Psychological Engagement in Choice and Judgment Under Risk and Uncertainty

Theories of choice and judgment assume that agents behave rationally, choose the higher expected value option, and evaluate the choice consistently (Expected Utility Theory, Von Neumann, & Morgenstern, 1947). However, researchers in decision-making showed that human behaviour is different in choice and judgement tasks (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968; 1971; 1973). In this research, we propose that psychological engagement and control deprivation predict behavioural inconsistencies and utilitarian performance with judgment and choice. Moreover, we explore the influences of engagement and control deprivation on agent’s behaviours, while manipulating content of utility (Kusev et al., 2011, Hertwig & Gigerenzer 1999, Tversky & Khaneman, 1996) and
decision reward (Kusev et al, 2013, Shafir et al., 2002).