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Bosnia on the border? Republican violence in Northern Ireland during the 1920s and 1970s

Keywords: Northern Ireland; ethnic cleansing; genocide; sectarianism; Irish Republican Army

Abstract

Unionist politicians have argued that republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/unionist community in those areas. These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing a wide-range of theoretical literature and archival sources, it demonstrates that republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.

Introduction

Paying tribute to the late Ian Paisley in September 2014, Northern Ireland’s First Minister, Peter Robinson, described his former leader as a figure who had held together a beleaguered unionist community which (among other things) had ‘suffered genocide along the border.’¹ His assertion represents particular narrative of republican political violence during Northern Ireland’s recent ‘troubles’.² The sectarian violence perpetrated by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Ulster’s border districts, some unionists suggest, constituted an eliminationist campaign of ethnic cleansing or genocide.³

There is nothing novel in this portrayal of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. It has been a feature of unionist rhetoric since the early 1990s. Republicans have likewise claimed that loyalist violence against their community constituted a form of ethnic cleansing.⁴ In recent years, however, the specific suggestion that republicans pursued a campaign of ethnic cleansing or genocide on the border has achieved increasing prominence in Northern Ireland’s political discourse. Robinson has elsewhere claimed the PIRA committed acts of ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the border county of Fermanagh during the 1970s. The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was also used by four unionist representatives during a 2012 Northern Ireland Assembly debate, centred on a motion calling for the government of the Republic of Ireland to apologise for allegedly ‘creating what became the Provisional IRA’ after 1969.⁵

This characterisation of republican violence on the border has extended to the discussion of the more distant past; specifically, the violence surrounding the partition of Ireland in the early 1920s, and consequent birth of the Northern Ireland state.⁶ Some journalists and victims campaigners have suggested that the original Irish Republican Army (IRA) – which emerged after 1916 and fought a violent separatist campaign
against Britain — was likewise responsible for ‘ethnic cleansing’ and/or ‘genocide’ along the then newly created boundary.\(^7\) This reading of history has served an explicit political purpose, creating a contiguous, uncomplicated narrative of republican malevolence and Protestant/unionist victimhood spanning both conflicts.\(^8\)

In this respect, allegations of ethnic cleansing or genocide on the border resemble other politicised narratives of victimhood in Northern Ireland. For example, the nationalist narrative of anti-Catholic ‘pogroms’ in 1920s Belfast, or the republican movement’s comparison of unionist rule in pre-1970s Northern Ireland to apartheid era South Africa. They are rooted in legitimate grievance, and find expression through reference to international experiences that far exceeded local realities. There is one significant difference, however. Whereas the latter examples have rightly been dismissed within the scholarly literature, the narrative of republican ethnic cleansing on the border has gained credence from it.\(^9\)

Part of the problem relates to a lack of clarity in the usage of terms such as ‘ethnic cleansing’, which are then seized upon to justify particular claims. Henry Patterson’s recent book on border violence is a case in point.\(^10\) Nowhere therein does Patterson himself argue ethnic cleansing occurred, although he quotes other sources using the term. However, in a subsequent newspaper interview, he quoted a British Army officer, cited in the book, stating ‘what amounts to ethnic cleansing’ occurred in border areas, without further elaboration.\(^11\) At the book’s launch, former head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, Ken Bloomfield, reportedly said the PIRA’s campaign was ethnic cleansing, and an academic review commends the book’s ‘dispassionate reading that there was a campaign along the border that could safely be described as “ethnic cleansing”’ (despite Patterson himself not explicitly making that claim).\(^12\)

Similar criticisms apply to the historical literature regarding republican violence during the Irish revolutionary period (1916–23). The suggestion of republican ‘ethnic cleansing’ on the border in the early 1920s has been emboldened by the fierce popular and scholarly debate concerning the alleged ethnic cleansing of Protestants in southern Ireland in the same period. This was sparked by the work of the late Peter Hart who suggested (but did not ultimately conclude) that the IRA’s persecution of the Protestant minority in various parts of the modern-day Republic of Ireland ‘might be termed “ethnic cleansing”’. Though few scholars endorse this interpretation, it has nonetheless become embedded in the historical discourse on the period.\(^13\)

Lack of clarity has been compounded by scholarly unease regarding the subject. This is, perhaps, because the suggestion of ethnic cleansing in the Irish context is closely bound with ethno-sectarian victim selection. This is certainly true of the recent literature regarding the ‘troubles’, where Patterson’s work has represented a continuation of debates concerning PIRA sectarianism.\(^14\) It is also the case with the historical literature on the 1920s. A small (but vocal) minority of historians have based their criticism of the ethnic cleansing interpretation of republican violence in southern Ireland on a rejection of IRA sectarianism during the period.\(^15\) By criticising the ethnic cleansing narrative, therefore, it might appear one is questioning the republican movement’s overt engagement in sectarian violence.

Consequently, more moderate voices who have engaged with the issue of ethnic cleansing have primarily been concerned with reaffirming the sectarian realities of republican violence, rejecting the suggestion only in highly qualified terms. Gemma Clark’s recent study of violence in Munster during the Irish civil war (1922–23) has done so solely on the basis that republican violence was not state sanctioned, but does not appear to doubt its eliminationist, exclusionary designs.\(^16\) Patterson, while remaining
somewhat non-committal, suggests that PIRA violence on the border in the 1970s and 1980s did not reach adequate proportions to be termed ‘ethnic cleansing’, though hints that it might have if not for British security forces. Others have critiqued the ethnic cleansing narrative while side-lining discussion of the violence involved, instead relying on statistical analyses of demographic change; an approach that, while informative, fails to engage with the interpretative concept it purports to discuss. (Incidentally, these analyses found no compelling evidence to support the suggestion of ‘ethnic cleansing’ or genocide in Ireland during either conflict.)

The representation of republican violence on the Irish border amidst partition and during the recent ‘troubles’ is not merely of academic importance – it continues to shape political debates about attribution of blame for past violence and the ways in which these conflicts are remembered. Given the contemporary relevance of the topic, it is incumbent on scholars to properly interrogate the suggestion that it constituted ethnic cleansing and/or genocide, and to do so with appropriate conceptual precision.

Accordingly, this article examines the character of this border violence during both the 1920s and the 1970s – the most violent phases of the respective conflicts. It is the first study to compare politically motivated violence during these periods, despite the frequent distinctions drawn between the violence carried out by founders of the modern Irish state and that of the PIRA during the recent Northern Ireland conflict.

The article’s aims are threefold. Firstly, it seeks to clarify conceptual terms such as ‘sectarianism’, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘genocide’ as applied in the Irish case. Given the above-mentioned implications of the lack of terminological precision for contemporary public debate, such clarification is crucial.

Secondly, the article interrogates a range of historical evidence to analyse and compare the violence during both periods. In doing so, it examines three motifs in IRA/PIRA violence during both periods – which form the basis of unionist accusations of ethnic cleansing or genocide. These are: reprisal attacks; attacks on the security forces; and the economic targeting of Protestant/unionist business interests. In each case, it will be argued that there is no persuasive evidence that a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing or genocide took place during either period. Indeed, using such terms obscures more than it illuminates, and is arguably insensitive to the victims of these abhorrent practices elsewhere.

Thirdly, the article introduces a new concept for considering debates about political violence in Ireland, functional sectarianism, defined below. This concept, we suggest, will help advance scholarship by understanding instances of violence in a more sophisticated way, moving debates beyond questions concerning moral legitimacy and the contemporary assignation of blame for actions during past conflict.

To be clear, this approach is not meant to deny the suffering across communities during the two periods, nor is it an attempt to justify acts of violence. As Alex Schmid has noted, the academic study of political violence should offer an intellectual forum where scholars can discuss terrorism ‘without being suspected of sympathising with terrorists.’ Furthermore, we make no apologies for engaging in a debate that some scholars view as little more than a ‘distraction’. As shown above, debates about alleged ethnic cleansing and genocide during both periods are still current, and firmly embedded in the popular, political, and scholarly discourse. Clearly, it is untenable to suggest that they should be shelved. Rather, it is necessary to engage in detailed analysis, to clarify
concepts, advance our understanding of both periods, and provide the basis for more informed public and scholarly debate.

**Ethnic cleansing, genocide and sectarianism – the problem of definition**

The terms 'ethnic cleansing', 'genocide', and 'sectarianism' have frequently been used in academic and media sources discussing the conflict in Ireland. However, despite, or perhaps because of, the sensitive and often politicised nature of these terms, the literature shows few attempts to define precisely what they mean. This lack of clarity has impaired existing debates concerning the nature and dynamics of political violence during both discussed periods. Recognising this, and to allow a more dispassionate interrogation of the application of these terms to violence in border regions of Ireland, it is necessary to discuss their definitions. This will involve engaging with literature beyond Ireland, across disciplinary boundaries.

'Ethnic cleansing' is perhaps the most problematic term. It originates from the Wars of Yugoslav Succession after 1992. Drazen Petrovic argues it derives from the Serbo-Croat phrase 'etnicko ciscenje', and acquired its present day connotations from its use as a military term – to 'cleanse' an area of the enemy. Nevertheless, whilst the term is widely used, its meaning is imprecise, defying 'easy definition'. Some workable definitions of the term are available, however.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, defined ethnic cleansing as 'the systematic [emphasis added] purge of the civilian population based on ethnic criteria, with the view to forcing it to abandon the territories where it lives'. He further argued that 'this policy was the objective of the whole conflict' in the Former Yugoslavia. Additionally, Bell-Fialkoff claims that ethnic cleansing involves 'the expulsion of “undesirable” populations from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.' Petrovic offers an extensive definition of ethnic cleansing, worth recalling here:

> [A] well-defined policy of a particular group of persons to *systematically* [emphasis added] eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and is very often connected with military operations. It is to be achieved by all possible means, from discrimination to extermination, and entails violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Petrovic’s definition is echoed in Michael Mann’s work. Mann classifies ethnic cleansing as ‘the removal by members of one such [ethnic] group of another such [ethnic] group from a locality they define as their own.’ Whilst definitions can be either very broad or overly legalistic in tone, the literature agrees that ethnic cleansing usually displays the following features:

1. It is a systematic process;
2. It is supported by the authorities or tolerated by them;
3. It is motivated against ethnic, national and religious characteristics and directed against non-combatants;
4. Its advocates cannot respect international law;
5. It has different forms, from administrative measures to extermination, and can encompass methods such as threats and intimidation. It violates the Geneva Conventions and is a crime against humanity.
We suggest that the above characteristics provide a useful basis to test the definition of ethnic cleansing as applied to the Irish case in both periods, although we argue that state involvement or acquiescence is not necessarily required to meet the definition.

If ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a difficult concept to define we might expect the term ‘genocide’ to be more clear-cut. Genocide, after all, has a much longer provenance, and is codified in international law. The term was coined by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944. The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide subsequently agreed in 1948 to make genocide an offence under international law. The resulting 1951 treaty defines genocide ‘as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’.

These were:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

There are, however, major criticisms of the UN definition. Its categories of group identity are too narrow, most notably excluding politics and gender. The wording is vague on the issue of ‘cultural genocide’, and, indeed, on whether or not genocide necessarily involves mass killing. Some ambiguity may also obtain where it is unclear if a particular massacre was meant to destroy a particular group ‘as such’. In these cases, the atrocity may be classified as a crime against humanity, rather than genocide per se.

To complicate matters further, genocide has also been criticised for its shortcomings as an interpretive concept. It is argued, for instance, that in placing too great an emphasis on proving or disproving perpetrator intent, it is at odds with the often complex processes of cumulative radicalisation that produce such events; because identifying the precise point at which murder and atrocity became a project of annihilation is difficult (if not impossible) to prove definitively. It has also been noted that the concept fails to adequately account for the ‘blurring and blending’ of multiple and overlapping identities in the situations to which it is applied. Furthermore, there are issues around the way in which genocide is quantified. Speaking from an historian’s point of view, for example, Mark Mazower has criticised the UN’s emphasis on the proportion of an ethnic community killed rather than the number of victims. Citing a 1996 case, in which five Brazilian miners were convicted of genocide after killing sixteen Yanomami Indians, he notes that ‘the lawyer may focus on the similarities with what happened in Rwanda; the historian is struck by the differences.’

In light of these issues and ongoing debates, at least twenty-two scholarly definitions of genocide have emerged over the past six decades. Helen Fein, moreover, has identified four sub-categories of genocide, which have different motives, but are all eliminationist in intent. For our purposes, however, Donald Bloxham’s concise summation will suffice: ‘[genocide is] the physical destruction of a large proportion of a group in a limited or unlimited territory with the intention of destroying that group’s collective existence’. Like ethnic cleansing, it can encompass different methods. However, it is qualitatively different in that the purpose of ethnic cleansing may not necessarily be the total elimination of a group or minority from existence, but to ‘cleanse’ such group or minority from a particular area. Whilst the scale of the violence could be similar, the literature suggests that the terminal logic of genocide is elimination, whereas
the logic of ethnic cleansing is the pursuit of all measures, including mass killing, by one ethnic group to rid a piece of territory of another, rival group.

This understanding of genocide, we suggest, is broadly in keeping with the spirit of the UN convention and majority of scholarly definitions, whilst avoiding certain problematic constraints – such as those concerning identity, or an undue emphasis on the state. It is also in step with the intuitive notions of the concept which have informed unionist allegations of genocide in the Irish borderlands.42

Finally, it is necessary to explore the concept of sectarianism. In the Irish context, sectarianism typically refers to the atavistic animosities between the Protestant and Catholic communities. It is commonly held as a defining feature of the more recent ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland and an important dimension of earlier conflicts throughout Ireland as a whole, not least the Irish revolution. More importantly, for our purposes, it is also central to the narrative of ethnic cleansing and/or genocide on the Irish border in the 1920s and 1970s. Despite its ubiquity, however, sectarianism is an under-theorised concept,43 with most accounts simply ‘taking the meaning for granted’. 44 Many scholars of Irish history and politics use the term intuitively, offering few suggestions as to how it should be defined or applied. This is even true of popular survey texts aimed at both an academic and general readership.45

Attempts to define sectarianism have largely been confined to the sociological literature regarding the recent troubles in Northern Ireland, and have varied considerably. Perhaps the most useful general definition, however, is that of John Brewer: ‘[sectarianism is] the determination of actions, attitudes and practices by beliefs about religious difference, which results in their being invoked as the boundary marker to represent social stratification and conflict.’ Among sectarianism’s key features, he contends, is the assignation of difference to particular groups.46

Nevertheless, as recent scholarship on the Middle and Far East suggests, defining sectarianism is complicated by the fact that it is intertwined with ethnicity, identity, and nationalism.47 Likewise, in the Irish context, finding an adequate definition is complicated by a complex intersection of religious, political and cultural identity. This problem is perhaps most obvious amid discussions of violence, where debates about the applicability of the sectarian epithet reveal significant variations in how it is framed. Looking to the historical literature on the 1920s, for instance, there is a noticeable (though largely unspoken) division between those who view sectarianism in terms of ethnicity and those who view it more narrowly in terms of religion. Similar differences in emphasis can also be observed amid scholarly debates as to whether (and to what extent) the PIRA campaign was motivated by sectarianism.

Crucially, Brewer notes that sectarianism can involve both intentional and unintentional discrimination. Intentional discrimination refers to acts or policies of unequal treatment that are predicated on religious difference. Unintentional discrimination refers to acts or policies whose consequences ‘are discriminatory even though this was not intended.’48 Similarly, Tim Wilson has suggested that the sectarian significance of violence in Ulster in the early 1920s owes less to the motives or intents of its perpetrators, and more to the way it is interpreted by the community at large. Drawing on Frank Wright’s concept of ‘representative violence’, he argues that ‘most acts of violence tended to be interpreted in terms of the overarching communal conflict […] communal identities of protagonists were stressed over local or interpersonal factors.’49
We therefore suggest that sectarianism is best understood as discrimination against or holding of discriminatory attitudes towards a person or group of persons because of their religious background. Following Brewer, an act or acts can be sectarian in consequence if not necessarily in intent. Sectarian violence, then, is violence directed against a person or group of persons because of their religious background (in the Irish case, Catholic or Protestant). However, as the following analysis demonstrates, such a definition will fall short if we seek to understand the manifestations of and motivations behind political violence in Ireland during both the 1920s and 1970s.

Therefore, to better understand the nature of republican violence in comparative perspective, it is useful to distinguish between violence, motivated purely by religious hatred against the target group, and politically motivated violence which may have been overwhelmingly experienced by a group sharing a particular religious background, but not systematically applied or ideologically motivated by a desire to target or remove the group because of their religion. We define this kind of violence as ‘functionally sectarian’ violence, and in the following sections we will examine both the 1920s and the 1970s to consider its appropriateness to aspects of the republican campaigns in either period. This approach aims to move the discussion away from highly politicised language, and has potentially useful methodological implications for the study of political violence in other divided societies.

The comparative cases: violence during the 1920s and 1970s

The unionist narrative of ethnic cleansing and/or genocide on the Irish border during the 1920s and the 1970s rests on two main contentions. The first is that IRA and PIRA violence constituted a systematic campaign against Protestants, with a view a removing them from border districts. Discussion of this point has typically focused on incidents of murderous violence, with no differentiation between civilian victims or members of the security forces (many of them part-timers or reservists). Second, it is alleged that sectarian killing was accompanied by a more obscure, but concerted, economic campaign. In rural districts, this took the form of land-grabbing, which was often facilitated by acts of violence and intimidation. In towns, meanwhile, it was evidenced in attacks on the ‘Protestant economy’ – notably, Protestant-owned businesses and the economic infrastructure of predominately Protestant areas. These latter allegations usually relate specifically to the recent troubles, though are potentially paralleled in agrarian unrest and economic boycotts of the 1920s.

There are, of course, other aspects to the narrative – the alleged complicity of the Irish government, or claims that republicans have shifted their attention to ‘cultural war’ (specifically, by contesting Orange parades). Yet it remains, first and foremost, a commentary on the nature and objectives of militant republican violence. Accordingly, we examine three areas of the republican campaigns of the 1920s and 1970s which have characterised the ethnic cleansing/genocide debate: reprisal attacks; attacks on the security forces; and the targeting of the ‘Protestant economy’. We argue that, in none of these cases during either period, can evidence of a concerted campaign of ethnic cleansing and/or genocide be discerned. Indeed, at this stage, we can safely rule out the latter entirely. The suggestion of genocide on the border rests on little more than a conflation of the concept with that of ethnic cleansing. To quote one unionist politician: ‘whether you want to call it ethnic cleansing or genocide, it amounts to the same thing.’ Accordingly, we will focus primarily on the issue of ethnic cleansing.

Drawing on our comparative analysis, moreover, we tentatively suggest that such violence failed to develop partly because of the republican movement’s self-imposed
constraints. This is not to deny that either the IRA or the PIRA were responsible for horrendous sectarian violence, or to take their pronouncements or legitimations for such violence at face value. Rather, it is to reject the implication that a more substantial sectarian massacre or forced exodus was stunted by external factors alone – such as the intervention (or lack thereof) of the state, or the resilience of the victimised minority.  

**Reprisals**

Accusations of ethnic cleansing or genocide on the Irish border are most often made with reference to extraordinary episodes of reprisal violence. The most notable examples are the Altnaveigh (1922), Tullyvallan (1975), and Kingsmills (1976) massacres, which claimed multiple Protestant civilian lives. Such incidents provide an understandable emotional impetus for claims that republican violence constituted a systematic attempt to ‘cleanse’ Protestants from border districts. Yet, such assertions ultimately rest on the flawed notion that ethno-sectarian victim selection necessarily involves eliminationist intent. Furthermore, by ignoring the exceptionality of such violence, and its inherently reciprocal nature, such interpretations obscure their actual logic – deterrence.

That republican reprisals were acts of deterrence is perhaps most clearly illustrated in the earlier of our two periods, for which the available sources are most comprehensive. Though republicans were responsible for numerous retaliatory incidents along the border between 1920 and 1922 – most often in the form of attacks on property or individual ‘tit-for-tat’ killings – there were only two large-scale reprisals. These occurred at Rosslea, on the Fermanagh-Monaghan border, in March 1921, and at Altnaveigh, near Newry, in June 1922. Both were carried out in retaliation for attacks committed locally by loyalists, who at the time were primarily organised through the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC), an official paramilitary auxiliary to the police. Together the attacks claimed nine victims, seven of them civilians. And of these seven civilians, all but one was killed at Altnaveigh, which was undoubtedly the more brutal incident.

At both Rosslea and Altnaveigh, the IRA was pursuing the limited objective of deterring violence from their opponents. One of those involved in the reprisal at Rosslea, for instance, later recalled his senior officer’s attitude in planning the attacks: ‘when you hit them hard they will not strike again.’ The Altnaveigh reprisal was conceived with similar intent. The IRA officer who sanctioned the operation later spoke of having ‘cured those Specials [USC] of a tendency to pursue pogrom tactics in south Armagh’, and boasted that ‘we hit them back twice as hard and we had them cowed in our area.’ The fact that the victims at Altnaveigh were civilians was rationalised elsewhere by another local IRA officer, who claimed that it would ‘make unionist civilians (if any unionists could then be classed as civilians) realise that even in their own district they were not immune from punishment for the misdeeds of their relatives serving in the “B” Specials.’

Though abhorrent, this is not the logic of ethnic cleansing. Rather, it is the logic of ‘representative violence’, a means of communal deterrence in which ‘anyone of a great number of people can be “punished” for something done by the community they come from’. Furthermore, as Wilson has demonstrated, republicans were not unique in this respect. Loyalist violence was guided by the same overarching dynamic.

Like the 1920s, the 1970s witnessed many sectarian ‘tit-for-tat’ killings. The Tullyvallen (September 1975) and Kingsmills (January 1976) massacres in County Armagh (both close to the border) are among the most notorious. At Tullyvallen, five Protestants were murdered whilst attending an Orange Hall. At Kingsmills, eleven Protestants returning from work were shot. The one Catholic in their company was released. Both killings were claimed by the South Armagh Republican Action Force, a *nom de guerre* for the local...
PIRA. These events proved the PIRA at times engaged in nakedly sectarian acts, but do not constitute evidence of systematic ethnic cleansing. According to the perpetrators, both attacks were carried out in ‘reprisal’ for the deaths of Catholics in Belfast, although were undoubtedly influenced by recent murders of local Catholics. The Republican News explicitly stated that if loyalists ceased killing Catholics ‘then the question of retaliation from whatever source will not arise’. There is also evidence that some PIRA leaders opposed the reprisals because of their sectarian implications. Former Officer Commanding of the Belfast Brigade, Brendan Hughes, claimed PIRA prisoners wrote to the outside leadership complaining about the sectarian aspect to the campaign.

The PIRA, however, blamed the British state for the sectarian turn in the violence. Gerry Adams, writing as ‘Brownie’, claimed the British state was ‘trying to divert the IRA from the shooting and bombing war’ against the police. Nevertheless, it was not until the late-1980s that reprisal policy changed. From then, the PIRA stated that only those directly involved in loyalist killing should be targeted (although there were occasional exceptions). This was not always welcomed by rank-and-file members in particular locales, but, under Adams’s leadership, retaliations along the lines of Kingsmills were generally forbidden.

As during the 1920s, therefore, republicans envisioned reprisals as a means of deterring loyalist violence. And, like the 1920s, these reprisals involved ethno-sectarian victim selection through the logic of ‘representative violence’. The fact that such practices were brutal is undisputable. And that many Protestants perceived them as an existential threat to their culture and way-of-life is understandable. They were also, arguably, counter-productive at least in the long-term. Although some republicans, at the time, argued that Kingsmills stopped the tit-for-tat spiral of killings in the area, and thus served the PIRA’s purpose. However morally abhorrent this logic is, it does not provide a compelling case that republican violence constituted an attempted ‘cleansing’ of the Protestant population in the border areas.

**Attacks on the Members of the Security Forces**

Republican attacks on the security forces present a particular difficulty for the discussion of ethnic or sectarian violence along the border. The vast majority of locally recruited personnel – that is members of the USC in the early 1920s, and members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) or Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) in the 1970s – were Protestants. Many were part-timers or reservists who served in their locales, but otherwise led civilian lives. The distinction between civilian and combatant was thus blurred. These individuals were at once combatants and representatives of the broader Protestant community. From a republican perspective, they were logical military targets. From a unionist perspective, however, they were co-religionists and communal cohorts. For this reason, therefore, we argue that this strand of violence is best understood as functionally sectarian.

This was certainly the case during the 1920s. Prior to the creation of the USC in late 1920, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) bore the brunt of the republican campaign. Consequently, the victims were often Catholic, and although they may have been well integrated into the communities in which they served, they were rarely native to it – RIC constables being forbidden to serve in their home counties. With the introduction of the USC, however, IRA attacks on the security forces acquired a sectarian significance. Furthermore, if the victim was a B-Special – a part-time constable who patrolled his home district one night per week – it would also carry specific local resonances. USC constables, like their RIC comrades, were attacked whether on or off duty.
Their homes and loved ones were liable to be targeted in reprisal operations, the reasoning for which has already been discussed. During the first six months of 1922, many were abducted and held prisoner south of the border for the purpose of negotiating prisoner exchanges.\textsuperscript{72} Again, this was likely to occur whether a constable was on or off duty. Indeed, many were ‘arrested’ by republican forces after crossing the border to attend agricultural fairs, or to sell produce.\textsuperscript{73} In addition to direct attacks on personnel, other aspects of the IRA’s campaign against the USC had a broader sectarian impact. Orange Halls, for example, were sometimes targeted as a result of their (real or imagined) connections to the force; in some districts they served as meeting places and equipment stores for B Special patrols.\textsuperscript{74}

Yet although sectarianism should not be ignored as a factor in such violence, neither should it be seized upon as its primary motivation. Ultimately the victims were combatants, and this was a much more salient factor in determining their fate. Nevertheless, this violence was functionally sectarian in its impact upon the Protestant-community. It was ultimately understood in terms of sectarianism, sometimes to the extent of precipitating sectarian reprisals against the Catholic-nationalist community.\textsuperscript{75}

Likewise, during the 1970s, PIRA attacks on the security forces are perhaps the clearest example of how its campaign of violence was functionally sectarian. The PIRA’s campaign in border areas primarily targeted British and local security forces. Even during the so-called 1975 IRA/British truce, the North Armagh PIRA warned that ‘British patrols’ were at risk ‘at all times’.\textsuperscript{76} It also warned that the truce excluded the ‘Orange police [RUC]’\textsuperscript{.77} Prison officers were also at risk. In 1977, the PIRA stated it would ‘hunt down’ prison officers, ‘an important cog in the British war machine’.\textsuperscript{78}

Since the early 1970s, the PIRA’s focus had shifted from urban to border areas. This followed security force successes in curtailing the PIRA in Belfast and Derry.\textsuperscript{79} Security force personnel and installations in border areas were targeted in ‘hit and run’ style attacks. Those responsible often escaped to the Republic, evading capture.\textsuperscript{80} Furthermore, the late 1970s saw an ‘Ulsterisation’ of the conflict— with local security forces increasingly replacing British troops. The RUC and (mostly part-time) Army reserve, the UDR, were crucial to this strategy.\textsuperscript{81}

For the PIRA, however, members of these forces were considered ‘legitimate’ targets, whether on or off duty, since (they argued) they could have been ‘gathering intelligence’ on PIRA members at any time. Part-time members of the security forces were regularly attacked by PIRA units in border regions during the 1970s. The PIRA thus claimed the targeting was motivated by ‘military necessity’ rather than ‘pure revenge’.\textsuperscript{82} As in the 1920s, the sectarian implications of this targeting were obvious. The Protestant community experienced these deaths as a ‘communal loss’.\textsuperscript{83} Howsoever morally dubious, the attacks had an essential political, tactical and strategic logic. But they were not part of a wider plan to ‘ethnically cleanse’ Protestants from border regions.

\textit{Targeting of ‘Protestant economy’}

Following Petrovic’s definition, the targeting of the ‘Protestant economy’ might constitute ethnic cleansing if it was systematic, and conducted with an intent to force the Protestant population to flee, either in whole or substantial part, from a given area. In this respect, the suggestion that ethnic cleansing was pursued through a concerted and aggressive campaign of land acquisition can be dismissed. Although such incidents did occur, they were too few in number and too incoherent to constitute a systematic effort.
During the earlier of our two periods, detailed returns of agrarian incidents between May 1920 and November 1921 record fewer than ten occurrences across counties Armagh, Down, Londonderry, Fermanagh and Tyrone. There is, moreover, little to suggest that they became any more substantial in the following seven months, after which IRA violence in Northern Ireland sharply declined. The same is true of the 1970s; widespread violence regarding land ownership was not a feature of the conflict. Furthermore, sectarian competition over land – in which the ‘ownership of a farm [means] the symbolic occupation of an area’ – is a long-standing (indeed, continuing) feature of communal relations in rural Ulster. Such attitudes, and their associated practices, were not unique to the conflicts of the 1920s or 1970s. And although the violence and instability of these periods may have intensified such antagonisms, and imbued them with sinister connotations, there is little to suggest any substantial change in their essential nature.

Two other aspects of the republican campaigns are less clear cut, however; the Belfast boycott in the 1920s, and the PIRA’s economic campaign in the 1970s (and thereafter). Both could certainly qualify as systematic, since they represented coordinated strategic policies. But did they constitute ethnic cleansing? The Belfast boycott was instigated by Dail Eireann, the republican movement’s revolutionary assembly, in August 1920. It was suggested by a number of prominent Belfast republicans as a response to the expulsions of Catholic workers from the city’s shipyards, and intense inter-communal rioting, labelled as a ‘pogrom’ by nationalists and republicans. Yet the policy was also clearly envisaged as a means combating partition – which the British government was in the process of legislating.

By exerting economic pressure on northern unionist business interests, it was argued, the boycott would ‘make Belfast realise that it is in Ireland and must be of Ireland.’ The boycott was implemented throughout Ireland, and in the soon-to-be border districts of Ulster it was pursued with particular enthusiasm (though varying levels of persistence) until 1922. Suppliers and consumers alike were encouraged to boycott goods, and avoid doing business with Belfast based financial institutions. Those who did not comply – traders, organisations, individual consumers – faced various forms of pressure and intimidation, including visits from the IRA or inclusion on public blacklists. The IRA also engaged in direct acts of destruction and sabotage targeting Belfast goods and firms, as well as non-compliant local traders.

As suggested above, the Belfast boycott was certainly systematic. Yet it did not constitute ethnic cleansing for two reasons. First, there was no intent to coerce Protestants/unionists to flee. Rather, it represented an attempt to force their inclusion in the Irish nation (as imagined by republicans). As flawed and naive as this was, it was nonetheless assimilationist. Second, though unionist business interests were the main target, and Protestants thus its primary victims, the violence and intimidation surrounding the project was not confined to unionists. Catholics – both nationalist and republican – faced similar treatment. Boycott blacklists posted in Newry in December 1921, for example, included local branches of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, a Sinn Fein controlled district council, and the nationalist MP for South Armagh. Indeed, in this regard, the boycott and its associated activities are perhaps best understood as being functionally sectarian.

Similarly, during the 1970s, the PIRA’s attacked infrastructure and economic targets, to pressurise the British government, for example destroying the cross-border electricity interconnector. The PIRA’s logic was explained by Derry IRA leader Martin McGuinness in 1972: ‘We are prepared to bomb any building that will cause economic
devastation and put pressure on the Government’. This tactic was common to other nationalist groups, such as Basque separatists Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).

The victims of this campaign comprised all religious backgrounds. And predominantly unionist towns were by no means exclusively targeted, as one would expect if a campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was underway. Largely nationalist Strabane was particularly affected. The PIRA even dropped milk-churn bombs from helicopters on this border town in 1974. Foreign industrialists were also targeted. Thomas Niedermeyer of Grundig was kidnapped and killed by the PIRA in December 1973. Consequently, Grundig decided against expanding its business in the border town of Newry.

Whilst affecting the whole community, the victims of some attacks on businesses were overwhelmingly Protestant. One such attack was The La Mon Hotel bombing on 17 February 1978. Whilst not located in a border area, the border is central to the La Mon narrative, since it was suggested the perpetrators fled to safety in the Irish Republic.

An incendiary device was detonated, killing 12 people. Another 30 were burned, some horrifically. The PIRA admitted responsibility, and accepted its warning was inadequate. La Mon was apparently targeted because it was believed RUC officers were meeting there, but this meeting occurred a week previously. All those killed at La Mon were Protestants. The intended targets had been RUC officers, most likely from the Protestant community. The attack, therefore, had sectarian implications. However, what characterised La Mon was its ‘indiscriminate’ nature. This was true of most PIRA bombs, which killed and maimed members of both communities. The La Mon attack was a sordid act of gratuitous violence, but it was not part of a concerted campaign of ethnic cleansing. Rather it is best understood as functionally sectarian in nature, given its traumatic effects on the Protestant community.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that republican violence in border regions during the 1920s and 1970s, contrary to the claims of both academics and contemporary politicians, cannot properly be understood as ethnic cleansing or genocide. There was no systematic attempt to ‘cleanse’ members of the Protestant/unionist community from border districts. That does not mean that violence did not often have sectarian implications. Evidently it did, and the criticism of some of the more gratuitous incidences of sectarianism by senior republicans during both periods is a striking testament to that fact.

However, we have argued that this violence is best understood as functionally sectarian, whereby republican violence was, in particular cases, overwhelmingly experienced by members of the Protestant community, but was not directed at them simply because they were Protestants. To conclude that such violence was evidence of ethnic cleansing would require evidence either of a plan to eliminate Protestants and unionists from border areas, or practical evidence that republicans were waging a total war against that community. We have found no such evidence.

Furthermore, accepting that violence against the Protestant/unionist community was ethnic cleansing would logically require us to conclude that killings overwhelmingly affecting members of the Catholic/nationalist community constitute evidence of a parallel campaign of ethnic cleansing by loyalist paramilitaries, whether working alone or in concert with the state. Instead, the evidence suggests that religion and ethnicity were
not the sole reasons for the targeting of members of the Protestant community. The following grisly example from Bosnia offers an interesting analogy.

As Stathis Kalyvas has argued, the Muslims killed as part of the Prijedor Massacre in 1992 ‘constituted a general pool of targets for revenge-oriented violence by the Serbs’. However, the specific targets tended to be selected ‘on the basis of individual characteristics, such as their past actions’. During both periods in Ireland, similar logic informed republican victim selection. Many members of the Protestant community were thus attacked because of their (perceived or actual) involvement with security forces, but not because they were Protestants per se. In this, as Kalyvas has also suggested, local contexts are highly important. This was particularly true in Ireland, where the logic of representative violence as a form of communal deterrence was in evidence. As is the case during civil wars, the convergence between republicans’ ‘local motives’ and their ‘supralocal imperatives’ led to violence that intersected between ‘the political and the private, the collective and the individual’. Unlike Bosnia, however, the violence in Northern Ireland never assumed an eliminationist character.

Perhaps a more puzzling question for scholars of political violence is why no systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing was carried out (by either side) during these periods. Why did Irish groups not abandon ‘moral restraint’ and engage in ethnic cleansing and genocide? As mentioned, republican leaders during both periods were condemnatory of the most notorious excesses during the conflict. However, the absence of more extreme violence can perhaps be partially explained by what (or who) republicans considered as comprising the ‘Irish nation’. For republicans, Protestants and unionists were not considered a different ethnicity, but an integral part of the ‘imagined community’ of the Irish nation. Unionists were regarded even by militant republicans as fellow Irishmen, albeit deluded into believing they were British by colonial oppression. This was certainly the case in the 1920s, even among IRA hard-liners such as Eoin O’Duffy. Similarly, the Official IRA Chief-of-Staff, Cathal Goulding referred to the 1970s as a time when ‘Irishmen had been killing Irishmen with obscene enthusiasm’; and further that a ‘great many of our fellow Irishmen are unionists’. The PIRA held similar views, arguing that unionists were ethnically Irish not British, but were victims of false consciousness. The British presence encouraged unionist obstinacy, and had to be removed before unionists embraced their Irish nationality. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Irish nationalist analysis of unionism had largely taken this form. Howsoever naive this was, and however contradictory it appears alongside other strands of republican thought and practice, there is little evidence it was insincere. As much as some scholars may baulk at an ideological explanation for the apparent restraint of the republican movements of the 1920s and 1970s, it is nonetheless clear that they lacked a sufficiently powerful ideological narrative – or doctrine – for the justification of a mass sectarian slaughter.

Even so, this is only part of the picture. The avowed non-sectarianism of Irish republicanism also had a darker side, exuding what Richard English has described as ‘a sense of superior morality’ – typical of nationalisms – in which bigotry is seen ‘as something which is the preserve of Protestants’. It seems fair to suggest that this ultimately served to blind successive republican movements to the inherent sectarianism (functional or otherwise) of much of the violence they did commit. Ideological non-sectarianism, therefore, appears to have served (somewhat paradoxically) to both facilitate and limit the sectarian violence of the IRA and the PIRA.

A nationalistic sense of superior morality is not merely the preserve of republicans alone, however. It is also central to unionist allegations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the 1920s and
1970s. As English has noted with regard to Irish nationalists, a sense of ‘victimhood at the hands of enemy villains’ has often been crucial to such claims, and not infrequently involves the construction of grossly distorted historical narratives. Arguments concerning ethnic cleansing during the two periods, then, appear to be driven by political considerations, rather than dispassionate analysis of evidence. Instead, the ethnic cleansing debate is part of an ongoing political argument concerning the memory of the conflict, manifesting as (conscious or unconscious) efforts to monopolise victimhood or absolve elements of each community of responsibility for the troubles.

These kinds of responses are not unusual in post-conflict contexts. The ‘official history’ of the Rwandan genocide, with blame apportioned to one community, offers one of the more extreme instances of the monopolisation of victimhood, despite evidence that it provides an incomplete account of those horrific events. This is not, of course, to compare the events that occurred in Rwanda with those of Northern Ireland; but to illustrate similar trends concerning the politics of historical memory in post-conflict societies.

Given the continuing relevance of such debates, it might be questioned why scholars have not devoted more time to comparing violence on the Irish border during the 1920s and the 1970s, given the similarities concerning the allegations. Contemporary politics might, again, be one explanation. In the Republic of Ireland, particularly, commentators and politicians alike have been keen to stress the differences between the PIRA and the IRA that founded the southern state, although journalists such as Kevin Myers have referenced Patterson’s recent book in seemingly endorsing an ethnic cleansing narrative that highlights similarities between both periods. As this article has shown, there were indeed some similarities in terms of the violence that each group perpetrated – its forms, dynamics, logics and (indeed) its limits. Both, of course, also perpetrated acts of violence that contributed to a bitter legacy that is still keenly felt in Northern Ireland.

Nevertheless, during neither period was there a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Protestant/unionist community. In attempting to explain the violence of both periods as functionally sectarian, this article has provided an alternative way of understanding inter-communal violence, divorced from contemporary political cul-de-sacs, and rooted in contextual understandings about motives and outcomes. With sectarianism and inter-communal violence rising globally, it is hoped this approach will have implications for our understandings of political violence within and beyond Ireland.

2 For recent histories of the IRA see e.g., Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Macmillan, 2003), Kacper Rekawek, Irish Republican Terrorism and Politics: A Comparative Study of the Official and Provisional IRA (London: Routledge, 2011). For histories of the Northern Ireland conflict, see e.g. Thomas Hennessey, A History of Northern Ireland, 1920-1996 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Paul Bew, Ireland: the politics of enmity,


6 Ireland was partitioned under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920. Six of Ulster’s nine counties became Northern Ireland, which remained in the UK, with limited selfgovernment. The remaining twenty-six counties became the Irish Free State in 1922, Éire in 1937, and the Republic of Ireland in 1949.


15 See, e.g. Regan (see note 13 above)


17 Patterson (see note 4 above): 351

18 For southern Ireland in the 1920s, Fitzpatrick; Bielenberg (see note 15 above). For the Irish border in the 1920s, see Lewis (see note 7 above): 162-3; see also, Terence Dooley, “Protestant Migration from the Free State to Northern Ireland, 1920-25: A Private Census for Co. Fermanagh”, *Clogher Record* 15, no. 3 (1996): 87-132. For the ‘troubles’ see Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, *Northern Ireland: The Choice* (London: Penguin, 1994): 7-8

19 In the first conflict, IRA frontier violence escalated significantly in early 1921, and reached its height in the first six months of 1922; Lynch (see note 7 above) 47; Hart, (see note 9 above): 40. More recently, border violence increased after 1972 when British security forces had greater successes in urban areas. See Shaun McDaid, *Template for Peace: Northern Ireland, 1972-75* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013): 16.

20 The benefits of diachronic comparisons of a single case have been noted. Arend Lijphart. See, ‘Comparative politics and the comparative method’, *The American Political Science Review*, 65, no. 3 (1971): 682-693. Distinctions drawn between both periods drove debates about historical ‘revisionism’ in Ireland, particularly during the 1980s, as Northern Ireland republicans stressed continuities between their armed campaign and the violence leading to the foundation of independent Ireland. On revisionism, Robert Perry, *Revisionist Scholarship and Modern Irish Politics*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).


24 Petrovic, (see note 23 above): 342.

27 Bell-Fialkoff, (see note 25 above): 110.
28 Petrovic, (see note 23 above): 351.
30 Mann, ibid.; Petrovic, (see note 23 above): 353-53; Mazowiecki, (see note 26 above): 44.
31 Mann, (see note 30 above): 17.
37 Jones, (see note 34 above): 34–6
39 For a list, Jones, (see note 34 above) 16–20.
40 These are developmental, despotic, retributive, and ideological genocides. See Helen Fein *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (London: Sage, 1993).
42 See, e.g. ‘MPs in row over IRA “genocide”’, *Newsletter*, 3 Feb. 2012;
48 See notes 13 and 14 above.
50 Patterson, (see note 4 above): 347: 349-50; Bruce, (see note 14 above): 66–67
56 For Rosslea see, McGarry, (see note 7 above): 59–61. For Altnaveigh, see Lewis, (see note 7 above): 149–63.
57 John T. Connolly, Irish Military Archives (IMA), Bureau of Military History (BMH), Witness Statement (WS) 598
58 ‘Chronology’, c.1933, University College Dublin Archives (UCDA), Aiken papers, P104/1309; Aiken to Childers, 18 April 1924, Trinity College Dublin Archives, Childers papers, Ms 7847.
59 John Grant, IMA, BMH, WS 658
60 Wright, (see note 47 above): 11.
61 Wilson (see note 7 above)
66 Moloney, (see note 63 above): 172; 194.
70 Some republicans later admitted killings such as Kingsmills were counterproductive. Rogelio Alonso, The IRA and Armed Struggle (London: Routledge, 2003): 165. However, various contemporaries are on record as claiming that Kingsmills was tactically effective. T. P. Coogan, The IRA (New York: Palgrave, revised edition, 2002): 443; Toby Harnden, ‘Bandit Country’: The IRA & South Armagh (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1999): 190.
72 Lynch, (see note 7 above): 100–5; Lewis, (see note 7 above): 147–8.
73 See, e.g. ‘File relating to the kidnapping of three fisherman’, 1922, PRONI, HA/5/228; Craig to Churchill, 1 February 1922, TNA, CO 906/20
74 See e.g. details of an attack on Orange Hall near Keady, Irish Independent, 14 May 1921. For the USC’s use of Orange Halls see, Wallace Clark, Guns in Ulster (Omagh: Strule Press, 1966): 32–4.
75 See, e.g. the details of a series of reprisals in Killylea, Co. Armagh in 1921. Lewis, (see note 7 above): 79–80.
79 Meeting between Prime Minister and Mr Lynch, 4 September 1972, TNA), CJ4
Reynolds to Goddard, 16 January 1974, PRONI, Office of the Executive/1/28.


English, (see note 2 above): 175.

Patterson, (see note 4 above): 353.

Returns of agrarian outrages, May 1920–Nov. 1921, TNA, CO 904/121/2–3.

See, for example, Divisional Commissioners Bi-monthly Reports, Dec. 1921 – June 1922, PRONI, HA/5/152.

See e.g. John Darby, Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1986): 47-8.


The nationalist narrative of a Belfast pogrom in the years 1920-22 is largely rejected by historians in view of the reciprocal nature of much of the violence, though it is acknowledged that Catholics were overrepresented among the victims. See note 11 above


See, e.g., Lynch, (see note 7 above): 44–6; Lewis, (see note 7 above): 86–7. The boycott was, perhaps, most ruthlessly pursued in Monaghan; McGarry, (see note 7 above): 57–8.

See e.g. ‘File relating to the kidnapping of three fisherman’, 1922, Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), Home Affairs Department (HA)/5/228; Craig to Churchill, 1 February 1922, The National Archives (TNA), Colonial Office (CO) 906/20

Patterson (see note 10 above): 163.

Belfast Newsletter, 18 July 1972.


McDaid, (see note 19 above): 118.

Patterson, (see note 10 above): 121-22.


The Enniskillen (1987) and Shankill bombings (1993) are exceptions, but these were not representative of the overall campaign.


Rebel groups in other conflicts have also used acts of violence to ‘send strong signals to the civilian population’ such as the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru. Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 246.

Kalyvas, (see note 102 above): 387.


Brian Hanley, “Terror in Twentieth Century Ireland” in David Fitzpatrick (ed.),


108 McGarry, (see note 7 above): 56.


115 See e.g. Cillian McGrattan, Memory, Politics and Identity: Haunted by History (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).


117 For one politicised intervention, The Good Old IRA: Tan War Operations (Dublin: Sinn Fein Publicity Department, 1985).

118 This is palpable in recent years, with growing southern support for Sinn Fein, and the decade of commemorations; see, Irish Independent, 5 January 2014.

119 Irish Independent, 29 March 2013.