THE BRITISH POLITICAL ELITE AND THE ISSUE OF EUROPE 1959 TO 1984

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Dedication

To the memory of my loving parents, Robert and Emily Nicholls

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the debate over Britain's application for membership of the European Community. It explains the significant impact which short-term political calculations played in the stances adopted by individual members of the political elite. This political expediency was a major reason for the inadequacies of the debate on membership.

Central to the research is a set of individual trajectories displaying the positions adopted by parliamentarians and political parties from 1959-1984 during which time Britain's very membership of the European Community was at stake. The trajectories include a representative sample of Conservative and Labour MPs compiled using interviews, voting records, speeches and other evidence.

While the aim of the thesis is to analyse whether members of the elite held views determined by concerns other than the substantive issue itself, the thesis also advances the argument that many failed to consider the long-term implications of Britain's membership. The lack of a comprehensive debate of sufficient quality contributed substantially to later problems with Britain's relationship with Europe.

The chronological chapters analyse significant events at particular stages in the evolution of Britain's relationship with Europe. The 1975 referendum on Common Market membership for example, is a spectacularly significant milestone – not only for Britain and Europe, but also in respect of the positions taken by Britain's political elite, whose views were often shaped or changed as a consequence of the political machinations surrounding the issue. Analysis of this and other events including general elections and leadership changes, provide a greater understanding of why members of the political elite subordinated the issue of Britain's future in Europe to short-term, pragmatic, party management or career considerations.

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Abbreviations

ACML	Anti-Common Market League
AEU	Alternative European Strategy
BfS	Business for Sterling
BIE	Britain in Europe
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CBI	Confederation of British Industry
CCO	Conservative Central Office
CDS	Campaign for Democratic Socialism
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CLP	Constituency Labour Party
DLC	Democratic Leadership Council
DVLA	Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EDM	Early Day Motion
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ERM	Exchange Rate Mechanism
EU	European Union
FBI	Federation of British Industry
GATT	General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
HEFCE	Higher Education Funding Council for England
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MCC	Marylebone Cricket Club
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEC	National Executive Committee
NFU	National Farmers Union
NRC	National Referendum Campaign
PEST	Pressure for Economic and Social Toryism
PLP	Parliamentary Labour Party
PPS	Parliamentary Private Secretary
QMV	Quality Majority Voting
RDAs	Regional Development Agencies
SDP	Social Democratic Party
TEU	Treaty of European Union
TGWU	Transport and General Workers' Union
TUC	Trades Union Congress
VAT	Value Added Tax

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Introduction

1.0: Introduction

The original hypothesis that many British politicians formulated their position on Europe for short-term political advantage was overtaken in the course of the research by a recognition that this was just one characteristic of what now appears to have been a debate of insufficient quality. This phenomenon contributed to many of the problems in Britain's relationship with Europe in recent decades. For the debate to have been more effective, politicians would need to have either used evidence-based arguments or utilised their own instinctive view of the subject as opposed to opportunistically determined views in respect of themselves or their party. This opening chapter provides an outline of the conceptual and core chapters and explains how they substantiate the arguments of this thesis. In considering a broad selection of studies on the issue, the aim of the literature review is to place my own examination of Britain and Europe in the context of other literature on the subject. Also included is a methodology sub-section illustrating the approach taken in the construction of this thesis.

The arguments deployed in this thesis are developed by a theoretical framework which clarifies the key concepts. For example, throughout the debates on Common Market membership, sovereignty has been referred to by several of the leading actors to either advance or prohibit the cause of Britain in Europe[1]. A chapter is therefore devoted to the history and concept of this highly complex term. Similarly, to aid further the analysis of the British political elite, a chapter is included on elite theory, and a working definition of the British elite is provided. These conceptual chapters are followed by a series of chronologically based chapters which provide supporting evidence for the main conclusion.

Daddow (2011) provides support for the original hypothesis about the motives of the British political elite on an individual *and* party level, concerning the UK's place in Europe with his suggestion that 'the supposedly principled question of Europe was subordinated to pragmatic electoral concerns and domestic party positioning' (Daddow, 2011, p3). In testing the hypothesis, this thesis presents the results of research on individual politicians and the major British political parties. The outcome of this research is illustrated by the inclusion of trajectories of a representative sample of Conservative and Labour MPs. The

[1] In respect of the terminology employed in this study, the generic terms 'Europe', 'Community', and 'European Community' are occasionally used when referring to the Common Market', EEC, EC, or EU.

trajectories demonstrate the changing positions of specific politicians during the twenty-five year period under review.

In demonstrating the way in which the British political process determined the decision for Britain to join, and retain her membership of the Common Market, this study casts light on British party politics between 1959 and 1984. The consequence of many members of Britain's political elite approaching the issue of Europe on short term political considerations rather than ideological commitment was the tendency to fail to interrogate the true nature of the European project. These short term political considerations also contributed to Britain's later anxieties in respect of further European integration.

Chapter three*, a thousand years of history* looks at debates in the early 1960s over Common Market membership. The significant influence US foreign policy and the impact of American capital had on Britain's decision to apply for membership of the Common Market is analysed. The main focus of the chapter however, is on the internal debates and divisions within the Conservative Party, and in particular the Labour Party during this period. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's application in 1961 and Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell's response in his speech to Labour Party Conference in 1962 are of particular significance. This chapter discovers the extent to which both leaders expressed either a nationalistic view in respect of their relationship with Europe or used the issue for party and electoral advantage.

As the title of chapter four suggests, *Labour pains* focuses primarily on the problems faced by Harold Wilson in his struggle to keep the Labour Party united. Following Macmillan's failed attempt at Common Market entry, Prime Minister Wilson also found himself facing not only US pressure to apply for membership, but also demands from the pro-European right-wingers in the Party. Having been seen to have strongly supported Gaitskell's passionate 'thousand years of history' speech, Wilson needed to be able to make an application without on the one hand appearing to shift position on Europe, and on the other hand attempt to maintain party unity for electoral advantage. It was therefore the overriding consideration of maintaining party unity which allowed Wilson to take differing stances of the issue of Europe. Examples of members of the political elite taking a position on Europe for reasons of personal or party advantage include Wilson's choice of George Brown as Foreign Secretary rather than the anticipated appointment of Callaghan. As Pimlott (1992) and Castle (1990) suggest, this was a decision based less on Europe and more concerned with Wilson's fear of a plot to replace him with Callaghan as leader. In Macmillan and Wilson's respective applications for membership of the EEC,

the conditions of entry were inextricably linked with party management, with both leaders lacking total commitment to Europe. Wilson also used the pressure from the CBI for Britain to join the EEC to his own electoral advantage. As a consequence of his application for membership in 1967 therefore, Wilson subsequently gained the support of British business. In evidencing a number of instances such as these, this chapter further illustrates the key arguments of this thesis.

The crucial House of Commons vote on the principle of EEC membership and the subsequent severe ructions in the Labour Party as a result of sixty-nine Labour MPs defying the whip to vote with the Conservatives is analysed in chapter five, *Britain into Europe.* The 1970 General Election is also of particular significance insofar as the successful Conservative leader Edward Heath was determined to take Britain into the Common Market in spite of public opposition and a manifesto which promised only to negotiate on European membership. The debates on Europe during this particular period were fought in the midst of a power struggle within the two major political parties. With the aid of primary sources including those from Conservative Central Office, this chapter demonstrates the individual motives of Heath and the extent of the Conservative government's determination to ensure Common Market membership.

Prime Minister Harold Wilson's decision to hold a referendum on Common Market Membership in 1975 had a huge impact not only on both the Labour and the Conservative parties, but also on individual members of the political elite. In chapter six, *the people decide,* events leading up to the referendum are analysed: these include the general elections of 1974, and the crucial House of Commons three-day debate on the Labour government's recommendation that Britain remain a member of the Common Market. This chapter explores Wilson's motives for holding a referendum and, despite a clear verdict from the public, demonstrates how the issue was to be far from settled. This was a period of particular significance for several leading players in the European debate. As such, this chapter not only analyses the reasons why some of the political elite changed their position on Europe, but also reveals the highly significant consequences for the parties and individuals as a result of the 1975 referendum.

For some members of the political elite, the public's verdict on the 1975 referendum meant the issue was over at least for the foreseeable future. For others however, the debate continued. A large number of Labour left-wing anti-Marketeers were unhappy at how the defeat on Europe was followed by a general offensive by the leadership against the left of the Party on other issues. Chapter seven, *the longest suicide note in history*

examines the events following the outcome of the referendum including the resurgence of the Labour left as a consequence of the 1979 General Election defeat. This chapter also analyses the Labour Party Conferences held in 1981 which were dominated by the left. These Conferences formed the cornerstone of policy for the forthcoming 1983 General Election, and for some right-wingers in the Labour Party, provided the catalyst for the formation of the Social Democratic Party. Although this chapter focuses primarily on the Labour Party, it was to be the Conservative Party that was to become the party most deeply divided over the issue of Europe. The justification for ending this thesis in 1984 is that as a result of Labour's defeat in the 1983 General Election with the resultant change of leadership and shift in its policy over Europe, the IN/OUT debate was effectively over. It was at this point that both major parties had largely accepted Britain's place in Europe with the subsequent debate being concerned with the extent of European integration.

Testing the central argument of this thesis, chapter eight, *trajectories on the issue of Europe 1959-1984* examines the positions taken by individual MPs, the two major parties, the British press and public opinion over the twenty-five year period. This chapter analyses the effects on individual members of the political elite in the light of European events over the period of study. This is assisted by the trajectories which illustrate the positions taken by the major parties dependent on whether they are in or out of office.

The conclusion summarises and explains the findings of the research, and also reflects briefly on the inter-relationships between the period analysed and the continuing European debate. It is clear from this study that during the period which included two unsuccessful and one successful application, the long-term implications of membership did not weigh heavily with many members of the political elite. The evidence suggests that for many MPs of both major parties, short-term considerations were of greater importance. There is evidence for example as discussed in chapter six, that party management was of greater concern for Wilson and Callaghan than a genuine commitment to European membership. Analysis of the trajectories in chapter eight also provides evidence to substantiate the central argument that positions adopted on Europe were in many cases, more for reasons of party or career considerations than that of taking a principled position on the issue. A further finding of this research is that public opinion was a factor in decisions taken by the political elite. This was particularly the case during the 1975 referendum for example, when the elite was fractured on the issue and the opinions of the public was required.

This research also finds that the short-term nature of the debate stored up future problems for political parties and their leaderships. For example, as discussed in chapter five, by holding a referendum, Wilson held the Labour Party together sufficiently to win the 1974 general election, yet the party became openly divided following the 1975 referendum result. Furthermore, Macmillan's decision to apply for membership as examined in chapter three, and Labour's change of policy on Europe under Kinnock's leadership as discussed in chapter seven were both a significant part of their respective modernisation programmes as opposed to both leaders being fully committed to Britain's place in Europe.

Recently released documentation provides further evidence to substantiate the central argument that members of the political elite used the issue for short-term considerations. For example, as discussed in chapter five, the questionable method with which Conservative Central Office attempted to obtain the support of the Ulster MPs in the crucial House of Commons vote on membership in 1970 displayed a greater need to save the government from defeat than a genuine commitment to Europe. Moreover, Wilson's letter to Monnet endorses the argument that leaders are prepared to adopt differing positions when favourable to do so.

As demonstrated in chapter two, the concept of sovereignty has been used by the political elite in a variety of ways to serve their purposes at any particular time. This study also finds that British governments take account of elite opinion. It is only when the elite is fractured, as in the case of the 1975 referendum, did governments consult the public. During the entire period of this research, there was a lack of evidence to show that events in Europe had any influence over the debate in Britain. Subsequent events such as the Maastricht Treaty and the speeches by Delors and Thatcher did however considerably shape the debate, and have been highly influential on parties and individuals. A similarity between the period 1959 to 1984 and the current situation is that politicians and parties adopt positions on Europe for short-term political or electoral advantage, and as a recent opinion poll[2] demonstrates, Europe is still an issue that enthuses the elite rather than the general public.

[2] Of the issues considered most important facing Britain, a representative quota sample of 970 adults across Great Britain placed Europe/EU in ninth position on 11 per cent (Economist/Ipsos-MORI, 18 December 2014).

1.1: Literature Review

In focusing not only on the major parties but also providing a forensic examination of individual MPs, this thesis provides an interpretation of Britain's relationship with Europe different from previous publications on the issue. This literature review examines the existing and essential arguments on the subject. The thesis highlights the inadequacies of the debate over Europe caused largely by the British political elites' focus on short-term considerations. In considering a broad selection of studies therefore, this thesis places my own examination of Britain and Europe in the context of existing literature on the issue.

Milward (2002) provides a major work on the official history of Britain's early relationship with Europe. Milward looks in detail at the issues facing Britain following the Second World War and how these influenced the decision on whether to apply for membership of the Common Market. He discusses the various opportunities and problems facing post-war Britain, such as the commitment to the Commonwealth, the possible threat of the Soviet Union - hence US involvement in Britain's decision-making process, and the possibility of Common Market membership being advantageous in a time of economic difficulties. Milward provides a highly detailed account covering an eight year period and concentrates primarily on the background and arguments involved in Britain's initial application. Using a wealth of evidence and statistical information, Milward's work is therefore defined as an official history of Britain's relationship with the EEC. This thesis however, differs insofar as it not only provides a forensic examination of the political parties but also analyses why individual MPs subordinated the issue to short-term considerations.

Writing on the theme of accusations made in respect of Britain's attempts at sabotaging the development of the embryonic EEC, Ellison (1996) provides a detailed analysis of the British government's Plan G. Ellison argues that 'the need to either acquit or condemn Britain of perfidy has obscured the intricacies of the policy beneath the Free Trade Area proposal' (Ellison, 1996, p1). The main aim of Ellison's study has been to interpret Whitehall's decision-making process and to determine whether the Macmillan government's proposal of a Free Trade Area was indeed an attempt to prevent the creation of the Common Market. Ellison provides a valuable contribution on the political-decision making of the Treasury and the Foreign Office during the period prior to Britain's initial application for membership. Martin Schaad (1998) covers a similar period to that of Ellison (1996) in his study of Britain's Plan G. In his examination of the strategic aims and motivations behind the British government's policy towards European integration in 1956, Schaad concludes that whilst Plan G did not contribute positively to European integration,

neither did it consist of a policy which aimed to thwart the plans of the Messina countries in their formation of the Common Market. Whilst outside the period of this thesis, Ellison and Schaad's studies nevertheless provide a greater understanding of the reasons for Britain being a reluctant partner in Europe. These studies are predominately concerned with the background to Britain's relationship with Europe. This thesis however is distinct insofar as it not only examines the issue over a much broader period but also because of its focus on British major political parties and individual members of the political elite and their motivations for taking a particular position on the issue.

Also writing on the period of Britain's initial application, Wilkes (1997) in his own chapter on his collection of essays, utilises recently released official documents and memoirs of those involved in the negotiations. As John Young (1998) in his review notes: Wilkes provides not only an overview of the negotiations, raising a number of key interpretive problems, but also providing 'a closing discussion based on eye-witness evidence of the breakdown of the talks' (Young, 1998, p992). In the same volume, Ludlow (1997) focuses specifically on the area of British agriculture in respect of the Brussels negotiations and examines the wider significance of the agricultural discussions. For example, as Ludlow argues, it was the problems encountered over the agricultural negotiations which exposed the weakness of the British position generally. The strength of the opposition by the National Farmers Union (NFU) towards British membership at this time brutally highlighted the lack of consensual support for the Macmillan government's European policy.

Remaining on the period of Britain's first application to join the EEC, Ludlow (1997) makes use of newly released archive material including those of the EEC Council of Ministers and the European Commission to challenge traditional views of Britain's initial attempt at membership. In *Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC*, the author contends that historians need to examine the negotiating process from a wider EEC perspective rather than focussing on parochial national concerns. Ludlow also argues that attention should be drawn away from the drama surrounding de Gaulle's veto and redirected towards 'the duller details of the negotiations in Brussels' (Chick, 1999, p1759). In his review, Chick (1999) writes that Ludlow's arguments are valid and clearly defined, but is critical of the lack of a deeper political analysis of the negotiating process (Chick, 1999).

A highly detailed analysis of early Euroscepticism is provided by Robert F. Dewey Jr (2009). Unlike many other studies of this particular period, Dewey focuses mainly on domestic opposition to Britain's first entry to the Common Market. Using a wealth of

supporting primary sources, this book emphasises the opposition movement against entry into the Common Market. From a 'low political' viewpoint, Dewey therefore examines anti-Common Market populism such as that exercised by the Beaverbrook press, and the role pressure groups played in respect of the issue of Europe in the early 1960s.

Described by Roger Morgan (1996) as 'a deeply convinced Eurosceptic' (Morgan, 1996, p825), Bell's (1995) Euroscepticm is made abundantly clear in his assessment of the consequences of Britain's membership of the Common Market. In his conclusion, Bell refers to Britain's membership as a 'disaster' and is highly critical of the price paid for membership – not merely in terms of cash, but in the effect it had on the Commonwealth, and the loss of British sovereignty. With the benefit of government papers available after the passing of thirty years, Bell (1995) has examined and evaluated the quality of the reasoning behind the Macmillan Government's decision to apply for membership of the Common Market and found that 'there was no paper presented to Cabinet in 1961 with a cool and sober assessment of advantage and disadvantage, of risk and opportunity' (Bell, 1995, pii). Instead, the decision to apply for membership was the 'culmination of a continuing process, a search through a succession of avenues for a solution to the problem for the United Kingdom that appeared to be presented by the development in part of Western Europe of a new economic and political entity' (Bell, 1995, pii). Bell makes a significant contribution to the commentary on the issue of Britain's relationship with Europe, insofar as it benefits from the use of hitherto unpublished official documents, and that it is written from the (rare) perspective of a Eurosceptic academic.

Kaiser (1996) examines the early period of Britain's relationship with Europe from a different perspective. He is critical of 'the perception that Britain "missed the bus" at Messina, arguing that policy was, to some extent, based on rational considerations and concerns about the destination and reliability of the EEC bus' (Lynch, 1998, p188). Aided by the use of primary sources, including Conservative Party records, interviews and private papers, Kaiser uses an argument which supports this thesis, insofar as he presents Macmillan's application 'as an instrumental decision dictated by external crisis management – "appeasing" the US and party political considerations (modernising the Conservatives and dividing the Labour Party)' (Lynch, 1998, p188).

Whilst Wilkes, Ludlow, Dewey, Bell and Kaiser provide valuable accounts of the issue, these works all focus on the early period of Britain's relationship with Europe. This thesis however covers a much greater time span and provides a distinct account. It examines the background to Britain's first application but further, Britain's second application, the

final successful bid for membership, the 1975 referendum and the subsequent relationship between Britain and Europe.

In a collection of essays edited by Oliver J. Daddow (2003), an in-depth analysis of the 1967 attempt at joining the Common Market is undertaken. 'In a thorough reinterpretation of the leader's motivations, Daddow has assembled an array of specialists who contribute chapters focusing on domestic and external influences underpinning Wilson's conversion to pursuing an application' (Holden, 2003, p217). Daddow argues that the 1967 application represented a 'successful failure' insofar as both pro and anti-Marketeers were ultimately appeased, the Conservatives were outflanked on the issue, and the Wilson government had laid the groundwork for Heath's later successful application. Whilst all the essayists make valuable contributors using recently released material, of particular interest to this thesis is Neil Rollings piece on the effect business had on Wilson's application. Rollings examines the role of the CBI in the 1967 application, and the pressure on Wilson to introduce the continental system of Value Added Tax rather than the existing British method of taxing company profits: significantly, Wilson's application gained the support of British industry. In his review, Russell Holden (2003) suggests that a further chapter would be helpful to shed light 'on the wrangles which intensified within the Labour Party after 1970, establishing a context for understanding the difficulties faced later by Callaghan, Foot and Kinnock in the following decades' (Holden, 2003, p218). In undertaking a forensic examination of the Labour Party's divisions over Europe up to 1984 and beyond, this thesis therefore fills the void as outlined by Holden, and by the use of primary sources and recently available material, adds considerably to existing knowledge.

The second volume of the official history of Britain and Europe is provided by Wall (2013). Here, Wall continues where Milward (2002) ended and examines the arguments leading to Britain's second unsuccessful application in 1967 and concludes with the 1975 referendum on Common Market membership. As was the case with Milward's official history, Wall relates to a specific period in Britain's relationship with Europe. Unlike this thesis, Wall's study does not question the quality of the debate, nor does it fully examine the motives of the individual members of the political elite in adopting a particular position.

Stating from the onset that he supports British membership of the Common Market, Kitzinger (1973) focuses on the period 1970-1972. He outlines the background to the birth of the Common Market and explores the arguments used by British politicians and others in respect of membership. For example, successive British governments made applications after the six founding member states had set up the Common Market to the

benefit of themselves. As a result of these belated attempts at entry, a burden was placed on Britain which was a major cause of disagreement between the political elite. Kitzinger analyses Britain's foreign policy, and the domestic and economic factors which were instrumental in the decision to make application for membership of the Common Market. In his review, Laurent (1973) states that this work is 'concerned with the diplomatic dynamics behind the third try of Great Britain to enter the European Community; with domestic processes of persuasion, mounted in order to gain the parliamentary and public approval for British participation in West European unity' (Laurent, 1973, p150). This thesis however is different from Kitzinger's study. It not only provides evidence in the form of trajectories illustrating the effects of the processes of persuasion as outlined, but also covers a broader period, and examines the motives for the stances taken by individual MPs.

Simon Bulmer (1983) writes of the impact British domestic politics has on European Community policy-making. Here, Bulmer analyses how domestic political considerations such as electioneering or the influence of particular interest groups effects Britain's attitude to the Community. Bulmer uses Prime Minister Wilson's renegotiation of the terms of entry during 1974-75 as an example of how domestic politics impinged on Britain's relationship with Europe at this time. Bulmer does not however, undertake an examination of the behaviour of individual members of the political elite on the European issue.

Continuing on the theme of domestic politics and the influence this has on Britain's European policy-making is dealt with in a systematic way by Baker and Seawright (1998). In this compilation, the authors not only analyse the major political parties, but also examine the role played by the civil service, the press and the trade unions in Britain's relationship with Europe. The editors and contributors have however, omitted to examine less traditional domestic factors in their approach. As Kaiser (2002) notes, the authors have failed to examine less traditional domestic factors in their approach, especially 'the wide range of non-governmental organisations which must have a substantial influence not perhaps so much on the general direction of British European policy, but certainly at the micro level of policy-making' (Kaiser, 2002, p163). In the sub-chapter on governance, including the role of non-governmental organisations, this thesis seeks to address this omission.

As this thesis looks at both Labour and Conservative members of the political elite in respect of the part they played in the issue of Europe, it is necessary to look at some of the leading literature which focusses mainly on individual major political parties. Crowson

(2007) examines the Conservatives' position on Europe over two chronological periods, 1945-1975, and 1975-2006. In his review of Crowson's work, Daddow (2009) suggests that 'Europe' is an area in which pragmatism often triumphs over principle, as such, the issue 'becomes something of a domestic party political plaything' (Daddow, 2009, p662). Crowson also corroborates existing evidence which demonstrates that general elections are decided not on Europe, but on domestic issues. As Daddow (2009) states 'this does not bode well for those who would like to see more opportunities for genuine public discussion of the merits or otherwise of Britain's continuing involvement in the EU' (Daddow, 2009, p662). His concern explains the reason why this thesis delves more deeply into the claim that for Britain's political elite, Europe was subordinate to domestic, political, career or party considerations which undermined the opportunity for a high quality debate.

Focusing predominantly on the period following the 1975 referendum and the emergence of Thatcherism, John Turner (2009) contributes to an understanding of the way the continued development of European integration has affected Conservative Party politics. Turner's analysis demonstrates how 'Europe' has exposed the main fault-line within contemporary Conservative politics. His work also examines how the growing divisions over the issue led in 1997, to the Conservatives' worst general election defeat in living memory.

The Labour Party's policy-making process on Europe is examined by Robins (1979) who concludes his work following the 1975 referendum, the outcome of which, for some members of Labour's political elite, settled the issue of Europe. As this thesis demonstrates however, the debate over Europe was far from over. Nevertheless, as the trajectory in chapter eight of this thesis demonstrates, and as Mowlam (1981) notes, Robins shows how the nature of Labour's decision-making on Europe varies over time and whether the party is in or out of office. Although Mowlam (1981) recognises that Robins has attempted to tackle the difficult issue of Labour's decision-making on Europe, she does however suggest that the structure of *The Reluctant Party* fails to live up to expectations: 'It is unnecessarily complex in parts making it very difficult to follow the arguments' (Mowlam, 1981, p391).

A further significant analysis on Labour and the key debates over Europe is provided by Roger Broad (2001)**.** Aided by interviews with leading Labour figures, Broad narrates the story of Labour's long internal conflicts over the issue, leading to the party's change of policy on Europe under the leadership of Neil Kinnock following the general election of

1983. One of the most important dilemmas for Labour was the abandonment of its commitment to withdraw from the European Community – a commitment which formed part of the 'modernisation' process designed to make the party a serious electoral challenge to Conservative domination.

Richard Heffernan's (2001) examines the reasons for Labour's volte-face on Europe following its heavy defeat in the 1983 general election. In a reversal of former positions, it is now Labour that is the pro-Europe party with the Conservatives now deeply divided on the issue. Heffernan nevertheless argues that Labour's apparent enthusiasm for Europe is based on pragmatic considerations, as evidenced by very few Labour ministers in the Blair government supporting a European super-state. In supporting the argument made in this thesis, Heffernan writes that 'changing party ideology and the climate of "elite" opinion, in combination with real and perceived national interests and key interest group expectations, have had a significant impact on Labour's perception of itself as a party and the European policy it is bound to follow' (Heffernan, 2001, p187).

Focusing on the British left, and including an examination of the 1975 referendum on EEC membership, Andrew Mullen (2007) argues that the British left's policies on Europe post-war underwent three significant shifts. In two significant respects, Mullen seeks to address deficiencies in the existing literature. He not only examines the European policies of the whole range of the British left, but also provides an analysis of European policy shifts over the whole post-war period.

In their focus on a single major party, the works of Crowson, Turner, Robins, Broad, Mullen and Heffernan contribute considerably to our understanding of Britain's relationship with Europe. This thesis however is distinct in its examination of both major British political parties and individual members of the political elite on the debates over European membership.

In attempting to isolate one particular cause of British policy choice on Europe, Mark Aspinwall (2004) undertakes a scientific study of the impact party management has on Britain's relationship with Europe. Here, Aspinwall examine the tension faced by British governments between on the one hand the wish to cooperate with their European partners, and on the other hand the pressure to maintain domestic autonomy whilst remaining a member of the European Union. There is much in Aspinwall's arguments to support those made in this thesis, insofar as party management is without doubt a significant factor in the party leadership's position taken on Europe. Aspinwall provides a

persuasive and evidence based argument in support of his theory on party management. Aspinwall's study however, relates only to the period from 1974 and unlike this thesis, does not consider the often changing positions of the individual members of the political elite.

It is the adherence to what Wallace (1991) describes as the myth of English exceptionalism that continues to place great strains on Britain's foreign policy-making. For example, Wallace argues that the British myth is that of 'a free country confronting an unfree European continent have made it peculiarly difficult for the political elite to come to terms with the redefinition of national identity needed to cope with international economic and social interdependence and with Britain's altered international position' (Wallace, 1991, p69). Examining Britain's relationship with Europe over a broad period therefore, Wallace provides an added dimension to existing literature on this issue. Whilst relating to this thesis through his exploration of the concepts and uses of sovereignty by the British political elite in respect of foreign policy, Wallace's work does not examine other reasons which this thesis emphasises.

The columnist Hugo Young (1999) provides an insightful account of Britain's relationship with Europe. Although this is an important work, Wolfram Kaiser (2002) nevertheless states that Young's book is 'emphatically unacademic in its treatment of Britain in Europe' (Kaiser, 2002, p158). Kaiser (2002) critiques the author for his use of sweeping journalistic statements, and for occasionally entering the story himself. For example, Young refers to his Catholic school experience in the 1950s, 'leaving the reader to wonder whether this explains his enthusiasm for the European project' (Kaiser, 2002, p158). This is however, a compelling narrative: From a clearly pro-Europe perspective, Young outlines the story of Britain's relationship with Europe from Churchill to Blair and examines the role of a considerable number of leading players in the debate throughout this lengthy period. Whilst being a very lively study, *This Blessed Plot* does not provide an evidential base to appreciate the motives of politicians on the question of whether Britain should join the Common Market.

A chronological historical account of Britain's uneasy relationship with Europe is provided by George. In his review, Wexler (1991) states that George's focus is directed at answering one specific question namely: 'what is the basis for Britain's continuing reputation as an "awkward partner" in the Community? This question in fact, provides both the point of departure and the underlying theme for the entire narrative' (Wexler, 1991, p704). George emphasises the influence of external circumstances and domestic political

considerations in determining British policy towards European membership. In contrast, the thesis presents an individualised analysis of changing attitudes.

Bogdanor (2005) provides a further insightful account when providing an historical perspective of Britain and Europe. Bogdanor examines the reasons why Britain was never an enthusiastic member of the European Community and traces this back to the experiences of the Second World War which served to undermine Britain's incipient Europeanism. The war also confirmed the British in the view that 'their fate was separate from that of the continent, and that they, unlike the shattered nations across the Channel, remained a great power, with a reach far beyond Europe' (Bogdanor, 2005, p692). Bogdanor examines the mind-set of Britain's politicians in their approach to Britain and Europe – which, particularly in respect of the first application, was for many, one of membership of Europe being seen as a last resort. This is an important analysis, but does not attempt to focus on the motives and actions of individual members of the political elite.

Jim Buller's (2000) theoretically informed narrative examines the Conservative Governments from 1979 to 1997 in respect of the domestic politics approach. Buller analyses the reasons why economic policy under the leadership of Thatcher and Major became Europeanised by means of the signing of the Single European Act and joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism for example. Buller argues that this Europeanisation was considered by the British political elite to be advantageous, despite the strong possibility of it leading to divisions within the Conservative Party and therefore being a contributing factor to electoral defeat in 1997. Whilst being limited to the eighteen year period of Conservative rule, this critical commentary helps explain the short-term nature of the British political elite's position on Europe and to the precursors of Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party. This thesis however, explores a greater period and also examines both major political parties on the issue of Europe.

Anthony Forster (2002) questions the extent to which it is sufficient to define Euroscepticism in what he suggests is a one-dimensional way: 'principally as a Conservative Party phenomenon, with few apparent roots in the history of Britain's relationship with the European integration project prior to Maastricht' (Forster, 2002, p299). Here, Forster argues that scepticism towards British involvement in European integration goes back to the end of the Second World War and was widespread in both the Labour and Conservative parties for several different reasons. One particularly important point made by Forster which strongly supports the arguments in this thesis, is that the anti-Marketeers were excluded from key party and government positions within

the Conservative Party. 'Within the Labour Party, by contrast, opponents of engagement with Europe continued to enjoy a central place in the party's counsels until the mid-1980s' (Forster, 2002, p300). This adds weight to the argument made by this thesis, that for some Conservative and Labour members of the political elite, party and career considerations were uppermost in their minds, and as a result contributed to the view that the key debates on the issue of Europe lacked quality. Forster provides an important analysis of the evolution of Euroscepticism which has proved valuable but remains tangential to the argument of this thesis.

As early European integration was economic in character, it was therefore understandable that the Treasury had greater responsibility for Britain's policy on Europe. Ludlow (2003) however, looks at the reasons why the Foreign Office displaced the Treasury as the dominant force in Britain's first application. Ludlow examines how the Treasury's concern over Community expenditure became subordinate to Foreign Office pressure to pursue Britain's entry. It was under Macmillan's premiership that the Foreign Office became more involved in Britain's negotiations with European ministers. The Foreign Office 'had woken up to the issue's importance, reorganising itself in 1960 so as to be better able to handle questions of European cooperation and no longer willing to let the Treasury regard the issue as a private hunting ground' (Tratt, 1996, p147). Ludlow outlines the crucial role of Whitehall policy making and in so doing, analyses the power struggle between two major civil service departments which proved pivotal in Britain's future bids for entry into the European Community.

An alternative view of British foreign policy is provided by Curtis (1995) who argues strongly that far from being concerned at promoting peace and democracy, successive British governments since the Second World War have introduced policies that were strongly influenced by American pressure. Whilst Curtis's work only partially covers Britain's involvement in Europe, it does nevertheless add weight to the arguments made in this thesis in respect of Washington's influence on Britain's initial decision to apply for EEC membership.

As the major political parties and individual MPs were influenced in their policy-making on Europe to a significant extent by the position taken by the written media, this thesis includes a trajectory of the British press from 1959-1984. Displaying how each of Britain's leading periodicals support or oppose Britain's membership of the European Community, the trajectory is then used in conjunction with the trajectories of individual MPs and political parties to provide supporting evidence of the influence of the press. Whilst outside

the time frame of this thesis, Anderson and Weymouth's (1999) study provides a critical account of how Britain's relationship with the European Union is represented to the public by the British press. The authors argue that in the case of the tabloid Eurosceptic press in particular, the intention to influence public opinion on the issue of Europe is abundantly clear. Whilst acknowledging that the British public have now more than one source of information, Anderson and Weymouth nevertheless conclude that the discourse of Euroscepticism, particularly as expressed by the tabloids, to be an insulting performance.

Covering a much broader period than Anderson and Weymouth, Oliver Daddow (2012) examines reasons why almost all of the British press which were once in favour of Britain entering the EEC and of remaining in Europe at the time of the 1975 referendum have, since the mid-1980s shifted to a largely Eurosceptic position. In his analyses, Daddow also includes a comprehensive study of the significant influence Rupert Murdoch had, and still has on not only the public, but also on the British political elite in respect of government policy-making on European issues. Whilst it is clear that the majority of the British press, and particularly the tabloids, take a Eurosceptic view, it should be recognised that the debate prior to 1973 was one of in or out of the EEC, and as this thesis argues, the press at that time was largely in line with wider elite opinion on the issue.

Curtis's work on British foreign policy and Ludlow's study of the role of the Treasury and Foreign Office contribute towards an understanding of the issue of Europe in British politics but their work is marginal to this thesis. Similarly Anderson and Weymouth and Daddow's extended work on the influence of the British press relates to one aspect of this thesis.

The issue of Britain in Europe sets entry into a wider historical context which is essential for this study. Official histories such as the volumes by Milward (2002) and Wall (2003) have therefore proved invaluable. It is clear from the literature reviewed, that while the authors contribute greatly to the understanding of Britain's relationship with Europe over given periods, none focus specifically on the British political elite and on the individual members' motives for taking a particular stance on the issue of Europe. Indeed, the existing literature has not fully addressed the extent to which Britain's relationship with Europe was highly fractious and divisive, not only for both the Labour and Conservative parties, but also down to a very individual level. Moreover, a political debate dominated by short-term considerations prevented the emergence of fully considered positions on the issue. As a result of undertaking a forensic examination of not only members of the

British political elite from both major political parties, but also an analysis of the press and public opinion, this thesis offers a distinct interpretation of Britain's relationship with Europe.

1.2: Methodology

The overall direction of this thesis is one of testing the hypothesis that for many members of the British political elite engaged in the decision-making process in respect of Britain and Europe, their stance was based more on party political or career considerations rather than an ideological position on the issue. As such, this study examines the positions taken by the major political parties and individual members of the political elite during the course of a twenty-five year period. Through the use of primary sources including interviews and recently released documents, a number of trajectories have been constructed demonstrating the shifting positions of the Labour and Conservative parties and leading members of Britain's political elite at any given time.

During the course of this study, the tried and tested methods of political history, which are increasingly applied to contemporary events has been used. In his discussion on historical facts, Carr (2001) states: 'Every journalist knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts' (Carr, 2001, p5). The pitfall of a journalistic approach is therefore avoided by the use of a very wide range of sources, and the depth with which I have tackled this subject. Throughout the course of this thesis, the rules of historical research have also been observed. In this respect, Elton (1967) notes: Historical research does not consist of 'the pursuit of some particular evidence which will answer a particular question; it consists of an exhaustive and exhausting, review of everything that may conceivably be germane to a given investigation' (Elton, 2002, p60). In keeping with the historical method, this thesis draws substantially from primary sources, such as recently uncovered documents made available by Conservative Central Office, and a significant number of interviews with senior figures from the two major political parties.

Whilst this thesis is based on political history, it does however, draw from social science methods. For example, a Weberian, recommendation is taken for this research to be as value-free (wertfreiheit) as possible and to remove any ideological assumptions on the author's part (Weber, 2010). Weber argued that empirical social research must remain value-free. As a result, *wertfreiheit* preserves not only the scientific character of the research, but also avoids giving false impressions about its ability to validate moral and political claims (Ciaffa, 1998). Although Weber recommended a value-free social science,

he did however, doubt its possibility (Scruton, 1996). As Walliman (2006) observes, social scientists are members of society and culture, motivated by personal presuppositions and beliefs, any analysis is therefore based 'on a "view from somewhere". This is inescapable and even to be desired' (Walliman, 2006, p26). Moreover, historical facts presuppose some measure of interpretation; 'and historical interpretations always involve moral judgements' (Carr, 2001, p73).

A willingness to move beyond the specifics of the in/out controversies in the controlled period of my research enables me to produce insights into the current importance of the debate over Britain in Europe. The arguments which this thesis advances are framed by a theoretical discussion of the key concepts of elites and sovereignty. Consequently a two-part chapter both develops a working definition of the political elite and examines sovereignty which has been deployed by many of the leading actors to advance or prohibit the cause of Britain in Europe. This conceptual chapter is followed by a series of chronologically based chapters which provide supporting evidence for the main conclusion. The methods employed in this thesis extend beyond empirical and evidence based research. I sought to strengthen my account of the period by intensifying the clarity of the concepts of elites and sovereignty which are essential to my research.

The core chapters comprise an analysis of the main events during the period in which British governments made attempts for Britain to join the Common Market. The events examined include general elections, leadership and deputy leadership elections, the 1975 referendum on continued Common Market membership, and annual and special party conferences. The aim of these chapters is to understand further the role of the political elites and to outline the absence of genuine debate on Europe, and also to explore the extent public opinion played in the elites' decision-making on the issue. These chapters then form a lead into the evidence based trajectories which substantiate the central hypothesis.

The British press played a prominent role in the debate over Common Market membership throughout the period of study, and as such, a trajectory of the individual periodicals' positions was necessary. It was decided to take all the mainstream daily newspapers plus leading journals the Economist, New Statesman, the Spectator and Tribune. Sourcing an in or out of Europe position required painstaking research, for on numerous occasions, the newspaper headlines did not necessarily reflect the actual position of the periodical. The research involved visits to the British Library Newspapers section and the British Library to access their archives of the Spectator and other journals.

Public opinion was also considered throughout the debate over Europe, particularly during the times when application for membership was being made, or around the time of the 1975 referendum on continued Common Market membership. It was therefore decided to compile a trajectory showing the highest pro or anti percentage figure for each month that polling data was available, from 1959 to 1975. As demonstrated throughout the core chapters, and evidenced by a number of leading authors such as Bulmer and George, both the press and public opinion had a significant influence on the political parties' and individual MPs' positions taken in respect of the issue of Europe. As a result, their inclusion serves to strengthen the central argument of this thesis.

The policy of individual MPs on the issue of Common Market membership comprise a representative sample of the British political elite who were actively engaged in the decisions made in respect of Britain's relationship with Europe. MPs from both Conservative and Labour parties were selected for a forensic investigation on their positions on Europe. Slightly more Labour MPs were chosen as a result of this party's greater internal debates and disagreements on the issue. As the issue of Common Market membership during the period 1959 to 1984 was one of whether Britain should be in or out, the trajectory needs to reflect this. Therefore, research on the individuals seeks to determine a position based purely on pro or anti as evidenced by voting records in the House of Parliament, public statements, interviews and biographies. In respect of the press, public opinion and the individual MPs, this required the adoption of a quantitative research method. This resulted in the use of a tabular format to record the data in a clear and concise manner to provide ease of analysis and comparison (Walliman, 2006).

It is recognised however, that despite voting a particular way in a parliamentary vote on Common Market membership, this does not necessarily mean the MP agrees with this position. It may be of course that he is voting as a result of tribal loyalty to his party, or for personal or other political considerations. For example, in respect of voting in the 1975 referendum, Everitt (1976) quotes Hugh Simmonds, Chairman of Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome, who claimed to 'know personally of a considerable number of well-placed and leading Conservatives who are admitting in a private conversation that they will vote NO, although campaigning in public for a YES vote' (Everitt, 1976, p13). Although in a press interview Simmonds refused to name anyone, 'but alleged they were doing it out of a misplaced sense of party loyalty' (Everitt, 1976, p13). Other than evidence gained from personal interviews, the majority of the primary sources, particularly in respect of the trajectories has been researched from Hansard, Conservative Central Office, the People's History Museum, the British Library, and the British Library Newspapers section. A

comprehensive analysis of each of the individual trajectories has been provided in chapter eight.

1.2(i) Interviews

During the course of the study, a number of interviews were undertaken to obtain primary information to strengthen the arguments made throughout the thesis, to provide an insight into the intra-party debates, and to aid the compilation of the trajectories. In planning the interviews, consideration was made in respect of obtaining a balance between Labour and Conservatives, and pro and anti-Europeans. It was also necessary to attempt to interview former and current MPs as soon as possible. In some cases, the MPs and former MPs who were prominent in the debates over the period of study were now in their advanced years with fading memories being a distinct possibility.

Interviews were undertaken with currently serving and former MPs who had been instrumental in the debate over Britain's relationship with Europe. The aim of the interviews was to gain a deeper insight into the reasons why they took a particular position on the issue and to question why they may have changed their view on Europe if this was applicable. Interviews with Labour MP Mike Wood and Conservative MP Philip Davies were undertaken with the aid of a recording machine and the interviews subsequently transcribed. However, I dispensed with the machine for the remainder of the interviews for two reasons: First, the perception was that the interviewees were to some extent inhibited by the presence of a recording device and as such may have prevented them from being fully forthcoming and open in the interview. Second, there is the danger of creating problems of accuracy in the process of transcription. As a written record of interviews enables the addition of judgements on the non-verbal aspects of communication by those interviewed, I therefore relied solely on note-taking and memory for the subsequent interviews. The questions posed for the interviews were semi-structured and open-ended, broadly consistent but with variations suggested by the particular orientation and record of specific interviewees. The semi-structured interviews were qualitative and open-ended to allow the interviewees to range over their wider reflections on the subject. Given the nature of the subject area, I considered Mason's (2004) point that this type of interview was 'likely to generate a fairer and fuller representation of the interviewees' perspective' (Mason, 2004, p66). In respect of the questions to be asked, a discussion with my supervisor, Prof. Evans, resulted in the decision to combine a semi-structured interview with elements of a flexible strategy to allow the interviewee to develop his or her answer.

The people interviewed were chosen because they were either leading players in the debate over Britain and Europe during the period of study, or were members of a more recent intake of Conservative or Labour MPs and whose views on Europe were possibly based on events which occurred after the period under review. The interviews provided aspects of originality. For example, the interview in 2009 with Mike Wood, Labour MP for Batley and Spen provided an insight into his views on Britain's membership of the European Union. Whilst describing himself as essentially pro-Europe, Wood, a left-wing backbench MP expressed concerns over the direction of the EU, particularly in respect of its undermining of the NHS. The relevance of including Wood and Davies in spite of them being outside the time frame of this thesis, is that both were influenced by Margaret Thatcher and by the political images, myths and memories of the 1970s and 1980s.

The interview with Labour MP Lord Kaufman was particularly enlightening. In an engaging interview, Lord Kaufman revealed it was he and not Neil Kinnock who was responsible for Labour's shift of policy on the issue of Europe. I asked Lord Kaufman why Labour decided to reverse its position of opposition to membership of the Common Market. He replied that for the Labour Party to be taken seriously by informed opinion, it must drop its policy of withdrawal from the European Community. Lord Kaufman also referred me to his regular 1980s Guardian column *Leave it to Gerald*, where he discussed the re-casting of Labour's foreign policy in the wake of the party's 1983 General Election defeat.

Little in the way of originality was gained from the interview with Lord Howe who constantly advised me to seek the answers to my questions in his autobiography *Conflict of Loyalty*. It was interesting however, that when asked why he had supported Britain being in Europe, he replied that it was because of Churchill. This demonstrated to some extent a misinterpretation of Churchill's position in respect of Britain's relationship with Europe. Whilst it would be correct to say that much of Churchill's rhetoric was in support of a United Europe, he did nevertheless also state that his vision was one of a federal Europe without British membership.

Elected in 2005, Conservative MP Philip Davies provided an insight into how his Eurosceptic position on Europe was formed. As discussed further in the *analysis of European events* in chapter eight, I asked Davies what or who influenced him in becoming opposed to Britain's membership of the European Union. His reply was that it was Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech in 1988 that had the most influence. This reply is somewhat surprising given that whilst Davies is for complete withdrawal from the EU, Thatcher was in favour of remaining a member. His reply unwittingly provided an

important insight into the manner in which political ideas can be modified in practice, and of the ambiguities of political legacy. Even though Thatcher maintained her position of being in favour of British membership of the European Community in spite of her Bruges speech, it is significant that she bequeathed a rather different legacy for some Eurosceptic MPs.

Since the gathering and presentation of data for the trajectories was based on quantitative research, and the interviews and subsequent analysis were based on qualitative methods, this thesis adopted a mixed approach. As Gray (2014) notes, 'sometimes quantitative and qualitative elements can be conducted quite independently and not in any particular order - hence they could be carried out concurrently, sequentially, with qualitative before quantitative or vice versa' (Gray, 2014, p202). In the case of this thesis therefore, it was necessary to construct a framework using quantitative research methods to enable the building of trajectories based on raw data. To collect this data however, qualitative methods of research, particularly in respect of interviews were necessary with both types of research methods operating concurrently.

1.3: Ethics

The University of Huddersfield guidelines on ethical research have been followed, and approval has been obtained from the University Ethics Committee in respect of all interviews conducted during the course of this thesis. The interviewees were initially contacted directly or in some cases, such as the request for an interview with Lord Howe, through their secretaries. At this stage, information was provided in respect of my position and where I am based, my supervisory team, the aims of my research, the reason for requesting an interview and assurances of anonymity and confidentiality. At the interview stage, I outlined the aims of the interview and informed the interviewee what would be involved and what would happen to my findings. I explained fully to the interviewees the purpose of the consent form and read through it with them prior to requesting their signature to it. I also signed a copy of the consent form and issued this to the interviewee. I assured the interviewees that the contents of the interview would be used solely for the purpose of the thesis and any request for anonymity would be assured and strictly adhered to.

Chapter Two: Key concepts: Political Elites and Sovereignty

2.0: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine two key concepts which are integral to the analysis in this thesis. It is necessary to define the character of the political elite since it is suggested that Europe was used by elements within the elite on both sides of the issue, to secure electoral and political advantage. It is also necessary to examine how the concept of sovereignty has been used by members of the political elite on the European issue. It is suggested that this malleable concept was used in a rhetorical rather than in a precise manner.

2.1: Political Elite

The definition of the political elite for the purpose of this thesis is Members of Parliament. This is because it was they who were directly involved in the political decision-making on Britain's membership of the Common Market, and so the evidence of their behaviour is readily available. While this definition is utilised however, it is apparent that there is also an inner core of formal decision makers drawn from within the executive. The inner core and other key actors alike are both influenced by wider economic and social groups who would be included in a broader definition of the elite. These wider groups are excluded from the working definition in the thesis because evidence of the activity of these groups is both intangible and inaccessible.

In recognition that elite theory is complex and diverse, the chapter draws selectively from elite theory. It explores various themes including the interaction between business and politics, and also considers whether the British political elite exists in a cohesive and permanent form as asserted by Mosca (1939). Whilst not arguing that the United Kingdom had an ideal representative democracy, there are insights from pluralist democratic theory which support the argument of this chapter. These insights explain that the masses can play a role in influencing elite decision making, or at least requiring the elite to pursue vigorous forms of political manipulation and propaganda to achieve its objectives.

As politics is highly influenced by transient events, a temporal perspective is necessary because the power of the political elite and its responsiveness to public opinion changes over time. This is particularly the case with Britain's membership of the Common Market, because the issue of Britain in Europe presents itself as a political issue differently in each of the decades from the 1950s to the present time. This study however, merely discusses a twenty-five year period. Throughout the period 1959 to 1984 there were dynamic

interactions. These were within the political elite, between the political elite and the wider elite, the elite and the electorate as mediated by the press, and with Britain's relationship with Europe. These interactions are considered in turn.

An example of the dynamic interaction between the political elite is suggested by Aspinwall (2004) who provides evidence to show that 'centrist ideology is supportive of integration, while support declines as one moves to the extremes of the political spectrum' (Aspinwall, 2004, p4). This helps explain why in broad terms (albeit for different reasons), it was the left of the Labour Party and the right of the Conservative Party that was mainly opposed to Britain's membership of the EEC. Furthermore within the major political parties in Britain there was a strong tendency for the concentration of power within the leadership. Duverger (1976) noted that a consequence of discipline, centralisation and cohesion being more developed in the Labour Party than in the Conservative Party 'there is greater concentration of powers when Labour has a majority than when the Conservatives are in the majority' (Duverger, 1976, p398). This view supports the evidence contained in the trajectory (table eight) which shows that when in office, Labour was almost always in favour of Britain's membership of the EEC. In the case of the Conservative Party there is less doubt about the dominance of the party leadership. As evidenced by the trajectory (table eight), the Conservative leadership and Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet were in favour of Britain's membership whether they were in or out of office: This was in part as a result of the Conservative Party's inherent tribal loyalty to the leader. It was also as a consequence of the enormous power held by the leader. As McKenzie (1964) noted, 'the Conservative Leader, whether in power or in opposition, has the sole ultimate responsibility for the formulation of the policy and the electoral programme of his party' (McKenzie, 1964, p21).

Similarly, Michels (1966) argued that control of parties tends to fall into the hands of a combination of parliamentary leaders and party bureaucrats. Large scale organisations such as the major political parties and trade unions develop a bureaucratic, hierarchically organised structure. The price of this type of bureaucracy is that the influence of rank and file members is lessened; with the concentration of power being held by those at the head of the structure. The leaders 'possess many resources which give them an almost insurmountable advantage over members who try to change policies' (Michels, 1966, p16).

This is hugely significant for Britain's political parties, and in particular the Labour Party whose original purpose was to provide representation for the British working class. It was the established parliamentary leaderships that were responsible for determining policy,

despite the efforts of more democratic, extra-parliamentary bodies such as Labour's National Executive Committee and the trade union movement (Parry, 1971). There has been a constant trend for the Labour Party to adapt to the parliamentary system 'shedding its fundamental view of Conference sovereignty and ending with a power structure virtually indistinguishable from that of the Party's political opponents' (Minkin, 1978, p11). In the 1970s, control of the Party had continued to remain in the hands of the leadership, despite the strength of predominantly left-wing trade union block votes at Labour Party Conferences (Haseler, 1976). In respect of Labour's policy-making process, 'the leaders of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) became the most important policy-making group in the Party' (Minkin, 1978, p11).

To illustrate the interaction between the political elite and the wider elite, the parliamentary elite charged with determining Britain's relationship with the Common Market would, according to writers such as Aaronovitch (1961) and Miliband (1969) be influenced by the power of Britain's finance capital. For example, in his discussion on the economic power of the finance capitalists in Britain, Aaronovitch (1961) concluded by arguing that decisions which affect the welfare and lives of millions of people result from this group controlling the state, and that these decisions are taken 'without public discussion or effective popular control' (Aaronovitch, 1961, p134). This argument is supported by Miliband (1969) who states that 'Western democracies are regimes in which an economically dominant class rules through democratic institutions' (Miliband, 1969, p22). In respect of Britain and Europe, the Marxist arguments of Aaronovitch and Miliband provide a compelling reason to believe that the decision to take Britain into the Common Market was strongly influenced by the power of the economic elite. This need not be incompatible however, with the view that the elite considered it was acting in what it considered to be the wider national interest.

Political outcomes are also influenced by inequalities in the distribution of resources (Smith, 1995) Evidence supplied by Butler and Kitzinger (1976) detail the enormous scale of inequality of resources utilised by opposing factions in the 1975 referendum on Britain's continued membership of the Common Market. For example, the total expenditure for Britain in Europe (BIE), which campaigned in favour of Britain remaining in the Common Market, was £1,481,583.This amount being largely funded by leading British and American businesses including ICI, Shell, Ford Motor Company, and Sun Alliance. In stark contrast, the expenditure for the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) which sought Britain's withdrawal from the Common Market was just £135,630, provided mainly by trade unions sympathetic to Britain's withdrawal (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976).

The example of the British referendum on Europe in 1975 nevertheless suggests there was very little division within business. With the exception of the trade unions which were split on the issue, all the large interest groups, particularly those of business, were almost entirely pro-Market (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976). As Gifford (2007) notes:

> The support of big business for membership during the 1960s and 1970s and its fear of exclusion from the European market became the overriding factor in the minds of British political elites, and translated into a consistent pro-European policy (Gifford, 2007, p463).

Amongst the groups in favour of Britain remaining in Europe was the Consumers Association and the National Farmers Union (NFU). Indeed, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 'devoted large resources to the cause and businessmen and companies were revealed in several surveys to be over 90 per cent pro-Market' (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p171).

Decision-makers in Parliament were also influenced by such institutions as courts of law, the armed forces, educational establishments and the civil service. In virtually all institutions of society, it is the middle class that form the 'bridge' or act as the agent to the ruling elite and in many cases becoming part of the elite themselves. As education is a requirement for entry into the civil service, and as a good education is far more easily obtained by the middle class, the civil service thus becomes 'impregnated with the values of the ruling class, thereby strengthening the grip this class has upon the state machine' (Parry, 1971, p34).

The civil service in Britain is a particularly pertinent example of what Mosca (1939) describes as the bridge between the ruling elite and the rest of society. From the 1950s to the 1970s the upper echelons of the civil service was comprised almost entirely of middle class people educated at Oxford and Cambridge rather than products of the predominantly Clarendon group of British public schools which includes Eton, Winchester, and Harrow (Sampson, 1966). Evidence to support Sampson's claim is provided by Perkin (1978) whose study over a 90 year period found that 'the major public school element in the high civil service has declined steeply from 71 per cent to 25 per cent, and Etonians and Harrovians from 48 per cent to 9 per cent' (Perkin, 1978, p231). Significantly the civil service was one of the institutions that wielded influence on the Conservative government's decision to seek membership of the Common Market in 1961. This was particularly true of the Foreign Office and the Treasury which had 'begun to work seriously on the technical and practical issues involved' (Bennett, 2013, p71). As a result of the expanding economies of the six EEC countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Foreign Office and the Treasury, along with British industrialists and politicians

increasingly found ‘membership technically feasible and assumed that Britain could play a prominent or leading role in Europe’ (Lieber, 1970, p138).

Through greater knowledge of the political process there becomes an ever widening gulf between the representatives and those they represent. It is only therefore a matter of time before those leaders lose their sense of solidarity with their original class and there ensues ‘a new class-division between ex-proletarian captains and proletarian common soldiers’ (Michels, 1966, p109). One such example would be that of trade union leader Vic Feather. From being a working class union official, Feather attained the position of General Secretary of the TUC in 1969 and was made a life peer in 1974. The example of Vic Feather is used to illustrate how the elite can co-opt leading figures of the labour movement into the spheres of the elite world for the purpose of allowing the elites to ‘relate themselves and the classes which they represent to those over whom they exercise hegemony’ (Rex, 1974, p216).

The acceptance by the Labour Party of all the conventions in respect of the office of Prime Minister and Cabinet government ‘ensured that effective power within the Party would be concentrated in the hands of the leadership of the PLP’ (McKenzie, 1964, p639). According to Rex, the political wing of the labour movement had now been effectively taken-over by the elites, including those ‘who had been through the elite educational institutions to look to the *Labour Party* as the means by which they will further their parliamentary careers’ (Rex, 1974, p217). Naturally, Rex’s strictures would carry as much force had the parties insisted in Britain remaining *outside* the Common Market. Whilst being mostly applicable to the Labour Party, Michels’ (1966) theory adds further weight to Aspinwall’s (2004) judgement that the centrist leaderships of the major political parties have largely been supportive of Britain being a member of the European Community.

The question of how the political elite handle public opinion is answered to some extent by Timothy Garton Ash (2006) who argued that in respect of successive governments’ decisions to take Britain into the Common Market, ‘public opinion was hardly considered at all – until it was seen to be beginning to be a problem’ (Garton Ash, 2006, p460). The September 1962 Cabinet Minutes record that ‘public opinion was getting dangerously sceptical, and needed correction: correction, like penal correction. And so there was a little propaganda blitz, and then public opinion was forgotten’ (Garton Ash, 2006, p240). This view is confirmed to some extent by the examples of two members of the political elite, namely Roy Jenkins and Edward Heath who were undoubtedly determined to take

Britain into the Common Market irrespective of opposition from their own parties and from the public.

As Prime Minister, Heath pressed ahead with the negotiations for entry despite the majority of the British public maintaining that they would prefer to stay out (Tribune, 22 October 1971). This is supported by an opinion poll conducted by Gallup in October 1971 where respondents were asked if they were for or against joining the Common Market. Only 32 per cent were for joining, 51 per cent against, and 17 per cent did not know (Gallup, 1976). Heath proceeded at speed with Britain's application to join the EEC, and without the direct and full-hearted consent of the British people. The application was made despite the nature of the 1970 manifesto with its mere one line statement on Europe, which promised 'to negotiate, no more, no less' (Conservative Party Manifesto, 1970, p28). In addition, only 3 per cent of his speeches during the 1970 General Election campaign were devoted to the Common Market (Butler and Pinto-Duschinski, 1971). This was despite Heath writing in his autobiography that 'the bedrock of European union is the consent of the people' (Heath, 1998, p359). If the 1970 manifesto is taken to be the legitimising process for decisions to be taken in the 1970 Parliament, then the government's application to join the Common Market cannot be said to be with the full-hearted democratic consent of the British people. It was this which for many suggested the need for a referendum in 1975.

It would be an exaggeration to suggest that elite power is untrammelled as that would be to disregard not only the pluralist arguments, but also the influence of the media and public opinion. Leading pluralists Dahl (1959) and Lindblom (1977) for example, whilst acknowledging the privileged position of business in respect of government decision-making, nevertheless argue that in a pluralist society, business, albeit the most powerful, is only one of a number of competing challenges to parliamentary authority. Dahl (1956) suggests political decisions can be arrived at through a number of different means other than business, and that groups including politicians, trade unions, consumers and voters can all affect policy outcomes (Dahl, 1959). Conflicts between differing business interests also serve to weaken corporate influence to (Lindblom, 1977). With the exception of the Express Group Ltd, the mainstream British press endorsed the predominant elite consensus. As Wilkes and Wring (1998) note, at the time of Britain's first application, not only was the majority of the British press in favour of EEC membership, but also television coverage of news and discussion programmes were 'biased more towards entry than against it' (Wilkes and Wring, 1998, p190). In more recent times however, with the focus now on the extent of EU integration as opposed to a straightforward question of whether

Britain should be in or out of Europe, British politicians are facing a largely Eurosceptic press. Indeed, as Roy Greenslade (1996) of the Observer wrote: 'The British newspaper is a nationalist enterprise, beset by the realisation that its own power is threatened by greater European integration' (Greenslade, Observer, 28 April, 1996).

There is also evidence to support the view that elite power is limited by the influence of mass public opinion. Dewey (2009) reveals Conservative Central Office's (CCO) fears over anti-Common Market public opinion. CCO's own secret polling in 1962 'exposed just how far populist anti-Market forces had succeeded in creating public anxieties about threats to national character' (Dewey, 2009, p11). This forced the Conservative government into a 'publicity campaign in support of entry, one that directed most of its energies towards countering the sceptical claims' (Dewey, 2009, p11). To create the illusion of legitimacy, issues are often politicised. This has the effect of ensuring that any particular significant policy appears to have been made by the people, or at least receives popular approval. The decision would however, have actually been heavily influenced by corporatist interests (Lieber, 1970).

What actually constitutes public opinion is itself far from clear cut. As a result of their powerful position, the political elite are able to manipulate public opinion in a number of ways. For example, 'what gets measured as public opinion is always dependent on the way questions have been framed and ordered' (Shapiro, 1998, p511). If different outcomes occur as a result of a change in the framing or order of the questions, this is caused not by one of the changes but because the public lack any fixed opinion, and develop their view based upon the questions asked. The public therefore rely implicitly on 'the particular question it has been asked, so as to determine what exactly the issue is and what considerations are relevant to settling it' (Shapiro, 1998, p512).

Walker (1966) argues that there is a clear presumption of the inadequacies of the average citizen at the heart of elitist theory and 'as a consequence, democratic systems must rely on the wisdom, loyalty and skill of their political leaders, not on the population at large' (Walker, 1966, p286). This argument is particularly relevant as far as Britain and Europe is concerned. For example, the British government tested elite and public opinion shortly before and during the attempts to join the Common Market and found that whilst the opinion of the informed elite became overwhelmingly pro-European, 'the attitude of the British public as a whole, as measured by the opinion polls, stagnated and then became less favourable' (Lerner, 1962, p6).

During the period 1960-61, the British government consulted the opinion of elites made up of parliamentarians, top civil servants, members of the press and industrialists. It found that these elite groups 'were becoming increasingly receptive to the idea of EEC membership' (Lieber, 1970, p233). Moreover, in 1961 'eight out of every ten elite respondents felt Britain must join, and more than half were ready, if forced to choose, to see the UK sacrifice some of its Commonwealth interests to promote European ones' (Lerner, 1962, p6). Significantly, Richard Crossman (1963) claimed that 'the British people had been scarcely affected by the sudden wholesale conversion of the Whitehall establishment' (Crossman, 1963, p736). In addition, Younger (1964) argues that 'the public is far more concerned with domestic issues and leaves foreign policy to an elite or oligarchic constituency' (Younger, 1964, p31). Leiber (1970) also suggests 'it was informed elite opinion in itself, and as expressed in the various centres of power, which set the real limits on the domestic scene' (Lieber, 1970, 234). Once Prime Ministers have taken a lead, such as Wilson's decision to hold a referendum in 1975 and campaigned in favour of retaining Britain's EEC membership, they have been 'remarkably successful in manipulating public opinion to their advantage' (Daddow, 2004, p206).

2.2: Sovereignty

Throughout the course of this study, the question of sovereignty will be raised as an issue by the political elites of both major parties. As such, it is essential to determine whether there is a consensus on the definition of sovereignty, particularly in respect of Britain and the European Union. This chapter examines sovereignty from a British historical perspective and specifies the diversity of existing definitions. These definitions are then used to examine the various ways in which the British political elites use their own individual, pragmatic definitions of sovereignty for their own purposes. This part of the chapter therefore provides a brief history of the concept and examines the different versions including parliamentary, popular, shared and pooled. A number of quotations by members of the political elite using the concept's various definitions are also included to illustrate how the rhetoric of sovereignty has been used by politicians to serve a certain purpose at a particular time. It is suggested that 'sovereignty' is not identical to parliamentary sovereignty owing to the challenges posed by increased executive power, governance and globalisation. The chapter includes a typology of the various uses of sovereignty by members of the political elite to illustrate the way the concept is susceptible to misuse and abuse.

2.2(i): Concepts of sovereignty

The concept of national sovereignty is complicated by politicians, particularly Conservative MPs adopting diverse meanings to such terms as absolutist or pooled. Absolutists focus on the legislative supremacy of the Westminster Parliament. For them, undermining the sovereignty of Parliament not only threatens legislative independence and the tradition of liberty, but threatens 'the very consent to the law that rests on the legitimacy endowed by elected lawmakers' (Ludlam, 1998, p42). By contrast, poolers 'tend to judge sovereignty by its usefulness as a policy resource to be bargained with in international policy arenas in pursuit of national security and prosperity' (Ludlam, 1998, p42).

One reason why the concept of sovereignty is so complex is that it can be used to support *or* oppose integration into the European Community. For example the pro-Europeans who support the pooling of sovereignty maintain that sovereignty is not an immovable concept to be closely protected but rather 'it is a matter of using this state power and authority in the best possible way to secure advantages for the British people' (Geddes, 2004, p183). Those opposed to European integration however, argue that sovereignty is not being pooled, but surrendered. Therefore, a 'non-zero-sum perspective contrasts with a Eurosceptical zero-sum understanding of national sovereignty: you either have it or you do not' (Geddes, 2004, p183). Former Labour Minister Peter Shore in his article published in the *Sunday Times* in 1998, berates British politicians for deceiving the British public when they claim European integration has reached its limit, and with at most, just a little pooling[3] of sovereignty. Writing in the *Financial Times*, Labour Foreign Secretary Robin Cook took a more positive view of the pooling of sovereignty. Cook was highly critical of Conservative Eurosceptics and their media allies for sending distorted messages about the EU[4].

A definition which relates strongly to the British conception of sovereignty is provided by Nugent (1999) who separates the issue into two main aspects. These are the external and internal concepts of sovereignty. The external aspect is that which relates to the extent Britain can make decisions on policy and laws without being subject to outside interference: a version of which he regards as national sovereignty. In respect of internal sovereignty, the tradition of parliamentary supremacy and the understanding that 'no law or other instrument can prevent Parliament from doing whatever it wishes is referred to as parliamentary sovereignty' (Nugent, 1999, p391).

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[3] See Typology 2.2(v)
[4] See Typology 2.2(v)

It was *parliamentary* sovereignty which was the stated and sometimes unstated concern, and often the focus of participants in the Common Market debate. The concept of parliamentary sovereignty is defined as a principle of the UK constitution:

> It makes Parliament the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. Parliamentary sovereignty is the most important part of the UK constitution (www.Parliament.uk, accessed 1 September 2013).

The issue for *some* members of the political elite in respect of Europe is that Britain's membership of the European Union is seen to undermine both national *and* parliamentary sovereignty.

2.2(ii): History of sovereignty

To fully appreciate the context in which the term sovereignty is used, it is important to consider the historical aspect of Britain's sovereignty and to ascertain the relevance of sovereignty, particularly in relation to Britain and Europe. The English political theorist and philosopher Thomas Hobbes considered sovereignty to be a means of preventing people reverting to a state of nature (Hobbes, 1991). For Hobbes, sovereignty was absolute and the holder was required to have complete authority with power being undivided. Hobbes 'could not conceive of a mixed or balanced government; it was absolutism or anarchy, and preferably absolute monarchy' (Aylmer, 1975, p232). There is a comparison which could be made between Hobbes' absolutism in the seventeenth century and the more recent conflicts between those who hold the British Parliament to be sovereign and those who consider that sovereignty can be pooled or shared with Europe. At the time of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's application for entry into the Common Market in 1961, opponents stressed the 'dangers to Britain's political independence, citing threats to the role of the Queen, the British legal system, and the supremacy of Parliament' (Lieber, 1970, p200).

The concept of *parliamentary sovereignty* resulted from the outcome of the Revolution Settlement of 1689, being essentially a compromise, with 'sovereignty not being held by the monarch alone, but within the King in parliament' (Aiken and Henning, 1970, p230). An absolutist today therefore would deem parliamentary sovereignty to reign supreme and would reject any sharing of sovereignty between the British Parliament and the European Union. Given that parliamentary sovereignty is based on a form of compromise however, perhaps it is not unreasonable to suggest that Parliament and the EU should have shared

or joint sovereignty. The English Civil War in the seventeenth century was therefore instrumental in producing a fundamental debate over sovereignty. Even historically therefore, the concept of sovereignty had become complicated and diverse.

2.2(iii): Challenges to parliamentary sovereignty

The internal and external challenges in the form of executive power, governance, and globalisation suggest that parliamentary sovereignty has absolutist connotations which do not reflect political reality. A few examples of these developments in political practice will exemplify these challenges.

The major internal challenge to parliamentary sovereignty is the growing domination of executive power. This branch of government includes not only the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers and civil servants but also enforcement agencies such as the armed forces and the police. The term is also often used to describe the smaller body of decision-makers including the Prime Minister and immediate colleagues who take overall responsibility for the direction and coordination of government policy (Heywood, 1997). Smith (1999) suggests that the idea of parliamentary government 'is now a chimera, having existed in reality only during a very particular period of the mid-nineteenth century' (Smith, 1999, p218). As a result of economic, social and political factors, party discipline and executive domination had, 'by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century started to shift power away from the parliamentary arena into the executive' (Smith, 1999, p219). One of the most significant reasons for this shift of power was the growing strength of political parties. Lenman (1992) notes 'the reassertion of executive control over the legislature came with the rise of organised mass parties in the later nineteenth century' (Lenman, 1992, p18). Parliament's failure to block the poll tax, in spite of widespread opposition by Conservative backbench MPs, is an example of how Margaret Thatcher and her government 'were able to push through major legislative change often with little popular support because of the executive's control over Parliament' (Butler et al, 1994, p227).

In recent times, Prime Minister Tony Blair was an exponent of what came to be described as *sofa government:* the term being coined as a result of the informal and exclusive nature of this type of decision making. Furthermore, under the Blair Government, Cabinet deliberations were 'heavily predetermined by pre-decisions taken outside of the cabinet system by other, smaller ministerial meetings involving the Prime Minister, his staff and other senior ministers' (Heffernan, 2003, p355).

A wider definition of the executive would include departments of state and the civil service. The term executive can more broadly be used to encompass the senior civil service and major departments of state. Sampson (1992) recognises the inter-penetration of the British civil service with foreign bureaucracies. Furthermore, bureaucracies 'become still more impenetrable as they become more interlocked with bureaucracies abroad' (Sampson, 1992, p32). This has significant importance, particularly as the fusion of the British and European Union executives leads to an even greater threat to parliamentary sovereignty than does the British executive itself.

Parliamentary sovereignty is also faced with the significant internal challenge of governance; a concept which in broad terms describes the increased participation of non-governmental actors in public policy-making and delivery. The term is used to imply an appreciation of an increasingly complex relationship between state and society in which 'network actors are prominent in policy-making and the state's primary role is policy co-ordination rather than direct policy control' (Bache and Flinders, 2004, p35). This raises questions concerning the challenge of governance to state power and parliamentary sovereignty. The devolution of political authority to Scotland and Wales clearly exempts the exercise of certain powers in these countries from parliamentary sovereignty.

The functions of government can now be re-defined not only in terms of governance, but even multi-level governance (Jessop, 2004). This recognises the existence of governmental structures at a global, European, national, regional and local level. Multi-level governance also includes business and the voluntary sector. The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and the Environment Agency are examples of non-parliamentary bodies developing policies at regional level. Most recently, in his 2014 Autumn Statement, Chancellor Osborne announced greater powers to UK cities, particularly those in the north of England. This follows the Conservative-led Coalition government's 2012 initiative 'City Deals' which de-centralised some powers to UK cites. Bounds (2014) notes that cynics point to the general election in 2015 as the main reason for the government's focus on the north of England (Bounds, Financial Times, 3 December, 2014). Whilst this measure amounts to de-centralisation not devolution and remains subject to parliamentary agreement in future, it demonstrates that the centre is not always an effective form of government.

Despite the increased power of these non-governmental bodies therefore, they are merely agents for the centre or the 'government's flexible friends' (Weir and Beetham 1999, p196). Furthermore, despite governance becoming a popular concept in contemporary

political debate, subnational governments, such as regional and local authorities, 'inevitably hold merely a collaborative role, with central government retaining overall control' (Stoker and Wilson, 2004, p10). Although subnational governments have enjoyed a degree of autonomy 'the state never surrendered its legal authority over these institutions' (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p15).

The major external challenge to parliamentary and national sovereignty comes in the form of globalisation. It is largely as a result of the growing importance of interdependence in a globalised world that nation states 'have chosen to surrender parts of their sovereignty to transnational arrangements in a number of policy sectors' (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p84). When becoming a member of the Common Market in 1973, Britain committed to the 'slower, deeper processes of joint decisions, compromises and constraints, which were never spelt out in the White Paper's promise: no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty' (Sampson, 1992, p156).

Parliamentary sovereignty has also been undermined as a result of British foreign and security policy since the Second World War being largely subservient to, and economically reliant on the United States. In the midst of the sterling crisis of 1965 for example, Prime Minister Harold Wilson 'made a secret deal with the United States to avoid devaluation and retain a British military presence east of Suez in return for massive US support of sterling on the foreign exchanges' (Coxall and Robins, 1998, p31). Furthermore, Pimlott (1992) notes that during the relationship between Wilson and President Johnson, there was; 'in crude, geopolitical terms, a sense in which Britain's world role had become a mercenary one, as the United States' hired help' (Pimlott, 1992, p388).

Jessop (2008) claims it is misleading to suggest that globalisation exerts pressure on the sovereign state. Sovereignty provides only one aspect of the modern state and that 'forms of sovereignty have been reorganised in the past and a post-sovereign international system is imaginable' (Jessop, 2008, p190). Rather than challenging sovereignty itself, Jessop (2008) argues that globalisation can only put pressure on 'particular forms of state with particular state capacities and liabilities' (Jessop, 2008, p190). These forms could therefore include expenditure on the welfare state and other significant areas such as those outlined by Falk (1999). The advocates of globalisation may exaggerate the degree to which national governments must avoid social democratic or socialist policies. This perception, however, affected the policies of New Labour. Whether or not the perception

is exaggerated, it does appear that Parliament lacks the capacity to implement policies which disregard international competitiveness.

It is apparent that executive power, globalisation and governance undermine parliamentary sovereignty although there is scope for argument over the extent of the challenge. Parliament retains the ultimate authority to overthrow the executive, although rarely exercised in practice. The central state possesses overall control over the complexities created by governance, and globalisation does not entirely eradicate the power of domestic parliaments.

2.2(iv): Politicians and political parties on sovereignty

In the case of the Conservative Party, it was the pro-Europeans which were untroubled by a sharing or pooling of sovereignty. What is evident from those Conservative politicians who supported entry into the Common Market from 1961 onwards was a belief that 'membership would give Britain a renewed sense of autonomy and that it would increase the range of feasible options for Britain' (Crowson, 2007, p87). As Patten (2001) notes, some pro-European Conservatives argue that in the modern world, sovereignty is now exercised at several different levels, from the local to regional, and from European to global (Patten, 2001). This demonstrates the manner in which some pro-European Conservatives were prepared to dilute the concept of sovereignty in order to advance their cause. If sovereignty is taken to mean the ultimate location of power, it can scarcely exist at a multiplicity of levels.

Conservative politicians have attempted to use the question of 'sovereignty' to justify their particular stance on specific issues of European politics. Geddes (2004) illustrates what he calls the slippery nature of sovereignty by providing several examples including that of former Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson who supported the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) but opposed the single currency. Kenneth Clarke, a pro-European Chancellor supported the ERM and the single currency but opposed the creation of a European Central Bank. All these members of the political elite, including Margaret Thatcher who opposed both the ERM and the single currency, invoked sovereignty arguments (Geddes, 2004).

From a Labour Party perspective, it was perfectly reasonable for a Labour government from 1945 to become 'increasingly keen to protect the national arrangements that had led to full employment and the creation of a national welfare state system' (Forster, 2002,

p17). This commitment to British parliamentary sovereignty was however, in some ways surprising given that 'for more than 30 years British Socialists had urged a supranational authority to control the vested interests of the capitalist states' (Forster, 2002, p17). Even Labour leader Clement Attlee who was sympathetic of the European idea, wrote in 1939:

> In the common interest, there must be recognition of an international authority superior to the individual states and endowed not only with rights over them, but with power to make them effective, operating not only in the political but in the economic sphere. Europe must federate or perish (Attlee, 1939, p13).

A leading soft-left member of the Labour Party, Neil Kinnock who *at this time* was opposed to Britain's membership of the Common Market, expressed his views on sovereignty in Tribune in 1975, when he accused the EEC of being the robber of the sovereignty of the British people.[5] In 1979, four years prior to him becoming Labour leader, Kinnock had moderated his views on the EEC to some extent largely as a result of the Labour movement's involvement in Europe. Furthermore, the Labour movement, including the trade unions had now started to try to 'use the instrument of the Community to redistribute wealth between nations and social groups within the nine countries' (Westlake, 2001, p102). Kinnock remained an anti-Marketeer however, despite acknowledging that some attempts had been made in respect of wealth redistribution within the EEC. He wrote that the Common Market is still primarily a trading bloc and is a long way off becoming a Socialist European Community. At this time, Britain is a fully sovereign country, 'therefore further attempts to transfer powers over our political and economic policies to European institutions must be resisted by the Labour Party' (Kinnock, cited in Butler and Harris, 1979, p18). Labour's position in respect of sovereignty however did change significantly following the heavy defeat in the 1983 General Election and the resultant move to 'modernise' the Party. For example Labour's 1987 manifesto removed the Party's commitment to withdrawal from Europe.

2.2(v) Typology on the use of sovereignty by members of the political elite

Parliamentary sovereignty

Speaking in the House of Commons debate on the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament, Enoch Powell offered his interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty.

> 'All belief in democracy, above all in parliamentary democracy, is an act of faith, as the maintenance of all free institutions is an act of faith. It depends on the faith that the

[5] See Typology 2.2(v)

> political will of the people is capable of self-expression and of impressing itself upon those free institutions and ultimately moulding them to its will. If that be not so, then democracy and Parliament and all their theory are empty husks. So it is a question of faith whether the people will defend, are determined to defend, have the desire and purpose to defend, or, if it is lost, to restore and regain, the supremacy of Parliament and the political independence of this country' (Powell, Hansard, 5 July 1972, cc 568}.

Pooled sovereignty:

In a keynote speech in Cardiff on 28 November 2002, Tony Blair argued that the pooling of sovereignty is necessary 'in order to extend the reach of democratic action' (Blair, 2002). In the same speech however, Blair provided an example of the malleable nature of sovereignty when he stated:

> 'We fear that the driving ideology behind European integration is a move to a European superstate, in which power is sucked into an unaccountable centre' (Tony Blair, A Clear Course for Europe, 28.11.2002).

Former Conservative Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe offers an example of his interpretation of the pooling of sovereignty. Howe (1990) believes sovereignty is not a pre-defined absolute but an adaptable evolving organic notion:

> 'it is to explain how sovereignty constitutes a resource to be used, rather than a constraint that inhibits or limits our capacity for action' (Howe, 1990, p678).

In his defence of a pooling of sovereignty, Robin Cook claimed that the Labour government's vision was one of a 'stronger Britain in a wider Europe, a confident Britain that does not fear for its identity, culture or sovereignty' (Cook, Financial Times, 13 November.2000, p25). Cook went on to discuss the EU and claimed that this is unique in world history:

> It is a union of freely co-operating nations, pooling their sovereignty in certain areas in order to strengthen it overall. We have not yet developed the vocabulary to get this complex idea across forcefully and to show why supporting the EU should be the natural reaction of patriotic British citizens (Cook, Financial Times, 13 November.2000, p25).

Pragmatic interpretation of sovereignty

Milward (1994) argues that 'elevating national sovereignty into an absolute irreducible entity, giving to it a mystical attribution, is to deny the historical record of the development of the European state' (Milward, 1994, p436). Furthermore, 'if the European project is dedicated to the preservation of the nation state, then a flexible interpretation of sovereignty is imperative for its success' (Dewey, 2009, p33). For Roy Jenkins therefore:

> The real issue is not how you can preserve the greatest degree of that rather sterile concept of sovereignty but rather how you can most increase the country's influence. And I don't see committed long-term European that I am – the full federal form of the United States of America ever working in Europe. The differences are too great' (Jenkins, 18 November 1998, cited in Dewey, 2009, p33).

Absolute sovereignty:

An absolutist view of sovereignty is provided by Peter Shore (1998) who states:

> A large part of the strategy for achieving a political union with Britain's European neighbours is the neutering and surrender of the powers of the nation state so that in the end, to fill the gap, a European state becomes unavoidable' (Shore, Sunday Times, 27 December 1998, p12).

Neil Kinnock expressed his strong views on sovereignty in 1975 when he was opposed to Britain's membership of the EEC at this time. Writing in Tribune he stated:

> Sovereignty, far from being something exercised by Edwardian gunboats, is the real power of the people to control their destiny. That membership of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the International Labour Office, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does not impair the power of the people to elect representatives accountable solely to them. That none of these organisations can decide where and how people shall be employed, what taxes they shall pay or what control they exercise over indigenous resources. Only the EEC in its political and economic dimensions is the robber of the real sovereignty of the people: all the other international bodies are borrowers and lenders of support from Governments (Kinnock, Tribune, 21 March 1975, p5).

National sovereignty

Speaking in the House of Commons debate on EEC membership, Enoch Powell (1971) argued that once a member of the Community, Britain's national sovereignty would be lost and made a comparison to Scotland joining with England in 1707. Powell stated:

> 'One could usefully envisage the change which would be involved by considering what happened with the Scottish nation, when they were a nation in the political sense. They contracted a permanent union with England. From that time onwards Scottish sovereignty was merged indissolubly with the sovereignty of the new political unit which was thereby created. It is in those terms, if we are to be fair to ourselves, that we must envisage the loss of sovereignty as it is called—the effacement of British national sovereignty—as a consequence inherent in the achievement by the E.E.C. of its goal' (Hansard, 21 January 1971, Vol. 809, cc. 1373).

During the same debate, Denis Healey (1971) in response to Powell argued:

> What matters in the Common Market at present are the views of national governments. It is true that there is a valuable dialogue between national governments and an international or supranational Commission. Whereas each national government has a veto in this dialogue, the Commission has none, and the governments always have the last word' (Hansard, 21 January 1971, Vol. 809, cc. 1397).

2.2(vi): Analysis

Geoffrey Howe's (1990) example demonstrates precisely how the use of sovereignty has been open to exploitation. Despite the apparent cynicism displayed by some members of the political elite in their use of the sovereignty argument, it is however important to consider Howe's point that the nature of sovereignty has evolved over time. If Howe and others who believe that sovereignty can be pooled have won the argument, then any criticism by the absolutists would be effectively rendered meaningless. As sovereignty can be defined in so many ways, it has allowed members of the political elite to use their own, frequently changing interpretation of sovereignty for political or party advantage when the situation dictates. This has particularly been the case in respect of Britain and Europe, with instances of senior politicians changing their definition of sovereignty as a result of particular events. Moreover, for Conservative and Labour members of the political elite, this was even dependent on whether their party was in or out of government.

Over the period of this study, there have been several individual members of the leading political parties who were genuinely passionate in respect of their concern about the loss of Britain's sovereignty. Nevertheless, the fluid and evolving nature of sovereignty and its ambiguous definitions ensured ideal opportunities for those who wished to exploit the concept for their own personal or political motives. Furthermore, the weight of evidence suggests that despite the Conservative Party and to a lesser extent the Labour Party still being divided over the question of Europe, the issue of sovereignty when used in the Common Market debate *has* been exploited in a manipulative manner by members of Britain's political elite.

2.3: Summary

This chapter has examined the diverse nature of the British political elite in the context of elite theory. It also justifies the working definition as Members of Parliament for this research. Whatever influence the majority of businesses and the permanent civil servants had over the decision to join Europe, the final power to decide rested with the political

elite, particularly in respect of its inner core. As further examined in later chapters, the elite's decision making *was* however affected by public opinion. This explains why some elitists were prepared to take their cue from the changing public attitudes in order to advance personal or party advantage.

There is strong evidence to support the possibility of a growing elite consensus, heavily influenced by business interests, that Britain should join the Common Market. The elite included business as dominant influence acting on its own behalf which had little concern for public opinion. There were however, many in the elite that were outside the consensus. As evidenced by Aspinwall (2004), the lavish funding of the Yes camp by business during the 1975 referendum 'is sometimes erroneously taken to represent overwhelming support to remain in the European Community. However, economic ties to the US and the Commonwealth were considered by business to be at least as important' (Aspinwall, 2004, p71). It should also be noted that although there is a strong argument to suggest that it was mainly the Conservative elite, rather than Labour, that was more heavily influenced by the interests of business; this was however, not the case with *all* Conservatives. There were those for example, who wished to see Britain in Europe as a substitute for loss of Empire, and those who considered that a united Europe with Britain as a leading member was essential for the defence of Western Europe.

In recognising elite power in determining the issue of Britain's membership, it is not possible to condemn the decision to join the Common Market simply because it did not necessarily reflect public opinion, because Britain is formally a representative democracy. Allowing for that however, it can be shown that political parties were not fully transparent and accountable in their relations with the British electorate. This is because of the divergence of the manifesto commitments or lack of them from the behaviour of political parties in opposition and in government.

The highly complex and controversial nature of sovereignty and how it has been interpreted by the British political elite has also been examined in this chapter. The Common Market debate left unresolved whether sovereignty belongs to the state, Parliament, or the people; and whether it can be transferred or 'pooled', wholly or in part, to external forces. In any event, the concept was invoked both by members of the elite who were consistent on the issue of Europe and those who readily changed their position. Sovereignty itself is therefore regarded by many on both sides of the political spectrum as having only limited value politically with the term frequently being used as a rhetorical device.

The tenacity with which some politicians used the term sovereignty when debating Britain's membership of the Common Market between 1959 and 1984 neglected the changing realities of political power resulting from executive domination and the emerging phenomena of globalisation and governance. The diverse and complicated nature of the concept of sovereignty is exemplified in this chapter by the broad range of interpretations. Whilst by no means an exhaustive list, this chapter has examined, from an historical and political perspective, examples of the types of the concept including; parliamentary, national, absolute and pooled sovereignty. The British political elites were therefore 'bandying' a term they either used manipulatively or did not fully understand. There was a distinct lack of clarity and even conscious manipulation of the concept by some members of the political elite on both sides of the argument. The European debate did more to abuse than cast light on its precise meaning of this elusive concept. This chapter focused therefore on how the concept has been used by members of the political elite to influence an unaware British public.

Chapter Three: A Thousand Years of History

3.0: Introduction

This was a period where the issue of Europe was highly fracturing, with the political elites beginning to split and the question of sovereignty, albeit in a limited and suppressed way, was beginning to loom over the debate. The request to join the Common Market was a turning point and a decisive moment in the history of Britain and Europe. This chapter provides a greater understanding of the reasons for, and the circumstances surrounding Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's decision to make Britain's first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC). The chapter discusses the impact the Conservative government's application had on not only the Conservative political elites, but also the reaction to this application by the Labour Party elite. In addition, analysis is provided on the impact the United States had upon Macmillan's attempt at entry into the Common Market, and Gaitskell's key speech to the Labour Party Conference in 1962 is subject to an in-depth examination.

This chapter demonstrates that as early as the 1950s, the political debates over Europe were of a short-term nature and lacked quality. For example, evidence supports the view that Macmillan, Gaitskell and Wilson adopted positions on Europe for reasons of party unity or electoral advantage. The shifting positions on Europe of some of the leading players on the issue during this period are examined to demonstrate the potency of political calculation and party advantage in accounting for the positions adopted, thus further developing the core arguments of this study.

3.1: Background to Britain's First Application

Prior to Macmillan's application in 1961, the British governments' policy on Europe was 'pragmatically formulated by a long and well established professional policy-making machine' (Milward, 2002, px). British policy towards Europe after 1945 was most frequently criticised for being 'mistakenly grandiose, the result of lingering fantasies of the United Kingdom as a worldwide major power' (Milward, 2002, px). Moreover, 'between 1945 and 1950 Britain could have become the leader of Western Europe. She chose, however, to play the role of World Power, leader of the Commonwealth and privileged ally of the USA' (de Carmoy, 1971, p1).

> The political impetus for the unification of Europe effectively dates from the closing stages of the Second World War. Those were the years when leading statesmen all over the world, following the principles laid down in the Allies' war aims, sought to create a far stronger League of Nations, a United Nations, even a federation of the world. Shocked by the legal and illegal crimes against humanity which they had

> witnessed in the previous decade, both in the pre-war dictatorships and during the war itself, appalled by the vast problems of hunger and want facing every part of the world at the end of that conflict, the World Federalist movement took as its main aim the abolition of physical force as a method of diplomacy, the abatement or abolition of national sovereignty, and the creation of a body of international law in the full sense of the term pronounced and sanctioned by a world authority (Kitzinger, 1973, p20).

British Conservatives however, had little intention of giving up national sovereignty. For leading Conservatives including Duncan Sandys and Harold Macmillan who were to become ministers following the General Election success in 1951, 'an emerging European federation posed, in their eyes, a threat to the prosperity of the United Kingdom which should and could be forestalled' (Milward, 2002, p80). The political aspect of the Treaty of Rome was fully understood by the British government, which had been briefed in 1956 to the effect that:

> The Messina Powers want to achieve tighter European integration through the creation of European institutions with supranational powers, beginning in the economic field. The underlying motive of the Six is, however, essentially political (Bell, 1995, p1).

Nevertheless, the Foreign Office at the time of Britain's first application took a pragmatic position, playing down the implications of loss of parliamentary sovereignty: Instead, the Foreign Office's position was based on whether it was in the best interest of Britain's foreign policy to become a member of the EEC. As Milward (2002) notes, Foreign Office officials 'could justify the lack of discussion about sovereignty by pointing out that de Gaulle had repeatedly denounced the whole concept of a federal Europe' (Milward, 2002, p443). Furthermore, as the terms of the Treaty of Rome had not yet been fully agreed in 1961, 'some ministers assumed that, if Britain became a signatory, the loss of sovereignty could be mitigated by British participation in the discussions' (Milward, 2002, p444).

During the early 1960s the Conservative government's response to growing opposition to its policy on the Common Market was to issue a pamphlet addressing the political implications of Britain's membership. In an attempt to defend loss of sovereignty, the pamphlet stated: 'in renouncing some of our own sovereignty, we would receive a share of sovereignty renounced by other members' (Gifford, 2008, p47).

The EEC was formally created on 1 January 1958 (Young, 1993). Britain however, stood back from the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Rome 'because of a belief that the enterprise might fail and because in any case major British economic interests were seen

to lie elsewhere' (Bell, 1995, p1). It was clear that the Conservative government was well aware of the federalist objective of the Common Market. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Heathcote Amery was responsible for a memorandum to Macmillan and his Cabinet, a part of which stated: 'it is impossible to say to what extent, if we joined the Six, we should in fact be committing ourselves to the acceptance of the ultimate objective of becoming part of a federal state in Western Europe' (Bell, 1995, p147).

It was a not too dissimilar story as far as the Labour government was concerned. In 1950 it not only avoided discussions over the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC), but also declined to be included in talks of 'the Schuman Plan which led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Dewey, 2009, p3). It is to some extent unsurprising that in the late 1940s and early 1950s the Labour government was reluctant to become involved in Europe given that the strength of the British economy was 'greatly superior to those of most of the Continent' (Kitzinger, 1973, p24). Furthermore, up to 1951, the Labour government was committed to setting up a welfare state in Britain. The attitude demonstrated by both major political parties therefore helps understand why the political debates over Europe lacked quality and were of a short-term nature. Neither Labour nor the Conservatives wanted to be burdened with 'open-ended economic commitments to the Continent and of compromising their own economic policy with the ideas of the Continentals – interpreted by one side as high capitalism, by the other as dirigist planning' (Kitzinger, 1973, p24).

Initially opposed to Britain becoming a member of the Community, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan finally made an announcement in the House of Commons on 31 July 1961 that Britain was applying for full EEC membership. The application was made for political and economic reasons: 'Britain realised that a united Europe could become a world power and that in this Europe, she could play a leading role' (de Carmoy, 1971, p1). After almost eighteen months of negotiations between the EEC and the British Government, on 14 January 1963 French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application (King, 1977). Throughout this period both the Conservative and Labour parties were divided over the issue of Europe. Yet as a result of the landmark speech in 1962 by Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell which broadly united his party, the battle lines had been drawn between the Conservatives as the pro-European party and Labour as the party committed to keeping Britain out of Europe.

One reason for the Conservative government beginning to take a greater interest in Europe was that a growing number of British companies were investing in the Common

Market. An article published in The Times on 15 September 1959 indicated that a number of chairmen of British companies have 'expressed concern in recent months of the effect expected on UK companies of the loss of trade in Common Market countries' (The Times, 15 September 1959, p17). In addition, the article states that as a result of the unfavourable conditions under the Common Market regulations:

> It is not surprising to find that British companies are moving into Europe on an increasing scale. Not much publicity is being given to this movement of British capital but it is clear that several major industries are grappling on a fairly large scale with what they consider to be a menace to their export shipments (The Times, 15 September 1959, p17).

The economic argument was the only reason senior Conservative Rab Butler had for supporting Macmillan's 1961 application for membership. In a conversation with Tony Benn in February 1963, Butler stated that 'I am very doubtful about it and I only supported it because of our exports' (Benn, 1987, p7). Indeed, as de Carmoy (1971) notes, at this time, Britain 'began to recognise the commercial advantages of belonging to a wide competitive market undergoing expansion' (de Carmoy, 1971, P1).

A further factor to influence the Conservative government over the question of British entry into the Common Market was the impact of American capital. In an interview published in the Times on 17 May 1960, David Rockefeller, Vice-Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank set out conditions of US support for the Common Market. The first condition was perhaps not surprisingly, the establishment of a low external tariff. The second condition however, was that 'the European Economic Community should remain an open club, ready to admit any newcomers who accepted the political and economic obligations of the Rome Treaty' (The Times, 17 May 1960, p20). This statement appeared to demonstrate vision from Rockefeller as this is indeed the current position of the European Union. Rockefeller provided an insight into his true attitude towards the EEC when he stated in his interview that 'at present French wages were on the average lower than those in Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg' (The Times, 17 May 1960, p20). If Britain should remain outside the Common Market therefore, the concern for the government is that American capital would more likely find its way to Europe than to Britain.

When Macmillan entered Downing Street in 1957, 'he could have led Britain into the Europe of the Six and been received with open arms' (Lamb, 1995, p7). He delayed however, in the mistaken belief that the other European members would be grateful to Britain for saving them from Nazi domination and that they would not proceed without

including Britain in the Community. At this point Macmillan retaliated by commencing negotiations for a free trade area comprising seventeen countries including the six common Market states (Lamb, 1995). Although Macmillan's idea was vetoed by de Gaulle in 1958, it was however, a forerunner of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which was set up in Stockholm on 20 November 1959 (McAllister, 1997). There was considerable concern from British politicians and businessmen alike however, that this new creation was a poor substitute for being a member of the EEC. Nevertheless, Macmillan 'stuck to his view that EFTA was but a stopgap on the road to unity' (Horne, 1989, p217).

Macmillan's approach was typical of the Conservatives' general position on Europe in the 1950s. When Britain was invited by the Six to join in European integration in 1955, the British government did not take this seriously. The UK's attitude towards Europe throughout the 1950s 'remained disengaged and sceptical, and few politicians of any persuasion, or government officials, showed much interest in it' (Bennett, 2013, p69). Indeed, 'Conservative Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden and Foreign Secretary R.A. Butler thought the matter a bore' (Broad, 2001, p30). At this time 'European integration simply did not seem to British Ministers the most pressing international issue. Forging ever closer ties with the US, particularly in the context of nuclear power, seemed much more important' (Bennett, 2013, p69).

Despite the hopes of EFTA being able to negotiate a free trade area with the EEC, this failed to materialise however. This was due in no small part to the US government making it clear that they regarded the EEC as being of far more importance than EFTA. In addition, 'British and American big business interests were increasingly pressing for Britain to join the European Community' (Sampson, 1967, p210). British exporters considered EFTA from the start 'a poor exchange for the threatened loss of trade in the Common Market' (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p33). This led reluctantly therefore, to Macmillan eventually applying for membership in July 1961 with EFTA proving to be an 'embarrassing complication, like the Commonwealth but less important – a secondary albatross which the Ancient Mariner had fastened round his own neck in a fit of pique' (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p33).

3.2: The First Application

Britain's first application for membership of the EEC was eventually made on 10 August 1961. Although Macmillan's request was merely an inquiry into the possibility of an application, and not an unconditional commitment to membership, it did however, make it

'rather difficult to confront the government and defeat its policy' (Forster, 2002, p12). The response from the written media was mixed. For example, both the Guardian and the Economist supported Britain's entry into the Community although there was 'strong opposition from the right wing, pro-Commonwealth newspapers owned by Lord Beaverbrook' (Young, 1993, p71).

The stance on Europe taken by large sections of the press however, had changed in little over a year. In 1960, not only was the press becoming increasingly supportive of membership of the Common Market, but in addition, there was 'a strong European movement in the country which encouraged the government that a shift in policy would be conducive to public opinion' (Gifford, 2008, p44). Apart from the Daily Express and other Beaverbrook newspapers, plus the left-wing *Daily Worker* which were all opposed to Britain's involvement in Europe, 'the British Press was united in feeling that the Government must work for the closest possible relationship with the Continent' (Camps, 1964, p287). Some journals such as the Observer and the Economist made it abundantly clear that Britain should join the Common Market. The Guardian, however, although advocating that Britain should join, was more guarded in its position. A leading article on 27 May 1960 stated:

> The choice is exceedingly difficult; once the initial shift towards Europe is made, radical changes in defence and foreign policy must follow. But the choice is between swimming in the main stream and vegetating in a backwater (Guardian, 27 May 1960, cited in Camps, 1964, p288).

In respect of public opinion, a Gallup Poll conducted in the month following Macmillan's application showed that 52 per cent approved, only 18 per cent disapproved and 30 per cent did not know when asked the question: 'if the British Government were to decide that Britain's interest would best be served by joining the European Common Market, would you approve or disapprove?' (Gallup, 1976, p599). The same question was asked a month prior to the application and the result showed that just 38 per cent approved, with 22 per cent disapproving and the largest number of people (40 per cent) not knowing (Gallup, 1976). During the same period, it is notable that although the public's opinion on Europe had become more positive following Macmillan's application, the public's rating of Macmillan as Prime Minister had diminished. In July 1961, a month prior to the application in August 1961, 54 per cent of the public were satisfied with Macmillan as Prime Minister (Gallup, 1976). A Gallup Poll taken in September 1961 however, showed that only 43 per cent of people were satisfied (Gallup, 1976).

The conclusion to be drawn is that as Europe was not a salient issue with the public, it therefore had only a minimum effect on Macmillan's decreasing popularity. Although the Gallup polls show that public opinion did become more positive towards Europe, this was due not to any ideological conversion to European integration but as a result of membership of the Common Market being presented to the electorate 'in purely pragmatic terms' (George, 1991, p66). One of the main reasons for the reluctance of the British public to fully welcome membership was the victory in the Second World War. For the countries of continental Europe, the experience of the War 'undermined nationalism, in Britain it reinforced an already strongly developed sense of national identity' (George, 1991, p66).

In entering into negotiations on Common Market entry, Macmillan was prepared to take risks with his own party which was at the time, divided on the issue. It was almost inevitable however, that the 1961 application by Macmillan would fail given the terms insisted upon by the Conservative government. A crucial element that did not endear itself to President de Gaulle was the unenthusiastic, half-hearted and cautious approach adopted by Macmillan. George (1990) writes of the application that Britain, although recognising the necessity of making the move, was far from welcoming it. Some observers considered that the Prime Minister 'appeared to be trying to "back into Europe", and this was likely to have unfortunate consequences' (George, 1990, p33).

A revolt by Conservative back-benchers was resolved on 31 July 1961 by Macmillan pledging himself fully that 'Commonwealth, and EFTA nation rights will be safeguarded at every stage. Therefore negotiations with Europe cannot possibly succeed' (Terry, Daily Mail, 2 August 1961, p2). As a result of his gaining the support of the majority of his backbenchers who were now safe in the 'knowledge' that the forthcoming application would fail, Macmillan just a day later on 1 August 1961 'routed rumours about his health with a superb 40-minute performance in the Commons' (Kirby, Daily Mail, 3 August 1961, p2).

It was not only the Conservatives that were angry with Macmillan. 'The cries of "shame" stabbing through the cheers when the Prime Minister announced that we are making formal application to join the European Economic Community came from both sides' (Shrapnel, Guardian, 1 August 1961, p1). One Conservative backbencher, Anthony Fell even went so far as to demand the resignation of Macmillan and referred to the Prime Minister as 'a national disaster' (Dewey, 2009, p12). Macmillan nevertheless gained the support of the vast majority of his MPs. The Commons vote was ultimately 315 to 5 in

favour of the Prime Minister's decision while 'approximately twenty Conservative MPs abstained, along with the bulk of the Labour Party (PLP), whose leadership had adopted a noncommittal position' (Dewey, 2009, p12)

The vote itself on 3 August 1961 was significant as it provided an illustration of the Labour Party's position on Europe at this time, with the Labour Opposition officially abstaining from voting with just five Labour members including Michael Foot voting against the government. It also demonstrated the position of the Liberal Party as *all* Liberal members voted for the Conservative government's proposal to negotiate the terms of entry into the EEC (Boyd, Guardian, 4 August 1961).

Prior to the vote being taken, Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Wilson spoke in the debate and suggested that this was not the right time to be negotiating Britain's entry into the EEC. Wilson, who was to become Shadow Foreign Secretary on 2 November 1961, stated: 'to be on one's knees, however, because of the crippling blows which the economy had sustained and was sustaining was not the right posture for negotiations that could decide the country's whole future' (The Times, 4 August 1961, p6). Wilson was objecting to the terms and the timing of entry rather than suggesting an outright rejection of Britain in Europe. However, as one of the five Labour rebels to vote against the whip, Michael Foot said during the debate:

> The Opposition leaders seemed to be saying they would be in favour of entry into the Common Market as long as the adjustments were so great that there would be no Common Market at all. Mr Wilson and Mr Gaitskell seemed to be saying they wished to enter the West European football club as long as they could have consultation with the MCC and the rules of the game were altered to resemble cricket (The Times, 4 August 1961, p6).

Foot was making the argument that Gaitskell and Wilson produced a whole series of powerful demands for protection, qualifications, and modifications to the Common Market which were so wide reaching as to make becoming a member almost meaningless. As such, Foot argued that the Opposition should vote against the motion rather than abstaining (Hansard, 3 August 1961). The reason for Labour's abstention was primarily to keep the Party united. Labour at this time was recovering from a series of bitter debates over Clause Four and unilateral disarmament. Gaitskell therefore, sensing divisions over Europe 'immediately adopted a wait and see position' (Dewey, 2009, p12). As Forster (2002) notes, Labour was also caught unprepared by Macmillan's shock announcement. The leadership therefore needed time to carefully consider a response, particularly as a

result of the ‘tensions within the party’s own ranks stemming from the growing influence of pro-Market individuals’ (Forster, 2009, p27).

The Labour leadership was also acutely aware of the shift in elite opinion which was now one of a pro-Common Market position. It was not only the majority of the press which had now moved in support of membership but there is evidence to suggest that the position of the wider elite was also shifting towards the view that Britain should become a member of the Common Market. For example, a Common Market Campaign document in support of accession ‘was signed by 140 prominent officials, parliamentarians, economists, academics, journalists and business leaders’ (Dewey, 2009, p12).

The Labour Party in 1961 had neither backed nor opposed negotiations yet this had not prevented the TUC from making a firm decision to support the Conservative government’s decision to open negotiations to join the Common Market. This became certain when on 9 August 1961 ‘their economic committee decided to recommend the general council to give the Government the go-ahead signal’ (Randall, 1961, Daily Mail p3). The TUC’s stance reflected the prevailing view of the nation, as an opinion poll carried out by National Opinion Polls Ltd and published in the Daily Mail on 21 August 1961 demonstrates. People in the poll were asked whether they were in favour of joining the European Common Market providing there are safeguards for Commonwealth, farming and current trade agreements. The answers were that 80 per cent were in favour and just 20 per cent against. This was compared with 74 per cent in favour and 26 per cent against when the previous poll was taken on 27 July 1961 (Terry, 21 August 1961, Daily Mail).

The opinion polls also exposed Macmillan’s unpopularity at this time however. In the same edition of the Daily Mail, the headline to the poll was: ‘The Premier’s popularity is still dropping’. Macmillan’s popularity amongst the electorate was now just 44 per cent compared to 72 per cent a year earlier (Terry, Daily Mail, 21 August 1961). It would be reasonable and logical therefore to conclude that the opinion poll conducted on the electorate in respect of their view on Britain’s entry into Europe had some bearing on Macmillan’s decision to apply for membership. This conclusion is reinforced by Crowson (2007), who states that: ‘Conservative Central Office increasingly believed a commitment to the EEC would help the party win the next election’ (Crowson, 2007 p30).

The application for membership should be understood in the context of Britain in the 1960s: a period of self-criticism by the political, economic and academic elite. Macmillan’s initial application in 1961 therefore ‘formed part of a more general reassessment of

Britain's place in the world, and the need to modernise British institutions' (Gamble, 1998, p16). As Dorey (1995) notes: 'Managerialism and modernisation were the concepts which often underpinned the efforts of politicians to solve Britain's economic and political problems during the 1960s' (Dorey, 1995, p67). In view of this, becoming a member of the EEC was therefore clearly an important element in Macmillan's design 'to bring about the political and economic modernisation of Britain' (Green, 2002, p190). Indeed, electorally selling entry to the Common Market as part of a modernisation package 'would allow the Conservatives to counter accusations that they were running out of steam' (Bale, 2012, p79). Further evidence to confirm that Macmillan strongly linked his modernisation programme to his EEC application is provided by Green (2002), who argues that the Cabinet decision taken on 22 July 1961 to apply for membership 'at the same time that the new economic planning initiatives were being formulated, was no coincidence' (Green, 2002, p190).

Macmillan's bid was therefore inextricably linked to his modernisation project *The Modernisation of Britain* which was outlined in detail during the period of negotiations (Turner, 1994). By incorporating the application to join the Common Market into his overall modernisation programme, Conservative centre-right progressives viewed this as 'a way of instilling a new beginning, distancing the Party from its past' (Turner, 2000, p54). The project was relevant to the tactics employed by Macmillan and shows Europe subordinate even in policy and governance considerations to other national goals such as addressing social imbalances between the regions of Britain and by making the optimum use of new technology. As the 1961 Daily Mail opinion poll demonstrated however, despite public support for entry into the Common Market, Macmillan's tactic of incorporating Europe into the modernisation programme in the hope of boosting his popularity had clearly proved unsuccessful.

A combination of factors contributed to the Conservative government's decision to apply for membership including the shifting of elite opinion in favour of entry, and Macmillan now believing that Britain's place was in Europe. In addition, although he considered possible internal dissent, Macmillan was aware that only one MP had voted against and was therefore confident he would have the support of his party. Nevertheless, in a speech during the 1962 by-election at his old constituency Stockton-On-Tees, Macmillan delivered 'the strongest public call that he had yet made in support of European policy' (Hutchinson, 1980, p82). Macmillan talked of the government accepting the tremendous challenges and gigantic opportunities the Common Market presents to the British people.

In discussing the negotiations, Macmillan said: 'This is not child's play. This is high policy – and we know what we are doing' (Hutchinson, 1980, p84).

It was of little surprise therefore that Macmillan decided to commence negotiations at this time as 'a confluence of domestic circumstances appeared favourable to Macmillan's endeavour. These included the support of the FBI, financial interests in the City of London and provisional approval from the TUC' (Dewey, 2009, p12). The Conservative government was concerned that 'if the EEC were successful, and particularly if political co-operation were added to economic integration it might become the main partner of the United States displacing Britain' (George, 1990, p29). Economically, there were also fears that Common Market countries would benefit from trade from United States' companies. An example of this fear was demonstrated in an exchange between the Labour MP for Bassetlaw, Frederick Bellenger and Reginald Maudling, President of the Board of Trade in the House of Commons on 3 November 1959. Bellenger asked for the number of inquiries or proposals from American sources for the building or leasing of factories in Britain that had been cancelled since the Common Market became operative. Maudling was unable to supply the numbers but said he was aware of one American company that had established a manufacturing base in a Common Market country in preference to the UK. Pressed further by Bellenger, the President of the Board of Trade was asked whether:

> This statement conflicted with reports from the United States Office of Business Economics, which said that American capital investment is being switched to the Common Market countries from this country. In reply, Maudling failed to provide specific evidence to dispute the reports quoted in Bellenger's question and concluded with the words: We must watch the matter very carefully (Hansard, 3 November 1959, c843).

John Young (1993) provides evidence of the pressure exerted by America when he states that 'Eisenhower himself warned Macmillan that the special relationship would decline if Britain did *not* join the EEC' (Young, 1993, p71). Following the lack of military support by the USA over the Suez crisis of 1956, Edwards (1993) also suggests that the relationship was now starting to be seen as more special through British eyes than through American, and 'post-war hopes of partnership had been replaced by an economic and military dependence by means of which Britain was consigned to a role of increasingly impotent avuncularity' (Edwards, 1993, p209). The influence of the United States therefore cannot be underestimated: it is one of the major reasons for the position taken by *both* pro and anti-Europeans, *and* by both Conservative and Labour politicians, albeit for different reasons.

The threat of Communism perceived or otherwise was a concern expressed on numerous occasions by Prime Minister Macmillan and was also a factor in respect of America's interest in the EEC. This view is supported by Young (1993) who suggests that 'the US valued the EEC as both a solid economic and *political* barrier against Communism' (Young, 1993, p68). Following the Second World War, political instability was an ongoing concern for Washington as this 'heralded the prospect of the Communist Parties spreading their appeal in democratic countries deemed of vital strategic importance to the Americans' (Daddow, 2004, p77). Speaking in the House of Commons on 2 August 1961, Macmillan expressed his fear that 'any or all countries of Western Europe could become satellites of Moscow' (The Times, 8 August 1961, p8). The American interest was indeed strong as demonstrated in a Washington report on 4 August 1961 where Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee predicted that 'the United States might itself eventually join the Common Market if Britain did so' (The Times, 5 August 1961, p6).

The United States' impatience over Britain's entry into Europe was also a concern for companies that relied on the Commonwealth countries for trade. For example, in a letter to The Times published on 17 November 1961, Maurice Petherick, Chairman of the Commonwealth Industries Association argued that the object of the persistent American attempts to push Britain into the Common Market was political. One political reason being that Europe with Britain being a partner would be better equipped to defend against the Russian 'threat'. The other reason as indicated by Petherick was 'America's fear that discriminatory tariffs would be imposed upon them' (The Times, 17 November 1961, p15).

It was not only Soviet Russia that those who supported Britain's entry into Europe were concerned with. For others, the fear was that if Britain did not join the Community then it would be Germany which assumed control. At the October 1961 Labour Party Conference, Shirley Williams, secretary of the Fabian Society and on the right-wing of the Labour Party said 'West Germany would be left leading a block as economically powerful as the Soviet Union' (The Times, 6 October 1961, p14). It must be remembered that it was only sixteen years since the end of the Second World War and therefore, the threat of Germany was still fresh in the minds of politicians of all parties. However, one of Labour's prominent anti-Europeans, Richard Crossman from the left of the Party speaking at a meeting of the East London Fabian Society, suggested that the Common Market will be dominated by Germany and France even with Britain in it. Crossman went on to say:

> As Socialists we cannot accept the view that we must enter the Common Market because this country cannot manage to pull itself together and organize its economy

> properly outside the Common Market. We need to put our house in order first, ideally, and then negotiate, rather than be driven to negotiate by the weakness of the country (The Times, 19 September 1961, p16).

For many on the left of the Labour Party however, it was not Germany, nor France, but capitalist America that was of greater concern. This concern was confirmed by a Washington report prepared for the Congressional Joint Economic Committee by Christian Herter, former Secretary of State, and William Clayton, former Under-Secretary of State whose conclusion reads:

> We believe that the United States must form a trade partnership with the European Common Market and take the leadership in further expanding a free world economic community. More than any broadening or reshaping of the existing law, however, we believe that the most hopeful vehicle for strengthening the west and for defeating Khrushchev in the cold war is to be found in the example of the Common Market (The Times, 4 November 1961, p9).

The Labour Party has been divided over Europe for decades and the reasons for this are complex. One of the reasons for this division is that of sovereignty, a concept which is discussed in chapter two. Speaking In the parliamentary debate on the MacMillan Government's decision to make a formal application to join the Common Market, Harold Wilson offered his view at this time on sovereignty:

> The question is not whether sovereignty remains absolute or not, but in what way one is prepared to sacrifice sovereignty, to whom and for what purpose. That is the real issue before us. The question is whether any proposed surrender of sovereignty will advance or retard our progress to the kind of world we all want to see (Wilson, Hansard, 3 August, 1961, cc 1667-1668).

This somewhat uncommitted view of sovereignty by Wilson typifies how the concept was used by some politicians and the wider elite at this time. As Milward (2002) notes, 'in the 1950s, sovereignty, whether that of the nation-state or of parliament, hardly figured in the public debate, except as a rhetorical flourish' (Milward, 2002, p442). The absence of public debate on the issue continued into the early nineteen-sixties with most opposition to Britain's application in 1961 being based more on the question of whether membership would be a beneficial foreign policy decision rather than on any loss of national sovereignty (Milward, 2002).

Other reasons for the divide are ideologically or economically based, such as Britain's right to impose import controls to protect British jobs. This particular argument in itself is significant. Import control was one of the main arguments espoused by the left of the Party as a reason to maintain Britain's independence from Europe. Nevertheless,

Labour's position on Europe in 1961 was overwhelmingly determined by Macmillan's decision to apply for entry into the Common Market (King, 1977). This decision meant Labour had to seriously consider its own position on Europe: significantly, this position would be influenced by partisan and tactical considerations.

3.3: Gaitskell's speech at the 1962 Labour Party Conference

The decision by the Conservatives to apply for membership of the EEC had therefore huge implications for the Labour opposition. Although Labour abstained from the Conservative's pro-Common Market motion, 'gradually, between the summer of 1961 and the autumn of 1962, the Party's position hardened into one of outright hostility' (King, 1977, p11). This position on Europe ultimately led to leader Hugh Gaitskell's major speech at the 1962 Labour Party Conference in Brighton. Here Gaitskell spoke passionately against Britain's entry into the Common Market (Young, 1999). Furthermore, his speech was to have enormous implications for his party. The real significance of Gaitskell's speech was that for the first time, certainly on a major issue, he and the recently formed Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS) which represented the revisionist wing of the Party were in disagreement (Haseler, 1969). The CDS was formed soon after the Labour Party's 1960 Scarborough Conference with the prime intention of reversing the Conference decision which was in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament (Cronin, 2004). CDS included prominent pro-Europeans such as William Rodgers, Roy Jenkins, Roy Hattersley and Anthony Crosland. The group was subsequently dissolved on the return of the 1964 Labour Government. As the overwhelming majority of CDS members were pro-Europe they were set at odds with the Party leader on the issue of Europe. Gaitskell considered it more important however, to appeal to the public and unite the Party rather than taking a principled position on the issue. In what was to be a Rubicon moment, Gaitskell was prepared to gamble therefore, confident that because of their close relationship, his pro-European friends would not defect to Wilson's side.

The speech by Gaitskell in 1962 was to be largely remembered by his phrase *the end of a thousand years of history*. Here he was referring to the question of Europe becoming a federal state. As Shore (1993) notes, membership of the Common Market would mean that Britain would lose its 'freedom of action not only in trade, but in foreign policy as well' (Shore, 1993, p81). The possibility of Britain becoming absorbed into a political federal was of great concern to Gaitskell. In his opinion 'British membership of a federal entity in western Europe would be inimical to the nation's well-established links with the Commonwealth' (Broad and Daddow, 2010, p205). Gaitskell also spoke of the attitude of the Liberals towards Britain entering into a European federation and dismissed them as

being ‘a little young’ (Labour Party Annual Report, 1962, p159). He was just as scathing towards the Conservatives, accusing them of hypocrisy by stating that ‘when they go to Brussels they show the greatest enthusiasm for political union. When they speak in the House of Commons they are most anxious to aver that there is no commitment whatever to any political union’ (Labour Party Annual Report, 1962, p159). At the October 1962 Conservative Party Conference at Llandudno however, Macmillan responded by mocking Gaitskell’s ambivalence on the Common Market issue with the words ‘she didn’t say yes, she didn’t say no; she didn’t say stay, she didn’t say go; she wanted to climb, but dreaded to fall; so she bided her time and clung to the wall’ (Williams, 2009, p422).

In his speech, Gaitskell was passionately outlining the different history of Britain compared to the other Common Market countries and addressed the audience with the words:

> We must be clear about this: it does mean if this is the idea, the end of Britain as an independent European state. I make no apology for repeating it. It means the end of a thousand years of history. You may say, let it end, but my goodness, it is a decision that needs a little care and thought. And it does mean the end of the Commonwealth. How can one really seriously suppose that if the mother country, the centre of the Commonwealth, is a province of Europe (which is what federation means) it could continue to exist as the mother country of a series of independent nations? It is sheer nonsense (Labour Party Annual Report, 1962, p159).

Gaitskell did not however, completely rule out entry into the Common Market, but would only consider becoming a member if all the conditions were met. These conditions included safeguarding the interests of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries and the countries of the Commonwealth. Gaitskell in his speech paid tribute to the aid Commonwealth countries supplied to Britain during the two World Wars. Here he remembered Vimy Ridge and Gallipoli and also significantly said ‘Harold Wilson will remember the loans from Canada, the willingness of New Zealand and Australia to accept very low food prices to help us out year by year’ (Labour Party Annual Report, 1962, p161).

Although there was no specific mention of the word, Gaitskell in his 1962 speech alluded to the possibility of a referendum. Towards the end of his speech, Gaitskell repeated his demand:

> If and when the final terms are known, the Party – the major Opposition Party, the alternative Government of the country comes to the conclusion that these terms are not good enough, if it is our conviction that we should not enter the Common Market on these terms, so that there is a clear clash of opinion between the two major political

> groupings in the country, then the only right and proper and democratic thing is to let the people decide the issue (Labour Party Annual Report, 1962, p164).

For what he considered to be their lack of trust in the wisdom of the British people to decide on the question of entry into the Community, Gaitskell also derided the Conservatives:

> We are now being told that the British people are not capable of judging this issue – the Government knows best; the top people are the only people who can understand it; it is too difficult for the rest. This is the classic argument of every tyranny in history. It begins as a refined, intellectual argument, and it moves into a one-man dictatorship; "We know best" becomes "I know best". We did not win the political battles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to have this reactionary nonsense thrust upon us again (Labour Party Annual Report, 1962, p164).

Gaitskell's implied commitment to a referendum may however have been made to appease both left and right wings of the Party rather than a genuine desire to let the people decide. Clearly the left could be very happy with the speech as many of their concerns would be addressed if the safeguards for entry were met. The right can also to some extent be satisfied that there was not an absolute commitment to remain outside the Common Market. Gaitskell showed great vision in that he had created an opportunity for a referendum to be held at a later date. As history shows, this was to be the case in 1975 when a referendum was indeed held under the leadership of Harold Wilson, and therefore this aspect of his speech did serve a practical purpose.

Unsurprisingly, the senior figure of Roy Jenkins who, although not as forthright in his views on the Commonwealth countries, nevertheless stated that he was less concerned about the old Commonwealth countries which he thought could manage well enough on their own. The overall thrust of Jenkins' speech was that Britain should enter Europe as a Labour Movement fully committed and enthusiastic (Labour Party Report, 1962). In the summer of 1961, Jenkins wrote in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) financed magazine *Encounter*[6], 'a long refutation of the case against entry and particularly of the Commonwealth argument which was then used on both left and right in politics' (Jenkins, 1991, p143). In a speech clearly aimed at addressing the points made by Jenkins, Healey acknowledged the sincerity of Jenkins' views, yet forcibly outlined his disagreement of them when he asked:

[6] Edited by Stephen Spender and Irving Kristol, *Encounter* was first published in 1953 and covertly funded by the CIA. Under the editorial team of Spender and Melvin Lasky, the magazine was finally 'outed in 1967 as a recipient of CIA funding' (Saunders, 1999, p3).

> Why is the Government in fact trying to get us into Europe? Entirely for negative and backward-looking reasons, because it has totally lost confidence in its ability to solve the economic problems of our own nation, because it is inspired by a rigid hostility to a United Nations in which independent Afro-Asian countries now have a central role, and because – and this is most important of all – there is a growing fear and hostility in the Conservative Party to the new Commonwealth because coloured men are now going into what they regarded as a white-man's club (Labour Party Annual Report, 1962, p175).

Healey went on to talk about the global problems facing Britain and Europe and how the Commonwealth could play a central role in solving them. He addressed the points made by Jenkins directly by arguing that the Labour movement needs to restore the faith of the Commonwealth countries. Healey claimed that If entering the Common Market on terms which meant the dissolving and disintegration of the Commonwealth system 'we should be committing a crime against ourselves, we should be committing a crime against humanity' (The Labour Report, 1962, p175). This was a carefully considered speech that could appeal to all wings of the Party. The speech not only supported the leader but also served to isolate Jenkins as one who had little commitment to the Commonwealth and who appeared to wish to gain entry into the European Community at all cost. Healey's words therefore served not only to outline his stance on the issue of Britain's entry into the Community but also to enhance his own position for a future leadership election.

Whilst clearly at odds with some of his previous allies such as Jenkins, Gaitskell's speech may not have been as potentially damaging in respect of party unity as at first thought. In the period leading up to his speech, the left of the Labour Party was already strongly anti-EEC. However, Young (1999) notes that when Patrick Gordon Walker, Michael Stewart, Denis Healey and James Callaghan – key figures who have supported him over nationalisation and disarmament 'began to move towards the anti camp, Gaitskell could not but take notice' (Young, 1999, p160).

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Nevertheless, only two weeks before Gaitskell's ground-breaking speech, a new split opened in the Labour Party with some MPs who were in favour of Britain joining the EEC challenging what they considered his hostile attitude on this issue. In a Daily Mail report on 21 September 1962, it stated that 'at least six front bench Labour spokesmen are now known to favour the Common Market' (Daily Mail, 21 September 1962, p2). The report also claimed that 'roughly 100 Labour MPs are now believed to be firmly for, against an equal number against' (Daily Mail, 21 September 1962, p2). It did seem at this time then that Gaitskell had not only to prepare for one of the most important speeches of his political life but also to set a tone for the entire future debate. A crucial aspect of this

speech was that it demonstrated that it was now respectable for the centre/moderate left to be critical of Britain's entry into the European Community.

Gaitskell's speech at the Labour Party Conference at Brighton on 3 October 1962 not only galvanised the Party faithful but his powerful words also had some of his previous critics swinging on to his side. One of those critics was Barbara Castle who wrote: 'his pro-market friends were appalled, while I, for once on Gaitskell's side, cheered. The battle-lines had been drawn for fourteen years of argument in the party' (Castle, 1993, p329). This was a particularly prophetic comment by Castle given that the referendum on Europe occurred just over fourteen years later in 1975. The speech fully satisfied the anti-Marketeers that Gaitskell is now 'for all practical purposes lowering himself off the fence and getting poised for commanding a political campaign against any Government decision to go into Europe' (The Times, 4 October 1962, p8). Furthermore, Harold Wilson 'expressed delight from the chair, declaring Gaitskell's address an "historic speech" which should be printed and sent to every member of the Party' (Pimlott, 1992, p249).

A further indication of the impact of Gaitskell's speech was that Frank Cousins, leader of the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) 'offered to cover the printing costs up to one million copies' (The Times, 4 October 1962, p8).

> Mr Cousins, who has been Mr Gaitskell's most damaging and influential critic inside the trade unions, was joined by Mr Manny Shinwell, who has made it his elder statesman's business to maintain an unrelenting stream of criticism about his leader. Mr Shinwell went so far as to suggest that the printed form of Mr Gaitskell's speech should replace the national executive committee's statement *Labour and the Common Market* (The Times, 4 October 1962, p8).

That Cousins should now take this action as a result of Gaitskell's speech is not without significance. The trade union movement had been divided on the issue of Britain's membership of the Common Market throughout the 1950s and 1960s with individual unions taking distinctive positions. As far as the Trades Union Congress (TUC) was concerned, despite a series of heated debates in Congress over Britain's membership, a pragmatic, 'wait and see posture was the dominant motif of official Congress policy until the early 1970s' (Rosamond, 1998, p132). Gaitskell's speech and Cousins subsequent positive reaction to it therefore, not only added support to the position of the TUC but alleviated tensions, at least temporarily between anti and pro-Common Market unions. The conclusion reached by some of the delegates at the conference was that it was only a matter of time before 'Mr Gaitskell openly set himself at the head of the anti-Market

campaign and swept on to lead Labour to victory in a general election' (The Times, 4 October 1962, p8).

Whilst not personally xenophobic, Gaitskell's phrase was calculated to appeal to the patriotic sentiments of party and country. His ultimate position was, according to Hugo Young (1999), that of a global internationalist and his fear of the loss of the Commonwealth was a constant cause for concern: 'he wanted a bridge between the Commonwealth and Europe, which could not be constructed if we destroy the Commonwealth by our entry' (Young, 1999, p169).

There is a certain irony in respect of Gaitskell's speech in that many of those people who were now four-square behind Gaitskell in his position on Europe were the very people on the left of the Labour movement that had opposed him on the previous debates on nuclear weapons and on his attempt to abandon Clause Four. Haseler (1969) wrote that it was the first time in his career that 'Gaitskell had sided with the left on a major policy issue and it also established him, in their eyes, as something more than a tool of a handful of revisionist intellectuals' (Haseler, 1969, p237). It is clear that tactics were emerging strongly here as Gaitskell, should he have lived and become Prime Minister would have been left with considerable freedom to manoeuvre on Europe and other issues.

Leading a party that was deeply divided over Europe, Gaitskell, in the autumn of 1962 was facing a dilemma. He was 'part of a section of the Party that could be said to be agnostic on the issue' (Gifford, 2008, p46). Yet, when faced with a divided party, Gaitskell was 'determined to have it both ways: to blow Macmillan's project out of the water, while insisting that he was not in principle opposed to it' (Young, 1999, p162). Nevertheless, when Gaitskell delivered his 'thousand years of history' speech to the Labour Party Conference in October 1962, he had 'chosen the course of opposition to the European project' (Gifford, 2008, p46). This was in spite of delivering a party political broadcast only a few days earlier on 21 September 1962, 'ruminating about the desirability of a wider Europe, and saying what a force for good in the world it might be' (Young, 1998, p168).

What did surprise many however, was the extent of the speech. Few people had expected such passionate opposition to Britain's entry into Europe. Gaitskell also made a shrewd move by his continued reference to the Commonwealth. This reflected the 'continued significance of the Commonwealth for many on the left and the right of the Party as the main alternative to the Empire' (Gifford, 2008, p47). However, Nairn (1973) suggests that 'by evoking the Commonwealth, the opponents of the government's European strategy

demonstrated their inherent conservatism' (Nairn, 1973, p63). This implied that the 'British state was above the narrow nationalism of Europe because of its imperial history' (Nairn, 1973, p63).

In respect of the Commonwealth, the implication from Gaitskell's speech was that under a Conservative government, the Commonwealth would be under threat. Whilst acknowledging that Gaitskell was conscious of party advantage, Edward Heath accepted that Gaitskell was genuinely concerned about the effects on the Commonwealth and suggested that 'he should have realised, however, that as chief negotiator, I would ensure that 'the interests of the Commonwealth were not betrayed' (Heath, 1998, p223).

It is noteworthy that those members of the Shadow Cabinet who supported Gaitskell in his opposition to British entry included Harold Wilson who was to be the next leader of the Labour Party. Wilson resented the Gaitskellites and in particular Crosland and his friends: the Hampstead Set as they were known. Wilson resented policy being decided by this upper middle-class clique of Oxford 'chums' (even though he had attended Oxford himself). Crosland similarly despised Wilson and in private referred to him as 'dirty little Wilson' (Jefferys, 1999, p68). This mutual dislike based on class was clearly evident and Jefferys notes that 'one journalist who experienced Labour's in-fighting in the 1950s later wrote that the "snobby Frognalites" affected to believe that Wilson had "China ducks" on his sitting room wall' (Jefferys, 1999, p68). Conceivably, Wilson may *at this time* have been opposed to Europe as much for *personal*, as for economic or cultural reasons.

The wholehearted and vocal support offered by Wilson, despite failing in his challenge to Gaitskell's leadership in 1960, did not do his chances of winning a future Labour Party leadership election any harm. Wilson's future prospects were particularly enhanced as his opponent the pro-European George Brown had the embarrassing task of having to wind-up the conference debate – a debate that had overwhelming support for the National Executive Committee policy statement. Nevertheless, according to Crossman (1981), in his attempt to redress the balance on the pro-European side, Brown appeared to have support 'not just from committed pro-Marketeers, but also from right-wing trade union leaders unhappy about Britain's economic prospects' (Crossman, 1981, p965). Crossman, a senior Labour Party figure and intellectual heavyweight did not have a particularly high opinion of Brown and felt that Gaitskell was burdened by having Brown as his deputy. In his diary entry of 14 June, 1961 he wrote:

> Brown is not only superficial and lightweight intellectually; he is not only vain and vulgar; he is not only drunken; he is also a little cad. However, in the new spirit of

> unity, such words should not be recorded, even in a diary. But I do record them, because this day spent with the leadership reconvinced me of my rightness in asserting that I would never lift a finger to replace Gaitskell by George Brown (Crossman, 1981, p949).

Less than a week later however, despite a split over Europe remaining within the Labour Party, the pro-Marketeers appeared to be on the retreat:

> At the conference a gesture will be made to the pro-Market element by pointing out that the party *might* switch to support if the entry terms can be bettered. This is a tactic, however, rather than a reality. The prospect of radically changed terms appears remote. 'Both the major parties are preparing for a straightforward battle for or against the Common Market (Daily Mail, 26 September 1962, p1).

The view as expressed by the Daily Mail political correspondent did indeed prove accurate. As a result of the landmark speech by Gaitskell and the overwhelming vote in favour of the Common Market motion at the Conservative Party conference at Llandudno on 11 October 1962, the subject of entry into the Common Market had now become a straight party issue. The vote by the Conservatives and Gaitskell's speech also 'went a long way – some will claim the whole way – to killing the Common Market question as an internal bone of contention with the Conservative Party itself' (The Times, 12 October 1962, p13). As a result of Gaitskell's speech, for the Labour Party, politics and Europe had now become inextricably linked.

Once again, Gaitskell showed tremendous tactical awareness, for despite the passion displayed in his speech, the Labour Party under Gaitskell's leadership had considered the issue of the Common Market as a potential vote winner over eighteen months previously. Indeed, an article published in The Times in May 1961 entitled *Labour sees Common Market as an electoral windfall* suggested that:

> Labour are going to take a leaf out of the book used by Sir Winston Churchill between 1945 and 1951 and attack Government policy where it is weak, without putting forward positive proposals of their own as though they were themselves carrying out the responsibilities of Government (The Times, 19 May 1961, p8).

The article also correctly forecast that the Labour leadership may win back the party conference on defence and therefore through the provision of a strong alternative position on Europe, Labour would be in a greatly enhanced electoral position. This positioning on Europe did not please every senior Labour figure however. Roy Jenkins resigned from Labour's front bench in July 1960 over the issue of Europe and was referring to Denis Healey, Harold Wilson, Douglas Jay and Patrick Gordon Walker when he said he was

‘sorry to see the enthusiasm with which some Labour Party spokesmen are lining themselves up against our going into Europe’ (The Times, 1 June 1961, p9).

Despite the immense impression Gaitskell’s speech made on his own party, it did not appear to have the same impact upon the general public. Opinion polls carried out by Gallup in September 1962, the month prior to the speech showed 46 per cent approval to the question: ‘if the British Government were to decide that Britain’s interest would best be served by joining the European Common Market, would you approve or disapprove?’ (Gallup, 1976, p647) The public’s response to the same question posed in November 1962, just one month following the speech, actually showed a *decrease* in the approval rating at 42 per cent (Gallup, 1976). As time went on, this issue did become of greater significance to the public, although these polls suggested that at this time, particularly as Britain was not yet a member of the Common Market, it was the political elites that were more concerned over the issue of Europe than the British public. This view is supported by Butler and Stokes (1974) who state that no one should be surprised that policy questions such as entry into Europe or retention of nuclear weapons, whose consequences for the lives of ordinary people are uncertain and indirect, should be matters on which attitudes are formed only to a limited extent. Indeed, ‘most of the policies which provide the focus of conflict at the elite level excite little reaction in the mass electorate’ (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p284).

This therefore adds weight to the argument that it is the elites and elite opinion that are the most crucial in respect of deciding policy. As a consequence, this lack of reaction from the British public on the question of Common Market membership was to significantly influence both major political parties in drafting their respective manifestos. Labour in its manifesto for the forthcoming general election in 1964 under the leadership of Harold Wilson tended to play down the issue of Europe. Furthermore, in a highly detailed manifesto, the Common Market is mentioned only briefly and is very much non-committal. For example, the manifesto refers to the end of colonialism and states:

> Harold Macmillan and Alec Douglas-Home both declared there was no future for Britain outside the Common Market and expressed themselves ready to accept terms of entry to the Common Market that would have excluded our Commonwealth partners, broken our special trade with them, and forced us to treat them as third-class citizens. Though we shall seek to achieve closer links with our European neighbours, the Labour Party is convinced that the first responsibility of a British Government is still to the Commonwealth (Labour Party, general election manifesto, 1964, p14).

Both the Conservatives and Labour placed very little emphasis on Europe in their respective manifestos. According to evidence provided by Evans and Norris (1999), the percentage of manifesto sentences devoted to a positive emphasis on Europe was just a quarter of one per cent from Labour and just over one per cent from the Conservatives. Similarly, 'the negative emphasis on Europe in both parties' 1964 manifestos was even less with Labour and the Conservatives on nought per cent each' (Evans and Norris, 1999, p14). As Janssen (1991) states; 'traditionally European integration has been an issue with low political salience, only occasionally emerging as a topic that moves British public opinion' (Janssen, 1991, p207). The statement made by Janssen (1991) assists in understanding why politicians were influenced by tactics in choosing their shifting stances on the issue of Europe, even to the point as demonstrated in their 1964 General Election manifestos of playing down the issue when it suited them. This was despite the politicians considering it to be a vital issue for the future of the country. Nevertheless, and most importantly, the issue could be strong enough to swing a *minority* of individual voters particularly as the Labour Party was now seen as a united party.

Events of 1963 were to have enormous consequences in respect of Britain and Europe and were particularly dramatic for the Labour Party. In January 1963 Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell was to die after a short illness aged only 56 and be replaced by a new leader. The significance of Harold Wilson's leadership and his general election victories in 1964 and 1966 and how this affected the Labour and Conservative parties' position on Europe is discussed in chapter four.

3.4: Summary

This was a highly significant period for the British political elites over the question of Britain and the embryonic Common Market. Largely as a result of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's first application in 1961 and the responding landmark speech by Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell, there was, just one year later by Autumn 1962 a clear division between the two main political parties. Amongst the political elites and political commentators, the issue of Europe was now of limited salience for the forthcoming 1964 General Election largely as a result of de Gaulle's veto on January 1963. Given that the issue of Europe was dropped after the veto, this demonstrates that the elite could determine whether Europe was to take a high or low position on the political agenda. Europe was however, highly significant in that it was a factor that divided Labour and the Conservatives, in spite of the intra-party disagreements within both parties.

The weight of evidence suggests that pragmatism and tactical considerations played a major role in Macmillan's eventual unsuccessful application for membership. For despite some opposition from a small minority of backbenchers, Macmillan, largely as a result of his House of Commons speech on 2 August 1961 galvanised his party in support of the bid and thereby eliminated to a great extent party disunity on this issue for the time being at least. Nevertheless, as the opinion polls showed, Macmillan's popularity with the British public was declining at this time. Therefore by taking a clear lead on Common Market membership, Macmillan had demonstrated support for the Party's modernisers who considered Europe to be 'the catalyst for wider economic and political change' (Turner, 2000, p54). At this time, Conservative Central Office also 'increasingly believed a commitment to the EEC would help the Party win the next election' (Crowson, 2007, p30).

The Conservative Government was also concerned at the amount of British and American companies that were choosing EEC countries as bases for their businesses as opposed to setting up in Britain. The very real possibility of the United States displacing Britain as the main partner of the EEC was an additional imperative for Macmillan to adopt a pragmatic approach to entry into the Community. The influence of the United States was of huge importance throughout this particular period. Politically, the perceived threat of the Soviet Union was a factor in the US exerting pressure on Britain to join the Common Market. There is also considerable evidence to suggest that economically, the US would benefit by Britain becoming a member of the Common Market. Indeed, the United States had seriously considered applying for membership herself, providing further support for the assertion by many on the Labour left that the Common Market was fundamentally a 'capitalist's club', thereby creating a dilemma for socialists.

To many on the Labour left, the issue was not necessarily about the Common Market itself, but was about American involvement in Britain's decision to apply for membership. The historian and long-time Labour Party member AJP Taylor articulated the anti-American view of the Labour left at this time in an article written for the Sunday Express where he depicted the Common Market application as 'symptomatic of a wider surrender to US foreign policy' (Taylor, 1961, cited in Dewey, 2009, p91). Anti-Americanism was not confined to the Labour left however. Elements of those within the Conservative Party sceptical about Britain's closer involvement with Europe remembered American self-interest during the inter-war years and 'were not willing to trust the Americans' (Crowson, 2007, p72). There existed a suspicion amongst Conservative imperialists that 'American enthusiasm for British involvement in Europe stemmed from a desire to see the end of the Commonwealth and destroy imperial preference' (Crowson, 2007, p72)

Macmillan's decision to apply for membership of the Common Market in 1961 reflected an inextricable combination of growing conviction and electoral considerations. His decision contributed to the Labour Party's position on Europe which gradually became more openly hostile and culminated in what was soon to become known as 'the end of a thousand years of history' speech by Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell. This speech was so skilfully constructed and delivered with such power that it brought to Gaitskell's side even those within his party with whom he had so robustly debated issues of nuclear weapons and the removal of Clause Four. His frequent reference to the significance of the Commonwealth showed particularly good judgement insofar as this issue was of great importance for many on *both* wings of the Party. Gaitskell also demonstrated his vision and tactical awareness when preparing the ground for the possibility of a future referendum on the question of Europe.

This monumental, passionate speech also crucially contained the vital component of widening Labour's appeal beyond its natural support base. Gaitskell's speech was likely to have been designed to bring in not only 'middle-of-the-road' or floating voters but also previous Conservative voters and thus made Labour significantly more electable. This was one of the key reasons why the speech was so well received on both sides of the Party and had the effect of uniting the bulk of the Labour Party in preparation for the forthcoming general election. The battle lines between the Conservatives and Labour had indeed been well and truly drawn.

During this period, members of the political elite adopted tactical positions under the guise of principle. This chapter has provided a number of examples illustrating this, such as Gaitskell's stance on Europe which resulted in him largely uniting his party. His landmark speech in 1962 was however, largely based on the rhetoric of sovereignty, invoking the loss of a thousand years of history if Britain entered the EEC. Milward notes that in the 1950s and up to 1961, sovereignty did not figure highly in the public debate. However, the period commencing 1962 saw the emergence of the concept as a significant factor in the debate over Europe. On the Macmillan Government's decision to make a bid for EEC entry, Harold Wilson used his interpretation of sovereignty in his opposition to the application. Wilson argued that the question is not whether the concept is pooled or absolute, but the way it is surrendered. The issue of Europe at this time was highly fracturing, and whilst there was a clear division between the Conservatives and Labour, this was also a period of deep divisions *within* the political parties.

Chapter Four: Labour Pains

4.0: Introduction

In December 1966 Richard Crossman asked the question: 'does Harold want to go into Europe, or doesn't he? I don't think he knows himself' (Crossman, 1979, p254). Through analysis of Wilson's speeches and the internal debates within a deeply divided Labour Party, this chapter primarily aims to understand Prime Minister Harold Wilson's actual view on Europe and reveal his motives for making what proved to be an unsuccessful 1967 application to join the Common Market. The chapter also discusses why the Conservatives broke with tradition and elected Edward Heath and discovers how not only senior Conservatives, but also how Labour elites reacted to the election of a pro-European leader of the Conservative Party. It is apparent from these examples just how entangled the issue of Common Market membership became with the short-term demands of domestic party politics.

4.1: Wilson's leadership

The death of Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell on 18 January 1963 was claimed by Roy Hattersley to be 'one of the greatest ironies of modern politics' (Hattersley, 1997, p152). Because of his support for revisionism within the Labour movement and passionate opposition to nuclear unilateralism, Gaitskell was hated by many on the left of the Party. However, Gaitskell's 'one thousand years of history' speech in 1962 denouncing the concept of a federal Europe transformed his standing within the Party' (Castle, 1993, p129). In 1959 Gaitskell's opinion poll personal rating was 20 per cent behind Macmillan yet by the end of 1962 he was 10 per cent ahead and 'it seemed that he was certain to lead a united Opposition to victory' (Hattersley, 1997, p153). Following a leadership election later that year between James Callaghan, George Brown and Harold Wilson, it was Wilson that emerged victorious in the contest.

Notably, one of the candidates, the pro-Marketeer George Brown, who had spoken in favour of Britain's entry into the Common Market at the 1962 Labour Party Conference, now appeared to be taking a somewhat different view. At a Young Socialists' dinner in Dewsbury, Brown made it clear that he did not want Britain to be a member of the Community at any price (The Times, 14 January 1963). Whilst it is necessary to consider the audience to which Brown was speaking, he did nevertheless, repeat this message just days after Gaitskell's death, in a rally in Newcastle Upon Tyne on 20 January 1963, during the course of the Labour leadership contest, he declared:

> We cannot accept the narrow concept which is involved in de Gaulle's terms. We must make it perfectly clear that these terms cannot be considered because they fundamentally point to a different association from the one we could consider and would have a terribly divisive effect upon the world (The Times, 21 January 1963, p13).

Newly elected Labour leader Harold Wilson appeared on the television programme "Meet the Press" on 20 March 1963 and stated that 'if Labour was in power after the next general election then it would make a fresh attempt at joining the Common Market' (The Times, 21 March 1963, p11). Wilson had earlier offered wholehearted support to Gaitskell's position on Europe and as stated in chapter three, even went so far as to suggest that Gaitskell's whole Labour Party Conference speech of October 1962 should be distributed free of charge to every Labour Party member. Therefore, this announcement to the press could have left Wilson open to the charge of being ambiguous at best and duplicitous at worst over Europe. Wilson also made it clear however, negotiations would only be resumed if the conditions as outlined by his predecessor Gaitskell were met (The Times, 21 March 1963).

This comment by Wilson was made largely as a result of President de Gaulle announcing in January 1963 a unilateral French veto on British membership. One reason for the veto was that de Gaulle 'did not consider that Britain had accepted a European vocation' (George, 1990, p34). The other major reason for the veto was de Gaulle's view of Britain's relationship with the United States. The internal critics of the Conservative government did not waste any time apportioning blame. They suggested failure was partially due to the government having been 'trying to have it both ways by maintaining the special relationship with America whilst trying to be a good European' (Crowson, 2007, p32). However, although de Gaulle did despise what seemed to be a revival of the special relationship, 'his opposition to Britain joining the EEC was mainly based on his determination that France should dominate it' (Verrier, 1983, p166).

Despite this, following Britain's application in May 1967, Lord Chalfont on behalf of the Labour government declared 'Britain does not lay claim to any special relationship with the United States and would do so even less when she became a member of the European Community' (The Times, 10 October 1967, p1). In what was clearly an attempt to appease de Gaulle and thus improve Britain's chances of a successful application, Lord Chalfont, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office who was in charge of Britain's Common Market negotiations, stated; 'the so-called special relationship had for some time been changing in character, just as foreign policy had changed as Britain concentrated more upon the affairs of Europe' (The Times, 10 October 1967, p1). Given that the United States, as

discussed in chapter three, was putting pressure on the British government to become a member of the EEC, the statement by Lord Chalfont could go some way to suggest that the relationship with America is 'special' only through the eyes of Britain. Rather than being a partner in a special relationship, Britain was in reality, highly dependent upon the United States, particularly in the key areas of intelligence and nuclear matters (Ponting, 1989). Furthermore, the 'myth' of the special relationship was deliberately created in an attempt to disguise Britain's dependence on America and that 'if the British believed in the 'special relationship' then the United States by the 1960s did not: they regarded Britain as a useful ally but no more' (Ponting, 1989, p43). Those who argued therefore, that the special relationship did exist sought to differentiate Britain from the rest of Europe and in doing so undermined the case for entry.

By the time Macmillan made his bid however, American opinion strongly favoured Britain's membership. As Hill (1983) notes, 'any suggestion that British foreign policy should rely on its traditional bastions of the United States or the Commonwealth or a combination of the two would be given short shrift by the cognoscenti' (Hill, 1983, p26). This was reinforced by business and the opinions of the commentariat[7] who continued to support Wilson's attempt in 1967. Andrew Shonfield (1973) for example, a regular contributor to television, radio and newspapers was unequivocal on the issue when he declared 'I have been a partisan of entry for many years' (Shonfield, 1973, p7). Also in support of membership, Michael Shanks (1961) argued that joining the EEC would be instrumental in modernising Britain (Shanks, 1961). Moreover, Daddow (2004) discusses the significant role of the Federal Trust[8], 'a body with a strong chain of connections and a big will to shift elite opinion in favour of Britain taking the European route' (Daddow, 2004, p88). As explained by Pfaltzgraff (1969), it was as a result of the organisation's meetings, conferences and subsequent literature that 'enabled the idea of Common Market membership to be spread among newspaper editorial writers, Members of Parliament, and other persons capable, in turn, of influencing a broader segment of British opinion' (Pfaltzgraff, 1969, pp. 24-5).

The criticism by Gaitskell and the Labour Party of the Conservative Government under the leadership of Harold Macmillan may well have been justified. Richard Crossman (1963)

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[7] These views were advanced in books, articles and the broadcast media by such writers as Camps, Kitzinger, Pinder, Shanks, Shonfield and Hugo Young,

[8] An independent think-tank founded in 1945 by William Beverage, the Federal Trust for Education and Research is credited with 'bringing Britain into Europe and leading the British section of the European movement to a federalist stand in the British political debate on the future of Europe' (Bosco, 1997 cited in Daddow, 2004, p88).

confirmed the Labour Party's opinion that Macmillan only really wished to commit the country to membership of the Community because it would be a distraction from the failures of his own Government. In his speech to an American audience, Crossman (1963) described Macmillan's attempt to enter the Common Market as a political gimmick and said that it was:

> An attempt by a most adroit and ingenious politician to extricate himself from his domestic difficulties and manoeuvre himself into a situation where, having successfully negotiated terms of entry, he could appeal to the country posing as the greatest statesman since Disraeli (Crossman, 1963, p735).

It is clear though that Macmillan was genuinely disappointed and angry that his application had been vetoed by de Gaulle. With despair, on 29 January 1963, the day of the veto, he wrote in his diary 'all our policies at home and abroad are in ruins – except our courage and determination' (Horne, 1989, p447). It certainly did appear that the expectation was that Britain's application would be accepted as 'ministers in almost every department had been hard at work on it' (Horne, 1989, p449). Not all were as disappointed as Macmillan with the outcome however. One Labour left-winger, Jennie Lee, summed up the feelings of many of those on the left when she declared in 1963 that the EEC is:

> An economic shield for NATO, a capitalist club left over from the Cold War, a conspiracy of big business, which would subvert efforts to plan the economy, and which would exclude the Commonwealth and the Third World from its markets (Hollis, 1997, p244).

Lee raised a number of issues in this short statement, including Britain's relationship with the Commonwealth and the Third World. Indeed, Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell in his speech at the 1962 Labour Party Conference cited 'a thousand years of history' and spoke with great passion on how membership of the Common Market would 'irrevocably undermine traditional ties with the Commonwealth and North America' (Jefferys, 1993, p54). The US influence in respect of Britain's defence commitments was powerful and therefore as a result of pressure from the Americans, Wilson responded by publicly pledging to maintain Britain's defence commitments East of Suez. In a speech on 16 December 1964 in the House of Commons, Wilson provided a demonstration of British exceptionalism when he announced:

> I want to make it quite clear that whatever we may do in the field of cost effectiveness, value for money and a stringent review of expenditure, we cannot afford to relinquish our world role – our role which, for shorthand purposes, is sometimes called our "East of Suez" role. I was glad to see last week in Washington the full recognition the United States gave to our unique role as a world peacekeeping power. They recognise, I know, the importance of the bases we provide in case of need, simply because, as I

> said, we are there. Our maritime tradition, our reputation, our mobility, despite inadequate equipment, about all our Commonwealth history and connections, mean that Britain can provide for the Alliances and for the world peace-keeping role a contribution which no other country, not excluding America, can provide (Hansard, 16 December 1964, c424).

Navy Minister Christopher Mayhew however, was placed in what he considered to be an impossible position given that the Navy's resources did not match Britain's commitments as outlined by Wilson. As a result, on 22 February 1966 Mayhew resigned as Navy Minister strongly arguing that Britain was far less powerful economically and militarily than the position often implied by Wilson (Mayhew, 1987). The revelation of this judgement by Mayhew was unsettling for Wilson who continued to believe in Britain as a powerful military world force. Although as Pimlott (1992) observed 'it had become obvious that existing and projected levels of military resources were inadequate for the tasks they were supposed to perform' (Pimlott, 1992, p388).

Wilson was however, reluctant to cut Britain's world commitments fearing that to do so 'would be a preliminary introduction to Common Market entry of which he was not in favour' (Benn, 1987, p392). As a result of Britain's vastly reduced future role in world affairs however, coupled with the current economic crisis, Wilson was forced to reconsider his position on Europe (Ziegler, 1993). In addition, Wilson was in no doubt that his next Cabinet appointments would reflect the Party's balance of opinion on the Common Market. 'He is afraid of being isolated in a minority and forced to go into the Common Market by a Cabinet which consists principally of Common Marketeers' (Benn, 1987, p392). The realisation by Wilson in 1966 that Britain could no longer remain a world power and that Britain's future lay in Europe led therefore to a Cabinet reshuffle of which the pro-European George Brown was to become Foreign Secretary to pursue membership (Young, 1999).

On 18 July 1966, less than a month before his promotion to Foreign Secretary, Brown had discussed with Barbara Castle his intention to resign from government telling her 'we've got to break with America, devalue and go into Europe' (Coopey et al, 1995, p131). Although Brown ultimately did not resign, Douglas Jay, a significant anti-European suggested that had Brown resigned then 'the application to join the Market would probably never have been made' (Jay, 1980, p363). By making Brown Foreign Secretary, Wilson would be seen, particularly by the other member nations as having promoted a pro-European to the task of leading Britain into the Common Market. This would have not only sent a signal to de Gaulle that he was serious about European entry but would also further enhance his own pro-European credentials.

The motive behind Brown‘s appointment however, had perhaps less to do with the new Foreign Secretary’s view on Europe than Wilson’s fear of Callaghan. In a conversation with a Guardian reporter, Callaghan prematurely stated that he was to become Foreign Secretary, with Jenkins taking his place as Chancellor. Once this came to Wilson’s attention, he immediately changed his plans. In his diary entry of 1 August 1966, Wilson wrote: ‘if I carried out the Guardian instructions I would no longer be Prime Minister but taking orders from one of my colleagues’ (Pimlott, 1992, p436). It was only later that Wilson claimed that it was Brown’s strong views on the Common Market that formed the basis of his appointment to Foreign Secretary (Pimlott, 1992).

Three Labour diarists also shared the more conspiratorial view of Wilson’s motive for Brown’s appointment. Barbara Castle (1990) suggested Wilson feared a ploy to make James Callaghan Prime Minister with Roy Jenkins Chancellor in order for them to form a Coalition Government. ‘But by making George Brown Foreign Secretary, I have cornered him. And George Brown was never the danger’ (Castle, 1990, p88). Tony Benn in his diary entry of 6 August 1966 formed a similar view when he wrote that Wilson ‘is convinced that a deliberate plot was conceived to get rid of him’ (Benn, 1987, p466). There is a difference however in Benn’s account that ‘the plotters’ intention was to make Jenkins Prime Minister with Callaghan as second in command having first removed Brown’ (Benn, 1987, p466). According to Richard Crossman (1979), following the appointment of Brown as Foreign Secretary Wilson was enormously exhilarated and claimed ‘he had now got his friends about him’ (Crossman, 1979, p215). In perhaps revealing Wilson’s sense of insecurity, when Crossman suggested that Callaghan be Leader of the House, Wilson replied that he couldn’t trust him in that role because he would be a threat to his own future. Instead, Wilson chose Crossman for that key position as he was ‘the only person who *hasn’t* got political ambitions against him’ (Crossman, 1979, p215).

There is evidence to suggest that Wilson’s position on Europe was influenced to some extent by one of his senior advisors, Thomas Balogh who worked for the Prime Minister until June 1968 (Blick, 2004). According to Marcia Williams, Wilson’s private and political secretary, ‘Balogh never disguised his personal dislike of the European project’ (Williams, 1972, p180). Wilson was lobbied by Balogh to ‘focus on the expansion of Commonwealth trade, at the expense of European integration and in resistance to the US drive for multilateralism’ (Blick, 2004, p105).

The decision to apply for membership in 1967 was nevertheless, likely to have been made as early as the autumn of 1966. The European Economic Correspondent for The Times, following consultation with British sources at the EFTA meeting in Lisbon 27 Oct 1966 forecast that Britain's application would be made 'in the second half of next year, after the conclusion of the Kennedy round in June' (The Times, 28 October 1966, p18). The purpose of the application was that 'the *declaration of intent* to join the Common Market would be sufficient in itself to aid the recovery of the ailing British economy' (The Times, 28 October 1966, p18).

Former Labour MP and future member of the Social Democratic Party, Dick Taverne[9] (1974) was convinced that 'as Prime Minister, Wilson became genuinely converted to the cause of the European Community: one only has to read his speeches in the 1967 debate on the Common Market to see the strength of his commitment' (Taverne, 1974, p102). While Wilson did indeed call for Britain to become a member of the Community, this does not mean that he was converted to the cause. It must be remembered that as a passionate supporter of Britain's membership in Europe, Taverne's testimony may well have been tainted. There was, nevertheless, further support for the views of Taverne. This came from the unlikely source of Richard Crossman, who in his diary entry on 19 February 1966 states 'as Wilson sees it, the difficulties of staying outside Europe and surviving as an independent power are very great compared with entering on the right conditions' (Crossman, 1979, p164). The key words here of course are 'the right conditions'. For some in the Labour Party such as Roy Jenkins for example, the conditions of entry were of only secondary importance.

For Wilson, the conditions were of far greater importance. In an election speech in 1966, Wilson declared: 'Negotiations? Yes. Unconditional acceptance of whatever terms are offered? No' (Pimlott, 1992, p434). Wilson was instinctively hostile to the Common Market mainly as a result of his attachment to the Commonwealth and his attitude was more in favour of remaining outside. He did, nevertheless suppress his instinct because 'he could see that Europe was the direction things were going and there was no point in leading the Party in the wrong direction' (Pimlott, 1992, p435). Therefore the reasons for the focus Wilson placed on the terms of entry were twofold. First, it was Wilson's agnosticism on

[9] In the October 1971 House of Commons debate on the principle of entry, Taverne voted with the Conservatives, defying a Labour three-line whip and 'in the knowledge that the local Party had called upon every Labour MP to vote against entry' (Seyd, 1987, p56). Deselected by Lincoln CLP in 1972, 'Taverne's revenge was to resign his seat and fight the consequent by-election on 1 March 1973 as *Democratic Labour*, comprehensively defeating the official Labour candidate' (Rosen, 2005, p309). Taverne was also successful in the February 1974 General Election, but was defeated by the official Labour candidate Margaret Jackson in the October 1974 General Election.

Europe which led him to believe that the conditions were of particular importance. Second, as with Macmillan's bid, the issue of the conditions and party management were inextricably linked. As a result of Wilson placing the emphasis on the conditions, he not only helped blur the issue on which the Party was divided, but also enabled Labour to differentiate itself from the Conservatives.

Prime Minister Wilson applied to take Britain into the EEC in May 1967 in the knowledge that this application would have a strong possibility of being vetoed by the French President, de Gaulle (Thorpe, 1997). Moreover, he was informed of this as far back as January 1967 by one of his Cabinet Ministers Barbara Castle. Whilst in Germany, Castle had been told by the head of the international section of the Ministry of Economic Affairs that 'de Gaulle was determined not to have us in and that the Five would not be willing to risk disrupting the Market by defying him' (Castle, 1990, p107). In other words, 'we were wasting our time as long as de Gaulle was there' (Castle, 1990, p107). Whilst this may appear quite odd given the information supplied by Castle, Wilson knew exactly what he was doing in that by applying for membership he appeased the Party's pro-Europeans by apparently trying to gain entry. At the same time, the failure of the application brought relief to the anti-Europeans. As a result of the advice given by Castle and others, Wilson would have been aware of the strong possibility that de Gaulle would veto the 1967 application. For Wilson therefore, party management was merely short term. His solution simply sidelined the issue of Europe. Future problems in terms of party management would be inevitable when de Gaulle eventually left office or if a further application was undertaken by a future Conservative government (Thorpe, 1997).

Despite being offered advice by Castle however, which suggested that his application would fail, Wilson nevertheless felt the need to punish many of those who did not vote his way. Seven Parliamentary Private Secretaries (PPS)[10] who abstained in the Common Market vote on 10 May 1967 were sacked by Wilson. A further PPS Joyce Butler of the Housing Ministry resigned shortly afterwards as she opposed the Common Market decision (Daily Mail, 12 May 1967). The sackings may have been influenced to a large degree more as a result of Wilson's anger at the press coverage of the opposition to the Common Market application. According to Castle (1990), Wilson was livid in the Cabinet room having read The Times the day after the vote. He even suggested that 'the Labour Government should refuse to talk to journalists of certain papers at all; such was his anger' (Castle, 1990, p129). Wilson of course did have some reason to be angry. After all, the vote was won by a huge majority; 488 votes to 62, yet much of the press focused on

[10] See *Appendix 1* for the list of sacked PPS's.

the opposition to Wilson's decision. For example, the Daily Mail headline of 11 May 1967 was: Labour 33 vote against Wilson (Daily Mail, 11 May 1967). When referring to The Times, Wilson said angrily to Castle: 'to read it no one would ever guess we had a majority of nearly 500' (Castle, 1990, p129). With the exception of the Beaverbrook owned newspapers, Wilson faced a hostile press, particularly on the issue of Europe. This was in sharp contrast to Macmillan who had the benefit of a favourable and supportive press. As noted by Wilkes and Wring (1998), Wilson engaged in conflict with most of the pro-entry press including the Labour supporting Daily Mirror which 'doubted the sincerity of his conversion to the pro-entry case' (Wilkes and Wring, 1998, p193).

The actual punishment meted out to the 33 Labour backbenchers was only what The Times referred to as a gentle rebuke. This supports the view that Wilson's anger was indeed more a reaction to the press coverage rather than to the rebellion itself and, having had time to reflect, decided to let them off lightly. John Silkin, the Government Chief Whip sent a duplicated letter to each of them expressing his difficulty in finding any redeeming features in this demonstration. Silkin also expressed the hope that he 'would never have to write again rebuking them' (The Times, 3 June 1967, p1). Party loyalists however, considered the backbenchers to have got off too lightly, and demanded far greater action, such as the withdrawal of the party whip for any future action of this nature (The Times, 3 June 1967).

It did not take Wilson very long to end his ban on the rebel MPs[11] and parliamentary private secretaries. In October 1967, the Times, in what it considers to be a 'conciliatory gesture to left-wingers' reported that Wilson had forgiven the PPS's and that Ministers would be asking them if they wished to return to their duties (The Times, 9 October 1967). It is of little surprise that Wilson quickly forgave the rebels. This group was broadly to the left and therefore their actions would have suggested to the Labour leadership that party management issues were not particularly difficult.

Not everyone in the Labour government was as disappointed with the failed attempt as Wilson appeared to be however**.** In demonstrating that the divisions over Europe were not limited to the backbenches, one of the defeated candidates in the 1963 Labour leadership contest, James Callaghan who was now Chancellor of the Exchequer 'viewed the rebuff of Britain's application by President de Gaulle in 1967 without any great sense of loss'

[11] See *Appendix 2* for the list of 33 Labour rebel MPs

(Morgan, 1997, p392). Callaghan is described by Morgan (1997) as 'a Eurosceptic[12], without the implications attached to that term in the 1990s' (Morgan, 1997, p393). Yet, in the Cabinet meeting held on 30 April 1967 to decide whether Britain should make an application for entry into the Common Market, it is notable that Callaghan voted in *favour* of an application. In a statement shortly after the announcement on 2 May 1967 in the House of Commons that a second attempt at gaining membership was to be made, Callaghan spoke of his conversion to the pro-European cause:

> My experience over the last two-and-a-half years has led me to the conclusion that nations are not free at the moment to take their own decisions. International factors had an effect which is much more than I had assumed when I took office and the argument about sovereignty is rapidly becoming outdated (Young, 1998, p195).

It did appear that Callaghan's somewhat reluctant conversion was as a result of his acceptance that Britain was not now a world power and the only option remaining was to become a member of the Common Market. Callaghan could however, have been positioning himself for a future leadership campaign. This view is supported by Morgan (1997) who writes that later, in 1971-72, Callaghan's prominent campaigning *against* Britain's membership was as a result of internal party positioning as 'Wilson's air of fallibility opened up again the prospect of a changing balance in the party and perhaps a challenge to the leadership' (Morgan, 1997, p394). In 1971, as a member of the Shadow Cabinet, Callaghan was opposed to membership of the Common Market and was described by Pimlott (1992) as 'a good weathercock – where Callaghan went, so would much Centrist, non-intellectual and trade union opinion' (Pimlott, 1992, p581). As Broad (2001) states in his discussion on the 1963 Labour leadership contest in which Callaghan came third, 'for Callaghan, Europe was not, and never would be, an issue of principle' (Broad, 2001, p55).

During the course of the Common Market debate in May 1967, Wilson appeared on the BBC television programme Panorama and when asked if entry into the Common Market might involve the pound being devalued, he emphatically denied this claiming 'it was not a sign of strength and would not impress the Common Market countries' (Daily Mail, 9 May 1967, p1). Six months later however, on 18 November 1967 the Chancellor announced that sterling had been devalued (Crossman, 1979). Devaluation was also very unpopular with the British public as a Gallup Poll in May 1967 indicated. When asked the question: 'To get into the Common Market, Britain may have to devalue the pound so that it is not

[12] In the 1960s, Eurosceptics were better known as Anti-Marketeers and made Britishness their focal point. Dewey (2009) notes that far from being a parliamentary phenomenon, Euroscepticism in the 1960s was a 'movement that orchestrated its most significant arguments and achievements outside Westminster' (Dewey, 2009, p5).

worth so much abroad, do you approve or disapprove?' (Gallup, 1976, p930). To which 14 per cent approved and 63 per cent disapproved with 23 per cent not knowing (Gallup, 1976).

French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou told George Brown 'devalue and you're in' (Pimlott, 1992, p433). The issue of devaluation therefore presented the Labour leadership with a dilemma. On the one hand, the Europeans insisted that Britain first devalue as a condition of entry, whilst on the other hand, the public's disapproval of devaluation could be electorally damaging. Wilson was reluctant to devalue as he feared this would not only dent his own reputation, but 'feared the effect it would also have on the Labour Party, and doubts whether it was needed or would be efficacious' (Ziegler, 1993, p253). Brown believed however, that Wilson's reluctance was only because of a promise made to President Johnson not to devalue. Both Brown and Callaghan therefore persisted that the 'only course for Britain was to devalue, enter the Common Market and endure the wrath of the Americans' (Ziegler, 1993, p253).

Far from being electorally damaging, the sterling crisis of 1966 however which led to the devaluation of the pound in 1967 led to the Labour government becoming *more* popular in the opinion polls the following year. The public, largely as a result of media coverage particularly on television were not only acutely aware of the country's severe economic problems but also impressed at the way the government was meeting almost daily to find a solution. 'Press reports of disagreements in Cabinet actually increased the favourable view of the government and led Crossman to note 'an astonishing improvement in public opinion' (Bennett, 2013, p102).

Despite the reassurance from Pompidou that Britain would be admitted if the government devalued, Britain's second application was however again rejected by President de Gaulle on the grounds that because the British government's policies were being pursued in response to American pressure, this was 'an obstacle to closer linkage with Europe' (Bennett, 2013, p106). Although de Gaulle may have been using this as an excuse to veto the application, Britain's commitments overseas were nevertheless, economically damaging. This led pro-Europeans of all parties to support withdrawal from Britain's commitments East of Suez as 'continued support for US policies in the Far East might prejudice British chances of ever joining the EEC' (Bennett, 2013, p106).

Wilson's leadership was in many ways a product of the changing and turbulent 1960s. Despite being educated at Oxford, he was a grammar school boy from a northern town

and from a lower middle class background. His modernising agenda and rhetoric of the 'white heat of technology' resonated well amongst the skilled working class and professional middle classes. Therefore it was of little surprise that the Conservatives found themselves under some pressure to find a candidate that was also more representative of the period. The Conservative Party which had been led by three Old Etonians in succession, now decided that 'to confront Wilson's image there had to be chosen not a contrast, but, as far as was feasible, a replica' (Clark, 1998, p336). As a result, on 28 July 1965, following their election defeat to Labour in the previous year, the Conservatives broke with tradition and elected[13] a non-aristocrat, Edward Heath.

Heath was one of the younger generation of parliamentarians, of which the 'new intake of 1950 to 1951, 1955 and 1959 had a much greater proportion of pro than anti-Europeans' (Forster, 2002, p24). Heath's leadership had a significant effect on senior Conservatives and also forced Labour to react to this pro-European leader. In contrast to his predecessor Home, Heath was 'aggressively projecting himself as a dynamic force for modernisation' (Heppell, 2008, p43). In addition to his own self-projection, the Conservative newspapers supported Heath largely as a result of his *style* of leadership. He was described as 'a man of action, a tough-minded bachelor, aggressive in thought and speech, having the energy of a powerhouse and as being classless and restless' (Evans and Taylor, 1996, p145). Heath's stance on Europe was therefore viewed by many senior Conservatives as an important aspect of this more youthful, modernising dynamic force. 'It was his association with Europe which gave Heath a distinctive appeal which attracted younger MPs' (Evans and Taylor, 1996, p144). The Conservative Peter Thorneycroft also noted that on Europe, 'the brains of the younger generation were on one side' (Forster, 2002, p24).

This new generation 'was increasingly willing to give serious consideration to closer British engagement in European structures' (Forster, 2002, p24). This then 'slowly began to change the balance of opinion within the parliamentary Conservative Party' (Forster, 2002, p24). The details emanating from the policy review groups led Conservative policy makers to believe that 'the twin themes of a European future and the modernisation of Britain were emerging from group after group' (Ball and Seldon, 1996, p27). Heath did not waver in his belief that Europe and modernisation were the twin themes that really mattered, 'or at least that anything else came a long way behind them in importance (Ball and Seldon, 1996, p28). Labour therefore needed to respond to this emphasis on

[13] In 1965 following the resignation of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Conservative Party broke with tradition and decided to elect their leader. Edward Heath the successful candidate was described as 'the grammar school boy to replace the Old Etonian, the man to take on Wilson' (Pimlott, 1992, p395).

modernisation and Europe as represented by the new intake of predominantly pro-European Conservatives led by Heath.

Despite the new Conservative leader being a committed pro-European, this did not publicly affect Prime Minister Wilson's approach to Europe: Britain would only enter the Common Market if the conditions were suitable. Wilson maintained his official public stance shortly after a French under-secretary had hinted that France was moving towards accepting Britain into the Community. In a speech in Bristol in 1966, Wilson angered Heath by saying of him:

> One encouraging gesture from the French government and he rolls on his back like a spaniel - then remembering that I should probably receive thousands of letters from dog-lovers, went on to explain that some of my best friends were spaniels (Wilson, 1971, p217).

This speech by Wilson could have suggested that his intent was to take a totally different approach to Europe from that of the Conservative leader. Yet, the following year, Wilson was to apply for membership of the Common Market himself. As a direct result of his Bristol speech however, Wilson had skilfully managed to distance himself from Heath's approach to Europe, which he had portrayed as being one of joining the Community at any price. At the same time Wilson had presented himself with the opportunity of applying for entry into the Common Market on his own terms.

4.2: The Second Application

Wilson was in a difficult position in the autumn of 1967. The negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market were being considered by the other members, yet it was de Gaulle who was still providing the main barrier to the application. The Prime Minister was under pressure from both sections of his own party and from some members of the Conservative opposition to take a tougher approach to de Gaulle. For example, Edward du Cann, the former chairman of the Conservative Party suggested that many Conservatives shared his view that General de Gaulle's attitude to Wilson's attempt to join the Community had resulted in Britain being forced into a humiliating position. Therefore, there was 'no sense in pursuing the application at this stage' (Clark, The Times, 6 December 1967, p3). In a parliamentary debate on 28 Nov 1967, Labour MP Eric Heffer asked if the Prime Minister was aware that 'if one constantly holds out an olive branch and gets kicked in the teeth, there comes a time when you have to drop the olive branch and turn in other directions?' (The Times, 29 November 1967, p6). During the same debate, a further attack on Wilson's European position came from another Labour MP Renee Short who said to cheers from many on the Labour benches:

> These continued suggestions that we should go on knocking on the door are rather ludicrous and humiliating to the British people. This was immediately repudiated by Wilson who claimed that Britain was not knocking on the door but that we have slammed our application on the table (The Times, 29 November 1967, p6).

In the light of such immense criticism and pressure, Wilson nevertheless continued to pursue Britain's application. In her diaries, Barbara Castle writes that by the time Heath became Prime Minister in 1970, 'Harold Wilson had personally become a convert to Britain's membership of the Community' (Castle, 1990, p412). Although it was difficult to pinpoint Wilson's *personal* view on the Common Market at this time, he did find it worthwhile in terms of tactical and party management considerations to pursue membership. Furthermore, at the time of Britain's second application, 'public opinion was clearly turning in favour of the Common Market in the light of the obvious decline of the Commonwealth and the limitations of EFTA' (de Carmoy, 1971, p1).

As with the Macmillan application, 'the implications of EEC membership for national sovereignty were somewhat disguised, and rarely spelled out by either government or opposition' (Lynch, 2003, p71). Nevertheless, Conservative leader Heath was aware of the possible impact of the issue, and in the House of Commons argued:

> When we surrender some sovereignty, we shall have a share in the sovereignty of the Community as a whole, and of other members of it. It is not, as is sometimes thought, an abandonment of sovereignty to other countries; it is a sharing of other people's sovereignty as well as a pooling of our own' (Heath, Hansard, 17 November 1966 cc 653-654).

Wilson considered Europe to be a new way of trying to achieve success in economic policy. His tactics were to 'defuse potential issues that the Conservatives might exploit' (Ponting, 1989, p214). The newly formed Confederation of British Industry (CBI)[14] was also strongly in favour of Britain becoming a member of the Common Market. Envious of the tax systems of EEC countries, the CBI was pressing for the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT), and as such 'demanded a shift in the tax base away from profits and direct taxation in general to a greater emphasis on indirect taxation' (Rollings, 2003, p125). Wilson's application for membership in 1967 therefore gained significant support from British industry. Richard Crossman also supported Wilson on the application despite

[14] The CBI was created in 1965 under the leadership of John Davies, 'a passionate European' (Rollings, 2003, p117). The CBI leadership's ability 'to create business opinion on Europe was one factor in explaining why British industry was apparently so strongly in favour of entry into the Common Market' (Kitzinger, 1973, p259).

previously being opposed to Common Market membership. Crossman's argument for now being in favour was that 'if the Labour Government did not apply, it would, he thought – lose credibility' (Shore, 1993, p96).

Wilson also needed to pre-empt the pro-European Conservative leader Heath, particularly on the question of EEC entry. Therefore Wilson considered himself to be in a no-lose situation: if the negotiations were successful then he personally would gain the credit for this and subsequently the Labour government would likely to be in an improved electoral position. Should the application fail, he at least would have 'demonstrated the difficulties so that the Conservatives could not accuse him of failing to try' (Ponting, 1989, p214). As such, Wilson had succeeded in his objective of ensuring that Europe did not become a controversial issue at the next general election. The failure of the application also ensured that the Labour Party would not be involved in an internal struggle over Common Market membership. This led one of the Party members to comment there was an 'overwhelming sigh of relief from a clear section of the Cabinet that de Gaulle had saved the Labour Party from having to go ahead with Europe' (Thompson, 1993, p393). Wilson's policy could therefore be seen as a 'successful failure' (Daddow, 2003, p25) He managed to not only appease both pro and anti-Marketeers within the Labour Party, but also to 'outflank the Conservatives and Liberals on the issue of Europe, and to set the scene for Britain's entry into the Community' (Daddow, 2003, p25).

Despite the failure of the negotiations, the issue of Europe was now on common ground with both Labour and the Conservatives taking a broadly similar position. It was not just a case of Wilson attempting to pre-empt the Conservatives as Ponting suggested however, but that of Heath pre-empting Labour. In his report on the 1966 General Election, the Director of the Conservative Research Department Brendon Sewill suggested that if the Labour Government moved to the left, then the Conservatives' task of winning the next election would be made that much easier. Sewill was concerned however, that Labour might adopt, belatedly and half-heartedly, what he considered Conservative policies such as those on Europe, reform of the trade unions and some social policies, in an attempt at continuing to control the centre. Sewill stated 'we need to work out a method for dealing with this' (Johnman, 1995, p192). The Conservatives were aware that Wilson would be bidding for the centre-ground and therefore Heath, in a speech in Carshalton in 1967 'committed the Party to the centre-ground and by extension attempted to pre-empt both Labour and any potential tensions within the Tories' (Johnman, 1995, p192).

4.3: Summary

In what was a similar scenario to Macmillan's failed application to join the European Economic Community, Prime Minister Wilson's unsuccessful application was also based on tactical considerations and party management. Both Prime Ministers were faced with difficult economic conditions at the time and both saw Europe as a factor in the modernisation of their respective parties. From having a clear division on Europe between the Conservatives and Labour at the close of 1962 there was now almost commonality between the parties on this issue by the end of 1967.

The division on Europe between Labour and the Conservatives which had reached its height as a result of Gaitskell's speech in 1962 proved beneficial to Labour who were already on course for victory at the forthcoming general election. Despite leading pro-Europeans such as Jenkins disagreeing with his speech, Gaitskell was confident that as part of his clique, they would not risk disturbing party unity particularly in the run up to a general election. This proved to be significant in that although the question of Europe did not register particularly highly in the electorate's list of priorities, party unity was to be a decisive factor in Labour's general election victory in 1964.

This chapter has focussed on Labour Prime Minister Wilson and his efforts to keep his party united under extremely difficult economic conditions. Although Wilson was agnostic on Europe, he was aware that by at least making an application it would appease the pro-Europeans in his party and at the same time shift the blame for the need to devalue the pound on de Gaulle's demands rather than the faults of his own government. The Labour government also faced a fresh threat with the election of a pro-European as leader of the Conservative Party. The leadership of Heath made Wilson look closely at his own approach to Europe particularly as the new Conservative leader was chosen as a dynamic force for the modernisation of Britain of which Common Market membership formed a major part. Wilson nevertheless maintained his public position of only wanting Britain to be a member of the EEC if the conditions were favourable; a device to maintain party unity. This chapter has revealed one major difference in respect of the political elites and the issue of Europe: once in government, the prevailing elite view is dominant, whereas in opposition, opportunism surfaces for those members of the political elite who have doubts over the issue.

Chapter Five: Britain into Europe

5.0: Introduction

Two highly important episodes which were to significantly affect the major political parties and individual actors on the issue of Europe are the focus of this chapter. The first to be examined is the general election of 1970 which saw the return of a Conservative government under the leadership of the pro-European Edward Heath. The second is the crucial vote following a parliamentary debate in October 1971 on the motion to support Heath's decision to join the Common Market.

The main points to be drawn out from this chapter are the lack of quality in the debate over Europe, and that the issue is inextricably linked with party and political gamesmanship, with parties and individual members of the political elite taking positions based on short-term considerations. This chapter includes a significant amount of primary sources, including recently released material which serves to support the key arguments of this thesis. For example, at the time of his acceptance of Jean Monnet's 1968 invitation for the Labour Party to join the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Wilson was simultaneously arguing against a federal Europe. A further example to substantiate the arguments in this thesis is in respect of the 1970 General Election. Despite evidence of an almost complete absence of debate on the issue of Europe, and with no manifesto commitment for entry, as Prime Minister, Heath nevertheless immediately went straight ahead with his attempt at British membership. It is however the 1971 Common Market debate which best illustrates the key arguments of this study. A crucial debate which was to affect the future of Britain was decided on reasons which were less on the issue of Europe itself but rather on the need for the Conservatives to win the vote to save the government. The extraordinary lengths and the promises made by Conservative Central Office to capture votes from the Ulster members for example, further substantiates the key arguments of this thesis.

The 1970 General Election was significant in that Heath and the Conservatives proved unwilling to convince the public of the case for membership because focusing attention on the issue might have damaged their prospects of victory. Rather, Heath was anxious to take Britain into the Common Market by stealth, confident that the almost 'tribal' nature of the Party would ensure loyalty for his actions. The 1971 motion on which 39 Conservatives voted against the government and sixty-nine Labour MPs voted against the whip exposed the deep divisions, particularly within the Labour Party. It also illustrated the short-term and complex nature of the issue of Europe, and in so doing, it further

demonstrated the way in which the issue throughout this period interplayed with other political considerations.

Throughout the debate over Europe there was a constant sub-text in respect of power struggles within the political parties. Harold Wilson for example was acutely aware of the leadership ambitions of Roy Jenkins yet needed to keep the Party united for electoral purposes (Meredith, 2007). Had Wilson simply become openly anti-Europe he would clearly have gained support from the predominantly anti-Common Market left, but he would be viewed by many as being the leader of a divided party and thus risk severe electoral damage. The option of joining the anti-Marketeers was not open to Wilson. By doing so he would have been adding to the damage already done by allowing the charge that he had been inconsistent. Wilson's political credit would therefore have been destroyed 'not least among the leaders of the other members of the Community, with whom he would have to work closely if he ever became Prime Minister again' (King, 1977, p50).

Kitzinger (1973) however, believed that Wilson acted as a *secret European* within the Labour Party. He had fully committed to Britain's entry into the Community when in power in 1967, and by refusing to fundamentally change his position until a year after the 1970 General Election Wilson 'headed off any really massive organised political opposition to entry until after it was too late for that opposition to become effective' (Kitzinger, 1973, p276). Evidence to support Kitzinger comes in the form of a letter sent by Wilson on October 1968 accepting Jean Monnet's invitation for the Labour Party to join the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (Conservative Central Office, March 1969). The acceptance of Monnet's invitation did not necessarily establish his *personal* view on Europe, but as the Conservatives held a copy of Wilson's letter to Monnet, it presented them with an opportunity to use this against Wilson on a charge of hypocrisy in the event of him making a statement opposing Britain becoming a member of a federal Europe. There is, nevertheless evidence from Wilson himself which is contrary to Kitzinger's view. In 1971 Wilson contrasted the Soviet Union's constructive discussions in respect of nuclear disarmament with the Conservatives' 'receptivity to nuclear collaboration within the EEC framework' (Robins, 1979, p97). Wilson stated:

> If Conservative policy at any time were to be directed towards a nuclear component in a united Europe, a united Europe which includes Germany, any hope of a constructive reconciliation between Eastern and Western Europe would disappear (Labour Party, 1972, p48).

It is unsurprising therefore, that the overwhelming majority of Labour MPs who were at this time opposed to Britain's entry into Europe, were also unilateralists in respect of nuclear weapons.

Newly elected Prime Minister Heath lost no time in making his intention clear. In June 1970, just twelve days after the Conservative's election victory, Heath made Britain's third application to join the EEC (Crowson, 2007). This time round however, 'the tone was more optimistic than previously. The view was not *whether* but *when* Britain would join' (Crowson, 2007, p38). Despite the commitment to reduce taxation, reform industrial relations and to end the heavy subsidies to industry to which the previous Labour government had become committed, the prime objective to which the Heath Government attached most importance during its first two years of office was to procure Britain's entry into the European Community (Stewart, 1977). Heath devoted the first one and a half years of his premiership to 'getting Britain into the EC; the rest to an attempt to make a success of membership and to define a new course for the Community itself' (George, 1990, p42). Achieving the first objective was his most positive contribution to Britain's future. 'The failure of the second also left its legacy for his successors' (George, 1990, p42).

5.1: The 1970 General Election

The speed at which Heath set about his attempt to get Britain into the EEC after Europe played such a small part in the Conservative manifesto leaves the Conservatives open to accusations of cynicism. Crowson (2007) notes 'the party's manifesto avoided any overt commitment and merely acknowledged a wish to open negotiations' (Crowson, 2007, p147). Powell (1971) quotes Heath as saying on the eve of the election that the decision to join the Community should take place 'with the full-hearted consent of Parliament and people' (Powell, 1971, p35). In an example of informed opinion taking precedence over public opinion, all three major parties officially expressed themselves wholeheartedly or conditionally in favour of Britain's membership, with only a minority of candidates taking an unequivocal stance on the issue. This was in spite of public opinion, which at this time was largely opposed to Britain joining the Common Market. As a consequence, 'the Common Market was not an issue, nor could electors in any way mark their wishes or opinions on it by their vote' (Powell, 1971, p35).

Heath's total commitment to Europe perhaps reflects even greater cynicism by the Conservatives particularly as just 2 per cent of Conservative candidates in the 1970 General Election were wholeheartedly in favour and 'only 3 per cent of utterances during

the campaign were concerned with the Conservative case for Europe' (Crowson, 2007, 147). Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky (1971) state that during the 1970 election campaign in which the electorate was denied a direct choice on many key issues, including the question of Europe, 'the most recurrent of the issues that never really received any limelight was the Common Market' (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, 1971, p159). In addition, government policy on Europe following the general election victory differed from the promise made in *A Better Tomorrow*, the Conservative manifesto. The manifesto stated that 'there is a price which we are not prepared to pay. Our sole commitment is to negotiate, no more, no less' (Evans and Taylor, 1996, p160).

The major political parties devoted such little attention to the Common Market that it was only made into a general campaign issue by Enoch Powell, and the Scottish Nationalists (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, 1971). The lack of attention to the issue at this time is unsurprising given that not only are general elections more concerned with the economy and domestic issues such as the cost of living, but also as a result of divided parties being more likely to suffer electorally. As such, despite the existence of divisions within the political parties over the issue of Europe, it only becomes a matter of public debate at times when debated by the elite.

In Barbara Castle's view, although the 1970 General Election was partly lost as a result of Labour apathy, she was convinced that the primary cause of Labour's defeat was Roy Jenkins' budget that same year (Castle, 1993). Even Peter Jenkins[15], a close supporter of Chancellor Jenkins, endorsed this view 'in a commentary on the election headed *How Roy Muffed It* in which he argued that Jenkins 'could have safely relaxed his austerity a bit more' (Castle, 1993, p427). The views expressed by Peter Jenkins and Castle leave Jenkins open to the charge that his desire for a Labour victory in the 1970 General Election may have been diluted to some extent, particularly as his own position on Europe reflected that of the Leader of the Opposition, Edward Heath.

There is every possibility however, that Jenkins' budget could have been produced with the prime intention of being of benefit to the country and party, rather than for any personal career opportunity. Morgan (1997) supports this view, noting that despite refusing the option of a popular electioneering budget, Jenkins did have the support of the Cabinet which agreed with his strategy (Morgan, 1997). Press reports however, suggested that Wilson was pressing for a "give-away" spring budget 'while Jenkins, whose political career would suffer less than Wilson's from a Labour defeat in the general

[15] Peter Jenkins' commentary *How Roy muffed it* is cited, but not referenced in Castle, 1993.

election, was putting the case for a “responsible” one’ (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, 1971, p131). A telling insight into the dilemma faced by Jenkins is provided by Richard Crossman (1979) who considered that a cautious and conventional budget would lead to Labour facing certain defeat. Such a budget however, would have allowed Jenkins to retain his reputation as a strong Chancellor, *and* place him in a favourable position to seize the party leadership should Labour lose the general election (Crossman, 1979).

5.2: The 1971 Common Market Debate

Under pressure from the Government Chief Whip Francis Pym, Leader of the House William Whitelaw and also reinforced by a great deal of Conservative Party opinion, Prime Minister Heath gave a free vote to Conservative MPs on the six-day Common Market debate for 28 October 1971. Wood (1971) writes that the Labour and Conservative leaders of the anti-Market campaign ‘gloated over what they described as a retreat by Mr Heath after receiving his Chief Whip’s arithmetic for the crucial vote’ (Wood, The Times 19 October 1971, p1). The highly successful British-French summit meeting between Heath and French President Georges Pompidou on 19-20 May 1971 nevertheless provided Heath with the impetus and confidence to seek parliamentary approval for the negotiations. Heath was overjoyed at the reaction of the French President following twelve hours of talks in which he convinced the President that ‘Britain was genuine in its desire to enter the European family’ (Heath, 1998, p372). President Pompidou finished his statement by saying:

> Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become European, and that Britain wanted to enter the Community only so as to destroy it or divert it from its objectives. Many people also thought that France was ready to use every pretext to place in the end a fresh veto on Britain’s entry. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see before you tonight two men who are convinced of the contrary (Heath, 1998, p372).

In contrast to Heath, Wilson refused to allow his MPs a free vote on the issue. The Times editorial of 20 October 1971 accused Wilson of abandoning national interest in favour of party considerations. Whilst acknowledging that he did have a legitimate obligation and a duty to consider the interests of his party, ‘to put party before country on a matter of pre-eminent importance is one of the crimes for which a party leader can never be forgiven’ (The Times, 20 October 1971, p1). The conclusion drawn by Wilson from Heath’s dramatic decision to allow the free vote was that it had the effect of making Heath appear a liberal, sensitive and democratic leader. Wilson therefore, having been placed in an extremely difficult position reasoned ‘the Shadow Cabinet must devise some counter to it, though stopping short of a free vote’ (Wood, The Times, 20 October 1971, p1).

Despite allowing a free vote, a letter from Conservative Party Chairman Peter Thomas to Norman St John Stevas reveals the extent of the Conservatives' determination to win the vote. Thomas was aware that the result was likely to be tight and took the view that the Ulster members could hold the key to the eventual outcome. His letter suggested that some of the Ulster members who were against could therefore be persuaded to abstain for the government to improve its position. Thomas wrote:

> I would suggest that someone should indicate to the Ulster members that they may need friends at some time in the future and that they would be more likely to find them if they supported the government on the Common Market issue. The Ulster members have used this argument to put pressure on the government concerning Ulster but it is a two-edged sword (Thomas, Conservative Central Office, 1 February 1971).

Conservative Central Office (CCO) documents also reveal that Labour pro-Europeans discussed their own and other Labour MPs' voting intentions with the Conservative Party Chairman Peter Thomas. Labour pro-Europeans indicated to Thomas that many more of them would vote with the government if there was a free vote on the Conservative side (Conservative Central Office, 1 February 1971). The critical information offered by the pro-European Labour MPs was not only instrumental in influencing Heath's ultimate decision to allow his MPs a free vote on the issue but also demonstrated that a number of Labour MPs were committed to the European cause to such an extent that they were prepared to jeopardize their own futures and risk splitting the Party. The determination to ensure victory in the 1971 vote also demonstrated that *Heath and the Heathmen*, as they were dubbed by Andrew Roth (1972), were fully committed to Europe and that the issue was at least as important to them as party and other political considerations.

According to Lazer (1976), Heath's move was 'primarily a symbolical and psychological ploy against Wilson' (Lazer, 1976, p262). As the voting lines at this time were fairly fixed, offering a free vote did not have such a substantial effect. Should Heath have 'withdrawn the whip at the start of the nationwide discussion on entry however, the results on all sides might have been different' (Lazer, 1976, p262). Despite the absence of a free vote, Wilson failed to keep the Party united as sixty-nine Labour MPs defied the whip and voted for the Conservative government motion providing Heath with a comfortable majority of one-hundred and twelve (Castle, 1993,). Barbara Castle stated that 'this treachery caused immense bitterness. The rift in the party was now so deep it was hard to see how it could ever heal' (Castle, 1993, p449). This comment by Castle is perfectly understandable given that had Wilson allowed a free vote on the issue, it is reasonable to assume that there would have been far more than the sixty-nine MPs voting with the Conservatives. A week prior to the vote, the Tribune (1971) editorial suggested that the Labour pro-Marketeers

would have much to answer for should they vote to keep the Heath Government in power. The editorial posed the question:

> Who can forgive those who throw away this chance to drive Edward Heath from power now? Certainly not the vast majority of the Labour movement which, in its conferences during the past year, have shown how determined it is not to allow the Tory Government to drag an unwilling Britain into the Common Market (Tribune, 22 October 1971, p1).

For Wilson, it was what he considered the unacceptable *terms*[16] that caused the greatest problem in respect of Britain's entry into the Common Market. Wilson in arguing against the terms was affirming Labour Party conference policy which rejected the Common Market terms of entry by a majority of four million votes (The Times, 5 October 1971). In making the terms the main consideration, Wilson was looking as far ahead as the next election, and for the present keeping the Party united. Whilst being uncertain of his innermost convictions on Europe, The Times (1971) having examined his statements, accepted that for the past decade Wilson could not be accused of inconsistency in respect of his stance on the terms. 'Since 1962 Wilson has stressed that the terms of entry had to be consistent with British interests and those of the Commonwealth' (The Times, 16 July 1971, cited in Broad, 2001, p79).

In respect of Wilson's own future election prospects, the Labour frontbencher, Harold Lever made the point:

> If Wilson had fought *for* entry on the terms available in 1971 his only real allies would have been the Jenkinsites – the temptation, if they had won, to discard Harold in favour of Roy would have been very strong (Lever, quoted in Whitehead, 1985, p65).

This view is supported by Ziegler (1993) who claims that 'by maintaining his freedom to manoeuvre when he returned to power was Wilson's greatest success' (Ziegler, 1993, p387). Pimlott (1992) commented that Wilson, despite being given an assurance by Jenkins that the pro-Marketeers would support him in the event of a Callaghan leadership challenge, 'knew he could not rely on them in the longer term' (Pimlott, 1992, p582). Consequently, Wilson turned to those he knew best, despite their loyalty having been seriously tested and strained during the periods in government. 'Wilson might not be left-wing in most of his policies, but he was left-wing by heritage, and the Left cautiously welcomed him back' (Pimlott, 1992, p582)

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[16] See *Appendix 3* for the main points of the full terms.

The sixty-nine Labour rebels[17] who voted against the Labour whip on 28 October 1971 were spearheaded by most of those who, in the early 1960s, had been the backbone for the Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS) and included David Owen, Roy Jenkins, William Rodgers, George Thomson and David Marquand (Haseler, 1976). The social democrats in the Labour Party in 1971 were now in a difficult position. The issue of the Common Market had made them become aware of being a minority in the Party as well as being perceived as rebels (Williams and Williams, 1989). The conflict within the Labour Party over the issue of Europe however, 'had strengthened their alliance, which would later become the basis for the formation of the SDP' (Williams and Williams, 1989, p102).

Neil Kinnock, who at this time was opposed to entry into the EEC, particularly on Conservative terms, believed that by voting for the Bill, Jenkins and his pro-EEC colleagues had helped to sustain a government representing the interests of the class enemy. To Kinnock, this was not acceptable and he claimed that greater involvement in policy making would be demanded by the rank and file Labour Party members as a result (Westlake, 2001). Writing in Tribune, Kinnock stated:

> Labour MPs are not delegates, but they are not Tories either – if the grass-roots movement now demands answerability and exerts new disciplines, it is primarily an expression of frustration by people who slog their guts out and open their pockets for MPs who ignore repeatedly confirmed conference decisions and save a Tory government. Conscientious support for the European ideal is accepted. But what kind of conscience permits Labour MPs to save the creators of a million unemployed? (Kinnock, Tribune, 5 November 1971, p1).

The opposition to EEC membership by Kinnock at this time provided an early example of the 'pragmatic, complex and often idiosyncratic reasoning which characterised his approach to many of the controversies confronting him during his career' (Westlake, 2001, p87).

The more enthusiastic Labour rebels, some of whom went on to form the SDP attempted to hold the moral high ground and claimed that their pro-European position was based on principle. There is evidence to suggest however, that the more extreme pro-Europeans' aim of seeing Britain in Europe was not their only aspiration. Susan Crosland (1982) for example, suggests that the issue of Europe was inextricably linked with Jenkins' ambition to lead the Labour Party. Whilst acknowledging that Jenkins himself was a long standing advocate of the Common Market, Crosland claimed however, that standing shoulder to

[17] See *Appendix 4* for the list of 69 Labour rebel MPs.

shoulder with his fellow pro-Europeans, were right-wingers 'whose chief interest was Roy Jenkins, their concern for the Market less pressing' (S. Crosland, 1982, pp. 220-221).

Tony Benn (1988) however, argued that what was at the heart of the Social Democratic Party was its members' commitment to a federal[18] Europe. Benn claimed that within the Labour Party, a group of pro-European MPs not only refused to accept adverse Conference decisions on Europe, but also decided that 'if their dream of an enlarged Common Market conflicted with their membership of the Labour Party, then the Party would have to be sacrificed' (Benn, 1988, pxiii). In suggesting however, that Europe was the overriding reason for Labour MPs defecting, Benn was perhaps overlooking the possibility that Labour's Social Democrats were becoming dissatisfied with the way the Party at this time was being infiltrated by those on the extreme left.

In their analysis of the defectors' votes in the 1971 debate Crewe and King (1995) provide evidence that 'it was *not* their passionate commitment to Europe, which bound the SDP defectors together' (Crewe and King, 1995, p106). The authors concluded that there was no clear relationship between defecting and being in favour of Britain joining the Common Market. 'On the contrary, most of Labour's Europeans did not join the SDP and some of the Labour MPs who did join were not notably pro-Europeans' (Crewe and King, 1995, p107). Williams (1984) also suggests that although many of the defectors to the SDP *happened* to be pro-Europeans, this was incidental. Former Labour MPs who joined the SDP did so initially as a result of their opposition to what they regarded as an intense swing from the Party's long-standing commitment to parliamentary government (Williams, 1984). This therefore demonstrates the degree to which Europe is entangled in the highly divisive politics of the Labour Party at this time.

The evidence provided by Crewe and King (1995) and Williams (1984) therefore encourages speculation as to Benn's motives for the reasons he gave for Labour MPs defecting to the SDP. It would undoubtedly be less politically damaging to Benn *had* the

[18] One of the founders of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), David Owen (2009) claims never to have been a federalist. The Liberals however, according to Owen, sought a European superstate, and it was their commitment to federalism which was one of the reasons why he did not want the SDP to merge with the Liberal Party (Owen, 2009). An example of the 'federalism' favoured by the SDP is provided by Dick Taverne who was to become a leading member of the Party.. Taverne, like Owen claims he did not wish to see the development of a European superstate. He did however seek international co-ordination between national governments in an attempt to solve problems such as environmental issues and Third World poverty. Taverne argued that national governments are more interested in short-term national interests, as opposed to taking a Community view which 'may be more in line with the long-term interests of all the member states' (Taverne, 1974, p115).

reason for the creation of the SDP been as a result of their ultimate aim of an enlarged Common Market rather than defecting from Labour precisely because of Benn himself.

If the Labour Party was being dominated by the left, those members who were later to either form or join the Social Democratic Party assumed that the Conservatives would turn further to the right thus leaving a vacancy in the centre to be taken by the Labour defectors and other supporters such as the Liberals. Dick Taverne, who was to stand in 1973 as an independent Democratic Labour candidate in Lincoln after being sacked by his local Labour Party for refusing to support Labour's opposition to the Common Market sensed as early as 1970 what was happening to the Party. Taverne claimed that at grass roots level, 'a new kind of activist was really taking over: he was more intolerant, he was more Marxist in general approach' (Williams and Williams 1989, p102).

For some Labour right-wingers, including those who had taken a consistent position, Europe was complicated to such an extent that it became entangled with other issues within the Party. Although pro-Europeanism was undoubtedly far from the only reason for the creation of the Social Democratic Party, the issue of Europe did nevertheless, provide the Labour right-wingers with the ideal opportunity to fill what they saw as the vacuum in the centre ground of politics. Europe by the early 1970s had become 'a surrogate issue, of more importance to the struggle over the ideological direction of the Labour Party, than the question of Britain's future per se' (Forster, 2002, p40). Thus the vote on Europe proved for some to be a litmus test on the way they believed the Party would evolve. The pro-Europe position was for some Labour MPs, symbolic of whether the Labour Party would either be dominated by the left, or if there were sufficient numbers as indicated by the Parliamentary vote; enable Labour to become a social democratic party. In the struggle for power within the Labour Party, the commitment for Social Democrats such as Jenkins to Europe was 'as much a matter of what would happen to their faction as what would happen to their cause' (Young, 1999, p276).

5.3: Summary

The purpose of this chapter was primarily to demonstrate the significance of two particular events which were critical as far as both the Conservative and Labour parties were concerned. The first of these was the 1970 General Election which allowed newly appointed Conservative Prime Minister Heath to take Britain into the Common Market. In so doing, this not only shaped Britain's future, but also had a profound effect upon both the major political parties. The second event was the 1971 Common Market debate. Of particular significance here was the vote on the motion for Britain's application for entry

into the EEC on the terms as agreed by Prime Minister Heath. As many as sixty-nine Labour MPs defied the whip and voted with the Conservative government and therefore fully exposed Labour's division on Europe. Significantly, almost a third of these Labour rebels went on to become members of the Social Democratic Party.

The 1970 General Election proved to be significant as it exposed the Conservatives' lack of transparency on the European issue, as evidence supplied by Crowson (2007), and by Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky (1971) suggests. The Conservatives said very little about Britain joining the Common Market during the course of the general election campaign, yet immediately following electoral success, Heath lost no time in pressing forward with Britain's application to become a member of the Community. The commitment and ultimate success of Heath in securing Britain's place in Europe provided a personal legacy for the Prime Minister. It also made the Conservative Party a predominantly pro-European party at this time, and had the effect of officially uniting the Party, something which Heath may have considered to be electorally productive. However, as discussed in chapter six, Enoch Powell's advocacy of a Labour vote in the February 1974 General Election also demonstrated the subterranean anxieties of some Conservatives over the Common Market; almost a forerunner to the United Kingdom Independence Party's[19] (UKIP) emergence some thirty years later.

The 1970 General Election and the 1971 Common Market Debate were two significant events which brought into sharp focus the individual motives for Heath's decision to take Britain into the Common Market. As a result of all three major political parties being largely in favour of entry, voters were denied a clear choice on the issue, thus exposing the scant regard the political elite had for the electorates' opinion on the Common Market issue at this time. Throughout the period of these key events, Labour leader Wilson had demonstrated his substantial tactical political ability. He not only kept at bay the leadership threat of Jenkins, but largely as a result of maintaining his stance on the *terms* of entry, Wilson also ensured that his deeply divided party was sufficiently united for the purpose of success in the 1974 General Election.

[19] Founded in 1993, the United Kingdom Independence Party, despite not yet winning a seat in Parliament, progressed to a position of third place according to the BBC (2014) poll of opinion polls (BBC, 20 January 2014). UKIP also won the most seats in the 2014 European Parliament election for the United Kingdom. In addition to being a receptacle for protest votes for those disillusioned with the major parties, UKIP's rise in popularity comes as a result of its success in making the connection between public concern over Eastern European immigration and Britain's membership of the EU (Martin, Daily Telegraph, 26 January 2014).

Chapter Six: The People Decide

6.0: Introduction

The 1975 Referendum was a particularly significant milestone in the history of Britain's involvement in the European Union. This chapter focuses on the events leading up to Prime Minister Harold Wilson's calling of a referendum, and explores the individual motives of the leadership and MPs in respect of their relative positions on the question of Europe at any given time. The effect the decision to hold a referendum had on both major political parties is also analysed as are the critical repercussions arising from the British peoples' decision. These repercussions proved to be significant for the Labour Party in particular as the referendum decision deepened the cleavage between the left and right of the Party and created severe long-term problems for Prime Minister Wilson.

As discussed later in the chapter, the decision to hold a referendum was made to secure Wilson's main aim of maintaining party unity. Similarly, as a result of the Wilson Government's decision to campaign for a Yes vote and thus achieve the government's desired outcome of remaining in the EEC, the left of the Labour Party were consequently in a far weaker position, not only on Europe but on other domestic issues. This chapter also analyses Individual members of the political elite, providing a forensic examination of the motives of politicians for taking a particular stance on the issue at any one time. Evidence suggests for example, that the reason for Enoch Powell's volte-face on Europe was not based on a principled shift of view, but was instead a personal attack on Heath. Considerations such as these, as evidenced throughout this chapter, are instrumental in demonstrating the core arguments of this study: that the debate over Europe not only lacked quality, but also for many members of the political elite, Europe was subordinate to party, career or electoral considerations.

In addition, the chapter provides analysis of the 1975 referendum campaign. This includes the arguments put forward on both sides of the debate and also discusses the complexities of the issues such as that of sovereignty, which had a number of left-wing Labour MPs and right-wing Conservatives joining forces. The reasons for this are outlined, as are the role of the media, and the controversial issue of campaign funding. Also discussed is the key role of Wilson's renegotiated terms which formed the major argument by the Labour government for its recommendation to the public of a Yes vote on the referendum. In a pamphlet sent to every household in Britain, Prime Minister Wilson claimed to have made 'big and significant improvements on the previous terms' (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p295). In urging the British public to vote to remain in the Common

Market, Wilson stated ‘we confidently believe that these better terms can give Britain a New Deal in Europe: A Deal that will help us, help the Commonwealth, and help our partners in Europe’ (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p295).

The holding of a referendum in June 1975 on Britain’s continued membership of the European Community was in itself a victory for the anti-Marketeers. This was a very short-lived success however, as the electorate voted by seventeen million to eight million in favour of membership, the outcome of which was a major defeat for the anti-European cause (Forster, 2002). The referendum to determine whether Britain stayed in or came out of the Common Market was crucial in more ways than one; it decided, perhaps permanently, Britain’s commitment to European integration. The British public had now given its consent and therefore the referendum legitimised Heath’s decision to take Britain into Europe. Labour’s Ted Short justified holding a referendum when he stated in the House of Commons in March 1975, ‘the issue continues to divide the country. The decision to go in has not been accepted. That is the essence of the case for having a referendum’ (Hansard, 11 March, 1975, c292). As a result of the referendum, the issue of Europe ceased to divide the nation. ‘The decision to stay in the EEC was accepted; and to that extent, the device fulfilled precisely the purpose it had been assigned’ (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p279).

Perhaps even more important was that the result not only defeated the left on the issue of Europe, but also dealt a devastating blow to the left on other issues such as nationalisation and the economy. Wilson’s victory on the referendum provided him with the opportunity to remove Benn from his position as Secretary of State for Industry (Cronin, 2004). The nature of Benn’s dismissal was symbolic as it removed the central advocate of the left wing strategies. As Eric Varley, Benn’s replacement lacked the ideological zeal of his predecessor, it was unsurprising therefore that ‘little more was heard of the planning agreements, the nationalisation of docks and shipbuilding, and the industrial democracy envisaged in the 1974 manifesto’ (Broad, 2001, p122). In offering the British public a referendum on Europe Wilson took what appeared to be a calculated risk, but in reality the odds of victory were stacked heavily in his favour. By defeating the left of the Party on Europe he would find managing the Party and retaining some degree of unity easier than if the left had been victorious on this issue. Had the left won then ‘the Labour Government would have been more divided than ever before and a mass exodus from senior Cabinet positions would have occurred’ (Thorpe, 1997, p184).

6.1: The February 1974 General Election

Prime Minister Edward Heath called a general election on 28 February 1974 directly as a result of his confrontation with the miners. Heath faced a difficult decision at this time. He was under immense pressure from the media and his own party on both sides of the argument as to the merits of holding an election at this time. Despite advice from fellow Conservatives that a snap election would fail, Heath took the risk of an early election on the issue of 'who governs Britain, democratically elected politicians or militant trade unionists?' (Dorey, 1995, p125). The Common Market played an important part in respect of the outcome however, and unlike the 1970 General Election, the British public did have a genuine choice over the issue. In its manifesto, Labour pledged not only to look again at the terms of Britain's entry into the Common Market, particularly in respect of the budget contribution and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), but also 'promised a popular vote on EEC membership, which offered the potential for withdrawal' (Crowson, 2007, p40).

It is in the Labour Party manifesto of February 1974 that the question of a possible referendum of Europe is raised. The manifesto stated that if the renegotiations are successful, 'it is the policy of the Labour Party that, in view of the unique importance of the decision, the people should have the right to decide the issue through a general election or a Consultative Referendum' (Craig, 1990, p189). This statement by Wilson, taken from the February 1974 Labour Manifesto could be regarded as an example of 'spin'. As discussed later in this chapter, many of the leading political elites from *both* a pro and anti-Europe position dismiss the renegotiations as a political exercise by Wilson in order to further his efforts in securing a positive vote on the 1975 referendum.

Although the question of who governs Britain had dominated the election, the Common Market had 'played its part in Heath's demise when in the dying days of the campaign Enoch Powell had urged Conservative anti-Marketeers to vote Labour' (Heffer, 1998, p698). In a speech in Birmingham on 23 February 1974, just five days prior to the general election, Powell advocated a vote for Labour, criticising the Conservative government, and bitterly attacking Heath for taking the country into the Common Market without the consent of the British people (Pimlott, 1992).

The precise effect Powell's intervention had on the eventual outcome of the election is inconclusive. National Opinion Poll (NOP) polls however, taken the day after his Birmingham speech found that in the Midlands, Labour now had a lead of 2 per cent, whereas a week prior to the speech, NOP had the Conservatives 13 per cent ahead. In NOP's national poll, 6 per cent of respondents said they were more likely to vote Labour

as a result of Powell's speeches (Clark, 1998). 'In a very close result, these figures, even if only fractionally projected, would be of critical importance' (Clark, 1998, p356).

The reason Powell gave for encouraging the electorate to vote Labour in the forthcoming general election was Wilson's promise of a plebiscite on Britain's membership of the Common Market, and that Labour's position on Europe was closer to that of his own (Shepherd, 1996). It is significant that Powell was a leading *pro-Marketeer* prior to being dismissed from the Shadow Cabinet as a consequence of his controversial 'Rivers of Blood' speech on race and immigration. Having delivered his speech on 20 April 1968, Powell was sacked by Heath the following day. Shortly after becoming a backbencher, he shifted his position to that of an anti-Marketeer (Shepherd, 1996). Fisher (1977) suggests Powell's changed stance on Europe could be seen as more of a personal attack on Heath rather than an ideological shift on the issue. Following his sacking by Heath, Powell 'foreswore all his previous pro-European policies and publicly proclaimed his new-found opposition to joining the EEC' (Fisher, 1977, p131). Conservative Minister Alan Clark wrote that Powell's 'patriotism and formidable acumen were a most dangerous combination in scrutinising the country's relations with the EEC' (Clark, 1998, p342). Powell's controversial 1968 speech therefore came as a gift to Heath, providing him with the perfect opportunity to be rid of a man he not only hated, but also feared (Clark, 1998).

There is therefore, a strong possibility that Powell's dramatic change of position on Europe was motivated by reasons other than ideological. Although Powell's volte-face may well have been rancour as a result of his sacking, an alternative explanation is that he had been suppressing his previous anti-Europe views for reasons of party loyalty or personal ambition. As Minister of Health in Macmillan's Government, Powell raised no objection to the Cabinet's decision to apply for membership (Young, 1999). Furthermore, under Heath's leadership in 1965, Powell was reported to have played a leading role in the writing of *One Europe*, 'a paper advocating full military, economic and political union of Europe' (Roth, 1970, p372). In either case, there is at the very least, circumstantial evidence that other factors were at play, and that his changed view on Europe was taken for non-ideological reasons. As an opponent of European integration, Powell in 1993 attempted to explain his previous support for British membership of the Common Market. Powell claimed that in the early 1960s he failed to understand that the Common Market was a political and not an economic structure. Therefore given Powell's earlier strong commitments to a federal Europe, this was an argument which Shepherd (1996) dismissed as 'not wholly convincing' (Shepherd, 1996, p248).

Despite believing he could win the election, Heath's 'deepest political instinct revolted against an election fought against the miners, pitching the Tories against the trade unions in a contest that would arouse class antagonism on both sides' (Campbell, 1993, p593). The February 1974 General Election was nevertheless to be fought against the *background* of the miners' strike. This was despite the protestations of Harold Wilson who had considered that the media had, in the early weeks of the campaign, focused too much on the dispute rather than paying attention to Labour's initiatives, particularly on the question of the EEC (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974). In the foreword to Labour's manifesto, Wilson categorically stated that 'this election is *not* about the miners. They are in the firing line today. The housewife has been in the firing line ever since Mr Heath was elected' (Labour Party, February 1974). This reference to the housewife was in all probability an attack on Heath's negotiated terms on Britain's entry to the Common Market which Wilson considered to have had a detrimental effect on the price of food for British consumers.

Although the question of who governs Britain had dominated the February 1974 General Election, a number of right-wing Conservatives blamed the defeat on the commitment to take Britain into the Common Market. During the election campaign, the Conservatives were reluctant to herald Heath's achievement, with less than a quarter of candidates mentioning the government's success on securing Britain's membership. This was as a result of Labour being committed to renegotiation and a referendum, therefore suggesting that entry was still not final (Crowson, 2007).

6.2: The October 1974 General Election

This general election was called by Prime Minister Harold Wilson as a result of the difficulties of Labour in office, having worked from February 1974 under a minority position (Coates, 1980). Labour's victory in the February General Election gave them 301 seats. The Conservatives won 297, and the combined seats of the other parties was 37 (Dorey, 1995). Following the October election, attempting to implement policy with an overall, but slim majority of just three, the situation remained difficult for the Wilson Government (Dorey, 1995). Although Europe in the October 1974 General Election was not a salient issue, it was the *divisions* in the Labour Party however, in respect of Europe that was of greater importance to the electorate.

Leading Labour anti-European Peter Shore was particularly damning of the media's coverage of the referendum campaign. Shore stated that 'the role of the media was notable in this referendum campaign as it was unbalanced almost beyond anything in my political lifetime' (Broad and Geiger, 1996, pp 91-92). This view of the media was also

confirmed shortly before the referendum vote, when Tony Benn spoke at the opening rally in London of the Tribune group's campaign for withdrawal in the forthcoming referendum. He accused the mass media of being violently opposed to the No campaign and reflecting the 'economic interests which find the Common Market attractive' (Clark, The Times, 11 April 1975, p6). In addition, Benn attacked those who covered politics on behalf of the mass media for 'seeking to make this campaign a campaign about personalities and about the Labour Party' (Clark, The Times, 11 April 1975, p6).

6.3: House of Commons three-day debate 7-9 April 1975

The vote[20] in the House of Commons on 9 April 1975 on the Labour government's recommendation to continue Britain's membership of the European Community is of huge significance. Analysis of the vote shows that of 315 Labour MPs, 137 voted for, 145 against with 24 not voting. In the case of the Conservatives however, 249 voted for, with only 8 voting against and 18 did not vote (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976). This clearly demonstrates the almost equal split between the pro and anti-Europeans within the Labour parliamentarians, and the unanimity amongst Conservative MPs. Although traditional tribal loyalty to the leadership is a partial explanation for Conservative unanimity on this issue, it was also electorally in the Conservative Party's interests to maintain unity at this time. As former Conservative MP Alan Clark (1998) later recalled:

> In 1975 the narrowness of the Labour margin in many constituencies, the divisive and unpopular character of much of their policy and especially their subservience to the unions gave the 276 Conservative MPs in the House of Commons a particular status: The Shadow Cabinet was an administration-in-waiting (Clark, 1998, p386).

The Wilson Government negotiated the terms of entry, 'but It was widely felt that the changes introduced were marginal' (Ashford, 1992, p127). It is hardly surprising therefore that the Conservatives voted in such large numbers to support the Labour government given that the new terms on which Wilson made such great play about were so similar to the terms on which Heath took Britain into the Common Market.

David Marquand (2008) was equally unimpressed when a triumphant Wilson returned in March 1975 from a European Community summit in Dublin with unsurprising news of the two outstanding issues - 'Britain's contribution to the Community budget and continued access to the British market for New Zealand's dairy products, had been resolved successfully' (Marquand, 2008, p261). For Barbara Castle, the Cabinet meeting on 17

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[20] See *Appendix 5* for a complete list of Ayes and Noes including the political party each MP represents.

March, shortly after the Dublin summit was all too predictable. Castle (1990) wrote of being bored even before the meeting began: 'I groaned at the thought of the tedious charade that lay ahead. We all knew that everybody had made up their minds and that nothing anyone said would change anything' (Castle, 1990, p576).

It was not only the anti-Marketeers but also pro-Marketeers that attacked Wilson's renegotiation. Roy Jenkins (1991) argued that the renegotiations were largely cosmetic. It was an exercise that produced not only the maximum ill-will in Europe, but also the minimum of result, 'except for a smokescreen under which both Wilson and Callaghan could make their second switch of position on Europe within five years' (Jenkins, 1991, p492). Jenkins may have had a point. Peter Shore[21] (1993) expressed similar sentiments when questioning what the new terms were, and in what way did they differ from those negotiated by Heath? Shore talked of conditions having to be defined and redefined and 'over the years, whatever Wilson's instinct and analysis may originally have demanded got lost and blurred in a maze of his own words' (Shore, 1993, p100). Left-wing MP Eric Heffer in a Tribune rally speech in Manchester Free Trade Hall on 11 April 1975 even went so far as to claim that the 'so called victories of renegotiation had given Britain less than it had before it entered the EEC' (The Times, 12 April 1975, p3).

From a more neutral perspective however, Kenneth Morgan (1997), whilst accepting that the terms won were very far from perfect, did consider that the negotiations were 'serious, gaining important concessions for Commonwealth produce and a major interim settlement on the budget issue' (Morgan, 1997, p428). Whether the renegotiated terms were cosmetic or real, they did have the effect of producing a change in the dynamics of Wilson's Cabinet. Prior to the renegotiations the Cabinet had comprised of twelve ministers that were anti-Europe and nine pro-Europe. The "renegotiations" now provided a reason for Denis Healey, Edward Short, Merlyn Rees, John Morris, Bob Mellish and Anthony Crosland to now fall in with the pro-Europe camp. The changes in the terms concerning agriculture and overseas development were also sufficient to earn the support of both Fred Peart and Reg Prentice. 'Including the ministers in the Lords it was now sixteen for and seven against' (Broad, 2001, p105). Wilson now had a Cabinet favouring membership by a majority of more than two to one. This turnaround enabled Wilson and Callaghan to put to the British people a claim that the renegotiations were a success and

[21] In what could be considered a case of putting the issue of Europe before party, former Labour Cabinet Minister and leading anti-Marketeer Peter Shore's widow Liz, her daughter Tacy and son-in-law Bob Smith have defected from Labour and are all now standing as candidates for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2013 Cornwall Council elections (Western Morning News, 29 April 2013).

thus recommend a Yes vote in the forthcoming referendum on Europe. Therefore, despite Labour MPs being marginally balanced in favour of the anti-Marketeers, 'the domestic battle, like the international, appeared to have been won' (Morgan, 1997, p425).

One of the recent converts to the pro-Market side was Labour Cabinet Minister Reg Prentice[22] who had achieved considerable success in Shadow Cabinet elections during his career as a left-wing anti-Marketeer. He outlined unequivocally his view on Europe at this time during the October 1971 House of Commons debate on Heath's application to join the Common Market. Prentice stated: 'I personally am opposed, and have been opposed for many years, to British entry into the EEC both on domestic and international grounds' (Hansard, 25 October 1971, c1334). Despite this, as his trajectory in chapter eight demonstrates, Prentice shifted to a pro-Common Market position following Labour's success in the October 1974 General Election, and Wilson's renegotiated terms.

Prentice's about-turn on Europe can be attributed to some extent as a result of Wilson's shrewd move in bringing the former anti-Marketeer into the Cabinet as Minister for Overseas Development in 1975. It was in this role that Prentice found the European Council to be 'a relatively congenial and even amenable body' (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p28). Wilson's new terms however, were considered by members of both sides of the Common Market debate to be only a modest improvement on those negotiated by the Heath government in 1972. It therefore brings into question the motives for Prentice's change of position, and as such adds weight to the view that for some members of the political elite, their position on Europe is secondary to that of short-term political, party and career considerations.

One MP that did not vote on the terms was Barbara Castle who was in the United States during the whole period of the debate lecturing to the Harvard Medical School on the British Health Service. On the question of the referendum, Castle found her relations with Wilson very strained. 'He would clearly not easily forgive the dissenting Ministers for having organised their opposition to his renegotiated terms so promptly and effectively' (Castle, 1990, p588). Wilson was also angered and embarrassed that 'he had to rely on Conservative support to win the vote in the House of Commons' (Castle, 1990, p588).

[22] Following deselection in Newham North-East as a result of his battles with left-wing constituency activists, Prentice achieved political notoriety as the highest ranking Labour figure ever to defect to the Conservative Party (Guardian, Obituary, 22 January 2001)

6.4: The 1975 Referendum

The 1975 Referendum was significant to Wilson personally, for despite his opposition to Europe only a few years earlier, Wilson was the man who cemented Britain's place in Europe. Wilson used the issue of sovereignty as justification for the holding of a referendum. *The Times* political correspondent described Prime Minister Harold Wilson's speech to a Labour Party rally in Cambridge on 11 April 1975 during the referendum campaign 'as his first important speech since the House of Commons approved the renegotiated terms for Britain's membership of the European Community' (The Times, 12 April 1975, p1). Wilson said:

> What the referendum means is that it is not enough for any politician or political leader to say what he believes. In this unique case, it must be for the country to decide what is best for the mass of the people, and for their children. This referendum means that in a matter vitally affecting sovereignty; the ultimate sovereignty has been handed back through the ballot box to the sovereign people (Harold Wilson, quoted in The Times, 12 April 1975, p1).

As a result of the British people having their say in the referendum, Wilson's action had legitimised Britain's entry into Europe whilst at the same time, diminished the significance of Heath's legacy. Wilson's own major legacy was that he had kept the Party together. It also significantly affected the next choice of leader following Wilson's 'shock' resignation in March 1976. The left was still reeling from defeat over Europe and was therefore in a far more difficult position to argue that its policies would be successful in winning voters at the next election (Cronin, 2004). It was in order to avoid further splits in the Party, 'rather than in the cause of wider democratic principles, that Wilson chose to hold a referendum on the issue of European membership' (Turner, 2000, p70).

On the Labour government's motion on 9 April 1975, to approve the EEC White Paper on renegotiation, this was comfortably approved by an overwhelming majority of 226 votes. David Wood (1975) Political Editor of The Times reported the following day however, that despite the division figures of 396 for and 170 against providing a comfortable majority for the government; this only told half the story. With more Labour MPs voting against the motion than in favour of it 'Mr Wilson won on the night because he led a three-party coalition in which there was an overwhelming Conservative majority. Indeed, Conservative commitment to Europeanism has never been stronger' (Wood, The Times, 10 April 1975, P1). 'Mr Wilson may have been fortified by the division figures to go out and vindicate the answer Yes in the referendum, but his party managerial difficulties have been intensified' (Wood, The Times, 10 April 1975, p1).

Commenting on the outcome of the government motion, The Times editorial the next day whilst acknowledging his enormous skill in keeping his party together, accused Wilson of preferring unity to decision. As a result of the Labour left's victory on Europe, they were unlikely to let up and the editorial suggested that:

> Mr Wilson can hardly retreat, because a No vote would destroy his party and his position. He will have to fight for his political life on the European issue, not only against Mr Heffer or the Tribune group, but against Mr Benn and other more formidable colleagues. In that fight he will deserve support; the militant left are a menace to the welfare of Britain; to withdraw from Europe would be a national tragedy (The Times, 10 April 1975, p17).

The referendum campaign and subsequent result reinforced the existing deep divisions within the Labour Party and 'despite the two-thirds public endorsement of membership, the issue of Europe was to divide Labour for the next ten years' (Turner, 2000, p70). The Common Market was viewed by many of the right as a bastion against the threat of the left, which at this time not only posed a serious challenge to the Labour Party, but was also portrayed through the predominantly right-wing media as posing a threat to Britain's political and social order. The referendum was therefore seen as a litmus test on Britain's future political direction. In her diary entry shortly after the result was known, Barbara Castle (1990) writing on the role of the press during the campaign noted that 'commentators everywhere hinted to the fearful that a vote against the Market was a vote for Tony Benn's domestic policy' (Castle, 1990, p608) The Observer's (1975) comment on the outcome of the referendum was particularly insightful:

> It would be wrong to interpret the referendum result as a direct repudiation of those Labour left-wingers who opposed EEC membership because they want to tackle our economic problems by collectivist State controls. People voted No for a whole variety of reasons, though few can have voted in support of a left-wing socialist thesis (Observer, 8 June 1975, in Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p275).

The 1975 referendum was important 'because it began a process of realignment in British politics' (Crowson, 2007, p43). The referendum exposed the division within the Labour Party which was to lead in 1981 to the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), a consequence of which provided a very significant advantage to the Conservative Party.

Senior Conservatives during the referendum campaign had sensed potential opportunities for their party. Douglas Hurd (2003) for example, admitted it had been pleasurable working alongside people who were usually political opponents and consequently he never lost the habit of discussing any subject comfortably with men like Roy Jenkins, John Harris and William Rodgers, who had campaigned alongside him for a Yes vote in the

referendum (Hurd, 2003). Hurd was not as enthusiastic about Europe as was Jenkins and Rodgers however. An illustration of what may be either an absence of long-term considerations over Common Market membership, or an example of how members of the political elite are affected by short-term political motives is provided by Hurd's own memoirs. Although in 1975 Hurd voted for a Common Market, he did not vote for political interference from Brussels. 'We did not campaign in 1975 about a single internal European market, a common foreign policy or a common currency. These ideas came later; they were not current in 1975' (Hurd, 2003, p238).

To suggest that the division over Europe was one of right versus left would be a gross oversimplification however, particularly given that those on the extreme right wing of the Conservative Party and groups such as the National Front all supported withdrawal from Europe. There was a host of participating organisations involved in the referendum campaign. These groups served to blur the issue of right versus left as a result of individual members actively campaigning against their own party's position on Europe. These organisations included: Communists For Europe, Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome, Labour Campaign For Britain in Europe, and Liberal No to the Common Market Campaign (Everitt, 1976).

Furthermore, despite two-fifths of voters in the referendum being Conservatives, opinion polls suggested that the overwhelming majority of these were in favour of Britain remaining in the Common Market. Nevertheless, the anti-Market appeal to patriotism and national sovereignty should have resonated with many Conservative voters (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976). The one leading anti-Marketeer who might have reached Conservatives on these issues was Enoch Powell. Yet for many Conservatives Powell was seen as 'a deserter who had betrayed his party by telling Britain to vote Labour in February 1974 and again in October' (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p111).

Within the Labour Party, the position was equally complex with those opposing Europe doing so for a variety of reasons. Heppell, Crines and Nicholls' (2010) study[23] on ideological alignments within the PLP challenged the traditional interpretation which suggested there is a high degree of cohesion within the right and left blocks (Heppell et al, 2010). Their findings demonstrated that some MPs deemed to be on the left of the Labour Party by means of their position on defence and economic policies were also in *favour* of Britain's membership of the Common Market. Conversely, a number of those deemed to be on the right of the Party using the same criteria were found to be *anti* Common Market.

[23] See *Appendix 6* for details of policy-based ideological alignments within the PLP 1976.

Support for the challenge to the orthodox view is provided by former Labour leader Neil Kinnock. Interviewed in 2004, Kinnock acknowledged that the categorisation of left and right was problematic, and stated:

> Big mistake that a lot of us made including me, even though possibly I got over it a bit earlier than one or two others, was to draw up a category of left and right. Which had as major definitive considerations – not sole, but major – where you stood on the European Community, and where you stood on the Bomb. And some people were very left wing and very pro-European. Others were on the right and very CND. And many in both cases so as to make the line a bloody zig zag! And we all were massively misled by these definitions (Kinnock, 2004, cited in Hayter, 2005, p6).

During Edward Heath's term of office, Wilson as leader of the opposition opposed the Conservative government's position on Europe largely as a result of the adversarial nature of British politics. Wilson therefore used Britain's membership of the Community 'as a device to criticize the Heath government' (Geddes, 2004, p75). Wilson made it clear that it was the *terms* of membership that he was concerned with and not opposition to Europe *per se*. By pledging a future Labour government to both a renegotiation on revised terms *and* a referendum Wilson reasoned that 'a shift to a broader public debate could avoid deep Labour Party divisions being exposed to the public' (Geddes, 2004, p75).

The idea of a referendum on Europe is commonly attributed to Tony Benn. His proposition for a referendum 'angered supporters of the Common Market as opinion polls led the left to make the assumption that the referendum vote would lead to an anti-European verdict' (Cronin, 2004, p159). In an interview conducted in May 2010, Labour MP David Clark, later Lord Clark of Windermere claimed he called for a referendum on Europe independently and possibly ahead of Benn. Clark promoted the idea of a referendum through various outlets such as the press, public meetings and discussions with constituents in his surgery, then reported his findings to the local media. Clark also ran the idea through the local party machine and discussed the possibility of a referendum with colleagues in the parliamentary tea rooms. Lord Clark (2010) recalls that there was general initial resistance to the idea of a referendum on Europe and overall very little support. The task of persuading other Labour MPs became easier however, when Benn later highlighted the cause (Lord Clark of Windermere, Interview, 18 May 2010***).***

It is significant that the Labour MPs who were allies of David Clark in his call for a referendum were predominantly new Members of Parliament as a result of winning their seats in the 1970 General Election. These included Edmund Marshall, Peter Hardy, Brynmore John and Eric Varley (Lord Clark of Windermere, Interview, 18 May 2010). Tony

Benn argued that 'a popular vote was needed on Europe and tried to use the Common Market issue to marginalise the moderate, social democratic wing of the Labour Party' (Young, 1993, p114).

Labour had not however, made a categorical commitment to a referendum. The pledge made in October 1974 was only to consult the people through the ballot box after new terms had been negotiated. This could have meant a further general election, but as the anti-Marketeers were in the majority in both the Labour Party and in the Cabinet, it was a referendum that 'was clearly the instrument of choice' (Young, 1999, p280***).*** Furthermore, largely as a result of the bitter conflicts between the Heath Government and the trade unions, Wilson had inherited a country deeply divided along class lines. The issue of Common Market membership was for Wilson therefore, 'a welcome diversion from such matters, and because it divided the country along lines other than class, it offered a possible escape from the danger of such conflicts becoming entrenched' (George, 1991, p76). Notably, Wilson and Callaghan during the referendum campaign having recommended the new terms of British membership to the public 'were now more concerned with preserving the unity of the Labour Party than with making sure of victory on 5 June' (King, 1977, p106).

Wilson had a history in the Bevanite[24] era of political manoeuvring in order not only to further his own career but also to help advance party unity. He again demonstrated his political skill by finally persuading enough members of his Cabinet to change their minds 'in order to secure a majority among them to recommend staying in the EEC' (Donoughue, 1987, p57). An example of Wilson's personal view on Europe is provided by his former press secretary Joe Haines. Whilst Wilson was in Jamaica at a Commonwealth conference just weeks away from the 1975 referendum, backbench Labour MP Ian Mikardo had plotted to overturn the Party's policy of remaining in Europe. Although subsequently out-manoeuvring Mikardo, Wilson's reaction to this success is illuminating:

> He was mockingly grateful to his wife, Mary, to Marcia and to me for the parts we played in overcoming Mikardo's shabby conspiracy while he was out of the country – because we were all, each of us, privately anti-Marketeers (Haines, 2003, p49).

[24] Wilson, along with John Freeman, joined Bevan in resigning from the Labour government in 1951 on the issue of prescription charges. The damage caused to the Labour Party as a result of the resignations was almost solely attributed to Bevan, with Wilson's resignation largely unnoticed (Pimlott, 1992). By demonstrating his Bevanite credentials however, Wilson had gained considerable support from those on the left of the Party which proved to be of sufficient benefit for him to achieve victory in the 1963 Labour leadership election.

A further insight into Wilson's view on Europe is provided by Donoughue (1987) who writes that 'Wilson was never very sympathetic towards the EEC or indeed to anywhere abroad except the old Commonwealth' (Donoughue, 1987, p59). Wilson viewed Europe as a wider issue however. Pulling out of the Common Market would have left Britain at the mercy of the Little Englander isolationists. These people in the Labour Party 'were the Prime Minister's left-wing enemies and in the Conservative Party were often the worst kind of right-wing extremists' (Donoughue, 1987, p59).

Whilst Wilson may have been in favour of remaining in the Common Market, it was however, with some reluctance. As Young (1999) notes in his discussion on Wilson's tour of Europe with George Brown in 1967, there was a recognition on Wilson's part that 'the government itself would benefit from a revivalist project: that "Europe", however regrettably, was becoming the only place to look' (Young, 1999, p191). A senior Labour figure close to Wilson throughout the debates on Europe, offered further insight. When asked where Wilson really stood on the Common Market replied: 'I don't really know, I guess this was the enigma of Harold'.

There were strong feelings on both left and right wings of the Labour Party over the possible outcome of the referendum on Europe. On the right, Shirley Williams felt strongly enough to announce that if the referendum resulted in a No vote then she would withdraw from public life (Coates, 1980). Williams' comments caused a sensation and the right-wing press lost no time in making political capital out of it (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975). As far as those on the left were concerned, the fear was that if the referendum went against them, the ability of a Labour Government to introduce socialist policies in Britain would be severely restricted. This view was confirmed to some extent by the Conservative Deputy Leader, William Whitelaw. In a speech to the Institute of Public Relations in Stratford Upon Avon on 20 April 1975 he claimed there was little doubt that the main body of people who desired to see Britain leave the European Economic Community were left-wing socialists who want to establish a complete socialist state. 'They are afraid of our remaining in Europe because they fear their freedom to do so might, in some way, be inhibited' (The Times, 21 April 1975, p4).

In the campaign itself, the commitment to a referendum significantly eliminated the requirement to adhere to party allegiance. This led to two cross-party umbrella organisations being formed, 'Britain in Europe (BIE) and the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) which were to campaign for a Yes and a No vote respectively' (Forster, 2002, p50). Britain in Europe had been in existence some years earlier and had merged in

1969 with the wealthy European Movement which had been established as far back as 1948. The European Movement was professional and well-organised but was considered to be too 'committed to federalism to appeal to a sceptical British public and its contempt for the whole process of renegotiation was regarded as too blatant for some tastes' (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p72).

Within the European Movement therefore, it was decided to revive the name Britain in Europe and this name was to be used during the referendum campaign. The phrase therefore met the criteria of freshness and brevity, and in addition placed 'an emphasis on the *status quo* nature of the campaign. Britain was "In". It was the "Outs" who were trying to upset things' (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p72). Despite £125,000 of public money being paid to both pro and anti-Market organisations, the campaign in terms of finance could hardly be said to be equal. This subsidy was 'designed to prevent the pro-Marketeers from seeming to have too grotesque a monetary advantage yet in the event they spent £1,482,000 to the anti-Marketeers £134,000' (Butler, 1989, p80). In addition, although BIE had only operated formally in January 1975, the Yes supporters had been planning their campaign almost a year earlier and had secured a significant amount of financial backing. Businessmen 'Lord Drogheda, John Sainsbury and Alastair McAlpine had been seeking financial backing and by May 1975 raised £1,481,583. In contrast, the No coalition secured only £8000' (Crowson, 2007, p43).

Following the Conservative defeat in the February 1974 General Election, it is notable that newly appointed Leader of the Opposition Margaret Thatcher approached Heath and asked if he was willing to serve in her Shadow Cabinet in a position of his choosing (Fisher, 1977). When this was declined, Thatcher then suggested that he might instead be willing to lead the Conservative Party's referendum campaign on Europe from an official position. 'Again he refused, but said he would take an active part in the referendum with a private programme of speeches all over the country' (Fisher, 1977, p183). Heath's decision was not too surprising however, given that he had been disowned by his own party 'in favour of a subordinate of his for whom he had little respect' (King, 1977, p107). The task of taking charge of the Conservatives' pro-Market efforts eventually fell to Deputy Leader of the Party, William Whitelaw (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976).

Accusations had been made by the *Get Britain Out Campaign* that the government was close to rigging the referendum to ensure a majority for remaining in the EEC. The chairman of the *Get Britain Out Campaign*, Mr Christopher Frere-Smith speaking at a press conference on 18 April 1975 stated that he had not seen any mention in the press of

the Market Research Society having written to Wilson expressing their concerns at how the referendum question 'was loaded in the direction of those who favoured Europe' (Clark, The Times, 19 April 1975, p3). Frere-Smith added that these people are market research experts whose views 'confirmed the suspicion that the Referendum Bill would be tailored to ensure an overwhelming vote in favour of remaining in the EEC' (Clark, The Times, 19 April 1975, p3). Evidence from leading opinion pollster Robert Worcester (1975) largely confirms this view. As late as January 1975, MORI polls showed that by a narrow margin, most people polled stated that their preference was to leave the European Community when the question posed was for a straight forward in or out. When the question was amended however, and the public was then asked: if the Government were to renegotiate the terms and strongly urge that Britain stay in, how would you vote? On this occasion, a completely difficult outcome was obtained with a two to one margin in favour of Britain staying in (Worcester, 1996). Although this justifies to some extent the poll-rigging accusations of Frere-Smith, it also clearly demonstrates that the political elites were prepared to consider the impact of public opinion polling at this time.

The Common Market was seen by many on the right as a bulwark against a socialist Britain and as such, the possibility of Britain leaving was considered by the British 'establishment' to be a threat to its dominant position. Tribune's (1975) front page article on the forthcoming referendum exacerbated the right's fears when it claimed that 'the Establishment in this country is frightened about the consequences of a No vote' (Tribune, 7 March 1975, p1). The threat from the left was to some extent understandable particularly as events from across the globe during this period served to heighten the right's fears. Beckett (2009) cites America's humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam, the overthrowing of fascist dictatorships in Greece and Portugal, the increasing strength of China and the Soviet bloc as examples of the mid 1970s being a time of 'apparent advance of the left and retreat of the right in the wider world' (Beckett, 2009, p308).

In Britain, however, the left-wing threat was greatly exaggerated, particularly by the right-wing press. Although the left in the Labour Party and the trade union movement was in the ascendency throughout the early and mid-1970s, the power held by the Labour leadership was sufficient to ensure that radical policies such as those outlined in Labour's Programme 1973[25] would never be fully implemented (Cronin, 2004). Nevertheless, throughout the 1975 referendum campaign the predominantly right-leaning British press published stories outlining the socialist 'threat' should the electorate vote to leave the

[25] Labour's Programme 1973 included a call for 'a dramatic shift of power and wealth towards working people and a major expansion of public ownership' (Cronin, 2004, p136).

Common Market. The Times (1975) for example, quoted the deputy Conservative Party leader Willie Whitelaw who said that most of those who are campaigning for Britain's exit were 'left-wingers who want to establish a complete socialist state' (The Times, 21 April 1975, p2).

In the Labour Party's one-day special conference on Europe held on 26 April 1975, the National Executive Committee (NEC) recommended that Britain should leave the EEC. Conference voted by two to one in support of the recommendation, with the votes cast being 3,724,000 in favour and 1,986,000 against, leaving a majority of 1,738,000. The significance of this conference is that 'the advice of Prime Minister Wilson, who argued in favour of Britain remaining a member, was spurned by the majority of the delegates' (The Times, 28 April 1975, p4). The NEC's reaction to Wilson was unsurprising given that shortly before the special conference, the Labour Party published an appraisal of the Common Market renegotiations which stated that 'although the government had done its best to meet its manifesto objectives, it concluded however that the terms had not been met' (Broad, 2001, p107). Not only was Wilson's advice disregarded but he was in trouble with a section of his own party shortly before the referendum decision.

As a result of Wilson's speech at the weekend prior to the referendum in which he put the case for the EEC, ultra left-wing MP Thomas Litterick, a member of the Tribune group launched an attack on the Prime Minister claiming that the line of policy as decided by the NEC and the Party conference was deliberately and clearly abused. 'That speech was in flagrant contradiction of that policy and I am asking the general secretary to discipline the Prime Minister as a result' (The Times, 2 June 1975, p3).

Moreover, 'newly uncovered minutes of a Labour Cabinet meeting in March 1975 showed that Prime Minister Harold Wilson was urged by his ministers to inform the British people that 'membership would seriously compromise Britain's ability to govern itself. In the event, the Government's official pamphlet explaining the referendum gave no such warning – and instead assured voters that the "essence of sovereignty" would be protected by staying in' (Holehouse, 2004, p1). These minutes were among a set of Foreign Office papers on the European Union requested by Business for Britain, a group which is campaigning for a new relationship with Europe. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) initially refused access to the minutes saying 'the release would prejudice the interest of the UK abroad. The decision was overruled by the Information Commissioner' (Holehouse, 2004, p3).

Following the result of the referendum, Britain's press offered its own judgements on who were the winners. The Sunday Express on 8 June 1975 suggested that the real victor is Edward Heath given that Britain in Europe is his personal achievement. Having been rejected twice by the electorate and latterly disowned by his own party, Heath has experienced the cruelty of public life. 'But he has the richest of consolations, that he has left an abiding mark on his country's destiny' (Sunday Express, 8 June 1975, in Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p275). Whilst commenting on the derisory turnout and feeble majority, the Daily Telegraph stated that the result of the referendum is, 'quite frankly a triumph for Mr Wilson. His gamble has paid off handsomely, perhaps even better than he had ever dared hope' (Daily Telegraph, 7 June 1975, in Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p275). Wilson's task was to 'advise the British people on what would be the right result' (Goodhart, 1976, p173). Phillip Whitehead (1985) claims that there was never much doubt that Wilson would get the result he desired (Whitehead, 1985) Yet, despite succeeding in getting the 'right' result in the referendum, trouble still lay in store for Wilson. David Wood (1975) in The Times editorial of 14 April 1975 quoted a Labour backbencher who complained after the Commons vote on the EEC renegotiation White Paper: 'Drive nails into Harold Wilson, and they come out screws' (Wood, The Times, 14 April 1975, p13). The backbencher stated that the referendum defeat provides only a temporary halt for the socialists within the Labour Party. 'The nails that come out as screws are being driven into the coffin of the kind of socialism that Mr Wilson, most of the Cabinet, nearly half of the Parliamentary Labour Party, and the overwhelming mass of Labour voters believe in' (Wood, The Times, 14 April 1975, p13).

6.5: Summary

The general elections of 1974, the 1975 House of Commons vote to recommend continued membership, and the 1975 referendum were particularly significant events to have occurred during this period. This chapter explores not only the extent to which the individual motives of the political elite influenced the outcome of these events, but also the degree to which the events affected the leadership of the major political parties in respect of Britain and the Common Market.

The impact of Enoch Powell for example, in the run up to the February 1974 General Election was of particular significance. In this instance, Europe was the issue of importance to Powell, with Labour's promise of a referendum on continued membership being enough for him to urge Conservative supporters to vote Labour. Having previously been a committed supporter of Britain's membership, Powell's conversion to the anti-Common Market cause however, coincided with his sacking by Heath, thus inviting

speculation as to the motive for his total reversal on the issue. The greater emergence of arguments over sovereignty by members of the political elite was a key factor in the debate over Europe at this time, with Powell prominent amongst those invoking the rhetoric of the concept to further his own position in respect of opposition to EEC membership.

The April 1975 House of Commons three-day debate on the Labour government's recommendation to continue Britain's membership of the Common Market was significant in that it not only exposed the divisions within the Labour Party, but also highlighted the unity of the Conservatives at this time. Wilson recommended continued membership as a result of the Labour governments' renegotiated terms. As several of the leading players on both sides of the argument commented however, there was little difference in the renegotiated terms to those previously negotiated by the Heath Government. Whilst this posed no dilemmas for the Conservative Party, the renegotiated terms were however, to prove crucial in shifting the balance of Labour's Cabinet in respect of the Common Market. The new terms were a sufficient pretext for leading Cabinet members including Healey and Crosland to move over to a pro-Europe position and therefore support Wilson in the referendum campaign.

Harold Wilson's calculated risk in holding a referendum and the subsequent outcome was a success for the leadership. The plebiscite satisfied the demands of the left whose members believed that the referendum would be won, particularly as the opinion polls showed the public to be against membership. At the same time, as a result of Wilson's renegotiated terms, the almost overwhelming support of the media, and the Labour government officially campaigning for a Yes vote, the pro-Europe members of the right who were fearful of defeat were sufficiently placated.

The calling of a referendum did however, provide an example of the short-term interests of the leadership and illustrate how the issue of Europe was subordinate to matters of party management. The result of the referendum, whilst cementing Britain's place in the Common Market for the foreseeable future, not only temporarily masked the obvious divisions within the Labour Party, but also the subtle and more significant divisions within the Conservative Party.

Chapter Seven: The Longest Suicide Note in History

7.0: Introduction

The result of the 1975 Referendum had very significant consequences for Labour's position on Europe. Although it did not have to, there was at least an obligation on the government to take into account the will of the people and remain committed to membership of the Common Market. The referendum defeat however, was certainly not the end of the debate – indeed far from it. Offered for reasons of party unity, the referendum contributed to a further fracturing of the elite and the general population on the issue of Europe. It is significant that in later years, as discussed in the conclusion, the Conservatives revived Euroscepticism and pledged a further referendum – also for reasons of party unity, should they be successful in the 2015 General Election.

This chapter is therefore concerned predominantly with the events following the 1975 Referendum and how the outcome affected the divisions over Europe particularly in respect of the Labour Party. Both the 1979 and the 1983 General Elections and the role Europe played in respect of the Conservative and Labour parties' campaigns are discussed, as are the events leading to the formation of the Social Democratic Party. As far as the major political parties were concerned, the 1983 General Election result and the subsequent inquest into Labour's defeat signalled the end of a long internal struggle by anti-Marketeers to take Britain out of the Common Market. Analysis is also made of the Labour Party Special Conference in January 1981 at which the most significant decision was to change the way the Labour leader is elected. The Labour Party Annual Conference held in October 1981 which voted to withdraw from the Common Market without a further referendum is also examined. Finally, this chapter addresses the issues leading up to and including the European Parliament election of 1984. This election is seen as the point in which the Labour Party eventually arrives at the conclusion that the United Kingdom is a member of the EEC and fully accepts this. For both major political parties, withdrawal from Europe was now no longer on the political agenda.

In opposition from 1974 to 1979, the Conservatives 'could still be seen broadly as the least divided of the main parties when it came to Europe. They were a pro-EEC party' (Crowson, 2007, p45). As Turner notes, 'the bulk of the party had accepted the decisive result of the pro-European referendum result in 1975 and the party was seen by many as offering a new and more positive approach' (Turner, 2000, p76). Throughout the period between the referendum result and the 1979 General Election, the issue of Europe within the Conservative Party was kept deliberately low key: A position which suited new leader

Margaret Thatcher, 'who was yet to form her strident views on the matter, because there was no wish to detract from the objective of questioning Labour's domestic record' (Crowson, 2007, p45).

The Conservative Party leadership in the mid to late 1970s was, to a considerable extent able to conceal divisions on Europe. In the aftermath of the 1975 referendum, 'opportunities for anti-Marketeers to advance their cause became considerably more scarce' (Forster, 2002, p50). Indeed, following the decisive referendum majority for remaining in the Common Market, 'Euroscepticism was dormant, subdued or outside the political mainstream for the next decade' (Holmes, 2002, p1). Furthermore, Conservative sceptics wanted 'to re-establish their loyalty to their own party after the referendum and in part because the approaching general election limited the attraction of parliamentary disobedience' (Forster, 2002, p50). The Conservatives maintained their position of the party of Europe by exploiting the more visible divisions within the Labour Party 'and allowing the Tory leadership to deal with dissent within its own ranks' (Turner, 2000, p76).

Following the Conservatives' general election victory of 1979, growing tensions over European policy increasingly divided the leadership and party. 'The touchstone for these divisions centred on Thatcher's use of national sovereignty as applied in Community budgetary arguments about Britain's national interest' (Turner, 2000, p76). George (1991) notes that during the first period of the Thatcher Government, when the dispute over Britain's budgetary contributions to the Community dominated, 'nationalistic rhetoric was very much to the fore' (George, 1991, p70). Dissent within the party at this time resurfaced as a result of the adversarial approach employed by Thatcher in her dealings with Britain's European partners, with a number of senior figures in the party unhappy with the Prime Minister's combative approach. The Defence Secretary Francis Pym for example, was concerned that 'Thatcher was whipping up anti-European sentiment amongst the British electorate and similarly alienating Britain's European partners' (Crowson, 2007, p49).

There were nevertheless, pragmatic reasons for Thatcher's approach to Europe. As a result of opinion polls revealing the extent of Thatcher's unpopularity in the early 1980s, the nationalistic tone of her European rhetoric was as much an electoral device as evidence of intent' (King and Wybrow, 2001, p191). The Conservative leadership was also fully aware of Labour's move at this time to a more anti-Community position. As Turner (2000) notes, 'there was a concern that Labour might turn the budgetary issue into a wider electoral issue about EC membership in general (Turner, 2000, p90). As a result of its

policy on Europe becoming an electoral incubus for Labour, Thatcher therefore maintained her adversarial approach to dealing with her European partners, without wishing to raise the possibility of British withdrawal from the EC.

The complexity of Conservative opinion on Europe *at this time* is demonstrated by Ashford (1992) who argues that the various factions can be divided into six specific groups – most of which support membership. The first group consists of those who advocate a Europe des patries: a position taken by Prime Minister Thatcher and expressed in her Bruges speech of 1988. The second group is comprised of Conservative modernisers who are of the belief that British interests are better served by playing a more active role within Europe. The third group identified by Ashford comprise the free-market neo-liberals. In return for a freer and larger market, members of this group are prepared to accept a loss of national sovereignty. The federalists form the fourth group, believing that considerable British sovereignty must be surrendered to achieve the optimum benefits of membership. Formerly the anti-Marketeers, the fifth group are now more commonly known as Eurosceptics; its members' stance on Europe ranging from opposition to further integration to that of outright withdrawal. The final group comprise those who are passive supporters of Britain's membership of the European Community. Without sharing the enthusiasm or hostilities of the other groups, they are nevertheless, of the view that there is little alternative to remaining in Europe.

The debate within the Conservative Party over Europe throughout the period leading up to the 1983 general election was therefore based on the extent of European integration rather than the straightforward question of whether Britain should be in or out of the Common Market. As a result, this led to a far more nuanced debate being undertaken by the Conservative members of the political elite.

7.1: The 1979 General Election

Europe did not play a major part in the 1979 election campaign of either Labour or the Conservatives. Britain's membership of Europe was generally now accepted by the leading parties' *front* benches. The 1975 referendum on the EEC 'had seen the centrist leaders of the main parties crush the anti-Europeans' (Butler and Kavanagh, 1980, p5). The issue of Europe was far from over however. Despite the hopes of the leadership of the Labour Party, Europe was to cause further division and lead to the eventual formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in March 1981. As early as 3 June 1980, one of the founder members of the SDP, David Owen, in a chance meeting with Malcolm Rutherford, a journalist working for the *Financial Times* obtained news that was to have serious

consequences for himself and the Labour Party. Owen was informed that a meeting of the Safeguard Britain Campaign was to be chaired by Shadow Cabinet Minister and anti-Marketeer John Silkin. The purpose of this meeting was to call on the next Labour government to withdraw from the Common Market unconditionally (Crewe and King, 1995). This news led Owen to consult with two other senior pro-Europeans, Shirley Williams and William Rodgers. On 6 June 1980, it was agreed by the three former Labour Ministers that they 'should issue a joint statement and that it should focus on Europe – in other words, that it should be a direct riposte to the Silkin inspired demarche' (Crewe and King, 1995, p43). The following year, Roy Jenkins, who since resigning his post of Home Secretary in 1979, had spent the past four years as president of the European Commission returned to lead the Social Democratic Party.

The disagreements within the Labour Party over the issue of Europe were crucial elements in the formation of the SDP. In the 1979 General Election Jenkins had divided loyalties yet was of the opinion that a Conservative Government would probably be preferable as far as Britain's attitude to Europe was concerned (Jenkins, 1983). In commenting on the formation of the SDP, Young (1999) argued that whilst there had been disagreements on a number of issues including defence, nationalisation and elitism versus populism, Europe was however, 'of all these questions, perhaps the most specific catalyst' (Young, 1999, p302).

Labour therefore, was a deeply divided party, particularly over Europe and this division was exploited by the Conservatives. When the Conservative Party's Steering Committee obtained evidence that in the 1975 Referendum, most Conservative supporters had voted in favour of remaining in the EEC 'Thatcher claimed that this represented a fear of Labour's left-wingers, Benn and Shore, and not Euro-enthusiasm' (Evans and Taylor, 1996, p211). During the 1979 election campaign, whilst the Conservatives displayed a united and largely pro-European front, Thatcher herself possessed a 'Little Englander' instinct on Europe. She shared the view of Norman Tebbit who stated 'the Ministry of Agriculture looks after farmers and the Foreign Office looks after foreigners. Britain's Community partners were, in her vocabulary, "they" and "them" – in other words, foreigners' (P. Jenkins, 1987, p285).

A major contributor to Labour's defeat in the 1979 General Election was the deep divisions within the Party. David Marquand was one of the sixty-nine Labour rebels to vote against the whip in the 1971 House of Commons debate on Britain's entry into the Common Market, and was later to join the Social Democratic Party. In 1979, shortly after

the general election defeat, his analysis of the Labour Party's split condition found that the gulf between social democrats and socialists was now the deepest in British politics. Marquand argued that the Labour Party was of the belief that politicians such as William Rodgers, Roy Hattersley and Shirley Williams have more in common with the left-wingers Tony Benn, Stan Orme and Eric Heffer, than they have with Conservatives such as Edward Heath, Ian Gilmour or Peter Walker. In this situation, to pretend that 'socialists and social democrats are all part of the same great Movement is to live a lie. But it is a lie which the Labour Party has to live if it is to live at all' (K. Coates, 1979, p16). There does appear to be some truth in Marquand's view as former Labour Cabinet Minister Roy Jenkins believed that the Thatcher government would be best for Europe. Commenting on the Conservatives' victory in the 1979 General Election, Jenkins had mixed feelings about the result 'believing on the whole that a change of government would help Britain's relationship with the rest of the Community' (Jenkins, 1989, p374).

7.2: Labour Party: Special Party Conference – January 1981

Following Labour's general election defeat in 1979, the right and left of the Party attributed contrasting reasons for the outcome. For the right, it was the Winter of Discontent 'where the behaviour of the trade unions in general, and those in the public sector in particular, had destroyed the Party's popular appeal' (Leonard, 1981, p112). The aim of the right post 1979 General Election therefore was to moderate and adjust the electoral appeal of the Party (Richards, 1997). The reverse was true of the left however, which attributed the blame for the defeat on the autonomy of the PLP. The left argued it was what they considered to be the anti-working class policies of the Callaghan government in general, and specifically 'the Labour Government's incomes policy itself – rather than the strikes which flowed from it that was responsible for the Party's defeat' (Leonard, 1981, p112).

It was the left's version of events of the 1979 General Election defeat which emerged victorious and as a consequence, the left succeeded in forcing through significant structural changes at the January 1981 Special Party Conference (Richards, 1997). In respect of choosing the future Labour leader for example, conference decided that the trade unions would receive 40 per cent of the vote in the electoral college, with MPs and constituency parties having just 30 per cent each (Crewe and King, 1995). Whilst the future founders of the SDP were dismayed by this vote, Tony Benn was delighted with the result and called for 'further constitutional changes to bring the parliamentary party under even stricter rank-and-file control' (Benn, Sunday Times, 25 Jan 1981, p1). The alienation of the right was further compounded when conference successfully defeated its motion advocating one man – one vote for Labour Party members (Crewe and King, 1995). The

outcome of Labour's Special Party Conference therefore 'provided the catalyst for the subsequent formation of the SDP, thereby further contributing to the demoralisation and disarray of the right-wing of the Party' (Richards, 1997, p19).

7.3: Labour Party: Annual Conference - October 1981

Labour's 1983 General Election manifesto committed the Party to a policy of withdrawal from the Common Market if successful in that years' general election. This manifesto commitment was a result of decisions made by delegates at the 1981 and 1982 Labour Party Conferences. The motion supported by Labour's National Executive Committee at the Brighton Conference on 31 October 1981 was only to make a study on the effects of withdrawing from the Community and was comfortably carried 'with 5,807,000 for, and 1,000,000 against' (Labour Party, 1982, pp238-244). A further significant motion debated at this Conference calling for the general election manifesto to include a commitment to a referendum was easily defeated by a large majority (Labour Party, 1982, pp238-244). Given the result of the 1975 referendum defeat, it was therefore unsurprising that this motion was lost and the NEC supported the motion advocating a study in respect of withdrawal was carried.

This Conference was far from being solely concerned with the issue of Europe however. In a report of over 350 pages, just 10 pages were devoted to the debate on withdrawal from the EEC. As reflected by Conference decisions, Labour's 1981 Conference was dominated by the left's attempt to gain control of the Party. The Labour Party Conference Report (1982) for example, details a number of resolutions and amendments moved by left-wing delegates in respect of the Party Constitution (Labour Party, 1982, pp199-210).The delegates' aim was to make the Parliamentary Labour Party more accountable to Party Conference and NEC decisions. The left's task was made considerably easier however, as a result of several senior right-wing Labour figures having earlier defected to the SDP. As Broad (2001) notes, 'with the hard-core pro-Europeans out of the party, and the other pros demoralised, party opinion on Europe went with the flow of the radical policies' (Broad, 2001, p146). Conference votes therefore, 'in favour of left-wing policies, particularly on the EEC and defence, were taken as given' (Butler and Kavanagh1984, p60).

The 1974-79 Labour governments' support for EEC membership was viewed by the left as part of the betrayal of a socialist programme. In the left's desire to reverse many of Labour's policies therefore, the issue of Europe became enmeshed in a whole range of policy issues. As Daniels (2007) argued, 'attitudes towards Europe within the Labour Party

became entangled with intra-party factional conflicts over the control and ideological direction of the party' (Daniels, 2007, p74). Europe as an independent area of policy was therefore reduced to a secondary issue, and as such accounts for the absence of real debate on EEC membership. For the 1981 Labour Party Conferences, Europe as an issue of policy was purely incidental.

The relatively small amount of Conference time spent on the issue of EEC membership raises the possibility therefore, that those who held an anti-Europe position were as equally unquestioning on the issue as the pro-Europeans. The policy of withdrawal from the EEC, rather than resulting from the issue being seriously debated, was one of a number of manifesto commitments driven through Conference which formed part of the power struggle within the Labour Party at this time.

7.4: The 1983 General Election

The Labour Party manifesto which contained a number of radical left-wing policies was later dubbed by Labour MP Gerald Kaufman as the longest suicide note in history (Healey, 1989)[26]. History confirms nevertheless, that despite suffering a catastrophic defeat, with a share of the total vote lower than in 1979, 'Labour still performed better than the Conservatives did in 1997, 2001 and 2005' (Morgan, 2007, p384). One such radical policy was a commitment to leave the EEC. Labour in its manifesto argued that being a member of Europe was an obstacle to achieving a revival of the British economy through radical, socialist policies. The manifesto stated that 'British withdrawal from the Community is the right policy for Britain – to be completed well within the lifetime of the parliament' (Craig, 1990, p382). The commitment to withdraw from the EEC was in direct contrast to the Conservative manifesto which, whilst congratulating itself on making a success of British membership of the Community, argued that withdrawal would be catastrophic for Britain economically and it would be a 'fateful step towards isolation, at which only the Soviet Union and her allies would rejoice' (Craig, 1990, p343).

Labour's alternative economic strategy at the time of the 1983 General Election 'had been premised on the imposition of selected import controls – a semi-autarchic vision fundamentally incompatible with continued membership in the Common Market' (Cronin, 2004, p350). It did appear however, that Labour's manifesto commitment to withdraw from the EEC altogether was a policy that Labour candidates in the election wished to steer

[26] Generally attributed to Gerald Kaufman, the phrase 'the longest suicide note in history' is a critique of Labour's 1983 General Election manifesto. In their work *The British General Election of 1983* however, Butler and Kavanagh (1984, p62) attribute the quote to Peter Shore.

away from. According to evidence provided by Butler and Kavanagh (1984), only 11 per cent of Labour candidates compared with 30 per cent of Conservative candidates raised the issue of total withdrawal (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984). These figures were hardly surprising given that at this time, Labour was divided over the question of Europe, although all Labour candidates would have been expected to adhere to Party policy. In contrast, the Conservatives were broadly united over Europe and as such their candidates were in a more confident position to espouse their party's policy.

The Conservatives were without doubt in a more fortunate position in respect of Europe during the 1983 election campaign. At this time, Thatcher saw the EEC 'essentially as a Europe of separate nations with certain common interests – in bargaining, say, with the US over economic issues and in trying to develop an internal free market in goods and services' (Riddell, 1985, p214). In a press conference held on 18 May 1983, Prime Minister Thatcher outlined her government's intended policy on Europe should they win the general election:

> We are part of it, we fight our corner on those things we need to fight on and we fully co-operate with the policies of the EEC. It brings new investment to Britain, new job opportunities in the Common Market. And as you know, so many of our industries are geared and equipped to sell into that Market (Thatcher, 18 May 1983, p2).

The Conservative government considered that its own position on Europe to be a vote winner with the electorate. This view was confirmed by opinion polls undertaken during the 1983 General Election, which showed that it was the Conservative's position in respect of Europe that was the most favoured by the electorate (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984).

The Labour Party was soon convinced by the evidence provided by the opinion polls 'that withdrawal from Europe was a loser for them and they were rather surprised that their opponents did not make more play of it' (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984, p92). The opinion polls taken during the 1983 General Election go some way to demonstrate the conservative nature of the British public and that Labour's policy of withdrawal from the EEC would not be a popular measure. The view of the majority of the British public was one of accepting the permanence of membership, particularly as Britain had now been in the Community for ten years. In addition, the polls not only indicated the concerns of the public over possible job losses should the United Kingdom leave the European Community, but also, the respondents indicated that they were in favour of 'a strong assertion of British interests' (Riddell, 1985, p215).

In his post-election reappraisal, even Labour leader Neil Kinnock from the centre-left acknowledged the current situation in respect of Britain's membership of the EEC. Kinnock argued that in any general election in the late 1980s, withdrawal would not be an issue. 'Mrs Thatcher and the Conservatives had won the argument in the UK, if not in the EEC as a whole' (Riddell, 1985, p215). Notably, although Labour suffered a heavy defeat, most of the Labour defectors to the SDP lost their seats with the SDP candidates only winning six seats altogether (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984).

Labour's manifesto commitment to withdraw from Europe also suffered from the Conservative's attempts to link Labour with Communism and to portray the Labour Party as one dominated by Marxists. As the issue of Europe formed an integral part of Labour's programme, 'the aim of the Conservatives therefore was to associate this policy with the rest of their *red menace* argument' (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985, p85). Thatcher was quoted in the Daily Telegraph denouncing Labour's manifesto as 'the most extreme put before the electorate in modern times' (Daily Telegraph, 11 May 1983, page 1). Conservative ministers during the campaign constantly used the tactics of bombarding the British public with the intention of frightening them away from Labour. Willie Whitelaw for example, in a television interview stated that the British people would almost be living in a police state should Labour be elected. In a similar vein, Peter Walker declared that 'the Labour programme delights the Kremlin' (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985, p85). It is hardly surprising therefore, given the scare tactics employed by the Conservatives, that the consensus of the opinion polls *at this time* showed that the majority of the public were now pro-Europe (Jowell and Witherspoon, 1986).

Inaccurate stories put out by certain sections of the right-wing press also contributed to a negative attitude towards the Labour Party's position on Europe. For example, on 16 May 1983, the same day as the publication of Labour's manifesto, the Daily Mail reported that if Labour won the general election it planned to scrap the building of a Nissan car plant in Britain with the subsequent loss of a possible 35,000 new jobs. Nissan however soon qualified the story saying 'If Labour got to power it would not substantially affect our proposals' (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984, p199). Following Labour's subsequent complaint to the Press Council which accepted that the report was likely to mislead readers, the damage, unfortunately for Labour was already done.

The policy on Europe however, was just one of a range of factors which contributed to Labour's defeat in the 1983 General Election. In what he describes as a catastrophic defeat, Richards (1997) argues that this was as a result of electorally unpopular policies,

particularly on the economy and defence, combined with Labour's image 'as a divided, extreme and weakly-led party' (Richards, 1997, p25). In respect of the leadership, Michael Foot was considered by some MPs in the Party to be a liability rather than an asset. Pro-Marketeer Labour MP Giles Radice for example, was particularly scathing of Foot's leadership and urged Denis Healey to make a move against him (Radice, 2004).

A further factor to affect the outcome was Britain's defeat of Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1982, a victory which the Conservative supporting right-wing press ensured was still fresh in the minds of the electorate (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984). More importantly however, was the emergence of the Liberal-SDP Alliance as a third force. As discussed earlier in the chapter, this compounded Labour's problem of being deeply divided on a number of policy areas including defence and membership of the EEC.

A number of significant issues therefore contributed to Labour's heavy defeat in the 1983 General Election, with the issue of Europe not even making the top four of the reasons given for voting against Labour (Miller, 1984). For the Conservatives however, as Margaret Thatcher's Press Conference of 18 May 1983 demonstrates, Europe *was* considered to be of importance. As such, for reasons of tribal loyalty to the Party, Conservative candidates were overwhelmingly supportive of their government's policy on Europe throughout the election campaign. This contrasts sharply with Labour candidates, the majority of whom opposed Britain's membership of the EEC. As discussed earlier in the chapter, left-wing MPs were opposed to Europe largely as a reflex action against the policies of the 1974-1979 Labour Governments. Europe however, was not a salient issue, and therefore did not play a major role in the outcome of the 1983 General Election.

Future leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair provides a further example of how the issue of Europe has been used for short-term political advantage. In May 1982 when standing for the by-election for the safe Conservative seat of Beaconsfield, Blair's campaign leaflet argued in favour of Britain leaving the EEC. The leaflet stated that being a member of the EEC 'takes away Britain's freedom to follow the sort of economic policies we need. That and the cost of the indefensible farm policy are just two of the reasons for coming out' (Rentoul, 1995, p82). At that time, under the leadership of Michael Foot, Labour was in favour of withdrawal from the EEC and Blair had career and electoral success to consider. It is worth noting however, that in his speech as Prime Minister delivered to the European Parliament on 10 May 2007 he claimed he is not only a passionate pro-European but also that he always had been. Blair said 'I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in

Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market' (Seldon, 2007, p542).

7.5: The Labour Party and Europe: Post 1983 General Election

Prior to his becoming elected leader of the Labour Party on 1 October 1983, Neil Kinnock was not only unilateralist on nuclear defence, but was also an anti-European. Throughout the 1970s, Kinnock wrote articles published in Tribune, and made a number of speeches outlining his very strong opposition to the Common Market. Writing in Tribune on 2 May 1975, Kinnock articulated the views of many on the left when he described the EEC as a free market and capitalist organisation which would hinder the struggle for socialism. He also made the point that as a result of its political and economic dimensions, the EEC 'would rob people of their sovereignty – the real power of the people to control their destiny' (Kinnock, Tribune, 2 May 1975, p2). Kinnock's position on Europe in the 1970s therefore, contrasted sharply with his view once he became leader. As leader his position on Europe not only changed, but he also 'represented himself as never having been an anti-European in the manner of late-period Tony Benn' (Young, 1999, p477). Labour's shift in policy on Europe following the 1983 General Election defeat was not a complete reversal however. Jones and Keating (1985) argue that it was highly doubtful that Labour's 'grudging acceptance of the reality of membership of the Community marked a fundamental and irreversible shift. The official party line was no longer withdrawal but re-negotiation' (Jones and Keating, 1985, p190).

New Labour leader Neil Kinnock took a pragmatic view towards Europe, particularly as the election policy of complete withdrawal was unpopular with the electorate. Furthermore, along with the greater part of the Labour leadership, Kinnock had doubts as to whether there was a realistic possibility of the policy being implemented. 'From the beginning of the leadership contest he made it known that he favoured its abandonment' (Westlake, 2001, p230). This revised position on Europe by Kinnock was supported by The New Statesman, which argued, in its first editorial following the election defeat, that Labour should now drop its policy to leave the Common Market. 'The idea that a country the size of the United Kingdom can or should play a major independent role is a dangerous and potentially expensive anachronism' (Kinnock, New Statesman, 17 June 1983, p1). In an article in the same edition, Kinnock outlined what was the most important reason for his shift in policy towards Europe. The 1984 European elections, as one of the first major tests of Kinnock's leadership, would become the means of demonstrating that Labour was 'regaining support in the country and as a means of focusing attention upon the multiple inadequacies of a Tory government' (Kinnock, New Statesman, 17 June 1983, p1).

Barbara Castle, another anti-European Shadow Cabinet Minister agreed. At the 1983 Labour Party Conference she warned: 'if Labour were forced into third place in the European elections its claim to be the alternative government would have received a mortal blow' (The Times, 4 October 1983, p4).

The implication to be drawn from this is that if the Labour Party was to fight the European elections with any form of conviction, and to be successful, then 'it must abandon its policy of withdrawal from the European Community as quickly as possible' (Westlake, 2001, p232). Despite Labour publicly abandoning its hostility to European membership following the 1983 General Election defeat, the 'new delegation of Labour MEPs to Strasbourg however, remained profoundly anti-Community; in 1985 it displaced its left-wing leader, Barbara Castle, with the even more critical Alf Lomas' (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988, p14). There was nevertheless, now a belief in the Labour Party that its policy of withdrawal from Europe was an obstacle to the return to power. Grahl and Teague (1988) make the point that 'even many strong opponents came to realise that acceptance of membership was a price that had to be paid to form a credible opposition' (Grahl and Teague, 1988, pp72-85). As Heffernan (2001) states, it was the 'combination of the climate of elite opinion, with key interest group expectations, that had such a significant impact on Labour's perception of itself as a party and the European policy it was bound to follow' (Heffernan, 2001, p187).

For the Conservatives, the united front displayed during the 1983 General Election campaign masked the Party's deep divisions over Europe. Margaret Thatcher's involvement in Europe however, particularly in respect of her Bruges speech, served to blur the issue. Daddow (2011) describes the speech as a tipping point in the history of Britain's relationship with Europe, in that Thatcher described her own particular version of a pro-European norm. In her Bruges speech, Thatcher stated that whilst she believed Britain's destiny is in Europe as part of the European Community, she also emphasised her interpretation of a Europe des patries (Daddow, 2011). In so doing, Thatcher was instrumental in providing the catalyst for the previously suppressed differences on Europe to burst wide open. As Ashford (1992) argues:

> The debate on membership did not divide the party as much as the issue of the direction of Europe, as support for membership was broad-based within the party, while the debate on direction has been complicated by the association with the conflict between Thatcherites and 'wets'. The separate issues of federalism and interventionism have become confused in the debate within the party, summed up by the phrase 'socialist superstate'. Thus federalists and confederalists, interventionists and free marketeers, can be found in the Conservative Group for Europe, while the

> Bruges Group includes confederalists, free marketeers, and anti-marketeers' (Ashford, 1992, p143).

Thatcher's Bruges speech 'helped shape Conservative policy during the Maastricht negotiations and after, a period which saw an intensification of anti-European activity in Britain in and outside Parliament' (Sowemimo, 1999, p347).

7.6: Summary

The events of 1979 and the early 1980s were of critical importance to the two major political parties. Following two successive general election defeats, Labour eventually and pragmatically changed its official policy on Europe. For the Labour Party, defeat in the 1983 General Election signalled the beginning of an attempt to end the deep divisions within the Party over Europe. Whist this chapter has concentrated predominantly on Labour, it was now the Conservative Party that was to become the most divided over the issue of Europe.

It was the left's version of where the blame lay for Labour's defeat in 1979 which was to emerge victorious, and as such policy decisions at the Special, and Annual Conferences of 1981 reflected the subsequent left-wing dominance of the Party at this time. Europe was therefore just one of a number of radical policies driven through the 1981 conferences with only the minimum of debate on this issue. A major consequence of the left's domination was that of making the PLP more accountable to conference and NEC decisions. As a result, the Labour manifesto for the 1983 General Election contained detailed radical policy commitments including Britain's withdrawal from the EEC. The defection of several leading Labour figures to the newly formed SDP shortly after the Labour Party Special Conference allowed the left to have more of a free rein as far as determining policy was concerned.

The disastrous defeat in the 1983 General Election and the immediate resignation of Foot as leader led to major changes in Labour Party policy. Under newly appointed leader Neil Kinnock, one of the first policies to change was Labour's commitment to leave the EEC; this was however, undertaken with some reluctance and for pragmatic, rather than ideological reasons. Nevertheless, as Grahl and Teague (1988) argued, the acceptance of EEC membership was a price that had to be paid if Labour was to have any realistic expectation of returning to power. Furthermore, Heffernan's (2001) point that the climate of elite opinion at this time was very strongly in favour of Britain's continued membership of the EEC was particularly relevant. Considerable pressure at this time therefore

mounted on the Labour leadership to reconsider its position on Europe. As one leading figure in the Labour Party was later to remark; in order to be taken seriously by *informed opinion*, the Party needed to shift to a pro-Europe position.

Labour's 1983 General Election manifesto commitment to withdraw from the EEC was made as a result of decisions made at the 1981 and 1982 Party conferences. As examined in this chapter however, the decision on Europe was discussed only briefly, and indeed, largely became policy as a result of the domination of the left in the Labour Party at this time. The lack of a quality debate on the issue was also to some extent due to the number of left-wing anti-Europe delegates greatly outnumbering the predominantly right-wing pro-Europeans, with many of their former colleagues having defected to the SDP. For the Conservatives during this period, the debate over Europe was more nuanced than that of Labour which was still divided over whether Britain should remain or leave the EEC. Tensions within the Conservative Party however were now over the extent of integration and the size of Britain's budgetary contributions. This chapter's examination of the 1981 and 1982 Labour Party Conferences and Labour's volte-face on Europe following its heavy defeat in the 1983 General Election has explicated the key arguments of the thesis: It has demonstrated how the issue of Europe, particularly at a time when the issue was one of in or out, exposed not only the absence of a quality debate, but also illustrated how the issue has been used by members of the political elite for short term political and electoral considerations.

Chapter Eight: Trajectories on the Issue of Europe 1959-1984

8.0: Introduction

The aim of the Conservative and Labour trajectories is to provide evidence to test the hypothesis that some members of the British political elite took a position on Europe that was politically pragmatic rather than having a clear commitment to Britain's place in Europe. The members of the political elite included in the trajectories are a representative sample of MPs chosen because of their involvement as leading actors in the debate over Common Market membership during the period 1959 to 1984. This is not an exhaustive list however. A number of leading figures on *both* sides of the debate, including Edward Heath, chief negotiator of Britain's application under Macmillan's premiership, and anti-Marketeer Peter Shore have been excluded because of their totally consistent position on the issue. Indeed, in respect of voting in the 1975 referendum, Everitt (1976) quotes Hugh Simmonds, Chairman of Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome who claimed to 'know personally of a considerable number of well-placed and leading Conservatives who are admitting in a private conversation that they will vote NO, although campaigning in public for a YES vote' (Everitt, 1976, p13). Although in a press interview Simmonds refused to name anyone, 'but alleged they were doing it out of a misplaced sense of party loyalty' (Everitt, 1976, p13).

It should be noted that the MPs included in the trajectories have been listed as either clearly 'pro' or 'anti' in respect of their support or opposition to Britain's membership of the Common Market based on their voting records, autobiographies, biographies, interviews and other evidence. It does not mean however, that any of these individuals on either side of the House was not at some point highly critical of the Common Market itself, or of Britain's membership within it. Members of the political elite who had changed their view on Europe could, with some justification argue they were simply shifting their position on a broad spectrum of the issue. An example of this is provided by **Margaret Thatcher** *(table twenty).* As discussed in chapter seven, Thatcher possessed what Patrick Jenkins (1987) described as a 'Little Englander' instinct on Europe (Jenkins, 1987). Although opposed to deeper European integration, Thatcher nevertheless remained fully committed to Britain's membership. For example, Thatcher's case might suggest that classifying politicians as uniformly pro or anti underestimates shifts in attitude and nuanced differences which sometimes occur in response to political calculation. It is also important to note that none of the events in Europe during the period of study was sufficient to shift the selected politicians' position to any great extent, and evidently not enough for them to change from pro to anti vice-versa. Later events however, such as the Maastricht Treaty and

Thatcher's Bruges speech were of enough significance to affect some politicians sufficiently to change their view on the issue.

8.1: Analysis of trajectories

What is apparent from the trajectories is that whilst some MPs have remained consistent in their position on Common Market membership throughout, others have changed their view for a variety of reasons. The vote in the House of Commons in October 1971 when Parliament decided to apply in principle to join the Common Market was particularly significant for some members of the political elite. The Conservative **John Nott** *(table sixteen)* for example was anti-Common Market from 1959 to 1971 yet became a supporter of membership in 1972 and remained pro-Europe throughout the period under review. Nott provides an illustration of the powerful impact of tribal loyalty and peer pressure: despite being influenced by the views of Enoch Powell on the consequences of Britain's independence once a member of the Common Market, Nott confessed that 'the influence of other friends and colleagues got me through the lobbies behind the government' (Nott, quoted in Seabright, 2010, p152).

The Conservative members tended to adhere to a particular position on Europe with the majority supporting Common Market membership throughout. This is unsurprising in that the Conservative leadership both in and out of office held a pro-Common Market position. There were however, exceptions. A number of Conservatives were against Britain's membership including **John Biffen** *(table ten)* who was opposed, apart from 1967 when he defied a three-line-whip to vote in support of Labour's application (Campbell, 1993). It is perhaps significant that Biffen, who was described by Campbell (1993) as one of Enoch Powell's most prominent younger disciples, was dismissed from Edward Heath's front bench just one year earlier (Campbell, 1993).

As discussed in chapter six, **Enoch Powell** *(table seventeen)* switched from being a supporter not only of Britain's membership but also of a federal Europe, to one of total opposition to the Common Market. The reasons Powell gave for his dramatic change of view was questionable. Powell claimed that he failed to understand the true nature of the EEC, saying he had thought it to be all about economics. Yet, as Young (1999) observes: 'it is quite incredible to imagine Powell, a particular student of constitutional matters throughout his political career, being unaware that the entire nature of the EEC tended towards the ever closer union of political Europe' (Young, 1999, p243). This adds weight to the view of a number of political commentators that the real reason for Powell's volte face on Europe was as a result of his dismissal from Heath's Shadow Cabinet following

his infamous speech on immigration in 1968. It also raises the possibility that as a committed nationalist, Powell's genuine position on Europe may actually have been that of opposition throughout his political career; his earlier support for Britain's entry into the Common Market therefore being based more on party and personal considerations and less on an ideological view on Europe.

As Paymaster-General in the Macmillan government, **Reginald Maudling** (*table fifteen)* was instrumental in the formation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). As a result however, of his experiences in negotiating with the six members of the EEC, and in particular with the French and Germans, Maudling had come to believe that 'for Britain to join the Common Market would be both fruitless and a mistake' (Bennett, 2013, p83). On 21 July 1961, despite warning of future rows within the Conservative Party, Maudling nevertheless supported the Cabinet's decision that a British application for membership should be made. Still believing that the six members would offer terms unacceptable to the Government, Maudling recognised however 'the political and commercial necessity to find this out by experience' (Bennett, 2013, p83).

Briefly against Common Market entry in 1959 and 1960, **Anthony Barber** *(table nine)* like Maudling, supported the Conservative Cabinet in its decision to apply for membership in 1961. Barber was in favour of entry into the Common Market for economic reasons. Although not a passionate supporter of membership, Barber summed up his view in a statement to the House of Commons: 'I take the view that on balance without doubt, provided we can get reasonable terms, entry will be to the advantage of this country and will improve the prosperity of our people' (Hansard, 15 June 1971, c218)

Instinctively pro-European, **Geoffrey Howe's** *(table fourteen)* view was consolidated by the Suez crisis of 1956, an event which led former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson to announce that Britain had lost an empire but still had not found a role. Howe became convinced that Britain's role 'would have to be in Europe' (Howe, 1995, p66). In an interview in 2012, Lord Howe was asked why he became a supporter of Britain's membership of the Common Market. He replied that he was strongly influenced by Churchill's vision of a united Europe (Nicholls, Interview, 13 June.2012). Howe's view is somewhat surprising given that whilst Churchill did indeed seek a united Europe, it was one with Britain on the outside acting as a bridge between the continent and the rest of the world (Young, 1999).

As delegate to the Council of Europe during the period 1962 to 1966, **Nicholas Ridley** *(table eighteen)* became converted to a position of support for a more federalist Europe. He later claimed however, that he was shielded from reality 'by the fact that we were not then even members of the Community' (Ridley, 1991, p139). Nevertheless, despite shifting his position along the spectrum, Ridley continued to support the leadership's position on Europe throughout his parliamentary career.

Whilst opposed to British membership of the Common Market, **Hugh Fraser** *(table thirteen)* did however wish to see Britain join the European Coal and Steel Community. Along with a number of moderate Conservatives, Fraser preferred 'association to participation and the wish for Britain to continue to play a world role based on the Atlantic alliance' (Crowson, 2007, p108). In the 1972 House of Commons debate on Common Market membership, Fraser spoke of loss of national sovereignty and was categorical in his opposition to joining a system which he considered to be 'weakly international, undemocratic, elitist and not in the interests of our people' (Hansard, 13 July 1972, c1942). On the European Community Membership Bill in 1975 however, Fraser changed his position with regret. In his speech in the House of Commons, he stated that whilst he would never be a passionate Marketeer, Britain was already a member of the Common Market and that 'to pull out of Europe now would be a disaster at home for confidence within this country and a disaster for our relationships abroad' (Hansard, 8 April 1975, c1073).

Peter Tapsell *(table nineteen)* is a further example of a member of the political elite to have changed their position on the issue's broad spectrum. Although Tapsell's evidence based trajectory shows him to be pro-Europe throughout, he was nevertheless opposed to closer integration. Along with fellow left-winger Peter Walker, Tapsell 'opposed the European Community in part because they saw it as a trade cartel with a common rather than a free market, and preferred the more global and multiracialism of the Commonwealth' (Forster, 2002, p71).

An imperialist, **John Biggs-Davison** *(table eleven)* was strongly opposed to Britain's membership of the Common Market arguing against a little Europe mentality and urging the need for links between Britain, Continental Europe and the Commonwealth. He was however prepared to favour Common Market membership 'if terms compatible with Commonwealth development and the maintenance of national sovereignty could be secured' (Dewey, 2009, p181**).** A number of Conservative former anti-Marketeers changed their position on Europe following the outcome of the 1975 Referendum (Forster,

2002). Biggs-Davison also shifted to a pro-Common Market position in 1975, although his voting record shows that he had decided to support Britain's continued membership *prior* to the result of the referendum. On the Labour government's motion recommending Britain's continued membership of the Community, Biggs-Davison voted in favour (Hansard, 9 April 1975).

In 1961, **Peter Walker** *(table twenty-one)* and John Biggs-Davison founded the Anti-Common Market League (ACML), an organisation whose primary purpose was to resist any further weakening of the Commonwealth (Forster, 2002). Having been appointed to Heath's Shadow Cabinet in 1965, Walker became converted to a pro-Europe view. Young (1999) writes of Walker's conversion: 'this element of self-interested rationality – the lack, in the end of gut feeling, helps account for Walker's rare status as a committed sceptic who then enthusiastically went over to the other side' (Young, 1999, p376).

In contrast to Walker, **Edward du Cann** *(table twelve)* remained opposed to Common Market membership throughout his political career. Despite being a senior member of the Conservative Party, du Cann was not offered a position in Heath's Cabinet. In his autobiography, du Cann states: 'unlike some of my contemporaries, of whom the most prominent example was Peter Walker, this was not a subject on which I would change my mind' (du Cann, 1995, p174). In the final week of the 1975 referendum on Common Market membership, du Cann even made an open appeal to rank and file Conservatives to vote against their own leadership. His speech concluded with the words: 'there is always a higher loyalty than party loyalty – loyalty to one's country, and what one honestly believes to be her best interests' (King, 1977, p123).

In respect of Labour members of the political elite, it is significant that those who had ambitions of party leadership or who had senior ministerial positions such as Foreign Secretary changed their position on Europe to that of the current leadership's position. The trajectory demonstrates for example that **James Callaghan** *(table twenty-four)* was against Britain's membership of the Common Market during the years leading up to Labour being in government under the leadership of Harold Wilson in the 1960s. Once again out of office in 1970 and Labour opposed to Britain's membership on Conservative terms, Callaghan reverted to an anti-Common Market position until Labour was re-elected in 1974. When asked during a House of Commons debate in 1974 whether he was in favour of Britain's membership of the Common Market in principle, Callaghan replied that he did not want to go any further than the Labour Party manifesto (Hansard, 27 March, 1974).

Denis Healey *(table twenty-eight)* shifted his position on Europe no less than eight times during the twenty-five year period under review. Healey was also a candidate for the Labour leadership and similarly to Callaghan was opposed to Britain's membership of the Common Market up to the Labour general election victory in 1964. Having then changed his position on the issue, he remained a supporter of membership up to Wilson's application in 1967. In 1981 Healey once again took a position of opposition in an attempt to gain support from the Labour left in the deputy leadership election contest in which he was successful. As Broad (2001) notes: during the deputy leadership campaign Healey 'resorted to disparaging comments on the Community that outdid Harold Wilson's in 1970-71' (Broad, 2001, p146). Healey again reverted to a pro-Europe position following Labour's defeat in the 1983 General Election to join the majority of his colleagues in falling in line with the new leadership's abandonment of Labour's previous commitment to leave the Common Market.

The trajectory of former Foreign Secretary **Michael Stewart** *(table thirty-seven)* is a further example of a senior minister changing his view on Europe to that of the leadership. Stewart was opposed to the Common Market up to Labour's application in 1967 when he changed to being in support of Britain's membership. In opposition during the Heath Government, Stewart reverted to an anti-Common Market position until Labour returned to power in 1974.

Labour Prime Minister **Harold Wilson's** *(table thirty-nine)* trajectory is almost identical to that of Michael Stewart. Wilson was opposed to Common Market membership until 1967 when his position changed to one of support. From 1971 to 1973 with Labour out of office, Wilson again reverted to opposition to Britain's membership claiming the terms negotiated by Heath were totally unsatisfactory. Once again in government, Wilson reverted to a pro-Common Market position. Furthermore Wilson, whose position on Europe has been discussed in earlier chapters, consistently claimed that for him, it was the terms of entry that was the deciding factor.

Although not a Member of Parliament at this time, **Tony Blair** *(table twenty-three)* voted Yes in the 1975 Referendum (Young, 1999). In 1983 however, as an MP serving under the leadership of Michael Foot, Blair promised in his 1983 election address: 'we'll negotiate a withdrawal from the EEC, which has drained our natural resources and destroyed jobs' (Booker and North, 2003, p202). Following the change of leader and subsequent Labour leadership policy on Europe, Blair reverted to a pro-Common Market position.

For **Tony Benn**, *(table twenty-two)* membership of the Common Market was incompatible with Labour's economic policy, the Alternative Economic Strategy. Moreover, most of the trade unions and 'all the left-wing organisations such as the Tribune Group and the Campaign Group shared this view' (Ashford, 1992, p144). Although Benn supported Wilson's application for membership in 1967, he reverted to his former anti-Common Market position following the Conservative general election victory in 1970. Benn did however, remain opposed to membership throughout the remainder of the period under review, and was an active campaigner for a No vote in the 1975 Referendum.

Although he described himself as generally pro-Europe, **Anthony Crosland** *(table twenty-five)* was not particularly enthusiastic about Britain's membership of the Common Market and claimed in 1971: 'if it became a question of keeping Mr Heath in power by voting for Europe, then he would not do so' (S. Crosland, 1982, p219). An example of someone changing position on the spectrum, Crosland considered Europe to be an issue of low salience and as such abstained from the House of Commons vote on 28 October 1971 on the Conservative government's proposal for entry into the EEC.

Richard Crossman *(table twenty-six)* was strongly against Britain becoming a member of the Common Market up to the point of the Labour government's application in 1967. As discussed in chapter three, Crossman, from the left of the Party suggested in 1961 that even if Britain became a member, the Common Market would be dominated by Germany and France (The Times, 19 September 1961). Crossman did however, support Wilson's 1967 application and only reverted to a position of opposition when the Conservatives regained power in 1970. In an example of a shift of position on the spectrum, Crossman still considered himself to be largely sceptical over Common Market membership in 1966. At a meeting of the Cabinet however, where Wilson discussed the possibility of a Labour government application, Pimlott (1992) notes that although Crossman wobbled, he 'wobbled in a pro direction' (Pimlott, 1992, p438).

A Member of Parliament from 1970, **Neil Kinnock** *(table thirty-one*) was anti-Common Market until he became leader in October 1983 following Labour's general election defeat of that year. Kinnock opposed the Common Market on the grounds that membership would not only deprive the British people of their sovereignty, but as a result of the capitalist nature of the organisation, would also create barriers to socialism in Britain (Tribune, 2 May 1975). Nevertheless, shortly after his election as Labour leader, Kinnock took a pragmatic view on the issue of Europe. As discussed in chapter seven, Kinnock

considered the forthcoming 1984 European elections to be the most deciding factor in not only his, but also the Party's shift in policy.

Gerald Kaufman *(table thirty)* had been an anti-Marketeer since becoming an MP in 1970 and only changed his position following Labour's heavy defeat in the 1983 General Election. It is perhaps significant given Kaufman's consistent opposition to the Common Market that he failed to make any speeches in the House of Commons on the subject; although this is unsurprising given Kaufman's position in Wilson's old kitchen cabinet (Pimlott, 1992). Highly critical of many of the policies Labour fought the 1983 General Election on, particularly nuclear disarmament and the commitment to take Britain out of the Common Market, Kaufman was attributed with naming Labour's 1983 manifesto the longest suicide note in history.

For **Douglas Jay** *(table twenty-nine)* and the nationalist right of the Labour Party, the issue of Common Market membership was the loss of sovereignty. As Ashford (1992) notes: 'sovereignty weighed more heavily than socialism as the primary source of opposition for most of the Labour Party' (Ashford, 1992, p144). Remaining consistently anti-Europe throughout his entire parliamentary career, Jay reportedly even went so far as to carry his own supply of British cornflakes whenever he was required to visit continental Europe (Young, 1998).

During the 1960s, the rift within the Labour Party over Europe was so bitter that despite his right-wing views, **Reg Prentice** *(table thirty-three)* was put on the Tribune group slate 'because he was a passionate opponent of the Common Market' (Baker and Seawright, 1998, p58). As discussed in chapter six, Prentice's change of view on Europe coincided with his appointment into Wilson's Cabinet in 1975 as Minister for Overseas Development. In 1979 Prentice achieved political notoriety as the highest ranking Labour figure ever to defect to the Conservative Party (Guardian, Obituary, 22 January.2001).

Opposed to Common Market membership from 1959 to 1966 **Fred Peart** *(table thirty-two)* did nevertheless support the Labour Government's proposed application for membership. Whilst acknowledging that the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) raises problems affecting cost of living in Britain, Peart stated 'if we are to join the Community, we must come to terms with it' (Hansard, 9 May 1967, c1404). In opposition from 1970 to 1973 he reverted to an anti-EEC position until once again, under a Labour government from 1974 he once more supported the leadership in its pro-Common Market position.

In 1967, **John Silkin** *(table thirty-five)* was the Chief Whip encouraging MPs to support Britain's entry into Europe. It was therefore ironic, suggested David Owen (1992) that following Labour's 1970 General Election defeat, Silkin 'now felt free to reveal his hostility to the European Economic Community and had joined the Tribune Group of left-wing MPs' (Owen, 1992, p172).

A member of the left-wing Tribune group**, John Prescott** *(table thirty-four)* was strongly opposed to the Common Market. Along with Bryan Gould and Stuart Holland, Prescott was a signatory to the Alternative European Strategy (AEU), a document produced shortly in advance of the European elections of June 1984. As discussed in chapter seven, whilst continuing to oppose Britain's membership of the Common Market, the signatories argued that Labour's policy in Europe should be that of co-operation between European socialist governments (Hull History Centre, UDMR/316, 1984). Although reluctantly accepting Labour's change of policy on Europe under the leadership of Kinnock; as a result of his co-authorship of the AEU Prescott could perhaps have been seeking a half-way house on a journey towards finally tolerating membership. It is not too fanciful to suggest that Prescott, Gould and Holland subordinated a consistently principled opposition to Common Market membership to a piece of political manoeuvring.

Concerns for the future of the Commonwealth was the reason for Labour right-winger **Patrick Gordon Walker's** *(table twenty-seven)* initial opposition to Common Market membership (Dewey, 2009). Despite his concerns for the Commonwealth in respect of the Common Agricultural Policy, as a Cabinet Minister in 1967 Gordon Walker did however support Wilson's application for membership (Pearce, 1991).

Labour right-winger **Eric Varley** *(table thirty-eight)* was opposed to Britain's membership of the Common Market particularly on the grounds of energy policy (Castle, 1990). This is understandable given that his status as Member of Parliament came largely as a result of support from the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). While Varley's continuing opposition to Common Market membership might have excluded him from senior ministerial office, he was actually appointed by Wilson in June 1975 to replace Benn as Secretary of State for Industry. This suggests that it was possible for a moderate loyalist to refuse to alter his views on Europe. Significantly however, his desire to accept ministerial office demonstrated his readiness to serve in a government committed to Common Market membership.

A passionate pro-European, **John Smith** *(table thirty-six)* had 'never seen any difficulty in reconciling a sense of national pride with a desire for international co-operation' (Brown and Naughtie, 1994, p91). Smith wanted Britain to play a leading role in Europe and believed that 'both our economic strength and fairness could be advanced through European integration (Brown and Naughtie, 1994, p91). Such was his support for Common Market membership that in the House of Commons debate on 28 October1971 Smith was one of the sixty-nine Labour MPs that defied the official Labour whip and voted with the Conservative government (Hansard, 28 October 1971)

As far as the British press *(table five)* was concerned, the majority had taken a pro-Common Market position throughout the period under review. This is particularly true of the right-wing press with the exception of the Express Group newspapers during the ownership of the anti-Marketeer, Lord Beaverbrook. In 1964, the first year of it taking over from the Daily Herald, the Sun was also anti-Common Market, but became in favour of Britain's membership from 1965. The right-wing Spectator is the most inconsistent: although taking a pro-Europe position most years, it was nevertheless opposed to British membership of the Common Market from 1969 to 1971 and from 1973 to 1976. This is explained to a large extent by the paper's change of ownership. The Spectator was owned by the pro-European Ian Gilmour from 1959 to 1967 and as a result the editorial reflected his views on Common Market membership. Harry Creighton, the Spectator's new owner was very much opposed to the Common Market and subsequently appointed fellow anti-Marketeer George Gale as editor (Blake, 1978).

The left-leaning newspapers the Daily Mirror and the Guardian were all pro-Europe from 1959-1984, whilst the Labour supporting weekly Tribune was consistent throughout in its opposition to Britain's membership of the Community. The left-wing New Statesman reflects the change of position of several members of the political elite insofar as it was anti-Common Market up until the outcome of the 1975 referendum then switched to being in favour of Britain's membership. As discussed in chapter six, the overwhelming majority of the British press were actively supportive of obtaining a Yes vote in the 1975 referendum on Common Market membership. The outcome of the 1975 referendum is particularly significant in that from this time, with the exceptions of Tribune, the Express Group newspapers, and for a brief period, the Spectator, all the British press covered in the trajectory were pro-Europe.

Public opinion *(table six)* and the views of the political elite differed sharply throughout the period 1959-1984. In the years when British governments made attempts to join the

Common Market, opinion polls showed support for membership only marginally above 50 per cent at best. In respect of Britain's initial application in 1961, the trajectory shows public opinion to be in favour throughout that year. This is perhaps unsurprising as the application gave the issue of Common Market membership a greater saliency than in previous years (Nugent, 1992). In 1973, the year Britain joined the Common Market, polling showed the British public to be opposed to membership in every month bar January. What is significant however, is that in the months leading up to the June 1975 Referendum on continued membership, public opinion changed dramatically from an anti-Europe position of under 50 per cent to a solid 64 per cent in July of that year in support of remaining in the Common Market. The 64 per cent figure was the highest spike in favour of membership since accession, and demonstrated the impact the Wilson Government in particular, and the British political and broader elite in general, had on influencing the British public to support the Yes campaign.

Following the outcome of the 1975 Referendum, opinion polling on the issue of Common Market membership was limited. Yearly figures supplied by Jowell and Witherspool (1986) demonstrated however, that in the general election year of 1983, 53 per cent of the British public was in favour of Britain remaining a member of the EEC (Jowell and Witherspool (1986). As Butler and Kavanagh (1984) note, the opinion polls toward the end of the general election campaign had the Conservatives 23 per cent ahead on the issue of Europe, 'one of their largest measured advantages on a policy issue' (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984, p143). It was of little surprise therefore that following Labour leader Michael Foot's departure shortly after the electoral defeat, 'his policy on Europe was one of the first to disappear after him' (Young, 1999, p476).

The 1975 referendum *(tables one and two)* proved influential insofar as several members of the political elite changed their position as a result of the British people providing legitimacy for Britain's membership, and as a result considered the issue settled. It is also clear from the trajectories of individual *Labour* MPs that several of them became pro-Europe following the general election defeat of 1983 and the subsequent change of policy on membership by the Labour Party leadership.

Analysis of 'European Events' (*tables three and four*) demonstrates that changing political events in Europe did not correlate with attitude changes that were more likely to result from political calculation. As discussed in the conclusion however, subsequent events to the period under review, including Jacques Delors' speech to the TUC in September 1988, Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech delivered in October 1988 and the signing of

the Maastricht Treaty by John Major in *did* significantly influence a number of MPs. For example, it was Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech in 1988 which was largely responsible for Conservative MP Philip Davies's view that Britain should leave the European Union. Questioned as to why he wanted Britain to come out of the EU given that he was influenced by Thatcher who, despite her having issues with Europe, nevertheless publicly remained in favour of membership, Mr Davies stated: 'Just because that was not the view of her Government doesn't necessarily mean it wasn't her private view' (Davies, interview by personal communication, 16 August, 2014). Furthermore, a number of Conservative MPs were sufficiently influenced by Thatcher's speech to join the Bruges Group[27], an organisation which describes itself as 'the Campaign for a Europe of Sovereign States and supports a Europe of economic but not political unity' (Ashford, 1992, p139). It should be borne in mind that from the mid to late 1980s, the differences of opinion were now on the direction of Britain's relationship with Europe and not an in/out debate.

It was Delors' speech in 1988 which was of particular significance as far as Labour was concerned. Delors' speech was to have a major impact on the views of the Labour movement in general and on the Labour Party in particular. With the prospect of even only a limited form of socialism, membership of the European Community was considered by some former anti-Marketeer Labour politicians to be a far more attractive alternative to long-term Conservative rule. In the wake of Delors' speech, Neil Kinnock for example, 'signalled a more positive approach by Labour to the process of European integration' (Westlake, 2001, p471). It should be remembered however, that in the mid to late 1980s the straightforward in/out debate over Europe had effectively ended. The debate was now over the direction of Britain's relationship with Europe and as such was significantly more nuanced and complex.

The position taken by the Conservative leadership and Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet when in or out of office *(table seven)* confirms that this party was consistently in favour of Britain's membership throughout the period of study. In contrast, the Labour leadership and Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet's position *(table eight)* has mostly varied according to whether or not the party was in power. It should be noted however, that under the leadership of Wilson, Labour's official position was one of support for Britain's membership dependent on the terms of entry.

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[27] Often associated with the Conservative Party, the Bruges Group is 'an independent all-party think-tank set up in February 1989 to promote the idea of a less centralised European structure than that emerging in Brussels' (Daddow, 2011, p71).

8.2: Summary

There is apparent substantial consistency amongst the Conservatives and apparent chicanery and manoeuvring in respect of Labour. In the case of the Conservatives however, there is a need to recognise that Common Market membership was consistent with free-market economics, improving Britain's trade position, and modernising Britain's economy in the light of European competition. Common Market membership was seen therefore as providing Britain with a competitive blast from Europe. The Common Market was also seen by Conservatives as a bastion against their exaggerated fears of socialism in Britain. There were also major enthusiasts for Europe in Conservative leaderships, represented most spectacularly by Heath who convinced leading Conservatives that the Party could gain a competitive advantage in British party politics by portraying itself as the party of change and modernisation, which in contrast to Gaitskell and Wilson's lack of enthusiasm for Europe, made the Conservatives appear electorally more attractive. Once the Conservative Party leadership determined a pro-Common Market position, the Party's instinct for power explains why the tribal loyalty of Conservative MPs ensured that most fell into line. The Conservative consistency proved to be shallow in the longer term, with significant fissures opening up as the Party shifted its position on Europe.

The explanation for the Conservatives' apparent consistency does not entirely acquit Labour of manoeuvring on the issue. In defence however, Labour was more transparent over Europe and willing to have internal debates on one of the most profound issues in British politics in this period. Although some Labour members of the political elite were not immune from English chauvinism, it is also evident that whilst many Conservatives saw membership of the Common Market as a bastion against socialism in Britain, it is equally evident that some Labour figures aspired to the view that Britain still had the opportunity of pursuing a national policy of socialism if Britain remained an independent nation.

8.3 Trajectories

Table one

1975 Referendum (Conservative)

Anthony Barber	-
John Biffen	Anti
John Biggs-Davison	Anti
Edward du Cann	Anti
Hugh Fraser	Pro
Geoffrey Howe	Pro
Reginald Maudling	Pro
John Nott	Pro
Enoch Powell	Anti
Nicholas Ridley	Pro
Peter Tapsell	Pro
Margaret Thatcher	Pro
Peter Walker	Pro

Table two

1975 Referendum (Labour)

Tony Benn	Anti
Tony Blair*	Pro
James Callaghan	Pro
Anthony Crosland	Pro
Richard Crossman	-
Patrick Gordon Walker	-
Denis Healey	Pro
Douglas Jay	Anti
Gerald Kaufman	Anti
Neil Kinnock	Anti
Fred Peart	Pro
Reg Prentice	Pro
John Prescott	Anti
John Silkin	Anti
John Smith	Pro
Michael Stewart	Pro
Eric Varley	Anti
Harold Wilson	Pro

*Although not yet a Member of Parliament, Blair voted Yes in the 1975 Referendum (H. Young, 1999, p282)

Table three

European Events (Conservative)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
Anthony Barber	a	p	p	p	p	p	p	-	-	-
John Biffen	-	a	a	p	p	a	a	a	a	a
John Biggs-Davison	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	p	p	p
Edward du Cann	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Hugh Fraser	a	a	a	a	a	a	p	p	p	p
Geoffrey Howe	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p
Reginald Maudling	a	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	-
John Nott	a	a	a	a	a	a	p	p	p	-
Enoch Powell	p	p	p	p	p	a	a	a	a	a
Nicholas Ridley	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p
Peter Tapsell	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p
Margaret Thatcher	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p
Peter Walker	-	a	a	p	p	p	p	p	p	p

Key:

A = November 1959, formation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
B = August 1961, UK, Denmark and Ireland request negotiations for EEC membership
C = January 1963, de Gaulle vetoes British entry into EEC
D = May 1967, UK reapplies to join EEC
E = November 1967, de Gaulle vetoes British entry into EEC for a second time
F = April 1969, de Gaulle resigns and is replaced by Pompidou
G = January 1973, First enlargement with UK, Denmark and Ireland joining EEC
H = March 1975, Dublin Summit – British renegotiations completed
I = June 1979, First direct elections to European Parliament
J = June 1984, Second direct elections to European Parliament

a = anti
p = pro

Table four

European Events (Labour)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
Tony Benn	a	a	a	p	p	p	a	a	a	a
Tony Blair	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	p
James Callaghan	a	a	a	p	p	p	a	p	p	p
Anthony Crosland	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	p	-	-
Richard Crossman	a	a	a	p	p	p	a	-	-	-
Patrick Gordon Walker	a	a	a	p	p	p	a	-	-	-
Denis Healey	a	a	a	p	p	a	a	p	p	p
Douglas Jay	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	-
Gerald Kaufman	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	p
Neil Kinnock	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	p
Fred Peart	a	a	a	p	p	p	a	p	-	-
Reg Prentice	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	p	p	p
John Prescott	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	p
John Silkin	-	-	p	p	p	p	a	a	a	a
John Smith	-	-	-	-	-	-	p	p	p	p
Michael Stewart	a	a	a	p	p	p	a	p	p	-
Eric Varley	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Harold Wilson	a	a	a	p	p	p	a	p	p	-

Key:

A = November 1959, formation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
B = August 1961, UK, Denmark and Ireland request negotiations for EEC membership
C = January 1963, de Gaulle vetoes British entry into EEC
D = May 1967, UK reapplies to join EEC
E = November 1967, de Gaulle vetoes British entry into EEC for a second time
F = April 1969, de Gaulle resigns and is replaced by Pompidou
G = January 1973, First enlargement with UK, Denmark and Ireland joining EEC
H = March 1975, Dublin Summit – British renegotiations completed
I = June1979, First direct elections to European Parliament
J = June 1984, Second direct elections to European Parliament

a = anti
p = pro

Table five

British Press on the issue of Europe 1959-1984

	Eco	Exp	Gua	Her	Mai	Mir	NS	Spe	Sun	Tel	Times	Trib
1959	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti
1960	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti
1961	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti
1962	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti
1963	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti
1964	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti*	Pro	Pro	Anti
1965	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1966	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1967	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1968	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1969	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1970	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1971	Pro	Anti	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1972	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1973	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1974	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Anti	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1975	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1976	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1977	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1978	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1979	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1980	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1981	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1982	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1983	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti
1984	Pro	Pro	Pro	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Anti

Key:

Eco = Economist
Exp = Daily Express
Gua = Guardian
Her = Daily Herald**
Mai = Daily Mail
Mir = Daily Mirror
NS = New Statesman
Spe = The Spectator
Sun = The Sun*
Tel = Daily Telegraph
Times = The Times
Trib = Tribune

*The Sun first published 15 September 1964
**Daily Herald ceased publication 14 September 1964 and replaced by The Sun

Table six

Public Opinion on the issue of Europe 1959-1984

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1959	-	-	p54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1960	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1961	-	-	-	-	-	p46	p38	p48	p52	p48	p52	p53
1962	-	p47	-	p47	p53	p37	p42	p39	p46	p41	p42	p37
1963	p50	p42	-	-	-	-	p46	-	-	p46	p59	p42
1964	-	a40	p42	-	-	-	-	p41	-	-	p44	
1965	-	p48	p59	p57	p60	p55	p56	-	p55	-	p54	p60
1966	p66	p60	p59	p68	p70	p66	p61	p71	p70	p67	p65	p67
1967	p65	p61	p57	-	p43	p40	a45	-	a41	p46	a44	p43
1968	-	a48	-	-	-	-	a43	-	-	-	-	-
1969	-	-	-	-	a44	-	-	-	a58	-	-	a45
1970	-	a75*	a57	a59	-	a57	-	a56	-	a56	-	a66
1971	a58	a62	-	-	a59	-	-	a47	-	a51	p44	a47
1972	-	p42	-	43/43	a45	-	a51	-	a42	a41	-	a45
1973	p38	-	-	a42	a45	-	a44	a52	a49	a49	a48	-
1974	-	a58	-	a51	a45	a53	a50	a53	-	-	a46	-
1975	-	a50	a42	p43	p49	p64	-	-	-	-	-	-
1976	p39											
1977	a42											
1978	a38											
1979	p43											
1980	a59											
1981	a41											
1982	a48											
1983	p53											
1984	p48											

Yearly figures from 1976 to 1984 provided by Jowell and Witherspoon (1986)

Key:

a = anti
p = pro

The figure quoted is the highest: anti or pro.

Table seven

Position taken by Conservative Government/Opposition 1959-84

	59-64 Con	64-66 Lab	66-70 Lab	70-74 Con	Feb-Oct 74 Lab	74-79 Lab	79-87 Con
1959	Pro	-	-	-	-	-	-
1960	Pro	-	-	-	-	-	-
1961	Pro	-	-	-	-	-	-
1962	Pro	-	-	-	-	-	-
1963	Pro	-	-	-	-	-	-
1964	Pro	Pro	-	-	-	-	-
1965	Pro	Pro	-	-	-	-	-
1966	-	Pro	Pro	-	-	-	-
1967	-	-	Pro	-	-	-	-
1968	-	-	Pro	-	-	-	-
1969	-	-	Pro	-	-	-	-
1970	-	-	Pro	Pro	-	-	-
1971	-	-	-	Pro	-	-	-
1972	-	-	-	Pro	-	-	-
1973	-	-	-	Pro	-	-	-
1974	-	-	-	Pro	Pro	Pro	-
1975	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	
1976	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	-
1977	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	-
1978	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	-
1979	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	Pro
1980	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pro
1981	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pro
1982	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pro
1983	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pro
1984	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pro

This table records the position taken by the Conservative leadership and Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet during periods in and out of office.

Table eight

Position taken by Labour Government/Opposition 1959-84

	59-64 Con	64-66 Lab	66-70 Lab	70-74 Con	Feb-Oct 74 Lab	74-79 Lab	79-84 Con
1959	Anti	-	-	-	-	-	-
1960	Anti	-	-	-	-	-	-
1961	Anti	-	-	-	-	-	-
1962	Anti*	-	-	-	-	-	-
1963	Anti	-	-	-	-	-	-
1964	Anti	Anti	-	-	-	-	-
1965	-	Anti	-	-	-	-	-
1966	-	Anti	-	-	-	-	-
1967	-	-	Pro	-	-	-	-
1968	-	-	Pro	-	-	-	-
1969	-	-	Pro	-	-	-	-
1970	-	-	Pro	Anti	-	-	-
1971	-	-	-	Anti	-	-	-
1972	-	-	-	Anti	-	-	-
1973	-	-	-	Anti	-	-	-
1974	-	-	-	Anti	Pro	Pro	-
1975	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	-
1976	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	-
1977	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	-
1978	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	-
1979	-	-	-	-	-	Pro	Anti
1980	-	-	-	-	-	-	Anti
1981	-	-	-	-	-	-	Anti
1982	-	-	-	-	-	-	Anti
1983	-	-	-	-	-	-	Anti
1984	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pro

This table records the position taken by the Labour leadership and Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet during periods in and out of office.

Table nine

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Anthony Barber

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Pro
1962	Pro
1963	Pro
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	-
1976	-
1977	-
1978	-
1979	-
1980	-
1981	-
1982	-
1983	-
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1951–1964 and 1965–1974

Table ten

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

John Biffen

1959	-
1960	-
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Pro
1968	Anti
1969	Anti
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Anti

Member of Parliament 1961-1997

Table eleven

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

John Biggs-Davison

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Anti
1968	Anti
1969	Anti
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1955-1988

Table twelve

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Edward du Cann

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Anti
1968	Anti
1969	Anti
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Anti

Member of Parliament 1956-1987

Table thirteen

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Hugh Fraser

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Anti
1968	Anti
1969	Anti
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1945-1984

Table fourteen

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Geoffrey Howe

1959	Pro
1960	Pro
1961	Pro
1962	Pro
1963	Pro
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1964–1966 and 1970-1992

Table fifteen

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Reginald Maudling

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Pro
1962	Pro
1963	Pro
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	-
1981	-
1982	-
1983	-
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1950 until his death in 1979

Table sixteen

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

John Nott

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Anti
1968	Anti
1969	Anti
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1966-1983

Table seventeen

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Enoch Powell

1959	Pro
1960	Pro
1961	Pro
1962	Pro
1963	Pro
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Anti
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Anti

Member of Parliament 1950-1987

Table eighteen

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Nicholas Ridley

1959	Pro
1960	Pro
1961	Pro
1962	Pro
1963	Pro
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1959-1993

Table nineteen

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Peter Tapsell

1959	Pro
1960	Pro
1961	Pro
1962	Pro
1963	Pro
1964	Pro
1965	-
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1959-1964 and 1966 to present.

Table twenty

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Margaret Thatcher

1959	Pro
1960	Pro
1961	Pro
1962	Pro
1963	Pro
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1959-1990

Table twenty-one

Conservative Trajectories 1959-1984

Peter Walker

1959	-
1960	-
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1961-1992

Table twenty-two

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Tony Benn

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966 Jan-Mar	Anti
1966 Apr-Dec	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Anti

Member of Parliament 1950-1983 and 1984-2000

Table twenty-three

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Tony Blair

1959	-
1960	-
1961	-
1962	-
1963	-
1964	-
1965	-
1966	-
1967	-
1968	-
1969	-
1970	-
1971	-
1972	-
1973	-
1974	-
1975	Pro
1976	-
1977	-
1978	-
1979	-
1980	-
1981	-
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1983-2007

Table twenty-four

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

James Callaghan

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1945-1987

Table twenty-five

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Anthony Crosland

1959	Pro
1960	Pro
1961	Pro
1962	Pro
1963	Pro
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	-
1979	-
1980	-
1981	-
1982	-
1983	-
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1950-1955 and 1959 until his death in 1977.

Table twenty-six

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Richard Crossman

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Pro
1975	-
1976	-
1977	-
1978	-
1979	-
1980	-
1981	-
1982	-
1983	-
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1945 until his death in 1974.

Table twenty-seven

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Patrick Gordon Walker

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	-
1976	-
1977	-
1978	-
1979	-
1980	-
1981	-
1982	-
1983	-
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1945-1964 and 1966-1974

Table twenty-eight

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Denis Healey

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Anti
1969	Anti
Jan to May 1970	Anti
Jun to Dec 1970	Pro
Jan to May 1971	Pro
June to Dec 1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1952-1992

Table twenty-nine

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Douglas Jay

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Anti
1968	Anti
1969	Anti
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1946-1983

Table thirty

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Gerald Kaufman

1959	-
1960	-
1961	-
1962	-
1963	-
1964	-
1965	-
1966	-
1967	-
1968	-
1969	-
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1970-present.

Table thirty-one

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Neil Kinnock

1959	-
1960	-
1961	-
1962	-
1963	-
1964	-
1965	-
1966	-
1967	-
1968	-
1969	-
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1970-1995

Table thirty-two

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Fred Peart

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	-
1978	-
1979	-
1980	-
1981	-
1982	-
1983	-
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1945-1976

Table thirty-three

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Reg Prentice

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Anti
1968	Anti
1969	Anti
1970	Anti
June 1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1957–1987 (Conservative MP from 1979)

Table thirty-four

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

John Prescott

1959	-
1960	-
1961	-
1962	-
1963	-
1964	-
1965	-
1966	-
1967	-
1968	-
1969	-
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1970-2010

Table thirty-five

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

John Silkin

1959	-
1960	-
1961	-
1962	-
1963	Pro
1964	Pro
1965	Pro
1966	Pro
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Anti

Member of Parliament 1963-1987

Table thirty-six

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

John Smith

1959	-
1960	-
1961	-
1962	-
1963	-
1964	-
1965	-
1966	-
1967	-
1968	-
1969	-
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
1972	Pro
1973	Pro
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	Pro

Member of Parliament 1970 until his death in 1994

Table thirty-seven

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Michael Stewart

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Pro
Jul 1971	Pro
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Pro
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	-
1981	-
1982	-
1983	-
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1945-1979

Table thirty-eight

Labour Trajectories 1959-1984

Eric Varley

1959	-
1960	-
1961	-
1962	-
1963	-
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Anti
1968	Anti
1969	Anti
1970	Anti
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Anti
1976	Anti
1977	Anti
1978	Anti
1979	Anti
1980	Anti
1981	Anti
1982	Anti
1983	Anti
1984	Anti

Member of Parliament 1964-1984

Table thirty-nine

Labour Trajectories 1959-1987

Harold Wilson

1959	Anti
1960	Anti
1961	Anti
1962	Anti
1963	Anti
1964	Anti
1965	Anti
1966	Anti
1967	Pro
1968	Pro
1969	Pro
1970	Pro
1971	Anti
1972	Anti
1973	Anti
1974	Anti
1975	Pro
1976	Pro
1977	Pro
1978	Pro
1979	Pro
1980	Pro
1981	Pro
1982	Pro
1983	Pro
1984	-

Member of Parliament 1945-1983

Conclusion

'In the House of Commons were two bodies of freedom-loving Britons, chosen in more than six hundred constituencies and subject to influences that ran back to an electorate that was numbered in the millions and divided by the complex interests and aspirations of an advanced modern society. Yet day after day with a Prussian discipline they trooped into the division lobbies at the signals of their Whips and in the service of the authoritative decisions of their parliamentary parties. We are so familiar with this fact that we are in danger of losing our sense of wonder over them' (Beer, 1969, p351).

The main purpose of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that the motives of individual members and specific groups within the British political elite on the question of Britain's membership of the Common Market were not based primarily on a consistent ideological position, but based rather on party political or personal advantage. In so doing, a number of issues which feature prominently throughout this thesis are explored. In respect of the question of sovereignty, this study examines the political elite's use of their own differing definitions of the concept for political advantage. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the British press played a significant part in the debate over Europe, and as such members of the political elite could not ignore its views when formulating their opinions on the issue. Similarly, it was essential to examine the role of the general public. Evidence suggests that particularly during periods where the governing elite is encountering domestic difficulties, or when highly fractured such as in the case of the Labour Party at the time leading up to the 1975 referendum, public opinion is often invoked. As Turner (2000) observes, 'the level of understanding of developments in Europe has been low and public perceptions have often been manipulated for party advantage' (Turner, 2000, p10). The rhetoric of sovereignty, the role of the press and the public are key factors which the political elite take into account in policy-making on Europe, and which therefore contribute to substantiating the overall argument of this thesis.

Analysis of the trajectories in chapter eight demonstrates that whilst there is a great deal of evidence to support the hypothesis, there is also evidence which shows that many of the political elite held a consistent and principled position on Europe throughout the period of this study. As a result, the hypothesis is only partially confirmed. Although the weight of evidence provides support for the hypothesis, there is nevertheless, also evidence to suggest that even in respect of those members of the political elite that did not waver in their position on Europe this was largely as a result of factors other than principle. It was

for example, the tribal nature of the Party during the period of this study that led some members of the Conservative elite to support the prevailing position of the leadership. Whilst it may therefore suggest from viewing the trajectories that certain Conservatives such as Thatcher and Howe held a consistent view - predominantly in *support* of membership, deeper analysis of the trajectories suggest that this was more a result of their support for party or career considerations than their taking a principled view on the issue.

In addition to providing evidence in respect of individual members of the political elite, the trajectories outline the various positions on Europe taken by the British press, and of public opinion throughout the period under review. The trajectory confirms that the majority of the British press during the period were overwhelmingly pro-Europe, with the position of the Economist, the Guardian, the Mail, the Mirror, and the Times unchanged throughout. The only newspaper included in the trajectory which took an anti-Common Market view was the Express, under the ownership of Lord Beaverbrook. The left-wing journals New Statesman and Tribune were also anti but changed their position in 1975 following the result of the referendum on continued membership of the Common Market.

The influence of the pro-entry press on the Macmillan government could be exaggerated during the period leading up to Britain's entry into the Common Market. Indeed, 'most pro-entry publications still took their cue from government as it began its ambivalent shift towards membership of the EEC in 1960' (Wilkes and Wring, 1998, p191). It would be erroneous however, to underestimate the influence the press had on the public, particularly during the 1975 referendum campaign. Certainly as far as the anti-Marketeers were concerned, the clear pro-Community bias of the press 'seemed to explain the shift of public opinion polls from opposition to membership in 1974, and to the widespread acquiescence signalled by the Yes vote in the referendum' (Hollingworth, 1986, p50).

The public were most heavily canvassed on the question of Britain and Europe during the years 1961 to 1975. Although public opinion was found to be generally divided throughout the period of this study, it is significant that the highest spikes for a pro Common Market view were all around the time the British government either applied for entry or sought the public's support in the referendum. Two possible conclusions can be drawn from this: First that the government was waiting for the optimum time when public opinion was most favourably inclined towards the Common Market before making its application. Second, that public opinion had changed to a pro Common Market position having been subjected

to manipulation and a propaganda campaign. In either case, this demonstrated that public opinion was a factor in the decisions taken by the political elite on the question of Europe.

A further consideration is that of the Conservative and Labour leaderships' position on Europe whether in or out of office. It is clear from the trajectory (table seven), that the Conservative leadership was pro Europe whether in or out of office. Labour's position however was conditioned by political expediency and concerns over the terms of membership. The trajectory (table eight) shows that Labour opposed Europe when out of office, and was in favour of membership when in power. The only exception to this position was the period 1964-1966 when Labour was in office yet opposed membership. It should be noted that following the general election defeat of 1983, Labour in 1984 under Kinnock's leadership abandoned its policy of withdrawal from the Common Market. This was the only time during the period under review that Labour had taken a pro Common Market position whilst out of office.

As the focus of this thesis is on politicians exercising or aspiring to win power in a party based democracy such as Britain, the activity therefore is inevitably focused on the two main political parties in Britain. Although both parties are analysed in the thesis, it was the Labour Party which ultimately confirmed Britain's membership through the referendum in 1975, and which receives more attention owing to the Party's greater internal dissention on the subject. It should be noted however, that the discussions on the two main parties are generalisations, and that allowance has been made for individual dissent and in particular, challenges to the leadership. Consideration has also been afforded to the temporal perspective given the significance of major changes relating not only to the Common Market itself such as enlargement and new treaties, but also in respect of changes to Britain's relationship with it, and the impact of domestic policies during the period under review. It is nevertheless, as discussed in chapter two, the power of the leaders, and the structure and character of the two major parties that have been largely instrumental in establishing their position on Europe.

The Conservative Party's strong links to business and its traditional commitment to Britain being a major player in foreign affairs were significant factors in its decision to favour Britain becoming a member of the Common Market. In addition, as discussed in chapter three, there was pressure from British industrialists, and the threat that American capital would find its way to mainland Europe if Britain did not join the Community.

Further, the hierarchal nature of the Conservative Party, and deference to the leadership ensured that policy would ultimately be determined by the leader. The tribal loyalty inherent in the Party during the period under review was also a significant factor in ensuring policy was at least *seen* to be supported by the Party as a whole. Indeed, despite strong opposition from some MPs, and from many grassroots Conservatives, it was the power held by the leader of the party which decided the Conservatives' position on Europe. As Ball (1998) states, 'Conservative Party policy is the policy of the Leader of the Party' (Ball, 1998, p98).

Therefore despite internal divisions on the issue, in 1960 the Macmillan government, following consultation with senior civil servants, fundamentally reappraised Britain's policy on Europe. Fearing economic damage and a diminishing influence in world affairs if Britain remained outside the Common Market, Macmillan concluded that Britain's interests would be better served, and her influence enhanced by membership (Broad, 2001). The terms demanded by the Conservative government however, meant the 1961 application would likely prove to be unsuccessful. In addition, President de Gaulle who was subsequently to veto the application was far from encouraged by Macmillan's cautious and half-hearted approach to entry.

Macmillan's approach however, should be understood in the context of a government that was encountering economic difficulties and a nation in a period of self-criticism by the political and wider elite. As considered in chapter three, the motivation behind Macmillan's application was complex. Ideology or a genuine desire for Britain to be a member of the Common Market played a lesser role in the bid than the urgent need to galvanise his party during a period when his popularity with the public was on the wane. As Bale (2012) notes, the application could 'electorally be sold as part of a modernisation package that would allow the Conservatives to counter accusations that they were running out of steam' (Bale, 2012, p79). Furthermore, Crossman (1963) viewed the application as a political gimmick. It was an attempt to not only extricate Macmillan from his domestic difficulties but also, if the negotiations were to prove successful, 'he could appeal to the country as the greatest statesman since Disraeli' (Crossman, 1963, p735).

As a committed European, Prime Minister Heath was determined that his legacy would be that of the man who took Britain into Europe. Although Heath was successful, much of the negotiations for entry had actually been undertaken by the previous Labour government led by Wilson, and it was fortunate for Heath that following the death of de Gaulle, he was now able to deal with the more sympathetic President Pompidou. Heath however, had

been faced with the far more difficult task of winning the parliamentary vote for British entry. The tribal loyalty of the Party at this time was such that despite needing the support of rebel Labour MPs, Heath did manage to obtain sufficient Conservative MPs to ensure that the motion was carried. European integration had however, caused Heath's backbenchers to be 'more rebellious than any since the war' (Ludlam, 1998, p34). This period of rebellion culminated with the dramatic resignation of Enoch Powell who had called on voters to elect a Labour government and thus secure a referendum on membership (Norton, 1978).

Although there were those from both Conservative and Labour that had a clear commitment to Britain's place in Europe and were prepared to act on principle, the long-term implications of the European project tended not to weigh heavily with Conservative MPs in particular who, as well as their endemic tribal loyalty were affected by short-term considerations. It was only during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher that the realities of European political integration dawned on many Conservatives. The Conservatives' position on Europe was therefore determined by a combination of factors. Under Macmillan, the Party reluctantly made a belated attempt at joining the Common Market largely as a result of pressure from British and US business, the US government, and the Foreign Office. Therefore, whilst there were some MPs committed to Europe, it was these influences rather than a value position which affected the Conservative Party generally on the issue.

Whereas Macmillan was hesitant towards Europe, the same could not be said about Heath who was fully committed to taking Britain into the Common Market. Despite the Conservative elite tending to follow the received wisdom of the Party which had become very much pro-Europe, it nevertheless also had its own internal conflicts. In spite of serious challenges however, the view of the leadership ultimately prevailed. Heath's victory in the crucial parliamentary vote in 1971 not only demonstrated the tribal loyalty inherent in the Conservative Party, but also brutally exposed the deep divisions within the Party on the issue of Europe. As discussed later in this chapter, the Conservative Party is still deeply divided over Europe, although latterly despite a significant number of backbench MPs calling for outright withdrawal, this division is now largely in respect of further integration rather than a debate on whether or not Britain should leave the European Union.

The trajectories which examine the Labour Party suggest that some members of the Labour elite took a more inconsistent position on Europe. The explanation for this is to

some extent as a result of the Party's organisational structure. Traditionally, and in contrast to the Conservative Party, Labour has been what might be called a 'bottom up' party due, in part to its extra-parliamentary origins (McLean, 1980). The nature of the Party's structure and the way the Party selected its MPs during the period under review meant that there was an inevitable tension, particularly on policy, between the more radical MPs many of whom sponsored by left-wing trades unions, and the social democratic leadership of the Party. As discussed in chapter six, there is evidence that both Wilson and Callaghan were concerned more with party management than a genuine commitment to Britain becoming and remaining a member of the Common Market. This is demonstrated by their shifting positions as illustrated in the trajectories.

Macmillan's application in 1961 was a key moment for the Labour Party as it now had to consider very seriously its own position on Europe. The decision by the Conservative Cabinet to apply for membership of the Common Market had huge implications for the Labour opposition. Labour's position gradually hardened against entry, culminating in Gaitskell's major speech in 1962 where he spoke passionately on the loss of a thousand years of history if Britain joined the Common Market. Gaitskell's speech however, hinted at the possibility of a referendum on Europe, and this indeed was later to be the means by which Wilson was to unify his party at least temporarily on Europe.

The Labour leadership throughout the period under review had been faced with a divided party over Europe, and as outlined in chapter five, it was the parliamentary debate in October 1971 where sixty-nine Labour MPs defied a three-line whip that fully exposed the divisions within the Party. Wilson demonstrated immense political skill in keeping both factions satisfied and sufficiently united to win four general elections. With pressure mounting from those on the left of the Party for a referendum however, Wilson acceded to their demands. This move on Wilson's part not only had the desired effect of satisfying the left, but also as a result of campaigning for a Yes vote, placated the anger of the right who had largely opposed the referendum.

As discussed in chapter seven, the outcome of the referendum was not to be the end of the matter as Europe was to cause further division and dash the hopes of the Labour leadership. Indeed, Wilson's announcement of the end of the issue proved to be premature. As Robins (1979) states: 'The Labour Party was forcibly marched down the road leading to Brussels; it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which members decide to follow one of the many roads out' (Robins, 1979, p131).

Following the general election defeat in 1979, the Party's leftward shift included a commitment for Britain to leave the Common Market, a move which led to the eventual formation of the SDP in March 1981. Following a further general election defeat to the Conservatives in 1983 however, and the subsequent change of leadership from Foot to Kinnock, the Party began a modernisation process, part of which was to accept Britain's place as a member of the Common Market. As one of the leading figures in the Labour Party throughout this period was later to remark; in order to be taken seriously by 'informed opinion', the Party needed to shift to a pro-Europe position.

The *leadership* of the Labour Party had largely been in support of Britain being a member of the Common Market, particularly when in government, and this is confirmed by evidence contained in the trajectories. When in opposition, the position of the leadership had been to oppose membership unless the terms were deemed by the Party to be in Britain's interest. There is evidence to support the view that leaders are at times, prepared to take a contradictory position on Europe. For example, as outlined in chapter five, in 1968 Wilson accepted an invitation from Jean Monnet for the Labour Party to join the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Although this did not necessarily establish Wilson's *personal* view on Europe, his response to Monnet presented the Conservatives with an opportunity to use this against him on a charge of hypocrisy in the event of him making a statement *opposing* Britain becoming a member of a federal Europe. However, despite possessing a copy of Wilson's reply to Monnet, the Conservatives did not use this evidence against him – perhaps wisely, given that their own leadership accepted a similar invitation. It is therefore unsurprising that both major parties were silent on the issue of Britain becoming a member of a federal Europe. Indeed, in Nicholas Ridley's (1991) judgement, 'the British people would reject any government that sought to cede control of the country to a federal Europe' (Ridley, 1991, p136).

Labour's debate on the question of Europe was one which was conducted against the backdrop of a divided party. In his response to Macmillan's bid for entry, Gaitskell's speech in 1962 was politically outstanding, not least because it served to encourage Labour's anti-Marketeers whilst at the same time not deviating from the official Party position which was to consider entry if the conditions were met. However, as discussed in chapter four, despite Gaitskell's *thousand years of his*tory speech sufficiently uniting the Party for electoral victory under Wilson's leadership in 1964, tensions over Europe remained.

The election of the Heath Government in 1970 proved to be particularly significant for Labour. During Heath's period in office, Britain had now become a member of the Common Market and disunity in the Labour Party over the issue of Europe had magnified. Therefore, primarily for the purpose of party management, Wilson offered the public a referendum on the issue in 1975. In the 1980s, it was the electoral dominance of the Thatcher Government rather than an ideological shift on the part of Labour's elite that led to the modernisation process, with the change in policy on Europe being a key factor in a pragmatic attempt to make the Party electable once again.

In very broad terms, the question of Europe has often been one of left versus right within both major parties, with the left of the Labour Party being anti-Europe and the left of the Conservative Party pro-Europe. This is confirmed to some extent by Heppell, Crines and Nicholls' (2010) survey of Labour MPs which shows that large groups of backbench MPs from the various wings of the Party subscribed to tendencies which adopted coherent political ideas. Labour MPs belonging to Tribune and Manifesto groups for example, took a similar position as their colleagues on issues such as the approach to disarmament and the Common Market (Heppell et al, 2010). As demonstrated throughout this study however, there have been various notable exceptions such as leading figures Peter Shore and Douglas Jay. Whilst being two of the most prominent Labour anti-Marketeers, both opposed unilateral disarmament, an issue which was supported by many of those Labour members who were also opposed to Britain's membership of Europe.

One of the most striking aspects to emerge from this study is how the concept of sovereignty has been utilised by members of the political elite in a way which serves their own purposes *at any particular time*. For example, former Conservative Foreign Secretary and pro-Marketeer Geoffrey Howe (1990) attempted to justify the pooling of sovereignty by arguing that sovereignty is not absolute but is an 'adaptable evolving organic notion' (Howe, 1990, p678). Howe viewed sovereignty not as a constraint, but as a resource to be utilised in the furtherance of what he considered to be in Britain's interests. The notion of a malleable sovereignty would, however allow people to use the concept in a way which suits their purposes at any particular time. It is perhaps not too surprising therefore that Howe, a leading British Conservative took this position on sovereignty given the view of Kaiser (1999) who claimed that posturing by governments on the issue is all about domestic considerations and that 'a large majority of the Conservative governing elite has never cared much for the concept' (Kaiser, 1999, p209).

The contrasting ways in which sovereignty has been used throughout the debate over Britain and Europe is of particular importance, and the various challenges to parliamentary sovereignty including globalisation and the increased dominance of the executive have been discussed in chapter two. Sovereignty as a term has allowed members of the political elite to take a position for or against entry at any particular period without undermining their claims to patriotism. Significantly, some of the leading actors in the debate changed their definition of sovereignty to correspond with their shifting position on Europe. For example Neil Kinnock was an absolutist on sovereignty when he was opposed to Europe, but when the Labour Party was undergoing its modernisation process following the heavy general election defeat in 1983, was quite prepared for Britain to cede power to Europe. Kinnock justified his shifting position by suggesting that sovereignty was only being *loaned* to Europe.

There is evidence to suggest that it was *elite*, as opposed to *public* opinion that was mainly considered by British governments. This was not the only opinion that mattered however. As demonstrated in the trajectory (table six), the impact of public opinion, and grassroots Labour Party sentiments affected the stance adopted by some individual Labour MPs. Public opinion mattered for the Labour Party leadership, more so than it did for the Conservatives who took a more consistent position on Europe. Whilst a further consideration for some individual Labour MPs identified in the trajectories was that of intra-party debates, their shifting positions were however, more a result of the influence of changing *elite* opinion. Furthermore, those politicians orientated to winning political power were driven by the dominant view of the British elite, with Conservative MPs consistently supporting the views of the wider elite. Not only does this explain the Conservatives' position on Europe, but also provides the answer to why most Labour MPs came round to the view that it was necessary to go along with the opinions of the wider elite.

Having consulted the opinion of various elite groups in the early 1960s, the Conservative government found all the groups, which included members of the press, industrialists, parliamentarians, and top civil servants all increasingly favoured Britain's entry into the Common Market. Peter Shore (1966) summed up the mind-set of the wider elite at this time when he claimed: 'by mid-1962 the whole political, intellectual, and moral force of Britain's Establishment was committed to the enterprise' (Shore, 1966, p22). Since membership of the Common Market was such a major decision affecting Britain's future it is significant, though not surprising, that on a complex issue of economic and foreign policy, public opinion was regarded as malleable by the political elite and therefore open to their forces of persuasion. This proved to be easier in Britain where there is a

comparatively compliant political culture. In the period from 1959-1984 as evidenced by Almond and Verba (1972) 'there even remained a deferential tendency and high levels of political trust' (Almond and Verba, 1972, p455). As such it was the role of elites, rather than the impact of public opinion which proved to be so decisive. Given that the elite was highly fractured - particularly between party elites, it was therefore possible to mobilise public opinion as part of inter-party elite game-playing.

The political elite, and in particular the inner core of those close to the party leadership was at times prepared to manipulate or ignore public opinion on the European issue. They were, however, always very much aware of public opinion. For example, Wilson took what appeared to be a calculated risk in holding a referendum, yet was well aware that at the time he called the referendum the odds were heavily stacked in his favour. Wilson was acutely aware of the public's views, and as such before deciding on the date of the referendum in 1975, felt confident that opinion could be swayed in favour of remaining in the Common Market. Furthermore, given his awareness of public opinion, it was unsurprising that Wilson chose April to announce the date of the referendum as 'it was not in fact until early March that clear indications emerged of a turn in the tide' (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p249). It was not however, by mere chance that public opinion turned towards the position taken by the government. Britain's membership now appeared to be a more attractive proposition to the public as a result of a propaganda campaign which exaggerated the benefits of the re-negotiated terms undertaken by Labour. Whilst this may be an example of public opinion being manipulated, Edward Heath was quite clearly prepared to ignore public opinion after his general election victory in 1970. Heath made his decision to take Britain into the Common Market in spite of the Conservative manifesto stating that on Europe, 'the government would negotiate, no more, no less' (Conservative Party Manifesto, 1970, p28).

The Common Market issue provides a good illustration of the complex relationship between elite and mass opinion. In this thesis elites are defined as a narrowly political entity. To understand the behaviour of the political elite on the Common Market it is necessary however, to recall the broader definition as defined in chapter two. Here the wider elite includes economic, social, political, and academic opinion. Significantly, political leaders are more likely to listen to the opinions of the informed elite than to the views of the general public, with widely held opinion usually used in a negative way to estimate broadly how far a government can go on any particular issue without alienating the electorate. In most cases, public opinion is used positively 'only when it originates from informed elites, some of them inevitably concerned to protect or further special

interests' (Shepherd, 1975, p7). The views of the general public can nevertheless influence elite decision making. In addition to the example of Wilson ensuring favourable public support prior to deciding on the date of the referendum, evidence from Conservative Central Office demonstrate the use of political persuasion and propaganda on the British public. With a view to advancing the interests of the Conservative Party, attempts were made therefore to convince the public of the case for Common Market membership. Public opinion therefore suddenly becomes important when elite cohesion breaks down. The 1975 referendum was such a case: the political elite appealed to the people with politicians often using the rhetoric of sovereignty, expressed in populist terms to further their arguments.

Whilst this thesis does not suggest the existence of a project led by business and the political elite to take Britain into the Common Market, there is however, evidence of a convergence of interests. Lindblom (1977) argued that British and US business exerted disproportionate influence over Britain's political elite and stated 'the requirements to meet the needs of business means that it achieves a privileged position in government' (Lindblom, 1977, p175). It is however the example of the 1975 Referendum that perhaps best illustrates business influence. Virtually all the large business groups, including the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) supported the case for Britain's continued membership. Indeed, many of the leading British and American companies contributed considerable sums to help finance a victory for the Yes campaign. Yet it is important to note that common political economic interests do not translate into a sustainable political elite consensus.

The pressure exerted by US business and government cannot be exaggerated. A major reason for Wilson to rethink his views on Europe and to press ultimately the case for entry was as a result of problems caused by the US in the 1960s (Pine, 2007). Furthermore, as early as Macmillan's attempt to join the Common Market, the application was depicted as 'symptomatic of a wider surrender to US foreign policy' (Dewey, 2009, p91). It was not only business and US interests however, that were to be hugely influential. The role of the civil service, particularly the Foreign Office should also not be underestimated. The Foreign Office, along with British industrialists and politicians increasingly found membership of the Community feasible, and took the view that Britain could play a leading role in Europe. This view was formed largely as a result of the booming economies of the six EEC countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s compared to Britain's underperforming economy.

The simple in/out debate concealed far more nuanced positions on Britain's membership that have since emerged. The term Euroscepticism is used today as a surrogate for those who were either highly sceptical or fully opposed to Common Market membership. In reality the debates which took place during the period covered in the thesis involved a spectrum of attitudes – from very pro to very anti. For some, the debate about the *terms* facilitated movement along the pro-anti spectrum. Because the issue covered by this thesis ultimately came down to one of for or against membership, there was a lack of quality in the debate about Britain's relationship with Europe. This gave rise to the subsequent myriad of positions about the precise nature of the relationship between Britain and Europe.

Throughout the period 1959 to 1975, there was scant evidence of events in the Common Market shaping the British debate. Since 1987 however, there have been substantial developments in Europe which, unlike the period under review, *have* shaped the debate. Jacques Delors' intervention for example, whilst advancing Labour's enthusiasm for Europe, had the opposite effect on the Conservatives whose support for Europe was subsequently diminished. European Commission President Delors' address to the TUC on 9 September 1988 was to have far reaching consequences for the political elites of both major parties. Delors outlined his vision for Europe and spoke to delegates about 'the opportunities available to them through the EC framework of improving the social and employment conditions of workers and their families' (Butt, 1992, p160).

The contrast between the Conservatives and the revised position of the majority of the Labour movement was now sharp. As a likely consequence of Delors' speech, Prime Minister Thatcher's Bruges speech on 20 September 1988 outlined what was in effect, a rejection of her government's previous approach to Europe. Thatcher's speech served to launch the phenomenon of Euroscepticism. As a result, Conservatives' sympathy for European membership was subsequently reduced, and attitudes significantly altered to the point where leader David Cameron in a speech to Party Conference in 2006 felt moved to deplore the penchant for his own MPs to 'bang on about' Europe (Parker, Financial Times, 13 May 2013).

Events which followed the period under review, such as the Maastricht Treaty, the determination of John Major's Government to exclude Britain from the Social Chapter, and the Lisbon Treaty have served to galvanise both Euroscepticism and the advocacy of withdrawal, and subsequently led to the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The substantial influx of Eastern Europeans, particularly Polish immigration in

2004, and the negative response by the tabloid press has also served to reduce the support of the British public to the European cause (Page, 2009).

As discussed in earlier chapters, evidence suggests there was an elite consensus in favour of Britain's membership of the Common Market. In respect of the British press for example, the trajectory in chapter eight (table five) illustrates that the overwhelming majority of publications were in support throughout the period of study. This earlier position contrasts with the printed media today where there is now a divergence of opinion on Europe. The popular tabloids, along with The Times and the Telegraph have various degrees of Euroscepticism, whereas the Guardian and the Independent are committed to the European project. It is worth noting however that despite some publications being highly critical of the EU, all the mainstream newspapers with the exception of the Express newspapers remain opposed to Britain's actual withdrawal from Europe.

While the more nuanced debate currently taking place over Britain's relationship with Europe and the impact of the changing agenda within the EU contrasts with the 1959-1984 period, there are however, areas of similarity between the two periods. It has been demonstrated in the thesis that attitudes to Europe were shaped by domestic considerations, particularly around the area of whether socialism would be advanced by Common Market membership. Similarly in recent years, the stance by politicians and political parties on Europe is influenced by support for, or opposition to a neo-liberal market economy. For particularly right-wing Conservatives, as discussed in earlier chapters, membership of Europe was a bastion against socialism in Britain. The current position for Eurosceptic Conservatives is that Europe is a barrier to the free-market, whilst for Labour and for some Conservatives, Europe is viewed as a safeguard against the excesses of neo-liberalism. Whilst Labour has for the moment a settled position on EU membership, the diametrically opposed positions between pro-European Conservatives, and Eurosceptics opposed to further integration or even complete withdrawal has created bitter divisions within the Conservative Party. Furthermore, if the Conservative Eurosceptics who may ultimately vote to remain in the EU are excluded, the pro-Europeans become a minority in the Party**.**

The difficulties and divisions encountered by the current Conservative Party are further compounded by diminishing tribal loyalty. When referring to Conservative divisions over the Maastricht Treaty, Riddell (1992) notes: 'What binds the Tory party together is an almost tribal sense of loyalty – not necessarily to the leader, as the events of November 1990 showed, but to its own survival' (Riddell, 1992, p 423). Although the main division

within the Major Cabinet, and on the backbenches was over Europe, several senior ministers hostile to further European integration, including Michael Portillo, Peter Lilley and Michael Howard nevertheless *publicly* supported Prime Minister Major and Douglas Hurd's negotiations at the Maastricht summit (Riddell, 1992). More recently, on 15 May 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron 'faced the largest revolt on Europe from his own MPs this parliament with 114 Conservative backbenchers supporting a rebel amendment on the Queen's Speech' (Settle, 16 May 2013). Whilst it cannot be said with any certainty that Europe is the cause or simply a symptom of the diminishing tribal loyalty of the Conservative Party, the issue has however, been the cause of the largest revolts by backbenchers against Conservative governments since the 1980s.

A further similarity between the period under review and the current situation is that parties and politicians continue to adopt stances on Europe for short-term political gain. In 2014 for example, Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats and deputy Prime Minister of the Coalition Government, challenged Nigel Farage, leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) to take part in two live televised debates on the question of whether Britain is better off in or out of the European Union. Clegg has consistently held a pro-Europe view, but particularly needed to appeal to his core vote. As the BBC political reporter Brian Wheeler notes: 'Clegg fears his party may be wiped out in May's European elections. That is why, pundits say, he had nothing to lose by throwing down the gauntlet to the UKIP man' (Wheeler, 26 March, 2014).

It may well be that the Eurosceptic majority in the current Conservative Party are now genuinely driven by conviction over Europe, and confuse their own preference over those of the British people for whom Europe is not a salient[28] issue. For the Labour and Liberal Democrats' parties however, there is a calculated playing down of European enthusiasm as they judge such a stance to be electorally disadvantageous. Their caution over Europe is concealed by their current emphasis upon the vague concept of a 'reformed' European Union. An equally obvious similarity between the period of study and today's debate is that Europe as an issue enthuses members of the elite rather than the electorate as a whole.

In 2014 there is a full spectrum of attitudes on Britain's membership of the European Union. These include immediate withdrawal, later withdrawal, and tepid support for

[28] Data supplied by Ipsos-MORI for the Economist shows that in June 2012, of the issues considered most important facing Britain, respondents placed Europe/EU in ninth position on 8 per cent (Economist/Ipsos-MORI, 20 June 2012).

membership if powers can be repatriated, through to support for the status quo or exceptionally the position that dare not speak its name: Euro-federalism. While this dilemma exists in other European countries, the British problem is intensified by the inadequate debate between 1959 and 1984. In his Labour Party Conference speech in 1962 for example, Gaitskell complained about the poor quality of the Common Market debate (Catterall, 2003). Furthermore, 'in certain important respects, the bid for European entry launched by his successor did little to improve it' (Catterall, 2003, p250). As Forster (2002) argues, during the 1975 referendum, 'a full and open debate was certainly not assisted by the determination of Britain in Europe (BIE) to avoid arguments about the political and federal nature of the EC' (Forster, 2002, p54). The long-term significance of the 1975 referendum is that it set a precedent for the Conservative Party to commit to a further referendum in 2017 on Britain's future in Europe (BBC News, 28 April 2014). The motivation is identical to that of Harold Wilson: to resolve intra-party conflicts.

On what was patently the most significant decision to affect Britain's future in the post-war period, the Conservative, Liberal and some Labour members of the political elite in the 1960s considered Britain's position against the influential backdrop of American pressure and a broad elite consensus. As a result there was a dearth of effective scrutiny, a sense of inexorability and little focus on likely longer-term trends within the European project. Operating in this context, certain members of the political elite were motivated by non-ideological and short-term considerations rather than a thorough analysis of the issue. Given that the issue was for many a device employed for short-term political gain, Britain can be said to have drifted, rather than decided to enter the Common Market. It is paradoxical, given the longevity of the debate that the judgement of some MPs was confined to short-term political considerations. To paraphrase Lord Acton, it was almost as if Britain's entry into the Common Market occurred in a fit of absent mindedness, and could therefore explain why Europe remains such a toxic issue.

Appendix 1: Labour Parliamentary Private Secretaries sacked by Wilson - May 1967

Labour Parliamentary Private Secretaries sacked by Wilson for abstaining in the House of Commons vote on 10 May 1967 on the government's recommendation for Britain to join the Common Market.

Eadie, Alexander (Midlothian) PPS to Margaret Herbison
English, Michael (Nottingham West) PPS to Douglas Jay
Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston) PPS to Roy Mason
Kerr, David (Wandsworth Central) PPS to Judith Hart
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe) PPS to Fred Peart
Pavitt, Laurence (Willesden West) PPS to Michael Stewart
Watkins, Tudor (Brecon and Radnor) PPS to Cledwyn Hughes

(Daily Mail, 12 May 1967).

Appendix 2: The 33 Labour rebels - May 1967

The 33 Labour rebels who voted in the House of Commons on 10 May 1967 against the Labour government's recommendation for Britain to join the Common Market.

Allaun, Frank (Salford East)
Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Baxter, William (West Stirling)
Booth, Albert (Barrow)
Davies, S.O. (Merthyr Tydfil)
Dickens, James (Lewisham West)
Driberg, Tom (Barking)
Dunwoody, Gwyneth (Exeter)
Hobden, Dennis (Brighton Kemptown)
Hooley, Frank (Sheffield Heeley)
Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire South)
Jackson, Peter (High Peak)
Jeger, Lena (Holborn and St. Pancras South)
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Kenyon, Clifford (Chorley)
Kerr, Anne (Rochester and Chatham)
Kerr, Russell (Feltham)
Lee, John (Reading)
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham North)
Macmillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Manuel, Archie (Ayrshire Central)
Mendelson, John (Penistone)
Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Molloy, William (Ealing North)
Neal, Harold (Bolsover)
Norwood, Christopher (Norwich South)
Orme, Stan (Salford West)
Perry, George (Nottingham South)
Shinwell, Emanuel (Easington)
Silverman, Julius (Aston)
Swain, Tom (Derbyshire North-East)
Varley, Eric (Chesterfield)
Yates, Victor (Ladywood)

(Daily Mail, 11 May 1967).

Appendix 3: The Full Terms

(Main points at a glance as outlined by the Financial Times, 24 June 1971)

Sterling balances: An "orderly and gradual run down" but no timetable set.

Community budget: U.K. contribution will start at 8.64 per cent of budget, rising to 18.92 per cent in fifth and last year of the transitional period. The budget now runs at about $3,000m a year.

New Zealand: Butter exports will be phased down to 80 per cent of present quantities in the fifth year, cheese exports will be phased down to 20 per cent of present levels, both together being equal to 71 per cent of present dairy exports. During third year, the future of butter exports beyond the five years will be reviewed.

Fisheries: The Community policy is to be reconsidered next month (July 1971) at a meeting between the Six and the four applicants.

Commonwealth sugar: The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement continues until 1974, after which the Communities will 'have at heart' the interests of developing Commonwealth producers. No quantitative guarantees, but U.K. – Commonwealth interpretation ("secure and continuing access") read into Community record.

Other Commonwealth: Developing countries and dependent territories will be offered association or trade agreements for India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Most Hong Kong products will benefit from generalised preferences.

Industrial tariffs: Between U.K. and Community eliminated by 1 July 1977. By then full common external tariff in force. Duty-free quotas or reduced Community tariffs for twelve industrial raw materials and tea.

Agriculture: Five-year transition, with gradual alignment on Community prices by end-1977. Tariffs on horticultural products also eliminated then.

Coal and steel: No transition period, except for tariff alignment.

Institutions: U.K. will have same representation and voting weight as France, Germany and Italy, with ten votes in the Council and two seats on the Commission.

*Labour and capital: Provisions for the free movement of labour and capital, essential elements of the Rome Treaty, have not been completely finalised in the negotiations. Britain has said it can in general accept the free movement of Labour immediately after entry.

*This item not included in the Financial Times 'main points at a glance'.

(Reginald Dale, Common Market Correspondent, Financial Times, 24 June 1971).

Appendix 4: The 69 Labour rebels - October 1971

The 69 Labour MPs who voted with the Conservative government in the Common Market Debate in the House of Commons on 28 October 1971

Abse, Leo
Albu, Austen
Archer, Peter
Barnes, Michael
Barnett, Joel
Blenkinsop, Arthur
Bradley, Tom
Buchanan, Richard
Corbet, Freda
Crawshaw, Richard
Cronin, John
Dalyell, Tam
Davies, Ifor
de Freitas, Geoffrey
Dell, Edmund
Douglas, Dick
Dunnett, Jack
Edelman, Maurice
Edwards, William
Ellis, Tom
Faulds, Andrew
Foley, Maurice
Ford, Ben
Ginsburg, David
Gordon Walker, Patrick
Gunter, R.J.
Hannan, William
Hattersley, Roy
Houghton, Douglas
Howell, Denis
Jenkins, Roy
Johnson, Carol
Lawson, George
Leonard, Dick
Lever, Harold
Lomas, Kenneth
Lyon, Alexander
Lyons, Edward
Mabon, Dickson
Mackie, John
Mackintosh, John
Maclennan, Robert
Mallalieu, E.L.
Marquand, David
Mason, Roy
Mayhew, Christopher
Noble, Michael
Oram, Bert
Owen, David
Palmer, Arthur
Pannell, Charles

Price, William
Rankin, John
Richard, Ivor
Rodgers, William
Roper, John
Rose, Paul
Sandelson, Neville
Sheldon, Robert
Silkin, Sam
Smith, John
Stewart, Michael
Strauss, G.R.
Taverne, Dick
Tomney, Frank
Wells, William
Whitehead, Phillip
Willey, Frederick
Williams, Shirley

(Hansard, 28 October 1971)
(Dod's Parliamentary Companion, 1972)

Appendix 5: House of Commons three-day debate - April 1975

House of Commons three-day debate 7-9 April 1975 on the Labour government's recommendation to continue Britain's membership of the EEC.

Ayes:

Abse, Leo (Lab)
Adley, Robert (Con)
Aitken, Jonathan (Con)
Amery, Julian (Con)
Anderson, Donald (Lib)
Armstrong, Ernest (Lab)
Arnold, Tom (Con)
Ashley, Jack (Lab)
Atkins, H (Con)
Awdry, Daniel (Con)
Bagier, Gordon (Lab)
Baker, Kenneth (Con)
Banks, Robert (Con)
Barnett, Joel (Lab)
Beith, A.J. (Lib)
Bennett, Dr Reginald (Con)
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Con)
Benyon, W (Con)
Berry, Anthony (Con)
Biggs-Davison, John (Con)
Bishop, E.S (Con)
Blaker, Peter (Con)
Blenkinsop, Arthur (Lab)
Boardman, H. (Lab)
Boscawen, Robert (Con)
Bottomley, Arthur (Lab)
Bowden, A. (Con)
Boyden, James (Lab)
Boyson, Dr Rhodes (Con)
Bradley, Tom (Lab)
Bray, Dr Jeremy (Lab)
Brittan, Leon (Con)
Brotherton, Michael (Con)
Broughton, Sir Alfred (Lab)
Brown, Hugh D (Lab)
Brown, Robert C (Lab)
Brown, Ronald (Lab)
Brown, Sir Edward (Con)
Bryan, Sir Paul (Con)
Buchanan, Richard (Lab)
Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Con)
Buck, Antony (Con)
Budgen, Nick (Con)
Bulmer, Esmond (Con)
Burden, F.A. (Con)
Butler, Adam (Con)
Callaghan, James (Lab Cardiff SE)
Cant, R.B. (Lab)
Carlisle, Mark (Con)

Carr, Robert (Con)
Carter, Ray (Lab)
Cartwright, John (Lab)
Chalker, Lynda (Con)
Channon, Paul (Con)
Churchill, W.S. (Con)
Clark, William (Con)
Clarke, Kenneth (Con)
Clegg, Walter (Con)
Cockcroft, John (Con)
Cohen, Stanley (Lab)
Coleman, Donald (Lab)
Cooke, Robert (Con)
Cope, John (Con)
Cordle, John H (Con)
Cormack, Patrick (Con)
Corrie, John (Con)
Costain, A.P. (Con)
Craigen, J.M. (Lab)
Crawshaw, Richard (Lab)
Critchley, Julian (Con)
Cronin, John (Lab)
Crosland, Anthony (Lab)
Crouch, David (Con)
Crowder, F.P. (Con)
Cunningham, Dr J (Lab)
Davies, Ifor (Lab)
Davies, J. (Con)
de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey (Lab)
Dean, Paul (Con)
Delargy, Hugh (Lab)
Dell, Edmund (Lab)
Dodsworth, Geoffrey (Con)
Doig, Peter (Lab)
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James (Con)
Drayson, Burnaby (Con)
Duffy, A.E.P. (Lab)
Dunn, James A. (Lab)
Dunnett, Jack (Lab)
Durant, Tony (Con)
Dykes, Hugh (Con)
Edelman, Maurice (Lab)
Eden, Sir John (Con)
Edwards, Nicholas (Con)
Elliott, Sir William (Con)
Ellis, Tom (Lab)
Emery, Peter (Con)
Ennals, David (Lab)
Eyre, Reginald (Con)
Fairbairn, Nicholas (Con)
Fairgrieve, Russell (Con)
Fell, Anthony (Con)
Finsberg, Geoffrey (Con)
Fisher, Sir Nigel (Con)
Fitch, Alan (Lab)
Fletcher, Alex (Con)

Fletcher-Cooke, Charles (Con)
Ford, Ben (Lab)
Fowler, Gerald (Lab)
Fowler, Norman (Con)
Fox, Marcus (Con)
Fraser, H. (Con)
Freud, Clement (Lib)
Fry, Peter (Con)
Galbraith, T.G.D. (U)
Gardner, Edward (Con)
Garrett, John (Lab)
Gilmour, Ian (Con)
Gilmour, Sir John (Con)
Ginsburg, David (Lab)
Glyn, Dr Alan (Con)
Godber, Joseph (Con)
Golding, John (Lab)
Goodhart, Philip (Con)
Goodhew, Victor (Con)
Goodlad, Alastair (Con)
Gorst, John (Con)
Gow, Ian (Con)
Gower, Sir Raymond (Con)
Graham, Ted (Lab)
Grant, Anthony (Con)
Grant, George (Lab)
Grant, John (Lab)
Gray, Hamish (Con)
Grieve, Percy (Con)
Grimond, J. (Lib)
Grist, Ian (Con)
Grylls, Michael (Con)
Hall, Sir John (Con)
Hall-Davis, A.G.F. (Con)
Hamilton, Michael (Con)
Hamilton, W.W. (Lab)
Hampson, Dr Keith (Con)
Hannam, John (Con)
Harrison, Col Sir Harwood (Con)
Harvie Anderson M.B. (Con)
Hastings, Stephen (Con)
Hattersley, Roy (Lab)
Havers, Sir Michael (Con)
Hayhoe, Barney (Con)
Hayman, Helene (Lab)
Healey, Denis (Lab)
Heath, Edward (Con)
Heseltine, Michael (Con)
Hicks, Robert (Con)
Higgins, Terence L. (Con)
Holland, Philip (Con)
Hooson, Emlyn (Lib)
Horam, John (Lab)
Hordern, Peter (Con)
Howe, Sir Geoffrey (Con)
Howell, David (Con)

Howell, Denis (Lab)
Howell, Ralph (Con)
Howells, Geraint (Lib)
Hughes, C. (Lab)
Hurd, Douglas (Con)
Irvine, Bryant Ciodman (Con)
Irving, Charles (Con)
Irving, S. (Lab)
Jackson, Colin (Lab)
James, David (Con)
Janner, Greville (Lab)
Jenkin, P. (Con)
Jenkins, Roy (Lab)
Johnson Smith, G (Con)
Johnson, James (Lab)
Johnson, Walter (Lab)
Johnston, Russell (Lib)
Jones, Arthur (Con)
Jones, Barry (Lab)
Jones, Dan (Lab)
Jopling, Michael (Con)
Joseph, Sir Keith (Con)
Kalberry, Sir Donald (Con)
Kellett-Bowman, Elaine (Con)
Kershaw, Anthony (Con)
Kimball, Marcus (Con)
King, Evelyn (Con)
King, Tom (Con)
Kirk, Peter (Con)
Kitson, Sir Timothy (Con)
Knight, Jill (Con)
Knox, David (Con)
Lamborn, Harry (Lab)
Lamont, Norman (Con)
Lane, David (Con)
Langford-Holt, Sir John (Con)
Latham, Michael (Con)
Lawrence, Ivan (Con)
Lawson, Nigel (Con)
Le Marchant, Spencer (Con)
Lester, Jim (Con)
Lever, Harold (Lab)
Lewis, Kenneth (Con)
Lloyd, Ian (Con)
Lomas, Kenneth (Lab)
Loveridge, John (Con)
Luard, Evan (Lab)
Luce, Richard (Con)
Lyon, Alexander (Lab)
Lyons, Edward (Lab)
Mabon, Dr J. Dickson (Lab)
Macfarlane, Neil (Con)
MacFarquhar, Roderick (Lab)
MacGregor, John (Con)
Mackenzie, Gregor (Lab)
Mackintosh, John P. (Lab)

Maclennan, Robert (Lab)
Macmillan, M. (Con)
Madel, David (Con)
Magee, Bryan (Lab)
Mahon, Simon (Lab)
Mallalieu, J.P.W. (Lab)
Marks, Kenneth (Lab)
Marquand, David (Lab)
Mason, Roy (Lab)
Mates, Michael (Con)
Mather, Carol (Con)
Maude, Angus (Con)
Maudling, Reginald (Con)
Mawby, Ray (Con)
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin (Con)
Mayhew, Patrick (Con)
McCrindle, Robert (Con)
McGuire, Michael (Lab)
McNair-Wilson, M. (Con)
McNair-Wilson, P (Con)
Mellish, Robert (Lab)
Meyer, Sir Anthony (Con)
Millan, Bruce (Lab)
Miller, Hilary (Con)
Mills, Peter (Con)
Miscampbell, Norman (Con)
Mitchell, David (Con)
Monro, Hector (Con)
Montgomery, Fergus (Con)
Moonman, Eric (Lab)
Moore, John (Con)
Morgan-Giles, Rear-Admiral Charles (Con)
Morris, J. (Lab)
Morris, Michael (Con)
Morrison, Charles (Con)
Morrison, Peter (Con)
Neave, Airey (Con)
Nelson, Anthony (Con)
Neubert, Michael (Con)
Newton, Tony (Con)
Normanton, Tom (Con)
Nott, John (Con)
Oakes, Gordon (Lab)
Ogden, Eric (Lab)
Onslow, Cranley (Con)
Oppenheim, Sally (Con)
Osborn, John (Con)
Owen, Dr David (Lab)
Padley, Walter (Lab)
Page, John (Con)
Page, R. Graham (Con)
Palmer, Arthur (Con)
Pardoe, John (Lib)
Parker, John (Lab)
Parkinson, Cecil (Con)
Pattie, Geoffrey (Con)

Peart, Fred (Lab)
Penhaligon, David (Lib)
Percival, Ian (Con)
Perry, Ernest (Lab)
Peyton, John (Con)
Phipps, Dr Colin (Lab)
Pink, R. Bonner (Con)
Prentice, Reg (Lab)
Price, David (Con)
Price, William (Lab)
Prior, James (Con)
Pym, Francis (Con)
Radice, Giles (Lab)
Raison, Timothy (Con)
Rathbone, Tim (Con)
Rawlinson, Sir Peter (Con)
Rees, Merlyn (Lab)
Rees, Peter (Con)
Rees-Davies, W.R. (Con)
Renton, Sir D. (Con)
Renton, Tim (Con)
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon (Con)
Ridsdale, Julian (Con)
Rifkind, Malcolm (Con)
Rippon, Geoffrey (Con)
Roberts, Albert (Lab)
Roberts, Michael (Con)
Rodgers, Sir John (Con)
Roper, John (Lab)
Rose, Paul B. (Lab)
Rose, Stephen (Lib)
Rossi, Hugh (Con)
Rost, Peter (Con)
Rowlands, Ted (Lab)
Royle, Sir Anthony (Con)
Sandelson, Neville (Lab)
Scott, Nicholas (Con)
Scott-Hopkins, James (Con)
Shaw, Giles (Con)
Shaw, Michael (Con)
Sheldon, Robert (Lab)
Shelton, William (Con)
Shepherd, Colin (Con)
Shersby, Michael (Con)
Short, E. (Lab)
Silkin, S.C. (Lab)
Silvester, Fred (Con)
Sims, Roger (Con)
Sinclair, Sir George (Con)
Skeet, T.H.H. (Con)
Small, William (Lab)
Smith, Dudley (Con)
Smith, John (Lab)
Speed, Keith (Con)
Spicer, Jim (Con)
Spicer, Michael (Con)

Sproat, Iain (Con)
St. John-Stevas, Norman (Con)
Stainton, Keith (Con)
Stanbrook, Ivor (Con)
Stanley, John (Con)
Steel, David (Lib)
Steen, Anthony (Con)
Stewart, Ian (Con)
Stewart, M. (Lab)
Stokes, John (Con)
Strang, Gavin (Lab)
Strauss, G.R. (Lab)
Summerskill, Dr Shirley (Lab)
Tapsell, Peter (Con)
Taylor, R. (Con)
Tebbit, Norman (Con)
Temple-Morris, Peter (Con)
Thatcher, Margaret (Con)
Thomas, Jeffrey (Con)
Thomas, John Stradling (Con)
Thomas, Mike (Lab)
Thomas, P. (Con)
Thorpe, Jeremy (Lib)
Tinn, James (Lab)
Tomlinson, John (Lab)
Tomney, Frank (Lab)
Tugendhat, Christopher (Con)
Van Straubenzee, W.R. (Con)
Vaughan, Dr Gerard (Con)
Viggers, Peter (Con)
Wainwright, Edwin (Lab)
Wakeham, John (Con)
Walden, Brian (Lab)
Walder, David (Con)
Walker, P. (Con)
Walker-Smith, Sir Derek (Con)
Wall, Patrick (Con)
Walters, Dennis (Con)
Ward, Michael (Lab)
Watkins, David (Lab)
Weatherill, Bernard (Con)
Wellbeloved, James (Lab)
Wells, John (Con)
White, Frank R. (Lab)
White, James (Lab)
Whitehead, Phillip (Lab)
Whitelaw, William (Con)
Whitlock, William (Lab)
Wiggin, Jerry (Con)
Willey, Frederick (Lab)
Williams, Alan (Lab)
Williams, Alan Lee (Lab)
Williams, Shirley (Lab)
Wilson, Harold (Lab)
Winterton, Nicholas (Con)
Wood, Richard (Con)

Wrigglesworth, Ian (Lab)
Young, Sir G. (Con)
Younger, George (Con)

Noes

Ashton, Joe (Lab)
Atkins, Ronald (Lab)
Atkinson, Norman (Lab)
Bain, Margaret (SNP)
Barnett, Guy (Lab)
Bates, Alf (Lab)
Bell, Ronald (Con)
Benn, Anthony Wedgwood (Lab)
Bennett, Andrew (Lab)
Bidwell, Sydney (Lab)
Biffen, John (Con)
Body, Richard (Con)
Booth, Albert (Lab)
Buchan, Norman (Lab)
Butler, Joyce (Lab)
Callaghan, Jim (Lab) (Middleton & Prestwich)
Campbell, Ian (Lab)
Carmichael, Neil (Lab)
Carson, John (UUUC)
Carter-Jones, Lewis (Lab)
Castle, Barbara (Lab)
Clark, Alan (Con)
Clemitson, Ivor (Lab)
Cocks, Michael (Lab)
Colquhoun, Maureen (Lab)
Cook, Robin (Lab)
Corbett, Robin (Lab)
Cox, Thomas (Lab)
Crawford, Douglas (Scot Nat)
Cryer, Bob (Lab)
Cunningham, G. (Lab)
Davies, Bryan (Lab)
Davies, Denzil (Lab)
Davis, Clinton (Lab)
Dean, Joseph (Lab)
Dempsey, James (Lab)
Douglas-Mann, Bruce (Lab)
Dunlop, John (UUUC)
Dunwoody, Gwyneth (Lab)
Eadie, Alex (Lab)
Edge, Geoff (Lab)
Ellis, John (Lab)
English, Michael (Lab)
Evans, Fred (Lab)
Evans, Gwynfor (PC)
Evans, Ioan (Lab)
Evans, John (Lab)
Ewing, Harry (Lab)
Ewing, Winifred (Scot Nat)
Fernyhough, E. (Lab)

Flannery, Martin (Lab)
Fletcher, Ted (Lab)
Foot, Michael (Lab)
Forrester, John (Lab)
Fraser, John (Lab)
Freeson, Reginald (Lab)
Garrett, W.E. (Lab)
George, Bruce (Lab)
Gilbert, Dr John (Lab)
Gould, Bryan (Lab)
Gourlay, Harry (Lab)
Halton, Frank (Lab)
Hamilton, James (Lab)
Hardy, Peter (Lab)
Harrison, Walter (Lab)
Hart, Judith (Lab)
Heffer, Eric (Lab)
Henderson, Douglas (Scot Nat)
Hooley, Frank (Lab)
Hoyle, Doug (Lab)
Huckfield, Les (Lab)
Hughes, Mark (Lab)
Hughes, Robert (Lab)
Hughes, Roy (Lab)
Hunter, Adam (Lab)
Hutchison, Michael Clark (U)
Irvine, Sir A. (Lab)
Jackson, Margaret (Lab)
Jay, Douglas (Lab)
Jenkins, Hugh (Lab)
John, Brynmor (Lab)
Jones, Alec (Lab)
Judd, Frank (Lab)
Kaufman, Gerald (Lab)
Kelley, Richard (Lab)
Kerr, Russell (Lab)
Kilroy-Silk, Robert (Lab)
Lambie, David (Lab)
Lamond, James (Lab)
Latham, Arthur (Lab)
Leadbitter, Ted (Lab)
Lestor, Joan (Lab)
Lewis, Arthur (Lab)
Lewis, Ron (Lab)
Lipton, Marcus (Lab)
Litterick, Tom (Lab)
Loyden, Eddie (Lab)
MacCormick, Iain (Scot Nat)
Madden, Max (Lab)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Lab)
Marten, Neil (Con)
Maynard, Joan (Lab)
McCusker, H. (UU)
McElhone, Frank (Lab)
McMillan, Tom (Lab)
McNamara, Kevin (Lab)

Meacher, Michael (Lab)
Mikardo, Ian (Lab)
Miller, Dr M.S. (Lab)
Miller, Millie (Lab)
Molloy, William (Lab)
Molyneaux, James (UUUC)
Newens, Stanley (Lab)
Noble, Mike (Lab)
O'Halloran, Michael (Lab)
O'Malley, Brian (Lab)
Orbach, Maurice (Lab)
Orme, Stanley (Lab)
Ovenden, John (Lab)
Pavitt, Laurie (Lab)
Pendry, Tom (Lab)
Powell, Enoch (Con)
Prescott, John (Lab)
Price, C. (Lab)
Reid, George (Scot Nat)
Richardson, Jo (Lab)
Roberts, Gwilym (Lab)
Robertson, John (Lab)
Roderick, Caerwyn (Lab)
Rodgers, George (Lab)
Rooker, J.W. (Lab)
Ross, W. (Lab)
Ross, William (UUUC)
Ryman, John (Lab)
Sedgemore, Brian (Lab)
Selby, Harry (Lab)
Shaw, Arnold (Lab)
Shore, Peter (Lab)
Short, Renee (Lab)
Silkin, John (Lab)
Silverman, Julius (Lab)
Skinner, Dennis (Lab)
Snape, Peter (Lab)
Spriggs, Leslie (Lab)
Stallard, A.W. (Lab)
Stewart, Donald (Scot Nat)
Stoddart, David (Lab)
Stott, Roger (Lab)
Swain, Thomas (Lab)
Taylor, Teddy (Con)
Thomas, Dafydd (PC)
Thomas, Ron (Lab)
Thompson, George (Scot Nat)
Thorne, Stan (Lab)
Tierney, Sydney (Lab)
Torney, Tom (Lab)
Urwin, T.W. (Lab)
Varley, Eric (Lab)
Walker, Harold (Lab)
Watkinson, John (Lab)
Watt, Hamish (Scot Nat)
Weetch, Ken (Lab)

Weitzman, David (Lab)
Welsh, Andrew (Scot Nat)
Wilson, Alexander (Lab)
Wilson, Gordon (Scot Nat)
Wilson, William (Lab)
Wise, Audrey (Lab)
Woof, Robert (Lab)

Ayes 396, Noes 170

(Hansard, 9 April 1975)

Appendix 6: Policy-based ideological alignments within the PLP 1976

Ideological Policy Divides

Name	*Economic Policy*	*Defence Policy*	*European Policy*
Code:	Expansionist = a Agnostic = b Consolidator = c	Unilateralist = x Agnostic = y Multi-lateralist = z	Anti-Common Market = 1 Agnostic = 2 Pro-Common Market = 3
Abse, Leo	a	x	3
Allaun, Frank	a	x	1
Anderson, Donald	c	z	3
Archer, Peter	c	y	3
Armstrong, Ernest	c	z	3
Ashley, Jack	c	z	3
Ashton, Joseph	a	x	1
Atkins, Ronald H	a	x	1
Atkinson, Norman	a	x	1
Bagier, Gordon A T	a	y	3
Barnett, Guy	a	x	1
Barnett, Joel	c	z	3
Bates, Alfred	c	y	1
Bean, Robert	a	x	1
Benn, Tony W	a	x	1
Bennett, Andrew F	a	x	1
Bidwell, Sydney J	a	x	1
Bishop, Edward S.	a	y	3
Blenkinsop, Arthur	a	x	1
Boardman, Harold	a	x	1
Booth, Albert	a	x	1
Boothroyd, Betty	c	z	3
Bottomley, Arthur	c	z	3
Boyden, Harold James	c	z	3
Bradley, Thomas G	c	z	3
Bray, Jeremy W	a	z	3
Broughton, Alfred D	c	z	3
Brown, Hugh D	a	y	3
Brown, Robert C	a	y	3
Brown, Ronald William	c	z	3
Buchan, Norman F	a	x	1
Buchanan, Richard	c	z	3
Butler, Joyce	a	x	1
Callaghan, James	a	x	1
Callaghan, L. James	c	z	3
Campbell, Ian	c	z	3
Canavan, Dennis	a	x	1
Cant, Robert	a	x	3
Carmichael, Neil	a	x	1
Carter, Raymond	a	y	3
Carter-Jones, Lewis	a	x	1
Cartwright, John	c	z	3
Castle, Barbara	a	x	1
Clemitson, Ivor	a	x	1

Cocks, Michael	c	z	3
Cohen, Stanley	c	z	3
Coleman, Donald	c	z	3
Colquhoun, Maureen	c	z	3
Concannon, John	c	y	1
Conlan, Bernard	a	x	1
Cook, Robin	a	x	1
Corbett, Robin	a	x	1
Cox, Thomas	a	x	1
Craigen, Jim	a	x	3
Crawshaw, Richard	c	z	3
Crosland, Anthony	c	z	3
Cryer, Robert	a	x	1
Cunliffe, Lawrence F	a	x	1
Cunningham, George	c	z	1
Cunningham, John A	c	z	3
Dalyell, Tam	a	x	3
Davidson, Arthur	a	x	1
Davies, Bryan	a	x	1
Davies, Denzil	a	x	1
Davies, Ifor	c	z	3
Davis, Stanley	c	y	1
De Freitas Geoffrey	c	z	3
Deakins, Eric	a	x	1
Dean, Joseph	a	x	1
Dell, Edmund	c	z	3
Dempsey, James	a	x	1
Dewar, Donald	c	z	3
Dixon, Don	a	x	1
Doig, Peter	a	y	3
Dormand, John	a	x	1
Douglas-Mann, Bruce	c	z	1
Duffy, Patrick	c	z	3
Dunn, James	a	y	3
Dunnett, Jack	c	z	3
Dunwoody, Gwyneth	c	y	3
Eadie, Alexander	a	x	1
Edge, Geoffrey	a	x	1
Edwards, Robert	a	x	3
Ellis, John	a	y	3
Ellis, Robert	c	z	1
English, Michael	a	x	1
Ennals, David H	c	z	3
Evans, Alfred	a	x	1
Evans, Ioan	a	x	1
Evans, John	a	x	1
Ewing, Harry	a	x	1
Faulds, Andrew	a	y	3
Fernyhough, Ernest	a	x	1
Fitch, Alan	c	z	3
Flannery, Martin	a	x	1
Fletcher, Edward	a	x	1
Fletcher, Leopold	a	x	1
Foot, Michael	a	x	1
Ford, Benjamin	c	z	3
Forrester, John	a	x	1

Fowler, Gerald T.	a	x	1
Fraser, John	a	x	1
Freeson, Reginald	c	y	1
Galphern, Myer	a	x	1
Garrett, John	a	x	1
Garrett, William	a	x	1
George, Bruce	a	x	1
Gilbert, John	c	z	1
Ginsburg, David	c	y	3
Golding, John	c	z	3
Gould, Bryan	a	x	1
Gourlay, Harry	c	z	3
Graham, Edward	c	z	3
Grant, George	c	z	3
Grant, John	c	z	3
Grocott, Bruce	a	x	1
Hamilton, James	a	x	1
Hamilton, William	a	y	3
Hardy, Peter	c	y	3
Harper, Joseph	c	z	3
Harrison, Walter	c	y	1
Hart, Judith	a	x	1
Hattersley, Roy	c	z	3
Hatton, Frank	c	z	1
Hayman, Helene	c	z	3
Healey, Denis	c	z	3
Heffer, Eric	a	x	1
Hooley, Frank	a	x	1
Horam, John	c	z	3
Howell, Denis	c	z	3
Hoyle, Douglas	a	x	1
Huckfield, Leslie	a	x	1
Hughes, Celwyn	c	z	3
Hughes, Robert	a	x	1
Hughes, Roy	a	x	1
Hughes, William	a	x	1
Hunter, Adam	a	x	1
Irvine, Arthur	c	z	1
Irving, Sydney	c	y	3
Jackson, George	c	y	3
Jackson, Margaret	a	x	1
Janner, Grenville	a	y	3
Jay, Douglas	c	z	1
Jeger, Lena May	a	x	1
Jenkins, Hugh	a	x	1
Jenkins, Roy	c	z	1
John, Brynmor	c	z	3
Johnson, James	c	z	3
Johnson, Walter	c	z	3
Jones, Barry	c	z	3
Jones, Daniel	c	z	3
Jones, T. Alec	a	x	1
Judd, Frank	a	x	1
Kaufman, Gerald	c	z	3
Kelley, Richard	b	y	1
Kerr, Russell	a	x	1

Kilroy-Silk, Robert	a	x	1
Kinnock, Neil	a	x	1
Lambie, David	a	x	1
Lamborn, Harry	c	z	3
Lamond, James	a	x	1
Latham, Arthur	a	x	1
Leadbitter, Ted	a	x	1
Lee, John	a	x	1
Lestor, Joan	a	x	1
Lever, Harold	c	z	3
Lewis, Arthur	a	x	1
Lewis, Ronald	a	x	1
Lipton, Marcus	b	y	1
Litterick, Tom	a	x	1
Lomas, Kenneth	a	y	3
Loyden, Edward	a	x	1
Luard, Evan	c	z	1
Lyon, Alexander	c	x	3
Lyons, Edward	c	z	3
Mabon, Dickson	c	z	3
MacFarguhar, Roderick	c	z	3
Mackenzie, James	a	x	1
Mackintosh, John	c	z	3
Maclennan, Robert	c	z	3
Madden, Max	b	y	1
Magee, Bryan	c	z	3
Mahon, Simon	a	y	3
Mallalieu, Joseph	b	y	3
Marks, Kenneth	c	z	3
Marquand, David	c	z	3
Marshall, Edmund	c	z	3
Marshall, James	a	x	1
Mason, Roy	c	z	3
Maynard, Joan	a	x	1
McCartney, Hugh	a	x	1
McDonald, Oonagh	a	x	1
McElhone, Frank	a	x	1
McGuire, Michael	a	y	3
McMillan, Thomas	a	x	1
Meacher, Michael	a	x	1
Mellish, Robert	c	z	3
Mendelson, John	a	x	1
Mikardo, Ian	a	x	1
Millan, Bruce	c	z	3
Miller, Maurice	a	x	1
Miller, Millie	b	y	1
Mitchell, Richard	c	z	3
Molloy, William	a	x	1
Moonman, Eric	c	z	3
Morris, Alfred	a	x	1
Morris, Charles	a	x	1
Morris, John	c	z	3
Moyle, Roland	a	x	1
Murray, Ronald	b	y	1
Newens, Arthur	a	x	1
Noble, Michael	b	y	1

Oakes, Gordon	c	z	3
Ogden, Eric	c	z	3
Orbach, Maurice	a	x	1
Orme, Stanley	a	x	1
Ovenden, John	b	y	1
Owen, David	c	z	3
Padley, Walter	c	z	3
Palmer, Arthur	c	z	3
Park, George	a	x	1
Parker, John	a	x	3
Parry, Robert	a	x	1
Pavitt, Laurence	a	x	1
Pendry, Tom	a	x	1
Perry, Ernest	b	y	3
Phipps, Colin	c	z	3
Prentice, Reginald	c	z	3
Prescott, John	a	x	1
Price, Christopher	a	x	1
Price, William	b	y	1
Radice, Giles	c	z	3
Rees, Merlyn	c	z	3
Richardson, Jo	a	x	1
Roberts, Albert	c	z	3
Roberts, Gwilym	a	x	1
Robinson, Geoffrey	b	y	1
Roderick, Caerwyn	b	y	1
Rodgers, George	b	y	1
Rodgers, William	c	z	3
Rooker, Jeffrey	a	x	1
Roper, John	c	z	3
Rose, Paul	c	z	3
Ross, Ernest	a	x	1
Rowlands, Edward	c	z	3
Ryman, John	a	x	1
Sandelson, Neville	c	z	3
Sedgemore, Brian	a	x	1
Selby, Harry	a	x	1
Shaw, Arnold	b	y	1
Sheldon, Robert	c	z	3
Shore, Peter	a	z	1
Short, Edward	a	y	3
Short, Renee	a	x	1
Silkin, John	a	x	1
Silkin, Samuel	c	z	3
Silverman, Julius	a	x	1
Skinner, Dennis	a	x	1
Small, William	b	y	3
Smith, John	c	z	3
Snape, Peter	a	x	1
Spearing, Nigel	a	x	1
Spriggs, Leslie	a	x	1
Stannard, Albert	b	y	3
Stewart, Michael	c	z	3
Stoddart, David	a	x	1
Stott, Roger	a	x	1
Strang, Gavin	a	x	3

Strauss, George	c	z	3
Summerskill, Shirley	c	z	3
Swain, Thomas	b	y	1
Taylor, Ann	a	x	1
Thomas Jeffrey	c	z	3
Thomas, George	b	y	3
Thomas, Mike	c	z	3
Thomas, Roland	b	y	3
Thorne, Stanley	a	x	1
Tierney, Sydney	b	y	1
Tinn, James	a	y	3
Tomlinson, John	c	z	3
Tomney, Frank	c	z	3
Torney, Thomas	a	x	1
Tuck, Raphael	a	x	1
Urwin, Thomas	c	z	3
Varley, Eric	c	z	1
Wainwright, Edwin	a	y	3
Walden, Brian	c	z	3
Walker, Harold	a	x	1
Walker, Terry	c	y	3
Ward, Michael	c	z	3
Watkins, David	a	x	1
Watkinson, John	c	z	3
Weetch, Kenneth	c	z	1
Weitzman, David	b	y	1
Wellbeloved, James	c	z	3
White, Frank	a	x	1
White, James	c	z	3
Whitehead, Phillip	c	x	3
Whitlock, William	c	z	3
Willey, Fred	c	x	3
Williams, Alan	c	y	3
Williams, Alan Lee	c	z	3
Williams, Shirley	c	z	3
Williams, William	b	y	1
Wilson, Alexander	b	y	1
Wilson, Harold	c	z	3
Wilson, William	a	x	1
Wise, Audrey	a	x	1
Woodall, Alec	a	y	3
Woof, Robert	b	y	1
Wrigglesworth, Ian	c	z	3
Young, David	a	x	1

(Heppell et al, 2010).

Appendix 7: Conservative and Labour trajectories

Conservative Trajectories

Barber, Anthony
Biffen, John
Biggs-Davison, John
du Cann, Edward
Fraser, Hugh
Howe, Geoffrey
Maudling, Reginald
Nott, John
Powell, Enoch
Ridley, Nicholas
Tapsell, Peter
Thatcher, Margaret
Walker, Peter

Labour Trajectories

Benn, Tony
Blair, Tony
Callaghan, James
Crosland, Anthony
Crossman, Richard
Gordon Walker, Patrick
Healey, Denis
Jay, Douglas
Kaufman, Gerald
Kinnock, Neil
Peart, Fred
Prentice, Reg
Prescott, John
Silkin, John
Smith, John
Stewart, Michael
Varley, Eric
Wilson, Harold

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