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SECURITIZATION THROUGH RE-ENCHANTMENT: THE STRATEGIC USES OF MYTH AND MEMORY

Introduction

The concept of ontological security has come to be associated in late-modern sociology with the loss of moorings in a global order of what Bauman refers to as unsicherheit, a combination of risk, doubt, fear, mistrust and insecurity. A global order in which the modernist anchors of class, gender, race, religion and nation have been called increasingly into question renders the process of identity acquisition a matter of danger, but also of opportunity for some. Along with other citizens in the contemporary world, many Canadians have experienced ontological insecurity and existential anxiety. Mitzen refers to ontological security as: ‘the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time’. Ontological insecurity is further associated with the confusion, doubt and mistrust that comes from competing sources of collective identity. Lacking a clear and coherent sense of personal identity, citizens become increasingly disenchanted and disengaged from the political process.

As we shall see in the Canadian cases under consideration in this article, the attainment of ontological security does not necessitate either essentialism or monological reasoning with regard to one’s social identity. In fact tolerance of ambiguity when it comes to one’s identity is the basis of an ontologically secure openness to plurality, inclusivity, and diversity. Irrespective of this, certain entrepreneurs of identity, including dominant forces within the State, may choose to privilege and promote particular collective narratives and myths in order to furnish discursive anchors that will attach large groups of citizens to specific constructions of political reality and political projects. To the extent that such uses of myth and memory succeed in galvanizing and mobilizing a large enough group of citizens on the basis of a shared re-enchantment, the dominant political forces are entrenched and their agenda are supported.
This article brings together research traditions in ontological security, securitization studies, and the analysis of (dis)(re)enchantment in order to illustrate the strategic use of discourses and the shaping of regimes of signification surrounding the construction of national myths. We examine the role of the government in the promotion of collective identities and the building of regimes of signification. The central contention of the article is that the Canadian Conservative government of Stephen Harper, which governed from 2006-2015, largely failed in its attempt to re-enchant Canadians through the displacement of a pre-existing liberal regime and its replacement with a more securitized regime of signification. The Harper government attempted to reframe Canadian narratives and myths, promoting those that challenged the liberal regime of postcolonial citizenship, multiple and hybridized belonging, seeking to supplant them with more traditional narratives of Anglo-conformist nationalism and loyalism. The methodological approach adopted in the analysis of the three cases is a discourse analysis of government documents and transcripts of speeches. Three sites of discursive intervention are investigated to illustrate the strategic work of the Harper government in shifting the dominant regime of signification: (1) National Museum and Archive policy, specifically the renaming of the Canadian national museum; (2) the militarization and royalization of national institutions and commemorations, notably the renaming of the Canadian navy and; (3) the privileging of anglo-centric and loyalist tropes in the performance of citizenship rituals, and associated with this, reforming Citizenship legislation.

**Canada: The Colonial and Postcolonial Context**

Each of these three initiatives represents an attempt to recover the boundedness and connectivity of conservative and colonial Canada in the face of a pre-existing liberal cosmopolitical and hybridized postcolonial identity. It is evident throughout the analysis of these changes that the strategic goal of changing the regime of signification requires considerable hegemonic work on the part of the government and its supporters. The pre-existing and long-standing liberal social order that the Harper Conservative government sought to supplant remains profoundly popular and embedded. As we shall see, the liberal social order has resisted attempts at direct transformation.
While the impact of coloniality with regard to Indigenous Canadians continues to shape
the present in profound ways, Canada’s history as a white settler outpost of European
empires, with no further colonial history of its own beyond internal colonization,
constitutes the basis for the evolution of ideologies and discourses of nationality in
Canada. The coexistence of balanced and powerful ethnoreligious minorities in Canada’s
past, the French Catholic and English Protestant communities of the 18th and 19th
centuries, sustained a politics of elite accommodation, evident in the historical
compromises of the Quebec Act of 1775, the Constitutional Act of 1791, the introduction
of Responsible Government in the late 1840s, and the Constitution Act of 1867. Under
these constitutional developments, the colonial hegemony of the British North American
Empire was always balanced and tempered through the French fact, the survival of first
nations, as well as through the evolution of a federal state based de facto upon strong
provinces.

Ironically, it was on the basis of such a conservative social order that the preconditions
emerged for cultural pluralism, communitarianism, accommodationist ethnic policies,
multiculturalism, and diversity. While the bases of these cultural traditions were
mediated through Canadian loyalism to the British connection and adherence to a
monarchical order, the communitarian development of Canada as a ‘community of
communities’ established the cultural grounds for pluralism and multiculturalism. A key
moment in the development of contemporary liberal Canada was the creation of the
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963), under the leadership of
Liberal Prime Ministers Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau. The work of this commission
eventually produced Canada’s official bilingualism and multicultural policies, which
entrenched a pluralistic civic nationhood in which membership of communities was
grounded in individual choice and the premise that Canada’s communities would strive
for co-operation, communication, and collaboration in a broader civil society. In the face
of an aggressive and troubled United States in the 1960s, at war in Vietnam and
experiencing the upheavals of the civil rights movement, an assertive pan-Canadian
nationalism conditioned the emergence of a distinctive and independent Canadian civic
nationality, combining liberal individualism with an openness to collective identities. The public policy face of this liberal regime was constructed around the introduction of official multiculturalism (1971), the Foreign Investment Review Agency (1973), a series of nationalized industries and crown corporations, notably Petro-Canada (1975), the Citizenship Act (1977), and the passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. Each of these policies contributed to an evolving regime of signification in which individual freedom, a sense of independent civic nationhood, and a communitarian recognition of diverse communities combined to shape a liberal social order. While the deep cultural traditions of accommodation and tolerance for diversity continued, these governmental and legislative changes both reflected and further conditioned shifts in the political culture and political economy of Canada away from the traditional. They highlighted a break with the largely Anglo-conformist heritage of Canada toward a more cosmopolitical, pluralistic and progressive polity that entered Canadian society.\(^9\) Notable among the changes was the passage of the 1977 Citizenship Act, which removed the prior discrimination in favour of British Subjects over Aliens. The liberal social order forged a unified civil society in which ethno-cultural particularisms and social norms were matters of individual volition rather than collective attribution. The liberal social order was in general highly regarded and the various changes it conditioned became highly popular.\(^{10}\) Both the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and official multiculturalism remain highly popular and defining characteristics of Canadian civic nationality, the attachment to which and sense of collective identity from its citizens remains high.\(^{11}\)

**Securitization and Re-enchantment**

The concept of ‘securitization’, theorized by the Copenhagen School of International Relations, brings together the structural analyses of global forces and relations with phenomenological analyses of the circumstances under which such forces and relations come to be socially constructed as threats by political and other leaders, and the consequent political projects they establish to counter such threats.\(^{12}\) To securitize an issue challenges society to promote its value by committing greater resources to solve the related problems through confrontation and compulsion, while desecuritization means
removing an issue from the realm of politics of existential survival thus making it easier
to resolve through cooperative means.\textsuperscript{13} Mitzen’s analysis focuses on states as actors. She
argues that ‘states seek to secure their identity as a particular kind of actor’.\textsuperscript{14} Both
Mitzen and Kinnvall develop the concept of the securitization of subjectivity, by which is
meant the recourse to familiar and trusted anchors and markers of identity that often
invoke myths, parables and other metanarratives associated with the nation, religion and
gender.\textsuperscript{15} Such bids to securitize are intolerant of ambiguity, uncritical and essentializing,
promoting black and white perspectives, boundary making and an us and them mentality.

The concept of disenchantment was first theorized in the work of Max Weber, who took
the expression from Schiller.\textsuperscript{16} The concept describes the loss of a sense of spiritual and
affective attachment that is associated with growing secularization and bureaucratization
in modern society. The late modern onset of existential anxieties and ontological
insecurities can be expressed in certain ways as a deepening of disenchantment through
diminishing trust in grand narratives and established institutions, combined with a
generalized uncertainty, fear and insecurity. The potential for re-enchantment arises
through two principal channels, according to Jenkins: First, recourse to everyday
explanatory frameworks that transcend rationalist and logical explanations; and, second,
collective attachments that counter and even stand in opposition to rationalism. Jenkins
exemplifies the first as including ‘frameworks of luck and fate; long-established or
‘traditional’ spiritual beliefs; ‘alternative’ or ‘new age’ beliefs; and ‘weird science’.\textsuperscript{17} The
second category includes: ‘collective attachments such as ethnicity; sexualities;
toxications and ecstasies; the escapism of television, computer games, and the internet;
and consumerist cultural hedonism’.\textsuperscript{18} The political arena constitutes a site in which
entrepreneurs of identity can attempt to shape re-enchantment through the use of
symbols, metanarratives, myths, event planning, public architecture, rhetoric, and
spectacle. For Klein historical memory is mythico-religious.\textsuperscript{19} Klein’s analysis of
historical memory reveals that memory can constitute forms of re-enchantment that are
counter-hegemonic and run counter to the canons of the received historical record,
thereby empowering and validating the lives of marginalized peoples. At the same time,
memory can also be invoked in the service of ethno-nationalist and particularist projects.
Three Cases

In the context of pre-existing widespread support for the liberal social order, the Harper Conservatives attempted to re-enchant certain Canadian myths of nationhood and did so in part by calling into question and limiting the authority and impact of those agencies that might challenge their social conservative narratives and discourses in their attempt to ‘crush once and for all what remains of the left’s agenda [and] its vision of a just society’. This included environmental agencies, wayward backbenchers, the Courts, government scientists and Statistics Canada. In a 2013 survey of professional public servants, 24 percent reported being often or sometimes asked to exclude or alter technical information for non-scientific reasons. A further 37 percent reported being prevented from answering questions on their areas of expertise from the media or the public. By calling such agencies into question, the moorings of authority and scientific certainty were substantially loosened. Such loosening opened the way to new hegemonies as regimes of signification were reshaped. As Brubaker notes, ‘Nationhood is not an unambiguous social fact; it is a contestable – and often contested – political claim’. The tropes of nationhood are produced and consumed in a specific cultural economy. The Conservatives attempted to reshape who was employed in the production of cultural knowledge and how much control they exerted over their labour process and technologies of cultural production, and through attempting to influence the dissemination and conditions of reception of such knowledge, they actively reshaped the regime of signification.

Securitizing measures were substantially enhanced under the Harper Conservatives, with a broad range of new legislation on border control, immigration, citizenship and counter-terrorism. The general law and order agenda of the government included moves such as increasing mandatory minimum sentences in a climate of declining crime, introducing victims’ rights legislation, and defunding health programs designed to help drug addicts. Given Canada’s broad political cultural support for the core values of the Pearson and Trudeau era, notably support for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and for
multiculturalism, the Harper Conservatives’ criticisms of the liberal social order were initially muted and covert. Harper’s goal was to win over Canadians to social conservative values through gradual change and multiple small and seemingly insignificant acts that taken together shifted the cultural landscape. The general thrust of Harper’s social conservative project of transformation was evident in a speech he made to Civitas, a right-wing thinkers group, in 2003 in which he criticized the ideas of the left:

The real challenge is therefore not economic, but the social agenda of the modern Left. Its system of moral relativism, moral neutrality and moral equivalency is beginning to dominate its intellectual debate and public-policy objectives [...] It has moved beyond old socialistic morality or even moral relativism to something much darker. It has become a moral nihilism – the rejection of any tradition or convention of morality, a post-Marxism with deep resentments, even hatreds of free and democratic western civilization [...] we need to rediscover Burkean or social conservatism because a growing body of evidence points to the damage the welfare state is having on our most important institutions, particularly the family.  

The covertness of Harper’s approach was evident when he later stated that ‘real gains are inevitably incremental […] The explicitly moral orientation of social conservatives makes it difficult for many to accept the incremental approach. Yet in democratic politics, any other approach will certainly fail […] conservatives should be satisfied if the agenda is moving in the right direction, even if slowly’.

The Conservative project was to shape a new social agenda that would benefit the party at election time through the cultivation and expansion of a moderate conservative middle ground of support. The Harper Conservatives often quietly and covertly unfolded a series of strategic and tactical interventions as well as policy initiatives designed to roll back the liberal social order reforms and to reinvent a more traditional and British Canada.
Invoking the generalized perceptions of risk and threats to security in Canada, particularly in a post 9/11 context, the Harper Conservatives attempted to re-enchant certain Canadian metanarratives through the invocation of a conservative patriotism. There are direct parallels here to Stuart Croft’s work on the construction of ‘Britishness’ and how this has contributed to both the securitization of the majority population as well as the insecuritization of Muslim minorities since 9/11.\(^\text{26}\) Harper’s project was focused on symbols and metanarratives of Canada as a proud military nation, the Crown and the monarchy, family values, and conformity to a set of conservative civic virtues. As a corollary, the Conservatives eroded and undermined a series of pre-existing liberal metanarratives of Canada as a peacekeeper, and honest broker in the world between the global South and the advanced world as well as the West and the East. It called into question the core elements of Canada as a pluralistic multicultural state and a socially progressive and environmentally conscious country. In brief, a central project of the Harper Conservatives was to root out the liberal social order and to re-enchant a social conservative order anticipated to slowly transform the political culture and institutions of Canadian politics. In this regard, they were attempting to accomplish what Brent Steele characterizes as ‘consistent self-concepts’ that would anchor the Canadian state through forms of routinized foreign policy.\(^\text{27}\) As we shall see, the attempt to impose such a uniform and monological narrative ultimately foundered in the face of the dominance of Canada’s diverse, contested and open regime of signification.

Harper attempted to re-enchant the myths of the imperial British connection and as Canada as a loyal outpost of empire. In his first major speech made outside Canada, to the UK Chamber of Commerce, Harper referred to Canada’s past in the following terms:

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\ldots \text{ much of what Canada is today we can trace to our origins as a colony of the British Empire. Now I know it’s unfashionable to refer to colonialism in anything other than negative terms. And certainly, no part of the world is unscarred by the excesses of empires. But in the Canadian context, the actions of the British Empire were largely benign and occasionally brilliant.}\]^{\text{28}}
Paying homage to Winston Churchill Harper drew on an image of Canada as hegemonically white, Anglo-Saxon and masculine and a Canada of deference toward the elites with an associated set of Burkean social conservative values on Crown, loyalty, nation and family. It is this blending of securitization with re-enchantment that we examine throughout the remainder of this article.

Renaming the Canadian Navy

The Harper Conservatives accentuated the British connection in many ways. Embassies around the world and the Department of Foreign Affairs were ordered to hang images of Queen Elizabeth in prominent places. From 2012 - 2015 certain Canadian embassies closed and reduced Canadian staffs took up residence as lodgers in British embassies in a direct symbolic move that placed official Canada literally under the British flag, thereby symbolically shrinking Canadian sovereignty. Harper referred to the UK – and Canada’s connection to it – as: ‘the “little island” and the “Great Dominion” … eternally bonded by language, culture, economics and values’.  

Despite the historical experiences of Canada in claiming and pursuing an independent foreign and defence policy from the First World War onward, including a successful Second World War naval campaign in which Canada emerged as a global force, the bonds of attachment to Britain continued to be strong. Following the Second World War, there was a generalized sense among Canada’s political class as well as the junior officers and ratings in the Royal Canadian Navy – as it was known at that time – that its senior officer class was a cohort of extreme anglophiles, who insisted on regarding the Canadian navy as an extension of the British navy and of propagating archaic British customs that were increasingly out-of-place in the Canadian context. One example was Rear Admiral Harold T. Grant who insisted on sending all junior officers to Britain to complete their training, removed all ‘Canada’ flashes from uniforms, ordered officers to remove the word ‘Canada’ from their uniforms and removed maple leaf symbols from ship funnels in the fleet’. In 1963, one of the old guard, Rear Admiral Jeffrey Brock, made the mistake of putting on a show of pomp and ceremony in order to impress the new Liberal Minister
of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, on a visit to Halifax. Hellyer was appalled at what he regarded as ‘an abuse of indentured labour reminiscent of the dark ages’. Under Hellyer, the armed forces were unified in the years 1966 to 1968 and the use of the term ‘Royal’ in the navy and air force was discontinued in 1968. He then presided over a Canadianization and modernization of the navy in moves designed to bring the armed forces into conformity with the liberal social order. The emphasis was on the consolidation of a small professional military, specialized in peacekeeping. Traditional distinctive uniforms of the army, air force and navy were abandoned, to be resurrected under the Mulroney Conservative government in the mid 1980s.

The Harper Conservatives came in determined to re-enchant Canada as a courageous and muscular military nation, and took advantage of the year to celebrate the War of 1812 as a chosen glory of the Canadian nation. Further militarization characterized preparations for the spectacle of 2017, Canada’s 150th anniversary. Harper and his colleagues were determined to rid Canada of what they perceived as decades of Liberal indifference toward the military and to redefine Canada as a fighting nation. Examples of how the Harper Conservatives made symbolic use of politics was in the 2007 designation of a 170 kilometre stretch of Highway 401 as ‘The Highway of Heroes’ and the plan to erect a ‘Mother Canada’ statue in Cape Breton, depicting a 24 metre-tall statue of a grieving woman, arms outstretched toward Europe. There was relatively little parliamentary debate on the matter of the proposed renaming of the navy. However, in 2010, the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence took up the issue. In those debates, while there was a consensus view that the term ‘Canadian Navy’ should replace ‘Maritime Command’, there was a split on whether ‘Royal’ should be added.

Those speaking in favour downplayed the British and imperial connections and made the argument that a ‘Royal’ navy expressed a proud and distinctive Canadian tradition under the Crown. The strongest supporter of this view was witness Ian Holloway, Dean of Law at the University of Western Ontario and naval reservist. Holloway attached the Royal label to a generalized pride in Canada’s military history: ‘it [“Royal Canadian Navy”] is the name under which we had the third largest navy in the world at one point’.
Holloway applied the logic that since all naval ships were called ‘Her Majesty’s Canadian ship’ and since all naval personnel swore allegiance to Her Majesty, then it was logical to refer to the navy as The Royal Canadian Navy. Senator Mitchell rejected that perspective, arguing that just because an institution swore allegiance to the Queen, did not necessarily imply that it would be called Royal.37

These attempts to shift the ground of the signifieds and referents of ‘Royal’ were contradicted by those, including Senator Mitchell, who argued: ‘To me, it just drags us back into the past and belies that effort, those accomplishments and many of the great moments in Canadian military history’.38 Mitchell’s rhetorical tactic here was to link the concept of an independent and non-royal navy tradition to the chosen glories of a mythologized Canadian military greatness, thereby calling into question the monopoly of the royalists in claiming this connection. Mitchell further claimed that ‘“Royal” conjured up an era of a shroud of colonialism that covered Canada and does not reflect the present era’ and ‘I cannot see how “Royal” in front of “Canadian Navy” can in any way, shape or form enhance, inspire greater pride than simply “Canadian” all by itself. Why do we need a crutch?’39 In 2011, the Harper Conservatives re-named Canada’s navy and air forces to include the word Royal.40 Those who criticized the move regarded it as a backward step to the days of Canada as a dominion of the British Empire. The government followed this up in 2013 by discontinuing the use of the term Canadian Forces and returning to the expression Canadian Armed Forces.

This was a further move toward renaming the military in more martial terms. Also in 2013, the Harper government ordered the removal of maple leaf rank designations from Canadian uniforms, restoring the British army pips that were in use on Canadian uniforms until the 1960s.41 In each of these steps, the government occluded the history of the Canadian navy under the decades of the liberal social order and symbolically reinvented the glories of the British connection and the Manichean perspective of Canada at war with friends and foes.
The renewed Royal Canadian Navy reimagined battle fleets aggressively defending supply lines rather than taking part in peacekeeping patrols and goodwill missions. The renaming exercise for the navy was connected to Harper’s Northern Vision and assertive claims to Arctic sovereignty. This vision recalled the Prime Ministership of Conservative John Diefenbaker, who held power prior to Pearson and Trudeau, was an anglophile and promoter of the Commonwealth, and who himself promoted a Northern vision. It further linked to the social conservative and Cold War rhetoric of fighting the Russians, this time for access to shipping ways opened up by climate change and, consequently to potential new sources of fossil fuels.

Renaming Canada’s National Museum

Croft makes reference to the manner in which museums perform identity work ‘to construct and maintain a personal narrative and in so doing, to sustain ontological security’.

The passage of Bill C-7, the Canadian Museum of History Act in 2013 was ostensibly a routine updating and renewal of the federal heritage mandate and presented as little more than applied good sense. Its major provision changed the name of Canada’s largest museum from the ‘Canadian Museum of Civilization’ to the ‘Canadian Museum of History’. However, some key stakeholders, including the Canadian Association of University Teachers, the Canadian Historical Society and the Canadian Anthropology Society, testified before the Senate that the museum would disproportionately focus on Canada’s military past.

The changes took place in the broader context of the Harper government’s lionization and mythologizing of certain historical events, including the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain. The War became a new founding myth regarding the Canadian nation and its celebration an invented tradition. Harper wrote:

I invite all Canadians to share in our history and commemorate our proud and brave ancestors who fought and won against enormous odds….The War helped establish our path toward becoming an independent and free country, united under
the Crown, with a respect for linguistic and ethnic diversity. The heroic efforts of Canadians then helped define who we are today, what side of the border we live on, and which flag we salute.44

Behind this revisionism was an attempt to reframe Canada’s multicultural heritage from civic pluralism and the setting of the liberal social agenda to a social conservative referencing of Canada as a fulfillment of its British colonial roots in a Manichean reassertion of borders. In this effort, many Canadian agencies were enlisted, including Heritage Canada, National Defence, Parks Canada, Canada Post, and Library and Archives Canada.45 Both the language of Bill C-49 (an earlier version of Bill C-7 that died on the order paper) and the Minister of Canadian Heritage, James Moore, stated that the programming of the new museum would focus on Canada’s history and identity rather than ‘anthropology and different civilizations’.46 Moore’s speech to the House of May 22 2013 was replete with the rhetoric of nostalgia and chosen glories and the construction of national myths: ‘Canada needs a national institution that celebrates our achievements and what we have accomplished together as Canadians. Our children need to know more about Canada’s past’.47

Moore employed similar rhetoric in his communication with the House of Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage in which he outlined the Harper government’s plans to celebrate Canada’s 150th anniversary in 2017:

The road to Canada’s 150th birthday offers us an unprecedented opportunity to celebrate our history and the achievements that define who we are as Canadians. Recognizing anniversaries such as the bicentennial of Sir George-Etienne Cartier’s birth, the centennial of the start of the First World War, the 75th anniversary of the start of the Second World War and the bicentennial of Sir John A. Macdonald's birth encourages Canadians to gain a true sense of our nation’s history and reaffirms our pride in our achievements. Our government is proud to invest in projects that contribute to our collective identity and define who we are as Canadians […] .48
Moore’s language reflected the social conservatism of the Harper government in its focus on two historical wars and two prominent conservative politicians of the past. In an ideological bid, Moore claimed this as ‘true’ and central to the constitution of Canada’s national identity and history. There was no mention of the historical fate of Canada’s First Nations, the lives of immigrants, the poor or women, and Canada of the past 50 years was not referenced. A debate on the renaming of the museum took place on June 5, 2013. Minister of Canadian Heritage, James Moore, opened the proceedings by declaring ‘There is nothing ideological about this. It’s actually quite straightforward’. 49

This is the classic defence of all ideologues and is in fact a central aspect of hegemonic work: to claim that one’s own position is mere good sense and business as usual occupies a rhetorical centre ground for whatever is being promoted. The strongest critic of the proposed renaming was James Turk, a witness to the Committee and Executive Director of the Canadian Association of University Teachers. Turk began by pointing out that there had been very little contact with professional historians, anthropologists and archaeologists in the deliberations leading up to the name change. Pointing to changes in the language of the Act in comparison to the one it replaced, Turk pointed out that references to ‘the research and knowledge advancement function of the museum is under threat’. 50 Turk further pointed out that:

The new act will replace the museum’s emphasis on human cultural achievements and human behavior with “ […] events, experiences, people and objects that reflect and have shaped Canada’s history and identity […] ”. It’s a troubling emphasis on dates, heroes, and objects, an approach that historians have moved well beyond. The great man/great woman version of history risks leaving out the experience of the vast majority of Canadians […] Other concerns are the elimination or marginalization of the history and culture of first nations people, and of issues of colonization, industrialization, gender relations, migration, environmental transformation, and so forth. 51
Turk made reference to widespread cuts in the budgets of Library and Archives Canada, Parks Canada, the closure of federal department libraries, reduction in public access to libraries, elimination of inter-library loans at the National Library and the elimination of grants for local and regional archives. In the context of these broad cuts to programs and institutions as well as the lack of consultation and unilateral moves by the government, Turk stated that:

The decision to transform the Canadian Museum of Civilization seems part of a pattern that suggests the government’s interest in using history to serve its own political agenda […]. The celebration of the War of 1812 was the transformation of a rather tawdry series of skirmishes into some defining characteristic of Canada’s history. The rewriting of the study guide for people who want to become new citizens […] is a celebration of heroes, warriors, with pictures of warrior events […] It’s the glorification of the monarchy […].

Turk’s reference to citizenship and the monarchy linked renaming the Museum of Civilization as the Museum of History both to the renaming of the Canadian navy and to the reforms in the Citizenship Act, which we consider next. In all three instances, the common link, as Turk observed, was to render history and memory in the service of specific metnarratives of past glories and social conservative discourses. Among Immigration Minister, Jason Kenney’s senior advisors in redrafting the Canadian citizenship guide - to which Turk refers - was Chris Champion, whose book stressed the enduring characteristics of the British connection and downplayed the achievements of the Pearson/Trudeau decades.

**Reframing the Citizenship Act**

The new Citizenship Act, passed as Bill C-24 in June 2014. Its central provisions included the requirement that applicants for citizenship demonstrate ‘knowledge of Canada and of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship’. It further substantially
increased the residency requirements of permanent residents in order to address the perceived challenge of Canadians of convenience, those who were not physically present in Canada throughout most of the waiting period. The Act also tightened up the regulations around the revocation of citizenship, extending it to those who had been convicted of treason, terrorist or other serious offences. In practical terms, this could only apply to dual citizens, including some who had been born and lived exclusively in Canada. This in essence created a second class of Canadian citizenship, one that applied to those with dual nationalities, some of whom might potentially face the prospect of exile. According to Barbara Jackman of the Canadian Bar Association such changes to the rights of dual nationals were probably unconstitutional.55

The issue of constitutionality was raised in Question Period in the House by NDP MP Andrew Cash, who said: ‘Mr. Speaker, what is clear is that this bill proposes new powers to deport a Canadian-born citizen to a country to which they have no connection. This is nonsensical, and it is most likely unconstitutional’.56 In response, the Minister accused the NDP of underestimating the threat to Canada caused by ‘terrorists, traitors and spies’.57

These issues were further elaborated in the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology on June 17, 2014. In the debate on the Citizenship Bill, Senator Eggleton stated: ‘One of our witnesses, Lorne Waldman, pointed out that this bill is creating two classes of citizens: Those who were born here and are free to travel, take jobs, go have their education wherever they want, stay as long as they want; and then there are those who are naturalized citizens, who could be accused of misrepresenting their intent to reside and as a result could lose their citizenship’.58

Reframing the Citizenship Act exhibits elements of what Vivienne Jabri argues is colonialism on a transnational scale: ‘We might say that where the colony in modernity was subject to conquest, the postcolony is subjected to the post-panoptic governmentalizing manifestation of power, where populations and not simply individuals, are shaped and regulated into governable, manageable entities’.59 In the

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context of other securitizing moves, the Citizenship Act was premised on the basis of a master narrative of global insecurity, evidenced in the dual citizen approach to citizenship revocation, as well as the attempt to re-enchant a Eurocentric view of Canadianism. Such provisions favoured the European communities and Western immigrants and were bolstered by a substantial increasing in the cost of applications for citizenship as well as significantly more demanding language requirements.

**Conclusion**

The renamings of Canada’s armed forces to include a Royal Canadian Navy and Canada’s largest and most important museum as the Canadian Museum of History, as well as the ongoing legislation to tighten up citizenship controls and regulation in Canada, were expressions of steps designed to securitize subjectivity. These were implemented by the Harper Conservatives in the context of re-enchanting a mythical Canada of the past, grounded in the British connection, muscular militarism and loyalty to the Crown. This version of Canada attempted to reshape the regime of signification in such a way as to privilege social conservative readings of history and to diminish the impact of the pre-existing liberal social order. The new version of history was of kings and queens, heroic deeds and wars, in which Canada of the past was again a dominion of the British Empire. Strategically taken into the contemporary era, this promoted a Canadian nation that rejected what the Harper government regarded as the moral relativism and neutrality of the liberal social order and replaced it with a robust and Manichean world view of a set of core Canadian values, represented in the new citizenship requirements, in which Canada’s borders were securitized through stringent and differential requirements for dual citizens and new Canadians as they were immersed into a set of specific ‘Canadian values’.

Further supporting this was a national Museum of History, which while as a government agency it retained its official freedom from interference in the running of its day-to-day operations, had been recast as a showcase for past glories, promoting an Anglo-centric ethnicity, rather than an institution devoted to the critical questioning of Canada’s past,
an institution whose renaming took place without extensive contact with experts in history, archaeology and anthropology. The resurrection of the royal connection and the renaming of the navy and air force made use of the re-enchantment afforded by royal tours and the romance associated with the British class system to securitize Canada’s place in the world, to recall heroic acts of the past and to reframe the military as masculinized armed forces prepared to attack the enemy and protect ‘our values and freedoms’.

The Harper Conservative’s bid to transform Canadian political culture and institutions reached its apogee in the federal election campaign of August to October, 2015. Locked into a challenging three-way contest, the Conservatives introduced a series of cultural wedge issues around security, ethno-racial differences, cultural politics and immigration. These were designed to shore up their support base. Measures included: A dramatic securitization of immigration, refugee and citizenship policy, in which the spectre of the terrorist loomed large: the implementation of a ‘barbaric cultural practices tip line’; and a ban on the wearing of the Niqab at citizenship ceremonies. The Conservatives lost the election and while their socially conservative initiatives might have solidified their base of support, it is evident that they were largely unsuccessful in undermining core liberal social values, at least in English-speaking Canada.

Given the defeat of the Harper Conservatives in the federal election of 2015 and the new administration of the Liberal Party of Canada under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, it remains to be seen how effective have been the various attempts at institutional reframing and cultural transformation of the Harper decade. The prominence of a range of socially conservative and securitizing policy pronouncements during the campaign and their evident inability to convert Canadian voters, indicates that the liberal social order remains dominant in at least English-speaking Canada. A national survey by the Environics Institute in October 2016, a year after the victory of the Trudeau Liberals and following the arrival of 31,000 Syrian refugees into Canada, demonstrated that attitudes toward immigration among the Canadian public had grown more positive. The proportion expressing concern that immigrants were not adopting ‘Canadian values’ was ‘the lowest
recorded in more than 20 years’. Equally, the proportion of those believing that ‘immigration controls are effective in keeping out criminals’ was the highest in over 20 years. The Harper project was desecuritized throughout the election campaign in a manner similar to the two-fold process described by Rumelili.\textsuperscript{62} The threat of physical security concerns was substantially diminished, while the core sense of ontological security associated with the liberal social order was re-instituted. Rumelili identifies the challenges associated with such processes of desecuritization when he asks: ‘How may Self/Other relations be re-configured to remove the perception of threat while maintaining the distinctions necessary for security-of-being?’\textsuperscript{63} The answer, at least in the ascendancy of the Trudeau Liberal Party and its victory over the Harper Conservatives, is that in the Canadian context, categorizations and identifications of Self and Other in the tradition of the liberal social order have a longstanding grounding in multiculturalism, in which differences are already recognized and affirmed as equal, mutually supportive, and integrated into a larger civic unity.

As the eldest son of former Liberal Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, whose administration ushered in many key liberal social policy shifts, current Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau fought the 2015 election campaign on the repeated rhetorical invocation of a positive politics of inclusion and hope set against the negative politics of division and fear. In the immediate aftermath of the election, the new Trudeau administration set about dismantling elements of the symbolic order of the Harper administration. Throughout their first year in office, the Trudeau Liberal government has systematically dismantled and reversed substantial elements of the Harper Conservative legacy. Bill C-24, The Citizenship Act, has been repealed. The Trudeau administration ordered the removal of the portrait of HM The Queen in the lobby of the Foreign Affairs building and their replacement with two Canadian coastal landscapes that originally hung in the same spot. For now at least, Canadians have supported the avowedly desecuritizing entrepreneur of identity, rather than his securitizing counterpart. In so doing, Canadians have opted for the postcolonial possibilities of an open and diverse regime rather than for the social closure and bordered exclusion of an essentialized and binary order.
The regime of signification encompasses a cultural economy, which is comprised of the relations of production of cultural objects; conditions of their reception; an institutional framework between production and consumption; and the ways in which cultural objects circulate. It also refers to modes of signification, and specifically relations between the signifier (sound, word or image), the signified (concept or meaning) and the referent (the object in the real world) (Scott Lash, *The Sociology of Postmodernism*, Oxford: Routledge, 1990, p.5).


29 Harper, Address by the Prime Minister of Canada at the UK Chamber of Commerce.
31 Hellyer in Milner, ‘More Royal Than Canadian’, p. 281.
33 Noah Richler, What We Talk About When We Talk About War, Fredericton, NB: Goose Lane Editions, 2012; Jamie Swift and Ian Mackay, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety, Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012.


42 Croft, ‘Constructing Ontological Insecurity’, p. 223.


54 Canada, Bill C-24: An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts. Legislative Summary, Ottawa: Library of Parliament.


60 A phone line dedicated to the reporting of anyone suspected of engaging in behaviour deemed to be ‘barbaric’. There was no precise definition and such behaviour remained ill-defined beyond the vague characteristic of contrary to ‘Canadian values’.

