British Party Politics and Foreign Policy: The Case of Zimbabwe

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A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2012
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Acknowledgements

Although I always loved Tennyson’s (2012) words, through this project they have gained more meaning to me: “though much is taken, much abides;..., that which we are, we are, one equal temper of heroic hearts, made weak by time and fate, but strong in will to strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.” This surmises my whole experience of life to this date, tried by tough times, marked for death, but ultimately saved by others. From those who gave me another chance, I have drawn the strength to carry on challenging inert practices that victimise the future and keep us stagnant. As I sail beyond the sunset of the project and append my name to it, I know that this does not tell the full story about how we got here. This is my modest attempt to acknowledge this fact.

My supervisors have carried the burden of strict deadlines, constantly shifting conditions and keeping me focused, perhaps in a way, much more than I did. For this small part of her overall work, my deep indebtedness to Dr Catherine McGlynn is overwhelming. I am grateful for her insightful guidance and the clear and comfortable manner she nurtured me into an academic. I cannot thank her enough for her patience and unceasing spirit, which is, in fact, what has made all this possible. I owe the same level of indebtedness to Dr John Craig, for his passion and knowledge and for how he cared for me when it was time to move, to find me an equally competent team. Professor Brendan Evans deserves a notable mention for those trips into British politics and politicians. In no other place, with no other team and no other university could I have achieved this, hitherto, improbable dream of mine.

I must thank a lot of institutions and individuals who have provided me with encouragement and advice. The University, the Department of Behavioural Sciences and colleagues who offered a scholarship and part-time position as a lecturer, I am in debt. These provided me with both the means and continuous academic engagement that I needed. Additionally, this support came when I needed it most. The generosity of the university was, to me, an exceptionally enabling provision. I am grateful to the University and my supervisor for inspiration through hopeless periods in my research.
Finally, I want to thank my family and friends for their love and support. During the years of my research, times were tough, but the encouragement from family and friends proved to be more efficacious than any amount of torture by President Robert Mugabe’s secret service. This support has transformed me into more than just an academic and professional but helped me inch another step close towards humility and purposefulness. I will forever be in perpetual gratitude to Darryl, Tanith and Saisha. I can only be thankful for the smiles, laughs, games, love, patience and understanding that re-energised and re-assured me of the purpose of life itself. Surely, there were many times where only your love made the difference. I am grateful. To Melody, surely this had to come to an end, at some point, with that comes a new sense of yet another journey, both different and similar to the last. My brothers and sisters, Vusumuzi Sibanda in particular took over the active responsibility of looking after our mother. I am profoundly grateful to my sisters, Sikhumbuzo and Gugulethu, for being the guarantors of comfort for mum and the children. To Xolani, one of my brothers, I am exceedingly grateful; the struggle continues; the hope lives on and the dream shall never die. Imran Hussain was a pillar to me for providing logistical support when I could not drive after a car accident. Surely, my friend you, you felt my pain, shared hopes and visualised my dreams.

The lists of those who have made my story even possible are endless but my appreciation, to everyone, is eternal and sincere.

Nkululeko Sibanda
Huddersfield, England
Dedications

Dedicated to my mother.

Your esteemed acts of personal sacrifice and unsurpassed commitment to my brothers, sisters, community and me, got me this far.
# Abbreviations & Acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<td>AAP</td>
<td>Anglo-American Plan</td>
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<td>AIPPA</td>
<td>Access of Information and Protection of Privacy Act</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South African Company</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Central African Federation</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Constitutional Commission</td>
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<td>CCJP</td>
<td>Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIO</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Commission</td>
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<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Institute for Commonwealth Studies</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>LAA</td>
<td>Land Acquisition Act</td>
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<td>LC</td>
<td>Land Commission</td>
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<td>LHA</td>
<td>Land Husbandry Act</td>
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<td>LWVVA</td>
<td>Liberation War Veteran Association</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>None Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<td>NIBMAR</td>
<td>No Independence before Black Majority Rule</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUSPOTECH</td>
<td>National Union of Students in Polytechnic and Technical Colleges</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Administration</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>POSA</td>
<td>Public Order and Security Act</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Rhodesian Front</td>
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<td>RFA</td>
<td>Rhodesian Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>RNFU</td>
<td>Rhodesia National Farmers’ Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency Internationally</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives</td>
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<td>TRG</td>
<td>Tory Reform Group</td>
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<td>TTM</td>
<td>The Tribunal Magazine</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
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<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WGI</td>
<td>Worldwide Governance Indicators</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War I</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<td>ZANU PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union</td>
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<td>ZCC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Council of Churches</td>
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<td>ZCFU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMCORD</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZINASU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Students’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIPA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPN</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Policy Network</td>
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Abstract

The basic tenets of International Relations have become subject to uncertainty and debate. The academic consensus that dominated the field has cracked with further questions arising on the conventional assumptions’ claim to universality. Post-modernist thinkers, who have challenged its foundation on structured thinking, affirm that normalising discourses within traditional foreign policy position restricts academic advancement in the area. They challenge the notion that geopolitics and national politics are mutually exclusive. They argue for an interpretive approach of IR, which could show that some principles and understanding that shape domestic policymaking may affect foreign policy positions. Their interpretation of politics, including IR, is that, its fundamentals require an interpretive review of actions and their consequences. These reveal the socio-political and environmental influences that help shape policy, which traditional approaches to foreign relations fail to reveal. In over a century, the political situation in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe tilted towards the ideological position of the party in Britain. A debate about the nature of government, human rights, economics and Britain’s role in these, has characterised the foreign policy debate between the two states. The definition of these concepts has depended on the party running Downing Street. The emphasis on similar issues in the 1970s and 1980s differed to that of the late 1990s, indicating divergent interpretations of national interests, which most scholars regard as causal of the apolitical nature of IR. The high levels of public interest Rhodesian/Zimbabwean interests pushed foreign policy into the ideological field of domestic politics. This challenges the IR premises established by convention IR approaches. Thus, using the case study it is clear that dominated views of foreign relations are unable to verify the whole picture of what transpires in a political field.
Part One

Introductory and Literary Treatise

In this sense, the archaeology of knowledge functions as a criticism of such procedures, arguing against their flattening of those knowledge’s into the expression or representation of other social relations, of the historical development of sensation of other social relations or human subjects whether that be considered as free or imprisoned (Brown & Cousins, 1986, p. 33).
Chapter 1: Introduction and Methods

Problem Setting – Introducing the Study

1.1. IR Limitations
This thesis explores political parties and their role in British foreign policy. It focuses on Zimbabwe, as a case study, and examines the role of domestic political ideology in the management of Rhodesia and its successor state Zimbabwe by successive United Kingdom (UK) governments. Zimbabwe-UK relations provide a microscopic lens for critically assessing the understanding of the interplay between foreign and national politics. Britain’s policy shortcomings on Zimbabwe provide an opportunity for the study of the broader relationship between political science and IR (Porteous, 2005; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2001; Taylor & Williams, 2002). The case, at hand, plays into both internal and external politics in Britain.

Given the above and increased academic research contesting the legitimacy of mainstream theories that emphasise a distinction between domestic politics and international relations (Rengger, 2000; Donnelly, 2000; Dougherty & Pfaltzraff, 1991), this provides a chance to explore intersection of these two concepts. The failure of traditional literary studies to explain the limitations of British IR on Zimbabwe indicates a possibility of intellectual debt and requires a different approach. This review of British political party foreign policy intends to contribute to political science literature by exploring the limits of traditional IR theories, using Zimbabwe as a case study.

This study follows my experiences working as a political activist and leader in Zimbabwe since 1999. Within various capacities, I interacted with foreign governments and their functionaries and became interested in the foreign policy. I hoped to understand the roles that other countries can play in helping dictatorships transition to democracy. In my masters Degree thesis, I discovered that the UK’s foreign policy in Zimbabwe had been unsuccessful in achieving stated objectives. These failed in the face of massive international agreement and the noble nature of their intentions. I, therefore, argued
that literature was unclear on the reasons why Zimbabwe had been recalcitrant from its days as British colony. I then recommended further intellectual effort to establish reasons for policy inadequacies. At the time, scholars were beginning to question traditional IR theories (O'Tuathail, 1996; O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). Since then, Conservatives have replaced the Labour government in Westminster and policies continue to have minimal impacts on the goal of a consolidated Zimbabwean democracy. On the other hand, various scholars have begun questioning traditional IR theories and their applicability to modern day practices, research and analysis of foreign policy. As such, this study locates itself in a controversial literary perspective forming the intersection between traditional IR theories and political theories by studying their historical and contemporary influence on Zimbabwe-UK relations. It utilises postmodernist and interprevist analytical approaches to assess the hypothesis that British Foreign Policy towards Rhodesia and Zimbabwe disproves the conventional IR thinking that separates ideology from foreign policy.
1.2. Methodological Approach
The study of foreign policy is an ancient art (Winham, 1969) in which scholars try to explain political interactions between countries, societies and organisations (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004). However, in the post war period this specialised and elite institutions and individuals have usurped this area (Winham, 1969). These have progressively professionalised as an exclusive area. Winham (1969) writing about qualitative research methods in foreign policy analysis notes this has contributed to increased academic rigidity and underscores that this imposes limits on the subject. In concurrence, Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004) identify further steps necessary to help strengthen the study of IR study as an academic area. They underscore the importance of inquiries that ensure compatibility between the research question, theory and methodology, rather than those ‘corralled by narrow specialisms’ (Rengger, 2000). This notion promotes the ‘international’ as an external problem whose solution exists out there by those who know most about it; that is, IR experts and their elusive spy apparatus.

In Africa, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) are at the forefront of designing methodologies for policy research (Moyo, et al., 2000) and western governments are widely suspected of dictating the terms (Porteous, 2005). Since the end of the cold war, aid donors insist on collaborating with these organisations instead of the states, which they regard as corrupt (Loquai, et al., 1998). This is the primary concern with the evidence that Britain has relied on to inform policy in Africa (Porteous, 2008), and drawing most of its staff for the NGOs, with most members of staff its de facto department responsible. As Gibbons, et al., (1994) argues that research funding whose structures become more ‘mission-focused’ and ‘market-oriented’ may betray the motivation towards knowledge application and dissemination. This uneasy relationship between research and funding causes immense concerns for many scholars. Shaw (2010) bemoans this growing trend by pointing out that 50% to 80% of scientific and technological studies are prisoner to the economic, social and strategic goals imperatives of their funders. Most scientific researchers have a sense of hopelessness in the face of increased
donor influence over research methodologies (Porteous, 2005). In the case of Africa, data collection is an accountability tool (Dorman, 2001) forcing researchers to provide expected data as value for money. This produces a myriad of problems decried by science because research methodology selection must follow the question (Sackett & Wennberg, 1997), instead of relying on predetermined paradigm or strong social constructed assumptions (Stone, 2002).

Admittedly, this is not the central argument of this study but it is a necessary consideration in discussing the quality of data flowing from third world countries to the west. One has to make the broader observation regarding this methodological problem in IR research on Africa. Issues of data validity and quality do impact on the continuing research results that mirror orthodox designs, which separate the ‘national’ from the ‘international’. Concerns are greater given the massive growing role of NGOs and multilateral development organisations as instruments for western foreign policy in the South. The structured and power configured relationship between the funders and researchers causes major concerns about methodological independence. Thus, research relying on such data needs to assess it integrity, otherwise it would join the long trail of disciplined literature (Porteous, 2008).

Similarly, donor governments’ argue and challenge official data. The information tends to be manipulated to paint the picture that the specific regimes want. Thus, their methodologies are questionable to, however, this is also the case with large and independent multilateral institutions. For example, Transparency International (TI) (2010) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) methods for surveying corruption and governance in Africa have been discredited (McFerson, 2010) on legitimate grounds. McFerson (2010) questions both TI and WGI as based on out-of-context perceptions and Mkandawire (2004) notes that despite the rise and prominence in African IR research.

In the final analysis, the positioning of NGOs as both agents and beneficiaries of foreign policy, data collectors and policy implementers weakens the validity of their information. Mainstream policymakers and related researchers fail to accept self-interests that these organisations may develop as
part of their function. Additionally, Tvedt (1998) finds little evidence that NGOs meet any scientific methodologies in any of their work. He notes that this is despite their supposed role as champions on participation, transparency and public efficiency. Many mainstream scholars, aligned to government, tend to ignore the impact this has on official data. In light of this, Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004) argue that despite their popularity, official methods, such as the use of diplomatic policy papers or surveying IR elites for information about foreign policy yields discreditable results. However, the predominant traditional views of foreign policy tend to prefer diplomatic sources as the only legitimate sources of information for IR study.

These three studies on foreign policy, were partially or exclusively concerned with the relation between Britain and Zimbabwe, illustrate this well. Tom Porteous’ (2008) study of UK development policy examines the creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) as a ministry instead of the subordinate Office for Development Assistance (ODA) as the key to understanding Britain’s policy on Zimbabwe. Initially he emphasises the limited traditional view that Foreign Policy is solely a realm of the Prime Minister and his elite advisors. Showing some practical confusion, he later contradicts himself with the complaint that DFID eclipsed the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Africa. He argues that when Tony Blair took office the officialdom did not consider Africa as significant both economically and commercially. Yet he also admitted that, ‘in Zimbabwe the UK government came under internal pressure to take action proactively against the regime of President Mugabe even as the options were limited’ (Porteous, 2005, p. 291)

Taking these two arguments together clearly shows Porteous believes that foreign policy is a sanctuary of the elite, decided ‘out there’, ‘in the international’ but also that the ‘domestic’ somehow participates through politically pressurising the elites. This admission shows, in line with my argument in this thesis that the narrow specialism of orthodox IR sometimes imprisons academic inquiry by forcing it to conform to its already decided organon. In another piece of work, Porteous (2008) shows the contradiction between his expected classical perspective and the reasoned understanding. Firstly,
he makes a generalised argument that, *Ivory Tower* elitists decide British foreign policy in accordance with their perceptions of national interest. However, when he engages data he suggests that there is some ideological impact on policy. The tension, here, which remains unattended to, is that according to traditional IR, British foreign policy hardly changes regardless of which political party is in charge. Thus, politics plays an insignificant role in IR, yet when he gets into the details he finds that the creation of DFID was Britain’s systematic response African poverty in alignment with New Labour’s ‘third-way’ ideology.

Tamarkin (1990) studied British foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. While he focused on the policies of the Conservative government, they both take a classical view of IR. They emphasise specialism in IR, which they regard as a field outside the impact of domestic party ideas. For his part, Tamarkin (1990) argues that the resolution of the Rhodesia problem was almost entirely due the extraordinary abilities and skills possessed by Prime Minister Thatcher and Lord Peter Carrington. He contends that their actual stance in protecting British interests was the key to a problem that had vexed Britain for decades.

Taylor and Williams, (2002) unlike both Porteous and Tamarkin took a different methodological approach. Instead of taking a party line approach to their study, they considered British policy in Zimbabwe, in terms of its content and context. However, they shared their academic and thorough grounding with Porteous and Tamarkin, viewing ‘professional diplomats’ as the ‘behind the scenes’ interlocutors who ensure the achievement of results. Nonetheless, they also acknowledge that British foreign policy makers viewed the Zimbabwe problem as consequential in the domestic-political point scoring game. Interestingly, despite the earlier they still left a conceptual difference between recognising the impact of domestic political considerations in foreign policy and factoring them into the country’s policy in Zimbabwe. Thus, their research falls short because it limited itself to explaining the successes and failures of policy on the considerations that elitists made in response to changing variables overseas.
All three studies used traditional IR research methodologies and analytical approaches, which involve collecting and analysing data obtained from official sources such as, interviews, statements, policies and events. Additionally, all these studies promote a version of IR that upholds the dominant view that the UK’s attitude towards foreign policy in general and in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is the result of practical and reactive approaches. Finally, they all relatively relied on data generated by inefficient NGOs. However, this was not the case for Tamarkin’s (1990) study, whose publication before the ‘NGO era’ insulated it from what became the norm. Unfortunately, there are two problems with official information on Africa and related policies: NGO methodologies for collecting data are unreliable and secondly, (just as these non-state actors play this role in Africa) it could be that some useful information is available in the UK from non-state actors. Thus, this study is intent on following data collection methods and analysis that allows the study of non-state actors.

Criticism of official-leaning (relying on official accounts) research in the study of foreign policy has been growing mainly because of its insistence on the assumption that national and international politics are separate and irreconcilable. Yet in relation to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, literature review reveals the country’s consistent standing in Britain’s politics both at home and abroad (Chan & Mudhai, 2001; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2001; Thatcher, 1978; Smith, 1964; Porteous, 2008; Taylor & Williams, 2002). This relationship inherited its character from Cecil John Rhodes’ oversized personality as informed and characterised his views of nationalism, which led to his success in swaying Britain towards imperial expansionism in Africa against expressed policy (Windrich, 1975; Galbraith, 1974). These included, as Good (1973) points out racist convictions and beliefs that the English were the finest of the great Nordic peoples, thus their occupation of the world would necessarily make it a better place. His power, influence, contacts and politics allowed him and his company complete control of his actions in the Southern African country on the bases of a Royal Charter granted by Queen Victoria (Galbraith, 1974; Good, 1973).
The problems that this study addresses come along these lines: firstly, while literature overwhelmingly identifies British foreign policy weakness and failures in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe there is limited attempt to build futurological value for such research (Armitage, 2000). The focus on the failures of one administration to another identifies failures but suggests no solution. This is partly the fact that Vickers (2003, p. 2) in her treatise that ‘research on Labour’s foreign policy, both published and unpublished, focuses on quite specific time, on individual administrations or particular issues’. Secondly, these studies have followed traditional IR perspectives prevents scholars from questioning their sole authority and investigating the role of domestic politics.

Rengger (2000) contends that this theoretical single-mindedness erected ‘intellectual barriers’ which limit study methodologies that help understanding grey areas that are concealed to classical designs. More specifically Vickers (2003) makes the same arguments that international and national politics could compliment and produce more value for researchers. Philip (1995) advocates for broader approaches. While various scholars have pioneered studies marrying of political science and international relations (Walzer, 2000; Elshtain, 1998; Beitz, 1999; Rawls, 1999) there still is a deeper problem. As Wineburg (1994) argues a dominant slant prevents literature from considering the meanings, explanations and knowledges that are hidden in ill-structured, indeterminate or partial texts that are considered to be outside the realm of geopolitics.

Criticism of theoretically confined research is growing. In 2001, Saul Newman, criticised the arborescence of traditional IR research. In particular, he opines that the inability of studies to shake off given models limits research ability to develop new capabilities (Newman, 2001). Specifically, in IR studies, reliance on classical theory prevents any further exploration and forces all studies in one direction. Notably, Zimbabwe’s ability to control British policy impact annoys aligned researchers and policy makers. They are then not keen to show that domestic politics rather than some far flung variable could be responsible for the failure. With this in mind the Prime Minister becomes the easy target for blame (Coggins, 2006; Porteous, 2005; Fieldhouse, 1984; Kelemen, 2007; Abrahamsen &
Williams, 2001; Facchini, 2007), without affecting the proud sense of the function of British Politics. Ironically, this paints the impression that Zimbabwean or Rhodesian era leaders’ always had capacities beyond those of several British Prime Ministers (but not the system).

However, these answers build questions and problems of their own: such as the assumed coincidental continuance of these circumstances from Salisbury to David Cameron. It is unimaginable that none of these leaders was able to learn from the other in order to outwit Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Even if we accepted that the weakness and strengths of both governments were significant variables, research in this area has been considerable, yet as Keohane (2000) and Vickers (2003) argue, the full range (including political parties) of influences on foreign policy choices and pressures remains under-theorised. In a more general sense in reference to British politics Kerr and Kettell (Kerr & Kettell, 2006, pp. 17 - 18) warn that it is ‘theoretically underdeveloped such that it could benefit from a greater cross-fertilisation of ideas, research and methodological insights both from within and beyond itself’.

Philosophically, interpretations of Britain’s relationship with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe are extraordinarily effective. However, the complete rejection of the interaction between political science and IR blinds them from research possibilities. Similarly, O’Tuathail (1996) complains that insistence on classic theorise is ‘largely propagandist’, and makes classic IR a ‘crudely rigid and conspiratory’ way of reasoning. Earlier own, O’Tuathail and Agnew (1992) established the separation between the two grossly misleading while Rengger (2000) later, categorically claimed that everyday mainstream politics plays a role in IR. In fact, steadily growing literature indicates a strong correlation between domestic politics and foreign policy. Recently, studies of US policy on Israel by Mearsheimer and Walt (2008) find that most influence comes from a myriad of actors in US electoral politics.

These critics of mainstream studies seem obvious given the importance of understanding British policy in Zimbabwe. Despite this, prominent researchers and Foreign Office advisers continue to pay minimum attention to the problem posed by methodological approaches and their implications on
findings. This thesis argues that utilising a single framework for studying IR restricts research and inhibits further consideration of British foreign policy. It limits the research and analytical techniques available for academically rigorous studies. This has been a subject of dissent by many other scholars of social science. Sumner (1940) argues that making the difference between realities from the rest, requires methods that critical to test all propositions offered for acceptance. In a significant analysis of essentialist approaches to IR study, O’Tuathail (1996) calls for approaches that deconstruct its exclusive narratives. He follows the Weber (1949b) school of thought in emphasising how social meaning and action developed over time can be transformative and creative. He views classic IR as having developed much the same way and, therefore, contends in line with Mills (1959) that social science research problems ‘could only be adequately formulated if both troubles and issues, and both biographies and histories and the range of all their intricate relations’ (Mills, 1959, p. 226) are investigated.

Addressing the role of research, Weber (1978, p. 4) defines it as, ‘interpretative understanding of social action ... provides causal explanation of its course and consequences’. In response to the problem of traditional IR and the burden of research, this project will utilise identified theoretical models and a case study to provide a narrative account, with the purpose of creating a better understanding of British political parties as actors in foreign policy.

1.2.1. Theoretical and Analytical Framework
Simply to describe a foreign policy is to engage in geopolitics, for one is implicitly and tacitly normalising a particular world. Thus locating IR as geography because geography is a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organise, occupy and administer space (O’Tuathail, 1996, p. 1)

The hypothetical models helped determine the selected research methodologies (Sackett & Wennberg, 1997) however; epistemological and ontological considerations played an equally important role (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). These provide the theoretical and philosophical foundations
and pillars that support and guide the manner and style of researching. Creswell (2004) in a thorough study of research methods underscores the need for a researcher to identify the values that their selected theoretical approaches implant into processes of inquiry. Yet, in the study of IR, the science has not been as contested as in any other area (Rengger, 2000). He further notes that studies have not debated the question of theory in this area of research. Vickers (2003) identified specifically that in relation to domestic politics, foreign policy is under theorised. Accordingly, she credits the tendencies to focus on the State, as a monolithic entity, for sustaining discrepancies in foreign policy analysis.

From the foregoing, a researcher needs to position and have clarity on the principles that guide their study. In IR inquiries, there are significant concerns about the extent to which classical theories dominates the field, both methodologically and conceptually. These provide meta-narratives, which disqualify the use of other methods as outside the normalised nature of geopolitics (Agnew & O’Tuathail, 1992). Foucault (1980), warned against this in a discussion of the interplay between power and knowledge. As such as a researcher, I am sceptical, as a matter of principle, of all claims of truth, which I believe, have a role to normalising dominant perspectives. Shapiro (1991) condemns claims to truth and modernity by any theory, as suspicious attempts to silence the people’s historical struggles to create knowledge and understanding.

To this end, this study follows this school of thought and employs methods that attempt to discover narratives of foreign policy that have not been universalised. This study’s methodological design avoids approaching IR as if it were a linear and smooth surface for theorising but treats it as neither stable nor singular (O’Tuathail, 1996). I have already taken this philosophical position, in my Master’s thesis where I argued that humanist and traditional narratives of IR tend to dismiss local forms of knowledge in ways that are disempowering as they unjustifiably disqualify and subjugate national debates on foreign policy (Sibanda, 2008). My contention, therefore, is that classical IR models are not correct in being dismissive of national participation in foreign policy. Understanding national political
party participation in IR will allow the development of critical understanding of both UK politics and external relations.

Set within the above arguments Kant’s (2005) argument that the adult task of life and responsibility towards being free should include being critical in reflecting about all forms of art and sciences that shape lives, instead of blindly accepting all influences, reinforces the need for theoretical and methodological plurality. This argument underpins this author’s selection and use of methodologies for collecting and processes of presenting the data as Creswell (2004) suggests. Given the scholarly suggestions above, as a researcher, my partialities are minimal, in that I do not accept any position is necessarily the true position. In this, this author follows the schools of thought of practical philosophers such as Deleuze and Foucault. This writer agrees that theories and concepts that allow the mere reproductions of accurate views of the world are valuable. However, he also argues that those that challenge the form and structure of thinking are transformative. Other esteemed thinkers argue in terms similar to those that constitute the foundations of this theoretical conjecture. Freud, Nietzsche and Spinoza argued for analytical theory that avoids ‘passively mirroring or representing the world, but allows new methods and possibilities and thereby creates a world’ (Jones & Roffe, 2009). Ryan (1995) describes this as an approach to writing that embraces constructed and constructive nature of all work: that is the relationship between theory and its proponents, which means all work is subject to criticism because the writer is just as much in control of their work in the same way it controls them.

Given Haraway’s (1991) contentions regarding the problem of knowledge production and the history of the two countries in this case study; it is important to develop a theoretical framework for dealing with both data collection and analysis. Until recently, the general belief in research is that it is rational, objective and a neutral pursuit. The theory is that scientists are specialists who gather data and evaluate it using non-biased and homogeneous techniques. The first weakness of this assumption is that in the real world data ‘harvesting’ is impossible because knowledge is not somewhere waiting to
the collected. Rather, it also is subject the circumstances surrounding its creation, reinforcement and reproduction. Thus, standardised methods and procedures of data collection limit its validity of the information gathered. The claims by most are researchers to follow this approach are now waning faced down by new approaches. These, instead, consider knowledge as a contextualised creation. In fact, Haraway (1988) in a discussion of ‘situated knowledge’ established that knowledge production lacks neutrality and is constructed, partial, situated and positioned. Earlier in her work in 1991, Haraway dismissed claims of ‘objectivity’ as a parable that failed to show how such research could be undertaken. The relationship and the history between the UK and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe are subject to narratives that look objective but also contextualised and subjective. In designing the methods and collecting data, the author consciously considers the creative nature of making knowledge.

Following on from these scholarly interventions, this thesis utilises postmodern constructionism schools of thought to design and structure the overall thinking about the methods described below. This researcher is conscious that this step of explaining the philosophical and epistemological grounding for this project may attract criticism as either unnecessary diversion or some other reason. However, this writer argues that providing a context is a crucial step in proving the reader with indications of where the weakness and possible biases of the work maybe located and, therefore, empower the reader to construct their own realities out of the provided narrative. This study partly challenges the rigidity of classically IR theories, to avoid making the same mistake of seeking to provide the only truth, by hiding the study’s conceptual epistemological and philosophical context. This promotes literature development and progress through provoking scepticism and further research.

The selection of research methodologies for this study considered appropriateness and relevance to the study hypothesis and models. Whilst this researcher is aware of the inherent risks, he paid limited attention to whether classical researchers would accept the study with the either the political or IR mould.
Despite making arguments above about the weaknesses of techniques that rely on official sources, this study combines multiple qualitative methods including a case study, documentary research and formal modelling. Combining methods is tremendously beneficial in the study of IR as each method can compensate to the weakness of other methods (Bennet & Elman, 2007). The study aim to expand knowledge away from the limits of the generic IR requires methodological multiplicity, as advocated for by Monroe (2005). Howard (2010) supports this, in his study of methodological debates in IR research finds that researching ‘without a priori privileging one over the other’ has two instructive achievements: allows critical engagement and the empowering of both the reader and researcher.

1.2.2. Qualitative and Case Study Approaches
Political action should invoke a rethinking of resistance and authority in a way that traces a path between these two terms so that one does not merely reinvent a place of power (Newman, 2001, p. 53).

The question being asked determines the appropriate research architecture, strategy and tactics to be a used-not tradition, authority, experts, paradigms, or schools of thought (Sackett & Wennberg, 1997, p. 1636).

In concurrence with the conceptual framework of this study, its research designs resist the need align itself with methodological popularity and justifiability. There is sufficient academic for this approach. Renowned and peer reviewed experts on ‘research design’, Sackett and Wennberg, (1997) lament the loss of ‘intellectual and emotional energy’ by researchers while comparing and contrasting research methods. They find that instead of asking: what the best method is and argue that the better question will be to ask, which paradigm is the most appropriate for the question. In addition, this postmodern leaning study avoids recreating or reinforcing ‘methods’ or ‘disciplines’ of power by concentrating on the need to answer the question (Prakash & Klotz, 2007). They argue that selecting designs based on ‘truth’ claims is like engaging in ‘a political process of defining the legitimate methodological

Given the above outline of this study’s philosophical and theoretical background it is imperative to explain the choice a qualitative research design. The momentum that qualitative research has gained over the last century (Baker, et al., 1961) is in part a huge testimony that many scholars recognise it as a strong mode of inquiry. Shank (2002) sees qualitative research as an inquiry grounded in the world of experience and capable of systematically uncovering meaning. His lantern metaphor underscores that qualitative research helps shed light in the dark. Like the torch, the researcher ventures into the middle of a situation, and participates, in order to discover and reconcile meaning where none previously existed. Beard and Verma (1991) emphasised the capacity of this method to help focus on life phenomena. Mack, et al (2005) lands further support, to these claims, declaring that this methodology is effective with complex inquiries on elusive matters. Additionally, Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p. 3) view qualitative researchers as scientists who ‘study things in their natural settings attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring them’.

However, Atkinson (2001) rightly pointed out that the term qualitative research is an ‘umbrella’ for a number of approaches that fall under it. This broader point requires attention to avoid a philosophical conflict in view of this study’s own metaphysical grounding. The first question is should we discuss the qualitative versus quantitative (Prakash & Klotz, 2007). The second problem is that if I follow or approach this study by elevating one category of research over the other (Barkin, 2007) this would sharply contradicts the stated theoretical aims of challenging the methodological rigidity of traditional techniques.

The inflexible methodological classification and alignment to study disciplines circumscribes professional enclaves, while helping prevent cross-subject analysis. This tends to understand the social sphere through epistemologically trained lenses. These provide a sense of subject pride by providing
an analysis bulb from which aligned research boundaries, tools, procedures, concepts and theories. Chapter 3 discussed this at length critiquing the separation of national and international politics, as a matter of principle, in IR. The chapter will show how this confines the creation, enforcement and reproduction of knowledge within the confines of the instruments allowed by the bubble (Berger, et al., 1973). Crotty (1998) indicates that such locus points are capable of socially instituting and constituting structures that regulate practice, competences and performances (Derrida, 1992b) in research. This study seeks to be consistent with postmodern notions of knowledge production that resist authority and claims of ‘truth’ to sustain hegemony (Foucault, 1994).

Following the scholarly work above and commitment to postmodernity the use of a category of research methods, this study justifies the use of qualitative methods as Derrida (1997a; 1997b) suggests. His approach is that all academic endeavours must promote self-criticism, self-reform and self-education. Additionally, the methodological selection does not prevent the future use of classical techniques instead it opens debate on the ‘complexities and issues that have been ignored and suppressed’ (Kilduff, 1993, p. 13) by the cherished and popular practices of inquiry. The study successfully challenges State-centred traditional theories of IR but avoids focusing on the shortcomings of other research approaches and their inherent value. The selection of methods involves interrogating them for their ability to provide valid and useful answers to the questions. Rather the use of techniques depended on their ability to overcome limitations where others would succumb when confronted with the question at hand.

Following on from the above, this study further positions itself clearly in terms of its nature and that of qualitative research. Given that this study needs to paint a holistic historic picture, of the undocumented policy dynamics within political parties, it requires an insider research design (Geothals, et al., 2004). Qualitative methods can achieve this while simultaneously helping derive meaning from the idiosyncrasies of the two states hence its appropriateness for this task. Thus, the study relied on qualitative methods. The author is aware that there is a growing amount of literature
that emphasises the use quantitative designs in IR (Winham, 1969). However, there was no pathway forward for this methodology in this study.

In view of the above, including the explanation of methodology selection rationale, Yin (2003) opines that case-study designs are a viable and valid alternative for researchers embarking on exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory inquiries and are keen on avoiding designs that depend on variable manipulation. He further argues that case study designs add value to interpretive research, which is efficacious in complex real-life phenomenon studies. Consequently, the design is appropriate for the current study in which the context is inseparable from the various variables under study. His definition of a case study is perhaps the most thought provoking of his contributions. It is an ‘inquiry that uses multiple sources of evidence to investigate contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, in which the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2003, p. 13). Denzin (1989) views cases study as capable of facilitating interpretive interactionism allowing the researcher an ability to describe and phenomenon thoroughly. In his extensive writing on case study, he finds that it allows one to understand this differently from prevailing circumstances. Interpretive approaches are now widespread use in contemporary policy studies, because of its utility in ‘highlighting the contingency, diversity and contestability of beliefs, narratives and expertise that inform political action’ (Bevir, et al., 2013, p. 163).

Additionally, (Good & Scates, 1954) suggests that a case study is useful for testing hypothesis and the establishment of cause and effect (Cohen & Manion, 2001). Accordingly, this study utilises data to test two theoretical propositions to establish the causal effect of political thinking on the research’s hypothetical models. Additionally and in accordance with Becker (1970) and Easthope (1974), case studies help amplify research in life histories. Similarly, since this study partly sees the relationship between the two countries through the eyes of political actors, a case study approach is valuable.
1.2.3. Data Collection and Analytical Techniques

This section considers research techniques used to collect and analyse data. This study employs a variety of data collection methods. Documentary sources provided background information and an understanding of policy issues, actors, histories and dynamics between the two states. These included reports, biographies, websites, newsletters and public and conference publications, from political parties, interests groups and government. In addition, British national and international news media and literature archives helped provide information pertinent to understanding temporal cultural background. Interviews were one of the main means of gathering data because people could help provide an in depth information. These were semi-structured discussions with IR elites and activist.

1.2.3.1. Documentary Sources

Bryman (2004) notes that the term ‘documents’ refers to a wide variety of data sources and that can be categorised into major types. These include personal, official, private, mass media and the internet. Bailey (1994) characterised documentary research methods a cost effective way of gathering and analysing information from documents that refer to the study of phenomenon. Scrutinising documents is beneficial for originating new data from old information but can also be useful for supplementing other forms of data collection such as in-depth interviews (Hakim, 1982). This project engaged data from multiple sources ranging from official to personal sources.

Nonetheless, some scientists have accused this method of data collection of weaknesses that render them non-scientific. As such, Thompson and McHugh (1995) question the reliability of theory triggered through documentary analysis. Hughes (2000) responded effectively by pointing out the lack of evidence to such the claim. Nonetheless, these criticisms are from this study’s theoretical standpoint invalid. This is because, methods cannot be wrong or right they can only be fit or unfit for purpose. Putting it this way is a more generous statement as Sackett and Wennberg, (1997) criticised such a debate a waste of ink, paper and readers’ precious time.
Other criticisms of documentary research especially in relation to its relationship with context and identity include the possibility of bias and selectivity in terms of the documents and data. The valid claim is that a researcher maybe inclined to use or ignore information depending on their dispositions politically, socially and economically. This is not necessarily the case because bias is a crucial subject in all research regardless of methodology or technique. Fischer (2003) made this broader point that the researcher will always bring the baggage of their social life into research. However, to ensure some validity, the study employs John’s (1990) four criteria:

1. Credibility – to ensure that data was free from errors or any distortions
2. Authenticity – the researcher has to make sure they know data the sources of the data and that the data is genuine.
3. Representativeness – ensuring the data flows with the rest of the evidence, that it relates to the study
4. Meaning – ensuring that the evidence can be understood and interpreted meaningfully

In an extraordinarily detailed treatise of data collection, Scott (1990) finds these steps to have great utility for generation of information necessary to understand a long-term historical phenomenon. Given that the difficult relationship between the UK and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is both current and historical, a full understanding of this subject relied on the analysis of data that relates to the present and the past. Documentary searches helped the researcher to connect with the various times, places and people who lived through the UK and Rhodesia. Interestingly, the extensive examination of selected documents allows the establishments of connections between different data in ways that enable the development theories the same way as other methods (Forster, 1994). This study utilises the following data sources; policy reports, autobiographies, diaries, committee papers, correspondence, school magazines, textbooks, logbooks, newspapers, local registers, websites and visual sources such as photographs, videos, parliamentary papers, pamphlets, speeches and memoirs.
1.2.3.2. Semi-structured interviews

Classical IR research is a preserve for the highflying specialists; all research takes their perspective. The first model for exploration through this study will utilise these views. However, a challenging proposition, suggests that national political parties have a role in IR policy. As such, data collection includes views from both the elites and the domestic political activists. The background and proficiencies of the individuals involved are different; the subject matter is new and complex. In view of this, semi-structured interviews are a better method for gathering data to explore the perceptions and opinions on this elusive matter while allowing for the exchange of further information and clarity (Barriball & While, 1994). This is especially true when collecting data from people with different levels of education and personal histories. The researcher can standardise the quality and depth of data acquired by actively compensating for these differences. Semi-structured interviews allow the use of adapted techniques that regulate the method, for best results (Barriball & While, 1994). Gordon (1975) argues that the aim of this method is to equalise everything to ensure that answers are as intended by the interviewee, rather than differences emanating from other things, such as, different understanding of the same question (Denzin, 1989). This technique will do so because it allows a researcher to divert from the structured interview guide and try to get clarity or clarify understanding of the question or issues (Zeisel, 1987).

Additionally, given the ideological nature of politicians, semi-structured interviews provided necessary flexible temporal overlaps between data-collection, analysis and theory building. Denzin (1989) argues that these are crucial in the study of complex subjects and interviewees. Modifying the guidelines and being able to adjust the interviewing techniques minimised the effects of any power and control dynamics that could arise from the social and environment contexts. Throughout the data collection process, the interviewer also actively searched for and dealt with his own ideological preconceptions (Nast, 1997) by, when appropriate, exposing them to the interviewees who would rebut them.
1.2.4. Discourse Analysis

As an overriding approach to the analysis of the data collected, this project will employ discourse analysis approaches. Potter and Wetherell (2001) suggest that discourse analysis originated from a mix of philosophical, sociological and literary theories. Wooffitt (2005) adds that it enhances the appreciation of a phenomenon and relations on the bases of interactions. Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009) emphasised the importance of the web of power relations noting that discourses are both constructed by the speaker and constructive of the speaker. Put simply we are part of the relationships we make and the relationships we make also make us in return. This is particularly valuable to the case study in this project. According to Vickers (2003) the Rhodesia crisis lingered longer than many other diplomatic issues in Britain’s domestic and international political arena.

This technique allows the researcher to analyse the texts, not just in terms of what it said or how it manifests itself but also in terms of its effects on society and policy (Barnes & Gregory, 1997). This school of thought is in line with Foucault’s theory that sometimes places, structures and organisations do not exist entirely outside the realm of culture. Given this, the focus here was not on just what the data reveals but also on what that would have meant in its time, given the prevailing relations. Additionally, the analysis embodies the understanding that although cultures originate their own narratives, they are equally transformative and can invent new realities and values (Thrift, 1995). Expressed differently, this texts and narratives can be part of the processes of reproducing certain ideologies, values and philosophies as natural and universal truths, for example, these texts or presentations maybe part of a power relation struggle (Bacchi, 2000; Fairclough, 2000). Data is not innocent! Thus, data produced through interviews or documentary search may be part of power relations structures, for example, reproducing the classic thought that the local political party is just a culture consumer when it comes to foreign policy. In the case study the analysis for competing positions and claims while exposing their interconnectedness and how social and political contexts, at the most basic and yet pervasive level, shape them (Potter & Wetherall, 2001).
Additionally, Edelman (1998) opines that even if there was no other reason research should actively utilise or study discourses because they regulate *how we know, how we interpret the world and our shared understanding of events*. To Shaw (2010), it is the analysis of the interplay between language and other interactions to produce knowledge. This *priori* becomes the tacit assumption that codes human understanding of reality (2000). Fischer (1998) adds that discourse analysis explains through tracing the undercurrents that inscription collective practices and interfaces onto our realities. Thus, studying society requires a deeper analysis than just the application of academic structure to one’s work. Hence this study falls in line with Mills’ (1959) contention that the problems of social science are sufficiently articulated, when such comprises the exploration of dilemmas and disputes, both the accounts and history, and the range of their sophisticated associations.

By embracing discourse analysis as the analytical framework, this researcher, I have positioned myself as neutral on the subject before collecting information for analysis. The study uses Parker’s (1992) framework for distinguishing discourses before analysing them separately. This framework involves identifying Parker (1999) later interconnected institutions (Facchini, 2007), power (Pollak, 1975; Nyambara, 2000) and ideology (Guelke, 1980; Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004; Somerville, 1984) provides data to support for any of the research models.
1.3. Methodological Practice

In 1999, I began my career as a political activist, working then as an exuberant youthful activist. This involved doubling up as a member of an elitist policy network (Zimbabwe Policy Network - ZPN) and a President of the National Union of Students in Polytechnic and Technical colleges (NUSPOTECH). ZPN membership included distinguished lawyers and academics Bulawayo, who wanted to develop an understanding of other countries’ policy attitudes towards the country. This would inform strategic responses and messaging techniques for the opposition forces, allowing the maximisation of foreign aid. The students union that I led was quite oblivious of these policy initiatives; instead, it believed that exerting internal pressure would force change. My invitation to this group indicated its understanding of the relationship between local and foreign pressure. I eventually helped coordinate the students’ actions on broader issues that the network was dealing with. These positions in Zimbabwe were in the British context equivalent to what it would be as a leader of the Trade Union Congress (TUC). At this point, I began to notice clearly how non-state led foreign policy initiatives worked and how their connection to a local political organisation was useful to the overall agenda. Thus, in practical terms I observed the blurring of the line between the foreign and the national.

In 2001, as President of the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union (ZINASU) I joined another initiative called the Zimbabwe Crisis Group (CRISIS). Initial members of this group’s steering committee included some of the most elite academics in the country. These were Thoko Matshe, Brian Kagoro, Professor Brian Raftopoulos, Professor John Makumbe, Tony Reeler, Wellington Chibebe and me. The last two were leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and ZINASU respectively. Today, the Crisis Coalition is a leading with regional offices in Johannesburg that now has a strong international policy remit for democracy campaigns. Within this organisation just like my role working as National Coordinator of Zimbabwe’s Broad Alliance, I realised how local organisations participated in and influenced foreign policies of both Zimbabwe and other countries. I was responsible for communication between an alliance of all pro-democracy organisations and the world at large.
By 2003, my role evolved to include visits to foreign capitals and meeting with heads of states and foreign affairs experts. I visited the Americas, Scandinavia and mainland Europe. Led by these experiences, I believed that foreign policy was more than a preserve of the selected few. As a result, between 2005 and 2008, I carried out smaller studies in this area both for my undergraduate and master’s degrees. These enquiries relied on formal sources for data collection and analysis. From these experiences, I developed a critical view of the orthodox notion of IR. I questioned the positions which hold foreign policy as an art exclusive for statecraft specialists in which domestic politics in negligible.

In 2009, I began this formal research. I wanted to explore foreign policy in general. I used the UK’s foreign policy on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe as a case study by interrogating the participation of political parties in international politics. This study theorises that part of the problem with understanding existing IR narratives was methodological. As such, I sought a design that would allow the addition of new knowledge.

I searched JSTOR history, international relations and policy databases for literature covering the entire history of both Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe. I intended to build an understanding of those areas of IR that are unclear or lack agreement on, firstly, and secondly as Hackim, (1993) indicates to cross-examine and analyse them. After reviewing the literature, I found myself building a list of possible elite and activist interviewees. Additionally, the use of literature generated through multi-design provided good data for the determination of idiographic causations. This aligns with Mills’ (1959) contention that such an approach to science draws on a whole network of intertwined issues allowing growth and progress in IR theory. Analysing existing data using techniques that separate superficial and complementary narratives provides an alternative approach.

Cognisant of the above, earlier on in this project, I reviewed and analysed relevant contextual issues relating literature on IR theories and documents specific to the case study. Additionally, I spent a lot
of time in the political archives for both the Conservative and Labour parties, sifting through large amounts of materials. Specifically, this was at the People’s Library in Manchester and the Conservative Archives in Oxford. I followed this up with contacting individuals that I had identified through literature for interviews. During the interviews, I sought clarification on issues arising from both literature and the data. In relation to the case study I collected data from 1890 right up to the present period. However, in doing so I was guided by the results of preliminary research which revealed various times in which Rhodesia/Zimbabwe featured more prominently in British Politics. The table in Appendix 3 shows the timeframe under consideration in the case-study.
1.4. Research Hypothesis and Study Models

1.4.1. Hypothesis
The preliminary research and search for data as set in the section above provided evidence that two competing positions currently trap research in international politics. Scholars tend to follow the dictates of IR theory, yet studies that are more recent have encouraged the investigation into other possible variables in IR such as ideology. The general perspective of classical IR, in relation to ideology, as informed by the beliefs of such authors as Hans Morgenthau, is that ideology introduces rigidity into a country’s foreign policy (Malament, 1970). Given the foregoing, this thesis tests the hypothesis that British Foreign Policy towards Rhodesia and Zimbabwe disproves the orthodox IR position that party political ideology’s role in foreign policy is minimal. It will seek to use the case study to show that these are active in many foreign policy endeavours.

1.4.2. Models
The exploration of data to test the above hypothesis started with a preliminary literature review. This yielded evidence that confirmed my disconcertion with the discourses on IR research models. Brecher (1999) a respected former president of the reputable International Studies Association (ISA) decried the backward and stagnant nature of IR research caused theoretical intolerance, closed-mind mentality and flawed but dominant dichotomies. Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahnias (2004) argue that different approaches would engender a prolific understanding of IR and promote it extensively. He also contends that the synthesising of all these competing theoretical claims has the potential of transforming the area into a genuine social science discipline. Additionally, I found data relating to foreign policy positions and to possible influences from local political parties. Renowned authors such as Vickers (2003) strongly argue for the development of new theories in relation to the intersection of foreign policy and national politics. Rengger (2000) contests the separation of political theory from IR narratives and research. From this, it was clear that I faced two challenges, in enormous magnitude for a young researcher, still seeking validation and space in the field. Firstly, I had to challenge established theoretical concepts and secondly attempt to provide challenging supposition. As such,
the project’s acceptability is in the balance because the dominant elitist structures of the field can dismiss it out rightly. Secondly, without any accreditation to one of the *Ivory Towers* of capital cities or one of the prestigious Universities, further threats, such as securing examiners presented serious challenges. For these reasons, this study seeks no validation but contributes to the field by adding a dissenting voice and intriguing a different thought. Only the strength of the study’s hypothetical models, the methodology and analytical approaches are the tools for authentication of the work acceptable to the author. Thus, the study collects and analyses data on the bases to two hypothetical models:

1. The classical view of IR is that the UK’s attitude to foreign policy in general and on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in particular is the product of pragmatic and reactive approaches.
2. The challenging view of IR is that the UK’s attitude to foreign policy follows the same ideological prism as domestic policy.
1.5. Justification of study

The despair in Britain surrounding the situation in Zimbabwe in the last decade illustrates this point, for it was a colony, and then a country, that twice ‘got away’ from Britain and British influence, once in the 1960s under Ian Smith, and then again in the 1990s under Robert Mugabe (Jackson, 2007, p. 1361).

UK foreign policy influences many events in most third world countries, dating back to Great Britain’s Empire. This situation is even more so in Sub-Sahara Africa, a region that has been grappling successive phases of political, humanitarian and economic turmoil, ever since the end of colonisation. Even the seemingly glamorous UK policy to promote ‘good governance, human rights and sound economic policies’ (Lloyd, 1999; Vereker, 2002) faces serious limitations and resistance in the continent but is most pronounced in Zimbabwe (Porteous, 2005). In fact, Porteous (2005) argues that British policy options have limited the countries options and emboldened the Zimbabwean regime. Evidently, there is so much at stake for millions of people, hence the need for a clearer understanding of the forces that have historically driven and drive the UK’s Zimbabwe policy.

Classical models would position the Commonwealth as a tool for strengthening the UK geopolitically. Certainly, the historical power relations within the club provide Britain with its colossal influence within the club. Notably, however, on the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe this, military force and economic superiority failed to achieve desired foreign policy outcomes or avoid a global sense of a weakening and timid waning superpower (Ryan, 2004). The inability by both Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Blair to use British advantage and acceptance that the military action was not an available option was for them testifies against orthodox theories of IR (Watts, 2005; Stothard, 2003). Expectedly but amazingly unsophisticated, most researchers on failed UK policies in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe continue to blame different administrations (Ryan, 2004; Taylor & Williams, 2002; Coggins, 2006). Nonetheless, most of the authors have yet to check if the appropriateness of their classical approaches to answering this IR question were incapable of producing different answers. Surely, if leaders had been the
problem then why would Rhodesia or Zimbabwe have been the only exception as their common failure?

This thesis attempts to deal with these by tapping into the widespread consensus that contemporary foreign policy analysis is still theoretically limited by the exaggerated divide between foreign policy and domestic policy (Armitage, 2000; Vickers, 2003; Murphy, 1995; Haggard & Simmons, 1987). Hence, as has already been established, in the current case study, researchers have produced the same answer and without achieving or producing any actionable knowledge to help policy makers improve the prospect for British policy in Zimbabwe. As Drezner (2011) puts it, researchers like to discuss the content of foreign policy instead of the tedious, complex and dynamic processes that inform and form it, leading to limited theory with the field. Moreover, many inquiries tend to generalise on foreign policy, thereby, minimising domestic sources of IR while emphasising government processes and events abroad, which they credit with providing IR content and conduct (Rosenau, 1969).

This thesis responds to the novel call for studies of international politics that avoid the analysis of IR away from its events and essences as interpreted through the lenses of dominant statecraft theories. It achieves this by focusing on the dynamics and practices that ingrain foreign policy events, times and essences (O'Tuathail, 1996). Secondly, the particular expectation for the UK to take a leading role, when there is a human catastrophe in a commonwealth country means that the responsibility upon British policy-makers remains remarkably high and is likely to continue for the near future (Chan & Mudhai, 2001). Thus understanding political party roles in setting the foreign policy agenda (O'Tuathail, 1996) may help change the future of politics on the international stage and perhaps lead to future IR successes in Zimbabwe. The UK has a vital role and influences sub-Saharan Africa greatly, thus the need for policy refinements and successes is overwhelming. Additionally, the resurgent discovery of domestic politics as a fruitful area for research in IR, (Armitage, 2000; Bryman, 2004) this study is an alternative perspective which contributes a new dimension to the study of IR and facilitates - 30 -
further research. The hope is that it may contribute to better-streamlined British approaches to IR in the south.

Vickers (2004) a highly regarded scholar in the study of both political and IR theories is one of the first to make the call for an expansion of IR, complaining that political party foreign policy remains both under-researched and under-theorised. She opines that scholars tend to assume that foreign policy takes place at the state level as a monolithic entity. Vickers is a leader in the movement to bridge the gap between domestic and foreign policy, of the Labour Party offering her theories through writings, research, international conferences and educational seminars. Murphy leads in this area as well, but he specialises on the Conservative Party policy. Like Vickers (2003), Murphy (1995) calls for additional research that would unpack IR into its constitutive parts. His approach to foreign relations is particularly relevant to this project because he has done some research on the Conservative Party decolonisation policy in Kenya. His model provides a basis upon which foreign policy study is in terms that relate not just to government, but also to dynamics within which statecraft takes place.

Furthermore, a study of this nature is rare in British politics and policy considering that the researcher is an outsider to the UK politics. The study adds to the pool of knowledge from an African perspective. As Bridges (2002), notes an outsider view can contribute to better understanding of the subject and the community involved as it shakes up the existing systems by providing a completely different take on an issue.

Finally, a review of literature shows that most researchers have tended to concentrate on particular leaders and particular periods (Facchini, 2007; Coggins, 2006; Owen, 2003). A wide review of the literature reveals that most researchers have maintained the 'disconnect' between different leaders' policies at different times, whereas establishing such links would evidently, help further simplify the already disjointed history of international relations (Eric, 1988). However, even in terms of academic research in its entirety, British foreign policy literature remains scant as researchers focus on areas of
military participation. Kenya is an African example where considerable numbers of British academic work is comparatively superior as the Royal Forces fought against Mau Mau rebels (Cowen, 1982; Darwin, 1991; Murphy, 1995). However, there is no doubt that UK’s top diplomats have spent more time on Zimbabwe than they have had to with most countries where the UK has taken military action. In any case, the UK could have gone to war in Zimbabwe if it heeded calls from the media and several other sources has on several occasions, recently and in the past (Watts, 2005; Evans, 2008; Lamb, 2007).
1.6. Ethical Considerations
The major part of this study took place in libraries and other documentary archives; contact with other people was minimal. As such, general ethical considerations were relevant. Cognisant of the researcher’s responsibility towards the public, the research profession, the University and the subject, I maintained highly scientific standards in collecting and analysing data. Furthermore, I maintained impartiality, to the extent humanly possible in assessing and reporting the findings.

This study utilised interviews with selected individuals and groups. Since the participants were not vulnerable individuals, there were no safeguarding concerns. However, I still developed strategies to ensure, the safety of all participants and those of my own, from directly or indirectly harm. The project strictly observed privacy laws by instituting, amongst others, methods such as data encryption technology and safe keeping methods, under lock and key, of all confidential data and any records of personal information. Additionally the study undertook deliberate and conscious efforts to eliminate chances of deliberately or inadvertently causing detriment to any social group (The Social Research Association, 2003). In dealing with interview participants, I guaranteed informed consent and provided adequate information about their rights before, during and after the interview. I also observed the University of Huddersfield’s rules and regulations on ethical research.
1.7. Health and Safety Considerations
Although this study considered health and safety concerns, with most of the work having taken place in libraries and within the University there were minimal risks. Nonetheless, health and safety rules and procedures were observed. I took guidance from University’s rules and guidelines.
1.8. Outline
This section lays out the report format while providing a summary of each Part and Chapters within them. The overall arrangement of this report is a vital part of both its structure but also the study and analysis.

1.8.1. Part One: Introductory and Literary Treatise
This part consists of chapters one and two, which introduces the study and provides a literature review. Chapter 1 provides the introduction of this project including the associated theoretical and empirical anxieties. Thus, it outlines the conceptual problem and research hypothesis. The central hypothesis is that a study of relations between the UK and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe reveals that foreign policy is not a merely reactive phenomenon, divorced from the ideology that shapes domestic policy. Also included is a detailed section on qualitative data collection and the two models constructed using preliminary literature.

Chapter 2 is the literature review. It provides a deep treatise of classical IR theories. This extensive consideration supports the analytical methodology, which requires an understanding of the construction of theories. A study of perspectives on political parties and ideology follows this before moving on to the main discussion on these. This analysis the political parties’ ideological priorities in their foreign policy debates and positions. The conclusion identifies a deficiency of empirical research based theory on the relationship between national and international politics.

1.8.2. Part Two: Britain and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
This part has three chapters and is primarily an examination of secondary and primary data, which is relevant to the case study. Chapter 3 considers the full history of Rhodesia following it thematically, to address the colonial and post-colonial periods in detail because the extent of the detail is essential for identifying party attitudes, policy orientation, before addressing contentious issues such as the land question. Considering all the issues relating to the colonisation, management and independence of Rhodesia in British foreign and domestic politics with a special emphasis on the history, achieves
the aforementioned. It identifies the period in which the Conservative Party helped imperial entrepreneurs break the rules in order to accomplish their business of colonising. It exploits the management of the newly acquired colonies by the government in London and explores how it allowed its foreign policy the colonialists to manage their own. It shows how this became a precedent for future conflict. Coincidentally, the Conservative Party oversaw the finishing part of Rhodesia transition into an independent Zimbabwean state. Given Prime Minister Thatcher’s strong capitalist values the final agreement embedded concrete protections of the rights of the rich land owners. The new Zimbabwean government could not easily rearrange property ownership, especially land, living it vulnerable to a racial minority because the country’s primary economy is agro based.

Chapters 4 and 5 are similar in that they consider the complete historic period of the colony. Because the project is a study of both IR perspectives and the challenging ideological approaches, these chapters reflect this. These start by identifying issues of regular recurrence within party politics and categorises them as valuable. Not surprisingly, racism and land tenure evidently appeared key to the relationship, as Britain had legal authority for their administration.

1.8.3. Part Three: Analysis and Conclusion: The Content of British Foreign Policy
This part analyses and concludes the project, in last two chapters. Chapter 6 analyses the attitudes of the Conservative and the Labour Parties’ to establish a connection between their principles and those found in foreign policy. The chapter makes the link between domestic and foreign policy. With this done Chapter 7, tests the hypothetical models and utilises the analysis in Chapter 6 to conclude that indeed there is evidence of ideology in foreign policy.
1.9. Summary
Despite Britain’s geopolitical status as a superpower, Zimbabwe has been a nag in her international relations and politics since about 1893. The chapter starts by identifying the limitations of classical IR theories and identifying the gap for an alternative study based on a challenging or alternative model. It then turns attention to drawing on international relations and policy analysis theoretical models to identify key themes and dynamics in the development of British political party policy in relation to Zimbabwe. A detailed discussion of the theoretical and philosophical background follows. Methodologies and study designs are outlined in terms of how they connect with both the problem and the philosophical underpinnings of the study. This section ended with a discussion and justification of specific data collection and analysis methods and their fitness for purpose.

Additionally, this chapter provides a strong justification for the study by indicating the gaps and limitations of exclusive classical approaches to foreign relations, as identified in the literature. Furthermore, this chapter establishes a hypothesis and articulates the intention to use theoretical models to understand the role, place and impact of British political parties in international policy formulation dynamics. Finally, the chapter provides an indication on the possible limitations and delimitations of both the study and the methods, and the measures taken to address them.
1.10. Limitations

The main limitations of this struggle was that contacts with some politicians for interviews were turned down. Tony Benn, Baroness Williams and Lord Hattersley all indicated that they were unable to commit to interviews. However, both Benn and Lord Hattersley chose to provide me with written work that was relevant to my study. However, these challenges did not negatively impact on the study given that its central methodology and design was to carry out a textual analysis that did not overly rely on official accounts, rather methods for understanding the background forces that informed and helped create institutions and actions. Nevertheless, it was learned from this experience that perhaps interviews with politicians needed to be arranged at the start of the project, as this could address the problem of time.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Literary and Theoretical Background

2.1. Introduction
Orthodox approaches to IR, such as realism have dominated the practice and study of foreign policy since the 1930s (Burchill, 2005; Donnelly, 2000). Donnelly (2000) argues that no other theory has given the same level of structure and form to the study of the subject. However, she also notes that this followed the ‘shattering political events’ of the First World War and its aftermath (Donnelly, 2000, p. 10). Predictably, as the main theory of the day, idealism was blamed for either failing to prevent or causing the rise of Bismarck and German militarism; aggressive imperialism and the Boer War; the First and Second World Wars; and the three most its momentous temporal ideologies, Nazism, Fascism and Marxism (Boucher, 1994). Thus, idealism took the blame, and ushered in realism, which used the fear of war as its pillar, upon which to anchor its central concept of power, anarchy and national interests. The desire to prevent war and the military victory of the allied countries, rationale given for why the great wars happened and the insecurity of the cold war period, justified and reinforced realism (Dominguez, 1993).

Similarly, the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe problem played out in this context, over the bulk of the last century. Consequently, these perspectives provide the dominant theoretical assumptions for the practice and study of its relations with Britain. Good’s (1973) fertile analysis of this, entitled, _U.D.I: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion_, provides an appealing example. He tacitly conforms to the hegemonic view that power is the central and only precept or conceptual lens for examining the situation. Realist principles guide his critique of Britain’s relationship with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe because _power_ is ineffective as a means of explaining content and outcomes. The metaphysics and knowledge structure used to plot the argument includes the assumption that power organises and controls the practices, aptitudes and performances of IR. In this rather well thought book, Good
(1973), who is a former diplomat argues that it was Britain’s multi-lateral approach that denied it overall power in the raw against Rhodesia.

Correspondingly, most studies on this subject seem to accept this model and eloquently recite all its hidden, implied and silent assumptions. Taylor and Williams (2002), for example, argue that choices made by diplomatic experts and IR elites are responsible for scattering British power and influence in the world. In order to make this conclusion they rely on realist leaning research and they admit so, within the text. Arguably, just like most IR research the evidence collected is self-serving for many reasons (Wilkinson, 2007). This tends to be so because their epistemology provides the social capital that structures and cultures both the making of knowledge and how we know or understand it (Delueze & Guattari, 2004; Derrida, 1992b; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977b).

Studying the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe crisis in British foreign policy following traditional approaches to IR is problematic. It fails to account for or suggest a successful solution to the problems that the concepts create. For this reason, humans are not considerably wiser for the IR theories about which we have written and the security of nations rests. Concerning Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, several questions arise: Why should this relatively small and poor country with relatively limited political power in IR challenge such a vastly powerful country? Given, its persistence and repetitiveness, are orthodox policies not necessarily adequate foreign relations practice and study? Could ideology be a factor in IR, considering Rhodesia/Zimbabwe’s popularity in British electoral and domestic politics?

Given this dominant traditional theories dict ate the terms of most IR studies. Furthermore, the resultant enquiries are incapable of challenging or disturbing the metaphysical and epistemological foundation of the informing orthodox perspectives because they borrow their rationale from them. To Bellamy (1993, p. 8), these studies lack the full force of the validity, that they confer to traditional assumptions since they overwhelmingly concentrate on justifying ‘political principles without reference to a wider metaphysical system’.
The alternative model suggested in the opening chapter, which avoids dialectically opposing orthodox theories, tests the ability of another approach to explain long-standing IR problems. This model borrows from emerging literature, which doubts the efficacy of the exclusive essentialist theories (Rengger, 2000). This hypothetical approach avoids the limitations besetting traditional research because of the restricted elitism bestowed by the few core premises of the realist versus idealist dichotomy. As Wright (1952) opines, concentrating on these theories and their principles is useless both politically and ethically because its restrictions reduce its scientific capacity to help understand shifting human and political action. Therefore, suggested approach examines established traditions while also investigating the role of other players, such as political parties, in IR (O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Vickers, 2003; Rengger, 2000).

Given this, this chapter engages literature on the metaphysics and epistemologies that underwrite the concepts and issues within IR in general. This includes, in the first section, a bird’s eye view of histories and philosophies of idealism and realism. Thus, it provides that elusive insights into the reasons and rationale for existing theories that are missing in most studies. Additionally, it confers further validity while providing sufficient literary grounding for testing and analysing data, evidence and study hypothesis. More specifically the philosophical approach enables the exposure of similarities and the origins of unified hence normalising essences of dominant perspectives (Alston, 1954).

This literature review will examine literature relating to ontological conceptions of IR, the role of political parties in policy-making and the ideological bases of the relevant British political parties in order to provide a critical understanding of gaps in the literature that the case study addresses.

For the most part, Britain’s ability to deal with Rhodesia seems unreal until a number of factors force a temporary resolution in 1979. In the early 1990s, the problem returns, again forcing Britain to re-engage international institutions on its troubled relationship with Zimbabwe. The chapter concludes that the problem, defied traditional IR assumptions because the smaller nation successfully challenged
Britain in geopolitics. This short summary sets the scene for the case study to be utilised to test the study hypothesis.
2.2. Essentialism: Ontological Conceptions of IR

Idealism was the most prominent IR theory until the end of the First World War and by the 1920s when its replacement by realism had begun (Burchill, 2005; Brightman, 1920). In fact, even as it was starting to decline in influence its proponents believed it was on the rise. This was Brightman’s (1920) claim that by the early 1920s idealism had become more vigorous than it had been the preceding decade. Smith (1920) declared it as most probably the philosophy of the great majority of men. Walker (1993) argues that it is the founding convention in IR theory.

Brightman (1920) notes that idealism as a concept is challenging to define because there are various interpretations. To avoid selecting a favoured definition at the expense of the rest, this researcher focuses on discussing the principles of the concept, instead of the definitions. Hasenclever, et al., (1997) successfully used central variables to identify and distinguish between major theories of international regimes.

However, before focusing on the tenets of idealism it is important to discuss the context within which its ideas were born and survived. As Mills (1959) argues the cultural environment, as characterised by the biographies and histories and all the relevant intricate relations are instrumental in social science research. He encourages an understanding of the complex social forces that are often partly predictable as creators of history and its thoughts. The broad context within which idealism was conceptualised may help highlight its strengths, weaknesses and characteristics. Malcom (2002) therefore notes that realism and are dialectically opposed theories.

Idealist thinkers hold biblical philosophies of the lion and the lamb (Adorno, 1940; Bible Society, 2005), which argue that humanity draws rank and dignity from good will (Pippin, 1991; Kant, 1996; Rintelen, 1977). Thus, humanitarianism and objective values represent the purpose of life instead of competitive desires (Brightman, 1920; Bornhausen, 1932). People therefore ‘should not treat others as a means but always at the same as an end in itself’ (Kant, 1993, p. 30). As such, metaphysically and epistemologically, idealists view reality as primarily cognitive, mentally constructed or otherwise
immaterial. It has no existence separate from what the mind ascribed to it, thus it is impossible to know anything independently from the mind and its ideas (Guyer, et al., 2005). Reality is not fully comprehensible in its own right because its perception is entirely shaped by properties that the mind or schemas of perception ascribe to it, despite having nothing to do with it (Epstein, 2002). As Pippin (1991) puts it, a noumenal world is unknown. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that the ‘conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience’ (Pippin, 1989, p. 33). This is the point of binary opposition between idealism and realism. Idealism in IR relies on ideals, values, beliefs and their importance to human relations to define IR (Rintelen, 1977; Weber, 2005). Societal leaders are those amongst humanity that meet the highest values (Rintelen, 1977; Aristotle, 1987), which they can defend at all cost. Hill (1980) concurs but also dismisses realist utilitarianism for allowing exploitation or manipulation of another in pursuit of survival.

Given the above, there six core principles within idealism (Kegley, 1995). Altruism, charitable nature, vulnerability to evil, desire for peace, faith in internationalism and the hope for a future global society are some of the most prominent. These principles are claimed to be universal and applicable the international relations (Weber, 2005). The assumption is that if one were noble as a citizen, nothing would cause them to change and act brutally and selfishly towards others at the state level. From this point of view, Kengley (1995) argues that the individualistic national interests are similar to those of the collective international system, because moral values are capable of improving the lives of both individuals and states.

However, like realists, idealists hold that the state is the main player in IR (Boucher, 1994). As indicated earlier, idealism holds that leaders are the most noble, therefore they make the state one of absolute morality far and beyond that of the citizens. The state is self-determining and owns its subjects (Jones, 1910). Thus, it is a superior person whose morality is greater than that of all its individuals, who owe their primary obligation to it (1994).
Notably, both idealism and realism are essentialist theories with binary and dialectical positions on humankind and its intrinsic nature. Realists’ primary view is provided by Hobbes:

> In the first place I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power; but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more (Hobbes, 1985, p. 161).

Notably there are multiple strands of realism (Rengger, 2000; Clark, 1999; Bull, 1976) but they all rely on established traditional conventions (Williams, 1996; Keohane, 1982; Clark, 1999; Haggard & Simmons, 1987; Dominguez, 1993). Differences are limited to application, interpretation and emphasis (Morgenthau, 1985) without challenging broader philosophical genomes (Wight, 1991; Walker, 1987), such as Hobbes’ state of nature (Donnelly, 2000; Thucydides, 1972; Wight, 1991) as the dominant metanarratives (Clark, 1999) for determining successful diplomacy (Donnelly, 2000; Machiavelli, 1950; Yurdusev, 2006; Biersteker, 1989). This holds that ‘the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (Orbell & Rutherford, 1973) even for the most benevolent and virtuous. The need for survival is for all human-kind, thus humans are in state of conflict (Clark, 1999; Hobbes, 1985), a ‘war of every man with every man’ (Orbell & Rutherford, 1973, p. 383). Accordingly, humans have no evil nature (Yablo, 1987) it is a simple desire to self-preserve (Hobbes, 1985; Bull, 1981). Accordingly in IR nations need to save their interests at all costs or face catastrophic extinction (Smith, 1986; Machiavelli, 1950). Realism spurned idealism as a backdoor penetration of religion into Catholic Aristotelian school (Brightman, 1920; Malcom, 2002; Brzezinski, 2012; Malcom, 2002) instead they viewed humans as pre-social or animal spirited, in pursuit of existence (Donnelly, 2000; Herz, 1951; Burchill, 2005; Hobbes, 1889; Morgenthau, 1985). As Machiavelli (1950, p. 56) accentuates, ‘how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live,’ and elaborates further that, ‘he who abandons what is done for what should be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation’.
Hobbes elementary human condition explains both political theory (Clark, 1999) and realism. Herein, he argued that individuals faced dire circumstances where they had to ‘kill or be killed’ (Herz, 1951). Burchill (2005, p. 31) sees this as a ‘regrettable but endemic’ truth and Morgenthau (1985, p. 4) summarises that the only way to ‘improve the world (given its inherent nature) is working with human greed (violence and power) and not against it’. While in political theory the state became the moderator of human actions, such a regulator is none existent in IR (Wayman & Deihl, 1994), thus violence it still the rule of the thumb. Consequently, Bull (1981, p. 720) declared that realist ‘entitled to infer that all of what Hobbes says about the life of individual men in the state of nature may be read as a description of the condition of states in relation to one another’. Thus, every nation is in a virtual state of war, one against all and any (Waltz, 1954; Gilpin, 1975) they seek to acquire and sustain a relatively superior position of power (Morgenthau, 1985). It is the extent of a country’s power that determines its position and relative safety within the anarchic state of nature (Burchill, 2005), rather than levels of foreign aid.

Given the above, realists define nations as fundamentally self-obsessed (Smith, 1986) thus the international political system is conflict-based (Donnelly, 2000). Power is thus a supreme player in shaping relations between states (Waltz, 1979). Thus, the proliferation of international organisations such as the UN fails to change the dynamics because they lack sovereignty (Chayes & Chayes, 1995), states still need to acquire more power for securing resources for its subjects (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1994; Frankel, 1996; Wayman & Deihl, 1994; Thucydides, 1972). As such, in geopolitics states seek to increase their power by engaging in power-balancing activities (Waltz, 1979; Keohane, 1986; Morgenthau, 1985; Gilpin, 1975) in order to protect national interests (Rosenau, 1964). This variant of realism came to prominence in the 1930s following the decline of idealism (Weber, 2005; Burchill, 2005).

Morgenthau’s book Politics among Nations argues that ‘the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in
terms of power’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 5). The identification of interests relies on ‘the facts as they actually lend themselves to the interpretation of the theory has put on them, and so do the conclusions at which the theory arrives follow with logical necessity from its premises?’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 3). Firstly, these views expose the belief that making foreign policy simply involves the identification of interests in relation to a state’s power. Secondly, that international politics has an underlying ‘reality’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 7), which systematic scientific methodologies and rigorous theories can reveal.

Views of IR as rational and pragmatic are both reactive and responsive to power. However, power motive for international politics are unclear everyone (Lumsdaine, 1993). As Morgenthau (1985) observes foreign policy is a reactive chess-like game that requires strategic thinking about gaining more power with less means. To these ends, mainstream approaches downplay political theory for its constitutionalism, accountability structures and order, which disqualify it the anarchic international system (Plato & Jowett, 1941).
2.3. The Politics of British Foreign Policy
The recognition of the nexus of IR and political theory sturdiness, especially the huge limitations posed by the governmentality of essentialist traditional approaches to foreign policy grant exceptionality to this work. The study is part of an emerging body of work examining foreign policy in relation to political party ideology. It explores a unique case study and provokes a rethinking of theory and enhances knowledges by adding a new perspective into the field. The growing numbers of researchers who question the privileged status of researching international relations in relation to the exclusive nature of the theoretical bases. This part of this chapter shows the disconnection between the study of British Foreign Policy and the practice of the same.

2.3.1. Theory versus Practise
The study of British foreign policy, like other general studies of international relations, is mainly classical in approach (Bevir, et al., 2013). The dominant study designs are ones that concentrate on individual Prime Ministers, their functionaries and the foreign policy apparatus below them (Coggins, 2006; Porteous, 2005; Fieldhouse, 1984; Kelemen, 2007; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2001; Facchini, 2007). These models tend to explain the behaviour of the British state in terms of the personal factors and abilities of the state leaders (Reynolds, 2000; Steiner, 2004).

There are countless studies that explain the behaviour of the British state in terms of the leader within their particular period (Porteous, 2005; Kelemen, 2007; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2001; Facchini, 2007). For example, the Falklands War is explained only in terms of Thatcher’s attitudes, while the Iraq war is blamed almost entirely in Blair (Steiner, 2004). These tend to be dismissive of other alternative ways of thinking about British Foreign Policy. This is viewed as a strength that plays up British foreign policy apparatus as fervently proud of their apolitical and disciplined nature (Carrington, 2011; Owen, 2012).

In general researchers of British foreign policy seem to feel compelled to record the official account of events simply in accordance with the official record. Although, it would be inappropriate to view
the study of British foreign policy as monolithic, the domination of traditional approaches is evident through literature. Steiner (2004) relies heavily on evidence provided by the FCO and its functionaries. In his treatise the understanding of policy making projects the domination of British foreign policy by the government official institution, expressly the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister. This further propagates the claim that the British Foreign Service is of high calibre (carried out at the highest levels of authority and by the finest) and acts apolitically reverberates in most research, just as much as the assumption that the whole service acts in unison (Steiner, 2004) and in response to the leader. Similarly, the Foreign Secretary as the leader of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is regarded as having good control of British foreign policy (Steiner, 2004). This belief has led to the Secretary enjoying special importance, above their colleagues within the Cabinet.

In terms of its character, studies of British foreign policy tend to pursue and push a nationalistic Anglo-Saxonian view (Wallace, 1991). This view indicates that the Foreign Service is run by very patriotic people who are interested in promoting British exceptionalism abroad. The FCO is presented as a source of national pride that helps distinguish Great Britain from other countries and defends the core elements of national sovereignty while promoting the country’s central values all over the world (Wallace, 1991).

However, there is also a growing literary recognition of the European Union and other modern developments in which Britain needs to assimilate into shared sovereignty. These present a huge challenge to the Magna Carta based Anglo-Saxonian tradition that forms part of the foreign policy rhetoric. This exudes a foreign policy systems that is based on the highest values represented by the intrinsic moral superiority of the English abroad, who stand above the messiness that is found in national politics (Bevir, et al., 2013; Wallace, 1991). Thatcher assured that this system would continue to protect ‘our national identity and our ancient traditions and heritage, which have done so much for the world’ (Thatcher, 1990). This indicates that the historic grandeur of the Britain still plays a central in the foreign policy ideology.
Mainstream analysis focuses on these broad assumptions that foreign policy practice is necessarily about nationhood and national identity. Using this as the vintage point researchers in orthodox theories find it logical to assume that IR elitists are solely guided by the need to protect the nation from the dangerous foreigners (Wallace, 1991). Thus, from their view the state has a legitimate obligation to carry out certain activities, such as war as part of this necessary endeavour. As such, what the state does in this area is both secretive, reactive and pragmatic, because ideology would be too prescriptive and predictable by the enemy. Equally, in foreign policy the British nation has to be projected as acting as one unit, undisturbed by the usual disagreements on home turf. As such, foreign policy is necessarily carried out by those who can be apolitical and simply professional. In response, Wallace (1991) argues that the idea of the national interest and defending against the other, are myths that serve to mobilise populations for domestic allegiance rather than international defence.

However, in the British sense, literature promotes a self-image of national rhetoric and imagery of a self-sustained state that is separate and contained. Nonetheless, this value of nationhood is undercut by Europe and questions the very concept of national identity when the economy and its image depends on markets other than those at home. Thus, despite the continuing debate about different forms of membership to the EU, its expansion and other related issues, it seems that the economic and political classes are aware that in reality the Anglo-Saxon approach contradicts the European imperative. These classes seem to be aware that there is no easy path away from Europe. Similarly, the idea that the FCO and the Prime Minister are totally responsible for British foreign policy is devoid of the fact that the EU has an international presence even though it forms part of that international itself.

There is also an emerging growth in British foreign policy studies and analysis that is constructivist, critical and post structural. However, the mainstream remains largely unmoved (Bevir, et al., 2013; Marsh, 2008b; Frankel, 1963). Traditional approaches continue to simply narrate the actions of the Prime Minister while de-emphasising the role of discourses, beliefs and identities (Fierke, 2007).
new studies tend to read British politics in a critical manner, which involves examining systems, beliefs and traditions and the meanings they provide that shape institutions and actions (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003).

Turning to the actual practice of British foreign policy, it seems to contradict most of the public and research rhetoric (Wallace, 1991) and this gap is continuously growing. Wallace (1991) argues that the actual conception and practice of the UK’s foreign policy is ideologically biased towards the political rhetoric of the Edwardian era. Thus, it has an ideological base position rather than being a purely reactive process that pragmatically follows events. In fact, Bevir, et al, (2013) contend that the actual practice of British foreign policy has always been subject to external influences ranging from public opinion, the press to include commercial interests. In recent years the messiness of the field has only grown. A range of different players have recognisable impact on foreign policy, in some instances in much the same way as the Prime Minister or the FCO (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003). In recent times British foreign policies have had to respond to modern changes in the structure of the international system, organisationally, technological advancement and institutional reorganisation. Some of these are worth exploring further in order to show that the actual practice is affected by the same issues that have changed the domestic political arena.

The advent of the EU for example is part of a heated debate both between different political ideological parties and also within them (Wallace, 1991; Bevir, et al., 2013). As already indicated above, the EU challenges the very notion upon which classical theories are built. Theoretically, as nations come closer in the model of the EU, the idea of nationhood fades into the distance. I these practical terms the EU has rendered the Prime Minister and the FCO less important in terms of the conduct of relations with countries within the union (Keens-Soper, 1999). Other Secretaries of State are now able to liaise directly and legitimately with their counterparts across the channel.
Technological advances have also impacted heavily in the practise of British foreign policy. On matters where FCO officials would have been the only feasible point of contact (Steiner, 2004), the telephone has enabled the Prime Minister to engage directly with their counterparts (Lane, 2007). This discounts the emphasis in traditional studies, on the role of the diplomatic staff. This means that they do not necessarily always know what is going on (Steiner, 2004), even when they are based in a foreign country, in question. The broader point to be made here is that the role of the FCO as the primary source of foreign policy, is not practical but secondly that British foreign policy fragmented (Bevir, et al., 2013) rather than a carefully planned response to the outside world.

Lane (2007) notes that British foreign policy making has had to change in response to multiple factors resulting from the pressures of modernisation. At the very best foreign policy, if it ever did, no longer requires to be centralised around diplomats and other specialist units of IR. She also notes that foreign policy is no longer just about the international but that it is now about the national. Additionally, she contends that the field encompasses more than the concern about national security alone. It now includes the need to transnational sources of insecurity such as crime, energy, environmental change and terrorism. These issues are also hotly debated in domestic policy, indicating their relevance across the various the national and the international spheres.

Given the above, the notion that international relations and political party politics are incompatible exists in literature but is evidently easily refutable in practise. International Relations clearly have become as entangled by the same issues that are debated on the bases of ideology in domestic politics. As such, in British politics the analysis of foreign policy that depends on traditionally approaches is itself disconnected from the actual practice. It is this fictional or mythical gap between official research and practical observations or critical assessments that this paper addresses.

### 2.3.2. Need for this Study: Deconstructing the Myth

Furthermore, the case study of the relations between Britain and Zimbabwe over the last 150 years provides a rich area of historic research, theoretical engagement and policy analysis. It also potentially
occupies an academic gap in IR research by utilising a blend historical and political study approaches. This is in addition to the study of interactions and disconnections between IR and political theory. All these are issues that are considered to belong to different fields, and sometimes to mutually exclusive subjects. This interdisciplinary study also enriches knowledge by virtue of the complex theoretical and analytical techniques that it has carefully fused to produce a clear interpretive framework; it concurrently compares and tests models that challenge or reinforce the current methods. This study plugs the mythical gap between studies and the actual practice of British foreign policy, through;

’an analysis that focuses on the grounds of that system’s possibility. The critique reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal, in order to show that these things have their history, their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them, and that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself’ (Johnson, 1981, p. XV).

This work shows the difficulties of studying power relations concepts such and IR approaches. For example, traditional theories are emphatic about the paramountcy of anarchy and power, state dominance and the veil between IR and political theory. Both realists and idealists understand these main concepts as essential to their theories but disagree on their role and functions. Idealists consider the state to be a moralising force in the international scene yet realists view it as pursuing selfish interests. As such, the state is a profound actor in classic IR theorising. Yet recently academics are questioning these approaches as incomplete. Vickers (2003, p. 2) chastises scholars who tend to define the state as a unitary entity and ignore its ‘constitutive parts’. This study does not only consider political parties as part of the constituted state but as actors adding to dynamics in policy making.

The study further gathers knowledge on the foreign policy making dynamics that include several domestic sources of foreign policy, including state institutions and the prevailing political culture, which contemporary research ignores (Vickers, 2003). Although they may have an important role, in
specific policies, but because theory precludes them from IR analysis, they remain masked away and overlooked. In an earlier study, Rosenau (1969) makes this argument and decries the tendencies of IR scholars to minimise political theory as a source of international policy. He observes that, ‘literature is short on works that consider a wide range of nongovernmental variables and estimate how their interaction shapes the contents and conduct of foreign policy’ (Rosenau, 1969, p. 3). Mainstream views of classic theories present a partial picture of IR by automatically excluding all forms of domestic political activity from influencing or playing a role in foreign relations. This partly informs Rengger’s (2000) charge that orthodox IR principles are methodically and substantively limited. This study provides a new challenge to traditional IR; it questions the limitation of IR study to one elite specialist community instead of being part of the whole. Plato’s Republic (1941) records Socrates proposition that political theory must answer the broad question, how should we live? Thus, the study attempts to force IR research to answer this fundamental question in full.

Moreover, in attempting to answer the aforementioned, the study challenges traditional approaches to the appropriateness of research questions. It shows that asking open questions for research may help further broaden the field of IR research. Doing this ushers into the debate two of the most common problems dominating the theory and practice of international relations as argued by Dominguez (1993). Firstly, the disagreements about the issues it addresses and the disharmony associated with defining it, which continues to contribute to the slow development of theory. This perhaps explains the rigid nature and the concentration of its answers on wars and the lack of interest from theorists. For Dominguez (1993) this explains the propensity of popular research towards dominant approaches. Naturally, this allows power to maintain its place, by emphasising the separation of statecraft as a preserve of specialised elitists. Accordingly, IR elitists are the only avenue for foreign policy study because its practice is their exclusive choice, disconnected from everything else. Dominguez’s (1993) protests this premise arguing that, as a result, IR researchers have to rely on the people they are studying to review the same peoples’ actions. The significance of this study is in
that it identifies the possible limitations of traditional approaches. It shows all the normalised and seemingly benevolent classical methodological procedures which may predetermine research results.

Rengger’s (2000) addition and interpretation of Socrates are very instructive and teachable. His take on the problem of, what lives we should live, broadly includes a need to understand reality and its constitutive development. Similarly, it excites thoughts about distinct concepts such as justice, rights and liberty, which although, alien to IR practice and study, are at the centre and forefront of political theory. In effect, concepts of selfishness, anarchy and power are central ideas in its study. Yet political theory does not have the same liberty in relation to these questions and answers in IR. This theoretical point-of-separation between domestic and international politics receives particular attention. Although there are generally a number of reasons to concentrate on the distinction between the two, three of these are striking and remarkably persuasive. They represent an area of research that is understudied, thus this study provides a rare attempts to make that situation a problem.

Firstly, it highlights both the linkage and disconnection between the two. By so doing, it clearly legitimates, in theory, the hypothetical claim that international relations practical evidence disproves the orthodox IR position that foreign policy is unaffected by ideology or national political dynamics. This illuminates the emerging and growing scholarly calls for the development of thorough theory on the role of politics in IR (Vickers, 2003).

Secondly, as Renegger (2000) argues there are many overlaps between IR and political theory. In his view, the arguments and the evidence that supports views of mainstream IR discourses are implausible. The dominant narratives rely less on their strength and more on the reinforcement and protection that the exclusivity of the field offers. This, in turn, prevents any meaningful rethink despite growing criticism of the status quo. Consequently, he sees a desperate need for IR and political science researchers to deconstruct existing hegemonic views and investigate the linkages between these two fields.
Concurrently, Katz and Mair (2009, p. 754) write that ‘it is clear that the influence of external factors drawn from the worlds of international politics and economics needed to be taken into account’ in discussing the social, political or institutional features of political parties. They lament that IR researchers and social scientist seem to underestimate the profound impact of global events on domestic political configurations. In an unusual and interesting viewpoint, they argue that the cold war left-right dichotomous ideologies contributed the same onto national political parties.

Thirdly, it represents an important crossroad of IR and political science. While the ultimate leaders in both international and national policy attain authority to govern procedurally and simultaneously, their work conduct is highly differentiated. The latter remains loyal to the dictates of the social contract theory. According to which, the consent of the governed is the only source of justification for government action and authority as publicly and morally appropriate (Rawls, 1999). Rawls (1999) adds to this emphasising the centrality of the justice and the importance of regulation of the ‘basic structure’ to the social contract and consequently, political theory. As the previous section shows, the practice and theory of IR, suggests the opposite: the quest for power is the only justification why international political action and the exercise of authority distastes public oversight and broad participation. The separation of these fields allows this privilege hence, the Anglo-American claims that politics stops at the waters’ edge. In relation to these, the study engages the difficult concepts relating to power, hegemony and domination. This reach area of research allows the rethinking of the power dynamics and configurations of relationships between researchers and foreign policy makers.
2.4. British Politics: Political Parties and Policy Making

Contrary to the above, in political theory, the social contract’s basic structure guides the making of good policies (principle to justice) and provides procedures for civil accountability. Broadly, national politics and a structure that controls access to state authority are safeguards that ensure adherence to the will of the governed and declining public participation (Heath, 2007). Democracies rely heavily on political parties to sustain the electoral system (Katz & Mair, 2009). They provide a platform through which political parties organise and mobilise the population around specific ideological, agenda priorities and for attaining votes. They function as centres for motivating others towards a preferred model for achieving the good life or good policy (Heywood, 1997). As such, politicians and their parties try to serve the general good and promote transparency as the only way to be re-elected in further elections. For this reason, political parties are important in the study of national politics and require some special attention.

The role of political parties in the designing of the broad framework for policy formulation and implementation raises particular interest. The intrigue is on whether political parties matter in national politics. To answer this question, Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) carried out a study in the US, which is generalisable to most western democracies, in which they found data to back two bold claims. Firstly, that political parties are essential to democracy and secondly that they are instrumental in policy-making. Schattschneider (1942) concurs with the first assumption and opines that their traditional role of mobilising public participation in elections, and on the discussion of a variety of issues helps legitimise state structures and democracy.

Legitimacy, without which, institutions and departments operated by government would not be able to exercise power. Elected principals who make institutional appointments including permanent secretaries, judges and ambassadors also delegate authority to them. Morehouse (1973) makes a similar argument and goes as far as to identify linkages between political parties and policy outputs. Meanwhile, some scholars continue to argue that politics no longer affects policy decisions because
of the advances in the twentieth century (Skinner, 1976). Nonetheless, this argument remains weak in the face of political systems that operate on structures designed to give political parties relevance. The only reason for such argument to have traction is that some quantitative studies of this question are inclusive.

However, systematically reviewing qualitative studies reveals such controversy as a smokescreen; instead, there is unanimity in support of the thesis that political parties have a role in policy outputs (Klingemann, et al., 1994). These findings clearly indicate the complexity of the subject and the possible difficulties that quantitative analysis may have in attempting to code and quantify the relevant variables, leading to distinctive results. To resolve this, Imbeau, et al., (2001) suggest that parties matter in many different ways, which are very difficult to capture using quantitative techniques.

Given the above, Figure 2.1 below shows where parties participate in this process. Point C represents changing variables such as voter participation in elections, which may lead a hung parliament (Point S), in which no particular political party (Point P) has no outright control over policy outputs (Point O). The interplay between government structures and political parties goes either way depending on their constitution. This represents a modification to the original chart, showing the contra-effect that political parties may have on parliament as well as the changes that they can go through because of legislation (Katz & Mair, 2009; Beyme, 1996). Changing variables lead directly to policy output, and the banking crisis of 2008, which led to financial bailouts as direct policy responses, provides a fertile example.

**Figure 2.1: Generalised Linkages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point Key</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Socio Economic, Population Mood, Voter Turnout, Political Dynamics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Structural Variables, Parliament, Number 10, Party in charge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Party Organisation, Leadership,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Policy Out</td>
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Furthermore, although Richards and Smith (2002) did not study political parties per se, their engagement on the governance of the UK, touches on the subject. This is because policy-making role held by the party that holds parliamentary majority and Number 10. They see political parties as taking central responsibility (perhaps as expressed through Downing Street and Parliament) in the policy-making process. In its simplest form, through parliament, the government decides health, education, commerce, law and order, defence and foreign policies. More importantly, the majority party, as Richards and Smith (2002) emphasises, has the greatest sway on overall policy outcomes.

Given the above, it is noteworthy that British government politics, for most of the last one hundred years, is largely definable as a two-party system (Lipson, 1953). The Conservative and Labour parties dominated the government and parliament and, therefore, policy. Nonetheless, some researchers would find a study of just the two parties as partial because they are others in the British system. The impact of Liberal Democrats, who are currently in government in a coalition with the Conservative Party, on the country’s policy and political direction is undeniable. Regardless, though, the control of the House of Commons and Number 10 has been a matter of exchange between the two key players (McKenzie, 1963). The Labour Party positioned on the left and Conservatives on the right ideological continuum (Buckler & Dolowitz, 2012; Katz & Mair, 2009).
Additionally, Buckler and Dolowitz (2012), contend that ideology and related differences between the two major political parties still feature strongly in contemporary British politics. They argue that instead of avoiding ideology most modern parties tend to prefer re-modelling themselves. Qualitative research findings show policies driven by dogmas, depending on the party in power. Perhaps it is telling that they found that lack of parliamentary control impedes on a political party’s ability to enact ideologically skewed policies. This they find to be the case in David Cameron’s government, in which they indicate he has been unable to model and reposition policies, as did some of his predecessors, such as Tony Blair’s New Labour. This indicates that, at the very minimum there is a causal relationship between government party control and policy output. However, indicating the existence of this correlation is not synonymous with assuming that it is measurable mathematically. This perhaps partly explains the problems related to quantitative research failures.

Katz and Mair (2009) propose a completely different thesis. While they trace the history of the party as a political organisation to relate very closely to ideology, they see some major changes in modern western politics. Over the years, parliamentary legislation has subverted public control of politics through coercive restrictions to organisational activities attached to state funding thus minimising the role of society as the banker and owner of the organisation (Katz & Mair, 2009).

The total effect of the above changes is that they cause political parties to become similar and less defined, against each other, by organisational or ideological differences. In making this observation, Katz and Mair (2009) accentuate that political parties are moving away from society and towards the state. This is helpful to them because it is presently uncontested. It is worth noting that according to this thesis, parties are more inclined to cooperate in order to sustain a new system instead of their individual organisation. They see political parties as not competing for office by citing their differences in beliefs, political objectives, justifications and instructions (Pearson & Williams, 1984). In terms of ideology, they make the point that class and other structural issues have become less defined and irrelevant as a tool for political contests.
Organisationally, Katz and Mair (2009) contend that political parties are in contraction because of the professionalisation of politics and its reliance on the media. Moreover, they contend that such parties tend to have policies that are representative of the state’s position instead of any specific political organisation. Consequently, political parties tend to play the role of reinforcing state policy positions and for this reason; their proclaimed positions would be similar. To them, political parties are no longer defined by their ideological and policy differences, as they have become catch-all and less democratic.

Katz and Mair (2009) found that political parties drifted away from ideology. Instead of mobilising masses based on principled positions, they divided the party and reduced the control of the constituency on the governmental or parliamentary party (Katz & Mair, 2009). They argue that masses believe that the government is interested in policies on public goods; therefore political parties pursue this instead of shared values and the means of achieving the good life. Butler and Ranney (1992) envisage that the rise of media based publicity campaigns eclipsed the role of ideology only as a tool for organisation and mobilisation. Therefore, political debate and thinking about human social life continues to rely on ideology for guidance.

However, there are three key observations that arise from summarising the above arguments. Firstly, that political party ideology has a role in foreign policy either as the constituent or governmental and parliamentary parties. Secondly, that they influence the initiation of policy before reinforcing and imposing it from above. The third observation is that the declining influence of the constituent party in relation to the cartel-modelled party gives the parliamentary party a more central role in policymaking, one or the other way.

Koole (1996) criticises the concept of the cartel party, arguing that the attempt to classify parties into some omnibus category is not helpful to political party research. He points out that this limits the options available for further research and helps produce a reduced understanding of how these
organisations work. His argument is that attempts to provide a unified type of political party is wrong and fails empirical testing. In his view, studying political parties separately causes the idea of cartel parties to fall apart. He suggests that the field of study be open to distinct types of political parties, to allow the close study of each political party and system without a blanket veil preventing the coexistence of different types and schemas.

This review identifies a notable literary gap on political party foreign policy and the theory surrounding its practice. Vickers (2003) reveals that, these have led to scholarly calls for the of study political party policies not only in domestic but also in international politics. In line with this, and as suggested in Chapter 1, Part II of this thesis collects and analyses empirical data in order to substantiate any of this position by providing the grounds for testing both models of this study.

Nonetheless, before that, the next two sections locate the Labour and Conservative Parties’ ideologies based on their rhetoric and policy pronouncement, within their political contexts. The ostensible definition of ideology here accepts it as evolving, meanings a concept that continuously reshapes itself in response to its operational environment. In its basic form, ideology refers to the science of ideas about social life (Hill & Leighley, 1993). To understand it, these sections involve a rigorous study of materials produced by the parties to extract the overall underpinnings of their policy belief systems (Nincic & Ramos, 2010). While certainty of these is always scarce, attitudes and the main concerns of the parties would locate them on the ideological spectrum. However, instead of using these to position them on the left right divide, here the aim is to identify the various dogmas and their association to the party. For these sections, the Pearson and Williams (1984) rationale guides the approach which samples the practical political activities of a party, then theoretically examines them to detect the concepts, ideas and principles that help create them.
2.4.1. The Conservative Party

The Conservative Party’s ideology like most political parties seeking election into public office has transitioned and mutated to meet new challenges. These changes have responded to the external environment and in some cases, themselves reorganised the outside world. However, despite these deviations some values have remained the same to an extent. While this section will investigate and follow these modifications, it will also seek to highlight those characteristics of the party that have guided its most dominant discourses. As such, this treatise starts by tracing the party roots before following its development chronologically. However, interruptions take place in order to deal with particular issues that supervene because of their prominence. Such necessitates deeper consideration because of its relevance as a key theme to the whole study.

The emergence of the centre-right conservative movement followed the French revolution, which overthrew a traditional monarch (NDI, 2008; Charmley, 2008; Nisbert, 1952). Thus, the beginning of the party was a reaction to this event and the desire to preserve the deep-seated religious and aristocratic traditions of the British society, by preventing a similar revolution in the UK (Dickerson, et al., 2009). These origins endeared fear of revolution onto the mind, which would persist, through various generations of the party. Originally, the Conservative Party appealed to right-wing values, which translated to the protection of the church, strengthening national pride and reinforcing the centrality of religion and the monarchy (NDI, 2008). However, a study of the history and ideology of the 20th and 21st Conservative Party would require starting with a treatise of Lord Robert, marquis of Salisbury’s contributions. According to Green (1996) Salisbury enjoyed distinguishable influence in the development of modern day British Conservatism’s ideological trajectory. This he owed to the time of his leadership and his own decisiveness when led saw the party and the country through a delicate transition towards universal suffrage. As such, his ideas are an appropriate place for starting a critical appraisal of the party.
In pursuance of its objective, this thesis partly assesses British foreign policy in relation to specific issues arising from and within the Rhodesian/Zimbabwe crisis. It also critically assesses how both UK political parties dealt with such matter on the international stage on the establishment of democracy and respect for human rights. In this light, the interrogation of the Conservative Party’s position on this is valuable, in the identification of persistent patterns and ideological discourses. However, the party emerged into the democracy of the 20th century is the one that is more relevant to contemporary politics. The 1900s had ended with minority suffrage with the institution of various electoral reforms, which extended suffrage and established counties and the County Councils (Goodlad, 2004). The Party leadership had warned that this would be apocalyptic because the jealousy masses would take advantage of democratisation of the electoral system. This informed the party’s belief of the apocalyptic nature of greater suffrage.

According to Chilston (2003) in the late 1880s, the Party viewed the ideas of democracy as a threat to British life and a radical method of legalising crimes against property by the working classes. The objection was that democracy was an affront to the aristocracy of the land because it would provide the working classes with the opportunity to determine the laws of the country. In Maxwell (2010), Salisbury lamented what the party viewed as a dire situation, emanating from the proposals for reform from the Liberal Party:

We are in a state of bloodless civil war. No common principles, no respect for common institutions or traditions, unite the various groups of politicians who are struggling for power. To loot somebody or something is the common object, under a thick varnish of pious phrases (democracy). So that our lines are not cast in pleasant places (Maxwell, 2010, p. 315).

In her father’s biography, Gwendolyn (1975) indicated that an incessant and implacable hostility to democracy formed the core of his political philosophy. He posited that its radicalism threatened property rights, postulating that once given the power to vote the working classes would work towards
conflict and compulsory acquisition of property from the rich. He believed that the working class were jealousy and had no respect for the country’s institutions and traditions whose foundations flourished because of aristocracy and class differentiation. However, as Chilston (2003) argues the tide towards democracy was real and the Conservative leaders recognised the unstoppable wave towards reform that the Liberals had built.

The irreversibility of the progressive agenda indicates one of the historic characteristics of ideology in general and the Conservative Party’s specialism in dealing with undesired but irrevocable circumstances. Chilston (2003) details how the Liberal Party had already unnerved the propertied class, which was the political base of the Conservative Party, by pushing through various industrial laws. To the propertied class, these reforms threatened their wealth by placing limits on what industrialists could do, while humanising working conditions for workers. The Liberals had used Parliament to push through legislation such as the Factory Act. This enforced sanitary conditions in factories, prohibited child labour and reduced the working hours of women. These changes irked the Conservative Party, William Smith, then leader of the House of Commons, emphasised this in a letter to Salisbury:

The extension of the suffrage has brought us face to face with the most grave possibilities. It has made the extreme radicals masters of the Liberal party, and men support a policy now from which they would have shrunk with horror ten years ago. There is also this strange peculiarity in the English mind to be taken into account. Men who are strictly honest in their transactions with their neighbours have come to regard Parliament as an instrument by which a transfer of rights and property may equitably be made from the few to the many; and there is yet another feature of the present day which is disgusting, and that is, that familiarity with crimes against property, or a class which is not their class, gradually deprives these crimes of the nature of crime in the eyes of the multitude, and even seems to create a sympathy for them (Maxwell, 2010, p. 314).
Despite this opposition to reforms in the government and electoral system the Conservative Party, cunningly sought to limit the impact of these changes. Thus, Gwendolyn (1921) recognises that Salisbury’s opposition to change did not envisage that the party would prevent the expansion of suffrage. He simply hoped to slow down the Liberals while his party figured a clever way of granting voting rights to the working classes without threatening the superstructure (Goodlad, 2004). Additionally, Goodlad (2004) concludes that the Conservative Party showed their true genius, in slowing down change, through their management of the Liberal split over Irish Home Rule. Salisbury utilised it to ensure Conservative dominance at Westminster (Bentley, 2001). In general, he managed to preserve the status quo (Charmley, 2008) by masterminding changes that ensured structures of the monarch (Crewe & Searing, 1988) and the Empire were guarded (Greene, 1943) from the vulgarism of democracy.

As part of Salisbury’s strategy, he identified those members of the Liberal Party who shared some areas of common passion and co-opted them into government. His relationship with Joseph Chamberlain was a good example of an alliance that he utilised effectively. Posting him to the Colonial Office allowed him strengthen the claim that his party worked with all genuine patriots, while dismissing the rest of the party as dangerous to the Empire (Sowemimo, 1996). Sowemimo (1996) found that historically the Conservatives aligned with the Empire while depicting political adversaries as precarious custodians of the Empire and national security (Goodlad, 2004). For the party the Empire was an instrument for national security, thus required guarding with utmost vigour and jealous (Goldsworthy, 1994).

Thus, from this period the party entrenched its position as the only defender and most capable handler of British foreign policy superiority (as represented by the Empire) and national security. This was the argument made in national elections. Astute nationalistic rhetoric about the Empire dominated the approach to international relations during Salisbury’s tenure at Foreign Office (Roberts, 1999). Roberts (1999) contends that Salisbury’s attitude toward colonialism was utilitarian and viewed the Empire as
a ‘means to the end’ in terms of Britain’s own security and economic ends. During his leadership, large swaths of the earth became part Imperial inventory. However, he did not assume direct control of them, instead allowing the aristocrats in Chartered Companies to run them. This was the position that Rhodesia found itself in between 1894 and 1923. Given, Salisbury’s nationalism it is instructive that he would not add these to the direct control of the Queen. He mistrusted the New Britain’s political system, which incorporated jealousy workers as Rhodes later said about politicians in London.

In terms of the Empire, Conservatives traditionally found electoral political capital in arguing that the Empire and colonisation were virtuous missions to civilise the barbarian world (Darwin, 1988; Colley, 2002). Additionally, the party saw colonisation as the vehicle for global power and imperial defence. Goldsworthy (1994) records that the party assigned qualified pride, valued and referred to itself as the party of the Empire, which also meant that it was the party of British pride. In fact, the colonies were appurtenances of Britain, as a major power that interlinked with foreign and defence policies. In domestic campaigns, they argued that colonialism was crucial to the achievement of the country’s IR objectives (Goldsworthy, 1994).

Goldsworthy (1994) also notes that the party ignored imperial exploitation, by defining colonialism as an important tool for sustaining British greatness, at whatever the cost. Accordingly, Rich (1990) points out that, for this reason some Conservatives viewed colonial pioneers, who conquered the seas to build the Empire, as a more patriotic and an exceptional quarter of the English race. Chamberlain’s Centenary Committee (1937) campaign material on different qualities of Britons, seem to gravitate towards substantiating this belief about the party:

‘Great Britain’s advantage will lie not in the peopling of British countries overseas with degenerate stock, but with the best and most patriotic citizens whom she can supply as further customers for her goods and defenders of her common heritage’, (Chamberlain Centenary Committee, 1937, p. 15)
These words are valuable in terms of the message they convey about foreign and colonial policy because of the deep convictions regarding how Britain could sustain its dominance in the world. Secondly, the fact that they belonged to Chamberlain’s Prime Ministerial campaign, gives them the credibility they would lack had originated from the party’s fringe right-wing element. Additionally, as Murphy (1995) argues that their message found expression in the Rhodesia problem, which baffled and dominated British foreign policy to very recent times. He notes that some elements within the Party considered the Rhodesians as a special race, threatened with extinction within British borders, so much that even after the UDI; they felt determined to side with the rebellion. To them, the working class Labour Party politicians in Britain, who were of inferior character, had forced that revolt upon the Rhodesians. Hence, the belief by some that had Sandys and the Conservative Party remained in office after 1964; there would have been no UDI (Owen, 2012). As such, they prevented any settlement of the problem by advising and providing advance information about British positions to Rhodesians.

Additionally, according to Goldsworthy (1994) Conservative Party attitudes towards Rhodesia after the rebellion was that the settlers were capable of, thus justified in demanding a grant of independence. The existence of the Rhodesia Lobby, within the party, indicates that the settlers exhibited more patriotism, self-reliance and God-fearing qualities (Murphy, 1995) as exemplified by their role in the building and expansion of the Empire. Their position aligned perfectly, with that of Rhodesians, whom Lowry (1991), while expressing their hatred for the Labour Party, were passionately loyal to the Queen and not the government, because they believed in their own superiority within the British race.

As indicated earlier from its origins the Conservative Party prioritised conserving, the national, traditional values and structures that supported these (Charmley, 2008), including protecting existing socio-economic inequalities and privileges. Despite this though, the party itself is not averse to change (Nisbert, 1952), on the contrary, it will soon become clear that it manipulates innovation, more like a
chameleon, to camouflage its underpinnings. This formed part of its strong dislike for democracy, fearing that if the masses controlled parliament, then they would change the order of things. Perhaps, as an *orbiter dictum*, one could argue that this is the reason why the Royal Charter, without precedent, granted the BASC over 25 years of colonial control over Rhodesia. Salisbury had been uncertain about the effects of reform on parliament and government. When faced with inevitable change, Salisbury once proclaimed that the task of conservatism was to delay its implementation until it became harmless (Roberts, 1999).

Although the Party’s ideology changed in the period since Salisbury, some facets that act as pillars of Conservatism remained constant until recent times. The party’s strong relationship with property rights, as hinged on a class system that favours those who own the means of production, remains an important part of its philosophy. To a limited extent, the desire to weaken the state’s influence in the economy again has continued to grow; this protects property from the dangers presented by allowing the working class into parliament and government. A simple combination of clusters of ideas on free markets, natural rights, individualism, liberty and a minimal state (Driver & Martell, 2000), helps insulate these from the masses. For example, Thatcherism promoted the view that the state and social welfare are an anathema to individual responsibility (Alock, et al., 2008), which Conservatives promote in order to minimise tendencies towards organised interest groups, such as Trade Unions.

Thus, nationalism and notions of patriotism informed the party’s foreign and colonial policies and its attitudes towards the Empire. This approach to aristocracy explains the power and access enjoyed by ruling class individuals such as Rhodes in moulding British policy in the manner they did, as will be discussed in Part Two. Their general disposition towards social inequality partly explains the racial inequality they presided over in the colonies. However, in addition, the character and nature of the process and methods of colonisation, helped determine the party's policy attitudes. This is especially relevant to the last wave expansion at the end of the 19th century. As Blake (1977) found the frontrunners and leaders of colonial expeditions were members of the ruling class in Britain who
wielded massive influence. They were, in fact, a superior race within the English race itself, by virtue of their socioeconomic position.

In addition to a philosophy that emanates from the need to preserve traditions of economic, political and social structure, the party’s organisational structure is moderately determined by, while it help it reinforce the same ideological trajectory. Thus, the Conservative Party’s organogram strongly restricts internal revolution or conflict. Unlike its competitors, it has strong reliance in its leadership, which enjoys almost exclusive policy-making power (Vickers, 2003). Peele (1980) indicates that the leader has a huge control over government policy because the policy matters are left to the leader, who also ‘a free hand’ in choosing policy principals. The limited democracy within the party means that its backbenchers have very limited power in policy issues. While parliament and Conservative backbenchers have some general impact on policy, their role is almost non-existent in foreign policy as this is traditionally a preserve of the front bench (Vickers, 2003). Political elites traditionally dominate British policy on the grounds of their integrity, ethos and public responsibility (Richards & Smith, 2002), and this seems to align more with the Conservative Party. As an observation, this model allows the party to manage change a lot better than its parliamentary counterparts.

In light of the above, Keohane (2003) reports that Conservative Party approaches tend to rely on Hobbesian assumptions of the state of nature. As indicated, this theory holds the notion that Britain only survives in this unpredictable and violent world because of its prowess and ability to defend national interests, (Beech, 2011). Thus, it emphasised a martial image, in which it presented itself as the ‘party of Empire and patriotic issues’ (Green, 1996, p. 59), and bolstered its claim of being the true and natural defender of Britain and greatness (Oliver, 2007; Powell, 1965). Additionally, Keohane (2003) holds that the above also helped build a public discourse, which ordained it as the party of foreign policy and defence. The party’s rhetoric highlighted its nationalism as an imperative condition for identifying and protecting national interests, making them more important than any commitment to the dictates of the international society (Thatcher, 2010).
However, this changed following the world wars (Beech, 2011), which weakened British influence thereby forcing the Conservative Party to shift its rhetoric towards a diluted form of isolationist nationalism. Faced with these realities it adopted a policy of a ‘special relationship’ with the US, since the Empire and the Commonwealth had been insufficient against Hitler (Beech, 2011). Even then, Beech (2011, pp. 351 - 352) warns that a strong sense of nationalism still outlines ‘the diplomatic sphere for some Conservatives’ party leaders in Foreign Policy. These Conservatives view the idea of the ‘special relationship’ as either a condescending fable or an overstated mischaracterisation. He makes a further intervention that even for those, who professed their high regard for the ‘special relationship’, like Thatcher doing so was posturing within domestic politics. This political rhetoric helped her highlight differences between the Conservative and Labour policies. From this perspective, Thatcher Conservatism aligned to tradition Tory contours of national interests. Finally, Beech (2011) concludes that the Conservative Party seems to have readied itself to break with the past by following foreign policy seen through both nationalism and internationalism. Although nationalism and realism are different concepts, in particular cases the existence of one presupposes the other (Mearsheimer, 2011), as is the case in British politics. Thus, utilising the same logic this is true for internationalism and idealism.

Nonetheless, before the Conservative Party settles for a mutated version of foreign policy ideology, the contemporary period has been that of transition. Thus, rekindled nationalism, wherever and whenever expedient characterised the post war. Enoch Powell’s controversial stance on immigration and his rhetoric against anti-discrimination laws are typical examples. Like Salisbury before him, Powell opposed integration of the previously other into the British society fearing new groups would seek to dominate the native English (Powell, 1968). He objected to a proposed Race Relations Bill, charging that it would empower immigrants and the expense of the rights of British citizens to exercise racism in private. As such, he argued the proposed law presented the:
...is the means of showing that the immigrant communities can organise to consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with the legal weapons, which the ignorant and the ill-informed have provided. As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood’ (Powell, 1968).

Powell had been a high-ranking member of the Conservative Party who, had been a member of the Cabinet, was a contender to the party’s leadership throughout the 1960s and in the early 1970s. After this, some of his opinions and ideas found expression through Thatcher, who admired him as a great thinker (Evans, 2009). In fact, when asked to choose between immigration view of either Heath or Powell, she clearly sided with the latter:

    I am the first to admit it is not easy to get clear figures from the Home Office about immigration, but there was a committee which looked at it and said that if we went on as we are then by the end of the century there would be four million people of the new Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now, that is an awful lot and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture (Thatcher, 1978).

Given the above, Powellite ideas on nationalism and attitudes towards immigration are clearly significant in Thatcherite conservatism (Grayson, 2012). Firstly, their existence despite the paradox roused by One-Nation-Conservatism, which sought to provide social safety as a way of preserving the social fabric. This, sought to view immigrants as posing a threat to the superstructure and that people from the old-Empire, would compete for services with Britain’s working classes. The Commonwealth, which is the successor of the Empire, which had served the Britain very well as both a symbol of power and as part of the military that fought in both world wars (Low, 1916). From this, the character of the part aligns with the nationalism that formed part of its foundations and Thatcher’s attitude towards
Trade Unions and the working class show the same levels of suspicions as Salisbury. Her political proximity to Keith Joseph, whose own prospects diminished after his nationalist diatribe against lower classes is evidence of this. He expressed that he viewed them as unworthy to be parents that their children would be useless. He proposed involuntary sterilisation of members of this class. He contended that:

The balance of our population, our human stock is threatened. A recent article in Poverty, published by the Child Poverty Action Group, showed that a high and rising proportion of children are being born to mothers least fitted to bring children into the world and bring them up. They are producing problem children... If we do nothing, the nation moves towards degeneration...proposals to extend birth-control facilities to these classes of people...This could be a watershed to our national existence (Joseph, 1974).

In the same fashion as Powell before him, Joseph appealed to the public, to take away the rights of the poor because they were a danger to the continued greatness of the nation. Again, it is difficult to understand why he interpreted the problem in the manner he did, if not for ideological reasons. The challenge is that he identified the cause of these mothers’ inability as having emanated from elsewhere including the ‘permissiveness in television, in films, on bookstalls’ (Joseph, 1974, p. 11). He could have suggested restrictions to these businesses; perhaps he could have proposed tough policy changes in a number of areas instead of reducing the numbers of the degenerate stock. This speech strikes a popular choral cord within the Conservative Party, which relates to the belief in aristocracy through unspoken conventions of the inheritance of pure blood.

Other observations are clear in Beech’s treatise of comments from his elite interviews. These underscore biases towards classic IR theories that view the field of foreign policy as apolitical. However, they also claim that most decisions are pragmatic based on what the decision-makers’
selection of the national interests. Sir Malcolm Rifkind accentuates the spirit of pragmatism in his party:

The Conservative Party is one of the oldest political parties in the world so when you ask about tradition that is going back quite a long, long way and traditionally it will have seen our foreign policy objectives first of all as being the protection and enhancement of the national interest. But the Conservative Party is overwhelmingly a pragmatic party sometimes it takes pride in its pragmatism, sometimes it tries to pretend that it’s not that pragmatic but the reality is that it’s pragmatic. Because the world has changed dramatically and Britain’s place in the world has changed substantially then the way in which we implement our foreign policy has to reflect that fact (Beech, 2011, p. 359).

This pragmatism according to the interviews explains why the Conservative Party foreign policy is neither dogmatic nor ideological. However, the use of ideology in this regard seems to save the traditional claim by Conservatives politicians that in IR ideology is absolute. Accordingly, Keohane (2003) also identifies the party’s ideological intolerance of political criticism or scrutiny in foreign policies. The argument is that this subjects foreign policy to the rough processes of domestic policy, thereby exposing weaknesses to the dangerous ‘foreigners’.

Likewise, studies of the Conservative Party’s domestic policies points that remain unchanging while it also shows how it has evolved. Interrogating the Thatcher government, for example, which came into place nearly one century after Salisbury will be useful for the analysis in Chapter 7. In terms of a general approach to politics and the broader participation of society, Thatcher was no different in principle to Salisbury. She opposed and evidently reversed the influence of labour in British politics (Marsh, 1991). Her government took the view that workers input into government and economic policy was an unbearable burden on industry and profit. The argument was it was changing the tide in a way that promoted dictatorship the poor working class. Thus, she introduced policies that
curtailed and weakened trade unions in their ability to negotiate and inform politics. This brought to an end the corporatist system of economic management, which brought together a tripartite of government, industry and labour in regulating each other to promote universal interests. Conservatives restructured the society in order to transfer power and control away from the state and workers, to the industrial class (Marsh, 1991).

The Thatcher government also sought to reduce the influence of the state, which of course could no longer be trusted since the century’s adult suffrage laws had killed the aristocrats’ monopoly. Thus, much of Thatcher’s legacy is in the first instance, that of callousness towards workers and the poor. Jenkins (2007) argues that she had little concern for the victims that capitalism created out workers and the poor. He utilises the 1981 riots in Toxteth and Brixton to prove how she worried more about ‘those poor shopkeepers’ who had lost their properties (Jenkins, 2007, p. 164).

Secondly, at the very least, the Conservative government reversed nationalisation, through its privatisation and low taxes policies (Burton, 1987). Jenkins (2007) concurs, arguing that Thatcher set out to reduce the size of the state before centralising it. In doing this the Party stuck to its principle of a state that enables those with the capital to profiteer and increase self-reliance. It also promoted the concept of private property while consolidating it with laws that would prevent the majority or the state from trying to acquire or access such property.

2.4.2. The Labour Party
There is widespread literary agreement that the Labour Party had decidedly ideological beginnings if compared to other political parties worldwide (Turner, 1981). It began as a response to Britain’s aristocratic politics which excluded lower classes from government. A meeting ‘hosted by the Trade Union Congress with the purpose of examining Labour representation’ (Labour Party, 2012, p. 1) conceptualised the idea of the party. This meeting included 70 organisations representing workers attended the party’s formative meeting. These included the Fabian Society, which was an ideologically conscious left-wing think tank (Fabian Society, 2012).
Notwithstanding some labour sponsored Liberal MPs British political life and society had excluded these groups through its limited electoral and party systems (Dale, 2000). This was a concern mainly because Britain was one of the most industrialised nations on earth (Keohane, 2000) and its working class population had increased dramatically (Vickers, 2003). According to Vickers (2003) social, political reforms and growing trends to form parties that help express working class views, played a role that led to the formation of the Party. Additionally, Minkin (1980) indicates that for trade unions, growing numbers of judicial decisions limiting industrial bargaining rights provided some impetus.

The above environment influenced the Party’s foundational and early ideological inclinations immensely. However, other additional forces such as the underlining hegemonic socio-economic context for the working class around 1900 were equally transformational (Turner, 1981; Vickers, 2003; Minkin, 1980). This included the dictates for the party to allow and encourage broad base participation (Minkin, 1980). As such, most of its structures tend towards allowing more internal democracy compared to those of the Conservative Party. Its activists have historically utilised the annual conferences as tools for agenda setting on party and national policy. Such has not been limited to domestic politics, as Vickers (2003) found, this internal democracy is partly responsible for the party’s foreign policy ideology. She argues that, especially when in opposition, members are able to influence the direction and thinking about various topical issues.

The party’s composition, which included the disaffected and the unrepresented also contributed to its attitude towards democracy. This translated into a practice of politics and electoral campaigns, which entailed broad participation and consultation, which then produce agreed programmes. Dale (2000) states that unlike the Leader based Liberal and Conservative Parties, the new party was manifesto, programme and constitution oriented. Given its various constituents, its programmes highlighted the character of politics that went beyond the management of the economy, public administration and foreign policy. Hence, the party undertook to mobilise the state to increase welfare services to ensure improved lives for the unemployed and aged (Dale, 2000).
The Labour Party organisation is an important feature in its operations, much in the same way that the Party leader is in the Conservative Party (Turner, 1981). Hill and Leighley (1993) discuss three features that political parties need for attaining governing power as competitiveness, structure and ideology. They argue that these strongly interact and depend on each other for their strength and utility. Thus, the philosophies and ideologies that govern political parties help determine its electability and ideologies just in the same way that these affect its social values and ways of thinking.

An enhanced understanding of party political ideology requires an investigation that examines the interactive effects of competitiveness and ideology (Hill & Leighley, 1993; Burnham, 1987). The desire by politicians to be competitive in elections affects the aspects of ideology emphasised. A study by Hill and Leighley (1993) demonstrates the strongly related competitiveness and ideology in the manner in which they influence election turnouts. The Parliamentary Party have always used competitiveness to justify taking the lead in decision-making even when Conference was officially the body within the party that formulated policy (Minkin, 1980).

The impact of government on the Labour Party is that it weakens (Bing, 1971) its structure by imposing principles that are not compatible with its own. For example, while the principle of a mandate underpins the Labour’s intra-party democracy by requiring members to vote in accordance with a pre-agreed position, Parliamentary Privileges rules protected MPs from this level of accountability (Dale, 2000). Without the responsibility to save the Party’s interest, MPs tend to abandon the party that sponsored their candidacy. However, the Conservative Party does not face this problem as its structures mimic those of parliament (Minkin, 1980). Charmley (2008) points out parliament’s close functional relationship with it, indicating that initially parliament mainly served the interests of both property and a large private Empire. In fact, the Tories, forerunners of the Conservative Party designed the privileges. It also enjoys other advantages, which are disadvantages to the Labour Party. Its membership tends not to hold any policy alternatives from those of the leader who has the sole responsibility for that. Secondly, policy disputes have been historically limited because of the
homogeneity of the interests of the class that dominate conservatism (Dale, 2000). While this rule saves the Conservative Party well, it simultaneously undermines the Labour Party forcing it to operate with two loosely connected centres of power. Turner (1981) compares the task of leading the Labour Party as that of riding two horses.

After discussing the party’s broad operational circumstances, I now turn to its ideology. This breakdown of some of the forces that act on the Labour Party policy agenda is essential for this study. Firstly, it points to the centrality of context in the analysis of political history and its discourses. Secondly, it highlights the difference between the two parties, which comparative studies analysts often overlook. The general framework that could summarise the party over its history is that:

- It has a broad based ideologically enthusiastic membership
- The basic structure is both fluid, allowing the government structure to moderate its ideological creed
- The Parliamentary Party moderates between cleavages separated by ‘ideologists’ and ‘pragmatists’.

There is wide divergence of opinion on what should be included as constituting the beliefs that reflect the ideology of a party (Nincic & Ramos, 2010). This is true for the Labour Party given the competition for power to define the fundamental values and beliefs between the country and the government party. This underscores the importance of the determination of the structure with the party, which is responsible for sustaining its ideology. Given the above, the political base of the country as represented by the conference seems to be the centre of its traditions of thought (Dale, 2000; Minkin, 1980). As such, literature relating Annual Conferences and campaign materials can provide an insight into the trail of dots that connect priorities from one event to another. Similarly, speeches made by leaders will be pivotal in determining the impact of governmental structures on its policies. However,
unlike in the Conservative Party, the Labour Party policies trail requires one to study more than just the positions taken by various party leaders.

Studying historical documents of the party reveals that it has maintained some core principles and values. It is also clear that when in government the Labour Party attempted most legislative reform through packaging the issues towards the political centre. Connell (2010) contends that it believed in state intervention in the social and economic spheres in order to fulfil its principles of full the inclusion of different social classes in both these areas. According to its manifestos, for nearly a century, the party steadfastly pursued policies on welfare provisions for the poor, unemployed, children and the aged. This shifted with the inception of New Labour. More specifically, between the end of the war and 1979, the Labour Party had changed Britain remarkably in terms of the economy. These relate mainly to industrial takeovers by the state, which included coal, gas, electricity, the railways and the canals (Burton, 1987). This gave the state more power to control wages and working conditions for the poor but also expanded its interventions to uplift the poor.

Considering the years that Labour Party won elections and one before that, its inclination towards state intervention is clear. It was clear in its language that the party also believe that as policy had historically enabled capital at its infancy (Martin & Rubinstein, 1979) it would be appropriate to use to deal with such vices as poverty, illness and unemployment. Thus, the institutionalisation of the Welfare State represents a weaker version of this ideological position. Regardless of this, as Alcock (1992) notes, the policy represented the interests of the competing constituencies of the party, capturing its often-warring ideological factions.

Since its inception, the party promotes equality not just in areas of economics but also in social and political rights for oppressed groups such as women, lower classes and racial minorities. Atkinson and Spear (1992) indicate that in the case of equality for women within the workplace Labour Governments had instituted various policies within and outside government by 1982. Although the
multiple measures had been moderate in effect, the period after 1982 witnessed an increased focus on women issues (Short, 1996). Additionally, the party has tackled the race question, establishing the Race Relations Act in 1965 and strengthened it in 1968, are signs that the party’s commitment to a central theme of equality (Bleich, 2003). This happened even as leaders of Conservative and other nationalist groups worked hard to eviscerate it. This indicates that although the matter may have been on the agenda in any case the response from other political parties may have been different. Enoch Powell suggested that race integration would be impossible as such non-English races needed to emigrate (Powell, 1968).

The central idea of promoting democracy and inclusion for the oppressed, which for labour are guiding principles in domestic policy, permeate the foreign policy barrier. The principle of egalitarianism (that is strongly associated with human rights) is emphasised by the continued attitudes on women and racial equality. Secondly, the party’s insistence the rights to be free from poverty and provision of welfare are aligned to its desire for a peaceful society, in which humans collaborate extensively in making the experience of life worthwhile for everyone. Thus, peace is a recurrent and fundamental attitude. These social democratic values unite the party although members constantly argue about the means and the ends of establishing such a society.

From 1900 right up to the period of New Labour, almost all Labour Party manifestos exhibit common themes as shown in Table 2. The table shows the years of the publication of the manifesto, a summary of the record and the related theoretical interpretation principle. The principle acts like a binary belief code that seems apparent in the message that the party was conveying at the time. The table shows that since the formation of the party the meta-principles of the party’s way of thinking have remained almost static, even though they rely on ‘change and progress’ (Vickers, 2003, p. 193). In fact, she traces these to the ‘enlightenment traditions with their teleology of progress’ (Vickers, 2003, p. 193) and idealism. Thus, the Party holds that society can progress from war, inequality and nationalism (isolationism) and change towards peace, egalitarianism and internationalism (local and international...
solidarity). The change will be towards good because the party’s idealist inclinations presuppose that human are capable of solidarity and peaceful coexistence (Vickers, 2003).

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Manifesto Item</th>
<th>Principle</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1. The people to decide on peace and war</td>
<td>Peace, Participation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. Wars are fought to make the rich richer and the underfed schoolchildren are still neglected</td>
<td>Peace, Egalitarianism, democracy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. The Commonwealth of co-operative service</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1. Work for peace among nations including Russia</td>
<td>Internationalism, Equality</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Ties of sentiment with Dominions, instead of Imperialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1. International peace: arbitration and disarmament, League of Nations and International Labour Office</td>
<td>Internationalism, Peace, Egalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Progress colonies towards independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1. One world of peace and plenty</td>
<td>Internationalism, Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Unity of the Commonwealth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Opposing the arms race and two worlds as racism in the empire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1. End of colonialism: common wealth immigration</td>
<td>Internationalism, Peace, Egalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. New prospects for peace: Lead UN and NATO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1. Human rights promotion, fight against world poverty</td>
<td>Internationalism, Peace, Egalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Anti-isolationism, leadership in Commonwealth, NATO, ICC and UN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information obtained from Dale (2000)

This table shows the Labour Party as generally positive about other countries, seeing them as sharing a world where peace is a collective interest. With this view of the world, the party hopes that the world can work together to help free the oppressed while ensuring that human abuse is allowed anywhere on earth, even by local governments (Keohane, 2000). This indicates the party’s willingness to use state force, in the same way as they would in domestic policy against poverty, to intervene on behalf of oppressed people worldwide. Nonetheless, its default position is to that, humans are
beholden to peace, if given the chance. Realists view this as constituting the party’s weakness on foreign policy and defence ordinarily view this position. In an elaborate study of the party’s foreign policy historiography, Sylvest (2004) found that for the last half-century realist metanarratives have dominated IR research. As such, these would almost certainly understand foreign policy that did not exude nationalism and the projection of power, as weak or underdeveloped. He also confirms what the data in this study suggests; a position found in a wide range of literature, that narratives of power and interests do not inform the Labour Party’s foreign policy but a mixture of socialist and liberal internationalism. These originate in the idealism exuded by Labour government in the 1930s, which campaigned for the development of a League of Nations that would substitute unfettered military force as a tool for resolving conflicts of interests (Winkler, 1956). This would have the primary task of disarming all nations to agreed levels and providing a safeguard for the resolution of disagreements.
2.5. Summary

The introductory chapter established the preponderance of classic IR theories as essential tools and approaches to the practice and study of foreign relations. Any practitioner in this field would have to follow the broad categories of realism and idealism for it to be a serious endeavour. These have provided the backdrop for the analysis of British foreign policy towards Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Additionally, the chapter noted that the general acceptance of the common claim that international and national politics are incompatible, despite its management by the same people and institutions. However, contemporary studies have begun to doubt this established position, thus following up on this, the chapter sets out competing models to test this claim. Chapter 2 took over from this position intending to set the theoretical framework and background for this assessment.

The first section posits that idealism views humans as naturally inclined towards coexistence and desirous of peace and freedom, not just for themselves but all humankind. Noted is the influence of religion on the concept, which is that it originated within a context of state Catholicism. For this reason, it makes the claim that humans seek to be like their creator, who has the highest morality and exudes what is best out us. Thus, if given the right conditions we would be honourable, peaceable and desirous of solidarity.

Realism, on the other hand, contends that human nature situates us in circumstances of limited resources and insatiable wants. As such, humans pursue their selfish interests vigorously because the alternative is death. To stay alive we have to obtain and secure our needs, this requires the use or threat of force that would keep others seeking the same. Life, therefore, is at all times at the expense of another; thus competition and conflicts are the natural condition. This state of affairs is not there in modern society, at the national level, because the state now moderates our competition and access to these. This eliminates the need to kill each other. However, the lack of a legal authority at the international level allows this natural condition to be the default position. Anarchy, violence and the
ability to dominate others is still the approach of choice for realists. Their understanding is that in foreign relations, is that national interest and violence.

These theories occupy two dialectically opposed positions. However, regardless of this, essentialism guides both. They make a claim about the essence of humanity, arguing in one way or another. Although a discussion of essentialism is part of Chapter 7, it is appropriate to indicate what this chapter reveals and how this gives impetus to the continuation of this project. As Lowe (2008) argues, refers to the identity of an object. He notes that this is what ‘John Locke aptly characterised as the very being of anything, whereby it is, what it is’ (Lowe, 2008, p. 1). Firstly, this weakens both realist and idealist claims because if one of them is the real essence of human nature therefore the other cannot be since they are not objectively the same thing. If this disqualifies them from relying on human essence, then it opens them as mere concepts of IR. Secondly, claiming essence must not be capable of producing an alternative identity if it does then both these approaches are merely our conceptualisation of the human, instead of being it. They are easy ways of thinking about humanity in IR, to suite the desired ends. If this is the case, then again they lose the claim to truth and invincibility.

One of the justifications for conducting this study is to investigate the theoretical disconnect between national and international politics. The limited research in this area has led to repeated calls by contemporary academic and research leaders for change. The prescriptive nature of the claim to the essence of human nature by traditional IR approaches has in part been, buttressing them by preventing research into related relevant studies. Central to its defence is that since human nature has decided the conduct of foreign policy, subjecting it to the same analysis and methods used in domestic politics, saves no real purpose. However, researchers have underscored the fact that this position sustains itself, firstly, by disqualifying any notion of studying IR outside the already developed and ring-fenced natural premises. Secondly, the reliance of these approaches on their own hegemonic narratives in order to keep them out seems to have limited sway. Other recent studies have indicated that the institution of political parties has been on the decline, in terms of both ideology and national
politics. Nonetheless, the chapter notes that this does not mean that ideology and political parties have become irrelevant.

Additionally, the chapter discussed the Conservative and Labour Parties’ political principles and used literature to establish their general ideologies, both in domestic or foreign policy. At this stage, the chapter emphasised domestic policies because, owing to the existing attitudes; literature on party foreign policy remains limited. This thesis will consider this question in Part III, using the data collected in the cause of the research for this project. These sections find that ideology consistently impacts on political party foreign policy thinking.

The Conservative Party discussion indicates that the main principles guiding its policy thinking include the preservation of the old order of things. However, far from being static, the party regularly re-models and repackages itself to achieve this. Other, identifying doctrines are the commitment to property rights and natural social inequality. The party is antagonistic to the progression of historically weaker political groups it perceives them as presenting a threat to the natural order. The party had historically opposed the transformations that brought about the revolution electoral politics. It also has massive suspicions for advancement and progression of women, working classes and non-white immigrants.

The Labour Party, on the other hand, brought into politics and corridors of power members of groups that the Conservatives are uncomfortable with. The principles that inform its ideology include a firm social democratic commitment to egalitarianism, peace and solidarity. The party hoped to use the state to pursue progress and change towards a moral and idealist society as underpinned by the view that humanity has a predisposition towards such. Its policy aims were to create the chance and conditions for peace. However, this required planned and deliberate programmes to eliminate the inequalities, poverty and unnecessary competition, which have been the primary source of conflict. Its programmes and policies extending support for good, affordable and decent homes,
unemployment welfare, old age support, compulsory education and free health care for all are some of the examples of policies that accord to their principles. In addition to this are policies relating to promoting equality for workers, women and minorities. Nonetheless, the party has also evolved in a number of ways, not least in attitudes, towards its elites, to the market and the state. This is evidently the case in the party’s foreign policy initiatives.

The two political parties’ divergent underlying principles guarantee the existence of the ideological continuum. These make it easier to identify the dogmas that inform each party’s policy inclinations and choices. The data analysis in Chapter 6 seeks to identify these from within the discourses in the data collected and in connection to the narratives provided by this chapter. The concluding chapter will also utilise these in making the comparison of the two hypothetical models. Thus, Part I of this thesis has set the stage for Part II, which is the basic analysis of the case study.
Part Two

Britain and the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

By defining a constitutive outside he seemed to suggest, one often sets up an arbitrarily-defined political symptomatology, in which "symptoms are named, renamed and grouped in various ways", and which thereby tend to disenable an ethos of agonistic respect. In addition, if the purpose of critical political thinking is, in the terms employed by Gilles Deleuze, contributing to the invention of diverse a people, then instrumentalisation of a thinker's work is unavoidable, including those motivated by an anti-systemic sensibility (Adams, 2008, p. 147).
Chapter 3: Sources of Foreign Policy

Party Attitudes, Identification and Foreign Policy Orientation: A Study of Different Eras

3.1. Introduction
This chapter will introduce the case study. Given the post-structural approach to this study and its reliance on discourse analysis and deconstruction, the importance of context cannot be overestimated. Any studies of dominant narratives that separate them from their socio-political milieu constitute a rather futile exercise. As Pomerantz and Fehr (1997, p. 69) express that this methodology’s conduct requires a ‘sense in which conduct depends upon context’. Thus, similar conversations and narratives would have a different meaning depending on the ‘immediate, local contingencies of interaction’ (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997, p. 69). As such, this chapter provides a narrative of the time-based establishment in which actions and interactions take place.

The various sections of this chapter and the chronological organisation help provide succinct details of the relevant historical details. The chapter recreates the political, social and economic context that facilitated the establishment of Rhodesia. This treatise gives deserved regard to the fact that such environments are shifting ground thus it attempts to establish existing discourses, the issues they impacted on and those impacted by them. These informed and shaped the attitudes and principles that allowed Rhodesia to become the unique and troublesome colony.

Broadly, the chapter shows that the annexation of the last four colonies happened largely in spite British policy on the subject. It shows the upper hand that the Conservative Party, and the imperial aristocrats had over the state on matters of policy matters. It also unearths Britain’s approach towards imperialism at the time and going forward. The critical appraisal of the different key players, their interactions and actions, including their personalities, ideological positions and impact adds value to the overall analysis. It reveals their role and themes that informed or shaped their view of the world,
and perhaps how these contributed to the shaping of new realities, which became the Rhodesian and Zimbabwean experience.

Additionally, this chapter pays attention to the possible ideological sources of the late 20th century colonisation and the policies that they modelled. It also discussed the impact and power of nationalism, including how Conservative politicians and colonialist entrepreneurs used these as narratives to control the state. It shows that these provided most of the energy necessary for the sustenance of expansionism, and the racial undertones that it took. The policy and political context within which this happens reveal the powerful control of ruling elites in foreign policy. It shows that at the time, Britain famously promoted the abolition of both slavery and an exploitative colonisation, yet the contrary took place in Southern Africa, to be specific.

The chapter concludes by interrogating the popular narratives surrounding the Rhodesia problem. This includes the entrenchment of inequality and property rights in the new colony. Finally, it demonstrates the importance of discourses by outlining how the attempt by the Labour Party, to decontextualize Zimbabwe’s land problem provides the context within which British foreign policy became seriously limited against Mugabe. It shows that various contexts can simultaneously by drawing attention to the fact that this happened despite Britain’s policy enjoying popular Zimbabwean support and Mugabe being initially politically weak.
3.2 Colonial Policy: From Nationalism to Internationalism

3.2.1 Initiative for Imperial Policy

The expansion of South Africa through the acquisition of the Rhodesia was not necessarily the position of the British government, whether Conservative or Liberal (Olivier, 2008; Galbraith, 1960). When Rhodes first proposed the annexation of Zambezia as a British protectorate the UK’s Governor of the Cape, rejected the idea on the bases of cost (Martin & Johnson, 1981). Instead, the Governor Hercules Robinson preferred to enter into agreements (Keatley, 1963; Blake, 1977) with the political leaders in the country. The acquisition of the area of Matabeleland was contrary to Her Majesty’s government policy; instead it considered working with King Lobengula to build capacity to repel any aggressive European explorers (Samkange, 1968; Hansard, 1889). With fresh memories of the First Boer War and the Irish crisis (Dodwell, 1959; Robinson, et al., 1961) the government and the electorate wanted peace. The costs of the Boer war had been heavy and unwelcome. Dodwell (1959) found that as a result, national policy was shifting from Empire expansion to consolidation. The desire was to unite it rather than venture into new areas of conflict. Nonetheless, utilising his position Prime Minister Salisbury and his Colonial Secretary Lord Knutsford, acting with Rhodes facilitated the BSAC and Rhodes’ adventures into Zambezia (The Graphic, 1891). Rhodes deceitfully used fraudulent treaty documents to claim attainment of control over the area (Dodwell, 1959; Mtshali, 1968).

It is necessary to note that since the First Boer war, the government policy was that of consolidating the Empire rather than its expansion (Robinson, et al., 1961). Thus, Robinson, et al., (1961) concluded the Conservative government ‘extended the empire through the chartered company, not primarily to increase British trade, but to shape the intrinsically neutral movement of commercial development and colonisation to their own political design’ (p. 251). Salisbury the creator of 21st century conservatism-of-the-Empire portrayed it as synonymous to his party (Green, 1996). It was Rhodes’ ambition to colonise Africa from the Cape to Cairo and not that of the British government (Keatley, 1963; Austin, 1975). Even so, Salisbury and Knutsford enabled the privately managed enlargement,
which was largely untested, as an ambassador and custodian of the Imperial flag and its pride (Keatley, 1963). For this purpose, the BSAC sought and obtained a Royal Charter to help achieve aims that aligned closely with the party rather than the national interests, as defined by foreign policy experts (Martin & Johnson, 1981).

Given the troubled history of the Cape colony, clearly Tory leaders were always aware that the main reasons for keeping and expanding the Cape were rather personal (Blake, 1977). Sir Hercules Robinson gave light to this new imperialism, in his famous declaration that the Crown’s colonialism, ‘is a diminishing quantity, there being now no longer any permanent place in the future of South Africa for direct imperial rule on any large scale’ (Hobson, 2011). This expression riled those in London as it exposed that the expansionism in South Africa was not government policy but one run by Conservative politicians, financiers and adventurers. These would only reluctantly seek British cooperation when faced with hard times. This led to his resignation (Star, 1889).

The government’s position as outlined by the Governor Robinson, the Chief Diplomat in the area, was to pursue peaceful trading and business agreement with Zambezia. Robinson, et al., (1961) made similar findings in their excellent study of the Victorian politics at the heart of imperial expansionism in Africa. The tradition at the time was that the Governor of the Cape designed and led on all of Southern African policy (Mtshali, 1968). Windrich (1975) argued that, in practice, governors were executives and originators of policy in the colonies, including Rhodesia. On this matter, even the written rules concerning the rights of the natives and land apportionment, were seldom, if ever, applied, without the initiative and agreement of local administrators. As such, the Conservative Party orchestrated this expansion, taking glory for it and yet, quick to blame the company when things went wrong.

After obtaining the Zambezia territory Rhodesia, BSAC named the country and its cities after important people. They named the country’s capital Fort Salisbury in honour of the special role that the Prime
Minister and Conservative Leader, through his Colonial Secretary of State Lord Knutsford, played in influencing decisions in favour of the risky expeditions and expansion (*The Graphic*, 1891). Rhodesia, in fact, told the whole story of colonisation and its structure, the chart below shows the place of the Conservative Party between the Empire and the colony. The naming of the country and its most significant places summarised nature and extent of the partnerships, in the colonisation structure. The captured country’s naming into Rhodesia was in honour of Cecil John Rhodes, who initiated and pursued the idea to annex it (*The Pall Mall Gazette*, 1890).

Zambezia’s own town of Royalty, modern-day Masvingo, a place suspected then, of holding hidden treasures from the biblical King Solomon’s temples or palaces of Queen of Sheeba, (*The New York Times*, 1903; Hensman, 2010) became Fort Victoria, in admiration of Queen Victoria and the Empire. However, the Great Zimbabwe ruins eventually proved to have no gold treasures or have any relation with either the King or the Queen (Randall-Maciver, 1906). These seem to have been nothing more than overambitious readings of writer and fabulist Sir Rider Haggard’s novel titled King Solomon’s Mines, whose plot is in Africa. Thus in the pioneers’ belief that the place was of exceptional significance and wealth, apart from, being their first point of call, named it after Queen Victoria.

Politically, Cecil John Rhodes aligned very closely with the Conservative Party. Most of the directors on the first Board of the British South Africa Company, who held political views, were Conservative Party members. James Hamilton, 2nd Duke of Abercorn, like most UK parliamentarians of his time was an Oxford educated Conservative Party representative of County Donegal (Waite, 2007). Horace Brand Farquhar, 1st Earl Farquhar, was also a British Conservative elected to represent several constituencies in London. He was a high-ranking member of the party who once served as its Treasurer (Hansard, 1922). Thirdly, Major Edric Gifford, 3rd Baron Gifford was a Tory politician who like Rhodes mastered an excellent network within the ruling elite of Whitehall and decent friends at the Buckingham Palace (Black & Bolton, 2001; Keatley, 1963).
Fourthly, Albert Grey, 4th Earl Grey was a useful liberal friend to Cecil Rhodes. He helped in containing Chamberlain and other politicians (Slaby, 1972). In fact, Churchill (1938) noticed that overtime Chamberlain changed so much that he ended up standing to the right of the Conservative Party. He opined that there was, ‘the tale of radical Joe. We see this robust, virile, aggressive champion of change and overturn marching forward into battle against almost all the venerable, accepted institutions of the Victorian epoch’. Alexander Duff, 1st Duke of Fife, was also a Liberal politician; however, he enjoyed strong relations and shared conservative views on colonialism.

Finally, Cecil Rhodes the founder and leader of BASC was a liberal politician. He supported the Irish Parliamentary Party, led by Parnell whom he backed even after a scandal of having an affair with party colleague’s wife (John, 1974). The remaining Board Members are unknown to have held any political views. It is apparent in the evidence here that Tories and Conservative-leaning politicians dominated BSAC. This is evident from various angles, for example; the three permanent directors of the Company were essentially Conservative politicians. Arguably, it is the characters and composition of the Board that facilitated the granting of the Royal Charter to the company. Its issuance was at a time when the country’s official attitude towards further expansion was non-existent in the aftermath of the First Boer war and the Irish Crisis.

As such, as already argued above, the Charter was a political method of achieving colonial expansion by any means. Meanwhile, it cushioned the Conservative – Liberal coalition leadership from any possible political backlash. This effectively put the Charter and BSAC in the British Ballot Box. The company and its affairs became a special matter within British national politics. The public, private and media audiences attracted by Cecil Rhodes and his colleagues prove this point (The Morning Post, 1895). It embowered a strong sense of British personal and national pride when in success but tremendous fear and insecurity when it staggered. This greatness amassed its true nature in Rhodes’ own words about what he thought as the function of colonialism and its relation to the British race. In
an essay titled, *Confession of Faith*, he wrote, ‘I contend that we are the first race in the world and that the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race’ (Rhodes, 1902).

The Royal Charter successfully turned the BSAC into a governmental structure. It bestowed upon the company authority and power to make decisions normally reserved for elected and accountable officials in Her Majesty’s government. The company could make peace and war, create its police force and generate laws. This relegated Britain to a subservient role of guaranteeing external security and relations. As the Jameson War later demonstrated, despite having this responsibility the country was powerless to enforce and ensure its decisions on the company (Hansard, 1896; Kirkman, 1969). These obligations included managing the country’s foreign relations. At the time, this meant ensuring that Portugal and German authorities stopped all attempts to annex Rhodesia (The Graphic, 1889; The Scene-Shifter, 1896; Perham, 1966). Despite taking this enormous responsibility, formal steps to constitutionalise the country under the Imperial power waited for 25 years, because of conditions set in the Royal Charter.

### 3.2.2. Colonial Entrepreneurs and Policy Initiatives: Nationalism
Although the arrangements in the preceding section turned out to be politically useful for governing political parties and the company, its expeditions cost the British public immeasurably financial and in blood. Nonetheless, the London administration continued to rely heavily on the Company. The first of these is the 1895 Jameson Raid of South Africa’s Boer Republics. This botched attempt on Transvaal is significant because it sheds light on the philosophical questions that characterised Rhodesia’s relations with Britain. The invasion led to many other events that laid the foundation and parameters for future relations with the mother country and its ‘consequences had a far-reaching effect on both the administrative and political history of that colony’ (Hensman, 2010, p. 59). Closer to home it led Chamberlain into a position weaker than that of Rhodes and BSAC, because both Rhodes and Lord Grey held important secrets about the Secretary for Colonies’ own involvement in it (Blake, 1977).
Firstly, the Boer war was the largest and most notable of these conflicts. It became Britain’s longest, costliest, bloodiest and humiliating war fought between the Napoleonic and Great Wars (Weber, 1999; Lowry, 2000). A hundred years later Queen Elizabeth II regretted the war, falling just short of apologising for it (BBC, 1999). At the time, the war bitterly divided the public. One of its critics was Liberal Leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who charged that it was not a war because it was ‘waged by methods of barbarism’ (Lowry, 2000, p. 2; Vickers, 2003, p. 44). An Independent Labour Party MP, Kier Hardie charged that it was an entrepreneurial war (Koss, 1973). He argued that capitalism purchased and sustained it with the assistance of unscrupulous (Conservative Party) politicians and aligned media. He retorted that any claims of a good war were misplaced calls to tyranny, which his party abhorred.

However, the Conservative-leaning press propagated a different story. The claim was that the military was doing a terrific job defending British interests in South Africa. It used the contextual overwhelming public sentiment of patriotic to suppress alternative views on the war. Particularly this sought to overshadow human rights issues that they considered to be none-issues. You were either pro-Boer or for the Empire. Thus, when Liberal Party aligned public figures raised concerns about the human rights of the Boer women and children in South Africa, and the media vilified them as sell-outs (Morgan, 2002; Campbell-Bannerman, 1902). The Labour Party at its 1901 national conference, while the war was raging on, resolved that General Kitchner’s concentration camps tarnished British Imperialism (Labour Party, 1901). Vickers (2003) notes the label that the party got for being a disloyal opposition, while the country was at war. This was to haunt the party’s public and academic narrative right into the future including during the Great War. In fact, fictitious stories generated narratives and discourses that Boers were responsible for their own death because of their own barbarism and suspicious refusal of British help (Weber, 1999; Morgan, 2002).

Emily Hobhouse, a British woman who campaigned for women’s rights regularly faced vociferous denunciation as an overreacting hysterical busybody for campaigning against the brutality of the war
against Boer women and children (Marouf Hasian, 2003). The London Times, for example, described Campbell-Bannerman’s comments as ‘irresponsible, if not subversive’, it general reasoning was the popular claim that, when at war, one’s country comes first, whether right or wrong (Koss, 1973, pp. 238 - 239). Koss in a London Times editorial, summarised the pro-War public temperament in his bold assertion that:

When a nation is committed to a serious struggle in which its position in the world is at stake
... it is the duty of every citizen, no matter what his opinion about the political quarrel, to abstain at the very least from hampering and impeding the policy of his country, if he cannot lend his active support (Koss, 1973, p. 239).

However, despite the pro-War movement and its strong media backing the public attitude changed by the end of the war. Parliamentary debates shifted away from the ‘war and heroism’ mantra (Hansard, 1901). Arguably, the electoral landslide victory by the Liberal Party in 1906, led by Sir Campbell-Bannerman, is the final piece of evidence that when presented with details the British public rebelled. The popular discourse began to gravitate towards questioning the credentials of war and the suffering Boer women and children, as a result.

Eventually the public began to worry that the war helped erode Britain’s high moral ground, which was a large part of the Empire’s public narrative (Morgan, 2002). It formed part of the political discourse that led to Conservative Party’s sweeping loss at the 1906 poll, thus it is important for two reasons. Firstly, in 1901, the media and public rebuked Campbell-Bannerman, describing as an ‘enemy of the country’ and ‘friend of his country’s enemies’ (Campbell-Bannerman, 1902; Porter, 2007), yet he became leader of his party and eventually Prime Minister, in spite of these earlier labels. The fact that he won the election with a wide margin underscores the intensity of electoral disapproval, which had skyrocketed within a short period. It also eroded the potency that the Conservative Party’s consecutive landslide election victories, had afforded. The impact of the war on the elections is
apparent in manifestos. These billed it as a major issue. While acknowledging the limited information contained in electoral memorabilia at the time, Vickers (2003) also found that the Imperialists generally lost their argument for war.

The damage caused to the British Empire’s reputation abroad had also started to appear in the foreign press. French editorials questioned its human rights (Lowry, 2000) in reference to the plight of Boer women and children. With this the proud legend that British colonial explorers and missionaries were rather friendly to the people they colonised, began to vanish. Even within the British public, pro-war moral arguments that imperialism had helped end slavery and import civilisation to colonies became bankrupt. This was despite the fact that in 1893 imperialists Chamberlain, Rhodes and Milner had successfully employed a similar urgings to drum up support for the Matabele (Weber, 1999) was disintegrating. In that case, the native King had brought doubt to the legality of the agreements, concessions or treaties, permitting Rhodes into the country (Hoghe, 2008). Mtshali (1968) and other researchers in this area such as Martin and Johnson (1981) and Palmer (1977) have produced sterling accounts that cast aspersions on the pact. Without the ability to prove that the King was reneging on his signature, the imperialists had no lawful reason to fight, thus they claimed he was a brutal savage.

However, it was important because the war connects to Rhodesian history in many ways. Firstly, its pioneer Dr Jameson was the ruler of Rhodesia under Rhodes. Secondly, Zambezia was largely an extension of South Africa by colonial press and politicians and newspapers covered it under the heading of Transvaal or South Africa. Additionally, Rhodes who was the Premier of the Cape was also the head of BSAC. Chamberlain notes that the Charter, South African Order in Council 1891 and Matabeleland Order in Council 1894, established the authority of the High Commissioner in South Africa as that of being the representative of the Crown (Chamberlain, 2006) thus led on the policies on the country.
This was Milner’s position. He was an acclaimed champion of the Empire, who believed that its vastness had to pay service to the English race. Ian Smith, the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, writing in memoirs, ‘The Great Betrayal’ reiterated the Milner credo that:

My patriotism knows no geographical, but only racial limits, I am an imperialist and not a Little Englander, because I am a British Race Patriot....It is not the soil of England, dear as it is to me, which is essential to arouse my patriotism, but the speech, the tradition, the spiritual heritage, the principles, the aspirations of the British race (Smith, 1998, pp. 4 - 5).

In addition to believing that his race provided him with the system of principles and beliefs for guiding his life purpose, he provided the following rationalisation for a race based system of government. Arguably, the Rhodesian and South African apartheid and the UDI found inspiration and built their philosophies (Smith, 1998). He required the British state to grant independence to any settlement of English race people anywhere on earth and to protect them in their chosen path:

The British State must follow the race, must comprehend it wherever it settles in appreciable numbers as an independent community. If the swarms constantly being thrown off by the parent hive are lost to the State, the State is irreparably weakened. We cannot afford to part with so much of our best blood (Milner, 1958, p. 386).

While the Rhodesian Front viewed rebelling as a hugely dangerous step (Smith, 1998), it argued that it was their absolute right to do so. Milner’s role as in deciding the futures of both South Africa and Rhodesia helped strengthen this belief by Cecil Rhodes. His policy attitudes were integral in deciding the social and structural progression in both countries (Marks & Trapido, 1979). On the question of Rhodesia’s attitude towards the mother country, Ian Smith, was very clear that it was the worldwide acclaim of his race that mattered and that on those bases independence was a birth right. In his speech on the event of UDI in Salisbury, he declared:
To us has been given the privilege of being the first Western nation in the last two decades to have the determination and fortitude to say: "So far and no further." We may be a small country, but we are a determined people who have been called upon to play a role of worldwide significance (Smith, 1998, p. 6).

Secondly, the Raid led to two more wars in Matabeleland and Mashonaland, respectively. As the news of the Jameson’s failure in the Transvaal swept the country the Matabele people saw a chance and began a revolt (Martin & Johnson, 1981). The rebellion was partly a response to the failure of the invasion, which emboldened the native. However, it was also in part because the incursion relied on Rhodesian police and militias. Owing to this, the European force in the country, numbered only a merge forty-eight mounted police (Blake, 1977). Accordingly, Blake (1977) the insurgents aimed at rebuilding their Kingdom by installing a new King to replace Lobengula, who disappeared after the 1893 war. At the time, Lord Frederick Carrington took immediate charge of the Rhodesian forces suggested the extermination or deportation of all the Matabele. They survived for three reasons. Firstly, because the war ended in a negotiated settlement, secondly, the loss of their notorious female commander weakened their resolve and finally, the Imperial government would have likely opposed such action under the flag.

The Mashona uprising followed the Matabele war. Until then this tribe had peacefully accepted colonisation by the Company. In fact, legend has it that thousands of Shona people were part of the army that attacked Lobengula in 1893 (York Herald, 1893). However, Martin and Johnson (1981) note that even the peaceful Shona tribes and their rulers took the chance to rise against the self-acclaimed benevolent settlers (Low, 1916). It is notable that the colonialists previously claimed that these tribes were historically, ‘quiet, inoffensive’ and ‘unwarlike’ (Hensman, 2010), as part of their campaign for war against King Lobengula. The MP for Belfast West charged that the Chartered Company failed in everything peaceful in Africa other than turning peace into chaos. He charged that BSAC achieved nothing in Africa other than start wars, even against the Shona tribe (Arnold-Forster, 1897).
overrunning of the authority of traditional Chiefs, expropriation of cattle and the introduction of a hut tax, drove them to fight (Mtshali, 1968). This war lasted over a year, which saw the capture and execution of various leaders of these tribes, including the frail Lady Nehanda and Chief Kaguvi.

3.2.3. Political Parties and the Colonial Policy: Internationalism
British media across the length and breadth of the country (Huddersfield Chronicle, 1896; Western Gazette, 1896; Manchester Evening News, 1897) covered the Zambezia uprising forcing politicians to take keen interest. Henry Labouchere (1896) MP for Northampton, for example, wondered if the company was failing to manage its relations with natives appropriately. Arnold-Foster (1897) complained that the operations of BSAC had inflicted a shameful history upon the Empire.

Defending the charges, Wyndham (1897) used the untrue legend of the time, claiming that the House needed to honour Rhodes and Colenbrander because they were peace bearers. They gave the Ndebele and Shona harmony and not war as charged. The divisions between the political parties on how to deal with the BSAC questions and its problems in South Africa were clear. The Conservative Party leaned towards the Company’s position and espoused the ‘kith and kin’ attitude, for good or bad, whether true or false (Murphy, 1995). For example, before the 1896 uprising, there is no history of the Shona ever engaging in any war, not even against their rather brutal Ndebele rulers (It is imperative to note that this brutality exists only in the writings of BSAC aligned historians and racial enthusiasts within the Conservative Party). Even so, against the company, they did and fought gallantly for over a year, with one of the Chiefs never surrendering. The government anchored its policy positions on ideological reasoning and to that extent, remained merely pandering to the British electorate while achieving its philosophical goals.

Furthermore, in dealing with the aftermath of the uprising in the colony, Chamberlain exposed the entrenched partisan nature of his decisions and policies. Initially, Salisbury’s appointment of Chamberlain itself was an indication that he required someone in the Colonial Office, who was a self-confessed conservative on the subject. Chamberlain’s participation in the Jameson raid and Boer War
would prove his ideological Conservatism on colonialism. Many historians, documents and individuals made unavailable for a House of Commons’ hearing prove that the government, through him was complicit in the matter (Galbraith, 1970).

However, more significant was the appointment of Sir Milner as High Commissioner for both South African and Rhodesia. His extreme ideological standing is a confession to the partisan nature of the resultant policy positioning. The fact that these appointments followed the difficulties on race relations in South Africa and Jameson’s Raid (which was an act of international aggression thus preserved for the imperial government) is questionable for many reasons. Milner’s credo was that the territories possessed the right to claim independence and assert racial superiority. It is arguable that this sealed South Africa and Rhodesia’s long history with either independence or apartheid.

Although acting under Milner, to Rhodesia, Chamberlain sent Sir Richard Martin as Resident Commissioner. His appointment made the difference, for Rhodesia. According to Hensman (2010), Sir Richard Martin was a professional diplomat, whose experiences included working as deputy High Commissioner of South Africa under Robinson’s leadership. His inquiry of the uprising in Rhodesia exposed weaknesses in the BSAC’s administration and indicated the possibilities of forced labour (Hensman, 2010). Hensman (2010) criticised the report citing that most of the respondents, did on condition of anonymity.

Simultaneously, the Rhodesians set up their own committee to send another report drawn by business leaders in Bulawayo, praising the administration of the company. The Company used its Conservative contacts in parliament wisely, by prematurely sending the Sir Richard Martin Report and its response to them, in advance of presentation before a Select Committee (Labouchere, 1897). It is worth noting that, although Chamberlain initially announced the Sir Richard Martin Inquiry to his fellow parliamentarians, he stubbornly delayed its publication to the Commons (Hansard, 1897).
issues raised in the report resonated with the three different factions, as organised in accordance with their political thinking.

These were, firstly, the pro-BSAC, mostly composed of managerial staff and associates. This group relied on a special network of supporters within British party politics, connecting mainly to the Conservative Party. For this group, the pre-eminence of the English race was the most main function that serviced the greatness of British Empire (Milner, 1958; Rhodes, 1902). This group rejected London policy on race; they charged that it would amount to appeasement and surrender to natives, at the expense of those who made English Empire possible in the first place (Milner, 1958). For this function, the Company was the best way to ensure to prevent the Home government from interfering with this goal.

The second faction was imperialistic and favoured a colony administered from London. Its philosophy hinged on London’s role in guarding the Imperial image against the excesses of its people abroad. This included emphasising moderation on racism and extravagances. This was a smaller group that consisted of expatriates. There is limited evidence to suggest that Sir Richard Martin was a member of this group. However, it is possible to deduce from his actions that he trusted London (Hensman, 2010). This group received some sympathy from the Liberal Party, which like them worried about the public treatment of natives (MacNeill, 1914). Their position closely linked to official policy as stated in the British parliament and would have preferred joining the Union of South Africa (UK Cabinet, 2012); this includes those who would accept a representative government under the Crown.

Finally, the average white worker and industrialists longed to remain subjects of the Monarch but to be free from London or the Company. This group was suspicious of the company and more comfortable with links to London; however, terms for such associations needed to be their own. The central issue for them was attaining independence from all forces and having a chance to serve the
Monarch and themselves (Windrich, 1975). This group shared the desire for independence but was unwilling to remain under any control.

In London, these divisions were also evident. Most members of the House on the Conservative side argued in favour of the company. They viewed Rhodes with respect and defended his and the Company’s work and record, vehemently (Ormsby-Gore, 1914). Ormsby-Gore (1914) protested the untruths and monstrous attacks on the Chartered Company. MacNeill (1914) argued against the Conservative Party’s support for a private enterprise, while ignoring the dangers they were bringing to the reputation of the country. The war subdued inter-party disagreements on many subjects including the Rhodesia situation. With a less divided population and limited political wrangling between British political parties, Rhodesia held a constitutional referendum in 1922.

However, to get to this stage this newly constituted nation followed a thoroughly ideological divide in London and Rhodesia. Meanwhile, British politicians debated the appropriate vision and approach that would serve the Empire better (Hansard, 1929). This somehow led to an oversimplified engagement of issues relating to the colonies. Both parties were keen on portraying themselves as the true custodians of Imperial greatness. As such Parliamentary Debates of laws relating to Rhodesia turned into showcases of support for the colony (Hansard, 1930) instead of focused and responsible debate.

The 1930 parliamentary discussion of the Rhodesian land laws the Labour Party challenged the status quo. Until then, the Conservative Party’s approach characterised by had generally defaulted to Conservative Party policy on Rhodesia. Now, Lord Passfield (Sydney Web), a founding member of both the Fabian Society and the Labour Party chastised the norm. He was part of a new and growing internationalist school of thought he argued for a change of policy.

He produced a memorandum detailing the significance of native interests as part of Britain’s policy in Africa (Mtshali, 1968). The new trend towards internationalism Lord Oliver also made the same point
in another publication for the Fabian Society, titled Imperial Trusteeship, in which he answered the outstanding question of the whole future of relations between Europeans and Africans (Olivier, 2008). The position spelt out in these documents is best summarised in an earlier report by Sir Hilton Young’s Commission. The report’s leading recommendation was that:

The field of native interests should now be clearly defined and safeguarded, that there should be a clear idea now and at each stage of development what British policy both as regards natives and immigrants is to be, and that this policy should be affirmed not merely as that of one political party but with the concurrence of all (Hilton Young Commission, 1930).

It is incredibly instructive that the report was sure to mention the importance of this policy being non-partisan. Thus, he was aware of the impact party politics as an important factor in British policies to these foreign lands. His report took the ideological position that the mistreatment of African natives departed from the country’s policy of justice and human rights and aligned with the Conservative ideas around supremacist nationalism.

On Rhodesia, the report outlined that the abuse of natives and their rights to land followed and capitalist tendencies of the Chartered Company, as inherited from South Africa (Windrich, 1975). In reaction, Rhodesians (North and South), with Conservative Party support resurrected the idea of a Federation. Windrich (1975, p. 29) explains that the sudden change of heart, especially on the part of Southern Rhodesians was partly on the hope that unified country ‘would enhance their political stature and economic growth.’ Such a size could minimise the threat presented by the acclaimed new paramountcy of native rights to British Imperialism (Perham, 1966). Settler colonialists had become uneasy with increased Labourite calls for a reformulation of colonial think in order to recognise the social, political and economic rights of the colonised natives. For example, Arthur Creech Jones declared assumptions guiding Labour policies:
They are, first, that discrimination and racial superiority must be made to disappear as quickly as possible, and that the relation between this country and the colonial peoples should be a relationship of partnership....The second point is that political and economic privilege and domination has to go, and that is its place there shall be freedom leading up to responsible self-government. The third assumption is that economic exploitation of natural resources and the people in the interest of groups ... has to go .... The fourth assumption is that the test of our policy should not be British advantage but the happiness, prosperity and freedom of the colonial people themselves (Albinski, 1957, p. 190).

Thus, the leaders of the Rhodesias determined a growing ‘possibility of combining the two territories in a defensive autonomy against the intrusion of such dangerous ideas’ (Perham, 1966, pp. 4 - 5) of going ‘soft on the Native question’ (Mtshali, 1968, p. 94)

The Labour Party’s view of the amalgamation was that it presented a difficult question to the government’s responsibility concerning native people’s rights (Somerville, 1963; Jones, 1951). Somerville (1963) also found that the Conservative Party supported the Rhodesians and paved the way for the Federation, without justification or regard to its stability prospects. The Labour and Liberal parties strongly protested the lack of safeguards for Natives rights (Somerville, 1963) Prime Minister Winston Churchill rammed the proposals and established the Federation (Welensky, 1965). This ignored some reasonable suggestions by the Labour Party, for example, to give Africans the right of appeal against Federal rules and laws to the Commons in Britain (Perham, 1966). However, once formed CAF was unable to overcome its initial weakness of illegitimacy to a sizeable proportion of its citizenry. However, the Federation succumbed to the pressures of unrest among its African population within ten years (Welensky, 1964; AP, 1959; AP, 1959; UPI, 1960). After several Commissions of Inquiry into both disturbances and the viability of the Federation, it faced its dissolution in 1963 (Monckton Commission, 1960).
The Conservative Leader and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan worried about the Federation and its political weaknesses (Somerville, 1963). In an attempt to save it and prevent the matter from entering the upcoming election campaign, he set up the Viscount Monckton Commission. This was unsuccessful, and the Labour Party forced the matter back into the agenda. Its manifesto charged that, ‘the Tories ignored Labour’s solemn warnings that nine-tenths of the peoples of Nyasaland and Northern, and Sothern Rhodesia opposed the Federation which the Tories were forcing on them’ (Dale, 2000).

To increase the chances of a positive report, the terms of reference for the Royal Commission limited its enquiry to the economic ramification of dismantling the Federation. However, this too backfired, as the It was its futurological conclusions about the political state of the CAF that the settlers in Rhodesia (Hansard, 1960) and the Conservative Party supporters in the UK found incessantly scathing (Mtshali, 1968). In fact, Somerville (1963) notes that questions regarding the country’s political prospects were left out as part of the Commission’s mandate. It was only indistinctly included after the Labour Party forced it with a threat to boycott the Commission altogether. The Commissioners opined that Rhodesia’ aversion of none-racists policies, made the partnership unworkable and impossible (Monckton Commission, 1960). It also effectively granted each member the right to secede, which Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia soon took, one after the other.

As soon as the threat of UDI by Rhodesia became evident, the Labour Party pushed on Sir Douglas-Home’s Conservative led government, trying to get it to make specific declarations. Mainly, they pushed the government take a hard stance on Rhodesia. However, faced with an election within a year the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet ran circles around the questions refusing to take them (Hansard, 1964). Labour also made the issue of human rights and independence for African nations election issues, devoting a whole section of its manifesto to the subject of ‘the end of colonialism’ (Dale, 2000). They blamed the Conservatives for presiding over policies that tarnished the UK’s image abroad, while also breaking its historic promises the settlers in British colonies.
However, between the political parties, both Conservative and Labour were committed to one principle on the matter of Rhodesian independence. Additionally, sections of the British media suggested that the Conservatives’ stakes in Rhodesia would not allow them to act reasonably on the problem. The left-leaning Tribune, appealed to the newly appointed minister Butler to:

...think in bigger terms. The African movements of East and Central Africa want a Federation embracing all their territories. This is the political and economic answer. But if it is to be established the right of the peoples to democratic independence must be recognised. The European domination of the Rhodesias must be ended. I am afraid the Tory Party is too tied to the vested interests to allow Mr. Butler to do that (Brockway, 1962).

However, despite all the hype about Butler, he effectively played into the British strategy of the time (Somerville, 1963). In the same article, the author recognised that Socialist (Labour) and Liberal members were fundraising for the cause of independence in Northern Rhodesia. However, he emphasised that ‘even’ some members of the Conservative Party we involved:

I welcome the fund which has been started by Socialist, Liberal and even some Conservative sympathisers to help UNIP. If our support for African freedom means anything we will give ourselves and get others to give. The treasurer is Lord Listowel, 74 Denison House, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, and S.W.1.

Given the above, it seems that general expectations of the Conservative Party included that it would not support African nationalism. When they did, this was worth noting as out of the ordinary. All things being constant, the party would have rather have supported settlers’ interests at all costs, in the same mould as Rhodes and Jameson did to Uitlanders in South Africa. However, in the new information age this could no longer happen without hurting Britain’s international image. Even some Conservatives helped give steam to this public narrative. In Murphy (2005) Prime Minister Macmillan told his Australian counterpart Sir Robert Menzies, that, more than a third of his backbenchers would support
the Rhodesian rebellion. In parliamentary vote, years later, a similar ratio of backbenchers supported the Rhodesia on the matter, and the other two thirds fell into two other groups. It would seem that revolt supporters within the party were in the majority, in consideration of the number of MPs who only disagreed with Rhodesia for declaring independence against the Queen, but would have supported without the UDI.

Additionally, another Conservative Prime Minister Douglas-Home also expressed his own support for the Rhodesian government. In his memoirs, he wrote:

> It would have been possible and perhaps in terms of real politics we could have done so (given independence to a minority government) with a reasonably clear conscience, but hitherto when handing over power to another government, we had always done so to a majority; and if there was to be an exception, and we were to pass authority to a minority, we felt that we must take scrupulous care to ensure that the majority would be helped along the road of shared political authority and eventually of majority rule (Douglas-Home, 1976, p. 133).

The policy proposals that both Douglas-Home and Sandys (Secretary of State for Colonies) once suggested to the Rhodesian high commissioner was passive on human rights and built on Britain acting as a guarantor publicly reaffirming native rights and then undertaking to fund their education (Murphy, 2005). Murphy (2005) also notes that when violence and coups de tats broke out in East Africa Sandys shared his opinion. He expressed the view that it was wrong for Britain to force Rhodesians to move fast on the race questions. He thought that the pre-Federation arrangements would be able to solve the impasse. The High Commissioner in Rhodesia, although sympathetic to Sandys’ ideas believed that the incoming Labour Party led government would reverse them, as they did not guarantee racial equality. For this reason, he did not implement them.

The UDI came soon after a new Labour Government came into office in 1964. At this time, the political stage for the Rhodesia crisis already existed in a number of areas. Primary among these were the
impressions that previous Conservative Party led governments had given the Rhodesians (Albinski, 1957). They made them believe that in terms of the Empire, British nationalism would always triumph over everything else. Smith later regretted his faith that Britain would ‘follow the race’ as once decreed by Milner:

It was this British spirit that Ian Smith mistakenly believed still existed. But such visionaries were no more. Following two fratricidal wars, which Britain itself initiated by declaring war against Germany, a natural and willing ally, the flower of British manhood and its Empire were gone. Proud nationalism gave way to a pale internationalism (Smith, 1998, p. 5).

As such, while London held the responsibility to adjudicate on all matters of racism it lacked resolve in doing so where Rhodesia was concerned (Murphy, 2005), hence the existence of expectations that the same could be done on the existing crisis. Thus, when the race question arose after the collapse of the Federation, both the Conservative Prime Minister and the Rhodesians anticipated, if given time, emotions would burnout and the problem wither away naturally (Somerville, 1963). It was not until the change of government to Labour in 1964 that Rhodesians felt squeezed and made the dangerous decision to declare UDI. Cleverly, they twinned this with attempts to campaign directly to the British public (ICS, 2012). For example, the Rhodesian Authorities organised for pre-printed Air Mail letter for citizens to send to friends, family and contacts in Britain. These were intended to gain support from the public, by highlighting that the British economy suffered more from the Rhodesian sanctions. As such, there was no way for politicians to think about Rhodesia and fail to perceive it as an electoral issue.

The Labour Party’s political thinking about Rhodesia as an issue did not become clear until a few years before the UDI, where patterns began to form. Notably, off script overtones from Labour Party leaders contradicted those of their Conservative Party counterparts. In a letter to a Rhodesian African nationalist, Dr E Mutasa, while his party was voting down the 1961 Rhodesia Constitution, expressed
his opposition to minority rule (Blake, 1977). This position was consistent with the parliamentary party, which opposed the Federation and the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution because room created for African political advancement was limited. It also concurred with the 1962 conference’s resolution, which called for a speedy settlement (*The Guardian*, 1962).

Despite the foregoing, Wilson’s years at Number 10 would not be enough to usher in a solution to the problem. In fact, Blake (1977) notes that Wilson’s Labourite policies were marginally different in comparison to those implemented by Conservative administrations before him. It would seem that the ground laid by Butler had been solid, as he tried to prevent the Rhodesia crisis by maintaining some sense of the Federation (Blake, 1977). His memoirs reveal that these were attempts to preserve the dying association. He states that his opposition to the Monckton Commission, and its report was that its arguments ‘were largely couched in terms of our own domestic policies’ (Butler, 1971). He seemingly forgot that British parliamentarians held legislative authority over the territories and that; therefore, if indeed this was the case it perhaps was an avoidable consequence of the constitutional arrangement.

Given the above, Rhodesia somehow exerted itself onto British political party and electoral politics. It resonated in governmental and parliamentary circles. In fact, Charmley (2008) found that it had national significance and both parties accusing each other of failing to manage the case in government. It leaped into a parliamentary party splits on both sides, as it did in cabinet (Murphy, 2005). On the question of the UN backed oil sanctions on Rhodesia, the Conservatives parliamentary ended up with three-way split. The parliamentary vote produced large number of Nays, Ayes and abstentions (Maxey, 1976; Peele, 1980; Charmley, 2008; AAP - Reuters, 1965; Political Editor, 1978). These unprecedented events in British parliament indicate how Rhodesia played in domestic politics (Stuart, 2002). The majority of the party favoured the status quo, hoping the problem would eventually go away, if left unresolved.
However, Charmley (2008) indicates the other two blocs, included one that favoured policies to prop the UDI making the ‘kith and kin’ argument despite the rebellion’s disrespect of the Monarch. While, the Labour Party divisions did not occur seriously in parliament, they were differences in policies followed by government and those proclaimed in the country (Maxey, 1976). Within the administration, the Chancellor of the Exchequer led a faction that opposed the Prime Minister’s economic sanctions (Coggins, 2006).
3.3. Tooling Post-Colonial Foreign Policy

In Africa, the Lancaster House conference was the bedrock of Zimbabwe’s independence, but in Britain it signified an end to a stubborn problem. It had been a constant source of irritation and national friction. In attempting to generalise on the proceedings of this conference it is important to note beforehand that most of what transpired in these negotiations remains secret and in some cases, records do not exist (Onlsow, 2009; White, 2000; Stoler, 2009). It is clear that the conclusions depend in part on the trends and outcomes rather than full knowledge of what really transpired because the conference design and aimed at empowering and control to the convenor, to minimise disagreements (Onlsow, 2009). Thus, this section triangulates data and evidence as it develops its arguments.

The Lancaster House discussions, which led to Zimbabwe’s independence, were an important pointer to the UK’s policy direction. When the August 1979 Commonwealth conference resolved that Britain would lead the final process of granting Zimbabwe independence, Prime Minister Thatcher was enthusiastic:

The Commonwealth is putting confidence in Britain and we are the power to go ahead and do it. We shall in fact try to carry out the duty they have placed upon us...Well the United States would not expect to play a role in any constitutional conference. I have not the slightest shadow of doubt that when we are successful in completing the process, set out at this conference, the US will be among the first to recognise an excellent Constitution (Thatcher, 1978, p. 2).

However, she was ambivalent about her role in the post-colonial state. While the Prime Minister envisaged no role for any country to participate in constitutional matters, it is curious that this new policy seemed to avoid the fact that Britain initially internationalised this problem. The Rhodesians and South Africans opposed the move and in fact, the Commonwealth had played a role in getting the Conference underway. This indicated Britain’s desire to hand this problem to the international community as a way to make it go away. Nevertheless, the government sought to limit the
participation of other countries in the constitutional process itself (Carrington, 1988). Such acts of nationalism gave Britain the responsibility of creating the foundation for this country’s independence, a footing that it could guarantee. This would include dealing with all the problems that arose as a direct result of the management of the independence process.

The first curious matter was that of the transitional period and the appointment of the governor. This was a departure from previous plans in which a caretaker government supervised by an international military force to allow for a transition (SSFCA, 1977). The length of time given for political campaigning and for preparing for elections was inadequate. This brings attention to two contradictory situations. The government wanted to relinquish its responsibilities for Rhodesia. This was in contradiction with the brief colonisation of Rhodesia, making entirely a British show (Carrington, 1988).

Thus, after re-establishing colonial responsibility, there was a need for a longer transitional period to help establish a new state. In fact, it was nearly impractical for a country that had been at war: it would have been barely enough for UK, where this period takes anything between five and eight weeks (TI, 2008). The elections followed only six weeks after party leaders had returned home from London (Carrington, 1979). This period included Christmas holidays, which were very popular in that country.

From this perspective, there was insufficient time for the preparation for the plebiscite but it would seem Britain wanted Rhodesian independence granted. This is particularly important given the accusations later that Robert Mugabe’s Maoist forces did not completely ceasefire and attend assembly points; instead, they remained in remote rural areas intimidating people into voting for his party (Renwick, 1998; Todd, 2007). This like allowing Cecil Rhodes to misrepresent matters, leading to various invasions in African laid the roots for future conflict, the humble beginnings of ZANU PF’s faith in election victory through violence. Necessarily so, because under these hasty conditions even complaints to this effect by the Rhodesian Army were ignored by the governor, who viewed attending to them as potentially destabilising to the agreement. In discussing this Lord Robin Renwick, who headed the Rhodesia Department under Thatcher’s government regretted:
Mugabe’s troops were frankly cheating and not observing the cease-fire and engaging in all sorts of acts of intimidation, thereby giving the Rhodesians an excuse to try to upset the applecart. So we had a constant exercise in brinkmanship throughout the Conference. We had a constant exercise in brinkmanship in Rhodesia but in the end we did succeed in de-colonising Rhodesia in circumstances where the war was ended and the country was going to get the best start it could in life as an independent country (Renwick, 1998).

Secondly, the relegation of the land distribution as secondary to the political settlement produced its future problems. This is so, given the centrality of the issue of land to political, social and economic rights, and even the question of Rhodesian racism. The approach as moored on overprotecting the rights of minorities (Renwick, 1998), thus postponing ‘the most acute and difficult question that would confront’ (Palmer, 1977, p. 246) an independent democratic Zimbabwe government. This was tantamount to writing into the constitution that economic imbalances should not be addressed in any way what so ever.

Britain thus entered into the constitution an uncompromising section on property rights, as a strategy for protecting the individual and economic supremacy of the settler community (Stevens, 1979). This once again set the foundation for another future conflict, which ironically affected the same minority they intended to protect. This arrangement would prevent the new Zimbabwe from acquiring any land from the minority that already held most of it. It would provide land landowners to refuse to sell and provided them with direct access to the High Court. If for some reason the government won the case, the property owner could require the State to repatriate the payment to another country of their choice. The Lancaster Constitution ordered that:

> When property is wanted for one of these purposes, its acquisition will be lawful only on condition that the law provides for the prompt payment of adequate compensation and, where the acquisition is contested, that a court order is obtained. A person whose, property
is so acquired will be guaranteed the right of access to the High Court to determine the amount of compensation... Compensation paid in respect of loss of land to anyone who is a citizen of or ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe will, within a reasonable time, be remittable to any country outside Zimbabwe, free from any deduction, tax or charge in respect of its remission (Carrington, 1979, p. 4).

Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe co-leaders of the Patriotic Front (PF) or the Front posed questions to Constitutional Conference relating to land and democracy (Carrington, 1979). However, Carrington utilised various heavy-handed tactics to get both sides to agree (Novak, 2009). He keenly and constantly reminded the Front that international opinion favoured a resolution and if they stalled, the world would be sympathetic to Britain (Stedman, 1988; Times, 1979). He indicated that the Thatcher government with its inclination towards Muzorewa (Botha, 2008; Onlsow, 2009) would simply recognise Muzorewa, if the talks failed for any reason (Stedman, 1988). In addition, the British got Presidents Julius Nyerere and Samora Machel, of the frontline states Tanzania and Mozambique respectively, pressed recalcitrant and untrusting Mugabe to accept negotiations (Carrington, 2008; Huyse, 2003). In dealing with the Smith, Carrington found good favour in South Africa’s refusal to extend credit lines to the Rhodesian government, for the continuance of war in the first instance (Botha, 2008; Carrington, 2008). This forced the Rhodesian regime to consider the conference as a better option as compared to its initial of continuing the war regardless of the outcomes of the Lancaster House deliberations.

On the land question, the evidence seems to disagree with the popular narrative that the Lancaster House compact was a complete failure (Murdoch, 2002) and that Britain actually committed to land redistribution. It is important to delve into the historical context of the land problem and the extent of British responsibility towards the African natives on this question. Initially, Britain had absolute responsibility for Rhodesia, in spite of the rebellion. It is the reason why the responsibility to grant
independence, of any nature, rested with Whitehall. Secondly, the natures of land disparities are a matter that Britain explicitly and implicitly participated in its creation.

As already discussed, throughout the administration of Rhodesia by BSAC London could have stopped the trends as they were developing. London had overall responsibility on the matter and yet its governors and officials allowed disparities to grow to unsustainable levels, throughout the pre-1923 period (Masilela & Weiner, 1996). When presented with the first unambiguous chance to deal with the unfortunate trends, through the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) of 1930, the government approved the law, which became the legal bases of all forms of discrimination in Rhodesia. Thus, the land question was never exclusively a matter between the internal white Rhodesian and black Africans. In fact, a Privy Council judgement in 1919 adopted this position in its declaration that the land in the colony belonged to the Queen. Thus, essentially, it seems reasonable, in line with nationalist movements’ positions to, at the end of colonisation; expect Britain to solve the land problem by accommodating both native black land hunger (Onlsow, 2009) and white farmers’ interests.

As the legal authority relinquishing hold of land, the Queen had a moral and perhaps even legal responsibility (Carter, 1979) to ensure the matter was resolved, and evidence shows that Thatcher’s government thought about and acted on this. Actually, as Onslow (2009) notes most other previous settlement proposals addressed this question. She also notes that, according to the data that is available currently, there are limited indications that the Front delegation placed any overall emphasis on this matter as it seemed to part of the broader agenda on the acquisition of power. However, Nkomo directly raised the question of land ownership in his opening address, on behalf of the Front delegation. As a part of a list of issues that he wanted the Conference to resolve, he asked, ‘What will be the future of the people’s land?’
However, in principle, there is limited knowledge of the Front discussions within themselves on how they were going to approach the question. As such, it is hard to determine why they accepted the final conditions as laid out in the *Freedom from Deprivation of Property* and *Legislative Powers of Parliament* clauses in the Lancaster House constitution agreement (Carrington, 1979). These together, would prevent the new state from amending the Law relating to land acquisition. Nonetheless, the British government seems to have considered this question in depth beforehand. Perhaps, being the reason why for abandoning a UN supervised grant of independence, to allow Britain to manage this part more effectively. Onlsow (2009) indicates that the need to handle the discussion of the land question determined the management of the constitutional conference. As such, it addressed it adequately, but from the perspective of the white farmer’s interest. The conference’s agreement shows that Britain resolved this question, for the conference by ensuring that the Rhodesian regime gained a huge concession on the question of land. Carrington (2008) notes that Rhodesia had ‘bedevilled successive governments … since the UDI’ and that the success of the conference, would help restore Britain’s within the Commonwealth and some of its closest allies.

Despite, the seemingly limited preparedness of the Front delegation, it stood some ground against the determined and dictatorial structural machinery of Lord Carrington’s team (Davidow, 1984), on the property clause. The nationalists had identified the clause as dangerous arguing that Rhodesia was a special case in which the native had fought for their land (Onlsow, 2009). Mugabe declared that, ‘We would welcome a settlement. But we can achieve peace and justice for our people through the barrel of a gun’ (Davidow, 1984). The Front argued the conference to adopt conditions that were not similar to those offered to other former British colonies, because Zimbabwe was unique in that this followed a war fought primarily for land, thus requires law that will expedite the equitable distribution of land. They indicated that agreeing to the arrangement would force their generals back to war, unable to tell their men why the war was over.
Meanwhile, Frontline states weighted in on the deadlock, indicating that as a standard, they supported the adoption of the proposed constitutional arrangements minus the provision on land. Simultaneously, South Africa indicated that since the Front was on the verge of winning the war (Brickhill, 1995), if it abandoned the talks because of that, the South African Defence Forces would intervene (Onlsow, 2009). Carrington’s reinterpretation of the Property Clause aided this by indicating that it had limited relevance to the question of equitable land redistribution. He pursued the mantra that, regardless of the clause, with enough money to pay compensation then there would still be the capability to acquire land. Charlton (1990) notes that Lord Carrington’s commitment to help raise adequate funding that eventually allowed the conference to continue. Then President Carter’s supportive government indicated that it would contribute an agricultural development fund (Brzezinski, 1985), the Front was compelled to resume negotiations and accept the Property Clause. Carrington issued a statement, to inform the front that the clause would not prevent native land access if enough resources were available to help in the acquisition of under-utilised land:

We recognise that the future Government of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The Government can of course purchase land for agricultural settlement, as we all have seen. The Independence Constitution will make it possible to acquire under-utilised land compulsorily, provided that adequate compensation is paid....

The British Government recognise the importance of this issue to a future Zimbabwe Government and will be prepared, within the limits imposed by our financial resources, to help. We should for instance be ready to provide technical assistance for settlement schemes and capital aid for agricultural development projects and infrastructure.

If an agricultural development bank or some equivalent institution were set up to promote agricultural development including land settlement schemes, we would be prepared to contribute to the initial capital ... The costs would be very substantial indeed, well beyond the
capacity, in our judgement, of any individual donor country, and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should however be ready to support the efforts of the government of independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2003).

However, it is notable that the US provided no tentative levels of support (Vance, 1983) to entice the Front to sign on. Thus, faced with this question Nkomo (2001) points out that after the US had stepped in doing otherwise would have given Britain what they wanted, a Muzorewa regime. Nonetheless, leaders of the Front seem to have resigned the fate of the land question to the attainment of the political power necessary for changing the rules later and allow for land redistribution (Onlsow, 2009). Thus, the Front responded to Carrington by caving in to the promise by the Americans, whom they had come to trust (Brinkley, 1996) but had no moral responsibility on the matter. The front indicated that:

We have now obtained assurances that...Britain, the United States of America and other countries will participate in a multinational donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic development programmes. These assurances go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in Government (Muchemwa, et al., 2011; Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2003).

However, on the question of Carrington unilaterally excluding the Front and work with Muzorewa, as Sir Shridath Rampal put it then (Onlsow, 2009), the claim that Britain would win the IR war on Rhodesia by accepting Muzorewa’s government was unfounded for many reasons. Primary to this was the fact that international opinion against the regime was already decidedly hostile. The UN had already rejected the April 1979 election; the Lusaka Conference had called for negotiations that would end in unanimity (Carrington, 1979) and not a British decree. It is unlikely that after 15 years of international
condemnation of the UK conspiring with Smith to keep the UDI regime in power (Stevens, 1979) and its failure on the oil sanctions monitoring of the Mozambique Indian ocean cost, anyone would believe the stance to have been genuine and innocent (Anglin, 1978; Roger, 1978). In general, although this was an overriding meta-narrative within the conference and in the international community, it was factually wrong. Nonetheless, it helped the conference convenor by ascribing to him more authority and power than was granted by the Commonwealth as the sanctioning authority.
### 3.4. Land Inequity, Genocide and Redistribution

The Lancaster House conference, its disputes, conduct and the conclusions reveal the inner workings of British policy towards the independent state of Zimbabwe and its future. The British state seemed exhausted and determined to relinquish its responsibilities towards the colony of Rhodesia. However, there were in the process a number of competing interests and issues to consider. Just as the Wilson government discovered the UDI was an intransigent matter. It roused various strong conflicting difficulties and players; similarly, Carrington found the act of relinquishing power equally tricky. This was the case because the interests that made the issue complex were still present and contending to determine the outcomes.

At the time of the UDI, Britain faced a repulsive Commonwealth that largely wanted the rebellion stemmed immediately, a complex Rhodesian and British public, a United Nations (UN) that was unfriendly and an Opposition whose position was transitory. As such, the UK government needed to please all the constituents of the matter. The most challenging fact was unclear, what position the British public was comfortable with, in the long run.

These forces still existed in 1979 and most of them were present either directly or indirect at the conference itself. Carrington had the huge challenge that his own party and perhaps the leader of government needed convincing in order for her to support the initiative he was spearheading. In managing the conference and attaining a resolution he had to appease all the interested. However, it would seem that unlike most attendants he needed the conference to succeed at minimum costs to Britain. This included making sure that the racial distribution of arable land stayed in place until, those who benefited from this arrangement voluntarily decided to relinquish their historic privileges. Thus, the Lancaster House Constitution was adopted on the basis of the promises made by Britain and backed up by America that financial aid would be made available to help develop equality in Zimbabwean agriculture (Carrington, 1979).
In light of the above summary of the implications of the Lancaster House agreements, British policy towards the new Zimbabwe began a shift towards a donor led policy in which the British government had a role. The awareness of policy makers of Britain’s need to outsource Zimbabwean policy to donor organisations is implicit in its language and actions. For example, on the 4th of July 1980, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Commons originally agreed to investigate the questions of aid and development relating to Zimbabwe (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1981). This question implied that the UK had some responsibility in the matter, and it seems that is why the Committee changed this to limit Britain’s involvement to that of one voice among a cacophony of many others. The new question was the investigation of the *Role of British Aid in the Economic Development of Zimbabwe*. To conduct its investigations the committee visited Zimbabwe and engaged a wide range international aid organisations and government officials. In line with Britain’s policy of protecting the rights of the (white) minority, they received advice from David Stephen of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Minority Rights Group.

The Committee found that Zimbabwe expected contributions of up to £75 million from an Anglo-American supported Zimbabwe Development Fund over three years instead of £35 million over the same period (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2003). Zimbabwean rulers had utilised the 1977, Anglo-American proposals as the baseline figures, on agreeing to the Lancaster House Constitution. This suggested a minimum of US$100 million, but proposed that the amount needed to approach US$150 million (SSFCA, 1977). In addition, the committee notes the difficulties and limitations of multilateral donor funding for Zimbabwe’s land reform based on the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) was that most of these had conditions disallowing use of funds for land acquisition. These donors preferred that their money be utilised in other priority areas (Soames & Lynch, 1981).

Yet even before it was clear whether the land reform was fully funded and Zimbabwe was a little under two years old, Britain declared, ‘mission accomplished’ after the first conference. Similarly, donors
hardly referenced the land question, avoiding the inequalities while emphasising the importance of productivity as superior to resettlement (Palmer, 1990). The utility of this argument was similar to the discourses used to justify the emergence, existence and function of structural inequities within Rhodesian society (Jennings & Huggins, 1935). The potential economic and administrative function of differentiated land access was a political facade for segregation and racism (Phimister, 1986) whose benefits accrued to the majority through the trickle-down economic theory (Moyo, 2000).

With this approach, Britain seemed to detach itself from many issues affecting Zimbabwe. It employed the donor method of helping resolve the land and development questions as a protective veil against the nuances of history and the contexts it builds:

The Zimbabwe Government has not indicated to us any dissatisfaction with the level of assistance being provided by particular donors nor has it asked for any UK support in seeking increases in particular aid donors’ pledges. If it were to do so, however, we would consider what help we could usefully provide (Carrington, 1981, p. 3).

Lord Carrington (1981), through various government innuendoes and statements articulated that Britain felt its role was limited to do was help mobilise international aid for Zimbabwe. He indicated that doing so would fulfil the UK’s undertaking to help organised donors for the land problem. The Thatcher government pursued this ‘hands-off’ approach at all costs.

Mugabe’s genocide between 1982 and 1987, in the Southern parts of the country (Todd, 2007; CCJP, 2008) and the media silence or government lack of interest in the genocide, is a special case in point (Hill, 2005). The massacres carried out by the fifth Brigade, under the Gukurahundi programme are recognised as genocide by the International Alliance to End Genocide a Washington, USA based international organisation, reputable for its work in this area. In 2010, the organisation finished a review of the massacres and declared:
The Gukurahundi meets the definition of genocide because it was carried out by, exclusively ethnic military brigade trained to target a minority ethnic tribe. Shona youth militias, the notorious “green bombers,” also participated in the genocide. These militias still exist, like neo-Nazi groups, and conduct terror campaigns against opponents of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF in election campaigns. General Constantine Chiwenga, Commander of the Zimbabwe Army, and Sidney Sekeramayi, Minister of Defence, were senior officers directly involved in the 1983-84 genocide (Genocide Watch, 2010).

Werbner (1991) confirms that this extermination was to eliminate the Ndebele people who supported Nkomo and thus stood in the way of the one-party state. Julius Nyerere one of the most important of Mugabe’s handler, had impressed upon the idea of a one-party state (Shaw, 1986). In fact, members of the Brigade included Tanzanians (CCJP, 2008) and despite killing thousands of people, the Brigade suffered no casualties. Mugabe resorted to killing the people of Matabeleland, in an attempt to copy Julius Nyerere’s ‘quasi-nationalism’, which emanated from a mistaken, flawed and overly simplistic aspiration towards nation building (Werbner, 1991).

According to Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) this narrow strategy depended on a theory that absolute power and moral authority based unity provides the best chance for development in a post-colonial environment. To achieve this pan-ethnic nationalism he utilised violence to create a one-party state and eliminate unnecessary opposition, to the agenda of creating quick development. Thus, the Ndebele and their support for ZAPU presented an unwanted hurdle in Mugabe’s journey towards a purely ethical and hard-working nation, in which more time would be spent on development and not politics. The only way round this problem would be to use, a specialised force, trained in terrorising people into complete submission to prevent any future revolt against the one-party state, once established. Mugabe acknowledged that the aim of the military action in Matabeleland and Midlands would ‘reorient’ (Hill, 2005) the people by casting away all those who could not fit his political disposition.
During the pass out parade for the Fifth Brigade Mugabe handed its commander a flag inscribed with the word Gukurahundi (a Zimbabwean team that means the wind that blows off the chaff after the harvest). It is important because while Mugabe was exterminating unarmed civilians the British military was assisting and funding Zimbabwe army (Hansard, 1983; 2001; Foreign Affairs Commitee, 2002). The Catholic Commission on Peace and Justice (2008) found that these atrocities cost between 10,000 and 20,000 lives in a little over 4 years. Reports of these atrocities indicate one of the most systematic and well-planned exercise in the extermination of people (CCJP, 2008; Anderson, 1986), when British forces were operational within the country. North Korean specialists trained the offending fifth Brigade of 5,000 men (Reading Eagle, 1981), which operated outside the normal military command. Its training lasted more than a year and a half, although its training was only to fight internal situations.

In terms of British policy concerning these grave human rights violations, the British deputy high commissioner at the time explains that they did not notice what was going on in Matabeleland because they were concentrating on South Africa’s apartheid problem (Hill, 2005). Sir Nicholas Winterton, who raised the issue in Parliament at the time, indicates that the British state was aware of the massacres, ‘Of course they knew. We all knew’ (Hill, 2005). Another, arrear for exploration lies in the fact that, at the time there were tens of NGOs, funded by the UK operational in Zimbabwe. It is implausible to suggest that the situation in South Africa blinded them as well. In fact, while this was going on the government commended and impressed upon NGOs to cooperate with the Zimbabwean rulers (Carrington, 1981). This therefore provides the only conceivable explanation for the silence expressed by all actors in Zimbabwe.

Official government positions remain unknown until all documentary evidence, currently classified, may reveal in the future. However, this was consistent with the policy that had been developing following the Lancaster House talks. Therefore, little doubt exists about the fact that the British
government looked aside while Mugabe was committing one of the most brutal acts in human history, accounts of which tell of horrors not heard of in Hitler’s Concentration Camps (CCJP, 2008; Hill, 2005).

Mugabe started planning and effecting plans for genocide three months after the country’s independence. Hill (2005) notes that after the outbreak of the massacres Nkomo fled the country to London but Britain ignored his calls to bring the situation to the attention of both at the UN and with the Commonwealth. Instead, from 1984 onwards, at the height of the murders, Mugabe received accolades from British and American institutions. Ironically, these included honours for championing democracy and human rights. The massacres and the Britain’s silent diplomacy towards them, define the indifference of policy approaches to African suffering in Zimbabwe by the UK’s Conservative government.

The 1990 expiration of the sunset property clause provided another chance to test both Mugabe’s resolve towards land redistribution and Britain’s commitment to the protection of white farmer interests. Mugabe faced the harsh reality was that his government had resettled just over 71,000 of a planned 162,000 families (Deininger, et al., 2004; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004). Thatcher’s government on the other hand faced an unchanged situation concerning land ownership in Zimbabwe, about the same levels as at 1979 prevailed. Since then only a small number of farmers had sold their land for redistribution (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2002).

Given the above, further finances and compulsion seemed necessary to allow redistribution to meet objectives (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2002). Initially, Mugabe responded by enacting the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 to allowing the government to acquire land from any farmer as long as there was enough compensation. Furthermore, Zimbabwe appealed for more funding to enable it to make pay outs to affected farmers.

Meanwhile, owing to prodding from Thatcher, Mugabe in the main did not compulsorily acquire land from white farmers despite the new law (Deininger, et al., 2004). Thatcher pushed Mugabe towards
capitalist economic policies. She impressed upon him the need to maintain investor confidence by embracing liberal economic policies as part of the land reform programme (Thatcher, 2010). The Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had begun encouraging Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) as the only way forward for economies and for the Zimbabwe agricultural sector (World Bank, 1991). Thatcher impressed upon that, the he needed to change his economic policies to align them with WB and IMF whose studies had shown that African countries, which followed ESAP, did better than those who did not (Thatcher, 2010).

Given the above, Mugabe forestalled his policy of land acquisition and the resettlement of the land hungry peasants in its place offering land to new black farming bourgeoisie as new members of the large-scale commercial agriculture (Hansard, 1998). This followed advice from research initiatives led by the Bretton Woods decried what they viewed as Zimbabwe’s preoccupation with ‘the quantity of land being redistributed rather than with the performance of the land reform program’ (Deininger, et al., 2004, p. 1698). As such, Mugabe approached the land as if it were not a political matter but an economic issue, by offering it to black bourgeoisie whom he thought would use to maximum economic output (Moyo & Yeros, 2005). It was partly this land reform programme that was later declare as corrupt and inefficient, (Committe on Foreign Affairs, 2002) understandably so because the selection of new beneficiaries caused anger and accusations of cronyism. The accusation of inefficiency also emanates from the 2000 Fast-Track Land Reform program. Researchers do not agree on the origins of this hastily organised program, but there are two main narratives (Derman, 2006). One holds that it was Mugabe’s political expediency, in an attempt to restore his crumbling political fortunes (Campbell, 2003; Bond, 2001) and another blames cumulative British policy failures (Moyo & Yeros, 2007). These arguments are the subject of discussion in chapter six.
3.5. Decontextualizing Discourses: The Dialectical Dilemma

The ascension into power of the Labour government produced new approaches to Zimbabwe policy. By the time, Mugabe had requested further funding from Britain to fund the land reform. This led to the Harare Land Conference of 1998 (Commonwealth, 2008). Drawing from a report produced by the UK Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the conference, stressed the incorporation of Labour’s general policy in Africa. Thus, it did not deal with the land question in its own right but aligned it to poverty reduction, democracy, human rights and economic development. The conference also agreed to support reforms that would include the participation of both the private sector and the civil society (NGOs). British policy on the other hand squarely relied on the Zimbabwe government accepting it as part of a broader programme of poverty reduction (Hansard, 1997). DFID believed that the problems with the rising instances of land occupation in rural Zimbabwe (as other problems in Africa) were a direct result of poverty rather than a genuine desire for land. Thus at the early stages, the Blair government helped equip the police so Mugabe would use them against land hungry citizens, while poverty reduction programmes were being put in place hopefully to allay the problem of occupation. In this regard, Ms Short (1997) when asked by Sir Alastair Goodland, what DFID was doing to help with the maintenance of order in rural areas, indicated that:

DFID is supporting a programme of reforms by the Zimbabwe Republic Police to introduce community policing, including in the rural areas... We have told the Government of Zimbabwe that we cannot support the rapid programme of land acquisition that they seem to envisage. We would be willing to support a properly prepared programme of land reform as part of a partnership to eliminate poverty (Hansard, 1997, pp. 448 - 449).

Just like the Thatcher government, before it, the Labour government did not consider relevant the historical context of Zimbabwe’s land programme. Rather the general approach was to deal with Zimbabwe based on its generic approach to Africa. Short’s letter to Zimbabwe, which many regard as a watershed moment for the relations between the two countries, articulated an attitude that already
existed since at least 1979. Analysts have relied on one part of the letter (Copy provided in Annexure 2), in which Short declares the decontextualized approach to Zimbabwe’s land problem by British policy makers. She argued that, ‘we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe… our government has no … links to former colonial interests’ (Short, 1997, p. 1). This statement demonstrates that the government desired to build a new discourse, in which it was just another of the many well-meaning donors, in which no special relationships or context existed. The rest of the letter specifies a policy which Carrington had announced in 1979, when he declared that, ‘no single government’ could afford Zimbabwe’s land problem and what the Conservative government had indicated when it argued that by assisting mobilise donors, it had played its part. The letter proceeded, professing Short’s hopes for Anglo-Zimbo relations:

We will set out our agenda for international development in a White Paper to be published this week. The central thrust of this will be the development of partnerships with developing countries, which are committed to eradicate poverty, and have their own proposals for achieving that which we and other donors can support. I very much hope that we will be able to develop such a relationship with Zimbabwe (Short, 1997, p. 1).

This statement underscores the basic principle that Britain viewed Zimbabwe’s land question as part of the larger programme towards Africa. The UK would judiciously follow its predetermined policy on Africa to approach this problem without falling into restrictions and debates presented by present or past realities.

Furthermore, she argued that Britain would fund ‘individual schemes that would have to be economically justified to ensure that the process helped the poor’ (Short, 1997, p. 2). The emphasis on funding the land program only if it would lead to increased economic output for the poor meant, in accordance with existing studies from the Bretton Woods indicate that even a programme similar
to the ones that the UK had funded in the early years of independence would not qualify under the
new stringent methods. Popular studies such as one carried out by WB aligned researchers, Deininger,
et al (2004) had already concluded that those programs had failed the economic measure, this
notwithstanding the fact that later empirical studies carried out after Mugabe’s fast-track land reform
program found that it had not been a complete economic and social failure (Scooney, et al., 2010).

Furthermore, the letter, with its claim to being frank about British policy on the matter also distanced
its policy from any agreements made in the past. It acknowledged the ‘discussion in 1989 and 1996 to
explore the possibility of further assistance. However, that is all in the past’ (Short, 1997, p. 3). This
part read together with the earlier quoted demand that the Zimbabwe’s land reform needed to be
economically viable are clear indication that the ideals behind the aligned with the New Labour’s ‘third
way’ ideology. As such, although some may argue that the letter indicates limited understanding of
the finer nuances of diplomatic communication (an attempt to be frank), it is not useful for researcher
and analyst to be carried away by that and fail to read the clear New Labour message. The letter was
right on the policy issues because Short (2012) understood what both Mugabe and the Conservative
government were ignoring, which is that, since 1990 the Zimbabwean government had given up its
agenda of land reform. Thus, the message was an attempt to locate a path between the past by
breaking with the past or supplementing it with an ethical dimension and promoting capitalism in
Africa (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2001). For Mugabe, this had become no more than a tool for evading
political responsibility and accountability at home (Short, 2012) and abroad.

The 1997 electoral campaign that led to the electoral victory was themed around radical thinking,
which would be a shift from old socialism and radical socialism. The party manifesto championed this
with the claim that ‘New Labour is a party of ideas and ideals but not outdated ideology. What counts
is what works. The objectives are radical. The means we will be very modern’ (Labour Party, 1997).
Thus, the letter espoused the same spirit; deny any connections with the past, separating itself from
the policies of the Conservative government and inserting a new initiative that combined social responsibility and capital liberalism.

The most salient point in the letter is the call for the casting away of issues that arise from history and their divisive nature. It would seem that New Labour believed that these histories belong to their era and Africa would just press a restart button and follow the leadership provided by the UK. In a speech to the South African parliament, Blair (1999) argued that the world had learnt from the ‘struggles of the twentieth century between traditional views of capitalism and of socialism, to combine economic dynamism with social justice’. Following these policy ideals, the government defined the source of African problems as conflict caused by poverty and oppression (Hain, 1999). As such, British engagements aimed at promoting good governance, human rights and sound economic policies (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2001).

However, despite the proclamation by the Labour government that the combination these issues as IR objectives for Africa were part of a new policy approach, literary and empirical evidence proves otherwise (Gaskarth, 2006). As early as 1991, the Harare Commonwealth Declaration identified peace, the rule of law and economic development as essential to the security and prosperity (Commonwealth, 1991). Accordingly, from 1991 to 1997, the Conservative Government, in the annual human rights report also effectively viewed these issues as interrelated and important to human advancement (Gaskarth, 2006). The evidence present here suggests that, while the Blair government claimed a new policy and a break with the past, such was just superficial (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2001; Gaskarth, 2006) when considering British policy towards the broader African continent. Williams (2002) that this assessment is equally true for the Labour Party, itself because it had dominated the human rights dimension since, at least, the end of the war in 1945.

In terms of British policy towards Zimbabwe, Chan and Primorac (2004), the change was apparent. They found that Blair used the first meeting with Mugabe to 1997 Edinburgh Commonwealth meeting,
to inform him of his policy to break with past and restart all things. This meant that the Major government had made to continue organising support for land reform would no longer be forthcoming. Policy towards Zimbabwe’s land programme would become part of New Labour’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. No special conditions or funds would be available for resolving the land problem; hence, it would face the same restrictions and conditions as all other aid or donor funds. Thus, in later years, it would this reversal of promise that the Mugabe regime would use to counter British policy indicating that Blair had reversed commitments made by the UK in the past. Chan and Primorac (2004) note that Mugabe’s response to this was what eventually led to the compulsory acquisition of white farmer land.

The Blair government based on ‘ethical foreign policy’, which in sub-Saharan Africa consisted mainly of aid with conditions for poverty reduction, good governance and economic utility (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2001). Mugabe rejected this policy on the question of land charging that it was a cheap neoliberal capitalist model for imperial Britain to sustain white farmer land privileges, while disabling Zimbabwe from ensuring its people have basic socioeconomic needs (Williams, 2002). For Britain the hope was that these rather ‘noble intentions’ would allow Britain to move Zimbabwe’s land issue away from colonial history, into a realm where the discourse of a problem within the context of 21st century capitalist globalism. However, the policy backfired, instead of promoting a narrative of Britain that ‘is not based on its imperial past, or on present military strength, but on the values of a confident, creative, tolerant and inclusive society’ (Cook, 1997), it got the UK stuck in that history with Zimbabwe. Secondly, instead of moving Zimbabwe into the broad category of countries governed by the UK’s general policy towards regional Africa, Zimbabwe became a specific policy quagmire. In fact, Hill (2001) summed this up in terms that evoked the Rhodesia and UDI experiences as Zimbabwe becoming ‘where the limits of British influence were most sharply exposed’ with the UK, once again finding itself as ‘having responsibility but not power’ (p. 347).
Britain’s policy on Zimbabwe, which sought to build a narrative of Mugabe as a despotic leader, who had lost the faith of his own people, failed to hold total ground (Taylor & Williams, 2002). Mugabe counteracted this with indication that Britain’s colonial complex and the desire to sustain white dominance of Zimbabwean economy, informed such campaigns. These two dialectically opposed arguments became the stalemate in which Britain was unable to master the global narrative of the Zimbabwe situation. Certainly, where it mattered most support was scarce, two of the most powerful African states, South Africa and Nigeria opposed sanctions against Zimbabwe and accused the Commonwealth of flouting its own procedures in suspending Zimbabwe (Taylor & Williams, 2002). Most African and Asian countries also rejected the Blair discourse, which sought to decontextualize the land problem and the Zimbabwe crisis, presenting it mainly as a matter of good governance, human rights and the rule of law (Henshaw, 2007). Mbeki drew comparisons between of the historical and contemporary context for Britain’s ethical policy on Zimbabwe, charging that the UK:

‘In the interest of their “kith and kin” did what they could to deny the people of Zimbabwe their liberty, for as long as they could, have become the eminent defender of the democratic rights of the people of Zimbabwe. Yet those who fought for a democratic Zimbabwe, with thousands paying the supreme price during the struggle, and forgave their oppressors and torturers in a spirit of national reconciliation, have been turned into repugnant enemies of democracy’ (Mbeki, 2003, p. 3).

However, by then Blair had lost international political capital that would help sustain the narrative of ‘ethical’ intentions in international relations owing to the invasion of Iraq. According to Phimister and Raftopoulos (2004) Mugabe utilised the unpopular war to attack both the UK and US for their new imperialism and war-like disposition. They note that speaking to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2003 he accused Blair and Bush of ‘turning themselves into fierce hunting bulldogs raring to go, as they sniff for more blood, Third World Blood’ (p. 388). These arguably gained
Mugabe needed pan-African and Third World support while denying Britain the necessary global support it needed for its own narrative (Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004).

Given, the above, British policy sought to isolate the Mugabe regime and to highlight the contraventions of various international conventions. Western media and governments lamented ‘Mugabe’s subversion of democracy and the rule of law, attacks on human rights and press freedom and seizures of white-owned land’ (Henshaw, 2007). The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which was the main challenger, and white farmers faced brutality allowed by the state and carried by ZANU PF linked militias, regularly calling themselves War Veterans (Chan & Mudhai, 2001). The Courts of Law including the Supreme Court faced systematic purging and pressure (Makumbe, 2002) to rid them of imperialist elements, in their ranks. The FCO, worked on these worrying issues indicating its ‘concern at the pressure being applied to the judiciary by the Government of Zimbabwe. It was also mobilising the Commonwealth Secretary-General to reiterate his concern and would discuss Zimbabwe with colleagues at the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group’ (Hansard, 2001, p. 394).

Additionally, Britain decried the introduction of new laws that suppressed the press such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which, together, oppressed the media and precluded the rights of assembly and association (Hansard, 2001). Furthermore, Makumbe (2002) finds that the state orchestrated political violence and election fraud that made it impossible for democracy to exist. Zimbabweans were forced to live in fear and large-scale retribution was carried out in urban areas where ZANU PF had lost most its support (Zimmerer, 2009).

3.6. Summary
Deducing from the evidence from this case study it is apparent that imperialist entrepreneurs instead of the government held the initiative for Britain’s colonial policy by the end of the 20th Century. These entrepreneurs held a huge sway over government and in fact, controlled its policy. They exercised a wide range of powers, mostly with the support of the Conservative administration but not necessarily
the legislature. Parliamentarians from opposition parties held strongly articulated positions against these actions in the colonies. These entrepreneurs had a huge capacity evidenced by their ability to make both war and peace, with the government merely inching towards their direction. Thus, the power of the colonisers comes across as unfettered.

The colonialists legitimised expansionism by claiming that their work was partly to spread the noble values of Christianity and to broaden the greatness of the nation. Their divergence from policy on war and other exigencies appealed to the greater good mantra, which argued that action was necessary to help end inter-Africa slavery and tribal conflicts. In response to the pursuit of principled goals, the British taxpayer generously bankrolled the Rhodesian colonial enterprise despite its private ownership. The actual process of colonising Zambezia, what became Rhodesia and then Zimbabwe, became more violent than the UK authorities wanted. Nonetheless, the response from the media was good for the colonialist. With this, British nationalism fermented and Cecil Rhodes enjoyed the status of gallant hero after his forces defeated King Lobengula. However, Liberal and Labour Party members, who argued for colonialism that was both co-operative and benevolent in nature, soon challenged Rhodes’ military expeditions; the Boer War is a case in point. This war was unnecessary just like the one with Rhodesia. This proves the dishonest of both the BSAC and Rhodes while showing that Rhodes controlled policy while the government merely defended it. In this case, the public disapproved and voted the Conservative Party out of office.

In the meantime, Cecil Rhodes and settler colonialists established themselves in Rhodesia. They implemented racially discriminatory laws. Meanwhile, the parliamentary party debated the country’s policies in the new colonies. Serious scrutiny was, however, prevented from taking place by existing intonations of nationalism. This allowed the compulsory acquisition of land for redistribution, wherein the majority of arable stretches were ring-fenced for private European ownership while enforcing forcible migration of most natives from ancestral land to agriculturally barren communal lands (Njaya & Mazuru, 2010). This became the hallmark for differentiated economic and social development
(Shaw, 2003). Although the Labour Party was, in principle, opposed to these approaches, it allowed them to prevail.

The world wars dramatically reduced both the utility of the empire and nationalism. The empire had to break down to allow Britain to transition to a new phase in world politics. While the Conservative Party grudgingly (Horowitz, 1970) accepted the seeming reality, it sought to do so while protecting what it viewed as the British pride. The granting of independence to colonies would start with colonies were native populated, but those with a considerable race of British descent, power would gradually be handed over to the settlers (Horowitz, 1970). This led to the fateful CAF, which the Conservative Party hoped that eventually independence would follow the pooling together its white constituencies to make a sizeable population, to justify doing so to a minority government. Internationalism became a relatively more popular method for ensuring national and world security. Western and eastern efforts against the Third Reich, won the Second World War.

A combination of the failure of the CAF and strengthening international institutions such as the Commonwealth and the UN provided the temporal condition for the Rhodesia rebellion and its prolonged duration. Meanwhile, the nationalist sentiment and the remaining British influence on the world stage, produced limitations for UK politicians while it empowered the rebels. Within the growing context of the cold war, Rhodesia became a theatre in which realism and idealism played out.

The end of British colonisation of Rhodesian finally took place in 1980. However, the negotiations at the Lancaster House conference revealed the Conservative Party’s major foreign policy guiding principles. These perhaps can help explain its historical and future positions on the subject. Britain’s management of the negotiations at this conference revealed its ideological principles. These were in relation to the maintenance of economic structures and protection of private property. The negotiations exposed the party’s commitment to its conservative ideas of shoring up aristocracy and property rights. The sunset clause in the Lancaster agreement, on which Britain hinged on the
conference’s success, mirrored the Social Darwinist approach that Salisbury encouraged. It understood that social organisations that fail to evolve soon become extinct (Carl, 2010).

In the preceding years, Conservative Party policies supported Mugabe, disregarding his murderous pursuits of power, in a bid to move him from self-acclaimed socialist values towards neo-liberalism. If he changed his ideological orientation, he would abandon the politics land redistribution. This would earn him continued support in various critical areas such as the military and police, areas that would save the dual purposes of helping him increase his grip on power while ensuring he was able to maintain the required social order in agriculture. Britain was by then experience of utilising an equipped the police force to deal with popular public strikes, after the disturbances in miners’ strikes in the 1980s, in which even military action became conceivable (Wallington, 1985).

While Britain was supporting Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1997, its policy sought to distance the UK from Zimbabwe’s controversial issues, while ensuring that the land question did not escalate. In this manner, the UK shaped Mugabe’s policies on land and economic reforms. This greatly influenced the trajectory of the land problem, to an extent that when initial land occupations began, the government and Mugabe agreed on cooperation to provide Zimbabwean police with enough capacity to protect white-owned farms from former War Veterans (The Hansard, 1983). Nevertheless, within three years of the Labour Government and its approach, relations broke down completely. With this, Mugabe finally did what he had sought to do since 1979, but failed due to the Conservative Government’s policy of minority rights or kith and kin protection.

The third way politics inspired the 1997 Labour government’s policies spirited on detachment from the past. This effectively decontextualised its approaches to social problems. Its ahistorical policy drew upon its interventionist approach, which viewed Africa, as a continent plagued by poverty and bad governance. In a private interview Short (2012) indicated that for Africa this entailed a blanket continent-wide development programme to deal with poverty while promoting good governance. The
Party used this cornerstone approach to strengthen its historical claim to anti-colonialism and placket itself from the remnants of debate emanating from the imperialism. Its priorities were to fight poverty, which in many cases was the source of constant conflict. Thus, Britain disowned previous assistance programmes that did not fit into its policy structure or referred to the colonial past. This gave rise to a new conflict, which extended into British multilateral relations, echoing the Rhodesia crisis that the Conservatives had done so much to prevent.

Meanwhile, Zimbabwe reacted by suspending all the safeguards that had protected private property owners and stopped guaranteeing state protection to the white farmers (Berry, 2002). Mugabe believed that the prospects of this would force a change of policy in Britain. However, since the nationalist ‘kith and kin’ attitude were mainly that of the Conservative Party, the Labour led government did not react with changing its policy. Instead, took the matter to the international stage, citing grave human rights violations. The UK’s western allies rallied against Zimbabwe accusing it of being a pariah state and imposed sanctions. On the contrary, Third World and eastern countries believed Mugabe had legitimate concerns on the land question and that British actions were a matter of colonial nostalgia. This partial support emboldened the otherwise politically weakened Mugabe to continue and escalate repression against the local opposition, which he accused of being an agent for western imperialism.
Chapter 4: Statecraft and the Case Study

Case Study: IR Narratives

4.1. Introduction
This chapter interrogates the intractability of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe foreign policy problem and its relationship with the ideologies of Britain’s major parties. This dates back to the 1890’s acquisition of Lobengula’s Kingdom by a Cecil Rhodes’ British South African Company (BSAC). In a rather unusual fashion, Whitehall allowed the company to run the colony for nearly three decades, because of political considerations in local British politics.

Disraeli opined that the political situation was averse to further expansion, because of the costs and the opposition built by experiences with Irish Home Rule (Robinson, et al., 1961). This crisis reduced party loyalty by those in the House of Commons and reminded their leaders of the British public’s thirst for peace, economy and prestige, which modernised to a cross racial trusteeship and antislavery. However, the ideological conflict between the old unaccountable colonialism and demands of responsible imperialism set British parties apart. They constantly wrangled forcefully for the heart and soul of the popular discourse about which party was the best manager of British pride and the Empire.

As such, the acquisition of Rhodesia was a function of domestic political chicanery, which helped define Salisbury’s personality within the Conservative Party (Green, 1996). Rhodes’ manipulation of information and skills in lobbying got him the resources and tools he needed through support from the Conservative Party and its leader Prime Minister Salisbury (Mtshali, 1968). The utilisation of BSAC aimed at cushion British politicians in the event of any disaster. However, Rhodes planned his initial column into Zambezia (renamed Rhodesia) to ensure British direct intervention if the situation became unmanageable, by organising its composition to include both sides resident in the Cape.
Meanwhile, the settler population developed its own interests and alignments in three directions. The choices were to support continued control by the company, join the Empire as a colony or pursue independent aspiration (Windrich, 1975). This largely mirrored the major British political party positions. This chapter reviews evidence, which suggests that the Rhodesia challenge emanated from the government’s refusal to accept its ideological origins.

The Conservative Party ideology dominated in the acquisition of Rhodesia before losing power for a long stretch. The resultant policy break and shift created the Britain’s longest foreign policy problem, with the new state. When London finally ended Rhodesia, as Tarmakin (1990) famously observed, applying orthodox IR principles claimed that pragmatism in contrast to ideology contributed to the solution. However, this failed to account for the ideological origins of responsible government, the race and economic disparities that bedevilled Rhodesian relations with Britain. Similarly, the scourge of the failed Central African Federation (CAF) was initially a political and partisan problem to an ideological challenge.

The chapter employs archival and documentary research evidence to outline the serious and emotive political conversation in Britain at various stages of colonisation. It follows the arguments and counter debates to show how ideology led Britain from one problem another, in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. These out context choices left the Rhodesia settler in the first instance, in limbo, with an uncertain future owing to partisan ideological nature of their foundations. Similarly, the Rhodesian solution was a further postponement of the same-old crisis, through purported pragmatism, which turns out to be the same old problem.
4.2. Responsibility without Power: Rhodesia

4.2.1. De-facto Dominion

Rhodesia was an evocative issue. ... Wilson once called it ‘the most difficult and complicated problem which any British Government has had to face’. His Foreign Secretary believed the Rhodesian crisis affected ‘the whole of mankind and the peace of the world’. ... Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, found that Rhodesia raised ‘issues as momentous as any that have ever occupied this House in its history (Good, 1973, p. 23)

That Rhodesia was Britain’s most intractable colonial responsibility and political hotspot is incontrovertible (McWilliam, 2003; Peele, 1980; Weitzer, 1984). The fact that Zimbabwe occupies the same position is equally irrefutable. The relations between Rhodesia and Britain were unique (Facchini, 2007; Ryan, 1995; Soames, 1980), from the inception of the earlier. The acquisition process was noncommittal, anomalous and anachronistic (Maxey, 1976; Buxton, et al., 1921; Windrich, 1975; Soames, 1980). This peculiar constitutional position for Rhodesia confused politicians and experts because it was neither a colony nor dominion. This unprecedented legal position worked mainly because its governance was a matter for personal relations between Salisbury, Lord Knutsford and Cecil Rhodes (Robinson, et al., 1961; Mtshali, 1968). Thus, in a parliamentary debate 40 years after the establishment of the country, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury Major Elliot indicated that:

I was about to descant upon the peculiar constitutional position of Southern Rhodesia. I should be out of order in going into it at length, but it is a Colony, which is in process of evolution towards a Dominion, and it has already reached a certain stage in that evolution. It is neither wholly the one thing, nor yet wholly the other. It is in the process of transition, and we have to allow for these things, in the British Empire,...it is in fact not a colony...on that constitutional position it is necessary for us to stand. I am afraid that I can go no further than that (Elliot, 1932, pp. 339 - 340).
This policy proposal gave all colonies preferential market access for their sugar products and identified Rhodesia as an excepted colony for the purposes of the law. Members of Parliament (MP) questioned the language and sought clarification. However, as above, the Secretary indicated that the official status was a working position. In fact, he only managed to clarify that it was wrong to refer to Rhodesia using the common language of colony and dominion categorisation. He also succeeded to show that the concept of responsible government was vague. This reinforced the observable reality that both sides were confused about what it meant.

Apart from the manner of attaining the colony and having it administered by BSAC for nearly three decades (Versi, 2003), the constitutional arrangement was fraught with political and ideological dangers. Setting up legal arrangements for the administration of Rhodesia became a serious balancing act. Firstly, the colony became polarised into various camps, for example, settlers closely aligned to the Company and its senior administrators were inclined to resist any change. For this, they employed well-trained private networks (Henderson, 1972). Secondly, the middle classes mainly preferred closer relationships with London, thus utilised official channels to support this position. This resulted in a referendum, which ended BSAC’s government and allowed for new constitutional arrangements, in which issues such as the Human Rights of natives, Land acquisition, Democracy and Racism became central to the formal relationship Rhodesia and London (Low, 1916).

The 1923 constitution established a strong responsible government based on racial segregation. This came with the promise of progression to dominionship if the economy and political systems became adequately self-sustaining (Smith, 1964). In a pitch before a combined session of the Royal African Society and the Royal Commonwealth Society, Smith (1964) reiterated that Rhodesia’s first generation of settlers had expected trust and equality with London. He laboured the notion of equality and mutual respect in service to the security and growth of the Empire. Rhodesians emphasised their role in the World Wars, tapping strongly into this remind Britain that they explored favours back. He also
eloquently articulated the country’s proud membership to the Commonwealth even an economic cost:

We have for a long time now been continuing to make our contribution towards Commonwealth and Western defence in the shape of air force squadrons. And, my Lords, ladies and gentlemen, we have always paid for that. The contribution has come from the pockets of the Rhodesian taxpayer to the extent of some £2 million or more per year; if we have contributed towards Commonwealth and Western defence to that extent, then it is fair to say that we have relieved the British taxpayer of that sum of money. But we have always been very willing to do it; we never complained. Because we were members of this particular club, we felt it was worth belonging to. We were not in the club for what we could get out of it; rather it gave us great satisfaction to be able to contribute something towards it (Smith, 1964, p. 17).

In addition to the above, the Rhodesia Foreign Affairs (RFA) ministry (1978) and Windrich (1975) further claim that Rhodesia’s agreement to join the CAF hinged on the understanding that the final consequence of this would be independence. Consequently, Rhodesia felt that her demands for independence were rational and justifiable (Facchini, 2007). This called into question the integrity of Britain as a country that could be trusted to follow up on its promises.

Meanwhile, as Facchini (2007) indicates the Empire was partly a tool for British geopolitics. It helped strategically position UK defences were needed within striking distance of its interests at minimum costs. The two world wars and the new improvements in military technology produced consequential new realities in international politics. It also meant that the Empire became an obsolete military technique and thus diminished the tactical value of colonies across the globe as viable sources foreign relations influence (Ryan, 2004). In terms of defence, the vast Empire proved valueless in the war compared to the Russians and Americans in contributing to victory (Darwin, 2011). Britain moved from
expansion, to consolidation before beginning to retreat while replacing the Empire with the Commonwealth, at least as official policy (Darwin, 2011; Miller, 1974). Robinson, et al., (1961) finds that, given the forbearing perspective, Rhodesia became a tactical liability, which needed to be deposed. However, dispensing it became a demonstrably formidable problem that lasted nearly four decades. In the process, it sucked Britain’s international ego and threatened its foreign relations (Editorial, 1966; UPI, 1965; AAP - Reuters, 1965). This was because leaving colonies had to ensure that it did not create problems that would return in some future years to haunt Britain. The racist regime in Rhodesia had the potential to cause a race war in the whole of Africa and threaten the peace of the world.

Given the above, Wilson’s policy response to the UDI needed to ensure that the independence of colonies met basic conditions as would be acceptable in a post-war world. Thus, when CAF failed, Rhodesia became more isolated in her demands for a white minority regime in a landlocked country. Allowing that condition to prevail in what was then curiously referred to as central Africa would have been catastrophic. The context was that many former colonies had gained political freedom, including Rhodesia’s own partners in the Federation. Its future as a racist regime was doubtful; it could potentially present the same challenges to Britain as the Falklands and its war, only without the advantage of being an island, out at sea. When the CAF collapsed, the cover for the colony bulked. At the same time, Britain was no longer colonising (Darwin, 1988). As such, the granting of dominion status as an alternative to the Federation had the Rhodesian referendum rejected it became impracticable (Sills, 1974). Similarly, granting independence under a minority regime would have required security guarantees from Britain, unless done to a majority government.

In light of this, the British government required safeguards from any independence agreements with Rhodesia to the effect that a minority government not last beyond the safety window. Consequently, the policy and approach to the UDI composed of six principles, expressed in shorthand as No Independence before Black Majority Rule or NIBMAR. Although, initially there seemed to be universal
support for this policy, by the end of the decade, the consensus ceiling cracked and trained resistance became evident (Facchini, 2007). Owing to sanctions busting mechanisms by multinational firms, South Africa and Portugal the Rhodesian economy withered away, the projected crippling effects of the UN mandated restrictions (Minter & Schmidt, 1988; TNA, 1964; The Sun, 1965; KRWE, 1966). Britain had limited control over South Africa because of its vast economic assets based in the country (TNA, 1978) yet Portugal was a close ally of the United States (Maxwell, 2003).

A large part of Britain’s problem with Rhodesia was a consequence of history. Part of this is that Rhodesia had been a de facto dominion since 1923 (Hansard, 1979), enjoying minimal interference from the Commonwealth Relations Office (Butler, 2000). In the post-War period Britain’s freehand had been lost, policies and responses to the situation in the colonies stopped being an internal matter. In the context of the cold war Butler (2000) notes that Washington grew increasingly conscious that Africa was the new theatre for games of world dominance.

While Britain previously decided the fate and position of Rhodesia, especially concerning the prospects for dominionship and independence, it was now tough. While London adjusted to these new realities, Salisbury did not, it still dealt with the imperial authorities in the same manner as it did during the hay days of British Nationalism. Through the years, Whitehall carried out successive actions and positions indicating an unwavering advance towards independence or dominionship (Windrich, 1975). Facchini (2007) notes that Rhodesians were invited to the Dominions annual meetings between 1930 and 1964 and Good (1973) indicates that it was moved from under the aegis the Colonial Office to the Dominions Office, although it was technically not a dominion. Additionally, London ignored African opinion to institute the Federation, in order to protect settler interests, as Welensky famously threatened Britain:

If we do not get federation ... I am going to everything in my power to bring more Europeans into Northern Rhodesia. I don’t care where they come from, Great Britain. Holland, Germany,
South Africa, Australia, America – it doesn’t matter a damn – just let them have a white skin and be willing to work. The very day have 100,000 in the country we will demand dominion status (Welensky, 1953, p. 26).

These positions taken by officials both in London and in African indicate that there was a meeting of minds, on the fact that the Federation was a tool for indirect granting of independence. As such, when it failed in this perspective, where Rhodesia was ready for independence, the expectations in Salisbury were that London would act according to the norm and alter the country’s status accordingly. To them Britain was responsible for the resultant contagion, because they had changed nothing, their expectations and actions were as they had always been. But for the waning superpower the challenges were acute, with American relations at stake and the cold brewing up and the Empire crumbling, policies that responded to all these (Butler, 2000). Thus, when the conflict began, they quickly highlighted these as proof of British inconsistencies on past polices that gravitated towards the granting of dominionship (McWilliam, 2003).

4.2.2. Post-World War Colony: Policy Transition

Britain began to withdraw the policy initiative it had granted to settler politicians on an unofficial basis (Butler, 2000), in which London had all along surrendered its constitutional responsibilities to the majority of the population (Maxey, 1976; Facchini, 2007). This arrangement, which helped in the creation of the Federation, at once, became history, even the seemingly feared ‘demanding of dominionship’, failed to nudge British policy away from its accountability for policy responsibility towards natives. Prevailing socio-economic, ideological and geo-political conditions required Britain to take public steps in enforcing its roles and duties in the colonies. Thus, the exceptional extra-constitutional arrangements (Good, 1974; Buxton, 1927) which an independent Britain could afford became an expensive luxury in the age of symbiotic relations, the UN and Commonwealth. These could not be appealed to for as grounds or causes for independence in the new period because London had responsibilities whose application the new world was watching (TNA, 1964).
However, Rhodesians partly responded to the new world, with the charge of inconsistent policies from London. They contended that the minority regime was essential to West and that attacking it was averse to Britain’s own national interests within the cold war dichotomy. To them the old could be utilised, for example, if the excuse for federation was that it would stop Boer apartheid from spreading northwards, and then white Rhodesia was the last bastion of Judaeo-capitalist values of the West, in Africa (Smith, 1998). Certainly, Rhodesian segregation as a policy was similar in facets to apartheid. It was as pervasive socially economically and politically (Austin, 1975). It contained the same rules, such as pass laws, unfair taxes, unequal rights to education and employment, segregated living and many others. In that regard, a Federation led by Rhodesia was more likely to spread racism northwards than curtail it.

Furthermore, for them, their supporters in Britain, across the white Commonwealth and intermittently in Nigeria, the narrative that analysed this matter from an international perspective or allowed the new world’s angle was wrong for that reason alone. The dispute was between Britain, a great power that could assert itself in world politics and one of its subjects, thus it needed to be resolved at this level (The Deseret News, 1966). The participation of any other party was unacceptable interference. Thus, determined opposition was mounted against the concept of international community which was dismissed as a ‘bunch of communist dictators’ (Smith, 1998), who would naturally work against British interests and threaten world peace (The Deseret News, 1966).

From this point of view, Smith’s government and its international supporters indicated granting Rhodesia independence was the right thing to do in the interest of Britain. Kilpatrick (1966) writing for the Evening Standard Newspaper argued that by not caving in to Smith, the Prime Minister was threatening both Anglo-American relations and the existence of the UN. His understanding was commonly place among sections of the media. It held that Rhodesia was a peaceful country whose membership to the family of nations was better than that of many newly independent African
countries (*The Deseret News*, 1966; Kilpatrick, 1966; Smith, 1998). Therefore, despite its folly with racism, it was better than some accepted members of the international community.

The UDI Prime Minister regularly presented alternative and more combative arguments, when he became aware that London was not going to give in easily. He set out to overplay how the Rhodesian population represented what was best about the British race (Darwin, 1991; Smith, 1998) and how its actions brought greatness to Britain. This seemed to target the nationalistic nature of colonial politics within the UK. He claimed that white Rhodesia, if maintained, would play an important role of preserving and ensuring Western triumph in the Cold War (Smith, 1998). His reasoning was that Rhodesians had proved their worth by building a first world country in the heart of Africa, through visionary capabilities for that can sustain the Empire, something that Whitehall lacked (Windrich, 1975; Good, 1973). He shared Cecil Rhodes’, the coloniser of Zambezia, perspective that favoured colonialism over imperialism, which was the root of their demand for independence (Good, 1973), because if we could build the Empire that we can run our own affairs on behalf of the Monarch. As such, while they were proud of their British heritage and connection they wished to pay allegiances only to the Queen (Charlton, 1990) without depending on Whitehall’s political class (Lowry, 1991).

The greatness argument extended to the Great Wars. They reasoned that since they had demonstrated sacrifice and heroism in service to the Queen and loyalty to their ‘Kith and kin in the United Kingdom and elsewhere through two world wars’ (Charlton, 1990; *The Evening Independent*, 1965), it was time for London to return the favour of freedom. At one point, Ian Smith evoked memories of both world wars and likened Britain’s stance against the UDI to Germany’s militaristic fascism, emphasising that his was at that point feeling the same threat and determination felt by the UK then (TNA, 1965). Rhodesians emphasised these thoughts by and their determination by declaring the UDI on Armistice Day and sending the telegraph to the UK government at 1:00pm to coincide with the official start time of the celebration (Coggins, 2006). These actions directly compared the British government’s actions to Hitler’s (Good, 1973) showing that Rhodesians viewed British policy as
presenting an existential threat and aggression. These also showed Rhodesian resolve and willpower to resist (TNA, 1965).

Following the UDI, in taking the sanctions route the government seem to have misinterpreted the situation, believing that at the slightest pinch of economic sanctions Smith’s government would surrender (The Sun, 1965). This policy resulted from three predetermined courses of action for the government (TNA, 1964, p. 450), which Michael Cary, Acting Secretary of the Cabinet, identified as:

i. To take no action, i.e. to ignore what would be an unlawful act. ...it would be possible to hold this position for more than a few days at the most, by which time we would have lost the opportunity to influence the course of events and would have jeopardised our international standing.

ii. To legalise the unconstitutional action taken by Southern Rhodesia and recognise her as independent (with or without the Queen as her Sovereign). This would involve us in the international odium aroused by Southern Rhodesia’s action; we would split the Commonwealth; and would have forfeited, probably irretrievably, the confidence of the Africans.

iii. To regard the action of the Southern Rhodesian Government as severing the relationship with Britain and consequently with the Crown and the Commonwealth, in which case the consequences would...

Policy responses to UDI indicate that the government chose to utilise a combination of the first and third courses of action. That is, they regarded the action as illegal but did not require the severance of relations. As such, the Queen maintained the Civil Service and the Governor remained deployed until 1970.

The third option included the possibility of military action to restore legality (Lewis, 1966; The Evening Independent, 1965), which many in Britain and abroad called for (The Sun, 1965). Wilson’s government
resolved not to intervene militarily and he could only do so at the request of the Rhodesians for the maintenance of peace and order (Reuters, 1965). Instead, he pursued sanctions at the UN, pointing out the shared history between the two countries made any military attack difficult. Additionally, the political discourses at the time, which portrayed the two countries’ defence structures as similar to different wings of within the same military, precluded this option. The plot by Rhodesia to emphasise their role in the world wars (Coggins, 2006) including the choice of date and time of declaration partly seem to have saved a useful purpose, in terms of avoiding a military attack.

The media largely peddled this equivalent line of thought arguing that the ‘British problem would be a severe one ... and ... it would be a difficult undertaking in terms of British domestic politics’ to fight a war against Smith’s forces (Editorial, 1966, p. 19A). The government’s policy was similar to this dominant discourse on the incapacity of the British military to attack Rhodesia successfully (Murphy, 2006). Prime Minister Wilson, even before the UDI, famously warned that:

If there are those in this country (Rhodesia) who are thinking in terms of a thunderbolt, hurtling through the sky and destroying the enemy, a thunderbolt in the shape of the Royal Air Force, let me say that this thunderbolt will not be coming, and to continue in this delusion wastes valuable time and misdirects valuable energies (Wilson, 1965, p. 634).

However, from an IR traditional approach and judging from the support received for UN backed sanctions and other international platforms such as the Commonwealth and the OAU, had Wilson acted militarily, support would have been universal (Reuters, 1965). He would have enjoyed huge international support and affected positively Britain’s worldwide increasing the country’s global leadership, presumably. This was partly because on the international scene, the anti-war policy portrayed the image of a weak former world power that could no longer have sway even on its own colonies (Kirkman, 1969; Good, 1973).
Given the above, Wilson soon found himself with sanction diplomacy as the only option (Chan & Mudhai, 2001; Onslow, 2005) despite their portrayal of Britain as weak in geopolitics (Watts, 2005). In addition to political arguments at the time, academics like Maxey (1976) also found that the policy damaged the UK’s grandeur on the international stage. South African government was one the first to show that they believed the UK to have weakened. Various countries believed that the UK relied on the UN Security Council (UNSC) because it had lost influence so much that it could not solve its own internal matters (Verwoerd, 1965; Onslow, 2005). Despite the overwhelming view that the policy diminished Britain’s global pre-eminence on the international arena (Coggins, 2006) the Wilson government sustained it.

The UN approach insulated the government from some political attacks at home and abroad (Good, 1973). Good (1973) notes that in IR the impasse became an issue of global acclaim, at some time topping Russian and American cold war thoughts. Rhodesia’s neighbours also faced great military and economic peril, all of which Britain had to manage in order to prevent an Africa-wide racial war. In the Commonwealth most members threatened to pull out in large numbers (AAP - Reuters, 1965; Reuters - AP, 1965; Reuters, 1965), while at the UN, a huge block of diplomats boycotted Britain, walking out during the Prime Minister’s speeches (Good, 1973). Specifically, the Afro-Asian block accused Westminster of double standards in dealing with Rhodesia (Facchini, 2007) citing the refusal to use military force to restore legality within its territory at the expense of Africans (Evans, 2008; Good, 1973).

Rhodesia was an emotive subject affecting both domestic and international politics. Thus, overtime it eventually became an issue in Anglo-American relations, whose importance to national interests was paramount, in the context of the cold war (Belfiglio, 1978; Ovendale, 1995; Thatcher, 1978). Beginning with the Roosevelt administration the US indicated advocated for very strong anti-colonialist inclinations, which Britain generally responded to (Louis & Gifford, 1982) despite the absence of any direct pressure (Butler, 2000). Butler (2000) notes that, while Washington worried about Africa and
colonisation, it ‘recognised the colonial powers’ responsibilities, consulting them on American policy towards the region and avoiding actions that might generate friction’ (p. 134). However, as the Cold War deepened the communist eastern bloc used the Rhodesia situation to rebut Western attacks on their political values of communism (Gallagher, 2009; Thatcher, 2010). The Soviets, in fact, used notions of oppressive colonialism as an excuse to provide military support for African nationalist movements. Accusations such as, ‘you colonialist, imperialist, you have robbed Africa and its poor … ask, the Institute on Human Rights in New York, to investigate the abuse of human rights and freedoms in South Africa, Angola and Cuba’ (Botha, 2008). This set a new sense of urgency for a quick solution.

With reference to Rhodesia, there was the specific aim to contain perceived growing Soviet Influence in the region. The USSR was helping arm African nationalist movements that were fighting to have control over the continent’s future. America, for example, worried about the successful cooperation between Cuba, an important Soviet ally, and the new communist regimes in neighbouring Mozambique and Angola (Belfiglio, 1978). Through Angola, both Cuba and Russia militarily enabled the Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army (ZIPRA) a military wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) (Soviet Neivs, 1965). Controlling these African states would have given the USSR a strategic advantage in African geopolitics. Outflanked by history and its relations with Britain, Americans could not militarily support the Africans in order to gain favour with them. Thus, it utilised its diplomatic advantage with Britain to counter the war strategy with one of peaceful transition as a method of forcing change while ensuring long-term grip on the new situation (Director of Central Intelligence, 1999; Noer, 1985).

The failure of the sanctions and general policy on Rhodesia chagrined America, who in turn increased pressure on Britain to be decisive (Thatcher, 1978). Although, Britain approached the UN on the rebellion, it still hoped to have enough control of its own policy towards Rhodesia. However, America and the UN systems increased in power leading to instances in which Britain needed to use its veto or

By 1970 the sanctions had failed to achieve swift change in Rhodesia and the unexpected change of government in Britain gave Ian Smith some hope (KRWE, 1968); that Conservative Government would change course. However, while the Rhodesians and the Conservatives believed that Wilson had been the reason why a solution on Rhodesia had been elusive, it turned out, as Wilson noted, that in fact various conflicting interests were responsible for the prolonged crisis:

I do not believe that a British Government have ever had to face a problem so complicated or so apparently insoluble. I have to use a mixed metaphor to explain how this problem strikes me. What we are trying to do is to go straight down the middle of the road in a four-dimensional situation. There is the dimension of Rhodesian opinion—and that is not uncomplicated the dimension of public opinion in Britain, and that is not entirely uncomplicated the dimension of the Commonwealth and the strong views that our Commonwealth colleagues have and the dimension of world opinion, as expressed particularly in the United Nations, where it can take the form of a mandatory and possibly dangerous resolution (Wilson, 1965, p. 1982).

The new Prime Minister believed that there were two options on the matter. Britain could only work with Smith either find an agreement or to simply legalise his regime (Cabinet, 1973). It was based on this view if the situation that he believed Wilson failed because his approach disregarded Smith’s pivotal role and was less friendly and antagonistic towards the UDI regime. Thus he argued his policy was similar to that of the previous in many ways but that (Zvobgo, 2005) yet it was radically different (Walsh, 1972), especially given that Rhodesia had declared itself a Republic, severing relations with the Queen. Although, Heath was largely preoccupied with the European Economic Community (EEC), in the form of the European Communities Act (Milward, 1993), the Commonwealth and Foreign
Secretary resumed talks with Rhodesia almost immediately. The two sides quickly agreed to draw proposals for allowing Rhodesia legal independence.

On the foundations outlined above, the British government approved the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals for settlement, and ordered that the Rhodesian people as a whole needed to approve it before it became law (Douglas-Home, 1972). For this purpose, the government appointed a Royal Commission led by Lord Pearce. In May 1972, the Secretary of State reported that the Commission had ascertained that an overwhelming majority of African opinion had rejected the proposals (TNA, 1972; Douglas-Home, 1972). This was in part because they would have led to independence without majority rule (Todd, 2007). Analysts like Loney (1975) contend that the native were probably right because under the provisions of these proposals they would have ended up in a position worse that they were under the UDI regime. He believed that with the arrangement prevented the attainment of majority rule by more than one hundred years back. Following this, the government resolved to continue on the policy of sanctions. Between then and 1974, the government policy included the maintenance of sanctions but with a hand off approach. Meanwhile Smith would work on African opinion to build enough support for another proposition designed on the foundation that this proposal had set (TNA, 1972).

Without the option to force Smith into legality and after the relaxation in monitoring sanctions between 1970 and 1974 by the Conservative government in reaction to the rejection of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposal, the UK government’s policy on the matter was unclear. This was the situation when the Labour Party, came into office between 1974 and 1979. The Heath government had opted to wait until Smith got Africans on board, with the proposals, which the government reckoned they had not fully understood (TNA, 1972), during the Pearce Commission’s consultations. However, by 1975 the political situation in Southern Africa changed dramatically as a direct result of the leftist military coup in Lisbon on the 25 of April 1974 (Maxwell, 2003). Portugal had been a key supporter of the Rhodesian regime, through Mozambique and Angola. As such, the coup represented a significant loss for UDI Rhodesia. The most dramatic effect of this was the withdrawal of Portuguese militaries.
from Angola and Mozambique and the movement towards independence (Maxwell, 2003). Previously, South Africa enjoyed the company of friendly and supportive neighbours yet independent Angola and Mozambique opposed its apartheid system of government. It needed to appease them, so it offered to bring Rhodesia to the negotiating table (TNA, 1975; 1974). The British government, believing it had good relations with most African players in the region, resolved to play along and act when needed.

According to British government documents, towards the end of the decade, the situation worsened for Rhodesia and the Americans were keen to pull back the growing Russian influence. Soviet backed Cubans had deployed military specialists in Angola and Mozambique (TNA, 1978). The British government opined that this skewed the favour against the Rhodesians. More seriously, ZIPRA had over army of over 14000 (TNA, 1978), half of which a motorized conventional force which it coupled with guerrilla operations (Pettis, 2008). Nkomo the leader of the Patriotic Front was convinced by the end of the 1978 that his Russian advised forces were on the verge of militarily over running Rhodesians (The Hansard, 1979). He asserted this in a statement indicated a strong belief that they had an upper hand. His threat was that ‘the war has reached such a stage that there can only be a settlement by military means. If there are to be talks, they will have to be carried out by generals meeting on the battlefield’ (The Hansard, 1979, p. 626). In addition to fighting the ZIPRA military, the Rhodesian army would continue to face the in pouring of ZANLA guerrillas. These had penetrated most of the country’s communal native areas that the Rhodesian Army infrequently patrolled and indoctrinating people using Maoist style, all night rallies known as *Pungwes* (Preston, 2004). Although the full military strength of ZANLA because of lack of rank discipline (Ranger, 1980) (which led to its expulsion from Zambia) was unknown but it maintained a small Maoist ‘hit and run’ force, which guaranteed continued destabilisation in rural areas in the country. Thus, British policy was to support the Anglo-American Plan (AAP) drawn by David Owen, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs in collaboration with Cyrus Vance the United States’ Secretary of State (Owen, 1978).
When Thatcher took office in May 1979, she was intent on ending the Rhodesia crisis and seemed unwilling to follow on the AAP (The Hansard, 1979). She was leaning towards finding any possible excuse to return Rhodesia to legality at any cost; she leaned towards granting such status to an internal settlement that Smith had worked out (Renwick, 1998). The legitimacy of the internal government that Thatcher wanted to recognise and legalise was in question since the international community led by the UNSC (UN Security Council, 1979). However, in pushing this policy she argued that despite the weaknesses in the internal agreement, the elections had been significant in that the election turnout was at over 80 per cent (Thatcher, 1979). She hailed that it had been the first ever election that was based on universal suffrage in the history of Rhodesia. Her central policy seemed to be that of wanting the problem to go away (Owen, 2012). Her desperation to this effect was evident in most of her arguments on this subject. She often sounded unsophisticated and overly simplistic in her arguments. For example, in a bid to justify legalising the illegitimate internal election she argued that:

We are conscious of Britain's responsibilities towards Rhodesia. We intend to carry them out with full regard to the situation as it exists now in that country and to the wishes of its people. Terrible war still rages in Rhodesia. Hundreds of ordinary anonymous Africans who never had any part in UDI are being killed every week by fellow Africans (Thatcher, 1979, p. 622).

This is important given that this statement followed nearly three months after the general election, on a popular issue, which had been part of her election platform, yet she struggle to define a policy position on it. She chose to define her policy broadly as referring to Britain being ‘conscious of responsibilities’. Furthermore, in more simplistic terms she proceeded to describe the war against discrimination and racism merely the ogre of Africans killing their own.

There is a possibility Thatcher meant nothing noteworthy in this statement since she had a tendency to be ‘selective and ahistorical’ in her analysis (Evans, 2009, p. 104). There is, however, a need for
academic analysis because her public position gave her words great importance. Additionally, her assertion was inaccurate for a number of reasons. In fact, allegations at the UN were that the illegal regime was directly killing civilians and refugees who had escaped neighbouring countries (UN Security Council, 1978; Todd, 2007). Clearly, Thatcher’s views of the Rhodesia war were either selectively or racially informed. On the main African soldiers had no camps or stations, they lived in mountains were feed and provided intelligence by common villagers. The danger for civilians was that in reaction, the government would burns crops and move whole communities into concentration camps, nicely named as Protected Villages (PVs) (CCJP, 2008). In these conditions starvation and other problems soon killed people in numbers through hygiene, diet and other challenges. The statement also seemed to suggest that her policy included criminalising the Africans’ right to struggle for determination. She believed this with reference to the Falklands Islands, that freedom is worth a war.

The clarity of British policy on Rhodesia was questionable for the bulk of the time but it began to shape up after the Commonwealth Conference on the 7th of October 1979 in Lusaka (Thatcher, 1978). The public view of her approach was that she was preparing to recognise Muzorewa’s government and grant independence on those foundations. Hence, the media question in Lusaka regarding her media reports in Australia that Britain was planning to lift sanctions and recognise Rhodesia. Her statement indicated her new position of accepting that the war was not just about Africans killing Africans but that there were legitimate concerns that required solution. Thus, instead of castigating the Patriotic Front, and aligning Britain with Muzorewa she was preparing to work with all parties to the conflict. Notably, Britain began to agree that universal suffrage would be meaningless when a war in the background hinders the ascertainment of free participation. Thus, the cessation of war and eradication of state racism were necessary to the legitimacy of any settlement agreement (Hansard, 1979). As such, Lusaka helped clarify the emerging British policy response to the shifting ground in Rhodesia. This was that Britain would organise a Conference in which all parties, that is the Rhodesian Front, Patriotic Forces and Muzorewa’s government would attend constitutional talks. The
Commonwealth Lusaka plan (AP, 1979), which brought the Zimbabwe independence, through ensuring a cease-fire in the war, end to economic sanctions, call a conference of all leaders, allow democratic elections supervised and require Britain to temporarily formally colonise Rhodesia.
4.3. An Intractable Problem: Zimbabwe

The conditions outlined above led to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 without a concrete resolution of the main of concern (Taylor & Williams, 2002); with both parties just satisfied that at least, the problem was over (Charmley, 2008). The Lancaster house talks resulted in a constitution that postponed the thorny land problem for ten years (Carrington, 1979). In 1991, Zimbabwean chiefs started farm invasions and the issue heated up again, putting Zimbabwe on the British and international political agenda once more. Chan and Mudhai (2001) and Thatcher (1989) noted that the improved Anglo-Zimbabwean relations lasted for nearly one decade over the two centuries. By the year 2000, Zimbabwe returned into British politics with growing concerns firstly around the land question and government accountability initially (Green, 2004). The situation deteriorated, with major concerns about human rights, the rule of law and an end to political violence (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004).

Animosity between the two countries has grown to levels similar to those of the Rhodesian rebellion era, since the mid-1990s. The problems now as was the case with Rhodesia, include human rights, race (Porteous, 2005) and land distribution (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004). Since the late 1990s, the two countries have been mobilising international support against each other. Consecutive UK governments have successfully mobilised for sanctions against Mugabe’s inner circle (The Economist, 2003) but the impact on the regime has been minimal. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, has marshalled enough support to thwart UN sanctions (Dempsey & Innocenti, 2002) and prevent the UK acquiring any policy sympathisers in Africa (The Economist, 2007; Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004). In Zimbabwe, just as was the case during Rhodesia, various calls for the UK to take military action against Zimbabwe (Evans, 2008; Lamb, 2007) have also yielded limited policy traction.

The media and academics covered the Zimbabwe problem consistently (Porteous, 2005) challenging and critically analysing government policy (Taylor & Williams, 2002). The dominant discourses include concerns about the rule of law, democracy and human rights. Meanwhile, Mugabe charged that the
British government was engaging in new imperialism and meddled in Zimbabwe’s internal issues of a sovereign state to prevent the seizure and equitable redistribution of agricultural land. Both countries have sought to build strong international alliances in support of their counter positions. Nonetheless, despite, overwhelming support from Western countries and the majority of UNSC members, British foreign policy has been limited. This ignores the higher moral ground of the policy on human rights and freedom in Zimbabwe and against a government that the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice named as an outpost of tyranny (Rice, 2005). The policy has failed to gain enough support within key international institutions such as the Commonwealth, Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Sirota, 2004), UN and the African Union indicating serious shortcomings. Unlike the short-term consensus gained at the UNSC against the late Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi (UNSC, 2011) China and Russia have vetoed a few UNSC British and American sponsored resolutions on Zimbabwe (Porteous, 2005; Taylor & Williams, 2002; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2001).

The pre-eminence of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in British politics is incontestable. In fact, Tamarkin (1990) writing about the making of Zimbabwe, notes that by 1979, the problem ceased to be a simple race or colonial conflict but a political problem for the UK. He argues that its solution required multiple strategies. He also suggests that its resolution required skills in conflict resolution, ideological flexibility and idealism. Good (1973, p. 23) stressed the evocative nature of the rebellion and pointed out that it, ‘aroused emotion and inspired superlatives’. In addition, Charlton (1990) writing about diplomacy and the independence of the UK’s last colony in Africa recognises that the resolution of the Rhodesia became a thorn in British political life that needed urgent removal. In contemporary literature, Porteous (2005) also viewed Zimbabwe as a thorn-in-the-flesh, and on this matter, the UK is still under domestic pressure to act on President Mugabe.

Studies of Anglo-Rhodesian IR reveal a skewed preponderance towards classical theoretical grounding. This reveals itself through the preponderance of research on matters relating to utility of military force to restore legality, the importance of Rhodesian’s contribution to the Great Wars and
the relevance of the individual, as if other variables such as society and political parties played no role. For example, Good (1973) dedicates a whole section of the book to the discussion of this power narrative. His seemingly blindness to the potential weaknesses of theories he concluded his work without attempting to find the place for other possible nominal or actual variables. Additionally, he engages in a strong debate relating to the individual skills of both Prime Minister Wilson and Ian Smith in dealing with each other. He provides an account of their leadership skills. He, however, then criticises Wilson’s inabilities, including accusing him of being short sighted in his plans. This suggests that he partly believes in the traditional notion that IR is a preserve of foreign policy expects as directed by national leaders. He subscribes to the notion that the success or failure of Rhodesia’s and in our current situation, Zimbabwe’s containing British foreign policy reflects the public leadership abilities. In this regard, it approves the idea that for Smith, then and Mugabe, their individual leadership brought them the results.

Most of Good’s (1973) book provides details of activities and discussions regarding possible military action by the Organisation of African Union (OAU – now AU) and the military challenges that the Rhodesia problem posed on its northern neighbour Zambia. Despite identifying Britain as having been reticent about the issue and its attempt to control it and avoid OUA action, he ignores the need to investigate why this is the case. Could British politicians have been under some form of pressure from the local population? Could an investigation of organised groups and communities in Britain, such as political parties, provide answers to the unexplained actions taken by Britain? Thus, the book’s reliance on the classical approaches only concentrates on actions relating to power, the role of the state and IR elites and yet fails to account for some of their actions. The alternative model that this thesis will discuss in the following section and chapters utilises data to provide answers to some of these gaps within the relevant literature.
4.4. Summary
Rhodesia caused British leaders considerable political problems. The colony was like that from its controversial acquisition. It was connected to one of Britain’s most illegitimate wars, as the country’s founding colonialists initiated the military attack against the Boer state. Its status as a subject of the British Empire remained unclear, falling simultaneously into the colony and dominion categories. As such, Britain never directly colonised, a private entity owned imperial aristocrats undertook its administration and government for the first thirty years. Although, Britain acquired oversight over the colony’s legislation, when it attained self-responsible government, the UK operated a non-interference policy, effectively turned Rhodesia into a de-facto dominion.

The context of independence nurtured Rhodesian quests for clearly outlined dominion status (Perham, 1966). Rhodesians had been able to enact laws that militated against stated British colonial policy. During this period, private company implemented policies that restricted native human rights. These included allowing the compulsory acquisition land and livestock, from the local population as the price for victory. In accordance with British laws and policies, these promulgations were ultra vires prima facie, but the government abdicated on its role as guarantor of native rights. Perhaps weighed down by the aristocratic power over the state, it ignored Rhodesian colonial entrepreneurs’ illegal means to enhance private profits. This obvious accustomed the settlers to special treatment even if such meant a departure from both the law and policy.

When the government demanded the reversal of these laws, disregarding the conventions that time and practice had instituted, the outrage was profound. Racism, inequality and exploitation became the mainstay of Rhodesia’s economic success and socio-political fabric. The Rhodesians felt betrayed by Britain’s unconventional stance, and decided that London was militating against them. In context, settlers’ indignation at the refusal to grant independence because of experience in self-governed, including unchecked authority over natives for nearly half a century, was partly firmly founded (Hansard, 1965). Indeed the government’s policy was not in harmony with history and the reality it
had created. These were problematic but so was the attempt to change Rhodesia as if its systems and ways of life had not existed. To them, NIBMAR was a set of principles that indicated Whitehall’s timidity in the face of black power and communism. However, on a similar note, the Rhodesians could not expect native Africans to be patient and continue subsidising their bourgeoisie lifestyles. The society built on racial equality modelled alongside that between a ‘rider and his horse’ (Loney, 1975, p. 99) could not be eternally sustained, at least overtly.

Given the nationalist undertones, which had characterised the relationship between Britain and Rhodesia thus far, the Labour led government’s policy response to the rebellion was limited. Cowed by this the government policy internationalised parts of its Rhodesian policy, outsourcing the disciplining of the rebels into line through UN sanctions and Commonwealth prodding. While ruling out the use of force, it reserved for itself the task of using persuasion and negotiations with Rhodesian’s leaders. Britain refused to play the role of colonial master, claiming that while it had the legal responsibility it lacked the required power. This of course was not the government’s response to an earlier insurrection in Kenya, in which the government acted quickly and militarily (Presley, 1988; Mwangi, 2010; Branch, 2007; Stichter, 1975). The most evident underlying difference in the situations was the race of those behind the revolt, which attracted different forms of nationalist reaction in Britain.

Much of the Rhodesian crisis played itself out in the context of the Cold War. Although, the Americans respected Britain’s authority over the matter, the continued instability in Southern Africa became an issue of increased interest in geopolitics. The involvement of Russian supported Cuban military in Angola unsettled the Americans. As such, they became more involved and persuaded the South Africans to help honourably end Rhodesia’s minority regime. Cornered by this and an escalating threat of an all-out conventional war from ZIPRA and continued communal instability from ZANLA guerrillas the settler regime agreed to negotiate a settlement.
Rhodesia finally became independent under a new name of Zimbabwe in 1980. For the succeeding 10 years, Britain sought to support Zimbabwe’s independence without interfering in internal matters. Britain helped organise multilateral donor funding for the country while providing both technical and practical support for resettlement programmes on available land. Anglo-Zimbabwe bilateral relations began to strain towards the end of the 1990s. This soon developed a new international relations problem for both Britain and Zimbabwe. Human rights, democracy and the rule of law, dominated the UK diplomatic offence against Mugabe. Zimbabwe on the other end accused Britain of interfering with its sovereignty. The history book replayed itself, as the UK government faced calls to send the army into Zimbabwe. Once again, Britain noted that Zimbabwe was an intractable problem in which, it had responsibility but limited influence. For this reason, its policy towards Zimbabwe sought to enlist international institutions such as the UN and the EU. Pan-African institutions such as the AU and SADC provided Mugabe multinational support.
Chapter 5: Political Party Foreign Policy

Case Study: Political Party Discourses

5.1. Introduction

The practice of the making of foreign policy is often a difficult task as a field of work. From a traditional point of view, it is generally fashioned by incoherence and unpredictability (Dumbrell & Barret, 1990). Vital (1968) describes foreign policy as characterised by policies whose formulation, planning and implementation are constrained by the unavailability of knowledge of the operational field. She also notes that these experts lack the tactical and intellectual advantages that accompany clearly defined and appreciable goals. These have tended to be uncommon in this area of work. Resultantly, combinations of factors such as these solidify the study of foreign policy as a challenging endeavour. If unforgiving ambiguity shrouds IR activities and aims, whose morality is sometimes questionable, then their analysis is inevitably a formidable task.

However, structural analysis models glossed over these problems by influencing practice and the study of IR utilising the claim that ‘states behave in the international system’ to protect their interests at the global level (Wendt, 1987, p. 1). Neorealist assumptions that diplomats’ goals are therefore decided by national interest as defined power, force analysis to remain at the system-level (Singer, 1961). Morgenthau (1985) argues that state leaders are religiously committed to the desires of their nation so that they lose all other motives or ideological inclinations. Internationalists (idealists) on the other hand, support the system-level structural analysis by defining IR as organised by principles of capitalism that ‘underlie and constitute states,’ which are the main actors (Wendt, 1987, p. 1).

The structural system-level analysis presents several advantages and disadvantages (Singer, 1961; Wendt, 1987). In fact, in both their studies, Singer (1961) and Wendt (1987) present strong arguments
that based on a cost-benefit analysis the cons outweighed the pros of these approaches. Although these are themselves compelling arguments, their justifications in dismissing orthodox approaches face the fundamental weakness of relying on similarly structured thinking for their findings. Thus, Howard (2010) predicts that the rationale could disintegrate into a question of which method a research favours. This study avoids this by emphasising the value of new research, in consideration of national sources of foreign policy (Vickers, 2003; Rengger, 2000). This, Monroe (2005) explains in simple terms as a quest to expand knowledge beyond methodological, structural and theoretical approaches.

This diversification of research, could add more value, if in doing so, it attempted to control for the weakness of the existing classical approaches. While Chapter 1 identified a number of these from, those relevant to this chapter are included here for purposes of clarity. As Vaughan-Williams (2005, pp. 1, 2) warns ‘structure and space gradually became privileged over time and context in analyses of world politics’. He then reminds the Mesquita’s (1996) caution about the power of the hegemonies that sustain paradigmatic views, researchers must utilise history as the laboratory for testing their models about causation.

History identifies the attitudes, which are essential for determining distinct discourses and in explaining differing narratives of the same situation. Accordingly, McGuire (1985) finds that these, in turn, help locate the ‘objective of thought’ on the ‘dimensions of judgement’. Thus, actions and spoken words reflect structured and hierarchical organisation of attitudes. Likewise, attitudes are meaningless unless their context is fully established. Hence, holistic view is that, the simple identification or recitation of events, beliefs and cognitive processes of leaders in British policy is insufficient for assigning meaning to them. Instead, of producing accounts for structural-system analysis, the emphasis must be to expose the underlying circumstances that govern and characterise the discourses and accounts as they develop.
The context for this exercise is that it follows various accounts in which the Anglo-Zimbabwe relations have been analysed. The main actions and extracts of conversations inform the current IR shuttling between the countries at the world stage. In both Rhodesia and now, Zimbabwe, international diplomatic action failed to resolve their problems. In both circumstances studies based on interest interests, have exacerbated by finding in terms the cutthroat raison d’État, in which one success always comes at another’s expense. Vaughan-Williams (2005) described this analytically pre-loaded system as afflicted by the *problem of history*. He explains that by this he does not mean that IR studies do not refer to history, but that utilisation is limited to mere circumvention by extracting from, instead of finding its meaning and using it as part of the analysis.

This chapter solves this *problem of history* for the current study, by helping identify the issues that inform the events and actions of the past. It explores the construction, purposes, functions and the causes of variability in historical accounts. In general, it detects issues that are constant through Britain’s long relationship with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Thereafter, it theoretically locates these within their temporal and historical environment. This refers to the context of existing political party attitudes and their inference to specific policy belief systems and principles of thought.

In this case, land and race are predominant issues that have historically dominated and dictated the content of Anglo-Rhodesian (and Zimbabwean) relations. The question of race is important given its relevance to imperialism and the discriminatory nature of the colonial state of Rhodesia. Over the past century, it has underwritten the attitude of human rights and economic development of the African country. The fear of adult suffrage formed a significant part of the reasons for the Rhodesian rebellion. The land question partly responded to the same issues. This subject alone almost derailed the Lancaster House settlement negotiations and remains a source of contagion in British multilateral and bilateral relations with Zimbabwe. However, although this chapter mainly identifies the issues, it interrogates the corresponding attitudes of different players and the principles of thought they apply in dealing with them.
Chapter 4 addressed the Anglo-Rhodesia/Zimbabwe relations using the system level approach. This identifies a number of issues that are central to the problem. It also shows that the identified issues became serious problems, mainly because of their handling. It highlights the contradiction between official policy on Rhodesia and the actual practices on the ground. Additionally, it considers the real issues that animate the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe colonial status, racism, land, democracy and human rights (The Gazette, 1965). As such, this provides a critical assessment of the crisis from an official classical point of view. It shows why Britain, while being the colonial master ended with a responsibility in which it itself as having no power.
5.2. Race Narratives

5.2.1. Underlying Colonial Policy Context
The appropriate context for government policy on the colonisation of Zambezia arose from the American Revolution, which helped reset the attitudinal pendulum of slavery in a world where Britain was the biggest player (Living Heritage, 2012; Eltis & Woodruff, 2007; Shillington, 2007). The language, experiences and the resultant realities of the revolution and the subsequent declaration of independence forced the onset abolitionism and anti-slavery Britain (Edwards, et al., 2009; Drescher, 2007). Particularly, the declaration created sensitivities on the connection between human dignity and liberty as desirable qualities, without which the King’s own Empire could face justifiable revolt. The defeat and the Constitution the Americans adopted partly portrayed them as more altruistic than the King. Thus, the lessons learnt were that the old oppressive and exploitative colonisation system had to end, to preserve further calamities (Low, 1916). The starting point was to deal with the scourge of the slave trade which both Parliamentary Houses adopted motion (Hansard, 1806). The House also suggested that the King take a leading role in promoting abolition as a new policy. This was to include the building of ‘strong ties, mutual interest and conviction in the justice and benevolence of British rule’ (Low, 1916, p. 225).

This followed the employment of slaves by the British military, as soldiers against their American masters in return for freedom (Edwards, et al., 2009). Some of these arrived back in Britain at the end of the war where two things happened, they became impoverished street beggars in London, and the few who could, began to write and tell stories of enslavement that shocked the public profoundly. Anna Falconbridge, wrote about the effects of slavery of the Britain’s image, ‘it is scarcely possible that the British Government, at this advanced and enlightened age, envied and admired as it is by the universe, could be capable of exercising or countenancing such a Gothic infringement on human Liberty’ (Falconbridge, 1794). Equiano a slave himself wrote, ‘I had never seen among any people such instances of cruelty’ (1788), and these words rang true into the sympathetic ears of shocked white
people who soon joined the burgeoning abolition movement (Winder, 2005). These campaigners in turn effectively portrayed the human trade in the grimmest of terms. They described the business as ‘an oppression which, in its origin, and the inhumanity of its progress ... exceeded, or even equalled, in the most barbarous ages’ (Merrill, 1945). These campaigns endeared into the British public psychology forms of human treatment that would be unacceptable, from these moments going forward.

Thirdly, as this was at the dawn of Napoleonic Wars, which posed existential threats to Britain, slavery played into this as well. Napoleon enjoyed growing trade within Europe. Internationally, as Britain ruled the waters, his trade was minimal. Consequently, stoppages and disturbances, in the supply of labour or slaves could limit benefits and trade with his overseas territories in South America and in the Caribbean Islands. Britain sought to use its sea advantage against Napoleon. However, slaves were also a source of strength for him, as such the British publicised their opposition to Napoleon’s slave trading both to gain sympathy at home and to help weaken him (Shillington, 2007).

5.2.2. Enslaving the Natives or Compulsory Labour
Given the above, the government’s new approach to slavery and colonial questions became engrossed with a peculiar awareness of a morally upright and ethically superior coloniser (Rose, 1807). To the public, the history of slavery became a painfully regrettable scourge to the conscience and image of the Empire (Drescher, 1994). As such, the Empire began its reformation. Although slave trading and servitude did not end until the late 1830s, tyranny and enslavement became a nearly universal national anathema, after that. Only those who profited from the trade, thus businesses and traders opposed abolition. Notably, many of these beliefs about trade and colonialism were similar to those held by the late 19th century colonial entrepreneur, Cecil John Rhodes. He held that, in spite of policies against both slavery and expansion, the world derive greater good from the growth of the Empire, its trade and settler people. In a recent study titled The Tory Interpretation of History in the Age of Parties, Knights (2005), notes that these aristocrats historically shared these political views on trade and race
purity with the Conservative side of the political aisle. As seen in Chapter 3, the modern party utilises
cannot be described in these strict terms.

Race and discrimination have always been pivotal to the discussion of Rhodesia in British politics.
Racism is an important question in the study of Rhodesia for many reasons. It was the first the first
principle that Britain required granting independence just as it was prominent as part of debate during
acquisition (Labouchere, 1897) and its divisive nature prolonged the Anglo-Rhodesian conflict (Good,
1974; Austin, 1975). The Rhodesian problem became the UK’s most difficult problem since the World
War II (McWilliam, 2003). This was in part because of the progress the rest of the world had made on
racism and the position taken by Rhodesia on the matter. Britain’s own evolution on racism and her
international position on racism and slavery helped ensure the conflict.

Thus, it is important to consider the origins of the official government’s position on racism and slavery.
This will help show that the settlers were wrong to think that the British government would be willing
to relinquish this principle. It would seem that Rhodes’ success in using sheer deception, and collusion
caused the confusion of the interests of BSAC and those of the Crown in the acquisition of Rhodesia
(Austin, 1975), led the settlers to believe that on any other question their resolve would prevail.
However, it will also indicate that the historical relationship between the Company and successive
Conservative Party led administrations constantly undermined imperial authority and emboldened
the settlers (Perham, 1966). As Austin (1975), discovered settlers believed that future governments
would be inclined towards giving in to their demands. Blake (1977) also argues that various British
politicians colluded with self-interested, ambitious and ruling class individuals and pursued, in the
monarch’s name, adventurous policies that were unnecessarily costly to the imperial and colonised
public.

Additionally, Sir Alec Douglas-Home also seemed to predict that had the Tories won the 1964 elections
perhaps it would have been conceivable for Britain to give independence to a minority racist regime
A future Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, shared these thoughts, telling her audience at Keston Park Hotel in Kent in 1965, that had Sir Alec Douglas-Home remained Prime Minister, the Rhodesian problem ‘would never have come to such a pass’ as he ‘was a force of reason and moderation’ (Thatcher, 1965, p. 1). This statement seemed to suggest that the fault for UDI lay with the irrationality of either the Labour Party separately or together with its then Leader Harold Wilson. She, like Sir Douglas-Home, believed that the principles for independence were unnecessary as conditions for talks with the rebels (Thatcher, 1966). Arguably, this was an indication that perhaps her commitment to a politically multi-racial Rhodesia was subservient to Smith’s whims.

When the Conservative Party later won the 1970 general election and Sir Edward Heath became Prime Minister; he teamed up with Sir Douglas-Home to test these ideas. He believed that the six point conditions for independence were too restrictive on dialogue with Ian Smith (KRWE, 1968). He thought that it was hopeless to try to force Rhodesia into pre-UDI arrangements, preferring a negotiation between Britain and Smith, before asking the people of Rhodesia to ratify it (The Guardian, 1968). In parliament both as an opposition MP and leader he criticised the Labour Government six-principles as a request of an unconditional surrender of Smith. He seemed to regard the UDI as having been a mistake for Rhodesia, which required repentance and redemption followed by forgiveness and restoration of legality (TTM, 1966) rather than punishment and capitulation.

The Tories were gullible to the racial regime’s fantasy, which unrealistically described its discrimination as the *Rhodesian way of life* (UPI, 1965) in which *our* Africans are the happiest (Austin, 1975). Smith famously proclaimed during the period of negotiations of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals that, ‘nobody has yet been able to tell me where there are Africans who are happier – or, for that matter, better off – than in Rhodesia’ (Martin & Johnson, 1981, p. 1). It would seem that this led them to believe falsely, that any agreement with Smith, would address the problem. The *happiest Africans* would readily accept a settlement coated with piecemeal changes hoodwinking the nationalist ruling classes into the echelons of political power. However, what the Conservatives were unaware of was
that Smith’s regime knew that Africans would reject a supremacist constitution; hence, its attempt to rely on Government funded and sanctioned African Chiefs’ Indabas (conferences) for Native ratification or opinion (Wood, 2012). As such, direct consultation with the population disapproved of the 1972 agreement, (as detailed later in this section) (The Times, 1972) to which the Conservatives and Smith seemed to push the blame onto the Africans and point towards allowing the Smith and the Africans to solve their differences internally.

This seems to have been the plan given that it also eventually produced a settlement. The terms of the settlement perpetuated minority control and ensured the continuance of racist policies. As such, the external world and the Zimbabwe liberation movements rejected and condemned it. The UN Security Council resolution 445 declared that ‘any elections held under the auspices of the illegal racist regime and the results thereof, will be null and void and that no recognition will be accorded either by the UN or any Member State to any representatives or organ established by that process’ (UN Security Council, 1979). Consequently, the 1979 Zimbabwe – Rhodesia elections and the resultant government failed to attain internal and external political legitimacy.

Foote (1986) notes of the UK’s governing political parties, the Conservative Party is more malleable to persistent accusations of holding racist attitudes. The party tends to oppose change until it becomes unavoidable, as indicated in Chapter 3, and this has caused its attitudes towards race issues a problem. Knights (2005) opined that the paramount difference between the Conservative and other parties is its attitude towards progress and revolution. Chapter 3 also established that the party prefers order as an alternative of revolution, continuity above change, duty to rights and authority instead of liberty (Knights, 2005). These principles led it to stances that were perceivable as opposed to other races in reference to debates on anti-slavery laws, decolonisation and attitudes towards established minority colonial governments such as Rhodesia. The existence of these perceptions has been evident in the party’s ability to attract minority and female voters and leaders. This resulted in the party changing in
process for selecting parliamentary candidates in 2005 and the appointment of ethnic minority or female candidate in winnable seats for the 2010 general elections (Squires, 2010).

5.2.3. The Issues and Party Principles
One of the most interesting and perhaps unique features of Rhodesia is the manner of acquisition and the delayed onset of British authority in the area. This allowed the achievement of political objectives in the territory using otherwise unorthodox means. Utilising systematic deception in some cases and governmental connivance in others he achieved his objectives, in spite of the law and policy (Austin, 1975). For example, despite protestations to the Queen by King Lobengula, he obtained a Royal Charter for his Company on whose strength; he presided over the robbery of their cattle, illegal acquisition of land, the Jameson Raid, the Mashonaland War and use of forced labour. It was for this reason that he prematurely resigned as Premier of the Cape and from the Company Board. Rather intriguingly this failed to convince authorities in London to consider the impact of all this on the Empire and Britain’s future is intriguing hence this section. This is a key issue, which this chapter discusses, in relation to how political parties participated in this situation.

In pursuit of Britain’s humanising policy, Rhodes camouflaged the colonisation of Zambezia as a mission to protect the natives from aggressive foreign expedition and from war among themselves. However, within the first three years of occupying the country he caused and fought three wars against both natives and Boers (The Star, 1893; Hensman, 2010; Good, 1973). These resulted in unnecessary expenditures of British taxpayers’ resources (Austin, 1975) in pursuit of a non-government policy and at huge cost to the international and future reputation of the Empire. This thesis emphasises aspects of these wars, which indicate inconsistency with stated government policy, and the participation of political leaders in acts that were detrimental to Britain universal image.

The main task of this section explores the political origins of Rhodesian attitudes and the IR crisis it became. To do this it utilises a number of interim questions included in the paragraph. It provides evidence that in most cases, the authorities in London, allowed Rhodes to get away with murder and
that this partisan position became a problem in later years. Firstly, the war of colonisation with King Lobengula raises pertinent questions about the concession document that Rhodes presented to the Queen in order to obtain the Charter. Why would the Ndebele, who invited the Queen’s protection fight so gallantly against their invited guests? The second question regards the Mashonaland War, in which BSAC refused to negotiate and continued to fight for over a year, brutally killing military commanders who surrendered and enslaving their followers. Does it not turn out that the Shona people required King Lobengula to protect them from the savages of colonial oppression? His Kingdom to the South effectively prevented Rhodes’ people from mistreating the Shona for the first three years of occupation. Contrary to the impression given in Britain by Rhodes and his surrogates about the Ndebele, evidence shows they hated war and negotiated peace when possible. They worked out a peace deal Rhodes, while their Shona counterparts continued the war for a year. Did the unprovoked Jameson Raid, an attack on another independent country, not indicate that Rhodes could not be trusted with other people’s interest, instead of his own?

With regard to these wars and accompanying reports indicating that the BSAC was failing to effectively Rhodesia (Birmingham Daily Post, 1893), parliament ordered an inquiry. The government appointed Sir Richard Martin to carry out the investigation and submit a report (Hensman, 2010). The Company, its supporters and surrogates, fiercely criticised his report, taking issue with the fact that some of Sir Martin’s respondents were anonymous. However, these responses are demonstrably weak and oversimplified. Applying John’s four criteria of validity and triangulating the findings, confirms this. Given Cecil Rhodes and BSAC’s record with honesty and his ability to arm-twist others, and associated accusations of bribery (Porter, 2007), it is likely that the disparagements were just another gimmick.

Sir Martin’s report concluded that the causes of the Ndebele and Shona uprising included frustration with the Company for instituting compulsory labour practices (Austin, 1975; Hensman, 2010). The report stated that, ‘out of the eight Native Commissioners of Matabeleland who have sent in reports, only one, the Native Commissioner for Bulawayo, refrains from admitting that the practice of forced
labour did exist’ (Martin, 1897). The reaction of the Conservative-led government was to make minor changes to the Constitution while allowing the Company and Rhodes to continue in their roles (Porter, 2007).

The fact that the Company allowed the practice of compulsory labour resurfaced in 1902. Unwilling to deal with the same question and to have to conduct another inquiry, the Conservative government was uncompromising in dealing with any questions. Chamberlain was hardnosed when the matter came up in the Commons. In fact, he refused to link this practice to the danger of causing war similar to the 1896 raid. His tactic was to deny any knowledge of race informed slavery and to refuse to link that to past problems. When asked whether he was aware that the Chartered Company’s officials are allowing the compulsory acquisition of labour and that this condition may lead to war as before, he retorted:

I have no such information. I am not aware of any rebellion among the native population, nor of any despatch of armed forces by His Majesty’s Government to assist the Company in an emergency which has not arisen ... (he) is now referring to something that took place two and a half years ago (Chamberlain, 1902, p. 502).

Compulsory labour related closely to the question of race. Rhodesians considered the colour bar as appropriate, describing it as being equal but separate. It is imperative to note that racism manifested itself in many other facets of the Rhodesian society. In this matter, it also related to slavery and war, raising the expectations that the government to act decisively and swiftly. This was mainly because Britain was building a high-stakes international campaign on the matter, and the British public was opposed to it. This is particularly so given the UK geopolitical strategies at the time. In keeping with this strategy, some Labour members of parliament, following tightly in the steps of Liberals, consistently questioned the Conservatives position. They risked the peril of the naivety labels, which the media and aristocracy gave to those who challenged any actions of Britons abroad.
World War II saw a period in which the Conservative Party openly supported race-qualified government policies in Rhodesia. Given that this was a time of war, Britain may have required military contributions from Rhodesia, and the government was preoccupied with war efforts. However, several contextual conditions help build doubt on this excuse. Firstly, if WWII was about freedom, then Rhodesian racism was inconsistent with notions of liberty but fascistic tyranny. Secondly, the fact that the Labour Party did get the time to show concern about the issue would undercut the Conservative Party. In 1942, opposition Labour MP Creech Jones asked the Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs about Rhodesian Legislation that would sanction compulsory labour, for the country’s black population. Emrys-Evans indicated the Conservative government’s support for the new law:

No native will be required to work for longer than six months at a time, and he will be paid not less than the ruling current wages for the class of work which he is required to perform. Natives so called up will be regarded as in the employment of the Government, and, if their services are required for work at farms or mines, they will be placed under the supervision of officers appointed by the Government for the purpose. The operation of the Bill is restricted to the period of the present war (Emrys-Evans, 1942, p. 1784).

Labour MPs indicated three issues that were worth highlighting about the law. Firstly, they argued that the law could lead to provide forced labour for private gain. Secondly, there was the fact that the British government was not willing to demand its position as guarantor for the natives. Thirdly, it discriminated against the natives, as it did not apply to white Rhodesians. Finally, Creech Jones was of the opinion that laws against discrimination would be in keeping with the UK’s original colonial policy and be beneficial at the end of the war.

Every report which reaches this country indicates that squalor and misery of these peoples, and I suggest that in war time we should repair our negligence of the past years so that when
the peace conference comes we at least may say with a clear conscience that Great Britain is discharging her sacred trusts to the colonial peoples... We dare not ignore our shortcomings in this respect... we should remove the colour bar in Southern Rhodesia... we should reserve the segregation policies that mar our work in the Continent of Africa (Jones, 1939, p. 350).

Rhodesia developed a system in which the natives were in service of their white counterparts, while managing to portray these as representing the unique, *Rhodesian way of life* (Austin, 1975). Various pieces of legislation backed this segregation. They were mainly concerned with physical separation, economic activity (industrial relations and bargaining), social life, property ownership (land), voting rights and education. The Graphs 3a to 3c below represents a tabulation of the relationships between Britain’s political parties and Rhodesia’s racial laws and policies, before UDI. Appendix 1 provides the details summary of the major discriminatory laws allowed by various British governments.

**Graph 3a: Racial Laws Allowed – Party Comparison (1893 – 1965)**

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**Graph 3b: Racial Economic Laws Allowed – Party Comparison (1893 – 1965)**
As shown here so far, political parties governed Rhodesian history and its relationship with Britain. Rhodes, who enjoyed close links with the British aristocracy and the Conservative Party, engineered its colonisation. Otherwise, as indicated earlier the UK’s general position on Lobengula’s domains was that of cooperation while consolidating the rest of the Empire (Robinson, et al., 1961). The development of the new country’s attitude relied mainly on Rhode’s personality and his contacts within British political life. Historically, they relied on the Conservative Party, which approved most requests from Rhodesian settlers, sometimes against established government policy. The Rhodesian faith in the Conservative Party’s support and hostility towards Africans is evident throughout history. For example, in 1972, Smith refused to host an All-Party Parliamentary visit if the Labour and Liberal Parties did not change their nominations. This was explicit evidence of where the Rhodesian Prime Minister believed his support lay (Hansard, 1972).

Although, ideological differences were evident between how Labour and Conservative governments dealt with Rhodesia, at the onset of the rebellion, a sense of unity prevailed (McLaughlan & Kernohan, 1966). In parliament, the parties coalesced around Harold Wilson’s six principles conditions and the UN approach. This initial position seemed to bring UK political parties together in their approach to the rebellion. Prime Minister Wilson sought to build a level of national consensus on the subject. He did this through occasionally meetings with his Conservative and Liberal counterparts and informing them about his policy positions (Norton-Taylor & Milne, 1996).
However, both the British and Rhodesians believed that the British public generally supported the rebellion. For example, after declaring UDI the Smith’s government distributed a pre-printed letter to the regime’s supporters for distribution to friends and relatives in the UK. The letter capitalised on the UK’s massive economic problems (Maxey, 1976; Meyer, 1966) and emphasised that these would worsen in Britain (The Montreal Gazette, 1966) if Wilson pursued a policy of sanctions at the UN (ICS, 2012). Between the parties, Robert McLaughlin argued for Wilson’s position and confessed that in dealing with Rhodesia the Conservatives were bound to a racist legacy (McLaughlan & Kernohan, 1966). In the same conversation, Kernohan, a Conservative Party parliamentary candidate in the 1959 general election, opined that it would be shameful and wicked if the Labour Party tried to shoot our own ‘Kith and kin’ on behalf of Africans, about whom he had little knowledge.

Nonetheless, by 1966 the Conservatives managed to break away from Wilson’s national consensus approach (The Calgary Herald, 1965). For many of its members, it became a personal issue pitting man against his brother, white versus black as concealed careful in the ‘kith and kin’ rationale (Editorial, 1965). These party members sought to force a break from the government’s policy (The Calgary Herald, 1965). Their position at this time gravitated towards Smith’s own (Editorial, 1965). However, the Rhodesian’s rebellion against the monarch riled a sizeable group, forcing them to vote with the Labour Party in the Commons.

When the Labour Party had managed to get the UN to vote to sanction the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1968 through the Commons, the House of Lords stalled them (Purvis, 2011). Wilson’s response was the drawing of the House of Lords Reform White Paper, meant to curtail the powers of a Chamber that has historically aligned with the Conservatives (Green, 1996). In the House of Lords where the Conservatives traditionally enjoyed a healthy majority, the story was different. Every time that the Tories won the general elections, the Rhodesians felt relieved and hopeful. Ian Smith wrote that, ‘when the Conservatives won the British general election a few months later, with
Edward Heath as Prime Minister and Alec Home as Foreign Secretary, hopes rose for a settlement’ (Smith, 1998, p. 7).

Soon it became clear that Wilson’s national unity approach to the rebellion had failed to resolve the matter quickly, as he had claimed. In the late 1800s, the Conservatives successfully used the Boer Wars and the colonisation of Matabeleland as a political wage issue against Liberals (Green, 1996). As Green (1996) argues, it nurtured a reputation as the ultimate guardians of the nation and Empire. Additionally, he noted that their roles in imperial expansion and consolidation helped the party link with social groups that were repelled by their economic elitist branding. He also argues that the emergence of socialism and the decline of colonialism were gobbling this political advantage. Having, built a good relationship with Rhodesian pioneers and the upcoming generation that trusted them, (Welensky, 1965) they sought to take advantage of the crisis and save kith and kin.

The Conservative Party’s responsiveness on matters relating to the welfare of white Rhodesians was quicker and decisive but less resolute where the rights of Natives required attention. For examples, in 1964 Nkomo, an African nationalist leader incarcerated by Smith’s security forces was the subject of a UN request to a Conservative government seeking assistance in securing his release. Douglas-Home deployed the quintessentially Tory diatribe, although crudely dismissive but effective. He reminded the UN that the UK possessed no authority or right to dictate to Rhodesians what to do about their internal affairs (Tribune Magazine, 1964). Nonetheless, on the flipside of this argument always lay the fact that at the time, Rhodesia was not a sovereign state but a rebellious territory governed under the authority of the Queen. However, following Sir Garfield Todd’s (a former Prime Minister of Rhodesia) detention in Rhodesia, the same authorities took steps to ensure his speedy release (Hansard, 1972). This was despite the 1972 declaration of a Rhodesian republic, which official cut off the country’s link with the British Crown (BBC, 1970). In reaction, the Governor resigned, although, in reality, his position became redundant if the Queen was no longer the Sovereign. Finally, the British government had lost all control over Rhodesia.

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Just as Wilson was dealing with growing international condemnation, the Tories added their own domestic pressure (AAP - Reuters, 1966). They were intent on showing that the Labour government’s foreign policy on Rhodesia had failed. As such, when they decided to rebel against the national approach, in December 1965, about 100 Conservative members of parliament signed a letter denouncing Wilson’s conditions for independence, in favour of unconditional negotiations (The Calgary Herald, 1965). They intended to show the world that Wilson’s sanctions policy was struggling in parliament. Thus, the signing of the parliamentary censure motion was deliberately set to coincide with Wilson’s meeting with American President Lyndon Johnson, to weaken his foreign policy. The positions between the parties remained locked in two different camps, with most Labour MPs dedicating themselves to the idea that all negotiations with Smith needed to start with the idea of ‘one man, one vote’ (Trotter, 1977).

Some of the leading Conservative Party leaders proposed different approaches to the ‘five principle’ condition. Sir Douglas-Home in 1972, was one of them, as such, he worked out an agreement with the Smith regime (Smith, 1998). Under these arrangements, Britain would spearhead the recognition of the white-supremacist regime on condition that both governments would fund education for Africans, and slowly integrate them into the politics of the country (The Times, 1972). However, another condition in the settlement proposal was the appointment of a Commission from the UK to test its acceptability by the Rhodesian public. When Lord Pearce went to Rhodesia with his Commission the public hugely rejected the measure (Hansard, 1972) forcing the matter to go back to the drawing board. It is crucial to note that Sir Douglas-Home came close to succeeding in getting recognition for a race-based regime. Additionally, Ian Smith curiously liked the proposal that he was prepared to block the participation of specific Labour Liberal Party British MPs, who he regarded as sympathetic to Africans and hostile to Rhodesia (Hansard, 1972).

Winston Churchill, a rising Conservative Party rising star and grandson to Sir Winston Churchill (one of the most revered former Prime Ministers) chose to end his illustrious political career instead of...
continuing to support sanctions against Rhodesia (Thatcher, 1978). Churchill’s keen interest in the Rhodesia crisis resulted in his warning that if the matter remained unsolved, it could usher in a new error of world war equivalent to that caused by Hitler’s Germany (Musel, 1976). He warned that if Britain maintained its support for majority rule, the Moscow’s Cuban mercenaries would win, and the world would be on a dangerous path given Russia’s military spending.

Churchill sought to exploit an assumed legitimacy on this subject, in predicting the next world war. It was his Grandfather Winston Churchill, before him, who foretold and cautioned against Nazi Germany. Thus, he warned the West against majority rule campaign in Rhodesia, because of its Russian links (UPI, 1976). He coated the kith and kin argument as providing a strong Western alliance in Africa, which was a necessity given that this was where Russia’s world takeover theatre was taking place. He opined that Rhodesia’s minority regime was an essential condition for global peace, and that it was strategically necessary to resolve the problem without pinning it down to race and racism (UPI, 1976). Churchill dismissed the race question indicating that his interests were on a different matter:

I am really was trying to say is, it was not a racial or an African question; it is an alliance question ... if we go down this slope for very many more months it will not be a question of the independence of a few African countries or European domination in Southern Africa or our economic situation as far as the Cape route is concerned it will be a question of peace; global peace for the first time in 30 years (Musel, 1976).

However, despite the shift by sections of the Conservative Party from the six-point principle, the official position remained unchanged for most of the UDI period. Constantly, the party dealt with its own rebels, most of them supporting Smith against further adverse action from the UK (AAP - Reuters, 1965; AAP - Reuters, 1966). Operating in this environment the Labour Party sought to work with America instead (Trotter, 1977). Its leadership identified a bigger role for America whose predominance in world politics was likely to help persuade South Africa to change its policy towards
In fact, even Thatcher herself backtracked from endorsing the Rhodesian internal settlement because of the opposition the idea received from the Americans. Owen (2012) still believes that the policy was successful in ending the rebellion in 1980 (Owen, 2010). In fact, on the day of the Zimbabwe in independence Queen Elizabeth II responded to a congratulatory remark about Lord Carrington’s role with a strong reminder saying, ‘Yes indeed. But we mustn’t forget that it was David Owen who put it all in train’ (Owen, 2010, p. 315).

When Prime Minister Thatcher tackled the Rhodesia issues, she found a solid foundation put in place by Dr David Owen and Cyrus Vance, hailed as the Anglo-American plan (CIA, 1981). The Lancaster House talks were already scheduled, and South Africa was on board to ensure Smith’s compliance. Vance (1983) credits the successes of the Rhodesian settlement talks on the ground laid by the AAP, far having guaranteed the conference way before the elections in Britain. The resultant constitution declared Zimbabwe an independent Republic in 1980. Tamarkin (1990) credits the Conservative Party touting its ability to set ideology aside on this foreign policy matter in order to achieve a goal in its own interests.

Historically, Thatcher proclaimed a policy predisposition towards a settlement based on the principle of majority rule; however, a minority regime was a tolerable sacrifice, if needed. She deemed doing so as either necessary or pragmatic and aspired more towards putting the away (Thatcher, 1976). However, there were other factors at play pressing Thatcher towards a multi-racial government instead of her preferred interim but racial arrangement. Nkomo the leading African nationalists had indicated that the Liberation movements were winning the war (Hansard, 1979). Secondly, the cooperation of South Africa and the leadership provided by the US, all tilted both balance and control of events away from Conservative Party preferences. Finally, her keen desire to reset and strengthen Anglo-American relations (Thatcher, 2010) in light of impact the Rhodesian crisis was having on Cold War politics; she would have been willing to end the minority regime in the Southern African country, if she had to choose.
Zimbabwe’s attainment of independence in 1980 solved the problem of overt racial segregation in the country. The Rhodesian type was largely a result of government imposition in contrast to racism based on innate prejudice. Rhodesian governments had hoped that keeping natives away from everything would force them into perpetual servitude (Palmer & Birch, 1992). The evidence shows that Rhodesians strongly believed their speciality as a race that is worth of the service of Africans (Smith, 1998; 1964; Hansard, 1969). Rhodesian racism was acute because its premises were more than the usual skin colour prejudice; it also partly emanated from British nationalism (Smith, 1998). They discriminated against other non-English Europeans, and believed that they were the finest of the English people. For example, while Rhodesians desperately desired White immigration to boost their numbers, they discouraged non-English speakers (Mlambo, 1998; Blake, 1977). Mlambo (1998) also notes that in England they sought the moderately rich military veterans encouraging them to consider resettling to Rhodesia, which they did.

The main proponents of the Rhodesian experiment had themselves been members of the British aristocracy, educated in Cambridge and Oxford (Blake, 1977). Blake (1999) also notes that their immigration policies, which sought to incentivise more of the military middle class testifies to this effect. With this in mind, it is arguable that they viewed themselves as a special group. The reasons and motivation for the Jameson Raid, indicates clearly that other white races received differentially treatment compared to the English. Thus, racism against the natives was not limited to race, but extended to the desire to sustain supremacy. To sustain the oppression of 95% demographic majority, discrimination and active immigration were the only viable long-term policy. Evidence shows that the question of literacy was hardly applicable in Rhodesia because from evidence indicates that by the time of UDI nearly half the population was literate (Hansard, 1969).

Rhodesia’s principle of racial segregation and superiority penetrated every aspect of life (Windrich, 1975) more than is currently recognised. The country’s economy thrived on racial inequality, which ensured that the agro-based economy was in the hands of the minority. The apportionment land
between the two races was thus an immensely important arrangement (Blake, 1977). The entire system ensured that the native did not have a chance to compete with their white counterpart, and more importantly to earn the right to vote. This was important because earnings and savings or the economic value of a citizen could earn them a spot on the voters’ role. As such, jobs, wages, education, health, rights and even the walking paths guaranteed slow progression for Africans, thus keeping them in place. It was cunningly in the way in which it prepared 95 per cent of the population to serve the interests of it minority (Perham, 1966). For example, because of bans on Natives’ use of paved footpaths, they always had to follow long roads to get to the same job as a white colleague.

As Blake (1977) observes the system ensured that resources and labour were always available, hence Rhodesia early economic miracles. This was subsidised through native labour and unfair about numerous taxes. While saddled by unjustifiable taxes including on houses (hut taxes), animal and marriage taxes, the natives utilised, mainly primary health care services. Other ways of taxation included occasional destocking (discussed in detail in section 3.4.2). However, post independent Zimbabwe has been similar to its predecessor state, in terms of how it has played into British politics.

5.3. Land Issues

5.3.1. Historical Factors and Symbolism
The relationship between King Lobengula and his visiting friends from the BSAC, whom he regarded as hunters had been that of cordial and mutual respect. Unknown to him, they were secret agents employed by the company. The information they collected would help the company acquire the Kingdom as a colony. After 40 years of visiting the Kingdom, the British imperialists were convinced that the Kings was ‘one of the most skilled African rulers’ (Austin, 1975) as such there was initially no desire to fight with him. However, in 1890, Rhodes’ army occupied Mashonaland but felt threatened by the King they had avoided. For this, they led Britain and Mashonaland into a bloody war with King Lobengula, at the end of 1893 (Blake, 1977; York Herald, 1893). The last battle took place on the banks of Shangani River wherein the colonial war ended with King Lobengula’s disappearance.
This victory defined the future relationship between the Ndebele and the BSAC. Given the heroic legend of the Ndebele, it was for the conquerors and the conquered, to show each other who the Victor was and that the King had left. Blake (1977) likens the fate of Ndebele to that of the Saxons at the mercy of the Normans after the battle of Hastings. The BSAC's army immediately began acquiring all the livestock and land in the Ndebele country, under the pretext that this had been the property of the King (Austin, 1975; Blake, 1977). Now that Lobengula was defeated, all his property belonged to the winners of the war. However, the same fate soon befell the Shona (Blake, 1977). For the three years between 1890 and 1894, the settlers maintained a cordial relationship with them because they reasoned that King Lobengula would have intervened.

From that period going forward, the systematic disposition of Natives of their Land and property became the common practice. Austin (1975) observes that land-grabbing practices by members of the Pioneer Army happened without any official record by the Company (Hansard, 1914). In fact, they defied the BSAC's authority over the matter, claiming that they acquired the right to land by defeating King Lobengula (Blake, 1977). Lord Olivier (1926) confirmed this history in parliament:

When the Chartered Company’ forces invaded Matabeleland in 1893 they thereafter proceeded to exercise certain acts of ownership. They were remonstrated with at the time by His Majesty’s Government, who pointed out that they had no little to exercise those acts of ownership, but they proceeded for many years to exercise, and to presume that they possessed, the ownership of the lands of Southern Rhodesia (Olivier, 1926, pp. 542 - 3).

In his contribution, Lord Olivier (1926) also noted that following many years of this exercise the Privy Council eventually disapproved of it in 1919. Its decision ordered that land ownership rested with the Crown. Its proclamation allowed the BSAC to implement a provision of the 1898 Order in Council, which require it to identify and allocate land for use by Natives. After this land was made available all black Africans were expected to inhabit these areas these reserved areas. Any Natives who lived
outside these areas for any reason were levied rentals and grazing fees, which they could pay either in cash or in kind (by labouring for the landowner if so required) (Harcourt, 1913). Natives could not legally purchase or own land. They relegated the natives to inferior agricultural land reserves as communal lands.

Although the 1923 Constitution did not include racial segregation on land, Ormsby-Gore, (1927) observed that Winston Churchill instructed that soon after the constitutional debate the responsible government could adopt an amendment. He noticed the need to sustain Rhodesian segregation thus; he advised that a new law would be necessary to protect the system. Given the rise of the Labour Party and possible opposition from liberals, it would seem that Churchill might deliberately have avoided attempting to put such a provision as part of the 1923 Constitution through the Imperial parliament. This Constitution generally offered Rhodesia something akin to independence, with minimal competences reserved for Her Majesty’s pleasure, as follows (Mutumba, 1973, p. 39):

i. constitutional amendments;

ii. any laws, except in respect of the supply of arms, ammunition or liquor to natives which subjects natives to conditions or restrictions which do not apply to Europeans;

iii. any law constituting a Legislative Council

Land division tasked European land and Native reserves in segregated places in the country. For the most part, Europeans occupied most of the fertile land along the country’s arable and rich great dyke (Perham, 1966). The Native Reserve system required that Africans move to designated areas, in most cases away from their ancestral homes and lands or accept a new status as labour tenants (Hansard, 1910). However, in parliamentary debates, the Prime Minister insisted that this was untrue, even as it was clear that moving would unreservedly cause to abandon their historical land and location. In fact, the claim from the Conservative bench was that Southern Rhodesia’s Africans received good
treatment compared to all other natives in the whole of the Empire (Hansard, 1910). Despite the systematic deprivation and evidence of land grabbing by settlers, which led to the legal challenge sent to the Privy Council, the Conservative Party chose to see or hear no evil unless someone brought irrefutable evidence. In doing this, the Conservative Party seemed to ignore their irrationality. In this case, conflict over land ended up on the tables of the Privy Council, yet the Prime Minister accepted the notion that Africans were happy.

In another example, in response to a question from a Labour Party, Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, relating to an amount of Land owed to the BSAC. He opined that the bill would end up on the British taxpayers’ desk if it was not picked up by Rhodesian natives. He asked the Secretary for State that:

… apart from that, will he see that this £4,000,000, or whatever sum it amounts to, if it is not met by the British taxpayer, is at any rate not thrown on the backs of the natives of Rhodesia—that their lands are not taken from them and sold or mortgaged to meet this charge? (Hansard, 1921, p. 137).

Earl Winterton sought to dismiss the question with another one, which doubted the legitimacy of the first. He inquired if the Colonel ‘was aware that the people of Rhodesia greatly resent the attempts made in certain quarters to introduce (the question of) prejudice into the matter? (Hansard, 1921). However, placing value on Rhodesian objections to segregation, was self-defeating because, in any case they would be expected to since they legislating and legalising on the bases of race. Certainly, they would object to suggestion to the contrary and even then, the British parliament and government had the required competencies to do so regardless of Rhodesia preferences.

The LAA of 1930 brought legalised the segregation of land between the two main races. Although the implications of the segregation were far reaching, affecting a wider range of life in the country (Jennings & Huggins, 1935). It affected the social, economic and political prospects of its racial groups.
Thus, segregation in colonial Rhodesia expressed more than just racism and access to land. A newspaper at the time expressed the daily life impact of the Act:

Salisbury itself is a clean roomy city of rambling, tree lined streets and modest sized skyscrapers. During the day Africans throng the streets of Salisbury a few of them in tribal dress, many in rags. At night, the Land Apportionment Act segregates them into African townships (UPI, 1965, p. 1).

Jennings (1935) indicated that some of those who conceived the Law saw it as an opportunity to ensure economic domination by the Europeans. Reserves consisted mainly in barren or semi-productive land, for a number of reasons, which included limiting native productivity and ensuring both subservience and dependence on European Agriculture. There was uneasiness that freely producing Africans could present competition for White farmers, thereby reducing their profitability while simultaneously affecting the availability of labour (Sullins, 1991).

The Labour Government’s attitude towards the Rhodesia’s LAA was to warn that it contravened provisions of their Constitutional arrangements. Lunn (1930), firstly, taking a position that previous government avoided and secondly, as part of the Labour led administration that had followed another that had collapsed within a year. He warned Rhodesians that their law needed changing before he could consider recommending it to the Queen for assent. He stated that:

In view of the terms of the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Letters Patent, there are legal difficulties in bringing this Act into effect, but the Secretary of State is in communication with the Government of Southern Rhodesia as to the steps which might be taken to enable legislation in the terms proposed to become operative (Lunn, 1930).

David Holden (1965) expressed the effects of LAA in terms of how it forced the African to serve the European economy of Rhodesia:
In the mornings they come in their thousands by bus and bicycle to serve Salisbury’s European economy. In the evenings return to sleep – per chance to dream. If their dreams are disturbed, we should not be surprised. For in a lifetime, their old life has been utterly destroyed, but the new life has not yet admitted them to its full rewards. They are third class citizens in their own homeland (1965, p. 42).

This was an economy of two hundred thousand served by a cheap labour force of nearly five million. The LAA was Rhodesia’s most potent tool for managing and sustaining the country’s political, social and economic minority. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour Government recommended it for the Queen’s assent. In fact, after initially suggesting that changes were necessary the government later the Labour Government buckled and changed the patents in order to allow the deprivation of natives of any opportunity to own land and right to live and work in their country freely (The Hansard, 1930). Martinco (1964) noted that discrimination existed at all levels of life. He also pointed to the importance of the LAA of 1930 in erecting a barrier that affected the country’s life in education, social and employments levels.

This Act became the focus of discussion in the period running up to the UDI of independence and immediately after it as a starting point in discussions of Rhodesian independence (Reuters, 1961). For example, in 1961, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Sandys believed that he had reached a solution to the Rhodesia crisis. This was after the Central African Party suggested and embraced the repeal of this law as a prerequisite for a constitution for Rhodesia. The 1961, Africans opposed new Constitution on the basis that it did not help repeal the LAA (The Leader Post, 1962).

5.3.2. The Socio-Politics

5.3.2.1. The Pan-African Narratives
Literature seems to ignore the pivotal role of land reform as a central motivating factor and tool in the nationalistic movements in Rhodesia. Instead, the questions of race, politics and the UDI, receive overwhelming attention. As evidence shows, these relied on the context provided by land-use
patterns for their sustenance and relevance (Kriger, 2008). Ownership of land as a means of production inclined the attitudes of Rhodesians towards each other. It also informed the relationship between the colony and Britain, based on how London reacted to initial segregation. British politicians systematically rubber-stamped the land expropriation, which entrenched social and economic structures of repression and degradation of the natives (Nmoma, 2008). This indicated to the settling community what the mother country would permit them to do. However, another rather surprisingly matter, that needs highlighting, is that land distribution influenced African attitude towards the state during the UDI era. This is true of the approach that post-independent Third-World countries take in relation to the UK policies in Zimbabwe. This includes the continued suspicion that London is bias in favour of the land owning class. To this end, it was important for any political settlement to consider and promulgate concrete solutions to land disputes. Trivialising land issues by postponing the decision about its resolution was detrimental to the durability of any agreement (Lan, 1985; Moyana, 1984).

In addition, to its economic and political value Africans regarded land as a source of special spiritual value (Chan & Primorac, 2004). Thus, nationalist leaders utilised this symbolism to gather some support and sacrifice from the population during the long Rhodesian bush war. Their appeals to the public relied heavily on the upsets to these that resulted from the dislocations from land that followed the Lands Commission (LC) of 1894, LAA of 1930, Land Husbandry Act (LHA) of 1951 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969 (Alexander, et al., 2000; Smout, 1975). Similarly, the legends of the experiences of the 1893 and 1896 war and its brutal means and confiscation of land were still existent in folklore.

Another view of the land question relates to the realities of population density among the African population. The vast amounts of properties that the white population inherited from history, either through economic advantage or directly from expropriation, contrasted with the realities experienced by natives. The Rhodesian government often failed to respond to population growth in African areas by increasing their quarter, which resulted in overcrowding in the designated areas. Phimister (1986)
notes that this lends the exhaustion of these lands leading them to become less agriculturally productive to meet the native farming and survival.

As a way of summarising, the state that settler Rhodesians built was distinctively structured through its land policies. Effectively designed and anchored the country’s social fabric on racial segregation and economic inequality. The land was thus the main political tool for managing the participation of natives in the economy either as labourers or through restrictions in movement. Various laws on land, economics and freedom of movement forced natives into the money economy (Rennie, 1978). This affected the native population by curtailed its members the ability to sustain families without having to offer labour to the white population. Equally, land access ensured the exclusion of African farming as competition to settler agriculture.

This background, however, did not feature prominently at the Lancaster House conference. Faced with this rather historiography of the land question, Lord Carrington avoided extensive debate of this subject. Its resolution for the purposes of the constitution was to promise, using ambiguous figures, to support funding for Zimbabwe if the front endorsed the property clause. This led the adoption of a new constitution and the conference ending as a huge success. From then going forward, Mugabe ignored the urgent land hunger among some sections of the society. Thus, the question did not receive prominence in the media and from Mugabe until after 1997, in favour the policy of reconciliation and pragmatist. However, in the long term, the land question became the serious social upheavals, which the government if aware. Sydney Sekeramayi a minister in Mugabe’s government from 1985 once remarked, about the need the heightened prospects for land among native Africans. He expressed that, ‘failure on the part of government to meet these expectations could well degenerate into a cancer relentlessly eating away the promising foundation upon which all of us are trying to build a genuinely democratic, non-racial and egalitarian society’ (Alexander, 1994, p. 331).
5.3.2.2. The History of Land, Violence and Power

Quest for Absolute Power: Smokescreen – Targeted Violence and Land Threats

Mugabe’s policies in general are some of the most misunderstood and badly interpreted, owing, mainly to the abundance of conformist ‘praise texts’ that characterised post-independence Zimbabwe (Kriger, 2008). This period witnessed some of the world’s largest historical cover-ups and revisionism. It was characterised by complete silence over the murders of almost 20,000 Ndebeles by Mugabe through a personal well-trained militia that the west was unwilling to acknowledge. This led to a dearth of literature because of a systematically compliant academia. Authors and researchers maintained a blind eye towards Mugabe’s history of violence, while concentrating on the triumphalist accounts against colonialism.

Historical revisionism dominated the literature on Mugabe and Zimbabwe since independence. Mugabe’s heroism and that of his party became the mainstay of history, politics and literature. Prominent historians such as Ranger (1985) and Lan (1985) followed the established ZANU narratives on the liberation struggle. Thus, given the government violent activities in Matabeleland soon after independence, the role of ZAPU and its military wing ZIPRA is missing in the mainstream historical accounts. In fact, there is an emphasis on Mugabe being the Maoist-Marxist whose worldview in informed by populist mass based politics (Ranger, 1985). This designation of Mugabe’s ideology emanates from his party’s constitutional amendment in 1984, but has limited resonance firmly grounded in policy (Shaw, 1986).

These versions of history were consistent with the image that Mugabe’s reconciliatory tone that he had adopted at independence. Nonetheless, they were incompatible with his biography in which he consistently exposed high levels of intolerance to ideological, cultural and political diversity (Robins, 1996). The splitting of ZAPU, leading to the formation of ZANU in 1963 followed the fault lines of tribalism and nepotism (Flower, 1987; Sylvester, 1990) with a tribal Shona faction of the party revolting against the Ndebele leadership of Nkomo (Sithole, 1999). On the contrary, patriotic and
mainstream history, claim that Nkomo’s moderation in relation to the 1961 UFP constitution, and its mandate was the main reason for the split (Sithole, 1993). As argued by various authors, including Astrow (1983), the operational similarities between the new ZANU and old ZAPU, indicate that the reasons were both tribal and power greed. However, even if this argument were true, it would still support the thesis that Mugabe was averse to both negotiation and prone to intolerance. This accusation is prominent in his politics for much of the 15 years of the war, in 1976; he reiterated his uncompromising attitude while attending the failed Geneva conference. He indicated that he would ‘burn the country to ashes and rebuild it in our own image’ (Cliffe, 1981, p. 158), and that in a new ‘Zimbabwe, none of the white exploiters will be allowed to keep a single acre of their land’ (Caute, 1983, p. 78).

Meanwhile, Mugabe’s military forces operated mainly in communal lands occupied by Africa natives. Here, the difference between life and death was the mere word of another citizen to the freedom fighters. ZANLA soldiers and their messengers (Mujibas and Chibwido) killed and beat up people accused of misbehaving or for selling out to exploiters (Ranger, 1985; Kanengoni, 1997). Meanwhile, Britain and the international community were sceptical of Mugabe and preferred working with Nkomo (Owen, 2012; Sithole, 1993). This was true for the frontline states whose insistence on the formation of Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) was an attempt to get rid of ZANU (Ranger, 1980).

Mugabe’s own takeover of the leadership of ZANU displayed a tendency to both violence and unreasonableness (Ranger, 1980). Such was directed at President Kaunda of Zambia, who responded by expelling ZANU from his country in 1975. However, more importantly it was characterised by a rather tribal context with mainly one faction of the Shona tribe (Zezuru) conspiring in prison against then leader Ndabaningi Sithole (Sithole, 1999; Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Once again, the political strategies and rhetoric utilised against Nkomo in ZAPU in 1963, succeed against Sithole and have accepted into patriotic history. With the pending Geneva conference, in which Mugabe suspected that conference might succeed, and he would not be in power at the time, so together with
Maurice Nyagumbo, Edgar Tekere and Enos Nkala; they executed a plan to oust Sithole (Ranger, 1980). Ranger (1980) also notes that Sithole was not fully committed the armed component of the struggle was hogwash. As such, there was a need to prevent him from going to negotiate on behalf of ZANU, they propagated the idea that was weak and like to sell-out and allow the Geneva conference to succeed. They claimed that this was necessary as outright military victory was certain. Thus, Mugabe attended the conference and stalled its proceedings. Mugabe used this as part of a broad strategy to by enough time to complete a leadership coup within ZANU PF. This was similar to his refusal to unite Zimbabwe’s liberation armies. Both the claims made little sense because nearly all the 155 men that made ZANLA, were loyal to Sithole at the time and a combined force would have helped Africans win independence quicker. Mugabe only gained the loyalty of any soldiers after visiting training sites in Mozambique. ZANLA’s fighting capacity reached its height in 1977 at 4000 young men and boys.

Historically, ZANU has enjoyed considerable success through using political violence. Even as early as 1980, ZANLA militants engaged in the annihilation of opposition supporters. Mugabe ordered his militants not to surrender but remain in the communities intimidating voters to ensure they voted for ZANU (Todd, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). His excessive desire for power, consistently led his party along the path of violence and extreme intolerance. He habitually referred to the use of unrelenting violence as a method to appeal to the public and to cow the population. Regularly, the public appeal included reference to the violence of the war and threats that ZANU would go to war if another party won any election (Kriger, 2005).

When presented with a need to accommodate divergent views and go forward, he always elected disunity and conflict. This was evident in his refusal to allow his party to participate in the elections as part of the Front (see election poster in Appendix 2), although this would have allowed him to achieve the one-party state that he pursued vociferously (Cliffe, et al., 1980; Nyawo & Rich, 1980; Ranger, 1985). This indicates his readiness to divide the nation and its people for power when appropriate, especially when one considers that soon after these elections. The policy of eliminating any opposition
was, in fact, the power that swept past its most important election yet and brought it into power (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). Electioneering purposes is a well-established function of Zimbabwean military, with those members of the military that carry out these functions often receiving both accolades and promotion (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012).

However, soon after the elections Mugabe appeared to have metamorphosed into a completely new creation and champion of reconciliation. De Waal (1990) opines that his attitude was something of a miracle which humanity had rarely espoused given the length of the war and his own incarceration by the Rhodesian government. His 1980 independence speech proclaimed:

If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interests, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you and me to you. The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten (Huyse, 2003, p. 34).

Mainstream literature and the popular narratives hold that Mugabe was initially a hero and then a reconciliatory political leader who forgave his enemies in 1980. Because of these narratives, he enjoys no criticism whatsoever for his first decade in power yet his purging of opposition began within two years of his regime.

However, the mythology of a reconciliatory Mugabe and its triumphalist historiography ignored reality then and is a case of dangerously amnesia today (Huyse, 2003). More so because Mugabe was always a public matter despite the establishment and Britain’s hope that he was someone different. In fact, Sylvester (1986) indicates that early Zimbabwe was as repressive as its predecessor state, with an Executive who dominated both parliament and the courts. These included emergency powers, which could overrun the legislature and preventive detention, which could override court decisions on personal freedoms. At the same time, the ZANU PF Central Committee controlled the Executive itself, rather than the Unity government’s cabinet (Nyawo & Rich, 1980). Within the first four years of
independence, Mugabe began acting otherwise in accordance with the rule of law (2007). Following the arrest top ZAPU leadership, including Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, (The House of Lords, 1984) Mugabe ordered the police to keep them in prison even after the Supreme had ruled for their release. Lookout Masuku never made it out of the prison alive under very suspicious circumstances in which there are suspicions that Mugabe’s spy agency, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) poisoned him (Todd, 2007). Alexander (1993) notes that these arrests and harsh treatment included the torture and killing of many would be ZAPU candidates for the 1985 elections.

Similarly, Nkomo went into exile fleeing arrest after Mugabe publicly sacking and call for his arrest (Alexander, 1993). The Matabeleland massacres followed these events and as already indicated, most researchers and the media ignored these murders (Kriger, 2008). In fact, at this time, pro-ZANU texts increased at this particular time with the vilification of ZAPU and the people of Matabeleland. The state control of the media at the time was absolute and powerful interests, which sided with Mugabe, tightly restricted even the international media (Hill, 2005). Additionally, in 1985 when Mugabe failed to get any support from the European electorate, he dismissed the White Minister of Lands, Denis Norman from the Cabinet (Lodge, et al., 2002; Holland, 2008). He wrote a letter to Norman explaining the reasons for demoting him saying, ‘obviously the whites have not appreciated what I have done for them, or what you have done for them, and I will therefore give them a black minister’ (Selby, 2006, p. 40).

As such, while Mugabe’s response to the resounding victories of ZAPU in Matabeleland and Midlands despite the violence that was already unleashed, for the white community, in addition to removing Norman from the government, he utilised a Sixth Constitutional amendment to abolish the 20 seats that the law guaranteed to them (Alexander, 1993). Mugabe furthered consolidated these reprehensible and repressive actions by acquiring further power to his office through the 1987 Executive Powers amendment to the constitution (Tendi, 2010; Sylvester, 1990). With the Unity Accord in December 1987, in which Nkomo and ZAPU effectively disbanded their party to join ZANU
PF, Mugabe inched close to attaining his goal of a one-party state (Tendi, 2010; Todd, 2007; Nkomo, 2001; Mugabe, 2001). All pieces to the puzzle seemed in place for this to happen in upcoming 1992 elections, where there was going to be no opposition.

The advent of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) jeopardised Mugabe’s quest for the one-party state (not one-party rule, which became the substitute concept after Nyerere realised the perils of legislating one-party state). This new party opposed the Mugabe in the 1990 election and thus prevented Zimbabwe from being a country with just one political party in parliament, and from instituting a \textit{de jure} one-party government (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). Mugabe violently responded towards all the supporters of the opposition party. He threatened to ‘cut’ the head off from Commercial farmers who aligned with the party (Sylvester, 1990). ZUM effectively delayed and prevented Zimbabwe from becoming a one-party state. ZUM was not effective in winning parliamentary seats, because it only got three out of a possible 120. However, as a splinter from ZANU PF it dispelled the notion of enough unity within the ruling party for it to transform into a one-party state and secondly, it galvanised the opposition forces against the whole idea. Additionally, although it only managed three parliamentary seats it received 20 per cent of an election that had a 60 per cent attendance of registered voters (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). Nevertheless, Mugabe once again used the language of violence effectively to win this election, thus cemented the party’s reliance and belief in utility of intimidation as a campaign tool (Kriger, 2005).

The 1995 elections were nearly the most peaceful and least competitive election that Zimbabweans ever participated (Dorman, 2005). This was not because Mugabe had changed his approaches to electioneering, but about half of the parliamentary seats were uncontested as there was no opposition to ZANU PF candidates (Sylvester, 1995). Secondly, Mugabe had prevented Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU (Ndonga) whom many expected would amalgamate the disorganised opposition into challenging Mugabe’s party, from participating in the elections (Sithole, 1993). Sithole failed to participate in the 1996 presidential contest as he faced charges of treason for assassination attempts...
on Mugabe (Laako, 2003). Additionally, Mugabe used the new Land Acquisition Act of 1992 to acquire Sithole’s farm compulsory in which the government violently evicted over 4000 families, suspected of being his political supporters (Auret, 1994). This weakened his party, which had depended on the farm for most of its funds.

Additionally, MP Margaret Dongo, who had just upset the ZANU PF establishment by contesting against a senior party member, was another possible contender (Laako, 2003). However, other than her gender in an electoral environment that was male dominated, she failed the constitutional age qualification that required a presidential candidate to be over forty years of age. Although, the lack opposition to ZANU PF’s re-election campaign for both the 1995 and 1996 elections rendered them none-events, the shire extent to which ZANU PF pursued, its potential competitor with instruments of the state was alarming. Moreover, while there was no aggression during the elections, the internal primary elections were very violent.

Defaulting Hegemony: Exposed – Land Grabbing and Violence
The 2000 and 2002, general and presidential elections like all the others before them witnessed ZANU PF employ all the electoral tactics that had worked since 1980. The common manoeuvres included threats of war, intimidation and violation of voters, the use of the land question, placing of charges against opposition leaders and the accusations of imperialist takeover. In the same manner as happened to Nkomo, Dabengwa and Masuku, just before the 2002 presidential elections the Government of Zimbabwe placed treason charges against Tsvangirai, Welshman Ncube and Renson Gasela (Moore, 2003). The courts heard that they had conspired to assassinate Mugabe. Despite these similarities, these elections were markedly different from those held in the past for a few reasons. They followed immediately after a constitutional referendum in which the ruling party and Mugabe campaigned for an affirmative vote but the country rejected refused to heed (Pottie, 2003).

The UK’s New Labour government shifted British policy from that of the two Conservative Party led governments that prioritised the need to protect the rights of the white minority in the country. The
land question and position of commercial farmers were no longer the important determinants of British policy towards the country (Short, 1997). Rather issues of governance, human rights and poverty became primary indicators of support and cooperation (Raftopoulos, 2002). The growing civil society, led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) with the strong facilitation of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) gave rise to the new opposition. In quick succession, this took the form of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and MDC (Dorman, 2003; Moyo, et al., 2000; Raftopoulos & Sachikonye, 2001; Makumbe, 2002).

These circumstances forced Mugabe, who had become accustomed to relying on patriotic history, media and civil society revisionism (LeBas, 2006) to contend with, and account to an international community that had previously been unwilling to listen to his critics (Raftopoulos, 2002). Commercial farmers utilised their contacts in Britain and in the Commonwealth to help drum up support for the NCA and MDC. The NCA campaigned for a new constitution, indicating that the existing document bestowed excessive power in the presidency. Mugabe whose initial reaction was not favourable, tried to steal the momentum from the NCA by putting together a Constitutional Commission (CC) that would lead in formulating a draft to be put to the people through a referendum (Dorman, 2003). He managed to run the process, including a wide range of people but the product never gained legitimacy because he had managed it, hence the resounding rejection by Zimbabwean voters in 2000 (Makumbe, 2002). With this Mugabe lost in three different ways, first, he lost his public image of indispensability, secondly he failed to draw the momentum away from the oppositional civil and political sectors and thirdly, the land issue he had pushed into the proposal as a selling point, stood rejected (Berry, 2002).

It is the last part of this that ZANU PF reacted to, as the few days after the referendum experienced nationwide violence. The Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association (LWVA), aided and promoted by the state went on a rampage of violence against white farmers, the opposition and trade and students unions (Makumbe, 2002). From this point forward, Mugabe declared that the country
was in a state of war against imperialist elements that were within the country attempting to help Britain recolonise Zimbabwe indirectly by preventing land acquisitions (Dorman, 2003). Thus, the occupation and murder of white farmers, opposition activities and the torture of large numbers within the population began, and a complete disregard of the law enveloped the country. Members of the LWVA, particularly, and occasionally armed with state weapons seemed above the law and threatened or attacked any institution or individual (Makumbe, 2002).

Land inequality was a real issue in Zimbabwe throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, as evidenced by numerous sporadic and legitimate land occupations. The objectives of these initial occupations of large-scale Commercial farms were to influence government policy (Moyo, 2000). After the initial efforts to resettle landless people in the early 1980s, the government diverted its attention elsewhere despite the availability of acquired land (Selby, 2007). In Matabeleland, the government’s Gukurahundi programme affected most government development programmes, including resettlement. Eventually the reduced pace of resettlement in the last half of the 1980s led the government eventually the policy (Moyo & Skalnes, 1990). Budgetary allocations for this programme faced progressive reductions and affected the ability of the government to utilise land offered or acquired. However, as the resources dwindled, ZANU PF senior officials sharpened their rhetoric in favour of resettlement and redistribution:

Of course we have all accepted that the first phase of resettlement had its shortcomings, especially on the settler selection aspect. It was meant to address a political reality ... we had to give them land irrespective of whether they were productive or not. There was no time to plan, select and train these people...the second phase should be a productive one (Mangwende, 1992, p. 23).

In the early 1990s, two major events forced Mugabe to rethink his land redistribution policy, which already failed to prioritise change.
A severe drought hit the country in the 1991 – 92 farming period and at the same time, Mugabe accepted Thatcher’s advice to embrace ESAP from Bretton Woods (Thatcher, 2010; World Bank, 1991). With the drought, people in areas that were unable to sustain crops sought new land. On the contrary, the ESAP conditions required the government to reduce its expenditure and encouraged agricultural reform that encouraged a shift from increased communal use but towards commercial production and economic liberalism (Raftopoulos, 1991). Thus, despite the Land Acquisition Act (1992), which allowed more flexibility in the acquisition of land by the state, Mugabe’s government did not utilise it at all. However, there are arguments suggesting that Mugabe’s allegiance to capitalist policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s resulted from the slow merger of the existing capitalist structures and his incoming redistributive Marxism, without causing serious disruption (Mkandawire, 1985). However, this rationale falls apart given the right-turn taken on the land issue in the early 1990s indicates no intention to get back to socialism. If the supervening circumstances forced ideological inclinations on ZANU PF, the fact remains, that Mugabe was never at one point a practising socialist. Instead, he would be an aspiring Marxist whose conditions never allowed a chance to try his ideology. In fact, by the mid-1990s ZANU PF and Mugabe had completed their drift to the centre, prompting Raftopoulos to conclude that the drift was going to be long-term (Raftopoulos, 1991). Likewise, Tsvangirai noted the need for workers to create alliances with rural peasants in order to help push ZANU PF from the far right towards the middle. He argued that:

The workers will always have a role, since they are the producers. They should not advocate workerism because 80 percent of our population are peasants. What they should do is to try and link up workers and peasants into strong structures to advance their interests. That’s the only way we can draw the ruling party away from the right wing and convert it to our own purpose’ (Tsvangirai, 1990)

Thus, by 1990, the right wing of the party, which had been campaigning for much on the 1990s, had succeeded in pushing the party towards liberal capitalism (Selby, 2007). A variety of new black elitists
led by Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero and businesses used their influence to get SAPs approved
by the government. They also created effective interests groups to cover a variety of economic areas,
including promoting affirmative action. More important is the influence they had over the land policy
that Mugabe would implement until the conflict about 1999. The policy followed both their direction
and that of the ESAP, which gave land priority to their members instead of communal peasants. This
right of the centre ideological position was the one that ZANU PF and Mugabe occupied at the time
that the Mr Blair won the 1997 British general election. In fact, Mugabe had had sought and accepted
a delivery of all-terrain Land Rover trucks for use by the police in helping protect farms from land
hungry squatters, the last 500 of which were not delivered after Zimbabwe stopped protecting the
police (The Hansard, 2000).

This part of the subsection outlines the context within which Britain and Zimbabwe become involved
in a bitter IR war from 1999 onwards. For most of the period before this, Mugabe has widely
exaggerated nationalist credentials and his willingness to stall and reorient land reform away from
acquiring white minority farms, allowed him a regular recipient of western honours. Notably, the
foundation for this was his speech of reconciliation at independence, rather than any particularly
illustrious contribution to the liberation struggle beyond that of other old-guard political leaders.
However, to those sections of the population who had experienced the ZANU PF brutality, these
accolades were always an interesting puzzle that gave rise to conspiracy theories that Mugabe would
later utilise against western powers. To them, Mugabe got a multi-party democracy but by 1995, he
had effectively turned it into a de-facto one-party state. In Mugabe’s country, minorities would only
exercise their right to democratic participation under the aegis of ZANU PF.

The Ndebele after Gukurahundi submitted themselves and their political participation to ZANU PF.
Their White counterparts after receiving several threats for voting for, or supporting the wrong party,
they withdrew participation. Similarly, Mugabe used the threat to take land from white farmers as an
effective strategy for swaying British policy towards the country. The Conservative Government
understood the ramifications of upsetting a man they did not fully understand. Nonetheless, the Labour government policy did not emphasise the protection of commercial farmer interests, instead of its principles. From this point on the curtain was torn and the world, for the first time, knew Mugabe for the kind of politics he had always practised. What is intriguing is that the Labour Party’s policy and approach towards the land question, was markedly similar to what ZANU PF had begun in early 1990s, which was to redistribute land to the new black elites who would then utilise it for intensive economic activity (Selby, 2007). However, the UK government disagreed that it had a further historical responsibility on the subject. This had been a trump card for Mugabe; it would seem used this part and its connection with protecting white farmer interest to get Britain ignore his human rights and other repressive records.

Given the above, it was mainly after the Labour government came into office that scholars began to address the history of violence aligned to Mugabe, both before and after 1980. In the period, before this Mugabe operated a totalitarian regime in which questioning or criticising the government was a serious offence. For example, in 1989, Arthur Mutambara, president of the Student Representative Council at the University of Zimbabwe, was arrested for arguing publicly that the University ‘has thus been rendered completely disreputable and hence the incumbents have lost legitimacy’ (Raftopoulos, 1991, p. 1). Mutambara was criticising the decision to by the authorities to close the University following student demonstrations. The state exhibited the gravity of its repressive nature by further incarcerating then Secretary-General of ZCTU, Mr Tsvangirai for showing solidarity with the arrested students.

The difference between being within your rights was very thin here. This relationship between the state and civil society was similar to that between Mugabe’s liberation war guerrillas and the ordinary citizens during the war (Kriger, 2008). People generally played a clever game in dealing with ZANLA forces because mere accusations of working with the Rhodesian Forces led to deaths of many (Kriger, 1988). Similarly, when confronted by Smith’s army they played along to that gallery, because again,
they were brutal to suspected opponents. It is essential to note this because, earlier patriotic historians such as Ranger and Bhebe (1995) have emphasised identifiable situations where the people could simply choose to align with one over the other. In independent Zimbabwe, once again people were still not free to express dissatisfaction with ZANU.

In pursuit of the policies of the new British government pursued specific objectives relating to human rights, democracy and liberalism (MacGinty, 2009). Mugabe contrasted this against the need for land reform and economic progression of the black majority. The political and social environment in the country was such that members of the LWVA suspended the law and arbitrarily executed their form of justice on those they accused of selling out. This Mugabe portrayed to his growing number of supporters in the Third World as an indication of the thorny nature of redistribution and land hunger among black Zimbabweans. Such violence and political polarisation characterised Zimbabwean elections (LeBas, 2006). Despite this, Mugabe lost the 2008 plebiscite, which he only won after Tsvangirai withdrew from the run off.
5.4. Summary
Rhodesia was part of the last wave of colonial expansion and by then Britain had gained adequate understanding with both acquisition and management of colonies. Combinations of events and circumstances acted together, helping to shape the country’s policy in this area. The Royal Army had rather been humiliated and unsettled by the narratives that followed the loss of the American War of independence. The end of this war brought slaves to Britain, causing the birth and growth of the abolitionist movement. Experiences with the Irish Home Rule initiative and the first Boer war contributed to public disdain for war and conquest. However, the Napoleonic growth in mainland Europe required responses to keep it under control.

These above presented conditions, variously affected attitude towards both colonialism and slavery, in general. Experiences in Ireland and the loss suffered in South Africa’s Boer War (resulting from the loss at the Battle of Isandlwana), as well as the narratives of heavy handedness having led to the American rebellion, pushed British policy away from traditional colonial approaches. The new public image of slavery plummeted, severely reducing any support for it. Equally so, slowing it down would, at least in part reduce Napoleon’s growth, given its dependence on slaves in Caribbean Islands. As such, colonial and international policy shifted from conquest and war towards a benevolent Empire and from expansionism to consolidation.

Against this background, this chapter shows the Conservative government, and the entrepreneur aristocrats disregarded the underlying policy in the colonisation of Rhodesia. The tendency to disregard the legal position marked a large part of Rhodesia’s early life (Perham, 1966). While a private company, which sought to make a profit, managed it, the government allowed its pioneers to run their own affairs with no interference. Several administrations in London evidently abdicated on their duty as guarantors of the rights of native rights (Mutumba, 1973). Instead of restricting racism, slavery and discrimination Britain, in some instance enabled Rhodesian in establishing a society based on racial inequality. In 1923, sensing that parliament would refuse to enact the responsible constitution for
Rhodesia, suggested the consideration of the land question independently as an amendment, after the conclusion of the constitutional process. Laws and policies relating to compulsory labour, restricted rights to vote and segregation in land access received government support and Royal consent (Mutumba, 1973).

Chapter 3 shows that ideologically the Empire was a strong tool for nationalism. The Conservative Party claimed the spot of being its defender and portrayed the Labour Party as less patriotic. This is curiously important, for example; the Labour government approved Rhodesia’s LAA of 1930 (Mutumba, 1973), which it had initially opposed. The Act consolidated and legalised government segregation, restricting black natives to particular areas.

Overtime the practice of complete independence by Rhodesia developed into a strong sense for the declaration of the dominion of Rhodesia, which set the stage for the 1964 rebellion. Part of the impetus for this was the fact that the relationship that Britain had curved with Rhodesia had indicated approval for the colony’s policies. This narrative had grown to the extent that it had become a de-facto constitutional convention even including its approach to the rights of natives. In matters where change was required, the history was that London sought direction from the colony or sought to surrender the decision to it government. Even in matters that the law explicitly reserved for approval by London, Conservative representatives regularly argued for them to the left to the Rhodesian government. This was Sir John Mellor’s argument in a debate regarding a Bill on Compulsory Native Labour (Hansard, 1942). Additionally, even for a huge initiative such as CAF, the Conservative government relied on the views of the white population, which was primarily from Salisbury. In fact, Britain never used its prerogative to block Rhodesian legislation (Perham, 1966).

Throughout Rhodesia’s lifetime, in both parliament and elsewhere, the Conservative Party never sought a redress of racism. In fact, just as the Rhodesians did the party believed that African natives were happy and accepted their position as inferior (Maughan-Brown, 1982). The proud statement
used by Rhodesia, which glorified racism as the *Rhodesian way of life*, represented the notion that all the people of the country approved the concept it protected. Thus, in a parliamentary debate when a Labour Party raised the question of Rhodesia racism, a Conservative Party Member, indicated that Rhodesians hate to know that some people would see their segregation as inappropriate. Other narratives used by the Conservatives include the open claim that even when the wrong white settlers had to be defended because they were *kith and kin*. As such, although the UDI was treasonous and act that is contrary Conservative ideology of nationalism, the party still argued that the UK to recognise the minority government and proceed.

Following the UDI the Labour government sought assurances that Rhodesia would progress towards adult suffrage (MLH, 1963; MLH, 1963). Although, this seemed to be the same position that the Conservative Party, the party departed from this completely, especially at the leadership level. Considering the strength of the leader in the party, then this was more likely to be the actual position of the party. On several occasions, the Party leadership expressed preference for a settlement based on a white minority rule. In fact, this was the party’s preferred position until after Mrs Thatcher’s sudden change of position in Lusaka at the Commonwealth Summit. It is a position that the Conservative government allowed in the 1972 Anglo-Rhodesia proposal. The path to majority rule based on income and property ownership would have taken several decades under the proposal. By the time of the proposal, Africans working in privileged European areas received a merger 7.4 per cent of the average white workers’ income (Maughan-Brown, 1982). Thus, it would have taken many more years for Africans to reach the required property threshold.

Rhodesia was in a league of its own, because, in effect, it was never colonised by Britain and had enjoyed de-facto dominion status for most of its life as a member of the British family of countries. Land policies had conflicts between the settlers and Africans. However, it was also a decisive issue, which helped structure the country socially, economically and politically (Maughan-Brown, 1982). Thus, in Rhodesia access to land by Africans was the main cause of the Bush war (Alexander, 1991).
This armed struggle was the parallel reality that the Anglo-Rhodesian conflict overshadowed. Conversely, the land question was never a prominent matter, on its own merits, in terms of British policy. It had relevance from the perspective, including adult suffrage, racism, segregation and economics.

Politically, the parties in Britain developed trends that help point at their positions. Firstly, although the Labour Party initially approved the LAA, it required its repeal, in the 1960s not for purposes of land redistribution, but because it embedded within in the structures of racism and segregation. A new political system was unachievable without its repeal or modification. From this point of view and reading this with the Anglo-American proposal for settlement, the Labour government envisaged some form of compulsory land acquisition for development or resettlement purposes (SSFCA, 1977). Secondly, the 1972 Anglo-Rhodesian proposal by the Conservative government did not suggest reform to land distribution instead merely sought to increase the amount of land available for native purchase. The Lancaster House agreement was a modification of this position, in which property rights were entrenched and unchangeable for 10 years, initially.

For the first ten years of independent Zimbabwe, Mugabe initially embarked on a resettlement programme and managed to move over 50,000 families in Mashonaland by 1985. This became the largest number of families resettled from the 152,000 target. Thereafter, the pace of land distribution to the natives slowed down until after 1990. Between 1985 and 1999, Mugabe’s government land policy did not actively seek to continue redressing the question of inequality. In fact during the 1990s land distribution was no longer about the landless but a burgeoning black farming class. Land inequality has always been an important issue for poor Africans in Zimbabwe but Mugabe has not been that consistent champion. In fact, New Labour’s policy to support land reform that met the economic aspirations of the country was strikingly similar to one Mugabe had overseen for nearly a decade. However, one area in which Mugabe had been unwavering belief in violence and threats
against the people of Zimbabwe. The history of both the land question and war were his potent tools for electioneering.
Part Three

Analysis and Conclusion: The Content of British Foreign Policy

I think I have in fact been situated in most of the squares of the political checkerboard, one after another and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in service of Gaullism, new liberal, etc. ... None of these descriptions is important by itself; taken together, on the other hand, they mean something. And I must admit that I rather like what they mean (Foucault, 1997, p. 113).
Chapter 6: Foreign Policy Principles in British Politics

Foreign Policy Discourses: Locating the Objects of Thought

6.1. Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of British political party foreign policy principles, establishing their re-current nature within the case study. It also contains dedicated sections organised in relation to the models set out in the introductory chapter.

1. the UK’s attitude to foreign policy in general and on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in particular is the product of pragmatic and reactive approaches

2. the UK’s attitude to foreign policy is viewed through the same ideological prism as domestic policy

To contextualise this analysis a summary of the theoretical arguments in the matter of IR and politics follow this introduction. This recounts the high stakes and the continuing academic debate on whether there is any correlation between the two fields. The summary explores the linkages between them. Perhaps that would be a serious contribution to the very debate at hand. It rejects the central notion of classical IR research that this area or any other requires protection from any form of scrutiny from alternative angles. The belief and assumption that our actions continue to create and recreate the world as we come to know it, informs this radical approach. Knowledge creation should transcend the limitations of broad theoretical categories imposed by experience and existing interpretations of social life. This summary of the conjectural concepts is central in emphasising the interpretive analytical framework utilised here to deconstruct and reconstruct case study data. Doing this enables the re-arrangement of seemingly disconnected meta-principles in order to understand their role in ordering both thought and action in real time.
Section 6.3 identifies the main principles present in the international and political discourses in the case study. It focuses on state and political party institutions, their positions and principles and how those inspired actual policy. Constant (common) metanarratives (themes) are identifying from within the data by triangulating them against the temporal and long-term context within which they sustained themselves. Their reaction, dominance and reproduction over a long period indicate their position as powerful instruments for guiding the objectives of policy thought either within government or political parties. In making this analysis I ‘wanted to know the structures, strategies or any properties of’ that are continuously present within the policy process (Dijk, 1993, p. 300). Potter and Wetherell (2004, p. 201) define these as attitudes and clarifies that these in turn are responses that ‘locate the objects of thought about dimensions of judgement’. This section draws attention this ‘evaluative hierarchy’ (Potter & Wetherell, 2004, p. 201). This chapter exposes these attitudes, because although not ‘overtly expressed’ are the bases for eventual policy because of their intransitive, transitive and normalising role.
6.2. Summary of the Study Problem and Methodology

Traditional approaches to IR tend to collect, analyse data and information produced by specialised and official institutions or sources. This is prescribed by major theoretical assumptions and research that follows a different path is judged as poor. The argument is that since the state is the main player, which determines the role of all other players, nothing in knowable without studying its positions and actions. Consequently, classical IR studies conclude that it is the only source with data that can facilitate the study of the arrays of exchanges within the system as a whole (Singer, 1961). They hold that international structures are only understandable through the discernible attributes of the State (Wilkinson, 2007).

My alternative argument argues that traditional IR studies’ facilitation of the production of very accurate biographies (Carl, 2010) within foreign policy. I am critical and sceptical of the type and the prioritisation of structured data gathered from and through IR institutions. In traditional terms the researcher relies on data produced and provided by official channels in to make a full understanding. Realists view the state as an objective actor that sets out to shape the world around it. Additionally, idealist theories aim to change the attitude of various units forcing them to work towards mutual peace and benefit. Given, the aforementioned, I fear that official sources should not always be trusted objective information.

This study argues that traditional approaches may lack exploratory capabilities and tend to exaggerate the state as one of the players in IR while downplaying that of other players. The fact that these approaches also encourage that parliament stay out of foreign policy causes a lot of panic (Rengger, 2000). Furthermore, resulting from overreliance on the state traditional research tends to be descriptive of IR content and the main actors. Studies are unable to produce an understanding of the interplay between the numerous forces, activities and dynamics present in the production of policies and the position taken by states. This is particularly important because the data, especially interviews with specialist assume that positions stated by practitioners are pure and influenced by national
interests. However, in effect, these are the polished decisions and position vetted and confirmed after passing through meticulous tests provided by the social environment. This is perhaps why traditional theorists are eager to separate IR from any other area, claiming that IR institutions are ideological neutral and tend to act in the national interests. This helps researcher feel okay about the quality of data acquired from institutions and their actors because these are unprejudiced and professional. However, the question that these findings raise is whether these realities are a potential problem for classical theories of IR. Do some of their premises ‘rig the game’, by allowing some of its premises to double up as intermediaries in the research process?

Reflecting on these doubts becomes important when one notes that classical IR theories lack scientific proof (Wilkinson, 2007). Legitimacy for these theories emanates from the hegemonic nature of their supporting philosophies and their domination of other paradigms in this area of study. While the philosophical premises for these assumptions need no methodical proving, the theories developed out of them require scientific testing. Utilising data gathered through the actors and players within the state machinery itself seems an unusual stretch for any research methodologies (Wendt, 1987; Singer, 1961; Rengger, 2000). The dominant widespread use of these theories helps reinforce these theories by making them self-fulfilling prophesies (Wilkinson, 2007), hence the difficult task of challenging the central notion that precludes others alternative approaches. That is, research that is not based on inside information but one that relies on data that can reveal tensions and conformities within foreign policy.

The problem of inside data becoming some form of self-fulfilling prophesies emanates from several contentions. Foucault’s (1997, p. 297) game of truth, seems of the best criticism of an approach of this nature. He defines this as claims or conclusions emanating from ‘a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which on the basis of its principles and rules of procedure, may be considered valid and invalid through results obtained using specified methods.’ The problem is that such procedures results and outputs need to be understood in terms of their basic value system. Thus, metanarratives tend to
inform and enforce worldview points in line with versions of the world that strengthen the dominant theoretical framework (Walker, 1993). This explains that in a dominated environment, the production of knowledge actively copies, reinforces and sustains the already existing basic structure and authority. Therefore, the primary task of studying IR under conquered conditions must be to understand the forces responsible for the hegemonic position of some perspectives or ways of creating knowledge. Otherwise, most knowledge simply and unwittingly participates in strengthening existing realities, thus adds no real knowledge advancement.

Hegemony and domination, perhaps, partly explain the widespread popularity of traditional research designs despite them being more than descriptive and biographical accounts of actors and issues. Husserl (1960) would define this as the result of universal innate schemas, which give rise to classical theories of IR. Utilising his thinking, orthodox paradigms of IR are interpretable as cognitions of the world propped as objective. Thus, to get behind this containing situation, there is a need to deconstruct this created reality (Derrida, 1973).

This thesis locates IR research within and in some relation with political sciences, in an attempt to allow it to explore, in addition to the biographies of IR, social and historical factors. This involved collecting data from non-traditional sources and the utilisation of post-structural data analysis techniques. Wilkinson (2007) avers that IR elitists resist change heavily, seeing it as an attempt by other fields to dominate their ring-fenced and protected field and argues that such a relationship is both impractical and not sustainable. However, from a post-structural point of view, this coordinated effort to insulate IR studies has become a worth studying. The reasons for setting aside the relationship between the two make it very important to classical IR (Culler, 1983). Additionally, from a dialectical point of view, IR is in fact, what it is because of what it is not (Hegel, 1874), thus the thesis that it is independent, requires the study of the antithesis that it is dependent in order to reach at the synthesis of what its truth is.
While there are other possible reasons for carrying out this study, the way chosen, the focus here is on utilising politics to explain diplomacy, in part. The study has indicated thus far that there is a growing call for studies of this nature to grow. The realisation that political parties and other non-state players influence international policy is a prospering area of both study and learning. In fact, other recent studies have found a correlation between foreign and domestic policy. In a study of the Northern Ireland Peace Negotiations and the related policy, MacGinty (2009) attests to this and decries the tendency by IR and Political Science researchers to separate the two. They evidently interrelate with the development of the Labour government’s liberal internationalism to the party’s Third Way ideology.
6.3. Metanarratives and Attitudes in British Foreign Policy

Essentialism refers to a mode of analysis in which social phenomena are analysed not in terms of their specific conditions of existence and their effects with regard to other social relations and practices but rather as the more or less adequate expression of an essence (Hindess, 1977, p. 95).

In light of the discussion above it now seems logical to set out a framework for a non-conformist and non-essentialist analysis of IR. This does not understand its task in terms of an indispensable essential nature propounded by Hobbes (Hobbes, 1985). It refuses to accept the bounds of the *out-of-control* externally created essence of human behaviour in IR. It argues that this imposes limits research greatly by preventing introspection. Within the same veil, this approach makes the same argument in relation to idealism. Although this is different, it too takes an essentialist approach as inspired by the Roman Catholic Church. It defines humans as naturally inclined towards Godly wisdom and knowledge, with a benevolent essence that shuns the dangers of competitive living. It emphasises this moralistic view of human nature as providing the guiding aspiration of international interactions (Bornhausen, 1932).

The additional or alternative view that I am presenting here utilises discourse analysis to identify narratives, attitudes and principles, hidden within data but creative of dominance in study of foreign policy.

The framework followed here draws attention to other possible ways of studying or understanding IR. Thus by that nature it disturbs the powerful position that traditional approaches have always enjoyed. This therefore challenges the superiority of orthodox approaches by not conforming to and legitimating their ontological conceptions of essentialism. These, in turn, allow traditional IR approaches to make truth claims and the associated power (Gane, 1986). Likewise, this allows realism and idealism to remain unchallenged.

In relation to the case study, Tarmakin (1990) falls into the trap of tradition. He analysed the Conservative governments’ policy on Rhodesia in 1979, without considering it as part a continuing narrative within the Party. Based on the nature of his study, his findings that the Party followed a
pragmatic approach, thus resolved the crisis, his conclusions are convincing. His contention that
pragmatism brought about the resolution of the problem, is also independently attractive because an
agreement was reached and Rhodesia returned to legality. Thus, he claims the superiority and
emphasises the power of traditional approaches that are divorced from ideology.

However, when Tarmakin’s (1990) analysis is stretched to include some historic information, a lot of
trouble brews for his conclusions. For example, his contention that the Conservative government was
successful because of its pragmatic approach become troublesome when juxtaposed with the failure
of the 1972 plan by the same party. It also becomes indefensible when one considers the failure of
the Federation, which had been a pragmatic solution at the beginning of Rhodesia’s quest for
independence. Thus, although traditional approaches seem to provide some insight into foreign policy
on an ad-hoc bases it seems enriching to check them against the impact of time and history.

Given the aforementioned, IR analysis and the interrogation of the problem of orthodox approaches
require the exploration of the epistemes of foreign policy. Analysis should aim at unearthing trends
across different time and historical categories before making any truth generalisations. Tamarkin’s
(1990) study shows the limitation of thinking about identifying any evidence (to prove the
truthfulness) for success in foreign policy and then tracing the immediate policy. Rather, a fuller
analysis must consider the modes of production of the policy and any intervening historical facts. This
concurs with Foucault (1997, p. 297) in encouraging ‘rules of procedures’ that allow validation and
invalidation the production of truth or knowledge by cross examining information across time to
establish metanarratives. This involves searching data for codes and values that in relation to each
other help shape the way the world is understood, in this case, the manner in which each party
pursues foreign relations policies. As the Foucauldian School indicates discourse analysis (Gane, 1986)
reveals the consistencies in policy that help unearth historical discontinuities, breaks and transitions
and explain events, including some instant decisions. This way this research is able to account for the
historical stages and changes that form the base of traditional IR analysis in the case study. Simply put,
the analysis contrasts history and politics against leadership in order to make sense of specific 
highlights in foreign policies, their impacts or outcomes and outputs. For example, orthodox IR 
approaches view British policy in Zimbabwe in terms of five historical stages. These are the 
colonisation (the triumphs of Rhodes), the formation and failure of CAF, the UDI Rhodesia rebellion, 
Zimbabwean Independence and the current land and human rights crisis. Yet, in reality there are 
common narratives that cut across these issues and the various stages that is understood can help in 
the development of a resolution.

Additionally, another challenge for traditional approaches that focus on specific events, the leaders 
and discontinuous historical periods tends to suppress novelty. Continuously flowing research helps 
create and explain new events by indicating the forces that outlive one event and are likely to affect 
the next. These are responsible for antecedent circumstances and environments. Foucault (2001) 
warns that these discontinuities are part of the discursive structures that protect inexplicable notions 
like ‘the state of human nature’. He argues that these overwhelming concepts, although universally 
accepted, they rely on the claim of indispensable truth and the essence applied to them by the 
proponents of the methods. The analytical technique followed by this thesis overcomes the limits 
imposed the notion of essence and believes that there is not true position of things. All the parts of 
the world we live in are created by humans and not imposed by some external natural force. Thus, to 
understand our actions now we need to understand how our positions have evolved or reinvented 
over time. In fact, it moves from answering question of whether what these theories find is true to 
considering how such truths are constructed.

As indicated in subsection 2.3.1, the IR and Domestic policy academic debate has reached a 
crossroads. The veil separating them has become a hotly contested subject and various academics 
believe that the constitutive parts of IR need interrogation. Theoretically, researchers find that 
maintaining orthodox approaches prevents further development in theory (Rosenau, 1969). Thus, 
understanding the metanarratives relevant to the case study will move IR studies beyond answering
the question why things happen into an era where research becomes able to answer question relating to their impact on future developments. Additionally, questions relating to the concepts of power, anarchy and selflessness, which are subjects in political debates, weaken the traditional disconnections between IR and political theory. Similarly, the impact of external factors, including political parties (Vickers, 2003; Katz & Mair, 2009), simply mean that classical IR thinkers face the need to go beyond human essence in order to understand foreign relations. The mirroring of the cold-war dichotomy into national political party division and vice versa (Katz & Mair, 2009) clearly indicates the strength of this analysis. Finally, the contemporary world is not satisfied with the practices of essentialist IR approaches. Their suggestion that public authority in foreign policy activities is to seek more power requires some form of oversight into the precise. Bringing political sciences provides a chance for the governed to ensure that foreign policy is relevant and there is accountability (Rawls, 1999).

Political parties are critically important to the process of ensuring accountability and the appointment of officials, including those in charge of foreign policy (Morehouse, 1973). They are pivotal in policy thinking, planning and implementation (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993) through their role in providing the framework for democracy; they legitimise the government and its IR institutions (Schattschneider, 1942; Katz & Mair, 2009). They already play a significant role in foreign policy therefore the evaluation of policy output and outcomes needs to reflect their influence (Morehouse, 1973; Richards & Smith, 2002). Conversely and consequently, political parties rely on ideology as their science laboratory of ideas about social life (Hill & Leighley, 1993). Arguably, such ideas play a role in shaping IR thinking. As such, this chapter analyses Part Two in order to identify relevant policy attitudes (Pearson & Williams, 1984) that help locate their position within Britain’s ideological spectrum (Nincic & Ramos, 2010).
6.3.1. The Conservative Party

6.3.1.1. Ideological Traditions

In general, the Conservative Party of David Cameron is vastly different from that of the 19th or 20th century. Notably, most Conservative practitioners and researchers argue that the party is inclined to take sensible instead of strictly ideological policy positions (Beech, 2011). Others have consistently sought to promote the fallacy that the party as non-ideological and entirely pragmatic (Jarvis, 1996; Fair & Hutcheson, 1987). They point out that this indicates the Party’s general predisposition towards change rather than stagnation. However, some researchers question whether such changes are superficial: they create nominal difference while strengthening the superstructure that forms its basic approaches to society. Thus, this thesis ploughs through the central party ideologies in order to understand the key themes that normalise changing positions. Given this, therefore this thesis makes no attempt to answer the question, whether or not it is true that the party is pragmatic. In fact; the attempt is to identify what constituted these changes and such pragmatism. If there are connecting threads of ideas within between ideological changes and also in relation to pragmatic decisions, then, these are further examined below as part of the established principles.

In summary, British conservatism was a response to the French revolution. The upheaval affected the French both politically and socially, while impacting on the wider European continent significantly. The governing principle for the early Party was to preserve the elite within British socio-political structures. Social order organised the Party in terms of the church and monarch, political and military classes that constituted the governing group. The origins of the Conservative Party are understandable through investigating not just its history once formed, but also by considering the reasons for it creation. Firstly, it is important to underscore that although the French revolution is one of the main reasons for its formation, there were many others. Its genesis is hardly attributable to just one event for the simple reason that it could not have been that straightforward. However, it was part of the transitional
context, which was ‘determined primarily by social class agents and intra-societal social conflict’ (Nygaard, 2007, p. 147).

The disposal of the Monarch in France, by the revolution set an example that British Conservatives sought to avoid (Nygaard, 2007). The desire was to manage any social transition such that any change retained the existing order of things. Thus, since the Party believed that privilege was natural and needed protection from the jealousy underprivileged classes, during transition. One of the Party’s initial aims was to prevent the overthrow of the traditional Monarch. It has been successful in achieving this goal as all the changes to the British Monarch including modernisation do not even consider removing it. It is a permanent feature of an effective and influential democracy. However, the changes relating to parliament and government continue to threaten the capital class that continues to seek to reduce and minimise the influence of the majority middle to working classes. Additionally, the capitalist class grew stronger in influence, as Georges Lefebvre and Albert Soboul, predicted that the French revolution marked the completion and ‘crowning of a long economic and social evolution that has made the bourgeoisie as the new master of the world’ (Nygaard, 2007, p. 148).

Thus, if every new beginning of the Party still continues to create the conditions, that the inception of the Conservative Party intended to achieve, then its core it still that. In this case, the Party set to preserve hierarchy of society believing that it was natural (Charmley, 2008). It sought to sustain a society whose function was to serve the rulers, then the rich and finally, the ordinary members. From this perspective, Conservatives envisaged a peaceful life where no social group was disgruntled or mistreated but each simply accepted its God-given position as appropriate for it. In short, this thesis argues that the underpinning tradition extrapolated from its formational period:

If society exists for anything at all, it exits for the sake of itself and thus the sake of its ruling, leading and tone-giving members, and for the sake of the distinctively valuable, eminent,
virtuous, ingenious and creative members emergent in its midst and last but not least, for the
good of its members pure and simple (Kolnai, 2004, p. 193).

Historically, the party conserves existing structures, and allows measured changes that help
modernise the social order while preventing revolutions that would otherwise upset the
superstructure. Thus, each of these classes expressed their patriotism and nationalism by accepting
their role and responsibility with the hierarchical setting. The ruling class making the society possible,
the nobles making sure it has what it needs to survive and continue. Those at the bottom of the
hierarchy would graciously accept their role. In general, this seems to have underpinned Conservative
philosophy, and in the 19th and 20th centuries. The political system preserved and protected the
powerful and interest of the monarch. The property-owning class enjoyed the rights to vote, manage
capitalism and run the government. At the same time the working classes were there to be governed,
if for any reason, for their own good.

The hierarchical approach to society and its problems is part of the party’s ideology. These narratives
have survived the various internal transitions within party politics and its policy machinery. In Britain
the party’s operational environment have changed since its formation. Consequently, it has
transformed itself as a guarantee for its survival as the societal shifts. Charmley’s (2008), shows that
the Conservatives understanding the importance of discourses and discontinuities, including how
those create the power to conserve values. He notes that party embarked on constant change if for
anything, but for the sake of survival itself. Salisbury’s constantly modernised the Party by high jacking
issues from unfriendly proponents then allowing the party to manage the change process to limit its
impact on the superstructure. According to Dijk (1993) deviations are important aspects of the power
created by metanarratives because they provide the general impression that there is progress.
Equally, Foucault in The Order of Things (2001) noted that claims of discontinuities in ideology are part
of the mystical rhetoric that suppresses novelty. This protects the underpinning ideals that continue
to flow unchanged, by claiming that the party, and inevitably so, like human life in general has progressed and modernised.

For purposes of this thesis it is perhaps useful to look at the changes that the Conservative Party brought about. Salisbury, who originally resigned from Cabinet because of the 1867 Reform Act, simply opposed it to the extent that it failed to preserve the underpinning tradition of the party. He believed in the gullibility of the masses that they would accept as progress any change even it was non-conclusive. Thus, superficial change could be sold as a huge compromise while preserving existing and entrenched interests of the ruling classes. After becoming Prime Minister, he welcomed change and progress that simultaneously conserved the novelty of his party’s ideological inclinations:

We have to give some satisfaction to both the upper classes and the masses. This is especially difficult with the upper classes - because all legislation is rather unwelcome to them, as tending to disturb a state of things with which they are satisfied. It is evident, therefore, that we must work at less speed and at a lower temperature than our opponents. Our bills must be tentative and cautious, not sweeping and dramatic (Salisbury, 1886).

In light of the above, this thesis argues that changes in policy approaches by the Conservative Party do not necessarily equate to a different party. They rather reflect its adaptation new environments and how it has been successful in portraying ideological positions as pragmatism (Jarvis, 1996).

Tradition research on Conservative Party history and foreign policy may reflect pragmatism. This, nonetheless, would concentrate on specific historic periods and avoid studying the party’s central ideological tenets. These would be dismissed as irrelevant to IR research. Thus, many researchers would argue that although the party has original inclinations towards the preservation of a particular social order it has modernised and become more pragmatic. It therefore now prepared to embrace social programmes to prevent class conflict (Charmley, 2008). However, this assessment is incomplete because this does not represent a change of ideology but prevention of a class conflict to preserve
traditional privilege. The underlying theme here is the protection of the propertied class and their privilege. This is present in Salisbury’s decision to increase voting franchise as it is in Thatcher’s decision to grant Zimbabwe independence while preserving land and wealth inequality.

One-Nation-Conservatism was a useful strategy that helped the party associated itself with reform and modernity and to attract support from lower classes, including ethnic minorities (Jarvis, 1996). It created the impression that the party was less interested in ideology but doing what works for Britain’s progress. This is the best position for an ideological organisation when the population actually believes it has abandoned ideology. For example, Mohammed Amin, the Vice Chairperson of the Conservative Muslim Forum indicated joined the party because of its appeal to both monetarism and the notion of caring for the poor to keep the peace. He explained his position in relation to, the Tory Reform Group (TRG) consists of members and supporters of the British Conservative Party, and it promotes One Nation Conservatism. ‘I joined in the early 1980s, shortly after the Conservative Party took office following Thatcher’s victory, because I share its values’ (Amin, 2012). It is instructive that Amin joined the party because of the positions taken by the Reform Group. He bought into the narrative progress towards modernity and change within the party. The argument here, however, is that the party always allows inconsequential change.

The idea of the Tory Reform Group itself presumes that the party needs to change and modernise. It feeds the notion that the party is willing to change and has done so much that it no longer discriminates against the poor and the unfortunate in society. This is problematic because there is no evidence that the Conservative Party was ever guilty of this charge. Instead, as indicated above, the party’s attitude has to protect those at the top and middle from any revolution that might deprive them of their natural position. Firstly, the party does not aim to do this by deliberately disadvantaging the poor but allowing them to earn within the limits of their nature. Secondly, the party remains committed to a society of a lean government and rules, as a way of freeing entrepreneurship. A free-market system that runs on limited regulations is highly profitable for those with the capital (Amin,
2012) and the expense of the masses. Those without the capital contribute their labour, which without rules or strong bargaining capabilities does not allow upward mobility thus strengthens the existing social and economic structure and the power of the rich. Thatcher’s restructuring of society strengthening the industrial class by weakening the state and workers (Marsh, 1991) clearly show this broader inclination. On the other hand, the 2008 global financial collapse and the unjustifiable rewards that the managers of banks paid themselves underscore the untrustworthy and negative impact of deregulated business environment (Brzezinski, 2012). However, the Conservative Government limit just the powers of unions and curtail the influence of the working class while relaxing the rules for capitalists.

Although the Thatcherite policies were themselves portrayed as a radical change in conservative ideology this seems to concentrate again on the content of the policies, instead of why these policies were necessary. In fact, although in various degrees, they represented the party’s desire to relieve the industrial class of any responsibilities while protecting them from the others (the working classes and foreigners). The claim to difference party’s domestic policy of the 1930, whose aims were to build a:

- Rigorous economy; reduction of taxation; thorough reform of the unemployment system;
- effective protection for our manufacturing industries against foreign competition by the immediate introduction of an emergency tariff; a guaranteed wheat price for the British farmer, combined with a tax on foreign malting barley, and the prevention of the dumping of foreign oats and other produce; a system to secure a definite market for home-grown and empire wheat (Fair & Hutcheson, 1987, p. 560).

The policy in 1930 was appropriate to its time that the objective of promoting capital through tax reduction on the rich. This was at the expense of the poor who lost services to cuts. Thatcher achieved the same objective using the copycat methods. However, on protecting the industry, the threats in her era were not necessarily international competition but corporatism, which is the need for
industries to negotiate with government and workers. Instead of introducing laws for market protectionism, she pushed through new regulations on trade unions. The difference it terms of radicalism followed the frustration that the party had faced with the growing Welfare State and corporatism that by 1980 and had become a real agenda issue after Keith Joseph had pushed it through (Fair & Hutcheson, 1987). The reason for the policies was not a desire for change but the attempt to reduce the growing influence of workers and the state on business and society.

The party’s principles in relation to class politics require a short analysis here because it relates to the case study. In general, conservatism seems to have a benignly racist ideology, at the very least. A recent study of the limited ethnic minority attitudes towards the party, by Lord Ashcroft found a widespread belief among British ethnic minorities, that the party has unfavourable attitudes towards black people. In one of his study groups a participant charged that:

The Tories had a lot of racist policies so it was easy not to vote for them. They appeared to be a racist group. ‘If you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour’. And if you go back to the rivers of blood speech, Enoch Powell, there was no-one in the Conservative Party denouncing him and saying this isn’t the way forward. What he said was widely accepted (Ashcroft, 2012).

Enoch Powell’s speech certainly set the party on the wrong path and proved difficult for the party to deal with. To this end, it has not successfully dealt with the ‘ghost’ of his speech. In fact, the popularity of his speech among British voters led to the party’s surprise victory in the 1970 elections (Howard, 2012). In the speech, Powell used highly evocative language, but he expressed a sense of nationalism that viewed the Britain as a country for the English and not outsiders. In so doing, he temporarily won the favour with section of the working class who were terrified, as Thatcher expressed in 1978, by the possibility of swamps of foreigners.

However, the question of race within the Conservative Party takes a completely different angle. In the view of the principle of privilege and advantage, Conservatives held the view that members of each
class belong to it because of natural dispositions. Thus, within the English race, there was justification for the exploitation of working classes and suspicious attitude about their intentions. The fact that the party feared the poor and sought to denigrate them on these bases has no racial limits. Fear of the other, had consistently been one of the main characteristics of the party, which felt that a new other would always upset the existing system, forcing it to change. From this angle, it is arguable that like a generic Conservative, for example Salisbury, Powell was baffled societal changes. There are various examples in which the party prominently campaigned against the expansion the working classes in strong terms, suggesting that any increases through birth of people within this background posed a threat to the greatness of Britain. The party equally represented members of these groups as physically threatening.

Comprised within this Division is a densely populated slum quarter. The railwaymen, car men, coal workers and porters, general labourers, road sweepers etc. are mainly Labour. Every encouragement is given to rough children to make themselves at once a nuisance and a danger. They swarm in hundreds! So-called bands parade the streets during election times, and mud and filth is flung upon any Conservative poster, or any windows showing a Conservative bill.... It is impossible to get a 'show', whilst the meaning of fair play or free speech is little understood.... (Jarvis, 1996, p. 74).

In this quotation, it is not just the ideals that are repeated in Conservative data but even particular words. The statements above conveys the message that working classes are incapable of raising children into complete and worth human beings. They are merely production belts for further trouble in society. Nearly half a century later, Keith Joseph’s aspiration for the leadership of the party and the country were shuttered by these words. He made the mistake of taking his argument further to suggest the forcible use of contraception to prevent these poor families of introducing more problem children to the population, thereby causing an imbalance (Joseph, 1974). The proponents of these
views felt a profound sense of national duty to prevent the impending class disaster. This uses the word *swarm* much in the alarming way and sense as Thatcher in 1978 as part of an election campaign.

Additionally, in a similar fashion as utilised by Powell, the party had historically utilised identical tactics to demonise and characterise the working classes among its core constituencies. For example in 1927, a Conservative publication charged about a street in a working class neighbourhood:

> Elizabeth Street...is again dark and threatening, as are some of its inhabitants...Bert Allsop a big, burly blast-furnace labourer, more than half animal... frightens local women, particularly his anaemic-looking landlady... More conversant with street violence than political economy.... Bert makes for an intimidating presence....he is over-fond of beer and a little too ready with his fists (Jarvis, 1996, p. 74).

This expresses the deep mistrust and disdain that the party had for workers, the language and plot above is identical to Powell’s example. Firstly, the language portrays an intimidating situation in which a vulnerable female property owner finds herself at the rough end of dangerous people. These threatening people seem to have taken over the street. Powell gave a particularly similar example in which a female property owner found herself trapped in a situation where immigrants were taking over the community and business she loved, in addition to the serves the depended. She felt helpless in her trapped situation. Given this analysis, and the use by Powell of an example of a property owner, it is arguable that class was just as active as race in his treatise.

In conclusion, the Conservative tradition has an underpinning consistency in terms of dealing with the working class. This includes becoming very alarmed by the population numbers and perhaps any activity that would continue to grow their numbers, including immigration. This not necessarily motivated by hatred per se but a fear of the mob, which may organise itself and try jealousy retribution against the ruling class. This is constantly expressed as fear of the threatening nature of members of this social class, whether they be defined as immigrant or blast furnace labourer.
6.3.1.2. Principles in Foreign Policy

In reference to Rhodesia, the Conservative Party’s approach follows a clear line of preserving the interests of the ruling classes and disdain for working classes. This tradition and its associated attitudes are easy to track, especially when one focuses on them rather than the acclaimed historical discontinuities in foreign policy. This is despite two facts; firstly, that Conservative historians have sought to claim that the party is largely pragmatic and reactive in its approach to both domestic and foreign policy. Secondly, that IR as an area is apolitical because only experts and not politicians make the necessary decisions.

In order to support the broader point here that principles operational within the Conservative Party’s general ideological frameworks are present in foreign policy this analysis deconstructs the history of Rhodesia. To achieve this, I have refused to conform to traditional approaches to the problem, as promised in Chapter 2. The section above has found that, in effect, Conservatives, although bound to have various approaches, have a central task that they all have been beholden to for nearly two centuries. At the centre of this, is class politics, which assumes that the three natural classes that make up the society need not act upon jealous towards each other (Salisbury, 1886; Jarvis, 1996). The rulers must continue to do so as ordained by God, capitalist, professionals and armed forces must accept this and utilise their expertise to develop and sustain the social order and economic prosperity. On the other hand, the masses must accept their role at the end of the ladder without using their numbers to upset the system. The subsection argues that there is a connection between this broader attitude and ideological principles in the party’s domestic and Rhodesian policies. This subsection considers principles, including the importance of the monarch, nationalism, natural advantage and property ownership.

Firstly, Conservatives were in power when Rhodesia and presided over its acquisition as a colony. As indicated in Chapter 3, the management of the process completely disregarded British policies (Blake, 1977) while fully utilising the state to support the aspirations of the imperialists (Grenville, 1970;
Martin & Johnson, 1981; Robinson, et al., 1961). In fact, the party supported the capitalist imperialists to the extent that it costs the party re-election in 1906, in the strong belief that such was the responsibility of the state towards the private gain of its entrepreneurs (Keatley, 1963). This level of support the party has never provided in enabling the aspirations of the poor or working class population both in Britain and abroad. The party also supported and enabled the BSAC’s arbitrary acquisition of land from the natives before enslaving them. This again was against official policy on in British foreign policy. However, for the Conservative Party, the British public would only need to know that this was patriotism. However, for the Conservative Party, the native’s natural position was that of being master, and their subjugation by the colonialists was certainly a good thing for them and the rest of the world (Rhodes, 1902). This attitude resonates with the position of the party in relation to British working classes, the fact that these were black Africans seems more coincidental than total consequential.

As indicated in the subsection above the party’s attitude hinged, in part, on the belief that success in life was a natural endowment for some members of a particular society. That is to say, that even within Britain the party’s position was that the working classes, for example, would not have been able to colonise any nation because they were part of a degenerate stock. Again, as indicated above reference to these people, who are just not good enough, from the Conservative Party percolates and permeates some of its most dearly and passionately pursued domestic policies. Great figures within the party including Milner, Chamberlain, Powell, Joseph, Thatcher and Cameron, all have talked about the useless class that threatens British success by its unwillingness to work but depend on state welfare or the dangerous trade unions that are up to little use. On the contrary, the party’s attitude towards the rich and successful is enduringly reassuring. They are the part of the population that makes the country prosperous, thus, as Chamberlain’s centenary committee warned, Great Britain’s advantage in the world and as an Empire rested on its ability to send the best people for colonisation and not the working classes (Chamberlain Centenary Committee, 1937, p. 15). As such, for all the missteps,
including several wars in Southern Africa, the party still viewed Rhodes’ colonial company as representing the best of Britain and that was important enough.

Despite the irresponsibility that Rhodes had shown in managing the Southern African expansion and the provocation of wars, including the infamous Boer War, the party still allowed the colony a de-facto dominion status. This allowed the settler leadership to institute policies that were at variance with British standards. The government also continued to help to send and encourage emigration of its best citizens (in accordance with Conservative definition), in the form of ex-militant service men to the colony after both world wars (Blake, 1977).

The Conservatives supported Rhodesian policies, which segregated against natives both politically and socially. The party opposed was in principle to the conditionality of one-person one vote in relation to the resolution of the UDI crisis. In addition, to a variety of its leaders including Douglas-Home and Thatcher argued that the crisis needed to be resolved by simply legitimising the minority regime (Douglas-Home, 1976). The 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian proposal also kept in place the different qualifications for voting, suggesting that the party, still believed that the Rhodesian ruling class deserved superior rights compared to poor Africans.

However, as the Lancaster House negotiations would prove, the notion of superiority readily attached to the question of property ownership than it did to race. The voting system and land segregation that had taken place against the natives and the apartheid system that prevented them from entering cities without permission and the political restrictions, had been mainly about property and capital. Just like conservatives in Britain, the Rhodesian whites viewed their working classes as both intimidating and dangerous (Jarvis, 1996). They feared strongly, especially with reference to the Matabeles that they would reorganise and try to retake property from the White holders. This was initially the reason for the Order in Council for separate homelands (Smout, 1975). Britain had been hoping to prevent
another Matabele uprising similar to the one in 1896. However, at implementation the Rhodesians also used them as tools for both control and for prevention of agricultural competition.

Firstly, they ensured that these areas were agriculturally unproductive and secondly, they requested that any natives visiting European areas acquire permission before hand. Thus, as Salisbury lamented democracy for Britain in the late 19th century, democracy in Rhodesia presented the same dangers. He argued that, the extension of the suffrage would led to grave possibilities in which the working classes would use parliament to transfer property rights from the few to the many on class bases (Maxwell, 2010).

Given the above approach, the Lancaster House negotiations succeeded only because Zimbabwean nationalists buckled on the question of land, agreeing not to compulsorily acquire it, once given the right to one-person one vote. This was an important ideological position for Britain that the next fifteen years of its policy with Zimbabwe, hung on the property clause, which offered security to the land-owning minority (Onlsow, 2009; Foreign Affairs Committee, 1981). Once again, a Conservative Government allowed or ignored atrocities similar in scale to those committed at colonisation as long as that saved the interest of property rights in that country. Both the Thatcher and Major administrations supported and honoured Mugabe during and after the atrocities and helped train his military including the commander of the militia that committed the Matabele killings.

Before concluding, it is important to address the claim to pragmatism in conservative politics. It is also has been indicated that this was important to the resolution of the UDI problem. To analyse this Rhodesia is an excellent example. These relate to the fact that in the case of the Rhodesian independence this hinged on various attempts to legitimise a minority regime (Welensky, 1964; 1953; Horowitz, 1970). It started It is with the CAF initiative in 1953, where the Conservative government working with European populations in Nyasaland and the Rhodesians sought to institute a larger country, in order to pool together the property owning populations of these countries, so as to offer
them independence on those bases. The step was nonetheless pragmatic in the sense that faced with eminent decolonisation; the party took pre-emptive steps to allow the granting of independence to a minority regime in the federation (Horowitz, 1970). By this time, the trusted the Europeans, especially in Rhodesia, that their Africans were rather content with their position and separately unequal to the ruling race (Austin, 1975). As such, there was every belief that the Federation would be stable and strong enough to help sustain the small population in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The reaction to decolonisation and the pragmatic steps taken by the party, in this did not mean that the party had not taken a party position. The whole idea was to protect *kith and kin* by building a larger Federation in which all the European populations in Southern Africa would work and support each other. This reaction was similar in strategy to the responses given by the party towards the ‘politics of personal taxation and the enfranchisement of women’ early the 1910s and 1920s (Jarvis, 1996, p. 80). Sensing that women were not likely to join unions or vote on sex lines the party rushed and promoted their right to vote, something the party had rejected prior to that change of heart. The party used this approach in the failed Anglo-Rhodesia proposal of 1972 and was a strong part of the 1979 negotiations, which was largely, still an Anglo-Rhodesian agreement on land, which the Africans unknowingly embraced. The tactic of attempting to slow down or prematurely deal with a problem of societal change is a tactic that Salisbury initiated, adding that the party needed to do so in order to prevent changes that would affect the social super structure (Austin, 1975).

In conclusion, Conservative Party relations and attitudes in the management of policy both in domestic and international affairs, arguably relate to the tradition of preserving the status quo and managing change. The party considers organised labour and the poor working class as presenting an existential threat to its members, business and economy. Contrary, to popular belief that part has a much more rigid position in terms of policy, but have an effective outlook of worrying more about the impact of their actions that the actions themselves. Property ownership and the class nature of society provide
a pivoting group for conservatism. These principles are present in domestic and foreign policy initiatives.

### 6.3.2. The Labour Party

#### 6.3.2.1. Ideological Traditions

The Labour Party as the literary assessment summarised in section 2.5 indicates, had strong ideological beginnings (Turner, 1981). Accordingly, Tarmakin (1990) the Labour Party’s failure to resolve the UDI problem from 1964 to 1979 proves that it relied on ideology far too much. The Rhodesia crisis required pragmatism of the sort that the Conservative Party pursued leading to the 1979 Lancaster House resolution. To evaluate any claims related to this, this thesis investigates the ideological underpinnings of the Labour Party.

Britain led the industrial revolution and most of its citizens were workers in factories and mines for most of the 19th century. Despite a large section of the population forming the workforce that made this possible, these workers had limited rights and did not participate in the political process (Keohane, 2000). The country’s parliament and the courts consistently passed laws and judgements that made it difficult for working conditions to improve (Minkin, 1980). With time trade unions became interested in matters of the state to balance the industrial class that already controlled London (ILP, 1895). Additionally, the hegemonic socio-economic context for the working classes helped shape the thinking within the party not just in terms of its attitudes in politics but also its structure. Finally, the party was, in fact, a coalition of a variety of organisations, who shared some but also varied on other interests and ideological commitments. The Fabian Society is an example of an institution that already had well established philosophical underpinnings that required careful management in order to accommodate members’ differences. This democracy became a huge part of the party’s internal mechanism.

Given this structure and the membership, the Labour became the first party to utilise agreed and written down programmes. It produced manifestos and other papers spelling out its intentions. This was necessary for internal democracy, but also because the party was itself demanding democracy for
the working class. As a result, unlike the section on the Conservative Party where an analysis was necessary initially to identify the principles, because they were not always written down, the Labour Party’s principles were clearly delineated in literature and identified in section 2.5 of this thesis. As such, this section is shorter because its analysis concentrates on identifying these principles in domestic and foreign policies.

In doing so it is necessary to not that, the party’s principles, identified from party programmes would not necessarily be different from what informs policy. Although, the limiting structural realities filter the party’s policies, these do not affect the attitudes that inform their initiation. This requires mention because as various authors argue that the incompatibility between state and party structures causes concern on whether policies are those enunciated by the party in the country or the government party. This makes little different when the analysis is focused on the underpinnings of policy rather than its outcomes. However, it is certain that desire for internal democracy in the Labour Party has the effect of tempering down through the compromise filter internally, and the pragmatic sieve in government. Secondly, because of its focus on British workers, the party tended to show a weakness in its foreign policy approach (Vickers, 2003) hence sometimes it has had to alter its policies in order to retain contextual legitimacy.

Before the analysis, it is important to summarise the principles established in literature. The central attitude of the Labour Party has been to challenge the hegemonic domination over the state by the industrial class (Labour Party, 2012). It would use any influence through representation of the working class and deprived to ensure the state made provisions for their survival through vices such as poverty, illness and unemployment. For Atkinson and Spear (1992) this meant that its central tradition is that of promoting democracy and inclusion for the oppressed. This is promoted not as an end in itself but to ensure that freedom and equality for all, in reference to poverty and suffering. The party thus follows social democratic principles in which, while it rejects the ideological divide, it seeks to achieve universal rights to education, fair remuneration, health care, full employment, and assistance and care
for the unemployed, disabled, temporarily incapacitated, the young and elderly. However, as indicated in Chapter 2, the party often has to move to the centre in order to govern under the current governmental structure.

In general, the Labour Party approaches policy making from idealist perspectives, as a matter of course (Vickers, 2003). Thus studying these, as I have done in this thesis can reveal the attitudes that enable the thinking and actions within policy. The party posits that human beings are decent and if appropriate conditions are present, a good life is achievable, for all. The natural human inclination towards solidarity and peaceful coexistence, if there are no conditions makes this possible. Thus, the elimination of poverty, inequality and disengagement is necessary for improving the experience of life for humanity.

6.3.2.2. Principles in Foreign Policy
As Vickers (2003) argues, historically the Labour Party is considered weak on foreign policy. Recently, however with the wars in Sierra Leone, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and notably Iraq, this perception has changed. In relation to the empire and indeed Rhodesia and Zimbabwe, Kelemen (2007) argues that its official stance sought to promote closer relationships with the colonies in the hope that cooperation would lead to mutual benefits in the end. In this area, the party also sought positive change and progress towards egalitarianism, peace and international solidarity. In modern policy formulations, MacGinty (2009) expresses these as ‘security and stability (peace), reinforcing statehood (egalitarianism), democratic governance (participation), sustainability of a peace settlement (interventionism) and promotion of free markets (internationalism)’. However, from time to time, the actual political activity designs intended to portray them in a better light than the Conservatives Party (Kelemen, 2007; Drezner, 2011). MacGinty (2009) emphasises that idealists view their approaches as superior, especially given that the doctrines of human rights, gender rights and adult suffrage from their underpinnings.
Overall and in concurrence with Keohane (2003), the literature and the evidence provided in the case study indicates party tendencies towards idealism in both domestic and foreign policy. This is the premise upon which its critics argue that it is weak in foreign politics. The argument is that, foreign policy requires constant cynicism, thus an approach that trusts other nations to be virtuous is viewed encouraging to detractors. This, for many classically theorists, is the reason for Britain’s failed quick response to aggression from Germany, Japan and Italy in the 1920s.

Sylvest (2004) challenges the premise behind this and argues that it is out of context. His contention is that in the circumstances, even with the highly romanticised warrior-minded approaches of realist political leaders were unlikely to deter Hitler’s fascist nationalism. He reminds us that, in fact, it was the false notion of national interests that disturbed an international interdependent order, organised by shared economic and other common advantages. Additionally, such claims overlook the fact that Labour Government policy also differs to its own positions depending on whether it is power or in opposition (Vickers, 2003). Thus, in his analysis Keohane (2003) notes that the party utilised both ideology and pragmatism concurrently. As such, the party nurtures its foreign policy by seeking a path between the theory and practice of politics.

The fact that the party relied on pragmatism when in government, is a claim upon which there is huge scholarly agreement. Keohane (2003) like most authors on the party’s foreign policy notes that there is a disconnection between the party on the ground and the party in power. However, he observes that such a conclusion elevates the substantive study of whether the party sought to shrink or restrain the empire. Doing so would be to minimise the structural and contextual limitation of policy. These include the Commonwealth, an institution that the Party promoted as the foundation for building mutually beneficial relations between the colonised people and Britain. Vickers (2003) identified a number of structural limitations to the party’s ability to implement purely ideological policies. Realist approaches that emphasised nationalism, already dominated the world around Britain; it is almost certain that pragmatism meant gravitating towards it. In an interesting treatise of the impact of ideas
in the Labour Party's foreign policy, Miller (1967) notes that although idealism was prominent in the party's opposition politics, notions of power and national interest diluted its government policy. Nonetheless, he also emphasised the structural limitations that tempered with ideology, failed to prevent the party leadership from smearing its foreign policy attitudes with underlying principles of peace, freedom and justice.

In relation to the case study, perhaps one policy position is clearly at odds with the party's idealist principles. The approval of the LAA of 1930 exemplifies a policy that perpetuated both segregation and racism in Rhodesia yet the Labour Government requested that the Queen approve the measure. In fact, in terms of Rhodesia, the question of land is almost central to the complete domination of the natives before and after that period going forward. It is also at the centre of the current conflict. Another policy in which the Labour Party took a position that had inherited by a Conservative government was the decision to declare that war against the UDI was impossible. The taking of a military action before the UDI, may have been a goodwill gesture to Rhodesia's leaders but it certainly and possibly was the last form of encouragement that they had required before a rebellion.

However, this latter position was not as decisive as the one on the LAA. This was especially intriguing because at about the same time the Fabian Society released a paper, which encouraged the abolition of discrimination and racial superiority in the colonies. It called for the establishment of a relationship in which respect and benefit accrued on both sides. More importantly, the paper characterised political and economic privilege and domination of one race by another as wrong. Finally, it called for freedom and self-government for people in the colonies (Albinski, 1957). Thus, it would seem there are two possible explanations for this position, firstly, that the inexperienced party would have felt bound by tradition of de-facto dominion. Secondly, the Labour Party was unwilling to pick a political fight with the Conservatives, given that at the time it carried the stigma of being weak on both foreign policy and was still recovering the notion of that it was a pair of unsafe hands for the Empire. Clearly, various domestic dynamics informed this policy position.
It is important to note that from that very period the Labour Party, either when in government or private, did not do anything to help the Rhodesians maintain their superiority. While in opposition in 1953, the party rejected the whole idea of the Federation, on the basis that African opinion was necessary. However, the Conservative government rejected these calls and attempted at the great experiment, which failed 10 years later. In 1964, when the Conservatives changed their support for Wilson’s policy, the party stood firm and required Rhodesia to fulfil the six-point plan.

Similarly, after losing power in 1970 and regaining office in 1974, the Labour government continued to demand a genuinely comprehensive resolution to the Rhodesia crisis. The 1976 Anglo-American proposal (Owen, 1978), for example, was a far better document that the other that was signed at Lancaster House (Carrington, 1979). Its main advantage was that, it did not propose a ten-year ban on land redistribution and made a specific provision of aid for purposes of reforming land ownership patterns. The commitment of the Labour Government was to both the white farmers and the future of land ownership in Zimbabwe. The fund that the Americans were going to help build would have insured a plethora of welfare programmes and successful land reform.

When the Labour Party returned to power in 1997, its policy like its domestic policies aimed at reducing poverty, promoting good governance and economic liberalism. More striking was the fact that the New Labour’s domestic agenda was apparent in the policy it sought to deal with Zimbabwe. The party had campaigned for the British election on the basis that it would change London (Labour Party, 1997). These changes, however, did not go down very well with Mugabe, who had become accustomed to dealing Conservative Party approaches. They ignored all his exigencies, so long as he protected property rights. Thus, when the Labour administration tied aid to other issues such as good governance and economic performance, his reaction was to threaten and eventually take away land from commercial farmers on the basis of race. However, the Labour Party, by so doing, in practice treated Mugabe no better or worse than it did Ian Smith. The party was using the British state to acquire more rights and progress for poor Zimbabweans (Short, 1997; 2012). During the UDI, the party
used the identical tactics to make demands on the minority regime for a movement towards majority rule.

Given the above analysis, the fundamental conclusion here, which is not an answer to the question whether the party was right or wrong in its policy, relates principles that guided the party’s policies at home and abroad. Clearly, from the perspective, of utilising state interventionism to help distribute rights across a population it would seem the Labour Party was committed to the same principles both at home and in Zimbabwe. The emphasis on the state to guarantee the rights of the poor, including helping in the provision of education, health care and protection against poverty while making specific demands on them, was a central feature in the policy that Britain discussed with Zimbabwe.
6.4. Summary
Regularly, foreign policy presentation focuses on the limited sets of interaction between states, with the rest of the informing activities regarded as top secrets. Despite the fact that foreign policy is highly consequential in that it is mainly responsible for wars and ensuring the existence on countries, regions and the world, it would be plausible if the public knew or participated in it. Unfortunately, this is not the case because the world is currently organised anarchically. As such, the only way to understand what consideration policy makers may have made in policy is to track foreign policy for repetitive discourses and to try to understand their intended function and purpose.

This Chapter sought to do the above, but there is a need to keep the analysis and identification of such attitudes in perspective. Section 6.2 achieves this by revisiting and summarising the study problem and methodology. This provides a reminder that classical methods, which ensured compatibility with discourse analysis. It shows how, such an analysis is necessary and appropriate for IR theories. It briefly shows the limits of other approaches and points out the ideological biases between the Labour and Conservative Parties, vis-à-vis idealism and realism. The summary also includes a treatise of the literature that makes the argument that the conduct of IR takes place is social settings. Thus, the thesis has concluded that it important to study foreign policy to discover why its social environment might not affect it.

The concept summary reintroduces and shows that metanarratives and attitudes are responsible for allowing the invention and reinforcement of domination in the social and academic world (Foucault, 2001). As such, the presence of any narrative may help point at the issues that a party repeatedly appeals to, as important by either the Labour Party or the Conservative Party. Identifying these, helps identify the same principles in both national and international politics (Potter & Wetherell, 2004) before concluding. It is this information that is crucial for testing the Models and for drawing conclusions on the subject.
Chapter 7: Avoiding Trivia and Strategic Foreign Policy

The withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference left the British Government with several disagreeable alternatives. In law at least, they could use force against German rearmament; or they could give up an idea of a disarmament convention and let events take their; or, finally, they could make further efforts for a disarmament convention and try to persuade Germany to return to the Conference at a price. This last, combined with some rearmament at home, was the policy chosen (The Earl of Avon, 1962).

Two Hypothetical IR Models and Conclusion

7.1. Study Summary
The second part of the thesis employs a case study to develop arguments around ideology and party politics in the realm of foreign policy. In this case, British foreign policy engaged all its aspects including dealings and various votes at the UN, Commonwealth, Third World engagement, the Empire and the Cold War. Rhodesia also evoked special questions in British history and in relation to the racism, economic policy, the Great Wars and global leadership. The relationship has also been evolving both in British geopolitics and domestic political campaigns. It has presented with a sense pride and embarrassment. It also represented the longest and last colonial problem, which continues to be a reminder of Britain’s legacy as a colonial master. Various British governments found them stuck with the Rhodesian question for a century and in history that is more recent the last four governments have had to deal with a changing Zimbabwe.

The first one hundred years starting in the early 1890s, saw Rhodesia rise to become of the Empire’s most illustrious examples of Britain’s finest blood overseas. The colony’s people demonstrated this by making the largest, as a proportion of its population, military contribution to the Allied Forces efforts
in Germany for both World Wars. However, after World War Two the loyal but ambitious colony rebelled against British authority and declared its independence unilaterally. In response to this Britain balanced a delicate international effort to undermine the minority regime without appearing too harsh on Britons abroad. The Labour government was particularly sensitive of its tag as a pure custodian of British greatness abroad, which is something, that Rhodesia was partly thought to represent. It was a first world country in the middle of Africa (although all the progress was funded by native oppression and abuse). Thus Labour engaged both the US and the UN in its attempts to discipline the colony and exit honourably. This was largely characterised by parallel bilateral efforts to resolve the crisis. Four Prime Ministers failed to bring the question to a resolution with Thatcher resolving it on the strength of work and preparations put into place by Callaghan. The greatest issue in the dispute was the question of one-person one vote.

This brought Zimbabwe into the group of modern nations. Relations between the two nations have evolved from being cordial throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s and to outright antagonism from the late 1990s onwards. Just as they did with the Rhodesia problem, British political parties have sought to compete against each other based on their political positions on the subject. The overriding theme in the new conflict is that of land inequality and white farmer interests.

Additionally, Part Two of the thesis shows that the most studied or referred periods of British foreign policy on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe are the UDI era and the current period which began at the end of the 1990s. These emphasise the individual diplomatic leadership in keeping with traditional approaches. Typically, traditional conceptions of foreign policy emphasise power and violence they rarely cover periods of good relations between countries. Thus, when there is no clash of interests between two nations traditional theorists assume that foreign policy becomes redundant. As such, the outcomes of any conflict are the major indicator of the IR abilities of a government. In this case, expectedly, Tarmakin’s (1990) blames the Labour Party for the prolonged UDI, crisis indicating that its failure was to approach IR based on ideology. This predictable because in 15 years of the problem, the
Conservative Party held Number Ten for 4 years and yet was able to over sea a transition, soon after taking power in 1979. Sensing the contradiction in policy analysis Queen Elizabeth, arguably the most experienced individual in British national and international politics warned that, warned against that the traditional sweeping generalisation of foreign policy, should avoid giving all the credit to Lord Carrington would be an incomplete and forgetful proposition (Owen, 2010). She indicated that the outgoing Foreign Secretary had done a lot of work too.

Once again, when the Labour Party assumed power in 1997, relations with Zimbabwe changed for the worse. In response, Britain embarked on another foreign policy campaign on the international stage and a challenge from Zimbabwe. The results in terms of British policy aims were limited given that its aims of poverty, reduction, promoting democracy and economic development transformed into human rights abuses, violence and farm invasions, as a response to Blair’s Third Way approaches. The international political environment became polarised as Mugabe succeeded in blunting the British geopolitical spears, with an anti-imperialist claim. Once again, research indicates that these failures were a result of limitations in policy making by the Labour Party (Taylor & Williams, 2002). In response, the Labour Party points to the Gukurahundi murders committed by Mugabe while a British Conservative Government continued to assist his regime. In fact, Cook argued in parliament that, ‘it was the Conservative Government who presided over the government of Great Britain at the time of the Matabeleland massacres, which led to the killing of 10,000 people in Zimbabwe… Thatcher increased aid by £10 million at the time of the massacres’ (The Hansard, 2001, p. 799). Instead, the government failed to use international institutions such as the Commonwealth to deal with Mugabe.

With these in mind, it is clear that for this case events outside the two crises eras tend to rouse limited interest from both researchers and the public. Secondly, the case study appeals to both national and international politics. It also reveals the fact that in general and specifically to the current case study, analysis of the case study has been limited to orthodox IR. However, this falls within the problematic area of IR study identified in Chapter 1. This indicates that studies in foreign policy tend to rely on
orthodox approaches thereby falling into of the crossroads of the supposed disconnect between national and international discourse outlined in Chapter 2. To overcome this Chapter 2, challenges traditional approaches or suggest the incorporation of political party influences on foreign policy in order to find out if indeed the Foreign Policy conduct is in spite of national politics. The argument is that separating International Politics from other traditions, allows it to remain very specialist and able to act both pragmatic. This allows it to be able to react quickly to an arising situation while avoiding the usual kerfuffle of ideology found in national politics. Sub-section 6.4.1 analysis information in Part Two, to find out if it supports the supposition that, foreign policy is a pragmatic and reactive process, in which state apparatus identify the national interest and act only to achieve that with a flexible willingness to change course if the national interest requires so. Sub-section 6.4.2, also analyses discussions in Part Two to find any evidence supporting the assumption that there are ideological consideration in the making of British foreign policy decisions on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.
7.2. Hypothetical Models
This major section, of the concluding chapter utilises ideological categories identified through the analysis in section 6.3 and Parts One and Two, to address the hypothetical models for the thesis. It combines the two models in order to project possible outcomes on the basis on these narratives and ideologies. This will superimpose such principles as associated with a political party on a specific period within the case study, to create a continuation and predict the policy trajectory, if say one party had stayed in power more than it actually did. These trajectories will thus show if having a particularly ideologically inclined political party has an impact on foreign policy output and outcomes.

I recognise that this is speculative in nature to the extent events have already happened, but the documents and evidence are clear on what each party intended to do. Drezner (2011) successfully utilises a seemingly speculative world scenario, in which the international political system is under Zombie siege to theorise about IR. This book is a good example of theoretical postulation using a created controlled variable. Just as the probability of reliving any past electoral period being zero, so are the odds for a Zombie attack on the world.

The period between 1979 and 1997 is helpful for a variety of reasons. Model 1 is premised on Tarmakin’s (1990) assumptions, which analysed the 1979 transition and Model 2 emanates from the announcement by Blair (1998) that British support for the land reform will be conditioned on transparency and its capacity to contribute to a wider partnership to reduce and progressively eliminate poverty. This changed the bilateral relations from the supposed pragmatic positions taken by the successive Conservative governments in order to sustain a good environment for commercial farmers. This effectively reset British policy to the pre-1979 conditions.

7.2.1. Model 1: The Pragmatism of IR

7.2.1.1. Pragmatism: Adjustment of Foreign Policy
Pragmatism in foreign policy is an approach that necessarily relies on or represents a rejection of dogmatism. This means that policy drivers direct their practices through a system of adjustment and
are always ready to modify and find the best possible methodological position in international politics. Central to this is the desire to present foreign policy as ideology neutral. In British terms, both the main political parties tend to agree at least on the notion that foreign policy is both values free and apolitical. The last Labour Party foreign secretary to manage the UDI presents this argument, basic of universal rights:

So I approach this issue not from an ideological position. I approach this issue the position that apartheid was an indefensible position and Ian Smith’s attitude, which was of course very different from a lot of his predecessor who were white Prime Ministers, different from obviously Garfield Todd and of course different from Welensky, head of the Federation. I think these were unacceptable. I was the first British Foreign Secretary to make it quite clear that there would be no resolution unless based on one-person one vote. Anna was not prepared to look at the franchise of the As and Bs and all that sort (Owen, 2012).

On the other hand, Carrington in his role of leading Lancaster House negotiations effectively ended the UDI. The Conservative narrative of this victory was that the Labour Party failed because of its ideological interpretations of majority rule as a concept. This longstanding belief informed the Party’s stance leading to the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals. The party believed that the Labour Party’s demands for the one-person one vote were attempts to force Smith to capitulate. As such, in this proposal, the property ownership based franchise was maintained albeit with the promise eventually became rich enough to vote. Carrington argues the same about the neutrality of foreign policy:

I always thought foreign policy was to do with British interests. That was what it was all about not to do with ethics much. I mean you don’t want to do something unethical, but the thing was British interests. That’s what you’re for, that’s what the Government is for. I don’t find any particular difficulty about that… I’m not an ideologue (Carrington, 2011).
Thus, the overriding theme in these arguments indicates the as Ralston (2011) contends, for the most part, that IR practice is independent of domination by any of classical political ideologies. The following section is a concluding summary of the relations between Britain and Zimbabwe from 1979 to 1997. It intends to show that, it does matter which political party controls policy.

7.2.1.2. Property Rights: Ending UDI and Appeasement of Mugabe

For nearly a century Britain’s relationship with Rhodesia was eventful and unlike any other. The colony had witnessed several wars, acted as staging ground for the second Boer wars, participated in both World Wars and finally rebelled against Britain by announcing UDI. The colony was exceptional in many ways, notably its acquisition and participation in the Great Wars. The small country sent a larger proportion of its population to the wars than any other Commonwealth nation. It became an example of the national pride abroad but when a disagreement ensued Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence. The crisis was long and gruelling for British Politicians. As such, when it was resolved in 1979, the Conservative government received high accolades for ending it.

This resolution followed the Lancaster House negotiations, in which the land distribution was the most dominant and difficult question. In fact, it presented two unyielding visions of the future and the redress of racial imbalances. PF leaders preferred an agreement that would allow them the compulsory land purchasing, underwritten by the British Treasury. Lord Carrington, on the contrary, demanded a constitutional clause that would prevent any forced sale of land in the first ten years of independence (Onlsow, 2009). Britain’s position as inherited from the Rhodesian National Farmers’ Union (RNFU) proposals, which became the Conservative Party’s only acceptable basis for a settlement. It was only after the Commonwealth Secretary General announced that the Americans were still on board to help Britain fund Zimbabwe’s land reform, that the PF delegation believed there was a compromise (Selby, 2006). Ultimately, the agreement on this question granted the RNFU demands, with the proviso that Britain and America would fund the programme. This arrangement followed the best-case scenario for the farmers, who considered land merely as their pensions, which
they would convert into money when circumstances required; meanwhile, they preferred to hold onto as much as possible. However, for PF it was a compromise to the extent that the coming in of the Americans meant that the funding levels would be similar to those in the AAP, which had created the foundations for the negotiations.

With the property clause, Zimbabwean farmers had secured the best possible outcome, which allowed them ten years of continued business. After this period, they would be ready for retirement. They would have the option to renegotiate terms of continued ownership or sell the land to government. However, despite this political settlement, there was still a lot of ambivalence about how this would actually play out politically in Zimbabwe. For this reason, Mugabe’s offer for reconciliation in 1980 was a huge step towards certainty. The farmers seized this moment fully and utilised their influence in British and Commonwealth policies to provide Mugabe enough support for as long as he kept his pledge (Selby, 2006). Part of this was the narrative of Mugabe that portrayed him is probably the ultimate hero of the Zimbabwean struggle. This would provide him with a large enough personality to deal with any exigencies within his ranks that might want to rock the boat of the land question.

This approach became necessary because the election results of 1980 caught everyone by surprise. During the negotiations, Britain expected, at the very least, a coalition government between Nkomo and Muzorewa, to be the result (Owen, 2012). Thus, after Mugabe’s victory even the Rhodesians made noises about returning to war. Mugabe was a largely unknown quantity at the time. His public record was scant and terrifying, as it included the power greed, signified by the ZANU leadership debacle between 1974 and 1976. This had caused massive indiscipline within the organisation, which had led Kenneth Kaunda ZANU’s expulsion from Zambia causing the Party to relocate to Mozambique. Secondly, he had been in the leadership of ZANU PF for a little over two years, and he had recently declared himself a Leninist-Marxist. Finally, his rants about war at the Geneva conference added to the level on uncertainty about his leadership credentials.
This background largely informed the reaction of the Conservative government to his victory. However, when he declared reconciliation in his acceptance speech, the world immediately began to build a larger than life narrative about him. This is the reason for Mugabe’s co-option of Zimbabwe’s patriotic history (LeBas, 2006; Raftopoulos, 2002). This portrayed him as a good a national hero who had been the father of the Zimbabwean revolution, who reconciled with Smith, who had put him in prison. All these, well known historical mainstays narratives were, for the most part, over emphasis for many reasons. Firstly, even if Mugabe had wanted, with the Zimbabwe independence resulting from negotiations, he could not have legally turned against Smith. Secondly, Mugabe had just assumed the leadership of ZANU after Sithole had led it for over ten years. Finally, Mugabe was never the longest serving Rhodesian prisoner; there were other people with more serious claims for revenge.

At the Lancaster House negotiations, British interests aligned with those of the Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers’ Union (ZCFU) by the sheer fact that Carrington campaigned for and took grandstanding positions on the matter. This became the foreign policy preoccupation of the Thatcherite policy towards Mugabe. Part of this included preventing Zimbabwe from revolting against the farmers, much of which took the form of combined quiet diplomacy and appeasement. As such, the UK government required NGOs and the media to cooperate with Mugabe, including, during the infamous Matabeleland massacres. This explains the extreme censorship and persecution of Geoff Hill after he attempted to report the genocide (Hill, 2005; CCJP, 2008). It also accounts for the continued support for Mugabe during the period of the murders and the refusal by the government to investigate the violence despite parliamentary requests (The Hansard, 2001, p. 799).

When Mugabe totally excluded the white people from the Zimbabwean political system through banning their political parties and threats of land acquisition the silence and support did not end. The unused Land Acquisition Act of 1992 seems to have been one of those tools that Mugabe sought to use to keep alive the threat against the farmers. From this angle, it does not seem so curious that the Queen knighted Mugabe just over a year after the Act was passed into law. This was consistent with
the placation approach that the ZCFU utilised internally, suggesting a strong coordination of policy between Britain and the farmers. For example, in light of the then impending expiry of the sunset clause Nkomo, then Vice President, warned that, ‘the land question in this country sparked a revolution and now threatens to douse the fires of that revolution and start another this time based on class’ (Selby, 2007, p. 4). The response from the ZCFU, instead of alarm, was to declare that the Zimbabwe government was the best that the farmers in the country ever had.

The end of the initial first ten years the environment shifted in Zimbabwe as a new and growing black middle class begun to demand economic empowerment. Their lobby groups were powerful and influential, Mugabe conceded to them while simultaneously crushing any revolt or pleas for land by the peasantry populations. As Thatcher (2010) indicates, she supported this bourgeoisie approach, linked it to ESAP, an economic approach, she personally had convinced Mugabe to embrace. This added another dimension to the appeasement policy, which had been effective for managing the pre-1990 land issue. However, ESAP refocused the land question away from being about the landless peasants into both economics and the impact of the rising, politically threatening and ambitious black ruling elite. The poor blacks were manageable through given the military support and police equipment provided by the Conservative governments.

The change of government in Britain with the 1997 came just as Mugabe was expecting another UN Summit on funding Zimbabwe’s land reform. The Major administration was heavily involved in the preparations. Throughout the preceding 17 years, Mugabe enjoyed the exclusive support from Britain despite his attitude to democracy and human rights. In fact, the height of UK aid took place during the worst atrocities, in Matabeleland (The Hansard, 2001). However, systematically Mugabe used the land question to continue to request help. The Land Rover vehicles given to the Zimbabwe Republic Police in the mid-1990s seemingly were available to help mechanise the police in their duty of protecting white farmers from landless people. In addition, to that Mugabe systematically used them as tools in his political games. They were effective in managing student demonstrations and any other form of
political dissention. As such, by 1997, there was no realistic threat to white-owned farms had the Blair administration not changed the course and attached conditions to assisting ZANU PF. Mugabe considered the demand for transparency and democracy as an insult to his many years of protecting white farmers. Mugabe was not committed to resolving the land problem; he needed for internal Zimbabwean politics. Mugabe ‘wanted the old order, he wanted Britain to be the Britain he understood, and who is this … woman saying that she comes from former people who had been colonised, this was intolerable’ (Short, 2012). His reaction was swift and precise, as he used the remaining Land Rovers to help encourage and support the previously subjugated masses to occupy mainly white-owned farms.

The aforementioned provides various avenues into the centre of the argument that this thesis is present. There is enough to show that, in fact, the Conservative Party rode on an ideological position whose central theme and principles were the centrality of property and its ownership. The only other constant in its policy would in fact the race of those in possession of the best land in Zimbabwe. This is true from 1979 to 1997, and the party’s position prior to this period corroborates such a claim. The only other time that it had policymaking power, between 1970 and 1974, it proposed a settlement whose central tenet on the rights to vote was property ownership. While the AAP that the Lancaster agreement was anchor on, as the Queen cautioned (Owen, 2010), had a clear programme for equalising land distribution in a future Zimbabwe and provided a specific level of British and American financial support necessary to do this. Unchanged the plan would have empowered and obligated the state to redistribute land without overreliance on the leaders’ goodwill on the matter. Doubtlessly, the plan itself was predicated Labourite ideological principles that economic growth and the provision of opportunities for all, is a recipe for political stability.

There are two conclusions that one can draw from the above, Britain would not have needed the ever changing pragmatic appeasement policy had the land question been addressed from the same perspective as the AAP. Secondly, although Conservatives utilised piecemeal pragmatic approaches to
manage Zimbabwe over 17 years they were defending a primarily ideological principle of property ownership and the privileged class (Doyle, 1997). Finally, as a matter of ideological discipline the Conservative Party, as Foucault (2001) would argue, utilised the policy shifts and changes not to become an agent for change, but camouflage the conservation of old structures and protect them from abrupt change. In the Rhodesia case, the ten-year sunset clause bought time for the elitist system to acclimatise to a post-colonial system and attempt to change it towards its own structures. The adoption of ESAP by the self-acclaimed Leninist-Marxist Mugabe attests to this fact. It indicates the mild success in terms of Conservative strategic vision of its policy, therefore, indicates that pragmatism is just but means to, but not the end (Vital, 1968).

7.2.2. Model 2: Principled IR

7.2.2.1. Strategic Vision in Foreign Policy

Foreign policy requires arrays of thinking that allow the creation of plans for achieving nationally desired results by marching them to the best available resources (Drezner, et al., 2011). These patterns of understanding the entry point for ideology into IR, are the ‘normative values and enduring beliefs… about what reality is’ (Levi, 1970, p. 4). Hunt (1987) adds that ideology provides a constitutive ‘framework through which policymakers deal with specific issues’.

However, both political the main political parties in Britain tend to argue that ideologies have no role in foreign policy. In fact, there is a strong dislike for any reference to ideology, in terms of the public and popular narrative. To engage the quotation utilised in section 7.2:

I always thought foreign policy was to do with British interests. That was what it was all about not to do with ethics much. I mean you don’t want to do something unethical but the thing was British interests. That’s what you’re for, that’s what the Government is for. I don’t find any particular difficulty about that…I’m not an ideologue (Carrington, 2011).
In this statement, Carrington clearly makes the case for state-led and indicates the ethical considerations were not at the centre of his approach. Then, he makes it a point to indicate that, such as stance is not ideological but merely the right thing to do, it saved the British interests. This, however, approach is generally, applicable in the analysis of the Conservative Party’s approach to its policy in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1997. In this, the ethics of ignoring Mugabe while he was killing the Ndebele people and taking away voting rights, thus building his dictatorship, was justifiable on the basis that there was a greater good serving the national interest.

Carrington shares the discomfort with being an ideologue with his predecessor Lord Owen. However, even the explanations for this are different in terms of the important and non-negotiable principles. Their prescriptive views and permanent views about what their ultimate responsibilities, as foreign policy principals seem to clash along ideological lines. Owen’s (2012) treatise of the UDI crisis, on contradiction puts the ethics of non-racialism as the framework through which he dealt with this specific issue:

I don’t personally think that treating people, whether they are black or white is an ideological issue. I think it is a fundamental right, so ideology seems to me to be a set of ideas, which are politically driven so I don’t think it’s an ideological position to believe that all people are born equal. So I approach this issue not from an ideological position I approach this issue the position that apartheid was an indefensible position (Owen, 2012).

Certainly, this does not suggest that Lord Carrington would not have taken the same position or indeed that he did not. However, it is imperative to not that in 1972; the Conservative Party maintained the racial structure of the Rhodesian state, in its proposals. Secondly, the major difference between the AAP and the Lancaster House agreement was on how they dealt with the land ownership dispute in which the latter effectively continued the historical imbalance.
7.2.2.2. The Continuous Discontinuity to Colonialism

The party base loved my department and what we did because party base tends to be on the left, was against the British Empire, was against colonialism, cares about inequality and poverty, wants a more progressive fairer world ... that is the traditional stance of Labour Party members ... so that helped to strengthen our policies (Short, 2012).

Rhodesia was one of Britain’s longest foreign policy problems, which was eating into and highlighting its vulnerability even against its own colony. Despite initially agreeing on how to deal with matter, the two major political parties eventually soon began to disagree. Britain was historical tied to the problem and was expected by the world to resolve it and grant legal independence to its erstwhile colony. Thus, while both parties recognised they emphasised different principles and one of the Labour Party’s mainstays was a subtle opposition to the concept of the empire. The party manifesto declared a need for a commonwealth of cooperative service to each other instead of imperialism as early as 1924 and specifically calling for an end to colonialism in its 1964 campaign (Dale, 2000). For the Labour Party, ending UDI was not just about a legal responsibility but also a matter of principle within its political base.

As the argument the quote above, in general the Labour Party and its principles of egalitarianism pursued a stance to ensure a transition in Rhodesia that would embrace its core principles. Such principles were widely popular with its National Conference and the Party publicly campaigned on them. Thus towards the end of Rhodesia, the Party had prepared with the Americans a plan that would have dealt comparatively effectively with the question of political rights for the country’s African population, but also with existential economic inequality subjects such as the land issue. A specific fund was to be set up and managed to ensure land acquisition and farmer compensation from the start. However, their loss at the 1979 general elections put the Conservatives in command of that transition. Soon, the party’s principles changed the trajectory, utilising Britain’s power to limit land
reform and assume an umpire’s position and guarantor of white farmers’ property continued favourable access to land.

Between then and 1997, British policy towards Zimbabwe slowly became a terrible fix in which the end of the UDI, did not effectively translate into discontinuation of the overall relationship between the two countries. In fact, British principles suffered as it became directly involved in a situation that compromised its values, including the silence on the Ndebele Massacres, the provision of military aid during that crisis and the granting of Knighthood to Mugabe in 1994. This was just three years before the whole world learnt about his tortuous and terrible history. Effectively, Britain locked itself into the old Imperial role in a post independent Zimbabwe, in which it took the blame from Mugabe for the land imbalances, which he by 1997, was not pursuing.

Meanwhile, Mugabe strengthened his control on both the media and the general narrative of Zimbabwean history. With the support or cooperation of Britain, he maintained strong limits on NGO activities and academia production (CCJP, 2008). These factors, combined, allowed Mugabe to build an international image as the greatest and only hero of the Zimbabwean struggle for independence. The long-term problem with the appeasement policy was that it allowed a projection of two different sides on the land question, with Mugabe as the hero and Britain as the villain:

That goes back to history and the fact that he was a hero at the time of Smith...Mugabe was very helpful to the freedom of the people of Zimbabwe. I thought of him as a hero at the time... but ... Britain became, kind of useless, ineffective, couldn’t do anything, stuck in our old role. No use to anyone (Short, 2012).

This was the policy environment that the Labour Party inherited from the Conservatives. Guided by its ideology the Party did not foresee the limited policy options it had on Zimbabwe when it came into power. Instead, it sought to disconnect itself from colonialism as it always had, but failed to note that Britain was intricately sown into Zimbabwe’s own internal politics through the land question. In as far
as that question was concerned the UK’s foreign policy power would be limited because of the perception that it was historically and practically responsible for Zimbabwe’s land inequality 17 years after independence. The apolitical analysis of foreign policy is what followed the Labour Government’s, when it declared that its interest in the Zimbabwe were not colonial. However, clearly the Labour Party had historically pursued policies that opposed colonialism, thus was right to make this claim. Regardless, though the Party was limited in thinking that since its ideology was clear on the subject it could exonerate Britain from having some form of responsibility in Zimbabwe’s problem of racist land access. Although, political parties may have their own positions on foreign policy when they implement them as government policy they are rightly regarded as none partisan at that point.

The Labour Government’s policy followed the idea of targeting British aid towards specific issues, such as poverty reduction and human rights (Short, 1997; 2012). The claim though that New Labour’s Britain was a break from the past, including the colonial history, was portrayed by Mugabe as insensitivity and arrogance towards the history of imperialism and the disadvantaged it placed on colonised people. He then began a campaign against Zimbabwe’s white farmers, believing, wrongly that this would scare Blair into changing course on policy. He wrongly, believed that when it came to foreign policy Blair would act like the Conservative leaders before him, who would have rather prevented the white property owning class from losing its property. He assumed that such a position was in the British interests and therefore would affect its policy regardless of which political party was in power. He was wrong; Blair’s emphasis in that foreign policy was guided by liberal idealism rather than the protection of the property owning class and capitalism. Meanwhile, Mugabe drew important international sympathy from not just the Third World but from the EU whose initial delegation to Zimbabwe on the issue asked Britain to stand aside because it was divisive (Short, 2012). Blair for his part, mobilised Western support as led by America, the world’s ultimate superpower.

This created an impasse between Britain and Zimbabwe. This partly resulted from Mugabe’s failure to understand that the historical and ideological narrative of British Labour Party’s foreign policy.
Conservative led governments emphasise different issues in their policies compared to a Labour Prime Minister. While, Thatcher and Major pursued policies that promoted the history of conquest and the preservation of historical inequalities, Blair was concerned himself with an idea of democracy and foreign aided development in Africa. Partly, the Labour Party’s own failure to realise that Foreign Policy principles are interpreted as national interests, thus justifying them using ideological inclinations is a dangerous attempt. Blair needed to acknowledge that although foreign policy may and is sometimes conceivable through the sieve of political ideas; its practical aspects take the posture of universal national interest. As Sylvan and Majeski (2008, p. 5) argue although foreign policy ‘identification of its problems and solutions maybe be idealistic it also involves carrying out specific tasks’ which require a more pragmatic outlook. Thus, although the Labour Party may have always promoted democracy and equality in relation to colonialism in Zimbabwe, the Empire was British and not just Conservative.

Given the above, the new Labour government needed to consider its overall policy environment in Zimbabwe. This entailed that from a geopolitical point of view Britain’s position against Mugabe in the event of a conflict on land was considerable weak. The metanarrative was stuck in history, with Mugabe as the hero fighting against a gate keeping Britain, which continued to use its historical power to safeguard the interests of the white farmers. As short (2012) notes the rhetoric coming out of the British right, including the Conservatives, in the immediate aftermath of the initial farm invasions was not helpful in terms of this kind of situation. It strengthened Mugabe’s case against Britain. However, the question is whether the Conservative government could have sustained its policy any longer.

In this, regard it important to consider whether Conservative government would have opted to continue with a policy of protecting farmers. Fish (2012) argues that it would not do so given that Zimbabwean farmers had strong links with British farmers who have access to the party leadership. This argument seems plausible given the sacrifice that the party had gone through to preserve the very privileged position of the white farmer. However, since this policy was not strategic but pragmatic
and a response and reaction from one event to another. In the wake of the internet age, and since Mugabe’s hegemony was partly preserved by a partisan media, the implications of an internal revolt against Mugabe provide no easy options for a policy based on one individual. However, soon Zimbabwe’s white farming community would have continued to enjoy some security, until, at least, such a time that Mugabe lost control in Zimbabwe.

As such, it seems appropriate to conclude that the New Labour Party’s egalitarian principles affected both its policy visioning and practice in Zimbabwe. This gave the policy both strength and weakness, its limits were a direct result of the policy failure to respond to the actual environment. However, in a very similar manner, the Conservative Party’s principle initiated, and reactive policy seems stronger, in the short term, to preserve the identified interest. This includes preventing revolution.
Chapter 8 Conclusion and Recommendations

“I often quote concepts, texts and phrases from Marx, but without feeling obliged to add the authenticating label of a footnote with a laudatory phrase to accompany the quotation. As long as one does that, one is regarded as someone who knows and reveres Marx, and will be suitably honoured in the so-called Marxist journals. But I quote Marx without saying so, without quotation marks, and because people are incapable of recognising Marx’s texts I am thought to be someone who doesn’t quote Marx. When a physicist writes a work of physics, does he feel it necessary to quote Newton and Einstein?” (Foucault, 1980, p. 52)

The Genealogy of IR Governmentality

8.1. Meaning of Findings
Exploring the role of political parties in foreign policy is a risky enterprise in IR research. I discussed the reasons for this in the formative stages of this chapter, which I also highlight in the Methodological summary in Chapter 6. It is fashionable for political scientists to avoid the seemingly academically perilous task of studying political theory and international relations. It is more difficult to do so when theories exist to justify why they ought to studied together separate (Wilkinson, 2007) and they are also cross-departmental. This thesis de-emphasised these weighty categories and positions, which it regards as unfair theoretical insulation of IR from free research (O’Tuathail, 1996).

The numbers of researchers that challenge the unjustifiable insulation of IR from political science theorising are growing. Like these researcher, I analysed political party based foreign policy discourses and identified uninterrupted themes and narratives (Foucault, 2001), which aligned with discontinuities and continuities in British foreign policy within the case study. I also deliberately avoided the structural trap that often cages historical studies by following a sophisticated combination
of thematic and modular presentation. Additionally, I utilised two hypothetical models to project the policy trajectory based on the party in power, while controlling all other variables.

The case study shows the development of the Rhodesia problems and each political party in Britain pursued policies, which were not necessary, different but sought to achieve different long term outcomes. In Rhodesia, the shared ideological position by the Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, his Colonial Secretary Chamberlain and Rhodes led to the colonisation of Zambezia much against official foreign policy. The nationalistic ideology was to allow British entrepreneurs to expand and become wealthier. Over the years, when the Labour Party assumed office, curtailed by its lack of credibility and experience on the international stage sought to follow polices set by the previous government. As it developed confidence however, it boldly instituted policies that aligned with its ideology. This happens to the Conservative governments, within the case study. In the early 1970s the government policy was to grant Rhodesia independence under a white minority regime if it could be established that the native African population would not disregard that position. This had been the claim by Rhodesians. Although the Conservative government did not believe that Labour hard been right to demand equality for the colony to be brought back to legality, it was bound by the standards set by the previous government in terms of even consulting Africans for their views. When, it was clear that the measures would fail the Conservative government also pulled back. As such, evidently, an incoming government is unable to immediately follow its ideological positions on foreign policy but it gradually does so.

I will also conclude that political party ideology plays a role in international relations and helps shape its character. This is a hugely risk endeavour but I set out to explain where this conclusion places itself. What is important to notice is that ideology, in this case study seemed to inform the process of thinking about foreign policy but the policy itself is packaged as a national strategic output. This is what is usual interpreted as IR and perhaps where most studies are limited to. In this sense, as is the case in most subjects then research studies could claim that IR is unaffected by political party ideology.
Studies of this nature, ones that concern themselves with reciting policy outputs and outcomes without investigating the idealistic and information structure that informs choice, may be truly poetic, but has no real knowledge value. In the school and arguments provided Derrida and expanded by Bulley (2009) this paper shows that the existence of the obvious gap between the actual practice of British foreign policy and its study, is indicative of all naturalised knowledge. Once knowledge is viewed as self-evident it is unable to unearth its own contradictions and instabilities that undermine their very own logic. The warning by the Queen, regarding the question of who brought about the resolution of the Rhodesia crisis is such an example. She reminded everyone that if logic was that foreign policy had its impact then it would have been impossible to imagine that Lord Owen had not contributed to the solution, which took place soon after he had left office.

Additionally, drawing on various examples within the case study, governments that come into power are always keen to show policy changes in terms of domestic policy because it affects the voter. This means that foreign policy remains unchanged for a considerable amount of time after another political party takes power. This is therefore partly what encourages some researchers to think that, in foreign policy political parties tend to continue an existing political trajectory. However, in the case study, Thatcher took the Rhodesia crisis very seriously and sought to have it dealt with because she believed it would show her as stronger that the Labour Party in domestic politics. Thus, where politicians believe any problem presents areas of concern by the voter, they tend to act on it soon after they get into office.

Thus the case study shows that political ideology has an impact on the policy outputs, in line with findings that are becoming popular with open-minded researchers (Levi, 1970). I agree with traditional IR approaches that pragmatism is an essential strategic approach to foreign policy. However, I make the additional conclusion that also is not only factor in all cases and at all times. Claiming that this is the case simply serves to protect the elitist interests of high ranking permanent practitioners in IR. It also is greatly limiting to students of IR, who think that IR is an exclusive area that exists outside the
whole. The inflexibility of traditional IR research disempowers research and researchers while allowing specialist excess power to control the field without criticism or challenge.

Another key outcome of this study is that pragmatism is usual a significant approach to a foreign policy issue if there is a conflict. This is also true when there is an urgent crisis which requires quick action. In other intrinsic parts of foreign policy, where there is no need for expedience or limitations of a moment, decision makers can shape policy on the bases of shared political or ideological values. These values sometimes affect include considerations relating the identification of the national interests.

The timeframe chart in Appendix 4 shows connects the ideological positions for both the Labour and Conservative Parties separately that transcended each of their periods in government. For the Conservatives ideas relating to domination, class difference and nationalism characterised policy approaches within the case study from 1890 right across to 1997. This finding is largely similar to and follow the Conservative political ideology which Peele (1980, p. 191) defines as ‘giving priority to national interests over other goals’. It was slightly different for the Labour Party that started off with a very low profile on foreign policy but after gaining some confidence in the 1930s, the party seemingly pushed forward policies informed by similar ideas as those at home. These included notions on equality, human rights, non-domination and lately liberalism. There is no other possible explanation for this consistency other than ideological inclination, given that these connected ideas followed disconnected periods.

This thesis determines that these are the real reasons for foreign policy and those nations, which not decide foreign policy at a strategic level tend to lose steam because they merely respond to a changing world without any attempts to fix some of its moving parts. Brzezinski (2012) comes to the same conclusion in his book *Strategic Vision*. Foreign policy experts fail to defend their foreign policy without borrowing an ideologically attained value to justify why their position is in the national interest. Clearly, if, as indicated, pragmatism as an approach that maximises the nation’s interests and doing
business with whomever necessary, whenever necessary’ (Beech, 2011), then national interests are the reason for IR. Thus, if both Lord Carrington and Lord David claim to be pragmatic non-ideologues, their contradictory policy sensitiveness to ethics are evidence that ideological differences exist in identifying the national interest concept.

Additionally, the conclusions in the second model compellingly indicate that the Labour Party’s egalitarian principles, which form the base for its national ideology on equality and the fight against poverty, informed its Land policy in Zimbabwe in 1997. Although, the announcement of this policy was following by fortuitous events, what emerges from this is that ideology informed the policy decision to emphasise poverty reduction, accountability and economic growth. Additionally, their ideological considerations are responsible for the Conservative Party government policy towards Mugabe over the 17 years, in which Zimbabwe’s land reform priorities changed to align with the Conservative Party’s domestic policy on property ownership and the cause of bloody liberation struggle for Zimbabwe was virtually a mere election issue (Short, 2012). Observably, Zimbabwe was soon becoming like the Conservative Britain of the Victorian era, with a quickly rising black aristocracy that made up the ruling class.

The combined conclusions from both the models do not refute each other. The construction of these models uses deductions derived from the thesis, thus are completely relevant. They support the notion that of pragmatism in international politics and recognise the irrefutable function of ideology in foreign policy formulation. The presence of similar principles in domestic and international politics indicates this. It is important to acknowledge that Model 2 on its own shows the unhelpful nature of ideology by bringing rigidity to foreign policy (Malament, 1970).

However, given the foregoing, this thesis successfully disproves the hypothesis that British Foreign Policy towards Rhodesia and Zimbabwe is unmediated by party political ideology. The thesis shows a need to balance between the ideological considerations and the need for policy to be both reactive
and changeable. Sometimes pragmatic steps are possible without the need to changing the ultimate policy objectives, as in the case of the Conservative Party, changing emphasis on protecting property rights in Zimbabwe in 1990, when the property clause expired. Instead, Britain sought and successfully dissuaded Mugabe from his position on land reform, pushing towards a ruling elite approach to Zimbabwean agriculture. This certainly did not change the primary focus on helping protect the interest a minority white land owning class.

Furthermore, by studying the patterns and attitudes of both political parties it is apparent that classically theories of IR present a power play game that supports and sustains the status quo. The focus on the state and the absence of an ideological position, especially for smaller countries means that they are unable to amass sufficient state power to offset the efforts of a more powerful state. When a smaller state, as did Rhodesia and later Zimbabwe, they displace the power of the structure and allow the creation of a new discourse and narrative that may help their case. Much of this agrees with an observation made by Lord Owen about realism. His conclusion is that international politics based on realism always give advantage to elite:

Kissinger did or didn't get a pledge from Ian Smith to allow one person one vote, I doubt he did. But he did tried in a way, but in most Kissinger negotiations he is quite content is to sign a piece of paper, at the end of the day the signatories all take a different point of view, and that’s a perfectly acceptable realpolitik view of politics. I will not say I was so pure that I would always rule it out but I think these types of discussions and negotiations come back to hit you I think by and large you should persist in trying to get it understood what your agreement is. A signature on a document is of itself is not worth much when people have a different view why they are signing (Owen, 2012).

This is an often forgotten facet of realism and its foundation on the natural condition of humanity, in which anarchy is the premise for peace. Simply, put the one with the bigger gun has the right
interpretation of what an agreement means. If they no longer like its prescriptions, they can pull out and if the smaller partner attempted to end an agreement, they need to be careful not to look like they are breaking it. Once we accept that classically theories are part of a game of power play, then it becomes inevitable that their dominance is partly an existential matter the current world structures. This certainly requires continued studying and post structural approached provide a rare opportunity for alternative interpretive analysis. This approach analyses theories not just in terms of what they teach but also how they, themselves are constructed and why?
8.2. Recommendations

During this project, several questions arose and remained unanswered, because they felt outside the general scope of this research. It is clearly from the data that the Zimbabwe question is not fully addressed and that many Zimbabweans live in this country who would be able to provide an insight into British policy during the Thatcher era, which although understudied is very interesting. Many of the former Rhodesian politicians are now resident in Britain and British politicians who dealt with them in the late 1970s are still around and retired. This presents an opportunity, which not unlimited for a closer look into foreign policy and national politics.

Additionally, the intersection between IR and political sciences is a very rich area for theorising and therefore, for teaching to middle-level students. This would be an engaging and fulfilling experience for academics and students who are interested in both theorising and empirical research. Related to this is the question, whether, why the Conservative Government allowed Mugabe to murder so many people? Was this part of real politics or a genuine oversight, this is important because in builds the narrative in the third world that Britain is sometimes brutal in pursuit of national interests.

Nonetheless, beyond this, a fulfilling immediate question to find out if the public in Britain considers foreign policy a subject to know about or talk about in general elections. As Brzezinski (2012) and Drezner (2011) going deeper into the 21st century and with huge strides in new technologies that bring the world even much closer together, nations with popular knowledge of politics and foreign policy will fare better in geopolitics.
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### Appendices

#### 9.1. Appendix 1: British Political Parties and Rhodesia

**Table 3a: Economic Rights**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law/ Policy</th>
<th>Natives rights denied:</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party in Office</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Apportionment</td>
<td>Property, Human</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Con - Labour</td>
<td>S Baldwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Conciliation</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>J R MacDonald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>J R MacDonald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Labour Boards</td>
<td>Human, Liberty</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>C Attlee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Husbandry</td>
<td>Property</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>W Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory Native Labour</td>
<td>Human, Liberty</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>W Churchill</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Rhodesian laws and policies that discriminated against the economic advancement of natives

**Table 3b: Political and Civil Rights**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law/ Policy</th>
<th>Natives rights denied:</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party in Office</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>Political, Voting</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>W Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>Political, Voting</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>H Macmillan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversive Activities</td>
<td>Civil, Assembly</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>C Attlee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order</td>
<td>Civil, Assembly</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>A Eden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful Organisations</td>
<td>Organise, Assembly</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>H Macmillan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Detention</td>
<td>Human, Civil</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>H Macmillan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOMA &amp; Emergency Powers</td>
<td>Human, Civil</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>H Macmillan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rhodesian laws and policies that discriminated against the political advancement of natives

**Table 3c: Individual Privacy**

- 311 -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law/ Policy</th>
<th>Natives rights denied:</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party in Office</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immorality Suppression</td>
<td>Privacy, Association</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>A Balfour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Registration</td>
<td>Privacy, Movement</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>S Baldwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African (ID)</td>
<td>Civil, Assembly</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>A Eden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Affairs</td>
<td>Natural, Human</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>S Baldwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Affairs</td>
<td>Natural, Human</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>H Macmillan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rhodesian laws and policies that discriminated against the individual natives
9.2. Appendix 2: PF 1980 Election Poster
23 December 1999

Dr The Honourable
Stan Mudenge MP
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Zimbabwe

Dear Stan,

As you know, I was planning to visit Zimbabwe in the early part of the year. But I am aware that you and His Excellency the President will be heavily engaged in the referendum on the constitution next month. And after that I am sure you will be busy in the run up to the parliamentary elections. I am therefore hoping to visit Zimbabwe soon after the elections, when I hope that together we can inject a new impetus in UK/Zimbabwe relations, based not only on our shared history but also looking positively to the future.

I would like to state for the record that neither the Attorney General, members of his office, any Minister, public official or any other agency of the UK Government knew in advance of Mr Peter Tatchell’s planned action against President Mugabe. We were as disturbed as you to learn that an incident such as this had happened to a Head of State visiting our country.

I and my officials have spoken to your High Commissioner to assure him of our full co-operation on security issues when the President next visits the UK.

I hope that this incident does not prevent us from looking to the future and moving forward in our bilateral relations. You will know that I am working hard to push Africa up the international agenda. I would like us to work together on this. I felt that my positive meeting with the President provided a platform for a much better understanding between our two countries. We should not allow the totally unexpected protest the following morning to undermine this.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Peter Hain
## 9.4. Appendix 4: Case Study – Timeframe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Ideological Skew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Colonisation, Conservative Party dominance and circumvention of government policy</td>
<td>Colonialism, Capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>New Government - Minimal policy, Rhodesian chance to consolidate racism and segregation. Conservative return, increased support for racist Rhodesia</td>
<td>Remnants of nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Labour Party: limited role or visible interest in Rhodesia, conformist policies embolden Rhodesia.</td>
<td>Strengthened colonialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Labour Party starts to asset equality and new internationalism in debates on Rhodesia. Threatens establishment with campaigns for independence</td>
<td>Internationalism, equality and independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Conservative Party helps Rhodesia react to threats of independence of Africans. CAF is the method of preservation but fails after 10 years.</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Conservatives lose power, Labour government and CAF collapse causes fear of African independence in Rhodesia. UDI. Internationalisation of case in IR</td>
<td>Internationalism, equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Labour loses power and Conservatives come in and try to legalise UDI by co-opting a fear Africans in Rhodesia’s Racial Voters’ Rolls. Plan fails</td>
<td>Nationalism, Capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Labour Party initiates IR initiatives to end UDI, AAP starts the negotiation process. Labour includes fair property ownership in proposals</td>
<td>Fairness, Internationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Conservatives retain unfair property ownership, Zimbabwe independence, Mugabe kills 20000 ethnic minorities, Thatcher ignores and Mugabe becomes a tyrant.</td>
<td>Capitalism and Liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>Zimbabwe and Britain break ties again. British Foreign Policy challenged again. Labour Party misjudges the power of anti-imperialism in the third world – tries to use its ideological position to disconnect itself from colonial history. Mugabe seems to win the IR policy outcomes.</td>
<td>Capitalism, Inequality and liberalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>