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# Journal of Transportation Security

## Airports at Risk: The Impact of Information Sources on Security Decisions

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# Airports at Risk: The Impact of Information Sources on Security Decisions

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## Abstract

Security decisions in high risk organizations such as airports involve obtaining ongoing and frequent information about potential threats. Utilizing questionnaire survey data from a sample of airport employees in European Airports across the continent, we analyzed how both formal and informal sources of security information affect employee's decisions to comply with the security rules and directives. This led us to trace information network flows to assess its impact on the degree employees making security decisions comply or deviate with the prescribed security rules. The results of the multivariate analysis showed that security information obtained through formal and informal networks differentially determine if employee will comply or not with the rules. Information sources emanating from the informal network tends to encourage employees to be more flexible in their security decisions while formal sources lead to be more rigid with complying with rules and protocols. These results suggest that alongside the formal administrative structure of airports, there exists a diverse and pervasiveness set of informal communications networks that are a potent factor in determining airport security levels.

**Key Words:** Airports, Security Decisions, Information Sources, Social Networks

# Airports at Risk:

## The Impact of Information Sources on Security Decisions

### Introduction

Airports, as complex social organizations, are mainly characterized as having a formal social structures bolstered by a legal set of administrative rules that affect its operational maintenance and continuity. Little emphasis is put on the rich fabric of informal networks that also play a critical role in airport management. We argue that these two forms of social structures provide in tandem the conduits for the selective flow of information through both formal administrative channels as well as informal social networks (Handel, 2002) that will affect the level of airport security. For airports, not only does the flow of information affect daily operations but it can also have a direct impact on security decisions (Huang et al, 2011). On the one hand, the formalistic administrative structure underpinning security decisions in airports is dominated by sets of clearly enunciated rules, regulations and protocols that are designed to determine security decisions. On the other, are the informal social networks that are generated through employee interactions within and between work units and departments (Crampton et al, 1998). In cases when a security decision needs to be made, it would seem that formal sources of information – given its legal and administrative prerogative - should marginalize information generated through informal social networks. Yet, recent ethnographic evidence has shown that informal social interactions in airports are alive and have an impact on group based security decisions making (Kirschenbaum et al, 2012), along with a great deal of bending and even breaking the rules (Kirschenbaum et al, 2012a).

To what extent do such informal sources of information impact on security decisions is not clear but these finding raise serious questions as to the veracity of the official formal sources as the sole determining factor is such decisions. In order to clarify this issue, we will explore and evaluate the degree that formal and informal sources of information within an airport organizational framework impact on security related decision making among its employees. Simply put, does the security information obtained through your friends have a greater impact on decisions than those coming through the chain of command?

The relative importance of informal social networks as sources of valuable information affecting behavior is not new (Kraut et al, 1990). But the degree of its influence during periods of crisis or threatening situations is less well documented. Recent evidence in the area of organizational behavior has shown the impact that both formal and informal social networks have on a range of decisions made during crises (Krackhardt and Stern, 1988). In the area of disaster management, scholars have pointed out how the flow and choice of both formal and informal sources of information can make the critical difference for survival. Such decisions include situation when evacuation, taking shelter and making preparations for various conflicts is required. What these and other studies have demonstrated is that

1 critical decision making in cases of threats – be they human made or natural – depends to a great extent  
2 on the sources of information available and the choice to utilize them. These same choices, we contend,  
3 are also available within the organizational framework of airports. The aim here will therefore be to  
4 first discover the degree that informal information flow networks exist within the formal airport  
5 structure and then examine the degree to which such informal sources of security information act in  
6 influencing security decisions.  
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### 10 **Structure of Airports**

11 Unlike the simplistic descriptions of airports as consisting of "airside" and "landside" sites, we  
12 argue that airports, as complex socially based economic organizations, have characteristics similar  
13 to all complex social organizations. One critical characteristic that will help in understanding how  
14 information sources affect security decisions is the existence of formal and informal internal  
15 communications networks. The formal structure typically seen in organizational charts reflect the  
16 legitimate administrative rules that determine the flow of command and power. The example of a  
17 subordinate either receiving orders (e.g., information) from her/his boss or passing on information  
18 to the boss and not through others as the administrative structure dictates reflects this type of formal  
19 structure. The informal structure, however, is more a product of social interactions that are  
20 generated within the various levels of the airports organizational setting and can be distinguished by  
21 the fact that it is through these social interactions – and not administrative directives – that its  
22 distinct network develops. The emergence of informal leaders, across departmental interest groups  
23 and informal channels of information flow develop as an alternative path of communications within  
24 the organization. In each case, the flow of information that maintains operational continuity  
25 follows different paths; one path is dictated by the formal administrative rules and protocols and the  
26 other through a loose set of recognized social networks based primarily on friendships and  
27 acquaintances. In many cases both types of communications networks are employed  
28 conterminously and even simultaneously (Varda et al, 2009). Therefore, making judgment  
29 decisions, especially under extreme pressure to keep flight timetables on schedule, can lead to  
30 bending or even disregarding the given set administrative rules (Angenendt, 2003).. These issues  
31 are complicated by the variety of potential security threats inherent in airports as major  
32 transportation hubs, and the multiple organizational levels in the airport administration that must  
33 make decisions when a crisis occurs.  
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48 This point should be emphasized as the complexity of managing the decision making chains that are  
49 an integral part of the airport organizational structure is complicated as multiple stakeholders are  
50 involved in airport crises management. This opens possibilities for conflicting interests and  
51 communications disruptions (Butts et al, 2007; Corbacioglu & Kapucu, 2005). For example, airport  
52 authorities want to maintain security but to do so may conflict with airline carriers wanting to keep  
53 to their schedules, passengers demanding little or no delays, control tower personnel seeking  
54 minimum disruption over air space and service providers wanting easy access for employees  
55 without going through security checks.  
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1                   **Information Flow**  
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4                   Recent evidence on security decision making in airports has shown it to be primarily based on  
5                   interactive group decision making (Kirschenbaum et al, 2012). These findings, along with the  
6                   variability among employees in complying with the rules and protocols, strongly suggest that  
7                   information sources for security decisions not only occur within the province of formal administrative  
8                   network structure but also outside it. This possibility is supported by studies of manufacturing, service  
9                   and public organizations which clearly describe the intermixture of both formal and informal  
10                  information networks found at all levels of the organization (Kirschenbaum & Rapaport, 2008 ). The  
11                  importance of internal company sources of information, for example, was found to be important in  
12                  policy and operational decisions (Keegan, 1974). In terms of internal organizational networks, a search  
13                  for relevant material may be related to the risk involved for the searcher (Blay, et al, 2012). Another  
14                  study focused on how security behavior could be affected by an internal security threat in contrast to  
15                  external security threats (Leach, 2003).  
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23                  In the case of emergencies and disasters, informal networks were found to be critical in maintaining  
24                  operational continuity (Rapaport & Kirschenbaum, 2008). Given the likelihood that the source of  
25                  information affecting an airport security decision may emanate from either or both formal and informal  
26                  sources, there arises the possibility that the source may have an impact on what kind of decision is  
27                  likely to be made.  
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33                  The possibility that sources of information affect decisions is not new. Studies of small group  
34                  dynamics as well as analysis of social networks in large organizations have clearly demonstrated the  
35                  impact of information sources on decision making (Kraut et al, 1990). In general, the complexity of  
36                  the organizations size and structure has an impact on the density of the informal social networks which  
37                  act as conduits for information distribution. But more importantly, these studies have made it clear that  
38                  informal sources of information generated within the organization have also different levels of  
39                  perceived risk ( Blay et al, 2012; Haung et al, 2011) as well as a differential impact on incentives,  
40                  penalties, peer pressures and perceived effectiveness that impact upon compliance levels (Herath &  
41                  Rao, 2009).  
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48                  In a sense, the formal networks are bolstered by administrative legitimacy but the informal social  
49                  networks by trust. Thus, information passed along by friends or coworkers with whom the employee  
50                  has a long association of mutual interaction appears to be seen as more reliable than simply "orders" or  
51                  "protocols" from an unknown, anonymous administrative source or even their direct boss (Willemyns  
52                  et al, 2010).  
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
57                   **Levels of Rule Compliance**  
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1 If we put the emphasis on compliance to rules or protocols themselves and not specifically to security  
2 decisions, we find that low compliance is very common (Haynes & Dantes, 1987) with individuals  
3 simply not complying with directives or orders (Morris & Schulz, 1992). One possible but promising  
4 explanation why certain people follow the rules and others do not has been put forward by utilizing  
5 theories of Organizational Citizenship Behavior (Shropshire, 2009). For example, complying with  
6 security protocols may be motivated by something other than financial compensation. Others have  
7 argued that security technology itself brings about a lowering of compliance by the over reliance on  
8 machine output (Gonzalez & Sawicka (2003). At the organization level, the disaster literature points to  
9 a large gap between emergency and disaster plans and actual implementation (Kirschenbaum, 2004).  
10 Apparently, due to the dynamic changing situation during crises, pre-determined emergency plans and  
11 directives are usually discarded, implying that the protocols are in the main ignored. If this is the case,  
12 it is reasonable to expect similar patterns of non-compliance to the emergency rules and protocols in  
13 high risk organizations such as airports.  
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21 As the research literature on compliance has predominantly focused on health care, it is not surprising  
22 that this concept has been viewed in terms of a bipolar measure: total compliance with instructions or  
23 non-compliance. In the jargon of the physician, "Did you take the medication or not?" Yet, this concept  
24 can certainly be viewed in more subtle terms such as "partially complying". This would broaden the  
25 range of potential compliance behaviors and provide an in-depth understanding of its variability. A  
26 closer examination of the construct 'compliance', especially as it relates to airport security, led us to  
27 reevaluate its general meaning and look for more subtle measures. A recent ethnographic study of  
28 airports clearly showed that compliance came in many shades; completely following the rules as to  
29 actually disregarding and even acting against them (Kirschenbaum et al, 2012). This led us to take a  
30 three pronged approach by deconstructing this concept in terms of various levels of actual behavioral  
31 compliance to the (semi) legal administrative directives (figure 1). The first level was based on  
32 measuring the degree to which an employee was "bending the rules" asking the question: "I would  
33 exceed or bend the rules if the situation called for it". The second level of compliance went beyond just  
34 bending the rules but actually "breaking protocol is sometimes necessary". The third level of  
35 compliance reflected an even more deviant behavioral pattern as was measured in terms of the question  
36 "I would even act against orders". Overall, we were able to decipher three significant levels of  
37 compliance to security directives allowing us to assess the degree to which each of the formal and  
38 informal sources had an impact on each compliance level. Our initial hypotheses argued that as security  
39 information was sought more from informal rather than formal sources, the tendency to deviate from  
40 the rules becomes more pronounced.  
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3 **Security Situation Requiring Decision**  
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


23 Figure 1: Security decision levels  
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27 **Methods**

28 To test our argument that there will be differences in decision compliance with security directives as a  
29 result of the source of information utilized in that decision - either through formal or informal networks  
30 - we have posited a theoretical working model (See Figure 2) which will guide us in our analysis.  
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36 Figure 2: Basic Working Model of Impact of Information Sources on Security Decisions  
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The model basically posits that within an airports' organizational environment there are available multiple sources of information concerning threats and alternative actions. These sources of security related information flow through a communications network that is either generated within the formal administrative structure of the airport organization (top-down or bottom-up) or through its informal conduit of social networks, for example, social gatherings during breaks,. Depending on the choice of source, we argue that an employee will make a security decision that will either comply or not with the rules and protocols generated by security agencies. Simply, the dominance of an employees' use of one source or the other, in our model, have an impact on the likelihood that compliance with the security rules and protocols will be adhered too. Thus, in order to explore the veracity of this argument, we generated a series of studies at a number of international airports in Europe, varying in size and traffic volume, and across different national states and cultures.

**Data Sources**

The data collected was based on three separate but interconnected sources. The first was an analysis of ethnographic observations followed by a full scale field survey grounded on an extensive and detailed questionnaire given to a purposely chosen sample of 514 employees at the airports (Kirschenbaum et al, 2012). This was followed by detailed personal interviews of over 360 security employees aimed at deciphering among other issues, the information flow network among employees. The overall characteristics of the sample showed that most were male (65%), having an average age of 36.5 years

(SD=21.1) with most under 30 years of age and close to half (42%) married with about a third single (38%).

The ethnographic study provided a general overall picture of the reality of employee behavior in the airports providing the basis for developing the structured questionnaire that covered a broad range of potential constructs involved in security decisions. The interviews were based on (70) open ended questions that provided basic information allowing us to determine both the formal and informal communication networks in the airports. Employing a networking analysis tool based on asking "who do you typically go to for advise" and "who typically approaches you for advise" when a decision needs to be made demonstrated that such informal communications networks exist within and between airport units and departments and provide an alternative means of seeking and obtaining relevant information.

A pilot questionnaire survey first tested the reliability and validity of the measures. In certain cases, the questionnaire was translated into the dominant language where the airport was located. The questionnaires were anonymous to meet the ethnical code of the Helsinki Protocols and given out and collected in the same day when possible. In our case, a part of the questionnaire was used; those measures that were relevant for investigating sources of information.

Key measures of "sources of security information" were employed. Respondents were asked if "I receive information about security threats" from "my direct boss", "through friends", "through rumors" "from briefings" "from written orders". In addition, we also tapped into questions that probed if they obtain security information "from friends outside the department" and "during meals and coffee/cigarette breaks". The first set of measures is based on a dichotomous 'yes-no' response. The second set of two measures is based on a 4 value Likert type scale from 'completely agree' to 'completely disagree'. The choice of these measures reflected two key perspectives found in the literature: one focusing on information that was obtained through formal administrative networks: "direct boss", "from briefings" and "from written orders". A second set of measures is aimed at discovering the extent of informal social network information sources such as obtaining information "from friends", "through rumors", "friends outside the department", and "during coffee breaks". This allowed us to distinguish how formal and informal sources of security information affected compliance with security decisions. In the case of the compliance measures, each was measured as a Likert type four (4) value scale ranging from "completely agree" to "completely disagree".

This distinction between communication network flows originating within the formal structure of the airport and that generated through social network interactions outside this framework is also obviously dependent on other sets of contingencies which will be examined employing a multivariate regression model. These variables have been cited as possible moderators in the link between security sources and actual decision making. They include in particular the impact of group or individual security decisions

external social network inputs, past experience encountering threats and if security information makes a difference in the decision.

## Results

In terms of the impact that security information had on their behavior, it appears (see Table 1) that such information is a critical component in making security decisions. Over 80 percent of the sample responded in the affirmative – agreeing or completely agreeing - that such information affects what they do on their job. Even when differentiating between those employees who state their job descriptions as security related to those who do not deal directly with security, the importance of information remains high; 90% against 65% ( $\chi = 0.000$ )

**Table 1: The security information I get affects what I do on my job**

	<b>Security Employee</b>	<b>Non-Security Employee</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Completely disagree</b>	3.4%	21.1%	8.3%
<b>Mostly Disagree</b>	7.6	14.8	10.5
<b>Mostly Agree</b>	43.2	43.7	42.9
<b>Completely Agree</b>	45.8	20.4	38.3
<b>Total Percent</b>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>N</b>	354	142	496

This confirmation of the value of security information in making a security decision led us to a next step that involved deciphering the source of the information. To do so we asked the respondents from whom they received such information. The results (Table 2) reveal that information sources vary from official formal conduits to informal sources such as friends and rumors. When asked where the employee obtains most of his security updates, we note that the prime source are two formal sources, namely the direct boss (70.8%) followed by written orders (63%). Simultaneously, nearly half also state that they also obtain updates from friends (53%) and even rumors (33%). In a sense, what we are seeing is that both the formal and informal communications networks provide a source for security updates.

**Table 2: Measures of Formal and Informal Sources of Information "I get most of my security updates from..." (N= 514)**

<b>Formal Networks</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Total</b>
My boss	70.8%	29.2%	100%
Formal briefings	52.6	47.4	100%
Written orders	63.0	37.0	100%
<b>Informal Networks</b>			
Friends	52.9	47.1	100%
Rumors	33.9	66.1	100%

**Information and Non Compliance**

Employing separate linear regression models that encompasses each of the three levels of " non compliance" as the dependent variable against the entire alternative formal and informal security information sources clearly and strongly suggested that the type and source of information an employee attains has a direct and significant impact on the degree to which she/he complies with the security rules and protocols. (Table 3). More closely evaluating the results shows that the significant determinants of both compliance and variations of non-compliance are concentrated in three key independent variables: (1) the clear expression that security information does have an impact on a decision; (2) information accessed through formal channels through the employees' boss and (3) from informal channels reflected in friends in other departments. From the size of the coefficients and significance levels, it can also be seen that the (1) impact of information is only marginally significant ( $p < 0.10$ ) while accessing information through (2) formal channels and (3) informal channels are highly significant ( $p < 0.001$ ) in terms of compliance levels. It should be noted that these levels of significance range across all the compliance levels.

The data in Table 3 also reveals a pattern of behavior that points toward the impact of both formal and informal communications networks on compliance. For one, the signs

**Table 3: Summary of Comparative Regression Models of Compliance**

	<b>Bend Rules</b>	<b>Break Protocol</b>	<b>Against Orders</b>
	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>
(Constant)	2.482	2.565	2.047
The security information I get affects what I do on my job	-.115*	-.124**	-.091
I get most security information through rumors	.001	-.024	.013
I get most security information Mainly through my boss	-.089	-.155**	-.086
I get most security information from friends OUTSIDE the department	.218**	.210**	.222**
I get most security information During meals and coffee/cigarettes breaks	-.060	-.013	.007

1. I exceed or bend the rules when the situation calls for it
2. Breaking protocol is sometimes necessary to get the job done
3. Would even act against orders

\*P<0.05

\*\*P<0.01

of the significant regression coefficients are clearly indicative that information gleaned from informal sources lead toward minimizing rule compliance while those obtained from formal sources maximize such compliance. In addition, these patterns of compliance behaviors are significantly affected by the degree that an employee sees such information as important in making her/his security decisions.

### **Conclusions**

Within the organizational framework of an airport, security decisions are made almost continuously. For the most part, these decisions involve routine decisions at security check points. Whenever a non-routine situation occurs, however, accompanied by a real or perceived threat, the decision making process can become complex and dynamic. It is at these times that situations arise when the routine rules and regulations may not neatly fit the circumstances. In these cases where a threat emerges, decisions are theoretically governed by rules and regulations supported by the airports administrative structure. What has been established by recent research, however, is that compliance to the rules and protocols varies and ranges from complete compliance to total disregard of the rules. A possible explanation that was explored here focused on the source of security information that the employee utilized in making a security decision. By tracing the source of information, derived through formal or informal communications networks, we were able to discern how each type of information affected security rule compliance. The underlying working assumption was that both access to security

1 information and the degree of trust of the provider would affect how such information would be  
2 utilized in a security-threat situation.  
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5 The results of the analysis clearly showed that information is considered a vital component in how  
6 airport employees make security decisions. This was found to factor into decisions made that involved  
7 all levels of compliance, ranging from bending the rules, breaking protocol or even acting against  
8 orders. With this in mind, we also discovered the importance of where such information originated; be  
9 the formal or informal communications networks. Security information utilized from formal sources  
10 predicted high rates of compliance while information received from friends (through informal  
11 networks) toward more flexible and adaptive behaviors. As in any other complex organization,  
12 organizational process have a highly dynamic nature, and spontaneous informal social networks are  
13 continuously generated through employee interactions. In such a context, when a decision has to be  
14 taken, informal information networks play a critical role, especially with respect to the ability to cope  
15 with the unexpected  
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## 22 **Implications**

23 Our findings have far reaching implications on airport security. For one, an airport can no longer be  
24 solely viewed as a strictly formal organization governing the security behavior of its employees by  
25 imposing administrative directives. Rules and protocols are being bent, broken and disregarded. For  
26 another, security decision making appears not to be a rote training-like exercise but is influenced by the  
27 organizational origin of the information the employee obtains. Apparently there is a vibrant set of  
28 informal social networks in airports that provides alternative paths for accessing information and, more  
29 importantly directly influence the degree that the security protocols will be followed. Our results show  
30 a clear pattern where information sources emanating from the informal network tend to encourage  
31 employees to be more flexible in their security decisions while formal sources more rigid with  
32 compliance tending to follow rules and protocols. This in itself should make those who advocate a  
33 purely engineering-technology perspective of airports design and security to take a step backwards to  
34 reevaluate the degree that 'human factors' play in the reality of airport operations.  
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