site itself was heavily fortified and denoted a ‘Red Zone' and barred to all demonstrators, encircled with an eight-kilometre perimeter barrier, and 13 'access portals', which also enclosed a major commercial sector covering several city streets. This was encircled by a buffer ‘Yellow Zone' which saw restrictions on freedom to demonstrate (della Porta, 1996). This denotes a central feature of summit policing, the terrain of ‘reconnaissance battles' (Bauman, 2002) fought out between activists trying to temporarily occupy this contentious (and previously public) space and police tactics and strategies to control and deny these territorial tactics. Protestors try to challenge this authority by use of mass actions such as 'swarming', a tactic that is at best ephemeral as they lack any means of fortification (Peterson, 2006:45). So-called 'hit and run' tactics by small groups of 'militant' activists are not aimed at occupying space but rather aim to disrupt the domination of space that authorities exercise (Peterson and Oskarsson, 2002; Peterson 2001).

This exclusionary geography was also operative transnationally at the EU border with the Italian authorities temporarily suspending the Schengen Agreement, conducting 140,000 border checks, with 2,093 people being rejected (only 298 were alleged members of the 'black bloc' anarchists). Internally, 'expulsion notices' were used to keep some Italian social-centre militants from Genoa (barring any return for 3 years to the city). Other internal measures included searches of private houses and social centres where protestors congregated (under Article 41 of the Penal Code, itself restricted to exceptional cases of urgency and necessity in searching for weapons) and hence of questionable legality. della Porta & Reiter (2006:18) cite the former head of UCIGOS (central political police), Arnaldo La Barbera that this was a deliberate tactic of 'preventive pressure' by the police to intimidate protestors. Protestors were also spied on, including telephone taps and the monitoring of online communications (ibid., 2006).

In trying to understand these actions, della Porta and Reiter (2006) attribute what they term the police's 'heavy handed' response to both internal aspects of the Italian police (such as lack of coordination in command, poor training with an over reliance upon voluntary draftees, as well as permissive legal powers enhancing the potential for arbitrary actions) and the relatively closed nature of the Italian political system to the type of claims-making challenges by the global justice movement. What the otherwise comprehensive analysis of Genoa protest omits is fully recognising the role of malevolence and malice of the Italian police as a causal factor driving police violence, one which first-hand accounts reported by Davis (2008) and others highlights. I shall develop this point later when examining my own case studies that too often policing scholars sideline this particular motivation.
The repressive nature of the summit policing operation at Genoa can be contrasted with Peterson's analysis of transnational summits in two Scandinavian countries; Sweden (Gothenburg in 2001) and later in Denmark (Copenhagen in 2002). Despite both countries being considered to have more open state institutional structures to new political challenges, Peterson also found that police forces in both countries responded with different degrees of repression, jeopardising guaranteed political and civil liberties. Peterson describes the three days of massive riots at Gothenburg by borrowing Rodney Stark’s (1972) earlier description of a ‘police riot’. In large part being attributed to deficiencies in the policing operation; a ‘dysfunctional police strategy’, poor training and communication, as well as a police culture that ‘demonised' protestors. Bjork, (2004 cited in della Porta, Peterson & Reiter, 2006) has attributed an important role to the contrasting legal frameworks operating in the respective countries in explaining the greater level of violence and disorder with the Gothenburg policing operation. In contrast to Sweden’s more legalistic one, the Danish legal systems embrace of a codified 'legal opportunism' was seen as allowing the police greater flexibility in calibrating their response to disorder. So whilst militant activists used uncertainty of action to retain the offensive tactically, Danish police also used uncertainty in when to intervene (i.e. when to be lenient) as an instrument of police power.

This is not to suggest that all summit protests result in violence and disorder, some pass off relatively peacefully. The Copenhagen (2002) summit is one example. Peterson (2006) attributes this outcome to a process of negotiation between the police and some sections of protestors, in addition to the police having in reserve a large paramilitary operation to maintain 'the initiative' against any potential protestor actions. In short, the police ensure they always had the upper hand on the streets. It is this, broadly conceived, two-pronged model, combining a consultative and communicative element and a militarised and potentially overtly offensive and escalatory public order strategy which appears increasingly to be the favoured approach by many police forces in both Europe and North America.

King and Waddington’s (2006) analysis of protest events in Canada from 1997 to 2002 (including the 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis) tends to confirm this later trend for a two pronged model. What is instructive however is that despite this emphasis on police negotiation with protestors, as Peterson reports from the Copenhagen (2002) summit operation, ‘encroachments’ on protestors civil liberties very much persisted, often achieved through subtler forms than the open police violence and legal repression so evident in Genoa and Gothenburg. Indeed, King and Waddington (2006) identify a mode of policing they describe as ‘superficially soft-hat’. The Canadian summits were openly coercively policed when internationally protected persons (IPPs) were present and trade and
economic interests were being discussed, but more covertly coercive when IPPs were not present, this despite police adopting a negotiated management with protestors.

The post-Seattle picture of how summit protests are policed appears to be evolving in response to a cycle of previous summit learning by both police and protestors, in particular, the strategic and tactical moves and counter-moves between both parties (della Porta, 2006:10; Noakes & Gillham, 2006). Reflecting on three US experiences of summit protests, including Seattle and the 2000 IMF meeting in Washington and the Republican conference in Philadelphia, Noakes & Gillham (2006) argue that the police have shifted to a form of coercive 'selective incapacitation' in order to prevent transgressive demonstrators from having any disruptive impact of summit proceedings. The strategy of negotiated management, which is in part supposedly designed to guarantee demonstrator rights, only applied to already contained demonstrators (della Porta, 2006:11). This puts a question mark over the utility of entering into negotiated management for protestors and explains the reluctance of some protestors to do so. A number of studies have examined the process and outcomes of negotiated management. Whilst there is some evidence that channels of open communication can lead to the de-escalation of violence and also maintain a limited opportunity for protest (Wahlström and Oskarsson, 2006;) there is an asymmetry of power in favour of the police which tempers any notion of 'negotiation'.

della Porta (2006:12) draws out a number of common elements characterising policing of global social movements post-Seattle. These are an emphasis on forceful control and a sidelining of demonstrators rights, with police control being deepened and extended through a greater emphasis on intelligence and communication technology. There is also a tendency for selective exclusion of some activists, including at the EU level with specific measures to monitor and control movement across EU borders of global justice protestors (Reiter and Fillieule, 2006). It is also likely that international summits present particular problems for the police and authorities, with IPP's and VIPs presenting attractive targets for terrorists (King and Waddington, 2005) and any form of challenge to them or the summit perceived as internationally delegitimizing the host government. In addition to this, characteristics of the global justice movement such as its heterogeneity of different participants, its wilful unpredictability, tactics of direct action, all conceived as a 'high threat' for police and authorities (della Porta and Reiter, 2006; Noakes and Gillham, 2006; and Peterson, 2006). The history of 'on the job trouble' (Waddington, 2000) at international summits also increases mutual mistrust and discourages negotiations (Wahlström and Oskarsson, 2006; della Porta and Reiter, 2006). This is the obvious justification for having heightened security measures, but summits also involve dimensions of state organisation previously unseen at non-summit protests (Starr & Fernandez, 2009). Nevertheless, what is instructive about Seattle, as with
Noakes and Gillihan (2006) report on the Miami summit, is the internal contradiction which Turk back in the 1980's observed, that “the US legal system embodies a strong emphasis on political freedom whilst at the same time a vast intolerance of actual political diversity” (p. 58).

2.6 Violence, law and the exception

Much of the sociological attention towards new social movements has focused on the organisational or structural level explaining their emergence, how they mobilise to participate and gain support, and why they succeed or fail in their political aims and objectives. The more criminological orientated work has examined the policing of this transnational activism in order to explain why some protest events can result in violence or remain mostly peaceful, as well as the changing nature of social control exercised by the authorities including the militarisation of policing thesis (King & Waddington, 2004; 2005; Jefferson, 1987; 1990; Kraska, 2011; 1997; 1996; 1994; Kraska et al 1997a; 1997b; Reicher, 2011; 1996; 1997; 2001; 1984; Reicher et al, 2004; Reicher et al, 2007; Sttot, 2011; Waddington, 2007; 1992; Waddington & King, 2007). In brief, the paramilitary thesis, particularly as it relates to protest policing, calls into question what Gidden's (1985) considers a central feature of the modern nation state, a clear delineation between internal security conducted by the police and external security carried out by the military. It often functions pejoratively and denotes through weaponry, dress, hardware, operational tactics and organisation, ideology and language. This trend of increasingly paramilitary operational capacity in 'public order' policing has occurred throughout Europe and North America, particularly developing tactical mobile units but also for large scale protest actions orientated to the rapid achievement of control (della Porta 1998:230; Wisler and Kriesi 1998:98–9; P.A.J. Waddington 1998, 1994; Kraska, 1997a; 1997b; 1997c) but practiced in the UK supposedly adhering to the tradition of impartial policing by consent (which I have critiqued earlier). Critics argue that the normalisation of paramilitarism introduces a militaristic mindset and subculture within public order policing which has a disturbing potential for net widening unlawful police violence, detracting from protestor safety and escalating problems it aims to minimise (Jefferson, 1987; 1990; King & Waddington, 2005; 2006; Kraska, 2001).

A number of unintended consequences can flow from this more coercive approach, and research since the 1960s suggests that the police actions often play a major part in causing and amplifying crowd disorder (for instance, Jefferson, 1990; Skolnick 2002; Reiner 2000; Reicher, et al, 2004; Reicher et al, 2007; della Porta 1998; Critcher and Waddington 1996; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993).

Whilst it is often difficult to exactly determine who is responsible when violence erupts at protests, as Peterson (2006:52) notes, responsibility is often assigned to protestors. It is frequently forgotten that the police also constitute a crowd, and that violence is the result of an interaction, usually under very emotive and stressful conditions. This last point draws on several UK studies of 'riots'
such as Waddington's 'flash points model' and Jefferson's 'amplificatory spiral model' of public order policing, each which points to the deficiencies of increasing paramilitarism (Jefferson, 1990; 1993; Waddington, 1992, 2005; 2007). It has long been recognised by policing scholars (and conceded by some senior police ranks) that once disorder breaks out, things can quickly get 'out of hand'. Senior officers find it difficult to maintain command and control over rank and file officers, especially when they make forays into the crowd such as baton charges to 'disperse' a crowd. As PAJ Waddington notes:

"Policing civil disorder engenders fear, anger and frustration amongst officers who are often too close to the action to understand what is occurring. The feeling that one has lost control and is at the mercy of unpredictable events only heightens anxiety. The opportunity to take forceful action allows not only for the expression of these emotions, but is exhilarating in its own right. For all of these reasons, it is essential that officers engaged in public-order situations are carefully supervised and controlled, for internal controls on behaviour are unlikely to prove reliable." (P.A.J. Waddington 1991, 137).

Whilst the 'paramilitarism thesis' has been much debated, and is contested by a small number of scholars (notably Heyer, 2014; PAJ Waddington, 2007; 1999, 1994a; 1994b; 1993a; 1993b; 1987;) the nub of the matter turns on the analytical purchase of 'paramilitary policing'. This is not a binary distinction, as Kraska argues, but a continuum between the military and an unarmed police force. The key distinction is that unlike the military the police do not (or should not) aim to kill an enemy but to apprehend suspects lawfully. Despite most protest events not resulting in violence, I will argue later that even this most fundamental of distinctions is breaking down and arguably no longer tenable, but the key point in this debate is that the boundary between the police and the military is changing or blurring, as is the less than lethal technology they employ (Haggerty & Erickson, 1999; Sheptycki, 2005). The other key implication of this type of policing is the danger that such police tactics and strategies act to intimidate people out of actively protesting. If paramilitarism is denying this area of citizenship, even if the police mostly rely on 'non-lethal' or less than lethal' violence or the ever-present threat of that violence, be it primarily directed at marginalised and non-institutionalised activists, this can have a deleterious impact on democracy.

2.7 Defining and Operationalising Repression

Much previous research across a range of jurisdictions has been concerned with how and why states use coercive power domestically towards existing dissenters (Davenport, 2007) including the use of direct violence to suppress social movements. Far less attention has been given to the myriad ways in which dissent is proactively channelled through what has been described as 'soft repression' (state surveillance, monitoring, cataloguing, infiltration and disruption activities). Whilst I have discussed earlier the different authority players, particularly in terms of political policing, I now want
to focus upon the methods available to them to control, delimit and defeat a range of social
movement activism. This matters because the consequences of political repression can be profound
in constraining, subverting, infiltrating and ultimately disempowering political protest (Opp &
Roehl, 1990, Starr, Fernandez & Scholl, 2011). At the same time the study of repression and the
threat of repression on social movements has been under explored in the social sciences (Boykoff,
2006) although there is a growing body of 'repression research' emerging (Earl, 2003, 2011).
Goldstein's magisterial study of political repression in America (from 1870 to the present - here the
late 1970's) similarly argued that social scientists have neglected the role of government through its
coercive apparatus in suppressing dissent and enforcing orthodoxy, particularly at times when
radical criticism of the existing order threatens established power. The policing of global economic
governance meetings is particularly important here because it involves dimensions of state
organisation that have not been considered in earlier studies of state repression. The academic
literature has generally failed to keep up with the complex relationships of repression and creative
resistance which have emerged post-Seattle (Starr and Fernandez, 2009). This is to move away
from an analysis of protest policing to consider the wider social control of dissent by the state,
elements of which I have touched on above, and which I pick up on later in successive chapters.

The subject of political repression is one that is charged with emotion, and one that appears no
doubt somehow out of kilter to many who live in a Western liberal democracy. The conventional
thinking is that democratic societies cannot use open coercion (police violence, mass arrests) on a
routine basis to quell dissent because to do so would result in losing too much legitimacy. Social
control must be maintained through other, subtler ways. The FBI's COINTELPRO domestic
'counterinsurgency program' in the 1960's which had the explicit aim of discrediting and disrupting
social movements through covert means, here; infiltration, psychological warfare, legal harassment
as well as resort to more direct violence is one such example (Churchill & Wall, 1990). In Britain,
where Senate Intelligence Committees are in shorter supply, covert policing practices and
undercover policing operations have been aimed at monitoring and undermining a broad swath of
political activism (for instance, see Evans, 2013; and Lubbers, 2012; 2015; also Monaghan & Walby
2012 for a Canadian perspective).

Notwithstanding definitional problems, repression is difficult to study empirically. Repression is also
a normative term, and as such defies precise definition. Most accounts view repression as involving
the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organisation, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as
deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel,
practices or institutions (Goldstein 1978, p. xxvii). A definition of repression common to social
movement research is provided by Stockdill (1996:146) “any actions taken by authorities to impede mobilisation, harass and intimidate activists, divide organisations, and physically assault, arrest, imprison, and/or kill movements participants.” Earl (2003) is critical of this conception and has argued that existing explanations of social movement repression fail to account for different types of repressive activity. Most obviously, more authoritarian states will differ from democracies, or where policing is more decentralised (as in the USA). Neither are state authorities the only actors that can serve as repressive agents (Bromley and Shupe, 1983) as recent work in the UK on private corporate actor’s attests (Lubbers, 2012).

Earl (2003) has offered a multi-dimensional typology of repression, one which takes into account the identity of the repressive agent (identifying a tight or lose connection between state agents and political elites), the character of the repressive action (whether direct coercion such as rubber bullets or more toward channelling restrictions on social movements), and whether the repressive action is observable (overt or covert). As such this represents a more refined and complex understanding of repressive forms and one useful for this study.

Marx (1979) has reviewed decades of (primarily US) research and whilst somewhat dated now, has detailed the broad strategies that have been used by authority players (and their allies to damage social movements, as has Boykoff’s (2007) later work in detailing what he terms the ten ‘Action Modes’ of state repression. Table 4 (below) sets these out and maps both typologies fitted against each other on the basis of similarity.

Table 4: Strategies and Practices for Inhibiting a Social Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhibiting Strategy</th>
<th>Action Modes of state Repression</th>
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<tr>
<td>Direct violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment deprivation</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Black propaganda’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass media manipulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass media depreciation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surveillance and break-ins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extraordinary rules and laws</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harassment and harassment arrests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public prosecutions and hearings</td>
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Inhibit freedom of movement, expression and action; create myth and fact of surveillance and suppression. Infiltration, 'badjacketing', and the use of agent provocateurs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damage morale</th>
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<tr>
<td>De-recruitment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Network demobilisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroy or displace leaders (leadership 'decapitation')</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroy infrastructure (premises and meeting spaces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Encourage internal conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Encourage external conflict with potential allies and opponents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inhibit or sabotage particular actions</td>
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</table>

It should be added that this tabulation represents the perspective of the outside organisation who constitute the subject of these strategies, not the authority players implements them who employ a different nomenclature. As Marx notes, the strategies can be pursued by multiple means (for instance using agent provocateurs who can serve a number of ends) and whilst analytically distinct, are inter-related. Whilst some of the strategies that Marx and Boykoff's itemise are fairly self-explanatory, others are deserving of some elaboration.

Reviewing Marx's contribution first, 'image damaging information' can be supplied by a range of authority actors (though typically 'police media liaison officers' or through the intelligence services to trusted or co-opted journalists) and in anticipation of a protest action. Such information is open to fabrication or exaggeration, or if more accurate, containing selective but privileged information from surveillance activities (i.e. informers, wiretaps, or online monitoring) but only in a contrived sense, for instance, as a result of authorities own covert actions in deliberately creating reputational damage (i.e. provoking movements into illegal actions or association with such individuals43) (Marx, 1979). The movements publications may come under attack from black propaganda, misinformation or disinformation campaigns (arguing they conflict with 'British values'), as well as discrediting celebrities aligned with the movements.44 The CIA's foreign activities appear to have gone further still, not simply manipulating

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43 A case in point would be the SDS undercover police officer Bob Lamberts' who infiltrated an animal rights campaign and allegedly planted of an incendiary device in Debenhams in Harrow, causing £340,000 of damage (Evans, 2017).

44 In the US the FBI ran extended propaganda campaigns to try and discredit the New Left and its adherents in the eyes of wider public opinion, FBI agents were told that "every avenue of possible embarrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored," this included selecting photographs that depicted of New Left leaders in the most obnoxious manner, sending articles to student newspapers or the 'underground press', university officials, donors, legislators and parents to discredit them (professing advocating of illicit drug use or sexual vice) (Marx, 1979:2; see also, Boycoff, 2006; Churchill & Wall, 1990).
or influencing news stories but becoming news services themselves in order to supply this disinformation and misinformation.45

The most often used strategy is information gathering through various surveillance techniques, although most of this information is of questionable validity and Marx (1979:3) argues is not actively used beyond a 'harassment function'. This can aid counter-intelligence functions or make social movements less open and democratic movement as well as deter participation (by inducing fear and apprehension in potential joiners). Other methods to indirectly damage a movement involve inhibiting the supply of resources and facilities. This can take many different forms and can bring in a range of other aligned authority players, for instance, the tax authorities auditing a movements funding, (or their contributors) or their charity status on political grounds, encouraging those renting meeting spaces or offices to a movement not to do so, denying employment to known activists (or attempting to get them sacked,46 or 'blacklisted' (in the UK, see Smith & Chamberlain, 2015).

Other methods are used to damage recruitment to the movement by keeping potential recruits away, impeding movement growth and weakening morale and commitment amongst current active members. This includes creating an unfavourable public image of the movement, or once activist identities are known, contacting their employers, teachers, parents, friends, neighbours or spouses in an effort to encourage them to dissuade the person from activism or to threaten them with negative consequences of pursuing this path.47 This can include ‘pressure sales’ using direct appeals and warnings from police (often Special Branch in the UK) sometimes relayed (almost always unexpectedly) at their homes ('door-stepping') who emphasise the risks and costs they may face, or give them damaging information about others in the movement (Marx, 1979:3).

Targeting social movement leaders due to their symbolic or instrumental value to the organisation can also weaken social movements, as it weakens the group of organisational expertise and presents leadership succession problems (Donovan & Coupe, 2013:116). This can include a variety of legal sanctions to prevent activism (i.e. injunctions against demonstrating, Banning Orders in

45 This includes the CIA supporting two European news services used by US newspapers, and in 1976 the CIA had about 50 US journalists or other news organisation employees employed and planted stories to help shape 'American public opinion' (Marx, 1979:2-3).

46 During the McCarthy era over 490 people lost their government jobs on 'loyalty' grounds despite no cases of espionage being uncovered (Marx, 1979:3).

47 This tactic used by the FBI has parallels in the UK's 'counter-terrorism' strand 'Prevent' through the Channel scheme, which also brings together agency actors and draws on parents, spouse, and teachers in an effort to dissuade and deter young people from being involved in what the state describes as 'domestic extremist' organisations (including environmental, peace and political organisations which advocate peaceful direct action).
vicinities or with other activists etc.), 'image damaging' efforts, harassment, a range of covert action, threats and assaults. A leadership 'decapitation' strategy (a leadership 'arrest strike' arresting and removing all leaders from the organisation) was used against the animal rights activist group, Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty (SHAC) by Special Branch.\(^\text{48}\) It appears from Donovan & Coupe's discussion, (2013:128) that the aim of the prosecution was to remove SHAC's campaign's organizing, planning, liaison and coordinating centre, and in addition, that the authorities were aware of the groups vulnerability of having all key leaders in a single hub (although not SHACs deficiencies in succession planning). Targeting and destroying an organisations infrastructure through violent police (including armed police) raids and evictions as a deliberate strategy by authority players at international anti-summits protests has also been noted by Scholl (1921:131-2) but here as a pre-emptive social control tactic.\(^\text{49}\) Donovan & Coupe's (2013) paper is significant in that it would appear to be a rare public admission that the UK political police do indeed intentionally use this tactic in an effort to destroy a social movement.\(^\text{50}\) Other methods can include co-opting leaders or displacing them, as when authority players infiltrate an organisation who become leaders (or lead players) or build rival movements. As Marx (1979) notes, one major aim of counterintelligence activities has been to create and drive internal conflict within social movements (with undercover agents encouraging personal conflicts or animosities or exacerbating tensions with opposing factions within the organisation (over tactics, goals etc.), including falsely accusing members of being informants to sow discord and distrust. Similarly, encouraging external conflict between movements and groups (especially ideologically) or taking action to prevent coalitions forming, or a related tactic is creating alternative social movements to compete with 'the target group'.\(^\text{51}\) The intention was to "cause disruption of both groups by having each expend their energies, time, and money attacking each other" (Donner, 1976:19). Social movements are particularly vulnerable to sabotage and disruption, especially when they take large protest actions. This is because they seek to expand their base and draw on the wider

\(^{48}\) A 'special unit' was devised for this, combining officers from Special Branch and CID using a range of covert methods and a 'diverse' range of NETCU data using "sophisticated intelligence-based approaches to identify offenders, build a prosecution case and arrest those who led and organized the campaign". Six leaders were charged with 'conspiracy to blackmail' (the prosecution strategy devised by the police investigation and CPS teams working 'collaboratively') (Donovan & Coupe, 2013:127).

\(^{49}\) At the 2000 IMF/WB summit in Prague; the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, the 2003 G8 summit Geneva summit, the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland and the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm Scholl, 2012:131-3).

\(^{50}\) The co-author Donovan is a serving Metropolitan police officer, although no details are provided as to whether he works for Special Branch, CID or NETCU.

\(^{51}\) For instance, the FBI created a right-wing 'Secret Army Organisation' in the 1970s in San Diego, that physically attacked leftist (Viorst, 1976; Marx, 1979).
concentric ‘zones of dissent’ (Star et al, 2011) (as discussed in Section 2.4), with that broader population of sympathetic but non-activist members as well as entering into ‘interest coalitions’ with other organisations. This brings unknown persons into the fold, requiring cooperative activity based on trusting relations but without being able to verify identities (for instance, people may need to be accommodated, fed and briefed etc.), offering a rich field of opportunity for disruptive intervention measures by a range of local and national authority players (including encouraging counter-demonstrations). Most often these measures can include social control activities restricting protest activity (sometimes under the guise of ‘no protest zones’) and routes (the ‘march to nowhere’), or police provocation and violence towards activists.

Whilst both Marx and Boykoff are writing very much from a US perspective, many of these same strategies find resonance in the UK, and are directly applicable to later social control methods employed by authority players at international summits (Scholl, 2012; Starr et al, 2011). What is helpful about both Marx and Boykoff’s work, and that of later UK counterparts (such as Bunyan, 1983; Connor, 2018a/b; Scratton, 1985 etc.) is the reconfiguration away from a legitimising official discourse of criminality (‘crime and disorder’) and its nomenclature (‘subversion’, ‘domestic extremism’ etc.) to reconceive what is actually occurring as a struggle for control over contested political space between state players and non-state challengers. The strategies and practices (‘Action Modes’) thus far outlined do not constitute an exhaustive list and are dynamic, rarely operate in isolation (and most often overlap) working in various conjunctions and sequences (Boykoff, 2007:288) but do provide some insight into authority players willingness to monitor, intervene and incapacitate domestic social movements affairs. These issues are important because these types of ongoing changes in policing and security involve principled changes to the relationship between the citizen and the state (Loader & Walker, 2007).

2.8 Conclusion

Thus far I have argued that broad social, economic and political cleavages have been conducive to the emergence of ‘transgressive’ social movements and that these counter-movements have (perhaps briefly) occupied the political stage as new, and from the perspective of international and

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51 Marx (1979:5, citing Wise, 1976:318-19) recounts one somewhat comical example of the imaginations at work here, which saw the Newark FBI suggesting an action to sow ‘confusion and suspicion’ at the Black Panther Party convention by sending a telegram warning that the convention food contained poison (with symptoms being stomach cramps) with the FBI laboratory planning to “treat fruit such as oranges with a mild laxative-type drug by hypodermic needle or other appropriate method.” Ultimately this injecting of fruit did not occur, not due to any legal or moral inhibitions on behalf of the authorities but rather due to the FBI’s lack of control over the fruit during shipment. Nevertheless, as Wise (1976) noted, Hoover had felt that the idea had “merit”, indicating that the FBI’s disruptive clandestine tactics operated with the approval of the highest tier of government.
state institutions, unwelcome agents of history. The movements goals have been to engender change, and they have devised a range of new and innovative strategies to achieve them, methods that are also contentious such as direct action and civil disobedience. This and their less institutionalised form mean they are more likely to be viewed as threats to the authorities who are tied to maintaining the political and economic status quo which they directly challenge. These methods and strategies interact across a range of different arenas with authority players, principally the police, who represent the primary state player tasked with controlling and suppressing manifestations of political dissent.

The police are not a single player however, rather they comprise a multiplicity of players, who pursue different purposes, have different norms as well as different degrees of agency (della Porta & Atak, 2015:114). This is not obvious to the casual observer (or perhaps even the seasoned activist) who infers from that most directly accessible aspect of superficial appearance, the uniform - a costume designed to harmonize each and all - to present the misleading facade of a unified institution. This is aided and abetted by official discourse which frequently references a similar claim whilst denying or cloaking internal authority discord. In fact, Manning (2010:50) argues that the most important problem that the police face is the tension between high and low policing. The weight of past and recent historical evidence demonstrates that the police are also politically embedded, despite their claims to being neutral parties in all of their frequent encounters with contentious players on the streets.

Other recent scholarship and scandal attests to the role that a range of authority players, including the state's security services, all play in monitoring, deceiving, inhibiting and disrupting these political challengers. As early as 1977, Bunyan's study of British policing reorientated a focus to this political role of the police. It revealed the extent to which the British state has developed a formidable domestic overt and covert coercive apparatus aimed at repressing political protest and dissent, itself deriving from Britain’s colonial past (Bunyan, 1981; Connor, 2018a/b; Scraton, 1985; Sabir, 2017). These measures mostly operate unseen and under the guise of crime prevention, but are justified as both a noble enterprise as well as a legitimate response to a wide range of state sanctioned 'categories of suspicion' and political offences, most usually termed 'public order', 'subversive', or 'domestic extremist' threats. This includes a growing number of specialist police units and agencies that have been created for the detection and suppression of political dissent, many of which are frequently deployed at counter-summits. In so doing, within the UK context, the co-ordinated nature of state players appears to challenge the proposed internally conflicted model of the state outlined by Jasper's (2015) and other 'strategic interactionists' as heterogeneous and
multi-interested. For instance, Jaspers (2015:1) argues that "in almost no cases does 'the state' act as a unified player."

The broader point here is to grasp the relationship between the state and social movements and the extent to which the key state players pursue the same goals, the police, officials and government. Moreover, there are now a number of summit protests which have demonstrated how the forms and methods of policing operations have exceeded legal limits in what are Western liberal democracies to those who are labelled internally by the authorities as representing political threats, although the precise construction of this threat can take a number of forms.

There has been little research which has examined how regular uniformed policing relates and compares to political policing. Another way of asking the question is the relations of political policing to the state and wider society. I have been arguing, along with others, that political policing is part of the larger exercise of political power, indeed it is interesting to note that similar techniques are used in political policing in both totalitarian and also democratic societies (Turk, 1982). Political policing is employed for defining and controlling resistance to the political system, this is because political order and authority can never be completely realised by the authorities, and the actions of resistors become 'political criminality'.

Writing in the 1980's and considering Western modern states, Turk predicted somewhat prophetically an increase in political policing, one which would be more concealed, more reliant on surveillance measures, and which was more dependent on subcontracting out some of these functions to the private sector. These developments were seen as increasing the struggle between resisters and political authorities, and when examined further, acts to undermine the liberal claim that the police are autonomous from state control. Bringing this discussion right up to date, domestic counter-terrorism measures have accelerated in the UK (and throughout other Western liberal states) this has increasingly resulted in a 'pre-crime' shift in criminal justice, "one which links coercive state actions to suspicion without the need for charge, prosecution or conviction" [...] and expands "the remit of the criminal law to include activities or associations that are deemed to precede the substantive offence targeted for prevention" (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009:641). This changing security and policing landscape has crucial implications for those wanting to dissent politically and to organise political protest actions.

Whilst I have discussed at some lengths the rationale, logic and architecture of political policing, the traditional method of state repression has been far simpler - that of police violence (using a range of non-lethal and lethal weaponry). In one sense this is a complex topic, because the police enjoy considerable discretion in defining a 'public order' situation to intervene in, and then in any
application of force. This is true legally as well as operationally (in respect to devising police policy re ACPOs 'public order manual') and practically (a lot of police violence takes place away from public view making accountability and governance that much more difficult). The prevailing scholarly view has been to see a successive shift in how the police react to political mobilisation and protest. By and large the story presented over many decades is one of increasingly 'humane' policing or the civilising of policing, where the police show a more tolerant and consultative approach - meaning a reduction in the use of state violence and legal repression. However, the reality is more complex and nuanced than this simple linear progression would have us believe, particularly when considering international summit events where there has been a resurgence of coercive and authoritarian policing. Any assessment also needs to fully consider the entire spectrum of measures directed towards controlling political dissent, as well as all the state and non-state players involved in these efforts to which this study is directed.
3. Methodology

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will outline my research approach and describe the methods used in this study. I will explain the fundamental principles behind the research and how the different strands of the study fit together, or perhaps more accurately, came together. I will then discuss how the research was conducted, the contribution of the chosen approach to the preparation for the fieldwork, including its unique benefits, difficulties and limitations. I will rehearse (but not resolve) the ethical issues which emerged and provide a reflexive account of undertaking the research, including its covert aspects. I feel this last element is worthwhile because one of the key methods, ethnography, is itself a reflexive process (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2014) and is a commitment to deliberating on observations, reflections, and records.

In the introduction, I identified that my central concern was to understand the social control of dissent taking place at international summits in the UK, and not simply of protest 'events'. My approach to this research is to view summits from a broadly ethnographic point of view. Over the course of the study, I've spent a lot of time attending, marching, chatting, sitting, squatting, running, dodging police lines, standing around or simply gazing at the summits and the many protests activities around them. The simplest question that I have been trying to understand is; what is going on? It is this that I have tried to make sense of, why the summits take the form they do? What unwraps and explains them? I draw conceptually upon Foucault (1977) and acknowledge the growing number of other researchers intellectual contribution working in the social protest field (della Porta, 1995; della Porta & Tarrow, 2012; Starr et al, 2012; Scholl, 2014, to mention a few). I devote analytic attention to describing these sites of struggle during summit protests, how protestors saw the police and reacted to their social control tactics, and the tactical interactions between the parties. What I offer is an empirically generated theoretical discussion of a number of concepts which illustrate these particular forms of 'biopolitical' power, and crucially, how it is changing and evolving in response to activists own tactical repertoires.

It might be helpful at this point to say what it is that I am not doing. This thesis is not an attempt to provide a full blown account or indeed ethnography of transgressive protest movements or its policing, it is not possible to provide any such 'complete ethnography' where one knows and tells the whole story. Whilst this is a work of social science which draws on empirical research, I have not aimed to systematically test ideas as with quantitative data as one would say, a reconviction study, to gauge the impact of an intervention (i.e. did the measure work?). This is because the arguments I put forward are largely the product of observation and not amenable to a tight theoretical...
statement that leads to easily testable propositions. Even where I have sought 'hard data' for instance on protestors complaints against the police or protestor injuries at the hands of the police, I am more concerned with explaining and describing a phenomenon and developing theory than with testing a hypothesis. Rather, I am starting from an empirical topic that is politically and socially compelling and then inductively generating concepts from it. This is to take a more grounded theory type approach, where one generates concepts and theoretical propositions from observations rooted in empirical data, not from a priori assumptions. Glaser (1967) argues that conceptualisation is at the core of grounded theory, where emergence or 'sensitivity to context' play an important role. Such an approach lends itself to the investigation of identities, perceptions, and emotions, as well as cultural dimensions within social movements (della Porta, 2014:11). Whether one can actually free oneself of all preconceptions in collecting and analysing data as seemingly proposed by Glaser's position is an extraordinarily complex issue, but I doubt anyone really can. I do not resolve this issue, rather I try to avoid the pitfalls of ignoring it. Suffice to say that in making sense of my data I attempted to think with and through the data (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007:168.) in order to engage with others findings, itself provoking why type questions and producing fruitful ideas. Throughout the emphasis is on 'middle-range theory', rather than grand theory or empiricism, and here focused on a conceptual area of inquiry (formal theory).

Finally, I should add that there is a slight of hand or perhaps 'retrospective falsification' in writing a methods chapter which purports to reconstruct a neat logical story represented in a formal doctoral outline. Some serendipity played a role, whilst other parts of the research have taken the form of a relatively unstructured opportunistic format. I did not undertake formal in-depth interviews with protestors, with pre-prepared questions digitally recorded, then transcribed, thematically coded and analysed and written up, as is routine in much qualitative study. I discovered that such an approach did not lend itself to the situations and constraints that I was so often in, especially activists fears over police infiltration. So I used lightly structured or 'controlled conversations' skewed towards the interests of the research which allowed me to continually talk with a wide range of people quickly and concisely (see Appendix 13 for a detailed breakdown of protestors across the respective case study sites). This is not an exhaustive list of protestors that I spoke to as I had many casual conversations to gather information (opportunistic meetings or walking alongside protestors). Otherwise I would observe and overhear protestors (at protest planning meetings and protest events) and follow a lot of people around to collect and collate 'ethnographic incidents' (Glaser, 1967) then integrate this with a range of other data sources. This means that the research problems are constructed partly during the fieldwork and one which allows for the emergence of new concepts, here being capable of addressing the research questions (della Porta 2014:6).
3.2 Contribution of the Research Design to the Research Study

There are three main methods the social scientist uses to understand human behaviour; observing it in process, viewing written accounts of it from records, or asking questions about it and listening to the answers (Deutscher et al 1992). In this study, I have used all three, but very much veered towards qualitative methods because studying transgressive social movements does not lend itself to quantitative methods.

Social control, or more critically, political repression is difficult to study, at least in its subtler covert forms, so my strategy has been to press into service every source of information of relevance that has been accessible to me. In fact, it is an irony that the organisations that have the most detailed insider knowledge about social movements, particularly transgressive ones, and the array, scope, and penetration of control measures taken against them, is also the most impenetrable for any researcher - being the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), NETCU (National Extremist Tactical Co-Ordination Unit) and the UK intelligence services (MI5). It is they who are eagerly gathering information any way they can, including across national borders, and could write the most authoritative and enlightening account. However, it is not my intention to assist them in any such venture (I provide a discussion of research ethics in section 3.7).

Due to this diverse range of information in this study I use an integrative mixed methods design (MMD) combining a range of primary and secondary data sources (detailed in Table 1, below). The method attempts to concurrently integrate these data sets to build up a complete picture of how the state policed three international summits taking place in the UK. These act as a series of six case studies or ‘workhorses of description’ (Boykoff 2006:44) to illuminate what mechanisms and processes occur, here based on the protest locations; two in London (the G20 and G8) and two in Wales; Newport and Cardiff (G7).

The summits took place over a five-year period (see Table 1 below). As several of the summits saw protest action at other locations in addition to the actual summit sites, I have treated each as an individual case study (n=3) to form a multiple case study. The choice of the number of case studies was in part dependent on very practical considerations such as the external resources, capacity and self-funding available to me as a part-time doctoral researcher with a full-time position as a

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This is not exhaustive as one thinks of ‘sneaky measures’ used in criminology such as conducting visual audits etc, where counting incidents of shattered glass on the pavement in a neighbourhood indicates a break-in and theft from vehicles even though this may not result in a documented crime report.

Later rebranded in 2010 as the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) but still run by ACPO.

I also conducted field research in two further case studies areas for the G8; being in London and also in Northern Ireland (Belfast and Enniskillen (G8), however, I have concentrated this thesis to a discussion of the G20 and NATO summits.
Research Fellow. Whilst this provides a modest number of case studies, each case is of intrinsic interest and shows how social control of political dissent exists within particular cases. They can be conceived by what Stake (2005:445) terms ‘instrumental case studies’ (as opposed to ‘intrinsic’) where the case study plays a supportive role in facilitating understanding, here in how the state controls political dissent and its implications. It is less a question of the typicality of the case, but rather whether the case advances understanding and theorising. Studied jointly, they provide sufficient depth and number to be able to inform my research questions. Moreover, case studies are a commonly used method when examining violent repression of protests, one which allows theoretical development about the conditions that result in state-based violence (Poulos & Haddad, 2016) although the theories cannot be tested (Adeola 2000; Roberts and Ash 2009; Downey et al. 2010).

Table 5: Summits Directly Observed by Author, Split by Case Study Site

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Summits (n=3)</th>
<th>Summit Date</th>
<th>Case Study Sites (n=6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G20 London</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 Fermanagh, Northern Ireland</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>London, Belfast, Enniskillen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Wales</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Newport, Cardiff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rationale for using an MMD conceptualisation is based on triangulation for convergent validation and operates rather like a cross tabulation in addressing the research aims and objectives. The research design was also sequential (Creswell et al, 2003) with data being collected in an initial stage, followed by the collection of the other data types during subsequent stages, in large part following the occurrence of the summits which acted as my unit of analysis. Time is hence a variable in the research, so, for instance, do summit control strategies vary over time and in ways that are theoretically significant - is there temporal variation in response to the G20 in London and the recommendations which flowed from the various official inquires into the policing operation? Has this witnessed an impact on how authorities control dissent in other ways? Having a sequential temporal order also has the benefits of learning as one goes along and refining research tools and practices in light of this. For me this included some very practical lessons that had to be learned retrospectively. For instance, I brought a (rather old) camera to take stills pictures of different players street tactics and use of space on the first G20 summit case study, particularly the police’s
methods of spatial control. I quickly realised that this was pretty hopeless as it was difficult to use when in situations where there was up close confrontations with the police (in order to make a record of events). I later substituted this for a small compact 'press and record' single strapped hand-held video camera with a good zoom lens and angled viewing screen, plus a monopod.

3.2.1 The Benefits of an Ethnographic Orientation to the Research Study

As I have been investigating how the state controls political dissent and the relationship between two principle types of players (state actors and protestors) I have chiefly been concerned to provide a fully contextualised approach, one which generates a rich detailed account of human experiences encompassing emotions, beliefs, and behaviours, whilst also examining narrative accounts located within the original context in which my observations occur. This all lends itself to a broadly qualitative method (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) informed by ethnographic traditions.

A further concern is to draw conclusions based on people's actions, not simply on what people say. I am interested in how people actually behave on protest actions, and how they respond to the control repertoires of the authorities. Jerolmack, et al (2014) argues that many sociologists who rely on interview and survey approaches often end up conflating self-reports with behaviour and in doing so commit an 'attitudinal fallacy'. This means they falsely infer situated behaviour from a verbal account of it. Social psychologists have long recognised that people's attitudes and dispositions provide only poor predictors of their behaviour in comparison to situations they find themselves in (Ross and Nisbet, 1991). This is a methodological health warning for anyone who privileges verbal accounts when explaining social behaviour. The corrective is to study naturalistic interaction in order to escape the attitudinal fallacy (Jerolmack, 2014:186). Consequently, I have given priority to the ethnographic data because of its richness but attempted an integrative mixed methods approach where there is a degree of triangulation and parallelism in the study design. As long as one is aware of the assumptions underlying different approaches such that they are not incompatible, this is a viable approach. As della Porta & Keating (2014:8) notes, "This means challenging a vision in which each method necessarily belongs to a certain epistemological and ontological pillar, and instead presenting each method within the deferent conception to which it has contributed."

56 At the time I was still in that small minority of people who had not seen fit to buy a smart phone, a decision I came to bitterly regret.

57 I found that this equipment is ideal as it allows you to work all aspects of the camera with one hand only whilst being able stay agile (including full sprints) without dropping the camera. Combined with a small and very light collapsible monopod and the retractable angled viewing screen (pointing down to show the operator what is being filmed) allows the camera to be elevated to capture what is taking place ahead of you but difficult (or dangerous) to access, notably when in confined spaces such as a police kettle or where one's view is obscured (being kept behind police lines).
My research questions initially arose from previous protest activities, and what I saw (and read). I had been dissatisfied with much previous work in the area, seeing it as too focused on presenting a neutral arena of 'protest policing' (for instance in the work of Waddington, 1992; King & Waddington, 2004; Reading & Waddington, 1987; Della Porta & Dani, 2006; Gellner & Toch, 1996; Sklansky, 2008; including the more critical voices such as Jefferson, 1987; Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984). As Scholl notes (2014:52) such an analysis too readily proceeds on a normative assumption, viewing disruption as invariably undesirable and public order policing as the necessary response. 'Pacified protest' becomes the undeclared but desirable outcome, itself the unacknowledged standpoint of liberal democracy. This position sidelines the consideration that 'public disorder' is socially and politically constructed. As Lacey (et al. 2010:135) counsels, we need to remember whose view of order, 'public order' is. The focus of much of this previous work concerns the relationship of this harder edge policing to ('a representative') democratic order, one which continually asks how we make public order policing more democratic. What gets submerged are both the explicit state interests in maintaining a particular public order and the subtle and less visible forms of social control which are enacted to uphold it. This is to look beyond those features most recognisable from a protestors perspective as repression, namely the most extreme acts of police violence and the proliferation of a host of statutory provisions and criminal regulation, to consider a wider view. Hence Starr (et al 2011) argues for a broader analysis of the social control of political dissent. Scholl (2012:54) goes further still, asserting that public order policing scholarship is "complicit in the ruling regime of social control" because it reifies the social processes behind concrete repressive acts and "reproduces the assumption of necessary control in its analytical categories."

Finally, the feasibility of accessing senior police who declined to be involved in the research and their 'partner agencies' (primarily national and foreign security services and their various contractors) and my concern to examine the impacts of state repression, naturally led to a focus on 'the policed', rather than the agents of social control. This also points to a basic problem of organisational sociology, that security organisations have no interest in becoming an object of research unless it serves the organisations own purposes (Ullrich, 2018). Whilst they are not entirely hermetically sealed - one can observe their actions and tactics on the ground - they control access to the field internally, and as many other policing researchers have discovered, the secrecy interests of such organisations and desire to avoid any reputational damage preclude access.
3.3 Data Sources

Data sources for this study come from a combination of primary sources: an ethnographic study (including photographic records), interviews, freedom of information requests, online media forums, and secondary sources: official and NGO reports, court records, newspaper accounts, and academic literature. I had attempted unsuccessfully to obtain NHS accident and emergency data (A&E) (discussed further in 3.5.1 below). Table 2 (below) details these data sources along with the data requirements of each. I now discuss the primary and secondary data sources in turn below, and provide a further rationale and consider their problems and limitations.
Table 6: Data Collection and Data Source Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Method</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
<th>Specific Data Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Ethnographic study (observational fieldwork)** | • Case study sites (n=6) | • Behaviour, attitudes and beliefs of protestors.  
  • Behaviour of police and other authorities  
  • Tactical interactions:  
    o Social control repertoire of state authorities (textures of control) and adaption by police and protestors  
    o Spatial dynamics and interactions in controlling dissent:  
      o Police strategy  
      o mobile blockades  
      o reduction of anonymous and safe space  
  • Spatial dynamics and interactions in controlling dissent:  
    o Police strategy  
    o mobile blockades  
    o reduction of anonymous and safe space  
  • Role and impact of authorities surveillance practices |
| **Interview Data** | • Local Authority Personnel (including representatives)  
  • NGO’s | • Political and economic dimensions to summit  
  • Tensions and collateral costs to the locality |
| **Newspaper and News Media Accounts** | • Medical personnel | • Potential for head injuries from Police impact weapons  
  • Information on potential delayed complications |
| | • Police officers - Public Order Unit | • Details of police public order training, weapon handling, and operational tactics;  
  • Details of command structure and supervision during public disorder events |
| | • Local, national and international press  
  • Online news organisations | • Behaviour, attitudes and beliefs of protestors.  
  • Police perspective Details of security operation and accompanying justifications  
  • Behaviour of police and other authorities (including spokesman)  
  • Tensions and collateral costs to the locality |
| **NHS A&E Data and Emergency Vehicle Data** | Retrospective chart review of individuals:  
  o Presenting to A&E  
  o Paramedics stationed at scene of conflict  
  o Transported by Emergency | • Number of injured crowd members;  
  • Injury pattern and extent of trauma;  
  • Level of force used against protestors/ crowd;  
  • Use of LL impact weapons and zone of impact (Red; Amber; Green)  
  • Type of weapon used  
  • Anatomic Impact Sites: pattern of injury |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MPS Police Complaints Statistics and Disciplinary Proceedings</th>
<th>IPCC Police Complaints Statistics and Disciplinary Proceedings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Number of hits received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Injury Pattern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Injury severity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer use of force and other critical incident reporting (by individual officers);</td>
<td>The nature and level of both police force and citizen resistance;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fellow officer reporting of police misconduct and brutality;</td>
<td>Account for multiple uses of both force and resistance;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Details of MPS’s investigations and disciplinary actions against officers;</td>
<td>Description of temporal sequencing—the behaviours as they occurred and which were prior to others (e.g., a citizen struggles to evade an officer, the officer applies a pain compliance hold, the citizen strikes the officer, and the officer uses their baton).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other police investigations that could have a bearing on detecting police misconduct;</td>
<td>Frequency of Police misconduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>Details of external oversight mechanisms and/or early officer intervention systems (how these function, their scope,</td>
<td>Number of Officers accused of misconduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal complaints by alleged victims of police misconduct and brutality made to MPS</td>
<td>Nature of misconduct</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weapons used by the officer</td>
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<td>Unauthorised/excessive force complaints</td>
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<td>Percentage of arrests resulting in excessive force complaint</td>
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<td>Discourtesy complaints</td>
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<td>Removal of Police identification tag</td>
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<td>Sustained complaints</td>
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<td>Legal cases filed</td>
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<td>Claims filed</td>
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<td>£ paid out</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legal cases closed or settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£ Paid out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCC police complaints data</td>
<td>Formal complaints by alleged victims of police misconduct and brutality;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCC investigations</td>
<td>Outcomes of IPCC decision regards formal complaints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. case notes* (in discussion with IPCC for access)</td>
<td>Disciplinary action against officer/group by relevant Police Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Analysis of disorder events using Media Video footage:

- Mainstream media news reporting;
- Indi-Media clips and postings of footage showing policing of the case study demonstrations and disorder.
- The nature and level of both police force and citizen resistance;
- Account for multiple uses of both force and resistance;
- Description of temporal sequencing—the behaviours as they occurred and which were prior to others (e.g., a citizen struggles to evade an officer, the officer applies a pain compliance hold, the citizen strikes the officer, and the officer uses their baton).
- Description police escalation of force in “small increments” in reference to the level of resistance encountered.
- Use the: Resistance Force Comparative Scale (RFCS) to provide a series of Force Factor Scores no resistance (level 1) and a verbal command (level 2) would fall within the continuum (i.e., commensurate force); verbal resistance (level 2) and a ‘takedown’ manoeuvre (level 4) would indicate a higher level of force than the continuum provides (i.e., more force); defensive resistance (level 3) and verbal force (level 2) would indicate a lower level of force than the continuum provides (i.e., less force). The entire string of sequences is examined and a determination is made as to whether the continuum is followed as a whole.
- Whether level of force used is commensurate to the level of citizen resistance encountered.
- Justifiability of level of force used.
- Measure how officers respond to various levels of resistance with similar levels of force:
  - Determine whether an incremental approach is used when applying force.
  - Determine if an officer (Identify potential illegal police violence
- Action of Supervisors and/or line officers - did they intervene when another officer is using excessive force against a subject.
- The RFCS will also be used in conjunction with video clip evidence of strike area hits in respect of the RAG criteria.

Official Reports and Inquiries into the policing of the G20, Anti-Cuts

- Judicial Inquiries;
- Think tanks and independent research organisations;
- Police Organisational Reports
- Behaviour of police and other authorities
- Behaviour, attitudes and beliefs of protestors.
- Details of operational police plan and intelligence;
  - Timeline of Events and police control actions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demonstrations and inner city 'riots':</th>
<th>Details of command structure and supervision during public disorder events;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Parliament and other associated Governmental Reports (i.e. Taylor Review into Police Disciplinary Arrangements, 2005)</td>
<td>- Eye witness testimony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Academic papers;</td>
<td>- Expert witness testimony</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Formal complaints by alleged victims of police misconduct and brutality;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Number of Officers accused of misconduct</td>
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<td>- Nature of misconduct;</td>
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<td>- Weapons used by officers;</td>
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<td>- Outcomes of decision regards formal complaints;</td>
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<td>- Disciplinary action against officer/group by relevant Police Forces</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Court Records pertaining to the case studies:</th>
<th>Type of weapon used</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Court documents pertaining to Criminal proceedings taken against the police;</td>
<td>o Only blunt weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Court documents pertaining to Civil actions against the Police.</td>
<td>o Only sharp weapon</td>
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<td></td>
<td>o Blunt and sharp weapon</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Anatomic Impact Sites: pattern of injury</td>
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<td>- Number of hits received</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Injury Pattern</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Injury pattern and extent of trauma;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Level of force used against protestors/ crowd;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Use of LL impact weapons and zone of impact (Red; Amber; Green)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inconsistent versions between Police officers and citizens</td>
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</table>

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<tr>
<th>Eye Witness testimony</th>
<th>The nature and level of both police force and citizen resistance;</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Information provided by observers on the ground</td>
<td>- Account for multiple uses of both force and resistance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Independent legal observers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>o Legal Defence and Monitoring Groups.</td>
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3.4 Primary Data Sources

3.4.1 Ethnographic Data
The ethnographic elements of the fieldwork took a total of nearly four months across the six case studies and constituted the most intensive period of fieldwork. The advantage with ethnography is that it directly observes behaviour, including the before and after events of that behaviour. This allows an understanding of the significance and consequences that state control has on protestors themselves, their adaptive tactics and mindsets. To do this meant embedding myself within the protestor camps in the run up to summits as well as during and after the summit. There was a number of reasons for this. Participating in the everyday life of the camps allowed a unique insight into a 'hard core' of protestors, their action plans but also their deliberations and concerns across a range of issues (security arrangements, media liaison, organisational structure etc.). It furnishes more information on how people define a situation, their face to face encounters, what Goffman (1961) called the 'interaction order'. It also presented opportunities to directly view the front-line work of Police Liaison Officers (PLO's) their attempted and successful contacts with protestors, in addition to the substantive wider event policing operation to control the protest camp as it was being set up and during its short lifespan (i.e. intelligence gathering, liaison, harassment, and a range of enforcement practices etc.).

3.4.2 Pre-field Preparation
My desire to study the states control of political dissent and protestor movements stems primarily from my past activism. In my student days, I had been involved in a range of left-wing and anarchist political movements. I had helped establish and run the Exeter Anti-Poll Tax Federation and was an active member of an activist network in East Oxford, including taking part in Anti-Fascist Action (AFA) events and a range of social justice issues locally and nationally. After being out of the activist scene for over a decade, I became involved in the Northern Police Monitoring Group (NPMG) and some other campaigning and direct action groups.

These combined experiences had sparked my academic interest in public order policing and police violence gained from attending demonstrations and actions and mobilisations. During this time, I had closely followed earlier summits protests in North American and continental Europe and felt an affinity to the protest movements taking place there. In 2005 I followed the G8 Gleneagles protest in Scotland as a 'complete observer' (Gold, 1958) by reading forum posts of different networks and following the more mainstream media coverage as well as the alternative sites such as Indymedia. Several friends attended the summit protests so I later gained those direct accounts of proceedings (but was not able to attend myself due to my own work commitments). What I learned about the
policing operation and how protestors had been treated fed my desire to study how the state controls political dissent at summit protests as a doctoral thesis.

All of this meant I was not a novice to the field role. If anything the danger lay in suspending my preconceptions, whether these derive from social science or from everyday knowledge to 'fight familiarity' (Delamont and Atkinson 1995, in Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007:80). I devised a shopping list of issues that I was interested in, that and the nature of the summit settings shaped many of the research questions (the 'foreshadowed problems'). The topics ranged from authority's covert forms of social control, the 'hierarchical micro-management of demonstrations' (Vitale, 2005), the pre-emptive measures aimed at intervening downstream well before any protestor (including disruptive) behaviour takes place, as well as examining any acts of police violence in response to protest events unfolding, as well as how protestors reacted to all of this.

Practical preparations involved buying some basic equipment, a small rucksack which would allow me to take my belongings if need be on protest actions but not be too bulky to slow me down. I was aware that I may need to remain agile and be able to run. Aware of impression management and the need to establish good field relations, I 'dressed down' less personal appearance to get in the way. This meant wearing old jeans and scruffy t-shirts to facilitate rapport 'in the field' and reduce differences. Other aspects of self-presentation, such as speech and demeanor I adjusted to conditions and who I was speaking to. None of this was difficult or especially contrived to achieve.

3.4.3 Gaining Access
The pre-fieldwork phase along with my reading of the literature had given me some insight into the formulation and clarification of research problems, and my previous experiences of being a protestor had provided a number of hunches and concerns that I knew I wanted to focus on. My initial strategy was to gain a deep connection to activist communities and thereby allow me to do the qualitative research. The actual gaining of access to the protests and the protest sites was in many (but not all) cases relatively easy but very much depended upon which particular protest group I was accessing and where I was intending to go. Anyone can, in principle, of course, enter public domains, attend open meetings, and take part in a march or demonstration. No process of negotiation is required for that. Nevertheless, gaining access to some planning meetings (both before and during summit protests) and to several convergence centers posed more difficult problems. Activists communities, especially the more transgressive elements face a dilemma, on the one hand, they want to politicise a wider population and build a broad-based movement to more effectively challenge hegemonic power structures, at the same time they need to keep some particulars of targets and tactics secret from an all too interested police force. This is complicated
by groups often endorsing a form of radical democratic decision making where tactics and actions are openly discussed, at least within affinity groups. In practice, this meant instigating a number of security procedures to try as best they could to ensure that this information was not easily obtainable to the police.

Negotiating access here also threw up some ethical considerations as I was very much aware that academic researchers were rarely held in high esteem amongst the protest groups I was most interested in. This was learned in part from the previous contact I had, but also came across from my reading of some remarks on the protest chat rooms and comments lists in the preparation phase of the research. My concern was not to alienate myself from the protestors by declaring that my main purpose was to 'study' the social control of political dissent and hence the protest activities taking place over the duration of the summits, although when I did discuss this I typically indicated that my research interests lay in police activities and the wider security apparatus making up the central objects of study. I also emphasised that I was a protestors as well but who was also undertaking a Ph.D. in the area. However, this wasn't helped by turning up alone and having been out of the protestors world for some time. I was also now a white middle-aged (middle class) male of conventional demeanour, the hallmarks of an off-duty policeman, at least to some!

Certainly, some of the protestors at each of the convergence centres were suspicious of my intentions, there were times when several openly questioned me and raised the issue that they thought I might be an undercover police officer or infiltrator on behalf of the police or intelligence services. This, of course, is hard to refute! How does one prove that you are not an undercover copper sent to spy on protestors? Whilst causing me at times some serious difficulties, negotiating access at some of these critical points did generate some important knowledge about the level of suspicion in the minds of protestors. They were acutely aware of police infiltration into the convergence centres and actively guarded against it. So whilst I had gained access, the problem of access was not resolved once I was inside. Not everyone was willing to talk, and even some of the most willing weren't always prepared to divulge all the information available to them. So whilst I remained sensitive to issues of access at different domains this restricted what I could do. That said, negotiating access generated some important insights about the field (I discuss the wider implications in further detail in my findings chapter 7). There is nothing that I could do in this difficult situation but to carry on as best as I could. To try and build trust and rapport I got to know as many people as I could. As I shared many of the views and was broadly sympathetic to the goals and ambitions of the movements, for instance, I didn't support NATO and found it relatively easy to speak at length about sustained criticisms of the organisation. The financial crash of 2008 and ensuing global recession at the hands of a financial elite was another easy entrance point and
conversation piece. This helped put some people at ease and I would ignore some protestors gripes about ‘academics’. However, there is no doubt that the rather stark question of being a potential undercover police officer stuck with me throughout the fieldwork phase.

3.4.4 Entering the field.

My aim was to be at the centre of the protest action where ever possible. As I was also interested in the form that the authority’s security operations took and its evolution, this meant visiting the sites and surrounding area at least a week prior to the actual summit event taking place, living at the various convergence centres for the duration of the summits or where protest events were taking place (as in Belfast and London) and taking part in as many protest events as I could feasibly manage. The locations of convergence centres were advertised on the web, and through Indymedia, and there would be an indication of the planned protests activities.

3.4.5 The Fieldwork and Field Relations

My primary concern was with eliciting information rather than with documenting perspectives, so sampling was less important here. When I spoke to people it was usually one at a time and on a one-to-one basis, thereby providing greater confidentiality. Other times I listened in on group discussions which could provide considerable insight into protestor culture and thinking. These discussions took place in and around convergence centres, on key headline and officially authorised demonstrations (where there would often be a lot of waiting around) and at some protest events, but more usually on downtime periods. Most of the time I would be on the protestors ‘territory’ which allows them to organise the context in a way they want - this usually took the form of informal chats which are by their nature less threatening than say a formal interview. Throughout I used active listening to what is being said in order to assess how it relates to the research focus.

I made efforts to try and ensure a wide coverage of protest and dissent activities rather than just singling out the superficially interesting event. Here the categories of gender, race, and ethnicity were less important. Age, on the other hand, was important. At the risk of gross generalisation, the transgressive majority of the protestors who were most active and in the convergence centres were younger (under 30) although by no means all.

Detailed field notes were taken throughout the ethnographic study days and were a central research activity. These were recorded in a notebook at opportune moments throughout the day and evenings when events allowed. When to record my observations certainly presented me with some problems, largely because of the sense of suspicion if seen busily jotting down notes in a notepad - these were justified concerns about police spying that many protestors had. This left me with a dilemma, I had told others about my study, but still felt self-conscious writing field notes in
view of other protestors. I was eager not to generate distrust or distraction. Considering the level of suspicion I felt that note taking was not congruent with the setting I was often in. Because of this, I had to make jottings, snatched in the course of observed action, sometimes just a few words as a marker for an important point for me to come back later to, an aid memoir if you like. I would then wait for a more opportune time to work these up into a more detailed concrete account developed from the earlier jottings, filling in the gaps later on.

I found that the days usually provided me with some openings to do this. Sometimes I would simply need to remove myself to the periphery of the setting (away from the convergence centre) to record what had occurred and details of the policing operation. I needed to be opportunistic here, so I would grab any down time to write notes, often I would do this late at night, when others were sleeping or in the day, in a quiet space out of view. Despite these limitations, note taking was carried out with as much thoroughness and detail as I could manage. Where ever possible I would aim to make notes as soon as feasible after the observed action to avoid details getting muddied or lost in the passage of time.

Where I was uncertain about something, either what happened or what was said, I would highlight this in the field notes. I was also careful to distinguish my own descriptive accounts from what was said to me - the 'voices' - in the notes both the accounts provided by participants and my own descriptions of actions and situations, on the other (I placed analytic notes in squared brackets to differentiate this material in the fieldwork journal). Whilst this was necessarily a selective process in what I recorded, I aimed to capture as much as possible. I followed the maxim ‘if in doubt, write it down’. I had my topic guide and key research questions in mind but recorded anything I thought significant.

Field notes were also used to record data from conversations and informal interviews. In order to make this manageable. I used headings to indicate the context of the particular note, so, time points and settings to record who was present, where, at what time, and under what circumstances. On some of the case studies, information about the research setting was also added to by the photographic record, especially around protest actions and the wider security operation in place at summits. I did not use any audio recording whilst engaged in the ethnographic element of the study, only in the more formal interviewing that took place at other times during the data collection period (i.e. local councillors for the area). The field notes were transcribed more or less soon after the observational element ended to maximise detail and concrete descriptions and provide the best quality data I could.
3.4.6 Leaving the field
Leaving the field rarely presented any particular difficulties for me, in part because 'the setting' itself disintegrates quite rapidly and usually within about a week of the summit formally ending. There is a natural ebbing away of protestors as people pack up and leave and the massive security operations wind down. This was relatively easy and did not require any negotiation. Much of the time this was just saying goodbye to a few people who I had gotten to know and exchanging contact details in order to chase up leads and feedback data and findings or exchange views. This was also a nice way of smoothing the departure. I often left the field with mixed feelings, some sadness, but also with a little relief that I would be returning to my 'normal life'.

3.4.7 Limitations of Ethnography
The weaknesses of ethnography are well known and relate to the generalisability of ethnographic work beyond those actually studied, or because only a single or a small number of cases are studied. Nevertheless, generalisability is not my primary concern as the case studies were of intrinsic interest in they allowed a close study of the mechanisms and techniques of social control at international summits. As my overarching aim is about theory development, I followed a more theoretical sampling approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) where a small number of cases, were designed to highlight properties of a particular category.

The choice of taking a broadly ethnographic approach also raises some difficult epistemological questions. I found myself continually returning to this and never fully resolving it. On the one hand I have wanted to embrace a 'critical social science perspective', one which explicitly acknowledges that all social inquiry necessarily participates in regimes of power/knowledge, and as such is well suited to understanding modern institutions that exercise power in society or ideological dominance, thereby linking interpretive and explanatory interests to normative concerns. This is to disavow the model of a detached neutral and disinterested observer and take a position as an activist.

3.4.8 Photography and video recording
As I noted earlier this evolved over time from lessons learned in the field. After the combative events of the G20 I adopted a small handheld digital camcorder which could also take digital stills to record elements of the various policing and security operations. Some 500+ still photographs were taken and 9 hours of video were shot throughout the fieldwork. The video recordings were indexed and filed. This digital photography was used to record aspects of the policing operations, not protestors actions or what occurred in the protestor camps due to the need (where ever feasible) to keep protestor identities confidential. This is probably somewhat futile as an effort due to the
authorities overbearing surveillance they were continually under, nevertheless, diplomacy and respect for activist sensibilities dictated I took no recordings here. Doing so would also have further reinforced some protestors hunch that I was indeed an undercover police officer.

Images acted as both an aide memoir to field-note taking and a record of the physical security structures and technologies of control, this included ‘protection’ measures such as barriers, fences and other physical target hardening and social control features located both at the summit perimeter and their encroachment into previously open civic spaces (i.e. city centre shopping areas, parks, and streets). Part of my aim here is to display social practices and power relations visually - a ‘critical visual methodology’ (Rose, 2012) if you like, one which visualises technological structures, infrastructure, and institutional power and maps how territorialisation and deterritorialisation affect the boundaries of physical spaces and social order. This is to focus on temporary structures and institutions, and I have tried to depict and logic and a practice, one which emphasises the connections and visual co-existence between security and surveillance. Here I am interested in documenting the boundaries between security and the everyday as it is imposed at summit locations. In fact there is an emerging genre of this type of photography practiced by artists such as Trevor Paglen and Simon Norfolk\(^8\) which aims to ‘visualise’ securitized environments (Anderson & Moller (2013:204) which has some relevance for my own efforts. I am also interested in how the assemblages of this security and surveillance infrastructure manifest itself, how it is controlled and institutionally legitimised, and well as acts of resistance or contestation to it (if at all). A further concern is to capture any techniques of normalisation, in other words, were any efforts made to soften or disguise some of these militaristic measures by the different authorities. Anderson & Moller (2013:217) in their discussion of photography, security, and surveillance, argue that "photography can serve as encouragement for resistance to taken-for-granted and increasingly invisible forms of security governance..." This does not, of course, capture those security practices that are purposefully hidden, either by their remote distance from any interested viewer or what is obscured by other means.

The other reason for using digital photography was to capture the more traditional repression practices, being incidents of police violence as well as police deployments, tactics, and procedures. Atkinson and Hammersley (2014:148) note that photography has only been employed more recently, for the most part, in sociology and some other disciplines (Collier and Collier 1986; Ball and Smith 1992, 2001; Harper 1993, 2000, 2006). Such data can also be illuminating in making sense of how participants consume spaces and objects, or how they move in given environments. Using such

\(^8\) http://www.simonnorfolk.com 'Ascension Island: The Panopticon (ECHELON for beginners)'
visual materials helps to further understand social action and social organisation. The photographs and the video recordings were then incorporated into some elements of the fieldwork to inform the ethnography. The main omission here is that I did not have video capture at the G20 protests when it was most needed.

3.4.9 Interviewing

Other primary data includes conducting a small number of interviews with Police (MPS Public Order Unit)\(^ {59} \) and Medics (\( n=3 \)). The opportunity to speak directly with a senior officer responsible for policing public order arose from one of my earlier detailed FoI's. It was simple good fortune that the officer contacted me by telephone and was prepared to address my FoI verbally (thereby saving time is responding in writing) allowing me the opportunity to ask a number of follow-up questions and clarify both matters of legality with officer’s use of less than lethal weapons as well as operational police policies. This was the only formal interview that I conducted with any senior police officer for this study. I also conducted three telephone interviews with two consultants and one registrar at two large NHS hospitals in Yorkshire. The medics had significant experience in diagnosing and treating head traumas and worked in neurology services as well as Accident and Emergency medicine. Participants were selected on this basis, and from a snowball sample from my original neurology contact (see Appendix 1 for copies of the interview schedule).

More generally I have had informal 'chats' with serving police officers on duty at summits where I have discussed policing arrangements and practices (approx \( n=25 \)). These have all been frontline officers rather than more senior personnel (i.e. bronze, silver, gold commanders\(^ {60} \)) and I was interested in garnering their views of the summit arrangements in respect to the proportionality of the operation; the cost of the operation; their views on protestors tactics and police tactics and measures. Whilst I have subsumed this under 'interviewing' it would more accurately be considered opportunistic 'controlled conversations'. The mass police presence at these events meant that there were many periods of inactivity offering chances to 'chat'. Those that were willing to engage (many were not, only offering the standard stock responses; 'above my pay grade mate'; 'the bosses don't tell us what's going on'; 'no idea mate, I'd have to ask the boss man') some would be prepared to engage in a less guarded fashion. This is not to suggest that I have a representative picture of police officer's views on these matters, far from it, only that some comments from officers can be revealing.

\(^ {59} \) This was not specific to any summit policing operation but rather police use of force practices in public order policing more generally.

\(^ {60} \) This refers to the command structure which operates in policing and found for large events policing.
I also conducted a small number of interviews with councilors and other representatives in Wales to further my understanding of the governance and political economy of summit social control. More specialised data was gathered from key informants, here people from advocacy networks such as Fitwatch and Netpol, several of which were taking part in the demonstrations, allowing me to converse with them at different touch points.

The formal interviewing used a series of semi-structured interview schedules designed around the different parties. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and up to an hour. This was deemed suitable for the various duty holders such as councilors, MP's as they were familiar with their use. The analytic design of the interview schedules often required the use of prompting and probing skills to elicit the richest data and cover relevant issues.

3.4.10 Freedom of Information Requests
I have made extensive use of Freedom of Information (FOI's) requests to obtain more specific information from a range of statutory agencies such as the Home Office, Ministry of Defence, the Metropolitan Police (MPS), and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). My FoI strategy reflected my wider data source strategy in the early stages of the research, what Larsen and Walby (2012:23) aptly call 'muckraking sociology'. I requested from MPS, Gwent Police (and local and national government agencies) all submitted FOI's which had applied for information on any aspect of the three summits, which I submitted at least six months after the said summits in order to maximise the capture of relevant requests.61

As Brown (2009:88) argues, FOI's are a 'potentially powerful research tool' for criminological researchers but underused by the research community. This usefulness is echoed in the Canadian context by Hewitt (2012:195) writing in the UK, who notes that his historical research on the Canadian security state “would not have been possible” without the Access to Information Act (ATIA).62 Interestingly, Hewitt is one of the several authors to note a considerable tightening of information release from ATIA's since the events of 9/11.

Having used FOI's previously as a researcher, I was aware that they could act as an important lever in dealing with what are otherwise highly secretive organisations. Moreover, even refusals and the public interest tests they sometimes invoke could provide some interesting clues on the subject at hand. This wasn't without its frustrations, though, experience with FOI's for this study has generally confirmed the argument that agencies find ways to protect sensitive information and thereby

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61 I owe this tactic to Kevin Walby, Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Winnipeg, Canada, after a skype chat having earlier delved into his and Mike Larson's excellent 'Brokering Access: Power, politics and Freedom of Information Process in Canada' (2012) UBC Press, Vancouver, Canada.

62 The Canadian Access to Information Act is similar to the UK's Freedom of Information Act.
undermine the right as well as the spirit of the FOI Act. Grossly inflated costs estimates for the work, delays in response and provision, and refusal notices were routine. This reflects the long-established cultures of secrecy in government and other public bodies bolstered by the large number of absolute exemptions available to responding authorities, notably any information regards what is considered to be 'national security'.

I did have some successes in gaining information however, although there was some variability by the agency. I found that MPS were especially intransigent when it came to FOI's. The most blatant example of this was a very detailed FoI I submitted (see Appendix 13) regards officer reporting of fellow officer malpractice and other associated issues during the G20 policing operation. It took me over one year to obtain the requested data and this was after several interventions on my behalf by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) to require MPS to relinquish the information. The statutory time limit to respond by a public agency is a maximum of twenty working days, and if there is a public interest test, a further twenty days is applicable. As there was no public interest test that MPS could legitimately require, my inordinate wait for the rather revealing data is that much more reprehensible, as was the ineffectual interventions of the ICO. My conjecture was that MPS recognised they had no legitimate grounds in which to deny me the data, so they prolonged my wait in order to reduce the potential for reputational damage to the organisation. Officer malpractice was a particularly sensitive issue for them as their policing operation had been widely criticised in a number of official reviews. Delaying the release of the information was thus a tactic to dilute its impact as information coming so far after the event is diminished in its news value.

Moreover, and unlike Brown's experiences, I found that my when my FoI requests were met with conditional exemptions which required the application of a public interest test, each was either entirely (or less frequently) very largely found against me by the independent reviewer. Likely this was due to the sensitive nature of the material I was requesting which often concerned procedures and practices of the various security operations at the summits which officials define as within a national security context, whereas Brown's was also researching within the criminal justice system but examining state responses to anti-social behaviour.

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63 What constitutes 'national security' is a moot point, when invoked, national security is a broad, sweeping concept and tends to be treated by the judiciary as an undifferentiated term but is a at heart a political concept.

64 In personal discussions with the ICO they admitted to the difficulties they faced in getting obstructionist public authorities to comply with FoIs and that they were largely reliant upon the good will of the organisation, with naming and shaming and imposing a fine being an absolute last resort option when all other appeals had failed.

65 Such independent reviewers are members of the organisation one is asking information of, which does some considerable violence to the notion of 'independence'.
The FOI's legislation can be conceived in a Foucauldian (1971) sense as a 'system of exclusions'. So whilst Fols are far from being a cure-all to this culture of secrecy, they are a useful method for extracting some very limited information where it would otherwise not be available (see Appendix 13.3 which details my Foi applications).

3.5 Secondary Data Sources

A number of secondary data sources are used to provide a complete picture of the policing operation at these summits.

3.5.1 NHS Data

The original intention in this study was to obtain NHS Reception Hospital Accident & Emergency Data (triage) and Emergency Vehicle Data & on-site paramedic data to gauge the number of injuries to protestors and hence a measure police violence. This is only particular to the G20 where there was widespread police violence. I was not attempting to account for all 'use of force' by the police but only to gain a more accurate picture of the most serious and potentially life-threatening injuries caused by 'non-lethal' weapons, principally when violence does occur, a baton blow to 'high risk' areas of the head, face or cranial area. These are of particular interest not only because as state violence is the most recognisable form of repression against unarmed protestors, but the doctrine of minimum force and respect for human rights puts some constraints on when and how police weaponry can be used, itself central to the police's organisational legitimacy. However, the very lengthy procedures to obtain this data meant that this element of the study could not be completed in time for submission and had to be suspended.

3.5.2 Complaints Procedures

Other indicators of violence and police malpractice can be found in organisational records such as; IPCC Police Complaints Statistics and Disciplinary Proceedings; Police Force Complaints Statistics and Disciplinary Proceedings; Officer use of force and other critical incident reporting (by individual officers); details of MPS's investigations and disciplinary actions against officers; Court Records pertaining to the case studies: and other police investigations that could have a bearing on detecting police misconduct. I say this regards to individual officer recording of each 'use of force' incident holds in theory, whether officers do indeed complete these documents is an empirical question, as is the accuracy and completeness of the log books, as is the extent to which they are

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66 Police public order training employs notions of 'green' 'amber' and 'red' target zones for baton use: green zones refer to fleshy primary target areas (such as upper legs or arms) whereas amber areas denote where a fractured bone would likely result if struck by a baton (i.e. forearm), and finally red areas are those such as the cranial region that constitute areas of 'last resort' (personal communication; Home Office, Public Order Unit). Baton blows to red areas can risk severe head injuries. These 'red' target areas are clearly more difficult to justify regards the doctrine of policing by consent and the legitimate use of minimum force.
reviewed by officer’s immediate superiors (I answer some of these questions in section 7.9). I had prolonged contact with the IPCC to obtain protestor complaints data (through Freedom of Information requests (see Appendix 13.3 and 13.3.1).

3.5.3 Media Footage
This is supplemented with analysis of disorder events using Media Video footage and reports and information gathered by various campaigning and interest groups (such as Liberty; Statewatch; Fitwatch; Editorial Photographers United Kingdom and Ireland, Independent legal observers, Legal Defence and Monitoring Groups etc.). I also examine activist Internet forum discussions from online alternative media sources as a data source to gain a fuller understanding of activist’s perspectives and to garner information on planning arrangements and security concerns. There is a considerable amount of natural data here in respect to posted opinions, some with detailed responses (which is also closely monitored by the police) so the sheer volume of material can present problems for analysis. There can also be a tendency for some users to make extreme statements due to the de-individuated nature of the internet, one which can feed into and justify state repression. However, my main use of this data was often to gain some practical information (monitoring any changes to meeting locations) and to gain a sense of anticipated numbers for meetings and actions, and to get a sense of some views on tactics (see Appendix 13.1 for my topic guide).

3.5.4 Documents and Newspapers
I have used documentary sources to provide information about the summit operations, this includes official reports and inquiries into the policing of summits (principally the G20) as well as information from legal firms and Chambers that specialise in Public Order Law and criminal and civil cases against the police. This is one means to garner some information on the police and authorities perspective and the wider security context. Unfortunately, this information was not available from other sources because my attempts to interview senior police (gold, silver or bronze commanders) were continually declined or went unanswered.

Examining these various reports had the additional benefit of stimulating analytic ideas and informed the generation of concepts throughout the study. I do not treat information from official sources’ at face value, however, rather I treat it as a social and political product to be examined and which reflect bureaucracies’ practical concerns. Whilst such records have considerable importance in such official bureaucratic settings, it constructs a ‘documentary reality’ and is constrained by ‘information control’ (Burton & Carlen, 1979). As such it represents one amongst other situated

67 In fact Binman’s Solicitors distributed a call out to advise protestors who might be considering legal action against MPS.
perspectives but provides an important clue into the purposes they are written for, what they take for granted and what they omit.

Finally, I make use of newspaper accounts of summits along with the work of other academics (including personal correspondence) as well as restricted or secret state documents pertinent to this study which are now in the public domain through efforts by whistleblowing organisations such as Wikileaks, The Intercept, and Spycops.

3.6 Data Analysis and Integration Strategy
As I had collected quite a large amount of data across a range of very different sources I needed to find a way of integrating this information in a logically coherent way that would inform my research questions. In doing this I looked for relationships, themes and patterns across the different sources, some of which I had already noted in the ethnographic field notes. This meant drawing together classifications generated from a combination of general common-sense knowledge and personal fieldwork experiences as well as adapting existing concepts and categories from the research literature. My position is to side with (Hammersley 1992:163) rather pragmatic approach that the level of precision in data to a particular claim will depend upon the nature of what is being described.

3.6.1 Ethnographic data analysis
I organised all the field notes in chronological order and transcribed them into word documents. This had the advantage refreshing my memory of the details of events and 'voices' and aided identifying categories and the emergence of analytic themes. It also allowed a sufficient level of searching within the documents.

As a starting point in the process of analysis, I re-read through all of the data and started thinking about what concepts and classifications to made sense of it. In part, this meant using existing ideas from the literature as a 'resource' but did not rely on any set of existing ideas. Earlier on some of these were more 'sensitising concepts' (Blumer, 1954) more suggestive than definitive, taking the form of germs of the overall analysis as I worked towards defining via recontextualisation more closely. I looked to identify any patterns in the data and for anything surprising or puzzling on the basis of common sense knowledge and existing theory, and if there were any inconsistencies or contradictions. This was done by assigning broad categories to the running notes, and then some further coding after that. The back and forth of this iterative process between the data and a running set of ideas allowed some new theory generation.
3.6.2 Interview analysis

I used a variation of content analysis for the formal audio-recorded interview data, partly because the interviews were quite open-ended 'topic category' formats with a loose question structure. The focus questions provided the response codes, and the participants the cases. The verbal answers given create one or more response codes, and these are derived from thematic categories on the basis of labeling with functionally equivalent meanings (i.e. 'open coding'). This left me with a series of named categories and thematic variables. I used descriptive analysis to examine associations among the qualitatively constructed thematic variables.

3.7 Ethical issues

3.7.1 Informed consent

Undertaking research into rights based activists and transgressive protestor groups is fraught with ethical, legal and practical challenges. My study threw up a number of these points of tension which I discuss here in more depth, principally issues of (1) informed consent, (2) privacy, (3) harm, (4) exploitation, (5) researcher safety, and (6) consequences for future research. I do not claim to fully resolve any of these, but want to avoid the pitfalls of ignoring them.

Any study that involves observation of large groups of people as a method will involve some degree of deception due to the practical constraints of consent (Dewalt, Dewalt, & Wayland, 1998). Neither do overt and covert research methods present a simple binary choice, rather they sit on a continuum between fully overt and fully covert observation (Routlet et al., 2017:488). My approach was not entirely one of covert participant observation, rather I tried to be open and honest with protestors that I spoke to and observed and to tell them that I was undertaking a PhD. in 'how the state represses political dissent'. This means I did not give a full account of my purposes rather I emphasised that I was primarily concerned with the authorities' actions, not that of the protestors. This presents the subject matter as non-threatening and in a way that facilitates the research. I would volunteer this information and be open about those purposes whilst adding that I was supportive of protestors aims and objectives (which was broadly true) and discuss my activist background. This was less of a problem for me as my own political attitudes did not differ markedly from those of the people being studied, in fact, most of the time they broadly aligned. I was also concerned to present the information about my research in a way that would not influence the behaviour of protestors and activist and thereby risk invalidating the findings. I should add here that at no point did I feel I was engaged in any acts of gross deception, it was rather a case of employing tact and some degree of impression management and 'interaction ritual' (Goffman, 1989).
This approach falls short of how many see the requirements of fully 'informed consent', where the researcher spells out the purposes and implications of the work to everyone concerned from the start, allowing people to decline if they should so wish. This was neither practical nor desirable due to the constraints of the setting such as a protest camp. I found that it is simply not feasible to gain consent from all those subject to being observed (and the throughput) without making the research highly disruptive. This is generally the case with naturalistic settings. Moreover, over the course of the fieldwork, some of the research questions also changed further problematising the pursuit of fully informed consent.

When undertaking the ethnographic study, I did not conduct formal interviews with any protestors, this was only done later at their agreement, and with a small number of campaigning organisations. I rather had a series of opportunistic informal 'chats' and undertook observations when in the field. If people wanted to withdraw or not speak, I respected those wishes. For police roles, I take the position of Rainwater and Pittman, 1967 (cited in Attkinson & Hammersley, 2007:212) that those in public office do not have the right to refuse to be researched and therefore their consent does not need to be sought.

3.7.2 Privacy
Privacy is a complex concept and the distinction between private and public can be difficult to draw. The nature of the research undertaken in the protestor camps did on occasion involve overhearing and taking part in private conversations and private group conversations (i.e. protest planning actions and other affinity group meetings). This was generally private to a specific legitimate audience, that of trusted fellow protestors, with the major concern being infiltration by undercover police or police informants by those present. Such information could be argued as belonging to its participants (and in principle so could observational data) but to take this view would make this type of research impossible to conduct in practice. Where discussion reached into legal gray areas or illegal acts (planned, contemplated or recounted) I stayed neutral, and to the best of my knowledge took no active part in active law breaking.68

3.7.3 Harms
Throughout I attempted to follow a 'do no harm' principle and to minimise any possible negative repercussions from my work. This covers the research process and the presentation of my findings. I was not interested in writing a manual for the security and police which would assist them to more effectively to repress activists.

68 The law on public order and protest (notably trespass) is complex and technical such that it is not always clear if planned or considered acts are lawful.
My aim was to conduct the research discretely along with ensuring the security of research materials by anonymising findings in a way that retains specificity but does not expose individuals or groups. Most obviously I was wary about publishing anything that would identify activists. This meant that I did not document events through film or photography at protest sites in order to protect the privacy of activists. This was not a difficult decision as visually documenting anything inside any of the camps which I attended would have been met with consternation from protestors. This did not overly hamper my study. Much of the time it was not necessary to include activist identities, so this did not prevent me from introducing context and nuance when discussing the themes of the research. There are limits to this, though, and the case study approach did not always allow me to aggregate findings and talk about several groups experiences in order to lessen the chances of identifying a specific group (as others have Ganesh et al, no date).

The principle of doing no harm is, however, exacting, and can make research very difficult or at times practically impossible to do. Invariably undertaking research requires some compromises. Tensions abound and I found myself being forced to make a series of judgment calls. Nevertheless, it is not perceived that this research study through publication or dissemination will have damaging or harmful consequences for protestor groups. Institutional and statutory agency actors have been identified unless confidentiality had been agreed.

3.7.4 Exploitation

Whilst costs and benefits of being researched are difficult to calculate, the relationship between the researcher and the researched were not considered to be exploitative.

3.7.5 Ethical Guidelines

Covert methods involve some form of deception, a practice which is generally frowned in research ethics. Having said that, several research bodies ethical guidelines, including the British Society of Sociology's (BSC) 'Statement of Ethical Practice' (2017) and the Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) 'Framework for Research Ethics' (2015) recognise that the use of covert methods can be necessary and justified in some delimited circumstances. For instance, the BSS (2017:5) cite an example where social life is 'closed to researchers by powerful or secretive interests', or the ESRC (2015:31) guidelines where seeking informed consent is 'impractical or meaningless such as research on crowd behaviour [...] both constituting circumstances that arose for this study. Moreover, the ESRC (2015:31) continue that:

"Covert research may be undertaken when it may provide unique forms of evidence that are crucial to the research objectives and methodology or where overt observation might alter the phenomenon being studied. The broad principle should be that covert research should not be undertaken lightly or routinely. It is only justified if important issues are
My research design conforms to these guidelines considering its concern with groups engaging in contentious activities such as direct action. My research also safeguards the anonymity of all research participants, in particular where informed consent has not been obtained prior to the research. Identifying such people could pose a risk to them or make them subject to unwanted attention of the authorities (see BSS, 2017:16:5). In addition, I was acutely aware that some protestors would be unlikely to participate consensually in the study as they are hostile to academic scholarship, seeing academics in the same negative light as the mainstream media.

Any form of deception in research should not be entered into lightly. Throughout my overall approach to these vexing issues is to steer a path between Kantian ethics (where individuals cannot be considered a means to an end, thus rejecting practices such as concealment, deception, and falsehoods, irrespective of one's final aim) and utilitarianism (where it is permissible to hide one's identity and publish confidential information when advancing a higher aim such as building knowledge or exposing injustice). I take a middle road, as Kantian ethics places the bar too high (in keeping with many philosopher's views on Kant) making field research on social movement groups nigh impossible in practice, whilst taking the objections to deception seriously by minimising any harm where feasible.

### 3.7.6 Researcher Safety

Engaging in demonstrations, protest actions, and social movements can present dangers to a researcher, either from the authorities (such as becoming a victim or unintended victim of police violence; police harassment; kettling; arrest and malicious prosecution) or from protestors or hostile onlookers (violence and intimidation) although such dangers should not be overstated. As Lyng (1998:221) argues, many important problems in the social sciences require the researcher to place themselves in situations that can compromise their safety and security. Protest policing is one of these situations. I wanted to be where the action is and to observe firsthand what was taking place, warts and all, this was my 'edgework'. Whilst I had previous experience of being on all sorts of demonstrations as well as being involved in quite violent protests, and was knowledgeable as to the hazards, I was never entirely sure where the research would take me.

In an important sense this part of the fieldwork simply saw me join public demonstrations as well as a myriad of smaller protest actions which on the basis of previous experience, mass violence is rare. However, I took a number of precautions which were largely based on common sense and years of experience in attending such events. This meant being aware of police formations and tactics and
the unfolding dynamics of protest actions and crowd tensions. If violence did flare up, keeping a safe distance so as not to be the direct target of police attacks but still being able to view and record events was my strategy. In such situations using non-confrontational posture and stance also assists in preventing being subject to police aggression. If you stand still, with your hands up, palms facing out in a ‘surrender posture’ it is that much more difficult, even for the most aggressive officer, to justify striking you with a baton. There are no guarantees of course, as previous experience had taught me from the Anti-Poll Tax demonstrations in London in 1990, where the police systematically batoned the heads of confined protestors who were desperately trying to escape this fate.

I also carried an old charged mobile phone\(^{69}\) (without any sensitive data) at all times, and a ‘bust card’ with contact details of trusted legal representation should I be arrested. Being conscious of police data gathering techniques, my field notes did not contain any personal details or useable operational intelligence. As a precautionary measure my other intended preparation was to equip myself with some protective clothing, some police style body armour for my arms (to be discreetly worn) which would be effective in blocking a police baton blow directed at me, as well as a NATO style helmet (either police or BBC journalist style). I had naively thought this a relatively straightforward matter, find a supplier, order and await delivery. I contacted ‘MLA Police/Prison /Equipment’ (who as the name suggests, are the major UK and international government supplier of ‘protective equipment’). At once they wanted to know whether I was a police or prison officer and if not, my purpose. Appealing to respectability I used my official university research ‘criminologist’ title and informed them I would be undertaking ‘field research’ about public order policing. I emphasised that I wanted to ‘keep myself safe’ with some protective equipment as I could, on occasion, find myself in ‘vulnerable situations’. In the ensuing exchange of emails I was told that MLA would not supply any of the equipment to me because “it could be used against the government”. Querying this response and emphasising that the items I had asked for were being sold by MLA as ‘protective equipment’ (and hence not offensive equipment - I had not requested any weapons) I was simply informed that this “was company policy for such items”.\(^{70}\) I was therefore forced to abandon that early plan, but noted that MLA’s actual policy belies its own advertising messages. Interestingly, this turned out to be somewhat of a leitmotif for the entire study.

\(^{69}\) On the G20 case study this was not a ‘smart phone’, but an older basic phone which had the advantage of storing little data. For later case studies I did have a smart phone, but apart from some carefully selected numbers the phone was kept at ‘factory settings’ as I was aware that the police routinely data mine protestors phones as an intelligence gathering technique.

\(^{70}\) Personal correspondence with Helen Creswell, MLA: Michael Lupton Associated, Halifax House, Seaton Ross, York, YO42 4LU (helen@mlaltd.co.uk)
3.7.7 Future research
Care was taken in conducting this research not to 'spoil the field' for future researchers. Having said that protest camps exist to build political and social movements and are inclusive by nature, as is participating in public demonstrations.

3.8 Researching the Policing of Contentious Protest Groups
I now turn to discuss my own critical reflections on the ethnographic study and the role of the researcher in the study. I feel it is important to reflect on my personal feelings and experiences of doing the work and the problems that I faced. At the back of each field journal I kept a record of processed notes and the reflexive monitoring of the research process. This recorded an internal dialogue, or 'internal conversation' (Archer, 2003) where my experiences of that day became the subject of reflexive evaluation and deliberation. Here I recorded what I thought were of analytic significance, really my anxieties and concerns, any surprises to shock, or indeed revulsion, even my level of personal comfort. I knew that how I felt would invariably have some bearing on the nature and balance of what I wrote in the fieldwork journal, as well as my 'comfort zone' would influence what I got involved in and how far I would go in any protest action I was caught up with. In addition, the lengthy periods in between the case studies, a natural result of the summit times, left me with plenty of time for reflection on the significance of the data and the implications for collecting further data. I also became more aware of own values, beliefs and background and how these may influence the research, my relationships with protestors and my accounts of the state players.

3.8.1 Researching Violence and Disorder
There is a certain sort of emotional intensity, danger, fatigue, and frustration that came along with undertaking this type of fieldwork. There is an emotional toll which brings with it a weariness from witnessing the sheer ugliness of violence when it happens, and from accounts you hear of it, and when it is meted out by those who claim legitimacy and authority, there is outrage. Studying the interactions taking place between protestors and police, particularly the outbreaks of violence meant having (and maintaining) close proximity to confrontations. I wanted to observe the actual violence as close-up as I could manage (and hence the justifiability of police violence) in relation to the 'Resistance Force Comparative Scale' which meant putting myself at risk of being struck by a police baton or shield or being arrested and prosecuted for involvement in what I was observing. This did weigh on my mind as there were many genuinely frightening moments when I realised I could be bludgeoned by a baton with life changing results. Like every other protestor I saw, I had no protective equipment, and was more or less defenceless in these settings. No amount of planning
'strategies for protection’ can overcome this problem if you want to directly observe these crucial episodes.71

One of the most trying element in undertaking the fieldwork was being continually faced with what I considered to be institutional injustices that degrade, demean and manipulate people. There is also something distinct about spending time in the oddities that are the summit locations. I found them to be so objectionable as spaces. The civic nature of what had been public space was transformed into highly securitised pens, with massive police and security presences, where a dizzying array of restrictions abounded. For me it was a vision made real of living a mini police state, and to add insult to injury, at the tax payers' expense.

3.8.2 Saying What Happened or Choosing Sides?

My knowledge is ‘situated knowledge’, my position and my perspective was from that of a protestor. I was contained behind police lines in kettles, or within police serials on marches, or evading police kettling tactics and hurriedly chased by officers. I spent a lot of time with protestors in planning meetings, convergence centres, and on protest actions, and was subject to police violence, surveillance and intimidation tactics. Indeed, there were many moments in the fieldwork setting, in that particular and peculiar transformed and deeply securitised summit space, when I felt as if being under siege from the mass of state players. At times I literally was. Often I felt a certain esprit de corps with protestors, especially in the face of police violence and intrusive surveillance. In addition, my background has been one of a (admittedly lapsed) activist, one who adheres to a long tradition in philosophy that recognises the permissibility of civil disobedience even under broadly just political conditions.72 In this sense my identity intertwines and overlaps with the research study, it also provides a ‘rewarding intersection’ as I share many of the concerns of the protest players whose interaction with the authorities I studied.

All of this leaves me open to the risk (as well as the accusation) of ‘going native’ during the fieldwork by abandoning the role of being a researcher, forgetting the research task and becoming the researched. This risk also holds true when analysing the data as well, by not establishing sufficient distance from it by overly adopting the perspective of protesters (Wahlstrom, 2011). For instance, how could I claim impartiality for the fieldwork under circumstances when I was being attacked by the police, irrespective of how the police would construe those actions, and when I saw fellow protestors being similarly treated? In those situations, what I felt was the raw emotions of anger,

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71 If I had been able to obtain protective equipment such as the extensive body amour worn by the police and a NATO style helmet then I would have been all but invulnerable to baton and shield strikes.
72 The most compelling philosophical statement of this position has recently been outlined by Delmas (2018) ‘The Duty to resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil’ OUP.
outrage and some considerable sense of helplessness. How could anyone not get emotionally and morally involved in a way that jeopardises the claim to objectivity? More pointedly, my previous activism had shown me that police violence towards protestors considered ‘troublesome’ could be brutal and vindictive, particularly when conducting baton charges to break-up and ‘clear’ areas of any protestors. Such circumstances can provide a free for all to dispense ‘street justice’ as the officer sees fit. Did I admit into the research frame my own subjective experiences, and if so, how can I claim that my findings are creditable? Indeed, the results of ethnographic research can often be considered as contaminated with biases and hence unreliable. Would other researchers in my position have generated the same findings (external reliability) or matched the data in the same way (internal reliability)? Did my conclusions accurately and authentically represent the reality of the social phenomena under study? Let me try and attempt to address these questions.

I had not set out to undertake what Gouldner (1968) terms a ‘sociology of the underdog’, although there are a number of ethnographic authors who make the case for openly partisan research. Penny Green (1993) sided with the miner’s when studying the 1984 strike, and Scholl's ethnographic study of transgressive protestors explicitly asks us to choose sides, as announced in the title of his book, ‘Two sides of a Barricade’. Nevertheless, it is rare to find explicit value arguments in ethnographic research. More often the goals of research ‘who side you are on’ is assumed rather than made (Hammersley, 2000:11). I did not set out to engage in advocacy research, which I was wary of, or to give voice to marginal or subordinate groups. This gave me some distance from proceedings and throughout I felt able to maintain a critical stance whilst conducting the fieldwork. Being conscious of these types of bias provides some corrective to being engulfed in protestors lifeworld. I also tried to validate the subjective data across a number of different levels and by speaking to as many different people as opportunities arose.

These constraints on ethnographic methods constitute a long-standing concern in qualitative research, as is the ability to remain objective and impartial when conducting sensitive research into highly politically charged issues. Simply by being present in a setting affects it in some way (LeCompe & Goetz, 1982:52) and as a partially covert researcher, there was a sense in which I was participating in that which I was observing. However, my observer role was one of an ‘observer as participant’, not a ‘complete participant’ or a ‘participant as observer’ (Gold, 1958). So despite some emotional toll from undertaking this type of fieldwork, I was aware of my own emotions. As Pickering (cited in Liebling & Stanko, 2011:429) found when researching policing in Northern Ireland, the experience of strong emotions such as outrage can be harnessed to inform understanding about the realities of policing, and an aid to removing myself from the research subject. Simply because a shared experience is shared does not mean it is invalid. Indeed, I agree
with Pickering that questioning shared experience in this way can be a form of betrayal of the research process. As Pickering notes, emotionality is a 'critical way of knowing' (cited in Liebling & Stanko, 2011:429).

I continually returned to these questions of bias and partisanship during the length of this study whilst being mindful that no research design can obtain absolute validity and reliability. My conclusion was all that I could do, as I did, was to try and provide a faithful and accurate rendition of what I observed, whilst trying to remain continually reflexive about my role and positionality. This is not to endorse 'campaigning research', rather that there is a moral duty to tell the truth as best as one can, no matter how inconvenient it is, and over and above any other professional obligation.

3.8.3 Are you a spy?

My initial strategy was to gain a deep connection to activist communities and thereby allow me to do qualitative research and to document how activists plan, adopt practices (or don't) innovate and react to state players. This was only partially successful and leads me to another profoundly difficult issue that I had which was the level of protestor suspicion and fear of police infiltration. I might have expected that such suspicions would dissipate as contact increased, but this did not happen. In part because some of the core activists (unsurprisingly) traversed numerous anti-summit protests, were made up of relatively self-contained communities, many of whom were organisers and often known to each other and would recognise me from past actions. The same questionable person arising again and again only acted to reinforce their suspicions, and whilst I was able to build trust amongst some people, other groups were either aloof or much more guarded towards me. For the latter case studies after the dramatic G20 convergence centre raids, I was identified by several core activists as being an undercover police spy. Given the nature of the research, it was difficult to distance oneself from such labels. This made the research effort that much more difficult and at times this carried some important consequences for the subsequent course of the research. So that whilst my physical presence was not immediately problematic on marches and at convergence centres, my parameters of action was more constrained. Some of these groups operated a little like cliques and several were wary of me post-G20, indicating the limit of my acceptance by some protestors at least. These informant choices hindered me from gaining a broader coverage of affinity groups, forfeiting some information about their experiences. Any gathered knowledge is a function of who gives it! Despite this, I constantly tried to cross-check my understanding of events and terms with different protestors and with what I directly observed.

Having been suspected of being a police spy lead to other difficulties. My attention to what would be going on of interest could more easily lead to infringements, the 'civil inattention' styles
(Goffman, 1971) of social interaction became that much more delicate. Certainly making any field-notes in these spaces became too difficult, even pursuing some lines of inquiry or trying to strike up a causal acquaintanceship could be laboured, at least for some. This made the experience of undertaking fieldwork that much more waring, and at times, sheer frustrating. I remember trying to talk to half a dozen protestors against the G8 summit directly after the convergence centre raid in London. I was trying to team up with those that I recognised earlier, but that had been inside at the time of the raid (I had not on this occasion) and was desperate to get more first-hand accounts. I wanted to find out precisely what had happened but was doing this whilst on a protest action that next morning, at pace on the streets in London. We were being shadowed by a large number of police as we made our way to the next location and pressing the point with different people who just weren’t willing to speak in any depth about the topic. One young female protestors would say nothing more than:

‘Oh you know, just the usual Met police violence’, and other words to that effect; ‘You know what their like? ... Their the Met ..’ (Field Notes, G8)

Then only to run off ahead, and that’s it. Whilst I caught up with her again later that day and managed to gain a little bit more information, it was continually hard going to get any sort of detailed account of what had occurred. I simply cite this as one example of the increasing difficulties I had in developing rapport with some protestors as the study progressed. Whether that was because the label had stuck or just the casual nature in which some protestors brushed off violent police encounters is hard to say. As a result, at times I found I was becoming more worn down and dispirited.

3.8.4 The Limitations of Direct Observation

The study is partial in another sense. Whilst the fieldwork was often intensive, it is not possible to give an exhaustive account of the protest activities and tactical interactions which took place at each summit (and proxy summit sites). The constraints of time and being only one lone researcher forced me to select what I observed and draw inferences from it. For instance, different affinity groups may organise quite small protest ‘actions’ and one would be forced to choose what to attend and where or alternatively whether it was more useful to stay in the convergence centre as there was more interesting things taking place there, or I suspected that other developments were afoot. Neither was I always privy to what was taking place, some protest actions were highly secretive with only a few trusted individuals being notified and selected. This was due to fear of police infiltration and losing the element of surprise.
Observation is also rendered difficult in large crowd events simply because a great many things happen very rapidly over a large area, and not all of it is easy to anticipate. It is also frequently loud, chaotic, cramped and at times totally confusing. As a single researcher it was easy to find myself ending up in the wrong place to get an overview of important incidents. I would then need to try and shift to another nearby street where an important episode was occurring. At other times in large demonstrations, protestors tactically splinter and disperse to evade police containment manoeuvres, and it was a matter of dumb luck where I ended up and what I saw. I was able to anticipate some events though, especially when tensions rise, from provocative and aggressive police action signals threats. This type of observation is haphazard by its nature unless one has a team of co-ordinated researchers (Adand, 2016:766).

3.8.5 Covert Research
The use of covert research has a strong tradition in criminology, particularly when researching difficult to access or secretive groups. My research role sat in a 'grey' area between the two poles of a continuum of overt and covert research. At the outset I would tell people I was undertaking a PhD. in how the state represses political dissent and would volunteer this information on an individual level and be open about my purposes, but also add that I was supportive of protestors aims and objectives (which was also true) and discuss my activist background. However, in a protest camp as in many other naturalistic settings, it is not feasible to gain consent from all those subject to being observed (and the throughput) without making the research highly disruptive. In a number of planning meetings, and for many in the convergence centres and other venues, my professional identity was not known, and here I was in effect operating in a covert manner but not at its most extreme form.

This carried a number of methodological advantages, it minimised reactivity to issues of gaining access and provided more spontaneous access to protestors lived experiences. Neither did I feel that I was being ‘interactionally deceitful’ (Ditton, 1977:10) even though at times I was eavesdropping on conversations, surreptitiously listening in and simulating friendships, as I shared many of the protestors objections to the political elites and the massive security apparatus mobilised in their favour. Neither did I think that my findings would harm any protestor.

3.9 Summary
My approach to this study has been to combine micro and macro methods across primary and secondary data sources as a way of buttressing the validity of the research. The core of the study has been at a ‘high resolution’ using an ethnographic ‘observer as participant’ role by embedding myself within anti-globalisation protest groups. Mingling with protestors at demonstrations and
actions, and spending extended periods at convergence centres and other protestor spaces allowed me to gain an insider’s view on anti-globalisation activism. It focused on how some anti-globalisation groups planned and strategised, how they reacted to, absorbed and resisted, disbanded or de-mobilised in response to state social control and repression. I was also able to observe the actual interactions themselves of protestors and authority players on the ground and in the streets at summit locations, including being in close proximity to violent confrontations. Combining participant observation with some controlled conversations with protestors, recorded in field notes, and supplemented by digital photography, enabled access to a greater amount of richer and finer quality data on protestors experiences of anti-summit activism than other methods would have allowed (such as questionnaire surveys, which also suffer from being retrospective, or newspaper accounts or internet conversation threading). This approach yielded data that cannot be obtained by other means and that is crucial to understanding anti-globalisation protestors dynamic interactions with authority players.

The relatively small number of telephone interviews I undertook with political representatives, medics and a senior police officer (specialising in public order policing at the Home Office) yielded an understanding of the local political context of the summit or provided some specialist technical knowledge from experts as to the use and consequences of using some police non-lethal weapons. This proved invaluable as a lot of police practice and policy is oral (it is not written down or codified) (Manning, 2010) and is otherwise not publicly available. In a similar vein, there is remarkably little publicly available scientific research concerning the likely medical implications of police baton strikes and other non-lethal weapons. These avenues remain a critical blind spot in research into police violence, as the level of discussion remains too general and fails to be fully cognizant of protestors unique vulnerabilities to serious injury. This Home Office interview and the casual chats with officers at summit sites, was the only direct primary data capturing the perspective of the police as no police or security persons were willing to take part in this study. To try and capture the perspective of the authorities I used direct quotes contained in numerous media interviews and strategic, tactical and operational justifications contained within official documents (notably the G20). Discussing the local political and political party context of the respective summits with a small number of representatives informed a wider understanding than the observational or other secondary data sources such as newspaper reports would have allowed.

A wide range of secondary data sources provided a macro picture of the summit events, including police complaint’s data (IPCC), official inquiry reports, Freedom of Information requests, academic

73 The officer was seconded to the Home Office.
studies, newspaper articles and financial costings data. Some of these data sources offered a revealing treasure trove of information and at a fine granulation of detail that was otherwise not publicly available.

Researching how the state manages and controls political dissent at anti-globalisation summits protests provides a host of difficult research challenges. Taken together, an integrated mixed methods approach provided the most suitable means to address my research aims and objectives. The MMD conceptualisation also allowed for some triangulation for convergent validation, and acted to further buttress the validity of my research findings.
4. CHAPTER FOUR: The Lead up to the G20 Summit Protests

4.1 Introduction

I start this chapter by detailing my observations of transgressive protestors preparations for the G20. These groups were important because they had not, at least publicly, been co-opted by the security apparatus and hence were freer to innovate tactically. My aim in attending these various planning meetings was to gain an insight into the extent of tactical planning amongst activists and the forms it took. I wanted to learn why some forms of collective action were chosen or preferred over others, what were the accepted forms of collective action within the group and how these were decided, was there any overarching continuity in how these choices were made, and what was the transferability of recognisable forms of collective action for these groups? I also wanted to learn how the anticipated actions of the police would provoke further activist tactical innovations, if at all. I also wanted to know if and to what extent any ostensibly violent actions were pre-planned and intentional, or whether this was the result of more spontaneous or expressive interactions on the day and/or resulting from the actions of the police themselves. In addition, I wanted to use these meetings to gauge activists concerns about conducting political dissent, whether the threat of repression acted to discourage (and demobilise) protestors from taking part in protest actions. This is because repression on political dissent can take manifest forms, internal (i.e. self-censoring) as well as external (i.e. overt or covert state action).

I then go onto to critically examine the pre-summit developments employed by MPS, and how these act as 'pre-emptive dissuasion' devices (Emer & Opel, 2008). Indeed, I argue that these measures operate as a form of information warfare, directed at de-mobilisation and de-motivation of alterglobalisation movements. After which I present my observational study of the G20 protests themselves. Here I argue that 'spaces of contention' are increasingly organised and securitised, which in turn shapes collective action and its repertoires, most obviously for the protest players, but is not limited to them, the same dynamics also holds for the state players. I also examine why the G20 resulted in such high levels of police violence. My argument will be that the official explanation from MPS (i.e. responding to protestors violence) is simply not creditable and is a falsification of events. The tactics used and level of force employed was entirely disproportionate to the eventualities they faced. I will argue that the key to unlocking and understanding the interactions between police and protestors during the case study summits is to view them principally as a struggle over space and the visibility of contestation. At the street level, the evolving tactical repertoires dynamically adjust to cycles of tactical innovation and their various countermeasures.

74 This does not mean that the various groups hadn't been infiltrated by the authorities, I discuss state spying in chapter 6.
Throughout I am concerned with exploring the broad contours of protest development, the shape and form of ‘antagonistic interaction' between these two principle players, and how protestors’ tactics and practices are selected, adapt and change over time. Moreover, how do the authorities work to control collective protest action and whether the policing operation acted as a means of repression against these collective forms of political dissent? Which strategies, tactics and actions of the police indicate repression in the policing of international summits? How does one recognise those specific acts of the police which concretely show domination and repression and those which do not? If not all actions of the police are repressive, then at least some actions would seem to be in the interest of the dominated - but why do these actions occur? This is not simply an empirical question, but it does concern explicitly what happened on the ground, the actions, tactics and strategies employed by the police and the credibility of the justification for them. In doing so I have produced a narrative account of being involved in the G20 protests from the protestors perspective.

A further useful way of conceiving this strategically is as a tactical ‘arms race' between protestors and the authorities. The notion of arms races have been used to conceive the interplay of adaptive responses between ‘attacker's and ‘defenders’ in volume crime (Ekblom, 2008) and counter-terrorism (Ekblom, 2016; Christmann, 2017). Such arms races result in a continual disruption in the balance of advantage between authorities and their adversaries. The winner of the race is determined by who out-innovates the other and deploys the adaption faster, with the authorities traditionally playing catch-up. Innovative capacity - creativity in the generation of new ideas and deploying them on the streets - has been with the anti-global activists. In this sense this entire study is one of examining the loop of co-evolution and adoption of candidate innovations and their trade-offs. From the authority's perspective understanding arms races (and their avoidance) involves fostering a variety of strategic approaches in preventive interventions as well as being prepared to invest in innovative capacity (Ekblom, 1998:1). At least some of this they have done, and the way they now deal with protest and dissent has changed markedly, even from the mid 1990's. Consequently, the G20 was one of the most significant public policing events in the UK for some time. In the next chapter (Chapter 5) I will report my observational study of the G20 protests (what happened on the ground) and then the aftermath of the policing operation (Chapter 6), before considering the raft of official inquiry reports which the policing of the G20 generated, why this occurred, and then submit the findings from these official accounts to critical examination from mine and others accounts of protestors’ experiences (in the final G20 case study chapter, Chapter 7).

In addition, there has been little empirical research examining the police's use of excessive force, particularly at the organisational level (Walker, 2005; Punch, 2009). This study aims to fill this gap.
and apply any evidence from the case studies to form a wider backdrop to discuss the role of accountability in police governance and reform. If the case studies do indeed demonstrate high levels of citizen injury, and by implication, police malpractice and excessive or unlawful use of force, then the current internal and external control mechanisms and procedures intended to prevent malpractice may be inadequate, or worse, inoperative, and will need to be re-examined in light of the findings.

In undertaking this next element of the study (Chapter 5) I do not intend to try and provide an exhaustive account of everything that happened on the G20 summit protest in April 2009. That is not possible to achieve considering the scope and chaotic nature of the protest events across entire parts of central London. The protests were very much multi-site demonstrations, rambling and roaming events, and where ever possible I moved around and within the different demonstrations to gain the best vantage points to observe police and protestor actions. I also have drawn on a wide range of other eye witness sources in order to interrogate the official accounts and hold them to scrutiny (in Chapter 7).

4.2 An Overview and Timeline of the G20 Protest: Selecting Defensible Locations

The G20 summit was hosted in London early in April 2009 and brought together leaders and dignitaries from around the world. The site base for the talks were located in the Excel Centre in Docklands, in East London's Canning Town. The various delegations were hosted in fortified locations in embassies and hotels, with co-ordination of arrivals and departing entourages 'secured' and escorted by home counties police forces outside the M25 motorway, although the most important VIPs (i.e. the US president) made the trip into central London via (then presidential) helicopter. As is the case with such events, much of the 'security arrangements' were shrouded in secrecy and under the all-pervasive invocation of 'national security'. Many of the details regarding such arrangements are thus a state secret, which leaves open the question as to whether ordinary citizens benefit from the maintenance of national security as conceived, notably the compatibility with a functioning democracy. As Buzan (1983:58-59) has argued, this undifferentiated concept used by the institutions of the state allows governments to "exploit the linkage between their own security and that of the state in order to increase their leverage over domestic politics."

Nevertheless, some elements of the physical layout are visible upon observation and some other elements can emerge from the media.

The authority's preparations for the control of space starts months before any demonstrations appear on the streets, beginning with the selection of the geographical location for the summit meeting (Fernandez, 2005). This was similarly the case with the G20, although MPS made much of
the relatively short lead in time of being given three months notice to ‘plan’ for the summit, itself an indication of the extensive contingency planning arrangements entered into. Whilst the policing operation (controversially) named ‘Glencoe’ had the official aim to ‘protect the summit and prevent disorder’, in reality the authorities’ efforts were directed at controlling space to enable the undisturbed movement of internationally protected persons (IPPs) and their wider delegations, the provision for selected journalists, and the movement of their own security apparatus. The aim was to prevent any protestors or sign of dissent from penetrating these fortified temporary global hegemonic spaces and to challenge the legitimacy of global power relations (Starr et al; 2011; Fernandez, 2005). Therefore, venue choices are carefully selected in order to maximise defensible space and avoid the possibility of protestors disruption. Doing so presents a number of dilemmas in the level of spatial control that can be exercised however, as well as the financial costs incurred, and the complicated logistics of transport and infrastructure (Scholl, 2012).

This is the only actual summit site I examine which was held in a capital and this has important implications in how the spatial dynamics of street conflicts are played out. Choosing a capital city also bucksthe trend in summit locations of moving from metropolis to more isolated and fortified rural sites, all of which carry the advantage of being hard to access for protestors and which afford little if any activist subculture or resources for mobilisation, or where the local population are not supportive of alter-globalisation movement’s activities. This is evidenced by police in the past publicly admitting to selecting remote venues on this very basis, such as the G8 in Gleneagles in 2005, followed two years later by holding the G8 in Heiligendamm in 2007 (Starr et al, 2011:33). This was not an option in London where oppositional political cultures and activist networks are well established. The capital also offers a range of alternative protest targets from that of the summit site, themselves sites of symbolic and political importance, so other means needed to be sought to subdue the level of protest with a range of other tools open to the authorities (I pick up and elaborate on these themes later on in my observational analysis in the next chapter). The importance given to site selection also results from lessons learned by the authorities in dealing with what is considered ‘protestor disruptions’ and indicates the extraordinary level of significance attributed to it.

Whilst scholars have started to analyse the spatial analysis of protest policing (Starr et al, 2011; Fernandez, 2008; Noakes et al. 2005) following Scholl (2012:110) I present the very extensive state account of how the policing operation was structured. "Glencoe" was the scene of a notorious massacre in February 1692 in the highlands of Scotland. Some thirty-eight men were killed by government forces who also burnt their homes, an act which resulted in the deaths of a further forty dependent women and children.

In order to do this the authorities would need to research the social history and profile locations, although it is not clear how this is accomplished.
preparations for the summit and the ensuing dynamics of the different street conflicts and how these affect the interactions between police and protestors. The occupation of symbolic space, or the symbolic occupation of space, as well as the disruption of spatial routines characterise the more recent repertories of protestors. What unfolds on the streets cannot be understood outside of this and the struggle to define and control this space. This is to embrace a more relational and symbolic understanding of space in protest activity (Fernandez, 2005; Dikec, 2005; Starr, 2006).

Summit sites are selected on the basis of being easily defensible in order to control and manipulate concentric space. In this sense it is calculated and pre-emptive in its nature as the technological and physical infrastructure at the G20 summit represents extrapolations of ongoing trends at previous summit sites, ones which have the recent history of disruptions of spatial routines very much in sight. Examples include the blockading repertoire, which came to prominence in the 1999 WTO summit in Seattle, where protestors blockaded all the intersections for the conference centre and shut down the conference for the first day. The same successful tactic was swiftly adopted again in 2000 in Prague at the IMF annual meeting, this time preventing delegates from leaving the conference centre. Whereas the 2001 Gothenburg EU summit saw delegates changing hotels when the outside streets had ongoing violent confrontations between police and protestors. The way that the authorities now deal with protest and dissent has changed in response to such tactics.

Consequently, the G20 was one of the most significant public policing events in the UK for some time. Over 5,500 police officers from seven different forces were deployed on April 1st and 2,800 on April 2nd, with the 'security' operation estimated to cost being £7.5 million (HMIC, 2009a:22). This capacity was complimented by new capabilities, reflecting a 'diffusion of innovation' (Wood, 2014) to incorporate new tactics and military style methods, one which brings into play how globalised policing has now become. In turn this has ushered in a 'new economy of security' (Gheciu, 2012:311) where we witness a blurring of boundaries between the traditionally separate categories of military and policing methods and technologies. The decentralised, but organised, timely and networked events in Seattle became a subject of study for police forces and the Rand Corporation, who developed counter tactics to minimise any such future occurrences (Fernandez, 2005:245; Armond, 2001). Wood's (2014:19-20) analysis of this diffusion process outlines three recognisable conditions for its uptake.

Firstly, adoption of an innovation is more likely when a crisis is perceived in the police's modus operandi (for our purposes, principally protestor's tactical successes in previous summit protests - notably in Seattle).
Map 1: Showing Site Location for G20 Summit Meetings and Defensible Space of Docklands
Picture 1: Barriers with Attendant Officers Blockading off Road Access to Excel Centre

Picture 2: Police Snipers (see highlight) and Surveillance to Photograph Protestors Who Try to Approach Excel Centre
Secondly, the increasing transnational integration of knowledge transfer, in part driven by the global integration of policing networks and their ability to act as a forum to spread information on 'best practices' and their merits and drawbacks. Lastly, the development of an internationally shared policing identity, where adopters see an alignment between themselves and their working contexts with earlier innovations. This last condition is facilitated by the integration of professional bodies which increasingly cut across organisational boundaries, integrating defence industry lobbyists and corporations, resulting in a drive towards militarised strategic incapacitation on the streets. This is not to suggest that the transmission, incorporation and use of these tactics does not vary across jurisdictions. They are in turn shaped by nations political systems, police organisations and organisational culture, and filtered by police epistemology, itself a product of an evolving history of protestors interactions. For instance, the 'epistemology of black' was seen most explicitly when G8 protestors travelling to Germany were sent back from the border because black clothes were found in their luggage (Scholl, 2012:98). Hence the notorious Black Bloc signifies a confrontational attitude and an association with a riot, demonstrating how the police use identification with a dress colour to differentiate 'disobedient bodies' from 'docile bodies'.

Thus far I have stressed the importance of the spatial dimensions of control and the development of tactical innovations by protestors and the authorities to achieve their divergent aims. However, the police's ability to successfully dominate and manipulate space to ensure their strategic advantage still leaves open the question of why the G20 demonstrations resulted in considerable police violence. In saying this there is much to unpack on this point, no more so than because any discussion in attributing what is loosely termed 'police brutality' involves a series of difficult legal, definitional, practical and situational issues. At this juncture I merely want to flag this issue without long digression (as I pick up on it later in the ensuing chapters). Suffice to say that previous policing scholarship on police use of force identifies the importance of police officer characteristics, police organisational characteristics, as well as the effects of situational characteristics (for a review of the empirical research see Worden, 1996). That said, this is incomplete. The other part of the answer lies in (ostensibly) senior police epistemology and the securitising moves that have increasingly secreted and congealed at international summits. It is the role of the securitising actors, and what lies behind their thinking that needs further analysis.

The 'fortress architecture' and the principles of defensible space used to ensure territorial control saw the Excel centre area become a 'sterile environment', with protestors entirely geographically removed from the location. These zoning practices and the associated fortifications appear many weeks before the arrival of summit delegations, sometimes they are several months in their construction. Moving out from this concentrically was a series of security cordons constructed for
the police to coordinate the transfers of delegations and to monitor the area for any incursions from protestors. These sector grids allow for easy surveillance and the immediate reporting to a central Operations Centre, thereby minimising the chance of successful incursions from decentralised protest actions. This protective umbrella of security arrangements were reported to be so 'rigorous' that Newham City Council had warned some local residents that they may find it difficult to get into their own homes. An order (of dubious legality according to Liberty) issued by the Metropolitan police required that those affected residents would need to carry two forms of identification (a proof of address and one photographic ID) to pass through the outer security zones. Furthermore, three Docklands Light Railway stations were closed along with the roads nearest the centre, severely restricting any pedestrian access. Whilst these are temporary transformations of urban space, very often involving public property, they introduce a unique type of land use which negatively impacts on surrounding neighbourhoods and the lives of residents. They are solely designed to enhance the exclusiveness of the visiting global elite. It is urbicidal in nature and aims at displacing and disciplining resistance, the complete erasure of visible (or audible) dissent. Few if any concession are made to local people (MPS stated that it 'regretted' any inconvenience caused). As Hollander & Whitfield's (2005:254) analysis of the US's experience of security zones note, often the creation of security zones leads to 'marginal spaces' which detract from their neighbourhoods rather than act as assets.

This securitisation of what were previously the spaces of everyday urban life can be seen as part of a 'new military urbanism', where if only temporarily, we see a blending of military, security and commercial practices (Graham, 2012). A further way of understanding the practices of planning and administration for international summits and the resulting spatial interactions is to invoke Bauman's (1989) notion of the modern state as a 'gardening state'. Here the population is split into "useful plants to be encouraged and tenderly propagated" as opposed to the weeds "to be removed or rooted out" (Bauman, 1991:21). The rule of order stands against the insistent danger of disorder in the social field, and hence the garden must be orderly and neat. On a practice level this means segregating to enforce uniformity, setting apart those useful elements allowed to flourish from threatening or harmful elements that must diminish. Gardening policy is also biopolitical policy, and Foucault's (1979) analogy of social control as disease control is similarly instructive. Foucauldian

77 Casciani, D. 30th March 2009 ‘The challenge of policing the G20’. BBC News
78 Louis Fernandez (2005) and later Christian Scholl (2012) have used Foucault's analogy of disease control to understand spatial control of dissent.
biopolitics alerts us to the extension of state power via techniques and technologies of governance (a form of political rationality) to the physical and political bodies of the population or 'global mass'. For Foucault this has produced a 'profound transformation' of the mechanisms of power. It is one which operates through dispersed networks (the dispositif) and works alongside repressive and disciplinary power to produce more docile bodies by aiming to control an entire 'milieu', such that protestors internalise their own normalisation as a population.

The logic underlying securitised sterile spaces is similar then to disease control, where the occurrence of political disturbance has to be isolated and contained in order to stop it spreading. As Scholl (2012:111) observes, "spatial disruption is the disease targeted by [the] authorities." Its visibility to the global hegemonic forces cannot be countenanced. This is achieved through a process of separation, containment and strict boundary maintenance, itself constituting a governing logic in which the police are committed to 'die in a ditch' in order to preserve and protect its sanctity. This logic also acts to shift the emphasis to pre-emptive action by the authorities in order to checkmate the spatial repertoires of protestors. Consequently the tactics of partitioning (resulting in separation) and isolating (leading to containment) are central features of Operation Glencoe. This doctrine and practice underscoring the precious micro-ecology of the summit allows for no exceptions in the realm of secure borders. This is why the G20 saw considerable police violence, due to the symbolic importance of the occupied spaces as well as 'forward panic' (Collins, 2008) by the police.

4.3 Preparing the Summit Site

A great deal of activity on both police and protestor sides occurs before any demonstrations take place on the streets. This happens in a phased manner as the summit approaches. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a range of covert measures, including attempts to recruit paid informants and infiltration of social movements occur months in advance to aid state pre-emptive actions. My observations also indicated that the authorities undertake an intense phase of spatial control just over one week prior to the main protest taking place (here the 'Put People First' demonstration).

An MPS marked police land-rover with three uniformed police officers sat inside routinely cruised by the protestor convergence centre. The small number of protestors stood outside stare blankly in unison as the police vehicle slowly passes by, their looks being returned by the officers sat within. ‘Look .. their com’in round again, they keep coming round now .. I reckon their gonna try and get in.’ (G20-A10; G20 fieldnotes)

Despite its wide application and usefulness in the social sciences, it is debateable whether Foucault's work gives us a coherent theory of biopolitics, it is somewhat speculative and sits within his broader conceptualisations of governmentality.
This same practice occurred at all of the case study sites, and took the form of intensive visible (using marked police vehicles) police patrolling in the protest areas, particularly in the vicinity of convergence centres and other locations where arriving protestors were congregating. Sweeps of these areas would happen as often as once every fifteen to twenty minutes, designed to send a message that you are under scrutiny, we are watching. In the ensuing days this attention would become even more direct, with pairs of Evidence Gathering officers appearing outside of convergence centres to undertake surveillance with digital camcorders in order to reduce activist’s anonymity in their organising space.

4.4 Protestors early planning preparations

Numerous organisations had been planning for several months to take part in protest actions to coincide with the G20 summit. I attended the early planning phases for several which I observed from the protestors perspective. In total I attended some twelve meetings by several different activist groups. Throughout I prioritised those transgressive groupings who had not entered into notification arrangements with MPS, a controversial requirement brought in by the Public Order Act (1986). It should be noted at the outset that here I am concentrating on a rather limited number of people who will be, all other things equal, the more committed activists to this form of public political involvement. As Starr et al (2010:14-15) have argued, protest action is that rather rare manifestation of political dissent and only constitutes one subset of a wider continuum to include contemplation, talk and action often existing within wider 'structures of abeyance' (echoing Tarrow, 1998). Following these authors, I wanted to consider the wider field of dissent, and to look beyond any static, decontextualised notion of an organisation or social movement and consider its development and sustenance in today's 'information society' which can shape people's subjectivities. Therefore I also monitored the framing of the wider media coverage leading up to and during the G20 summit regards the interplay between police and protestors as another dimension of this reportorial action.

Most of the meetings I attended took the form of pre-planning meetings ('gatherings') what were in the main, core activists and groupings in the run up to the summit. These were of variable size, sometimes just a dozen to more occasional larger meetings of fifty plus. Discussion orientated upon protest ideas, tactics and strategy, as well as protestor training and communication and media strategies.
Table 7: Timeline and Categorised Protest Events at the G20, London, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest Events</th>
<th>Key Movement Make-up</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No. Protestors</th>
<th>Police/Authority Response</th>
<th>Notified or Un-notified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>28/3/2009</strong></td>
<td><strong>Put People First March for Jobs, Justice and Climate</strong></td>
<td>Demonstrative/repression</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>Police facilitated march on pre-arranged route. 'Anarchist tinged' protestors segregated by police</td>
<td>Notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TUC and affiliated civil society organisations (Protest groups ActionAid, TUC, Save the Children, Stop Climate Chaos Coalition, Salvation Army, WWF, CND, Stop the War Coalition, British Muslim initiative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1/4/2009</strong></td>
<td><strong>Campaign Against Climate Change Iceberg Protest</strong></td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td></td>
<td>'Facilitated' march on pre-arranged route.</td>
<td>Notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Stop the War Coalition March</strong></td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>200/300</td>
<td>'Facilitated' march on pre-arranged route.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stop the war coalition; Palestine Solidarity Campaign; The British Muslim Initiative; CND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse</strong></td>
<td>Confrontational/repression</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protest was kettled, police used batons and dogs against protestors</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-capitalists, socialist alliance and autonomous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Number of protests</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Police Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Camp at the European Climate Exchange</td>
<td>Number of protests groups with the G20 London Summit</td>
<td>Confrontational /repression</td>
<td>2000/3000</td>
<td>Protest was kettled, police used batons and dogs against protestors</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20 Meltdown - Banquet at the Bank of England</td>
<td>Anti-capitalist/socialist organisation</td>
<td>Confrontational /repression</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4 separate processions, each led by the 4 horsemen of the apocalypse, to meet up at the Bank of England</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People and the Planet at RBS</td>
<td>Anti-capitalist/socialist organisation</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protest outside of RBS</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Mass Event</td>
<td>Other SMO's</td>
<td>Confrontational /repression</td>
<td>&gt;100</td>
<td>Protest by cyclists, some attempt was made to block/clog roads by cyclists by slow peddling</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative G20 Summit</td>
<td>Academic/Student; Anti-capitalist</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>200-300</td>
<td>East London University, venue for the alternative G20 summit, announced it would close for the duration of the G20 summit on 'safety grounds', announced the Alternative Summit is cancelled, withdrawing permission for its premises to be used. A hastily arranged summit event went ahead outside in university open space.</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising Tide Protest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/4/2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth March for Jobs</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>500+</td>
<td></td>
<td>'Facilitated' march on pre-arranged route with police</td>
<td>Notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogaden Community Protest</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitated demonstration within the police's 'designated protest area'</td>
<td>Notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Notified</td>
<td></td>
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<td>------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crash the Stock Exchange</td>
<td>Confrontational/repression</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protest action in City of London</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giant Game of Monopoly</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Protest action outside London Stock Exchange</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20 Meltdown Protest</td>
<td>Confrontational/repression</td>
<td>1000-2000</td>
<td>Protest action at hotels around ExCel centre</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Tomlinson vigil</td>
<td>Confrontational/repression</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Protest vigil against MPS violence and killing of Ian Tomlinson</td>
<td>Un-notified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.1 The Climate Camp Meetings

The climate camp had a New Year meeting and a series of local group meetings followed. Whilst a number of ideas were raised the overall strength of view orientated to learned patterns of contentious behaviour which allowed for tactical flexibility. Direct action and forms of civil disobedience which could be confrontational in nature were openly discussed in a 'bargaining out' of the ground rules for collective action, and whilst civil disobedience was accepted as a legitimate tactic by some, no one proposed any form of violent protest, either towards property or people. As one activist summarised the situation:

'Yes, it has to be fun, but as everyone knows here we've got to a point now that we have got to go a bit further to make things happen [...] I'm up for it.' [reference to acts of civil disobedience] (G20-A12, Field notes).

It was the group’s prior history of contentious action and its reputation to strict non-violence which appeared to be the restraint on the choices of action deemed available. Any resort to violence was eschewed both ethically and as a viable action alternative at the group discussions as well as with almost everyone I talked about the matter with. It was considered counter-productive leaving them open to inviting overwhelming violent repression from the ‘tooled up’ police. As one activist put it, 'The state does violence better than anyone else.' Neither did participants believe any resort to violence would help to build a wider coalition amongst other organisations or indeed immediate bystanders or a potentially sympathetic but distant general public. Indeed, a claimed moral superiority was itself a weapon the activists wanted to use for the economically and publically disruptive activity they were to embark upon, potentially putting the authorities at a moral and political disadvantage in how they responded.

Throughout discussion was openly democratic in decision making, although the more experienced activists (and confident speakers) were most influential. After some lengthy discussion and debate (not all of which I had been privy too) over meetings it was decided to hold four key protest actions (provocatively dubbed the 'Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse') under the banner the 'Climate Camp hits the City'. The central plank of the protest was to include a one day and one-night 'camp out' in central London on the eve of the G20 summit. There was some meticulous planning and preparations which were to be put in place, including reconnoitring the locale so that activists could rehearse tactics in the Square Mile. This was to be enacted by a game ('capture the flag' was proposed) which would allow different groups to effectively mimic state and protestor players to rehearse the feasibility of the camping plan and its vulnerabilities.

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80 CCM G20-A09, G20-A010, G20-A12, G20-15.
81 CCM G20-A10
There was some concern raised about how the anticipated heavy police presence would react towards protestors, particularly the targeting strategy, but such concerns did not override the key plan. Nevertheless, thought was given to providing training so that activists would be able to defuse and de-escalate any confrontational situations that might arise with any inconvenienced members of the public, or indeed, with the police - itself a further indication of the non-violent intentions of the planners and attending cohort of protest players.

The overarching aim was to attract the mainstream media's attention to a political message - the perceived failed economic system and from then a range of subsequent aligned environmental issues - by way of a highly visible form of dissent located in a very busy part of central London. This was in one sense defensive (a camp) as well as an act of self-exemplification (McAdam, 1995) involving living one's principles. The aim was not merely a publicity stunt, although the goal did include gaining international media coverage of the issues, but needs to be seen as a tactical innovation to a conventional protest cycle. Climate camps are not entirely new, and the activists had used this approach before with some success which was the primary reason why it was chosen, but it had not before been sited in the middle of a capital city. This 'modularity' (Tarrow) also increases mobilisation by reducing start-up costs, as the activists were already well acquainted with organising and running these types of climate camps. Reviving and recycling known forms of contentious action in this way avoids learning entirely new techniques with all its attendant burdens and risks. More than this, the insurgent activists were also more comfortable with the 'scenario of conflict' such camps ensue from the authorities. It fitted to what Farge and Revel (1995) have termed the 'rules of rebellion' which in the minds (and mutterings) of the attendees, the pattern of dissent was thought to likely follow a ritualised rather than volatile and violent form between contenders and the various agents of social control (state, local and corporate, partly in light of the mixed land ownerships). This represents an incremental modification as well as an experimentation at the edges of an existing form of protest, one which rejected increased militancy or any brash new invention during exceptional circumstances of the summit. Indeed, these field observations offers some support for Tilly's (1986) argument that rather than being the result of deliberate choices by collective actors, the chosen repertoire owes more to the loose interplay between challengers and authorities, where this form of protest is seen as more feasible and attractive than other alternatives.

In brief, the idea was to disrupt the smooth flow of the summit by making dissent visible, awkward, and inconvenient, as well as utopian, showing a model of democracy and community that is possible outside of formal institutions. So for instance, the plan for the camp was to pitch tents in
the street, set up a kitchen to make tea and cook jacket potatoes on stoves, conduct teach-ins and run a variety of workshops, as well as music and street theatre, all acting as educational and inspiring components to the camp. This was all to take place in a rich tapestry of collective action. As one activist remarked,

‘The G20 leaders have taken power from us, our labour organisations are smashed, environments pillaged, we need to show this tiny minority that we have better solutions, here, now, not them.’ (G20-A04, fieldnotes).

The key strategy then fits with two of the three elements of Rochon's (1990:108) idea of a 'social movements power', namely novelty and size (here hoped for) with the third, militancy, more sidelined. Large mobilisations can more effectively call into question authorities policies and advocate different solutions. Novelty carries the advantage of being able to attract media attention whilst also potentially shifting the strategic advantage by introducing some unpredictability to proceedings, itself provoking insecurity about the consequences of the protest for authorities (Tarrow, 1989). This last point does carry its own risk at summit events, (as I discuss in section 4.7.3 below).

There was at least two ways that success was viewed by the activists; firstly, shifting government policy through increasing popular support for the climate camps demands, including garnering support from the media for those demands, later translated into electoral pressure to produce that change, what Gamson (1990) terms as 'acceptance'. Secondly, and irrespective of policy change, having more ordinary (i.e. non-activist) people become politically involved in this deliberative process, thereby building the social movement, what Kriesi et al. 1995:207) terms 'procedural influence'. This last element was very much linked to the running of teach-in's and other educational forums throughout the brief life of the camp.

These initiatives were loosely organised through a network of local groups and promoted by social media (the 'Climate Camp website') with the aim of attracting as many people as possible to attend. Individuals were encouraged to 'invite a friend' (a strategy to double attendance) and help build the goal of a mass mobilisation. The conclusion of the climate camp planners illustrated the importance activists put on what Scholl (2012) has termed 'transgressive contention'.

The success of the various actions was seen as being dependent upon disrupting established routines in one part of the city of London. As others social movement scholars have argued, (notably, Tarrow, 1998:96-98) this form of contentious politics requires some form of disruption of the everyday routines for the event to become visible. In order to achieve this the planners were aware of the importance of innovation in their 'tactical repertoire' (Scholl, 2012) and of spectacle, as
well as the dangers of routinisation and ritualisation. It was recognised that acting predictably, for example as with the organised march on a pre-arranged route such as the planned TUC’s ‘Put People First March’ in the lead up to the summit enables the authorities to learn how to respond and thereby too easily facilitates social control (Tarrow, 1995:107). However, the protestors use of online media in the need to publicise convergence points, maps and protest activities also acted to hand the tactical advantage to the police, who once forewarned, were able to strategise a range of scenarios and plan counter measures accordingly.

At the outset the protestors were acutely aware of this, they knew that their web-pages, postings and forums were being closely monitored and mined as 'open source' operational intelligence for the authorities which would later feed in to a tactical game of cat and mouse to be played on the streets. This lesson had been learnt from previous actions. Consequently, the strategy employed was to restrict communication to outlining only the broad plan (camping in the square mile and a convergence time) but not the specifics of where, which would be released at the last feasible moment by subscribed text alert. Otherwise, the plan was only to use text messages if the original plan changed, in effect, if the camp was successfully prevented. This included a hit-list of protest sites including the provocatively titled 'climate criminals' locations in central London. This was to function as an alternative set of actions if the climate camp was thwarted. This way the protestors hoped to retain some of the initiative and an element of surprise thought vital to achieving their aims. They feared not to do this would simply check mate them on the day, on the streets. This was also the reason why entering into 'notification' arrangements with the police was firmly rejected.

In the context of summit mobilisations, the police were seen as an antagonistic adversary, whose primary purpose was not, as the official discourse proposed to ‘facilitate' protests, but precisely the opposite, to negate them, to make them as ineffective as possible, achieved through a combination of legal, and where necessary, illegal (including violent) repression (and what Collison, 1995, terms 'the ways and means act' rule bending and rule breaking). This was the general view amongst many of the seasoned activists present at the planning meetings for the climate camp and also for the G20 Meltdown, and one gained from their own shared recent history of protest struggles. 

This last point is important in considering what would have been in the forefront of the minds of police operational planners, specifically the implications and reputational risks of their plans to handle the un-notified protests. Thought was also given by protestors to a 'decapitation strategy', a pre-emptive strike by police to arrest the more central actors, so protestors were to be encouraged

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82 G20-A09; G20-A10; G20-A11; G20-A12; G20-A13; G20-A14; G20-A15.
to have phone numbers of friends and other groups to keep the communication network as decentralised as possible.

The key tactic was to co-ordinate a 'swoop' with many different groups of protestors (encouraged to be loosely organised into 'friendship groups') converging to an assigned spot, but who would first meet up at pre-arranged places within easy reach of the Climate Exchange. A similar tactic was used for protests in Prague in 2000, seeing activists swarming from multiple directions (and colour coded by level of intended militancy and hence risk to themselves from police violence) towards the convention centre. To aim was to overcome what Scholl (2012:124) terms 'rendering disruption unlikely', by making this event difficult to police, here synonymous with prevent. 'Decentralised swarming' grew out of previous street interactions between police and protestors when trying to overcome restrictive spatial zoning by the authorities and to create tactical dilemmas for the police.

The plan was for protestors to converge in from many different directions through a variety of different means and within minutes of each other. The logic was that many people moving confidently en-masse from lots of different directions would make it difficult for the police to use disruption tactics such as bogus 'stop and search' powers and to confiscate camping and other items and thereby frustrate the camp. Once people arrived the camp could be hastily set up and having been established, would be difficult to dismantle. This would require a degree of military precision to achieve (protestors were encouraged to synchronise watches) as there was real concern that those missing the swoop would be denied access to the camp by the police as a means of wrestling back the initiative. Physically these tactics are difficult for the police to stop without putting entire public spaces into lockdown. However, the concern was that once the 'swoop' began mobile police units would respond by trying to kettle recognisable groups, most likely at some tube stations (Liverpool Street and Bank were the key ones of concern). Protestors were to be forewarned of this possibility, and advised that once they notice a kettle forming, to move out and encourage others to move out also before it can close. As the G20 Meltdown was also occurring at noon at Bank, it was thought kettling would also be more difficult to achieve. Arming people with downloadable and printable maps of the city with grid reference points would also allow a last minute change of intended venue and shifting to an alternative plan. Detailed advice was to be provided, including wariness of police subterfuge such as being 'invited' into any 'protest pens' (cordoned spaces) rather to refuse and keep moving. As Hurl (2005:52) argues, "the segmentation of the space-time of the event" enables multiple tactical preferences to be deployed. This spatial division of various tactics and its unpredictability and fluidity was to be one of the camps main resources.
Protestors were also to be encouraged to use their phones to act as mobile intelligence agents (reporting police actions on the ground) providing 'sousvillance' (or inverse surveillance from below by the surveilled) in the heat of the action, as well as 'spreading inspiration' by uploading reports, picture and audio to platforms such as Indymedia.

Particularly noteworthy here is how extensive the protest groups preparations were, despite their limited resources. I now examine the LARC's preparations.

4.4.2 'Anarchos': The London Action Resource Centre Planning Meetings

The second set of meetings I attended was at the London Action Resource Centre (LARC) (located in central London) in the months running up to the G20. This brought together what could loosely be described as anarchists and those with broadly anarchist but more predominantly anti-capitalist political sympathies, some of whom belonged to the 'Whitechapel Anarchist Group' (WAG). Whilst this was their most distinctive trait (many would accept the label of being 'anarchos', although not all) more profitably, these can be thought of as 'high risk activism' (McAdam, 1986). Incentives to participate in the group were more concentrated in close-knit personal networks of friends, here set within the political opportunity model (Tarrow, 1991:15) offered by the summit and the gains an onset of a wave of mobilisation clearly offered. At this point it is important to stress though that this was not a clandestine group (and none were fugitives), despite its underground appearances and an aura of secrecy at meetings. This identity was in part a reaction to past experiences and conditions of continued police attention and harassment, who tend to see the easily identifiable black clothed anarchists as entrepreneurs for political violence, something akin to urban guerrilla warfare. That fed into the militant identity, status, and counter-culture. A more accurate description would be a grassroots insurgent protest group who endorsed self-organised direct action and anti-capitalist politics structured on non-hierarchical grounds.

As with the climate camp meetings, many of the participants had shared memories of similar protest events and actions, often having been involved in other aligned social movements and struggles such as 'Reclaim the Streets' and 'Carnival against Capitalism' (notably the J-18) and hence had seen 'front-line action'. This demonstrates the fluidity with which activists move between congruent causes. As such they were immersed in contentious protests, and carried shared meanings, requisite knowledge and a shared pre-history of antagonistic relations with the police. These collective memories structured and shaped this prior history of contention and directed much of the discussion about planned actions and tactics in how to confront the G20 summit, itself absorbed within a narrative of radical political struggle. It was these identities (anti-authority) and interests (a range of grass-roots interest and radical groups) as well as direct experience of police
aggression and rights violations which also structured much of the hostility and intransigence to the authorities. No dialogue with the authorities was entertained or entered into, although this would have been exceedingly difficult given the lack of any identifiable (or willing) leadership to negotiate with, even if there had been some trust in the police to genuinely facilitate their planned protest actions, which there wasn't.

Again, these were primarily planning meetings with discussion taking the form of both reactive claims (defending threatened rights) and proactive (claiming rights yet to be enjoyed) (Tilly, 1978). As Tilly (1981) notes, all repertoires of collective action are circumscribed by the material, organisational and conceptual resources and collective prior experience of the group. Whilst attendees were relaying information back to many other loosely associated coalitions of co-operating groups in the region and further afield, the core group meeting was generally quite small, amounting to 15-22 people. There was awareness and excitement that the G20 offered a rare and potent opportunity to (re)mobilise and broaden and widen dissent and to take direct action to achieve their ends. As one remarked:

*Bring it home! Awesome .. all these capitalist rulers in one place at one time that screw the workers, let's have some fun!* (G20-A03, Fieldnotes).

There was a restricted number of performances that the group chose between, and these included mostly non-violent legal 'conventional' (Tarrow, 1994) demonstrative actions, such as joining marches, performative and carnivalesque (public theatrical stunts in costumes) as well as more militant action (than was planned by the climate camp) involving non-co-operation and intervention strategies. This included the symbolic penetration of 'red zone' no-go areas, targeting the financial district and the symbols of banking with the acceptance by some of limited forms of movement initiated violence or what Koopman (1993:640) categorises as 'light violence' or 'performative violence' such as breaking windows and throwing objects at the police during a demonstration (as opposed to Koopman's 'heavy violence' involving more severe conspirational violence which can be directed at property including; arson, bombing, and sabotage, or people, involving; political murders or kidnapping). The smashing of windows to mark disapproval of the buildings occupants was used by the Black Bloc in Seattle (although this tactic has older pedigree, dating back to 1700's in London) and has been revitalised at some summit protests but in more limited form. However, it needs to be stressed that the soft violent tactics were more incidental discussions than constituting a formulated plan. Several spoke approvingly of *'bricking the banks'*;\(^8^3\) although it was difficult to

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\(^8^3\) G20-A07; G20-A08.
gauge the extent to which this was idle chatter in the wider context of the ensuing discussions. In the main, discussions more often focused on acts of civil disobedience.

Shortly after, the group were subject to an 'expose' by the Daily Mail newspaper who 'infiltrated' several meetings and protest actions outside the Bank of England in a sensationalised and one-sided attack piece. It was indeed the case that many of the attendees were interested in undermining the state's claim to legitimacy and rejected the authority of the state and its agents, the police, a rationale which hardly lends itself to gaining permission to protest. Whilst this position begs a number of complex questions which go to the heart of political philosophy; how one grounds legitimate political authority, the attendant question of an obligation to obey the law, as well as the relationship between law and morality, it is not my purpose here to interrogate (philosophical) anarchist thought. Rather I restrict my remarks to emphasising that for many of the attendees, if you do not recognise the legitimate political authority of the state then distinguishing between the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force becomes a question of moral philosophy (regarding justified and unjustified uses of force) and one's attendant theory of value and obligation (as Wolff discussion of violence notes, 1969:607). It should be added that as Flyghed (2002:23) reminds us, state violence through the use of police force is equally political in nature as its objective is maintaining the order and security associated with a particular power structure.

Whilst the Mail's piece acted to demonise the anarchist as spectre, strands of anarchist thought are a common philosophy to much of the wider alter-globalisation movement (for instance rejection of hierarchies in favour of voluntary association and co-operation; direct forms of democracy; embracing direct action; dismantling of oppressive institutions etc.) although alter-globalisations are not always explicitly anarchist. One of the key differences between the climate camp meetings and the LARC was differing positions on the role of violence in protest. The doctrine of non-violence (where violence is understood in a strict sense and in the context of these meetings, as the political use of force) depends on the assumption of an existing legitimate state for its coherence. Moreover, many of these protestors did not accept the legal boundaries inscribed in the status quo, rather they wanted to conspicuously challenge it through transgressive protest actions and civil disobedience. That said, my interest here lay in understanding the tactical repertoires at summit protests, and the interaction and dynamic interplay between protestors and authority players (law, order and government) as well as how protest actions come to be adapted, especially in light of these

84 Martin, A. (2009, 2nd April) 'Undercover with the anarchist mob: How the mail infiltrated the group at the heart of the violence.'
interactions. The most significant feature of the group is their collective refusal of regulation and negotiation beforehand with the authorities on any protest action, rather the strategy is to rely on surprise as a tactic, including staging confrontations to make visible antagonisms what are otherwise left invisible. As Scholl (2012:98-99) notes, "the unpredictability of black bodies places them outside of any anticipatory regime of police control."

Throughout my attendance at these meetings (and afterwards in the pub) it was notable how the groups collective protest memory shaped their perceived opportunities for future actions (as well as that of their self-identities). In the ensuing conversations, and between banter, these were often intertwined, bringing some continuity to the group members (Gongaware's 2010, ethnography has found similar processes). These activists often used the language of war when describing previous campaigns (which featured prominently in the Mail's account, and was alluded to in MPS's media briefings (see below section 4.5.1). Whilst many felt that violence towards the police and the institutions of authority was entirely justified, their deliberations were more tactical than ideological, orientated on how to overcome their basic powerlessness. As Adams (1983) has noted, this is the key problem facing any small insurgent group. Other discussion centred on maintaining unity with other participating groups that would be protesting during the summit, notably how to avoid conflict when pursuing a diversity of tactics. This issue was at its keenest when endorsing property destruction and whether corporate financial symbols should be targeted. Whilst both groups had rejected co-operation with the authorities when planning their protests, this remained a stark contrast, and it was left up to individual participants own choosing.

Because of the location and the group's political commitments, these meetings were of a more furtive and closed nature (with entrance facilitated by me knowing a fellow attendee who vouched for me). The group were alert to being infiltrated and provocateur action by undercover police officers (and journalists) in order to disrupt planned actions by the group or to discredit their cause. Undercover surveillance can be thought of as an interference strategy, although the extent to which it is coercive will depend upon how the information is acted upon regards disruption tactics. This last point is of note, because many were already conscious of this form of repression prior to the first thread emerging the following year (in October 2010) of what was one of the most closely guarded secrets in British policing, that of a clandestine unit of undercover police officers infiltrating 'subversive' activist groups. Attendees knew that the LARC would be known to the authorities as a venue for direct action, and that they themselves would be 'anarchist tinged' from the police's perspective, sitting outside the 'institutionalised negotiation and accommodation spectrum' (King,

85 G20-A01; G20-A02; G20-A 03; G20-A07; G20-08.
So it was recognised that this would lead to 'categorical suspicion' (Marx, 1988) with the group anticipating surveillance and other 'disruption' tactics. In short, they were aware that they constituted the 'opposition', a badge of honour for some. Hence the group were openly suspicious of any new faces during these early planning meetings.

Precautionary actions included a pervasive attempt at a 'security culture' to try and minimise any infiltration or surveillance, ostensibly employing loose security measures in the venue, usually in the form of a few minders on the door vetting those going in on the basis of being 'a known entity'. These security measures were a double edged sword for the organisation. Whilst they provided a degree of protection they also posed some obvious difficulties for widening the support at the planning phase, effectively restricting participation to a tighter knit grouping of 'known' and trusted faces. For instance, questions were asked (discretely) about me to my contact on numerous occasions, and some people were clearly suspicious about a relatively new member arriving a few months before the summit. This acts to show the impact of police covert tactics, it induces suspicion (and at times some degree of paranoia) damaging the development of trust between activists and making outreach activities that much more difficult. Who wants to be an object of suspicion on entering a new group? Moreover, foreknowledge of being a likely object of 'police interest' raises the cost of participation as well as the risk of the anticipated dangers from engaging in this particular forum (legal, financial, physical, social etc.) as a direct result of police action. As McAdam (1986) notes, most studies of social movement recruitment tend to focus on 'safe' forms of activism, not high-risk/cost activism. Building a sustained organised challenge to the authorities whilst trying to guard against state intrusive surveillance bedevilled the group’s efforts.

Other preparations included establishing a ‘convergence centre’ which was to be organised from 28th April, to allow people to stay in central London for the climate camp event, and if desired, to attend the 'Put People First' march by the unions and large NGOs. The pre-summit preparations by the authorities were also well underway, including a legitimation strategy. I now examine a very public site of struggle, MPSs strategy for influencing the mass media and the resulting content, one which the Mail's coverage of LARC dovetails with.

4.5 Pre-Summit Developments

4.5.1 Massaging the Message: G20 Protest Media Briefings

In February 2009 MPS released a series of press briefings stating that the police were preparing for "a summer of rage" from protestors due to the economic downturn, and that with the impending G20 summit banks were "viable targets" of this anger as well as headquarters of multinational companies and other financial institutions in the City. The media were informed that MPS
intelligence reports showed activists were planning protests in an "unprecedented" way, likely making reference to newer protest tactics employed in northern hemisphere summits such as Genoa, Toronto and Seattle. These dire briefings were widely reproduced throughout mainstream newspapers and news media. The Guardian newspaper provided the most comprehensive verbatim account of one such briefing, where Superintendent David Hartshorn (the head of the Metropolitan police's public order branch) announced that 'MPS intelligence reports' suggested that known activists" were re-emerging to the streets to foment unrest.

"Those people would be good at motivating people, but they haven't had the 'foot soldiers' to actually carry out [protests].

Furthermore, "Obviously the downturn in the economy, unemployment, repossessions, changes that. Suddenly there is the opportunity for people to mass protest" (Lewis 2009a, 1). Journalists were advised that both "extreme rightwing and extreme leftwing" elements were looking to "use the fact that people are out of jobs" to galvanise support (Lewis 2009a, 1). Building on this theme of impending violence, the press was told that the mood at some demonstrations had changed recently and that activists were increasingly "intent on coming on to the streets to create public disorder" (Lewis 2009a, 1). It was also reported that private city firms were also being advised by MPS to cancel unnecessary meetings and deliveries, and to beef up building security including boarding up and keep a low profile during the G20 protests. Warming to this theme of impending turmoil, Hartshorn stated MPS had 'tired and tested' and 'flexible' tactics to deal with any violence that may occur and that the G20 policing plan was one of the largest, most challenging and complicated public order operations it has ever devised.

Closer to the G20 protests Commander O'Brien issued an appeal and a warning to activists, "Come forward and make contact with us so we can make sure that your [legitimate] aims are achieved," whilst also acknowledging that:

"There are groups that by their very ethos won't talk to us. The groups which enter dialogue with us, we will facilitate [their events]. "We will not tolerate anyone breaking the law, be it by attacking buildings, people or our officers. We are looking to police peaceful protest. We don't talk in terms of riots. If anyone wants to come to London to engage in crime or disorder, they will be met with a swift and efficient policing response."

This rather contradictory message, playing up the expectation of protestor threat and violence whilst simultaneously giving a nod to denying threatened riots only gained traction with the mainstream press in one direction, not helped by other senior officers stating that the force was "up

86 Casciani, D. 30th March 2009 The challenge of policing the G20 BBC News
87 Casciani, D. 30th March 2009 The challenge of policing the G20 BBC News
88 Casciani, D. 30th March 2009 The challenge of policing the G20 BBC News
for it and we're up to it" an ominous reference suggesting that MPS were relishing the opportunity for physical confrontation.

Cable's (2015:139) content analysis of the resulting media coverage in the lead up to the G20 summit found the themes and dominant framing of MPS's briefings evoked two particular scenarios; firstly, suggesting violent protest reminiscent of the 1990 Poll Tax 'riots' and secondly, that activists would be coming out of retirement to cause maximum trouble on the streets. This created "a powerful template that resonated in the press" (ibid. 2015:139).

As activist groups were barred by MPS from attending any of the press briefing events, there was no immediate rebuttal available to them. Even if this restriction were not in place, the hierarchy of credibility in these instances would still lie very much with the police's own account. Neither can detractors refute the police's claims regards their intelligence picture (let alone the police's interpretations of it) as such documents are never shared publically or subject to Freedom of Information requests, they are in effect state secrets. The result was that the press headlines created and promoted the anticipation of violence at the G20 protests in fifty-three out of ninety-seven articles (ibid. 2015:139-140). For instance, the Sunday Mirror story drew on historic protests and the groups involved to enhance its storyline: “Anarchists from the 1990 Poll Tax riots are coming out of retirement to plot mayhem,” and "notorious groups such as Class War, the Wombles and the Whitechapel Anarchist Group have secretly ganged up” (Penrose 2009, in Cable, 2015:142). Whilst the Daily Mirror headline read “Countdown to chaos” in the build-up to the protests (Anon 2009, 5). The overriding impression left from the police briefings is that the G20 protests would be akin to an organised riot, a forecast which proved to be unfounded, at least for the protestors. This is not to deny that there were some cases of ambiguity or indeed the occasional challenge in the mainstream press to the dominant meta-narrative (such as Hahnel's article in the Times) as well as some letters to editors challenging the 'anarchist mob' narrative.

Is error to blame? In his oral evidence to the ensuing Inquiry into the policing operation by Joint Committee on Human Rights (12th May, 2009: Ev4) Paul Lewis of the Guardian argued that Met's press team were "really sophisticated" and knew exactly what they were doing in their choice of language (i.e. protests being on an unprecedented' scale, protestors storming buildings etc.) in ramping up the threat of protestor violence in the days before the protest. Notably, all the senior officers were using the same inflammatory words (12th May, 2009: Ev4) itself an indication that they had been briefed beforehand in a coordinated effort to do so.
MPS claimed that the media had hyped and exaggerated their briefings, but this claim is further undermined by successive police scholarship which shows that the police-media relationship is both symbiotic and reciprocal (Chibnall, 1977; Lee and McGovern, 2013, 2014; Mawby, 2010; Reiner, 2008). It is one which benefits both parties, at least most of the time notwithstanding some periodic tensions. Ercison et al’s (1989:378) analysis of the relationship between sources and the news concluded that, "News is a product of transactions between journalists and their sources. The primary source of reality for the news is not what is displayed or what happens in the real world. The reality of the news is embedded in the nature and types of social relations that develop between journalists and their sources, and in the politics of knowledge that emerges on each specific newsbeat." Whilst these findings are from a Canadian perspective, studies of the UK domestic news in national 'quality' newspapers as well as radio and television news similarly found extensive and growing reliance by journalists on such public relations sources (Lewis et al, 2008). So journalists tend to limit themselves to establishment communications (often pre-packaged) in increasingly under-resourced newsrooms as an 'information subsidy' (Gandy, 1982) and in the face of the enormous array of other sources. The other side of this symbiotic relationship is the active role the police play in creating the news through professionalised media departments. The aim is not to provide some window into the largely hidden world of policing, but rather to control information, here to pre-empt critique of police repressive tactics and conduct on the day. This is achieved by raising the threat level and presenting protestors in a negative light, allowing the police more room to respond robustly than is necessary when the summit itself occurs. Like all propaganda exercises, some grains of truth needs to be woven into the story for consumers to suspend their disbelief and accept the narrative. The media thus constitutes a site of struggle between protestors and police, each of whom desire to influence the prevailing 'margins of understanding' (Hall, 1973). As Scholl (2012:160-1) notes, legitimacy is "a weapon for contestation and co-optation", and is played out through the respective (and deeply one-sided) tactical legitimation repertoires.

This tactical pattern of manipulation by the police is reinforced when we consider evidence taken from the Leveson Inquiry of police forces and local press co-operating to achieve their respective agendas (Leveson, 2012a/b; Mawby, 2017). More damming was the Inquires probing into the relationship between the media and MPS, which was characterised by close working relationships

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89 Lewis et al's (2008:17-18) findings are damning, summarising their data the authors note that the "picture of the journalistic processes of news gathering and news reporting in which any meaningful independent journalistic activity by the media is the exception rather than the rule. We are not talking about investigative journalism here, but the everyday practices of news judgement, fact checking, balance, criticising and interrogating sources etc., that are, in theory, central to routine day-to-day journalism practice. News, especially in print, is routinely recycled from elsewhere, and yet the widespread use of other material is rarely attributed to its source (e.g. “according to PA...” [...])"
developed over many years, one which facilitated cosy understandings and exchange of information as well as being tainted by suspected preferential treatment towards an inner circle of reporters and by lavish socialising bestowed to some senior MPS officers (Leveson, 2012a/b; Mawby, 2017:495). In addition, media relations and image management have become pivotal components of police operations. Police public information officers (PIOs) actively manage crime news and information in an attempt to influence the content of media messages relevant to their interests (Mawby, 2002). This vested interest in exploiting their relationship with the news media will be felt most keenly where the police force's legitimacy comes into question. Public order policing is both politically sensitive and has the potential to radically undermine perceptions of police legitimacy (Jefferson, 1990, Waddington, 2007). Police behaviour can easily be viewed as 'heavy handed' when violence breaks out, especially when images show baton wielding officers meting out violence against demonstrators.

With this in mind we need to ask why did the briefings take the provocative form they did? Part of the answer has been suggested by Cable (2015) and reflected in HMIC's own report into the G20 policing operation, 'Adapting to Protest' (2009) (discussed further in Chapter 7 below). Namely the way the police interpreted protestor's online communications and leaflets disseminated by the G20 Meltdown activists. Cable argues this material played an influential role in how the police interpreted the aspirations of the protestors and relayed this in briefings to the press. The use of humour and irreverent language, with slogans such as 'storm the banks' and 'fighting back' as well as the central theme of the planned marches, named the 'Four Horseman of the Apocalypse' contained militaristic and confrontational overtones and imagery (i.e. 'hanging a banker', 'bringing the City to a halt') all of which neatly fed into the police's central assertions (we expect violence and disorder) and often mechanically relayed in many of the mainstream press's dominant narrative of fear and impending violence. This was despite the Meltdown spokespeople insisting that the protests outside of the Bank of England would involve "nothing more violent than dancing, theatre and possibly a little nudity" (in keeping with the theme of the Emperor's New Clothes) (Hoskins & Tulloch, 2016:113). This stress on the representational importance of these communications is again reinforced when the 'Adapting to Protest' report acknowledges that it was indeed the case that activist websites and chat rooms functioned as an important information source for police intelligence (HMIC 2009, 42).

90 The originally proposed part two of the Inquiry did not take place, as Mawby notes (2017:498) if it had it is likely the findings would have been more damaging for the police.
91 There is an explicit admission that the intelligence for 'un-notified' protests was garnered from 'open source materials' such as activist websites and leaflets (Adapting to Protest, p101).
Whether Cable's assertion is true and entirely accounts for the form the briefings took could only be answered authoritatively by an open and honest response from that small inner circle at MPS and the other authority players that devised and delivered these briefings. This concerns the micro-politics of meaning and how meaning-contests are strategically managed through what Ericson (1989) calls 'front region disclosure' in the form of publicity to selected 'inner-core' journalists. In the absence of ever gaining this information (occasionally retired senior officers pen biographies which provide such insights) we need to consider other explanations which could account for MPS's proactive media liaison efforts. I want to argue that the media briefings cannot simply be understood as an excessive or detrimental reading of protestors online communications chatter as Cable's (2015) analysis would have us believe. At the outset it needs to be remembered that making public statements by the police should be seen within the context of its particular bent to secrecy, itself an ingrained aspect of police culture (Manning, 2010; Ullrich, 2018). As Westley, writing back in 1950 (cited in Fassin, 2011:20) has pointed out "secrecy amongst the police stands as a shield against the attacks of the outside world, against bad newspaper publicity which would make the police lose respect; against public criticism from which they feel they suffer too much; against the criminal who is eager to know the mores of the police; against the law which the police to frequently abrogate."

In light of its secretive nature, any police messaging needs to be scrutinised sceptically with a simple question; what is its purpose, and cui bono, who stands to gain? Cable's account never considers any ulterior motives on behalf of the police. And yet its long been recognised that police media liaison has a number of functions, including news management to protect and promote the force's reputation (Mawby, 2007). This would have added impetus in light of the impending largest policing operation in MPS's history dealing with a politically contentious summit gathering conducted in the glare of the world's press. All such operations by the authorities threaten reputational damage. Therefore 'front stage' (and 'back stage') media management offers benefits for policing centred around promoting favourable images of policing, of which the media can be influential (Chibnall, 1977; Leishman and Mason, 2003; Reiner, 2007). As Lawrence's (2000:18) study of the media's role in constructing police brutality notes, given the considerable ambiguity involved in police use of force (I discuss this issue further in Chapter 5) whether it is understood as a problem of police brutality depends greatly upon which voices and viewpoints the media chose to emphasise.

The flurry of press briefings with its recurrent themes of violence and disorder ably promote a moral panic, which serves as a measure to pre-emptively quell criticism of any subsequent police malpractice and violence on the day, thereby reducing the risk of reputational damage for the forces involved. This assertion has greater credence when recognising that many of the police's tactics and contingencies were planned well in advance. It would have been at the forefront of
MPS’s operational commander’s minds that their tactics in accomplishing their organisational objectives would likely involve police violence and hence risks protestors injuries - 'on the job trouble' (Waddington, 1991). Their difficulty is that public order policing involves policing citizens, and 'respectable' people, not criminals (Waddington, 1998:129) and the police are acutely aware that their intended actions are communicating 'meanings of policing' (Mawby, 2002). Continued legitimacy requires not only the perception that the state's coercive counter-measures (to the protestors) in the level of force used or the degree of curtailment of freedom imposed, is not viewed as an overreaction (or conversely an under reaction). The usual tactic here would be an emphasis on a 'low-key' approach, with event policing taking a 'sensitive', unobtrusive, and restrained manner (with officers not responding to any taunts or verbal abuse or acting in a manner to escalate tensions, or worse, intentionally provoke them) and not to be drawn into confrontations, rather placing an emphasis on facilitating even disruptive protest.\(^9\) However, this requires room for manoeuvre which fits uneasily with the policing plan which emerged for the G20.

For instance, the police's prior experience with kettling would have taught them that it invariably requires considerable violence to achieve its ends, and in doing so can inflame and frustrate those forcibly detained, potentially leading to a spiral of further, but contained, violence. Moreover, police managers (at least in private) concede that there is little if any control over rank and file officers in some 'riot control' measures, such as baton charges and legal rules have little inhibitory effect on the occurrence of police violence in 'public order' situations (Uildriks & van Mastrigt, 1991:177). Being familiar with the occupational reality and the 'operational code' where police violence and malpractice functions as a type of informal punishment for defying police authority as well as a method of dispensing 'street justice' to those who are deemed disrespectful (so called 'diss crimes') then successfully labelling protestors as a violent mob in waiting appears increasingly attractive and eminently versatile. Any violent 'clashes' on the day can more easily be blamed on the actions of protestors (even if just blaming a minority 'intent on violence') whilst more readily portraying the police as calm, measured and merely reactive in their efforts to 'regain order'. This can be successful even in the face of contrary evidence pointing (as it did) to violent clashes instigated by the police. The press narrative also acts to marginalise and de-legitimise actions by protestors, divorcing them from the issues behind the protest as well as justifying what would otherwise appear to be oppressive policing. A similar tactic has been used by police in deaths in custody cases where forces have engaged in victim blaming via leaks to the media in order to deflect blame from police action (see Angiolini, 2017).

\(^9\) Mawby (2002:155-164) draws out several examples of this strategy when discussing several South Yorkshire Police (SYP) public order 'operations', notably policing a Sheffield Wednesday v Liverpool match at Hillsborough - a event which threatened to further embarrass and sully SYC’s image.
MPS provided the simple 'news peg', that significant event which met the journalistic practice of newsworthiness criteria to hang their intended story, and as is often the case with the media's handling of radical politics, the framing acts more to trivialise and distort rather than do justice to the complex issues that such movements try to raise. For instance, does Hartshorn's professed 'intelligence report' amount to anything more than 'people have growing political grievances and some people intend to try and mobilise wider support for them in an effort to effect some desired political and economic changes'? In other words, pursuing political activism which is the cornerstone of all functioning liberal democracies. In addition, saying that activists plan to come onto the street and be 'disorderly' studiously ignores that any dissident challengers are almost always at a disadvantage due to their limited status and resources. As a consequence, they are compelled to continually devise creative, novel and even disruptive actions to gain mass media attention. These demands result from at least two central problems they face. Firstly, as McCarthy & McPhail, (1998:84) argue, protest has been increasingly institutionalised as a normal part of the political process, one which at the same time often results in police and protestors playing out the same interacting behavioural repertoires (i.e. tedious 'marches to nowhere') resulting in routinised, predictable events of diminishing impact. It is likely that protests generally had become less effective as some scholars argue (Everett, 1992) prior to the resurgence of transgressive protest at international summits, exemplified by Seattle in 1999. Secondly, as Boykoff (2006:204) observes, states have added to this diminishing impact due to their increasing ability to control the timing, locale and mode of social movement action. The resulting dilemma for activists is to find themselves in an arms race, one where they have to ceaselessly adapt to more exceptional, novel and hence newsworthy actions, whilst risking inflating and radicalising their rhetoric and militancy. Tarrow (1998:116) dissects this dilemma: "The influence of the media on the perception of movements' action is double-edged. On the one hand, a growing 'frame' of the media is that public life is corrupt, a point of view that is comfortable for readers and viewers because it justifies inaction or demobilisation. On the other hand, the interests of movement-mounted dramatic activities quickly fades for the media unless they change or escalate their routines. When protests escalate, the media will continue to offer coverage, but are quick to give priority to their violent of bizarre aspects." This logic was exemplified in the media scrum when RBS was broken into by a handful of protestors (I return to this 'performative violence' later in the ensuing chapters).

Getting this fine line wrong can come at the cost of media depreciation, and as is the case with the G20, leaves them open to powerful oppositional actors re-framing events and being rendered to
what Boykoff (2007) terms the 'violent frame' and the 'disruption frame'.\textsuperscript{93} Neither is the routine news frame acknowledged and articulated despite its centrality to the way news media discourse constructs social reality, to how events are made sense of (Scheufele, 1999). As Gitlin (1980:7) argues in his analysis of the media's role in undermining the American New Left during the Vietnam war, media frames are "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse, whether verbal or visual". Hoskins & Tulloch (2016:117) note the pervasiveness of this violent confrontation frame with its insistent focus on discord and confrontation in the press coverage. They cite the \textit{Times} article discussing the entirely peaceful 'Put the People First March' labelled as the "unobjectionable face" of the anti-G20 demonstrations. The journalists later go on to talk of the "fiery rhetoric of groups such as G20 Meltdown which threatened to hijack Saturday's event" calling on supporters to "invade an office block with lights on and turn them off to coincide with "Earth Hour," a worldwide "power down" (ibid, 2016:117) (part of a worldwide environmentalist campaign advocating ‘turn the lights off hour’, which was joined by public buildings such as Sydney Opera House, the Eiffel Tower and London's Millennium Wheel).

Whilst the traditional assumptions of news treatment regards its technical and organisational features (such as the constraints of concision, deadlines, editorial judgement etc.) a significant proportion of the resulting stories are attributable to MPS's intervention emphasising violent clashes. Such a frame jars with or challenges the 'injustice frame' groups are at pains to highlight (Gamson, 1992). Why should this be so? What the police did not know, and admitted to not knowing, was the expected size of the various demonstrations on the day. Whilst technically the police have a duty to facilitate lawful protests, the larger the presence of crowds, the more challenging the task. Measures which erode popular support would surely be welcomed, although this is not a sentiment that would be publicly aired, but nonetheless needs to be seriously considered as a motivating factor in explaining why the media briefings took the form they did. This is to bring the politics of protesting back in, and to question the professed neutrality of the police, with the accusation that they act as agents for de-mobilising (as well as disrupting) new insurgent social movements (I pick up on this theme later in my discussion). There are parallels here to Gitlin's (1980) American study, which emphasised the way the media's amplification of what was often symbolic or token violence, and its communication to students (whom likely lacked personal experience of violence) acted to frighten and discourage continuation with the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) movement. The same tactic is in evidence in these briefings, one which

\textsuperscript{93} These were two of five dominant frames (the others being; the 'Freak Frame', the 'Ignorance Frame' and the 'Amalgam of Grievances Frame') emerging from social movements and mass media coverage at the WTO protests in Seattle in 1999 and the World Bank/IMF protests in Washington, DC in 2000.
supplies a further advantage by acting as a disincentive to those less committed potential joiners to attend the protest events.

Any analysis of MPS's actions has to consider who stands to gain in the context of what is about to unfold. MPS would have been aware of the definitional power they hold as an authoritative expert source in moving issues they view as important onto the public agenda. This plays to an informational bias (rather than an ideological one) in journalism for 'authoritative sources' and what others have argued is a tacit drive to restore societal order (Bennett, 2002:45-50; Kielbowicz and Scherer, 1986:75-6). Having the 'hierarchy of credibility' allowed them to mobilise their key messages and play into predictable newsworthiness values of fear and 'violent anarchists', and away from richer understandings of social problems such movements were trying to address. This because the police have a powerful interest in exaggerating the threat posed by demonstrators and depicting imminent danger of dramatic proportions and instigating this particular moral panic. The police can and do use the media deceptively to manipulate public perceptions of the perceived threat to form a 'crisis consciousness' and enhance their own ideological resources in the expectation of consolidating their interests. Under such conditions, expanding and justifying new and coercive counter measures out of proportion to the threat posed and at the cost of citizen's integrity becomes that much easier. Key events such as such as international summits constitute one such opportunity. Under such conditions it becomes easier to 'normalise the exceptional', comprising both the perceived threat and the means of response (Flyghed, 2002:29) be it intrusive and concealed surveillance of demonstrators, disruption techniques or the militarisation of coercive control. Its long been recognised that the internal rationale of large bureaucracies is to preserve and legitimise the continued existence of the organisation (Emsley, 1996) and the police are no exception here. Presenting new threats in turn also requires new coercive measures and acts to further legitimise the police as an organisation and expand their activities (Benyon, 1996:370) here by exploiting and facilitating the distorting of the anarchist folk devil.

I also want to take this analysis one step further, building on Scholl's (2011) and Boykoff's (2007;2006) work, and argue that these early skirmishes form one component part of a wider strategy which draws on counter-insurgency theory and practices which are being fought against new social movements. In this sense the media briefings constitute a form of 'black or grey propaganda', achieved by feeding selected material to the press rather than the authorities publishing it themselves. This tactic has parallels with the same approach the Ministry of Defence
used in Ulster (see also Kitson, 1971). If this assertion is correct, then it would proceed on the basis of classic counter-insurgency theory, where insurgencies are seen as having three distinguishable phases which need to be countered. Firstly, the identification and isolation of hostile elements within the target population, secondly; the elimination of those elements and a favourable projection of the authorities forces (here the police), and lastly; consolidations of gains, negotiations towards amnesty and the winding down of hostilities (Watson, 1978:382). The psychops element comes into play at the end of this first phase, isolating the perceived hostile element in the minds of the wider populace, as evidenced in the MPSs briefings (Ibid., 1978; Gonzalez, 2009). I aim to develop this line of thought in the proceeding chapters.

4.5.2 Reflecting on the media landscape

Much previous social movement research has not explored the repressive role that the mass media can perform. This is despite recent scholarship elaborating a more multi-dimensional, variegated and hence satisfactory concept of repression, one capable of differentiating between different types rather than simply focusing on its severity. The lack of attention to the social control role of the media is an oversight when considering the run up to the G20 summit and the fact that all such summits attract considerable levels of national and international news coverage. It is these subtler operations undertaken by the various authority players that can be at least as devastating to protestors tactics as any other form of direct repression. Moreover, as a number of other scholars have found, the corporate media reinforce a neo-liberal hegemony through the persistent under-reporting of counter-global social movement actions (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) whilst actively defending neoliberal policies and ideas whilst discrediting social movement's critiques (Juris, 2005; Pleyers, 2010, in Scholl & Freyberg-Inan, 2013:622).

Lee & McGovern (2014) have recently argued that police organisations' media engagement has now become a form of operational policing. This can be clearly seen in SYP's 'crucial' media strategy mobilised with Sheffield's local authority and their contractor Amy and used to counter local tree protestors (STAG) accusations of police partisanship, allowing SYP to maintain the facade of neutrality (as discussed in the earlier literature review). The aim is what Carley (1997) terms 'opinion control' through deceptively structuring the media environment as a calculated means of facilitating policing purposes. The particular form the G20 briefings took all worked to the police's

95 I draw on Lt. Col B. R. Johnston’s construction of insurgency theory, whom Watson (1978:382) refers to as ‘Britain’s then foremost psywar expert.
96 Notable exceptions include Boykoff (2007); Gitlin (1980); Hallin (1986); and Kielbowicz and Scherer (1986).
97 For instance, see Earl (2003;2004); Boykoff (2006, 2007).
advantage. A largely complaint and willing corporate media ran verbatim with the story, one which coalesced with its own hegemonic routines and biases. It also exploited the transgressive movements' political vulnerabilities and weaknesses, one which was skilfully manipulated at the outset by MPS. The result is to suppress political dissent through stigmatising and de-legitimising transgressive protest groups, with the added intention to pre-emptively neutral any anticipated criticism from protestor, allies and bystander public's reaction to inflammatory police practices contained in MPS's contingency planning tool box. This 'mode of suppression' (Boykoff, 2006, 2007) constitutes a form of 'grey propaganda' to create and sustain an overarching negative image of dissident social movements. As Boykoff (2006:200) has argued, the likely affect is to weaken or undermine a number of necessary preconditions for collective action and lead to demobilisation; not just the morale or commitment of adherents, but more crucially, the support of that far wider cohort of sympathetic bystander publics situated on the fringes of collaborative engagement and participation. Intimidation is also a complimentary mechanism of repression, which operates at the individual and group level, where potential joiners undertake a natural cost benefit analysis and ask themselves what could happen to me on the streets if I get involved in dissent? Here, risking exposure to mass violence and disorder which has its own deterrent dimension. The same question can also be posed at the level, and future, of a social movement.

This is one element in a catalogue of repressive tactics to increase the costs of social movement participation. As Koopmans argues (2005:161) repression also carries important deterrence and socialisation components. One of the aims of legal state punishment is both general and specific deterrence (deterring the offender from re-offending and the wider public from potentially offending). Nagin (1978:96) defines general deterrence as the "imposition of sanctions on one person [to] demonstrate to the rest of the public the expected costs of a criminal act, and thereby discourage criminal behaviour in the general population." General deterrence is about projecting a tangible threat (a sanction) by 'shaping people’s perceptions' of consequences should they exceed the boundaries of acceptable behaviour (Bahry & Silver, 1987:1067). Boykoff (2007:300) notes the resultant shift, away from the external goals of political action to look internally, to a consideration of how the state will respond to one’s political beliefs, acting as a brake on activism. The more effective the intimidation mechanism, so will the need to rely on direct police violence lessen.

Understandably all of these nefarious motives remain concealed, aided by the arms length distance between police media relations offices’ and receptive journalists and editor’s regards plausible deniability. The police, far from being neutral arbiters in the media environment, are active players who work to disempower and demobilise the G20 social movements. This is the case when examining Operation Glencoe. However, the later ‘struggle over images’ took a further and
unexpected turn for MPS. They hadn't bargained for the ‘difference a death makes’ from the killing of Ian Tomlinson at the hand of a riot policeman's baton. This was exposed through 'citizen journalism' and today's more complex media ecology of 'vertical communication flows' (Bennett, 2003; Cottle, 2006) later picked up by mainstream (horizontal) media. The unexpected event was to severely disrupted the careful police image management and the establishments master media narrative of ‘protestor violence’ shifted over night to ‘police violence’. This brought back in the political contestation of the spectacle. It visualised the earlier discursive contention and brought legitimacy to the claims making of insurgent groups, one which assumed the durable master frame. Most problematic for the authorities, it not only resonated within social movements, but more importantly, across sections of wider public sentiment to profound effect (I elaborate on this development in the next chapter).

4.6 Interim Conclusion

Thus far I have argued that the authority players entered into extensive preparations prior to the G20 summit taking place in central London. These preparations were primarily aimed at inhibiting, controlling, delimiting and crucially pacifying the much anticipated social movement activism which the presence of the G20 summit would bring in its wake. These efforts take a multiple of forms, one of which that I have concentrated on is also its most visible aspect, the command and control of space through security zoning practices and site selection and fortification. The principle aim here is to entirely inoculate the summit proceedings from any visible or auditory impression that there is active dissent taking place in opposition to it. This is engineered in by design and to ensure strategic advantage when protest occurs, and ruthlessly enforced (with deadly force if necessary). The control of space is a central aspect in the social control of dissent at the G20, one designed to try and deal with decentralised, non-hierarchical, network based and transgressive social movements.

I have also argued that the authority’s preparations for the G20 included an active media strategy with the explicit intention of creating an unfavourable public image of protestors, one which can be considered an integral element of its operational policing plan. Propagating image damaging information of protestors through friendly press contacts carried a number of advantages, principally the aim of inhibiting recruitment and mobilisation from that far broader pool of sympathetic potential joiners by increasing the perceived costs of participation. These highly useful tactics also carry the advantage of deniability.

Other tactics include a significant increase in overt police surveillance of protestors (and their infrastructure) in the days leading up to the summit. Whilst the authority player tactics are
multifaceted and assertive, they are also 'counter-insurgency infused', and ultimately aimed at disrupting and undermining political dissent from challenger groups.

Relating these early preparatory stages back to Marx's (1979) and Boykoff's (2007) typology, we can see that the authority players overtly (and no doubt covertly) surveil and gather information on the movement, in part as a harassment function but also to disturb and decrease any sense of anonymity. Creating an unfavourable public image of the transgressive social movements and counter ideology also aims to damage recruitment and inhibit popular support and damage protestor morale. A point which coheres with Boykoff's (2007:292-3) mass media manipulation through 'story implantation' (here to a willing audience) and 'mass media depreciation' by negative framing.98 This implies that the depicted radical groups are deserving of punishment, and through (here ideological) linking, makes the group more vulnerable to state repression.

Protestors also make extensive preparations, which involve strategies which anticipate manoeuvres and tactics by authority players in order to try and wrestle the initiative and gain advantage on the streets, although this is far from being an equal contest. In the next chapter I discuss my observational study of the anti-G20 protests and how they were policed.

98 A ‘frame’ is ‘an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment’ (Snow & Benford, 1992, cited in Boykoff, 2007:128).
CHAPTER 5. Observational Study of the G20 Protests

Thus far I have outlined some of the early interactions between the authority and protestor players in the preparatory stages to the G20 summit. Each of the respective groups are strategising to gain a strategic advantage in the forthcoming main event of the protest actions on the streets. This includes some of the subtler and quieter ways authority players seek to maximise their control and repress political dissent, in part through mass media manipulation and ‘black propaganda’ for opinion control early on. The authority player’s efforts were aimed at three principle audiences; sympathisers of the anti-globalisation movement, targets of the anti-globalisation for mobilisation and the wider public. This next chapter builds on these by focusing on the protest events surrounding the G20 and the police and protestor tactics and practices. My purpose is two-fold; to give an account of how the policing operation unfolded, the tactical repertoire of the authorities as betrayed by their actions on the streets, and my own and others eye witness accounts of police practices. I want to throw light on the mechanisms of social control used against social movements and the Action Modes (Boykoff, 2007) and other inhibiting strategies (Marx, 1979) utilised to do so during the protests themselves. Necessarily this now requires reporting on the protest policing practices themselves to identify them, which again take both subtle and unsubtle forms. For instance, when they occur, violent beatings are readily observable, but far more problematic for the authorities, they are recordable and transmittable to a wide array of audiences. There are a number of inter-related issues which arise from these observations, only some of which were examined by the raft of official enquiries into the G20 policing operation (examined in Chapter 7).

Five action modes of state repression were in evidence at the G20 summit and worked through four interactive mechanisms: Resource Depletion, Stigmatisation, Divisive Disruption, and Intimidation. These action modes were; Direct Violence (by police assault and aggression, aided by police officers without ID, including hiding ID); Harassment and Harassment Arrests (including pre-emptive police actions, notably at convergence spaces); Extraordinary Rules and Laws (here legal repression and I include here obstruction of legal observers and members of the press as well as misuse of legal powers including anti-terrorism legislation); Surveillance; Infiltration, and the Use of Agents Provocateurs.

One difficulty for Boykoff’s typology is where kettling (often without warning and no provision or opportunity for the contained to leave, including destruction of protestor property fits into his typology or indeed Marx’s more fine grained account. Considering that partitioning and isolation served such a crucial purpose in Operation Glencoe, this appears to be a difficulty (I return to this in my concluding chapter).
5.1 Demolishing Protestor Infrastructure: The G20 convergence centre raids

MPS conducted a series of paramilitary armed raids on protestor convergence centres (places where protestors could meet, eat and sleep) being used by activists. MPS did not have a search warrant and claimed they were acting under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The raided premises were an occupied derelict pub in Shoreditch on the 31st; and the Earl Street centre and the Rampart Street Community Arts Centre on the 2nd April, (see Map 2) reportedly using 240 police in full riot gear with shields and batons, some of whom were armed with laser sighted tasers. I was staying at the Earl Street G20 convergence centre when the raid occurred at midday on the 2nd April (when activists were organising to leave and resume protesting).

Approximately 70 riot police were deployed, being a similar number to the protestors inside the centre. The street was sealed off on both sides with uniformed police in serials wearing high visibility vests (but without riot gear) with further reserves held in LDV convoy vans preventing anyone from approaching or getting a good view of the proceedings. Some nine evidence gathering police, several with digital camcorders filming congregated in front of the convergence centre (although this had been a permanent presence for several days). A Jankel black armoured plated truck was also used to block the other end of the street in keeping with the extreme militarised costume of the ranks of riot police below. Fieldnotes detail some of the panicked reactions inside the convergence centre to this unfolding scene:

Several activists immediately spotted them as they started coming down the street, but tensions have been high for hours before by more evidence gathering officers appearing also heightened police activity in adjacent street. People know something is up [...] Lots of activists are hanging out of the widow to get a better look. All police are in full riot gear now and gathering in serial outside. Sure sign of a raid. Lots of shouting in CC ... 'What the fuck .. they must think were fucking terrorists.' [looking down at street] .. Everyone is in a panic, several voices shouting about what was rehearsed for police raid. (G20-A16, G20 Fieldnotes).

The scale of the operation and its militarised form caused further consternation from activists looking down on the unfolding scene. As the police ranks in full riot gear amassed outside, several activists tried to speak to the police (from the vantage point of the first floor of the building onto the street below)

Several people shouting out of CC to police now, trying to get their attention. 'Are any of the riot police willing to negotiate peacefully or are you just going to break into our building and evict all of us illegally.' No response from senior officers or evidence gathers at scene. No

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99 Personal correspondence, Bindmans solicitors.
100 This figure was for the combined operation as reported in the Evening Standard newspaper, I counted some 70 riot police backed up a similar number of uniformed police at the Earl Street centre.
Map 2: Earl Street Convergence Centre and its central Position to City of London Protest Targets
Map 3: City of London Climate Camp Kettle and Bank of England Kettle Locations
officers moving or makes any attempt step back and open dialogue. Serials forming tighter
outside CC entrance, some with batons drawn [my view partly obstructed]. Appears MPS
determined to use forceful entry (why?) (G20- A17, G20 Fieldnotes)

The officers ignored attempts by protestors to open a dialogue. In a vain attempt to protect the
convergence centre and those inside it, some activists blockaded the main doors, a tactic which
only forestalled the inevitable.

*Picture 3: MPS Block-off Street and Riot Police Prepare to Storm Earl Street Convergence
Centre whilst Activists Vainly Try to Negotiate to No Avail*

Once the scene unfolded there was a restrained panic, protestors were very much aware of their
impending peril and fearful of being beaten up by the police on the pretence that they were either
resisting arrest or posed a threat to the officers. This despite none of us being armed with any
weapons or having any protective equipment which would allow anyone to offer any resistance to
heavily equipped riot police. Some planning had been discussed in respect of an anticipated police
raid but it was clear to us what the primary objective of the police was now going to be. There were
to be no parameters allowed for any negotiation, only an authoritarian response:
No invitations to dialogue by MPS, no response to our dialogue, all rejected (not verbally). Smashing sounds downstairs, MPS breaking in. Shouting inside CC, 'Down, down, down..' (unknown activists). Everyone running for first floor option re raid scenario. (G20 Fieldnotes).

All but a couple of the protestors including myself congregated onto the first floor (mostly used as the main sleeping area) sat down in a circle, then held up our hands in the air, that way we felt there could be no excuses for the police to consider us as posing a violent threat which would allow them to over react.

The police smashed the door in using a battering ram, and proceeded to storm the building.

All protestors gathered on the first floor now. Scores of heavily tooled up police in full riot gear with shields and batons run through the building and up the stairs. As they burst into the building we were confronted with officers screaming "All of you down, get on the floor, get on the floor" conducted with their shields and batons raised to us, faces concealed with black balaclavas and visors. This was being screamed to protestors who were indeed sat on the floor, arms raised. There were two individuals who were standing (despite remonstrations from many to sit down), one positioned close to the door trying to see what was happening, another back from it, both with their arms fully raised and hands open in a sign of surrender. As first officer enters the room he immediately assaults the young man standing the other side of the doorway, striking him several times with a baton until he fell to the floor, then kneeling on his back as he was in a prone position, baton and shield raised to strike him again. This assault takes place without provocation and is witnessed by several other officers who were directly behind said officer. All protestors are shouting complaints having witnessed this assault. The next two riot police race into the room with taser guns101 drawn with red laser sights aimed at us as we sit, again screaming "All of you down, get on the floor, get on the floor", then as it (slowly) occurred to them that we were indeed on the floor, they shouted ‘face down', face down'. (G20 Fieldnotes)

The practice just described in my fieldnotes is in contravention of police guidelines on the use of tasers. It was clear that the overriding police commitment was to smash their way into the convergence centre. As more riot police entered the room, protestors who were sat motionless, arms above them with open palms, were then needlessly assaulted:

Protestors who are sat on the floor being physically pushed to a prone position, faces forced down onto the floor, limbs outstretched, many with officer's putting their knees into protestors backs whilst holding batons raised ready to strike them. No protestor is physically resisting. Protestors are all cuffed with plastic handcuff speed cable tie straps whilst in a prone position, then searched, and then questioned. Each is forced to provide names, addresses, dates of birth (DOB) and to submit to being filmed by MPS’s Forward Intelligence Team (FIT) who appear integral to this operation. (G20 Fieldnotes).

This data gathering exercise at the insistence of officers occurred despite there being no lawful requirement to provide a DOB or to be photographed, a point that officers would have been aware

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101 A taser is a weapon which delivers a series of 50,000 volt charges when triggered.
of. Once MPS had taken control of the convergence centre, the protestors were then marched outside:

All protestors are detained and forced to sit on the pavement curb, stood over by the same riot police in the raid. Two people are arrested, and one taken to receive hospital treatment from injuries sustained as a result of police violence. (G20 fieldnotes)

Whilst these raids were not a surprise to the activists, who had noticed the overt police surveillance taking place for several days, it was nonetheless disturbing to be subjected to such a heavy handed police action. From both observing and talking to people after the event it was clear that many were visibly shaken from the experience, although the more prevalent emotion was anger.

Picture 4: Overwhelming Force: Detained Activists (Handcuffed) After Armed Police Paramilitary Raid on Earl Street Convergence Centre\(^{102}\)

\(^{102}\) Image: Steve Butler Photographer.
I was not present at the Rampart social centre in Whitechapel, East London or the convergence spaces at the old Shoreditch pub. My later discussion with four other activists who were using the Rampart social centre (triangulated with media reports) showed that near identical tactics were used by MPS:

Met raided us, they were well up for it. [...] I don’t know how many mate .. [officers]. Usual Met .. we were all ... everyone was chucked out. Totally illegal, no warrant, nothing.[...] (G20-A22, fieldnotes)

[...] They definitely had tasers out when they bust in, I saw one for sure, and my girlfriend did, she was with me in the back [...] totally unnecessary, I mean ... they just want to do us, you know, we’re all getting the treatment. (G20-A23, fieldnotes)

Armed riot police broke into the centre, again entering with tasers drawn, violently forcing all inside to lie on the floor, and with the same information capture procedures by FIT. The police had been told that they could enter by knocking if they had a warrant to search the premises, again such opportunities were ignored in favour of forcible entry to the building.

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103 Image: Steve Butler Photographer

104 I was not able to speak to any activists who had first-hand experience of this police raid.

105 Activist G20: A21; A16; A24; A15.
The police justification for these violent raids was that they were based on 'police intelligence', claiming that they had picked out some of the people they viewed as responsible for causing the previous day's violence who were using the squats to sleep and returning to the centres. On this account the raids were an effort to apprehend these identified suspects, although crucially the number of suspects is not provided. In another account which widens the net still further, Superintendent Roger Evans (interviewed by the Metro newspaper) said that police had been hoping to match photographs of 'troublemakers' and 'ringleaders' from the previous day. As Evans noted:

"We have had officers keeping this building under overt surveillance. Our intelligence teams have been watching this [premises] for the last two days. I don't know exactly how many people were inside but it's around 70 so far. There are all sorts of people inside. People with piercings, people without piercings, people with dogs – the sort of people you might expect to find at a pop festival."

What is not clear from these justifications is the necessity or proportionality of the raids and the manner in which they were conducted. It also begs a number of further questions. As the convergence centres were under surveillance, and MPS had photographs of suspects, why didn't officers simply apprehend said individuals as they were entering and leaving the premises, most conveniently surreptitiously in adjoined streets? Alternatively, ask them to come out or have uniformed officers enter and arrest them, with backup in reserve if it proved necessary? Why were armed paramilitary raids used as a first resort rather than a last option when such raids involve subjecting all protestors to a protracted, frightening and dangerous experience, notwithstanding the considerable financial costs incurred?

It took a legal case against MPS by Bindmans Solicitors on behalf of several arrestees, and nearly one year later, to prove that the MPS raid had been unlawful on the Earl Street venue. The court proceedings revealed that not one of the activists in the centre matched any of MPS FITs intelligence photos taken from the previous day, contrary to the original claims of having such operational intelligence made by Chief Superintendent Michael Johnson. This forced the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to concede the operation had been unlawful as no reasonable grounds for suspicion existed. He also had to concede that it had been unlawful to arrest, to search, and to force activists to be recorded on film. The case resulted in compensation payments of £3,000 to each of the two claimants. Later civil cases relating to charges of false imprisonment and

unlawful assault saw a further 66 claimants totalling damages compensation payments by MPS of £207,135 (not including costs of £139,051).\textsuperscript{109} The Earl street raid represented a rare victory for protestors, whereas legality of the other raids are in question but were not challenged due to the difficulty and costs of doing so.

What then explains MPSs practice of conducting raids on these convergence centres if it was unlawful? Why target this group? Any viable explanation has to consider the role of strategic intent and discount the false 'offenders at large' justification. Added to this, even if the operational intelligence had been correct, which it wasn't, the scale and violent tactics of the raids created a major confrontation and were entirely disproportionate to the supposed threats, as well as criminalising all those inside the centres. Neither is it creditable that the many attending FIT officers sophisticated intelligence gathering operation simply got it entirely wrong across each protestors cohort.

The real purpose of the raids and subsequent closures of the convergence centres were part of a wider concerted plan to sabotage and degrade vital protestor infrastructure in order to frustrate and negate the protestor's capacity to mount protest actions. This only becomes apparent when applying the conceptual lens of a tactical repertoire and also conceiving of the summit protest region spatially, one mapped more as a frontline arena between two opposing groups, that of police and protestors. The stories peddled to the media by senior officer’s function as a convenient cover, and one for public consumption, which handily lends an air of legitimacy and legality to violent police action. Protestors had publicised maps showing over 138 targets of protest in central London (including fifty financial institutions), foreshadowing the possibility of smaller groups peeling off from the main body of a demonstration to seek out these sites to mount a protest action. As Scholl (2012:112) has argued also, when protestors construct convergence centres they are trying to organise alternatives safe spaces to intervene in what are the spatial and security preparations of the authorities, whereas the police pre-emptively organise space in the interests of hegemonic elites, with the purpose of ensuring that they are entirely free of any form of dissent. That is their over-riding goal and raison d'être. Each player has elaborate tactical plans, no more so than those of the authorities, and their main agents, the police. These will take the form of extensive pre-planning for contingencies as well as adapting to the ongoing dynamics of disruptive challenges from insurgent protestors (as opposed to respectable protestors) who as challengers lack any institutionalised power.

\textsuperscript{109} Information derived from personal correspondence with Bindmans Solicitors and also Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2011020002496 'G20 Civil case settlements' WhatDoTheyKnow https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/g20_civil_case_settlements#incoming-171909
MPS would have been well aware that convergence centres function as a centralised organisational core to transgressive social movements. It provides essential facilities such as sleeping areas, food kitchens, information points, meeting and planning rooms. The premises also hold independent media centres allowing protestors to communicate real-time updates to active protest actions and to disseminate counter summit arguments to the wider mass media. In addition to these core functions, centres can act as training and education centres as well as providing legal support facilities. The importance of such convergence centres lies in allowing the flexible co-ordination and diffusion of political actions as well as a space for retreat, recovery and to de-stress after actions. It also allows activists to network, share ideas and vitally, to align with groups within the larger political environment in order to sustain and grow the social movement. Research by McAdam (1986) on recruitment to ‘high risk/cost activism’ shows the crucial importance of these micro-structural factor for participants (as opposed to ‘withdrawals’) who have stronger and more extensive ties to other participants, as well as more organisational affiliations (and higher levels of prior activism) irrespective of people’s ideological commitment to a cause. In McAdam's (1986:88) words, integration into a supportive network is the ‘structural pull’ encouraging individuals to make good on their strongly held beliefs. In short, interpersonal ties matter more than anything else for participation. The tactical status and damage of the raids take on added importance when considering this recruitment dynamic. MPS wanted to deprive activists of this capacity to organise and grow, importantly from a vantage point situated in central London.

This disruption and neutralisation process is best conceived as an established tactical adaption (McAdam, 1983) by the authorities, which takes two basic forms: (1) Raiding and destroying protestor infrastructure, which has occurred at other international summit convergence centres, for instance in Prague at the 2000 IMF/WB; at the EU summit at Goteborg 2001 at the Hvitfeldtska School; at the G8 in Genoa 2001 and at the2003 G8 in Evian independent media centre squat in Geneva; Or (2) a strategy of containment at convergence centres, as in the 2005 G8 summit in Glenneagles, where the camp was surrounded during the night and following day by police, requiring activists to find ways out without being snatched by police, and similarly at the 2007 G8 at Heiligendamm, (Starr et al, 2011:40). Later, at the G8 in 2013, the London convergence centre was similarly violently raided and smashed by MPS on the dubious legal pre-text of searching for weapons.110

Such raids also provide the added advantage of conducting a 'proactive' intelligence collection trawl on all of the centres occupants, here pre-planned, to glean personal details which otherwise could not be obtained by the existing overt surveillance practices of FIT. Names, addresses and DOB allow

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110 I was staying at the convergence centre and observing the G8 policing operation.
cross tabulation with PNC and also with other databases on activists. Once the address of the Shoreditch convergence centre was made available online, police started stopping and searching protestors going in and out of the centre, indicating their close monitoring of protestor websites and efforts to harass and intimidate protestors. This included searching protestors wallets and pulling out bank and other cards to obtain protestors names as well as searching protestors under the Prevention of Terrorism Act:

We’ve been stopped twice now up by the C, so’s [protestor name], but I’ve heard same from others their do’in it ... really going into everything, my wallet, the lot, looking for anything, pulling my card to ID me, not supposed to, all under PTA. (G20-A18, fieldnotes)

This practice is a misuse of Sec 60 powers and anti-terrorism legislation more generally but forms part of a predetermined policy of de facto identity checks and retention. This provides rich corroborated intelligence not just on individuals, but on the social network itself, which feeds into MPSs existing data integration and analysis in the National Intelligence Model (NIM) which integrates open source, closed source and classified (image and signals intelligence) sources. This intelligence provides the raw materials to implement the 'control strategy' that the NIM identifies as an integral component, one in which 'disruption' and 'network demolition' are emphasised (Swain, 2013) (I discuss the role of surveillance practices in Chapter 6 below).

There is a further psychological dimension to the raids, in this sense it represents a psychological operation to demotivate, demoralise and disempower activists and to exact retribution. This is the reason why the raids took the violent form they did, and why overwhelming force was deployed in such an aggressive manner. This is both a product of the institutional policy within TSG operations (to dominate the space physically and verbally upon entry and 'neutralise' all within that space) as well as the growing militarisation of public order policing which instils a 'warfare mentality', or more accurately here, a terrorist mentality. Terrorising protestors inside the convergence centre as happened in Genoa (in even more extreme circumstances) was a deliberate act by MPS.

The postscript to this affair was the call by Binmans Solicitors for the Police Commissioner to provide not just an admission of liability (which was unavoidable having lost the case) but a public apology for having conducted the raid. This was refused, with the Met stating that admission of liability was sufficient. At interview by the Evening Standard, Johnson's opening line was to say that "People have a right to lawful protests but we will take action against those intent on violence". Those intent on violence were not the protestors, rather it was the state's own uniformed players. Indeed, there is also some anecdotal evidence indicating how some participating officers viewed the police’s massive G20 operation as an opportunity to attack protestors. For instance, the Observer newspaper (Townsend & Doward, 2009) reported that an MPS officer had boasted in a police blog
entry about 'the unwashed getting a good kicking' at the G20 protests (posted a day after the death of Ian Tomlinson), whilst another (this time identified officer) bragged about how he was going to 'bash some long-haired hippies' at the G20 demonstrations. Such statements of malicious intent proved to be ominous.

5.2 Analysis of the G20 Protest Events: Isolate and Separate

5.2.1 Docile bodies: 'Put People First March for Jobs, Justice and Climate'

The 'Put People First March for Jobs, Justice and Climate' march took place the weekend before the G20 summit started. It was heralded by organisers to be directed at the G20 leaders and to give 'ordinary people a voice' in expressing their anger at the policies of austerity and environmental destruction. The 'march' was well attended with an estimated 35,000, made up of a 'rainbow alliance' of some one hundred and fifty different organisations being represented, primarily trades unions, charities, environmental and church groups. As such it represented the largest single demonstration which took place over the ensuing days. The TUC had been one of the organising bodies, with the event organisers having liaised with police prior to the march regards the route and timing of the demonstration. The event was billed as a 'peaceful, law-abiding event suitable for all the family' (Put People First, 2009) although there remained a large policing presence to ensure that no splintering or surprises occurred from the route. In essence, the event involved gathering together, marching through the assigned streets, displaying signs of shared commitment and making a series of claims on the authorities, mostly by a series of speeches at the end.

Approximately 200 police identified 'anarchists' and anti-capitalists had joined this demonstration, who had been the subject of considerable surveillance activity and monitoring over several weeks by police 'Evidence Gathering' officers.111

The march was allowed with the smaller and somewhat conspicuous (by mostly dark colour dress) 'anarchist orientated' contingent that moved within it. This subgroup became the focal point of police attention, with riot officers walking within the crowd to delineate them from the mass of protestors. Stewards made no signs of objections to this [that I saw] who continued to urge march forwards, or to PLO’s. (G20 Fieldnotes).

This dominant style of policing jars with the emphasis on 'facilitating' the march. The police tactic was to undertake another policing operation within this larger operation, one which engulfed and isolated those that also joined the protest within a paramilitary presence. This saw riot police inserting themselves within the body of the march where they proceeded to surround those predominantly dressed in black garb, physically separating them from the other protesters. Such a tactic aims to contain, isolate and separate police identified 'radicals' from the other activists. It is of

111 G20-A25; G20-A26; G20-A28.
course unusual to see police officers embedded within a march and in effect marching with protestors. The usual practice at such events is to contain the march by using phalanx’s and police lines along the (here negotiated) route, whilst blocking off side streets and other avenues which offer the potential for splintering of the demonstration. As such, it can be seen as an elaboration of an earlier police tactic of separating and isolating demonstrations from the larger public, where the police surround the march and prevent any intermingling. Fernandez (2005:247) argues that this tactic stems from the North American experience of responding to decentralised affinity based tactics such as ‘snake marches’ (where protestors have refused to negotiate a permit and hence an approved controlled route) snake in and out of streets. The tactical response is for the police to surround the march, separating it from the wider public, and then insert police lines to break the march into smaller units, separating protestors from each other. As with the ‘Put People First March’, protestors are both contained and also isolated. This method of spatial social control has parallels with Foucault’s (1979) writings on disease control, where the identified infectious agent must be prevented from cross-contaminating the larger body through the strict control and division of space. As such the population is carefully inspected, surveilled, proportioned and channelled. This practice of deliberately fragmenting and isolating some protestors, physically excluding them from the mass of others acts to inhibit that shared purpose. Such practices cohere with Boykoff’s (2007) ‘divisive disruption’ a social mechanism of repression which acts to narrow dissident possibilities by fracturing them. Boykoff’s typology of repression stems from his work in the USA and is not particular to internal summit protests but does concern social movements.112 This practice was not met with any resistance from other groupings taking part in the march and appeared to be pre-arranged with the event organisers.

5.2.2 The Climate Camp: Bodies that matter

The Climate Camp represented the main form of protestor direct action during the anti-G20 summit, the occurrence of which pre-empted the most violent police instigated confrontation with protestors. The camp started at approximately 12:30pm in Bishopsgate moving out from massing swoop points around central London with pop up tents being hastily erected to block what would otherwise be a busy road, followed by sound systems, a food stall with a kitchen and other associated activities that had been planned with teach-in sessions. There were some one thousand plus people attending the camp, many were first time protestors who had taken part in Direct Action Training. For the first few hours all was going to plan with the camp being established and its activities in full swing. What happened next is worthy of some attention:

At 5pm police in riot gear with batons and shields start to surround the climate camp from both the north and south sides. Serials are simultaneously hemming the camp in on both sides assisted by using rows of police vans nose to tail (with engines running) and riot police several police officers deep, carrying round shields and batons. Protestor movement now prevented. No-one is being allowed in or out of camp. Tensions visibly rising as awareness of police tactic grows. Camp protestors are either in the camp with others on the periphery who are (unwisely) standing up facing the riot police lines. (G20 fieldnotes)

As the police cordons unfolded, I had many discussions with other protestors on the edge of the camp to gather information, one protestor told me that he had asked the besieging officers why the climate camp was being kettled, one replied:

"I don't have to give you an explanation because I am acting on information which is not available to you." Another police officer claimed: "There's been violence inside the Camp." states that this was then followed up with a bit of a laugh with him conceding he had lied. When challenged as to whether this was an acceptable way to conduct policing the officer simply laughed and said "Yes it is." (G20-A24, fieldnotes)

[Keetle 1] Reports that several protestors who tried to engage the police in amicable conversation, stating they should be free to come and go, have been grabbed aggressively and arrested for 'obstructing a public highway.' Appears to be highly antagonistic mentality amongst TSG. (G20-A25, fieldnotes)

Towards the front of the cordon, many police (but not all) were wearing balaclavas under the riot helmets which hid their faces from view. From my limited vantage point I surveyed several without any identification numbers and reported this to a climate camp Legal Observer, at least one then put an identification number onto the jacket during this stand off period. It is not clear how many others were without identification, but other protestors confirmed seeing other officers without identification.

The next key development occurred a little later, about 7pm as the police closed the cordon. Approximately some 30 minutes after this we learn the police baton charge ('dispersal' is the policing term) on the Bank of England protest:

[7pm] the demonstration besieged by police (6 to 8 deep) and forcibly kettles with stand-off. Atmosphere in the camp now completely changed, very tense as protestors looked on at phalanx's of tooled up riot police. In response many protestors are chanting "this is not a riot", holding up their hands to show that they held no weapons. I can see in several places the police starting to forcibly advance into ranks of confined protestors with shields and batons. Inexplicable? One squad wearing high vis jackets (appear to constitute a distinct unit) surge forward at the far end, this is achieved by a combination of pushing protestors with their shields and striking people with batons. (G20-fieldnotes)

Despite the fact that protestors were trying to flee this violent police surge, they were faced with little room for manoeuvre as these units continued apace:
Baton strikes are taking two forms in this early stage of the high visibility advancing group; a minority of officers at the front are wildly striking down, with the baton held high striking full arch to low blows aimed at those protestors directly around them, particularly protestors arms which were outstretched in efforts to keep distance between themselves and this advancing police line. These is also a combination of some protestors standing their ground and remonstrating with the police and others falling back in this melee, whilst other officers are aiming their batons at the lower parts of people's bodies (midriff and upper thighs). (G20 fieldnotes)

These police actions had a predictable impact, alarming protestors, but also enraging them. With the TSG units continuing to carve this path through the camp, several protestors rather uselessly kicked out at the advancing police line, only for these token gestures to be more directly targeted by baton blows. Police shields were also deployed as offensive weapons in other parts of the police lines surging forward:

Officers are using their shields as offensive weapons [note not defensive], this ranging from ramming people with the blunt front of the shield, including several police taking run ups of three or four steps back and then repeatedly charging to gain greater momentum to increase the impact of the blow, with the effect of sending increasingly penned in protestors flying. I see several others turning their shields to use the edge of the shield as a cutting weapon on their strikes in arced blows. But minority of officers in this forward frontline acting in this way. The side shield strikes are directed at particular protestor's faces that the officer had targeted. This was visible to numerous other officers in that immediate vicinity, although I saw none intervening or remonstrating with those responsible. Throughout this embattlement, protestors are standing with hands raised, calling out “this is not a riot”. As the batons blows come down, climate camp legal observers are shouting for protestors to take the police ID numbers, whereupon, and on masse, the serial of police I saw all covered up their badges and continued apace with baton blows. (G20-fieldnotes)

The other main tactic employed by officers conducting the kettle saw them using shields as a wall to violently push protestors back, both as they advanced, and towards anyone considered too close in proximity to their ranks, this interspersed with intermittent baton strikes. This betrays the violent nature in which the police kettle is both established and maintained:

Protestors on facing the police lines were getting badly hurt. I can see several protestors with their heads cracked open, one with a broken nose. The other police tactic in evidence is kicking and punching protestors, including women. This is happening all around me. I see one kicked women in the groin. Some occurrences of small number of protestors throwing water or plastic bottles at police lines as an act of symbolic defiance, along with much remonstrating. (G20 fieldnotes)

What the police are met with during this cordon is best described as disobedient bodies, but which have their own political grammar, one which takes a form of a civil disobedience despite facing overwhelming opposing odds. The resulting shifting mêlée sees many protestors as a collective using their bodies and their vulnerabilities as a central tool of protest. But these are not protected
bodies, unlike that of the heavily armoured riot police. The protestor’s bodies are inherently vulnerable, they have no padding or protection, it is almost through making their bodies visible, with raised arms in the air and open palms, men and women, young and old, that the bodies become a form of non-confrontational direct action (Scholl, 2012:90). As I observed through my own experience, this creates a predicament for the police which is played out at the micro level each facing off each.

This volatility continued as the kettle continues to tighten and the main vanguard of police continue to push forward:

Officers in high visibility jackets using shields pushing protestors in a tightening kettle with little space. At this point there are shouts of ‘sit down, sit down’, whereupon several hundred protestors try to sit down, people linking arms in resolve. The tactic momentarily slows the police advance, but police then start hauling individuals up and out of the crowd, grabbing them by their arms, legs, with one man being yanked up by his ear.\textsuperscript{113} As the baton charge proceeds it now becomes more disorderly, police are charging people and striking people faster than they can escape from the blows in the ensuing melee, this includes striking people’s heads (numerous protestors with bleeding head wounds around me) rather than striking the upper parts of their legs and torso’s. Panicked crowd, people are screaming and shouting, including verbal abuse at the advancing police line. There is a crush to escape the oncoming ranks of police leaving others being pushed to the ground, who are in turn more vulnerable to being batoned, kicked or punched by the advancing police line. (G20-fieldnotes)

The pre-planned nature of the intention to kettle the climate camp was apparent from the far earlier deployment of lines of police vans (n=20) parked on the eastside. This acted to create a walkway on the pavement, one which was effectively separated from the camp, and allowed an easy access route for the police to push on through that side, and then once assembled in police lines, to move protestors out from there. This sits uneasily with the police’s account (discussed more fully in section 5.5) that they were reacting to violent minority threat from within the camp.

At around 11pm the climate camp was violently evicted, protestor’s tents were deliberately trampled, tables overturned and police used bolt cutters to dismantle the bike barricades which had formed a barrier between protestors and phalanx’s of police. The infrastructure of the camp is wilfully destroyed and discarded to be disposed of by the authorities. As with the earlier convergence centre raids, the kettle serves several functions, an opportunity to inflict violence on protestors in what at times appeared to be a ‘police riot’ (Stark, 1972) as well as acting as a valuable mandatory intelligence gathering tool:

\textsuperscript{113}This is an old police tactic that I have seen on other demonstrations where protestors sit down and link arms. The pain becomes intolerable and the protestor is forced to unlink arms to protect their ear from being ripped off or damaged.
After a long wait with riot police aggressively maintaining the kettle, protesters are eventually released singly or in pairs, (announcement made by MPS people finally to be phased released from kettle singly or in pairs after 'giving details to officers.' as a condition of release) (some garbled sound from hailer). Each person is being forced to be searched, have to provide identification (this is recorded) are then being photographed by FIT, and some are being required to delete images of police from their cameras. (I'm viewing this from the line, and this appears to be taking place) 'When we were going out they wanted to go through my camera, one of the sergeants, otherwise we were told we couldn't leave ...' (G20-A28, fieldnotes)

This containment for the information trawl was not as thorough as perhaps MPS had intended, for instance:

Any refusal to comply with MPS's intelligence gathering efforts results in not being allowed to leave and being pushed back. The protesters are visibly tired, battered and fed up. There is a sense in the crowd of rage and dejection. Everyone wants to leave. Not all going to plan for MPS however, seems the intention had been to require every protester to undergo this interrogation but I saw that at least some protestors manage to evade this. (G20, fieldnotes)

With members of the climate camp now being slowly released through police serials from the cordon in one's or two's, and with camp being destroyed, there appeared to be little appetite for any attempt at further protest action, at least that evening. The police's determination to tightly manage the phased release, and their overwhelming numbers and the physical threat they presented, from my vantage point saw people slowly disperse (G20, fieldnotes).

These police tactics of violent confrontation and then violent containment for many hours had the effect of demolishing the climate camp protest. The wider implications of these policing actions are discussed in the concluding section.

5.2.3 Tactical Frivolity

A further example of innovative transgressive tactics by protestors is the staging of events such as open parody and mockery to try and embarrass and upstage (here against the police). For instance, the 'Space Hijackers' (an anti-capitalist activist group) each in fancy dress wearing faux police riot outfits (see picture 1 below) drove an armoured personnel carrier (a Alvis Saracen Mark 1 tank) to help assist MPSs policing efforts. Whilst eschewing violence the group undertakes direct actions "to effect and change the physical space of architecture" in confusing and recontextualising ways. The staging of 'the tank' into the City of London, parking it in Bishopsgate outside the RBS bank was in part the attract media attention of course and draw attention to the international arms industry as well as the increasing militarisation of policing. These tactics of parody are transgressive

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114 The Tank was purchased through local fund raising initiative - 'help arm the Space Hijackers'.
as they play with and move beyond what might be considered legally acceptable action. Driving a (although street legal) tank in central London with mock police livery (of chequered black and white stripes) is asking for trouble. It also can be seen as representing a direct challenge to sovereign power of the state through an act of ridicule by comically mimicking the coercive arm of the state to the state. Clearly this enraged the authorities, resulting in all eleven protestors being promptly arrested and detained by the police. Each was charged (by the CPS) with impersonating police officers and wearing police uniform with intent to deceive, charges that were later dropped two weeks before trial.115

Picture 6: ‘Space Hijackers' Mocking a Police Riot Tank

5.2.4 ‘You can beat the rap but you can’t beat the ride’

Charges were later dropped due to ‘insufficient evidence’ to realistically secure a prosecution and after seeking legal redress, the Space Hackers were awarded over £60,000 in damages for false imprisonment, assault, and breaches of the Human Rights Act by the City of London police.116 Whilst the police did apologise,117 this is an example of legal tools being used to repress a political

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116 Ibid.

117 The Commissioner of the City of London Police stated: “I accept the Crown Prosecution Service finding in discontinuing the criminal prosecution against you that there was no longer sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction. I regret that the standard of the treatment you received from the Force [on 1 April 2009] did not meet with your expectations and I am committed to continuously improving the service we
organisation. This takes several forms, most obviously it increases the costs of mobilisation (through incurring lengthy legal procedures, financial costs, disrepute of a criminal record as well as the stresses and strains of having to defend oneself against prosecution - irrespective of the perniciousness of the charges). It also yields demobilisation (the group are publicly removed on mass from the demonstration site and in doing so are in effect punished) itself a warning to other activists and bystander publics regards what happens when 'stepping out of line'. Writing from a US perspective, Earl's (2005) empirical study of arrest practices found that mass arrests initiate costly interactions with the legal system for protestors. These costs do not stop at the unpleasant physical reality of detention, but the resulting entanglement with the criminal justice system due to an array of costs imposed before any trial, irrespective of guilt or innocence. This can also lead to diminished legitimacy as media coverage of arrests can portray protestors negatively as lawless and violent whilst police action is justified and measured (Earl, 2005:118). Moreover, there is ample evidence to suggest that police forces (and wider law enforcement agencies) often target leaders of protests for arrest to drain dissenting movements of leadership and morale (Oberschall, 1978; Jones, 1988, cited in Earl, 2005; Connor, 2018). Such legal tools used for political policing ends ratchet up transaction and participation costs and form part of 'the process is the punishment' (Freely, cited in Earl, 2005:130). Writing in the last century and reflecting on the nature of political justice, the legal scholar Kirchheimer (1961:46) notes that "The trial involving a common crime committed for political purposes and conducted with a view to the political benefits which might ultimately accrue from successful prosecution; the classic political trial: a regime's attempt to incriminate its foes' public behaviour with a view to evicting them from the political scene; and the derivative political trial, are where the weapons of defamation, perjury, and contempt are manipulated in an effort to bring disrepute upon a political foe."

This brings into view the relationship of law and the state, one which in practice contradicts Aristotle's delusion that "the law is reason unaffected by desire." What we see is the authority's manipulation of legal procedure to achieve the ends of explicit political goals, where the devices of justice are used to repress political dissent, here under the banner of an uncommon crime. As Kirchheimer (1961) has noted, the trial is a manipulable technique to repress hostile or disruptive groups.

provide, to ensure public trust and confidence are maintained.” Press release: hodge jones & allen: City of London Police Pay-out to G20 protestors but take 18 months to remove personal data from national database.
5.3 Financial Fools Day - Bank of England Kettle

A broad coalition of some 4,000 protestors had gathered at the Bank of England situated in the financial heart of the city (nearby to the Climate Camp protest). This was a sizeable gathering despite the extensive negative media hype about anticipated violence. It is a mute question how many more would have turned out on the day if the press had been less partisan, but turning people's perception of participation into 'high-risk/high-cost activism (Adams, 1986) inevitably impacted numbers.

The protestors had arrived from four different directions to their planned destination, with routes punctuated by taking in a number of commercial premises on the 'hit list' (i.e. corporate headquarters for Caterpillar, Santander Bank, and RBS). This is a tactical innovation similar to what Scholl (2012) has termed the 'five-finger tactic', used in Gleneagles and also Evian which has functioned as an effective tactic to reach blockading points. These shifting moves like chess pieces on a board allowed me to reconnoitre several times between the venues of the climate camp and the Bank of England prior to the kettling which started to form at approximately 12:15 at Bank Junction (G20, fieldnotes)

Picture 7: Protestors Make Their Way to City Mile

The journey with the group of protestors I was attached to towards the Bank of England was not uneventful:

En route, some city workers are waving £10 notes at us from the safety of their office windows high above, emphasises the extent to which the fault lines were drawn and protestors' stigmatised? (G20 fieldnotes)

Passersby were stopping and staring at the scenes of large number of protestors making their way towards the bank of England. As we turn the corner we see that protestors are being allowed to proceed in and are starting to gather in large numbers. There is no obvious likelihood of disorder that I can see. However, at this point the primary objective of the police appears to be to incapacitate the protest:
Police are allowing protestors in but not out (an indication of what they have in mind?). The group I'm with are similarly looking around and are realising what is about to happen. 'We're gonna get keetled, they've just blocked the Exchange' (G20-A30) and we shift to try and find an exit route. Other side streets are being closed off by police lines, and I can see officers physically pushing people away from the junction. Reinforcements in the shape of mounted police are moving in too, taking the place of some police lines, another forewarning of their intention. Shortly, the lines snapped closed. (G20 fieldnotes)

The justification given at the time for containment was to prevent a breach of the peace, itself blind to the level of violence inflicted later that day on protestors to keep them contained. At first the mood inside the kettle was good natured with sound systems roaring although many were aware that they would be contained very likely until late evening. At first this was a segregated cordon however, allowing city workers and families to pass through but not anyone who passed for a protestor. Attempts by some protestors to gain an explanation as to why they were being contained were mostly ignored, either with stony faced silence from officers

Protestor: Why are you stopping me from leaving?
Officer: [says nothing]
Protestor: Why are you stopping me from leaving? [louder]
Officer: [says nothing]
Protestor: Hey, I'm talking to you ..
Fellow officer: Stand back! [shouts] You're not allowed to leave. (G20 fieldnotes)

This containment was mostly effective although small numbers did make a break and get out (including myself) through police error and confusion:

Approx 2:30pm: The police line temporarily brakes close by me, with a mass outpouring of hundreds of protestors escaping the kettle. One panicked officer shouts "What's the plan"? Lots of police on their radios, momentarily unsure how to react to reinstitute the containment ... (G20 fieldnotes)

There is no attempt by the police to facilitate the Bank of England leg of the protest, only to contain it. This brief breakaway section of the protest is the only unexpected contaminant now loose, with officers on the ground unsure how to react.

Police momentarily lose the initiative but quickly regain it. The kettle is closed completely, people being aggressively pushed and shoved back, can see some police kicking protestors. Mixture of police serials in riot gear, others in high vis vests, some with batons drawn. No way back in, all street I can see are heavily blocked. (G20 fieldnotes)
Once the kettle was closed everyone inside was then left without any food, water, or access to toilets for some seven hours. As with the Climate Camp kettling exercise, the Bank of England kettle was maintained by police lines with officers batoning and kicking (often with steel toe-capped boots) anyone who either got close to the serials, or who pushed to try and get out in growing frustration at being forcibly detained. Eyewitness accounts attest to some of the worst police violence taking place (I pick up on this in the next chapter).

5.4 The Alternative G20 Summit: Talking to ourselves

So-called ‘alternative’ or ‘counter-summits’ are a feature of many summit protest events. Social movement scholars such as Starr et al (2011:40) have argued that the authorities ‘happily’ facilitate such counter summits because they act to channel dissenting voices into spaces (often far from the actual summit site) as they are easy to control and draw activists away from spaces where disruptive actions are planned. The counter-summit in Neath is a case in point, although an entirely academic affair and devoid of any younger (transgressive) activists.

The venue for the ‘Alternative G20 Summit’ was to be the University of Westminster, a list of high profile speakers had been arranged. At the last minute the event was cancelled, at least occurring inside the built estate of the university. Not wanting to accept defeat several organisers hastily re-arranged as best they could on the green outside. Whilst the exact reasons for this have not been made clear, the university authorities had very unusually demanded that one of the organisers of

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the event (a serving academic at the university) would have to take full legal liability for any damage
that might be done to any part of the university during the event.\textsuperscript{119} Unable to accept such onerous
financial liability on one person's shoulders, and despite attempts by others involved in the
arrangements to find a way around this obstacle, the university had in effect prevented the event
from taking place without having to publicly announce they had done so. There is no data
suggesting that the authorities conspired to prevent the G20 counter-summit occurrence,\textsuperscript{120}
although this does not mean no pressure was put to bear. Nevertheless, hospitality was afforded to
large numbers of riot police who were allowed to congregate and use the campus facilities,
including the cafeteria.

Part of the explanation for the lack of any support for the counter-summit has been attributed to
the University of Westminster wanting to position itself in the more lucrative business and finance
sector of the education market. Distancing the institution in this way prevents contamination with
what senior management saw as 'radical politics', and the risk of reputational damage, especially to
a much prized overseas student market.\textsuperscript{121} This may reflect the increasing risk aversion and
withdrawal from aspects of civil society and critical pedagogy brought on by pressures of
globalisation and the continued embrace of neo-liberal doctrines by Vice Chancellors. It was notable
that in the Belfast case study that Queen's University closed its entire campus during the G8 summit
event also.

5.5 The Police Account of Operation Glencoe: Move along now, nothing to see here ...

The police justification for kettling and for their 'dispersal' of the climate camp by a baton charge as
well as the Kettling at the bank of England and all its associated violence came down to a simple
straightforward claim. Throughout the police were forced to use these measures due to a perceived
need to respond to violence from "a small group of protestors intent on violence, mixed with the
crowds of lawful demonstrators" (MPS, 2 April). Some of the declared 'ringleaders' were followed
by police helicopter.\textsuperscript{122} Commander O'Brien (Gold Leader) in charge of the operation stated:

"As we went on it was clear there were people within the group that were first of all involved in
juvenile and puerile behaviour. That started to escalate into quite provocative behaviour
towards police lines. There were small groups charging forwards and backwards into police

\textsuperscript{119} Telephone interview with anonymous source who was close to the proceedings at the time.
\textsuperscript{120} The university claimed that they possessed no briefing notes, meeting minutes or other documentation
relating to the event, and neither had they retained any senior management emails regards this matter in
response to my FOI applications.
\textsuperscript{121} Telephone interview with anonymous source who was close to the proceedings at the time.
\textsuperscript{122} Police helicopters are equipped with very powerful digital cameras (nicknamed 'hellitelly') which are
capable of discerning individual faces and tracking people whilst airbourne.
lines. It did seem to us from CCTV and police on the scene that they tried to find a way to ramp up the protest and hijack it into violence."

O'Brien conceded that the vast majority of protestors were 'good humoured' (i.e. not violent) but a small minority "wanted to get involved in a violent protest and not lawful protest". O'Brien continues;

"We started to see a good deal more violence coming from small groups in the crowd."
"Clear attacks on police lines, clear attacks on police by protesters and completely unprovoked. Then we saw a determined attack on the RBS where at least three plate-glass windows were broken." "There was a clear attempt to throw lighted material in that premises and we saw small amounts of minor thefts from the premises."

In regards to the climate camp the claim was that at 4:40 the Climate Camp was joined by what police considered a 'hard core' of protestors (by which they mean those looking like anarchists) who had 'hijacked' the demonstration, and that missiles were thrown, leading to police in riot gear with batons and shields started surrounding the camp using Sec 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 re mass breaches of the peace, property damage and public disorder. O'Brien speaking to the BBC said

"The Climate Camp had been in place on a thoroughfare of the capital, a major thoroughfare, for almost 12 hours."

O'Brien had originally stated that his officers would be:

"politely and proportionately" asking campers to move on and had acknowledged they were peaceful.123

"The vast majority of the campers did pick up their tents voluntarily and leave at the request of police. I believe we used the right sort of plan. We were polite, proportionate and pragmatic - and we are now where we are with a city that's open and people can get to and from work."

On April 2nd MPS had stated in press briefings that officers had "faced high levels of violence" in isolated incidents throughout the day.124 I witnessed a small number of drunken and offensive protestors verbally dissing some police, stemming from their previous negative experiences of police violence and aggression. The so called 'missiles' that were thrown and scuffles that occurred were from the sense of frustration and irritation at so many people being forcibly detained against their will for hours inside a police kettle, with many wanting to leave but also a palpable sense of injustice at the demonstration being negated in such a violent way. (G20 fieldnotes)

Summing up events and before the political fallout from Tomlinson's killing, O'Brien tellingly stated:

"The big main issue for us was to get the world leaders to and from a very important summit. We then had some challenges around protest. The lawful protests had no problem. Even the issues outside the Bank of England, it was only a small proportion taking part in

124 No author (2009 April 2) G20 Protests: Troublemakers 'will be tracked down', warn police. The Telegraph.
violence. They were trying to agitate and hijack that protest. We believe our tactics were proportionate and worked. The lawful protesters were the victims of them, not the Metropolitan Police.”

5.6 Interim Conclusion

From my direct observations of the protests, and discussions with other protestors, the highly aggressive and provocative police tactics at the convergence centres, but especially at the Climate Camp and the Bank of England, acted to deliberately raise the temperature, making violent confrontation more not less likely. In part this is a direct result of the key police tactic of kettling, which is the partitioning and isolation of a demonstration. All requests to leave were refused, irrespective of the reason (including serious physical injuries resulting from police violence). Much of the media coverage and the police's own accounts would have us believe that their actions were in response to an outbreak of serious protestor violence. On this account, the police's efforts were squarely aimed at controlling violence and disorder, as well as preventing further violence. I have argued that such a chronology gets the events exactly the wrong way around, that the violence was very largely police instigated, and appears to be as a result of prior police planning to impose the kettle on protestors and thereby stymie the demonstration in its entirety. The kettle is not a new tactic of course, and has been used on a smaller scale and at events which do not attract publicity (such as kettling football fans behind police lines for extended periods post-match). There are several reasons for this tactic, as the former Assistant Commissioner of the Met, Andy Hayman wrote in the *Times*:

"Tactics to herd the crowd into a pen [...] have been criticised before, yet the police will not want groups splintering away from the crowd."  

It was these pre-mediated tactical choices of increasingly using enclosure, segmentation and containment by the authorities, irrespective of the high level of violence required to maintain them, which acted to neutralise the tactical summit repertoire of the protestors. Containment by kettling relies on channelling and incapacitating protestors mobility and fluidity, if necessary, through brutal force. As Scholl's (2012:138) notes, since Genoa "spatial control is increasingly organised biopolitically."

When mass demonstrations are contained, it also relies on the acceptance, at least tacitly, of illegal police violence. This is sacrificed in order to give the authorities a lasting ideological success. It

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125 Casciani, D. (2009, 3 April, 3:50) Eyewitness: Two days of Protest, BBC News
needs to be remembered that the protestors wanted to make their voices heard and disrupt the G20 summit which was taking place at the Excel centre, something that they were not successful in doing. This crucial point gets lost in much of the academic and campaigning commentary on the G20. In part this is due to the reversal of the mainstream media's meta-narrative, and the ensuing public disquiet and wide-spread perception (deservedly) of a legitimacy crisis by MPS. I will go on to argue that this passing reputational damage was a price MPS were willing to pay (as well as financially) to avoid even a symbolic disruption of the G20.

The other tactic employed by the police was to use the kettling practice as an intelligence gathering exercise, with all protestors being stopped, searched, and required to provide proof of identity (name and address and date of birth) and to be photographed, all of which was a condition of being allowed to leave the kettle. A further disturbing practice was an attempt to destroy evidence of police violence and malpractice by instructing protestors that they had to delete photographs of officers from their cameras, under the threat of seizure. The justification given for this was a 'reasonable suspicion' that:

"The photos were intended to be used to assist in the preparation or commission of an act of terrorism, and must be of a kind that was likely to provide practical assistant to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism." (G20 Fieldnotes).

Not only is this practice in contravention of the official guidance from the Court of Appeal decision on the matter, it asserts that every protestor who photographed police officers were in contravention of Sec 76.

In the next Chapter I examine some primary and secondary data from official records, all of which provide further doubts as to the authority’s accounts of the policing operation at the G20.

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127 I witnessed this myself (although I was no subject to it as I did not have a camera at the time) and corroborated it from other protestors leaving the kettle. Other protestor reports of this practice were also published by Earth First!, indicating these were not isolated incidents where there was reason suspicion to invoke Sec 76 (2008) of the Counter-Terrorism Act makes it an offence to elicit or attempt to elicit information about an individual who is or has been a constable "which is of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism."

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CHAPTER 6: The Aftermath of Operation Glencoe: Rebuilding Police Legitimacy

Thus far I have examined the evolution and interplay of protestors and police tactics, and the influence of these tactics on each group within the site of struggle constituted by the G20 summit. I have examined how the refusal of 'negotiated management' by some protestors was used to discredit the social movement and thereby ease its subjection to physical violence and other repressive measures.

I now shift my focus to what occurred after the G20, and the range of official responses to the widely perceived crisis of legitimacy. I offer an alternative explanation as to why the enquiries occurred, and why they took the form they did. I do this because the fall-out from Operation Glencoe constituted a watershed moment in public order policing in the mainland UK, but one I will argue was largely wasted. There are a number of reasons for this which I start to explore here and in the next chapter. I begin with examining the main institutions tasked with addressing allegations of police malpractice and using data from the G20, bring to light some of their deficiencies which operate at the structural and policy level.

6.1 Out of Order: Political Violence

6.1.1 Determining the level of Police Force Used through Injuries and Complains

One of the primary responsibilities of a democracy is for a government to report accurately on how often its own agents injure its citizens, and to be able to fully justify these injuries. In some important respects the UK fails in this responsibility, as there is no systematic or useful national data available that describes the frequency and consequences of police violence when it comes to the policing of 'public disorder'. Knowing how many protestors are injured is important because it allows a fuller understanding of the extent of force used by police including potentially 'life threatening' force. Indeed, the authorities appear overly reliant upon injured parties (or those with grievances) to make a formal complaint against the police or seek alternative legal remedy by bringing a civil case against the particular police force (I return to the inadequacies of such practices below).

Whilst the news media frequently report numbers of injures to officers and citizens, these figures very likely underestimate the number of crowd injuries and overestimate injuries to officers.¹²⁸ By

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¹²⁸ This is because news organisations merely re-report figures provided by the police, which is itself a count of the total number of injuries officers have sustained on that day. This encompasses any injuries recorded by an officer, including any accident (such as a trip getting out of a police vehicle, a bee sting, dehydration etc.) which is unrelated to any assault – a point that is often neglected to be mentioned.
way of illustration, the publicised number of injured demonstrators during the second anti-poll tax
demonstration dubbed ‘The Battle of Brixton’, saw the police baton charge the demonstrator's
picket outside HMP Brixton, officially resulting in only six injured demonstrators - the exact same
number of injured as police officers (M. Towers, Daily Express, 21.10.1990). Direct observation of
these events saw a sustained baton charge by an estimated one hundred police officers moving
through the crowd and directing baton blows to the heads of dozens of demonstrators who were
unable to flee the vicinity (Christmann, 1996). Assuming that a baton blow struck to the head of a
protestor constitutes an injury, then the protestor injuries considerably exceeded the reported
figures.

As I have been arguing in the previous chapter, whilst 'law and order news' is always a site of
contestation, structurally much mainstream (corporate) media reporting is increasingly
'asymmetrical' in favour of the police (see also Mawby, 2010) with the police exploiting
communications strategies in order to control the external environment in a way that privileges
their own account and acts to buttress their organisational legitimacy. Far from being neutral
arbiters in these proceedings, the police are partisan players. With this key point in mind we need to
be sceptical about the accuracy of any data they provide, no more so than injured protestors at their
hands. Those who would doubt this assertion only need to consider the police's (including MPS)
long and ignoble track record of 'ethical compliance' in reporting data which reflect upon
performance and organisational reputation to external authorities. The precise opposite however
holds for documenting police officer injuries due to the benefits from an administrative
infrastructure. This is incentivised in several ways; officers know they can claim sick leave or light
duties from an injury as well as police injuries functioning as a politically expedient counter-balance

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129 Police forces have a poor track record in fulfilling their responsibilities here, for instance, in 2014 the former
MPS Commissioner Lord Stevens (who had run the Met for six years) testified to the House of Common's
Home Affairs Committee that “Ever since I've been in police service there has been a fiddling of figures. I
remember being a detective constable where we used to write off crimes." Asked if this was still going on,
Steven's replied: “Of course it is. In certain forces." “I was in a session with police sergeants nine months to a
year ago in Cheshire talking about what their feelings were about the police service. All of them said the
biggest scandal that is coming our way is recording of crime.” The same committee had been told that official
crime figures were often ‘massaged’ (i.e. downgrading offences to less serious crimes, persuading the victim
not to make a complaint and hence a crime record, or only recording a crime if it was solved) usually at the
instruction of senior officers in order to improve police performance. (Barrett, D. (2014, Jan 14th) Lord
Stevens admits police have been fiddling' crime figures for years. Telegraph). A month earlier, the Chief
Inspector of Constabulary, Tom Winsor, had told the House of Commons Home Affairs 'The fact is in an
anything that gets measured, once those who are being measured, whose performance are being measured, work out
how the system works, there's an incentive, resisted by many, to manipulate the process as to make your own
performance look good.' Home Affairs Committee (2013, December 17th) http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/7056644f-645b-4a8f-9a64-6e83aeb18e64. This occurs despite
numerous previous attempts by successive governments to stamp out the fiddling of figures and the
existence of a statutory duty on forces to supply the Home Office with accurate quarterly crime data on
‘Home Office List Offences'.
to protestor injuries in buttressing the police's case of violent protestors.

Police skulduggery notwithstanding, protestor (and those caught up in a demonstration) injury figures will only include those that come to the police's attention either as a direct result of their power of arrest, (typically recorded at the 'custody suite' under PACE), or those that receive treatment at the scene by the emergency services, and further, are then recorded as injured parties. Whilst each public order situation will differ according to a host of factors, it remains the case that the mass of an unruly crowd - whether they come into direct confrontation with the police or not - will escape arrest because police tactics will be directed at one of two primary goals; containment within police lines with riot shields and serials using baton blows, police canines or alternatively, dispersal with baton charges, police canines or horse charges, all of which occurred at the G20. Neither of these tactics is designed to supply a large number of arrests (even the use of snatch squad's only targets individuals) although some arrests will undoubtedly occur. Clearly, anyone sustaining an injury that avoids, or fails to be arrested, or does not receive treatment at the scene will go uncounted. This is not to suggest that protestors will receive treatment simply because they are injured however, irrespective of the cause. There were numerous examples of this during my G20 observations, including protestors with head wounds that were bleeding profusely from police baton strikes whilst inside the climate camp kettle as well as one protestor who appeared to have suffered a broken ankle and being refused permission to leave and seek outside medical assistance and told to 'elevate their leg' by police.

Other potential data sources including as on scene emergency services such as ambulance staff, if available, are not always able to access those injured by the police, in part because they are often kept behind police cordons and come under the direction and control of the police (Bronze) Commander. When police imposed a kettle as at the climate camp and Bank of England, ambulance staff were not present. The police do have dedicated medically trained ('Medic') officers, but this would appear an ancillary role to that of enforcement action, as the self-same individuals can be responsible for dispensing violence (see Picture 8 below). As a consequence, the injured may (understandably) not want to seek medical treatment from those that inflict said same injury, or from its organisational members. Anecdotally, during my observational period I heard half a dozen protestors make this very same point.
6.1.2 Official responses: Placation and attrition in the complaints system

It has been suggested that a police complaint system forms one of three pillars of accountability for a protestor or citizen seeking redress for police malpractice (Police Monitoring and Research Group, 1987:6). The other two being accountability under the law and accountability to the police organisation (its own disciplinary and regulatory framework).

The IPCC received a total of 297 direct complaints in relation to the policing of the G20 protest, 134 of which were termed by the IPCC ‘about the police use of force’, here meaning allegations of excessive force during the G20 protests on 1st and 2nd of April 2009. It is worth detailing the processing of these complaints, if nothing else than to examine the very considerable process of attrition which is exercised in this procedure (see diagram 1 below which sets out the key decision gates and outcomes by the IPCC).

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310 I do not mean to suggest that these are the only accountability structures as other forms exist (i.e. internal and external auditing; PCC’s, external Inspectors etc.) only that these are the most directly relevant to an ordinary citizen or protestor seeking redress regards to police practices affecting their lives.

311 All data supplied by the IPCC to author - personal correspondence.
Diagram 1: Destination and Outcome of Complaints Made to the IPCC Regards Operation Glencoe

297 (direct complaints received by IPCC)

212
Passed onto MPS

127
NOT passed to the IPCC (rejected or local resolution)

85
Rejected:
- 69 complaints were deemed 'not eligible'
- 16 people were deemed not to provide consent

85
Referrals passed to the IPCC

17 referred back to force

62 IPCC Supervised investigations

19 discontinued

4 're-determined' (sent back to police force)

3 withdrawn

27 'No case to answer'

1 written warning

1 'No case to answer' + 1 not known

30 concluded cases

12 passed to CPS
Despite the very high level of public disquiet and official attention, it remains that less than 1% (0.6%) of the 297 complaints received resulted in any misconduct action by a police organisation, and then, only one written warning and one dismissal (as a result of the police killing of Tomlinson). Most complaints were rejected by the IPCC, on the grounds that they related to operational police tactical decisions, i.e. being forcibly kettled for 7 to 8 hours (although the IPCC passed these to HMIC's own investigation for 'consideration').

Some 212 (71.3%) were passed to the police force for 'recording' (being a mandatory requirement). Therefore, 85 (over a quarter 28.7%) of the complaints were rejected, the bulk of which (n=69) were deemed not to be eligible under the Police Reform Act (2002) because the complaint related to something a person had not been a direct witness to or victim of (something they had seen on social media or TV or read in a newspaper etc.) with the remainder (n=16) failing to give consent for the complaint to be passed on to forces. Some 127 were not passed to the IPCC largely because they related to 'police tactics' and again were deemed outside of the scope of the Police Reform Act (2002) as this relates to operational policing decisions rather than an accusation of police malpractice. The IPCC states that the substance of such complaints were passed to HMIC's own review of police tactics during the G20 demonstrations for their 'consideration'. What cannot be denied is that all of these complainants are effectively denied any right of redress.

The 85 cases alleging serious assault by serving police officers were referred back to the IPCC. The IPCC then made a determination about whether they or the individual police force who were the subject of the complaint should undertake an investigation, resulting in a mere 6 independent IPCC investigations (or 7.2% of the original total received). The bulk of the remainder (n=62) were referred to as IPCC 'supervised investigations' a somewhat misleading term as the individual police force which is subject to the complaint then conducted the actual investigation, with the IPCCs role being limited to setting out what the investigation should encompass. This constitutes a very considerable sleight of hand as it breaches the original founding principle behind the IPCC that a non-police organisation should undertake the investigating. That the IPCC had publicly trumpeted that it 'investigated' all G20 complaint cases where there were allegations of physical assault similarly acts to mislead. What we are left with here is only the appearance of independence, as the complaints system very largely reverts back to the old discredited internal model of police complaints (the spectacle of the police investigating themselves) which has been the subject of long and 'extensive critique' (Seneviratne, 2004:333). If one accepts the "apparent pathological inability

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132 Under the Police Reform Act (PRA), the IPCC was required to get consent from the complainant before it could pass on a complaint to the AA. This was changed under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (PRSRA), and from 23rd November 2012, consent is no longer required.
of police to objectively investigate their peers” (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001:157) then it is hard to see how this decision could be justified if one's concern is impartial and robust investigation. A further 17 complaints were referred back by the IPCC to the police force in question to be dealt with as they saw fit (including rejection) or subject to 'Local Investigation'. Such local investigations are conducted entirely by the police force who again were the subject of the complaint, so for these unlucky complainants even the veneer of independence is lost. This is one of the most disturbing issues deriving from this analysis of the IPCC data, that the complainant does not get to determine who hears and investigates the complaint, despite them directing the complaint to the IPCC. This decision is made wholly and unilaterally by the IPCC and as is demonstrated here, in the main, this decision is against the best interests of the complainant if one privileges the outcome as the metric of interest. To do so is not an unreasonable position if one asserts that the IPCC’s role for handling complaints is to “contain and manifest an appropriate degree of independence” (Police Reform Act 2002, s. 10).

Of the 'supervised investigation', some 19 were discontinued for what the IPCC termed reasons of 'failure to cooperate rendering investigation impracticable as officers could not be identified'. This means that complainants stop responding ('engaging') and the IPCC consider that the investigation could not be progressed further. A further 6 were 'granted dispensation' (the complaint was officially dropped against the officer) due to loss of contact with the complainant. Whilst there is no way to compel complainants to continue co-operating, these cases do suggest the IPCC requires more robust administrative processes that minimise such attrition. 133 A further three cases were 're-determined' and sent back to the force so that they could deal with them by way of Local Resolution. Four were withdrawn as the complainants decided not to proceed.

Some 30 cases were concluded of which 8 (20%) saw the dissatisfied complainant appeal against the finding, with most appeals (n=6) being upheld (two were not). 134 The high numbers of successful appeals calls into question the robustness of the original investigations (very likely Local Resolutions) and requires considerable determination and fortitude from the complainant, with one case taking 4 years to be resolved. 135

133 The working practices at the IPCC see case managers responding to the mode of communication instigated by the complainant, and there appears to be no measures put in place to address attrition, for instance, as a matter of policy to request all complainants mobile phone numbers to ensure lines of communication are maximised (Personal correspondence to author from IPCC).

135 For instance a pensioner who was violently knocked to the ground by a police officer (PN 2509, 2550) and who was not satisfied with the IPCC complaint procedure, appealed to the IPCC who eventually accepted that he had a 'legitimate grievance against the Metropolitan Police Service'. It took over two years from this ruling, (and 4 years in total) for MPS to agree to pay compensation of £9,000. (Peace News, April 2013, Issue 2556).
Of the 30 'concluded cases', 12 were passed to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for consideration as to whether criminal proceedings were necessary. Of these twelve, three were also passed onto the own police force’s misconduct office, leading to one officer receiving a written warning, for another there was no further action and the outcome in the last case was not known. As for the remainder, 27 were concluded as 'no case to answer'.

Assessing the IPCC data in this way illustrates the very high degree of attrition throughout its complaints system. Operation Glencoe was one of the largest policing operations in British history, and demonstrated the willingness of the police to use brutal violence against protestors, which crucially, came to the attention of a mass public. As a result, it generated an unprecedented number of official enquiry reports (discussed in Chapter 7). Despite this level of public disquiet and official attention, it remains that almost all of the complaints were either rejected, dismissed or discontinued. Only two cases saw any misconduct action by a police organisation, and then, only one written warning and one dismissal (the last being as a result of the officer killing Ian Tomlinson). Most complaints were rejected by the IPCC, on the grounds that they related to operational police tactical decisions of direction and control, i.e. being forcibly kettled for 7 to 8 hours. This dramatically exposes the democratic deficit which lies at the heart of British policing. Constabulary autonomy means that the police set the agenda and prioritise their own policy directives and procedures, irrespective of how far it removes them from the object of community life. These issues were reflected on some three decades ago by Scraton (1985:167) who at the time concluded that the police had achieved political autonomy at the operational level which put them "beyond democratic control and accountability". Little seems to have changed since then when one examines the main mechanisms which exists for dealing with police complaints.

Outside of this complaints system redress remains limited to requesting judicial review of police practices or seeking Legal Aid and suing the police in a civil case for damages. The tort avenue is the only means where the complainant can hear officers having to answer for their conduct, unlike the complaints system where there is no such scrutiny available to the aggrieved party (Smith, 2004:23). Even in the unlikely circumstances where police disciplinary action does ensue, the complainant has no right to see the disciplinary report which remains the exclusive property of the Chief Constable (Scraton, 1985). Whilst Ward (2002:21) found that the chances of success in civil proceedings are 'dramatically higher' than with the formal police complaints system, bringing a civil case is far from straightforward, or for many, realistic. The stringency of eligibility for Legal Aid and the potential to have to meet police full legal costs (paid for from the public purse) if the case is unsuccessful acts as a powerful preventive measures to those alleging excessive or indiscriminate
force and malpractice. It is not known whether this situation has changed in any marked way since the IPCC came into existence from 2004, but on the basis of the G20 as a case study, it would appear not. Complainants are further disadvantaged when one considers there is no routine entitlement to financial assistance which would allow legal advice and representation to progress the complaint (Smith, 2009:254). All other avenues are closed to complainants, except to protest and risk recurrence of the same practices they had fallen foul of by the said same organisation.

The analysis also demonstrates that the current regulatory structure within the IPCC discards many complaints where the complainant was not physically present at the scene or who is not the victim, constituting almost a third of complaints passed to MPS (see diagram 1 above). This is a curious regulation for a reformed complaints system whose professed ambition is to more effectively address police malpractice. No more so than when considering that modern society is now subject to a revolution in multi-media technology, one which provides a hitherto unknown level of surveillance of the police and other governmental bodies, and can operate in real time. This is of particular importance as citizen journalism (‘sousveillance’ or ‘watching from below’) was prominent at the G20 demonstrations facilitated by independent media centres (i.e. Indymedia137) passing information onto other more mainstream information hubs. As Bradshaw (2013) has argued, we need to recognise that sousveillance is a form of direct action, one which aims to make instances of excessive and disproportionate police violence more visible to the public through a virtual (and physical) communications network as well as protect protestors vulnerable bodies from assault. Similarly, McGrath (2004:198) notes that “Counter surveillance involves using surveillance equipment in a way that reverses the usual vectors of power. As such, its most basic manifestation may be the video cameras carried at most political demonstrations, on the look-out to record any police brutality.’ These counter-surveillance techniques radically subvert the high visibility surveillance practices used by the state (notably by police ‘Evidence Gatherers’) designed to reduce activists sense of autonomy. Turning the lens back upon the authorities has the same aim, reducing police autonomy to engage in gratuitous and disproportionate violence by being watched and recorded. It is also a form of ‘strategic communication’138 (Borum & Tilby, 2005) to spread a message after and between protest events through documenting and publicising the graphic reality of state violence that can be meted out to young people, women and anyone else who dissents. This can take the form of producing short documentary films for the world to see stemming from independent journalists contributing video and digital footage. This is to visualise social conflict and

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137 In 2013 it was reported that there are over 150 Indymedia organisations (Indymedia Document Project 2013, cited in Bradshaw, 2013:450).

138 Borum & Tilby, (2005) distinguish this from ‘tactical communication’ which concerns exchanging operational information about police activities during a protest action in order to keep abreast of police tactics and gain an advantage.
highlight which side perpetrates violence as well as the repressive measures the authorities can use against protestors.\textsuperscript{139} The Guardian reported that an ICM Poll found 59\% of people questioned were opposed to the police operation Glencoe (whereas 31\% agreed it was a necessary response) (Lewis, 2009).

The significance of sousveillance is illustrated by the extraordinary deviant counter-measures made by police officers in London to instigate a form of legal repression (by deceitfully misusing Counter Terrorism legislation) to require individuals with cameras to delete all their photographs of any individual officers. A further police counter-measure was the removal or hiding of their identification badges as a precaution against identification and to circumvent protestor ‘counter surveillance moves’ (Marx, 2003). Overall, the G20 saw a premeditated attempt to sabotage material of potential evidential value as officers were aware that it could be used against their fellow officers, as well as bringing their force into disrepute by later posting on public platforms. This trend in suppressing visual documentation was also reported later at the G20 meetings in Pittsburgh, USA, where Bradshaw (2013:457-8) recounts how police arrested journalists and destroyed cameras and confiscated other media, none of which was returned. Documentation is not without unintended consequences though, as when a Pittsburgh university student was forced to pose handcuffed and on his knees as a ‘trophy photo’ with a group of Chicago police, who later received reprimands for misconduct (Chicago Police, 2009 in Bradshaw, ibid.).

In this sense the sousveillance strategy was successful, in part because it generated the number of complaints despite these being later invalidated by the IPCC and raised popular consciousness. Clearly the issue turns on how one defines a ‘witness’ or victim. I am asserting that one does not have to be physically present at a scene to witness a police action which is unlawful or abusive. A simple thought experiment illustrates this point. For instance, a duty holder monitoring cameras in a CCTV suite would see, and hence in a real sense witness a scene unfolding, albeit in real time - although they are obviously not present at the scene. If this person were then called to later testify in a court of law (as a result of some happenchance where the CCTV evidence were say accidentally wiped) would they not constitute a material witness? Indeed, they would. This begs the question as to why the IPCC is labouring under such a restrictive and antiquated notion of a ‘witness’. This policy is especially detrimental when activists established tactical communication infrastructures post evidence of perceived police malpractice and brutality on open access platforms as well as professional ‘reality TV’ documentaries which (often inadvertently) also provide an eye witness, ‘as

\textsuperscript{139} Bradshaw, (2013:457) cites a number of examples of this such as the police occupation of Pitt University during the G20 summit, titled: ‘Democracy 101: Pittsburgh G20 Protests and the Police Occupation of Pitt University’ (2009).
it happens’, view of the police in their daily operations. This is a crucial issue of policy, because in following a narrow definition of a witness necessarily prohibits any individual making a complaint who was not present at the scene when bringing recorded evidence to the IPCC’s attention, as they would fall at the first (perfunctory) hurdle - a somewhat perverse outcome.

Three years prior to the G20, the IPCC published results from surveying public attitudes to making a complaint about the police (Docking and Bucke 2006). Summarising the findings the authors reported that: "More than a third of respondents believed that complaining would not make a difference; a third thought that they would not be taken seriously if they complained, and almost a third said that they did not know how to make a complaint. Nearly a quarter of complainants said they thought it would take too much time to complain. In general respondents who agreed with these statements were men, younger people, those from socio-economic groups D and E, ethnic minorities, and those who had been unhappy with the contact they had experienced with the police” (Docking and Bucke 2006:viii, see also Smith, 2013). In similar fashion, the Crime Survey England & Wales has consistently shown over several decades that approximately 80% of people ‘really annoyed with the police’ do not complain (Smith, 2013:250). The post IPCC figures (2006/7) show the main reason (62.1%) for not complaining is ‘couldn’t see any benefit’ with nearly 4 out of 5 (78.8%) being dissatisfied with the handling of the complaint (Home Office 2007). In line with other criminological research on the impact of poor police-citizen encounters on reporting behaviour (i.e. Skogan, 2006; Victim Support, 2005; Wong & Christmann, 2008) the authors found that negative past contact with the police acted as a powerful disincentive to pursue a complaint. Over a third (35%) of those "unhappy with their contact stating they would not complain" (Docking and Bucke 2006:vii). As we would anticipate, social movement activists would have a higher preponderance of negative contact with the police, so disincentivising their willingness to pursue a complaint. As Smith’s (2013:251) review of the rather dismal outcomes attest: " Less than 5 percent of all recorded allegations against police in England and Wales have been substantiated following investigation in the last quarter-century (Smith 2006a). Even then, where a complainant has his/her complaint substantiated (fewer than 1000 annually since 1987), it is unlikely that the officer complained against will face criminal or disciplinary proceedings and is more likely to be spoken to by a supervisory officer.

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140 The survey was a representative sample of 4,000 people across England & Wales, with a booster sample of 915 ethnic minority respondents.

141 However, attitudes towards the police appears to play a more limited role when reporting being a victim of crime in respect to the most serious offences (for instance having to seek medical treatment or facing substantial financial loss) at least for volume crime (Skogan, 1984). It may be the case that this principle holds for the most serious cases of police abuse and malpractice in regards to making a formal complaint - although this is conjecture.
As we have seen from the G20 complaints data, given that the prospect is so small for success it is not surprising that many activists do not complain about police violence and abuse of power. This lack of confidence of the IPCC's abilities to undertake their role does not just come from those outside of the institution, but also from within. Some fourteen months prior to the G20 (in February 2008) over one hundred solicitors, barristers and legal executives from the network 'The Police Action Lawyers Group' (PALG) resigned from the Advisory Board to the IPCC. The mass resignation was motivated by their "increasing dismay and disillusionment" with "the consistently poor quality of decision-making at all levels of the IPCC". Moreover, they were damning at the IPCC's earlier attempts to deal with such problems, which they described as "pitifully poor". This constitutes a considerable vote of no confidence from those who specialise in handling complaints against the police. The IPCC's own report acknowledges that its Members (drawn from government bodies, police bodies and complaint advocates) have 'mixed' impressions of sitting on its Advisory board. They found that police representative bodies expressed 'generally positive' sentiments, in contrast to complaint advocates groups (The Independent Police Complaints Commission) who 'expressed concerns over the Advisory Boards usefulness' later (Nov 2007) withdrawing from the group.

6.2 Interim Conclusion

In this chapter I have made some assessment of the level of force used by police during Operation Glencoe from official complaints data, partly triangulated with data from Bindman's solicitors, and have made a determination as to how the complaints system has functioned for protestors. This shows very considerable attrition throughout the complaints system, which is a result of both structural and political deficits. Indeed, the IPCC appears to act as one of the many protective layers in the state's broader armoury, it primarily plays a presentational role, and in doing so lends a false sheen of legitimacy to upholding accountable policing.

A further consideration is that this complaints landscape has now changed markedly due to the ubiquity of mobile phones with video capture and social media platforms that allow police violence to be recorded and relayed to a wide audience, unfiltered by corporate or state players. At the same time the IPCC reject all such complaints generated from this sousveillance. Writing from a US perspective, Marx's (2003:384; but see also 1988; 2016) very considerable work on police surveillance practices has argued that counter-surveillance techniques which publicise questionable police practices may lead to their 'moderation or cessation'. Despite Marx's caveat ('may') this is

144 Ibid. (2008, February 25th)
perhaps too optimistic. Whilst we are not discussing equals here, as there is a deep inequality of 
resources and availability of practices between the authorities and those that resist this 
surveillance, leaving formidable barriers in holding officers to account - at least within the current 
complaints system in England and Wales. As Bradshaw (2013:453) notes in reporting on the 
experiences of the anti-corporate globalisation activists' in Pittsburgh, USA (occurring after the 
London G20) "counter-surveillance techniques have yet to tame the excessive use of force by the 
police at mass actions." In part this continuation of police violence and abuses of power is assisted 
by officers utilising a number of counter-measures on the ground to frustrate activists sousveillance 
efforts, but more problematically, the current accountability structures are inadequate to bear the 
weight required of them. This is evidenced in the process of attrition which raises serious question 
marks over the ability of the IPCC to provide effective and independent oversight. Attrition occurs 
both in terms of having the complaint upheld and also leakage from the independence of the IPCC 
to the police force of the serving officer.

In this respect the IPCC appears to be substantially replicating its predecessor, and because of this is 
losing the confidence of those representing complainants. Added to these considerations are the 
legal, conceptual and research difficulties in studying police malpractices and determining whether 
police violence is proportionate and justified. Whyte (2014) has argued that the legal system 
preoccupies itself with inter-personal violence, not institutional violence, this can also be seen as a 
failing of the IPCC, but not limited to it.

I move on to discuss these issues in the next chapter and consider the raft of official inquiry reports 
that Operation Glencoe generated.

145 As Marx (2016:36) notes, it is a asymmetrical relationship, as citizens cannot wiretap or carry out a myriad 
of other forms of intrusive surveillance, unlike the state's agents.
146 The three jurisdictions in the UK (England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) employ different 
models to deal with complaints against the police. It is interesting to note that Seneviratne's (2004) 
comparative review of all three argues for extending Northern Ireland's 'civilian control model' to other parts 
of the UK due to the inadequacies of the English & Welsh and Scottish models.
CHAPTER 7: Adapting to Scrutiny: The Official Responses to Operation Glencoe

7.1 Introduction

Whilst state violence enacted through the police has the advantage of stopping challengers, it does not come cost free for the police organisation or the wider authorities. The G20 illustrates that it can result in some loss of political legitimacy domestically (and in a globalised world with 24 hours news cycles, internationally as well). Images of policing of the G20 were seen to threaten the police's claim to legitimacy amongst some of the wider (non-activist) population. This was most decisively driven by a press 'politics of outrage' and a 'scandal amplification process' in agenda setting (especially in news print journalism) one driving a reversal of the news frame, from one of 'police violence' to systemic 'institutional failure' (Greer & McLaughlin, 2011:280). I now explore this process in some depth, moving from MPS's attempts at pre-emptive community management through media manipulation to an analysis of the official inquiry reports and their deficiencies.

7.2 Operation Glencoe: The Official View

A number of public bodies with an interest in public order policing felt it necessary to examine the policing of the G20 summit. Inquiries usually occur to shed light on practices, rules, and decision making of an institution or individuals after agreement that something has gone wrong, often in times of political crisis. It also means identifying why things go wrong, although inquires may steer away from apportioning blame in favour of understanding why blameworthy actions occurred in the first place (Slater & Matthews, 2015:302).

All of the five G20 inquiry reports that I examine in this chapter take this form of being investigative and inquisitorial rather than adversarial or prosecutorial (Roulston & Scraton, 2005:552). In keeping with this brief, none examine individual incidents of alleged police officer malpractice or misconduct, preferring to consign this responsibility to the IPCC investigations (the severe inadequacies of which were discussed earlier). The inquiry reports then, at one level, are curious creatures. The prefaces and opening introductionary remarks explicitly stress the need to rebuild legitimacy in public order policing (also reinforced in the names given to the enquiries), whilst at the same time presenting themselves as disinterested examinations into the police's operational and tactical measures. One way of reading the inquiry reports then, is as a form of perception
management, a technique aimed at carefully altering the perceptions of a target audience to provoke the behaviour the sponsor wants.\textsuperscript{147}

Burton and Carlen (1979:13) have argued that the setting up of official inquiries on contentious 'law and order' issues operate to produce knowledge in the form of 'official discourse' that supports the prevailing ideological social relations. Official inquiries respond to "crises in the popular confidence of the impartiality of legal state apparatuses" and as such damage the "ideological social relations that reproduce dominant social conceptions of the essentially just nature of the politico-judicial structures of the state." (ibid, 1979:13). Official discourse is seen as having a pedagogic quality which "seeks to redeem legitimacy crisis by the confrontation and appropriation of unofficial versions of discreditable episodes" (Ibid, 1979:44). Recognising that most inquiries are arbitrating between conflicting accounts and interpretations of events, there is a need for the official account to "confront, incorporate and suppress the unofficial version", here the one seen from citizen journalists, to over-rule them whilst incorporating other versions (Ibid, 1979:70; 76-77). Thus official discourse is "directed at ideological closure", and achieves this by imposing official knowledge that explains what has happened and repairs the state's 'fractured image' and the attendant legitimacy deficit it carries. On this view inquiries are neither impartial nor objective, nor are they simply initiated to restore public confidence in an organisation, but rather function as "routine political tactic[s] directed towards the legitimacy of institutions," (1979:13). From this critical perspective the "task of inquiries into particular crises is to represent failure as temporary, or no failure at all, and to re-establish the image of administrative and legal coherence and rationality" (ibid, 1979:48). In their rather damning conclusion, Burton and Carlen's research into official inquiries regards them as a device to serve and legitimate state institutions and their interests. Neither is it clear if public confidence is really restored at the end of an inquiry. Writing from a Canadian perspective on inquiries into summit policing operations, Salter & Matthews (2015:306) remind us that "Public outrage has a limited shelf life and tends to be centred on cases involving single individuals who have come to grievous harm," such as the police killing of Ian Tomlinson.

Echoing many of Burton and Carlen's themes, Scraton (2003:16) notes how official inquiries status and terms of reference are "used politically to deflect criticism and strengthen public confidence." Often headed by the 'great and the good' by those "with a track record of dependable public service" they are "plumbed into the ideological 'ways of seeing' and political 'ways of doing' that constitute the routine expressions of civil service practice." (2003:3). Writing in the context of

\textsuperscript{147} Tracey, (2012) defines perception management as "actions used to convey or deny selected information to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning, resulting in behaviours and actions favourable to the originators' objectives."
Northern Ireland, Rolston & Scraton (2005:552) note that official inquiries into the British states use of military force and paramilitary policing in Northern Ireland stand at the "'sharp end of a continuum' where the states interest are "most in need of protection." Under such circumstances official inquiries are rarely free from political management and manipulation. The policing of the G20 summit constitutes just such a 'sharp end.'

7.2.1 'The Difference a Death Makes'

The first report by JCHA published in March 2009 (Demonstrating respect for Human Rights? A human rights approach to policing protest) was not prompted by the G20 but rather considered a number of "serious concerns" from its predecessor Committee, that the right to protest was being eroded by excessively onerous restrictions. The report considers the "balance struck in law and in practice between the rights of different groups involved in peaceful protest", and makes a series of recommendations "aimed at ensuring that the rights to freedom of assembly and expression are fully respected." (JCHR, 2009a:1 my emphasis). The JCHA undertook a year-long review, and took evidence from forty-nine individuals and organisations, including policing bodies, protestors and businesses and individuals who had been the targets of protests. The Committee concluded that there were "no systematic human rights abuses in the policing of protest" (Ibid, p.v.). Falling just short of a clean bill of health, the Committee did raise some "concerns" however, all of which could be "addressed by legal and operational changes" (ibid, p.v.). Shortly after publication, intense scrutiny of public order policing resurfaced as a reaction by the assorted establishment to video footage from protestors at the G20 which acted to bring the police's account of events into disrepute. The individual cases which came to the public attention were especially damaging, no more so than the avoidable fatality of Ian Tomlinson.

Immediately after the death of Tomlinson and in another effort to shape and re-frame events, MPS publicly stated that a man had "died after collapsing"148 without any attention to how he had died, and later, that "officers took the decision to move (the fatally injured man) as during this time a number of missiles - believed to be bottles - were being thrown at them". Much of the mainstream media reporting on the death focused on this alleged protestors violence, and as they had done earlier, merely parroted the false information directly relayed from MPS. Later, commenting on the events of the day and undertaking a damage limitation exercise, the chairman of the Metropolitan Police Federation told BBC Radio 4:

"On a day like that, where there are some protesters who are quite clearly hell-bent on causing as much trouble as they can, there is inevitably going to be some physical

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confrontation. Sometimes it isn't clear, as a police officer, who is a protester and who is not. I know it's a generalisation but anybody in that part of the town at that time, the assumption would be that they are part of the protest. I accept that's perhaps not a clever assumption but it's a natural one."\(^{149}\)

This is a revealing statement, as Rosie & Gorringe (2009) identify, implicit here is that if Tomlinson had been a protestor, then the police action would have been justified, as he would have been 'fair game'. As Reicher (2011) also notes, the statement reveals a police epistemology which views anyone in the area as a likely troublemaker, unlike decent people who would have left the area and gone home.

The turning point in the news coverage came when the Guardian newspaper posted a protestor shot video footage which captured the attack on Tomlinson shortly before he died. This proved decisive, leading to more video footage emerging of the assault from different angles. It was this dramatic video tape which gave new credibility to allegations that many members of the public and also the police had formerly dismissed as merely fanciful. Skolnick & Fyfe's (1993:3) study of the US police's use of excessive force is applicable here. Recounting the beating of Rodney King, they stress it was not the conduct of the police that made the incident different from many earlier similar such occurrences, but the presence of a video camera! Which, unbeknown to the officers, captured the brutality of the beating for replay to what would otherwise have been a disbelieving public.

Over the next few days numerous citizen journalists at the G20 protests were uploading a host of video clips onto social media platforms appearing to show other assaults and wanton police aggression directed at ordinary protestors. In analysing the news coverage concerning the G20, Rosie & Gorringe (2009:14-15) emphasize the 'difference a death makes' in acting to shift the framing of the news coverage, away from protestors to that of the police themselves. What this episode starkly reveals is that the police were losing their ability to 'patrol the facts' (Ericson 1989). The emergence of these news stories provoked a flood of other videos from protestors and activists who were cheek to jowl with riot police. This provided a rare view from within the police encirclement and a powerful alternative account that challenged the official police version of events. This rise in citizen journalism brought a 'new visibility' (Thompson, 2005; Goldsmith, 2010) to the G20 policing operation. The ubiquity of mobile phone cameras with video capture technology and the development of video-sharing platforms such as U-tube and social networking sites conjoined to challenge, and on this occasion, usurp the police's own efforts at image management. This is an instance of the police's 'uncontrolled visibility', here resulting in greater public exposure to police misdeeds as captured by protestors in what has been termed an informational 'cybercascade'\(^{149}\)

(Sunsden, 2007) driven by the Guardian newspaper's original video footage publication. Such developments are facilitated by the growing interconnectedness of media platforms and social media sites (such as Twitter, WhatsApp, Facebook etc.) allowing cascades to occur rapidly producing a 'wildfire' effect (Sunsden, 2007). Focusing on the G20, Goldsmith (2010:920) notes that "Less can be left out now, so that the terms on which police can show that they are, and can be held accountable have changed, making them more vulnerable and exposed."

This development is important in two respects. It was the death of Tomlinson and the exposure of its nefarious circumstances by activists, along with journalist's first-hand experience of being kettled, that turned the tone of the entire mainstream media reporting on the G20. There is an expectation that officers will treat all citizens with basic respect (even those whose behaviour is disrespectful) comply with the law and generally work for the betterment of society. That mandate becomes especially difficult to reconcile when video footage appears to show police aggression, wanton callousness, and brutality. As the HAC (2009:2) report concedes, the police's use of "distraction tactics (the controlled use of force against those who appear hostile) while legitimate according to the police rule-book, shocked the public." Indeed, this medium can be thought of as a relatively new form of public disclosure, when cameras are turned on the police. Whilst policing has always been the most visible of any criminal justice institution (Chermak and Weiss 2005: 502) it has been primarily based on direct experience or observation, or through 'secondary visibility' from publication of photographs and written narrative accounts limiting people's awareness and moral assessment of most policing activities (Goldsmith, 2010:914). The G20 is an instance of where this dramatically changed.

I have been arguing that this development presented in a public relations debacle in slow motion, and the authorities with some acute anxieties. This is evident for all the inquiry reports. The JCHR (2009b:2) notes how "incidents and the tactics [of the police] that led to them caused considerable adverse comment and have the potential to seriously damage the public's faith in the police." The HMIC (2009b:5) report similarly fears that what it presents as the police's 'core values' are being "tested and are in danger of being undermined" [...] that the police are now "very much on display during these events and police conduct is subject to intense levels of exposure and scrutiny." In a similar vein, the MPA (2010:4) authors note the 'new phenomenon' of citizen journalists which has "put a spotlight on individual instances of violence which can give a misleading view of an event" [my emphasis]. It is instructive to note that all construe this development sceptically, emphasising their reservations. This is equally the case with Deborah Glass (2009:161) the then IPCC Commissioner, who writing in the journal 'Policing' disapprovingly notes:
"A [video] clip of police using force on protestors will bring out the bloggers rather than the reasoned thinkers."

None view or welcome it as a positive advance to increase visibility where before there had been little, if any.

What started out as difficult events turned into a full blown crisis management for MPS, requiring not reframing, but blatant falsehoods. Commander Simon O'Brien had originally argued that the tactic of kettling had only been used in response to protestor violence, and that peaceful protestors and any passers-by were always free to leave:

"There was no real deliberate attempt to say 'you are all going to stay here for hours' ... What I saw ... at that time [towards the end of several hours of 'kettling'] was a couple of hundred people who did not want to go. They had been the agitators throughout the day" (quoted in Laville & Duncan, cited in Rosie & Gorringe, 2009:13).

Furthermore:

"We were attempting to keep certain groups and individuals apart. Those who wanted to leave could, and those who wanted to stay and make their point, we facilitated that" (in Davenport 2009, cited in Rosie & Gorringe, 2009:13).

There are a number of points to discuss in O'Brien's statement; the first is that his claims about how the kettling operated on the day are simply false, and are aimed to assuage the growing public disquiet by way of what Ericson calls 'accountability', the "capacity to provide a record of activities that explains them in a credible manner so that they appear to satisfy the rights and obligations of accountability" (Ericson 1995: 137). As Ericson argues:

"Every act of publicity for accountability is also an act of selection and distortion in which some things are left out and some alternative formulations are ignored; every act of secrecy for accountability is also an act of selection in which some things are given out and some alternative formulations are explored."

O'Brien's account is also to suggest the fanciful idea that kettling facilitated protest, an assertion that protestors on the day would be unlikely to agree with. O'Brien also uses the tactic of 'division', by using the media to create police imposed categories of protestor ('good dissent' from 'bad dissent', coming for the protest and coming for violence) within which my observations showed that even some protestors who desire 'good media' want to fit. Nevertheless, O'Brien fails to reveal that all protestors were seen as unlawful on the 1st and 2nd of April by MPS, as later betrayed by the policing plans published in the HMIC report. This recognition makes his claims of wanting to 'facilitate' protest somewhat redundant.
The ensuing days saw the police version of events unravelling further. Rosie & Gorringe, (2009:13) note how the Guardian reported its journalist had spoken to many people who were far from being what the police had labelled 'agitators' but who were refused permission to leave cordons. In addition, more video emerged which continued to flatly contradicted the police's version of events. This was also true of the Tomlinson case, including an absence of MPS's protestors attacking police after Tomlinson collapsed and the ensuing efforts to resuscitate him.

This construing of Operation Glencoe in this manner acted to de-legitimised MPS's 'official account' even further. A press politics of outrage was now in full tilt and mobilised to condemn institutional injustice and 'cover-up', creating what Greer & McLaughlin, (2011:289) term a 'swarming effect', to name and shame those responsible in a form of "ritualistic public punishment and humiliation." The various miscarriages of justice associated with the Tomlinson and Fisher cases added to the concern over a break down in public trust in the police. When this takes place in a climate of public cynicism, diminishing deference to authority, and an expanding critique of the wider institutions of the criminal justice system, the establishment was forced to act and the raft of different inquiries soon followed in its wake.

### 7.2.2 Producing truth and rebuilding legitimacy: the official report findings

Reacting to this controversy, the JCHR’s issued an addendum report into the policing (on their earlier more substantive pre-G20 March report) *Demonstrating respect for Human Rights? Follow-up.* In similar fashion, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (HCA) undertook a parallel inquiry, *Policing of the G20 Protests*, aimed at investigating "some of the wider concerns raised about police operational and tactical measures" at large demonstrations. Overall, they considered the G20 policing to be "remarkably successful", congratulating the police for their work whilst raising some specific issues over the use of kettling, police use of force and police accountability. Attesting to how serious the reputational damage was thought to be, on April 16th, Sir Paul Stephenson, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police announced an enquiry into the G20 policing to be led by the Chief Inspector of Constabulary Denis O'Connor, in part to "restore faith and trust in the police through his leadership." This was the most extensive review of public order policing tactics undertaken by the HMIC, and constitutes a significant occurrence, irrespective of the tasked agency, due to the 'sensitivity' of this area for ACPO and its long held resistance to this

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150 The report is in two volumes, with Volume 2 publishing in full the witness and written testimonies. This second volume provides an extensive account of the G20 operation Glencoe.

An interim report, 'Adapting to Protest – Nurturing the British Model of Policing' was released in July, followed by a longer report some four months later in November 2009 (somewhat confusingly of the same name), which asked a wider question about the future direction of public order policing, one of HMIC's own construction, namely "How best should the police as a service adapt to the modern day demands of public order policing while retaining the core values of the British model of policing?". It was reported that the interim report had been delayed during the drafting process due to the MPS's mounting a legal challenge to HMIC criticising its interpretation of public order legislation as not ECHR compliant. What we see here then is an example of how 'recommendations' can be 'negotiated' into action before inclusion into the inquiry report (Slater & Matthews, 2015:309) here with the mandating organisation (MPS) proving especially intransigence to any reform process. Finally, in March 2010, the Metropolitan Police Authority's (MPA) Civil Liberties Panel also issued its own report on the G20 policing operation, one which overlapped the findings of HMIC but addressed what the panel felt to be "gaps in those scrutinies". This included reviewing a number of "longstanding issues related to public order policing", including balancing protestors rights with the rights of the wider citizenry not to be disrupted by protest. Nonetheless, the MPA Panel did accept all the HMIC report findings.

The level of intensity of official inquiry into the G20 policing operation is then very significant. In total, the five reports amount to some 926 pages including 384 pages of witness and written testimony. As such the inquiry reports are especially valuable as a research tool, not only for the deliberations of the respective bodies and how these types of inquiries operate when it comes to public order policing, but because they contain a wealth of evidence by way of witness testimony from key individuals, both police and protestors who were subject to Operation Glencoe. Evidence comes from senior police managers (including Bronze, Silver and Gold commanders who had strategic and operational responsibility for the G20 policing operation) as well as those at the most senior level of the Metropolitan police, ACPO, as well as government, including Ministerial level. It is rare indeed to find senior police officers being required to give an account of themselves and defend

55 Newburn (1994:10) notes with disappointment the resistance amongst police forces to include 'public order policing' of large events in their PSI study examining what democracy means in practice for policy change in policing. Newburn writes that ultimately ACPO refused to grant approval for what is perhaps one of the most important areas of public policy, leaving the authors having to opt for the safer territory of civilianisation: the development of crime prevention policy; and new policing responses to sexual violence in policing.

554 A progress report Policing Public Order on Adapting to Protest and Nurturing the British Model of Policing was published in February 2011. It was reported that HMIC had been forced to hire a senior barrister to defend their central recommendation that MPS's 'unlawful' interpretation of the G20 protests were inconsistent with Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The same article cites a HMIC 'source' stating there had been a 'huge battle' with MPS, but HMICs legal advice found in their favour. Lewis, P. & Evans, R. (2009 26nd October) Met hired lawyers to contest the findings of G20 protest inquiry, Guardian Newspaper.
their tactical, operational and strategic policing decisions in some detail. Witness testimony is also taken from a small number of protest groups and observers attending the protest events across central London (I return to this balance later).

I now provide a critical assessment of these reports, although I concentrate on HMIC’s interim and final report considering its significance, by employing my own observational analysis and findings as well as the wider academic scholarship. In doing so, I do not aim to give an exhaustive summary of all the issues covered by the reports or to present a thematic analysis, rather my purpose is to draw out the central deficiencies in the reports. I provide a summary of the terms of reference, key findings and recommendations for these inquiries and reports in Table 4 (below).

In part, I follow Gilmore (2013:86) and argue that the inquiries operate in the same sceptical way described by Burton & Carlen, and also Scraton. Official knowledge is imposed to repair the breaches in legitimacy and agency prestige, respond to political crisis, mobilise and restore public consent with the ultimate aim to renew political authority. I argue that despite the very considerable public disquiet and indignation that the scenes from Operation Glenoce caused, the raft of reports fail to constitute a blue-print for substantive change. It should be remembered that this somewhat dismal result is achieved with the benefit of considerable witness testimony and access to a video data record (here of an activity by a participant in the activity, or 'sousveillance') which situates the watcher (at least partially) at the scene. Despite this technological record, the reports produce knowledge which is very largely supportive of increasingly authoritarian policing and the prevailing political hegemony which they act to defend, whilst at the same time marginalising and abrogating the experience of protestors. One of the central questions I want to address is how the reports came to the findings that they did in light of the considerable contrary evidence available to them? This brings into view their claim to independence and impartiality which I argue is deeply problematic.

At least part of the answer lies in there being a great deal at stake here. The reports need to be read in the context in which they were written, a prevailing crisis of legitimacy and authority of an entire agency. This is to use scandal as a conceptual tool to analyse the workings of the police institution and the wider systems of governance of which the G20 reports form an integral part. The police’s organisational identity is its key resource for maintaining its legitimacy (Brown, 1997) hence legitimacy issues are especially salient for them (i.e. Davis & Thomas, 2003; Herbert, 2006). This last point is dramatically demonstrated in Skogan’s (2006) work on the effects of police contacts with

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155 Gilmore (2013) provides a thorough thematic analysis from a human rights perspective on four of the G20 reports.
citizens. Analysis of these types of encounters point to the operation of an acute 'asymmetry': such that negative experiences of the police can be up to fourteen times more 'impactful' and hence deeply discrediting than positive experiences. This carries some rather stark consequences for a policing organisation, it means they may gain little or no credit for performing well, whereas bad experiences resulting from forms of malpractice and unprofessional treatment (let alone brutality) can profoundly influence citizen's views and act to erode the organisations legitimacy. Given that most people do not have direct contact with the police, their knowledge is vicarious, deriving from what they learn from the media, by observation and from word of mouth (Smith, 2007:32). So, whilst many people believe in police legitimacy despite their lack of experience with the police, it is fragile and can be falsified by their experience. Prior belief in the police's legitimacy, or illegitimacy, is a powerful factor in what can be viewed as a causal spiral, either eroding or reinforcing legitimacy.

In his study, The Politics of the Police, Reiner (2010) details the policies and practices that have helped legitimate the police, these include; establishing a disciplined organisation with clear standards; allowing (or creating) the appearance that the police are subject to the rule of law; pursuing a strategy of only using minimal force along with propagating that image; remaining separate and aloof from politics and political control; securing acceptance for coercion by emphasising the police 'service' role; and cultivating the idea that the police are accountable to the courts, and in some mystical way, to the British people, rather than to the state. It is these hard won accomplishments which are threatened, not just by the G20 operation, but by changing policing behaviour which such summits typically bring into view. At a higher level then, policing is not merely about practices on the street (the physical or material term of the occupation), it is about reproducing a particular symbolic order. To achieve this the institution has to situate itself within a dominant place culturally, and hence socially and politically (Ericson, 1989:206). This requires strategically organising "physical facilities, cultural sensibilities and social relations to construct silence about most of their activities" (Ibid., 1989:224). To paraphrase Lord Denning's rationale justifying truth being a causality in protecting English justice, the absence of this institutional deceit contained in the G20 reports would reveal what constitutes his 'appalling vista', it would mean that the police were guilty of mass violent assault, widespread misuse of their legal authority (including illegal detention and containment), and that they did this recklessly and knowingly and with little, if any, regard to their obligations to Art 11 of the ECHR.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>REPORT</th>
<th>Purpose of Inquiry/Report</th>
<th>Key Findings and Recommendations</th>
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| JCHR (2009)  
Demonstrating Respect for Human Rights? A human rights approach to policing protest, Vol.1, HL Paper 47-1, HC 320-1 (Published 3rd March, 2009) | To seek evidence on:  
- the proportionality of legislative measures to restrict protest or peaceful assembly;  
- existing powers available to the police and their use in practice; and  
- reconciling competing interests of public order and protest. | Findings:  
- Found no evidence of systematic human rights abuses in policing of protests but raised some concerns re legal and operational issues;  
- Legislation broadly protects individuals’ right to protest;  
- The government should protect and facilitate peaceful protest (unless compelling evidence of legitimate reasons for restrictions);  
- Acknowledge significant mismatch between perceptions of protestors and the police about the way in which protest is managed;  
- Found some evidence that police do not strike right balance in protecting rights of those protested against;  
- Not share concerns expressed in the media that s76 CTA 2008 offence criminalises taking photographs of the police;  

Legal changes:  
- Amend s5 POA 1986 by deleting reference to language or behaviour that is merely “insulting” so that it cannot be used inappropriately to suppress the right to free speech;  
- Counter-terrorism powers should not be used against peaceful protestors:  
  - New guidance on the use of the section 44 stop and search powers;  
  - Duty of police to act compatibly with human rights  
  - Guidance be issued to address concerns about improper use of s76 of the CTA 2008  
- Repeal SOCPA (2005) to allow protest around parliament;  
- Reverse the presumption that hearings for protection from harassment injunctions regarding protestors are held in private.  

Operational changes:  
- Police and protestors need to improve ‘dialogue’;  
- ‘No surprises’ policing;  
- Improved human rights training should be integrated into other police training;  
- Tasers should not be used against peaceful protestors;  
- Post protest debriefings to ensure lessons are learnt and disseminated across forces;  
- HO to consider if police contracts and disciplinary procedures pay sufficient attention to human rights considerations. |
| JCHR (2009) Twenty-second Report of Session 20-08-09 Demonstrating Respect for Rights? Follow-up, HL Paper 141, HC 522 (Published 14th July 2009) | Follow-up inquiry, principally into the policing of the G20 summit, (with some consideration of other protests (including Tamil demonstrations and Radcliffe-on-Soar Power station pre-emptive arrest). Considered:  
- Police relations with the media  
- Communications between police and protestors  
- The use of close containment (“kettling”)  
- The use of force by the police | Dialogue  
- Enhancement of advanced discussions between police and protestors, including nominated point of contact within every police force;  
- Consider exploring the use of independent negotiators to facilitate dialogue and resolve disputes between police and protestors.  
Kettling  
- Can be lawful, but only if proportionate and necessary to do so;  
- Police need to take more account of individuals circumstances, including making efforts to allow people to leave as soon as possible and providing facilities such as medical facilities, toilets and water accessible to those contained.  
Police accountability  
- There should be a legal requirement for police to wear ID numbers or to identify themselves when asked;  
- Ensure that any exaggerated and distorted reporting in the media can be countered quickly and authoritatively by the police. |
|---|---|---|
- The policing of the G20 summit and police tactics employed  
- The sequence of events on 1st April 2009  
- Public perceptions, the legal framework and 'police professional practice'  
- The immediate issues arising in protest policing stemming from this review | Findings:  
- An absence of clear standards on the use of force for individual officers operating in the public order policing environment;  
- A disconnection between individual officer safety training and public order training;  
- A variation across forces in levels of understanding of the law and proper use of public order police powers;  
- Inconsistent approaches and tactics across police forces;  
- Inconsistent equipment;  
- Lack of public order command capability;  
- Out of date training and guidance;  
- Inadequate training in the law, including human rights and police public order powers;  
- Inappropriate use of public order powers; |
| HMIC (2009) | Adapting to Protest – Nurturing the British Model of Policing, London: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary. (Published 25th November, 2009). | The report asks one central question, “How best should the police as a service adapt to the modern day demands of public order policing while retaining the core values of the British model of policing?” | 12 Key Recommendation to ‘support and strengthen the British Policing Model’:  
• Revised guidelines on the use of force, covering ‘entrenching’ legal principles (of necessity, proportionality and the minimum use of force) in training in the use of force and planning and control of operations;  
• Codifying national standards of public order policing;  
• Clustered force working arrangements to ensure adequate senior public order capacity;  
• More consistent, relevant and also accredited public order training (including HRA framework; use of force and force continuum; scenario and contingency planning; crowd dynamics; proportionality of tactics);  
• No surprises communication philosophy with protestors, the media and wider public;  
• Active support of the Home Office to strengthen and sustain the British model of policing;  
• Clarification from central government on the use of Banning Orders on processions and the use of personal data gathering on protestors (including overt photography) by police;  
• Monitoring police use of stop and search powers and ensuring all officers understand these legal powers;  
• Clarification of precise role of Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs);  
• Reviewing ACPOs role to ensure transparency and accountability;  
• Common guidelines to ensure interventions by police authorities do not interfere with the independence of the police or protecting the public interest. |
| HAC (2009), Policing of the G20 Protests, Eighth Report of the Session 2008-09, HC 418. (Published 23rd June 2009) | Investigates some of the wider concerns raised about police operational and tactical measures when policing large scale public order events. The inquiry focused on:  
• Police relations with the media  
• Communications | Headline Findings:  
Overall:  
• G20 policing operation considered as 'remarkably successful' and congratulates the police for their work;  
• However, recognise some ‘failings’ in the operation, being:  
Kettling  
• Kettling is lawful but should be used 'sparingly and in clearly defined circumstances' which should be codified;  
• Should only continue for as long as 'absolutely necessary', comfort of those contained |
### Findings
- Agrees HMIC conclusion that underlying presumption underpinning police planning for protests should always be in favour of peaceful assembly and for police to show a degree of tolerance to protestors even if some commit offences;
- Significant scope to develop public order training to reflect changing nature of protest and ensure sufficient capacity;
- Need for appropriate supervision and sanctions in place to deter officers from behaving unprofessionally during protests, including failure to display ID;
- Officers also need to be more transparent about the strategies and tactics they are proposing to use, and why, to media and public;
- Much more should be done to ensure better engagement with the media (inc 'citizen journalists') to maintain public trust;
- Better communication with protestors during demonstrations would go some way to...
addressing the criticisms of police tactics and powers, but should consider whether some tactics and powers are inappropriate for use in public order situations;

- Endorses the culture of ‘no surprises’ in the HMIC reports and feels that this would contribute to restoring public faith in the policing of public order events.

Key Recommendations to MPS:

**Training and organisational learning**
- Need to understand the rights of protestors and the responsibilities of the police to achieve a shift in police attitudes;
- Equip officers with the skills to facilitate peaceful protest to:
  - de-escalate potentially violent situations;
  - communicate effectively in challenging situations;
  - contain and handle violence should it prove impossible to de-escalate;
- Analyse training needs and monitoring of attendance/delivery to ensure sufficient capacity.

**Supervision**
- Better define and communicate ‘intrusive supervision’ in a public order context;
- Ensure all officers understand their responsibility to challenge any inappropriate behaviour by their colleagues;
- Ensure disciplinary action against officers (and supervisors) where ID is not properly displayed without reasonable excuse.

**Event planning - communication and engagement**
- Clear guidelines to make it easier for protestors to access the police;
- Greater transparency in communicating policing strategies to show facilitating peaceful protest is a reality;
- Explicitly tell officers in briefings about the principle of facilitating peaceful protest;
- Police engagement with media should aim to create expectation that is conducive to peaceful protest;
- Have a single officer taking responsibility for the overall communication in joint force operations.

**Engaging with media**
- Review its approach to news management to facilitate transparent and fair reporting by the media and ‘citizen journalists’;
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<th>Command and control</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Have sufficient numbers of Airwave handsets with sufficient capacity and capability available.</td>
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<th>Tactics and equipment</th>
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<td>• Emphasise in operational briefings that any use of force should always be the minimum necessary to resolve a situation, including use of protective clothing and equipment;</td>
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<td>• Officers to use their discretion to allow protestors out of containment areas;</td>
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<td>• Monitor and evaluate the use of counter-terrorist and stop and search legislation at major public order events.</td>
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<th>Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs):</th>
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<td>• Consider the proportional use of FITs, justify and clarify their role and purpose and ensure they are adequately briefed, in line with HMIC recommendations;</td>
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My argument is this is precisely what took place and neither was this action the result of what the reports collectively attribute to the somewhat anodyne categories of advertent ‘misunderstandings’, ‘misinterpretations’, mistaken beliefs, deficiencies in ‘training’ or some similar type of systemic procedural, implementation and policy failings. This is to fundamentally misconstrue what was happening on the ground, and the nature of summit policing operations more generally. Before this, I want to examine the make-up and status of the respective agencies conducting the inquiries.

7.2.3 Questioning the independence of the inquiry bodies

Serious systems failings (perceived or real) within policing usually see solutions being called for which involve introducing some independent tier of governance, leastways the emphasis is always upon enhancing independence, not restricting it (Savage, 2012:95). Nevertheless, independence as a concept and analytical tool has been the subject of intense empirical and philosophical debate across a number of disciplines (Bartlett, 1993:52). Whilst all of the organisations reporting on the G20 policing operation make some claim to being ‘independent,’ we need to introduce some analytical rigour to avoid a merely rhetorical usage.

There are two limbs to the meaning of ‘independence’ in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: firstly, there must not be any institutional or hierarchical connection between the police officer (or organisation) under investigation and the investigator, and secondly, the conduct of the investigation must be independent in practice (Ramsahai v the Netherlands (2007) 46 EHRR 43). Greater importance is thought to attach to the first limb than the second, but this still leaves open the question of ‘independence in practice’. In addition, I want to draw on Carey’s (1966:48) work, who offers three meanings to the term independence. Firstly, the agency in question is not subordinate to another authority and is therefore able to provide honesty, integrity, objectivity and responsibility in its findings and recommendations. Secondly, there should be avoidance of any relationships which would likely (even subconsciously) impair objective judgement. Thirdly, independence requires avoidance of any relationship that would suggest a conflict of interest to a reasonable outside observer [my emphasis]. Taking these statements together allows us to consider the quality of independence as a working concept when making some determination to a body making such a claim.

This claim to independence is most problematic for HMIC, whom also constitute the principal reporting body due to its direct regulatory function and one to which police forces are obliged to
adhere. HMIC is a statutory body, but it is not subordinate to police forces although it does have both strong relationships with them and its membership is largely constituted from senior ranks. In a real sense this is an example of the police regulating (monitoring) the police. Similar criticisms have been levelled at the IPCC's ability to reach objective judgements when employing ex-police personnel to investigate alleged police malpractice, more problematically still, when investigating officers come from the same force as those whom they are submitting to investigation. This concern becomes equally apparent when one scrutinises the membership of the 'review team', led by the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Denis O'Connor (formerly Vice-President of ACPO and former Chief Constable of Surrey). Not only is O'Connor an appointee of the Home Secretary for his HMIC role, meaning he is handpicked for the position by the state, he is also, in effect, undertaking a review of his former police force, as Surrey was providing a substantial number of officers through the force 'mutual aid' inter-force support arrangements. In this respect there is a clear conflict of interest which operates at two levels, that of the policing organisation and also at the individual force level.

Of the other ten members of the review team, at least nine are formerly senior police officers who helped O'Connor produce the report, leaving a remainder of one non-police person on the team (a human rights law barrister acting as a legal advisor). Consequently, at least 82% of the review team are police officers or former police officers. This number increases dramatically when considering that the team were assisted by 'High Potential Development Scheme officers' and 'specialist public order officers' from police forces across England, Wales and Northern Ireland (HMIC, 2009b:217). 'Discourses of independence' also involve considerations of both legitimacy and effectiveness, if a body has an institutional connection with that body potentially complicit with the failings, this puts a question mark over their objectivity due to the distortions from associated vested interests (Savage, 2012:97).

In addition, there were seven members of an 'External Reference Group', whose remit is stated in HMICs interim report as being "drawn from the broad spectrum of interested groups. It will include representation from Human Rights Groups, the Media, Academics, Government Departments and the Police" in order to 'test' "the review methodology and emerging findings" (HMIC, 2009a:69). Clearly this is an important role, and one designed to lend legitimacy to HMICs findings and

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157 HMIC is not a public body specified in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 although it chooses to act as if it were (personal correspondence to author, Stephen Wells, Head of Service, HMIC).
158 Technically O'Connor is appointed by the Queen, on recommendation from the Home Secretary. (Personal correspondence to author, HMIC).
159 Operation Glencoe constituted a large pre-planned event and drew on police officers from seven constabularies, one of which was Surrey.
160 A further individual on the review team's background cannot be determined.
recommendations. Nonetheless, from the construction of the later actual membership there appears to be some notable absences when comparing this assertion to its later manifestation into reality. The majority of members are government insiders whose independence is similarly in doubt, including a Chief Constable, an ex-judge, two ex-Home Office senior civil servants (one of whom was a senior ex-MPS employee) with the remainder including a Baroness and two academics.

As I have detailed, even those appointments involving individuals from non-governmental backgrounds appear questionable if one's aim is to provide a number of desirable attributes such as providing robust, independent advice as well as drawing participation from the wider community of interest. If this were indeed the ambition, it is curious that at the initiation stage of the group no mention is made of any protest groups being invited. As they constituted 'the policed' they are the largest interested party to these proceedings and their inclusion would appear mandatory. The reference to 'human rights groups' is left unspecified although this would not necessarily incorporate social movement actors. Nevertheless, this point remains academic as neither was fulfilled in practice. The provision of a balanced range of external stakeholders is simply absent and would appear to be so by design, irrespective of the original promissory note contained in earlier HMICs interim report. All in all, the 'external reference group' is remarkably similar to the review team, neither of which inspire confidence in being either

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161 Mike Granatt was formerly a Director of Public Affairs and Internal Communication for the Metropolitan Police in 1989, and Director of Communication at the Home Office in 1994, and later senior civil servant at the Cabinet Office, holding senior communication posts (and press secretary to five cabinet Ministers) who also established the 'Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)' a body designed to reform Whitehall's civil emergencies arrangements after 'failures in the governments communication responses to crisis'. The second, Vic Hogg was the Acting Director General of the 'Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group at the Home Office.

162 Baroness Young of Hornsey is a cross-bench peer and the only person of 'diversity' on the group (being a black woman) this may explain her presence on the group.

163 These are instructive choices as well, as it includes Professor PAJ Waddington, who whilst having extensively researched public order policing (including highly unusually with the co-operation of MPS) and in this sense at first blush appears eminently qualified, however, he openly admits back in his (1994) work 'Liberty and Order: Public Order Policing in a Capital City' (i.e. London) of being 'won over' by senior Met officers and of his 'successful' incorporation into MPS's perspective on public order policing more generally (1994: 212). Indeed, during his fieldwork in the early 1990's and the poll tax demonstration outside of Brixton prison Waddington admits to momentarily stopping his observational study in order to go native and to help officers 'collect riot shields and helmets' (1994:164). As has been well established by his academic work, Waddington's analysis has rendered him "unapologetically partial .." producing a sociology 'for the police' (rather than of the police) and somewhat of a lone voice in policing scholarship, an feature he himself recognises (1994:212). This has continued apace during his later academic career. The second academic is Julian Roberts who is a Professor at Oxford and a member of the Sentencing Council of England & Wales. His work is in sentencing policy and practices, as well as public attitudes to the criminal justice system and has no background in public order policing. One would suspect that his expertise in public misperceptions and lack of knowledge about the criminal justice system, including the police (and how this should be rectified) and confidence in the criminal justice system (Understanding Public Attitudes to Criminal Justice, 2005) as well as his credentials from being a member of the Sentencing Council, whose 'appointing department' is the Ministry of Justice, facilitated his selection. In short, neither provide any critical perspective on public order policing, and can be seen as establishment insiders, presumably being known quantities in this respect.

'external or 'independent'. As Scraton (2002:16) also identifies in his analysis of official inquiries, such appointment decisions are inherently political and carry considerable impact; "Who is appointed as chair, assessors and advisor's forms part of a hidden discretionary process. Once appointed, chairs exercise broad discretion in gathering evidence and information, the conduct and progress of the inquiry, the selection of witnesses and disclosure of documents, the significance attached to evidence and its influence on findings and recommendations. There is no opportunity to challenge, and no accountability, concerning the decisions through which evidence has credibility ascribed or denied." HMIC would therefore appear to fail on Carey's second and third criteria of independence, resulting in both impaired objective judgement and a conflict of interest. We therefore cannot reasonably discount regulatory capture.

The remaining organisations reporting on the G20 such as the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (HCA) is a department select committee comprising fourteen members drawn from the three mainstream political parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats) and all of whom are MPs. There are several different classes of players here, but it includes members of government who holds the coercive power of the state and for whose interests the summit is partly being upheld. The challengers (i.e. protest groups) are of course challenging government actors and aiming to disrupt the status quo, and the exercise of state violence through police action of which the reports in part address, has the objective of maintaining the order and security associated with the current power structure of which they form part. This compromises the HCA's claim to independence, notably for some member's regards presenting a conflict of interest, in that Labour being the party of government (at that time). Such member's attitudes could be negative towards the type of dissent on the 1st and 2nd of April. It also leaves open the question as to the governmental role in the policing arrangements for Operation Glencoe. The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) has traditionally played a scrutiny role, with the MPA's Responding to G20 report is authored by the smaller 'MPA Civil Liberties Panel' made up of eight members, again drawn from the main political parties and some independent members. Whilst far from being outspoken, and accepting the core findings of HMIC, the MPA report was the most critical of the police and the only report into Operation Glencoe which explicitly stressed the need for appropriate disciplinary action against police malpractice.

7.3 Analysis of the G20 Reports

Each of the reports are complex documents, reflecting different mandates and preoccupations. Having said that, what is notable about them is what they all share, namely, their underlying assumptions, analytical frameworks, the tentative directions for policy reform, and their
endorsement and reproduction of certain significant 'organisational symbols' (McMillan, 1987:27) or cherished myths about British policing. What differences that do exist lie in their focus and emphasis rather than substantive positions or conclusions. Whilst none of the reports offer a complete defence of police actions, where criticism is levelled, it is always muted and off-set by attributing police malpractices and alleged illegality to some form of ignorance or implementation failure. In chapter four I argued that the police (by this I mean MPS as an institution) had acted to manipulate sections of the mainstream media in a way that facilitated, expanded and defended their own mandate and minimised 'on-the-job trouble' (Waddington, 1998) resulting from their contingency plans to neuter G20 protestors. Here I argue that MPS use a series of self-presentation strategies of performances - 'image work' - to manipulate and control inquiry member’s perceptions (many of whom are significant institutional actors). Many appear willing participants in this spectacle, perhaps in part due to their 'ideological plumbing' (Scraton, 2002:3) running a gamut of systemic issues such as value assumptions, bias frameworks of thought and embedded logics within which these institutional actors operate. In part, this can be seen by examining what is not entertained (discussed later, below) by those inquiries.

In addition, police wrong doing can be easily conflated with organisational issues and inquiries can fail to pay proper attention to normal police practices at summit protests (Slater & Matthews, 2015:312) or may be entirely ignorant of them. On this last point, it would have been instructive to know how many of the inquiry panels had ever been on a demonstration? This because stories (by this I mean narrative accounts) are understood by a listener in terms of their own background and experiences, as well as their relationship to the 'sponsor' of the story (here principally the police but also the authorities) as well as the wider characters named in the story (challengers and dissenters) (Goldberg, 2012:151). More prosaically, inquiry members need to be able to ask the right questions of those giving testimony, which represented a serious flaw in both panels conducting this work. The other difficulty with the witness’s testimony is that no comments were made under oath, indeed some of the police testimony contains falsehoods.

7.3.1 Questioning the questioners:
The purposes of the witness 'evidence' is to establish what happened and why it happened, it is to uncover the truth of the events, with the principle actors (the police) being viewed as 'legitimate agents of knowledge' (professionals). Whilst what is being communicated occurs within an established parliamentary etiquette, there remain competing perspectives and resulting stories from those perspectives, all of which diverge on the actus rea and the mens rea. In short, a conflict of interest situation with contested parties and accounts and one where the police are being judged.
However, examining the way the witness testimony is received and considered, as well as the questions and cross-examination posed, informs us about the form and structure of actually existing relationships between these parties.

The HAC panel come across in the oral evidence as often suggestive, deferential, and at other times almost obsequious, for instance Winnick (MP) to Hardwick (IPCC Chair):

"What has been said in the last week or so, you would presumably agree that the police at all levels should always recognise that they are the servants and not the masters of communities? Mr Hardwick: I think that is a very important point. The police are the servants of the people, as indeed I am" (HAC, 2009:Ev5).

Not only is this a leading question, which includes the questioner's opinion statement, it also presents a forced choice, all of which should be avoided if one's purpose is to gain detailed responses relevant to the investigation (Oxburgh, et al. 2010:59-60). Whether the police are indeed the 'masters or the servants' is however an empirical question, it can only be settled by making a judgement on how they act and in whose interests, notably at critical junctures such as the policing of international summits (this is what makes the examination of international summits interesting, as they provide a litmus test for this question). At other times the panel come across as obsequious. An illustrative example occurs when posing a question regards the false press statement MPS issued on the killing of Ian Tomlinson (which failed to state the crucial point that Tomlinson had been assaulted by MPS officers before dying) to the Gold Commander Broadhurst, in the following exchange: Mr Winnick:

"Why can you not answer yes or no? Commander Broadhurst: I need to put it in context. Chairman: We must allow the Commander to answer the question. David Davies: I would not be allowed to question a witness in this discourteous fashion" [my emphasis] placating, "Q384 Chairman: I think the Commander is going to give us an explanation. Commander Broadhurst: [gives explanation] Q385 Mr Winnick: Mr Broadhurst, can I say that if a moment ago I seemed discourteous, I apologise. Commander Broadhurst: You did not, sir. (HAC, 2009: Ev48-49).

These interviews form the central information gathering component from which the report findings emerge, as such their importance cannot be overstated. MPSs use of the media is a critical issue in Operation Glencoe, as with other critical and contentious issues the interviewees willingness to divulge information will be influenced by the interviewer's ability to elicit information (Oxburgh, 2010)
7.3.2 Semantic Engineering: Making Violence Easier to Live With

The HAC (2009) report and the earlier JCHR (2009c) contain extensive unabridged oral and written evidence from senior police figures, and follows a question and answer format, with some cross-examination, which as a document is revealing. It allows an examination of the ways in which police violence is constituted or denied, itself an insight into power relations. The dominant account throughout the reports pay deference to one type of language, and in doing so, generates and enacts particular repertoires of countermeasures. These observations are also attributable to the security agencies, who similarly use 'laundered language' (Brodeur, 1983: 509; but see also 1981; and Lee & Mann, 1979, for a fascinating discussion of the RMCP security service).

Here I am proposing that language does not merely describe an objective reality, but acts to construct it, and hence constitutes a form of political power. It is an organisational language which carries a boundary maintenance function. To paraphrase Camus, words can come from the perspective of the executioner or of the victim. Not only do the words from the police resolutely view proceedings from 'top down' as opposed to the mass of somewhat bruised protestors 'bottom up', the police discourse plays a political role in structuring reality within the communication setting of testimony. Police witnesses employ discourses and linguistic tools (particularly euphemisms) for ideological purposes. For instance, violently attacking a group of (unarmed) protestors by a mass of police officers in armoured riot gear by charging at them and striking their (unprotected) bodies with batons and shields becomes 'crowd dispersal'. Kettling protestors for hours without any facilities, food or water becomes 'containment'. Maintaining the kettle by batoning any protestor who gets too close to the surrounding phalanx of riot police becomes 'close containment practices'. Baton strikes are categorised as 'officer personal safety training'. Punching (including in the face) kicking (including protestor's shins or crotches, men or women) or batoning a person becomes 'a distraction blow'. Protestors being struck with a shield (be it to the face or body) is 'push-aways' or a 'defensive push'. Striking a person with the edge of a short shield becomes 'a defensive edge'. Police violence in all its varied forms and severity, including lethal violence, becomes the 'police use of force'. Riot equipment including 'less than lethal weaponry' (extensive body armour, short shields, batons, CS spray etc.) is 'personal protection equipment' (PPE) or 'officer safety equipment'. The emergence and spread of 'riot police' (riot control units) we are told are a 'misconception', rather they are 'police officers who are trained in public order tactics' (Sue Sim, ACPO Lead on Public Order, cited in HAC 2009b: Ev26). However, in a self-serving reversal of direction to this linguistic logic, a thrown plastic water bottle by a protestor becomes 'a missile', and damage to property becomes 'serious violence'. As Eric Partridge has observed when studying the aligned field of military combat; "War is the greatest excitant of new vocabulary" (cited in Hughes, 1989:26).
These and other institutionalised euphemisms act to substitute new evasive and non-violent expressions that mask the very violent and unpleasant nature of their referents. They contribute to changing the perceptions of police actions to the inquiry panels by (re-)presenting and imposing a police terminology on the proceedings. This happens throughout the testimonies, one that is itself policed judiciously by the assorted police spokespeople who make up the majority giving oral evidence. Witness Sue Sim, when confronted by a HAC panel member who introduces the commonplace word 'kettling' in the context of what it most obviously signifies, being 'very close to something that can boil over', and posed as a question to her. Such terminology is swiftly dismissed, and Sim replies curtly, "Yes, but it is not within police terminology." (HAC, 2009b: Ev25). As with theological scripture, the questioner is referred to 'the police manuals' as the authoritative document in deciding the naming of proceedings and the one to which all should abide by. This is not simply the existence of specialist language (jargon) for precise meanings, it plays an important role in the exchanges because they actively blunt questions of sentiment towards violent action and those on the receiving end of it. Soon after, Keith Vaz (MP) inadvertently raises a question about the date 'when kettling began', similarly gets short shrift: [Ms Sim:] "We do not kettle, Mr Vaz." (ibid., 2009b:Ev25). This same linguistic creativity populates the HMIC reports as well, where it is presented as unproblematic to justify police tactics and propagandise their cause. Such linguistic techniques are not new of course, there are parallels here in neighbouring areas such as the study of discourses supportive of militarisation (for instance see Kis, 2014) notably with the 'nuclearisation of language' (Hook, 1985). Nevertheless, all such narrative logic accrues benefit to the senders of its message, as it both hinders lucid thinking and influences the resulting recommendations of the inquires, even while going unquestioned by the respective panel members who defer to its logic.

In one sense what we are seeing in the reports is what Keane, in his study of Violence and Democracy (2004) has called the 'civilising' of violence, that violence can be publicly removable and is 'erasable'. The police have long been the purveyors of violence when controlling those marginal to society (Reiner, 2010) a method which was seen as a legitimate tool. But when this violence becomes a televisual spectacle for many to see, it takes on a different form, it disrupts a series of carefully crafted cherished myths about the British bobby and leads to a legitimacy deficit. These confrontational scenes intrude into the routines of tolerance found in modern life and destroys those standards and confounds the conventional order.

This near covert adoption of 'policing language' makes the violence witnessed at the G20 easier to live with along with a denial of the victim. This is also a component part of the 'presentational rules' that exists to lend an acceptable appearance to the ways in which policing is conducted, but not
adhered to (Smith, 2007:43). A repertoire of explanations is used by the police as rhetorical devices that both neutralise and deflect blame after the act by employing a series of justifications and rationalisations (Sykes & Matza, 1957; Cohen, 2001). None of the report authors effectively diagnose and dissect the systematic ambiguity that they are constantly being confronted with when taking police testimony, one created by the partly formal and partly informal rule system which is the means by which conflicting demands are met when conducting much policing. This is most familiar in what Klockers (1980) has designated as the 'Dirty Harry problem', where police use 'dirty means' (read here legal, ethical or politically dubious or outright unlawful methods) to achieve what they consider to be a 'just end' goal. Such efforts are greatly enabled by the characteristics of policing; which mostly takes place in low visibility settings, where supervision is weak or non-existent, and where individual officers exercise a great deal of discretion in what force they use and how they use it. These inherent problems in police accountability have been long recognised by scholars, but are studiously ignored by all of the reports. Without some foreknowledge of these longstanding problems in policing, the right questions cannot be posed, and the answers scrutinised.

7.4 The G20 Report Findings

7.4.1 Summit Protest as a challenge to confrontation management
Several of the reports starting point is to situate the context of Operation Glencoe within a "new world of protest", that we are seeing the 'professionalisation' and intensification of protest, both tactically and organisationally, particularly in terms of protestor motivation and commitment (i.e. Button et al., 2002:17). For instance, HMIC's (2009b:42) Adapting to Protest cites (the earlier discussed) police 'intelligence assessment' that "protest in London is undergoing not just a new resurgence but a reinvention with new allegiances being formed and the old foes are now working together, inspired by the global economic downturn." Framing the issue, HMIC (2009b:5) asks, "How best should the police as a service adapt to the modern day demands of public order policing while retaining the core values of the British model of policing?" The answer we are told is: "The police as a service needs to modernise its approach and be more inventive in using new technologies to engage with hard to reach or resistant communities." Gilmore (2013:94-96) offers a discussion of this same point, with the aim of refuting any such changes in protest to the level of 'discourse' rather than of substance. Whilst I believe she is wrong on this point, leastways in the case

165 The naming echoes the dilemma faced by the anti-hero and chief protagonist Harry Callahan, in the 1971 film Dirty Harry.
166 There are a few exceptions to this such as the custody suite, which since PACE is now equipped with CCTV designed as an accountability measure against police malpractices and to monitor as well as safeguard the treatment of detainees.
of much summit protest for some social movements, her (rightful) concern lies in what follows having accepted this premise. What it invariably leads to is the depoliticising of protest and an attendant increase in both pre-emptive police 'disruptive' actions and coercive policing with its drift into further para-militarisation. All these tendencies are apparent when viewing the policing of international summit protests.

What is especially noticeable from a reading of the G20 reports is that having accepted that protest has changed by developing tactical innovations and repertoires of contention, this issue never finds any thoughtful discussion. What we have is only an acknowledgement that the police are dealing with more 'fluid' and unpredictable protest events, ones involving non-hierarchical groups that may use creative forms of direct action, including civil disobedience. This is seen entirely as constituting a pressing challenge, itself located within a securitised discourse. Within this rigid confine protest takes just two forms; that of criminal (or criminally orientated) and disruptive (a breach of the peace) or alternatively, the peaceful expression of views on an issue. Writing on the Canadian experience of the shortcomings of similar inquiries (into their own highly discredited G20 policing operation), Slater & Matthews (2015:316) identify this very same logic when they say:

"It seems to us that it was foreign to them [the police] that protest could be radical in its content, aimed at broad systemic issues, and nonetheless not be a threat to public security. They did not appear to understand that concern for broad systemic issues would predispose people who were neither criminal nor disruptive, in a legal sense, to challenge whatever they saw as illegitimate authority in any way possible."

Slater & Matthews point also provides evidence for Wood's (2014) thesis that we are seeing an increasing 'diffusion of innovation' internationally in policing, and an enhanced sharing of 'best practices' through a globalised policing network of corporate and statutory actors. The unpredictability of organised and determined protestors and activists are typically portrayed as threatening, 'subhuman' and 'somehow similar to terrorists'. These globalising trends in the transfer of 'expertise' has seen in a hardening of the 'police identity' and the incorporation of new tactics which favour militarised solutions and strategic incapacitation (all of which serve vested corporate and military-industrial interests). These shifts are heightened where there is a 'perceived need for change' particularly when the police organisation feels its authority or legitimacy is threatened (Wood, 2014:93).

7.4.2 Negotiating Dissent?
The JCHR (2009a) and the HAC (2009) recommends improved communication and dialogue between police and protestors as a means of 'resolving misunderstandings' that lead to police use of force. However, in a moment of institutional capture, the HAC (2009:17) simply adopts the police
story and policing knowledge when it states the 'importance of communication', thus were told it is "in the protesters' interest to signal their peaceful intentions beforehand", this because it would "allow the police to focus their energy on those groups who have identified themselves as potentially violent through their lack of communications: 'if they choose to engage: great. If they do not then you know what you are dealing with and you police in a different way"" [my emphasis]. Discussing the Climate Camp kettle, the HAC (2009:17) authors view the 'reticence' of protestors to communicate which "affected the police's perceptions of the protest and made the use of force, unfortunate though it was, more likely" [my emphasis]. It is protestors therefore that need to "make every effort to prevent the police viewing them as a threat to public order." Such a reversal is to effectively blame protestors for police violence and repression.

The HAC report's (2009b:12) discussion of communication with the Climate Camp cites Commander Broadbent:

"they [the Climate Camp] will not put forward organisers because they say they are a non-hierarchical organisation where nobody makes decisions, which then gives me huge problems in trying to find out, as happened on 1 April, what they intend to do and where they intend to do it." (HAC, 2009b:12).

Following suit, the HAC remonstrates that "protestors did not fully communicate their intentions with the police beforehand [and] were those which experienced the greatest use of force by police." This apparent justification is attributed to protestors' unhelpful 'ideological' concerns, rather than one of tactical necessity (although the ideological stance against hierarchy was indeed the case). A cursory examination of the 'Bronze tactical plan' for protests on 1st and 2nd April contained in HMICs report (2009b:115) is revealing as it indicates what MPS had in store. The Four Horsemen marches would be 'identified' [picked up at nearby tube stations] and then "isolated, then escorted/contained" before being directed to [police sanctioned] locations to demonstrate, with "consideration being given to the length of time they will be allowed to be at the location" justified by concern over "disruption to the community". Crucially, all of these subjective judgements on the day would be decided by the police. Initial 'detention' is justified in the plan to "prevent breach of the peace or other offences such as obstruction of the highways." Similarly, sit-downs on highways would result in "containment" and "likely arrest". Any 'spontaneous demonstrations that occurred would result in immediate 'containment'. It is hardly surprising then that the demonstrators on the 1st and 2nd of April did not chose to disclose the detail of their plans. If protestor groups are perceived to be 'unpredictable' or 'uncooperative', then the police proceed with a militarised

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167 Some members of the Climate Camp did meet with MPS, however, MPSs requirement of having an authoritative representative or group of organisers could not be provided due to the non-hierarchical structure of the group.
strategic incapacitation approach, this is precisely what happened on the 1st and 2nd of April at the G20.

The JCHR (2009b) follow-up report also stresses 'enhanced discussion', even going as far as to suggest the use of 'independent negotiators' to facilitate dialogue and resolve any disputes.' This is perhaps one of the most radical departures from current practice arising in any of the reports, but is not entertained in the HMIC report which reinforces the primacy of constabulary independence in operational decision making.

7.4.3 Facilitating dissent?

This last point meshes with the other principle difficulty with all the reports, their assumption that the police actively seek to facilitate protestor's rights through a process of constructive dialogue and communication. This is at best a half truth. The 'negotiated management model' holds some obvious attraction for the police because they can potentially reduce resource costs, minimise confrontation and hence the risks of 'in-the-job-problems' (Waddington, PAJ., 1993). More crucially, negotiated management holds the advantage of engineering greater predictability into protest events and therefore minimising the chances of any 'disruption'. Such 'cooperation' comes at a very considerable price for demonstrators though, who find themselves quickly contained/detained or shoehorned into 'marching to nowhere', and forsaking their main tactical advantage over a more reactive adversary by losing fluidity, spontaneity, and surprise. The end result assures any protest action is very far from being auditable or visible to the very institutions and hegemonic power elites they want to convey their dissent to. In the main, protestors desire to be seen and heard by the people who matter. Remarking on this same point from a Canadian perspective, the Ombudsman report into the equally controversial policing of the G20 in Ontario stated: "The whole point in protecting freedom of expression is to permit messages to be communicated. By creating a security perimeter that separated protestors from participants, the ability of protestors to communicate directly with those they wished to influence was infringed, if not denied." (cited in Slater & Matthews, 2015:306). Indeed, it was this routinisation of protesting, and the perception of its neutering which drove the adoption of more creative forms of dissent through 'transgressive summit repertoires' (Scholl, 2012:46) one which adheres more to Tilly's (2004:7) 'transgressive contention'.

This most basic of points appears to be entirely lost on the inquiry authors. Indeed, none of the reports seriously question the police practice of widespread 'territorial incapacitation' but merely defer to it. The HMIC (2009b:43) report rehearses this issue in a revealing paragraph:
"It is important to acknowledge the significant threats which global protest may pose to a country’s national security, economic interests and to critical national infrastructure. In addition, significant obligations of protection are placed on the police in relation to visiting Heads of States and other high profile individuals. All these are legitimate concerns which cannot be ignored and may justify the police in imposing restrictions or constraints on individuals taking part in mass global protests. But this is an inherent part of the balance that must be struck between the rights of individuals to exercise the freedoms of expression and assembly and the rights of the wider community" [my emphasis].

At the same time, we are told by HMIC (2009b:48) that the police act as the "primary arbiter in relation to decisions around protests" due to them taking "impartial decisions because they owe no allegiance to any particular organisation or interest and [...] they are accountable to the law for the exercise of their discretion." HMICs assertion that a country’s national security, critical infrastructure and economic well-being is threatened from protests has many ramifications. This statement, which is in truth, at least here as presented an un-evidenced perception emanating from the police, acts to reshape that element of civil society as a dangerous internal threat (rather than external threat existing beyond the boundaries of the state). Logically then, under this guise the G20 protestors become potential adversaries to the state’s coercive apparatus. Such a position also suggests that methods appropriate to a state’s external threats should rightly impinge on its said same domestic ones. This is despite no social movement ever threatening to or attempting to harm any internationally protected person, indeed the only persons to have been killed at protests are protestors.

Germane here is the difficulty raised by Lustgarten & Leigh (1994) analysis of national security, that the very non-democratic practices used to supposedly sustain internal democracy pose a serious threat to the actual practice of democracy. Moreover, it is difficult to see how these rights are being ‘balanced’ when the reality of the G20 saw the conclusive incapacitation of protestors when the summit was in progress. HMICs assertion also overlooks the ‘essentially contested concept’ which is national security, and that any definition is a highly political one (Buzan, 1983). From my observations of the G20, and when examining pervious summit protests in other parts of the world, the end result of this ‘balancing’ of competing rights, sees the multitude have their rights significantly curtailed in favour of a tiny elite.

7.4.4 Police as neutral arbiters?

All of the inquiry reports herald a number of cherished myths about British policing and portray these unproblematically as if they were somehow obvious and unassailable truths. HMIC's (2009a:40) report similarly tells us the ‘core values’ of the British model are: "[...] independence, impartiality, discretion and accountability. It is a cornerstone of modern British policing that the
police, while a part of the State, is not an instrument of the Executive." Therefore, the police "must not take sides then for or against protesters, nor must they be seen to make judgments regarding the value of particular protest activity" (HMIC, 2009b:29). However, one does not need to adopt a reductivist or vulgar Marxist position and argue that the police operate as mere pawns of the state in order to question HMICs assertion of neutrality in arbitrating between state and protestors interests. ACPO (which is a private organisation) hold a very privileged position of influence and sit within the state apparatus, indeed at the highest levels of government, notably the Home Office. This is not mere happenchance, moreover, ACPO have also (successfully) lobbied Minister’s for increased powers which have acted to further criminalise protest. Perhaps more importantly, ACPO hold responsibility for designing Guidelines in how operational policing is to be achieved across all ‘core police business areas’, including ‘public order policing’. Turning to Carey’s (1968) earlier discussion of independence, such a close working relationship fails the reasonable observer test. By contrast to ACPO, the social movements protesting the G20 (in large part at least), lacked access to government and its officials, making their position weaker as they were left with fewer routes to seek redress in the wake of repressive police action. Giving testimony to the HAC (2009:Ev47) Commander Broadhurst reveals that:

"The summit itself was a success; the world leaders came and went. I even got a personal 'phone call from the Prime Minister thanking us, which I think shows the level of concern that there was in government about the potential for disruption to the summit, and all that goes with it."

Dwelling on this power imbalance makes HMIC’s assertion that much more implausible, as we are asked to believe that the interests of marginalised groups will be impartially balanced with those of a global political elite, one which carry the advantage of being championed by the institutions of the state and government. HMICs and the HACs contention of police neutrality also encounters a logical difficulty, if this were indeed the case, why did the reviews of policing at the G20 find worrying levels of inattention to human rights in its planning and in its execution? Why did it so consistently fail to apply the presumption in favour of peaceful protest (whether popular or not)?

Rehearsing the contention that the police are not an instrument of the Executive (although necessarily conceding that they are part of the state) is marshalled by HMIC as the key supporting argument for the continuation of chief constable operational independence and to ward off any intrusion by Police Authorities into this sphere.168 HMICs (2009b:154-59) final report accepts the

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168 This recommendation precedes the abolition of Police Authorities nationally and the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012, although separate arrangements exist for London (as they do for Manchester) where the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime appoints a Deputy Mayor who has responsibilities for holding MPS to account. That said, as with the old Police Authorities, this does not include
value of Police Authorities having a community engagement and observational role, but this is heavily circumscribed and only after they have been inculcated into the police perspective:

"it is critical that [Police Authority] members have the relevant knowledge of police powers and duties and the operational decision making structure" a perspective which even includes the significant value in police authority members gaining an understanding of the operational pressures and constraints faced by police commanders, as well as the perceptions of protesters and the public [...]" (HMIC 2009b:157).

The final recommendation is placed on Police Authorities to develop:

"Common guidelines [...] on monitoring public order policing to ensure the interventions of police authorities are informed and appropriate, protecting the public interest without compromising the operational independence of chief officers" (HMIC 2009b:159) [my emphasis].

This issue of constabulary independence and the resulting level of accountability has been the subject of much criticism by policing scholars and I do not intend to rehearse this lengthy literature here. The issue thrown up by the events of the policing of G20 is not simply the need for external observers of large policing operations, but we are told "practical and credible level of pre and post operation scrutiny for large-scale public order operations without intruding on police operational independence or interfering with the police responsibility to strike the right balance" [my emphasis].

Not only is the ability to ask the right questions in inquiries essential, one has to be able to contemplate the full panoply of human emotions as well, which in turn requires an understanding of what policing is for and about. O'Connor's accompanying remarks to HMICs report does accept that some officers replaced a 'proportional reaction' with a 'reciprocal' one when faced with 'aggressive protestors' although this does not find its way into the reports. This is another central weakness of all of the reports under discussion, they never seriously entertain officer malice as a motivation, or consider measures which would act to robustly address this. At the same time this is one of the few areas where some firm ground can be established regards police wrong-doing, but instead, police spokesmen, unable to deny the video record confronting them, fall back on the reliable stalwarts of poor training, inexperienced officers, and word-of-mouth practices.

7.4.5 Re-conceptualising International summits

Whilst the extent to which political elite threats decide the level of repression social movements face is exceedingly difficult to research and hence settle in any conclusive way, it makes intuitive
sense that they play an important role. This is because the host government has a great deal of political capital invested in the summits, itself reflected in the exorbitant 'security' costs shouldered and the bewildering array of restrictions that the executive is willing to see imposed on its citizen's protest activity. At this point it is helpful to examine Barker's (2001) work on the self-presentation of rulers (Legitimating Identities) as he offers a more richly dimensional account of what governments and rulers are doing, and for our purposes, one that can be applied to international summits.

Summit events can be understood then as a particular type of presentational ritual and a particular mode to legitimate governing. Barker argues contra Weber, that the monopoly of legitimate coercion is not something which belongs to the rulers but something that is claimed by them, the success of which depends on how, where and when it is made. On this measure, one thinks of Ceausescu's visible uncertainty in his public performance on the balcony of his palace in 1989, for Barker, this is what lost his legitimacy in the act of claiming it. Barker (2001:41) argues that: "Rulers appear to need to legitimate their power, to demonstrate constantly by rituals both spiritual and secular their unique prestige, as persons authorised in a manner that ordinary subjects are not, as persons set apart to exercise their powers and privileges of government." To achieve this our rulers need to be identified as special, as different from others, and this self-legitimation is a characteristic activity of ruling where rulers cultivate their dramatic personalities (i.e. the signing of a treaty).

Summit sites provide the artefacts and backdrop (ostentatious buildings, podiums, etiquette, portraiture etc.) the pomp and ceremony which are designed to legitimate through a 'politics of vision.' Leaders then are not simply acting in defence of their interests, they act in defence of their identity (Barker, 2001:35). This forms one part of a wider 'culture of legitimation' and one integral to ruling: "The legitimacy of a democratic regime rests on the belief in the right of those legally elevated to authority to issue certain types of commands, to expect obedience, and to enforce them." (Linz, 1978, cited in Barker, 2001:33). When rulers legitimate themselves they are giving an account of who they are, with ceremonial actions being an integral part of this identification process. "The action both creates and expresses the identity" [and] the "identity at one and the same time legitimates the person and is confirmed by the person's manner of expressing it" (ibid, 2001:35).

This need for legitimation extends to international government and its various forums, and international summits are a way that legitimation takes place in society. The value of Barkers thesis is to turn our attention to a much overlooked dimension of ruling, that leaders are cultivating their own sense of identity, one which is also sought from other international rulers, as well as justifying security services and to be privy to their correspondence on all matters concerning the summit arrangements. Needless to say no government would ever grant such a request.
themselves to their subjects. This is not to deny that summits involve an 'agenda', and the business of negotiation on international issues, be it world trade agreements as in the WTO or otherwise (although most of this work is done prior to the summit itself) but to draw proper attention to what else they are and what their function is. They form part of a carefully crafted and massively stage managed event, a ceremonial action which at its heart is about how government and international forums can be justified to its citizens, it is a way that legitimation takes place in society. To cite the anthropologist Geertz (2000:142-3) "Thrones may be out of fashion, and pageantry too; but political authority still requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims, and so does opposition to it." Challengers (protestors) to these forums and the credentials of existing rulers are also trying to legitimate their own distinctive identities, and the process of self-legitimation is similar to that of rulers.

I have discussed Barkers contribution at length to illustrate the magnitude of what is at stake and to pour further doubt on HMICs claims that, given this state of affairs, they proceed with neutrality and impartiality when faced with a mass form of rebellion which seeks to challenge an existing regime. Under such conditions, and under this conflict of identities, there is an intensification in the demand for internal control, indeed that is what we see played out on the streets.

7.5 Seeing Blue

The relationship of the police to political elites and the state, and the legitimation of ruling identities are not the only salient factors in deciding the level of repression social movements experience. If HMIC's claims are correct, then the radical goals of the challenger group should not make any difference in how they are policed as the police do not judge protestors on this basis and are impartial to presenting elite group interests. There is now a corpus of previous scholarship (Scholl, 2012; Star et al; 2010; Wood, 2014) which suggests that the policing of international summit protest events in the Western world increasingly take the similar form, although there is some cross-national variation as well as localised differences (Davenport 2000b; Wisler & Kriesi, 1998). Writing from a US perspective, Earl & Soule’s (2006:159) find that having radical goals did indeed affect policing presence. This is a finding from US policing, but has purchase in the UK due to the trans-nationalisation of summit policing practices. Whilst this should not be found, it is hardly surprising, as the function of policing is "ensuring the politics of stability and gradualism, most obviously in control operations and less so in providing emergency assistance, guidance and protection. The priority of control over service functions becomes evidence whenever authorities perceive group interest to be endangered." (Turk, 1982:164).
Also writing from a US perspective, Bayley’s (1994:120) analysis of organised police work argues he primary function of policing is “the suppression of collective unrest and the regulation of populations, what might be called state-centred policing.” In fact there is a fundamental divergence of interests, perhaps most powerfully and succinctly described by Waddington (1999:64); “Patrolling the boundaries of respectability—and thus reproducing patterns of domination and subordination, and inclusion and exclusion—is the exercise of largely invisible state power. Individual officers selectively exercise their discretion on the street under the guise of neutrally enforcing the law and keeping the peace. But the police “keep people in their place” in quite another, and much more visible, manner when they suppress overt dissent against prevailing social, political and economic conditions. Here the notion of the police as neutral and impartial enforcers of the law is exposed for the myth that it is; since their first duty becomes transparent—to protect the state, whose coercive arm they are. This exposure of the fundamental role of the police as custodians of the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercion can be revelatory […]” [my emphasis]. This ‘revelation’ appears to go unnoticed when one reads through the many pages of assorted witness testimony and cross-questioning from inquiry members to police and state officials.

The G20 protests were each trying to create visibility through acts of social conflict. This is only to recognise that the police (including other state authorities such as government, intelligence agencies, as well as the judicial apparatus) are powerful and purposive actors, who as such, have an antagonistic relationship between protestors on the streets. As Vitale (2017:197) argues, "Today, states portray their police forces as value neutral protectors of public safety, but in reality, states continue to monitor and disrupt all kinds of political activity through surveillance, infiltration, criminal entrapment, and repressing protest. The continued existence of these practices poses a major threat to any effort to change the basic role of the police, and, more broadly, to achieve the goal of racial and economic justice." Needless to say these are the goals the various social movements are pursuing.

The police organisation itself also plays a role in structuring the form that protest policing takes, notably the way that threats are constructed within the police organisation and perceived by individual officers on the ground at demonstrations. These situational factors centre around the police’s fear of losing control of a crowd which contributes to its use of repression and approximates

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171 This should not be interpreted that all policing is repressive or unwanted, clearly this is not the case and even repressive and highly coercive policing in some deprived high crime areas can make living conditions that much more tolerable.
Stark’s (1972) notion of a ‘police riot.’ (Earl & Soule, 2006)\textsuperscript{172}. This is aided by the mass media’s role in constructing militant protest as dangerous and criminal, as several of the reports acknowledge, ‘police officers read newspapers too.’ These threat variables include property damage, ‘missile’ throwing, and confrontational tactics by protestors, which are interpreted as indicators that control is lost or nearly lost (for instance; Kerner, 1968; Earl & Soule, 2006). All of these threats were present at the G20, but what is instructive when examining the timeline of events in HMICs report\textsuperscript{173}, is that it fails to provide context and reads more like a post hoc dramatisation, infused with policing terminology to drive its own self-justifying authoritarian logic.

A further point worthy of note is that throughout the police testimony contained in the HAC document, and all the reports discussion, is the acceptance in describing official violence as provoked by or as a response to protestors violence, never as active or as initiating. As I have argued previously, the police account reverses the ordering of events in some important respects. Moreover, even on MPSs own account of proceedings, police kettling and corralling protestors into ‘cordons’ (protest pens) were imposed prior to accusations of ‘protestor violence’. In addition, it needs to be remembered that the violence at RBS was ‘performative’, it was not directed against any person and what was remarkable about it was the constraint of the crowd. Only five protestors engaged in the property damage and entered the building, (far outnumbered by a scrum of press photographers lying in wait and who surrounded them). This is what MPS term a ‘concentrated group of protestors acting collectively to cause disorder [...]’ (HMIC, 2009a:77), is then quickly termed ‘serious violence’, justifying reinforcements of riot police, including use of police horses as ‘support’. Considering the size of the demonstrations this justification for police violence and kettling appears weak. More likely is that this is a post hoc justification for violent police repression, both because of the size of the protests, their unpredictability, and the multiple targets they had in mind, in the eyes of the police, and the challenge they represented to the summit - one which could not be conceded under any account, and hence the grasping of this opportunity.

This ‘threat approach’ has been the dominant explanation for repressive protest policing, especially those using what the authorities consider to be unorthodox and confrontational tactics (Davenport, 2000; Earl, 2003; Earl et al., 2003) and when insurgent challenging groups pursue multiple targets and goals (MacAdam, 1982). It was the result of a co-constitutive and asymmetrical relationship of antagonism and control between what are two opposing groups, police and social movement protestors. This has been a central contention of my thesis thus far and the reason for the shift in

\textsuperscript{172} Although it needs to be noted that Earl & Soule’s study is not specific to the policing of international summits but examines a far wider range of public order policing operations in the US.

\textsuperscript{173} HMIC (2009a:76) \textit{Adapting to Protest Annex D ‘Timeline’}.
policing to a 'dual model' of strategic incapacitation (in conjunction with negotiated management), as well as the increasing militarisation of summit policing operations, especially towards transgressive social movements. Thus far, my observational study would confirm these theorists’ findings, notably in explaining why MPS undertook the unlawful pre-emptive police operations conducted against the convergence centres. But this is not cost free for the institution, violence is ugly and scenes showing ranks of large heavily armoured male police officers, faces concealed behind balaclava\'s, with shields and batons bludgeoning defenceless demonstrators exacts a price. As Cohen (1993, cited in Scraton, 2002:16) remarks, the “unwillingness to confront anomalous or disturbing information” extends to democratic societies. What the reports and their agencies largely accomplish is to reproduce ‘regimes of impunity’ (Duschinski, 2010).

7.5.1 Police Skulduggery: Agent provocateurs?

There is also some evidence that the police were using agent provocateurs’ to incite the crowd (reported in the Guardian newspaper).\textsuperscript{174} Several men who were thought to be police officers had been seen throwing bottles at the police whilst being kettled, and were actively encouraging others to do the same, but having been recognised as police by a protester contained in the kettle, they quickly left, and flashed an ID to pass through a closed police cordon (which had refused exit to all other protestors for approximately five hours, including several who required medical treatment). Whilst this needs to be interpreted cautiously, as protestors can be inclined to buy into conspiracy theories as well as some holding anti-state beliefs, the easy escape from the cordon raises legitimate questions. Having been asked why these individuals were allowed to leave the cordon, and no-one else was, Commander Broadbent claimed he did not know who they are, and that there were not plain clothes officers in the crowd (HAC, 2009:Ev42).

This issue was also raised with Sim (ACPO Lead on Public Order) by the HAC (2009:Ev27) panel, who replies evasively: "I would not accept that that was acceptable behaviour, Mr Vaz. That is something that I would be very positive on." This irrelevant response fails to answer the question posed (were police acting as agent provocateurs’?). At this critical juncture, and not having had the question answered, the discussion shortly after ends. At the same time both Sim and Commander Broadhurst had stated on record there were no plain-clothes officers among the crowd, saying it would have been too dangerous to do so,\textsuperscript{175} (itself a revealing remark about how senior officers

\textsuperscript{174} Doward J. & Townsend, M. (2009, may 10th) G20 police 'used undercover men to incite crowds'. Guardian Newspaper.

\textsuperscript{175} Sim’s response is she would not ‘expect plain clothes police officers to be in a crowd at all’ (HAC, 2009:Ev27) [my emphasis] whereas Broadbent is decisive in his denials: “I was obviously the Gold Commander. \textit{We had no plain clothes officers deployed within the crowd}. It would have been dangerous for them to put plain clothes officers in a crowd like that. The only officers we deploy for intelligence purposes at public order are forward
viewed demonstrators). Some two years later this turned out to be a falsehood, with MPS being forced to concede they had twenty five 'covert officers deployed to the protests for 'intelligence gathering' purposes', although they denied using any agents provocateur to ferment unrest. The very considerable revelations of the sheer size and scope of MPSs infiltration into protest groups (sparked by the Mark Kennedy affair) attests to this, as it does to the importance of a 'high policing' function at summit protests, notably the activities of MPSs Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) (i.e. Evans & Lewis, 2013; Mills, 2017). What is less clear is the extent to which infiltration was used as a counter-insurgency tactic to disrupt and disintegrate the organisations being infiltrated (I pick up on this is the next chapter).

This is not a new tactic by police forces, anarchist groups have been frequently appropriated by agent provocateurs at other summits, Scholl, (2012:98) argues there was wide scale police infiltration in 2001 at the G8 summit in Genoa for instance. Police provocateurs were also identified at the 2007 security and Prosperity Partnership summit, identified by internet users (Truscello, M. (2011:287)). More mundane is the widespread use of police informants, and as Marx (1974) notes writing from the US experience there are pressures within the police informant role which push towards provocation. Despite official denials there is an incentive for the authorities to have agent provocateurs fermenting the crowd as it provides a post-hoc justification for a forced based police strategy as well as serving a wider political elite interest by discrediting and undermining the social movement, whose justice claims get over-ridden by the narrative of 'violent protestors'. Irrespective of the truthfulness of MPSs claims, which must be judged sceptically, this does not exhaust the field. The growing 'hybridity' which blurs criminal offences from national security concerns and offences (Brodeur, 2005:805) can implicate the security services in summit protests due to the nature of this political environment (notably as HMIC consider summit protests to constitute

intelligence team officers who are wearing full police uniforms with a yellow jacket with blue shoulders. There were no plain clothes officers deployed at all" (HAC, 2009:Ev42) [my emphasis]. On this same point, Sir Paul Stephenson denied the logic of using agent provocateurs as being "wholly antithetic to everything I have known about policing for the best part of 34 years" (HAC, 2009:Ev42) although that is not a denial of the facts of the matter.

Statement issued by MPS, cited in Press Association (2011, January 19th) 'Plain-clothes Metropolitan police officers were at G20 demonstrations', Guardian Newspaper.


For instance, Billingsley et al. (2001:5) state that approximately one third of all crime cleared up by the police involves the use of informers, although this is a method which is usually kept of the public view.

MPS have a long history of secrecy and subterfuge, for instance proven file shredding in order to evade transparency to the recent inquiry into undercover policing.
national security threats). The security services are also players here as are a wide variety of other corporate actors, although this line of questioning is not pursued by the HAC panel.

7.6 Controlling dissent through violence: Police wrong-doing in the reports

To differing degrees all of the inquiry reports address allegations of police wrong-doing (by this I mean either professional misconduct,\(^{181}\) malpractice or unlawful behaviour) including allegations of police disproportionate or excessive use of force, including baton charges and forcible dispersal, the practice of police officers concealing their identification; as well as police public relations strategies in the run up to major demonstrations. Although there are a number of dimensions to the use of force, ranging from type of equipment (i.e. police weapons), training, tactics, as well as methods to monitor such behaviour to hold officers to account (Neyroud, 2007:252). At the same time it has long been recognised that controlling the proper application of force is a central problem in contemporary policing (see for instance; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Kerstetter 1985; Jefferson, 1984, 1987; Waddington, 1992). To be lawful,\(^{182}\) any force used by officers needs to be necessary, proportionate and reasonable throughout the encounter in either 'self defence' or the 'prevention of crime'. In other words it needs to meet the 'minimum force' and 'reasonable force' provisions in the Act.

Thornton [QC] et al's (2010:269-70) comprehensive account of UK public order law argues that there is a subjective and objective test here (what the circumstances are that the officer using force believed them to be? And, was the degree of force used, reasonable in these circumstances?), with courts allowing police the same margin of discretion, judgement and error as a citizen. This does mean that each individual officer is accountable under law for their actions, consequently, in theory at least, this means that officers use of force can be challenged if it was held to be unlawful. Nevertheless there are important ambiguities relating to 'reasonable force' in policing, but

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\(^{181}\) By ‘misconduct’, I mean any conduct falling below the standards expected of an officer (i.e. misconduct or gross misconduct) in breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour as detailed in Home Office Guidance: Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance and Attendance Management Procedures. Home Office circular 026 / 2008. London, Home Office, and any subsequent Home Office circulars. By ‘complaint’, I mean any report, challenge or allegation (written or oral) by any officer (or police family member) of another’s (or police family member) perceived or otherwise improper conduct relayed via any officially recognised channel (through formal Police reporting channels, to a line manager, or through the force’s confidential reporting mechanism etc.). This includes where available, conduct of a ‘more minor’ nature that has been dealt with by normal management action (as referred to in Principal 10: Challenging and Reporting Improper Conduct; Home Office Guidance: Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance and Attendance Management Procedures. Home Office circular 026 / 2008).

\(^{182}\) Under Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967.
particularly in public order policing.\textsuperscript{183} This begs the question of what constitutes 'reasonable' force as opposed to 'excessive force', or more technically the 'reasonableness standard':

"The court, in considering what was reasonable force, would take into account all the circumstances, including in particular the nature and degree of force used, the seriousness of the evil to be prevented and the possibility of preventing it by other means: but there is no need to specify in the clause the criteria for deciding the question." (Cmd 2659, para 23, cited in Thornton, HHJP (QC) et al. 2010:320-1).

As Thornton et al (2010) notes, the general principle consideration is proportionality -here, "a favourable balance between the actual or intended consequences of a person's conduct and the seriousness and immanence of the threat or damage that he or she seeks to prevent" (Thornton, HHJP (QC) et al. 2010:320-1 [my emphasis]).

The ambiguities evident in the legal doctrine have added impetus when considering policing tactics such as the use of containment and the manner in which force was used by officers. Despite this limited information on protestors injuries and the recorded police violence which proved so scandalous, coming to any conclusive judgement about the police's 'use of force' is bedevilled by a number of problems. Chief among them is the wide discretionary powers that each individual officer has resort to, the permissive way that legislation is drawn in the use of those powers, the contestability of what occurred, and the often discredited nature of those on the receiving end of that violence ('police property') as well as the severe inadequacies of the complaints system (which I have touched on previously). Not only are there fluid legal boundaries around police powers, but any decision as to their legality is retrospective for any protestor as there is no higher authority to appeal to there and then. As Lipsky (1982) argues, police officers function as street level bureaucrats and represent the front lines of the law married with high levels of relative autonomy.

Writing on the subject of police excessive force from a US perspective, Klockers (1996:7) notes "There is no definition of excessive force that automatically renders it a form of brutality and escalates it to the form of a scandal." This means in practice it is especially difficult to identify what constitutes disproportionate or excessive police use of force (i.e. police brutality) and hence what is criminal and civilly liable without an investigation, and ultimately a civil or criminal case to assign guilt. On this subject, HMIC (2009b:114) state that proportionate means "the minimum [force] necessary to achieve the legitimate aim", although this tends to move the question back on what constitutes 'minimum force'. Most obviously the police are the enforcement arm of the state and are therefore entitled to use violence which would otherwise be unlawful (including deadly force).

\textsuperscript{183} As is there in 'armed policing' - see Squires P. & Kennison, P. (2010) \textit{Shooting to Kill? Policing, Firearms and Armed Response}, Wiley Blackwell.
This is compounded further in the context of 'public order policing' where there can be direct confrontations between two opposing groups (it should be remembered that the police also constitute a coherent group as do protestors). This is especially so when mass containment practices are favoured, and mass containment is necessarily forceful mass containment.

Scant research attention has been paid to the psychological processes engaged by both protestors and police during kettling, although there has been a concerted effort to understand 'crowd psychology' more generally to prevent disorder occurring and spiralling into violence. HMIC’s report makes explicit reference to this work and advocates principles informing police practice, notably the work of Steve Reciher. Whilst not specific to kettling, Zimring and Hawkins (1973:136–137) highlight the importance of emotions to potential offending decision making; "Decisions about criminal conduct that are made when a person is in circumstances which provoke great emotional arousal may be less amenable to threats than decisions that occur when the potential criminal is less aroused, because very high degrees of emotional arousal may eclipse thoughts of future consequences by riveting all of the potential criminal’s attention on his present situation.” Powerful emotions such as anger can override rational deliberation then (Loewenstein, 1996) because such decision making can precede rational thought and at times supersede rational deliberation (Massey, 2002) at least for some. One major cause of the emotion frustration is having continued failure towards a desired outcome blocked. The more important the goal, the greater the frustration felt and the resultant anger, hostility and aggression. This is evident from the swearing and gesturing matches by some kettled protestors with police, itself deemed protestor aggression, which results in an escalated force response. Consistent with previous studies, people experience higher levels of self-reported anger when they are under a sense of time pressure (O’Brien et al 2003).

Collins, (2008:377) has argued that it is the dynamics of the social situation which influences the occurrence of violence According to Collins, micro-level dynamics are crucial in explaining violence notably in the 'fog of war', in part because teams are more violent than individuals, notably where aggregates of combatants join in phalanxes, with each officer feeling their safety somehow depends on others. This is a typical occurrence in public order situations, specifically police containment in kettles. This finding that there is an 'interactional logic' to much of the violence at protests accords with my own observations, especially where 'forward panic' in hot emotional violence circumstances can predominate. Violence arises from situations that generate opportunities, where tensions build until they hit a climax, and where there is overwhelming strength on one side as compared to the other. The usefulness of Collins analysis is that it can explain the frenzy of police violence at the Climate camp 'dispersal', where the policing group
becomes almost out of control and seems to be incited by the weakness and vulnerability of its 'opponents' (Collins, 2008:402).

Kettling also treats everyone as the same, as trouble-makers without any heed to the different psychological groups which typically make up a crowd. As Reicher (2011:22) argues, kettling is the converse of facilitation. In doing so it draws on the old discredited crowd psychology of Le Bon, whilst violating the insights of the new crowd psychology, being the very same doctrine that HMIC claim to be converts to.

The police claim to only use minimum force to achieve their lawful aims, but consider a 'distraction blow' (a euphemism for punching, kicking or batoning a person) when they are perceived to be 'passively resisting' a police command. This takes on added impetus when considering the expansion of riot equipment including 'less then lethal' weapons. Police weaponry exists on a continuum of lethality, and ranges from impact weapons such as batons (PVC duty baton and ASP extendable batons, short shields, to firearms such as tasers. Police canine units dogs were also employed, whose bites can exert extreme force (up to 2000 psi) and lead to serious injuries and hospitalisation, most commonly lacerations and abrasions but also damage to nerve, vascular or tendinous structures as well as fractures and later, significant soft tissue infections (Adeyinka et al, 2013). This is particularly the case with the 'bite and hold' policy.

According to official police doctrine, the intended consequence of police use of so-called 'non-lethal' weapons is to cause pain and incapacitate and hence subdue those protestors who are acting in a violent manner or are reasonably perceived to be threatening violence, or are 'unresponsive' to verbal instructions. Perhaps nothing better indicates quite how permissive the legal rules are than this, a point never critiqued in the reports. Under these circumstances the police can lawfully strike an individual to 'gain compliance' despite the person not trying to hit or kick them, or presenting any conceivable threat. The (former) IPCC Commissioner, Glass (2009) discussion of eroding public confidence in the police after the G20 protests in the Policing journal is instructive here, partly because it reveals her solution to 'the challenge' of citizen journalists recording officers delivering such blows (and the incumbent allegation of police brutality) as simply the need to better 'explain' their practice and 'engage' with the public and media. This brings into light what is technically lawful from what is perceived to be legitimate by the many who witness or later watch these scenes. Beetham's (1991:16) post-Weberian analysis of legitimacy argues that there are three underlying structural constraints or dimensions governing the nature of legitimacy.

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185 There are longstanding disagreements over the usefulness and definition of the term 'non-lethal weapon' both as used by the police and the military, see Davidson, 2009 'Non-Lethal Weapons' Palgrave.
claims; "power can be said to be legitimate to the extent that it conforms to established rules; the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate, and there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation." Legitimacy deficits follow where there is a discrepancy between the rules and the supporting or shared beliefs, leading to withdrawal of consent. So irrespective of the technical legalities, many people are shocked when they see police officers hitting and beating protestors who are otherwise passive or remonstrating with them. The police use of force becomes a moral issue at this point, not simply a legal one. None of the reports really engage with this issue, or venture beyond questioning what is strictly lawful, the acceptability of what has rarely come to the public attention is conceived as a public relations concern.

7.7 Armed and Dangerous: The unaddressed issue of police weaponry

A further issue of concern is how police weaponry is used and where protestors are being struck. This last critical point receives no attention from the report authors, although questions are asked about police shields tactics (I pick up on this issue later in the discussion). This is an important because there is very little medical research on the short and medium to long term effects on citizens injured by such force options (Adepipe et al. 2012). Force weapon selection and use for riot control has evolved historically, in response to both what is described as ‘weapon failure’ when equipment is deemed by the police to be inadequate for the task and in response to injuries (some serious) to police officers engaged in ‘riot control’. Invariably this has seen a ‘tooling-up’ and ‘paramilitarisation’ of the police (Jefferson 1990; Kraska, 1997; but see Wright, 2000, 2007 for a broader analysis) and a burgeoning industry manufacturing, marketing and supplying crowd control weapons (Wright, 2000, 2011).

What is notable here is that police force’s weapon selection for use in public order policing is far less responsive to citizen injuries than to the desired operational imperatives, issues which fail to be addressed in any of the reports when discussing police use of force and the video data showing this available to them. Despite growing concerns over the willingness of the police to use significant levels of force, and occasionally extreme violence, to contain political protest, the police in the UK have effectively lowered the threshold for which force can be used, whilst being provided with, trained in the use of, and routinely deploy, public order body armour and weaponry that would have been 'scarcely imaginable' 40 years ago (Morgan, 186 Telephone interview with MPS: Public Order Policing Unit personnel. 187 There has been a massive (over 2,738%) increase in the manufacture of crowd control weapons, from 13 companies (in 5 countries, two of which were non-European) in the 1970’s to 10 of the 15 EU countries being involved in the manufacture, supply or distribution of crowd control weapons in 1999, growing to more than 369 major manufacturers, suppliers or distributors across countries (Wright, 2000:xix).
A similar case exists with the use of police short shields, which have been used by officers as a weapon to strike protestors, including using the edge of shields as impact weapons (an offensive rather than a defensive 'shield tactic'). As one protestors giving evidence to the HAC stated:

"They descended upon me with the sides of their shields on the side of my head, again just basically striking me with shields. Again, there was no request to move, no indication of what was happening or why. My girlfriend had been dragged behind me with her wrists bent behind her back, threatened to be broken and was pulled back behind the police line. She was then thrown back by officer's head first with her hands behind her back and landed on the floor. Whilst this was happening I was being struck on the side of the head by the sides of shields" (HAC, 2009:Ev13).

Neither did these controversial tactics form part of any national training or current ACPO Public Order Manual (being the police's own authoritative guide to public order policing). However HMIC (2009a:101) still attributed this practice to the "absence of clear standards on the use of force for individual officers operating in the public order policing environment".

On closer inspection this explanation is found wanting. HMICs earlier (April, 2007:17) Safety Matters (the subject of which is exclusively 'officer safety training', including the use of batons and shields) explicitly makes the recommendation that "forbids the use of OST [officer safety training] techniques other than those contained in the OST Manual" [my emphasis]. This could not be clearer and leaves no room for ambiguity. If using the edge of shields as a means to strike a person is not in the OST Manual, which it isn't, then it is forbidden to do so. Later, by way of explaining the practice of using shields in this manner, HMIC (2009) state that such tactics have "evolved on an informal word-of-mouth basis" and is "not nationally recognised and clearly involve the use of high levels of force by officers. This is not acceptable" [my emphasis], the HAC (2009) police spokespeople provide the same explanations in their witness testimony also. The frequency of this training occurs yearly (or in smaller blocks throughout the year) for officers (HMIC, 2007:3) so presumably officers would have been trained and have relayed to them from their trainers the content of HMICs recommendations? This makes the claimed ignorance of police personnel harder to accept as the over-riding explanation. It also begs the question of what does 'not acceptable' mean in HMIC's official capacity and in light of the police's role to uphold ECHR obligations. The answer is not very

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188 For instance, a small number of US states classify batons as deadly weapons (Cox et al, 1987:56).
189 The use of police shields as an attacking weapon, rather than a defensive apparatus – as the name would suggest – have been the subject of public formal complaints against the Police, including the more questionable use of the shield edges to strike protestors.
190 Glass, D. (2009). Commissioner's report following the IPCC independent investigation into a complaint that officers used excessive force against a woman during the G20 protests. London, IPCC. p4.
much. It refuses to recognise that some behaviour is inherently culpable and constitutes malpractice or ‘wrong-doing’, both because none of the reports make that shift in language despite its logical corollary, and because no indication or discussion is had which would indicate an interest in identifying the said individuals by any agency. Such a proactive stance is not raised by any of the other inquiry reports either. Given its ‘forbidden’ nature, and that officers would have presumably been trained since that recommendation had been put into effect, many of whom would have been present during Glencoe, HMIC’s argument distils down to the somewhat surprising proposition that officers need to be explicitly instructed not to use the edge of a shield to strike protestors with. This is another example of ‘wilful blindness’ by HMIC, as the only motive to use the edge of a shield against protestors, including head strikes, is the desire to inflict an increased level of pain and injury than would otherwise be afforded, a blindingly self-evident conclusion that is never entertained by the report authors.

Rather surprisingly there is no specific set of regulations governing police officers use of batons in terms of how the baton is used, where upon the body it strikes, or with what force, although there is ‘guidance’. These decisions are left to the discretion of the individual officer, with the much lauded proviso that any force used needs to be proportionate, and that in principle the officer is responsible and answerable in law for those actions, a point offered up repeatedly by the police witnesses as reassurance of accountability. In practice however, this claim does not hold up to any serious scrutiny. As I have demonstrated from my analysis of the IPCC data, rarely if ever, do these cases progress to being passed to the CPS for consideration to prosecute, and in the unlikely event that do, rarer still do juries pass guilty verdicts.

This situation is exacerbated by the scant research characterising police perpetrated abuse despite police officer’s excessive use of force being classified as a form of violence by the World Health Organisation (WHO). What research there is regarding the health implications of police violence has remained at the margins of public health (Cooper et al., 2004) although the public exposure to police violence has increased dramatically. It needs to be remembered that protestors at the G20 did not have any protective equipment which would prevent injury from police attacks, whereas police officers did, minimally NATO helmets (with visors) and batons and CS gas, or as with riot police, extensive body armour, including flame retardant suits and balaclava’s (which acted to masked their faces). Neither are protestors able to purchase protective equipment such as body armour or even NATO style helmets (which would ensure protection from baton blows to their

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192 Telephone interview with MPS: Public Order Policing Unit.
heads and faces) as the suppliers of this equipment refuse to sell to non-police personnel.  

In order to bring some conceptual clarity to the issue of what constitutes excessive force, I will proceed by way of imminent critique, taking seriously the general proposition such as the doctrine of minimum force to uphold the law, itself premised on the claim of policing by consent. What this actually means is of course a politically and professionally charged issue. Nevertheless, I shall contend that the doctrine of minimum force does provide a baseline in measuring proportionate from excessive force. The harm principle is recognised in Police Public Order Training given to officers, which employs a RAG typology of 'green' 'amber' and 'red' target ‘strike’ zones for baton use which accord to likely degree of harm inflicted:

- ‘Green zones’ refer to fleshy primary target areas (such as upper legs, torso or arms) where limited bruising and swelling will result;
- ‘Amber areas’ denote where a fractured bone would likely result if struck by a baton (i.e. on the extremities such as a wrist or forearm), and finally;
- ‘Red areas’ are those such as the head and neck region that constitute areas of ‘last resort’, where a fatality can follow from a baton blow. The MPS officer training manual states strikes to the head ‘are to be avoided’ with the accompanying warning “a blow to the head can cause a fracture of the skull or internal bleeding” (cited in HMIC, 2009a:60).

These 'red' target areas clearly require a higher level of justification (and perhaps only in extremis) when taking seriously the principle of minimum force. Baton blows to red areas can risk severe head injuries as despite the protective bone covering of the skull, the brain surface can get torn and bruised as it bumps against the skull, and blood vessels and nerves can rip. These injuries can cause bleeding, swelling or fluid build-up in the head, putting pressure on the brain, sometimes causing brain damage.

These considerations take on additional importance when considering the increasing police reliance of kettling protestors. In these cases, time and distance factors become more important (Meyer, 1981 cited in Cox et al 1987:58) as the distance between the officer and protestors is closer because protestors are pushed back together into a small space and contained within police surrounding serials (line formations). This increases the likelihood of a type of physical altercation where the

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954 The reason given to me on enquiry of a purchase to one of the main suppliers was that the equipment (here a NATO style helmet) ‘could be used against the police’, this despite my credentials as a criminologist and declaring that my reason was personal safety when undertaking fieldwork.
955 Personal communication; Home Office, Public Order Unit.
956 Telephone Interview: Dr Rajiv Singh, Consultant in Rehabilitation Medicine - Acute Brain Injury Pathway and Head Injury Clinic, Sheffield Teaching Hospital, Sheffield.
officer's ability to plan strategy is reduced, seeing them act rapidly, whilst having their own movements restricted by forming part of the police serial (including officers directly behind them). Cox et al (1985, cited in Cox et al 1987:58) earlier study argues that reducing time and distance factors sees a reliance on reverting to previously learned motor behaviours (prior to police training) such as 'clubbing', and striking at a person's head, including in an 'uncontrolled manner'. The same authors also argue that police batons have the potential to cause serious and diffuse injuries to the head and the face (with the skeletal structures of the face being less structurally sturdy than neurocranial bones and therefore more prone to serious injury - this would also hold for shield strikes). The neck area has a lower impact threshold still, being highly susceptible to police impact weapons, more so if struck laterally (ibid, 1987:59-60). Whilst this is a complex area of clinical medicine as well as weapon design, the neuropsychologic evidence is clear that even mild brain injuries resulting from impact weapons "have the potential to create important losses for defendants and serious liability problems for police agencies" (ibid, 1987:60). Interestingly, having had even mild brain injury greatly compounds the cumulative nature of susceptibility (Gronwall & Wrightson, 1975, cited in Cox et al 1987:60). So those with a history of previous mild brain injury impairs the brains ability to recover from any future injury.

Similarly, Heitzman (2010:405) found that the total number of blows to the head is significantly correlated with later executive deficits and emotional problems. This means that those who have experienced previous injuries in the past are more vulnerable to brain injury from any repeated exposure. Rather obviously such a vulnerability is not apparent to those riot police delivering blows and even when a protestor is bloodied with a recent head wound. As the authors note, the public have a very limited understanding of concussion and consequential underestimation of mild brain injuries ('hidden brain injuries'). This means different people will have differing degrees of susceptibility to the effects of head injury, one which is not available by any kind of observation. This is important because no officer would know about such susceptibility. The essential policy lesson and the practice implications are all clear, they should work to prevent officers from striking a protesters head in any confrontation situation, as Cox et al (1987:60-61) stress, "Important ethical considerations must be addressed, since it can be demonstrated with important degrees of certainty that head trauma from blunt instruments includes injuries ranging from death to social and physiological dysfunctioning." Indeed, even for the police batons appear dangerous, writing from a US perspective, Andrews et al (2009) report that the highest rate of officer injury sustained during police training (over a two-year period) pertained to baton drills and unarmed defence

197 There are a number of forces that need to be taken into account here, including the relative gravity of the baton, as well as the force applied and the direction from where the blow comes.
training. 198

According to Bindman’s Solicitors who prepared a dossier of evidence on protestor injuries caused by police violence from over 200 complaints they had received as a direct result of Operation Glencoe, over twenty related to head injuries from police violence (both baton blows, shield strikes and being punched in the face). This included two women claim to have been "pinned together" and hit repeatedly on their heads and arms with riots shields being struck whilst on the ground. My own observations of the G20 protests similarly saw protestors being struck with batons and shield (and punches) to the head and face. Whilst the true number is ultimately unknown, the propensity for police officers to direct baton blows to red areas is not an isolated incident in 'public order policing' the most notorious case was that of Blair Peach, who was struck and killed by a TSG officer by a baton blow to the head. Despite this fatality, it did not result in outlawing this practice. Of the few other documented examples in this sparse literature can be found from injuries sustained during the 'May Day Riots' (in 2001) and subsequent treatment at the University College London Hospital. Writing in the British Journal of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery recounting their documented examples the consultants note that 15 persons had sustained maxillofacial (the jaw and facial area) injuries. Typically, this was a laceration that required closure (and one broken nose) however, three individuals had reported loss of consciousness and two required admissions for neurological observations post head injury. All of these injuries had been sustained from being struck by a police baton to the face and jaw area by riot police officers.

Blunt force head traumas appear to be a feature of public order policing and this is one by design, not accident. It was these pre-mediated tactical choices of increasingly using enclosure, segmentation and containment by the authorities, irrespective of the high level of violence required to maintain them, which acted to neutralise the tactical summit repertoire of the protestors. Containment by kettling relies on channelling and incapacitating protestor’s mobility and fluidity, if necessary, through brutal force. Police kettling (although by no means exclusively) provides salient conditions for excessive police violence and abuse. That blows by batons are directed to the head, facial and neck areas are especially worrying when one examines the neurological evidence.

Clearly where protestors are struck is a very important issue, and as I have been arguing is one important metric in judging excessive force. Despite its centrality to this critical question, it is never raised in any of the inquiry reports. This is a serious oversight. Whilst HMICs (2009a:58) report does discuss at some length 'use of force' and its many 'distraction techniques' (including using here 'baton skills') and claims that "All the techniques used have been the subject of independent

198 Equating to more than two thirds of all injuries, including bruises, sprains and strains.
199 Personal correspondence with author, Bindman’s solicitors.
medical review" citing its (2007) Safety Matters report. On closer inspection this is less than clear as there is no explicit discussion of whom the 'medical experts' are in Safety Matters. We are only offered the same promissory note by way of a vague appeal to an unspecified authority; that these assessments of police non-lethal weapons remain in line with the 'most current medical opinion' (HMIC, 2007:16). Moreover, my review of the (admittedly scant) medical evidence is at odds with HMICs, and identifies the very real dangers of protestors being struck in the head. This points to re-defining batons are lethal weapons.

What is also absent here is any discussion of individual officer culpability but also motive. Mens rea and officer motivation are simply a blind spot in the analysis and discussion of remedy which would involve bringing into view the toughening of supervision and disciplinary sanctions. I maintain that Operation Glencoe saw several ‘police riots’, where police violence took the form of ‘backstage punishment’, not as MPS claims, in response to physical provocation from protestors. This is a form of informal punishment for those seen as defying police authority (see for instance Chevigny, 1995; Van Maanen, 1978; Westley, 1970) and is exacerbated in kettling situations because as Reicher (2011) has argued, the crowd tend to be viewed by the police as an undifferentiated mass of troublemakers. Both kettling and public order policing more generally provides ample opportunity for officers to hand out ‘street justice’ to disrespectful citizens (Criminal Justice Commission 1997 cited in Chan, 2000:89) who are defined as ‘deserving wrong-doers’ (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). This is to expose the morally expressive nature of police violence as punishment, one which can take the form of summary justice, exemplified by the police assault on Ian Tomlinson (discussed below) as one among many.

This brings into view a further major omission of the reports. Absent is any discussion of police occupational culture which is a core cause of situationally influenced police violence at protest events. The wider research literature on police occupational culture shows that its conception of justice ‘deviates considerably’ from that expressed in criminal law (Chan, 2000:91). Attention in HMICs report is limited to the managerial culture of police organisation, which is distinctly different from the occupational culture of street officers. None of the reports show a sufficient grasp of this insight, and are too easily persuaded by reassurances in regard to the effectiveness of police policies. As a US Task Force (2001:11–12) set up to examine police violence aptly stated; "Organizational culture eats policy for lunch. Any law enforcement organization can make great rules and policies that emphasize the guardian role, but if policies conflict with the existing culture,

200 In using the term ‘police occupational culture’, I do not mean to suggest that police culture is monolithic and unchanging across agencies and jurisdictions, rather I am drawing on some of the key principles from the research literature.
they will not be institutionalized and behaviour will not change. In police work, the vast majority of an officer's work is done independently outside the immediate oversight of supervisor.”

Neither was any efforts made by any of the police forces involved in Operation Glencoe to identify those officers using these shield tactics and to discipline them. This is a logical collorary of wrong-doing, yet all of the inquiry reports are silent on this specific issue.

7.8 Critical blind-spots: complicity in police wrong-doing

One recurrent question in the policing of the G20 is the complicit role of fellow police officers to fellow officer malpractice, aggression and unlawful behaviour. From my partial observations of the G20 demonstrations, and from the official reports and scholarly literature, there is no evidence of any fellow officer acting to control or even challenge what appears to be clear instances of fellow other officer malpractice. In some instances this involves a judgement call, notably the justifiability of force being used, but other police actions are more clear cut, such as side shield strikes and not wearing ID, or as was the case for some, deliberately covering ID so as not to be identifiable or removing it altogether. This is not a pedantic point as all officers have a legal and professional responsibility (as outlined in their 'professional standards' codes of practice) as well as a moral one, to these types of report cases, indeed, keeping people safe, including protestors is a central role to the professed police mission if we judge it on this basis? Reporting transgressions is also a requirement of their role, it is not a discretionary one. There are ample opportunities to do this during the operation, by bringing the issue to the attention of a senior officer (i.e. a Sergeant) in the unit, or failing that, to challenge the individual officer themselves. There are also reporting mechanisms, including anonymous reporting systems available after the operation has taken place in order to bring alleged malpractice to the attention of superior officers. This issue receives little attention in any of the reports, and when it is raised (by police spokespeople in oral testimony) it is only deployed as a reassurance device to reiterate this reporting requirement as a professional standard for all police officers in order to quell any disquiet in the panel ('be reassured police officers are required to report other officer's malpractice').

It is instructive to consider the details of two cases where a prosecution was sought against officers during Operation Glencoe. Ian Tomlinson was a 47-year-old passer-by who had been making his way home from work through the G20 demonstrations, but was confronted with a group of Territorial Support Group (TSG) officers. He was struck from behind to his upper thigh (whilst his hands were in his pockets) from a baton by a tall, powerfully built TSG officer (Simon Harwood). Moments later Harwood rushes forward and using both hands violently shoves Tomlinson in the back, sending him sprawling to the ground. Later, it was reported that one member of the public
had provided a statement describing how the crowd had ‘gasped’ at the horrific sound of Tomlinson hitting the ground. Directly behind Harwood is a phalanx of other TSG officers who witness these two offences. Tomlinson then sits on the floor, momentarily dazed, and remonstrates with the officer who hesitates, then leaves him to be helped up by several demonstrators. After the assault, Harwood strolls over and has a casual chat with his superior. As Reicher (2011:8) also notes, there is no sign of reprimand, everything seems to be entirely reputable and normal as far as the senior officers are concerned, as is the case with other accompanying fellow officers who continue on their way. None of the other officers in this group assist Tomlinson in any way, they don’t help him up, or reprimand Harwood, they nonchalantly walk on by. What happens next is of course well known, moments after, Tomlinson stopped responding to questions, collapsed and mysteriously died. Trained police medics later in attendance were unable to revive Tomlinson.

A second graphic case which came to prominence was that of Nicola Fisher, who on the following day was attending a heavily policed vigil for Tomlinson, when she was slapped and struck by a baton. This scene sees "a tall, powerful officer, his identifying numbers covered in tape, first delivering an insouciant slap across the face to a diminutive woman protestor and then, with great deliberation, swiping her legs with his truncheon" (Reicher, 2011:6). Again, what is of note here is not the casual derision of the individual culprit but the behaviour of the surrounding officers. None of the other officers express any shock, surprise or even disapproval to these actions which occur right in front of them.

Whilst both of these events received extensive coverage by the news media, official bodies and academics, but despite this most of the commentary (with the exception of Reicher, 2011) have omitted any consideration of complicity. Of course, there would be many other such examples of this complicity, I have just raised two prominent cases amongst many. As Graeber (2009:160) has noted in discussing police protestor conflict during summits, in any major protest action one is confronted by hundreds of things going on at the same time, and it is challenging to grasp even a fraction of what is occurring; "Major events might be happening twelve feet away—behind a wall, under an escarpment—of which you have absolutely no idea; at least, until much later, when you start to synthesize accounts."

None of the official inquiry reports pick up on this issue of fellow officer complicity and questions of resulting liability, rather they are simply assuaged by what is misleadingly testimony from police spokespeople or in the other reports the issue is never raised. None ask an obvious question; how

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201 Carey, J. (2013, August 12th) 'The Ian Tomlinson case shows why the police cannot investigate themselves', Guardian Newspaper.
many misconduct allegations or reports (written or oral) were made against the conduct of fellow police officers (or other police ‘family members’) during Operation Glencoe? My own Freedom of Information request into this (and associated matters) constitutes a substantive finding in my research. The answer is no officer made any such report, despite all the many instances of officers not wearing identification, hiding their identification, using excessive force, using forbidden methods to attack protestors with (despite their training) no officer felt it necessary to report any such malpractices. This includes the wider ‘police family’ and the many senior officers who carried specific responsibilities for maintaining police discipline and conduct. This issue of complicity opens up the question of whether and how one should respond to culpable conduct of the wider social group, as well as raising further questions in respect of the inaction of the police and CPS in attributing collective guilt. The law of joint enterprise has been expanded over recent years in the UK against those involved in political protest, as well as the inclusive areas of secondary liability in respect of a group of offences such as riot, affray and violent disorder (Wells & Quick, 2010:336) but has not been applied to state actors. Thus far my argument is that the kettling operations at the Bank of England and the Climate camp constituted what Stark (1972) has termed a ‘police riot’. Moreover, the cases of Tomlinson and Fisher are suggestive of wider secondary liability. Whilst it is a complex and growing area of law, joint enterprise holds that a secondary party can be held liable for the actions of the principle offender (as a secondary assessor) where they have ‘common purpose’ (i.e. aided, abetted, encouraged, provoked) thus; “participation in a joint criminal enterprise with foresight or contemplation is sufficient to impose criminal liability for that act carried out by another participant in the enterprise” (Wells & Quick, 2010:325). Whilst the Law Commission has more recently (arguably) narrowed the scope of secondary liability, the issue is whether the accompanying officers, in the act of not reporting what could plausibly be offences, assisted or encouraged the offence and intended that the conduct element should be perpetrated. It also raises the issue of whether police officers’ current positive obligation in law to report fellow officer illegality and malpractice, which as I have demonstrated is (at least at times at least and in respect of serious violence) inoperative, should result in a lower level of secondary culpability to strengthen the general deterrent value which is currently lacking. Whilst this is a striking finding, it does support the wider scholarly literature regards the police ‘operational code’ (Beigel & Beigel, 1977) or ‘blue code of silence’ concerning police use of violence. Policing is characterised by fraternity, kinship and inclusion, with membership inferring belonging to the powerful, ‘the biggest gang in town’ (Punch, 2009:184).

202 Author FOI (No. 2009050000552) to MPS.
203 Most notably in targeting those associated in ‘gang’ violence.
It is notable that the MPA (2010:15) report is the only report which questions the current disciplinary and sanctions regime in respect of the G20 policing. No doubt this reflects its greater degree of independence, although the recommendations appears in diluted form (the need for appropriate supervision and sanctions in place to deter officers from behaving unprofessionally during protests) this despite regarding it is "a key area where lessons could be learned." As the MPA (2010:15) authors note, HMIC's own inspection Adapting to Protest "did not consider supervision in any detail". This is perhaps a case of diplomatic language, as the HMIC reports produce no findings and offer no recommendations which are even suggestive of the need to scrutinise the current supervision or sanctions regime. Considering the nature of the events to which HMIC were inquiring into, this constitutes an extraordinary omission, although not an unsurprising one (as I have outlined in discussing HMIC's independence deficit). More so still when the earlier (pre-G20) JCHR (2009) Demonstrating Respect for Human Rights? A human rights approach to policing protest report also questioned if police contracts and disciplinary procedures pay sufficient recognition to the duty of officers to act compatibly with human rights.

7.9 Not Accounting for One's Actions:

Klockers (1996:13) has argued that to minimise police use of force (violence) requires any police agency to do three things; to monitor its use of force, evaluate the skill in its use, and educate officers in its skilled use. This means collecting information on every occasion where force is used that produces injury, especially those using police equipment such as batons and shields which can result in considerable physical harm to anyone on the receiving end.

The UK police already do the first of these, as officers have a requirement to record any use of force information in a 'use of force log book'.\footnote{HMIC (2009b:193) states "Police should record all uses of force, setting out the exact circumstances which led the police to use force and the nature of the force used" and this point is reiterated in the HAC (2009) report, one mobilised by police spokespeople to evidence accountability mechanisms sitting at the heart of police use of force. There was a much cited passage relied on by successive police spokespeople in oral testimony, and one reiterated in the other inquiry reports, namely; "Every officer is accountable under law and fully aware of the scrutiny that their actions can be held open to. The decision to use force is made by the individual police officer, and they must account for that."}

These are small booklets which contains standard information (date, time, location etc.) on the details of the type and amount of force used for every use of force incident, it also includes a sketch outline diagram of a person for the officer to draw upon to locate where a person was struck and any details of injuries sustained as a result of police action, as well as the context of the incident and any witness information. This record is also a legal document.
Whilst it needs to be remembered that the police are skilled at writing accounts of incidents in a way which does not infer excessive force or some other malpractice, if completed accurately, this still results in an audit trail which routinely records incidents. If completed, this supplies an important insight into any individual officer's use of force record, and one capable of flagging potential 'problem officers' that may be using excessive force. When linked to an early intervention system which can include other datum, this can increase police accountability and reduce instances of police excessive force (Walker, 2005). The importance of such procedures lies in the considerable evidence which documents police officers with 'performance problems' who are readily identifiable on the basis of the types of records (Walker, 2005:100).

It is a notable finding from this research that MPS did not undertake any review process of these use of force log books (see Appendix 6 which displays a copy of MPSs Evidence and Action Book), nor do they for public order policing events more generally. This means that neither the direct line manager (on the day) nor anyone in the wider organisation examines any of the log books which are submitted as a routine record of police force used. This does rather detract from the police's much cited claim that "Every officer is accountable under law and fully aware of the scrutiny that their actions can be held open to" [my emphasis]. This is not a routine scrutiny, not only in respect of the individual police operation, but more generally over their entire career. The only instances of the log books being 'scrutinised' is on those rare occasions when a civil or criminal case is taken against an officer and the log book is requested as evidence. The Harwood case is instructive here, as he had a history of complaints about repeatedly using excessive force (all but one of which were 'unproven') although the Met attempted to unsuccessfully hide this disciplinary record at the pre-trial hearings on spurious privacy grounds "Disciplinary records concern the private employment data of an individual." This is a further example of systematic ambiguity at the level of rule systems and organisational structure. The police log books appear to function more as a 'presentational rule' where the policing organisation can proclaim existence and abeyance of formal rules (all officers record their use of force and hence their behaviour is scrutinised and accountable) whilst leaving ample space for officers to follow their working rules which divulge from them. It has the merit of

205 For instance, see Alpert (2004) who found that those on the receiving end of police use of force had a different view from that recorded by officers in official reports, including being subjected to a higher level of force, including excessive force, than that recorded. Alpert, GP. & Dunham, RG. (2004) Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and Reciprocity, Cambridge University Press.
206 Most obviously records of citizen complaints against the officer, but they can include other 'performance data' (Walker, 2005:101-2).
207 Author FOI (No. 200905000052) to MPS.
accommodating the police solution to the Dirty Harry problem, with police managers remaining
distant, forsaking the opportunity to enquire into what could be discreditable events.

7.10 Interim Conclusion

It is rare indeed for a statutory body to conduct an investigation into any 'public order' policing
operation in the UK, and to require answers about operational decision making and police tactics
from the police themselves, rarer still for there to be five such of these exercises (notwithstanding
their variable remits). That development goes some way to demonstrate the seriousness of the
legitimacy crisis British policing was facing from the public outcry having seen images of what at
times more closely resembled a 'police riot', to borrow Rodney Stark's (1972) apt phrase.

The reports make for fascinating reading, and despite the considerable combined length, they are
revealing in terms of how protest groups are viewed by the police, as well as disclosing the policing
plan that was in store for many protestors (which would have otherwise remained concealed).
Unfortunately the reports starting point is all too frequently to rehearse a number of cherished
myths about British policing (political neutrality, fairness, only employing minimum force, etc.) with
HMIC being the most serious offender here, although it is characteristic of all. This is an ideological
position, not one borne from an observation of events, policing tactics or police and protestors
interactions on the ground.

My analysis of the report findings shows only muted criticism of the police and the wider policing
operation. More generally, the core police account (official violence as provoked by or as a response
to protestor violence, never as active or as initiating, or resulting from police tactics such as a kettling)
is accepted uncritically. I have provided a number of explanations as to why this is, central being my
interrogation of the bogus claims to 'independence' by the respective bodies - although this is found
to be most wanting by the HMIC authors - being the primary body to effect change to police
practice and policy. I find this independence claim to be deeply flawed, both conceptually and
empirically, something which becomes apparent when one drills down into the make-up of the
bodies and its incumbent 'ideological plumbing' (Scraton, 2002:3). Other explanations involve no
small amount of 'semantic engineering' by police witnesses giving testimony, along with ineptitude
and obsequiousness on behalf of the inquisitors.

My study of Operation Glencoe evidences a number of serious concerns in respect to the complicit
role of fellow police officers to fellow officer malpractice, aggression and unlawful behaviour. Whilst
fellow officers have a mandatory obligation to report any other officer's malpractice and
misconduct, none did (not their immediate supervising officers, their fellow officers standing beside
them, any of the wider 'police family', or senior officers observing events from their command and
control room or from the helicopter with its helecam, or indeed any CCTV control room operatives) (obtained from my own extensive and protracted Freedom of Information requests) (see also Appendix 13.3). This is in the face of many instances of officers not wearing identification, hiding their identification, using excessive force, using forbidden methods to attack protestors with (despite their training). This was the case for the entire Operation Glencoe, which also subsumes the high profile cases of the killing of Ian Tomlinson, and also the case involving Nicola Fisher. Moreover, none of the official inquiry reports pick up on this issue of fellow officer complicity and questions of resulting liability.

My research also identifies serious failings with the current system of police use of force overnight mechanisms, finding that this functions merely as a performative rule. It is one which allows senior officers to present the veneer of robust oversight procedures whilst disguising their wilful blindness. Whilst officers are required to record all use of force incidents in their log books (See Appendix 6 for a blank copy of the document - 'Evidence and Actions Book') there is no review process of these official documents (nor does this occur for public order policing events more generally). If an officer is safe in the knowledge that no-one will, even in the most perfunctory manner, review these official records, the accountability for using force that they are supposed to carry is surely negated. Like the absence of fellow officer reporting of officer malpractice and misconduct, this systemic failing was never revealed by any of the official inquiry reports into Operation Glencoe.

\[209\] Author FOI (No. 200905000552) to MPS.
Chapter 8: The Lead up to the 2014 NATO Summit Protests

8.1 Introduction

The 26th North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit met in September 2014 on the outskirts of Newport, in south Wales, at the five star Celtic Manor 'golf and spa resort hotel.' The summit brought with it a series of firsts for such events, each of which populated press headlines: the most costly summit 'security operation' in British history (originally underestimated at over £50 million); the largest policing operation in British history (seeing some 9,500 police officers drafted in from 27 different forces and boosted by an unspecified number of military personnel, security services and foreign secret service personnel); the world's biggest ever installation of temporary 'security fencing' (at over 12 miles); a considerable military presence (armed troops assigned to the manor, six warships in the bay of Cardiff) and an enormous no fly zone (stretching from Bristol to the east to Brigend in the west, Crickhowell in the north and the Somerset coast in the south); all assembled for the 'biggest ever gathering of world leaders in Britain'.

The approach taken by the police and authorities was not to allow protestors anywhere near the summit site or the Cardiff venue, all of which were protected by mass fortifications and an overwhelming security presence. Despite these elaborate and costly preparations, the anticipated mass protests never occurred, in part I argue, due to extensive 'protest avoidance' strategies undertaken by the authorities. In the following discussion I identify and critique the burgeoning security apparatus revealed by the summit and examine the dialectical interplay of resistance and restriction, adaption and reaction, between the beleaguered activist groups and their opulently resourced policing adversaries. These police and security state tactics, and their interaction with protestors has not been adequately explored (Zajko & Beland, 2008:722). Unlike the G20 summit, the majority of these techniques of control did not involve direct violent repression but were subtler, relying on manipulating people, space and geography, with the states coercive arm always in view and at the ready.

The summit resulted in momentous modifications to multi-use public settings spanning entire areas of Cardiff and Newport and considerable disruption and inconveniences to local people. Despite this imposition resembling a form of 'paranoid urbanism' it only animated occasional tensions between some protestor groups and the authorities, it did not result in any significant overt conflict with local people despite considerable encroachment and curtailment of their liberties. I unpick the reasons for this which in part also explains the general lack of support for the protest movements.

210 It should be noted that this was not the most expensive security operation for a 'mega-event', which was the London Olympics, dwarfing all other events at approximately £1 billion (Rogers & Blight, 2012) although the original price had been quoted at £213 million.
throughout the summit. I show that the authorities have innovated tactically in their pre-emptive community management strategies since the G20, all of which allowed them to win the 'hearts and minds' of many local people as well as appropriating local elites. I decipher some of the new frontiers that characterise these pre-emptive efforts, including adopting multi-dimensional counter-insurgency practices in addition to the more established procedure of shrewd site selection and timing. Other procedures which proved effective was a superficial charm offensive in many of the presentational aspects of policing on the streets as well as some elements of the summit. Saturation level policing was repackaged into a 'safeguarding' mantra, using friendly smiling police personnel. This acted to privilege the facilitative whilst disguising the intended repressive functions, an attractive fabrication able to draw on cherished myths about community policing which frequently 'won over' local people. In contrast to the authorities calculated tactical shifts, the more transgressive protestors failed to sufficiently adapt or innovate, remaining insular, with their own counter-measures towards police spying also impairing their effectiveness. Other wider national and international developments (re fear of terrorism and resurgent NATO anti-Russian propaganda) acted to shift public political consciousness away from protestors critical perspectives and deprive them of a fertile recruitment base to draw upon. This difficult political.

Map 4: Showing Newport and Cardiff Sites and their Situation Within South Wales
terrain was also exacerbated by the transgressive wings ideological and organisational impediments to engage with opportunities offered from mainstream media to propagate their cause. What is distinctive from examining the NATO summit is how the state's role in social control of political dissent blurs traditional divides such as military/policing, national/international, overt/covert, one which targets the entire population and more closely resembles Low Intensity Operations (LIO).

8.2 The Development of the NATO Summit Protest

Prior to the summit commencement, protest websites, including local anti-military groups (branches of Stop The War Coalition, CND, Stop NATO Cyrmu, and anti-arms trade groups) and loosely connected anarchist and student groups (posting on Indymedia websites) were keen to amplify the event and their opposition to NATO. Tensions with Russia over Crimea and the prospect of a new cold war as well as the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan appeared to make the summit an obvious goal for popular protest. A series of public meetings were held in Bristol211 and Birmingham212 to rally support for the planned 'week of action' before and during the summit. This can be seen as a type of expansive 'scalar strategy' (Leitner et al., 2007:160) in turning the local (Newport) event into a regional and national movement to advance the anti-NATO cause. These were led by established groups with some high profile speakers in attendance.213 Despite these efforts organisers appeared to struggle against the prevailing political climate and in their efforts at 'frame-bridging' NATO as constituting a sufficiently important issue of wide concern to attract large scale protests.

Activist groups had announced three main focal points of protest: a march through Newport on Saturday 30th August (some five days before the summit) a 'march on the manor' on the first day of the summit and a 'counter-summit' hosted over the following three days (each discussed further below). Sparse details had been released of the official summit schedule, except that almost all of the events were to take place within the secure grounds of the Celtic Manor, the exception being a dinner at Cardiff castle on the second day. Not that this last detail needed announcing, as fortifications had been underway in both cities weeks in advance. In Cardiff it appeared that the walls of the ancient castle and the largest policing operation in the country's history were deemed inadequate as a defensive measure against the official bogeymen of 'terrorism' and protestors. The more transgressive wing of activists, some of whom attended the earlier mentioned Bristol and Birmingham meetings, were also planning more autonomous protest actions, some of whom voiced their rejection of holding negotiations with the police (NATO, fieldnotes).

211 'Bristol Says No To NATO'
212 'Birmingham Says No To NATO'
213 Jeremy Corbyn, who was then a backbench Labour MP spoke at the Bristol event.
In contrast to the earlier 2009 G20 summit, Gwent Police, at least publicly, had appeared to downplay the likelihood of protestor 'trouble', although they had stated they were ready to deal with 'any impromptu' protests that might take place. This media line belied the reality on the ground though, where the pre-event preparations anticipated mass disorder. There was an expectation from official police sources, one periodically recounted in the media, that the authorities were expecting some twenty thousand protestors over the course of the three days. As it turned out, no such scale of protestor numbers were ever forthcoming, indeed on my estimates (reinforced by numerous media reports of the main protest marches) they struggled at best to marshal a tenth of this number. Even if this upper figure had been realised, it would still have resulted in a 1:2 ratio of police to protestors. As it turns out, there was considerably more police than protestors, approximately an 8:1 police (available) to protestor ratio for the event. The official justification for the size of the 'security operation' avoided reference to any such ratios, presumably preferring not to open a can of worms in favour of the eminently more flexible (and unfalsifiable) retort of 'safeguarding' delegates, local people and protestors' alike.

8.3 Securing Distant Places

The authorities enjoy many distinct advantages when it comes to forging spaces of social control, chief among these involves selecting the location for the summit and its timing. This allows them to strategise against previously successful protestor tactics such as decentralised blockading by selecting sites which are hard to reach, sparsely populated, and easily defensible (Starr et al, 2011; Scholl, 2012). These extensive spatial preparations were very much in evidence at the NATO summit, indeed more than any of the other case study sites. Site selection is just one of several methods where the authorities engineer 'protest avoidance' strategies in order to dwindle the scale of social mobilisation (Zajko & Beland, 2008). As activists choose to confront summit meetings spatially (as opposed to other methods such as by media, or by general education) a now well established process of fortification and an overwhelming security presence makes protest near the site practically impossible. Electing a midweek daytime schedule further frustrates the efforts of social movements in building alliances between diverse groups and individuals for mass collective action. Coinciding the summit with people's work and other commitments purposely drains the network of actual and potential dissenters.

8.3.1 'The Celtic Manor' Site

The five star 'Celtic Manor Resort Hotel' lay some two miles outside of Newport, in South Wales (see map 1 above and 2 below. As one interviewed local political representative noted when describing the choice of destination for the summit:
'It's an imposing building, stationed on a hill overlooking nearby Newport. But its better known to us locals as 'Colditz' due to its uncanny architectural resemblance to its namesake. It's a very masculine building you see [...] Matter of fact it was designed from its very inception to enable high security measures to be put in place, and it's also quite off the beaten track. I've no doubts that is why it was chosen [for the NATO summit] [...] The owner is also very well politically connected, so he's known in all the right circles. That's part of it to, he knows all the right people. He's trusted you see ... (Telephone interviewee, Local Representative SW02).

Over the three days of the summit ‘the manor’ did indeed take on many aspects of that prisoner of war camp, not to keep the incumbents in but to keep everyone else out. ‘The Manor’s’ geographical defence comes from being surrounded by two thousand acres of parkland sitting four miles outside of Newport and bisected by the M4 motorway to the south and the river Usk to the north (see map 2 below).

Map 5: The NATO Summit Location at the Celtic manor Resort Hotel and Surrounding Area

This meant the site only needed to be secured from two sides, the east and west. Despite these natural defences, immense fortification effort at exorbitant costs were still undertaken. The authorities enacted a near complete closure of the summit venue, with private contractors building a ‘wall of steel’ around the Celtic Manor grounds as well as the only two other venues delegates would visit. The luxury Celtic Manor hotel stands in contrast to the high levels of deprivation in nearby Newport, indeed many locals never considered ‘the manor’ to be part of Newport at all.
'Newport people don't really consider 'The Manor' to be part of Newport. Not really (sic). It's all quite posh, and it's too far out, it's not part of the city to most of us.' [...] They keep saying it's in Newport, but it's not, not if it's there. (Telephone interviewee, Local Representative SW01).

The official 'media centre' was also located in the grounds of Celtic Manor\textsuperscript{214} one of the many 'restricted areas' at the summit venue open to accredited videographers and photographers under 'escort'. Journalists spent much of their time in this security bubble, being shuttled by official buses from the designated media hotels to the co-located Accreditation Office and media entrance point at the Hilton hotel. This tactic of embedding journalists within the restricted areas further distances mainstream media from any dissenting voices left out on its exterior.

\textbf{Picture 10: Part of the 'Ring of Steel' Fencing Bisecting Space Between the Summit Grounds and the M4 Motorway (Closing off One Lane of the M4)}

The authorities need to strike a balance though, between presenting access obstacles for protestors but not so that they face insurmountable logistic issues for delegates. For these reasons the hotel's proximity to Junction 24 of the M4, and being close to Cardiff airport for international visitors, and its few access road into the site, added to its desirability. Extensive road closures were also instigated, officially this was to allow delegates speedier access to the venue, but effectively it meant previous public rights of way became private roads for the exclusive use of VIPs, their entourages and attendant security.

\footnote{Ministry of Defence https://www.gov.uk/guidance/nato-summit-wales-2014-operational-information-for-media}
8.3.2 Finding fallow ground in site selection

The nearest protest camp (a 'peace camp') had to be established some six and a half miles away at Tredegar Park, and three miles from Newport centre, after local objections to a more central green space prevailed at a public meeting. This brings into view another criterion for selecting this area of South Wales, not only was the summit hotel difficult to access and easy to defend, but it is located in a region where many of the local population were not supportive of protestor’s activities, including anti-NATO protestors. From my observations this was evident from the sheer strength of local feeling at a public meeting, which saw over a hundred people attend to object to protestors establishing a peace camp on Council owned green space near a community centre in the Pill area of the city:

Aug 12th: Well attended public meeting held in sports centre (n=110+), mostly local residents who live in adjacent properties and nearby. Appear largely hostile to the planned ‘No NATO’ activists using the park as a ‘peace camp’. No headway being made by activists. Lots of objections cited during meeting, lots of people wanting to make points but the implicit undertone orientates on locals disapproving of and fearing large numbers of people (not local to the area) staying there, and concern over 'trouble' (stated multiple times during meeting) resulting from any sort of protest, as well as leaving the playing fields out of use, then and later (due to mess and clear up required). (NATO fieldnotes)

Generally speaking, residents are constantly questioning that the 'peace camp' is going to be 'peaceful' ... [I'm overhearing this concern throughout] clearly this is not how the proposed encampment is being perceived. People are raising practical issues around the suitability of the park for such a camp, but it is this larger concern which appears to occupy people's minds. (NATO, fieldnotes)

A series of rumours had been in play for sometime, one of which was that one thousand tents were going to be pitched on the playing fields for the peace camp. Understandably, this and other similar rumours had alarmed some local people who occupied the rows of small terraced properties buttressing all around the park. However, it was the larger issue of who the people would be which was what seemed to animate the concern. As one local at the meeting stated after the meeting:

Resident: *We don't want it, it's as simple as that, you're going to have people coming down here starting problems .. and we don't want it.'*

Interviewer: *'What problems?*

Resident: *'All sorts of problems ... come on ... you know what their like. Things can get out of control. And we want to use the park. I know I do. And how can I do that now, if this lot come?'*

(NATO fieldnotes)
This hostility to activists was also shared by many of the local political leaders in the ruling Labour party. By way of explanation, one local organiser described the political complexion of the local Labour party:

‘Well, they call themselves Labour, but they’re not really, their ‘blue’ Labour. They are quite conservative. That’s why they’re so complaint with all this … they won’t kick up a fuss, oh no…’ [laughs] (Telephone interview with local organiser, SW06)

Much of the discussion at the meeting by representatives was framed in negative language, it took the form of ‘mitigating the harms’ that any peace camp might impact locally, although a nod was given to the ‘right to peaceful protest’. This interpretive framework was also picked up by the police, notably by Chris Armitt, the Gold Commander (and hence most senior officer for the NATO summit) who found time in his busy schedule to reinforce local people’s concerns about the location of the proposed peace camp:

‘It’s unfortunate, but it’s a reality, that we can’t prevent people from walking into a town anywhere in this country, and setting up a tent on a piece of public land.’

A Labour councillor who doubled as chair of ‘Pill Millennium Centre’s Trust’, lead the objections to any camping taking place on the proposed Pill site. As she was aware, upholding such a bar effectively meant the peace camp could not proceed as activists would not be able to stay overnight.

Neither were Newport Labour controlled council supportive of the camp at the new location either, sheer frustration saw protestors ending up having to threaten un-cooperative officials with contravening health and safety legislation in order to get them to unlock the shower facilities based in the park to be able to wash during the life of the camp. Eventually the council felt compelled to comply fearing prosecution. (NP04; NP05, NATO fieldnotes)

The Local Labour MP had been more equivocal, ‘flip-flopping’ on the NATO summit, with the local CND putting pressure on him to oppose it, only for him to eventually come out in support.

‘At first he was opposed to the NATO summit coming here, but, as the event got closer he changed, now he’s in support, be it luke warm. He’s completely flip-flopped on the issue.’ (Telephone interview with local representative SW01)

Overall there was little Labour party resistance to the NATO summit or its onerous security requirements being placed on local people and services. The Welsh Labour councillors and MPs generally ‘kept their heads down’ throughout, and complied with central governments wishes of

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216 Telephone interview with local councillor (SW01; SW03)
championing the summit ‘without much ado or fuss.’ (Telephone interview with local representative SW04)

8.4 Total Policing

Part of securitisation is about breaking previous bounds of political rules and procedures (which can take many forms) by using extraordinary means or emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998:24-25). Not only was there a dramatic transformation to many public spaces in both Newport and Cardiff, but also to local services and institutions. Such extraordinary measures see the rules governing even some mandatory statutory services being repealed, for instance, compulsory state education is 'suspended', contradicting the government's own stated policy regards the importance of school attendance. Some forty schools and nurseries in Newport closed for two days, others as far away as the Vale of Glamorgan were closed early due to local road closure to the public to allow their exclusive use for NATO and government personnel to travel more quickly to Celtic Manor. This included closing arterial roads through Cardiff city centre, causing significant disruption to local bus services, and instigating blanket no-parking zones for motorists. These previous public rights of way extended to pathways as well, and even preventing some local people from getting to work. Some critical infrastructure is curtailed (motorway capacity is reduced due to security fencing occupying an entire lane of the busy M4, and no fly zones are introduced banning aircraft). The usual charging rules for non-EEA nationals was also suspended under special powers by the Health Minister, with all delegates and VIPs to receive free 'emergency and necessary' healthcare on the Welsh NHS.217 Other local critical infrastructure was simply commandeered as if the region were in a state of war. The usually busy (and closest) hospital accident and emergency unit closed for five days and was turned over for the exclusive use of delegates and the emergency services serving the NATO summit.218 Local people's cultural life was similarly suspended as the 'security measures' badly affected sporting fixtures. The local football team were unable to play for ten days at their home ground and the rugby team had to move their match elsewhere (with the site being occupied by decamping ranks of police officers). The leading university in Wales, Cardiff university, had its main entrance closed for two weeks, leaving it with no connection between its main buildings. In addition, entire areas of what had previously been public inner city space are sequestrated,

217 Health Minister Mark Drakeford, a position also backed by the shadow conservative Health Minister. Reported in Selby-WO, A. (2014, 8th July) 'World leaders at NATO summit will be treated for free on the Welsh NHS' Wales online http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/world-leaders-nato-summit-treated-7384045
218 Cardiff and Vale University Health Board's statement tried to justify this extraordinary measure by downplaying its significance and emphasising that the closure as a “short-term measure” being taken to “help provide a triage and treat service in Cardiff city centre to support police and ambulance services during the NATO Summit.” The health board stated it had already issued an apology to “anyone affected by these steps.”
including local landmarks and heritage sites, which were appropriated for the exclusive use of the visiting dignitaries (the entire Bute park is closed, as is Cardiff castle).

What we see is how previous rules and procedures are violated by the security act, which breaks free of such rules, and whose governing logic is lifted above the haggling of everyday politics of place by a successful securitisation. At such summits securitisation has become institutionalised with its own formidable momentum. These procedures are legitimated through a security rhetoric and the politics of existential threat, a motivational foundation which escapes all public scrutiny. What warrants this (sic) threat profile and the scale of the security structures and expenditure are questions to which there is only official silence beyond the ubiquitous threat of terrorism.

South Wales history of longstanding links to the British military also made it a desirable location for the authorities. Being a base for a number of UK military operations as well as a home to a sizeable chunk of the UK’s armaments, aerospace and ‘defence’ industry sector, leaving the ‘host’ population that much more amenable to pro-NATO messaging (discussed further below). Furthermore, the army is the seventh largest employer in Wales and there are a quarter of a million ‘veterans’ living in Wales (Barclays, 2014:7). The ranks of those positively disposed to militarism grows further when one considers that the British Army has long strategically targeted young people from working class backgrounds and in deprived areas with low employment levels (despite official denials) specifically in Wales, including Cardiff (as well as some other northern cities). These carefully crafted advertising messages seek out young men who are motivated to escape disadvantage and who are open to the deceptively stylised allure which falsely glamorises the serving soldiers life. The young, poor and naive are therefore targeted with positive military messages in schools and colleges, and advertising campaigns which take place across a host of youth based forums (such as local cinemas, television, bill-boards etc.) instigating pro-military attitudes. Militarism is thus more deeply embedded in some areas of the country than others, notably amongst the young. This hands a key advantage to the authorities early on at the summit planning stage. By carefully selecting their location based on its area profile they are able to dictate more or less challenging conditions for social movement organising. The authorities knew that south Wales would likely be less sympathetic to activists espousing an oppositional anti-military political culture, and they were right.

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219 These practices were revealed in an MOD internal briefing document on the ‘This is Belonging campaign’ (a glossy army recruitment campaign) and despite MODs claims that they target all socio-economic backgrounds. Reported in the Guardian newspaper (Morris, S. 2017, July 9th, ‘British army is targeting working-class young people, report shows’.

220 Ibid., 2017.
The clear implication from this is that the authorities investigate the local political culture and socio-political history of an area as an important part of their site selection (other researchers studying summit protests in North America and other parts of Western Europe have also come to this conclusion, Starr et al., 2011:53). At the same time, little is known about the details of these data gathering activities, again, as with so much about what is loosely deemed security preparations for such events, these activities are in effect state secrets. Nevertheless, we can make some reasoned conjectures here. Within the UK context there is ample data available to them. The advent of local area based ‘tension monitoring’ is a sufficiently flexible institutional data gathering tool for these purposes and likely would be instituted in the advent of an international summit. Within this doctrine there is specific allowance for monitoring of ‘political extremism’, a vague and permissively defined category to which those favouring direct action tactics could be shoe horned into. Whilst these policies are squarely aimed at ‘community cohesion’ concerns, the terms of reference are similarly broad and pliable, such as understanding ‘local community dynamics’ which includes the equally amorphous ‘public order’ concerns finding its way in (Community and Local Government, 2008). Thus were told, “Local tension monitoring may take specific account of activities by members of any political group which increase community tension” (Community and Local Government, 2008:24) and ‘local political situations’ and ‘local demonstrations’ can be constituted as exacerbating tensions (ICOC, 2010). This last point gains further traction when considering emergency planning preparations, specifically responsibilities under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) which requires local authorities to work with ‘local resilience partners’ to “assess the risk of disruptive challenges and prepare to respond to the consequences” (Community and Local Government, 2008:15). Needless to say these processes are all police led, and would feed in to the routine local Special Branch surveillance of political activists, who constitute the ‘political police’ in Britain (Bunyan, 1975). None of this is new of course, and the surveillance of opposition and dissent is as old as the state itself, what has changed in the very considerable capacity to surveil entire populations (Bunyan, 2016). Machon (2005) reveals the extensive monitoring and surveillance of legitimate non-subversive organisations and individual members such as Trade Unions, CND, the NCCL, and peace campaigners, as well as Labour Members of Parliament.\footnote{Machon notes that despite these practices breaching MI5’s own rules, the work was justified by the agency arguing that it was investigating subversive penetration of these groups and not the organisations or individuals within the organisation (2005:46).} Moreover, the UK’s counter-terrorism campaign has considerably expanded the range and scope of intelligence gathering in the domestic sphere under the UK’s Prevent policy.
8.5 Interim Conclusion

The NATO summit acts to reinforce the importance of careful site selection to the authorities in order to maximise strategic advantages. This goes beyond the defensiveness of the individual site and its fortification (although these are critical considerations) to encompass the wider cultural and political profile of the area. The authorities managed to capitalise on the historical attachments to the British military in South Wales, both in terms of the long-term strategic marketing and targeting of recruits from here into the military by the MOD, as well as the regions having some economic reliance upon an armaments, aerospace and ‘defence’ industry. This was intended to provide a broadly unsympathetic local and regional audience to the oppositional anti-military political culture espoused by the protestors, if not, a hoped for hostile environment. The result was to shrink the potential pool of dissent, ranging across an initially disinterested wider public right through to potential sympathetic joiners. This hostile environment was also felt in terms of the sighting of the ‘peace camp’, eventually relegated to over three miles from Newport, providing further advanced warning of protest actions and greater surveillance opportunities for the authority players.

I now move on to consider why these strategies were successful, despite the considerable collateral cost to local people of hosting the summit meeting. I will argue that the strategies being employed by the authorities have important parallels with Low Intensity Operations (LIO) and counter-insurgency doctrine.
CHAPTER 9: Tactical Innovation by the Authorities: Pre-emptive community management

9.1 Contested Communications

Site selection is but one element of the preparatory work undertaken by the authorities, although there is little publicly available information as to what 'preparations' actually involves. A further critical area is establishing good lines of communication with local neighbourhoods, this is the case for both the police and protesters alike. Both sides compete to get their respective messages across, an element of which is to try and cultivate a general sympathy in advance of any upcoming confrontations that might be played out on the streets (Scholl, 2012:169). Communication becomes an important site of contestation, although for the NATO summit, a highly asymmetrical one.

The police issued glossy flyers ('NATO Summit advance notice', see Appendix 17: Picture 61, below) pictured with a friendly bobby on a bike as one means to raise 'understanding' of their preparatory and operational measures as well as forewarning and 'explaining' resulting disruptions. A dedicated website also provided updated information for local people, supported by other social media platforms employed to propagate this. Those living closest to the manor were door-knocked for a 'chat', as the police erected a temporary 10 foot high steel barrier stretching across the road and footpaths to block cars and people in anticipation of preventing the later intended 'Manor March' actually getting anywhere near the Manor hotel. Throughout the authorities benefited from being large institutional actors who had dedicated communication infrastructure and media liaison staff (both police and Newport council backed by national government) and carried the hierarchy of creditability to provide accurate information. This is in stark contrast to the lack of protestor infrastructure and meagre resources which resulted in the authorities being far more successful in getting their messages across. The anti-NATO coalition did run a web presence and advertised their events, but the activists at the peace camp lacked even an electricity supply to power this. This meant there was no effective media centre (partly because people struggled to charge electronic devices).

9.2 Dissuasion through 'Militainment': NATO propaganda efforts

Much of the preliminary public affairs work behind the scenes had already been done well before the peace camp had been decided, let alone established. Almost all of the local and national Welsh political and business elites openly endorsed the summit, or were at least neutralised to ensure they did not raise public objections or deviate from the official script crafted for public consumption - 'Wales as obvious beneficiary' frame commentary. The only exception to this was the Welsh Green

\[\text{Information from two affected local residents, Newport.}\]
party who were united in their condemnation and openly campaigned against the summit, but due to their marginal political position this only constituted a minor irritation. The levers and resources of local government were firmly in the hands of the FCO who had overall operational control. Nevertheless, this propagation process needed to be broadened to include a wider portion of the Welsh public. To achieve this end, the authorities conducted an insidiously spread propaganda campaign aimed to dominate local public attitudes and opinions. This was achieved through an assemblage of media companies and state and local agencies to enable consent operating via persuasion. Prior to the summit arriving a 'special festival'/ 'fun family day' was held in Newport to 'celebrate' the NATO summit coming to the city, jointly organised by the British state and Newport City Council. This practice takes a key tactic of protestors such as putting on placed based events including ‘teach-in’s', music, street theatre, and other celebrations and subverts it to bolster the authorities cause. As protestors know, such events can have a transformative nature, providing people with a sense of power through collective action and a stake in contentious politics. This is subverted, with the aim to align the target public to state and NATO objectives, and as an outcome, dissuasion from any kinds of dissent. What is presented is a hybrid of persuasion and dissuasion in the same manner (but not form) as counter-radicalisation initiatives operate (Bratich, 2014:15).

The virtue words and other slogans employed associates NATO with a 'festival', as it also did with 'security', 'leadership' and 'safety', linking NATO to the value system of the target audience in Newport. Operational effectiveness was achieved by adopting a successfully proven strategy taken from community integration events used in many parts of the UK:

The 'festival' is advertised as a 'NATO themed family fun day'. It is culturally themed to appeal to people's taste buds with different foods and drink from across the twenty-eight respective NATO countries being offered as an enticing culinary hook to attract local weekend crowds. Included are items such as 'reindeer burgers' from Iceland, 'smorgasbord' from Denmark, waffles from Belgium and paella from Spain, which also includes having somewhat tenuously anchored locally by having a 'Welsh stall' with Welsh cheese and locally brewed beer. Beers from other NATO countries are also on offer, this has the effect of widening the appeal of the event to both sexes who are in evidence. The event was well advertised in local media and is well attended, including families taking in the sights. (NATO fieldnotes)

The programmes ran ahead of the summit by some two weeks in order to resonate and bed down the message with the local populace. The festival was the draw which allowed multiple messages to be refined for different types of audiences (including by age) and different persuasion objectives. Encouraging attendance from the youth market was achieved by having four local bands playing, whereas younger children were enticed through offering face painting. (NATO fieldnotes)
This was only the backdrop to showcase the real message of the event, which was to sell militarism and the incumbent NATO doctrine. In line with established propaganda models, the framing effort also connects past cultural and historical events with the present through emotional and cognitive reasoning. A 'Battle of Britain' air flypast by the Red Arrows was offered, handily tagging on other NATO aircraft in the display to underscore and further legitimise NATO; Household cavalry marched through the city centre and played military music. Military hardware also featured prominently throughout, emphasising the doctrine of military capability:

There is an array of military vehicles and weaponry at the festival event. This is presented to 'visitors' in order to 'demonstrate' the various equipment, with plenty of army personnel on hand ready to do so. Young children are encouraged to get involved, and are lifted onto army tanks and peer through gun sights, with parents looking on. Different generations have been catered for, with the army deploying an inflatable assault course (for youngsters) and a climbing wall (for youths), no doubt with an air to future recruitment. (NATO fieldnotes)

This event can be seen as an evolving part of 'defence propaganda', one taking the form of what Debord terms the proliferation of 'networks of promotion and control', through every day entertainment and amusement, or what Bratich (2014) terms 'militainment'. Further efforts to sell the NATO summit saw a public 'ceremony' concocted 'presenting' a NATO flag 'to the city' attended by local dignitaries from Newport Council and the Welsh government. This and other events were heavily policed to ensure that proceedings went to plan without undue interruption. The small contingent of CND protestors wanted to object to the ceremony taking place:

'We were making our way towards the ceremony to demonstrate against the immorality of our City Council accepting the NATO flag. It was obvious we were a small peaceful demonstration but we were all stopped by the police well before we got close to the event. Everyone was, questioned and we had to give an account of ourselves as well as show identification. We were then followed by the police, it felt rather over the top. (Interview CND-01 activist)

'I didn't count how many policemen there were accompanying us, but there were a lot. They said if we were protestors then they were here to 'engage with us', but it was simply intimidation, all that stuff about having to show ID and that [...] they just wanted to keep us away from the platform, and they succeed.' (Interview CND-02 activist)

These public relations efforts also featured during the summit, notably charm offensives using local school children. A child from every primary school in Newport visited Celtic Manor for a photoshoot and to meet dignitaries. President Obama also made a scheduled visit to a local primary school in another stage managed affair which received considerable local publicity. Young children, it would seem, are the favoured audience for dignitaries. No doubt because they can be easily
manipulated, present the best photo opportunity, and are the least cognitively able to challenge those in power when meeting in the flesh.

9.3 Nation branding as tactical innovation

Wales underwent a brief process of assertive 'nation branding' premised on the official need to 'strengthen its image' to make it more attractive for global military-industrial capital and to the future needs of similar securitised events. The policing of protest at the NATO summit needs to be seen within this wider context of global neoliberalism and the neoliberalisation of cities. Territorial or location branding is a means of trying to create value between territorial elites and ordinary individuals (van Ham, 2002:250) and an opportunity for NATO to justify its existence by winning people's 'hearts and minds'. van Ham (2002:253) identifies two sides of location branding both of which are pertinent for the summit; the external side (ostensibly generating economic and political advantage by attracting clients into the area and charging more for goods and services) but also an internal aspect, which aims to deliver a greater sense of belonging, inclusion and confidence. As van Ham (2002:266-7) notes: "Branding asks everyone to speak with one, coordinated voice, a common language to express the brand's identity, a shared commitment to the brand's promise. Branding aims to inspire people to 'live up to' the brand's promise by 'living' the brand [...] Copying this commercial pattern to location branding implies that the people living in a branded country (or city/region) have to stick to the privileged script of their brand-leaders. In democratic countries, such a close coordination of a country's message may well result in a (be it perhaps benign) authoritarian system."

Lest this focus on branding appear frivolous, it needs to be remembered that (and following Foucault) ideas are forms of power manifest discursively (Burchell, et al., 1991). Branding strives for internal cohesion and consistency (in language and image) and the political elite behind such location branding act through this disciplinary technique to nudge local people into conformity. The manifest justification for this exercise was to place the territory (Wales) on the elites 'mental map', but this masks its true internal function, one of identity formation. Location branding is one mechanism through which elite norms reach the domestic arena.

This is overtly acknowledged by the bilingual summit logo (see Figure 2 above) which exploits Welsh culture and history, here as superficial decorations. NATO has a powerful international logo, which is counter-posed with four symbols (featuring the Celtic knot, a Welsh dragon, Cardiff Castle, and the only specific reference to Newport, the transporter bridge - being a local landmark). These summoned the key brand assets of myth, folk-motif and heritage that here aptly represent Wales in this inter-brand marriage. These are exploited, as is their underlying nationalism, in an effort to
claim the loyalty of citizens through the power of language and image. These are chosen also for their emotive identities and mediagenic properties, to evoke an emotional tie between a distant and unaccountable NATO and local people. The territorial flavour of the ‘country of origin effect’ is weaved in by the accent on local produce and goods, keying into the myth and heritage of the location (at the summit close delegates were gifted ‘goodie bags’ with local Welsh produce and goods).

**Figure 2: The Official NATO Wales Summit Logo**

The cultural messaging ploy to appeal to Welsh distinctiveness as a separate nation in the UK was not without its difficulties however. There was a brief campaign by some disgruntled local political elites who wanted a more distinctive role for the city than the official badging allowed:

‘Well, there was some concern that the city was being side-lined by using the ‘NATO Wales’ badge [...] quite a lot of anger as it was supposed to be about Newport. That’s what we were told. So some of the local Newport political elite mounted a bit of a brief campaign. They wanted the summit to be re-badged as ‘NATO Newport’ in recognition of what they considered the cities role, not ‘NATO Wales’. It was a bit of a short-lived spat though because, in the end, many local people in Newport just don’t consider the Manor to be really part of Newport anyway, they just see it as ‘somewhere else’, an elite bastion outside of the city.’ (Interview, local representative SW-04)

These minor difficulties aside, the overall logic of territorial branding follows that of commercial branding, one which is aimed at the widest possible audience (and hence why the insistence on ‘NATO Wales’ was not allowed to be overturned). Here we see vibrant coloured lamp-post banners adorning some of the main streets in Cardiff heralding ‘welcome to Cardiff’ and donning the NATO logo (see picture below). This signalling is for the consumption of local people however, as none of the VIPs or delegates ventured into this community, preferring to remain in their exclusive
enclosures. The 'welcome to Cardiff' message was literally meaningless in respect to the dignitaries it was supposedly directed at.

**Picture 11: Street Banners in Cardiff Displaying the NATO Summit Logo**

Local elected officials continually stressed the need to 'showcase security' for 'brand Wales'. What this is arguing for is Wales becoming a location whose strategic equity is attributable to a particular securitised product, one offering a protest free and disruption free venue for political and business elites, mimicking brands based on trust and customer satisfaction. This elite discourse sees Wales positioned aspirationally to be 'a master brand' in the competitive international market place of urbanised security. As van Ham wryly notes, marketing researchers are as interested in nationalism and identity as are international relations scholars. Nation branding in this instance is a political and social phenomenon, and the acknowledgement that territorial actors need to implement strategies designed to consciously use this tool to help secure their efforts in engineering a favourable climate
and reinforce a particular social order. In doing so the authorities are attempting to mould the formation of interests and identities, one openly competing for the allegiance and loyalty of their citizens against counter messages emanating from protest groups.

How successful were these location branding tactics? Measuring the real life effects of such exercises is notoriously difficult, but the prize here is not so much requiring even the modest goal of affording local people to accept (willingly or reluctantly) the NATO summit on their doorstep, but rather the default one of marginalising counter voices, and denying them a fertile environment to recruit from. Location branding and its attendant festivals add to the changing tactical role of pre-emptive state actions, one differing markedly from simple coercion. van Ham (2002:268) argues that public diplomacy and PR marketing are merging, and this case study suggests that states have realised that advanced marketing techniques have something of value to offer these types of nation formation efforts. It is also notable that the anti-globalisation activists failed to engage with this nation brand state tactic, leaving this field open without challenge. van Ham's (2002:269) insightful discussion of territorial branding conjectures that as a tactic it is vulnerable to being 'torn down' (symbolically more than literally) but no such susceptibility was evident during the Newport summit (I discuss the actions of the peace camp in section 7.8 below).

9.4 The Political Economy of Social Control

There has been very little research undertaken on the political economy of social control (Starr et al., 2011:50). Despite this lacuna, an appreciation of the costs involved can reveal some of the underlying power dynamics in the social control of dissent and the continuing development of the 'security state'. The past thirty years has seen the development of an entire industry orientated to securing international summits and global ministerial meetings. As these various international forums and institutions have become increasingly contentious, so the 'securing' of their meetings has become a more pressing task for the states hosting the gatherings.

The NATO summit is notable here as it represents the most expensive security operation for any UK hosted summit, costing over £81.2 million (being over thirty-five percent more expensive than the second most costly summit, the G8 in Northern Ireland (at 60 million pounds). This was pitched as 'investment' in the Welsh NATO summit by the Welsh government. To give some context to

224 Written Statement - NATO by Carwyn Jones, First Minister of Wales, Welsh Government.
these figures, the summit would cost each household in Newport over £1,280.225 Even this is a considerable undercount, as this headline figure does not factor in the military costs across the three services who were active throughout the summit, and these costs are not publicly available.226 Whilst calculating such costs is not a straightforward matter, the effective refusal to provide such information acts to neuter any critic (or any potential critic) to such operations on the basis of cost. Without basic cost data there is no means to challenge expenditure.

Despite the official haze over the true nature of this fiscal landscape, what is clear is that the resulting budgets for such events in the UK have become increasingly extravagant. A trend which is reflected with mounting costs of G8 and G20 costs internationally from 2001 onwards (Kirton & Tanna, 2010).227 When costs are revealed, authorities only provide the scarcest breakdown into broad categories in how these monies have been spent. More detailed analysis is refused by claiming that the information is ‘security sensitive’. Nevertheless, some revealing details emerge. Over three quarters of the cost (76%) was spent on deployments of police personnel (£62.5 million) and requiring officers to be drawn in from over half (27) of all other forces. This does not include the armed military personnel deployed inside the perimeter fence, the UK security services and foreign secret service agents (some of whom were observed in Newport and Cardiff). The FCO spent a further £107,000 on ‘vetting and accreditation’ which gives one indication of the scale of means that up to 2,183 people could have been required to be vetted.228 This reveals one element of the very considerable surveillance operation undertaken, and it should be noted that the consequences of failing a security check can be severe, resulting in refusal of employment, at least temporarily (see McEvoy and White, 1998).229 Moreover, Linn (1990:50) argues that vetting procedures carry no

225 The bulk of the costs were met by central government, although the Welsh government declared it incurred £3 million costs (£2 million on ‘enhancing security and resilience infrastructure’; ‘health cover arrangements’ and ‘co-ordinating emergency services’; £1 million on ‘promotional and marketing activities’, ‘military events in Newport and Cardiff’; a media reception in Newport; ‘branding key gateways in and around Newport and Cardiff’; ‘postcards from children to the NATO world leaders, and other promotional activities’. Written Statement - NATO by Carwyn Jones, First Minister of Wales, Welsh Government.

226 I have not submitted any FOI's to try and assess an estimated cost to these military operations, past experience with obtaining similar costings data from the MOD has resulted in them declaring that “costs are not calculated on an operation by operation basis […] the cost elements that would need to be part attributed to a single operation are spread across numerous MOD and NATO budgets.” (FOI2015/01975; FOI2016 0299).

227 As the authors note, difficulties abound in making comparative analysis across countries due to the differing cost variables and methodologies in compiling costs, however, they do provide tables for comparative costs.

228 Knowing the total cost spent for vetting and the individual vetting level price allows this rough calculation. Vetting costs derived from Freedom of Information request to the Defence Vetting Agency for minimum ‘security check’ (SC) to ‘developed vetting’ (DV) levels respectively (£49 and £761) https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/vetting_costs.

229 Uncorroborated accounts from local people recounted that staff working at the Manor during the summit who failed security vetting, or were deemed to be persons of suspicion by the US secret service, were laid off.
explicit recognition of a right to lawful protest, leaving those who do dissent open to being denied security vetting clearance (without explanation). This can be considered a further hidden collateral cost to the local population of hosting the summit.

The costs also reflect the very considerable multi-dimensionality of these operations, which include (although not fully priced) policing, surveillance and intelligence gathering, communications operations, target hardening measures, as well as domestic military deployments across all three services (i.e. the extensive use of military helicopters and fighter planes flying over the summit, naval frigates in Cardiff harbour and Cardiff bay, and armed troops deployed within the Manor hotel and at other undisclosed venues). As some other social movement scholars have also recently noticed (Starr et al. 2011:60-1) taken as a whole, this multidimensional package more closely resembles a Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) operation (or Low Intensity Warfare). As such it blurs more traditional distinctions between police/military, and domestic/international, warfare/peace, into an expanded security logic, whilst falling short of any declaration of hostilities230. Examining the NATO summit's institutional make-up (and its costs) also invites attention to the changing spatial configurations of security. These have been recalibrated, shifting in focus from national borders to sub-national, regional and urban scales (a trend other scholars have noted, i.e. Graham, 2004). The primary focus of the summit security operation was urban centred, despite the anti-missile defence system231 sat on the £1 billion HMS Duncan 'air-defence destroyer' parked in Cardiff docks.

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230 One intriguing dimension to this was the appearance of Gurkha's marching in police uniform (approximately n=30) in Cardiff.

231 HMS Duncan carries 'Sea Viper Missiles' as well as sophisticated electronic warfare systems, presumably brought in to defend against a potential sea launched or land launched ballistic missile attack on the venue site by a hostile foreign power. https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/october/14/141014-hms-duncan-celebrates-fourth-birthday.
In part it is clear that the security planners were 'thinking the unthinkable' in their contingency planning and contemplating highly unlikely but what they have deemed catastrophic events prompted in response to increasingly novel attack strategies. For instance, the pre-planning had been extensive, even including a mock terrorist chemical attack in Newport to 'test' the emergency services responses to such a scenario. Commenting on the operation Superintendent Glyn Fernquest, who led the exercise for Gwent Police stated:

"We will use the lessons learnt from the exercise to review and improve our major emergency plans so in the unlikely event of something like this occurring, the public of Gwent will get a well prepared and effective response" [And] "Hopefully the exercise didn't cause residents any major disruption and we are grateful for their support."[232]

'Support' here is assumed, as are the costs to such operations, being that Newport is not otherwise considered a target for chemical attack from terrorists. Examining security at 'mega-events' Boyle & Haggerty (2009) note how the spiralling costs of such events reflect spatial, temporal; and socially 'de-bounded' risks, all of which hazards falling into 'high consequence aversion', where worst case

scenarios drive inappropriate security measures. The spectacle of security can also disrupt the circuits of consumption, as when some local bar owners in Cardiff were complaining that the unusually quiet bars was a result of customers being frightened away by patrolling armed police walking the streets, as one bar owner remarked; "who wants to go out and see that?"

A further tactic by the authorities is to only reveal the actual costs of the event some considerable time after it has occurred, in the case of NATO, nearly two years later. Such a practice not only ensures any objections to hosting the event on costs grounds is difficult to make, but also that any public indignation at learning such a cost is reduced to resignation, notably when the estimated expenditure is exceeded. As the authorities are aware, the public have short memories, and the political capital is largely spent to any would be critics by the passing of time. It also makes it difficult to hold any spokespeople to account, as Gwent police had publicly stated policing costs would not exceed £60 million (an already inflated figure from the original estimate in circulation of £50 million as the entire budget) which they did by a further £2.5 million.

9.4.1 Benefit Realisation?

Officials often justify these considerable expenditures before the summits by citing the anticipated economic benefits, including increases to local business from tourism, the possibility of future investment and the international publicity the area will receive (Starr et al 2011:56). The same practices were evident prior to the NATO summit, with local and national political elites mobilising these promissory notes aimed at convincing a more sceptical local populace to the extolled benefits of the event. The clear aim was to generate support for the summit and quell traditional sensibilities in respect to the transformation and fortification of what was previously public spaces and the considerable costs and inconveniences which ensued (I expand on this point below in 'Tactical innovation by the authorities'). Despite these efforts, frequently such summits see collateral costs to local business from the road closure programme and fences which restrict public access. For instance, some local business reported a 40% reduction in trading since the security fence had been installed.

Two themes were apparent from an analysis of elite messaging advocating the NATO summit; the first was on the short and longer term economic benefits to Wales, in part through attracting global inward investment into existing industry (including the regional armaments industry) and by

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233 There is a spiralling security cost for Olympic summer games, from the $79.4 (USD) expenditure in 1984 to the $1.5 billion outlay in Athens in 2004 (unadjusted prices for inflation), the resulting price per athlete extends from $11,627 to $142,897, (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009:261) or a 1129% increase.

234 No author (2014, 8th September) 'Iron curtain is lowered as NATO bows out of South Wales' Western Mail newspaper, Cardiff.
attracting tourism as a result of the international press attention. Secondly, the prestige presumed to be bestowed by hosting a major event which required a high level of security. On this narrative, Wales was 'showcasing security’, admirably summed up by one senior Gwent police officer:

"It is fair to say that this is totally unprecedented [the size of the security operation]. While it's challenging, what a fantastic chance for us to display Wales across the globe and show the rest of our partners and colleagues that we are capable of delivering this on behalf of Wales."235

[my emphasis]

These types of statements act to reify securitisation and situate it within a nationalist frame, with a near imperceptible shift from something being done to Wales reconfigured into something done for Wales. What we see is the commodification of an earlier and successful securitising move, one which presents an existential threat (whilst these can of course lead to nothing as they very often do, they are never elaborated beyond ‘terrorism' and ‘protestors’) to a referent object (the summit delegates) to an accepting audience (the governing Labour party and the Welsh Assembly, but aimed more broadly at local people). National security is lionised, and repackaged as a desirable, saleable good. The concrete materialisation of power evident in these measures (what Poulantzas refers to as ‘condensation’) is both ideological and repressive. Positioning Wales into a 'security brand', a serious security actor for events, becomes a desirable end in an otherwise disorderly and insecure world and one which is held to benefit Wales. As First Minister for Wales Carwyn Jones said, the value of the publicity was:

"Literally incalculable. Schoolchildren will never forget the day they met Barack Obama – the first sitting president to visit Wales – and international decision-makers now know that Wales can handle epic logistical challenges."236

Here securitisation becomes the desirable good, and was portrayed as Wales somehow proving itself up to the task. Jones' statement makes no reference to the substantial financial costs incurred, the exclusionary nature of the event, or the very substantial negative impacts to local people, as well as the very real dangers brought to their doorstep.

The (un-priced) military component extends beyond the lending of some hardware, they are fully involved in the operations and directed at controlling domestic dissent. LIC stretches beyond these police and military components to include multiple governmental agencies, private contractors and even foreign military powers (i.e. US marines, US air force, and in particular US secret service

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235 Gwent Police Chief Superintendent Alun Thomas cited in South Wales Evening Post 'Wales takes centre stage as summit gets started' (2014, 3rd September).
operatives who were 'escorting' the US president on his arrival into the UK and throughout his trip).  

One element of this concerted propaganda campaign was commissioning a report produced by Barclays Bank, 'The 2014 NATO Summit and its impact on Wales' which was to provide the intellectual foundations to the local and national states economic case. Whilst dressed in the respectable clothes of sober analysis and facts and figures, the document is relentlessly upbeat throughout despite the poverty of its one data point. Rather hopefully citing the work of Deloitte, who examined the 25th NATO summit hosted in Chicago and estimated a total $128.2 million dollars of 'impacts', and by extension Barclay's assertion that the Newport NATO Summit should also prove similarly profitable. Notwithstanding the details of Deloitte's estimate methodology, this comparison is deeply flawed as Newport lacks the services and hospitality capacity that a large US city such as Chicago has, as well as there being considerably fewer delegates attending. Neither does the estimate off-set the overall costs incurred by the wider tax payer base of hosting the summit (which for the UK summit would on a break-even analysis need to minimally exceed $108 million, although this is a certain undercount re the uncosted military element and the declining value of sterling). The Barclays' report mostly consists of selected voices trumpeting the benefits of the summit for Wales on the basis of mere speculation, and is a roll call of vested political and corporate interests, including various senior personnel at the Celtic Manor (including its Director) being the chief beneficiary of NATO largesse. The unbridled optimism contained by the various selected 'boosters' in the business and political elite is only tempered by the single other data Barclay's bring to bear, the results of a business survey. This data has the drawback of being less amenable to manipulation, seeing the majority of those surveyed either disagreeing that the summit would bring much benefit to Wales, or thinking it merely neutral in outcome (Barclays, 2014:17).

Minimally, coming to some conclusion on this question requires a cost benefit analysis exercise, and thus is substantially an empirical question. On this point the FCO (who had overall governmental

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237 It should be noted that foreign agents such as these are frequently licensed to carry firearms (i.e. what would otherwise be unlawful in the UK) the presumption has to be therefore that they would use them against people they considered a security risk on foreign soil. My FOI requesting information on the circumstances under which foreign agents can lawfully kill UK citizens received a refusal notice from FCO.

238 Deloitte's study was a 'prospective estimate' (it is therefore unclear if the anticipated benefits were ever realised in the economy) and more worryingly, fails to off-set the actual total costs associated with hosting the summit from the anticipated gains of having done so.

239 This figure is skewed by the recent very considerable fall in the value of sterling against the US dollar, otherwise the required dollar total would be some 15%+ higher.

240 In response to these 'concerning' findings and as an indication of its propagandic tone, the author chastise their respondents by adding; "These businesses may be missing out on any potential opportunities and they are encouraged to take a closer look at the Summit and any legacy it may bring" (Barclays, 2014:17).
responsibility for the NATO summit) were unable to say whether the indicated financial or other benefits were ever accrued by Newport or Wales.\(^{241}\) Similarly, Newport Council was also unable to clarify this matter, simply stating that as the event was not organised by Newport City Council "The questions relating to economic impact are not recorded by Newport City Council."\(^{242}\) However, the council did provide two further documents 'of interest'. The first was what they referred to as two 2014 NATO Wales Summit 'case studies'. On examination these were a mere extension of the earlier propaganda exercise, each case study selected on the basis of being two direct beneficiary organisations; The University of South Wales (the 'host Venue' billeting over 1,600 Police Officers for 12 days) and the Riverfront Theatre and Arts Centre (who were contracted to undertake some of the outreach propaganda exercise in regards to the 'food festival' and what was more honestly described as "profile-raising activities for the armed forces, NATO and the Summit").\(^{243}\) Both of whom predictably wax lyrical about what a success the particular contracted service they provided was. That there were some organisations that received a short-term financial benefit from the summit is not in doubt. What is in question is the longer term benefits that were so widely claimed, as well as the overall cost-benefit analysis in light of the wider collateral costs (discussed below in section 7.7). The second document is some economic and tourism data,\(^{244}\) although not an economic analysis pertinent to our question, the data does track ten variables of interest over a eleven year period (2003-2014).\(^{245}\) Whilst later data would be needed for evidence of sustained impact\(^{246}\), even here the trend lines across the indictors show an existing upward curve line over the entire period, leaving our question at best unclear.

Whether there will be a substantial benefit to the Welsh economy is an empirical question which can only be settled after the fact, and needs to incorporate off-setting the associated costs in 'hosting' the summit. Nevertheless, the authorities proved willing to engage in a concerted and thinly veiled propaganda exercise with the economic sphere taking a centre stage in order to sell the summit to local people. The pattern here is for a range of local and national political elites to make considerable claims for short-term and longer term benefits from such summits as a means to bolster support, or more minimally, deter dissenting views of local people, particularly those many

\(^{241}\) FOI FCO (FOI2016 0299).
\(^{242}\) FOI Newport City Council 'Information management’ (REQ05190).
\(^{243}\) Whilst labelled as 'case studies', the documents reflect the views of two individuals speaking as employees of the beneficiary organisations: Project Manager Gemma Savage, Head of Conference and Events at USW and Jason Small, Operations Manager, The Riverfront Theatre and Arts Centre. Neither do they contain any financial information.
\(^{244}\) Global Tourism Solutions UK data, provided by Newport City Council.
\(^{245}\) It is interesting to note that Newport did not provide any later data which would be able to address the central economic issue.
\(^{246}\) The economic analysis is complex, and would need to disaggregate seasonal and other factors to identify the relative summit benefit.
negatively impacted. Once the event has been concluded, no serious effort is made to answer the fundamental question, did the promissory note get delivered? Neither do there appear to be any regulatory or accountability mechanisms when it comes to summit expenditures. For instance, the National Audit Office do not conduct any value for money analysis for such events on the basis of not recognising 'any value for money concerns' with such expenditures, as well as rather paradoxically arguing that their own 'limited resources' means they are unlikely to undertake such reviews'.

9.4.2 Legacy Benefits?

Another ruse used by the authorities in justifying costs and purchase outlay in the form of a refurnished security state is to claim this as a 'legacy benefit' for Wales. These typically take the form of vague and un-evidenced claims regards to this infrastructure:

"Most of the equipment purchased and improvements to infrastructure will be retained by the Welsh Government and/or public sector partners and will be used beyond the end of the Summit. This will help with business continuity and implementing civil contingency plans." [Jones, First Minister of Wales Written Statement - NATO]

Whether new operating standards for physical security, and its related hardware of razor wire, higher and more steel fencing, and enhanced surveillance cameras is indeed a beneficial legacy remains a deeply contested point.

Similar claims were made in the Barclay's report, despite the central assertion being flatly contradicted by the results of their own business survey. This inconvenient finding was studiously ignored in favour of reproducing the originally intended (highlighted) message irrespective of its incongruity in the text of the document:

"Wales is well positioned to ensure its economy enjoys a long-term legacy as a result of it hosting the NATO Summit." [Barclays, 2014:23].

There is however, another interconnected legacy benefit which did result from the summit, but one not to be found in any of the official propaganda. This 'shadow legacy' (Boycoff & Fussey, 2014) is the rather dejected and de-motivated protestor groups which were outmanoeuvred tactically and innovatively by the combined efforts of the local and national authorities.

Other less visible legacies such as developed security knowledge and deepened practice networks, as well as organisational innovations which integrate civil and military modes of control, all escape public attention and scrutiny. The legacy for Wales of an enhanced repression ready security state is a questionable legacy.

247 Author FOI and personal correspondence with N. Sayers (Director - Financial Audit, NAO)
9.5 Collateral Costs

The summit 'security operation' imposed a hermeneutic seal around the VIP's and delegates, this is why even roads (and airspace) were closed for their exclusive use. Starr (2016:60-61) recounts that the military planning team for the 2003 G8 in Kananaskis, Canada described their 'security methodology' as:

"Pretty aggressive stuff". We [Canadian security forces] were flying fighter planes en-masse. If anybody got anywhere near the meeting, they would have been shot down; same thing with anyone who tried to infiltrate the areas where he leaders were gathering. We made in very clear to everyone that we had soldiers with live weapons."

Whilst the Canadian's are more forthcoming than their British counter-parts in describing the reality on the ground for such events, the same military infrastructure was in place in South Wales with armed troops inside the venue. A large number of armed police were also patrolling the external areas surrounding the venue sites and throughout Cardiff and Newport. It should be remembered that the British police operate a de facto shoot to kill policy, as Glass's (2010:161) (the then IPCC Commissioner) defensive opinion piece on the aftermath of the G20, more or less concedes (although this is officially denied):

"The police shoot to stop an imminent threat to life. Every armed police officer will tell you though that the only way to do that effectively is to kill someone... [warming to her theme] The British police do not and have never shot to wound."

The presence of foreign security forces at the NATO summit also increases the incentive to repress demonstrations. Ericson & Doyle (1999:605) have argued that during the 1997 APEC summit in Canada, several Indonesian security forces had openly threatened to shoot any protestors who appeared 'threatening'.

With this in mind, what is carefully disguised in the NATO security methodology is the imminent threat it presents to both protestors and local people should they happen to fall foul of these measures. Protesting under these conditions carries some risk of being killed should anyone manage to get within the vicinity of delegates, irrespective of protestors goals never being to threaten violence. Despite this very considerable tooling up, seeing police officers in Cardiff and Newport city centres carrying Heckler & Koch MP5 sub-machine guns strolling with crowds, stringent efforts at normalisation occurs.

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248 These are the words of the IPCC Commissioner directly responsible for MPS and the City of London Police who also carries lead Commission policy responsibility for counter terrorism, firearms, and less lethal options and represents the IPCC on the ACPO Conflict Management and Strategic Firearms Committee. It is interesting to note that Glass (in the same piece) boasts that she 'successfully' completed the 'Firearms Gold Commanders Course', although it escapes her that in doing so she may have 'gone native'.

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Part of this is the calculated practice of officers putting on a ‘charm offensive’. This is a longstanding technique in British policing, both in community patrol work where officers seek to gain local intelligence, but also in static guarding duties. Here the tactic is to befriend and talk to members of an awaiting crowd (often behind barriers) as happened in Cardiff Castle awaiting the arrival of the entourage. Unbeknown to the public, the officer just seems to be being nice, the real motive is to scan and identify any potential threats in the crowd whilst also improving opportunities to gain information. Smiling is a powerful adaptive social signal, for the sender, it promotes social acceptance and affiliation whilst moderating socially negative reactions (Schmitt & Cohn, 2001:15). In this usage form, smiling is then a social interaction employed to gain acceptance and compliance. This was very noticeable when walking around the newly fortified city centres of Newport and Cardiff:

Surreal saturation policing presence in both cities in all central areas and buffer zones. Officers in groups of two or three on small circular patrols, or standing around in groups of five, six, seven chatting for extended periods to pass the time. Little to do but watch the world go by and keep eyes and ears. This is interspersed with firearms officers, almost always in pairs, submachine guns pointed down, wandering amongst the general public throughout key locations. Charm offensive appears to be in operation, particularly amongst armed officers, smiling and willing to engage in conversation with shoppers, tourists and locals. This modus operandi apparent across practically every firearms officer I pass. (NATO fieldnotes)

Armed officers can look rather intimidating carrying sub-machine guns, but smiling and nodding at people appeared remarkably effective, as is waving at small children. Frequent comments by locals shopping in their town area were “I can’t believe how many police there are!” (NATO, fieldnotes) It is this world of appearances though, which begs the question of what lies behind it which is not in any deep matter posed by those same passers-by. In fact, it became routine to witness groups of police officers passing each other in the streets, each taking to the opposite sides of the road in an effort to avoid clumsily confronting each other, quietly walking up and down smiling in an effort to give this display an air of normality to this strangest of scenes.
This facade can quickly be shattered though:

Three protestors approach a quasi-military police vehicle parked next to a police van in Newport, with five officers standing around it chatting to each other. It is an unusual sight, and they take out a camera to photograph the scene. The vehicle is a Jankel armoured Landrover (for public order’ policing). The mood amongst officers immediately changes, from a relaxed demeanour, smiling at local passers-by, to blocking the photo opportunity and aggressively warning off what is now unwanted attention. (NATO fieldnotes)

A game was carried out which I lost count of how many times I saw and heard, with locals asking/guessing to police ‘where are you from then?’ (i.e. which force/part of country) most being happy to play along irrespective of the wearing nature of the unremitting same question. The other tactic the police used was to introduce branded NATO light blue soft caps (like a baseball cap) (see picture 6 below), an innovation also used in the 2013 G8. These are perceived as less intimidating and also mesh with the wider event branding efforts. Whilst many officers were in riot gear (minus protective helmets), this too was disguised by wearing boiler suits to hide the body armour.

These micro-interactions and light touches make big differences, notably as saturation level policing carries risks, and this was extraordinary saturation policing throughout the cities. This is an application of Webster’s work in respect to the paradoxical nature of applying police power.
The logic is tied up in a simple paradox in using force. Bringing out robo-cop armoured riot police triggers the other side's defences, making it harder for protestors to compete also makes it harder to co-operate as people don't like to look like they are losing. So reducing the intimidation factor (everyone wear soft little caps despite carrying riot helmets) can assist in compliance towards adversaries as well as members of the public (Webster, cited in Zajko & Beland, 2008:730).

The coercive kernel of policing is concealed by presenting it as 'fighting terrorism' or as 'keeping everyone safe'. As one resident who wandered into the peace camp recounted to me when stopping and talking to a police officer stationed on a bridge overlooking the M4,
"I asked him if he was looking out for Iraq tanks? He said no, protestors." (NATO fieldnotes)

Despite working hard to mask its repressive nature (I discuss this more fully later) the nature of LIC often involves the use of extensive surveillance, non-lethal weapons, and intense public relations exercises or 'psyops' to win support from local people for the policy objectives sought. This can include by necessity misinformation programmes aimed a domestic audience as an integral part of LIC, usually aimed at containment to combat an adversary (as Molloy, 2001 argues). All these were features of the NATO summit with the adversary constituting dissenting protestors.

Despite a considerable number of negative impacts on local communities resulting from hosting such summits, local people are not consulted on the decision by their representatives. No public consultation was entered into before or after the event by Newport City Council to canvass local people’s views, indicating the democratic deficit at the heart of such decisions.249 Newport City Council’s strategy was to state that the decision of the site location had been made by central government.250

9.6 Interim Conclusion

What we see in the NATO summit is a shift in the tactical repertoire of the authorities, notably from a form of psychological warfare witnessed in the G20 where scare tactics linking protestors with disorder and violence were propagated through the media to good effect. This was not repeated, perhaps because it had been openly criticised by several of the inquiry reports, and doing so risked censure and further discrediting.

Rather the tactical repertoire for communication shifted to a more encompassing communication management strategy across a number of strands; a process of ‘nation branding’; promissory notes of bringing economic and prestige benefits to Wales in order to sell the summit and justify the very considerable expense; a propaganda offensive and finally, a charm offensive aimed at the local population. These developments indicate important tactical innovations by authority players, and in its multidimensional form now more accurately resembles a Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) operation (or Low Intensity Warfare). One which blurs the traditional distinctions between police/military, and domestic/international, warfare/peace, into an expanded security logic.

I have also argued that communication was an important site of contestation throughout and for both the authority and protestors players. But this was a considerably one sided affair, with protestors being only able to marshal even meagre resources to communicate their counter

249 FOI REQ05390.
250 Ibid., REQ05390.
message in the face of a well-funded multi-media strategy by the authorities, one beginning months prior to the summit meeting. In contrast the protestors suffered a number of considerable disadvantages, in part a result of the Peace Camp's lack of even basic infrastructure (there was no mains electricity supply to run a media centre) as well as a disorganised protestor group encamped and an ideologically hostile mentality to the international press. This last self-inflicted own goal proved disastrous, as when offered the opportunity to outline their anti-NATO argument to an international media arriving at the camp (on a quiet news day prior to the summit beginning) protestors refused to engage and were openly hostile.

The authorities economic arguments of substantial economic benefits and legacy benefits, reinforced by marshalling the local economic elites to their cause, acted to mostly dissipate the collateral costs in the media reportage. It remains unclear whether local people who experienced these costs (personally and financially) felt the same. The wider media strategy was also assisted by careful community policing strategies on the ground, one which acted to conceal the coercive kernel of policing, further mystifying social relations.
CHAPTER 10: Observational Study of the NATO Protests

10.1 Surveillance of Dissenting Bodies: Inside the peace camp:

Details of the protest camp (or 'peace camp') had been discussed openly on protest websites although far more poorly advertised, in part due to difficulties in securing a site after the originally intended location had been forced to change. Citing the camp in Tredegar park gave little legal cause for any police involvement. More crucially the camp did not actually pose any threat to the summits progress, and so was never raided and smashed. The camps location did present many practical problems for activists though. The park was over six and a half miles from Celtic Manor, and some two miles from Newport, giving police ample forewarning and opportunity to tail any and all activists as they left. Several had brought camper vans which doubled as buses to transport activists into town, these were routinely followed by police vehicles (including unmarked police vehicles) (NATO fieldnotes).

As it happens these elaborate arrangements were unnecessary due to the tiny numbers of protestors who arrived. My counts at the camp never saw numbers exceed two hundred at its peak. Despite these rather meagre numbers, the camp was joined by a constant presence of PLOs, usually in pairs, walking in patrol around the camps perimeter with a small contingent of officers stationed strategically in several police vans in the park car park (which provided the only road access route from the park). If any opportunity arose PLOs would assert friendliness and try and engage any protestor in conversation. Practically every activist spurned all such efforts, recognising this as nothing more than an intelligence gathering ploy by the 'soft smiley' police seeking out information about activist's numbers, tactics and intentions. The true nature of PLOs covert intelligence gathering had long been denied by senior officers, but the denial hinges on a mere technicality. Accordingly, PLOs are:

"Not tasked to gather intelligence by a police commander, [but] they may be presented with intelligence during the course of events", and if so they will in turn submit this “as per their usual force procedure” (NETPOL, 2016).
This rather fine analytical distinction allows senior officers the advantage of publicly denying police spying whilst benefiting from a line of intelligence closest to those drawn into 'dialogue policing'. By contrast, police mobile units stationed permanently in the car park were regular local officers, who provided back-up (not that there was any threat to PLOs from activists) and another layer of surveillance to tail and harass protest efforts.
As one would expect there was a constant police presence at the peace camp, but this was generally low key. It included PLOs patrolling the boundary, pairs of uniformed officers stationed at key junctions just outside the camp, and mobile units in the park car park as backup:

The police presence fluctuates with the rhythms of the camp, with police numbers strengthening as the summit began and in line with the two key protest marches. It is noticeable that none have made any efforts to come into the camp, which would have led to uproar amongst activists, although they had no need to undertake such provocation. PLOs and officers appear content to keep to its perimeter with little if any loss to their surveillance capacity. (NATO fieldnotes)

This notion of boundary and border played an important and pointlessly exaggerated role in the minds of many of the activists. The somewhat imaginary inside of the camp had been designated a 'safe space', although what this meant in practice was never entirely clear and in a state of some flux and confusion throughout the brief life of the camp. Rules were devised and tasked out, but with rules comes the interpretation and implementation of the rules, along with many meetings clarifying who was supposed to be doing what. Whilst these plans were well intentioned, there was continual implementation failure:
Morning planning meeting at the camp: reasonably well attended (n=43). Business issues of the day being raised and protest action plans – the latter being open to all but some affinity groups meeting up after this morning meeting for private briefings. Again, the ‘policy’ of the camp is under discussion; [approx. 20 minutes on this] what the policy is, who is responsible (everyone) but admission that there are ongoing tasking and ownership problems: ‘The trouble is people aren’t keeping to the policy .. the people who are supposed to be on duty at the reception aren’t always there, so there are times when anyone can wander in. Look, those people who are assigned to reception need to remain and not go off doing other stuff .. otherwise there isn’t any point in delegating .. if you volunteer for reception that day then you must stick to it, right? (NP-03, Fieldnotes)

The concern was a real one, ‘security’ from police spying and a certain amount of paranoia about police infiltration, spurred by the now common knowledge of covert policing practices of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS). Other concerns were the more mundane one of simple privacy (personal privacy) as well as revealing their individual identities. This last issue was similarly futile as the camp offered little if any privacy due to its being situated in an open park. Indeed, it functioned rather like a fish bowl, even the main tent was partially open to view for onlookers (see picture 15 above). Neither did concern over staying anonymous from the authorities make any practical sense or warrant the considerable amount of time and energy the camp put into discussing and strategising this matter. The extensive CCTV in the city centre and transport hubs (amplified by BTP ‘evidence gathers’ at rail stations) and ANPR systems on the main arterial roads made privacy of identity redundant.

10.2 Paranoia in the Camp

This constant surveillance presence and a pervasive suspicion and fear of police spying and infiltration did effect the shape and use of the camp, and ultimately, its effectiveness as a campaigning tool. Not all activists saw police infiltrators as a threat or a problem, but many did. This grew into a more pervasive air of suspicion as well as some paranoia and took a number of different forms. There was a tendency amongst some to openly accuse members at the camp of being a police infiltrator, which happened to at least three individuals I was aware of, including to myself:

‘Look mate, no offence, but I’ve seen you before at G8, I’m not saying anything, but you arrived, and later we got raided. Now it may be noth’in mate, but I don’t know .. so I don’t really want to talk to ya’ (NP-02, Fieldnotes)

This interchange took place as I passed by a small group of protestors sat huddled discussing the day’s affairs. I had been recognised from my 2013 presence at the convergence centre in London (to campaign against the G8 summit) which was later violently raided and smashed by MPS. There were details informing the raid which indicated the G8 convergence centre had indeed been infiltrated or informants were at work. As I had partly blagged my way in after long hours of
negotiating with the activists own 'security' on the door in London, understandably some of those same individuals now at Tredegar smelt a rat. The word spread quickly, and I found myself increasingly side-lined and worse, then later barred from some protest action planning meetings (and thrown out of one de-briefing meeting), and distanced when attending actions and marches (NATO fieldnotes). I was not alone:

There is a noticeable change amongst some groups in the camp towards me, some conversations stop as I pass by and the rumour mill is in full swing. Broached the subject with NP-08; NP-12 this morning and told them what some people’s suspicions were. They say they have not heard this but are removed from the two central activist groups at camp.... I put out my university credentials and online university webpage as proof of identity and character in the hope that this will assuage some of the concerns. Not sure it will do any good. (NATO fieldnotes)

Another person was designated a 'suspect' police spy today, a Canadian protestor staying at camp. The story I have got from several others after the Newport demo was that he had failed to answer to his given name at the demo, this happened several times in succession, raising a lot of suspicion. Later, there was an ugly scene with him being challenged aggressively by other protestors, resulting in a physical confrontation. Spoke to him several hours later, some damage to his camera from fracas (carries some expensive looking equipment), he is very upset, visible mark on the side of his face. Very personable type, pleads complete innocence to accusation. (NATO fieldnotes)

Lots of people talking about the Canadian incident this evening at camp, with varying views; some showing a lot of concern over the way he was treated believing it was wrong, others more circumspect, still others not saying anything. (NATO fieldnotes)

During the lifetime of the camp these concerns about police infiltration and spying grew, generating a number of debilitating effects. The camps responses included introducing 'security measures' particularly at 'Action Meetings'. This saw the sharing of operational information (the intended target, the type of action, when it would occur etc.) about planned actions being drastically curtailed as a direct result of this concern over police infiltrators or informants. This saw information restricted to only being disclosed in far smaller affinity groups (those smaller groups who were known to each other from past actions or drawn from trusted networks or got to know each other over the duration of the camp and trusted each other to an extent that they were reassured they were not an informant or infiltrator).

This resulted in the action meetings taking a very different form from the early life of the camp. No longer were any planned actions openly announced, where previously activists would also ask for others input in regards to ideas, knowledge, and initiatives, calling openly for volunteers. The chair of the meeting would simply state that a number of actions would be taking place but the details of which were no longer discussed (chiefly if they required any element of direct action or civil
disobedience) rather it was announced that people would 'team up' in their affinity groups later. This was not a rigid restriction, so people were offered, if they so wished, to announce actions and ask for volunteers but this only occurred several times and was restricted to more marginal actions. Instigating closed affinity group meetings when planning some protest actions (restricted to trusted networks) had a disabling affect, one which frustrated larger group action organising and the raison d'être for the camp. Whilst police infiltration was not the only concern amongst protestors (being a victim of police violence or malicious arrest also featured highly) the resulting pervasive culture of suspicion and less often, open hostility, also acted to draw divisions between activists.

The other area of difficulty at camp concerned visitors and the media. There had been long discussions at numerous camp meetings about what the media strategy should be. The camps regulations had settled for a kind of 'reception area' at one end of the camp, marked by a small sign, a few chairs and some anti-NATO leaflets and other assorted information, to which all newcomers were supposed to report, including members of the media. A further rule required that any journalist(s) would have to be 'escorted' beyond this point if they wanted to come in and talk to or interview protestors - a policy reflecting long held suspicions and hostility to the media (there was also a ban on all photography without individuals giving permission). These formal organisational structures suffered from poor implementation throughout, for instance, the reception area was only periodically manned, causing some confusion to some visiting journalists.

The protestors main focus was planning and instigating protest actions, instituted at affinity group meetings at camp through consensus decision making. Given the small numbers of protestors, the limited wider support within the localities and the overwhelming numbers of police, all these efforts appeared, and were, somewhat ineffectual. One significant window of opportunity did present itself, when the peace camp became an interest and itself a story for the national and international press. Many journalists and news crews had arrived ahead of the VIPs in preparation for the summit, and had a day or two with little to do (and little news happening) before the main event. This saw numbers of journalists making the trip over to the peace camp to get a story and the protestors perspective. Some of these I recorded in fieldnotes:

Conversation with several journalists today at camp reception:

For instance, one action which sought volunteers was to attend a police station and report war crimes of the delegates (a lone action which had been tried the previous day); another was a small scale action at a local Barclays bank.

These reflections derive from my conversations with over two dozen protestors at camp during the course of my fieldwork.
Journalists: ‘Hello, we’re from BBC Wales, we came over yesterday to try to talk with some protestors here, is there anyone that we could speak to today please? Just a short interview for the radio?’

Camp Reception: ‘Oh … hang on a minute, I’ll see if I can find someone, can you stay here please, we don’t allow journalists unescorted in the camp.’

Journalists: ‘What about you, would you like to talk to us and tell us why you’re here protesting today … what is it that you all want to achieve?’

Camp Reception: ‘Well, I can’t talk for others … hang on a minute … [leaves scene, shortly returns] no-one is willing to give an interview.

(NATO, fieldnotes)

All too frequently this opportunity to engage with the international media was squandered. Either there was no-one at the reception area, or no one was willing to talk and outline the protestors position to those eager to hear, whilst other activists were simply hostile. Journalists also found it difficult to navigate and were burdened by the rules of the camp (can we go in, who can we talk to, who does the escorting etc.).

These and other similar encounters that I observed and the cumbersome regulations would appear to have left journalists wary of visiting the peace camp due to the hostility that they found there:

There is deep suspicion and distrust of the mainstream media amongst the overwhelming number of protestors at camp. No-one seems to have any organised media strategy or be willing to engage with either national or foreign media to occasionally attend reception. Today’s morning meeting again signalled the attitude; “they distort everything” (unknown activist) a comment common in many other conversations. (NATO fieldnotes)

This dogmatic position proved to be a chief impediment for the activists (although one rarely recognised as such). Throughout there was a failure to appreciate tight media timescales, a lack of confidence in public speaking and media training to be able to succinctly make a point and defend it, and no shortage of dogmatic naivety. The key meeting at camp to discuss the media strategy occurred on the Friday, at least two days too late, as once the summit wound up, the world’s media similarly departed. Given that there was no protestor media centre at the camp, and that protestors had little effective movement links to other regional and national organisations, they ended up contributing to their own failings. The effect of these policies was to continually undermine the only viable method for disseminating the anti-NATO narrative that they supposedly wanted to propagate.

This strategic blunder may simply reflect the particular makeup of the peace camp at Tredegar, their limited numbers, and the pressures on a wide division of labour and consequently some over-reach, given that protest groups have shown increasing awareness of the power of the media.

Unlike previous summit meetings, the convergence centre and the transgressive social movements
were simply too small in number to have any meaningful impact on the ground. Neither did the internal structure of the movement or the way they organised themselves assist them to the changing character and opportunity structures of the setting they found themselves in. This leaving the camp to its small scale actions and no small amount of irrelevance.

10.3 The Newport March (Saturday 30th August)

The summit as a wider protestors event had been advertised for some weeks prior and badged under a broad anti-NATO coalition umbrella of ‘NO NATO Newport’. This was initiated by activists from a range of established national organisations from local affiliate groups (CND Cymru, Cardiff Stop the War Coalition, Newport People’s Assembly, trade unions, the SWP, anti-cuts and community groups working in conjunction with their national counter-parts and ‘European peace’. There was far sparser web-traffic in contrast to earlier G20 and G8 events on openly anarchist sites, although several drew attention to ‘Newport rising’ as it was dubbed, pointing to its Chartist traditions, but comments sections as a proxy for interest were meagre. The discussion there was orientated around ‘workshops, discussions and skill shares’ in preparation to delegates arriving. What was absent was any established agenda proposing disruptive opposition to the summit or indeed a sense of expectation for this.

The NO NATO Newport march was self-stewarded, with all aspects of the protest having been agreed during prior discussions between police and the organisers over a week beforehand. Therefore, the opening protest march had little potential to be confrontational:

The march was good natured and a self-stewarded affair, sticking to the assigned route throughout. PLOs are in attendance amongst the demonstration, chatting wherever they have a chance. Like the later ‘march on the manor’ it is largely a symbolic effort, with the pre-determined route being arranged far from the fortified summit site. (NATO fieldnotes)
These rather tokenistic gestures had been hard won however. Interviews with two organisers of the march stated that gaining permission to actually hold the march had:

‘It took us months of lengthy negotiations with Gwent police around the arrangements of the precise route that the march would take, [such was the] security sensitivities of the event. (Interview INP-03)’

Another organiser indicated that the ‘negotiation’ with Gwent police was ‘less of a negotiation’ and more about accepting the police’s wishes:

‘Ha, yes well … In the end we opted for this compromised route, it was felt that it was that or no march at all … to be honest, we didn’t have much choice.’ (Telephone Interview INP 02)

The question remained as to whether the effort was worth the reward. There was a palpable sense in which the organising groups had been ‘had over’ (Waddington, 1998) by police guile and obstinacy by playing up the international security to ensure they facilitated an ineffective protest. But more widely by the state authority’s extensive pre-emptive arrangements, not just in terms of the summits location, but also, crucially, the summit timing in addition to the wider community management efforts. In anticipation of mass protest, the choice of a mid-week event made mobilisation that much more difficult, again a deliberate ploy by the authorities. Feeling they had little choice, the organisers had opted for marching on the weekend before in anticipation of the event, despite no delegate having arrived and never venturing near the manor (Interview INP-03). In short, what had been negotiated was a somewhat pointless ‘march to nowhere’, snaking around and through Newport with a heavy police presence at every step of the way.

The march gathered at the centrally placed clock tower in Newport, and consisted of trade unions, the Socialist Workers Party (who had the heaviest presence) and anti-war groups, (including CND), as well as a singing choir in attendance. These were mostly an older crowd drawn from affiliations to these established organisations who fetishise non-violence, all of which were viewed as ‘reliable demonstrators’ by the police. (NATO fieldnotes)

253 Interview with two organisers of the march: (NPM02) one informal interview on the day at the march, another by telephone interview 8 days afterwards (NPM03).
The only other salient factor here is that these were not constituted of politically subordinate groups and due to the many SMOs present would have been able to pursue repression related grievances, itself constituting a check on the parameters of police indiscriminate or repressive action. In keeping with this low profile at the march starting point:

There is no FITs or overt police surveillance presence and only a small number of officers in everyday uniform with high vis vests, along with pairs of PLOs intermingling with protestors and vacuuming up any information they can entice out of people. The PLOs also proceeded within the ranks of the demonstration after set-off, fraternising with demonstrators and showing a willingness to facilitate the agreed goals of the march. (NATO fieldnotes)

**Picture 25: Marching to Nowhere: Strolling Around Newport with PLO's Embedded Within the Demonstration**

The authorities iron fist was held in reserve and out of close sight, with TSG units and Matrix units parked up in nearby backstreet should the police decide to exercise force on proceedings. Clearly nothing was being left to chance. The only marginal disturbance to this sobriety was several black bloc style clad protestors bussing in from the newly established peace camp, all of whom were unimpressed by the low general turnout for the event and demeanour. My estimate was between 1,000-1,200 protestors as a maximum, and as the march moved off further police units joined, with police presence easily outnumbering protestors.

At no point has any of the protestors veered from the agreed route, although it is being strictly reinforced by heavy police lines at junctions and side-roads, with more serials waiting in reserve. This entire event is summed well by one local journalist who remarked to me, "It's well disciplined" - the police's 'ground rules' were adhered to throughout. (NATO fieldnotes)
Threat based models (i.e. Davenport, 2000) assert that the extent and intensity of repression is directly related to the perceived threat a protest has to political elite interests. Taking this approach as our metric of interest, it is clear to see why the protest was not violently repressed. No delegates had arrived and the ‘agreed route’ never came close to the intended venue site (or threatened to ‘contaminate’ its preparations). Neither did the size of the protest present any threat due to its relatively small size (compared to the far greater police presence, notably in reserve), and very largely constituted ‘accepted groups’ (Tilley, 1978) who lacked radical goals, at least by comparison to the more contemporary oppositional movements goals redolent in the peace camp. Despite this it needs to be remembered that there was a massive police presence throughout (mainly held tactically in reserve) which reflects structurally the political and ideological pressure the police were responding to considering the status of the forthcoming event.

This description encapsulates how the police approached managing the demonstration, in tone and strategy. The end of the march was also orderly, without any impromptu deviations from the carefully agreed route and timings:

The finale of the protest is played out by a succession of speakers addressing the crowd on the key object of derision. After a lengthy series of speakers, the crowd quietly ebbed away without incident. (NATO, fieldnotes)

10.4 The 'March on the Manor'

The dubbed ‘March on the Manor’ was the only mass demonstration which offered some prospect of proceeding to where protestors at the camp actually wanted to go, a ‘target of derision’ (Waddington, 2012) although as with the previous march, a route had been arranged with police.

The march congregated at the central cenotaph and there was a larger presence of activists from the peace camp present, although the overall demonstration was smaller in number than its previous weekend outing (perhaps up to 500). There was a more intolerant, aggressive and confrontational approach from the police at the outset and during the demonstration. (NATO fieldnotes)

A deliberate tactic of police intimidation ensued, for instance:

There is a small group of protestors getting on a bus from Newport to Cardiff in the afternoon (in anticipation of the evening event) who are immediately joined by twelve police. On reaching Cardiff the protestors split up and the police similarly split to follow the half dozen who then enter a town coffee shop, with attendant officers then besetting them by sitting in a van for an hour. Several other protestors are arrested for frustrating the police

The protestors gathered over a period of approximately an hour, at the end of which and just before set-off the police took down a black box (square oblong shape) which had been strapped to a lamppost, this was put in a camera box and then into a police vehicle. Whilst this could be an innocent device, the suspicion amongst some protestors was this hid a surveillance device to capture protestors' mobile phone data. No officer would offer any explanation as to the purpose and timing of this (‘above my pay grade mate!’).
surveillance efforts, one (on a 'public order offence') for deliberately blocking EG cameras overtly filming protestors, another for refusing to take off a face covering. The other tactic police employed was blanket stop and searches in the vicinity, with those carrying 'bust cards' as a potential breach of the peace. The word quickly went around at this new police tactic, and protestors quickly abandoned carrying bust cards, perhaps to their detriment. (NATO fieldnotes)

The march was characterised by a very heavy police presence throughout, one which vastly outnumbered the protestors. No attempts were made during the demonstration to divert from the assigned route with avenues blocked by police serials and vehicles at every possible avenue.

What this demonstrates is how the police respond to the perceived threat at protests, and the decisive role that police epistemology plays in these calculations (previous knowledge of protest groups). The increasing level of aggressiveness was in accordance with this perceived threat, one which was pre-emptively met through a combination of legal repression, intimidation and fortification. on the approach to the manor and the end point of the march, diffusion of this 'flash-
point' was through the construction of a temporary steel police cordon cutting across the entire road and pavement (thereby closing off the street) (see pictures above).

**Picture 30: Here and No Further: The March to the Manor is Contained A Mile from the Summit**

This was assisted by a very heavy police presence, including police overt surveillance openly filming protestors on both sides of this barricade. This effectively ended the march after a brief and rather symbolic stand-off which involved some pushing and banging on an immoveable object.
10.5 Cardiff’s ‘Berlin Wall’ or ‘The Great Wall of Wales’

10.5.1 The intensification of urban territorial control

States attempt to control and defend summit spaces against contentious political actions, reflecting that state power is embedded territorially and in particular spatial routines (Tilley, 2000:138). Henri Lefebvre (1991:410-11) has argued that space is: "becoming the principle stake of goal directed actions and struggles [...] its role is less and less neutral, more and more active, both as an instrument and as a goal, as a means and as an end."

It is certainly the case that police and government actors now take spatial considerations far more seriously in a shift against disruptive protest tactics or 'transgressive contention' (Tilly, 2000). There is also concerted efforts by both these state actors aimed at protest avoidance, although these tactics increasingly morph into the more coercive arena of protest disruption, most notably where 'negotiation' is not entered into by social movements and the police cannot be assured of complete control throughout.
Picture 33: Barrier and Bollard System in Central Cardiff City Centre Approach to Cardiff Castle (in distance)

Picture 34: Incongruous Cafe Tables in amongst Security Barriers, Central Cardiff
This intensive control of space was evident in both Newport and Cardiff, which were turned into (perceived or real) protestor proof fortresses, couched in the official security discourse as deterring terrorism.

This was organised into a 'layering' or 'buffering' of concentric circles of security radiating out from the central meeting venue site with outer and inner security zones. These extended deep into the city itself, both the shopping areas, educational venues (notably Cardiff University) but also recreation areas (see Picture 9 to 11 above & 12 to 14 below) and the entirely of Bute park (see pictures 16 to 18 below). (NATO fieldnotes)
Picture 36: Local Cyclists Negotiating Barriers in Cardiff

Picture 37: Closed Road Barrier to Prevent Hostile Vehicles Approaching Inner Security Fence, Cardiff
Picture 38: Barriers for Hostile Vehicles and Protestors in Central Cardiff

Picture 39: Local People Strolling Between Barriers in Approach to Cardiff Dock Area
10.5.2 Visuals of the Secondary Physical Barriers in Cardiff

Picture 40: One of the Many Steel Fences in Bute Park Sealing Off Large Sections of the Park

Picture 41: Immoveable Objects: Steel Cable Fixings Inter-Linking Concrete Bollards Attached to Steel Fences and to Each Other

In traversing these newly fortified cities:

It is central to the maintenance of these zones that they incorporate a combination of intensive and saturation police patrols (including armed police) enhanced overt and covert surveillance measures, as well as a host of intelligence gathering operations. The intention is to hermetically seal off the principle actors - the NATO delegates physically, visually and audibly from all outside this hegemonic elite. (NATO fieldnotes)

Within Cardiff the physical inner ring was the substantial walls of the castle itself, and later in the afternoon the entirety of Bute park (although much of this had previously been zoned off with steel
fencing (see Picture 16-17 above, and 18 below) over a week in advance, restricting public access to the use of paths through the park. The outer second zone was the ten-foot-high steel fence constructed around every venue delegates visited, in Cardiff, the castle to which delegates had their dinner date. The third outermost physical barrier was the oval concrete bollards and steel retractable gates on all the approaches (pedestrian and road) to the castle. Ostensibly this outer layer was aimed at target hardening areas by blocking off any attack from vehicular borne IEDs, either being driven at speed.

**Picture 42: One of Many Sealable Access Gates in the Bute Park Fence**

**Picture 43: Steel Fence with Concrete Bollards Fortifying Approach Road into Cardiff Docks**
into a structure, or by significantly increasing blast stand-off distances to the intended target. Whilst the design principles employed in the physical structures betray this intended attack vector and the much lauded 'terrorist threat', these measures carry a dual function. What I specifically want to draw attention to is the co-presence of such defensive spatial measures which act by 'co-implication' (Leitner et al., 2008). The barriers (see picture 20 below) placed conterminously as tertiary fortification to the inner steel fences around Cardiff castle's walls also function as a measure against protestors. This is to recognise one of the ways that the geography of security architecture acts to constrain social mobilisation. The authorities purposively seek to prevent large numbers from moving fluidly and rapidly through the city. Doing so carries the advantage of restricting social movements ability to innovate on the fly, or being in motion to appear unexpectedly in a place ahead of those trying to contain them.

**Picture 44: Visitors Traversing Barriers in Cardiff City Centre Pedestrian Shopping Area with Police Looking On**

This territorial control of space is supplemented at a still wider enclosure by the expansive surveillance operation with officers stationed at all transport interchanges, and on all bridges on arterial roads into south Wales (to spot any travelling protestors), as well as other national surveillances methods (such as ANPR and interlinked CCTV systems).
The security gates and bollards are supplanted incongruously into what had previously been public space. Whilst they permit shoppers to move through them, they create pinch points and bottle necks which order their human flows. These points are manned by police (to ensure the gate remains closed) and by evidence gathers, to intimidate protestors and underscore their lack of anonymity (through filming). As Graham (2002:589) discussing ongoing infrastructural trends after the 9/11 attacks: "urban flows can be scrutinised through military perspectives so that the inevitable fragilities and vulnerabilities they produce can be significantly reduced." These newly formed mini citadels or security cage archipelagos prevent car bombers from approaching the inner security fencing and its protective zone, but only through constructing this immense security cage around entire city areas.

Why this would be attractive to and generative of tourism is a mystery that is never broached by the assorted boosters captured within the various glossy brochures for the event. The vision imposed would appear spending money and having fun, and yet it was a bizarre spectacle which attracted local people and the media driven charisma around the first President of the US visiting Wales. The authenticity claimed of particularism and localism is lost in these simulated landscapes. This massive system of (un-climbable) steel fences and barricades do not simply restrict access, they define who belongs and who doesn't, and in doing so re-shapes social interaction and mobility.
Picture 46: Steel Fence Built with Concrete Bollards Protecting main Approach to Cardiff Castle and Bisect the City

Picture 47: People make use of the Limited Access Prior in the Centre of Cardiff Prior to the Closure of the Fence
The 10-foot steel fence encircling the perimeter walls of Cardiff Castle provided a towering symbol of exclusion and privilege, dubbed by some locals as Cardiff's 'Berlin Wall'. Activists wanted an opportunity for their demonstration to be seen by attending delegates who would be arriving by road, as it had in previous demonstration events, the security operation was deliberately aimed to deny them even this minimal requirement. Following Ranciere, space becomes political when it is polemical place to address wrongs and demonstrate equality. Here, a place of encounter, to interrupt the naturalised order of domination by those that have no part in that order, that is to say those looking on. Politics has its proper place, but only in the partitioned order of the police (Dikec, 2005:174).

**10.6 Dinner at Cardiff Castle**

The fortification of Cardiff castle on the evening of the delegate dinner became the last significant opportunity to demonstrate against the summit. This was the only time that the delegates en masse left the fortifications of the Manor, only to be transported to another very heavily fortified site. Many members of the peace camp made the journey into Cardiff to attend with the intention of protesting as best they could, although there was an air of resignation that this would be at best symbolic due to their small numbers and the overwhelming police presence.
The securities fortifications of space and militaristic approaches were supplemented by a very heavy police presence throughout the city centre areas. This had a dual aim, to intimidate any protestors who arrived in Cardiff (in part through the use of roaming units of 'evidence gathers' to reduce any semblance of anonymity that a crowd may afford and to let people know they were being filmed, and unusually audio recorded) (see pictures 25 to 29 below) along with an intensive programme of policing and behaviour regulation implemented in Cardiff city centres security zones.

The city centre takes on a panoptical feel, evidence gathers cocooned in protective units, mingle with the crowds and demonstrators to film and (including audibly) record any 'persons of interest'. This overt surveillance is used to reduce protestor anonymity as well as a valuable additional opportunity to aid 'intelligence gathering' on political dissenters.

(NATO Fieldnotes)
This police surveillance dimension was not without its comical side, in part driven by my own fieldwork:

The far right EG officer of the group is smiling (picture above) at the irony of me photographing him. Later that evening when the demonstration had died down I ended up chatting to him and some of his fellow officers (x4 EG's). They appeared keen to talk, and all of them wanted to get a word in during our conversation, perhaps partly because they were rather bored with the few, if any, demands on their time (in light of the very high level of police including EG's presence at the scene) and as earlier (and later) all of the officers had noted me filming them. We discussed the implications of their surveillance role and the ‘surveillance society’ phenomenon. Each appeared to offer genuinely held views on these subjects. Whilst they recognised their actions as being somewhat intrusive and intimidating (at a push) they fell back onto techniques of neutralisation, by pointing to how commercial company’s actions were ‘far worse than anything they did’. They cited examples of this and somewhat bemoaned how the public were seemingly unaware of such practices. From our ensuing conversation, what the officers did not want to recognise is that the state is an entirely different entity to a private company and the implications of this. Notably in respect to how the data can be used for social sorting purposes, and the potential impacts and implications this can have for those captured in its surveillant web. (NATO fieldnotes)
The protest which took place in Cardiff was a rather last minute affair and involved a small contingent of protestors from the camp:

Expressions of interest circulate around the camp to see if there is a willing contingent to make the trip to Cardiff that evening; ‘Whose going down to Cardiff’ (NP-16). This receives somewhat of a muted response, but some others are interested. This turns on the feasibility of (and affordability) of travel arrangements to get there. Not everyone has sufficient money for public transport, and there is a bargaining out of who can catch lifts in the several protestor vehicles that will driving over to maximise the camps presence. (NATO fieldnotes)

The Cardiff trip feels much more like an impromptu affair, although a large banner has been brought to signal the anti-NATO message (one that is unlikely to have been seen by visitors to the Castle). The assorted protestors are closely shadowed by uniformed police from the camp and on all other available public transport routes (bus and rail). [A comical overkill here in respect to the incongruity of the 40 or so protestors and their ever watchful police trackers] (NATO fieldnotes)

On arrival, there is a mishmash of local people and tourists taking in this unusual scene, interspersed with a range of other small and eclectic protest groups that have also arrived to protest their concerns at the Castle boundary fences. There is a very heavy police presence in the city centre with roaming groups of police as well as a very heavy police presence as the camp protestors arrived (in dribs and drabs) adjoining the barriers on the road overlooking the castle. Clearly they were expected, but are vastly outnumbered by the enormous police and security presence. (NATO fieldnotes)

Black bodies and hoodies became the focus of police attention, not that these constitute symmetry with police armoured riot gear, stab proof vests, batons, tasers and full face protective helmets. A little tactical game ensued, where those dressed in black, some with banners in vain hope of
attracting the view of any delegate who might chance a glance over (never realised) were pursued by squads of riot police (still adorned with blue soft caps, with NATO helmets to hand). This tactical manoeuvre to prevent spatial mobility served little purpose except intimidation.

Scholl (2012:100-1) argues that black bloc style protestors are an effective 'simulation' of police frontal and confrontational manoeuvres, the antithesis of police: "[..] a dialectical image that lays bare the violent character of protest policing and the unwillingness of hegemonic forces to change power structures so long as they can continue to control." This is despite no actions of the peace camp resorting to this implicit assumption.

The crowds appeared to be waiting for the arrival of President Obama to the dinner, anticipating that 'something would happen' and that it was important, a spectacle not to be missed. The elaborate measures put in place to provide total security reflected the mode of transport to the dinner. Unlike their trips to the Manor, VIPs were not helicoptered in (presumably due to insufficient landing space) rather they were driven.
The massive police presence reached its zenith just prior to the arrival of the main guest at the front entrance, President Obama (although this was not confirmed visually). At this point the ranks of police were significantly reinforced, seeing a tripling of numbers (with officers in the hundreds) as if there were some expectation that there would be a sudden charge over the roadside barriers by onlookers and into the steel fence separating them from the castle walls.

Another team of officers (approximately 40) arrive to undertake a painstaking 'walk-through' and last visual inspection of the ground prior to Obama's arrival. Each is intently looking down, inspecting the pavement, side by side, slow stepping along that pathway where the VIPs presence may venture. (NATO fieldnotes)
It turned out that the arrival was a swift affair, with a drop-off, and without a nod or wave to the awaiting crowds or protestors, the passenger entered the castle, a shadowy figure more glimpsed than seen, and at once, it is over.

10.7 Concluding Remarks on the NATO Protests

Throughout the NATO summit the authorities had used several main tactical innovations, on the ground dominating the space where protest events occur and by doing so, were able to exercise greater levels of control. This occurred to a greater extent than the G20, and the increased physical control of the environment around the meeting resulted in protestors being deprived of any chance to show their dissatisfaction to world leaders - a direct result of pursuing a fortress model approach, but one which curtailed 'panic policing' or forward panic and the violent repression that characterised the G20.

The NATO summit also demonstrates that the limited commitment to 'negotiated management' policing has morphed into a more broadly pre-emptive and precisely targeted hybrid form of policing. Ensuring an overwhelming security presence is a favoured model, and one that has been used in other summits such as the 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis. In addition, the fortress urbanism, like rings of steel, even encompassing iconic buildings such as the Cardiff castle puts the political machinery of the summit largely out of reach. These spatial measures are reinforced by additional layers of protection by rivers, fences, buttressed by a considerable military presence (naval, army and air force).

The NATO summit is also instructive when considering the range of police and authority responses to protest and more crucially, wider embryonic dissent. What we are seeing is a convergence of sovereign and networked powers exercising new modes of control (Bratich, 2014). The very low turnout for the organised (and contentious wings) of protest attests to the considerable pre-emptive protest avoidance tactics used by the authorities which now more closely resemble low intensity warfare tactics (LIC). These appear in disguised form, such as the emphasis on nation branding. This also functions as a pre-emptive tactical measure by the authorities which carries a symbolic communicative character also.

Thus far I have argued, using Barker’s (2001) work on legitimation, that any 'sense-making' process in studying international summits requires recognising that they are, in considerable part at least, forums for legitimating elite identities through dramatisation and ritual. What is at stake is not simply the official version of 'securing the summit' but facilitating the claiming of legitimacy by the institutional actors taking part in the play. Rather unsurprisingly this perspective receives no official public discussion, certainly in these depreciative terms. The same political and ideological pressures
helping shape the police practices and actions are seen at state ceremonial events (such as royal ceremonies) in what Waddington (2012:49) in a momentary lapse of 'going native' refers to as the police's "professional obligation to act in resolute defence of politically significant occasions." It does appear in more tangential form in other jurisdictions however, for instance, from a senior Canadian government official tasked with summit planning discussing the 'concerns' of the Canadian Prime Minister's Office (PMO) about the importance of:

"The dignity of the leaders being observed, [and] the dignity of the event itself, important international meetings, especially conferences." (Canada, 2001, §9.3)

Recounting senior police preparations at the annual remembrance event at the Cenotaph in central London, Waddington (1994a:44-5) notes that: "Not only is every effort made to eliminate terrorist attack, acts of protest that would diminish the dignity of the event are rigorously prevented." Illustrating the extent of these measures and (later) conceding the 'infringement' on people's civil liberties, Waddington recounts that: "A person carrying a tin-whistle that might have been blown during the two-minute silence at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday was ejected from the crowd" [and area]. (Ibid.)

These are significant admissions because what this translates to in practice unpacks and makes sense of the unacknowledged key objectives for police and authority planning, the requirement of creating a 'dignified space' for attendees and one which stretches beyond considerations of security requirements which planners might identify. Zajko & Beland's (2007:726) discussion of the same Hughes Report in the context of political influence on the 1997 APEC summit security preparations fails to appreciate the full significance of this point. When protestors express grievances and convictions at perceived injustices, this is in part an admission that they are at the same time unable to correct the condition by their own efforts, and the protest action drawing attention to that wrong and the ameliorative steps by the target group who are held to shoulder some responsibility (here NATO delegates) (Turner, 1968:816). At the same time the legitimacy of public order policing rests on using police capacity and authority to establish an 'equilibrium' between the competing parties of government and society on the one hand and the rights and interests of protestors holding the grievance on the other (Lint, 2005:180). The work done by an insistence to uphold the

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255 This point becomes more acute when one recognises that there is no facility or mechanism for a citizen to participate in, or to influence, NATO's policies (strategic, operational and tactical). Neither does NATO ever consult with any of its many member state citizens, or citizen organisations, concerning its military policies and there are no future plans to do so. (FOI NATO This is a curious state of affairs when one considers the political hostility to supra-organisations such as the European Union and its widely perceived legitimacy deficit. NATO as an organisation lacks even this facade of democracy, and yet its policies are arguably more important for its citizens.
'dignity of the event' invariably side-lines protestors civil rights and ensures that protest is ineffectual.

In the final analysis, a sufficient number of protestors must believe that their actions can carry some chance of success in the face of their adversaries and it is perhaps the ultimate testimony to the authorities that this never came to pass. It may indicate that increasingly such summit protests are no-longer seen valuable enough to warrant contention.
11. Conclusion

I have been investigating how the state responds to and controls political protest, with a specific focus on contentious 'transgressive' protest at two international summits here in the UK. I have examined how the authorities and its associated 'players' achieve this control and the means through which it is achieved. In doing so, I have utilised concepts from repression research, specifically ideas of 'inhibiting strategies' (Marx, 1979) and 'action modes' (Boykoff, 2007). I have also drawn upon the strategic and tactical perspectives of Jaspers (2015) and Scholl (2012) to analyse the 'repertoires of action' and interaction that take place on the streets between the respective players, the authorities and their allies, the active protest groups and their allies, as well as the principle audiences for each other's actions (the media, interest groups, experts and intellectuals, bystanders and the wider publics). In doing so I have provided a synthesis of findings across a range of primary and secondary data sources to come to a determination about the nature and form of state repression and its effects on protestors and protest movements. Whilst my findings are limited to these two sites and hence situated within the UK, they need to be seen within the context of the broader trends in summit policing in the Western world since the watershed protests in Seattle in 1999. My findings also build on the model developed by the two landmark studies of della Porta, et al. in 1998 and 2006, and cohere with more recent work (by Wood, 2014, 2015; Scholl, 2012, 2013; Starr et al, 2011; de Lint 2005) and repression research (notably Marx, 1979; Boykoff, 2006;2007; and Earl 2003; 2005; 2011; Earl & Soule, 2010).

It needs to be noted at the outset that the rise and variety of these and other protest cycles, are driven by the long-term effects of socio-economic changes in the structures of capitalism over the last three decades. It is the shift from Fordism to neoliberalism and its attendant restructuring which has seen the dual effects of pauperisation of the lower classes and the proletarianisation of the middle classes (della Porta, 2005:35). Moreover, we have seen that since the globalist designs of the Clinton era have stalled, the arising conflicts which have been mediated by bodies such as World Economic Forum, the Organisation for economic Cooperation and Development demonstrates not the redundancy of the state but the continued power of the state in international political economy. As Oppenheimer (2000) notes in his study of the modern state, the relative informality of these forums and the lack of public scrutiny enables a privileging of insiders and the formation and perpetuation of elite interests. This has led to a growing number of disgruntled citizens to question, if not reject entirely, the ability of the current democratic regime to offer them substantial opportunities to take decisions on important matters in accordance with their needs and interests.

256 I have also drawn one the key incident from the third case study at the London anti-G8 protest (being MPS's raid on the convergence centre).

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11.1 Key Themes From the Research

At the outset of this study I made a forceful argument to bring the state 'back in' to policing analysis by examining the relationship between the state and the police and critiquing the police's implausible claim to neutrality in matters of protest policing. This position claimed by chief constables up and down the land, and their associated bodies (such as the HMIC) does not withstand any serious scrutiny, or indeed the history of Peelian policing (which was imported from Ireland to suppress political radicals), and only acts to further mystify social relations.

The state is a structural force through which social struggles are directed, and how it mediates social conflicts has a vital bearing on the social preconditions of political democracy and the ability of challengers to crack entrenched privilege. What my analysis reveals is the state and its coercive arm, the police, do much to modify, delimit, and repress protest action. This is the case in at least two senses, one more discreet in time, the other not. The control of space at the summit site and the entire city vicinity (including key transport arterial routes) begins many months before any protestors arrive on the streets. This careful mapping and planning is geared to provide social control advantages through selecting large defensible locations which then undergo extensive fortification, including establishing 'no protest zones'. In tandem, although much less visibly, overt and covert surveillance, increased infiltration of protest groups and harassment towards dissenters occur. Closer to the summit event these authority tactics intensify, with extraordinary rules and laws being enforced through a massive policing presence, harassment and harassment arrests, and at the G20, mass media manipulation and mass media depreciation as well as considerable police violence. This includes using non-lethal weapons against unarmed protestors to incapacitate them, enacted clandestinely as a method of dispensing 'street justice' and increasing the costs of participation, officially allowing police to control and retake any protest spaces; and pre-emptive legal repression (including legal tools such as banning orders and mass pre-emptive arrests, etc.) all of which aids protestor demoralisation and demobilisation (Noakes et al, 2007; Wood, 2015). At the G20, (and later in 2013 at the G8 in London also) we see the authorities disrupt and smash protestor critical infrastructure, including (but not limited to) convergence centres. More generally across all the summit sites that I observed there is an intensive use of police surveillance practices to intimidate protestors, reduce anonymity at protest spaces and increase transparency and real time intelligence gathering. All of these tactics are strategically adapted to the prevailing conditions imposed by each particular summit, and interact dynamically, although not always incrementally, to protestor's own tactical repertoires.
These more discrete and summit specific practices need to be considered in light of a broader and long-term ongoing effort by an entire secret state apparatus whose primary function is also to constrain, delimit and emasculate domestic political dissent. This brings into view who the state actors are and the relationship between them. Whilst my work only touches on this hidden dimension (in part because it is very difficult to investigate) the political policing practices of NETCU (WECTU) and NPOIU were very much in evidence in the manner that protest is now policed.257 These policing agencies constitute one part of a larger Orwellian 'shadow government', and form part of a dual set of institutions consisting of intelligence, military, diplomatic, financial and private/corporate contractors that make most of the key decisions in what constitutes a 'national security state'.258 As della Porta et al. (2004; 2006) argue, the involvement of multiple agencies in summit arrangements including the 'intelligence services' acts to reduce accountability and external controls on police interventions. Indeed, they are removed from public view and operate without the informed consent of the governed. As others have similarly argued (Bunyan, 1981; Scraton, 1985; Connor, 2018a/b) the British state has developed a formidable array of repressive agencies, all of which view any form of dissent outside a narrow frame of political activity as a threat.

This picture of widespread state repressive activity is aimed at protecting the dominant hierarchical social relations from 'deep dissent' (Connor, 2018a) which challenges the distribution of existing wealth and power in society. Far from neo-liberalism and globalisation weakening or 'hollowing out' the state (be it from a supposed shift from hierarchical governance to governance through de-regulated markets, associations and community engagement (the society-centred approach) we are witnessing its opposite. As Bell and Hindmoor (2009) have argued, government remains the central actors in contemporary governance. The addition of a range of new administrative forms facilitate governance, for instance the use of 'task forces' to co-ordinate policy across government (Taylor, 2000), Public Service Agreements (PSA's) (James, 2004) and efforts for more 'joined up government' (Hollliday, 2003) have seen the strengthening and enhancement of the core executive functions capacity.259

257 The presence of known senior NETCU (WECTU) and NPOIU uniformed officers were also identified at all the summit protests that I examined through NETPOL staff.
258 An instructive analysis of 'double government' from a US perspective can be found in Glennon's (2015) National Security and Double Government, OUP.
259 Reviewing this wider empirical literature, Bell and Hindmoor (2009:38) report on a review of over 800 individual studies of governance arrangements conclude that despite greater reliance upon horizontal, hybridised, and associational forms of governance, these reflect "a gradual addition of new administrative forms that facilitate governance in a system of constitutional authority that is necessarily hierarchical" (Rhodes, 2007, in Bell and Hindmoor (2009:39). Bell and Hindmoor (2009:45) conclusion is that such governments and state agencies are attempting to increase their governing capacities and policy objectives by undertaking experiments with different relational governance arrangements.
These developments, along with entrenched police paramilitarisation (in terms of equipment and tactics), the increasingly globalised field of policing expertise and 'knowledge transfer' with its preemptive logics and a 'disruptive turn' (Wood, 2014; Christmann, 2015), the role of specialist political policing agencies and their allies, a permissive legislative framework and a near inoperative system of police governance, have reorganised and recalibrated state repression in response to those earlier innovative protestor tactics and strategies. What has emerged is a hybrid form of policing that is both 'soft hat' and 'hard hat', it neither abandons the more conciliatory 'negotiated management' approach or fully abdicates to the more aggressive and at times brutal 'escalated force' model. The escalated force approach is employed in several ways, most keenly to keep activists very far from the fortified summit venues and its coterminous no protest zones, both visually and audibly. In this sense authority's efforts are aimed at sealing off hermetically the summit site and its delegates from any persons that might wish to show some form of dissent. The police are not only prepared to 'die in a ditch' (Waddington, 1991;1994) in order to accomplish this, when necessary, they engage in malpractice and illegality to achieve it on the day. This includes taking pre-emptive measures such as in London, during the G20, where a decapitation strategy was in operation, smashing convergence centres, likely due to their proximity to a range of protestor target sites. Here operational expediency trumps legality and civil liberties, at least for those labelled the 'official opposition' (Waddington, 1991; 1994). In these actions the police make up the rules as they go along, and have proved themselves to be prepared to break the law to which they are supposedly the chief custodians, as well as breach protestors human rights. The law is in effect eviscerated, but because this occurs behind the scenes and to 'police property' under the eminently pliable justification of 'preventing crime and disorder' however implausible or improbable this may be, such breaches are conducted with impunity. At the time and in these circumstances there is no external referee for the protestor to appeal to, and the police enjoy a monopoly of force (including lethal force) to subdue any opposition. There is no option to refuse the 'service' being provided or to request a different provider as the police are a coercive public monopoly. All the bruised protestor can do is to require 'retrospective accounting' (here through a civil suit) many months after the event, when tactically at least, there is nothing left to play for. The ensuing financial compensation to protestors (and the not inconsiderable legal costs incurred by both sides) like the legal judgement against the capital's chief constable, are simply a cost of doing the 'dirty work' that political policing requires, one met (ultimately) through the public purse. These practices continued post-G20,
notably in 2013, where the anti-G8 protest convergence centre in central London was similarly raided and smashed by MPS resulting in legal suits against MPS.\textsuperscript{261}

As della Porta & Reiter (1998:30-31) have observed, this hybridism of policing has allowed a continuity in policing roles, especially towards the officially labelled 'dangerous' protestor', one which has managed to retain the violent police actions on the street, at times redolent of Starks 'police riot'.

The findings from my two case studies also show the highly selective nature of policing styles used for different protestor groups based upon police epistemology and the claims of police intelligence. What we are witnessing in the UK is the adoption of a 'dual model' of 'strategic incapacitation' (Noakes, et al., 2005) one which employs increasingly militarised tactics and strategies which proactively, pre-emptively and precisely targets those groups deemed to be uncooperative or unpredictable. It should be stressed that this now encapsulates a large number of social movement actors and organisations. As the G20 illustrated, it is not simply reserved for violent protestors, but mobilised for any who sit on the fringes of the 'respectable' kind of demonstrator categorised through a partial and self serving stereotypical police knowledge. Why this is so needs some explanation and I have drawn on Brodeur’s, (1983) critical distinction between 'high policing' and low policing', and Barkers (2001) work on identity legitimation as two of the analytical keys to reveal the inner logic driving these practices.

This last dimension to international summits has largely escaped scrutiny by social movement scholars. The proper conceptualisation of such events requires a closer reflection on the role they play in the political life of our rulers, that they function first and foremost as a symbolic ritual to assert legitimacy claims. This is to take seriously Barkers (2001:2) proposal that rulers are in fact claim making, here a 'particular species of prestige which attaches to government'. When seen through this lens, international summits are 'elite parties' buttressed by pomp and ceremony, but one which allows rulers to make a claim about their right to rule, that they constitute being special people. They also allow some degree of self-assurance (including a means to assure other international actors present). In short, they are about legitimating ruling identities. This is to focus on the 'dignity of the event', masked under the oblivious 'security concerns' as the primary driver for police action and that of the broader state repressive apparatus. International summits are not the only example of this, in the UK some ceremonial events, including Remembrance Sunday and Royal weddings assume the same official intolerance to any potential visible or audible sign of dissent.

\textsuperscript{260} The 2013 G8 summit took place in the isolated Fermanagh, Northern Ireland, but protests against the G8 were organised to occur in London. Activist had drawn up a 'hit list' of corporate and state targets that they wanted to organise protest actions against.

\textsuperscript{261} Personal correspondence from NETPOL and Bindmans solicitors.
(Waddington, 1994a:44-5). It is one which is difficult to account for from a securitisation perspective alone, irrespective of the risk assessment methodology and vulnerability assessment employed. This is the case even where one takes the security orthodoxy seriously, and comprehensively maps out the theoretically plausible attack scenarios (all the attack scripts) that a terrorist or offender may take in mounting an attack and the opportunity-blocking preventative interventions.

My findings also suggest that the policing and security operations at summits aim to achieve a 'full-spectrum' dominance, one which more acutely mimics the low intensity warfare tactics used by the military. This is most apparent when examining the spatial transformations that localities undergo in the run up to a summit, although this constitutes one part of a wider and deeper set of repressive practices employed by the authorities. The summit security operations are no longer discrete episodes, nor particular to the site of the 'extraordinary event', as I have been arguing, they form part of a far broader set of ongoing pre-emptive monitoring, intelligence gathering and disruption practices residing across a network of state security apparatus. This is most obviously evidenced by the ongoing intelligence gathering efforts (HUMIT and SIGNIT) undertaken by state authorities (SDP; local and national Special Branch; NETCU; NDET, in addition to MI5; GCHQ). This process has been driven more recently by the considerable net widening effects of the UK’s controversial counter-terrorism policy Prevent, and the inclusion of 'non-violent extremism' into its remit. This vague construction of dangerousness enshrined in UK (but also EU) ‘soft law’ and across policy landscapes is one capable of capturing entire dissenting communities. It gifts to the police an eminently pliable tool which can justify intrusive surveillance and all manner of pre-emptive repression and 'disruption' tactics, including the armed raids on critical protestor infrastructure. This application of a 'terrorist' label (be it in the 'pre-crime' space) to domestic dissent constitutes one element of the increasing militarisation of policing long recognised by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. It is a mind-set which classifies protestors as similar to an enemy, construing them as an opposition, not a legitimate dissenting voice to be accommodated, but one to be strategised against and authoritatively defeated.

This last consideration also brings into view one of the many serious oversights of the official inquiry reports into MPS's handling of the G20 protests. The analysis undertaken is ahistorical and atheoretical, and clings to a cherished illusion about institutions, that they always abide by the law (Brodeur, 1983:810). Neither is there any recognition that the policing model has been transformed and increasingly follows a militarised logic. The authors never seriously consider that this network operates tyrannically at these times and in these spaces, that it is premised and organised with the pre-emptive aim of disrupting the capacities of the dissenting network from developing. It is an account and mind-set situated in the clothes of 'low policing' but operates on the logic of 'high
policing'. As with all political policing, its raison d'ètre is the protection of the political regime, and one which more closely resembles a 'war of manoeuvre' (Scholl & Freyberg, 2013). Observing the essential nature of high policing, von Hentig states “A political police is not so much an instrument for the protection of society as a form of political activity through the medium of the police” (von Hentig, 1919: 30). This distinctly political role of the British police in the detection and repression of dissent is still officially denied, despite the formidable array of oppressive agencies at the British states disposal (Bunyan, 1977). Rather the failings of Operation Glencoe were largely attributed to organisational issues such an inadequate officer training and guidance, poor communication on the day, 'misunderstandings', 'inconsistent equipment', as well as the uncritical acceptance of MPSs claims about 'violent protestors' to legitimise kettling and baton charges into the crowd. The hazardous nature of these practices continues in the face of medical evidence which shows the very considerable risks of baton blows to neck and cranial areas, a persistent feature of officers’ actions during operation Glencoe. Reading through the reports one cannot but help be struck by the successive agencies resistance to pursue the line of inquiry and pronounce clearly on police wrong-doing. This is to adopt a deviance model of policing and to recognise the antagonistic role of high policing, one I have argued is never seriously entertained by any of the respective agencies. In part this is explained by the considerable independence deficits these agencies carry, but also (notably those who took testimony) as well as failing to ask (and pursue) the right questions. Senior officers are also skilled at manoeuvring these proceedings, displaying tactical savvy even here.

HMIC's report did contain some muted but tangible criticism to this militaristic logic however, that MPS failed to start from a presumption of the right to protest. Whilst this is welcome, it falls far short in its recommendations without a capable guardian who can champion its cause in the face of securitising moves typical at summit and other international events.

My findings demonstrate the extent to which authorities have proved very capable of strategic adaption, both as an ongoing product of interactive learning between protestors and police on the streets (the longstanding practices of post-operation de-briefing sessions to harvest 'lessons learnt') (for instance, Waddington, 1994) as well as diffused cross-nationally, assisted by the growth of professional policing organisations and other alliances making networks which disseminate operational 'best practices' (Wood, 2014). This is a process which is influenced by external criticism however. It is notable that the NATO summit operation's psychops before the summit did not repeat the scare tactics seen at the G20 pressures (protestors were not demonised to the same degree at the NATO summit as they were at the G20) to a more holistic pre-emptive community management strategy. This included a series of charm offensives, overt military propaganda, and appeals to national and self-interests (in part by nation branding techniques through co-opting local
political and business elites as 'boosters') alongside careful site selection by central government. Whilst there has been very little research attention given to the political economy of controlling dissent, I argue that its media framing and propagation needs to be seen as one vital element of what Bratich (2014:16) terms 'pre-crowd control' measures, and investigated as a form of 'pre-emptive dissuasion' (Emer & Opel, 2008) and 'consent management' (Bratich, 2007). These and other pre-emptive tactics acted to frustrate anti-NATO mobilisation efforts and drain existing support for open dissent. It also demonstrates the continued central role given to communicative activities, particularly strategic communication and framing by the authorities in order to exercise influence over local people and their perceptions. This is a 'hearts and minds' strategy, but here also, wallets. It is this reach for holistic control, one stretching beyond the security ecology and into the wider environment (including cultural, social, economic, historical) which demarcates the NATO summit of particular interest and marks it with features of the authorities having adopted counter-insurgency doctrine.

My study also shows how police surveillance practices can have an incapacitating effect on the protestor groups that I observed. Whether real or not, protestors' concerns about police informants or infiltration at times acted to erode trust and co-operation between activists, and impair their ability to organise themselves and to mobilise wider support. Whilst this constituted only one (and perhaps relatively marginal) element of the failure to build a broader alignment, notably for the protestors anti-militarist message in Wales, it points to a disturbing feature for those wishing to challenge existing power structures.

In summary, protests at international summits remain a critical litmus test for any state, including Western liberal democracies, to provide spaces where its intransigent citizens can communicate dissent to their rulers. On the streets at least, this remains a somewhat distant reality, if it is ever to be realised, there needs to be fundamental reforms to bring about a genuinely democratic and accountable system of policing.

11.2 Original Contribution of this Research and Areas for Future Research

Understanding how the state and its agencies control and repress political protest taking place at UK international summits provides a rich stream of themes, all of which are worthy of further investigation. I have discussed these in brief above, but at this juncture want to raise some additional areas which (to my mind) also constitute some of the achievements of this research study. In doing so I do not intend to recount all my earlier points in the body of the thesis, but rather to flag up and build on some very specific points that I have made.
11.2.1 Pacifying disruptive subjects

I present a study of state repression and political policing, and in doing so build on the work of others in this area and aligned areas such as 'repression research' (for instance, Bunyan, 1983; Earl, 2003, 2004, Earl & Soule, 2010; Boykoff, 2006, 2007; Scholl, 2012; Scraton, 1985). I have demonstrated how state repression is changing and morphing, in part in response to tactical innovations by transgressive protest groups, although ultimately violent state power still very much remains in use. These changes can be thought of as a 'counter-insurgency infused' theory and doctrine, and which has important parallels with Low Intensity Operations (LIO), both of which seeks to disrupt and undermine support for dissent from challenger groups amongst local communities and the wider population. Authority players pursue 'pre-emptive dissuasion' through a 'hearts and minds' approach to win over the acquiescence of the population by employing a range of strategic communication methods, including propaganda, place and nation branding, and a range of other inducements and promissory incentives, all operating temporarily within a highly securitised environment. The key goal is not crowd control as such, but much further upstream, to temporarily 'dissuade emergence' (Elmer & Opel. 2008). As (Bratich, 2014:16) has noted, the aim is 'pre-crowd control' through immobilisation towards committed activists and dissuasion for wider publics or potential joiners.

This represents a fruitful area for further research, namely into how these doctrines are deployed, what form they take and under what other circumstances they emerge.

11.2.2 Impacts of Covert Policing for Protestor mobilisation, de-recruitment and de-motivation

My study has shown some of the impacts upon 'activist protestors' from covert police surveillance and infiltration tactics, how this can break down relationships of trust, frustrate protest organising, as well as deter wider recruitment efforts by existing protestors. Indeed, at times, and amongst some protestors, there was acute concerns shown about the dangers of police infiltration which led to some internal conflict and directed energies and resources to defensive maintenance practices indicating several of Marx's (1979) inhibiting strategies towards social movements.

This is a difficult area to study, in part because it requires being embedded within these activist networks in the first place in order to gauge its relative impacts, or gaining their trust to undertake data gathering.

There is also a need to further explore the impacts of policing strategies, notably aggressive and violent mass policing, intensive police overt surveillance practices, and police harassment and harassment arrests on protestor demobilisation and de-recruitment. These policing strategies and
tactics need to be assessed across a range of politically involved persons (with dissent being defined not simply amongst activists). Doing so presents a number of methodological measurement difficulties, nevertheless we require a better understanding of how these tactics impact protest involvement and within the context of protest social networks.

11.2.3 Studying Police Violence in Crowd Situations

Police violence in what the police get to define as 'public order situations' is very challenging for a researcher to study (for reasons I rehearse in Section 3.7.6 and 3.8 in detail). Most obviously it exposes one to a host of serious physical risks and well as legal ones (by being perceived as party to 'public disorder' and hence risks arrest and prosecution). At the same time the situations which put one in greatest peril are also those that can deliver the best vantage point in determining police malpractice and excessive use of force (including brutality). In particular, I have in mind here the RAG strike zones when officers are using baton strikes against protestors (be it in a police baton charges or in enforcing a police kettle), and the far higher level of justification supposedly required (only in extremis) when taking seriously the principle of minimum force. This requires constantly trying to predict trigger points and to situate oneself at a vantage point to observe (and hopefully record) the interactions, all whilst trying to maintain some safety. Typically accredited journalists covering large demonstrations stay behind police lines (and are instructed to do so) which only delivers one partial, and distorted, view. When violence does occur it is also unpredictable, therefore difficult to plan for as a research strategy, and necessarily requires opportunistic sampling by attending successive demonstrations. I found that this was made that much more difficult by the suppliers of personal protective equipment having a company policy to refuse to supply all non-police personnel. This despite the claim that it is 'defensive equipment' and that its only function was for 'personal protection purposes'. However, I was informed that they did not want the equipment to be 'used against the police'. A curious construction which betrays its real dual function as offensive as well as defensive.

Despite these dangers and difficulties there is a need to study police violence 'up close and personal'. Advances in camera technology (i.e. GoPro photographic devices) and others on the market make digital capture in cramped and volatile situations considerably easier, and the introduction of body-cams for officers as well as the increase in sousveillance all present important data sources for researchers to exploit in understanding the dynamics and excesses of police violence.

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262 On the G20 case study I did not have a video-camera, only a still camera, which also later got broken.
11.2.4 Protestor Injuries and Police Weaponry

My review of the sparse medical research literature on blunt force head trauma resulting from police 'non-lethal' weaponry also raises the urgent need for more research to be conducted in this area if these weapons are going to continue in use (see Section 7.7). Indeed, what research there is regarding the health implications of police violence has remained very much at the margins of public health medicine. Whilst HMICs (2009a:58) report does discuss at some length 'use of force' and police 'baton skills', I have found that its claim that "All the techniques used have been the subject of independent medical review" remains in doubt as we are only provided with an appeal to an unspecified authority that assessments of police non-lethal weapons are in line with the 'most current medical opinion' (HMIC, 2007:16). This surprising assertion by HMIC is not corroborated by any published medical opinion that I can find, indeed I consulted with a Consultant in Rehabilitation Medicine (Acute Brain Injury Pathway and Head Injury Clinic) who confirmed the opposite - the very real possibility of brain damage resulting from baton strikes to 'red' cranial zones.

Furthermore, my review of the somewhat scant medical literature reveals that police batons have the potential to cause serious and diffuse injuries to the head and the face (with the skeletal structures of the face being less structurally sturdy than neurocranial bones and therefore more prone to serious injury). Whilst this is a complex area of clinical medicine as well as weapon design, the neuropsychologic evidence is both clear and alarming. Even mild brain injuries resulting from impact weapons “have the potential to create important losses for defendants” (Cox, 1987:60), and the total number of blows to the head is significantly correlated with later executive deficits and emotional problems (Heitzman (2010:405). As I have noted earlier, these considerations take on additional importance when considering the increasing police reliance of kettling protestors, where time and distance factors become more important (Meyer, 1981 cited in Cox et al 1987:58) reducing distances between police and protestors due to the tightening of the kettle contained within police serials (line formations). Such circumstances can result in officers reverting to previously learned motor behaviours (prior to police training) such as 'clubbing', and striking at a person's head, including in an 'uncontrolled manner'. Given that there is no specific set of regulations governing police officers use of batons in terms of how the baton is used, what part of the body it strikes, or with what force, rather there is only 'guidance', with such decisions left to the discretion of the individual officer.

My observational study of police violence using 'non-lethal' weaponry during Operation Glencoe, triangulated with data from Bindman’s solicitors, attests to the practice of officers striking

263 Telephone interview with MPS: Public Order Policing Unit.
protestors in the head and face with batons (red strike zones) (as well as with shield edges) despite the very real dangers this presents to protestors. My conclusion should be alarming, that blunt force head traumas appear to be a feature of public order policing due to pre-mediated tactical choices of increasingly using enclosure, segmentation and containment by the authorities.

11.2.5 Fellow Officer Reporting Practices

My study of Operation Glencoe evidences a number of serious concerns in respect to the complicit role of fellow police officers to fellow officer malpractice, aggression and unlawful behaviour. I examined several individual high profile cases (that of the killing of Ian Tomlinson, and also that of Nicola Fisher) each of which saw a prosecution being sought against the respective individual (sic) officer who used their police baton to strike either Tomlinson or Fisher. In addition to this secondary data analysis I also drew upon my own more substantial ethnographic and observational study of the G20 demonstrations, my examination of the official inquiry reports into Operation Glencoe, and lastly, from the police's own official records (obtained from my own extensive and protracted Freedom of Information requests) (see also Appendix 11.3) to examine fellow officer reporting of police malpractice and lawlessness (the extended discussion can be found in Section 7.8).

As I noted in my discussion of these cases, both of the Tomlinson and Fisher cases received extensive coverage by the news media, official bodies and academics, but despite this most of the commentary (with the exception of Reicher, 2011) all omitted any consideration of fellow officer complicity. I had taken this issue up several years earlier (in 2009) in researching this particular area. Indeed, from my analysis of the entire Operation Glencoe, which generated extensive public disquiet (helped by the considerable amount of protestor media postings of showing considerable police violence) my study unearthed that not one single police officer from what was then Britain's biggest policing operation reported any fellow officer for any breach of professional practice (oppressive behaviour etc.) or potential wrong-doing or illegality.264 This is despite all the many instances of officers not wearing identification, hiding their identification, using excessive force, using forbidden methods to attack protestors with (despite their training). This inaction also includes the wider ‘police family’ and the many senior officers who carried specific responsibilities for maintaining police discipline and conduct.

None of the official inquiry reports pick up on this issue of fellow officer complicity and questions of resulting liability. In fact, this issue receives little attention in any of the reports, and when it is raised (by police spokespeople in oral testimony) it is only deployed as a reassurance device to reiterate this reporting requirement as a professional standard for all police officers in order to quell

264 Author FOI (No. 2009050000552) to MPS.
any disquiet in the House of Common JCHR (2009) panel in oral testimony (‘be reassured police officers are required to report other officer’s malpractice’). As I have argued, it is instructive then, that none of the panel members posed the next and rather obvious prompting question having been given this reassurance; namely, did they? If the panel members had, they would have learnt that this reassuring line ran suspiciously hollow. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge I am the only researcher who has asked this question despite the raft of official inquiry reports into Operation Glencoe.

11.2.6 Police Log Books

There is a further serious issue that my research reveals, and again, one which is not addressed in any of the official inquiry reports into Operation Glencoe or which I have seen raised by any other researcher. Every police officer has a requirement to "record all uses of force, setting out the exact circumstances which led the police to use force and the nature of the force used" (HMIC, 2009b:193). Despite the skill officers have in writing such reports, such a document potentially supplies an important record (and insight) into any individual officer’s use of force record, and can be used to ‘flag’ potential ‘problem officers’ using excessive force. When linked to an early intervention system which can include other datum,265 this can increase police accountability and reduce instances of police excessive force (Walker, 2005).

It is then a notable finding from this research that MPS did not undertake any review process of these use of force log books, nor do they for public order policing events more generally.266 This means that neither the direct line manager (on the day) nor anyone in the wider organisation examines any of the log books which are submitted as a routine record of police force used. Such a practice evidences MPSs disregard for the long recognised problem of officers using excessive force in public order situations. This is the case even when Operation Glencoe caused widespread disquiet and the ensuing raft of inquiry reports. Neither were any of the report authors sufficiently savvy or knowledgeable to pursue this line of questioning and uncover MPSs wilful blindness. As I have argued, such log books appear to function merely as a ‘presentational rule’, one which allows senior officers to present the veneer of robust oversight procedures.

11.2.7 Police Complaints Reform

One of the necessary foundation stones for realising the possibility of having a democratic and accountable police force is having an effective complaints system, one which is capable of

265 Most obviously records of citizen complaints against the officer, but they can include other ‘performance data’ (Walker, 2005:101-2).
266 Author FOI (No. 200905000052) to MPS.
responding to public demand (most obviously after large policing operations) and capable of getting to the truth of events and providing redress. If not, then there can be no trust or confidence in the system and officials cannot be held to account. Whilst I accept that this is symptomatic of a set of deeper problems - most obviously the lack of direct democratic control of policing policy and the permissibility of officers being able to use high levels of force with weapons against unarmed citizens and that this is decided by ACPO policy and hence removed from public consultation or oversight - there still needs to be a freely available mechanism to prevent officers acting with impunity. These points are at their most acute because the police are enabled by statute to act in a way which would otherwise be unlawful for a citizen to do so.

This study finds that despite the establishment of the IPCC the complaints system appears to be entirely inadequate, indeed worryingly so. The attrition rate for complaints to the G20 resulted in less than 1% (0.6%) of the 297 complaints received seeing any misconduct action by a police organisation, and then, only one written warning and one dismissal (as a result of the officer killing Ian Tomlinson). In light of what I directly observed of Operation Glencoe and heard from other protestors, this is an extraordinary outcome. There are a number of reasons for this dismal performance by the IPCC, all of which my analysis explores, nevertheless this headline figure and the higher resolution detail that I outlined presents a worrying picture of a failing system. I conclude that these flaws are partly structural and partly political. Structural because of the 85 cases alleging serious assault by serving police officers, only 6 resulted in independent IPCC investigations, with the remainder being referred back to the force (n=17) or 'supervised investigations' (n=62), which simply means that the police investigate themselves. Such a practice cannot be acceptable and breaches the IPCCs raison d'être that a non-police organisation should undertake the investigating. It should also be a matter of scandal that the IPCC had publicly trumpeted that it 'investigated' all G20 complaint cases where there were allegations of physical assault, which is to grossly mislead. The political flaws of the IPCC (lacking the will or intent to hold officers to account) have been raised by me and others.

Moreover, I have never seen my figures which were derived by IPCC data published anywhere, and neither has this data raised any official disquiet. This is an extraordinary outcome considering that Operation Glencoe received international press coverage and generated a total of five inquiry reports. I accept that the reports remit was not to investigate individual allegations, and on the odd occasion that they make reference to them it is merely to outsource the issue to the IPCC. However, my study maintains that there is a case for the IPCC to answer here and thus far it is one which has gone unanswered.
Part of the difficulty lies in there being no independent scrutiny of how the IPCC, or more problematically still, the supposedly 'supervised IPCC' investigations, or indeed force level investigations were conducted. In requesting these files under my capacity as a university Research Fellow, I was told that they could not be released due to 'data protection concerns', and that anonymising the documents would prove to be too time consuming.267 Whilst this last point is far from obvious, none of this is acceptable for an organisation which experiences an attrition rate like the IPCC’s for Operation Glencoe, a point which should also be obvious to the IPCC. It is not beyond the wit of man to remedy this, what is required is the political will to do so. That it has not happened is because the IPCC, and the various police forces that benefit from this lacuna, have no desire for outsiders to examine their internal investigative processes. One remedy would be to offer complainants (via a simple check box) whether they are prepared to allow their complaints to oversight by regulated external entities (such as researchers) in an effort to ensure that they are properly investigated. This would remove one all too convenient obstacle that currently keeps interested parties in the dark. Data protection, including the recent GDPR, like secrecy itself, are instruments in struggles, and can all too easily function to perversely protect the state from any unwanted prying eyes.

The other issue I raised, and have entered into correspondence with the IPCC over, is their overly exclusionary regulations, specifically the requirement for a complainant to be physically present at the scene for a complaint to be valid for consideration, despite the considerable rise of 'sousveillance'. The growth in this technology through the ubiquity of mobile phone with video capture technology and social media platforms to upload and distribute it is one method the disgruntled citizen can use to monitor police (mis)conduct, increasing surveillance capacity and making state agents newly visible. It is one method that attempts to control police discretion in circumstances where legal rules are wanting. I ran a thought experiment with an operative in a CCTV control room to demonstrate why the IPCC rule rejecting complaints based on real time video data is nonsensical. My conclusion I reach is that its only function is to artificially reduce the number of complaints, this for an organisation whose professed ambition is to more effectively address police malpractice.

My conclusion was that at each stage of the current complaints system, complainants are disadvantaged and there is no routine entitlement to financial assistance which would allow legal advice and representation to progress the complaint.268 The workings of the IPCC, and police

267 Personal communication with IPCC.
268 As Smith (2009:254) notes.
complaints more generally, requires considerably more scrutiny from researchers, particularly in respect to protest policing and repression research. As Ericson, (2007:391) has remarked in his examination of rules in policing, rules of criminal procedure are only likely to have some effect when prosecution is desired. The IPCC data appears to tell a different tale.

11.2.8 The Political Economy of Social Control of Dissent

There has been very little research into the political economy of international summit meetings and the industry that has developed around them. My research into this area builds on one of the few other examples of this work, being Starr et al's (2011) by examining what the summit costs were and where these monies went. Most obviously this provides important insights into the material preparations and how these change over time (i.e. transportation modes for delegates), as well as the multi-dimensionality of these operations. It also includes examining the rising costs of the security budgets, and what equipment is being purchased (for instance the ongoing 'investment' in more robust 'security fences' constructed to fortify summit sites) or the use of military equipment and its purposes (employing the military and its equipment is very expensive, and the NATO summit employed saw all three armed forces). Security budgets give some indication that the militaries are fully involved in these operations which are directed at controlling domestic political dissent.

These lavish events come at extraordinary public cost, with an ever greater share of funding being allocated for security. There remain many questions surrounding the politics of mobilising and using resources and how this is justified to the wider public audiences, including the authority player's media strategies, framing and messaging, and how this is layered onto the policing and security strategy. I have begun some of this work, in particular through examining the 'benefit realisation' strategies used by authorities, as well as 'legacy benefit' strategies, but there needs to be longer term local and regional economic analysis to more robustly test the authority's claims through genuinely independent research efforts. At the moment these claims function too much as promissory notes, ones which are conveniently never revisited as their work is done.

Hosting International summit meetings also brings a host of collateral costs to the locality, with some previously public spaces being temporarily confiscated (including some local services) and resembling heavily fortified war zones being but one. I have documented some of these collateral costs, these are real and go beyond 'inconveniences', but rather unsurprisingly, they are routinely underplayed by the organising authorities. They can also incur considerable local tension between local, regional and national government players as well as governmental departments in respect of
budgets and allocation - the local, regional and national political dimensions to such events are also worthy of more analysis.
12. References


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13. Appendix

Appendix 1: Interview Schedules

Figure A1: Interview Schedule for Political Representatives

Interview Schedule – Representatives

(V4I)

Background

1. What is your role on the Council/Authority/Parliament?
2. How long have you been in post?
3. What is the political and economic complexion of this area?

Summit location issues

4. Who made the decision to locate the summit in [NAME] area?
   PROMPT Agency name/Ministry; individual; what other organisations played a role in this decision;
   TRAINGLAUTE Local/national press coverage of decision

5. Were any local representatives involved in the location selection for the summit?
   PROMPT party affiliation; positioning & backstage considerations

6. Were any local representatives involved in the site selection for the summit?
   PROMPT party affiliation; positioning & backstage considerations

7. Why do you think this location was selected to host the summit?
   PROMPT: incentives/promissory notes; economic; political; social; strategic and tactical; influencers
   TRAINGLAUTE Local/national press coverage

8. To what extent were members informed about the [name] summit?
   PROMPT: when and how; stages of knowledge; fait accompli event; how well were they informed;

Local responses and concerns

9. Were there any concerns about holding the summit in [name].

10. What were these concerns?
    PROMPT Who were they put to;
    TRAINGLAUTE newspaper reports

11. Who raised these concerns and were they listened to?

12. Do you believe that [name] summit has benefited the local area, and the region?
    PROMPT Evidence base; tricky trade-off's
    TRAINGLAUTE Evidence base; LA econometric data; newspaper reports
13. In what way has it done this?

14. Overall, what was the experience of hosting the summit in [area name]?

15. Is there anything else that you would like to tell me about the summit [name] that I have not covered?

END

Figure A2: Interview Schedule for Medics

Interview Schedule – Medics

1. What experience have you had in treating patients who have been injured by police baton strikes?
   PROMPT Red, Amber zones; head trauma; patient accounts in free text fields of triage records; what do patient accounts tell us re justifiability of force?; do medics record this incident data; any relationship or data transfer A&E/neurology Depts. and police forces (PCCs) which are capable of flagging concerns re excessive force?

2. Are you aware of any cases (from colleagues or from the medical literature/conferences), if so, please discuss these and the resultant injuries?

3. What are the potential or actual medical consequences of a person being struck on the head (cranial area, including the face and neck) by a police baton?
   PROMPT: Short, medium and long term consequences; functionality; physical and psychological implications; precision of identifying and attributing LT consequences of blunt force head trauma.

4. Does the British medical profession (BMA) have any considered view on police officers use of such weapons and has this been codified in any policy guidance or briefing notes etc.?

5. In your view, should police officers continue to be allowed to strike people with batons to cranial areas? Please explain your reasoning?

6. Is there anything else that you would like to tell me about this area of medicine that I have not covered?
Figure A3: Interview Schedule for NGO Respondents

Interview Schedule – NGO’s

1. Would you say that the policing of political protest, particularly at International Summits, is changing here in the UK?

2. If so, how is the policing of political protest changing?
   PROMPT: repression levels and measures; overt, covert measures; incapacitation/facilitation/traditional; hard hat/soft hat mix.

3. Which measures by the authorities are coming to the fore and why?
   a. Can you give me examples of this in your case work?

4. What do you think these changes are in response to?

5. What are the impacts of this upon protest at International Summits (and protest more generally)?
   a. Can you give me examples of this in your case work?
   PROMPT: model of movement participation (x4) organisational infrastructure; planning/dissemination/mobilisation/demonstration; individual activists; activist environment.

6. Can you comment on the increasing role of surveillance of protestors and protest organisations by the authorities, and what you believe the impact(s) of this is?

7. Is there anything else that you would like to add that I have not already covered in respect to the changing landscape of political protest?
Interview Schedule – Metropolitan Police Public Order Unit

1. How long have you been in post and what is your expertise in this area of public order policing?

2. Under what lawful circumstances can a police officer strike a person in a Red or Amber area with a baton?

3. Are there grey areas in an officer’s discretion here, and what exceptions can occur?

4. In your view, how prevalent is excessive use of force with a baton in public order policing, and what do you base this judgement on?

5. If an officer does strike a person in a Red or Amber area, what record should be made of this event?

   PROMPT: name of document; how recorded; how archived; who has access to document;

6. Is there any requirement to look at or review these records?
   a. If so by whom (what duty holder), when, how, to what level of scrutiny?
   b. Is this data subject to any formal accountability audit?
   c. If so, does this operate at the officer level, operation level, force level etc.?

7. How much confidence should we have in these review processes?

   PROMPT: Are they paper exercises; would they be able to detect malpractice; do they hold officers to account; what procedures follow a concern if identified.

8. Given such a situation, what duty of care does the officer (and wider police family) have towards said person?

9. What measures are in place to prevent police abuses of force (police brutality)?

   PROMPT: ‘problem officer’ use of force accountability schemes; what information is collated; what leads to a red flag; how reliable/valid in theory and practice.

10. What training do police officers receive in the use of a baton (and shield)?

11. In your view, how well does this training equip an officer to use such weapons in a way which results in only the ‘minimum use of force’ being deployed?

12. What does the police’s ‘minimum use of force’ mean in practice in violent public order situations?

   PROMPT: Is this codified; where is this information; who holds it; when was it last reviewed and updated.
Appendix 2: Tables Detaining Conversations with Protestors (by Summit Case Study Site)

The respective Tables below detail the protestors that I directly consulted with and had ‘controlled conversations’ during the fieldwork. In providing this information I have steered between maximising the protection of participants’ identities whilst also maintaining the integrity of the data.

**Table A1: Interviewed Protestors at the G20 Case Study (Anonymised)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protestor</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of Fieldwork</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G20-A01</td>
<td>London - Planning meeting 1</td>
<td>December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A02</td>
<td>London - Planning meeting 3</td>
<td>January 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A03</td>
<td>London - Planning meeting 3</td>
<td>February 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A04</td>
<td>London - Planning meeting 4</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A05</td>
<td>London - Convergence centre</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A06</td>
<td>London - Convergence centre</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A07</td>
<td>London - Planning meeting 5</td>
<td>February 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A08</td>
<td>London - Planning meeting 6</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A09</td>
<td>South East - Planning meeting</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A10</td>
<td>South East - Planning meeting</td>
<td>January 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A11</td>
<td>South East - Planning meeting</td>
<td>February 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A12</td>
<td>South East - Planning meeting</td>
<td>February 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A13</td>
<td>South East - Planning meeting</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A14</td>
<td>South East - Planning meeting</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A15</td>
<td>South East - Planning meeting</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
</tr>
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<td>G20-A16</td>
<td>London - Convergence centre</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
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<td>London - Convergence centre</td>
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<td>London - Convergence centre</td>
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<td>London - Convergence centre</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
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<td>G20-A23</td>
<td>London - Convergence centre</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
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<td>G20-A24</td>
<td>London - Convergence centre</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A26</td>
<td>London – Demonstration: Climate camp</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20-A31</td>
<td>London - Miscellaneous</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
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<td>G20-A33</td>
<td>London - Miscellaneous</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
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<td>Protestor</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date of Fieldwork</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP-N01</td>
<td>Planning meeting 1</td>
<td>June 2014</td>
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<td>NP-N02</td>
<td>Planning meeting 2</td>
<td>August 2014</td>
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<td>NP-N03</td>
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<td>August-September 2014</td>
</tr>
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<td>Newport – Convergence camp</td>
<td>August-September 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP-N05</td>
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Appendix 3: Submitted Freedom of Information Requests

13.3.1 Submitted Freedom of Information Requests Concerning the G20 Summit

FOI 1: Freedom of Information Request to MPS – Fellow Officer Reporting

Tuesday, 05 May 2009

Freedom of Information Application:


Dear Chief Constable,

I have some FOI questions concerning fellow officer reporting of breaches of the Code for Standards of Professional Behaviour or police officer misconduct (police officers and senior officers). This concerns any reporting by officers (or ‘police family’) of fellow officers breaches or misconduct during and after the policing operation for the recent G20 protests in the London area.

Whilst this FOI request is being made to the Metropolitan Police, it is intended to apply to all uniformed and non-uniformed officers, PCSOs, Wardens, Special Constables, student officers etc (indeed the entire ‘police family’) who had any direct or indirect involvement in the G20 policing operation (this is to include officers from other forces assisting in the operation i.e. ‘mutual aid’ arrangements).

However, I realise that the Police ‘Standards of Professional Behaviour’ may not apply in respect to the entire wider ‘policing family’ re my questions below. Where this is the case could you advise me of what the alternative regulatory arrangements are for those individuals?

Some Initial Points of Clarification:


By ‘complaint’, I mean any report, challenge or allegation (written or oral) by any officer (or police family member) of another’s (or police family member) perceived or otherwise improper conduct relayed via any officially recognised channel (through formal Police reporting channels, to a line manager, or through the force’s confidential reporting mechanism etc.). This includes where available, conduct of a ‘more minor’ nature that has been dealt with by normal management action (as referred to in Principle 10: Challenging and Reporting Improper Conduct; Home Office Guidance: Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance and Attendance Management Procedures. Home Office circular 026 / 2008). Obviously there would be a need for some record of this, but in the cases where this information is available I would like it included in your responses please.

Questions

I would be interested in knowing answers to a set of related questions which I detail below. Please could you tell me:
POLICE MISCONDUCT

1. How many misconduct allegations or reports (written or oral) were made against the conduct of fellow police officers (or other police family member) for misconduct, improper conduct/abuse of authority by a fellow officer (or other police family member)?
   a. Could you specify both the number of individual complaints and the number of implicated officers to which the complaint(s) relate:
      i. How many complaints/reports were made (both the number of complaints and the number of allegations within each complaint)?
      ii. What was the nature of the alleged misconduct for each reported complaint/allegation?
      iii. How many individual officers do the complaints/reports refer to?
      iv. What is the rank, operational role (i.e. TSG) gender and police Force of both the complainant(s) and the alleged officers of whom the complaint was made against?

2. How many internal (non-IPCC) investigations and/or Force Misconduct Proceedings have there been for misconduct, improper conduct/abuse of authority?
   i. Conducted;
   ii. Pending, awaiting hearing;
   iii. or ongoing;
   b. If so, what are the outcomes of the investigations or hearings?
      i. What management action has occurred?
      ii. What disciplinary action has occurred?
      iii. What other action has occurred?
      iv. How many misconduct proceedings were referred to immediate management action and how many to a misconduct hearing?
      v. What number of officers subject to misconduct hearings accepted that their conduct fell below the standards expected of a police officer, if any?
      vi. How many investigations have found the matter to be one of ‘unsatisfactory performance’ (UPP) rather than misconduct?
      vii. Have there been any suspensions as a direct result of these procedures?

POLICING WITHOUT VISIBLE IDENTIFICATION MARKS

3. How many allegations or reports (written or oral) were made against the conduct of fellow police officers (or other police family member) by a fellow officer (or other police family member) for either not having any visible identification numbers/marks or for disguising/removing identification numbers/marks whilst on duty?
   i. If so, how many complaints/reports were made (both the number of complaints and the number of allegations within each complaint)?
   ii. How many individual officers do the complaints/reports refer to?
   iii. What is the rank, operational role (i.e. TSG) and police Force of both the complainant and the alleged officers of whom the complaint was made against?
4. How many investigations and/or misconduct proceedings (IPCC and non-IPCC) have there been for officers policing during the G20 policing operation without visible identification numbers/marks or for disguising/removing identification numbers/marks whilst on duty?
   i. Conducted;
   ii. Pending, awaiting hearing;
   iii. Or ongoing

b. If so, what are the outcomes of the investigations or hearings?
   i. What management action has occurred?
   ii. What disciplinary action has occurred?
   iii. What other action has occurred?
   iv. How many misconduct proceedings were referred to immediate management action and how many to a misconduct hearing?
   v. What number of officers subject to misconduct hearings accepted that their conduct fell below the standards expected of a police officer, if any?
   vi. How many investigations have found the matter to be one of 'unsatisfactory performance' (UPP) rather than misconduct?
   vii. Have there been any suspensions as a direct result of these procedures?

POLICE VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL LAW

5. How many misconduct allegations or reports (written or oral) were made against the conduct of fellow police officers (or other 'police family members') for any criminal conduct (including violent behaviour, assault, battery, verbal abuse) by a fellow officer (or other police family member)?
   i. If so, how many complaints/reports were made (both the number of complaints and the number of allegations within each complaint)?
   ii. How many individual officers do the complaints/reports refer to?
   iii. What is the rank, operational role (i.e. TSG) and police Force of both the complainant and the alleged officers of whom the complaint was made against?

6. How many internal (non-IPCC) investigations and/or misconduct proceedings have there been for any criminal conduct (including violent behaviour, assault, battery, verbal abuse)?
   i. Conducted;
   ii. Pending, awaiting hearing;
   iii. Or ongoing

b. If so, what are the outcomes of the investigations or hearings?
   i. What management action has occurred?
   ii. What disciplinary action has occurred?
   iii. What other action has occurred?
   iv. How many misconduct proceedings were referred to immediate management action and how many to a misconduct hearing?
v. What number of officers subject to misconduct hearings accepted that their conduct fell below the standards expected of a police officer, if any?

vi. How many investigations have found the matter to be one of 'unsatisfactory performance' (UPP) rather than misconduct?

vii. Have there been any suspensions as a direct result of these procedures?

**EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEM MONITORING**

7. Does the Metropolitan Police operate any kind of Early Intervention System or 'Comprehensive Personnel Assessment Systems' or 'Performance Problem Systems' which monitors/audits individual officer conduct (i.e. the rate of complaints/allegations made against that officer [either by a civilian or fellow officer]) and highlights the existence of so called 'problem officers'? For instance the US police have a number of early interventions systems; i.e. the Pittsburgh Performance and Assessment and Review System (PARS))

i. If the Met does have an early intervention system, what is this called and how does it operate?

ii. Is there any documentation available which explains procedures?

iii. How is the information in any early intervention system employed when conducting either:

   - ' Unsatisfactory performance' (UPP);
   - Misconduct hearings;

**USE OF FORCE REPORTING**

8. Do Officers have any requirement to report and document after their use of force incidents (i.e. police having used batons against demonstrators) in public order situations?

i. If so, is this limited to visible injury or complaint of injury?

ii. Are these reports reviewed by management?

iii. Is this data archived and retrievable?

iv. Is this data utilised or considered at an individual officer level when conducting:

   - ' Unsatisfactory performance' (UPP);
   - Misconduct hearings;

[END]
FOI 2: Freedom of Information Request to MPS – Fellow Officer Reporting clarification

Friday, 19 March 2010

Hi Carol,

Yes, I am ONLY interested in allegations/reports related to the policing of the G20 protests.

I am NOT enquiring about allegations made by members of the public or protestors (obviously except where serving Police officers were clandestinely taking part in the protests as part of the policing operation, but then they would still be classified as fellow officers).

I am ONLY interested in misconduct allegations or reports (written or oral) BY A POLICE OFFICER (or other 'Police family member', PCSO's etc.) that have been made against the conduct of FELLOW POLICE OFFICERS (or other police family members) for misconduct, improper conduct/abuse of authority, unlawful behaviour etc. during the policing of the G20.

In addition, details of any Police internal (presumably non-IPCC) investigations and/or Force Misconduct Proceedings/disciplinary hearings etc that have taken place for misconduct, improper conduct/abuse of authority unlawful behaviour (including violent behaviour, assault, battery, verbal abuse, removal or absence of visible identification marks to uniforms etc) WHICH WERE AS A RESULT OF POLICE OFFICER'S REPORTS (or police family; PCSO's etc.) OR ALLEGATIONS (written or oral) CONCERNING THE BEHAVIOUR OF FELLOW POLICE OFFICERS.

Clearly a great deal of time has now elapsed between the G20 operation and now. I am assuming that if any allegations, complaints, reports, etc by officers (and ‘police family’) against their fellow officers (or ‘police family’) conduct during the G20 operation would of occurred either during or shortly after the G20 operation (although there may have been some very belated reports some time after)?

Likely this would also mean that these allegations and reports would have all been logged by now by the police (Professional Standards Unit?), or whatever other internal body that has responsibility for documenting and proceeding with allegations/complaints/reports by Officers concerning their fellow officers conduct. I am led to believe this because there are specific Police internal mechanisms for officers (and ‘police family’) to report (including anonymously) concerns/allegations regards their fellow officer’s conduct. Presumably there must be a central internal body that deals with this, and consequently which could tell me how many allegations/reports had been received by officers re fellow officer conduct, the nature of the allegations, whether they had been investigated/proceeded with, and what the outcome of this process had been?

I hope this makes clear the nature of the information that I would like (and have included another copy of my FOI for your information). Whilst the FOI is detailed and may appear onerous, it is only concerned with officer’s (+ PCSO’s) allegations/complaints regards their fellow officers (+PCS0’s) during G20. I’ve assumed would fall under the MPS’s own internal disciplinary/professional conduct machinery, which if operative, surely would have accurate records of this and the subsequent proceedings. Again I was assuming that this could be supplied without to much difficulty. There may be some ongoing
Investigations/disciplinary Police hearings that have proved very protracted (especially if an accused police officer fights the case) so you may not have all the outcome information available, but by now I would of thought that most accusations/reports, if they did occur, would by now of been finalised.

Please do not fail to contact me if you require any other clarification or information.

Regards,

Kris

I am assuming that
Kris Christmann
Research Fellow

Applied Criminology Centre
Dept. of Behavioural Sciences
University of Huddersfield
CS/14 Queensgate Campus
Huddersfield HD13DH
West Yorkshire, UK
Wednesday, November 04, 2009

Applied Criminology Centre
Human & Health Sciences
University of Huddersfield

**FOI to MPS: no response after 120 working days**

I am a Research Fellow at Huddersfield University and have an interest in researching policing and police governance issues. I made an FOI to the Metropolitan Police on the 5th May 2009 (attached) via MPS’s FOI website (http://www.met.police.uk/information/metric/index.htm) and received notification of receipt after submission via their WebMailer service. I was given no further details of who would be dealing with the FOI, so follow-up was difficult. I naturally assumed that my FOI was being proceeded with.

This accomplished, I waited, and waited... and waited. To date I have had no response from MPS who are clearly in breach of their Section 10(1) FOI Act obligations which requires them to respond within 20 working days – a reasonable deadline. It would appear to me that MPS are flagrantly ignoring these obligations as I have been waiting some **133 working days** now without a response.

The FOI requests information about data concerning police officer misconduct and police officers informing senior officers of any fellow officer’s breaches of the Code for Standards of Professional Behaviour or lawbreaking during the policing of the G20 protests. This is obviously a very sensitive area, but one of great public and academic interest. The sheer scale of the delay leads me to suspect that MPS are deliberately evading their Section 10(1) obligations for reasons of political expediency.

Could you please advise me what enforcement action you will be taking against MPS to ensure their compliance with my FOI and their obligations as a statutory authority.

I look forward to hearing from you in due course.

Kris Christmann

NB: I have attached a copy of the original FOI sent to MPS.
FOI 2: Freedom of Information Request to MPS – Fellow Officer Reporting clarification

Monday, March 8th, 2010
Applied Criminology Centre
Human & Health Sciences
University of Huddersfield

FOI to MPS: no response after 220 working days

I am a Research Fellow at Huddersfield University and have an interest in researching policing and police governance issues. I made an FOI to the Metropolitan Police on the 5th May 2009 (attached) via MPS’s FOI website (http://www.met.police.uk/information/metric/index.htm) and received notification of receipt after submission via their WebMailer service. I was given no further details of who would be dealing with the FOI, so follow-up was difficult.

After an inordinate wait of 133 working days, and no response to my emails from MPS, I contacted the IOC and lodged a complaint with you concerning MPS being in clear breach of their Section 10(1) FOI Act obligations. Several days later I received a brief apology notice from an MPS employee who was dealing with the case (Carol.Conway@met.police.uk) stating that they were still collecting and collating the information – a somewhat extraordinary claim considering I had been waiting for over 6 months!

Obviously the MPS response was prompted by your intervention, however, since this last communication (dated 17 November 2009 15:05, and with the email now removed by MPS’s EmailXtract so I do not have the FOI reference number) I have continued to wait for a response from MPS which has not been forthcoming. It is now some 220 working days since submission of my FOI, and several emails later (again with no response from MPS) I am again contacting yourselves in an effort to obtain the information that I have asked for.

This delay is of particular concern to me, not only because it prevents me from conducting my research, but also because I believe that MPS are wilfully not complying with their Section 10(1) FOI Act obligations for reasons of political expediency. I suspect the FOI may well prove politically embarrassing to them, and MPS are therefore attempting to impede and delay any response for as long as possible, hoping that I either become worn down by obstructing tactics or more likely that the issue fades from the political agenda. How else can an organisation justify breaching their obligations to respond within 20 working days – a reasonable deadline – by ten times that, and still waiting?

My FOI requests information about data concerning police officer misconduct during the G20 protests in London, specifically details on fellow police officers reporting and
informing senior officers of any fellow officer's breaches of the Code for Standards of Professional Behaviour or lawbreaking – a duty incumbent upon all officers.

Clearly this is an issue of enormous public concern and academic interest, no more so because there is now a growing body of evidence indicating widespread police misconduct. These issues strike at the heart of police claims of legitimacy and accountable public order policing and hence are of potential embarrassment to MPS. In my view, this is the reason for the protracted 9 month wait.

On a related note, I have put in several FOI's to MPS over the last 18 months on related matters, and MPS consistently fail to respond in anything like the 20 day time period, usually I experience a minimum of 6 month delays or more, despite repeated reminders from myself. This leads me to believe that MPS are acting to wilfully evade providing information to the public where it does not suit them to do so. Whilst I cannot prove this charge, it is a conclusion that my own experience draws me to.

In light of my current FOI could you now please advise me what enforcement action you will be taking against MPS to ensure their compliance with my FOI and their obligations as a statutory authority.

Furthermore, could you also advise me as to what further action I can take as a citizen against MPS regards their consistent failure to meet their Section 10(1) FOI Act obligations? Is there any other organisation one can appeal to in order to change the culture within MPS such that others do not encounter the level of obstruction that I repeatedly found?

I look forward to hearing from you in due course.

Kris Christmann

NB: I have attached a copy of the original FOI sent to MPS.
FOI 2: Information Commissioner's Office Complaint Against MPS—Fellow Officer Reporting clarification

Saturday, 12 September 2009

Met Ref for my FOI: 2009060006318
Met original case number: 2009040001759

Dear ICO,

2nd April 2009
On the 24/4/2009 I made a detailed FOI request to the Metropolitan Police. I received notification that the Met received my FOI enquiry. The FOI concerned a series of questions over how and why the Met were using surveillance technologies and practices during the G20 protests, along with additional questions on the use of police tactics of 'kettling' and the surveillance which directly followed from this (I have attached the original FOI).

23rd of June 2009
On the 23rd of June, after some 58 working days after submission, I received a refusal notice and the issuing of a 'fees notice' set at the maximum level of £450 for an estimated 18 hours work deemed required 'in determining whether the MPS holds the information, and locating, retrieving and extracting the information'.

I appealed against this decision because it was both unreasonable and excessive (again I have included my letter to MPS stating why this is so). MPS said that they would respond to my appeal with a 'review' by 22nd July 2009.

This date came and went. Since then I have received a number of emails from MPS stating that they have been unable to meet the July response time for the review and stated a new later response time of 12th August 2009. This was also unmet, and again they rescheduled again for the 6th September 2009 for the review, which was again unmet. I have now been advised of a new response time of 6th October 2009 (I have these emails on folder if required).

Since I originally submitted the FOI some 114 working days have expired, and on the current estimate for MPS responding, 131 working days will have passed. As I understand it, all public authorities have a duty respond to FOI's in a 'timely manner', no later than 20 working days.

My complaint against MPS is not only have they failed their Section 10(1) FOI Act obligations, but I believe they are flagrantly ignoring these obligations. MPS fail to supply any reason why my FOI has not been responded to, although no doubt predictable appeals to heavy workloads do not justify breaching their Section 10(1) obligations, or realistically account for the sheer scale of the delay.

I believe that the scale of the delay raises the suspicion that it is being used as a deliberate tactic for MPS's own political expediency, at a time when their policing tactics and public order practices are coming under increased scrutiny and criticism. My concern is that MPS is deliberately delaying release of any requested information for as long as possible until the current public disquiet over surveillance and public order policing tactics dies down. If I am right, MPS are deliberately undermining citizen's rights under the freedom of information legislation for their own political expediency.

Could ICO progress my complaint against MPS? Could you also tell me what action you are going to take against MPS for their failure to comply with Section 10(1).

I look forward to hearing from you in due course.
FOI 2: Freedom of Information Request to MPS – Fellow Officer Reporting

Foi : Sent to HO Monday, 14 June 2010

Questions concerning Police Use of Force in Public Order Policing

I am a Research Fellow at Huddersfield University conducting some research into public order policing. I would be very grateful if you could assist me with the following questions (or direct me to another colleague who could answer them).

It may be preferable (and easier) to speak to someone at the Police Public Order Unit, either by phone or me visiting in person? If so, could I perhaps arrange at convenient time to phone or visit.

My questions are:

1. Does the Metropolitan Police operate any kind of Early Intervention System or ‘Comprehensive Personnel Assessment Systems’ or ‘Performance Problem Systems’ which monitors/audits individual officer conduct (i.e. the rate of complaints/allegations made against that officer [either by a civilian or fellow officer]) and highlights the existence of so-called ‘problem officers’? For instance the US police have a number of early interventions systems: i.e. the Pittsburgh Performance and Assessment and Review System (PARS)
   i. If the Met does have an early intervention system, what is this called and how does it operate?
   ii. Is there any documentation available which explains procedures?
   iii. How is the information in any early intervention system employed when conducting either:
       • ‘Unsatisfactory performance’ (UPP);
       • Misconduct hearings;

2. As I understand it after every incident of use of force an officer is obliged to record the incident details in an Evidential Report book. Could you please provide me with a blank copy of an Evidential Report book where an officer would record use of force incidents? (or tell me where I could obtain one).
   a. I’ve been told that this recording is ‘supervised’ by the officer’s line manager — could you explain in some more detail what this actually involves, for instance:
      i. Having used force, is it the sole responsibility of that officer to record the event, and that they are the sole author of this recording?
      ii. Does the line manager review all entries by those officers (and police family) under his/her supervision?
      iii. If so, what is the reviewing process examining and is it entirely up to the discretion of the supervising officers own review as to whether a concern (of whatever kind, but most obviously inappropriate/excessive force) is relayed?
iv. Is there any form of civilian oversight or auditing (or non-police oversight) of these reports?

Thanks.

Kris Christmann
Research Fellow

Applied Criminology Centre
Dept. of Behavioural Sciences
University of Huddersfield
CS/14 Queensgate Campus
Huddersfield HD1 3DH
West Yorkshire, UK
Thursday, April 02, 2009

Freedom of Information Application


Dear Chief Constable,

I have some questions concerning the recent policing operation that took place in London during the G20 protests. Both (1) concerning the police surveillance (evidence gathering exercises) and (2) the more specific ‘Kettling’ procedures, where your officers prevented people from leaving the area of the London G20 demonstrations near the Bank of England. After being detained for many long hours protesters were individually allowed to leave the scene but not before being physically restrained, and their names and addresses demanded along with their photographs taken, with anyone refusing being put back in the ‘pen’ (a strategy referred to as ‘kettling’).

I would be very interested in knowing answers to a set of related questions which I detail below under the following sections. Please could you tell me:

1. Police Surveillance Activity

I have noticed that part of your policing operation included numerous photographic and digital camera recording of protesters. This was conducted by officers called ‘Evidence Gathering’ Officers/Units. Please could you tell me:

1. What is the purpose of this activity?
2. What are you gathering evidence of? (A definite explanation would be helpful here as your practice would seem to of an indiscriminate nature - in that you recorded anyone who participated in or around the protest during the conference).
3. Once you have gathered this assorted digital data, how exactly is it being archived?
4. Are any of these captured images being further processed or analysed by image processing or computer enhancement techniques?
5. If so, what number of images in total is being processed by your technical staff as an overall proportion of those originally captured throughout your evidence gathering exercise during the protest period?
6. Are these recording and archiving practices specific to the G20 protest in London or rather standard practices to situations which might warrant a ‘public order’ or other unspecified concern by your force?

7. Are these captured images being data mined for any evidential purposes in regard to existing criminal investigations?

8. Are these captured images being data mined for any intelligence purposes in regard to existing criminal investigations or indeed for any other purposes?

9. If the data is being archived, for how long is it being archived?

10. Are these captured images being mined for any other purposes or archived for any possible future investigations?

11. Do your technicians (or subcontractors) employ any type of facial recognition software or biometrics technology to help identify specific individuals from the captured images?

12. Are these captured images employed to construct, enhance or inform any pre-existing or new ‘intelligence/surveillance files’, or indeed, constructing social, political or criminal justice profiles of any description upon demonstrators?

13. If so, do such files include protesters who were not known to have been involved in any illegal activities? Or alternatively, are the data used or archived with reference to only those individuals who are known to have a history of offending?

14. Were there specific individuals on a ‘surveillance list’ or other intelligence databases prior to the policing operation? If so, how many?

15. If these images are not being archived are they discarded at some future point in time? If so, when are the images discarded and what procedure is used to discard the images.

16. Does any other UK criminal justice agency, security agency, or other government department have access or is provided access to these captured images?

17. Is any other European or international agency or foreign national government enjoy access to or is provided access to these captured images?

18. How long have the Metropolitan Police (or its associated agencies) been acquiring protestor/demonstrator data by image gathering techniques by officer’s on the ground? (‘evidence gathering officer’s’).

19. Was the London City CCTV system also employed for image capture and subsequent processing, analysis and archiving of G20 protestors/demonstrators?

2. Ketttling’ Surveillance Strategy

1. The names and addresses of individual demonstrators were demanded of each person upon leaving the police cordon, what will happen to this personal information?

2. How have these names and addresses been recorded and how have they been archived?
3. Photographs of individual demonstrators were demanded of each person upon leaving the police cordon, why was this done and what will happen to this information?

4. How have these photographs been archived?

5. Are the names and addresses of demonstrators being cross matched with their photographs for archival purposes or any other purpose? If so, what is the purpose?

6. Will this personal and/or photographic data undergo any further analysis or scrutiny of any kind? If so, what will this analysis consist of and for what purpose?

7. Are these captured images and personal details being employed in any way to construct, enhance or inform pre-existing or new social, political or criminal justice 'intelligence/surveillance profiles on demonstrators'?

8. Are these captured images and personal details being employed in any way to be cross referenced, matched, collated or analysed in any way with any other datasets (police, security or other governmental datasets)?

9. Will the personal and/or photographic data from cordoned demonstrators be cross referenced/analysed with commuter data from the Transport for London data on passenger journeys from travel cards (Oyster cards')? If so, why and for what purpose?

10. If these images and personal data are not being archived will they be discarded at some future point in time? If so, how long will the images and personal details be held prior to being destroyed and what procedure is used to discard the images and personal data.

11. Will the demonstrator’s photographs and personal details be shared with any other UK criminal justice agency, security agency, or other government department?

12. Will the demonstrator's photographs and personal details be shared with any other European or international agency or foreign national government?

3. ‘Kettling’ Strategy Justification and Rationale

1. Why were your officers demanding the names and addresses of demonstrators, seemingly as a condition of leaving the police cordon?

2. Why were your officers taking photographs of each demonstrator seemingly as a condition of leaving the police cordon?

3. What was the purpose and justification for your officers to physically restrain demonstrators as they left the police cordon (by physical restraint I mean an officer grabbing their arm and holding them without their prior consent)? The Guardian Newspaper reported an officer stating this was to ‘prevent [each demonstrator] from falling over’. Is this the official justification?

If by chance there are questions you are unable to answer, could you kindly direct me as to where I may best find the answers.
I look forward to the favour of your earliest reply.

Yours sincerely,

FOI 4: Freedom of Information Request to MPS – Fellow Officer Reporting

Thursday, 22 July 2010

Freedom of Information Request

I would like to see any reports, memos, papers, briefing documents, emails, minutes or other documents from MPS (especially senior MPS management) relating to the Policing of the G20 in London during April 2009 or any subsequent public order operation conducted in London since that date (until 22.7.10) which make reference to or discuss:

Police Officer (or ‘Police Family’ members) reporting allegations of fellow Police Officer[s] (or ‘Police Family’) regarding misconduct; breaches of Standards of Professional Behaviour, or unlawful conduct of colleagues during the G20 operation or any subsequent public order operation (until 22.7.10).

Clarification of this FOI:


My earlier FOI established that NO Officers had made any reports or allegations concerning fellow officer (or ‘police family’) misconduct, unlawful behaviour or unprofessional conduct (including removal of identification marks/insignia) during the G20 operation. I would like to know whether MPS has raised this internally as a subject of discussion/concern/briefings or with an external body/statutory organisation, and what the contents of any such discussions/meeting/briefings were.
FOI 5: Freedom of Information Request to MPS – Police Batons

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FOI: MPS – Baton Type

Thursday, 15 September 2011

**MPS Batons**

1. Please could you tell me the make and model of police baton used by MPS?
   a. Please include both the short handed baton(s) and the long handed baton(s);
2. Please also indicate which baton(s) (make and model) are used by MPS TSG for public order policing purposes;
   a. Please state why said batons are chosen for public order policing?
   b. Please supply any MPS policy documentation relating to choice of police baton for public order policing;
3. Please also advise how long the current batons have been in service and advise if there are any planned changes (within the foreseeable future, including pre-tender/tender stage) to introduce new (or modified) batons?
   a. If so, please specify make and model?
   b. Reasons for adopting new baton?
4. Please also supply the manufacturer details (company name and country) for current (and planned) MPS batons.
FOI 6: Freedom of Information Request to MPS – Legal Costs

Tuesday, 05 July 2011

Met Police: FOI Legal Costs

What were the total full legal costs and any other associated costs incurred by MPS in challenging the two recent court decisions:

1. The (14th April 2011) High Court decision declaring unlawful "kettling" tactics used against demonstrators during G20 protests operations on the 1 April 2009 in Bishopsgate in central London.
2. An application from the MPS to the High Court to suspend an earlier ruling given on 19 May (emanating from an application for permission to appeal was made on 21 June) concerning the use of Police Bail procedures.
3. What is the total costs of all MPS legal challenges to any court over the past 5 years?
4. Who is responsible for the above decisions to challenge the High Court rulings?
5. What is MPS’ justification in launching legal challenges to British Courts? (please explain these justifications in details with any policy guidance documents or other accompanying records).

Please break down the cost by both challenges, and the total costs for the last 5 year period (preferably by annum).

In providing this information please state how the costs have been calculated. An approximate figure is acceptable if calculating the exact cost would prove onerous. If the total costs of these legal challenges are not known, please could you specify a date when the costs will be known?

Thank you.
Freedom of Information Request: MPS

I am conducting some research into occupational risks, media coverage and university student employment choices into the emergency services. One of my case studies is the G20 policing operation.

Deborah Glass stated in her article ‘The London G20 Protest: A bruising experience?’ Police Journal (vol 4, Issue 2, p160-2) that at least 34 police officers were injured during the 2009 London G20 summit policing operation - so this number could have been even higher! Please can you tell me:

1. How many police officers who took part in the G20 summit policing operation, were injured as a result of these duties?

2. What was the nature of these injuries? Please, can you itemise as precisely as possible what these injuries were as well as what treatment (if any) resulted from said injuries?

3. How many of these injuries required hospital treatment, or another specialist treatment (above and beyond first aid at the scene)?

4. In addition, please can you tell me if the injuries resulted in officers having sick leave, being put on ‘light duties’ or other special measures in order to fully recover from the injuries, and if so, for how long?

5. How many subsequent work days, if any, were lost due to officer’s injuries sustained from policing the G20?
11.3.2 Submitted Freedom of Information Requests Concerning the NATO Summit

FOI 1: Freedom of Information Request - NATO Summit Costs

MOD NATO FOI 22.11.17

Dear Ministry of Defence,

I have several questions regarding the hosting of the 2014 NATO summit in Wales.

It has been reported that the cost of the September 2014 NATO summit hosted in Wales to UK taxpayers was over £1.2 million pounds. Part of that cost was something called 'Production and media': at £5.9m.

1. Please can you provide a breakdown of these 'Production and media' costs, and list their main constituent items to the £10,000 metric (i.e. identify all costs over £10,000)
2. Other costs were 'Vetting and accreditation: £107,000', please can you similarly provide a breakdown of these costs.
   a. Please explain what you mean by 'accredited' as relates to the above meaning?
   b. In addition, can you state how many UK citizens were vetted (at any security level) for the NATO summit?
   c. In addition, can you state how many UK citizens were 'accredited' (at any security level) for the NATO summit?
   d. In addition, can you state how many non-UK citizens were vetted (at any security level) for the NATO summit?
   e. In addition, can you state how many non-UK citizens were 'accredited' (at any security level) for the NATO summit?
3. Please can you provide a breakdown of the 'Internal security: £1.7m' costs, and list their main constituent items to the £10,000 metric (i.e. identify all costs over £10,000).
4. Please can you state what 'An associated Ministry of Defence summit cost £694,000 to stage' means? What costs does this refer to please. Within the cost grounds of this FOI, please identify these individual costs.

Yours faithfully,

K. Christmann
11.3.3 Submitted Freedom of Information Requests Concerning the G8 Summit

FOI 1: Freedom of Information Request to MPS – Fellow Officer Reporting and Disciplinary Action

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Request Number: F-2013-03025

Keyword: Complaints/Discipline

Subject: Misconduct of Police Officers / Staff during Policing of G8

Request and Answer:

Question 1
Were any officers or police staff - either from the PSNI or deployed from other police services across the UK - arrested during or around the G8 in Northern Ireland in June of this year?

Answer
No police staff and no police officers either from the PSNI or deployed from other police services were arrested for incidents in any way related to the G8 summit which was held in Northern Ireland in June 2013.

Question 2
Were any officers or police staff - from the PSNI or otherwise - disciplined for any activity during or around the G8?

Answer
No police staff and no police officers from the PSNI or otherwise, were disciplined for any activity in any way related to the G8 summit.

Question 3
Were/are any officers or police staff - from the PSNI or otherwise - subject to investigation due to any misconduct during or around the G8?

Answer
No police staff and no police officers, from the PSNI or otherwise, were subject to investigation due to any misconduct in any way related to the G8 summit.

Question 4
If any officers or police staff were arrested, disciplined or were/are subject to investigation during this time, under what circumstances did these occur? How many were involved, and from which police services were they deployed?

Answer
Not relevant, please see responses to questions 1 to 3.
Question 5
During the G8 in Northern Ireland, what was the official procedure to deal with misconduct by officers or police staff brought in from other parts of the UK to help police the event?

Answer
No police staff were brought in from other parts of the UK. The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland has the legislative authority to deal with misconduct by officers brought in from other parts of the UK to assist the PSNI. This is by virtue and subject to arrangement under Section 60 of the Police (NI) Act 1998 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/32/contents

If you have any queries regarding your request or the decision please do not hesitate to contact me on 028 9070 0164. When contacting the Freedom of Information Team, please quote the reference number listed at the beginning of this letter.

If you are dissatisfied in any way with the handling of your request, you have the right to request a review. You should do this as soon as possible, or in any case within two months of the date of issue of this letter. In the event that you require a review to be undertaken, you can do so by writing to the Head of Freedom of Information, PSNI Headquarters, 65 Knock Road, Belfast, BT5 6LE or by emailing foI@psni.pnn.police.uk.

If following an internal review, carried out by an independent decision maker, you were to remain dissatisfied in any way with the handling of the request you may make a complaint, under Section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act, to the Information Commissioner’s Office and ask that they investigate whether the PSNI has complied with the terms of the Freedom of Information Act. You can write to the Information Commissioner at Information Commissioner’s Office, Wycliffe House, Water Lane, Wilmslow, Cheshire, SK9 5AF. In most circumstances the Information Commissioner will not investigate a complaint unless an internal review procedure has been carried out, however the Commissioner has the option to investigate the matter at his discretion.

Please be advised that PSNI replies under Freedom of Information may be released into the public domain via our website @ www.psni.police.uk

Personal details in respect of your request have, where applicable, been removed to protect confidentiality.
Appendix 4: Freedom of Information Responses

Here I document in chronological order my freedom of information requests made for this study, and responses to the requests. I have seen fit to redact the identities of correspondents, and reproduced the documents in pdf form for ease of display.

Mr Kris Christmann

Reference: T19539/8 18 September 2008

Dear Mr Christmann,

Thank you for your e-mail of 1 September to the Home Office regarding the police use of batons, particularly in disorder. Your request was handled in accordance with the terms of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

I regret to inform you that the Home Office does not hold the information that you have requested on the general police use of batons and also does not hold any research on the use of batons by police officers. However, I have been in contact with the ACPO Working Group, Self-Defence, Arrest & Restraint, who suggest you contact them at the following address regarding your questions:

Nicholas Sutcliffe (Inspector)
ACPO Working Group on Self-Defence, Arrest & Restraint Secretariat
Room 722, New Scotland Yard, The Broadway, London, SW1H 0BG

020 7230 0671

nicholas.sutcliffe@met.police.uk

If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review of our handling of your request by submitting your complaint within two months to the below address quoting reference 10181 to:

Information Rights Team
Information and Record Management Service
Dear Mr Christmann

REVIEW OF THE POLICING OF PUBLIC PROTEST: HMIC REFERENCE HMIC/FOI/2009/6

I am replying to the freedom of information request you made of HMIC on 2 June. I am the chief administrator in HMIC and I handle freedom of information matters; I am not directly involved with the Review.

I should begin by saying that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary is not a public body specified in the Freedom of Information Act 2000. However, we have chosen to operate as if we were, for two reasons: first, our “host” Department, the Home Office, is so specified, and secondly as it is our policy to publish almost all of our reports.

You posed five questions, and I believe that you will find that most are answered by the attached extract from our website. This was placed there on 12 May. In addition, you asked for information about those being consulted, and those conducting the Review. On your first point, we have set out to draw comments from those major protest groups which were present at the G20 demonstration, and individual participants or observers and the media, either by making contact with them or by responding to approaches made to the Review team.

As to the Review team itself, the Review is being conducted under the general direction (as is all HMIC work) of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Denis O’Connor. The Review team itself is led by Nick Brook, a senior civil servant on secondment from the Home Office. Senior advisers to the Review team include two HMIC Assistant Inspectors of Constabulary, Vic Towell and Jo Kaye; and the human rights adviser Jane Gordon. Other senior members of the Review team are Chief Superintendent Nicola Grevatt, Detective Superintendent Laurence Carr, Superintendent Moira Munro and Chief Inspector Julia Pink, who are all on secondment to HMIC from the Police Service. Each of these officers has experience in operational policing.

An External Reference Group is playing a critical part in ensuring impartiality of the review process. The group is drawn from a broad spectrum of interested groups and includes representation from Human Rights Groups, the media, academics, Government Departments and the police.
Its remit is to provide support and challenge to the review team and to develop critical thinking and ensure that the review draws from divergent views and that the conclusions are sound and evidenced based.

In addition, the team has a number of less senior police officers who are in the Police Service’s Higher Potential Development Scheme, and there is a small administrative resource.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent review of our handling of your request by submitting your complaint within two months to:

Information Rights Team
Information and Record Management Service
Home Office
4th Floor, Seacole Building
2 Marsham Street
London SW1P 4DF.

During the independent review our handling of your information request will be reassessed by staff who were not involved in providing you with this response. Should you remain dissatisfied after this internal review, you will have a right of complaint to the Information Commissioner as established by section 50 of the Act.

Stephen Wells
Head of Services
1 October 2014

Dear

Freedom of Information Request – Cost of NATO summit

Thank you for your recent request for information which I have enclosed below for ease of reference. Your request has been treated in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and/or the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.

Your Request: NATO Summit Costs

Please note that the council does not hold information on costs incurred by other organisations and as such this reply is limited to costs incurred directly by Newport City Council. This is in line with the Freedom of Information guidance on ‘recorded information.’

Newport City Council is pleased that the Nato summit was considered a considerable success and gave the city a presence on the global stage.

There was positive feedback on the ability of Newport and Wales to host such a significant event.

However, this did come at a direct cost to the city council and initial estimates indicate that the additional costs incurred in relation to the Nato summit were around £46,000, excluding staff costs. The council is seeking the recovery of the additional costs which has to be done through the Welsh Government.

These relate mainly to the two protest marches in the city, for example the provision of road closure signage, as well as providing water and toilet facilities for the peace camp in Trefedgar Park.

If the cost of staff time is added in, it is likely that the total cost would exceed £100,000. This amount represents an estimate as staff time is not recorded in Freedom of Information terms.
14 April 2015

Dear

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 - REQUEST REF: 0256-15

Thank you for your email of 05 March 2015 asking for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000.

I am writing to confirm that we have now completed the search for the information which you requested. I can confirm that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) does hold some information relevant to your request.

You asked:

1. Regarding the NATO summit in Wales a list of where each head of state/government stayed if not accommodated in the Celtic Manor and if this was paid for by the UK government.

ANSWER: Please see Annex A for the list of hotels used by delegations attending the NATO Summit. The British Government did not contribute to accommodation costs for delegation hotels listed in Annex A.

2. The number/type of cars and coaches that were hired for the NATO summit.

ANSWER: Please see Annex B for the list of vehicles used during the NATO Summit.

3. The organisational structure of the NATO summit organisation secretariat e.g media, protocol, accreditation.

ANSWER: Please see Annex C for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office NATO Summit Organogram.

4. A list of the delegations from each country attending the summit excluding any security/intelligence personnel.

ANSWER: The information you have requested in question 4 is not held by this Department. The accreditation process was managed by NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.

Some of the information in Annex A and C has been withheld using Section 24 (National Security), Section 27 (international relations) and Section 40 (personal data).
We believe that naming where each Head of State/Government stayed and naming the officials in the FCO Orgnigram for the NATO Summit is personal data relating to third parties. It is our view that disclosure of this information would breach the first data protection principle, which states that personal data should be processed fairly and lawfully. Section 40(2) and (3) of the FOIA therefore apply. It is the fairness aspect of this principle which we think would be breached by disclosure in this case. In such circumstances Section 40 confers an absolute exemption on disclosure. There is, therefore, no public interest test to apply.

We have also concluded that naming where each Head of State/Government stayed during the NATO Summit is exempt from disclosure under Section 24 (1) of the FOIA. Section 24 is a qualified exemption, which requires the application of a public interest test. The FCO believes releasing this information could compromise the security of future visits to the United Kingdom by Heads of State/Government from countries who attended the NATO Summit in Wales. We acknowledge the public interest in openness and transparency but we consider there is also a public interest in the FCO protecting national security. We have therefore concluded that the exemption applies and that withholding the material serves the public interest better than release in this instance.

Section 27(1)(a) of the FOIA recognises the need to protect information that would be likely to prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and other states if it was disclosed. The application of s.27(1)(a) requires us to consider the public interest test arguments in favour of releasing and withholding the information. We acknowledge that releasing information on this issue would increase public knowledge about our relations with NATO Allies and Partner countries. But s.27(1)(a) recognises that the effective conduct of international relations depends upon maintaining trust and confidence between governments. If the United Kingdom does not maintain this trust and confidence, its ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations will be hampered, which will not be in the public interest. For these reasons we consider that the public interest in maintaining this exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing it.

Once an FOI request is answered, it is considered to be in the public domain. To promote transparency, we may now publish the response and any material released on gov.uk in the FOI releases section. All personal information in the letter will be removed before publishing.

The copies of information being supplied to you continue to be protected by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. You are free to use it for your own purposes, including any non-commercial research you are doing and for the purposes of news reporting. Any other re-use, for example commercial publication, would require the permission of the copyright holder. Most documents supplied by the FCO will have been produced by government officials and will be protected by Crown Copyright. To re-use Crown Copyright documents please consult the Open Government Licence v3 on the National Archives website.

Information you receive which is not subject to Crown Copyright continues to be protected by the copyright of the person, or organisation, from which the information originated. You must ensure that you gain their permission before reproducing any third party (non-Crown Copyright) information.
Yours sincerely,

Event Manager
Conference & Events Team

Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 20170500000238

I write in connection with your request for information which was received by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 06/05/2017. I note you seek access to the following information:

1. Are you conducting some research into occupational risks, media coverage and university student employment choices into the emergency services? One of my case studies is the G20 policing operation. Deborah Glass stated in her article 'The London G20 Protest: A bruising experience?' Police Journal (Vol 4, Issue 2, p160-2) that at least 34 police officers were injured during the 2009 London G20 summit policing operation - so this number could have been even higher! Please can you tell me:

   1. How many police officers who took part in the G20 summit policing operation, were injured as a result of these duties?
   2. What was the nature of these injuries? Please, can you itemise as precisely as possible what these injuries were as well as what treatment (if any) resulted from said injuries?
   3. How many of these injuries required hospital treatment, or another specialist treatment (above and beyond first aid at the scene)?
   4. In addition, please can you tell me if the injuries resulted in officers being put on ‘light duties’ or other special measures in order to fully recover from the injuries, and if so, for how long?
   5. How many subsequent work days, if any, were lost due to officers injuries sustained from policing the G20?

DECISION

This E mail is to inform you that it will not be possible to respond to your request within the cost threshold.

This response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act). Please see the legal annex for further information on the exemptions applied in respect of your request.

REASONS FOR DECISION

In regards to Question 1: How many police officers who took part in the G20 summit policing operation, were injured as a result of these duties?

I can advise that searches were made within HQ Human Resources and SCO22 Public Order, who confirmed the information requested is not held in the format you are seeking. Therefore, initial enquiries were made to determine how the MPS would extract the information relevant to your request.

To this end, I have located previous MPS responses to similar Freedom of information requests made around the time of the G20 summit in 2009. These responses confirmed that 18 officers were injured during the G20 summit policing operation. It was also noted at the time that the MPS only held this type of information regarding its own officers. Therefore you may wish to contact other forces individually, namely: The City of London Police, British Transport Police and
the Sussex police.

However, in order to confirm the exact total number of MPS officers injured for this event, which took place over 8 years ago, will exceed the appropriate threshold. This is because the scale of the policing operation was considerable, as mentioned in the HMIC report ‘Adapting to Protest’, which states ‘Protests were held in the City of London on the 1st and 2nd April 2009 to coincide with the G20 Summit. The scale of the policing operation required was considerable – on 1st April alone there were 10 separate protests over seven sites in London’. Further reference can be found on this link: [https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hnio/media/adapting-to-protest-20090705.pdf](https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hnio/media/adapting-to-protest-20090705.pdf).

In regards to Question 2. *What was the nature of these injuries? Please, can you itemise as precisely as possible what these injuries were as well as what treatment (if any) resulted from said injuries?*

Please find below the data previously disclosed concerning the nature of the injuries. It should be noted that at the time when the original responses were sent in 2009, it was explained that searches were conducted on the MetAir system and that this system did not record the treatment given to individuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident Category</th>
<th>Body Part</th>
<th>Body Part Rate Per%</th>
<th>Category Total</th>
<th>Category Per%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Another kind of accident</td>
<td>Back</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit by a moving, flying or falling object</td>
<td>Hand R</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arm R</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eye L</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eye R</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finger R</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foot R</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shoulder</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit something fixed or stationary object by a person</td>
<td>Knee L</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically assaulted by a person</td>
<td>Arm L</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eye L</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eye R</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Head L</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Head R</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Throat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured while handling, lifting or carrying</td>
<td>Elbow L</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shoulder</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regard to the remaining questions: 3. *How many of these injuries required hospital treatment, or another specialist treatment (above and beyond first aid at the scene)?* 4. *In addition, please can you tell me if the injuries resulted in*
officers having sick leave, being put on 'light duties' or other special measures in order to fully recover from the injuries, and if so, for how long?

5. How many subsequent work days, if any, were lost due to officers injuries sustained from policing the G20?

To provide you with the additional breakdown for each injured officer, will require a member of police staff to locate each individual officer’s personal medical file (for example OH records, MetHR records and MetAir reports) and any other relevant records both manual and computerised concerning deployment on the 1st and 2nd April 2009. All records would need to be read as it would not be possible to determine whether or not any pertinent information was held within each record being considered. It is this aspect of the request that will exceed the 18 hour threshold under the Act.

We therefore estimate that the cost of complying with this whole request would exceed the appropriate limit. The appropriate limit has been specified in regulations and for agencies outside central Government; this is set at £450.00. This represents the estimated cost of one person spending 18 hours [at a rate of £25 per hour] in determining whether the MPS holds the information, and locating, retrieving and extracting the information.

Section 16 Advice and Assistance

I would like to provide you with some advice and assistance as to how you may narrow your request so that it does not exceed the appropriate limit. However, I am unable to advise you any further on narrowing your request, other than providing you with the information in this response. This is because even if you narrowed the scope of your request, this would still require a member of police staff reading through many records and would still exceed the threshold under the Act.

Yours sincerely

Mr. Lyng
Information Manager

LEGAL ANNEX

Section 17(5) of the Act provides:

(5) A public authority which, in relation to any request for information, is relying on a claim that section 12 or 14 applies must, within the time for complying with section 1(1), give the applicant a notice stating that fact.

Section 12(1) of the Act provides:

(1) Section 1 does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the authority estimates that the cost of complying with the request would exceed the appropriate limit.

Section 16 of the Act provides:

(1) It shall be the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance, so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so, to persons who propose
to make, or have made, requests for information to it.

(2) Any public authority which, in relation to the provision of advice or assistance in any case, conforms with the code of practice under section 45 is to be taken to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (1) in relation to that case.

**COMPLAINT RIGHTS**

**Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the decision is incorrect?**

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the response with the case officer who dealt with your request.

**Complaint**

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
foi@met.police.uk

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your complaint within 20 working days.

**The Information Commissioner**

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner please visit their website at [www.ico.org.uk](http://www.ico.org.uk).

Alternatively, write to or phone:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Appendix 5: FOI Disclosure Log (Pertinent FOI Responses)

I write in response to your request for information that was received by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 29 July 2013. I note that you seek access to the following information:

"Of those police officers from your force providing operational mutual aid to the PSNI during the G8 summit operation in June 2013, how many were:

1. Arrested (and nature of alleged offence)
2. Returned to their home force ahead of their expected end date as a result of drunken/anti-social behaviour/criminal behaviour (and nature of alleged offence)
3. Reported with a view to prosecution as a result of an incident in Northern Ireland (and nature of alleged offence)
4. Subjected to internal disciplinary proceedings as a result of an incident in Northern Ireland (and nature of alleged offence)?"

Of those police officers and civilian support staff from your force providing non-operational/training mutual aid to the PSNI during the G8 summit operation in June 2013, how many were:

1. Arrested (and nature of alleged offence)
2. Returned to their home force ahead of their expected end date as a result of drunken/anti-social behaviour/criminal behaviour (and nature of alleged offence)
3. Reported with a view to prosecution as a result of an incident in Northern Ireland (and nature of alleged offence)
4. Subjected to internal disciplinary proceedings as a result of an incident in Northern Ireland (and nature of alleged offence)?"

Following receipt of your request, I have conducted searches to locate information relevant to your request. These searches failed to locate information of the description specified by your request.

DECISION
No MPS police officers or members of police staff were arrested, returned to the MPS as a result of drunken/anti-social/criminal behaviour or reported for alleged criminal and/or disciplinary conduct as a result of an incident connected to the G8 Summit in Northern Ireland in June 2013.

COMPLAINT RIGHTS
This notice concludes your request for information. I would like to thank you for your interest in the MPS.

Your attention is drawn to the attached sheet which details your right of complaint.

Should you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please write or contact
Yours sincerely

In complying with their statutory duty under sections 1 and 11 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to release the enclosed information, the Metropolitan Police Service will not breach the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. However, the rights of the copyright owner of the enclosed information will continue to be protected by law. Applications for the copyright owner's written permission to reproduce any part of the attached information should be addressed to MPS Directorate of Legal Services, 1st Floor (Victoria Block), New Scotland Yard, Victoria, London, SW1H 0SG.

COMPLAINT RIGHTS
Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the response with the case officer who dealt with your request.

Complaint

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Public Access Office
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
PublicAccessOffice@met.police.uk

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your complaint within 20 working days.

The Information Commissioner

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner please visit their website at www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk. Alternatively, phone or write to:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wyche House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone: 01625 545 700
I respond in connection with your request for information which was received by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 28/02/2013. I note you seek access to the following information:

@metpoliceuk Freedom Of Information #FOI request How many “officers” are you sending to the #G8 summit in Northern Ireland during June 2013?

Following receipt of your request searches were conducted within the MPS to locate information relevant to your request.

**EXTENT OF SEARCHES TO LOCATE INFORMATION**

To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted within Specialist Crime and Operations - Public Order and Operations Support

**RESULT OF SEARCHES**

The searches failed to locate any information relevant to your request, therefore, the information you have requested is not held by the MPS.

Final numbers have not yet been confirmed.

**COMPLAINT RIGHTS**

Your attention is drawn to the attached sheet which details your right of complaint.

Should you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please write or contact me on

Yours sincerely
I write in connection with your request for information which was received by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 13/09/2013. I note you seek access to the following information:

I would like to make a FOI request in relation to the anti G8 demonstration in London, which took place on the 11th of June 2013.

1. Please provide the total number of arrests made on this date. Please also provide details of all cautions and charges brought forward on this day.

2. Please provide details concerning evidence of the presence of weapons in the dwelling on Beak Street that was raided by members of the police force on this aforementioned date.

3. Please provide detailed information concerning any weapons found within the aforementioned dwelling.

4. Please provide the full text of the warrant secured in relation to the aforementioned property.

5. Please provide information concerning the planning of the policing operation on the 11th of June and especially whether any assessment was carried out under the Human Rights Act 1998 by the police force in order to ensure the right to the freedom of assembly.

**EXTENT OF SEARCHES TO LOCATE INFORMATION**

To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted within Specialist Crime & Operations (SC&O).

**RESULT OF SEARCHES**

The searches located records relevant to your request.
DEcision

I have today decided to disclose the located information to you in full.

I will answer your questions in turn.

In Question 1 you asked:

Please provide the total number of arrests made on this date. Please also provide details of all cautions and charges brought forward on this day.

The MPS Response is:

Total Number of Arrests: 54

Total Number of Cautions: 2
* Possession of Class A Drugs
* Possession of Cannabis

Total Number of Charges: 15
* Articles to Commit Criminal Damage x 2
* Obstruct Constable
* Section 4 Public Order
* Possession of a Knife x 3
* Assault on Police x 3
* Theft
* Wanted on warrant
* Burglary
* Assault
* Criminal damage

All other suspects were either Bailed or No Further Actioned (NFA):

* NFA x 15
* Bailed x 22

In Question 2 you asked:

Please provide details concerning evidence of the presence of weapons in the dwelling on Beak Street that was raided by members of the police force on this aforementioned date.

The MPS Response is:

The following items were found and recovered in Beak Street:

Paintbombs
Spraypaint
Penknives
Multiple hacksaw blades
Sludge hammers
Crowbars
Multiple hammers
Metal bar
Handsaws

In Question 3 you asked:

Please provide detailed information concerning any weapons found within the aforementioned dwelling.

The MPS Response is:

See answer to question two re weapons found.

In Question 4 you asked:

Please provide the full text of the warrant secured in relation to the aforementioned property.

The MPS Response is:

11 June 2013
00:59

On this day an application supported by information was made by DS [Exempt S40] (Please see below for reasons for exemption of this information).

Warrant under Section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to enter:

The one set of premises situated at [Exempt S40] (Please see below for reasons for exemption of this information) BEAK STREET, W1F 9RQ

And search for:

Items to be used by suspects to commit criminal damage at any of the planned protests organized by the Stop G8 Campaign.

Authority is hereby given for any constable (+ accompanied by such other person or persons as are necessary for the purposes of the search), to enter the said premises on the number of occasions specified below within three months from the date of issue of this warrant and on each such occasion to search for the material in respect of which the application is made.

Number of occasions that each set of premises may be entered and searched under this warrant is:
Please note that in respect of the Officer making the application and the address that the warrant was executed at that Section 40(2)(3) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) applies.

Section 40(2)(3) of the Act states that information should be exempt if the question asked constitutes a request for personal information which is not the requestors.

Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).

I have applied this exemption in that the names of the individual identified by this documentation and the private address indicated constitutes personal data which, if released, be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The eight principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of the names of officers that are recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to Condition one and six of Schedule 2 of the DPA.

Condition one of the DPA requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to whether disclosure would constitute legitimate processing of that data.

Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.

This exemption is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

**In Question 5 you asked:**

Please provide information concerning the planning of the policing operation on the 11th of June and especially whether any assessment was carried out under the Human Rights Act 1998 by the police force in order to ensure the right to the freedom of assembly.

**The MPS Response is:**
The MPS works with event organisers, as well as internal and external partners and stakeholders in planning and facilitating thousands of events every year. The policing operation in place in London on 11th June 2013 related to a GB protest and was subject of a planning process overseen by a Gold public order Commander responsible for strategy, and Silver responsible for achieving the strategic aims.

Part of the Gold strategy was consideration of all relevant human rights enshrined within current legislation. That consideration sought to ensure that police helped to facilitate peaceful protest whilst maintaining the Queen's peace, preventing crime and disorder, and making sure that the rights of protestors were balanced against those of the wider community.

**COMPLAINT RIGHTS**

Your attention is drawn to the attached sheet which details your right of complaint.

Should you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please email or contact me on

Yours sincerely
COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the response with the case officer who dealt with your request.

**Complaint**

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Public Access Office
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
PublicAccessOffice@met.police.uk

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your complaint within 20 working days.

**The Information Commissioner**

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner please visit their website at www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk. Alternatively, phone or write to:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Winnalow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone: 01625 545 700
Appendix 6: MPS: Evidence & Actions Book (EAB)

The following section of the Appendix reproduces some sections of the Police Evidence & Actions book, (a copy was obtained from MPS). The EAB has not been reproduced in full as this is not necessary for the purposes of this Appendix, only to identify the pertinent sections as relates to this study.

This document is 48 pages long and comes in the form of a compact note book. Its purpose is to record the majority of incidents a police officer attends and to form a written record of incidents where the police have been called to take action (including use of force) (MPS EAB, 2010). Here the officer should make ‘thorough and professional notes’ in the appropriate sections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PERSONS CONCERNED/ARRESTED 1</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surname</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forename</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Title</strong> (Mrs., Miss, Mr.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADDRESS</strong> - Business or Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contact No.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Email</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Address</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post Code</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationship</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KNOWN TO BE INFORMED</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDENTITY CODE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELF DEFINED ETHNICITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DATE/LOCATION TO BE INFORMED</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INFORMATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date/time informed</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUSPECT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INJURY COMPLAINTED OF</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DETAILS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BODY LOCATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## WITNESSES
Full list of all police and private witnesses who can provide evidence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness 1</th>
<th>NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss, Ms.)</th>
<th>ADDRESS (Business or Private)</th>
<th>Post Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Contact No.</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness 2</th>
<th>NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss, Ms.)</th>
<th>ADDRESS (Business or Private)</th>
<th>Post Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Contact No.</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

## WITNESSES continued
Full list of all police and private witnesses who can provide evidence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness 3</th>
<th>NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss, Ms.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Contact No.</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VICTIM/SUSPECT/PERSON CONCERNED 2 DESCRIPTIVE FORM

Ethnic appearance as described by witness

IC Code: ________________ Height ________________

Apparent Age: ____________ Sex: ________________

Build: * Fat / Proportional / Thin / Stocky / Athletic / Heavy

Other: ____________________

Hair Colour: * Dark Brown / Light Brown / Fair / Blonde / Grey /
White / Black / Ginger / Auburn /

Other: ____________________

Hair Type: * Bald / Thinning / Receding / Straight / Curly / Wavy /
Dyed / Short / Collar length / Shoulder length / Very Long / Wig /

Other: ____________________

Eyes: * Blue / Brown / Green / Grey / Cast / Staring /

Other: ____________________

Complexion: * Fresh / Pâle / Ruddy / Tanned / Fair / Freckled /
Dark Tone / Mid Tone / Light Tone Other: ____________________

Facial Hair: * Beard / Moustache / Bushy Eyebrows / Sideburns /

Other: ____________________

Glasses Worn: * Yes / No Description: ________________

Accent: ________________

Words Used: ________________
* Ring where appropriate

**Glasses Worn:**  * Yes / No  * Description:

**Access:**

**Words Used:**

**Marks / Scars / Peculiarities:**  *(Describe Below)*

**Clothing:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Hat:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Top Coat:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Jacket:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Jumper:</strong></th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Shirt:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Trousers:</strong></th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Dress:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Skirt:</strong></th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Belt:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sock(s):</strong></th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Shoes:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Jewellery:</strong></th>
</tr>
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</table>

**Vehicle Used:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Reg. No.:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Make / Model:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Colour:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Type:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ring where appropriate

**Officer’s Name/Signature**

**Witness’s Name/Signature**
“STREET IDENTIFICATION” (Code D para. 3.2)

Use this section to record the “street identification” procedure. This informal procedure MUST NOT BE USED if police have sufficient information to justify the arrest of a particular person for suspected involvement in an offence. It allows a witness to be taken to any location at any time to see whether they can identify the person they saw.

- Make every effort not to direct the witness’ attention to any individual unless, in the circumstances, this cannot be avoided.
- If there is more than one witness, make every effort to keep them separate in order to prevent them influencing each other.

Record witness details on page 12/13
Record suspect details on page 3/4
Remember to date stamp signatures (with ATR)

(Record of Procedure)

Offence Details:

Date: ___________________ Time: ___________________
Place: ___________________
Type of offence: ___________________
Time police called (e.g., CAD): ___________________

Identification Process:

Date police speak to witness (at scene): ___________________
Time: ___________________ Place: ___________________

Note: If practicable, record the witness’s description of suspect(s) (use page 16)

If NOT practicable record the reason: ___________________
Note: If practicable, record the witness’s description of suspect(s) (use page 14)

If NOT practicable record the reason:

Ask: “Have you given this description of the suspect(s) to anyone else?”
Yes ☐ No ☐ If “Yes” record details (e.g., BT/police operator)

Ask: “Have you discussed the suspect’s description with any other witness?”
Yes ☐ No ☐
If “Yes” record personal details/description of other witness:

Route taken by witness to ID venue:

ID Venue:

Post Code:
Use this section to record the "street identification" procedure. This informal procedure MUST NOT BE USED if police have sufficient information to justify the arrest of a particular person for suspected involvement in an offence. It allows a witness to be taken to any location at any time to see whether they can identify the person they saw.

- Make every effort not to direct the witness’ attention to any individual unless, in the circumstances, this cannot be avoided.
- If there is more than one witness, make every effort to keep them separate in order to prevent them influencing each other.

Record witness details on page 12/13
Record suspect details on page 3/4
Remember to ‘date stamp’ signatures (with ATR)

(Record of Procedure)

Offence Details:
Date: ........................................... Time: ...........................................
Place: ...........................................................................................................
Type of offence: ...........................................................................................
Time police called (e.g., CAD): .................................................................

Identification Process:
Date police speak to witness (at scene): ..............................................
Time: ........................................... Place: ..............................................

Note: If practicable, record the witness’s description of suspect(s) (use page 14).

If NOT practicable record the reason:

..................................................
NOTES MADE AT SCENE OF INCIDENT/ARREST

TIME NOTES STARTED:

LOCATION NOTES MADE:

PERSONS PRESENT:

Notes not made/completed at scene must be recorded on page 33.

- Record first descriptions on page 14.
- Include questions and answers before and after caution. Keep an open mind. You are duty bound to gather all evidence. You should include hearsay.
- Do not be afraid to ask questions without cautioning. An officer is entitled to question any person from whom he or she thinks useful information can be obtained.
- Interviews of suspects must comply with PACE Codes of Practice.
- Offer notes of conversation for signature.
- ATR this page as soon as you arrive at the police station.
SUPERVISION

ALL EABs MUST BE SUPERVISED

Indicate whether the officer needs to make additional notes to clarify the details of the.

Yes ☐ No ☐

☐ scene the officers faced
☐ grounds for search / 5996 completed
☐ use of force
☐ use of officer safety equipment
☐ arrest / ID CCP PLAN
☐ CCTV
☐ review officer’s actions re victim / witness
☐ MERLIN PAC
☐ other (please specify)

I discussed the need for further notes with (Name of Officer)______________________

Full details of actions officer is to take

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

Supervisor’s signature_________________________

Print name and number_______________________

Date and time______________________________

Email________________________@met.pnn.police.uk
VICTIM/SUSPECT/PERSON CONCERNED 2
BACK
PLAN for Human Rights

Proportionality:
Police actions must be fair and achieve a balance between the needs of society and the rights of the individual. You should consider different options capable of achieving the objective and select the least intrusive.

Legality:
Police actions must be supported by legislation or stated cases. You must know your basic police powers well.

Accountability:
Police actions will be open to scrutiny. You should fully record your actions and the options considered. Show what factors influenced your decision, include reasons for not taking action.

Necessity:
Police actions must be 'necessary in a democratic society'. You must be able to justify any infringement of rights.

Retention period: 7 years
MP 56708
Appendix 7: Summit Flyers to Residents

Picture 60: Police Flyer to Local People in Newport

Appendix 8: Photographs from the G8 (2013) London Convergence Centre and Protests

Whilst I have only made mention of the June 2013 G8 London Summit Protests in this study in respect to the raid and smashing of the convergence centre, I have included some photographic stills from the centre prior to and post this raid in this additional Appendix (not the actual raid, where I was at the time outside of the convergence centre trying to get back in but blocked from doing so by newly formed police lines).
Picture 61: PLO's at G8 London Convergence Centre Being Rebuffed By Protestors

Picture 62: MPS Riot Police Pursuing Protestors (Post Destruction of Convergence Centre)

Picture 63: MPS Riot Police Beset Protestors and Surveil (All Taking Notes)

Picture 64: PLOs at G8 London Convergence Centre Prior to centre Being Raided and Destroyed by MPS

Picture 65: MPS Riot Police Beset Protestors and Take Notes (Post Convergence Centre Destruction)

Picture 66: MPS Officers Beset Protestors Surveil and Take Notes
Picture 67: MPS Riot Police Surveilling Protestors and Taking Notes

Picture 68: MPS Riot Police Follow Protestors on London Underground (One bored Officer reads the Metro)

Picture 69: Legal Observer in Carriage with Protestors and MPS Riot Officers

Picture 70: MPS Uniformed Officers Surveilling Protestors and Taking Notes