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NATIONAL EVALUATION OF NEW DEAL FOR COMMUNITIES:

SCOPING REPORT

REVIEW OF MAJOR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND EVIDENCE BASE: CRIME DOMAIN

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DECEMBER 2001
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 Overview of the Report’s Contents

The evidence base review for the Crime Domain examined some of the leading theories used to explain the manifestation of crime (i.e. what makes some neighbourhoods and places more vulnerable to crime than others), presented information on levels of reported and unreported crime and discussed current policy initiatives aimed at preventing and reducing crime. Particular attention was paid to developments relevant to Area Based Initiatives (ABIs).

The extent of the evidence base on ‘what works’ in crime prevention was then examined. Variations in the quality and robustness of the evidence base was discussed and examples of best practice were identified drawing upon the Home Office’s ‘Toolkits’ for crime prevention and a comprehensive review of crime prevention evaluation studies carried out for the US National Institute of Justice. The latter identified crime prevention strategies that work, those that are promising and those that demonstrably do not work (Sherman et al 1998).

Current and forthcoming evaluations of crime prevention initiatives that NDC Partnerships might draw lessons from were identified and efforts to build a comprehensive evidence base on effective crime prevention measures (the Campbell Collaboration – www.campbell.gse.upenn.edu) were outlined.

Lessons were identified for the NDC evaluation teams in terms of known problems and pitfalls in conducting crime prevention evaluations and in obtaining consistent crime data. Lessons for partnerships were also defined, particularly, in relation to project management, maximising the positive impacts of crime prevention interventions and partnership working.

Where feasible and appropriate, the review also sought to identify the extent to which local authority areas with NDC programmes had been successful in securing funds through the Home Office’s Crime Reduction Programme. Particular attention was paid to the Reducing Burglary Initiative, Targeted Policing and the CCTV programme.

2. Summary of Key Points

This summary lists the main points to emerge from the review in terms of crime theory, crime statistics, policy developments, effectiveness of crime prevention strategies and lessons for evaluators and partnerships. This Executive Summary inevitably will be selective and the reader is referred to the main Crime Domain Evidence Review for further information.
Crime Theories

The occurrence of crime can be explained by the convergence of a motivated offender, a suitable target for the offender (e.g. a vulnerable person, or unprotected property) and the absence of capable guardians against crime (e.g. a lack of surveillance and intervention by those who can prevent or disrupt the commission of an offence). These three elements comprise the Routine Activities Theory of crime.

Policies aimed at preventing and reducing crime do so by exerting influence over one or more of these three factors. Thus surveillance may be increased to promote guardianship (e.g. by using CCTV, establishing active home watch or business watch schemes, employing Neighbourhood Wardens), targets may be protected (e.g. by fitting window locks, strengthening doors and other forms of ‘target hardening’), offenders may be arrested or diverted from criminal and anti-social behaviour.

Focusing on guardianship and the vulnerability of targets, is described by the term Situational Crime Prevention (SCP). The latter is about blocking crime opportunities, making crime more difficult, risky, less rewarding or less excusable. It includes reducing crime through improved environmental design that utilizes ‘defensible space architecture’ (e.g. street layouts, concealed spaces, escape routes). SCP is particularly relevant to area-based initiatives such as NDC because of their emphasis on making places safer in which to live, work or visit.

Crime prevention initiatives implemented as part of, or in addition to, area based regeneration schemes embrace situational approaches but also attempt to address some of the social and behavioural risk factors associated with offenders and those at risk of offending (e.g. youth diversion schemes, intensive supervision of offenders, rehabilitation programmes).

Reducing crime through de-motivating offenders and changing their lifestyle and behaviour is labour-intensive, very costly and can take many years to bear fruit. More immediate and achievable impacts for reducing crime can be realised by controlling and limiting crime opportunities since crime cannot occur without the physical opportunity to carry it out.

A criticism of SCP is that it merely displaces crime into other areas or switches in from one type of offence (e.g. domestic burglary) to another (e.g. theft of goods from cars). However, research evidence suggests that displacement is often exaggerated and that only a relatively small proportion of crimes prevented through effective crime prevention schemes are displaced.

The opposite to displacement, the diffusion of benefits, can also occur. This is where crime prevention measures in one location can lead to a reduction in crime or ‘diffusion of benefit’ in other nearby properties or places because offenders tend to overestimate the reach of the crime prevention measures that are implemented.
Crime Statistics

5.2 million offences were recorded by the police between 1st April 2000 and 31st March 2001 (down 2.5% on the previous year). Drug offences represent 2% of all offences, violent crime 14%, burglary 16%, vehicle crime 19%, other theft and other property offences 48%.

There have been falls in burglary (down 8% on 1999/2000) and vehicle crime (down 7%) but increases in robbery (up 13%) and violence against the person (up 3%).

Recorded crime data only provides part of the picture because a considerable amount of crime is unreported. There are also differences between the number of offences reported to the police and those that are recorded.

The latest British Crime Survey shows that only 45% of crime is reported to the police. Theft of vehicle and burglary are much more likely to be reported (90% and 84% of incidents, respectively) than common assault (39%) and theft from the person (35%).

The Home Office have introduced a new classification of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) Families comprising local authorities with broadly similar social and demographic characteristics. This will enable police forces and local authorities to compare their local crime statistics, crime and disorder strategies and performance with other ‘similar’ areas.

The 39 NDCs are located within 38 Local Authority (LA) areas. These 38 LAs span just 6 of the 13 CDRP Families that have been created. The majority of NDC local authorities belong to just 2 of the 13 Families (Families 2 and 4). These two Families were almost entirely composed of NDC local authorities.

The Family Classification enables other local authorities broadly similar to NDC local authority areas to be identified. It will also enable crime levels to be more directly compared between local authorities that have and those that do not have NDC programmes within their boundaries.

Crime Prevention Policy Relevant to ABIs

Crime prevention objectives and interventions feature in past regeneration initiatives such as the Estates Action Programme, Safer Cities and City Challenge and form part current urban policy, most notably, the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund (SRBCF). Reducing crime and drug abuse and improving community safety is a key objective of the sixth and final round of the SRBCF.

The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act introduced a joint statutory duty on local authorities and the police to produce Crime and Disorder Audits for their areas (i.e. the territory covered by local authority districts) together with Crime and Disorder Strategies
containing crime reduction targets and clear proposals (i.e. crime prevention interventions) for reaching them.

There will be a Crime and Disorder Audit and an accompanying Crime and Disorder Strategy for each of the 38 local authority areas containing an NDC. The audits which will be published on 1
st April 2002, will contain relevant information on levels of crime, fear of crime and community perceptions both at the district and intra-district level (often down to ward level) for each of the 38 NDC local authorities.

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act requires all local authorities to consider crime and disorder reduction while exercising all their activities. Thus, the reduction of crime and disorder has relevance to a very wide range of NDC area local authority functions and statutory services (e.g. encouraging the rapid repair of damage caused by vandalism, removal of graffiti, reducing the level of void properties, enforcing trading standards).

Specific programmes directed at reducing particular types of crime (i.e. in addition to NDC) most relevant to ABIs include: The Reducing Burglary Initiative, the Distraction Burglary Initiative, Targeted Policing, the CCTV Initiative, On Track: Families, Interventions in Schools, Locks for pensioners, Drug Arrest Referrals, Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women Initiative, The Youth Inclusion Programme, the Neighbourhood Wardens and the Street Wardens initiatives, the Retail Crime Initiative aimed at improving the security of small retailers in deprived areas.

A number of Reducing burglary Initiative (RBI) projects operate within the 38 NDC local authority areas. In total over £13.5 m of Home Office funding through Rounds 1,2 and 3 of the RBI was channelled into NDC local authorities. Further research is required to explore the extent to which RBI target areas coincide or are proximate to NDC neighbourhood boundaries.

Targeted Policing Initiative (TPI) projects have been implemented in five of the 28 NDC local authorities. In total, over £1.73m of Home Office funding has been provided in these areas for the schemes although additional resources have been levered in. Since TPI projects generally apply to policing practice across a wide geographical area, there is likely to be some influence on NDC communities in those Police Force Divisions or Basic Command Unit areas that have projects operating.

To date, CCTV schemes have been funded in every one of the NDC local authority areas with the exception of Norwich. The highest investment so far has been in Liverpool, Sandwell, Manchester and Bristol. However, many of the schemes are in town centres and are unlikely to affect, directly, levels of crime within NDC areas, although, a significant proportion of the initiatives are residential schemes. Where schemes are proximate to NDC areas or in cases where NDC areas are near to town centres that have schemes, impacts on crime might occur. One of the priorities in the main phase of the evaluation will be to determine the exact location of CCTV schemes and to identify their proximity to NDC project boundaries.
RBI, TPI and CCTV were not distributed evenly across the 38 NDC local authorities. A total of 9 out of the 38 NDC local authorities received over half (52%) of the funding on these three initiatives. They were Leicester, Birmingham, Lambeth, Liverpool, Manchester, Tower Hamlets, Bristol, Doncaster and Bradford. NDC local authorities with much lower levels of funding included Hammersmith and Fulham, Rochdale, Brighton, Hartlepool and Oldham. These were certainly not among the areas with the lowest crime.

Only one authority, Norwich, failed to receive any funding under any of the rounds of the three initiatives.

What works in Crime Prevention

Many of the crime programmes that have been implemented have not been evaluated sufficiently to generate the firm evidence needed to draw conclusions on their performance. Much of the evidence base is weak because findings are not corroborated through the use of control or comparison groups, sufficient pre and post implementation time periods, systematic testing of interventions at different locations, tests of statistical significance for observed crime reductions and an inability to deal with the confounding effects of multiple interventions.

There are numerous examples of ‘best practice’ that have been identified by bodies such as the Local Government Association, Nacro and the Audit Commission (see examples of good practice in partnership working, data sharing and effective approaches to crime prevention at www.audit-commission.gov.uk/comsafe). However, in the absence of rigorous analysis some of these examples may not always prove to be effective.

The most comprehensive evidence base on effective strategies put together so far, is a systematic review of over 500 scientific evaluations of crime prevention practices undertaken by the University of Maryland (Sherman et al 1998). This is continuously updated and can be interrogated by visiting the website on www.preventingcrime.org.

This research saw the development of a scoring system, (the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods) for measuring the robustness of claims made about effectiveness in evaluation studies and the confidence that can be placed in such claims. The scale ranges from level 1 (simple correlations between crime prevention measures and crime at a single point in time) through to 5 (complex analyses using policy and comparison groups across multiple time points).

The most effective strategies include:

- the issue of threats against landlords for not addressing drug problems on their premises is effective as a means of reducing drug dealing and crime in privately rented accommodation;
• extra police patrols in high crime hot spots reduce crime in these areas;

• targeting repeat offenders. Reducing the time spent on the streets of known high risk repeat offenders and monitoring them and returning them to prison more quickly than when they are not monitored reduces their crimes.

The least effective initiatives include:

• Neighbourhood Watch programmes organised by the police. These fail to reduce burglary and other target crimes especially in high crime areas where voluntary participation often fails;

• Arrests of juveniles for minor offences cause them to become more delinquent in the future than if police exercise discretion to merely warn them or use alternatives to formal charging;

• Increased arrests or raids on drug markets fail to reduce violent crime or disorder for more than a few days;

• Community mobilisation of residents' efforts against crime in high crime inner-city areas of concentrated poverty without the aid of those in a position of power outside the community fail to reduce crime in these areas.

A much larger list of ‘promising’ crime prevention strategies was identified. Those most relevant to ABIs include:

• Community policing with meetings to set priorities;
• Community based after school recreation programmes (may reduce local juvenile crime);
• Redesign of layouts of retail stores;
• Improved training and management of bar staff;
• Street closures, barricades and re-routing;
• Target hardening of parking meters and public telephones;
• Problems solving analyses using situational crime prevention techniques;
• Intensive supervision and after care of juvenile offenders.

The Home Office has recently consolidated information from the research literature on effective crime prevention strategies (including Home Office-funded research) and is disseminating this in the form of ‘evidence summary tables’ through its Crime Prevention Toolkits web site (address www.crimereduction.gov.uk). However, the recommended crime prevention strategies are not appraised using a system as rigorous as the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods adopted in the Sherman study.

The Home Office suggests that some interventions can be effective in tackling and reducing several types of crime. Four ‘general purpose’ measures were identified: CCTV, more secure design for houses, cars and goods, targeting of crime hot spots and
known offenders and preventing repeat victimisation. These can all be effective in reducing domestic burglary, vehicle crime, robbery and anti-social behaviour.

**Lessons for Evaluators and Partnerships**

The most important lessons for evaluators in conducting crime prevention evaluations include:

- Resisting pressure by implementers to report positive findings of evaluations;

- Being clear about the reasons behind an observed lack of impact associated with a crime prevention strategy. Schemes might fail because of a lack of successful implementation on the ground or because of contextual issues (the wrong environment for the scheme to work). It could also be the case that the measures used by the evaluation to quantify success are not sensitive enough or have been misdirected (measurement failure);

- Using theory to identify how crime prevention measures might be expected to bring about change;

- Identifying the mechanisms that are responsible for reducing crime not just the fact that crime has reduced;

- Identifying what it is about the context that has lead to the success or the failure of a scheme. Without sufficient information about the context, it is difficult for the evaluator to make recommendations about circumstances under which successful schemes might be replicated;

- Planning sufficiently early for residents’ survey in order to avoid sampling problems, inappropriate or poorly constructed questions and respondent problems (e.g. poor response rates, lack of cooperation);

- Being aware of technical difficulties in analysing crime data (e.g. separating random fluctuations in crime from real effects; taking into account regional and national crime trends and any changes in recording practices that may affect results; being aware of problems in interpreting change when initial crime rates are very low (more difficult to achieve further reductions) or very high (may be a statistical artefact or blip).

**Key lessons on crime data acquisition include:**

- Allow sufficient time to negotiate access to recorded crime data and agree data protection arrangements. This can be a long drawn out process especially where disaggregate data (i.e. individual crime records) are required (e.g. for identifying repeat burglary and mapping displacement);
• Be aware that the size of police divisions and BCUs may vary dramatically between constabularies, thereby, potentially limiting the degree to which accurate comparisons can be made between schemes located in different police force areas. As the 39 NDC projects are located in 18 constabularies, there will be a need to collect data from forces operating different systems and with different recording practices. A full awareness of any differences will need to be gained during the course of the evaluation.

• In order to provide scientific and reliable results, any evaluation conducted must conform to what Sherman et al. (1998) define as a level 3 evaluation (or higher). For instance, in relation to crime trends, there must be comparisons between two or more comparable areas, one with and one without an NDC programme. Ideally, the evaluation would also seek to control for other factors (level 4 evaluation), and seek to compare multiple areas with and without an NDC programme (level 5).

For Partnerships, the main lessons are:

• Ensure clarity in the role of individuals, sufficient pre-project planning and preparation and the development of a strategic overview of projects that identifies how, where and when different interventions interact to produce desired outcomes (e.g. reductions in crime).

• Provide adequate and appropriate staffing resources (i.e. to ring fence project managers’ time) to ensure that project objectives are deliverable, and implemented effectively;

• Be clear about inter-agency relations (whilst recognising that these may evolve over time), and ensure that all parties are aware of the aims and objectives of the project, and precisely what their role should be.

• Ensure that the partnerships are aware of potential bottlenecks or issues that may impede progress from the outset so that they may plan accordingly. This can be particularly problematic with situational crime prevention measures that involve modifications to the physical environment (e.g. the fitting of gates at the rear of alleyways – ‘alleygating’).
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1. Introduction

The aim of this review is to produce a guide or map for those less familiar with the approaches and strategies to reduce crime and the fear of crime that they can use to navigate around what is a broad and often complex field. The primary focus of the review is on area-based approaches to crime prevention and community safety and the extent to which these have been successful.

After an initial examination of theories and concepts of crime most relevant to area based initiatives and the distribution of crime in Section 2, the review will then describe recent and current policy initiatives on crime prevention and community safety that impact upon deprived communities (Section 3). This will be accompanied by signposting the reader to relevant documents and websites where more information can be found.

The evidence base on crime prevention and some current and future developments and evaluation research will be outlined in Sections 4 and 5. Section 4 will identify crime prevention approaches relevant to area based regeneration approaches – the very strategies and interventions about which evidence on performance and effectiveness (‘What works, how and why’) is sought. Results from the research and evaluation literature that identifies best and less than satisfactory practice will be presented. This, by necessity, will be selective but, once again, sources and references will be provided for further reading.

Information about current and forthcoming research and evaluation studies on crime prevention will be presented in Section 5. This will also report on the latest developments aimed at generating a ‘one-stop-shop’ for accessing information on crime and crime prevention (the Campbell Collaboration).

Section 6 will set out the lessons for the NDC evaluation team, particularly in terms of data collection, quality and analysis and methodology. Section 7 will explore lessons for NDC partnerships implementing crime reduction initiatives. Finally, Section 8 will draw some overall conclusions from the review.
2. Theories, Concepts and Manifestations of Crime

2.1 Theories and concepts of crime

The much-quoted phrase 'tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime' implies two approaches to crime reduction. One is to target the opportunity for committing crimes so that the risks to offenders and the effort expended by them in doing so is increased (tough on crime). The other, implies that action needs to be taken, not only to change the attitude and behaviour of potential and actual criminals, but also, the underlying factors that drive them to pursue criminal careers (tough on the causes of crime). These factors may include social deprivation, unemployment, adverse housing conditions, poor parenting and the lack of education.

Crime prevention initiatives implemented as part of, or in addition to, area based regeneration schemes embrace approaches that reduce the opportunities for committing crime (e.g. through making people, properties and places less vulnerable) and address some of the social and behavioural risk factors associated with offenders and those at risk of offending (e.g. youth diversion schemes, intensive supervision of offenders, rehabilitation programmes).

However, our understanding of crime prevention requires an appreciation of the main theories of crime. These can be used, to some extent, not only to explain why crimes occur, where they occur and when, but also, to indicate what can be done to target crime in order to prevent it or to reduce it. The two are inextricably linked in that crime prevention, to be successful, needs to be based on sound theory, whereas, theory needs to be constructed from empirical evidence of the nature, scale and distribution of crime, including the insights provided through successful and unsuccessful attempts to prevent and reduce it.

For any crime to occur there needs to be a coming together of three elements. There needs to be a motivated offender, a suitable target for the offender (e.g. a vulnerable person, or unprotected property) and the absence of capable guardians against crime (e.g.
a lack of surveillance and intervention by those who can prevent or disrupt the commission on an offence). Suitable targets for crime may be a person or an item of property whose position in space or time puts that person or object at more or less risk of criminal attack. Capable guardians are not restricted to police officers or security guards but include anyone whose presence or proximity discourages a crime from happening and may include housewives, neighbours, employees who by just being present at a given place and time serve as guardians against crime.

The importance of the conjunction of these three elements was identified by Cohen in Felson 1979 in their paper on routine activities and crime. The components of the Routine Activities Theory can be viewed as a ‘crime triangle’ as shown in the diagram in Figure 2.1.

**Figure 2.1. The Routine Activities Theory of Predatory Crime**

The number of caretakers, acting as guardians, who are at home during the day has decreased because of an increased participation of women into the work force. Homes are often left unguarded while both parents are at work and children are either in day care or at school. Also, the growth of suburban living and the declining rate of traditional
neighbourhoods have decreased the number of familiar guardians, such as family, neighbours, or friends.

Policies aimed at preventing and reducing crime generally do so by exerting influence over any one or more of the sides of this triangle. For example, one way to disrupt the conjunction of these three elements would be by improving surveillance and helping to ensure that sufficient ‘guardians’ are around at specific times of day to make it more difficult for a motivated offender to target a suitable victim, perpetrate a crime (e.g. robbery, theft, assault) and make an escape. Guardianship can be increased by establishing an active home watch scheme, through the use of a concierge, porters and wardens on the entrance to property schemes, through installing CCTV cameras and through encouraging people to live in and to visit town centres so that there is a continuous flow of ‘capable guardians’ through such areas (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997). This might reduce crime through making it more difficult for offenders to commit an offence without being seen or challenged.

Reducing crime through improved surveillance or guardianship is particularly relevant to area-based regeneration programmes because of their emphasis on making places safer in which to live, work or visit whether these be town centres (Tanner and Oc, 1998) industrial estates and entertainment foci or residential areas.

Another approach is through making potential victims less vulnerable by protecting them from motivated offenders. This might include protecting their homes from burglary through so called ‘target hardening’ measures such as installing window locks, intruder alarms, reinforcing rear doors, placing gates at the entrance and exit points of alleys to the rear of terraced properties (‘alleygating’). Making residents more aware about crime risks and providing them with crime prevention advice to encourage them to take sensible precautions and to protect themselves goes hand in hand with ‘target hardening’.

The vulnerability of items of property can be explained by four key factors that influence the offender’s decision to target them. These are represented by the acronym VIVA,
namely, Value, Inertia, Visibility and Access. Their importance is set out in Box 2.1, below.

BOX 2.1 Factors influencing offenders choice of target

Offenders will only be interested in targets that they *value*, for whatever reason. Thus the latest popular CD hit will be stolen more from record stores than a Beethoven CD of roughly equal monetary value, since most offenders would like to have the former but not the latter. *Inertia* is simply the weight of the item. Thus small electronic goods are stolen more than weighty items, unless these latter are wheeled or motorised to overcome their weight. *Visibility* refers to the exposure of theft targets to offenders, as when someone flashes money in public or puts valuable goods by the window. *Access* refers to street patterns, placement of goods near the door, or other features of everyday life making it easy for offenders to get to targets.


The importance of this analysis in explaining changes in levels of acquisitive property crime is that crime can increase *without* more offenders if there are more targets, or if offenders can get to targets with no guardians present. Significantly, it also means that changes in the supply and distribution of goods (e.g. mobile phones, car air bags, DVD players) can produce more opportunities for crime (and a higher volume of crime) without necessarily any *increase* in criminal motivation or the number of offenders.

In terms of effective crime prevention measures within the context of area regeneration schemes such as the NDC, very little can be done to influence vulnerability of goods in terms of their availability, value and portability. However, regeneration schemes can influence factors such as access to goods in terms of protection (within homes, public buildings and businesses), surveillance and through improved environmental design that utilizes ‘defensible space architecture’ (e.g. street layouts, concealed spaces, escape routes). Additionally, influence on opportunity can be exerted through well-targeted problem oriented policing schemes that may be resourced using matched police force, Home Office and regeneration project funding.
The manipulation of these two sides of the Routine Activities triangle (see Figure 2.1), namely, guardianship and the vulnerability of targets, is described by the term **Situational Crime Prevention**. The latter is about blocking crime opportunities, making crime more difficult, risky, less rewarding or less excusable. Examples include:

- Making properties more difficult to burgle
- Designing anti-theft devices into cars
- Putting holograms and photos on credit cards to reduce forgery

The third course of action implied by the Routine Activities model is through influencing the offender. Reducing crime through de-motivating offenders and changing their lifestyle and behaviour is labour-intensive, very costly and can take many years to bear fruit. In Felson and Clarke’s view ‘statistical analyses to unravel individual causes of crime are highly complicated and seem to go in circles. We see no immediate prospect of success in resolving the many controversies about what causes individual crime propensities’ (Felson and Clarke, 1998, p.2). However, criminology theory tends to pay more attention to individual behaviour and to explanations of crime that focus on why individuals are more or less criminally inclined than to the environmental circumstances that provide opportunities for crime. On the other hand since crime cannot occur without the physical opportunity to carry it out, it follows that more immediate and achievable impacts for reducing crime can be realised by controlling and limiting crime opportunities.

A number of other relevant theories have been developed that complement Routine Activities Theory. A full enunciation of these theories lies beyond the scope of this review. Brief descriptions of them appear in Box 2.2. As with Routine Activities Theory, their importance lies, not only, in explaining how and why the vulnerability that leads to crime occurs, but also, what can be done through preventative measures to reduce susceptibility and, thereby, reduce crime.

Identifying and exploiting opportunities to reduce crime requires some careful thought and analysis of different situations. Some situations can facilitate crime. For example, the design, lay out and management of public houses can lead violence but also can be
engineered to prevent it. The widespread availability of handguns can lead to high homicide rates (e.g. in the US). Other situations and crime reduction opportunities may be highly specific. For example, devices designed to prevent stealing a car will not necessarily prevent it being broken into and goods stolen.
### BOX 2.2 Additional Theories of Crime and Crime Prevention

#### Rational Choice Theory
Rational choice theory looks at the way in which offenders make choices about targets of crime by ‘seeing the world’ from the offender’s perspective. Costs and benefits of committing a crime are weighed up including the chances of apprehension, the costs associated with the journey to crime or the expected reward from a particular offence, and the scenario with the highest net benefit is chosen. Each offender will make a different assessment depending on the offence. For example, joy riders may pick a car with good acceleration that is fun to drive, while parts “choppers” may pick an older car whose parts may be valuable for resale. Those simply wanting to drive home may pick the car most convenient to steal. *An awareness of these decision processes is helpful in targeting preventative measures in NDC areas.*

#### Crime Pattern Theory
This explains how people and things involved in crime move about in space and time. Central to the theory are the notions of ‘nodes’ ‘paths’ and ‘edges’. Nodes are departure and arrival points (e.g. stations, bus stops, home, work, school, leisure facility locations). Paths are the journeys between nodes. Each offender searches for crime targets around personal activity nodes and the paths among them. Paths are often closely related to where people fall victims to crime. Edges are boundaries of areas where people live, work, shop, seek entertainment. Some crimes are more likely to occur at the edges – such as racial attacks, robberies, or shoplifting – because people from different neighbourhoods who do not know each other come together at edges. Crime pattern theorists generate crime maps for different hours of the day and days of the week, linking crime to commuter flows, school children being let out, bars closing, or any other process that moves people among nodes and along paths. *Monitoring patterns of crime and hot spots within NDC areas will enable partnerships to keep abreast of changing conditions and emerging problems.*

#### Crime Attractors, Generators and Detractors
Brantingham and Brantingham (1995) defined places as ‘crime attractors’ that are locations, sites, properties that draw people in or bring people together who, if it were not for the location, would not be together. A pub might be used to fence stolen goods. As outsiders hear about it and decide to go there, it becomes a crime attractor. ‘Crime generators’, become areas of high activity as a side product of their levels of accessibility to the public. A school would be an example of a crime generator. A crime detractor refers to a location that discourages offenders and offending. A stable business, the presence of middle aged women, mixes of activities, or easy natural surveillance can have such a positive consequence. Urban areas can be viewed as a ‘patchwork of crime generators, crime attractors, crime detractors, and neutral areas’. *Identifying properties and sites that serve as crime attractors and generators can inform the targeting and re-targeting of crime prevention efforts within NDC areas.*
Social Disorganisation Theory
Social disorganisation has been defined by Bursik (1988) as 'the inability of local communities to realise the common goals of their residents or solve commonly experienced problems'. Sampson (1993) has identified three measures of social disorganisation; the inability to supervise and control teenage peer groups (especially gangs), the absence of local friendship and acquaintanceship networks and the absence of local participation in formal and voluntary organisations. Thus, areas that are 'socially disorganised' lack well defined social networks and their residents share very few common interests. Socially disorganised areas that lack ‘social cohesion’ generally have poor guardianship and higher than expected levels of crime and disorder (e.g. Curry and Spergel, 1988; Evans, 1989;Hirschfield and Bowers, 1997). Building social cohesion within NDC areas will potentially have positive ‘spillover effects’ in raising guardianship against crime. How far this is and is not realised will need to be carefully monitored.

Further details about criminological theories can be found at http://people.ne.mediaone.net/dianedemelo/crime/index.html

Situations and opportunities are often concentrated in time and space. A given location may be unfavourable for crime at one time but ideal for crime but another. For instance, an area that is primarily a business district during the day (with low crime) may become an entertainment area during the night (with a higher risk of theft and assault). Putting a secondary school next to a shopping parade may create opportunities for shoplifting, vandalism and truancy. Removing one or two drugs houses or badly run pubs can change the whole complexion of a neighbourhood. New roads or bus routes may create new crime risks in areas they touch while closing down crime opportunities in areas they cut off.

Some examples of how situational crime prevention can reduce opportunities for crime are shown in Box 2.3 below.

Some of the methods that have been adopted to implement the situational preventative approach include:

- Defensible space architecture
- Crime prevention through environment design (CPTED)
- Problem-oriented policing (POP)
The origins of situational crime prevention approaches within urban planning that relate directly to housing and the built environment, can be traced to Oscar Newman’s Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design. (1972). In this work, he puts forward an alternative for the design of urban environments, which he felt would lead to safer housing. Newman noted three criteria that he felt could increase the rate of crime in a residential housing estate:

- anonymity;
- lack of surveillance from residential blocks;
- availability of escape routes.

Newman was particularly concerned with anonymity, noting that people no longer had a sense of belonging to a ‘community’. From this he developed the idea of ‘defensible space’

“defensible space is a surrogate term for a range of mechanisms, real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence and improved opportunities for surveillance, that combine and bring an environment under the control of residents.” (Newman, 1972, p.3)

The principal ideas emerging from Newman’s work is the importance of natural surveillance. Whilst his work has been criticised by crime prevention and planning authors alike, his ideas and concepts have been used in both the ‘Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design’ (CPTED) and more widely in situational approaches to crime prevention.

The CPTED approach was developed at the same time as Newman formulated his ideas of ‘defensible space’. Extending beyond merely the residential environment, the CPTED approach promotes the idea that the environment can be manipulated to condition people’s behaviour so that crime, and the fear of crime, are reduced. Quality of life in this approach is apposite. The main idea is to focus upon opportunity for crime. It comprises of three strategies; natural access control; natural surveillance; and territorial enforcement.
BOX 2.3 Strategies for reducing Crime through Situational Prevention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase the perceived effort of crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Harden targets: <strong>steering column locks, anti-robbery screens</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Control access to targets: <strong>entry phones, electronic access to garages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Deflect offenders from targets: <strong>bus stop location, street closings, segregation of rival fans</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Control crime facilitators: <strong>photos on credit cards, plastic beer glasses in pubs</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase the perceived risks of crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Screen entrances and exits: <strong>electronic merchandise tags, baggage screening</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Formal surveillance: <strong>red light and speed cameras, security guards</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Surveillance by employees: <strong>park attendants, CCTV on double deck buses</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Natural surveillance: <strong>street lighting, defensible space architecture</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reduce the anticipated rewards of crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. Remove targets: <strong>phone cards, removable car radios, women’s refuges</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Identify property: <strong>vehicle licensing, property marking, car parts marking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Reduce temptation: <strong>rapid repair of vandalism, off-street parking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Deny benefits: <strong>ink merchandise tags, PIN for car radios, graffiti cleaning</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remove excuses for crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. Set rules: <strong>hotel registration, customs declaration, codes of conduct</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Control disinhibitors: <strong>drinking age laws, car ignition breathalyser, V-chip in TV</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Assist compliance: <strong>litter bins, public lavatories, easy library check-out</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One of the arguments that is used against situational crime prevention is that it merely displaces crime into other areas or switches in from one type of offence (e.g. domestic burglary) to another (e.g. theft of goods from cars).

A variety of different types of displacement can occur (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2000; Barr and Pease, 1990; see also Hakim and Rengert, 1981). For example, offenders may choose to commit crimes in different areas (geographical displacement), or cease to commit one type of crime but increase their activities in another type of offence (crime switch), or they may continue to commit a particular crime type but simply change the way in which they go about offending, for example, changing the targets that they would normally select (target-switch) or by using a different Modus Operandi (tactical-switch: Cornish and Clarke, 1989). Conversely, it is also possible that crime reduction schemes may have a diffusion of benefit (also known as the ‘free rider effect’; see Miethe, 1991; see also Clarke and Weisburd, 1994), reducing the risk of victimisation for potential
targets that are within close proximity of the target area, or that closely match them in some way (e.g. virtual communities).

The various ways in which crime displacement can occur are shown in Box 2.4

There is a small but growing body of evidence that displacement, where it does occur is often negligible and is usually outweighed by the number of crimes prevented where appropriate schemes have been successfully implemented. As Sherman et al observe:

‘Fear of displacement is often based on the assumption that offenders are like predatory animals (they will do whatever it takes to commit crimes just as a rat will do whatever it takes to steal food from the cupboard). …. Reviews of empirical studies examining place-focused prevention, police enforcement, and other preventive tactics in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, continental Europe, and Australia, find that there is often no displacement, but when displacement occurs it does not overwhelm other gains from blocking crime opportunities (Cornish and Clark 1987; Barr and Pease 1990; Eck 1993; Hesseling 1995). There is no evidence to suggest that these interventions increase crime by displacing it. … Concern about displacement is usually based more on pessimism than empirical fact. (Sherman, et al 1998, Chapter 7, page 49).

**BOX 2.4 Mechanisms of Crime Displacement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- <em>Committing the same crime in a different place</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime may be displaced to either:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Adjacent areas or 2) Similar areas which are not necessarily adjacent (e.g. Student areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <em>Committing the same crime at a different time</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Substitution - Time of day and day of week, where measures are time-based, e.g. lighting, patrols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Deferment - Time delay while offenders acquire skills necessary to circumvent preventive measure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Tactical**
- *Committing the same crime in a different way*
  1) Change in point / method of entry - eg. front / rear, window / door etc.
  2) Change to artifice burglary.

**Change in Type of Goods Stolen**
Substitution - different types of property stolen in response to preventive measures aimed at making stolen property easier to trace.

**Target**
- *Same type of crime committed against a different target*
  1) Substitution of a non-target hardened property in the same area.
  2) Substitution of a different target group, when preventive measures are directed at a specific group e.g. students or elderly.

**Crime Switch**
- *to any other type of crime but most likely similar*

**Perpetrator Switch**
- *Offenders ‘removed’ replaced by new supply*

**Outlet Switch**
- *offenders seek alternative outlets for disposing of property*

As discussed above, measures in one location can lead to a “diffusion of benefits” to other nearby properties or places or indeed points in time because offenders seem to overestimate the reach of the crime prevention measures that are implemented (Clarke and Weisburd 1994). Schardin (1992) reported that when magnetic tags were put in books in a university library, book theft declined. But so did the theft of audio and video tapes which were not tagged. Thieves apparently were unaware of which items were protected. Diffusion of benefits has also been found in projects targeting repeat domestic burglary (Pease, 1998). Moreover, there is good reason to believe that reductions in crime opportunity can drive down larger crime rates (Felson and Clarke, 1998). Displacement specifically in the context of more recent research carried out by the authors discussed further in Section 4, below.

The following section will present data concerned with national trends in police recorded crime rates, reported crime rates (British Crime Survey) and peoples self reports regarding ‘fear of crime’. The purpose of doing so is to give the reader an accurate picture of what types of crime are particularly prevalent, and the public’s reaction to crime. To anticipate the results that follow, this may dispel some myths as to what are the most prevalent crimes, and how the public actually perceive their risks of being a
victim of different types of crime. It will also illustrate the differences that are apparent for police recorded crime rates and reported crime rates as generated by the British Crime Survey, and provide reasons for these differences.

2.2 Reported and Unreported Crime

Information on recorded crime is published annually by the Home Office for England and Wales, Government Office Region, Police Force Area (PFA), Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) areas, CDRP Families (i.e. ‘similar’ groups of local authorities) and for Basic Command Units (BCUs) within PFAs.

The most recent series of published recorded crime statistics (July 2001) showed that the police recorded 5.2 million offences in the 12 months to March 2001, a fall of 2.5 per cent over the previous twelve months. There were falls in 34 of the 43 forces.

The share of all crime represented by individual categories of crime appears in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Recorded crime by offence group, 12 months to March 2001

Acquisitive property crime (vehicle crime, burglary, other property offences) accounted for most of the offences. Drug offences accounted for just 2% of all recorded crime.
The number of recoded offences is shown in Table 2.1. Violence against the person was up 3 per cent, robberies rose 13 per cent, but sexual offences fell by 1 per cent in the 12 months to March 2001. Burglary and vehicle crime both fell at a faster rate than the previous year. Burglary fell by 8 per cent, including a 9 per cent fall in domestic burglary. Thefts of and from vehicles fell by 7 per cent.

### Table 2.1 Total recorded crime by offence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence group</th>
<th>Number of offences and percentages</th>
<th>12 months ending</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 2000</td>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against the person</td>
<td>581,036</td>
<td>600,873</td>
<td>19,837</td>
<td>(78,248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>37,792</td>
<td>37,299</td>
<td>-493</td>
<td>(1,618)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>84,277</td>
<td>95,154</td>
<td>10,877</td>
<td>(17,442)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total violent crime</td>
<td>703,105</td>
<td>733,326</td>
<td>30,221</td>
<td>(97,308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>906,468</td>
<td>836,027</td>
<td>-70,441</td>
<td>(46,716)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total theft &amp; handling stolen goods</td>
<td>2,223,620</td>
<td>2,145,372</td>
<td>-78,248</td>
<td>(32,181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of and from vehicles</td>
<td>1,043,918</td>
<td>968,447</td>
<td>-75,471</td>
<td>(33,808)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud and forgery</td>
<td>334,773</td>
<td>319,324</td>
<td>-15,449</td>
<td>(55,270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal damage</td>
<td>945,682</td>
<td>960,087</td>
<td>14,405</td>
<td>(66,096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total property crime</td>
<td>4,410,543</td>
<td>4,260,810</td>
<td>-149,733</td>
<td>(106,831)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug offences</td>
<td>121,866</td>
<td>113,458</td>
<td>-8,408</td>
<td>(14,079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other notifiable offences</td>
<td>65,671</td>
<td>63,237</td>
<td>-2,434</td>
<td>(-2,036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total all offences</td>
<td>5,301,165</td>
<td>5,170,831</td>
<td>-130,354</td>
<td>(192,096)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Change between 1998/99 and 1999/00 in brackets.

**Source: Home Office 2001 Recorded Crime Statistics**

Recorded crime data only provides part of the picture because a considerable amount of crime is unreported. There are also differences between the number of offences reported to the police and those that are recorded.

The British Crime Survey (BCS), which is managed and analysed by the Home Office, provides estimates of the ‘true’ extent of crime and generates valuable insights into patterns of, and changes in victimisation. The crime figures produced by the BCS differ from those collated by the police because the crime count is compiled by asking individuals about their experience of crime irrespective of whether they reported this to
the police. This is referred to as a victimisation survey. Thus, for the crime types considered, the BCS provides valuable data concerning the under-reporting of crime.

Figure 2.3 shows the proportion of BCS incidents reported to the police in 1999 and 2000. The figure identifies the percentage for each crime category who reported the crime to the police. Overall, the majority of crime is not reported, although the last year has seen an increase in reporting from 41% to 45% for all comparable crime and 39% to 42% for all BCS crime respectively. Importantly, the under-reporting of crime varies between offence types, meaning that for some crimes the level of under-reporting is relatively minimal whereas for others it is severe.

Among the most under-reported crimes were common assault and theft from the person. Theft of vehicle and burglary with loss were much more likely to be reported (90% and 84% of all incidents, respectively in 2000).

For violent crime, in the 2001 BCS only around 45% of crimes recorded in the BCS were reported to the police. In addition, it is also clear that the number of violent crimes reported to the police has increased since 1981 (30% of all violent crime), which indicates a clear change in the publics’ reporting behaviour. The general trend observed for all violent crimes was also apparent for domestic violence, for which around 20% of incidents were reported to the police in 1981, whereas approximately 43% were reported to the police in the year 2000.
Comparing the 2001 survey with results from earlier BCS ‘sweeps’ shows that:

- BCS crime has fallen by a third between 1995 and 2000, with burglary and vehicle-related thefts both declining by 39% and violence by 36%.

- Over the same 5 year period police-recorded crime has also fallen, being down by close to 10%.

- Between 1999 and 2000 there has been the largest ever annual decrease in BCS crime (12%) with large falls for burglary (17%), vehicle thefts (11%) and violence (19%).

- This is the third successive sweep of the BCS where the overall level of household and personal crime has fallen.

- The overall victimization rate is at its lowest since the survey's inception in 1981

The greater decline in BCS crime as compared with police-recorded crime can be largely explained by increases in police recording of crimes reported to them. This may have
been prompted by guidance from ACPO (1995, 2001) and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC, 1996).

Increased levels of home and vehicle security are very likely to have contributed to these reductions. Local policing and crime reduction initiatives may have also played a part, such as the statutory local crime partnerships introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the various initiatives funded by the Crime Reduction Programme and the efforts of police forces in response to new performance targets. Relevant policies are discussed in detail in Section 3, below.

In contrast to previous sweeps, the BCS will, from 2001 onwards be conducted on an annual basis and, the sample size has been increased from around 20,000 respondents to around 40,000, increasing the reliability of the survey. For methodological reasons (see Kershaw et al., 2001: p. iii), the data currently available for the year 2000 are for a more limited sample of 8,985 respondents only. It is anticipated that analyses based on the full sample will be published in the summer of 2002.

**Domestic Burglary**

Table 2.2 shows the number of burglaries (in thousands) estimated to have been committed in England and Wales in 1997 and 2000. It also shows the percentage change over time for the BCS, and where available, for recorded crime. It is clearly evident that there has been a substantial decrease in the number of burglaries identified by the BCS over this time period. It is also apparent that this change exceeds that suggested by recorded crime figures. Possible reasons for the differences in the percentage change between data sets include potential changes in reporting behaviour on the part of the public, and in police recording practices. Notwithstanding these differences, both data sets illustrate that there has been a large reduction in this type of crime.
Table 2.2 Number of BCS incidents of burglary (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>% change BCS</th>
<th>% change recorded crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary Dwelling</td>
<td>1628</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>-35%</td>
<td>-11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary attempts</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>-38%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary attempts and no loss</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>-32%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary with entry</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>-32%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary with loss</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>-39%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to examining levels of victimisation, the BCS also considers the fear of crime. In relation to burglary, for the 2001 BCS, although only around 3.4% of households interviewed had been burgled, 24% reported that they thought it was likely that they would be burgled over the course of the following year (21% thought it was fairly likely, whereas 3% thought it very likely). 16% of respondents (compared to 19% for those sampled in 1997) reported that they were very worried about burglary, an additional 36% reported that they were fairly worried about this type of crime. Thus, although burglary rates are falling on a national level, it is apparent that the fear of burglary remains a concern for the general public.

**Vehicle crime**

Table 2.3 shows that there have also been reductions in levels of vehicle crime. Again, it is evident that the change over time is more dramatic for the BCS compared to police recorded crime data. In relation to respondent’s perception of the risk of car crime for the 2001 BCS, just over 30% of car owners believed that they were likely to be victims of car crime during the course of the next year. Over 50% of car owners reported that they were worried about car crime.
Table 2.3 Number of BCS incidents of vehicle related crime (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>% change BCS</th>
<th>% change recorded crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All vehicle thefts</strong></td>
<td>3461</td>
<td>2619</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft from</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td>1626</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>-3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempts of &amp; from</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>-30%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Violent crime**

Compared to 1997, in line with other crime types, there was a substantial decrease in the number of violent crimes recorded in the 2001 BCS (Table 2.4). In particular, there were significantly less incidents of domestic violence. However, these data reflect changes at the national rather than local level and for the NDC evaluation it is important that crime is monitored at the local level.

Table 2.4 Number of BCS incidents of violent crime (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>% change BCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All BCS violence</strong></td>
<td>3387</td>
<td>2618</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>-40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Racially motivated crime**

The BCS measures the incidence of racially motivated crimes by asking respondents to indicate for each crime reported, whether they believe the incident was racially motivated. From 1994 onwards, this question has been asked of all respondents. Some of the results of the analyses conducted by Clancey et al. (2001) will be summarised here.

First, Clancey et al.’s findings confirmed the results of previous research, demonstrating that the majority of racially motivated crimes take the form of violence or threats. Second, the risk of being the victim of a racially motivated crime is low for white people, being greatest for Pakistani/Bangladeshi people followed by Indian and Black people. Third, between 1995 and 1999 the number of racially motivated crimes fell by 28 per
cent, a figure that exceeds the fall in the overall rate of BCS crime (22%). This latter finding is in contrast to police recorded crime figures, which have shown an increase over the same period. These differences reflect the fact that more crimes are now reported to and recorded by the police.

The BCS also provides useful information concerning the fear of racially motivated assaults. For instance, respondents are asked how worried they are ‘about being subject to a physical attack because of their skin colour, ethnic origin or religion’ (Kershaw et al., 2000: p. 52). Unfortunately, at this moment in time no data are available concerning this issue for the BCS 2001. However, it is clear from all previous sweeps of the BCS that Black (51% in BCS 2000) and Asian (60% in BCS 2000) respondents express more fear of being the victim of a racially motivated assault than do white (12% in 2000 BCS) respondents. It is also evident that the former groups (23%-27% respectively) tend to be ‘very worried’ about this issue more frequently than the latter (7%). Thus, at the national level at least, it would appear that the fear of racially motivated attacks is of serious concern amongst Asian and Black people.

**Anti Social Behaviour**

Information on anti-social behaviour and incivilities comes from police calls for service information (command and control data). Data for recent years indicate that there may have been an upward trend in anti-social behaviour over recent years:

- Disorder offences represent a growing proportion of total police incidents. Calls to the police for these offences increased by 19% in 1995-98; (Audit commission 1999)
- Local authorities reported an increase of 127% in the number of possession actions for anti-social behaviour commenced per 1000 tenancies between 1996-1997 & 1998. This may be due to recent legislation or increased awareness of the problem
- The Chartered Institute of Environmental Health Officers reported in 1997 that complaints about neighbours had risen by 50% since 1993
- 80% of social landlords said that legal action was used more frequently in cases of anti-social behaviour now than five years ago.
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) Families

In order to facilitate comparisons in levels of recorded crime between different areas, the Home Office commissioned a group of academics to group together local authorities and BCUs into a smaller number of families using a technique known as cluster analysis (Leigh et al, 2000). The latter enables areas to be grouped together on the basis of their degree of similarity with each other across a range of variables. The areas making up each family would be broadly similar in social and demographic composition, thereby, enabling police forces and local authorities to compare their local crime statistics, crime and disorder strategies and performance with other ‘similar’ areas. Thus CDRPs could identify which Partnerships in their family have the lowest crime rates and, over time, are most successful at reducing crime, so that lessons on best practice can be learned.

A total of 13 Families was identified each, on average, containing 29 local authorities. The full list of family members appears in Appendix 2. The 38 NDC local authority areas span just 6 of the 13 Families. Their distribution is shown in Box 2.5, below. The majority of NDC local authorities belonged to just 2 Families (numbers 2 and 4). Moreover, these two Families were almost entirely composed of NDC local authorities.

The utility of the Family Classification for the NDC evaluation is twofold. Firstly, it enables other local authorities broadly similar to NDC local authority areas to be identified. Secondly, it will enable crime levels to be more directly compared between local authorities that have and those that do not have NDC programmes within their boundaries.
**BOX 2.5 Distribution of NDC Local Authority Areas across Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnership Families**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family 2</th>
<th>Family 3</th>
<th>Family 4</th>
<th>Family 6</th>
<th>Family 10</th>
<th>Family 13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brent</td>
<td>Hammersmith/ Fulham</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Doncaster</td>
<td>Brighton &amp; Hove</td>
<td>Oldham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>Luton</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>Hartlepool</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>Rochdale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>Walsall</td>
<td>Coventry</td>
<td>Salford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islington</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td></td>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>Sandwell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambeth</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td></td>
<td>Knowsley</td>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewisham</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td></td>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne</td>
<td></td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wolverhampton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 The importance of sites, locations and places

It is apparent from the brief overview of theories of crime above that crimes are not unique random events but rather share a number of common characteristics or features reflecting the routine activities both of victims and offenders. These common characteristics might include a tendency for incidents to occur in the same areas (spatial clustering), to afflict the same households or individuals (repeat victimisation), to occur at certain times of the day, or to feature specific modus operandi, affect particular types of property, or to be perpetrated against victims with similar demographic and social characteristics (e.g. unemployed single people).
The geographical distribution and concentration of crime and the extent to which this changes in response to attempts to regenerate areas is particularly relevant to area based initiatives.

Taking a more strategic view of the distribution of crime (i.e. at a regional or national level), most places have no crimes and most crime is highly concentrated in and around a relatively small number of places. For example, in the United States, Spelman estimates that 10% of victims are involved in 40% of the victimisation, that 10% of the offenders are involved in over 50% of the crimes and that 10% of places are sites for about 60% of the crimes.

More specifically:

- Most convenience stores have no or few robberies but a few have many robberies
- Most residents have no burglaries but a few residents suffer repeat burglaries
- A few bars have most bar-related violence
- A few properties account for most cases of arson
- Drug dealing is highly concentrated in a few locations even in areas with a high volume of drug dealing

These observations suggest that something about a few places facilitates crime and that something about most places prevents crime.

Even within NDC target areas there will be ‘hot spots’ of crime and a significant degree of spatial and temporal clustering or concentration in crimes against the person (e.g. assault, robbery and theft), in acquisitive property crime (domestic burglary, crimes against businesses, car crime), in drug dealing and in incidents of anti-social behaviour.

One type of ‘clustering’ that has informed anti-burglary strategies in many areas is that of repeat burglary. This is usually defined as addresses that have been burgled with loss on two or more occasions within one year. Significantly, research has demonstrated that households have an elevated risk of burglary following an initial incident (Polvi et al 1990, Farrel and Pease, 1994). In fact, the risk of being burgled is higher overall within a
one year period for households that have been burgled before. For example, Johnson et al’s Merseyside study showed that the risk of being burgled once was 3.3%, whereas the risk of being burgled again following an initial incident was 6.2% (Johnson et al 1997).

The greatest risk of being re-burgled occurs within a few weeks of the initial burglary. Research by Pivoli et al 1990 revealed that the rate of repeat offences per 1,000 burglaries was over 12 times the expected rate for the one month period following an initial event. The risk of repeat offences was also shown to fall dramatically over time, with a rate of only twice that expected after 6 months had elapsed following an initial incident. This trend has been observed in further studies (Spelman, 1995, Johnson et al, 1997).

The fact that prior burglary is a particularly strong predictor of future burglary dispels the intuitive expectation, and until ten years ago, the crime prevention advice, that having been burgled one, a household was unlikely to be burgled again. Indeed, lightening does strike twice.

The increased risk of victimisation following an initial incident can potentially be explained in one of three ways;

1. By opportunity factors - the premises may be particularly vulnerable and hence different offenders may separately choose the same premises;
2. The same offender might be responsible for the repeat victimisation of the same premises;
3. The original offender might discuss the premises with other offenders who commit the repeat offence.
(Source: Bottoms, 1995)

In terms of crime prevention it is, to some extent, unimportant as to which of these options is most likely. What is important is that prior victimisation influences future risk, and hence targeting properties or people who have already been a victim of crime, concentrates efforts on those who are most at risk. However, the swift time course of
repeat victimisation does suggest that many incidents are related to each other, and thereby provides some evidence against the idea of unplanned opportunities being the major modus operandi of burglary. In addition, that there is a distinct time window during which crime prevention activity will be most effective.

More recent research by Pease et al suggests that not only burglary but also other types of crime including robbery, theft, domestic violence, and commercial theft may be subject to the same trend, namely that risk of victimization is higher among those who have already been victimized. However, the positive side in terms of crime prevention is that by focusing preventive efforts on those victimised a first time, scarce resources have their most impact in preventing subsequent crime (see Section 4, below).

3. Policy Developments Relevant to Area-Based Regeneration

3.1 Early Initiatives

Until the mid 1980s, crime prevention was considered to be solely the responsibility of the police. The early urban policy and regeneration initiatives from the late 1960s through the 1970s (e.g. the Urban Programme, Community Development Projects) did not prioritise crime prevention in any of their programmes.

The emergence of community safety and crime prevention as a strategic objective within regeneration policy did not really emerge until the late 1980s when the the third Thatcher government re-stated the aims and objectives of urban policy introducing crime as a strategic objective in its Action for Cities publication. The latter was produced in 1988 and announced the Safer Cities initiative, a Home Office programme, initially, of 20 locally-driven projects selected from 57 Urban Programme authorities. The objective of the initiative was ‘to create safer cities where economic enterprise and community life can flourish’. The approach included the adoption of situational crime prevention measures (target hardening, CCTV, better urban design) to reduce burglary and car crime but was also concerned with reducing the fear of crime. In fact the initiative tackled a range of problems including domestic violence, shop theft and
disorder. Evaluations of schemes to reduce burglary under Safer Cities were generally positive pointing to the positive impact on burglary and the fear of crime that can be achieved both within and beyond targeted areas when intensive action was taken (Ekblom, Law and Sutton 1996).

After an expansion in 1993 to a further 30 projects and a transfer of responsibility to the Department of the Environment, the programme was eventually absorbed into the Single Regeneration Budget.

Another development worthy of mention was the publication by the Home Office, in 1991, of ‘Safer Communities: the Local Delivery of Crime Prevention Through the Partnership Approach’. Known as the Morgan Report, this recommended that local authorities, working with the police, should have responsibility for the development and stimulation of community safety. It suggested that the way forward was for local authorities to appoint a community safety coordinator with administrative support to work proactively with the police and other relevant agencies. The Morgan Report emphasised the broader concept of ‘community safety’, a concept that implied a much wider response to fighting crime. Hence:

‘The term ‘crime prevention’ is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the view that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On the other hand, the term ‘community safety’ is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater participation from all sections of the community in the fight against crime’


However, the government of the day was not particularly enthusiastic about committing additional resources to community safety nor about giving local authorities a leading role. In reality much of what was proposed was being carried out in a number of areas by local authorities on a voluntary basis. This was to change with the coming to power of the first Blair Administration in 1997 and the passing, one year later, of the Crime and Disorder Act.
3.2 Recent and Current Initiatives

The election of a Labour Government in 1997 saw a host of new approaches and initiatives either directly aimed at crime prevention or having clear strategic objectives to reduce the fear of crime and improve community safety.

The Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund, established in 1994 by the previous Conservative administration, had as its sixth objective ‘to tackle crime and improve community safety’. The challenge fund has been run as a competition whereby local partnerships bid for regeneration funds to implement programmes of between 1 and 7 year’s duration. The programme has had six rounds and has funded over 900 Partnerships throughout England.

In the first four rounds (1994 – 1997) there were no geographical limitations on where bids could be received from. This marked a departure from earlier initiatives such as the Urban Programme and City Challenge that tended to target the more disadvantaged areas. The University of Birmingham’s Stocktake of the first two SRBCF rounds found only moderate positive correlation of +0.6 between the distribution of

**BOX 3.1 Area-based Crime Prevention Policies 1985 - 1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mid 1980’s First Community Safety Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships and teams established at Greater London Council, Birmingham, Southwark, Hammersmith &amp; Fulham, Cambridgeshire County Council.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1985 Launch of Estates Action Programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration 1985 - 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A programme of improvements that would ‘transform unpopular housing estates into places where people would want to live’. Not primarily concerned with crime prevention but probably the most intensive government programme for the creation of safer communities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1986 Five Towns Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Office (HO) funding for appointment of Crime Prevention Coordinators over 18 months in selected areas of 5 towns. Each coordinator accountable to a multi-agency steering group comprising local government officers and community representatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**1988 Neighbourhood Watch**
The most prolific crime prevention initiative in Britain. 2.7 million households (14%) members of a scheme in 1988; 4.1 million households (20%) members of a scheme by 1992. However, there have been many scheme closures and also many entirely notional schemes set up for household insurance discount purposes.

**1988 The Safer Cities Programme**
Set up as part of the Government's 'Action for Cities' drive.
PHASE 1 1988 - Sept 1995: 20 cities and boroughs under the auspices of the HO. Up to £0.25m p.a. per project. OBJECTIVES: to reduce crime; to lessen the fear of crime; to create safer cities in which economic enterprise & community life can flourish
PHASE 2 1993 - 1998: a further 30+ projects under the supervision of the DoE. All part of the SRB regime. OBJECTIVES: as above, along with specific activities determined locally through a multi-agency steering committee.

**1990 Secured by Design and Police Architectural Liaison Officers**
Began in SE England in 1990. Now spread throughout the country. A service provided by Police Forces which includes the appointment of Architectural Liaison Officers by each Force to advise on principles of crime prevention through environmental design. Police Forces also produce written guidance. Assistance is offered to architects, planners and developers to enable them to build new structures and environments that avoid the security pitfalls of earlier designs.

Produced at the request of the HO. Identified a key role for local authorities in the promotion of community safety recommended improvements in research, in training and in the delivery of crime prevention policies

**1990's Local Authority Community Safety Teams**
The period following publication of the Morgan Report saw the establishment of Community Safety Officers (CSOs) in District and County Councils throughout the country

**1992 Town Centre Management**
Several local authorities start to employ town centre managers to coordinate the maintenance and improvement of public and communal areas. Arose out of concern about the deterioration of some town centres and their possible decline into unsafe and threatening environments. Managers acted as 'brokers' between statutory and commercial services encouraging good practice in security and town centre usage.
**1992 The Urban Crime Fund**

1 year crime reduction programmes in Merseyside, West Yorkshire, Northumbria. Joint HO/DoE funding

**1994 The Single Regeneration Budget (SRB)**

All 21 urban policies (including Safer Cities, City Challenge and the Urban Development Corporations) consolidated into a single funding regime. Integrated Government Offices for the Regions (GORs) established. SRB Programmes have emerged as a major funder of community safety (CS) initiatives.

Larger SRB-funded CS programmes included: The Safer Merseyside Partnership £9.8 m
Barnsley's Safer Communities Programme £8 m
The Community Safety 'No Place for Crime' Kings Cross £2.2m
Abbey Partnership Policing Initiative L.B Merton £1.4m

**1995 Home Office CCTV Challenge Fund**

New funding competition whereby L.A.s compete for funds to implement CCTV systems in town centres, schools and on housing estates.

**1996 Misspent Youth: Audit Commission**

Major Audit Commission report highlighting misdirection of resources expended on the juvenile justice system. stressed the greater need for resources to be spent on crime prevention/youth diversion.

**1997 Launch of Crime: The Local Solution**


Funding through SRBCF and the location of the most deprived areas (Mawson et al 1996). Resources were not being particularly well targeted to areas of need. In 1998 under round 5 of the SRB, new guidance was issued that required that 80% the funding was to be spent in England’s most deprived areas as identified on the government’s Index of Local Deprivation. This meant that initiatives with strong crime prevention elements would also increasingly be targeted within areas of disadvantage.

The objectives of the SRBCF were recast in Round 6 and were as follows:

- *To tackle social exclusion and promote equality of opportunity;*
- *To support activities that make the real and sustainable differences in deprived areas*
• Improving the employment prospects, education and skills of local people;
• Addressing social exclusion and improving opportunities for the disadvantaged;
• Promoting sustainable regeneration, improving and protecting the environment and infrastructure, including housing;
• Supporting and promoting the growth in local economies and businesses;
• Reducing crime and drug abuse and improving community safety

A large number of SRB-funded Partnerships have emerged that include crime prevention elements within their programmes. Some are entirely concerned with community safety interventions. The Safer Merseyside Partnership (SMP) is a good example of one of these. SMP received funding under Rounds 1 and 3 of the SRB Challenge Fund and implements a wide ranging programme of measures including action to reduce domestic burglary, a small business strategy, a youth action programme and measures aimed at reducing crime and vandalism on public transport (Audit Commission 1999, Hirschfield and Bowers, 1998, Hirschfield, 2001).

The most important single piece of legislation since 1997 as far as this domain is concerned has been the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. This introduced a joint statutory duty on local authorities and the police to produce Crime and Disorder Audits for their areas (i.e. the territory covered by local authority districts) together with Crime and Disorder Strategies containing crime reduction targets and clear proposals (i.e. crime prevention interventions) for reaching them. The audits and strategies were to be produced once every three years. The first round was published in 1999 (April for the audits and September for the strategies). The second round of audits and strategies will appear in 2002.

In practical terms, the production of these documents has necessitated a range of agencies coming together to share information for incorporation into the audits and, to a lesser extent, to help formulate the three-year strategies. Apart from the extensive liaison between local authorities and the police that is required because of the shared statutory duty, links have typically been established with health agencies, the emergency services (fire and ambulance), voluntary organisations and the business community.
A key component is the requirement to consult with local communities in order to identify crime and disorder problems for inclusion in the audits and their priorities for reducing both crime and the fear of crime for inclusion in the strategies. Special attention is given to canvassing the views of and engaging with ‘hard to reach groups’ within the community (e.g. homeless people, ethnic groups, socially excluded young people).

The 39 NDC programmes have been implemented within 38 local authority areas. There will be a Crime and Disorder Audit and an accompanying Crime and Disorder Strategy for each of these areas (as well as 5 year crime reduction targets, see below). The audits will contain relevant information on levels of crime, fear of crime and community perceptions both at the district and intra-district level (often down to ward level) for each of the 38 NDC local authorities. There will be variations in the both the breadth of coverage in terms of topics, partly reflecting local circumstances, partly data availability and in the depth of analysis, the latter reflecting disparities in the skills available to each partnership.

The strongest audits will be those that address the following questions:

**BOX 3.2 Mapping out the Crime and Disorder Problem: Key questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Where do crimes and disorder occur?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When do crimes and disorder occur?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do areas with one crime problem also have other crime problems?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where are these areas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which crimes do they have?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What else can we say about them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are they student areas or deprived estates?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are they single regeneration budget areas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are they bus routes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do they have crime prevention measures already? If so, which?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many incidents are we talking about?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much of the population / community is affected?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does crime in these areas compare to that in the district or the county?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where do the offenders live?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do they live in the areas with the highest crime rates?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much of all crime in the district is concentrated into the high crime areas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can we tackle the majority of crime by targeting resources into just a few areas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the volume of crime increasing or decreasing?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is crime diffusing or concentrating?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are crimes affecting the same areas or new areas?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evaluations of the first round point to wide variations in the ability of local authorities and partnerships to produce audits of sufficient quality or depth. The targets set by partnerships for the first year for the reduction of vehicle crime ranged from 2% to 25%. For domestic burglary, year 1 target reductions ranged from 1% to 16%. Targets also varied widely in terms of the definitions of crime used, their timescales and the geographical areas to which they applied.

Under the Local Government Act 1999, the 375 Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRPs) that operate in England and Wales have been required from April 2000 to set five-year targets (and annual milestones) for the reduction of:

- vehicle crime per 1,000 population
- domestic burglary per 1,000 households
- robberies per 1,000 population.

These targets are in addition to other crime reduction targets that appear in the three-year strategies. The five-year targets appear in local authority and police force Best Value performance plans together with statements showing how they intend to meet them. Under Best Value, all local authorities have to aim to match the performance of the best performing comparable authorities and services.

The target-setting has been accompanied by the publication, for the first time, of crime statistics for every police division in England and Wales from January 2000 to enable the public to compare crime rates for individual towns and cities, as well as police forces. Previously, comparative data at the national level had only been published for entire police forces (often covering several counties) rather than at divisional level. As a result, while people have been able to compare crime rates in Devon and Cornwall with those in the West Midlands, they have not been able to make more relevant comparisons like, for example, Plymouth with Exeter, or Sheffield with Cardiff Central. The publication of crime statistics for individual police divisions (basic command units) and for CDRP areas represents an significant improvement earlier practice that will facilitate constructive
debate about the performance of the key local services in reducing crime and disorder and help drive up their performance.

The drive for better performance goes hand in hand with support for the work of the partnerships and new resources, these include:

- A new national Crime Reduction Taskforce bringing together senior figures in the police service, local government and elsewhere to lead the drive for improved performance at local and national level;
- The appointment of a new regional Crime Reduction Director in every Government Office for the Regions (of equal status to the other directors in the regional offices) to scrutinise and support local Crime & Disorder reduction partnerships
- A national review of crime reduction performance by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, in collaboration with the Audit Commission and the Home Office
- An extensive programme of support for crime fighting partnerships, including training courses, regional seminars, consultancy support and a new crime reduction website;
- More support for the police in the form of technological advances and extra resources
- A 3-year programme of research to look in detail at the work of the partnerships, drawing out lessons to be learnt and drip feeding good practice back to the field in the form of published guidance, conferences and workshops.
- A series of training courses covering effective partnership working and run jointly with the Local Government Association and National Police Training.
- Seminars targeted at health sector managers, covering amongst other things, the role of the health sector in Crime & Disorder reduction partnerships.

A significant feature of the direction in which policy is heading are the steps the government has taken towards decentralising funding for crime prevention to the Government Offices for the Regions.

Each Regional Crime Reduction Director, is supported by a team that comprises secondees from police, local government and other services in the region together with a dedicated crime analyst. The teams have a broad remit that includes:

- identifying and disseminating good practice within the region;
• organising workshops and forums to support crime reduction work;
• establishing and maintaining regional networks relating to crime reduction;
• liasing with the crime reduction partnerships in the region.

Over the coming years, the Regional Crime Reduction Director will be responsible for allocating crime prevention funds to local CDRPs as more of the resources are managed regionally. A Partnership Development Fund (PDF) has been established for innovative crime prevention projects and partnership capacity building. A new Safer Communities Initiative (SCI) will run from April 2002 that will allocate crime prevention resources based on an assessment of needs within each region carried out by the Crime Reduction Directors.

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act requires all local authorities, including joint authorities, police authorities and National Park authorities to consider crime and disorder reduction while exercising all their duties. Section 17 aims to promote effective crime reduction in the ‘everyday activities’ of the police and local authorities (the Crime and Disorder Audit Statutory Partners). The implication of this requirement is that monitoring of changes in levels of crime and disorder will be needed to measure the impact on crime of local authority and police activities.

The local authority, both at district and county level, can have an impact on crime and disorder in many different ways. For example, through changes to the layout of housing estates, the size of hedgerows, the location of bus stops and taxi ranks, improved staff identification or visiting procedures, encouraging the rapid repair of vandalism and removal of graffiti, reducing the level of void properties and through the deployment of sufficient numbers of adequately trained staff in locations vulnerable to crime. **Thus, the reduction of crime and disorder has relevance to a very wide range of NDC area local authority functions and statutory services, from maintaining highways to planning to enforcing trading standards. Moreover, the decision making process of one department may have crime and disorder implications for another.**
Box 3.3, below identifies some possibilities and indicates ways by which local authorities can realise the potential of Section 17.

**BOX 3.3 Crime and Disorder Implications for Local Authority Departments**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service provider</th>
<th>Function impacting on crime</th>
<th>Potential impact on crime</th>
<th>Possible actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>• Enforcing school attendance</td>
<td>• Excluded and truanting children engaging in anti-social behaviour and crime</td>
<td>• Develop policy to maximise school attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Educational provision for excluded children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>• Determining future land use</td>
<td>• The built environment and allocation of land can provide opportunities for crime and disorder</td>
<td>• ALO assessments of all new public buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Planning applications</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure new buildings are built to Secured by Design (SBD) standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads and highways</td>
<td>• Insecure or unattended car parks</td>
<td>• Thefts from/of vehicles</td>
<td>• Aim for secured car parks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>• Nuisance neighbours</td>
<td>• Incidents of antisocial behaviour and crime</td>
<td>• Ensure strict tenancy agreements are in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Managing housing stock</td>
<td>• Void properties can attract crime and disorder</td>
<td>• Ensure properties are not left empty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse</td>
<td>• Collection</td>
<td>• Uncollected rubbish contributes to neighbourhood decline</td>
<td>• Ensure rubbish is swiftly removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disposal</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure that there are facilities where non-household waste can be easily disposed of to avoid fly tipping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure and tourism</td>
<td>• Provision of recreation</td>
<td>• Provide activities to avoid boredom</td>
<td>• Minimum level of recreation provision in areas with high density of young people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tourist advice</td>
<td>• Lack of awareness amongst visitors about problem areas and the need to take precautions</td>
<td>• Crime prevention advice within tourist literature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A number of new agencies has also been established since 1997 that in various ways contribute to the fight against crime and disorder in disadvantaged areas. These comprise:

- Drug Action Teams
- Youth Offending Teams
- Health Action Zones

Drug Action Teams (DATs) are local multi-agency coordinating groups set up under the Government's strategy 'Tackling Drugs Together'. All of the teams are headed by a DAT chair and most DATs have a coordinator. There are also Drug Reference Groups (DRGs) made up of various local professionals who advise the DAT on policy and practice.

Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) are multi-agency bodies whose remit is to reduce offending by children and young people, by providing a local focus for tackling youth crime. They bring together all the key local agencies with a contribution to make to reducing youth offending – police, social services, education, probation and health. They are accountable to local authorities and the other relevant local agencies.

YOTs tackle a broad range of issues that can place young people at risk of becoming involved in crime. These include:

- poor parental supervision
- domestic violence and abuse
- peer group pressure,
- truancy and school exclusion
- substance misuse
- mental health problems

The teams assess offenders and how best to deal with them effectively with proper regard for the protection of the public. They plan, supervise and, where appropriate, enforce community-based intervention and supervision work with young offenders - for example, following a police final warning or where an offender has been sentenced to a reparation order, action plan order, or other community sentence.
YOTs operate in each of the 39 NDC areas

Health Action Zones (HAZ) are seven-year initiatives that aim to achieve real improvements in health through focussing on deprived areas with poor health status and significant pressures on services. They seek to involve the people who live in those communities in improving their own health. They have been formed as partnerships between the NHS, local authorities (including social services), community groups and the voluntary and business sectors. Their aim is to develop and implement a health strategy that cuts health inequalities and delivers within their area measurable improvements in public health and in the outcomes and quality of treatment and care.

They also strive to increase sustainability by developing contacts with other zones, by disseminating ideas more widely – and by playing a major role in joining up existing initiatives.

There are several examples where HAZs are working in partnership with Crime Reduction Partnerships to part fund community safety projects. For example, on Merseyside, the HAZ has part funded a burglary reduction programme concerned with installing gates at the ends of alleyways to the rear of terraced properties (Johnson and Loxley, 2001). The gates are made by recovering drug misusers. Merseyside HAZ also part funds with Merseyside Police and the Safer Merseyside Partnership, an initiative to improve data on deliberate injuries and assault collected by front line staff at hospital accident and emergency units.

There are a number of areas of mutual interest between HAZs and crime prevention partnerships. They are shown in Box 3.4, below.

**BOX 3.4 Crime and Health Agencies: Shared Interests**

- Children and young people
- Vulnerable Adults and Older People
- Recovering Drug misusers
- Outreach to drug addicts and offenders
- Bail support
- Health in Prisons
- Prison release
• Crimes against health service property & staff
• Domestic violence
• Appropriate Adults
• Violence Injury Prevention

• Sex Workers
• Transportation
• Town Centres
• Data sharing
• Health Impact Assessment

There is a small but growing body of research on the links between crime and health (McCabe and Raine, 1997). These are summarised in Box 3.5, below.

BOX 3.5 Links between Crime and Health

| HEALTH STATUS - PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS | depression, somatisation, hostility, anxiety, phobic anxiety, ‘fear of crime’, sleeping difficulties, loss of confidence, loss of appetite (Norris & Kaniasty, 1994; McCabe & Raine, 1997). |
| HEALTH-RELATED BEHAVIOUR | start/increase in smoking, increased dependence on drugs, increase in use of medication, increase in alcohol consumption (McCabe & Raine, 1997). |
| GENERAL LIFESTYLE | ‘Avoidance Behaviour’ – avoid going out, visiting certain areas, using public transport, moving home (McCabe & Raine, 1997). |
| OTHER HEALTH DETERMINANTS | Increase in use of acute and community health services, increase in use of primary care services, reductions in recruitment of medical practitioners to high burglary rate areas, potential increase in demand for residential care in high burglary rate areas (McCabe & Raine, 1997; Goetz & Debertin, 1996; Mawby, 1999). |

Significantly, there is very little hard evidence of the health impacts of crime prevention. Dr. Hirschfield and his colleagues in the Department of Public Health are the first in the UK to make inroads into this area. Relevant work includes HIA case studies of burglary prevention and youth diversion on Merseyside undertaken by the applicant as part of a Department of Health-funded research and development project (Hirschfield et al, forthcoming) and HIA studies of local community safety projects carried out by the Liverpool Public Health Observatory (Fleeman, 1997; Winters and Scott-Samuel, 1997).

This research suggests that target hardening and improved surveillance (through public lighting and CCTV) can influence health determinants and impact directly upon health.
This is primarily through preventing crime and the associated trauma of victimisation, through reducing the stress and anxiety of becoming a victim of crime (i.e. the fear of crime) and through building up social cohesion within communities that participate in environmental and social crime prevention schemes. Some of the impacts identified in these local HIA studies are summarised in Box 3.6, below.

More recently, research has been carried out on the health impacts of crime prevention. The latter includes a Health Impact Assessment of Rounds 1 and 2 of the Reducing Burglary Initiative in the north of England (Hirschfield et al forthcoming).

**BOX 3.6 The Health Impacts of Crime Prevention (Hirschfield et al forthcoming)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of Positive Impacts</th>
<th>Examples of Negative Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEALTH STATUS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Mental Health: Peace of mind, greater security; Improvement in stress-related conditions; Prevention of re-victimisation and associated trauma.</td>
<td>Heightened awareness of crime leading to increased fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEALTH-RELATED BEHAVIOUR</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in coping behaviours harmful to health (alcohol, tobacco consumption);</td>
<td>Psychological impact of making homes into fortresses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL LIFESTYLE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Lifestyle: greater mobility and social networking</td>
<td>Displacement of crime into other areas with its associated health impacts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OTHER IMPACTS**

- *Economic/employment benefits* - employment opportunities; financial savings for public services and victims.
- *Environment* - Improvements to housing and general appearance of the area – void levels reduced.
- *Services* – improvements in relationships between victims and public services; reduced demand for residential care from older people.
There are 26 HAZs nationwide that cover some of the most deprived areas in the country. The areas that have HAZ initiatives are shown in Box 3.7. They comprise 11 in the first wave and 15 in the second. There will not be a third.

In total, HAZs include 34 health authorities and 73 local authorities. They range in complexity from those that comprise multiple health and local authorities and have the largest populations (such as Merseyside and Tyne & Wear), to those based on unitary local authorities but which take in only part of associated health authorities (such as Luton and Plymouth).

In terms of the NDC initiative, 28 of the 38 NDC local authorities (74%) will be covered by a HAZ. Those NDC areas that are not comprise, Birmingham, Coventry, Oldham, Bristol, Brighton and Hove, Norwich, Derby, Hammersmith and Fulham, Haringey and Southampton. However, 10 associated HAZs have been established in the south east of England and these include the NDC areas of Brighton and Hove and Southampton.

BOX 3.7 The Location of Health Action Zones (Those in italics cover NDC areas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Wave</th>
<th>2nd Wave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham; City &amp; East London; Plymouth (South &amp; West Devon HA); Luton (Bedfordshire HA); Sandwell; South Yorkshire Coalfields (Rotherham, Doncaster and Barnsley HAs); Manchester, Salford &amp; Trafford; Bradford; Tyne and Wear (Sunderland, Newcastle &amp; North Tyneside, Gateshead and South Tyneside HAs); Northumberland. North Cumbria</td>
<td>Tees, Wakefield, Leeds, Hull and East Riding; Merseyside (St Helens &amp; Knowsley, Liverpool, Wirral, Sefton HAs); Bury &amp; Rochdale; Greater Nottingham; Sheffield; Leicester City; Wolverhampton; Walsall; North Staffordshire; Cornwall; Camden and Islington; Brent (Brent and Harrow HA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Specific Initiatives on Crime Prevention

A number of specific programmes directed at reducing particular types of crime are currently being funded by the Home Office as part of its Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) and also by the Department of Transport, Local Government and Regions (DTLR) and Department for Education (DFES).

Box 3.8, below lists Home Office, DTLR and DFES special funding initiatives relevant to community safety programmes as of November 2001. These include the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund and the Neighbourhood Wardens and Street Warden Programmes through the DTLR. In addition, there is the Partnership Development Fund of the Government Office for the Regions and community safety funding from other regeneration programmes such as the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund.

The Government’s Crime Reduction Strategy

The government’s strategy for reducing crime includes the Home Office’s Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) and other special initiatives, some run by other central government departments. Relevant initiatives comprise:

- The Reducing Burglary Initiative
- The Distraction Burglary Initiative
- Targeted Policing
- The CCTV Initiative
- On Track: Families
- Interventions in Schools
- Locks for pensioners
- Treatment of Offenders Programme
- Drug Arrest Referrals
- Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women Initiative
- The Youth Inclusion Programme
- Tackling Prostitution: What Works
- Retail Crime Initiative
- Neighbourhood Wardens
- Street Wardens
- Community Chest
The most relevant of these as far as NDC is concerned is discussed below.

**The Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI)**

The RBI is a national crime prevention programme that aims to reduce burglary nationally by targeting areas with the worst domestic burglary problems and monitoring the cost effectiveness of the different approaches to find out what works best, in which circumstances.

The areas that have been targeted are those that have a significant burglary problem (areas or communities with a burglary rate of at least one-and-a-half times the national average - i.e. 36 or more burglaries, including attempts, per year per thousand households). In addition, around £2m has also been committed to projects to reduce the problems of distraction burglary - that committed by bogus callers for example.

The emphasis has been on tackling domestic burglary through inter-agency collaboration and innovative and complementary strategies. These can be grouped into distinct approaches, which include:

- Preventing initial and repeat burglaries of domestic dwellings through target hardening;
- Increasing the risk for offenders in committing burglaries through enhanced surveillance;
- Building confidence and reducing the fear of crime (e.g. high visibility policing);
- Targeting of offenders;
- Disrupting the market for stolen goods;
- Diverting young people from anti-social and criminal behaviour;
- Building social cohesion through involving local communities in crime prevention.

The initiative, which has a budget of £25 million over three years, has had three rounds. Under Round 1, which began in April 1999, 63 Strategic Development Projects were funded covering about 220,000 households that suffered around 18,000 burglaries in 1998. Round 1 projects were initially granted around £60k each, irrespective of the scale of the problem. In later rounds, applicants could bid for £100
for each burglary that occurred in the area or community over the previous 3 years. Those round 1 projects that would have been eligible for more than their original grant under this criterion and that have made good progress, were allowed to bid for the extra money.

Round 2 was launched in October 1999 drawing upon some of the early lessons from the evaluation of Round 1 and funded 161 projects covering nearly 600,000 households that suffered nearly 44,000 burglaries in 1999.

In Rounds 1 and 2, crime and disorder partnerships were invited to submit applications for funding to run projects aimed at reducing local burglary problems in areas or communities that suffered twice the national average burglary rate over the previous 3 years.

The third round began in 2001 and 23 projects have been funded so far covering around 1.3 million households This round was broadly similar to round 2 but with three significant differences:

- it was a rolling round - i.e. applications could be submitted, and were assessed, as and when they were ready with the one proviso that all bids had to be submitted by the end of January 2001
- the burglary rate criteria was relaxed from twice the national average to one-and-a-half times the national average, allowing areas that did not qualify for the earlier rounds to submit bids
- projects were not limited to 12 months' duration

A number of RBI projects operate within the 38 NDC local authority areas. In total over £13.5 m of Home Office funding through Rounds 1, 2 and 3 of the RBI was channelled into NDC local authorities (see Box 3.3, and discussion below). Further research is required to explore the extent to which RBI target areas coincide or are proximate to NDC neighbourhood boundaries.
An important part of the Initiative is the establishment of an evaluation programme to find out what works best in which circumstances. The Northern Crime Consortium (leading the Crime Domain for NDC) was commissioned by the Home Office to evaluate 21 projects in the north of England under Round 1. The evaluation will be completed in March 2002 and will include full process and outcome evaluations of each scheme and of the initiative as a whole together with cost-effectiveness data for various types of intervention. Some general lessons from this work are discussed in Section 7, below.

**Targeted Policing**

The Targeted Policing Initiative (TPI) is about problem-oriented and intelligence-led policing - i.e. analysing and understanding the real crime or anti-social behaviour problem, and its underlying causes, and then tackling it by the effective, efficient and focused deployment of the resources needed.

The TPI is not aimed at any particular type of crime, but at helping the police and other agencies to develop and implement a problem oriented approach. The latter includes analysing and understanding crime or anti-social behaviour problems, identify underlying causes, and develop appropriate responses.

**BOX 3.8 Current Policies on Crime Relevant to ABIs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Approx. Funding</th>
<th>No of Schemes/Projects</th>
<th>Start – End Dates</th>
<th>Lead Dept</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary Reduction Initiative</td>
<td>£25m in total</td>
<td>Round 1: 63</td>
<td>1998 -2001</td>
<td>HO</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Round 3: 23</td>
<td>2001 -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distraction Burglary</td>
<td>£2m</td>
<td>3 Forces – Derbyshire</td>
<td></td>
<td>HO</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Yorks. West Yorks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Policing</td>
<td>£8.5m</td>
<td>Round 1: 19</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>HO</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£21 m</td>
<td>Round 2: 39</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Track: Families</td>
<td>£11m</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1999 -</td>
<td>DFES</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Funding Authority</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation Fund</td>
<td>£20 m</td>
<td></td>
<td>HO</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of Offenders</td>
<td>£20 m</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Arrest Referrals</td>
<td>£20 m</td>
<td>Apr 2000</td>
<td>HO</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention Work in Schools</td>
<td>£12.2m</td>
<td>38 Schemes 103 Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locks for Pensioners</td>
<td>£12m</td>
<td>122 BCUs eligible</td>
<td>June 2000 - May 2002</td>
<td>DTLR</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence and Violence against Women</td>
<td>£6.3m</td>
<td>34 Projects (25 Domestic Violence/ 9 Rape/Sexual Assault)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Inclusion</td>
<td>£20m</td>
<td>70 projects</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Wardens</td>
<td>£18.5 m</td>
<td>86 Schemes to date</td>
<td>DTLR/HO</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Wardens</td>
<td>£50m</td>
<td>100 schemes</td>
<td>Aug 2001 - DTLR/HO</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design against Crime</td>
<td>Not specific</td>
<td>Not specific</td>
<td>BO/ DTI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV Initiative</td>
<td>£39m</td>
<td>Round 1:219 300 schemes expected</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>HO/DTLR</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tackling Prostitution: What Works</td>
<td>£0.5m</td>
<td>Between 5 – 10 projects</td>
<td>2000 – Mar 2002</td>
<td>HO</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Crime Initiative</td>
<td>£15 m</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>HO</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL for above</td>
<td>£432 m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is investing around £30 million over three years in over 50 projects aimed either at developing innovative approaches or at implementing proven interventions or problem-oriented methodologies.

This links very closely with the approach advocated by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in the report *Beating Crime*, which was followed up by the Calling Time on Crime Thematic Inspection. These were accompanied by reports from the
Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit: \textit{Getting the Grease to the Squeak: research lessons for crime prevention} and \textit{Not Rocket Science ? Problem solving and crime reduction.}

The Initiative has had two rounds. In Round 1, police forces (in collaboration with their crime and disorder partners) were invited to submit applications for funding to run development projects starting from April 1999. A total of 19 projects were approved with total funding of about £8.5 million from the Home Office, with more money levered in from other sources.

Round 2 was launched in December 1999 and 39 projects were eventually funded securing a total of around £21 million.

In selecting TPI projects, a strong emphasis has been placed on value for money (in terms of both the contribution to reducing crime and the wider lessons that could be learnt) and some form of innovation. The TPI projects generally represent a good spread across several different types of problem: property crime, vehicle crime, violence, racism, drug related crime, anti-social behaviour and fear of crime.

\textbf{TPI projects have been implemented in five of the NDC local authorities, namely, Knowsley, Hull and in the London Boroughs of Hackney, Southwark and Islington. In total, over £1.73m of Home Office funding has been provided in these areas for the schemes although additional resources have been levered in. Since TPI projects generally apply to policing practice across a wide geographical area there is likely to be some influence on NDC communities in those Police Force Divisions or Basic Command Unit areas that have projects operating.}

As with all parts of the Crime Reduction Programme, the projects will be evaluated and the lessons learnt will be published and disseminated to all local crime and disorder partnerships.
The CCTV Initiative

The CRP CCTV initiative is managed jointly by the Home Office and the DTLR. Under the initiative, £153 million of capital funding has been made available to crime and disorder reduction partnerships in England and Wales for the period up to March 2002 for new and extended public area CCTV schemes.

There have been 2 rounds, the first in May 1999 and the second in March 2000. To date £39m has been awarded to 219 schemes. A further 300 schemes are expected to be funded.

Under the first round, the main priorities have been to deal with crime and disorder problems in housing areas and to improve the security of public car parks, but funding was also available for CCTV schemes in town and city centres, including improvements and extensions to existing schemes, and other potential crime 'hot-spots' such as community, commercial and transport facilities.

Under the second round, car parks and high-crime housing areas have remained a priority, but there has been an additional emphasis on schemes to help reduce the fear of crime in rural areas, small shopping centres and near transport links. There has also a greater emphasis on partnership arrangements to involve local business and communities in the setting up and operation of CCTV schemes.

Crime and disorder reduction partnerships play a key role in helping to decide how CCTV can be used most effectively in partnership with other organisations such as Housing Associations.

To date, CCTV schemes have been funded in every one of the NDC local authority areas with the exception of Norwich. The highest investment so far has been in Liverpool, Sandwell, Manchester and Bristol. However, many of the schemes are in town centres and are unlikely to affect, directly, levels of crime within NDC areas, although, a significant proportion of the initiatives are residential schemes. Where schemes are proximate to NDC areas or in cases
where NDC areas are near to town centres that have schemes, impacts on crime might occur. One of the priorities in the main phase of the evaluation will be to determine the exact location of CCTV schemes and to identify their proximity to NDC project boundaries.

A comprehensive evaluation of the schemes led by the University of Leicester is currently underway to help determine the contexts in which public area CCTV is most effective. As with other CRP evaluations, this will be based on the ‘realistic evaluation’ model. It will be considering the impact of CCTV on fear of crime, the level and distribution of crime including displacement, the performance and effectiveness of the equipment and cost effectiveness.

**The Retail Crime Initiative**

The Retail Crime Initiative (RCI) – or more formally the Capital Modernisation Fund Scheme for Small Retailers in Deprived Areas – was announced in June 2001. £15m is to be spent over 3 years to improve security of small retailers in deprived areas. This makes this initiative potentially highly relevant to the NDC.

The problems faced by small retailers were highlighted in the Social Exclusion Unit’s report (Policy Action Team 13) on access to decent shopping facilities in such areas. The money is to be allocated to approved schemes in deprived areas, on a regional basis.

**On Track: Families**

‘On Track’ is a long-term initiative aimed at children at risk of getting involved in crime. It was launched in December 1999 and since April 2001 it has been incorporated into the Government's £450m Children Fund programme, although it continues to be evaluated separately by the Home Office.

There are 22 On Track projects in England in high deprivation areas, each covering around 2,000 children. In each an enhanced range of evidence-based preventive services (including parent training, home school partnerships, structured pre-school
education, home visiting and family therapy) is being developed for children aged between 4-12 and their families. Each project is investing around £0.5m a year over the next few years.

Inter-agency co-operation is being developed so that children at risk of offending are identified early and they and their families provided with consistent services through the period of the child's development.

Each project is managed by a local partnership including the main health, educational and social service providers, youth offending teams, the police and relevant voluntary sector organisations. The projects are expected to build upon and link together existing services and initiatives for children and families.

The key aim is to foster areas of excellence that deliver real reductions in delinquency in high crime communities and provide answers to pressing questions about what works best in terms of early prevention.

Although vulnerability to crime is a key focus, the projects are also expected to impact on educational and health outcomes and are, therefore, directly relevant to other NDC Domains.

The effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the arrangements is being evaluated by the Home Office.

**Intervention work in Schools / Effective Schools Management**

This initiative aims to reduce offending now and in the future by improving schools’ management of pupils’ behaviour and reducing truancy and exclusion. The initiative complements the DfES pupil inclusion programme.

A total of 38 schemes, encompassing 103 separate schools have been funded at a cost of £12.2m (including evaluation costs). All projects are expected to complete by July 2002.
An over-arching report to be produced by a National Evaluation Team is due to be published in April 2002.

**Youth Inclusion Programme**

The Youth Inclusion Programme (YIP) seeks to reduce offending, truancy and exclusion in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The projects do this by providing targeted assistance and support to the 13-16 year olds at most risk of offending, truancy or exclusion. The neighbourhood focus makes this particularly relevant to NDC schemes.

The overall budget is £20m, with half of which is being met through the CRP. Since the launch of the YIP in 1999, 70 projects have been funded. Each project receives £68,500 from the Youth Justice Board for each year they are fully operational. A further £6,500 per project is paid direct to local evaluators. In return projects must match grant funding with minimum local (partnership) funding in cash or in-kind of £75,000 per full year.

Each project is supported by the local Youth Offending Team, many of which have engaged voluntary bodies e.g. Crime Concern or NACRO to run projects on their behalf.

The interventions that are being implemented include:

- Family link centres based in schools, utilising their computer and computer materials, to provide support from parents and community volunteers. Activities include language support for ethnic minority students; literacy and numeracy;

- Lunchtime and after school homework clubs; holiday clubs;

- Skill centres aimed at providing excluded young people with training and qualifications to improve their educational standards and future employment prospects;

- Mentoring;
• Adult volunteering from within the local community;

• Environmental work, e.g. clean-up projects and development of recreational areas;

• Sports and other forms of constructive recreation;

• Arts work such as educational drama;

• Support services for parents and carers.

A number of targets have been set for the YIP to achieve. These are:

• to reduce arrest rates among the target group by 60%
• to reduce crime in the neighbourhood by 30%
• to achieve at least one third reduction in truancy and exclusions on the young people concerned by 2002.

The programme as a whole is being evaluated by the Board’s appointees, Morgan Harris Burrows, who co-ordinate 7 teams of regional evaluators (including Universities), pulling together the results of regional monitoring and evaluation. A bespoke Management Information System has been developed to enable electronic data gathering by projects.

A closer examination of this initiative to determine the location of individual projects in relation to NDC target areas should be prioritised for the main NDC evaluation. Once this has been explored the extent to which results from the evaluation and data contained within the management information system can inform the NDC evaluation can be established.

**Locks for Pensioners**
Up to £12m has been allocated for providing improved home security for low income pensioners. The initiative operates in conjunction with the New Home Energy Efficiency Scheme (New HEES) - a DTLR scheme to tackle fuel poverty. Launched in July 2000 the scheme will operate for 2 years.
The scheme applied to persons aged over 60, who are on income benefit and who live in an area with a domestic burglary rate higher than the national (English) average - based on the police Basic Command Unit (BCU) statistics published in January 2000. All but five of the NDC local authorities contain BCUs that qualify for the Locks for Pensioner Scheme. The five that do not are Plymouth, Walsall, Coventry, Knowsley and Norwich. This is because they did not have sufficiently higher-than-average burglary rates.

The HEES surveyors will, if the householder wishes, assess what new or additional home security measures are required, although, grants form part of a package that includes meeting heating and insulation needs of pensioner households and not solely their security needs.

The surveyors will check what security the property already has and decide what, if any, additional security is needed. Checks include the existing provision of door locks, door chains and viewers, window locks, anti-lift devices on patio doors and bolts. Smoke detectors are also provided through the scheme to reduce casualties and fatalities from accidental fires.

The effectiveness of the scheme is being evaluated by the Home Office as part of its CRP-wide evaluation strategy. This includes the tracking of individual properties to determine whether any of the properties are burgled after the locks have been fitted and to establish what effect the scheme has had on fear of crime.

**Neighbourhood Wardens**

The Neighbourhood Wardens Programme is part of the remit of the recently formed Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, within the DTLR, jointly funded by the Home Office and DTLR.

The programme is one of the outcomes of the Social Exclusion Unit’s research and consultation exercise into the problems facing the most deprived places in the country. This involved setting up 18 Policy Action Teams (PATs) to consider how to
improve the quality of services in poor neighbourhoods. This programme culminated in the publication of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal in January 2001. Its aim is to tackle all the complex causes of social exclusion at the same time, and to produce a long term plan to improve the quality of life in England's poorest areas in order to narrow the gap between the poorest places and the rest of the country.

PAT 6 examined the case for Neighbourhood Wardens. It had a wide membership drawn from the police, housing associations, local councils and organisations including Neighbourhood Watch, Crime Concern and the Chartered Institute of Housing as well as across Government. The Team looked at the merits of existing neighbourhood warden schemes - using a mixture of community patrol, concierges, caretakers or neighbourhood support workers - and whether and how they should be encouraged. The PAT6 Final Report was published in March 2000. One of its recommendations was to create a new unit to promote wardens and to allocate government grants to warden schemes.

A fund of £18.5 million has been set aside for allocation over a four year period as grants to pump prime new and existing warden schemes. The resources are being provided from the Crime Reduction Programme and DTLR's Housing Programme.

The purpose of the neighbourhood warden is to provide a uniformed, semi-official presence in a residential area with the aim of improving quality of life. The warden will be able to promote community safety, assist with environmental improvements and housing management and also contribute to community development.

Wardens will provide a reassuring presence, tackling graffiti, vandalism and low level disorder. They will also support vulnerable residents.

Their responsibilities include:

• keeping an eye on boarded up properties
• reporting suspicious behaviour to the police
• dealing with minor incidents of anti-social behaviour
• monitoring racial harassment and intimidation and report it to the police
• acting as a source of communication between local communities and the police.

This initiative was launched in August 2001, with 86 wardens schemes being funded at present. A Neighbourhood Wardens Unit also provides guidance on recruitment and scheme management, including a training programme for Neighbourhood Warden scheme managers.

**Street Wardens**

A £25 million Street Warden Programme was announced in April 2001 to help deal with neighbourhood nuisances such as litter, graffiti and dog mess. Building upon the Neighbourhood Warden schemes this new pilot programme of street wardens will increase the range and number of places covered by the existing schemes, and will give more emphasis to the environmental quality of the local area.

The role of the Street Warden is to:

• provide highly visible uniformed patrols in town and village centres, public areas and neighbourhoods.
• tackle environmental problems such as litter, graffiti and dog fouling, as well as promoting community safety.
• help deter anti social behaviour; reduce the fear of crime; and foster social inclusion.

Street wardens are similar to neighbourhood wardens, but have more of an emphasis on caring for the physical appearance of the area.

**Offender-based Initiatives**

A series of offender rehabilitation projects is also being funded through the Home Office’s CRP. These aim ultimately to reduce crime through working intensively with offenders in prisons and with those recently released back into the community.

More than £20 million has been made available to develop effective practice in working with offenders through the Treatment of Offenders Programme. This
initiative, with its focus on the prison and probation services, is based on existing evidence of what reduces re-offending. Targets have been set for numbers of offenders in accredited programmes and for reduced reconvictions. These comprise:

- 60,000 offenders on accredited programmes by 2003/04
- A 5% reduction in the rate of reconvictions by 2003.

The resources are being used to fund 31 pathfinder projects and 2 general offending programmes (Enhanced Thinking Skills (ETS) and Reasoning and Rehabilitation (R and R) adapted from prison service for the probation service). The Pathfinder projects comprise:

- 10 offending behaviour programmes
- 7 basic skills
- 8 community punishment
- 6 resettlement of short term prisoners

New pathfinders are currently being developed that focus upon:

(i) interventions with racially motivated offenders
(ii) effective interventions with black and Asian offenders
(iii) evaluations of bail and probation hostel regimes.

Although less directly relevant to area-based initiatives, if effective, these schemes may impact upon crime in some NDC areas.

**Arrest Referrals**

£20 million has been provided through the CRP to support the funding of arrest referral workers and treatment resources nationwide. Arrest referral schemes aim to impact upon drug-related offending, involving a mix of on-site and on-call drug workers managed and supported by drug agencies. Previous research has suggested that proactive arrest referral schemes provide positive benefits to drug-misusing offenders and to local communities (Edmunds et al, 1998).

The majority of these schemes have been running since April 2001 and have involved the recruitment, by police forces of arrest referral workers to work within police custody suites.
Significantly, £2 million has been set aside for in-depth evaluation of these schemes. The evaluation strategy includes the funding of a three-year study examining the efficacy of arrest referral schemes within London and an evaluation of initiatives in Brighton and Hove, where there is also an NDC scheme. Further evaluations are planned in Greater Manchester and Merseyside, both of which contain NDC projects. In view of this, it might prove worthwhile to explore links with these studies in the main NDC evaluation phase.

**Other relevant priorities and programmes**

Action to reduce disorder and anti-social behaviour, to impact upon vehicle crime and to promote better design that reduces victimisation through blocking opportunities for crime also form part of the CRP although they are not necessarily funded as separate initiatives.

Area based approaches for dealing with disorder and anti-social behaviour have required new tools for the police and local councils, such as anti-social behaviour orders, but they also form part of broader holistic regeneration strategies that address all of the problems experienced in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Thus youth inclusion schemes, work to tackle truancy and school exclusion, and indeed, the NDC Domain programmes are all relevant to creating conditions for stable, socially cohesive and healthy environments that reduce crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour.

In respect of vehicle crime, the Government has set a national target to reduce vehicle crime by 30% by March 2004, under a five-year strategy produced by Vehicle Crime Reduction Action Team. Area based strategies emanating from this include better links between information systems and improved car park security. Both the CCTV and Targeted Policing Initiatives are relevant to reducing vehicle crime.

The Design against Crime initiative, working with the Department of Trade and Industry and design bodies, seeks to encourage companies to think through the crime-resistance of their designs and systems before launching them on to the market but
also embraces the design of the built environment. The latter is most relevant to area based regeneration initiatives and includes:

- Local planning guidance - delivering Crime Reduction through Design (emerging from the Rogers Report and the subsequent Urban White Paper);
- The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Secured by Design Award Scheme

Guidance to local authorities and other agencies about the role of crime prevention in planning considerations is provided through the 1994 Planning Out Crime Circular. The Circular stresses the importance of incorporating measures to help reduce crime early in the design of new developments and the need for local authorities to work closely with Police Architectural Liaison Officers. Since the publication of the Circular there have been substantial improvements in the effectiveness of 'secure by design' measures (Armitage, 2000). An evaluation of the extent to which the 1994 guidance has been taken up by local authorities and other agencies is planned by DTLR.

Other activities include:

- Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce - (RSA) Student Design Award scheme
- Research in conjunction with the Design Council to assess the extent to which industry, designers and others are aware of the issues of crime resistance of the products they produce and the extent to which they take account of such considerations from the outset
- Electronic computer 'Chipping' of Goods to prevent property theft
- Tackling crime in the future - the role of the Foresight Crime Prevention Panel in predicting future crime trends as a result of new technology and other future developments.

3.3 Crime Prevention Initiatives in NDC Local Authorities

A key issue in the evaluation will be how to attribute observed changes in crime and the fear of crime to NDC programmes and crime prevention interventions. Gaining a
clear idea of the total investment in crime prevention being channelled into NDC areas is a starting point.

Box 3.9 below shows the crime prevention funding targeted at local authorities that have an NDC initiative within their boundaries. The initiatives concerned are the Reducing Burglary Initiative (rounds 1 through 3), the Targeted Policing Initiative (rounds 1 and 2) and the CCTV Initiative (rounds 1 and 2). Column 2 gives the name of the NDC area Local Authority, columns 3 through 5 give the total grant allocation to schemes located within the local authority boundary. These figures do not include any matched or levered in funding. The total provided for the three initiatives by local authority appears in column 6. Column 7 identified the percentage share of initiative funds provided to all NDC local authority areas that go to each NDC local authority. Finally, column 8 shows the cumulative percentage of resources.

Box 3.9 has been ranked in descending order of the total resource provided to each NDC local authority area. A total of 9 out of the 38 NDC local authorities (highlighted) received just over half (52.15%) of the funding on these initiatives. They were Leicester, Birmingham, Lambeth, Liverpool, Manchester, Tower Hamlets, Bristol, Doncaster and Bradford. At the other end of the scale, local authorities with some of the lowest allocations included Hammersmith and Fulham, Rochdale, Brighton, Hartlepool and Oldham. These were certainly not among the areas with the lowest crime.

Only one authority, Norwich, failed to receive any funding under any of the rounds of the initiatives examined. However, there were also some surprising omissions by disadvantaged local authorities in the provision of funds under the Reducing Burglary Initiative, in particular, Newham and Knowsley. The implication is that the competitive bidding regime established for the CRP has resulted in resources not always being matched to areas of need.

This work will need to be taken further and refined in the main evaluation. This will involve expanding the picture to include the full range of area based crime prevention
activity together with estimating the extent to which funded programmes impact directly upon the NDC target area.
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<th>Burglary Red</th>
<th>Targeted Policing</th>
<th>CCTV</th>
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<th>% Share</th>
<th>Cum %</th>
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<td>56,040,816</td>
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**BOX 3.9 Specific Crime Prevention Funds in NDC Local Authority Areas**

Notes: Bradford excludes £329,600 CCTV Round 2 funding for NDC area. Brent funding for CCTV Round 2 is 50% of a combined Brent/Camden allocation. Sandwell and Wolverhampton CCTV funding for Round 2 was a joint allocation and has been split 50/50. Funds for targeted policing in Islington and Southwark are 1/3 the combined allocation to Islington, Camden and Southwark under Round 2.
4. The Evidence Base on Crime Prevention

4.1 Interventions Relevant to Area Based Initiatives

The studies, evaluations and evidence base on crime prevention most directly relevant to area-based regeneration initiatives are those that focus upon situational crime prevention and other approaches (e.g. community cohesion building, enforcement action, targeted policing, offender rehabilitation and diversion) within specific places such as clearly demarcated residential neighbourhoods and non-residential areas (e.g. town centres, industrial estates). As the NDC targets disadvantaged residential areas, interventions influencing crime in these areas are particularly pertinent.

The most relevant strategies or ‘interventions’ are discussed, below.

*Location Specific Situational Crime Prevention*

This would include, for example, making individual households more secure from burglary through ‘target hardening’ or through improved surveillance. Target hardening might involve installing locks, bolts, chains, bars, spy holes that are fitted to doors, windows and their frames. It might also include fencing around the perimeter of a property. Household surveillance includes security lighting fitted to the outside of properties, as well as alarm systems (both overt and covert) and covert CCTV cameras.

This approach might also embrace gathering information (e.g. through close scrutiny of recorded crime data backed up by security surveys of individual properties) that would enable vulnerable dwellings to be identified and appropriate measures to be taken to reduce risk.

*Area-Wide Situational Crime Prevention*

This involves implementing measures that protect more than just one or a few properties but entire streets and neighbourhoods. They involve both physical
modifications to property and street layout as well as social measures such as building coalitions against crime within the community, encouraging the formation of residents’ associations and strengthening social cohesion to boost guardianship. The latter are best described as ‘stakeholding interventions’.

Examples include:

**Physical measures**

- Design improvements
- Environmental improvements
- Public lighting
- CCTV
- ‘Alleygating’ (i.e. gates installed on alleyways giving access to the side or rear of properties)

Improvements aimed at ‘designing out crime’ include building / demolition projects that aim to make the area less prone to crime. Environmental improvements include cutting back hedges and bushes, improved street cleaning, removal of graffiti.

**Stakeholding measures**

- Neighbourhood Watch schemes
- Resident involvement initiatives
- Tenant registration schemes
- Landlord registration/ incentive schemes
- Crime prevention publicity campaigns
- Crime prevention education

Resident involvement in crime prevention can be encouraged through the formation of resident associations, tenant associations and local community groups that are mobilised in the area.

Publicising crime prevention can involve a wide range of approaches. It embraces leaflets and information packs posted through doors or left in strategic locations, regular or ad hoc newsletters but also local radio/TV, newspaper and magazine coverage on crime prevention. Crime prevention education is a more interactive form of dissemination that seeks to raise awareness of risks and preventative measures by means of presentations or talks given to specific groups (schools etc.).
A common method of tackling high crime neighbourhoods is incentivising landlords to improve/maintain the security of their rented housing stock whether solely with their own funds or with assistance from a project. The approach can include the establishment of registration schemes of approved landlords or through publicity or direct representations made to landlords.

Other methods involve vetting potential tenants before providing them with accommodation (accredited tenants schemes) in order to screen out and exclude offenders from rented housing.

**Property Targeting**

Another way of increasing the risk and effort for offenders is by making items of property more difficult to dispose of. Typical methods include:

- Property marking
- Property registration
- Property storage

Items of property can be marked with residential postcodes using labels, UV pens, Smart Water (chemicals with a unique forensic identifier that can be traced precisely) etching and electronic tags. A complementary approach is that of property registration that might be either a computer based or paper based registration systems. Property storage schemes provide secure facilities for the storage of household /personal property for a temporary period of time (usually students during vacations).

**Enforcement Action and Policing**

In the examples of interventions given so far, the emphasis is on reducing crime by making it more difficult for offenders to commit crimes by making targets physically more secure or by increasing surveillance and the willingness and preparedness of communities to act as capable guardians against crime. Area-based crime prevention may also involve taking direct action to reduce offending through enforcement, intelligence gathering and better targeting of police operations to disrupt the ability of
criminals to offend in the area and to curtail anti-social behaviour. Relevant approaches include:

- Witness protection schemes (e.g. to protect witnesses of crime from reprisals)
- High visibility policing (e.g. increased patrolling in the area)
- Gathering analysing using intelligence
- Disrupting offending behaviour
- Anti-Social Behaviour Orders
- Eviction Orders

Gathering, analysing and using intelligence includes crime pattern analysis, offender profiling and use of available data including information from informants and from schemes like Crime Stoppers. The approach may be underpinned by the use of surveys of offenders.

**Disrupting offending behaviour**

Enforcement operations taken against offenders would include crackdowns, sting operations, offender targeting work, the employment of ‘trackers’, operations aimed at disrupting ‘markets’ that offenders rely upon (e.g. for drug dealing, for the sale of stolen goods). Other enforcement measures for dealing with disorder and incivilities include, eviction orders, court injunctions preventing return to an area and, since the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, Anti Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs).

**Changing Behaviour/ lifestyles of Actual/ potential offenders**

Finally, approaches to crime prevention might involve diverting, de-motivating and changing the behaviour of potential and actual offenders. Common interventions include:

- Youth diversion Schemes
- Supervision / treatment of offenders
- Drug rehabilitation schemes

Youth diversion schemes typically attempting to divert young people from opportunities to commit crime or to engage in anti social behaviour and, as such, is effectively a situational crime prevention approach. Without a component involving changing attitudes and behaviour it is primarily a short-term measure (occupying young people so that they cant commit crime). Some youth work programmes
combine youth diversion with strategies aimed at attitudinal and behavioural change. The latter can involve intensive supervision and if successful is likely to be sustainable over time.

Schemes involving the supervision / treatment of offenders, aim to work with known offenders to change their offending behaviour. These can be voluntary or orders of the court, but consist of a programme or course of activities/interventions. Drug rehabilitation schemes include drug arrest referral and drug treatment programmes – both voluntary and orders of the court.

4.2 Identifying ‘What Works’ in Crime Prevention

A major study carried out for the US Congress in 1997 (Sherman et al 1998) sought to review systematically over 500 scientific evaluations of crime prevention practices. Many other programmes have been implemented but have not been evaluated sufficiently to generate the evidence needed to draw conclusions on their performance. However, there is sufficient evidence to create provisional lists of what works, what does not work and what is promising in terms of preventing crime or reducing the risk factors for crime. Although produced in 1997, a web site is maintained where updates of what works, what's promising and what does not work can be found. The site address is www.preventingcrime.org

Research and evaluation findings will inevitably come with caveats and cautions. There is always a balance to be struck between 'reaching very few conclusions about what works with great certainty' and 'very many conclusions with little certainty'.

One major problem with many evaluations of crime reduction schemes is that studies are not sufficiently scientific in nature, thereby precluding any firm conclusions from being drawn. In relation to this point Sherman et al. (1998) developed the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods, to enable evaluations to be rated in terms of their validity, and to provide a guide to evaluators as to how to conduct a reliable evaluation. Box 4.1, taken directly from Sherman et al. (1998), is a definition of the scale:
**BOX 4.1 The Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods for Evaluating Crime Prevention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Correlation between a crime prevention programme and a measure of crime or crime risk factors at a single point in time.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Temporal sequence between the programme and the crime or risk outcome clearly observed, or the presence of a comparison group without demonstrated comparability to the treatment group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>A comparison between two or more comparable units of analysis, one with and one without the programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td>Comparison between multiple units with and without the programme, controlling for other factors, or using comparison units that evidence only minor differences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 5</td>
<td>Random assignment and analysis of comparable units to programme and comparison groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sherman et al. (1998)

Sherman et al. suggest that in order to provide evidence that a scheme has ‘worked’, it is necessary that a level 3 (or higher) evaluation needs to have been conducted. The evidence cited in much of the literature on ‘best practice’ does not always come up to these rigorous standards of evidence identified by Sherman and some of the claims made for effective strategies may indeed by misleading. In view of this, more
appropriate language would be to say what *generally* tends to work and what
*generally* tends not to work.

The ‘what works’ study, the only analysis to date to embrace the whole range of
crime prevention approaches, examined initiatives operating in different contexts (for
dexample, in schools, in families, in the labour market and by the police). The most
relevant findings from the point of view of area-based initiatives were those that
examined crime prevention initiatives in places, by the police and in communities.

**4.3 General overview of ‘what works’ in crime prevention**

The most effective strategies identified from the Sherman et al study included:

- the issue of threats against landlords for not addressing drug problems on their
  premises that appears to have reduced drug dealing and crime in privately
  rented accommodation (Green 1993, 1995, Eck and Wartell 1996)

- extra police patrols in high crime hot spots reduces crime in these areas

- Targeting repeat offenders. Reducing the time spent on the streets of known
  high risk repeat offenders and monitoring them and returning them to prison
  more quickly than when they are not monitored reduces their crimes

The least effective initiatives included:

- Neighbourhood Watch programmes organised by the police. These fail to
  reduce burglary and other target crimes especially in high crime areas where
  voluntary participation often fails (Rosenbaum 1986, Pate et al 1987)

- Arrests of juveniles for minor offences cause them to become more
delinquent in the future than if police exercise discretion to merely warn
them or use alternatives to formal charging

- Increased arrests or raids on drug markets fail to reduce violent crime or
  disorder for more than a few days

- Store front police officers fail to protect crime in surrounding areas.

- Police newsletter with local crime information fail to reduce victimisation
  rates in some US cities

- Community mobilisation of residents' efforts against crime in high crime
  inner-city areas of concentrated poverty without the aid of those in a position
of power outside the community fail to reduce crime in these areas (Hope, 1995).

A much longer list of potentially promising interventions was identified. The most relevant to area based initiatives that may well reduce crime included:

- Community policing with meetings to set priorities
- Higher numbers of police officers in cities
- Community based after school recreation programmes (may reduce local juvenile crime)
- Moving urban public housing residents to suburban schemes
- Redesign of layouts of retail stores
- Improved training and management of bar staff
- Street closures, barricades and re-routing
- Target hardening of parking meters and public telephones
- Problems solving analyses using situational crime prevention techniques
- Intensive supervision and after care of juvenile offenders

A more extensive list of effective, promising and non-effective interventions from this major study appear in Appendix 1.

In assessing so many evaluations, Sherman’s team concluded that much of the evidence base was weak. They comment as follows:

“The scientific rigor (as shown by the scientific methods score) supporting the conclusions is usually moderate at best, and is frequently weak. Forty-three percent of the studies did not use control places or measure crime for a minimal number of pre-intervention time periods. Only 6 percent of the evaluations compared the same intervention in at least 20 places and used control places. There were only two randomised controlled experiments among the studies examined. Often evaluators did not report significance levels for crime reductions, so we cannot determine the chances that the results were due to random changes in crime. In summary, a typical evaluation of a place-focused intervention involves a before-after comparison of a prevention tactic at a single location, compared to a roughly similar location or the surrounding area” Sherman et al 1998, p7:48

Moreover,

“Many of the evaluations studied the effect of multiple interventions implemented at about the same time. Even when the effects of a single tactic were identified, it was sometimes reported that other changes had occurred that could confound the evaluation results. Thus we might learn that crime was prevented, but we do not know what caused the prevention”. Sherman et al 1998, p7:48.
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, there was an element of certainty about some interventions where the scientific evidence pointed to clear positive impacts upon crime. Thus in relation to housing management interventions they conclude:

“It is difficult to be precise about what works, at which types of residential sites, and against which crimes. One set of tactics, however, does have a limited number of rigorous evaluations. Nuisance abatement is a place-focused tactic that "works." With the evidence available we are relatively certain that holding private landlords accountable for drug dealing on their property by threatening abatement reduces drug related crimes” Sherman et al 1998, p.7:10

They were less convinced of the value of street lighting in reducing crime:

“Lighting has received considerable attention. Yet, evaluation designs are weak and the results are mixed. We can have very little confidence that improved lighting prevents crime, particularly since we do not know if offenders use lighting to their advantage. In the absence of better theories about when and where lighting can be effective, and rigorous evaluations of plausible lighting interventions, we cannot make any scientific assertions regarding the effectiveness of lighting. In short, the effectiveness of lighting is unknown” Sherman et al 1998 p.7:92

The Home Office Toolkits also include examples drawn from research and evaluation evidence of ‘what works’ in crime prevention, although the solutions are not appraised using a system as rigorous as the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods. This could also be claimed about examples of ‘best practice’ that have been identified by other bodies such as the Local Government Association, Nacro and the Audit Commission. (Audit Commission 1999). The latter have established a Community Safety Website with examples of good practice in partnership working, data sharing and effective approaches to crime prevention. Details can be found at www.audit-commission.gov.uk/comsafe.

The Home Office have highlighted a number of the crime prevention strategies that have been identified as effective at reducing several types of crime. For example, CCTV, more secure design for houses, cars and goods, targeting of crime hot spots and of known offenders and a focus on preventing repeat victimisation are all relevant to reducing domestic burglary, vehicle crime, robbery and anti-social behaviour.
Two additional measures can be identified that impact upon acquisitive property crimes such as burglary, robbery and car crime. These are disrupting the market or outlets for disposing of stolen goods and the use of informant hotlines such as ‘Crimestoppers’. Stolen goods market disruption strategies make it harder for offenders to reap the rewards from crime by ‘fencing’ goods. Strategies include greater surveillance of second hand goods shops by police and ‘crackdown’ operations aimed at recovering stolen property. Informant hotlines also generate intelligence that increase the risks of apprehension or can lead to arrests.

The mechanisms through which these and other strategies reduce crime, and the research and evaluation studies that form the evidence base, are shown in Boxes 4.2 through 4.8, below.

Some strategies are more suitable for reducing specific types of crime when implemented in addition to the general purpose crime prevention measures described above. For example, target hardening (e.g. fitting of locks and bolts), property marking, crime prevention awareness raising campaigns and close surveillance of properties proximate to previously burgled dwellings (‘cocoon watch’) are particularly relevant to reducing domestic burglary (Box 4.3). Improved housing management practices (e.g. accredited tenants schemes, rapid repairs) and effective street lighting can form part of a general drive to reduce anti-social behaviour (Box 4.5). Education and diversion projects for young people and improvements in public lighting may be effective for reducing robbery (Box 4.6).

Vehicle crime reduction (Box 4.7) can be facilitated by a number of special measures in addition to the general tactics that appear in Box 4.2. These include the fitting of security devices in vehicles, motor education projects for young people to prevent joy riding and improved surveillance and management of car parks. The Home Office operate and maintain a vehicle risk assessment database that provides information on the vulnerability to crime by model and age of vehicle. This Home Office Car theft Index can be interrogated by accessing the toolkits website on www.crimereduction.gov.uk/cti97.htm
Strategies have also been identified to reduce crime against businesses (Box 4.8). Small businesses, that serve communities in disadvantaged areas (e.g. corner shops), can suffer high levels of crime. When they are forced out of business the impact on service provision to local communities can be significant. (Social Exclusion Unit, Policy Action Team 13). There will be examples of them in the NDC areas. Measures to reduce crime against small businesses include watch schemes to increase guardianship, target hardening (shutters and locks) and CCTV.

4.4 Discussion of Selected Interventions

The evidence base on what works comprises numerous studies that have explored, in detail, the performance of particular interventions through evaluations and case studies. Many of them have been produced as Home Office research papers and are referred to in the ‘summary of research finding’ column in Boxes 4.2 through 4.8. A few examples of successful interventions of direct relevance to area-based initiatives such as NDC, are described below.

Secured by Design

The Secure by Design (SBD) scheme, run by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), aims to encourage commercial developers to incorporate crime prevention measures that aim to reduce the opportunity for, and fear of, crime. In line with CPTED, the basic principles of this approach involve ensuring that properties have suitable standards of physical security; increasing levels of natural surveillance (thereby increasing the likelihood of capable guardians being present, or that crimes will be witnessed); limiting access to non-residents and potential offenders; increasing territoriality to attempt to maximize informal social control; and, encouraging residents to maintain their estate/area, thereby presenting the perception that crime and disorder will not go unnoticed (Armitage, 2000).
### BOX 4.2 Effective Strategies for Reducing Crime: Domestic Burglary, Vehicle Crime, Robbery and Anti-Social Behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Reasoning / mechanism</th>
<th>Summary of research findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase CCTV coverage</td>
<td>Cameras will either:</td>
<td>Can be effective where it is clear what impact the scheme is meant to have, and where the right conditions are in place for the cameras to have the intended effect. Works best as part of an integrated and evolving package of measures. (Tilley, 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure by design</td>
<td>Design, management and maintenance improvements can deter criminals by making it harder and more risky to commit crime.</td>
<td>Implementing action in a police beat reduced risks by nearly 10% ( \text{HO Research Findings No 42 Domestic burglary schemes in the safer cities programme. Ekblom Law and Sutton.(1996)} ) Evaluation of Secured by Design housing in West Yorkshire found cause for ‘qualified optimism.’ The incidence of recorded crime was much lower where Secured by Design (SBD) was in use, both for new build and for refurbished estates. Residents’ surveys found lower fear of crime among residents on SBD estates, while there was no evidence of displacement to different offences (Eg vehicle crime). Repeat burglaries were higher for SBD dwellings, suggesting that where weaknesses were found, offenders would exploit this, and underlining the need for SBD standards to develop rather than remaining fixed. Armitage (2000) Victims less vulnerable to robbery in well lit, open areas. Vehicles less vulnerable when parked within property boundaries (BCS Clarke &amp; Mayhew1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted policing of hotspots</td>
<td>The more precisely patrol presence is concentrated at the ‘hotspots’ the less crime there will be at those places and times. Crackdowns on identified problems must be followed by US evidence is that this is an effective strategy for dealing with local problems. (Goldblatt &amp; Lewis Wright and Pease 1995) The risk of crime displacement in response to targeting is often over-stated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Burglary, Vehicle Crime and Robbery</strong></td>
<td><strong>Target known offenders</strong></td>
<td><strong>Repeat victimisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeting the market in stolen goods</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disrupting offenders’ methods/routines can reduce crimes.</strong>&lt;br&gt;The higher the police arrest rates for high risk offenders the lower the rates of crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour.</td>
<td>Crime can be reduced by protecting victims from further crime.&lt;br&gt;A graded response to repeats, including household security improvements is effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hesseling (1994) reviewed 55 published articles on crime prevention measures and found that 40% showed no displacement at all; and, of that 40%, 28% showed diffusion (the spread of beneficial influence of an intervention beyond the places directly targeted etc.)</td>
<td>UK research indicates that this can effect a significant reduction in burglary. Chenery et al, 1997. Anderson Chenery and Pease 1995. Initiatives targeting vehicles, owners and locations create greater scope to make an impact on theft from vehicles (Chenery et al, 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targeting repeat offenders appears to be worthwhile. Goldblatt &amp; Lewis (1998).</td>
<td>Recent research indicates that targeting prolific burglars reduced burglaries. Farrell, Chenery and Pease HO Police Research Series Paper 113. Research points also to the benefits of targeting repeat serious traffic offenders, in particular those convicted of driving while disqualified. – similar activity may be useful when dealing with street robbers. (Rose, 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rates of offending/re-offending are influenced by how hard/easy it is to dispose of stolen goods. Reducing and disrupting the market for stolen goods will reduce incentives/incitement for theft.</td>
<td>Some evidence that difficulties in disposing of stolen property can deter inexperienced thieves from re-offending while active ‘fences’ (handlers of stolen goods) encourage more offending. Strategies for reducing illicit markets are being tested. Sutton 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rewards, free phone number and anonymity will generate information leading to arrests.</td>
<td>Schemes are in general highly productive in recovering stolen property/successful prosecutions. Clarke &amp; Harris, 1992. More useful in detection than prevention. Research findings by the Vauxhall Centre for the study of Crime at the University of Luton, indicate that in 63% of cases previously unknown offenders, or those</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
known but not suspected for the case in question were arrested and charged as a result of information from ‘Crime Stoppers’ information.

May be less suited to less serious robberies and to petty car theft where most offenders and victims are juveniles (Clarke and Harris, 1992). Sometimes regarded by those involved as an aggravated form of bullying.

(Adapted from Home Office Toolkit)

An evaluation of a number of estates that had been refurbished to SBD standards in West Yorkshire, conducted by the Applied Criminology Group (ACG) at the University of Huddersfield, demonstrated that, relative to matched comparison estates, there were statistically fewer burglaries committed on SBD estates. Critically, there was no evidence of crime-switch coinciding with the decrease in the burglary rate. That is, for vehicle crime, there were 42% fewer incidents on the SBD estates than experienced in the matched comparison estates.

The significant reductions in crime that occurred following the implementation of SBD measures, are shown in the graph in Figure 4.1., below.

**Figure 4.1 Impact of Design Improvements on burglary**

![Graph showing impact of design improvements on burglary rates](image-url)
Additional results from this study, that are of direct relevance here, relate to the fear of crime. In particular, a survey of residents revealed that, relative to those how lived on SBD estates, approximately twice as many residents who lived on non-SBD estates expressed concern for their safety at night, both on the streets surrounding their home and in their own homes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Reasoning / mechanism</th>
<th>Summary of research findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater use of intelligence</td>
<td>To provide the rationale and focus for dedicated squads</td>
<td>Performance was seen to have improved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property marking</td>
<td>To aid in reducing burglary and recovering property.</td>
<td>Evaluation of a successful scheme Laycock (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicity campaigns</td>
<td>Continuous publicity must accompany target hardening to maximise benefit.</td>
<td>Media involvement must be planned carefully and messages continually re-inforced. Tilley and Webb 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting property</td>
<td>Dwellings are particularly vulnerable during a change in occupier.</td>
<td>Increased incidence of property crime in both pre-move and post-move periods. Movers and Breakers; Ellingworth and Pease Vol 3 No 1 International Journal of risk, Security and Crime Prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raise public awareness/change behaviour</td>
<td>People can (but often fail to) take simple steps to protect themselves from being victimised. ‘Cocoon watch’ combined with tailored target hardening can prove effective.</td>
<td>General campaigns have limited impact and are unlikely to reduce the overall levels of theft. Burrows &amp; Heal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Campaigns targeted on vulnerable people/places show more promise. Forrester, Chatterton and Pease 1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘Alleygating’

A further example of an intervention that is growing in popularity, and that has applied CPTED principles in an attempt to reduce both burglary and other crimes (e.g. secondary fires, youths causing annoyance and vandalism) is Alley-gating.

Evidence suggests that for a large proportion of residential burglaries, offenders gain access via the rear of properties (see Johnson & Loxley, 2001). In response to this, Alley-gating involves the installation of security gates across footpath and alleyways, and is a form of situational crime prevention that attempts to reduce crimes by reducing opportunities for offending (Johnson & Loxley, 2001). The logic of this approach is directly in line with Cohen & Felson’s (1979) crime triangle, noted in the introduction of this report, which states that for crimes to occur the following must converge in space and time: a motivated offender, the absence of capable guardians against crime and the opportunity to commit crime. Thus, theoretically, the likelihood of a criminal act being perpetrated is reduced by removing/reducing opportunity.

At present a large-scale evaluation not limited to the impacts of alley-gating on residential burglary is currently underway on Merseyside (Johnson, Bowers, Hirschfield & Young, forthcoming), although, the results of this study will not be available for some time. However, a preliminary evaluation (Young, 2000) was concerned with the impacts of alley-gating on burglary has produced encouraging results. Briefly, this study examined changes in the burglary rates for 20 different areas in which alley-gates had been installed for a period of one-year. Across these areas, a total of 208 alley-gates had been fitted which protected 3,442 houses. The analyses indicated that for the two-year period prior to the installation of the gates, the average crime rate across the gated areas was around 2.8 times that experienced in the remainder of the police force area (Merseyside). In contrast, for the one-year period that followed the installation of the gates, the crime rate fell dramatically in the gated areas, being only 1.45 times that experienced in the remainder of the police force area, thereby, suggesting that the scheme may have produced reductions of up
to 50% in the targeted area. Although this represents the only evaluation completed to date, the results are clearly encouraging.

Organising an alley-gating scheme also involves establishing a consultation team who will arrange meetings with local residents to discuss the details of the project. The very fact that people are brought together in these meetings may lead to their increased involvement in the neighbourhood and a greater sense of community spirit and ownership. This benefit was experienced by local residents living in one of the neighbourhoods involved in the Liverpool alley-gating project (Johnson and Loxley, 2001).

*Interventions that address repeat victimisation*

A number of schemes have now been implemented that show clearly the benefits of targeting repeat victimization in terms of reducing levels of crime and potentially in improving detection.

The Kirkholt estate in Greater Manchester, was one of the earliest examples of how effective focusing on dwellings with previous burglaries could be in reducing crime. (Forrester, Chatterton, and Pease 1988; Forrester, et. al. 1990; Pease 1991; Tilley 1993a). A number of interventions were used at each targeted residence, including target hardening and organizing residents in surrounding homes to watch the burgled house (so-called cocoon watch). The scheme saw a 40 percent decline in burglaries in the first year following the start of the programme and subsequent decline over the next three years.

Another repeat victimization scheme in Huddersfield used a graded response to repeat victimization (Anderson, Chenery, and Pease 1995). Residents that reported a single burglary received a "bronze" response. This included crime prevention advice from the police, cocoon neighborhood watch, and improvement in dwelling security. If a resident was a victim of a second burglary within a year the police stepped up patrolling of the location, and put warning stickers on the dwelling. This was the
"silver" response. If a third burglary was reported within a year then the "gold" response was put into place. This included the use of video surveillance of the location and even more intense police patrols. Anderson, Chenery and Pease (1995b) report a 19 percent reduction in burglaries relative to changes in burglary in the surrounding area.

In conclusion, there are clear benefits in focusing on repeat victims of crime as this:

- automatically concentrates effort on areas of highest crime;
- automatically concentrates on individuals at greatest risk;
- fuses the roles of victim support and crime prevention which have been historically separated;
- explicitly links the police tasks of prevention and detection;
- provides a way of targeting prolific offenders; and,
- makes the clearance of a series of crimes more likely than when they were viewed independently.

Publicity

A further approach, noted above, that may also have an effect on crime rates is that of publicity. The mechanism through which this may affect change is through a change in offenders’ perceptions of opportunity. Smith, Clarke & Pease (forthcoming) have defined this phenomenon as an ‘anticipatory effect’, and provide evidence of anticipatory benefits for a number of different types of initiatives including CCTV (Armitage et al., 1999) and burglary schemes (Northern consortium, 2001) and a drink driving campaign (Ross, 1973). In fact, in the 52 evaluation studies considered, 22 showed evidence of anticipatory effects, with the crime rate reducing dramatically before any action on the ground was realised. However, it should be noted that general publicity campaigns produce only meagre results (e.g. Burrows & Heal, 1980), and hence any effects of publicity are likely to be caused by campaigns that provide more specific information about where and what is taking place (Smith et al., forthcoming), thereby conveying the risks to potential offenders.
CCTV

The use of CCTV systems in town centres has increased considerably in recent years. There are a number of possible mechanisms whereby CCTV in theory will impact upon crime (Phillips 1999). This is shown in Box 4.4, below.

The evidence of the effectiveness of CCTV mixed. There is some evidence that CCTV works in reducing car crime in car parks (Tilley, 1993; see also Poyner, 1992). Tilley (1992) has found that the effects of CCTV are enhanced when complemented with other measures. Research on Glasgow's City Watch Scheme, found that not only did the scheme help "detect and deter crime", complementing a broad crime management approach, but it also helped make "people feel safer, increase visits to the city centre" (Fyfe and Bannister, 1996, p.41).

However, other studies concerned with the impacts of CCTV in city centres suggest that CCTV may have a significant impact initially, although this may not be sustainable (Brown, 1995). In addition, studies have also found that crime rates may be affected even before systems become operational (e.g. Armitage, 1999; Brown, 1995).

Thus, currently it is unclear as to how CCTV has an effect, and how to sustain the initial benefits. Even less is know about the effectiveness of CCTV in residential areas - an issue more relevant to crime prevention in NDC areas - as this is a very recent development in Britain. This is one of the gaps in the evidence base that needs to be filled. The forthcoming evaluation of the CRP’s CCTV Initiative being undertaken by the University of Leicester should provide some answers during the next two years.

BOX 4.4 Mechanisms through which CCTV impacts upon crime

Caught in the act – CCTV could reduce crime by increasing the likelihood that present offenders will be caught, stopped, removed, punished and, therefore, deterred
You’ve been framed – CCTV could reduce crime by deterring potential offenders who will not want to be observed by CCTV operators or have evidence about them captured on camera

Nosy parker – A reduction could take place because more natural surveillance is encouraged as more people use the area covered by CCTV. This may deter offenders who face an increased risk of apprehension.

Effective deployment – CCTV may facilitate the effective deployment of security staff and police officer to locations where suspicious behaviour is occurring. Their presence may deter offenders or may mean they are caught in the act.

Publicity (general) – This may assist in deterring offenders (but crime might be displaced by location or offence)

Publicity (specific) – CCTV cameras and signs show people are taking crime seriously, and thus offenders may be deterred

Time for crime – CCTV may have less of an impact on crimes that can be done quickly as opposed to those that take a longer time, as offenders assume that they will have enough time to avoid the cameras or to escape from police officers or security staff.

Memory jogging – Publicity about CCTV encourages potential victims to be more security conscious and to take precautionary measures.

Appeal to the cautious – Those who are more security minded use the areas with CCTV, driving out the more careless who may be vulnerable to crime elsewhere
(Source: Phillips, 1999, p.127)
**BOX 4.5 Additional Measures for Reducing Anti-Social Behaviour**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Reasoning / mechanism</th>
<th>Summary of research findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved lighting</td>
<td>Better lighting will deter anti-social behaviour and make detection more likely.</td>
<td>Small scale studies suggest that better lighting may reduce crime and incivilities in localised areas, at least in the short term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>An evaluation of area-wide lighting improvements found these were popular and reassuring for the public but did not reduce crime to any great extent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Atkins et al, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved housing management</td>
<td>Clearly worded &amp; even-handed tenancy agreements Attention to maintenance of facilities &amp; open space in neighbourhoods, including rubbish collection street cleaning, 24 hour graffiti removal Rapid repair service Good housing allocation policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Home Office Toolkit)

**BOX 4.6 Additional Measures for Reducing Robbery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Reasoning / mechanism</th>
<th>Summary of research findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve lighting</td>
<td>Better lighting will deter thieves and make detection more likely.</td>
<td>Small scale studies suggest that better lighting may reduce crime and incivilities in localised areas, at least in the short term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ken Pease' paper argues that, 'Precisely targeted increases in street lighting generally</td>
<td>An evaluation of area-wide lighting improvements found these were popular and reassuring for the public but did not reduce crime to any great extent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Atkins et al, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See also, K Pease 1999 'A review of Street Lighting Evaluations: Crime Reduction Effects.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crime Prevention Studies, volume 10, pp. 47-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
have crime reduction effects'

| Education projects | Channelling young people’s interests in positive directions can deter them from offending / re-offending & remove some of the motivation for theft. | May be similar projects available locally that can dissuade young offenders from engaging in robbery and street crime. |

(Adapted from Home Office Toolkit)

**BOX 4.7 Additional Measures for Reducing Vehicle Crime**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Reasoning / mechanism</th>
<th>Summary of research findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Car park security enhancements</td>
<td>Controlled access/ Increased natural surveillance makes crime harder and more risky.</td>
<td>Research covering car parks in London and elsewhere found that risks of theft were highest in unstaffed car parks, especially those where cars were left for long periods. Staffed entrances greatly reduced theft of vehicles, though theft of contents could still be a problem. Car parks where attendants parked the cars had by far the lowest rates of theft. Thefts of components and contents were found to be higher where car parks served as pedestrian throughfares. (Clarke &amp; Mayhew, 1998) Examples of significant reductions in crime in Secured Car Parks are found in the published report of the Vehicle Crime Reduction Action Team. (<a href="http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/vrcat1.htm">http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/vrcat1.htm</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance new car security</td>
<td>Target hardening.</td>
<td>Enhancing new car security is important as part of a package of vehicle crime reduction measures. However, on its own higher levels of security may not necessarily reduce the risk of theft, especially theft from vehicles. (Clarke &amp; Harris, 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitting approved security devices</td>
<td>Added security makes vehicles harder to steal</td>
<td>Inconclusive. (Schemes that rely on motorists coming forward tend to attract the more security conscious drivers.) (Brown &amp; Billing, 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improve lighting</strong></td>
<td>Better lighting will deter thieves and make detection more likely.</td>
<td>Small scale studies suggest that better lighting may reduce crime and incivilities in localised areas, at least in the short term. An evaluation of area-wide lighting improvements found these were popular and reassuring for the public but did not reduce crime to any great extent. (Atkins et al, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motor education projects</strong></td>
<td>Channelling young people’s interest in vehicles in positive directions can deter them from offending / re-offending &amp; remove some of the motivation for theft.</td>
<td>Motor projects can and do work where they are carefully targeted and managed and run professionally to exacting criteria. Factors essential for success include careful targeting of participants, clear aims, good developmental programmes and incentives for participants to stay involved. (Smith, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raise public awareness/ change driver behaviour</strong></td>
<td>People can (but often fail to) take simple steps to protect themselves from being victimised.</td>
<td>Research on the role of publicity campaigns in anti-burglary strategies found that these could be effective as part of a wider strategy. Some of the strategies assessed also covered vehicle crime. Caveats are that publicity should not be over-optimistic and that brand names should not be over-used as this dilutes their impact. (Stockdale &amp; Graham 1995). Campaigns targeted on vulnerable drivers/vehicles/places show most promise. (Burrows &amp; Heal 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vehicle watch/ Over 25s schemes</strong></td>
<td>Stolen vehicles will be easier to detect when being driven late at night/by younger drivers.</td>
<td>Can be reassuring to the public / good for police-community relations, and may have a place in clearly defined neighbourhoods suffering from high rates of vehicle crime. However, schemes are unlikely to deter offenders. Rigorously policed they are</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
also extremely resource intensive for the police.  
(Honess & Maguire, 1993)

(Adapted from Home Office Toolkit)

**BOX 4.8 Measures for reducing Business Crime**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Reason/mechanism</th>
<th>Summary of research findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Intensive support for businesses suffering from chronic victimisation. | Crime can be reduced by protecting victims from further crime. | Repeat victimisation should be a focus for preventative strategies. Success depends on:  
  - Ensuring that crime recording systems can accurately identify repeat victims.  
  - Responding to incidents quickly.  
  - Motivating businesses to act on the advice received.  
  Where highly victimised premises are identified, it is advisable to target nearby similar ones to try and pre-empt crime migration to them. Tilley (1998) |
| External CCTV Cameras will either: | • deter thieves  
  • aid detection  
  • support successful prosecutions | CCTV schemes work best where there is a high degree of coverage, where they are part of a package of measures, and where the right conditions are in place for the cameras to have the effect intended.  
CCTV has most effect on crime levels in town centres with geographically simple layouts. In geographically complex town centres, a high degree of camera coverage can be more difficult to achieve and displacement of crime can take place.  
Tilley (1993); Brown (1995) |
<p>| Instore CCTV Cameras will either: | Evaluation of TESCO’ Integrated Security System concluded that it led |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of shopfront shutters</th>
<th>Crime can be reduced by making it harder and more risky to commit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• deter thieves</td>
<td>to unknown losses falling from £12,000 to £5,000 per week.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• aid detection</td>
<td>The initial capital costs of the equipment was high at £150K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• support successful</td>
<td>for an average superstore. However, the payback on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prosecutions</td>
<td>capital expenditure was realised within six months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Burrows (1991)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Upgrading building security</th>
<th>Crime can be reduced by making it harder and more risky to commit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A 1994 Department of the</td>
<td>Security upgrading schemes can be effective in stemming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment/Welsh Office</td>
<td>revictimisation of individual businesses. There is less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circular notes that solid</td>
<td>evidence that they lead to overall reductions in local crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>roller shutters can give</td>
<td>Tilley (1993a) (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an area a ‘dead’ appearance and are vulnerable to graffiti. This in turn can deter the public from using such locations, so losing the benefit of passive surveillance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where security shutters are required, the Circular recommends those with an open grille design.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular 5/94 (Department of the Environment); Circular 16/94 (Welsh Office)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Watch schemes</th>
<th>The presence of ‘capable guardians’ will deter offenders and/or increase the chances of detection.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Business Watch, Hotel Watch, Pub Watch, Club Watch)</td>
<td>Security upgrading schemes can be effective in stemming revictimisation of individual businesses. There is less evidence that they lead to overall reductions in local crime. Tilley (1993a) (1998)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A strategic and co-operative approach to reducing crime in an area, eg an industrial estate, involving a mix of measures, is more likely to be effective than target hardening by individual units. Johnstone et al (1994)
| Arrest referral schemes for drug-using offenders | Treatment for problem drug users can have a marked impact on drug related crime by removing or reducing the motivation for offending. | A study of arrest referral schemes in 3 locations found a marked fall in drug use, and in acquisitive crime, by a significant proportion of those taking part in schemes. Prior to arrest referral, the favoured method of raising money to buy drugs were shop theft, selling drugs and burglary. Edmunds, Hough, Turnbull and May 1999 |
| Intensive work with first-time offenders to prevent them from re-offending | Crime will be reduced by challenging offenders’ attitudes and behaviour. | A study of the Milton Keynes Retail Theft Initiative (RTI) found evidence that the scheme was having a real impact on rates of re-offending for first-time offenders. The re-offending rates for first time offenders attending the RTI was 3% compared with 35% for first time offenders dealt with differently. Time spent by police officers dealing with offenders was also significantly reduced, and the scheme’s success encouraged more reporting of shop theft. The scheme made no discernible difference where offenders had previous criminal records. McCulloch (1996) |
| Marking goods | Marking and tracking systems can assist police in identifying and recovering stolen merchandise and be a powerful deterrent to thieves. | Keeping accurate and detailed record of computer equipment (especially serial numbers) can assist the police considerably in the detection of computer hardware theft. Whitehead and Gray (1998) |

(Adapted from Home Office Toolkit)
Current research on crime displacement

No single standardised methodology for measuring displacement has, to date, been adopted. Work currently underway by the authors is attempting to address this issue (Bowers & Johnson, forthcoming; Johnson et al., 2001; Bowers, Johnson & Hirschfield, forthcoming). Considering research concerned with burglary conducted in the UK, using data collected via residents’ surveys, Ekblom et al. (1996) found that where interventions were less intensive geographical displacement often resulted, whilst where implementation was more intense minimal geographical displacement or even a diffusion of benefit was the more likely outcome.

In a more recent case study that used police recorded crime data and more sophisticated analyses using a Geographical Information System (GIS), Bowers, Johnson & Hirschfield (forthcoming) found evidence of both geographical displacement and crime switch (particularly theft from motor vehicles). Interestingly, however, within close proximity of the target area there was also substantial evidence of a diffusion of benefit, with households within that area being less at risk than predicted.

An important point noted in both of the UK studies relates to the possible reason for a diffusion of benefit as it relates to geographical (re)distribution of crime. In both studies, the authors have suggested that one plausible reason for this effect that offenders are unlikely to be aware of the precise operational boundary of the scheme. Consequently, they avoid properties that are not subject to crime prevention activity, but that are within close proximity of the target area. Johnson et al. (2001) report evidence that supports this conclusion (see also Bowers et al., forthcoming), showing that houses located within 500 metres of the scheme experienced a diffusion of benefit, whilst houses located within a zone of 500-1000 metres experienced a dramatically heightened risk. The risk to houses located further away was also heightened although the risk dissipated over space, thereby conforming to a distance decay function.
5. Future Work and Developments

5.1 Current and forthcoming evaluations

A large number of evaluations of crime prevention initiatives are currently underway or are about to commence soon. Some of these have already been referred to in the discussion of relevant policy initiatives, above.

Clear objectives have been set, by the Home Office, for the evaluation of the Crime Reduction Programme. These focus on providing answers to the following questions:

- What works in crime reduction?
- What works in fear of crime reduction?
- Which interventions are more successful in reducing crime?
- What is the comparative cost-effectiveness of different interventions?
- How can implementation failure be avoided?
- How effective has the Crime Reduction Programme been in developing the knowledge base and in mainstreaming 'what works'?

The evaluations most relevant to the NDC Evaluation include those of:

1. The Reducing Burglary Initiative
2. Locks for Pensioners Scheme
3. The CRP CCTV Initiative
4. The Youth Inclusion Programme
5. Intervention Work in Schools
6. On Track: Families
7. Targeted Policing
8. Retail Crime Initiative
9. Drug Arrest Referrals
10. Design Against Crime
11. Fear of crime

These evaluations will include process, outcome and cost effectiveness assessments strategically across entire initiatives and more in-depth studies of the performance and impact of individual schemes.
Box 3.9 above revealed that nearly all NDC local authority areas have acquired funding under the RBI and the CCTV programme and some under the Targeted Policing initiative. The extent to which investment through other crime reduction programmes (e.g. youth inclusion, drug arrest referrals, on track for families, intervention work in schools, and so on) is being targeted into NDC local authority areas needs to be identified. Further work then needs to be undertaken to identify or to estimate how far these resources are being spent within or in close proximity to NDC target areas. This picture then needs to be augmented by including other crime prevention activities taking place in these areas funded through the Single Regeneration Budget and partnership approaches emanating from Crime and Disorder Strategies and police-led initiatives.

5.2 The Campbell Collaboration

There is a need for a ‘one stop shop’ where evidence from research and crime prevention evaluations can be stored. This would help to disseminate information about what works in crime prevention and what potentially might and what manifestly does not work. The consolidation of crime prevention evaluation and research into a single repository that can be interrogated using key words and search terms is one of the objectives behind the ‘Campbell Collaboration’. Based on the Cochrane Collaboration in the field of public health, the aims of the Campbell Collaboration are to generate a body of knowledge on crime and justice matters and to facilitate the creation, updating and rapid dissemination of systematic reviews in criminal justice.

The initiative should improve international co-operation and the available knowledge pool on a range of crime and justice issues and improve the scope of future literature reviews which are essential to research programmes. Further details are available on the Website http://campbell.gse.upenn.edu.
6. Lessons for the Evaluation Team

6.1 Problems and Pitfalls

Fortunately, some of the problems with conducting evaluation research in crime prevention are well documented. For instance, in his book chapter "The Evaluation Jungle", Tilley (2000) points out some of the common problems and pitfalls for evaluation researchers. These include:

- Being put under pressure by implementers to report positive findings of evaluations. Obviously, for those who have put effort into a crime prevention scheme, the receipt of good news is often one of the primary objectives of commissioning an evaluation.

- Situations where the parties involved have different goals. For example, an academic evaluator might want to advance research interests through an evaluation. This is not the aim of partnerships and others involved.

- Failure to deal with technical difficulties. For instance, it will often be a requirement that primary data collection is carried out as part of evaluation. Without sufficient forward planning, surveys can have the following weaknesses:
  
  ➢ Sampling problems- such as inappropriate samples (asking the wrong people), unrepresentative samples (when the sample doesn't represent the population of interest) and samples of the wrong size;

  ➢ Problems with questions- such as not asking the right questions, inappropriate use of open-ended or closed questions, asking inadequately and inconsistently understood questions, unsuitable ordering of questions and miscoding answers or picking unsuitable tick-box options;

  ➢ Respondent problems- including respondent memory failure (for example, of when an incident of crime took place) and respondent acquiescence (when respondents are answering in a particular way just to please the researcher)

- Other sources of data may also have technical problems associated with them.

**Specific problems associated with crime evaluations include:**

- Pseudo-random fluctuations in crime rates- separating random fluctuations from real effects;
Changes in background crime rates - general crime trends need to be accounted for in outcome analyses.

Other changes in the area covered by a scheme - what else has changed in the area that might affect crime rates?

Changes in patterns of crime reporting and recording - which can alter levels of crime recorded in areas

The use of "packages" of crime prevention measures - this makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of any one intervention

Floor effects - when the initial crime rate is low it is harder to detect effects of crime prevention interventions

Regression to the mean - when the initial crime rate is very high any change in crime levels might be due to regression to the mean rather than real impact

Displacement - it is important to assess whether the action taken has caused displacement of the problem to other areas, times, targets or types of crime.

Diffusion of Benefit - it is possible that the scheme will have had the positive side effect of preventing crime against other targets or areas not directly assisted by a scheme

Timing - schemes might not necessarily have instant effects, so decisions have to be made on how long an evaluation should last

There are also various conceptual problems associated with undertaking crime prevention evaluations. It is important to interpret carefully the findings from an evaluation. Schemes might fail because of a lack of successful implementation of a project on the ground or because of contextual issues (the wrong environment for the scheme to work) not because they were not good ideas. It could also be the case that the measures used by the evaluation to quantify success are not sensitive enough or have been misdirected.

In particular, it is important to assess what it is about the context that has lead to the success or the failure of a scheme. Without sufficient information about the context, it is difficult for the evaluator to make recommendations about situations in which
similar schemes are likely to be successful. One further problem that crime evaluators face is the changing or evolving nature of both crime prevention and offending behaviour (this has been highlighted by Ekblom (1997)). Deterrents that have worked in the past might not always work in the future.

There are various practical steps that can be taken to address some of the issues that have been highlighted above. These include:

- Undertaking selective evaluations- concentrating on the important issues. For instance, the effectiveness of some crime prevention measures will have been better documented than others. It will be best to focus on interventions that are less common and that less is known about;

- Undertaking continuous monitoring- keeping up with a project's inputs, activities, processes and outputs. This will assist in the process of assessing the factors that lead to the success or failure of a scheme;

- Looking out for positive and negative side effects as well as intended effects of schemes;

- Use of theory- it is important to think through how an intervention is likely to reduce crime. This assists in setting out the evaluation framework and working out where to look for results;

- Examine how sub-groups are affected by crime prevention programmes. Different groups are likely to be affected in different ways and experience different outcomes. This often only becomes really apparent as implementation occurs, but should be anticipated by the evaluation team;

- Evaluate as part of a partnership- it is sometimes difficult to find the balance between undertaking an objective evaluation and still adding ideas and value to the programme being implemented. Finding such a balance maximises the potential utility of the evaluation;

- Evaluate for a long enough time period- it is vital that the evaluation continues for a sufficient time to pick up any effects of a scheme and gives data analysis procedures enough ‘after’ data to ensure that sound statistical analyses can be undertaken;

- Expect changes to happen- with an evaluation it is possible to understand what works at a particular time. However, due to the evolutionary nature of crime prevention and offending, the techniques used might not work indefinitely. This
needs to be anticipated when making judgements about the success or failure of a scheme.

6.2 Obtaining consistent crime data

Essential to the evaluation of most crime prevention schemes, is the availability of recorded crime data that are collected and classified in a consistent manner. Whilst recorded crime data are subject to problems of under-reporting, because of the precise nature of these data in terms of where and when crimes occur, they provide invaluable information that is not available through other means, such as residents surveys. For instance, any analyses of the time-course of repeat victimization, or the extent to which geographical or crime-switch displacement occurred, surely require accurate data concerned with where and when crimes occur.

However, there are a number of problems relating to police recorded crime data that evaluators should be aware of. First, the authors’ experience as evaluators of the Home Office’s Burglary Reduction Initiative indicates that there can be discrepancies between police statistics generated for pre-defined geographical units such as Police Beats and BCUs and the number of crimes produced by summing the number of individual crime incidents occurring in a given area over a given time period. It is not unusual to discover inconsistencies in data provided from different sources within a police force. Reasons for this are numerous but include the degree to which the ‘raw’ data are cleaned by police analysts providing the data. For instance, some analysts remove duplicate and misclassified records, whereas, others do not. An additional, but related problem, concerns changes in recording practices and/or recording systems. For example, changes in the counting rules for different crimes may occur for a variety of reasons. Hence, it is important that evaluators are aware of such changes and do not conclude that any changes observed always reflect true changes in offending.

Secondly, different police forces may attach different types of geographical references to incidents of crime on their databases, which may vary in terms of resolution. Thus, one police force may supply a geo-reference (an Ordnance Survey Easting and Northing coordinate) accurate to within one-metre and also a police beat
code, whereas, a different force may supply only a police beat code. Clearly, the types of geographical analyses that can be undertaken are dictated by the resolution of the data supplied. In addition, where specific police geographies are concerned, the size of these areas may vary dramatically between constabularies, thereby potentially limiting the degree to which accurate comparisons can be made between schemes located in different police force areas. As the 39 NDC projects are located in 18 constabularies, there will be a need to collect data from forces operating different systems and with different recording practices. A full awareness of any differences will need to be gained during the course of the evaluation.

Thirdly, in order to conduct a ‘realistic evaluation’, as a minimum, it is necessary to obtain both historic data that cover a reliable pre-implementation period for the areas targeted, and relevant comparison areas (for example, within the remainder of the police force area), and data that cover the implementation and post-implementation periods. Further, to enable analyses of how crime rates change over time to be conducted, analyses that are essential to the attribution of cause and effect, it is necessary to obtain crime rates for either monthly or quarterly time periods.

6.3 Evaluation Methodology

In order to provide scientific and reliable results, any evaluation conducted must conform to what Sherman et al. (1998) define as a level 3 evaluation (or higher). For instance, in relation to crime trends, there must be comparisons between two or more comparable areas, one with and one without an NDC programme. Ideally, the evaluation would also seek to control for other factors (level 4 evaluation), and seek to compare multiple areas with and without an NDC programme.

Where possible it is also advisable to examine both prevalence rates and measures of repeat victimisation (such as concentration or the percentage of total incidents that are repeats). For instance, Johnson et al. (2001) found that for one scheme, for some parts of the target area, whilst the overall burglary rate increased over time, the rate of re-victimisation actually reduced, suggesting that the scheme had a more
qualitative effect on patterns of victimisation. Thus, to fully understand the effects of an intervention it is necessary to consider rates of repeat victimisation as well as prevalence (see also Hope, 1995).

In addition, the authors’ own work concerned with burglary reduction, and Smith et al.’s (forthcoming) paper, suggest that crime rates may be influenced, not only, by action on the ground, but also, by anticipatory effects. Thus, provided that details of a crime reduction scheme are communicated to the public, and, in particular, to offenders, in advance of the scheme’s inception, reductions in crime rates may actually be affected before any implementation on the ground takes place. This has an implication for the evaluation of crime reduction schemes, as follows. Specifically, if projects communicate details of the scheme to potential offenders before the scheme is implemented, it is important that the evaluation team are aware of, and consider this in any analyses conducted. For instance, if crime is reduced immediately prior to the start of the scheme, and this reduction can be attributed, with some certainty, to an anticipatory effect (e.g. if there was a pre-implementation publicity campaign), then a simple ‘before and after’ comparison of crime rates may be misleading (Smith et al, forthcoming). Thus, if such a simple approach is adopted (and the authors would advocate a time-series approach) then serious consideration would need to be given to what the relevant before and after time periods should be.

7. Lessons for Partnerships

7.1 Project management

There are a number of factors encountered by crime reduction schemes that can impair the effectiveness of initiatives. These are summarised below drawing upon recent experience gained by the authors through their evaluation of the Home Office’s Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI) in the north of England.

Firstly, project management can clearly be an important factor. Several of the RBI projects identified problems arising from the late appointment of the project manager. In some of these projects, problems arose from the lack of involvement of the project
manager in the preparation of the bid, which caused some confusion as to the aims and objectives of the proposal and/or the rationale underlying the initiative. Other problems included uncertainty concerning personnel changes or a change in the project manager.

Further difficulties that have been identified include the lack of clarity in the role of individuals, a lack of pre-project planning and preparation and a lack of a strategic overview of projects that identify how, where and when different interventions interact to produce desired outcomes (e.g. reductions in crime). Given that it is sometimes difficult for project managers to gain a strategic awareness of projects wholly aimed at reducing crime, the challenge will be that much greater in initiatives such as the NDC where interventions are being implemented across several domains.

Workload was identified as a serious problem for several BRI projects. This was particularly the case where there were no dedicated staff, or where only part-time staff were appointed to work on the project. In the face of other commitments, staff found difficulties in finding the time to work on the scheme due to the pressure of other duties. The need for after hours working, because of the project emphasis on community involvement, also emerged as being problematic. Thus, it is important to allocate adequate and appropriate staffing resources (i.e. to ring fence project managers’ time) to ensure that project objectives are deliverable, and implemented effectively. Once of the reasons why this was a problem in the first round of the RBI was the relative modest resource provided by each scheme (circa £60,000 over one year). The resources and the duration of NDC programmes may overcome this problem.

Thirdly, project delineation was also problematic, for instance, several projects found that their original proposals were over-ambitious and too complex. One project realised that the target area boundary cut across streets, a factor that could potentially cause resentment amongst residents living just outside the target area as well as problems in monitoring crime figures. A few projects found that the burglary problems identified were incorrect and needed to amend strategies and targets. Some
projects also found it difficult to separate action taking place as part of the crime reduction scheme and action that was taking place as part of other operations.

Finally, a number of projects experienced significant delays as a result of unanticipated legal issues (e.g. obtaining closure orders in the case of alley-gates), and encountered lengthy delays due to local authority tendering and purchasing procedures. Hence, partnerships need to ensure they are aware of potential bottlenecks or issues that may impede progress from the outset so that they may plan accordingly.

7.2 Maximising positive impacts

Whilst a number of crime prevention strategies are known to have significant effects, the research concerned with anticipatory effects (discussed in 6, above) suggests that reductions in crime rates may be realised even before implementation begins. The key to achieving this would appear to be changing offenders’ perceptions of opportunity and risk. Thus, publicising specific crime reduction activity may represent a cost effective way of reducing crime. Although, as discussed above it is important that any publicity is not too general in nature as this is unlikely to have any effect.

Whilst the evidence concerned with displacement is far from conclusive, it is evident that crime may be displaced geographically, and to other types of crime. However, it is important to note that there may also be a diffusion of benefit, whereby, those not affected by a scheme may also experience a reduction in risk. In terms of cost effectiveness and geographical coverage, the aim of partnerships should be to attempt to capitalize on this latter effect. This might be achieved through the provision of misinformation to offenders regarding the boundary of the scheme, or by deploying resources geographically in a way that does not conform to a clear boundary. For instance, for some interventions, targeting a core area, but also a random selection of streets or houses outside of this area might produce the illusion of greater coverage.
Some consideration should be given to the possibility of crime-switch, and where this may reasonably be anticipated, counter measures should be considered. For instance, for a burglary reduction initiative, it is most likely that should crime-switch occur, offenders would commit more acquisitive crimes, such as theft from vehicles (see Bowers et al., forthcoming). Thus, implementing a car-crime initiative in the same and surrounding area may minimise this form of displacement.

Likewise, thought should be given as to where crimes may be displaced to, and where possible, interventions should be designed to minimise the likelihood of this occurrence. Considering where crimes are likely to be displaced to, a number of criminologists (e.g. Brantingham & Brantingham 2000; Eck 1993) have suggested that crimes will be displaced to streets or areas that are most similar to the area from which they were displaced.

Numerous studies, some of which were highlighted in the evidence review, have demonstrated the benefits of repeat victimisation strategies against residential burglary. For instance, Johnson et al. (2001) reported that for a target hardening scheme aimed primarily at reducing repeat victimisation, the risk to protected households following target-hardening was less than one-third of that experienced pre-implementation. Thus, it would appear that, as Pease (1998) has noted, focusing on repeat victimisation automatically concentrates on individuals at the greatest risk of future victimisation.

One important point to note, however, is that repeat offences tend to occur swiftly, with a high proportion occurring within one week of an initial event. Therefore, it is important to implement strategies quickly and effectively. An implication of this is that effective targeting systems and decision processes need to be established to ensure scheme success.

Research (Chenery et al., 1997) also shows that repeat strategies can be used to tackle car crime. Thus, repeat victimisation strategies need not be limited to burglary, but may extent to other types of crime where victims are readily identifiable. Chenery et
al. (1997) discuss what factors might affect the efficacy of both repeat domestic burglary and car crime initiatives, and suggest what might be incorporated in future work.

### 7.3 Partnership working

In relation to partnership working, a range of problems have been identified, which include a lack of cooperation or participation by one or more partners, representation of partners at an inappropriate level, imbalance between agency inputs, failure to take advantage of particular partners’ expertise, and poor inter-agency communication and information sharing. Thus, it is important that partnerships attempt to identify clear management structures, or inter-agency relations (whilst recognising that these may evolve over time), and that all parties are aware of the aims and objectives of the project, and precisely what their role should be.

Even though effective and promising strategies can be identified, projects often fail at the implementation stage. Some common pitfalls in implementation and ways to pre-empt and overcome them are listed in Box 7.1, below.

**BOX 7.1 Partnership Working: Pitfalls and Responses (Home Office toolkit)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pitfalls</th>
<th>Safeguards/ Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partners are reluctant to commit to action.</td>
<td>Identify levers / incentives, e.g. evidence of public concern, costs and benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review steps needed to seek/reinforce senior management commitment within key agencies, and to keep all those within agencies with an interest informed of relevant developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility for implementation is unclear</td>
<td>Assign responsibilities to a named individual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review/clarify roles and responsibilities of partnership/individual agencies and other stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The programme drifts and is</td>
<td>Review reporting systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| underachieving | Set clear milestones for performance of key tasks.  
|              | Review commitment of partner agencies. Strengthen agreement between agencies if necessary. Look at ways of increasing project ‘ownership’. |
| Project leadership is weak | Ensure the project leader has the time, commitment and skills to do the job, and identify training/development needs.  
|              | As well as project management skills, project leaders need the ability to work across traditional agency boundaries and operate in unknown/unpredictable areas. |

8. Conclusions

This review of the evidence base for the Crime Domain of the NDC has covered a lot of ground. The areas of crime prevention and community safety impact greatly on so many aspects of daily life and as such are highly relevant to each of the other NDC Domains.

The review has outlined some the theoretical underpinning of crime prevention and has discussed the wide range of policy initiatives and policy approaches currently attempting to reduce crime, especially in deprived areas.

Where feasible, additional information has been generated specifically for this review to identify how the 38 NDC local authorities fare in terms of investment provided through the Government’s Crime Reduction Programme. Information has also been provided to show where the NDC local authority areas fit in terms of the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership Families and in terms of other aspects of policy.

Further work will need to be carried out to refine this analysis of other crime prevention initiatives during the main evaluation.

Finally, lessons were identified for both partnerships attempting to implement crime reduction measures and for the evaluation team.
In combination, the information provided in this review provides a good starting point as a position statement to inform the evaluation of the Crime Domain.
Bibliography


Bursik, R.J. (1988) Social Disorganisation and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: problems and prospects, Criminology , 26, 519-552


APPENDIX 1:
What works, what doesn’t work and What is promising (Sherman et al 1998)

What Works?

- For infants: Frequent home visits by nurses and other professionals.
- For preschoolers: Classes with weekly home visits by preschool teachers.
- For delinquent and at-risk preadolescents: Family therapy and parent training.
- For schools:
  - Organizational development for innovation.
  - Communication and reinforcement of clear, consistent norms.
  - Teaching of social competency skills.
  - Coaching of high-risk youth in "thinking skills."
- For older male ex-offenders: Vocational training.
- For rental housing with drug dealing: Nuisance abatement action on landlords.
- For high-crime hot spots: Extra police patrols.
- For high-risk repeat offenders:
  - Monitoring by specialized police units.
  - Incarceration.
- For domestic abusers who are employed: On-scene arrests.
- For convicted offenders: Rehabilitation programs with risk-focused treatments.
- For drug-using offenders in prison: Therapeutic community treatment programs.
What Doesn't Work?
(Sherman et al 1998)

- Gun "buyback" programs.
- Community mobilization against crime in high-crime poverty areas.
- Police counselling visits to homes of couples days after domestic violence incidents.
- Counselling and peer counselling of students in schools.
- Drug prevention classes focused on fear and other emotional appeals, including self-esteem.
- School-based leisure-time enrichment programs.
- Summer jobs or subsidized work programs for at-risk youth.
- Short-term, non-residential training programs for at-risk youth.
- Diversion from court to job training as a condition of case dismissal.
- Neighbourhood watch programs organized with police.
- Arrests of juveniles for minor offences.
- Arrests of unemployed suspects for domestic assault.
- Increased arrests or raids on drug market locations.
- Storefront police offices.
- Police newsletters with local crime information.
- Correctional boot camps using traditional military basic training.
- "Scared Straight" programs whereby minor juvenile offenders visit adult prisons.
- Shock probation, shock parole, and split sentences adding jail time to probation or parole.
- Home detention with electronic monitoring.
- Intensive supervision on parole or probation (ISP).
• Rehabilitation programs using vague, unstructured counselling.

• Residential programs for juvenile offenders using challenging experiences in rural settings.

What's Promising?
(Sherman et al 1998)

• Proactive drunk driving arrests with breath testing (may reduce accident deaths).

• Community policing with meetings to set priorities (may reduce perceptions of crime).

• Police showing greater respect to arrested offenders (may reduce repeat offending).

• Polite field interrogations of suspicious persons (may reduce street crime).

• Mailing arrest warrants to domestic violence suspects who leave the scene before police arrive.

• Higher numbers of police officers in cities (may reduce crime generally).

• Gang monitoring by community workers and probation and police officers.

• Community-based mentoring by Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America (may prevent drug abuse).

• Community-based after-school recreation programs (may reduce local juvenile crime).

• Battered women's shelters (may help some women reduce repeat domestic violence).

• "Schools within schools" that group students into smaller units (may prevent crime).

• Training or coaching in "thinking" skills for high-risk youth (may prevent crime).

• Building school capacity through organizational development (may prevent substance abuse).
• Improved classroom management and instructional techniques (may reduce alcohol use).

• Job Corps residential training programs for at-risk youth (may reduce felonies).

• Prison-based vocational education programs for adult inmates (in Federal prisons).

• Moving urban public housing residents to suburban homes (may reduce risk factors for crime).

• Enterprise zones (may reduce area unemployment, a risk factor for crime).

• Two clerks in already-robbed convenience stores (may reduce robbery).

• Redesigned layout of retail stores (may reduce shoplifting).

• Improved training and management of bar and tavern staff (may reduce violence, DUI).

• Metal detectors (may reduce skyjacking, weapon carrying in schools).

• Street closures, barricades, and rerouting (may reduce violence, burglary).

• "Target hardening" (may reduce vandalism of parking meters and crime involving phones).

• "Problem-solving" analysis unique to the crime situation at each location.

• Proactive arrests for carrying concealed weapons (may reduce gun crime).

• Drug courts (may reduce repeat offending).

• Drug treatment in jails followed by urine testing in the community.

• Intensive supervision and aftercare of juvenile offenders (both minor and serious).

• Fines for criminal acts.
**APPENDIX 2: Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership Families**

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*Source: Leigh et al 2000.*