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Memory-Biased Preferences With Judgments and Decision-Making Prospects.

Kusev, Petko, Ayton, Peter and van Schaik, Paul (2008) Memory-Biased Preferences With Judgments and Decision-Making Prospects. In: Psychonomic Society Annual Meeting, 13-16th November 2008, Chicago, Illinois. (Unpublished)

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The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e.g., Birnbaum, 2008;
Brandstätter et al., 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Tversky & Koehler, 1994) of judgment and decision making share a common representational
assumption: people’s preferences and decisions under risk and uncertainty are task-independent. In five experiments, we studied the extent to which theories of judgment, decision making, and memory can predict people’s preferences. Applying prospect theory and support theory to these data, we find that (1) the weighting function required to model decisions with high-accessible features in memory exhibits different properties than those
required to model choices between monetary gambles, and (2) the accessibility (Fox & Levav, 2000; Kahneman 2003; Koriat, 2001) of events in memory affects choices between options, influencing participants’ decision
weights, but not their judgments of these options. This result indicates a failure of the descriptive invariance axiom of expected utility theory.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Subjects: Q Science > Q Science (General)
Schools: Huddersfield Business School
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Depositing User: Petko Kusev
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2017 13:28
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2021 12:21


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