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Big Data Risk Analysis for Rail Safety?

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ABSTRACT: Computer scientists believe that the enormous amounts of data in the internet will unchain a management revolution of uncanny proportions. Yet, to date, the potential benefit of this revolution is scantily investigated for safety and risk management. This paper gives a brief overview of a research programme that investigates how the new internet-driven data-revolution could benefit safety and risk management for railway safety in the UK. The paper gives a brief overview the current activities in this programme and infers whether big-data techniques provide a sensible addition to the safety and risk sciences. The overview shows that there is added value for introducing these techniques in the safety and risk domain but serious challenges need to be addressed.

1 DATA-REVOLUTION IN GB RAIL

1.1 Big data and safety management in railways

Computer scientists are quite clear in their belief that the data-revolution is coming of age. They have a firm belief that the enormous amounts of data floating around in the internet will unchain a management revolution of uncanny proportions (Chen et al. 2012, McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012; Watson & Marjanovic, 2013). Yet, to date, the potential benefit of this revolution is scantily investigated for safety and risk management.

Big data is the label for methods and techniques that take advantage of the large amounts of data on the internet however, authors disagree on the exact definition (Davenport 2014, Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). The broad interpretation is that big data deals with huge volumes of a variety of data-sources very quickly (volume, variety & velocity). In a narrower interpretation it is the next step in the development of decision support tools. In practice big data describes cloud-computing software tools that combine structured and unstructured data sources to support (commercial) management decisions.

In railway engineering some work was published about cloud computing and machine learning (Tan & Ai 2011; Li 2013; Thomas 2014). A particular area of interest is the acquisition of data with RFID systems (Yan & Yu 2009; Zhang & Tentzeris 2011; Makalar & Roy 2014; Kour et al. 2014). Although these works contain some references to safe operation, the do not deal with safety- or risk management.

This work investigates whether and how rail safety and risk management could benefit from a new generation of software tools that computer scientists develop today. This paper contributes to that aim by considering the initial experience gained in the BDRA research programme at the University of Huddersfield.

1.2 Data strategy for the GB railways

The choice for investigating whether the data-revolution could benefit safety and risk for the railways in the UK is not a coincidence. The increased dependency on data is addressed in The Rail Technical Strategy Report 2012 (TSLG, 2012). The report presents a vision for the GB railways for the next decade. The vision is based on the fact that the number of passengers on trains will continue to grow in the UK. With this growing demand, the railways have to ensure customer satisfaction and value for money by being safe, reliable, resilient, meeting capacity and being service oriented. Six innovation themes were defined to support these objectives: control, command and communication; energy; infrastructure; rolling stock; information and customer experience. These themes heavily depend on data. In support of these efforts Network Rail and ATOC have made relevant data-feeds available through the internet.
1.3 RSSB

RSSB is GB’s foremost rail risk analyst. It maintains the Safety Risk Model (SRM) and ensures that the data quality is maintained in the national incident database SMIS. About two years ago, an additional incident database was introduced that enables railway personnel to report so called ‘Close Calls’. RSSB has identified that maintenance and analysis of these databases and risk models is a meticulous task that could benefit from the modern big-data data-analytics techniques (Bearfield et al. 2013). This work is connected to these efforts in the sense that it supports RSSB in their efforts to introduce data-analytics into the SRM model and provides horizon scanning for future opportunities of data-analytics for rail safety and risk in the UK.

1.4 Current projects

This paper is written at a time that the Big Data Risk Analysis project is starting up at the University of Huddersfield. The research project is a joint effort by RSSB and the Institute of Railway Research at the University of Huddersfield. The objective is to investigate to what extent big data techniques can support the current risk model of RSSB and to investigate whether the modern data-analytics methods will change traditional risk analysis methods, and if so, how. Therefore, this paper presents an overview of the activities rather than detailed scientific analysis; these are reported in other papers in this conference and elsewhere (Hughes & Figueres 2015, Hughes et al. in prep., Figueres et al. in prep.). This overview helps understand whether the big data approach is sensible for safety and risk sciences and how safety and risk management could benefit from it. This paper treats the design of a technical system for BDRA applications, a description of two projects with some of their results, a brief consideration about software design for integrated BDRA applications and a conclusion.

2 TECHNICAL SYSTEM FOR BDRA

There are three major components in the technical system for BDRA. They are a Hadoop computer cluster, industry servers containing databases, interface devices and the Internet. Figure 1 depicts the system.

2.1 Data in the GB railways

The data servers of railway industry partners are depicted in the left of figure 1. The GB railway system depends on collaboration of many organizations in the railway industry including train operating companies, infrastructure managers, rolling stock companies, maintenance and construction companies, enforcement bodies, regulatory bodies and many more. Each of these companies assembles information about the railway system for their own purposes or to support the railway industry as a whole. Much of
this information is stored on servers that contain databases, information about technical systems, safety management systems, documents and laws. These servers are owned by individual organizations but sharing some of that data could benefit BDRA applications. Network Rail and ATOC are currently providing access to live data-streams that feed live data about trains and tracks: BPLAN, Corpus, Movement, RTPPM, Schedule, SMART, TD, TSR, VSTP, Fares Data, Timetable Data and Routing Data (NR 2015, ATOC 2015). All these feeds carry safety-relevant data.

RSSB plays an important role in the sharing of safety-relevant information. Especially the SRM and the information gathered through the SMIS database and the Close Call database provide key building blocks for BDRA. The current interpretation and analysis of these databases is based on well-known analysis techniques where incident databases feed fault-tree models (Dacre 2014).

Not all safety-relevant information is found on railway servers. The weather forecast or football matches would not typically be stored on railway servers but could be relevant for BDRA for GB rail. Since industry partners displayed a particular interest in these data-sources, they will be investigated in the near future.

2.2 Central processing cluster

Hadoop is the name of free software that combines the computing power of several commodity computers into a single processing cluster (White, 2012). Hadoop distributes data and algorithms over a number of commodity computers and collects the results after they have been processed. The software is robust in the sense that built-in redundancies protect against the loss of data by the failure of individual computers in the cluster. The use of commodity computers makes computer power cheap in the sense that the hardware can be bought from any computer supplier and even second-hand computers could be used. Though the maintenance of such a computer system requires the support from the ICT department, significant computer power is in reach for all but the smallest organizations in the GB railway industry. In addition to that, Hadoop is extensively used by Big Data researchers around the world.

Since safety-relevant data is distributed over many different servers in the railway system it is unlikely that a single computer cluster will collect all the safety-relevant information. It is envisaged that the central Hadoop cluster will be supported by auxiliary Hadoop clusters owned by train operating companies.

2.3 User interfaces

To date we have experience with one user interface (for RAATS, see paragraph 3.1) and work on an extensive literature review which is published elsewhere in this conference (Figueres et al. in prep.). We theorize that there will be three types of interfaces that safety experts recognize: safety-dashboards, mobile applications and warning systems.

Safety dashboards are based on safety indicators that are calculated from the data-sources. A dashboard assists (safety) decision makers, enforcers, and analysts to assess the current safety-situation in the GB railways. Each indicator would be supplied by an individual BDRA application that works with dynamic data from live-feeds or static data from databases. It is too early to report progress in this area but it is envisaged that the dashboard would be uniform throughout the GB industry. That is to say, there will only be one dashboard application that can be accessed by all GB railway industry partners. RSSB’s SRM and the safety indicators associated with it are the starting point for BDRA safety indicators.

Mobile applications could present a safety dashboard but more likely they are tools for entering data. At present, workers in the GB railways can use mobile applications to make a close call report. It is envisaged that mobile applications support a single group of workers, such as track workers. In contrast to the safety dashboard, many different mobile applications will be used to support different groups of workers in the GB railway industry.

The third application would be a relatively straightforward warning system. A warning system could give a heads-up for particular track sections when a storm is approaching or an automatic alerting system for the British Transport Police of rising crime rates at particular train stations. Again, it is envisaged that alarm systems would derive their information from the dashboard but would only target relevant groups of workers. Though these systems seem conceptually straightforward, the development of a reliable software application is challenging.

3 INITIAL BDRA APPLICATIONS

As this paper sticks to an overview of activities it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a complete description of the BDRA tools; this is reported elsewhere (Stow et al. 2015, Hughes & Figueres 2015, Hughes et al. in prep., Figueres et al. in prep.). A brief description of the applications provides insight in two fundamentally different developments.

3.1 RAATS

An event where a train passes a signal showing a red stop aspect without authorization is known as a 'signal passed at danger’ (SPAD). SPADs can range
from minor incidents where a signal is passed by only a few meters to a collision between fully loaded passenger trains. Following a fatal accident at Ladbrooke Grove in 1999 in which there were 31 fatalities (HSE, 2000), the GB rail industry made significant efforts to reduce the rate of SPADs.

SPAD risks are analyzed using a process which examines the potential consequences of passing a particular signal at danger. A weakness in the analysis was that it is unknown how many times trains approach a signal when it is displaying a red aspect. This project addresses that shortcoming by analyzing live data from signaling systems.

The source of the information used in the RAATS software is Train Describer (TD) data (NR, 2015). A Train Describer is an electronic device connected to each signaling panel which provides a description of each train (its ‘headcode’) and which section of track (or ‘track section’) it currently occupies. RAATS software reads the TD live-feed, stores it in a database, calculates which trains actually approach a red aspect and presents the data in a graphical interface or creates an excel file for further analysis. The red approaches to a single signal can be analyzed over a period from a single day to a period of a year. Alternatively the user can choose to analyze all signals in an area or indeed all the signals in the database.

Figure 2 illustrates the RAATS user interface. The pie chart shows the results for a single signal: ET776 which is located on the up Cowdenbeath line at Redford. The figure shows that at 23%, of trains approach the signal at red in the period of the 17th of August 2014 to the 13th of October 2014 which is a high percentage compared with the average. The bar chart shows the signals with the highest train approach frequencies (top ten) in the EA signaling area in Edinburgh (bottom left: Select TD). The names of the signals are not visible in this figure.

In this way, RAATS software provides intricate details about the number of trains approaching a signal at danger. This information can be used in subsequent risk analyses for signals. RAATS adds value to safety on the GB railways by analyzing a (large) live data feed which makes it a BDRA application.

3.2 Automated analysis of Close Calls

A close call is a hazardous situation where the event sequence could lead to an accident if it had not been interrupted by a planned intervention or by random event (Gnoni et al. 2013). Network Rail workers and specific sub-contractors within the GB railway industry are asked to report such events in the ‘Close Call’ database. Close call reports are freeform text reports where anyone can enter a situation that, in
their view, could have led to an accident. This leaves the reporter with more freedom to report what they think are dangerous situations and could, in theory, lead to a richer data-source for railway safety issues. The Close Call Database contains approximately 150,000 entries that were collected over a period of two years. Due to the large number of records, it is impractical to manually review the records and therefore computer-based techniques have been developed to extract safety relevant information from them.

Since the key information relevant to safety management is found in the free text computer assisted analysis of freeform text is used: Natural Language Processing or NLP. NLP techniques have been an emerging area of study over the past two decades road safety and medicine (Allen 1994, Wu and Heydecker 1998, Dale et al. 2000, Xu et al. 2009). One of the key problems is the inherent ambiguity in written language. These include jargon, abbreviations, misspelling and lack of punctuation. Processing of close call data by extracting information from free text involves five processes (Hughes & Figueres, 2015):

- Text cleansing, tokenizing, and tagging;
- Ontology parsing and coding (creation of a taxonomy of related words);
- Clustering (creation of groups of records that are semantically similar);
- Text analysis;
- And information extraction.

As this process description suggests, a sensible automated text analysis is complicated. The exact procedure is described elsewhere and reported in a paper in this conference (Hughes et al. 2015). This paper highlights two results of the information extraction process.

The first information extraction process was the identification of incidents with track workers. The SMIS database (reportable incident database) shows that incidents with track workers take place more frequently in the hours between 11:00 and 15:00.

This analysis was performed to investigate whether the same pattern is present in the close call database. An automated search query was programmed to retrieve the protection/possession arrangements events in the close call database as function of time-of-day. The results are compare with track worker near miss events in the SMIS database as function of time-of-day (voluntary reporting of dangerous situations) and with all events in the close call database as a function of time-of-day.

The relative distributions of these events by time of day are shown in figure 3. The figure illustrates that the SMIS incident database and close call reports follow similar trends during the day. Unfortunately, the times at which reports are made trend for all close calls are similar to the times reports are made for protection arrangements, which suggests that reporting bias may interfere.

The high fraction of close call events between 00:00 and 01:00 is due to a default of the reporting system that sets the time-stamp to 00:00 when the time of the incident is not entered by the person making the entry. This correction is made more frequently with the close call database than the SMIS database since there is less quality control on close call reports.

A similar problem was investigated in relation to trespassing: do trespasses take place at certain times of the day or do they take place with equal probability throughout a 24 hour period? Figure 4 shows the frequency of occurrence for trespass based on automated identification of trespass events in the close call database. Note that trespass does not occur with equal probability. Though trespasses occur in each hour of the day, the trend seems that they occur more frequently during working hours. What causes this trend is as yet unexplained but similar to the possession entries, reporting bias may play a role.
3.3 Reflection on application development

RAATS and the close call analysis were initiated to investigate whether computer scientists’ enthusiasm for the data-revolution is transferrable to rail safety for the GB railways. Two very different applications were selected on the basis that they are very different in nature. RAATS is an application that utilized live feeds to infer real-time safety information from Internet-based sources. This project demonstrates that sensible safety information can be derived from the live feeds currently available in GB. Since the software mostly deals with a numeric data-feed, it is relatively easy to comprehend the data and to design software for it. Yet, developing sensible software is a laborious process.

The close call project has proven to be a more complicated challenge. It involves cutting edge text-analysis methods, which are still under development in the computer sciences: NLP techniques and machine learning have not led to standardized software tools that can easily be implemented for safety and risk management. Despite that automated analysis of free text in the close call database showed that useful safety information can be obtained by automated text analysis. This allows freedom for reporters to express their safety concerns whilst searching for particular risks remains straightforward. This flexibility allows for rapid data-searches which supports hypothesis testing and the identification of new, or previously unknown, risk factors. Similar findings were reported by Taylor et al. (2014).

The experience that was gained by developing these initial tools and the information that was unlocked by them shows promise for the future of online data analytical safety and risk techniques. It also shows that an integrated risk dashboard for the GB railway as a whole is still a long way off.

4 SOFTWARE DESIGN FOR BDRA

The experience with initial BDRA tools demonstrated a need for a new approach to the BDRA software architecture that would address major challenges related to component technologies and data properties. Considering relevant relevance materials (e.g. Cohen et al. 2009, Sadashiv & Kumar 2011, Davenport 2014) and known best practices in defining architectures for new technologies, such as NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture, Intercloud Architecture Framework, and recent discussions by the NIST Big Data Working group, we have emphasized four components that address BDRA system:

- Data models, structures, types
- Data management, provenance, archiving
- Data analytics tools: BDRA software applications, visualisation, presentation
- BDRA infrastructure, including storage, computational power, network, operational support

It is likely that all data-feeds that are available today carry safety-relevant information and many more data-feeds might have to be monitored in the future. We expect that each data-feed would have a similar live-feed reading capability as RAATS and close call have today so the software for reading the live feeds, databases and incident entries could grow. In this approach, there would probably be a software layer that is exclusively dedicated to data-input processing. The subsequent analysis of the input data takes place in a second software layer. This layer may be based on applications and services the following data centric applications have to be considered: Hadoop related services and tools, cluster services, databases, NoSQL, parallel processing databases. Some of these tools are offered by the major cloud providers, such as Elastic Map Reduce, Dynamo, IBM Big Data Analytics, Cloudera however at this development stage we need to understand the overall architectural requirements. For this reason, the work is currently based on an in-house Hadoop cluster which makes it easier to control and understand software architectures. Decisions that have to be taken are mostly aimed at database architecture, communication protocols and perhaps programming language.

The software layer that deals with output and interfaces with the user is the least clear at this point in time. As part of the research programme 300 relevant research papers have been identified about this issue. The first results from that literature review process seem to indicate that the application of Information Visualization (InfoVis) systems to big data is not clear and new challenges are emerging. (Figueres et al. in prep.). Apart from that, visualization techniques are not just used for representation of results, they can also play a part in selection of datasets, representation of ontologies and software-monitoring tools. But the problem becomes more challenging when visualization techniques have to be tuned by safety experts and decision makers because it involves in-depth understanding of psychology and risk.

The BDRA system being developed today is shown in Figure 1. To address computational time issues we build our initial BDRA analytics on a Hadoop cluster as a scalable solution for future growing data demands. Given that many software architecture design factors are still under consideration another system may be adopted in the future.
5 CONCLUSION

This work investigates how the new internet-driven data-revolution could benefit safety and risk management for railway safety in the UK.

Though computer scientists are quite clear in their belief that the data-revolution will unchain a management revolution of uncanny proportions there does not seem to be a straightforward implementation for managing safety and risk. Two initial projects show that the data-analytical approach to railway risk analysis shows promise but the design of a smoothly operating integrated safety information system is not straightforward.

The RAATS project demonstrates that sensible safety information can be derived from live-feeds but the contribution is limited to part of the risks in the railways. Since RAATS is based on a numeric data-feed it is similar to technical risk analysis tools based on databases or RFID data. In that sense, it adds little additional knowledge to the safety and risk sciences. The close call project uses tools that are traditionally associated with computer science rather than safety and risk sciences. It demonstrates that it is not straightforward to extract safety lessons from free text data. Despite that, it is possible to support safety analysts to answer hypotheses such as: “trespass is equally probable throughout the day”.

The authors believe that this particular line of investigation could add new tools to safety and risk analysis in the future, for instance for the automatic classification of incidents in databases, for selecting relevant incident investigation reports in relation to particular safety threats and for the automatic identification of new safety risks based on text-searches alone. Yet the development of reliable tools will probably take quite some time.

In conclusion, the tools that are currently developed in computer science will yield useful new tools for safety and risk management in the GB railways and in other risk domains. But the road to reliable computer systems for automated data-analytic techniques for safety and risk is not straightforward. It requires novel risk analysis techniques, automated linguistic tools, dedicated computer systems and sensible interface-techniques; many of which have to be researched in dedicated collaboration projects between safety scientists, information technologists, software developers and railway engineers. The authors share the optimism that computer scientists have for big data, albeit in a much milder form.

6 REFERENCES


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