Home, Colonial and Foreign: Europe, Empire and the History of Migration in Twentieth-century Britain

In *The Lady Vanishes*, the comedy-thriller directed by Alfred Hitchcock and released in 1938, Charters and Caldicott (Basil Radford and Naunton Wayne) make their debut in a British film. They are in Bandrika — the fictional Central European country in which the film is set — and they are not impressed. Among the Bandrikan failings they identify are instability, inefficiency, childishness, complete ignorance of the game of cricket, and an unaccountable inability to speak English.

In rehearsing this catalogue of European failings, Charters and Caldicott represent the insularity that is often seen as a main characteristic of British attitudes to Europe in the twentieth century. There is a considerable historiographical consensus that the Second World War reinforced a sense of detachment from continental Europe through what David Reynolds calls ‘the enduring mentalité of 1940’. The persistence of such attitudes during the formation of the European Economic Community, Britain’s various bids for membership in the 1960s, and its final entry into the Community in 1973 are prominent in the most substantial literature on twentieth-century British-European relations which focuses on a meaning of ‘Europe’ which did not gain currency in Britain until the 1960s — the European Economic Community (EEC), subsequently renamed the European Union (EU). Characteristic titles suggest a main preoccupation of this literature — *Absent at the Creation, Reluctant Europeans*, and *An Awkward Partner*.²

Tony Kushner comments that: ‘until recently … little research has been carried out on how British national identity has been shaped in juxtaposition to the continent’.³ Linda Colley’s highly influential work is a notable exception, but by comparison with the rich ‘new imperial histories’ reconnecting histories of Britain and empire, social and cultural histories have paid little attention to the domestic impact of Europe. Colley’s study, charting the significance of France in the formation of British identity, is on the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.⁴ The extensive work on empire is mainly on the nineteenth century. The social and cultural history of both empire and Europe in twentieth-century Britain are therefore sparse, particularly in the period of decolonisation.⁵ There is, however, an increasingly rich literature on twentieth-century transnational movements from empire and Europe to Britain and in the opposite directions which offers a way of thinking about the social and cultural history of twentieth-century British relations with Europe and empire, as well as their connections.

Literatures on migration pay more attention to some groups than others. Until recently, work on European migrants, focused on the period before 1945 when they were main targets of anti-alienism.⁶ Much of the literature on the post-1945 period is by sociologists and follows the direction of racisms, shifting attention to black and Asian migrants from the Commonwealth and empire.⁷ There is a dearth of work on white groups from the Commonwealth who had limited visibility in Britain as migrants, visitors and tourists throughout the century.⁸ In literatures on migration from Britain to empire there is rich and extensive work, but comparatively little on the post-1945 period.⁹ Literature on British migration to Europe in the second half of the century comes from geographers, ethnographers and sociologists, not historians.¹⁰
Most of this work treats empire and Europe separately, as well as immigration and emigration. This essay makes connections between them, situating both empire and Europe in the history of Britain during a century when empire ended and Britain became a member of the EU. By exploring the complex interplay between Europe and empire in the history of transnational movements it looks at changing British perceptions of Europe and the world beyond Europe: of home, colonial and foreign. It argues that in the second half of the century, as empire ended, there was an increasing erosion of distinctions between ‘colonial’ and ‘foreign’ and a reorientation of British world views towards Europe that owed little to its membership of the EU after 1973.

Inward Movement: to Britain from Europe and Beyond

The opening words of *The Lady Vanishes* are an announcement by the hotel manager about a delayed train and a consequent rush for rooms in the hotel. He makes the announcement in Italian, French and German. Charters and Caldicott find all versions equally incomprehensible. When the announcement is eventually made in English, Charters displays his characteristic irritation with foreigners who speak other languages: ‘Why the deuce didn’t he say so in the first place’?

To prevent similar irritation in an English-speaking audience, characters in *The Lady Vanishes* speak continental European languages sparingly, occasionally lapsing into Bandrikan — the fictional language that the film invents to match its fictional setting. For much of the time a device is used common to many British films that feature continental Europeans. They speak English, sometimes falteringly, sometimes fluently, but with an accent that marks their national difference from native English-speakers. In the sound era from the late 1920s, films could also identify class, region and different national identities within Britishness by accent. Film-makers’ use of accented language for continental Europeans, however approximate the accents produced, suggests their confidence that audiences’ aural perceptions were sharp enough, within a wide diversity of British accents, to distinguish those which sounded ‘foreign’.

In the history of white migration, language and accents were importance signs of national difference. In the absence of physical markers of difference, such as skin colour, they received a good deal of attention. This was the case in outward migration from Britain. Angela McCarthy’s work on Irish and Scottish migrants shows that, in the early twentieth century, those migrating to the United States, in some contexts used languages such as Scots to differentiate themselves from the English. In other contexts they identified strongly as English-speakers to emphasise their connections with the United States, differentiate themselves from continental Europeans, and distance themselves from a European identity which they saw as ‘foreign’.\(^\text{11}\) In the history of inward migration, language and accent were often a marker of difference between white people from the Dominions in Britain and those from Europe. While European accents were nearly always heard as ‘foreign’, Dominions’ accents were more likely to attract the label ‘colonial’.\(^\text{12}\)

There were a range of responses to the ways in which accents were identified in Britain. Travellers from Australia sometimes criticised English idioms and commented on the diversity of British accents, while others were critical of what they
learned to hear as Australian ‘mispronunciations’. Some European migrants to Britain changed their names which, like accents, could sound ‘foreign’. German war brides who came to Britain after the Second World War kept their voices down in public and tried to disguise their accents in order to avoid trouble in an anti-German climate. Other European migrant groups continued to use their language and to teach it to their children in Saturday schools to maintain their national culture and identification. For the same reason, some were anxious not to lose their accent.

If British migrants to the English-speaking world differentiated themselves from Europeans as ‘foreigners’, those who moved to British colonies in Africa and Asia were officially identified as European: a term used to signify the racial distinction between white and non-white. This use of ‘European’ also had some parallels in the metropolis, particularly in official policy-making. Before the Second World War, only men who were ‘British subjects and of pure European descent’ were accepted for enlistment or commission in the Royal Air Force. Before 1949 only men who were the children of ‘parents who are, or were at the time of death, natural born British subjects of pure European descent’ were accepted into the Metropolitan Police. The language of race was also used for distinctions between Europeans and between Britons in a litany of racial types including Anglo-Saxon, Celtic, Nordic, Mediterranean, Slav and Teuton.

The literature on anti-alienism in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century suggests that, far from identifying migrants and refugees from Europe as fellow-Europeans of common descent, Britons saw them as suspicious, threatening and criminal foreigners. A belief that British morality was exposed to corrupting foreign influences was particularly apparent in the association of pimping and ‘white slavery’ with ‘foreign gangs’, often associated with Jews and — in the publicity surrounding the case of the Messina brothers in the 1950s — with Maltese. David Cesarani argues that anti-alienism was primarily a response to the mass immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe after the pogroms of 1881-2, culminating in the Aliens Act of 1905, targeted at limiting the entry of destitute Jewish immigrants, and the first of a series through which controls were successively strengthened. He traces the persistence of anti-alienism in British society through to 1940: a moment of intense anti-alienism against Europeans when invasion seemed imminent and a Fifth Column scare meant that all Europeans were regarded as suspicious and threatening.

The focus of this literature is on groups that were the targets of anti-alienist discourse and violence. Laura Tabili argues that ‘episodes of intense “othering”, discrimination and violence … remain[ed] better documented than everyday coexistence or conflict’ while an emphasis on conflict, ‘has allowed the most xenophobic and racist of historical actors to stand for all Britons’. A scholarly focus on Irish, Jews and Germans, she suggests, begs the question of other substantial migrant groups in Britain. Situating the history of Britain’s internal ‘others’ in the context of British and European empire building, Tabili identifies this as a factor that ‘rendered different “others” visible and apparently problematical at various times’. As France ceased threatening Britain’s imperial dominance Francophobia, prominent in British nation building in earlier centuries, waned. Germanophobia took its place as Anglo-German imperial rivalry intensified. The high visibility of German settled migrants in two world wars contrasted with the relative invisibility of French. The shift from Francophobia to Germanophobia was buttressed by a rewriting of racial
theory to repudiate the notion that Germans and English shared a common Anglo-Saxon origin: a view common in the mid-nineteenth century when all things Teutonic were widely admired. ‘Teutonic’ was recast as a signifier, not of admired virtues, but of barbarity.  

The tendency to focus on migrant groups that were targets of anti-alienism, identified by Tabili, is particularly apparent in the neglect of white groups from the Commonwealth. Angela Woollacott’s work on Australian women who travelled to the metropolis from 1870 to 1940 is a notable exception. Where Tabili looks at European migration in the context of imperial rivalries, Woollacott looks at white Commonwealth journeys in the context of imperial belonging: a context which meant that many Australians thought of their journeys as movements within a common British world and of their arrival at a place thousands of miles away that they had never seen before as ‘going home’. They were sometimes seen as ‘foreigners’ but the ‘colonial’ label they frequently attracted, distinguishing them from migrants from Europe, draws attention to hierarchies of Britishness which relegated white Britons from the Commonwealth to a subordinate place — less civilised and less sophisticated.

Unlike Australians, migrants from European colonies — Cyprus, Malta, Gibraltar — were rarely identified as ‘colonials’, but merged into the ‘foreign’ category. In the early part of the century, Ireland occupied a complex place within these categories as both colonial and part of the UK. In the mid-nineteenth century, representations of the Irish people were racialised, with *Punch* running a cartoon in 1862 that portrayed the Irish as ‘the missing link: a creature manifestly between the gorilla and the negro’. Italian organ-grinders were also portrayed in *Punch* in the same period as simianised and brutish. In the twentieth century both groups were usually seen as white, but colonial attitudes to the Irish were evident in dominant stereotypes of the ‘Paddy’ or ‘Mick’, and extended to other European groups. Even so, white migrants occupied a very different place from black seamen from empire who formed the core of the largest black communities in Britain in the first half of the century in seaport towns like Bristol, Cardiff and Liverpool. The numbers of black and Asian people who had settled permanently in Britain was very small in the first half of the century — officially estimated at about 7,000 in 1939. Migration and refugee movements in this period were overwhelmingly from Europe. Despite this, non-white seamen attracted attention through their association with the problems of miscegenation and ‘half-caste’ children. The Coloured Alien Seamen Order introduced in 1925 and renewed in 1938 and 1942 effectively converted them into aliens, requiring those without documentary evidence of their British nationality — evidence which the Home Office knew that few possessed — to register as aliens.

During the First World War, a postcard depicting a battalion of Indian troops was captioned: ‘Indian gentlemen marching to chastise German hooligans’. The First and Second World Wars not only involved the movement of troops from Britain to Europe, but also from empire. Indian troops were not used in the South African War of 1899-1902, fought against people of European descent in empire, because of fears of undermining white prestige. But they were extensively deployed in the First World War not only in imperial theatres of war but also in France where over 130,000 Indian soldiers served.
The literature on imperial troops and war-workers in Britain in both world wars, read alongside the literature on Europeans, suggests that when imperial forces fought against European enemies — as well as alongside European allies — there was some disruption of racial hierarchies. In the First World War, there were anti-German riots on a wide scale, the government introduced a policy of mass internment of Germans in Britain and, by 1919, 28,000 had been deported: one-third of the pre-war population.

In contrast, Indian soldiers who had been wounded in France arrived in Brighton by train to be greeted with cheers, while British buildings converted into military hospitals to care for the Indian wounded included Brighton Pavilion — a former royal residence. In the Second World War those interned included many German Jews who had only recently escaped to Britain, while Italy’s entry into the war on the side of Germany in June 1940 not only swelled their numbers but also prompted anti-Italian riots in a number of British cities. Their treatment contrasted with the reception of black and Asian imperial troops and war-workers in Britain. In the later stages of the war the majority of black people in Britain were American GIs, and Home Intelligence Reports showed that their courtesy drew much favourable comment in contrast to the behaviour of their white compatriots, and that there was widespread condemnation of the colour bar practised by the American armed forces.

Even in wartime, any disruptions of a racial hierarchy had considerable limitations, particularly through fears of miscegenation. In Britain, as in empire, these fears were always strongly gendered, with white men’s interracial sex regarded much less seriously. In the First World War, there was controversy over the employment of white women in hospitals for Indian soldiers and strict rules at Kitchener’s Indian Hospital in Brighton to prevent them mixing with women of the town. In 1919 there were riots in many cities against black communities, including attacks on demobilised soldiers from the West Indies regiment. Relationships between black men and white women were a trigger for violence in Liverpool and Cardiff. Favourable comment on black GIs in the Second World War did not extend to their relationships with white British women, which were widely condemned, with government attempts to deter such relationships. There were further riots against black communities in 1947.

The literature on European migrants has little to say about their sexual relationships with the British which seem to have attracted little attention. Peter Stachura notes that in the aftermath of the Second World War marriages between Poles and Scottish women led to friction when Protestants were marrying Poles who were usually practising Catholics. In any case Polish men preferred to marry women from a Catholic background, either British or other European. Women who married Polish men in the 4,000 British-Polish marriages recorded at the end of the war might be told to ‘go and live in Poland’, while Polish men acquired a hostile label: ‘Casanova’. But such responses were very muted by comparison with lurid fears about miscegenation. British-German marriages were an exception, and a matter of both official and popular concern. A wartime ban on fraternisation with prisoners-of-war, including Italians, was not lifted until December 1946. It was not until July 1947 that prisoners-of-war were permitted to marry British women. Popular concerns about such relationships sometimes reversed the usual gendered nature of anxieties. Six women in the ATS wrote to the Daily Express in 1945: ‘If the men we are fighting with prefer the daughters of the enemy we would rather have our ticket now, for what are we fighting for’? The mother of a British prisoner-of-war in Germany
wrote: ‘Our boy has been a POW in Germany since May 28 1940, but if the price of
his life and safety is to marry a German girl then I hope he never returns’. 38

While European and Commonwealth migration to Britain are often treated
separately, Kathleen Paul’s pioneering work on policy-making after 1945 offers a
comparative study of different migrant groups and the distinctions made by policy-
makers both between and within them. In the immediate aftermath of war in a context
of acute labour shortage, Paul contrasts initiatives taken to recruit a wide range of
European groups to the labour market, as well as continued encouragement of Irish
migration, with the limited and circumscribed entry of black and Asian migrants from
the Commonwealth. 39 While the fundamental division in official thinking was
between white and non-white, a wide range of distinctions were also made between
European groups. There was strong official approval for the 115,000 Poles who
stayed in Britain as members of the Polish Resettlement Corps and for the 86,000
people recruited from displaced persons camps in Germany and Austria, who were
renamed ‘European Volunteer Workers’ (EVWs), and an expectation that they would
become British subjects. The EVW scheme favoured women from the Baltic States
over women from Ukraine, viewing them as not only clean and healthy but also of a
good standard of education and spoken English. 40 Anti-Semitism in Britain as well as
the situation in Palestine were regarded by the Foreign Office as a reason to exclude
Jews from the scheme. 41 The situation in Palestine was also the context for anti-
Jewish riots in a number of British cities in 1947 following the hanging of two British
seergeants by the Irgun group. 42

Popular opinion about Poles and EVWs did not always follow the official line
of approbation and in some contexts they were seen as suspicious, threatening and
criminal foreigners. In 1948 a Daily Mirror editorial, under the headline ‘Let Them
Be Displaced’, drew on attitudes familiar in the history of anti-alienism, portraying
EVWs as criminals, but adding a post-war inflection, naming them also as black
marketeers. 43 On the previous day the newspaper had carried a front-page story on the
8,000 Ukrainians in Britain who had arrived in Britain in the spring of 1947 as
prisoners-of-war, but had their status changed to that of EVWs. 44 Doubts about the
war records of EVWs were a consistent undercurrent in popular responses. A
Committee set up by the Ministry of Labour found that opinion about EVWs included
the view that they were Fascists who had fought for the Germans, ‘some of the scum
of Europe’ and ‘the Jews of Europe’. 45 As David Cesarani’s work demonstrates, war
criminals of a range of nationalities did enter Britain under the EVW scheme. 46

An identification of EVWs as ‘the Jews of Europe’, despite their exclusion
from the scheme, drew on the history of anti-alienism in Britain in which the term
‘immigrant’ was widely used to mean Jews in the early part of the century. The late
1940s could be regarded as a transitional period between a focus on an ‘immigrant’
who continued to be associated with migrants from Europe, particularly with Jews, to
an identification of the ‘immigrant’ as black or Asian in the 1950s. This produced a
characteristic opposition between Britishness as white, and ‘immigrants’ as
‘coloured’. In the first half of the century many migrant groups from Europe had been
seen as threatening foreigners, but responses to post-1945 migration from the
Commonwealth identified a different threat: one that came from empire.
‘Home’ was a recurrent theme in the experience of black and Asian Commonwealth migrants, especially African-Caribbeans and Indo-Caribbeans who thought of Britain as the motherland, and of their journeys as internal migration within a common British world. Walter Lother from Jamaica records: ‘When I came here I didn’t have a status as a Jamaican. I was British, and going to the mother country was like going from one parish to another. You had no conception of it being different’. Such views were disrupted by migrants’ discovery that their place within this British world was unknown to most British. Unlike Australians they were seldom identified as ‘colonials’, and in the 1950s, as Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose observe, ‘were thought of as postwar migrants rather than imperial subjects with a long history connecting them to Britain’. A recurrent theme in their accounts of their experience is shock at British ignorance of the colonies. Through these experiences, as well as through more overt expressions of racism, they encountered what Bill Schwarz has called ‘the unhomeliness of the imaginary homeland’.

Despite the use of the term ‘European’ in African and Asian colonies to signify the difference between white and non-white, migrants to Britain from colonies in Europe were not always seen as uncontestably white. Studies of immigration in the 1960s variously defined Cypriots as ‘white Commonwealth immigrants’ and ‘coloured Commonwealth citizens’. The credentials of Dominions migrants as white were never questioned and, while generally lacking visibility, they became visible in government discussions in the 1950s about restricting Commonwealth migration which expressed the desire to preserve their rights of free entry. One reason for decisions to use informal rather than legislative methods to discourage black and Asian migration in the 1950s was concern that such rights could not be preserved without conceding that legislation was designed to prevent what the Conservative Committee of Ministers’ report called ‘a coloured invasion of Britain’. When legislation was eventually introduced in the 1960s, it did not concede this, and was not overtly directed against black and Asian migrants, although a memorandum by the Home Secretary, R. A. Butler, explained that ‘its restrictive effect is intended to, and would in fact, operate on coloured people almost exclusively’. Concerns to preserve the right of entry for white Commonwealth migrants became more overt with the passage of the 1971 Act which was distinguished by a ‘patrial’ clause, where rights to abode in Britain were confined to those with a parent or grandparent born in Britain — a requirement that many whites in Commonwealth could meet, but few blacks.

‘Home’ was not only a recurrent theme in the experience of Caribbean migrants, but also in a shift of attention in mid-century to the ‘immigrant’ as black or Asian. A focus on boundary maintenance, characteristic of the colonies came home to Britain in intense concern about sexual and domestic boundaries. Miscegenation was identified as a central feature of the ‘colour problem’ and in characteristically gendered terms, often framed around the question: ‘Would you let your daughter marry a Negro?’ Domestic boundaries — windows, yards, front steps — violated by immigrants, also received a good deal of attention. While nineteenth-century tales of empire were of an expansive identity, the story of the threat posed by ‘immigrants’ narrowed to the world of English homes, streets and neighbourhoods where the English were under siege from ‘blacks next door’. Indeed the themes developed in this story seemed to exclude the possibility that Britain had ever occupied a position as a colonial power or continued to embrace a global identity through the transition from empire to Commonwealth. The English spend a great deal of their time indoors
and their major preoccupation is keeping themselves to themselves. Englishness was increasingly invoked as an intimate, private and exclusive white identity and England as a domestic sanctuary threatened with violation. The themes of this story frequently clashed with a liberal approach to ‘immigrants’, but there was also some convergence, particularly in a common focus on a ‘colour problem’. Previously identified with empire, this was now redefined as a domestic problem.

As the ‘immigrant’ was identified as black or Asian after 1945, a view of the white population of Britain as homogeneous was increasingly evident. There was considerable erosion of the differentiation earlier in the century between most European groups in Britain as threatening foreigners and white Commonwealth migrants who had limited visibility as ‘colonials’. The process by which European migrants became less visible was uneven, and anti-alienism against them still found a good deal of expression in the 1950s. Advertisements for accommodation that specified ‘no coloureds’ often also specified ‘no Irish’. The children of German war brides playing with British friends, were confronted with anti-German remarks. Poles were called ‘bloody Poles and ‘bloody foreigners’. After the 1950s, the idea that Europeans were threatening and sinister foreigners recurred as an image of the Irish in the context of IRA bombings in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. But otherwise it increasingly disappeared. The relative invisibility of European migrants in the second half of the twentieth century is particularly evident in responses to developments through which Europeans migrating internally within the EU had rights of entry to Britain under the Single European Act of 1986 and the increasing realisation of its aspiration for the abolition of internal frontiers. These aroused little public comment. In strong contrast to European migrants in the first half of the century, and to black and Asian Commonwealth migrants in mid-century, EU migrants in Britain went more or less unremarked until the new millennium when migrants from the new EU accession states, particularly Poles, became highly visible.

By the end of the century, the redrawing of imperial and national boundaries through restrictions on Commonwealth immigration and the abolition of EU internal frontiers, reversed the position at the beginning of the century when migrants from the Commonwealth had unrestricted right of entry, while migrants from Europe were restricted. As the consequences of legislation unfolded in the last quarter of the twentieth century, migrants from the white Commonwealth and the EU outnumbered those from the Indian sub-continent and the Caribbean. At the same time there was increasing evidence of the extent to which Commonwealth migration in mid-century had changed the meaning of Britishness. Tariq Modood found that ‘British’ was a common self-identification amongst minority ethnic groups in Britain with a majority, in all groups except the Chinese, agreeing with the statement: ‘In many ways I think of myself as British’. He concluded that ‘one of the most profound developments has been that ‘ethnicity’ or ‘blackness’ is experienced less as an oppositional identity than as a way of being British’. A MORI poll in 2000 found that fears of miscegenation had become a minority concern with 75% of respondents to their poll saying they would not be upset if a relative married a person of Caribbean or Asian origin, while a further 80% said they would not be upset if their neighbour or their boss was black or Asian. A survey of British social attitudes in the new millennium found that only a minority agreed with the statement that ‘to be truly English you
have to be white’ — 17% of the salariat, 32% of the self-employed and 31% of the working class.64

**Outward Movement: from Britain to Europe and Beyond**

At the opening of *The Lady Vanishes*, Charters and Caldicott are anxious to get back quickly to an England which they describe as 'on the brink' and in a 'time of crisis'. They are making their first appearance on film before their characteristic obsession with cricket was established, and this appearance is in a production released in 1938, when the British Board of Film Censors would not pass scenarios that were openly critical of Nazi Germany. Charters and Caldicott’s opening comments therefore tease censors as well as audiences with the possibility that they are talking about a political crisis in Europe, before it emerges that their anxiety is about an ‘England’ that means the cricket team. Despite this disavowal of any comment on contemporary politics, reference is made to a political crisis in Europe. The continental characters become increasingly sinister as their plot to murder a British agent masquerading as a governess is uncovered, and they threaten the lives of all the British on the train. The murder plot concerns a coded message about a secret treaty between two European powers. The film ends with the British arriving home to a place of safety, even if Charters and Caldicott find that the cricket has been abandoned due to floods. By contrast Europe is a place of violence and danger.

The idea of Europe as a place of danger and of threat to British lives, particularly as a place of war and the threat of war, was prominent in the first half of the twentieth century, dominating much thinking about Europe. The century began with the ‘spy fever’ and fears of possible German invasion expressed in an extensive body of Edwardian popular fiction.65 In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, a dominant image of the continent was of its divisions, chaos and corruption as well as its suffering, and suffering itself became a threatening image as the prospect of mass starvation in Germany prompted fears of disease, rioting, violence, anarchy and further war. The majority of journeys from Britain to the continent in this period were for the purpose of war. Volunteers went to fight in the Spanish Civil War. In the First and Second World Wars the movements of British soldiers to the continent were highly publicised.

There was a tendency to use the term ‘abroad’ for travel to the continent while going ‘overseas’ was associated with the world beyond Europe, and particularly with empire.66 In the first half of the century, ‘overseas’ travel was generally to empire, involving arduous journeys, which millions of Britons undertook. They went to all parts of empire as administrators, traders and missionaries. Emigrants went for settlement primarily to the Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, and between the wars increasingly to Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. They went overwhelmingly to white settler societies in empire with a marked decline in the proportion emigrating to the United States.67

Before the First World War, Dominions’ governments actively solicited British migrants. Between the wars, the project of peopling the Dominions with British migrants came to be shared between British and Dominions’ governments. Both contributed to the costs of assisted passages. In the immediate post-war period there was a continuation of this mutual project in a revival of assisted passages.
schemes supported by British and Dominions’ governments. Between 1948 and 1957 over one million British migrants went to the Dominions. Kathleen Paul notes the paradox of British governments encouraging and funding British migration to Australia at a time of acute labour shortage in Britain and national bankruptcy. Simultaneous recruitment of Europeans to the British labour market to fill part of the gap left by British emigrants, added a further element of paradox.68 Such an apparently convoluted policy was not the result of some careless oversight, but part of a perception that too many EVWs in Australia would dilute its Britishness whereas in Britain they would become Britons. Even so, Australia, like Britain, recruited migrants from Europe who conformed to the requirements of its White Australia policy, including recruits from displaced persons camps in Germany and Austria. Between 1945 and 1964, British migrants accounted for just over half of all migrants entering Australia, only 33% of those entering Canada between 1946 and 1965, and 44% of those entering New Zealand between 1946 and 1976.69

Stephen Constantine tentatively proposes that the 1940s were a turning point for British migrants across all the Dominions. Before that decade, he suggests, although some migrants were unwelcome, the majority were easily assimilated, experiencing little sense of alienation from their new host cultures. By the 1950s, there was an increasing awareness that they were intruding into alien cultures and a consciousness of their difference not only from their hosts but also from other European immigrant groups.70 Work by A. James Hammerton and Alistair Thomson supports this view in the case of post-war migration to Australia, documenting attitudes that diverged from government aspirations to preserve the Britishness of Australia: intense hostility from Australians towards British migrants.

Hammerton and Thomson suggest that such hostility became more routine in the latter years of the assisted passage scheme, but their evidence also shows an earlier onset, and they date the probable origin of the term of abuse most widely used against the British — ‘whingeing Pom’ — to the 1950s. Non-English British migrants distanced themselves from this epithet, arguing that both ‘whingeing’ and ‘Pom’ were distinctively English. Even so, they faced abuse.71 ‘Whingeing Pom’ suggests how far Australianness was constructed against Britishness, and particularly against Englishness, even at a time when the Australian government were committed to maintaining the Britishness of Australia. The popular narrative of Australian ‘mateship’, strengthened in the Second World War, was of tough, virile, white men in a frontier society. ‘Whingeing Poms’ were feeble and effete.

Widely publicised celebrations of the millionth post-war migrant to Australia in 1955 featured a British migrant: Mrs. Barbara Porritt. Sara Wills observes that the idea that British migrants felt ‘at home’ in Australia was a recurrent theme of Australian press coverage of Barbara Porritt’s journey from Britain to Australia. The story made much of her former British home in Yorkshire and the county’s links with Captain James Cook to emphasise the close ties between Australia and Britain.72 Hostility to British migrants in the same period suggests increasing difficulties in feeling ‘at home’, compounded by disappointment with the hostel accommodation provided — often in former wartime barracks. Rates of return migration, at around 25%, demonstrated that many Britons did not feel ‘at home’ in Australia.73
The project of maintaining the Britishness of the Dominions represents a late moment in imperial identity. Its failure became increasingly evident in the 1960s which saw the assertion of nationalism and the increasing collapse of Britishness as a valued identity across all the Dominions. Even so, the 1960s were a peak decade for post-war British emigration to Australia, with around 40% of the 1,600,000 who emigrated between 1945 and 1982 arriving in that decade. Canada, New Zealand and South Africa also remained popular destinations. Although migration from Britain declined in the late twentieth century, a 2006 study by the Institute for Public Policy Research showed that they all featured, along with Australia, in the eight countries with the largest numbers of Britons who lived abroad. Other movements from Britain to Australia — by relatives visiting family and by tourists ranging from the affluent to the back-packer — increased dramatically from the 1980s. By the end of the century, more than half a million Britons visited Australia every year.

Few British colonies in Africa and Asia were viewed as places of settlement and ‘home’. Elizabeth Buettner’s work explores the transient lives of many British in late imperial India who distinguished themselves from ‘domiciled Europeans’ by maintaining contact with the metropolis, and particularly sending their children home for education. Their frequent journeys to and fro, she suggests, meant that they felt at home in both places and at the same time in neither, and were most fully ‘at home’ on the ships travelling between the two. On retirement, such transience was compounded for some by a choice of destination outside Britain, favoured for lower living costs, and sometimes for climate or availability of servants. Many went to imperial territory, including Cyprus, but non-colonial European Mediterranean resorts which could offer similar advantages also featured in the chosen destinations of interwar retirees.

Indian independence in 1947 brought most of this late imperial traffic to an end and, like decolonisation in other Asian and in African colonies, involved a considerable British exodus. The dominant British image of decolonisation was of orderly withdrawal with elaborate ceremony often surrounding the departure of officials and military. But some African colonies were places of considerable white settlement where many members of white communities saw decolonisation as betrayal of the cause of empire and had no wish to depart. In Kenya, they demanded tough action from the British government against anti-colonial resistance. Much reporting of colonial war in Kenya in the 1950s appealed to the idea of a racial community of Britons who were under siege from the violence of the colonised, focusing on atrocities committed against the British, not by them. In Rhodesia Ian Smith, who became Prime Minister in 1964, declared unilateral independence from Britain in 1965. He articulated the meanings of an independent Rhodesia in the following year: ‘If Sir Winston Churchill were alive today, I believe he would probably emigrate to Rhodesia — because I believe that all those admirable qualities and characteristics of the British that we believe in, loved and preached to our children, no longer exist in Britain’. Through the novel meaning Smith assigned to emigration, he portrayed himself as defender of the British nation against weakness in the metropolis, situating Britishness in empire, away from home.

British returning ‘home’ in the context of decolonisation formed part of the larger migratory flow from African, Asian and Caribbean colonies to Britain in mid-century, including East-African Asian refugees fleeing from Kenya and Uganda in the
1960s. Africans, Asians and Caribbeans who migrated to Britain played a main role in a continued traffic back and forth to former colonies in the second half of the century: a movement facilitated by the development of cheap flights. Many journeys were made to visit families — visits that South Asians sometimes combined with tourism and pilgrimage.⁷⁹ There was a good deal of return migration, including Caribbeans who returned when they retired from work in Britain.⁸⁰ The traffic included bodies of the dead transported for burial back to the place from which individuals or families had originally migrated — a practice which, despite an increase in preference for local burial, remained the ‘norm’ for many British Muslims.⁸¹

Cheap flights not only facilitated traffics with former Asian and African colonies by black and Asian Britons, but also a movement involving some reorientation of British world views away from empire towards Europe: a sharp increase in British tourism to Europe from the 1960s. This increasingly gave Europe associations with leisure and pleasure, largely displacing attention from war and danger. The continent continued to be associated with war through memorialisation of both World Wars, involving journeys by Britons to visit battle sites or the graves of loved ones. The Cold War meant that a sense of threat and danger continued, but one that was now confined to Eastern Europe. But a major image of Europe, widely disseminated in mainstream media, was ‘the holiday’, with different destinations marketed in tourist brochures and advertisements as places of sun, beaches and sex, of quiet rurality or of high culture.

In the first half of the twentieth century, movements from Britain to the continent outside the purposes of war had been limited. Cyprus, Gibraltar and Malta were British colonies with a British colonial and armed services presence. Small communities of British, including retirees from imperial services, lived in a range of Mediterranean resorts including the French Riviera, Mallorca and Tuscany.⁸² Journeys were made to the continent by holiday-makers. Between the wars there was the phenomenon that Paul Fussell has called ‘literary travelling’.⁸³ But much travel to Europe was confined to a wealthy elite. The development of mass tourism from the 1960s was to holiday destinations that had previously been favoured by this elite, but also to new destinations — notably the Spanish Riviera which attracted increasing numbers of migrants as well as tourists. By 2006, the largest number of Britons who lived abroad — an estimated 1,300,00 — was in Australia, but the second largest number — an estimated 761,000 — was in Spain.⁸⁴ With the waning significance of national boundaries within the EU, British migrants had easier access to EU member-states than to the white Commonwealth, and invested in a variety of property in Europe — as first homes, second homes, holiday homes and retirement homes.

Despite the abolition of internal frontiers, the ‘Europe’ of the EU played comparatively little part in the development of mass tourism. This was largely a movement from Northwest Europe to the Southwest, with migrants from Northwest Europe, including British migrants, following the same direction. Migration to Spain, Portugal and Cyprus was established before these countries acceded to the EU.⁸⁵ Through these developments, the traffic to Europe which had been dominated by soldiers in the first half of the century came to be dominated by tourists and migrants and, despite the employment of many migrants in Europe, was associated with leisure, particularly in media images where migrants were ‘living the holiday’ or retiring to the sun.
Literature on Britons who migrated to Europe charts a range of attitudes and experiences. Some of these recall those satirised through the figures of Charters and Caldicott in *The Lady Vanishes*: a conviction of superiority. Others ranged from admiration for European culture and landscape, through attachment to places of settlement as ‘home’, to the adoption of an ‘enclave mentality’ separate from host cultures and languages. There is little attention to the racial dimensions of tourism and migration to Europe and the extent to which ‘enclaves’ were white. Karen O’Reilly’s work on the British on the Costa Del Sol in the 1990s notes that although they emphasised their migration as fun and leisure, they also worked hard to establish a community of Britons that celebrated a Britishness of the past, no longer represented by contemporary Britain which they saw as depressing and depressed. Such a view echoed the perceptions of white settler communities in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, situating Britishness away from home, although in this case in Europe rather than in empire.

In the Cold War era, Eastern Europe was outside the ‘Europe’ of tourism and migration. Its image of drab, oppressed and impoverished societies was very far from the sun and sex, quiet rurality or high culture used to market holiday destinations. The ‘Europe’ of Cold War divisions subsumed the distinctions between Northwest and Southwest Europe, apparent in tourist and migrant journeys, into a dominant distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ Europe. In a striking comment on the invention of the idea of ‘Eastern Europe’ in the eighteenth century, Larry Wolff suggests that uncertainty over the geographical border between Europe and Asia ‘encouraged the construction of Eastern Europe as a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, Europe but not Europe’. The Cold War narrative told a similarly paradoxical story. Behind the Iron Curtain were the brutality and oppression practised by anti-Christian totalitarian regimes, but also oppressed peoples who were deprived of European democracy and freedoms. But in a post-Cold War world, ‘Eastern Europe’ was increasingly incorporated into the ‘Europe’ of tourist brochures and cheap flights and became a destination for holidays, stag nights, and trips by football fans. Refugees who had arrived in Britain in the Second World War and its aftermath also participated in this traffic. Those who had not gone back on principle, or because of fear of the risks, particularly to their families, began visits to see their families and what one Polish man, despite many years of exile, continued to regard as ‘my own countryside’.

The turn to Europe, apparent in British tourism and migration from the 1960s not only involved a wide range of attitudes to the continent but also a range of transient lives. Holiday homes and second homes, the fruits of greater affluence and disposable income, blurred the boundaries between tourist and migrant and produced very different journeys from those of migrants to the Dominions earlier in the century where prospects of employment were highly significant, particularly for men. While holiday destinations in Europe in the first half of the century were mainly for the wealthy and a dominant association of ‘Europe’ was with war, through the publicity given to mass tourism and migration from the 1960s, a dominant association of ‘Europe’ was ‘playground’.

**Conclusion**
The Lady Vanishes directs considerable satire at Charters and Caldicott for their determined insularity. But this is in the context of a film that is critical of the policy of appeasing Nazi Germany, even if — to evade censorship — such criticism is necessarily oblique. Britons are shown in the film as initially reluctant to recognise the threat to their lives and slow to get involved, and their eventual engagement with continental Europeans is to resist this threat. The film, despite its comedy and fictional setting therefore reproduces the idea — so prominent in the first half of the century — that Europe was a sinister and dangerous place. An identification of the continent and its peoples as sinister and threatening was also prominent in this period in responses to many European migrant groups in Britain and to many European destinations, particularly in the dominant traffic of military journeys to a continent characteristically associated with war. In contrast, migrants and travellers within empire often saw their destinations as ‘home’ even when they had never been there before and were travelling vast distances. White migrants from the Dominions in Britain and British who migrated to the Dominions were relatively invisible by comparison with migrants from Europe and never associated with the threatening or sinister.

By the end of the twentieth century Britain, like many other EU countries, became a net importer of people. Numbers migrating from Britain to all destinations dwindled. Even so, there were considerable continuities in the twentieth-century history of transnational movements to and from Britain. The significance of European migration to Britain throughout the century is often neglected. British migration to the Commonwealth was also significant throughout the century. Considerable changes in the second half of the century — more substantial migration to Europe and more substantial black and Asian migration to Britain from empire — had precedents earlier in the century.

Within these continuities, there were marked changes in perceptions of home, colonial and foreign through which the sharp differentiation between traffics with Europe and with empire was eroded. The white Commonwealth lost its associations with Britishness and ‘home’. Europe lost many of its associations with war and with the threatening and sinister. As British tourism and migration to Europe burgeoned, the sense of a continent that was foreign diminished and some migrants regarded Europe as ‘home’. Charters and Caldicott in The Lady Vanishes did not stand for all Britons even in the first half of the century. From the 1960s, British attitudes to Europe became more diverse and were less likely to involve a recital of European failings. At the same time, European migrants in Britain acquired the invisibility that had characterised white Commonwealth migrants and visitors throughout the century.

The EU — often the yardstick against which British attitudes to Europe are measured — played comparatively little part in the process through which British world views were increasingly reoriented towards Europe. Both the rise in tourism and migration to Europe and the invisibility of European migrants in Britain predated British membership. Reorientation towards Europe also had limitations. By the end of the century, migration to the white Commonwealth had declined, but visits to the white Commonwealth burgeoned. The British departed from African and Asian colonies but considerable traffic with former colonies in these continents was maintained, particularly by black and Asian Commonwealth migrants in Britain and their descendants. Through the dismantling of imperial frontiers, Britishness as a
globalised identity collapsed but, by the end of the century, the impact of migration from the empire/Commonwealth meant that Britain, shorn of empire, increasingly embraced a multiracial identity at home.

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8 But see Angela Woollacott, To Try Her Fortune in London (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).


12 Woollacott, To Try Her Fortune, 154-5.

13 Ibid.


16 NA AIR 2/3654; NA MEPO 2/8614.
21 Woollacott, *To Try Her Fortune*.
24 Laura Tabili, “We Ask For British Justice”: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
30 Omissi, ‘Europe Through Indian Eyes’.
35 Lane, *Victims of Stalin and Hitler*, 219.
38 *Sunday Express*, 8 April 1945.
39 *Daily Mirror*, 20 July 1948.
41 NA, LAB 12/513.
49 Hall and Rose, *At Home With the Empire*, 4.
51 Bill Schwarz, ‘Crossing the Seas’, in Bill Schwarz (ed.), *West Indian Intellectuals in Britain* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003), 8.
52 Webster, *Imagining Home*, xviii.
56 Ibid., Chapter 6.
64 *British Social Attitudes: Focusing on Diversity* (London, Sage, 2000), 58.
69 Constantine, ‘British Emigration to the Empire/Commonwealth Since 1880: From Overseas Settlement to Diaspora’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 31 (2003), 27.
70 Constantine, ‘British Emigration’.
73 Hammerton and Thomson, *Ten Pound Poms*, 264.
74 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hu/in_depth/brits_abroad/html/default.stm
75 Richards, *Britannia’s Children*, 275-6.
77 Ibid., 239-42.
78 *Sunday Times*, 6 November 1966.

Humayun Ansari, ‘ “Burying the Dead”: Making Muslim Space in Britain’, Historical Research 80 (November 2007), 18-22.


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