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Laybourn, Keith

In Search of Phantom Fortunes: Working-Class Gambling in Britain c. 1906-1960s

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Preface

This chapter is driven by my own personal interest. I was born in Barnsley in 1946 and raised in the nearby village of Monk Bretton. My father was a miner who worked at Monk Bretton pit. It was this pit which kept the village together until it was closed down by Roy Mason, who was Barnsley’s MP, and the Labour government, in the late 1960s. As a youngster in the late 1950s I often took small bets for my father and mother to the local bookie on Saturdays, and occasionally ran for him when I was only twelve years of age. I was barely aware that ready-money gambling on horses was illegal but then it seemed to me that small-scale gambling was an accepted and essential part of the leisure of the working-class culture of mining of which I was a part. I recall winning a £1 on my first bet, of 2s 6d I believe, when Mr. What won the Grand National in 1958. Gambling seemed to me a natural part of the fabric of working-class life at that time and it was with some regret that I lost an income when the 1960 Betting and Gaming Act was passed and legalised the institutionalisation of off-course ready – money gambling on horses through licensed betting shops in May 1961. Until I was fourteen or fifteen, then, gambling was part of my upbringing. Running beat doing a paper round which, thank goodness, I never had to do. It even beat going round the wooden seating at Monk Bretton cricket club looking for change that had fallen out of the pockets of merry and often inebriated spectators on a
Saturday and Sunday – although that could be profitable for I once gathered ten shillings from under the seats one early evening. I should explain that the cricket ground at Monk Bretton was at a steeply sloped angle which allowed batsmen to readily score fours down hill but made them struggle to score even one up the slope. Betting had been a boon to my finances until the licensing of betting shops in 1961 which saw an initial rush of small betting shops give way to the large commercial companies of Hills, Corals, Ladbrokes and Mecca. Even Jordans of Barnsley sold their five shops, the first of which had opened on Huddersfield Road near the centre of town in 1959. Since then I have often wondered about working-class gambling and it has already led me to write a book and an article on the topic.

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Gambling is an endemic feature of British society in the twenty-first century with the National Lottery legitimising it from 1994 onwards as an acceptable way of raising money for both the community and sporting projects. It was not always so for in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries determined efforts were made by the National Anti-Gambling League (NAGL), and associated religious bodies, to control gambling, and particularly working-class gambling. The overtly class legislation that was introduced, and most emphatically the Street Betting Act of 1906 which made illegal off-course ready-money betting in public places, was largely ignored by the working classes who resisted the limited and telegraphed gestures by reluctant police forces and an enlightened Home Office to enforce the legislative impositions of Parliament with which they generally disagreed. Indeed, most detailed social investigations into gambling suggest that a majority of working-class families participated in both illegal off-course ready-money gambling as well as substantial legal on-course gambling,
mainly at greyhound tracks. The working classes liked a bit of a ‘flutter’, particularly on the horses, even if much of it was strictly illegal.

At first, the leading anti-gambling organisation was the National Anti-Gambling League, formed and financed by B. Seebohm Rowntree, a Quaker chocolate manufacturer from York and social investigator, from 1890 until it expired in the late 1940s. Yet its activities were supplemented by the Society of Friends at first and, from the 1920s, by the Churches’ Committee on Gambling, the Christian Social Council on Gambling and many temporary organisations such as the Christian Emergency Committee that was set up in 1927 to oppose dog racing. Driven on by Rowntree, the NAGL emphasised that gambling should be opposed because it encouraged the poor to waste their money, thus causing poverty, because it was considered to be a corrupting influence on women and children, and since it encouraged a culture of getting something for nothing. Thus, unlike many Christian critics, Rowntree was prepared to accept that gambling was a product of social environment and not necessarily a personal failing. His amended views on gambling appeared in Poverty and Progress, his second survey of York conducted in 1936 and published in 1941. What he believed was that the working class he was studying were ‘in search of phantom fortunes’ and were wasting their money, although he came to accept that the gambling was small scale and regular.

Many contemporaries attempted to resist the accusations laid against gambling by the NAGL and anti-gambling organisations, as will become evident later. In addition, many historians have challenged the various assumptions and dangers of the excesses of working-class gambling. Carl Chinn, in his book Better Betting with a Decent Feller: A Social History of Bookmaking, suggests that working-class gambling began seriously in the early nineteenth century before the rapid growth of the sporting
press, and that it was a small-scale regular activity by most working-class families – an affordable part of their family budget. Mark Clapson made much the same case in his book *A Bit of a Flutter* in which he saw gambling as ‘a moderate, economistic and expressive form of recreation’, a type of self-help, which the authorities were finally forced to accept. Nevertheless, gambling and gamblers have had a bad press for most of the twentieth century. Indeed, Graham Sharpe, the Media Relations Director of William Hill, wrote, in August 2004, in a ‘Foreword’ to Carl Chinn’s book, that having moved from being a journalist to working for a bookmaker his mother said to him ‘From disreputable hack to unscrupulous bookie. All you need to do now is become an estate agent and you’ve completed the unholy trinity.’

The introduction of the Street Betting Act of 1906 and the conflicts between anti-gambling and pro-gambling forces have led to three questions which will be examined here. First, was gambling an affordable part of working-class leisure or an impoverishing waste? Secondly, why was the Street Betting Act of 1906 introduced? Thirdly, why did it take fifty-five years for this blatant piece of class legislation to be by-passed by the Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 - which allowed licensed off-course betting offices to be opened?

This chapter will argue that, by and large, working-class betting was small-scale, that the anti-gambling lobby was briefly effective between 1904 and 1906, and so made street betting illegal, but that it took more than fifty years for it to be removed from the statute book because even though the Home Office and the chief constables realised that it was futile to operate the Act, and to ban off-course ready-money betting, there were many factors which delayed change. In particular the failure of Winston Churchill’s betting duty (1926-9) and the growth of the football pools, greyhound racing and the Irish sweepstakes lottery, in 1930, slowed down the
pace of toleration. However, in the long run British society changed and attitudes towards gambling did likewise. It was another thirty years before, from 1 May 1961, the Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 legalised off-course ready-money gambling in licensed premises driven on by the fact that political parties were becoming increasingly dependent upon illegal lotteries, bingo and gaming activities and because society had become more tolerant of gambling in general.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the working classes were involved in a variety of gambling activities. Apart from gaming with cards, and localised gambling activities such as crown green bowling which was particularly popular in Lancashire, they focused very much on pitch and toss and horse racing. Pitch and toss, which continued with some popularity until the 1950s, was popular in Liverpool; at Coldwell, near Nelson, almost every day ‘hundreds of youths and men gathered from all parts of the district’. It was also popular in the North East and Yorkshire although it varied slightly from region to region. Normally, however, contestants pitched at a target to establish who was going to act as the banker although that process was later dropped as bookmakers began to act as bankers. The banker would then establish a circle of punters around him and take bets. A thrower would toss two coins high into the air, so that they would twist, the punter hoping to get two tails to land upwards but losing to the banker if they landed with two heads upwards. One head and one tail would lead to the coins being tossed again. Tossing ‘rings’, or ‘schools’, were fairly common until the Second World War but persisted in only a few areas, such as Queensbury, between Bradford and Halifax in the West Riding of Yorkshire. According to one ex-bookmaker, Queensbury was ‘the daddy of the tossing rings’. It operated in a ring which was seven yards by seven yards and was often run by Jack
Harris, ‘a hard man’. At other times it seems to have been run by ‘Bump’ Roe. The tossing school normally took place near the Bradford Beck at Queensbury, near an abandoned farmyard, and on one occasion, according to a participant, when the police raided only one man, Crutchy Wilks who had only one leg, escaped by crossing the beck on his crutches when police officers decided to avoid getting wet in the pursuit.

Nevertheless, it was off-course ready-money backing on horses which attracted most interest. Chinn suggests that a substantial proportion of the working class bet regularly on the horses in the early and mid-twentieth century. Many took their bets to betting houses, which were illegal under the 1853 Betting Houses Act, or to bookmakers who operated in the streets and alleyways of towns. The Street Betting Act of 1906 attempted to ban the latter activities. It is, however, clear that a significant proportion of the working classes, possibly the majority, still continued to place regular bets with bookmakers in their houses or on the street. The working class have always gambled but the modern boom appears to have begun in the 1870s and 1880s when newspapers began to publish results starting prices and results.

Illegal off-course bookies prospered in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They often gathered at meeting and betting grounds such as Williamson Square in Liverpool, Farringdon Street in London, the Midden in Leeds, and other venues. Many extended their operations to factories where their runners or agents gathered bets and often used time bags to store them in what was effectively a form of credit betting which thus made the gambling possibly legal. Every type of shop – from corner shop to fish-and-chip shop - was used by some to cover their illegal bookmaking operations.

This growth of bookmaking was underpinned by a culture of gambling which was developing throughout Britain. Newspapers such as *Sporting Life, Sporting Star*
and the *Sporting Chronicle* began to provide information about horse racing and they themselves began to organise competitions based upon the football pools and other forms of competition. This was undermined by the Ready Money Pools Act of 1920, only the second real success of the NAGL in the twentieth century, which ended their activities by imposing credit betting instead of ready-money betting on the punters. This meant that the punters could not be forced to pay up a debt which could not be pursued in law.

The working classes also increasingly participated in many gaming activities. Whist and partner whist were very popular but normally regarded as illegal, because they were initially regarded as relying upon chance rather than skill and were thus illegal under the 1823 Lottery Act. The Home Office generally took a lenient attitude towards whist drives and advised the police to ignore them although during the Second World War there was increased police action against card games, which were represented as being unpatriotic. Indeed, the Blackpool Chief Constable became obsessed with the need to stamp out gaming. So persistent was he that in one case a defendant, Mr. Bernard who was a corporal in the RAF, stated that

> We are all fighting for freedom but what kind of freedom is this? I was playing marbles at the age of eight. At 14 I was tossing pennies, a cruel offence. At 17 I went into the Army and started to play pontoon and, worse than that, poker, all offences against the law. Yet a wealthy man can ring up a bookmaker and have a bet on a horse. I hope that we are fighting for the day when we can have a game of cards when we want.  

The working class were all too aware of the class distinctions that existed in both gambling and gaming.

II
These distinctions were encouraged by the NAGL which was formed in 1890. It began in York and quickly spread throughout the country but was remarkably unsuccessful in the 1890s. The original impetus for it had come from F. A. Atkins, editor of *Home Words* and the religious periodical *Young Man* who responded to the anti-gambling call of Hugh Price Hughes, the ‘self-appointed keeper of the Nonconformist Conscience’. Its main purpose was to vehemently oppose every form of betting and gambling. In its early years the League was led by John Hawke, the honorary secretary, and later by J. M. Hogge, who became secretary in 1906. John Gulland, an Edinburgh solicitor and Whitehall civil servant in the 1930s, joined at about this time and eventually replaced Hogge in 1919. The NAGL aimed to oppose ‘every form of Betting and Gambling’ and to ‘diffuse among all classes of the community useful information; and to promote reform by legislation and effective administration of existing laws and bylaws.’ These objectives were issued in all the copies of the *Bulletin* which it issued twice per year until it went quarterly in August 1910. The *Bulletin* also published anti-gambling poems such as this one which appeared in 1895.

He saw a ragged-breek’d urchin run
A-shrieking out! ‘All the winners!!!’
And the Devil smiled, as he sniggered, ‘What fun!
What a bait for the greed-fired sinners!
When the gambling demon is awake,
Half the imps may be idle snoosers
But wouldn’t it sell if I published – from Hell –
My record of ‘All the Losers!
Of all the primrose paths ’tis the Betting trade
Leads straightest to perdition,

And all the losses each day (of their souls) I would say

Would fill a big 'Speshul Edition!! 13

In 1897 John Hawke won a High Court case, *Hawke v. Dunn* which ruled that a betting ring at Newmarket was a public place within the meaning of the 1853 Betting Houses Act. The issuing of starting prices there was thus illegal. This judgement was overturned within four months by the Jockey Club when Charles Powell, a clerk at Kempton racecourse, obtained a share of Kempton Park and then issued a writ against the company for an injunction of restraint in contravention of the 1853 Betting Houses Act which would force the authorities at Kempton to provide betting facilities. The contrived *Powell v. Kempton* case overruled the *Hawke v. Dunn* judgement. The issue was taken to the House of Lords but the *Powell v. Kempton* judgement was upheld. The NAGL was thus unable to stop gambling in the Tattersall’s rings on racecourses throughout the country. This forced the NAGL to drop attempts to control all gambling and to focus upon the easier target of working-class gambling. It became convinced that working-class gambling was immoral and should be stopped. B. Seebohm Rowntree recognised that working-class gambling was rife, and studied it in his survey *Poverty and Progress* (1941) but suggested that the working classes would not gamble if they had better housing and living conditions and thus implied that gambling was a product of a particular social environment rather than a personal failing. The NAGL therefore led numerous campaigns to control the ‘tipster’ press, and produced a large number of pamphlets that revealed the pitfalls of gambling, such as *Betting: A Boy to a Bishop, The Gambling Tree and its Fruit, Shall I Bet?* and *Why not make Money without Working?* 14 From the 1890s onwards, then, working-class gambling became the focus of the NAGL which claimed that the
working classes wasted an enormous amount of money on gambling. The fact is that there is little evidence to suggest that this was the case.

III

There are, of course, no precise figures for the level of gambling in Britain in the early twentieth century, although one estimate for 1905 suggested that the level of gambling had reached £50 million, and that there were about 20,000 bookmakers.\textsuperscript{15} During the inter-war years there was much speculation that it varied between about £50 million and £500 million, and even occasionally some recognition that these figures were likely to be turnover and not a loss of income by gamblers. The Rev. E. Benson Perkins, of the Wesleyan Methodist Church’s Social Welfare Department, published numerous pamphlets and books during the inter-war years, including \textit{Betting Facts} and \textit{The Peril of the Pools}, and generally estimated that gambling exceeded £50 million per year although the figure was raised over time.\textsuperscript{16} The Royal Commission on Lotteries, Betting and Gaming (1932-3) received estimates which varied between about £100 million and £500 million. The NAGL regularly estimated the gambling bill to be about £350 to £400 million in the late 1930s.

Most of these early estimates were little more than wild guesses. However, they became more accurate from the 1930s onwards. Rowntree’s \textit{Poverty and Progress} suggested that the working classes of York were spending small amounts of about one shilling per week on the football and one to two shillings on off-course ready-money gambling on horses. ‘One inveterate gambler told our investigator that he’d rather “have six penn’orth of hope than six penn’orth of electricity”’.\textsuperscript{17} The Social Survey of Betting (1951) suggested that rich men on £10 or more a week usually staked 4s. 6d. per week whilst much less well-off working men on £3 per week merely staked 2s. 6d.. Many women did the pools with their husbands, by
themselves or with group of friends or workers.\textsuperscript{18} The Hulton Readership Survey of 1949-50 estimates were slightly higher with men staking 3s. 10d. and women two shillings. It reported that about one third of women bet on the pools, and that they represented about 20 per cent of the pools market although their average stake was small at about 3s. to 4s..\textsuperscript{19} This corresponds with the Sherman survey submitted to the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51) which indicated that out of 250,000 coupons submitted each week 65 per cent of the coupons were for less than 3s. and 85 per cent for less than 10s. The average for each individual, rather than each coupon, was estimated to be even less at 2s. 6d. during the 1949-50 season.\textsuperscript{20}

From the later, more detailed surveys, it is thus clear that gambling was ubiquitous amongst the working classes. By the late twentieth century more than half of them gambled regularly on the football pools. Although there is no absolutely precise evidence on the extent of illegal off-course ready-money gambling on the horses, evidence suggests that it was endemic amongst the working classes. Where there is evidence of the amount gambled it is clear that the working classes gambled less than their middle-class counterparts, though this sum represented a higher proportion of their income from which they expected and got returns. In the end, the evidence supports the views of Clapson and Chinn that small regular amounts, rather than large pauperising sums, were spent on gambling by the majority of working-class families. This was a finding that did not go down well with the NAGL which persistently attempted to control working-class gambling through legislation even though it is clear that its major success, the 1906 Street Betting Act, was unenforceable and a waste of police time.

\textbf{III}
The Street Betting Act of 21 December 1906 amounted to little more than a page of text but it influenced, and occasionally dominated the way in which the police and the off-course bookmakers operated for more than half a century. It stressed that ready-money gambling in public places was illegal and listed the penalties to those who were caught. It was the one great triumph of the NAGL but it took them five years to get the Bill passed. John Hawke, of the NAGL, had first declared to the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Betting that he did not wish to meddle with personal liberty but still desired that bookmakers should ‘be placed in the dock’. As a result Lord Davey presented a bill to the House of Lords in 1904. It was delayed and Hawke, oblivious of working-class protests, wrote to A. J. Balfour, the Prime Minister, in May 1905 stating that ‘May I implore you to help the Street Bill. There can be no opposition of any importance. Churchmen and Nonconformists are agreed. The Opposition will assent.’ It took more than eighteen months for the Bill to be passed through the Lords and the Commons. Whilst strongly supported, one of its parliamentary opponents, C. Hay, observed that the Bill made ‘one law for the rich and another for the poor’. 

The 1906 Act attempted to stop the proliferation of gambling on the street that had occurred because of the 1853 Betting Houses Act which itself was aimed at the ready-money betting houses of the working classes and not at the betting clubs of the middle classes. Both acts operated against working-class gamblers and those bookmakers who offered betting opportunities for the streets, in houses, in shops and factories. However, both acts were ineffective in stopping gambling amongst the working classes and it is clear that police action varied immensely; it was intense in Manchester, routinized in Salford, and barely evident in Leeds. Yet, whether the police took an active or passive approach, they were unable to stamp out off-course
ready-money betting. The Labour Party, which had supported the 1906 Bill, also began to express its concern at the class bias of the legislation in the 1930s.

The debates surrounding the Betting and Lotteries Bill / Act of 1934, which incorporated the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Lotteries and Betting (1932-3), including the decision to retain the ban on public lotteries, were primarily about controlling legal gambling on greyhound racing. Nevertheless, they provoked much wide-ranging comment about the class nature of existing gambling legislation. A typical view was that of J. Jones, Labour MP for West Ham Silverstone, who stated that

The evils of gambling are only discovered when working men start gambling, then it becomes a moral offence. I can go to Throgmorton Street to-morrow morning and see a responsible kind of gambling: nobody calls it street betting. In some streets in my division I can see detectives busily picking up an odd man here or there who is taking betting slips. The other people can gamble with impunity. Those who put a shilling on a horse are heading for Dartmoor but those who put thousands of pounds down are not gambling at all; they are acting in a businesslike way. The Bill does not go so far as I should like it to go. If gambling is wrong, why not deal with it properly on a wholesale scale, and let gamblers go where they ought to go. There ought not to be one law for the rich and another for the poor which is the case today. 25

Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the Labour Party, and many of its leading figures such as James Ramsay MacDonald, Labour’s first prime minister, were fundamentally opposed to gambling. Much of Labour’s opposition was, however, swept away in the general election defeat of 1931, two months after the collapse of the second Labour government. Indeed, in the discussion surrounding the
second reading of the 1934 Bill the less critical views of its working-class representatives emerged when Mr. McGovern, the Independent Labour Party MP for Glasgow Shettleston, reflected that

I remember John Wheatley [Minister of Health and Housing in the 1924 Labour Government], when I was a boy of 16, reprimanding a man who was backing a horse. Wheatley said ‘I think you are making a great mistake because the bookies are bound to win.’ The man looked at Wheatley and said ‘Look here John, you don’t know what life is. Some people keep rabbits and some keep pigeons, some indeed keep white mice, but my way of enjoying life is occasionally to have a bob or two on a horse. I do that to get a certain amount of enjoyment. Don’t take that away from me.’

It is clear that the NAGL and Church interests reached a crescendo of support in 1905 and 1906 which they were never to achieve again. They did not get bills passed on stopping advertisements on gambling before the Great War. They failed to make gambling on greyhound racing illegal on several occasions in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. They failed to get private lotteries banned in 1934, could not stop the football pools when they tried to do so in 1936 and failed to stop the Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 being passed into law with its creation of licensed betting offices. They had some success but their policy of outright banning of gambling almost inevitably failed. There were occasional victories, perhaps the most successful being the passing of the Ready Money Pools Act in 1920. This act only allowed newspapers to offer credit betting on their pools schemes and effectively killed off this form of gambling although the pools companies were able to get round it in the late 1920s by offering credit betting and ensuring that their customers paid up the
following week with their next coupon by organising a body to collect the names of defaulter who would be denied betting rights.

The difficulty of the anti-gambling forces is that they were small even though they carried influence in Parliament, divided by religion, and prone to disagreements on the issue of gambling. Within the Society of Friends there was indeed some disquiet at the fact that the Rowntree and the Cadbury families bought a number of newspapers to strengthen the Nonconformist press. Two of these, the *Northern Echo* and *The Star*, were sporting, tipster and gambling papers. From 1907 onwards both papers dropped their adverts for credit bookmakers and refused to publish racing results and the *Star* got rid of ‘Captain Coe’, its famous tipster. By 1909, however, the sales of these papers were falling. The *Northern Echo*’s sales of 30,000 in 1906 (they had been at 5,000 before the Rowntrees took it over) fell to 25,000 in 1909 after which the racing pages and reports were restored to recapture lost sales. B. Seebohm Rowntree also arranged with Ernest Parke, the editor of *The Star*, to offer up to four daily editions of the paper while reducing the racing and tipster content in each successive edition. Parke argued that ‘a reduction in the amount of racing information would lead to the curtailment of its circulation and the disappearance of profits’ and that this should not occur.27 With Rowntree’s permission he restored the ‘Captain Coe’s Chat’ feature. Paul Gliddon’s recent article suggests that it was not hypocritical for the major anti-gambler to take the decision to restore the tipster press to his papers for financial reasons.28 This as not a view taken by some contemporary writers. Sir Edward Fry in his pamphlet *Betting Newspapers and Quakerism: A Letter Addressed to Members of the Society of Friends*, published in August 1911, complained that ‘The National Anti-Gambling League is largely supplied by members of the Rowntree and Cadbury families; those very men are themselves among the principal owners of
the Sporting Press.’ The Unionist paper *The National Review* suggested that ‘Captain Coe’ should be renamed ‘Captain Cocoa’, after the profession of the distinguished owners of the paper.  

**IV**

The legitimacy of the anti-gambling position was further undermined by many chief constables and the Home Office who were doubtful of the dangers of working-class gambling. Robert Peacock, Chief Constable of Manchester, was strongly in favour of the 1906 Street Betting Act. In fact he wanted much stricter legislation to allow him to raid the bookmakers but was worried about the lack of working-class cooperation. He sedulously applied the Act in Manchester until his death in 1926. However, most chief constables and the Home Office were critical of it over the next fifty-four years—although much of their criticism was equally aimed at the Betting Houses Act of 1853. The official line was that the police regularly prosecuted the ready-money bookies with vigour but there might be a few rotten apples in the forces who accepted bribes and turned a blind eye or pre-warned bookies of raids. The evidence is, however, that police regularly prosecuted bookmakers and often warned them of impending raids.

Yet it was quite clear that in many areas the police and the bookmakers were operating a relationship, often based upon a mutual understanding rather than corruption, which saw the police effectively charging a rent for gambling in a public place. In Salford, for instance the police kept a record of 51 pitches in the ‘South Division’, returned in alphabetical order, and attached to a log book which covers the period from 1907 to about 1958. The most detailed accounts are for the 1920s when the log book indicates that every pitch was fined £10 in the courts on either two or three occasions per year following two or three raids. Canon Green of Manchester in
fact provoked a debate about this when he spoke at Durham Cathedral on 19
November 1932. He stated that

Gambling is a grave source of corruption in the police. I do not say that all the police are corrupt. But some of them undoubtedly bribed. How does the bribery occur? The officer will go the bookmaker and say that ‘It is time you were on the carpet. Put a dummy at the end of the street and I will take him.’ The bookmaker puts in his dummy, the police fine him, and he is fined £10 or a month in prison. If he likes to have him fined he gets a sovereign for the job. If he goes to goal he gets £10.\(^{33}\)

The resulting debate, between the Manchester and Salford police and Green, raged in the Manchester Guardian over the next two weeks with John Maxwell, Chief Constable of Manchester, demanding, but not getting, evidence from Green.

Mr. Jordan, who ran an illegal betting shop on Huddersfield Road in Barnsley in 1959, has stated that ‘he had no problem with the police’ and recalls how on one occasion he was given prior warning and raided only to have the same officers come in the following week to place a bet.\(^{34}\) He noted that in the working-class community of Barnsley ‘everyone had a bet’. Ken Overton, a Birmingham bookmaker, vaguely referred to the Leeds situation where ‘the whole of the police from the chief constable down was conniving at the people breaking the law’ and the Chief Constable was sacked.\(^{35}\) The control of off-course ready-money betting was clearly not working.

The Select Committee on Betting Duty, chaired by Sir Henry Cautley in 1923, was one of the first opportunities for the senior police officers to complain that the 1906 Act was unenforceable and placed strain upon the relations between the police and the public. The Chief Constable of Liverpool stated that legalisation would make little difference for ‘It is easy now; if you want to bet you can do it.’\(^{36}\) Cautley
subsequently emphasised that that police officers told the same story ‘that betting was the only crime…in which the sympathy of the public was always with the offenders and the hostility of the public invariably against the police’. The Home Office was concerned about this in its annual meetings with the chief police constables and in the 1940s surveyed their opinions on the 1906 Act. The vast majority were in favour of the 1906 Act being withdrawn and the Chief Constable of Leicester added that ‘I am unable to find any evidence to show that it is in any considerable degree the cause of crime and lawlessness.’

In 1950 Sir Harold Scott, Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, presented a twelve-page report to the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51) in which he stated that the Street Betting Act was ‘class legislation because persons in a good status of life can bet on credit without breaking the law’, and that its enforcement ‘does nothing to improve relations between the Police and the public’. He added that the 1906 and 1853 acts were a waste of time for ‘in the K Division [of the Metropolitan area] where illegal betting was rife there were 577 arrests in 1948’ for which an ‘estimated’16,000 man hours had been expended to imprison one person. He added that ‘Since experience has shown the impossibility of suppressing cash betting of course it would be better to legalise it under strict control.’

The overwhelming body of evidence suggests that the police felt that the implementation of the 1906 Act, and related legislation, was a waste of time and money to control something which was essentially immoral but not normally criminal. This was an attitude which was also evident in the Home Office. The Cautley Commission of 1923 had revealed the failure of the 1906 Act and had encouraged it to consider the possibility of a Betting Duty, an unsuccessful version of which operated between 1926 and 1929. The Home Office was also interested in the
relaxation of the implementation of the rules on gaming and lotteries. Many card
games, such as whist, were considered to be lotteries and subject to the 1823 Lotteries
Act ban if they were played for money and unless there was an element of skill rather
than chance in the game. In a series of memorandums from 1913 to the 1930s, the
Home Office emphasised to the police that if whist, and other card games, were small
scale then no action should be taken against them. Indeed, the 1921 Memorandum
of E. Shortt, Home Secretary, advised that it ‘would not be politic to interfere with
whist drives of an innocuous nature’. When the Royal Commission on Lotteries and
Betting (the Rowlatt Commission) reported in 1932/33 and wanted the totalisator at
greyhound tracks made illegal – which would have made an aspect of on-course
ready-money gambling illegal at greyhound tracks but not at the more middle-class
attended horse tracks – the Home Office ensured that that did not become part of the
1934 Betting and Lotteries Act.

The fact is that the Home Office, just as much as the police was anxious to get
rid of unnecessary legislation in gambling and gaming which might be seen as
socially divisive. Indeed, it was J. R. Clynes, Home Secretary of the Labour
Government of 1929 to 1931, who summarised this position in 1930 stating that ‘I am
glad to have had an opportunity of making this statement, which ought to dispose
once and for all the suggestion that there is “one rule for the rich and one for the
poor”’. The Chief Constable of Manchester informed Clynes on 28 March 1930 that
his aim was ‘to promote reasonable uniformity in the enforcement of the law and the
avoidance of anything which might suggest partiality or discrimination’.

VI

If both the police and the Home Office were intent on removing some of the
legislation on working-class gambling, such as the 1906 Street Betting Act, during the
1920s and the beginning of the 1930s why did this not occur until the 1960s? The 1853 Betting Houses Act and the Street Betting Act of 1906 were practically unenforceable since a majority of the nation ignored them. Gaming and lotteries were a minefield which the Home Office was prepared to ignore as long as criminal groups did not become involved. Everything seemed to be set up for immediate and fundamental changes but nothing happened.

It is not easy to establish why there was a delay for another thirty years but it would appear that the Home Office and the police had to give way to the fears of Parliament. The fact is that in the late 1920s and early 1930s the more liberal attitude to gambling was possibly set back by three factors: the equivocation of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), the failure of the Betting Duty of 1926 to 1929, and the new developments in gambling.

The first of these factors, the PLP, has been the subject of a recent article which argues that it was unequivocally opposed to gambling until the 1931 general election swept away much of the old PLP, which fell from 291 to 52 MPs; thereafter there was more equivocation as the new body of Labour MPs often opposed gambling but objected to the class discrimination in gambling. This has already been touched upon earlier in this chapter. However, the central point to stress here is that whilst Labour MPs took a more relaxed attitude towards gambling and gaming some retained the lifelong hostility to gambling. Clem Attlee, later a Labour Prime Minister, Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health responsible for introducing the National Health Service, George Lansbury, Labour Leader from 1931 to 1935, and others voted against a private member’s Lottery Bill in 1932 which was designed to raise money for British hospitals; Bevan and George Thomas, a later Speaker of the House of Commons and a life-long Methodist, opposed the 1934 Betting and
Lotteries Bill. Most of the Labour MPs mentioned, and others, were to be found voting against gambling, and the Labour Party today can show remarkable mood changes, as they have done recently in 2006 and 2007 on the issue of the ‘supercasino’. If Labour could no longer be relied upon to oppose gambling then they could also not be relied upon to support it. There were also other factors at play.

Winston Churchill had introduced a Betting Duty on gambling in 1926, aimed mainly to raise money from the legal on-, and off-, course credit bookmakers. Churchill’s duty was to be based upon a 5 per cent duty on stakes and was to be supplemented by a £10 certificate to be paid by bookmakers in order to raise £6 million. In the end the duty was raised at 2 per cent for on-course and 3.5 per cent for off-course credit bookies. By 1928 the figures were down to 1 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively. And the duty was removed altogether in April 1929.47 The fact is that bookmakers simply did not pay the duty; James Maclean, a large off-course credit bookmaker in Scotland, paid £48,000 duty in 1927 and claimed that it put him at a disadvantage with the many credit bookmakers who did not pay.48 As a result the duty raised only £2,700,000 in its best year, 1928. Customs and Excise were reluctant to become involved in such a scheme again and the Home Office developed doubts about licensing off-course bookmakers.49

As if an equivocal Labour Party and a failed betting duty were not sufficient a check there was also the problem of the rapid rise of new gambling opportunities - the Irish Hospital Sweepstake Lottery, the growth of the football pools and, perhaps most damaging of all, the runaway success of greyhound racing. All three helped to determine the voting of MPs, many of whom were more positive to gambling than their predecessors.
The Irish Sweepstake Lottery was begun in November 1930 by Richard Duggan, a Dublin bookmaker, and by March 1932 there had been four sweepstake draws that had raised £13,800,000 – of which £2,800,000 went to the twenty-three Irish hospitals involved in the lottery. The first sweepstake was a flamboyant and attractive proposition for the British punter. It was drawn in the Plaza Cinema, Dublin Irish nurses turned the barrel as a blind boy pulled out the numbers under the scrutiny of General O’Duffy, the Commissioner of Police. The tickets were ten shillings each and were based upon the result of the Manchester November Handicap. It was an instant success and there were normally up to three draws per year afterwards based upon the Derby, the Grand National, and other classic races.

The concern of the British government was that a considerable number of tickets, possibly up to £3 million worth, per draw, were purchased by British punters. Indeed, the Post Office had opened up 9,000 letters headed to Dublin to try to stop the illegal movement of tickets. Any suggestion that public lotteries would be legalised in Britain was quickly rejected because of the state fear that it ‘would be followed by an immense increase in gambling among all classes’. In the end, the situation did not get any worse, perhaps because of the development of other gambling activities.

The growth of the football pools seemed more threatening to the government. Although the football pools had emerged in Lancashire before the Great War, and been developed in various forms in the newspapers, their great growth occurred during the inter-war years. H. Littlewoods was formed by H. Littlewoods and John Moores in 1922. From then onwards they mushroomed and although official figures omit the fixed odds given by bookies, it is estimated that by 1938-9 at least £22,500,000 was being spent per year by about a regular six and a half million
punters. This figure fell to about £3,500,000 in 1941-2, during the Second World War, but recovered to reach around £66,000,000 per year in 1947-8.\textsuperscript{55} It would appear that about half the adult population bet on the pools at some stage in the football season and B. Seebohm Rowntree reflected that half the 25,000 or so families in York were betting on the pools and that postal order demand, mainly for 6d. postal orders, rose from 5,300 in a normal week to 17,828 per week in the football season.\textsuperscript{56} There were, indeed, up to a hundred companies to bet with in the 1920s although the number gradually slimmed down. Apart from Littlewoods the firms included Vernons, Shermans, Zetters, Copes, Socopools, W. S. Strange (Edinburgh), T. Strange (Edinburgh), Western Pools (Newport), and Gamaco Football Pools (Leeds).

What worried the authorities and Parliament in the inter-war years is that the pools companies got round the Ready Money Football Pool Act of 1920 - which was designed to stop the growth of a variety of pools competitions in newspapers by insisting that they should be based upon credit betting – by setting up an organisation which would check upon defaulters and deny credit and payment to them. It should be remembered that gambling debts could not be recovered in the courts under the 1845 Betting Act. In addition, there was strong pressure placed upon MPs by the football authorities who were strongly opposed to their football fixtures being used for the pools. Sir Charles Clegg, a Nonconformist and Chairman of the Football Association in the 1920s, stated that ‘if betting gets hold of football, the game is done for’.\textsuperscript{57} The real fear was that gambling would lead to corruption with players becoming connected with pools companies, as occasionally occurred.\textsuperscript{58}

The peak of the reaction against the pools occurred in 1935 and 1936 when Charles H. Sutcliffe, a Methodist who became the new president of the Football League, pressed the FA Council to ban the advertising of pools coupons in the
football programme at a meeting on 7 October 1935. He also persuaded the FA to withholding the publication of football fixtures until the Thursday or Friday before the fixtures were to be played, although the restriction only lasted for two weeks in February and March 1936. The Football League also claimed copyright over fixtures in the ‘Pools War’. The issue continued for a number of years and was not finally settled until 1958 when Littlewoods eventually paid a substantial sum of money to the League.  

The public and parliamentary concerns about the football pools were substantial but not as great as those connected with greyhound racing. After a failed attempt to introduce it in the 1870s the first successful greyhound track was opened in Britain at Belle Vue, Manchester, on 24 July 1926. There were 1,700 people at the first meeting but by the spring of 1927 Belle Vue was attracting crowds of up to 25,000. By the end of 1927 there were forty tracks in operation and about 120 companies about to open. By early 1931 there were about 170-175 tracks, another fifty-five organisations held licences to open tracks, and there were about eighteen million attendances at the official tracks. By 1936 about nineteen million attendances were recorded at the National Greyhound Racing Club tracks, although there may have been up to thirty-eight million attendances if all the tracks were to be included. 

The rate of development was staggering and worrying for the authorities and anti-gamblers. There was an immediate reaction against greyhound racing from the NAGL, the Evangelical Free Churches and other anti-gambling groups. They feared that the working classes would be increasingly encouraged to gamble and fall into poverty. On the 27 October the Manchester Watch Committee called upon the Home Secretary to introduce legislation to abolish greyhound racing, complaining of ‘carelessness’
and contempt for ‘morality’ amongst the young of Manchester.\textsuperscript{61} On 13 December 1927 Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote a letter to the Home Secretary, warning him of the spectacle of the ‘animated roulette boards’ brought about by the development of greyhound racing.\textsuperscript{62} In 1928 the Home Secretary informed the Cabinet that ‘The principal objection against dog racing is that it is a mushroom growth which threatens to add enormously to betting facilities and, in particular, for betting by many whose means would not permit of their attending horse races.’\textsuperscript{63} At the same time John Buchan MP, the famous novelist, enlisted the support of 100 Labour, 50 Conservative and 30 Liberal MPs to press for the Dog Racing (Local) Bill designed to give local authorities the right to license or not to license local greyhound tracks. In supporting the second reading of the Bill on 11 May 1928 he condemned the ‘illuminated ribbon of turf’ that was threatening to substantially increase working-class gambling.\textsuperscript{64} In mid-July 1928, however, the Bill was withdrawn having been lost in the labyrinth of the Committee stage.

Despite this setback for the NAGL and the anti-gambling fraternity there was still strong opposition to greyhound racing. The development of the Tote, or totalisator on greyhound tracks was seen as worrying by the authorities, even more so when in 1933 it appeared that the use of the totalisators was illegal on greyhound tracks, although it was soon made legal by the Betting and Lotteries Act of 1934. There was, indeed, great concern in the government at the potential that greyhound racing might increase working-class gambling and cause poverty. Indeed, in introducing the 1934 Betting and Lotteries Bill, Sir John Gilmour, the Home Secretary, ignored some of the advice of the Royal Commission on Lotteries and Betting (1932-3) and declared that the Government ‘is entirely concerned with the effect of gambling on the social life of the country’. He added that ‘My main
proposals of the Bill did not interfere with private gambling, but only interfere with social problems as may be regarded as of serious moment to the country.\textsuperscript{65} He concluded, using comments that had circulated Whitehall for several years, that

The position as I see it, and as the Government see it, has been materially changed since the development of greyhound racing since 1926. There are only seven horse racecourses within 15 miles of Charing Cross, with 187 days of racing, whereas in the same area there are 23 greyhound tracks with over 4,000 days racing within a year. Greyhound racing has brought on-the-course betting facilities, often as almost a nightly event, into most of the large urban centres of the country.\textsuperscript{66}

There was, indeed, alarm at the prospects that greyhound racing offered to working-class gambling.

Both the NAGL and the Government worried about the impact of greyhound racing on women and children and the way in which it encouraged a ‘something for nothing’ attitude. In 1927 the Home Office received reports that of all attendees at greyhound meetings ‘30 per cent were women and girls’.\textsuperscript{67} In 1934 various parliamentarians noted the facilities offered for children. The Cartyne track, near Glasgow, had established a nursery ‘So that mothers can leave their children in the nursery while they go and gamble’ and Harringay track, in North London, provided an equipped playground where children could be left: ‘[t]wo see-saws, and a round sandpit complete with spades and buckets are some of the amusements provided for kiddies.’\textsuperscript{68} John McGovern, the Independent Labour Party MP for Glasgow Shettlestone in which the Cartyne track was situated, agreed that it was ‘a most degrading sight’ to see women taking their children to the nurseries on this track.\textsuperscript{69}
Nevertheless, the main criticism was that many greyhound tracks were running unregulated, and possibly illegal, totalisators where the owners determined how much of the total fund arising from all those who bet would be returned in winnings. As already noted many greyhound tracks ran their own totalisator in competition with the track bookies between 1928 and 1933, when they were found to be illegal, and from 1934 onwards when they operated under the conditions and controls of the 1934 Betting and Lotteries Act. Prior to 1933 the owners often kept about twelve per cent of the tote fund from bets for their expenses and profits but after the 1934 Act that was restricted to six per cent of the fund. Prior to 1934 there were claims of exploitation by the owners of the tracks who set up their own totalisators. Indeed, it was claimed of a Manchester company formed in 1931 (presumably the White City in Manchester although it could have been the Salford Albion) using a totalisator that it …in 1931 declared a dividend of £212,000. One man invested £100 and has been paid £6,000 a year ever since. Another guaranteed the company at the bank for a few thousand pounds, and he has drawn over £7,000 a year ever since. These fellows ought to be on the means test and know the meaning of poverty. King Solomon’s mines cannot compare with the money that has been raked out of greyhound racing and yet these people tell us that it is clean, honest and fair as any sport.\textsuperscript{70}

In effect, then, the decade between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s saw government, the Home Office and Parliament fear the increasing opportunities for working-class gambling and doubt whether or not licensing gambling could be successful. It was these fears and concerns that appear to have checked the liberalising
attitude of the police and the Home Office. Yet, after another quarter of a century off-course ready-money gambling was legalised through the licensing of betting offices.

VII

Between the 1930s and 1960 the attitudes towards gambling changed. Most of this seems to have occurred after the Second World War for at this time gambling on the pools and greyhound racing was strictly controlled – the football pools being reduced to about a fifth of their late 1930s level and gambling on greyhound racing being reduced slightly between 1930 and 1942 before recovering strongly.71 In the late 1940s the situation of working-class gambling did not change much but in the 1950s and the 1960s there were widespread cultural and legal changes occurring in British society – connected with sexuality, censorship, abortion, music and other cultural features – that marked these years out as a period of liberalisation. In addition, the final report of the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gambling (1949-51), better know as the Willink Report, contained a chapter on ‘The Social Effects of Gambling’ which concluded that gambling was generally not dangerous to the individual, family and community unless taken to excess: ‘It is the concern of the State that gambling, like other indulgences such as drinking of alcoholic liquor, should be kept within reasonable bounds, but this does not imply that there is anything inherently wrong in it.’72 It therefore concluded that the prohibition of off-course ready-money gambling was ‘difficult to enforce, it has become out of date as a result of the development of many other forms of legal gambling, it gives an appearance of class distinctions, and is clearly ineffective as a method of checking gambling….’ It added that most witnesses felt that there was a need for a change in the law and that ‘the continued prohibition of cash betting off course is neither necessary nor desirable’.73
In addition, by the 1950s most political parties were using the 1934 Betting and Lotteries Act to run their own bingo, card clubs and other lottery money-raising activities. The Labour Party did this on a grand scale between about 1947 and 1953, before it became clear that in many cases they were breaking the law by running illegal public lotteries rather than the legal private lotteries permitted by the 1934 Act. In fact a Labour Party lottery survey in 1954 suggests that about a third of the Labour Party constituency agents would lose their posts if the lottery (lotteries including bingo, whist, and some other card games) was stopped.\(^7\) Gaming had become part of the accepted culture of political parties, and it is not surprising that the Conservative government and the opposition parties operated together to get the Small Lotteries and Gaming Act passed through Parliament in 1955 and 1956, in the hope that it would legalise their fund-raising activities.

On 25 November 1955 Ernest Davies, Labour MP for Enfield, promoted his private member’s Small Gaming Bill to rectify the confusing situation about lotteries or games of chance. He stated that ‘The laws of betting, lotteries and gaming are so complex, confusing and muddled in character and interconnected and so unequal in their incidence that the law is completely out of line with public opinion and common practice.’\(^7\) He added that a vicar could run a raffle at a church bazaar but that if he sold a ticket outside the church hall, or inside it before the local MP had opened the bazaar, ‘he is in danger of being hauled off in a Black Maria.’ Indeed, Davies argues that if he, the lord chancellor, the home secretary, and the Chief Justice, played a rubber of bridge for so much as 1s. per hundred they ‘will be in danger of appearing before the beak at Marlborough next morning. The same state of affairs applies to lotteries run by clubs.’\(^7\)
The Small Gaming Act of 1956 allowed clubs and political organisation to offer better prices and to allow the public to join in bingo and other lotteries in the private clubs. It also set down the conditions for offering monetary prices. Unfortunately, however, it led to confusion. The 1934 Betting and Lottery Act allowed private lotteries to raise money for private clubs. The 1956 Act allowed the public into lotteries operated by clubs but did not allow the profits to be used for the benefit of the members of the private clubs; they could only be used for charity. This difference led to many clubs operating illegally by using the 1956 proceeds for their own members. In the end it proved necessary to clarify this situation again and in the wide-ranging Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 the Conservative government also took the opportunity to replace the 1906 Street Betting Act by introducing the licensed off-course book betting office. The decision to do this had already been taken in Cabinet. Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister, wanted a bill to regulate bookmakers by licensing them and allowing the formation of betting offices, a bill which would also ‘bring the tangled law on gaming into line with what is thought to be contemporary public opinion’. In effect it was implementing the findings of the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51) which had suggested the creation of licensed betting offices. Times had changed and the religious anti-gambling lobby, though still present, could not stop this move. In the end government had come to accept that it was not possible to impose a law that was flouted on a regular daily basis by a majority of the population in a democratic state.

VII

The central argument of this chapter is that in the early twentieth century the working classes generally acted with restraint when it came to gambling and gaming, a view advocated by Carl Chinn and Mark Clapson who accept that the working classes liked
‘a bit of a flutter’. It rejects the view of the NAGL that the working classes gambled to excess and that this resulted in deleterious social and economic consequences. Rather it maintains the ubiquity of gambling which was an integral part of working-class life.

The NAGL was successful in getting the blatantly discriminatory Street Betting Act passed in 1906 but it soon proved to be unenforceable. Indeed, by the 1920s most chief constables and the Home Office wanted the removal of the Act. The opposition of the Labour Party, however, still partly present after 1931, and the rising concern about the mushroom growth of the football pools greyhound racing and the Irish Hospital Sweepstake Lottery undermined the attempts to remove the 1906 Act during the inter-war years. However, this could not last forever. By the 1950s British society was changing rapidly and the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51) had concluded that the 1906 Street Betting Act, and indeed the 1853 Betting Houses Act, were no longer relevant in a modern changing society.

It is here that I return to my own starting point. In the 1950s I could not understand why off-course ready money gambling on horses was illegal. Equally I couldn’t understand why policeman would raid illegal bookmakers one day and place a bet with them the next. I couldn’t see why whist drives were illegal when they were so often used to raise money for local events, including the celebration of the Queen’s coronation in 1953. Why was it wrong for the working class to enjoy the same rights as the middle classes?

My research has indicated no great plot or conspiracy against the working classes but that there are many twists and turns in government attitudes. The actions of the Home Office, the impact of anti-gambling forces, the attitudes of the police, the evidence gathered for royal commissions and select committees, all ensured that there
is no straight course in the evolution of British social policy. These factors dictated the pace of events, and the oscillations in policy, but they did not necessarily dictate its direction; that was more conditioned by the needs of an increasingly democratising society which ultimately aimed to reduce social inequality.

The working classes saw gambling and gaming as part of their contribution to this process of reducing inequalities in life. It was regarded by many of them as a form of self-help which could liven up their lives and offer them the occasional financial windfall to alleviate temporarily their poor economic situation. As Rowntree reflected at the end of the inter-war years, the working classes were often ‘in search of phantom fortunes’ but they were also realistic enough to know that their flutters were likely to bring only limited rewards. Small flutters for small rewards became part of the fabric of the economy and leisure of working-class households in the first six decades of the twentieth century.

4 Chinn, Better Betting, p. xi.
5 Ibid., p. 90.
6 Chinn Interviews with bookmakers, Heslop Room, University of Birmingham, Tape 4141 and b, interview with Jack Ingham, 6 May 1988.
7 Ibid., Tape 391 a and b, with Mr. Cooper of Yorkshire, 14 April 1988.
8 Idem.

10 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, HO 45/20540, containing court cases in the *Lancashire Daily Post*, 6 May 1941 and the *Manchester Guardian*, 14 Feb 1942.


12 Taken from J. R. MacDonald, *Ideal Citizenship* (London, 1905) published by the NAGL. MacDonald was a leading figure in the emergent Labour Party and Labour’s first prime minister in 1924.

13 NAGL, *Bulletin* vol. 1, no.10, 10 May 1895, p. 103. The rhyme was later published as ‘All the Winners’ in *Punch*, 12 May 1895, p. 225.

14 There are no dates to these pamphlets.


19 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, Ho 333/32.


22 The National Archives of the U.K. at Kew, HO/10301/117059.


26 Ibid., col. 1214, part of the second reading of the Betting and Lotteries Bill, 1934.

27 TS, letter from Ernest Parke to B. S. Rowntree, 2 March 1911, originally in the Joseph Rowntree Foundation Library but now transferred to the Borthwick Institute, Library of the University of York.


30 Parke letter to Rowntree, 2 Mar 1911.

31 Select Committee of the House of Lords, 1901-2, Minutes, qq. 152-3, p. 9.

32 Betting Log Book, covering the Southern Division of Salford, Greater Manchester Police Museum, Newton Street, Manchester.

33 Manchester Guardian, 24 Nov 1932.

34 Chinn Interviews, Tape 296 a and b, interview between Carl Chinn and Mr. Jordan, 29 Mar 1988.

35 Chinn Interviews, Tapes 366 and 367, interview with Ken Overton.

36 Select Committee on Betting Duty, 1923, Report, p. 66 q. 1346 (Bigham); p. 58 q.1179 (Caldwell).

37 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 10 June 1926, col. 1747.

38 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, HO 320/12.

39 Ibid., HO 335/34, p. 3, evidence presented to the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51).

40 Ibid., p. 5.

41 Ibid., p. 7.

42 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, HO 45/14616, file on ‘The Legality of Whist Drives, 24 August 1928’; HO 45/14238, circular sheet on Lotteries (Sweepstakes and Draws) and Whist Drives, circulated Feb or Mar 1930.

43 Ibid., HO 45/14616, file on ‘The Legality of Whist Drives’.

44 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, Cabinet Conclusions, CAB 23, Cabinet 1 (34) 16 Jan 1934, item 5; Cabinet 8 (34), 7 Mar 1934, Cabinet 11(34), 21 Mar 1934; and Cabinet 17 (34), 25 Apr 1934. Totalisator: the system whereby all bets placed were put into a fund out of which payments would be made.

45 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, HO 45/14238, letter from J.R. Clynes to Sir William Jowett, Attorney General, no date but in Feb or Mar 1930.
46 Keith Laybourn, “‘There Ought not to be One Law for the Rich and Another for the Poor which is the Case To-day’: The Labour Party, Lotteries, Gaming, Gambling and Bingo, c. 1900-1960s”, History, 93 (2008), 201-23.


48 The Daily Mail, 29 June 1928.

49 Laybourn, Working-Class Gambling in Britain, p. 78.

50 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, HO 45/24919, a Memorandum to the Home Secretary 20 Feb 1932, and a similar memorandum dated 22 Mar 1931.

51 The Times, 17 Nov 1930.

52 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, HO 45/24919.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., memorandum 24 Feb 1932.

55 Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51), Final Report, Appendix II, p. 147;

56 Laybourn, Working-Class Gambling in Britain, p. 164.


59 Ibid., p. 158.

60 Ibid., pp. 189-90; Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51), Final Report, 1951, p. 103 and Appendix II.

61 Daily Mail, 28 Oct 1927.

62 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, HO 45/14222.

63 Ibid., quoting from the Cabinet Papers, CP 143, Apr 1928.

64 Daily Telegraph, 18 July 1928.


66 Ibid.

67 The National Archives of the UK at Kew, HO 45/14222, 7 Oct 1927 file.

69 Ibid., col. 1212

70 Ibid., col. 1158.


73 Ibid., 213.


76 Ibid., col. 1805.


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