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The Routledge companion to fascism and the far right

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'For all the enterprise, for all the time and critical intelligence devoted to the undertaking, we really have very little purchase on "understanding" "fascism"'.[1]

How should we interpret fascism? This puzzle has detained scholars for the best part of a century. Historians, social scientists, sociologists, political scientists and social psychologists have all struggled to comprehend the essential nature of the ideology. The 'consensus' view is that fascism represented middle-class rebellion against the established Enlightenment-influenced order; it was invariably irrational and anti-Communist and sought to impose a new age, a new civilisation. But the fact is that the study of fascism has become a battleground, an arena where competing ideologies have taken centre stage. There is no single interpretation of fascism; moreover, at certain junctures, the plethora of explanations that do exist merge and overlap.

As Payne suggests, the debate about fascism began as soon as the March on Rome had finished.[2] The first attempts at historiography were made during the 1920s and 1930s when Mussolini’s regime, and then Hitler’s, came under in-depth scrutiny. However, studies of fascism penned before 1945 are not regarded in a very positive light, with Gregor, for one, arguing that they are ‘full of generalisations’. [3] Following the Second World War, not unexpectedly, fascism suffered a period of ‘moral condemnation’ and ‘extra-terrestrial exile’. [4] The overall effect was that it was not taken seriously as historical subject matter.

Things began to change in the 1950s and 1960s. Arendt’s study of totalitarianism (1951) appeared to rescue fascism from scholarly oblivion, and thereafter a range of studies appeared.[5] Nolte states: ‘It is perhaps permissible to regard the years 1959 and 1960 as the beginning of a change, a change that was certainly related to an alteration in the world situation characterised by a relaxation in the Cold War, the onset of polycentrism in the East, and a renewed readiness for self-criticism in the West. In 1959, after a long hiatus, the concept of fascism once again appeared in the title of a book.’[6] He cites the works of Dante Germino, Seymour Lipset and Ralf Dahrendorf as representative of this new trend.

By the end of the 1960s it would be fair to say that fascism had acquired some respectability as a historical topic. More survey texts, detailed national histories and comparative studies began to appear.[7] By the beginning of the twenty-first century, ‘fascism studies’ had established itself as a specific discipline, with historians such as Griffin, Eatwell and Payne interesting themselves primarily in the ideological richness and variety of the genus. Neo-fascism and other forms of right-wing extremism
also gained its historians: such as Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan et al, Hainsworth et al, and Eatwell.

Over the decades historians have debated a wide range of issues. Should we talk about fascism in the singular or plural? Is it a homogenous or heterogeneous phenomenon? Should the emphasis be placed on varieties or commonalities? To what extent were Italian fascism and German Nazism ‘peas from the same pod’? Is there a generic fascism? And can ideal type theory, checklists, typologies and the notion of a ‘fascist minimum’ help us to understand the subject to a deeper level?[8]

Furthermore, is fascism new or old, revolutionary or reactionary? Is it merely a radicalised conservatism or an entirely novel phenomenon? Is there a post-1945 fascism as well as a pre-1945 fascism? Similarly, is there an extra-European fascism in addition to a European fascism? Would it be true to say that national disintegration in the years after 1918 was the root cause of fascism? Or were there other factors? What does the fact that fascist parties were able to forge alliances with conservative movements and ruling elites tell us?

Observers of fascism have faced a major quandary over whether to rationalise it or treat it with the utmost scepticism. Most commentators, with the notable exception of Allardyce,[9] have taken the former approach, as evidenced by the wide array of ‘theories of fascism’ that have emerged.

Payne, for instance, identifies eight main interpretations: fascism as a product of capitalism, moral breakdown, pathological neuroticism, the ‘amorphous masses’, economic development, totalitarianism, resistance to modernisation, and middle class radicalism.[10] Hagtvet et al go further and suggest eleven distinct perspectives: those associated with ‘demonic’ personality, moral disease, national development, capitalism as an agent, totalitarianism, the ‘revolt against transcendence’, social structure outgrowth, modernisation, an ‘aesthetic aberration’, cultural tradition, and counter-revolution.[11] De Felice, who devotes much of his study to theorising about the Italian experience, also makes a range of more general observations. He locates psychosocial, sociological and socio-economic explanations as well as a range of other ‘classical’ explanations.[12] Thurlow, meanwhile, refers to a ‘new consensus’ on fascism - connected to the writings of Payne, Griffin and Eatwell. Nevertheless he is still able to identify five ‘standard’ views from the pre-consensus era: the Marxist approach, the thesis of Ernest Nolte, and the notion of fascism as ‘extremism of the centre’, ‘totalitarianism’ and ‘a function of modernisation’.[13]

By way of synthesis, we can classify these ‘paradigms’ by theme (socio-economic, moral/psychological, political) and ideological orientation (Marxist, nationalist, conservative, liberal, idealist, Christian, Jewish).[14] To clarify things still further, these different theories will be outlined and explained separately. But we should be
aware that, clearly, someone who holds a Marxist viewpoint, for example, does so on the basis of certain assumptions about the socio-economic and political nature of fascism. Thus there will be much crossover between the two main sub-sections.

Interpretations by theme

Let us start with what we may choose to call the more ‘thematic’ interpretations. Moral and psychological theories hold that fascism was an ‘aberration’. The moral interpretation, advanced by both pro- and anti-fascist commentators alike, says that fascism was a product of crisis and disease in society.[15] Pro-fascist authors take a romantic line. They talk about ‘young and heroic idealists’ revolting against ‘a superannuated and materialistic social order’, and argue that fascism was a remedy for ‘moral crisis’, a spiritual reawakening, an ethical, heroic response to all that was wrong in liberal society.[16] The anti-fascist view, on the other hand, puts the emphasis on despair. According to this interpretation, fascism was an ‘aesthetic aberration’, a product of perversity and corruption, a return to absolutism, an escape from disillusionment.[17] As Drucker has stated:

Armaments, the totalitarian organisation of society, the suppression of freedom and liberties, the persecution of the Jews, and the war against religion are all signs of weakness, not of strength. They have their roots in blackest, unfathomable despair. The more desperate the masses become, the more strongly entrenched will totalitarianism appear to be. The further they push on the totalitarian road, the greater will be their despair.[18]

Summing up, Gregor says that this view sees fascism as ‘a consequence of moral failure, the advent of a new irrational and unethical conception of life that ruthlessly imposed itself upon the nation.’[19] But he also argues that it could never be a causal explanation because it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascribe ‘moral motives’ to human beings. He also casts doubt on the quality of the scholarship that supports this view.[20]

Moral and psychological interpretations of fascism are related in the sense that they both revolve around the notion of a ‘sick society’ or a world that has gone ‘mad’. [21] Kedward says that psychological approaches to fascism have always been controversial:

How does a knowledge of Hitler’s infancy help one to understand the rise of Nazism? Doesn’t psychology tend to excuse and explain away the evils of Fascist rule? How can psychologists analyse people who are dead? These are some of the familiar questions which stem from a suspicion of psychology as soon as it is applied to recent history. In fact they indicate more than suspicion. There is also a fear that psychology will upset the black-and-white view of fascism which has been prevalent since 1945; that it will demand a more generous understanding than we are prepared to give or that it will find
fascism to be less abnormal than we have assumed. In short, it may make us reconsider well-established judgements.[22]

However, he goes on: 'If we want to know why Hitler was so fanatically anti-Semitic or why violence is so recurrent in all fascisms or why so many people welcomed authoritarianism, then the approach of the psychologist will be as important as that of the political historian or the economist.'[23] So it is possible to rationalise the merits of psychological enquiry on an individual and collective level. Kitchen goes further:

The sadistic behaviour of fascist gangs, the extraordinary mass hysteria generated by fascist rallies, and the apparently pathological conduct of many fascist leaders seemed to be such striking characteristics of fascist regimes that it was widely assumed that psychology was the only discipline capable of providing an adequate explanation of fascism. Social psychologists saw fascism and anti-semitism as a fruitful area for fresh research and speculation, or as confirmation of their fondly held theories.[24]

Psychological interpretations suggest that fascism was attractive to certain personality types and tapped into people’s inner psyche. Carsten argues that certain aspects of fascism had particular appeal - the 'lust for power' and the 'hatred of weakness'. It is also manifest that fascism catered for those who wished for strong charismatic leadership and authority.[25] Here the work of Freudian Marxists Adorno and Fromm is important. Both men emerged from the Frankfurt School to cast important psychological light on fascism.

Adorno likens fascism to 'neurosis' and 'delinquency' and claims that the anti-democrat is 'anti-semitic, ethnocentric, an economic conservative, holds rather rigid beliefs, condones violence against opponents, uses stereotypes, distinguishes sharply between "in-group" and "out-group" and admires strong men.' This is the 'prejudiced personality' that, in Adorno’s view, is attracted to fascism.[26] Fromm takes a similar line, arguing that fascism aims at 'the annihilation of the individual self and its utter submission to a higher power'. The underlying contention in his work is that 'modern democratic man' cannot cope with unlimited freedom because it brings wholesale insecurity.[27] Kedward says that Fromm, 'saw the problem of man’s freedom as a psychological one: how far does man want to be free? Can he face the difficulties of freedom? Is he prepared to act alone? Will he value freedom when it is new, strange and uncomfortable? In short, does freedom breed as many fears as hopes?’ And he adds: ‘Psychologically Nazism had much to offer those who wanted both security and sadistic power in place of the freedom they were unable to face.’[28] It is in this sense that Fromm identifies the ‘sado-masochistic character’ and the ‘authoritarian character’, arguing that human beings have an innate desire to submit to authority. Kitchen, reflecting on these issues, claims that authoritarianism 'is part of the search for new secondary bonds to replace the primary bonds which have been lost'.[29]
Over time scholars have emphasised other psychological dimensions to fascism. Freud has spoken of the 'frustration, insecurity and failure' of the young Hitler and the 'psychosexual' problems he faced as a young child; Platt has described fascist ideology as a 'new way of making sense of the world'; Theweleit has referred to the distinctive 'inner world' of fascists; and Jung has equated fascism to an 'upsurge of the dark forces of mankind'.

As regards leaders and led, there are a series of psychological hypotheses. In the German context, 'Hitler-centric' theories are commonplace, though not particularly well regarded. Saussure and Erikson have utilised the model of the 'madman' in their enquiries into the leadership of fascist groups, while those historians interested in the 'rank and file' of such movements have built upon Le Bon's interest in 'the crowd' in history. Trotter, for instance, has talked about the 'instincts of the herd'. Payne argues that psychological interpretations are 'speculative'; Gregor says they are unprovable and able to explain 'too much'. Whatever the case, they certainly do not impress Marxists, the majority of whom feel duty-bound to stick to a strict economic determinism. But it would be wrong to dismiss all psycho-theories. It is stating the obvious to say that the rise of an ideological creed like fascism must tell us something quite profound about people and their psychological needs.

In the socio-economic sphere there are a range of would-be explanations. On one level fascism has been interpreted as 'extremism of the middle classes' or 'extremism of the centre', a theory associated with the sociological model developed by Seymour Lipset in 1959. He stated:

The classic fascist movements have represented the extremism of the centre. Fascist ideology, though anti-liberal in its glorification of the state, has been similar to liberalism in its opposition to big business, trade-unions, and the socialist state. It has also resembled liberalism in its distaste for religion and other forms of traditionalism.

In Italy particularly, where the middle classes were petrified of 'Red Revolution', fascism thrived on the fear of social change. Kitchen states that the membership figures of fascist parties supports the 'middle class' thesis, while Turner identifies a 'middle-class core' to fascism.

On the surface it might appear that Lipset's notion of 'middle-class extremism' is not too far removed from the idea of capitalism and high finance as the 'lackeys' of fascism (the Orthodox Marxist view). However, we should guard against categorising these two interpretations in the same bracket. It is true that those on the left depict fascism as the ultimate product of class struggle, of a middle-class
offensive against the working class,[35] but whereas Marxists view matters in a deterministic light - as rigid and somehow inevitable - those who buy into Lipset’s interpretation are less mechanical in their thinking and allow for an independent relationship. This is what Kitchen is alluding to when he contrasts ‘heteronomic’ theories of fascism with ‘autonomic’ theories.[36] In a totally different manner, some historians have depicted fascism as a mass movement, with an innate ability to appeal to ‘the crowd’. [37] Commentators refer to the new psyche of the people - their ‘mass mind’ and common purpose.[38]

Historians and sociologists have also debated the connection between fascism and modernisation. The most commonly-held view is that the two phenomena went hand in hand. It has been argued that fascism was the product of advanced, industrial society and a key staging-post in the modernisation process, and also that fascism was a ‘modernising force’ in itself; but if fascism and modernisation are intrinsically related, as many commentators say they are, why did fascism not take root in all industrial societies? This is the conundrum that exponents of the ‘modernisation’ thesis have to deal with.

However, not all observers are convinced by the ‘modernisation’ thesis. Some prefer to view fascism as nostalgic and reactionary, as an anti-modern, anti-modernisation revolt. Kitchen, for instance, argues that fascism was in essence the ‘reverse image’ of modernisation;[39] and Turner, focusing on the German experience, says that Hitler wished to create an ‘anti-modern utopia’. [40] Hence Cassels’ contention that there were actually two types of fascism: one that emerged in industrial societies and another that came to the fore in under-industrialised societies.[41]

On the whole historians have tended to accept the argument that sees fascism as an agent of, or accompaniment to, modernisation, but what is the relationship between fascism and development in a more general sense? Structuralist theories suggest that fascism is the product of ‘delayed industrialisation’. Gregor, for example, depicts fascism as a ‘developmental’ regime, one that in the Italian context helped the country through to economic maturity.[42]

It is also possible to view fascism in terms of national political development. Griffin talks about a ‘development sequence’ and emphasises the fact that Germany and Italy shared similar histories.[43] It is easy to sketch out the commonalities: conquest by Napoleon, unification in the 1860s and 1870s, weak liberal governments in the early twentieth century, and national humiliation in 1918. In both countries the post-war settlement became a cause of resentment and frustration - a state of affairs that was exploited mercilessly by Mussolini and Hitler.

Payne argues that ‘developmental’ interpretations are too ‘suggestive’;[44] others argue they are too general and vague. However, it is a fact that the emergence of Italian Fascism and German Nazism cannot be separated out from economic and political context. Nonetheless it would be prudent to take account of the general point made by
Drucker. From a liberal perspective he contends that the socio-economic dimension to fascism has been grossly exaggerated, claiming the emergence of Mussolini and Hitler had nothing to do with their economic agendas and dismissing the notion that fascism came to power on the back of one particular class or group.[45] He goes on to state that the defeat of the ideology will come when the liberal-democratic nations establish 'a new non-economic concept of a free and equal society.'[46] It could be argued that this line of thought is not just novel but a refreshing antidote to Marxist and sociological interpretations.

It could be argued that there are three mainstream 'political' interpretations of fascism. First, according to Mosse, Sternhell and Eatwell (among others), fascism was a radical new political solution. While Mosse, a historian of Germany, depicts Nazism as a 'Third Way' between Marxism and capitalism,[47] Sternhell, a scholar with French interests, interprets fascism as a revolutionary synthesis, declaring that fascism was at the same time a fusion of left and right and an ideological creed that was beyond left and right. His main thesis is that the roots of fascism lay in 1880s and 1890s France in the writings of Barrès and that in full bloom the ideology stood as a violent revolt against positivism and liberalism.[48]

British historian Eatwell takes a similar view, depicting fascism as 'elusive because it drew from both the right and left, seeking to create a radical "Third Way" which was neither capitalist nor communist.'[49] Elsewhere he has stated:

The pioneer French fascist Georges Valois (1878-1945) held that nationalism + socialism = fascism. This formulation helps illustrate the vital mutations at the heart of fascism, but is in crucial ways misleading…Although still misleading, it would be more accurate to say that nationalism + conservatism = fascism.[50]

These synthetic interpretations have a lot going for them. They take account of fascism’s roots - in the late-nineteenth century when new political ideologies had to make an appeal to the masses - and also help to highlight the cross-class appeal, and some would say ambiguity, of fascism.

Second, fascism has been viewed as counter-revolution, particularly by those on the left. In 1928 the Comintern announced that, 'Fascism’s chief function is to annihilate the revolutionary vanguard of the working class ie. the communist strata of the proletariat and their leading cadres.'[51] Five years earlier the same body had stated:

Although fascism by its origin and its exponents…includes revolutionary tendencies which might turn against capitalism and its State, it is nevertheless becoming a dangerous counter-revolutionary force. That is shown where it triumphed in Italy…The working classes of the entire world
are threatened with the fate of their Italian brothers.[52]

It is not that fascism championed monarchism or wished to restore traditional elites - far from it - but that, through organised state terror, it was ready to clamp down on all symptoms of dissent and opposition. In this sense fascism can be viewed as counter-revolution 'from above'.[53] In Italy fascism was perceived to be a response to fears of Socialist Revolution; likewise in France the ligues can be interpreted as a response to radicalism and the electoral rise of the left (the two 'waves' of French fascism relate directly to the arrival of the Cartel des Gauches and Popular Front in government (1924 and 1936 respectively). And it is also a fact that in 1940 the Vichy regime - regarded by many as the only example of genuine French fascism - styled itself as the ultimate in counter-revolutionary forces, banning the 1789 Declaration and replacing the revolutionary triptych, 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity', with the new slogan, 'Work, Family, Country'.

That said, the equation of 'fascism' with 'counter-revolution' raises as many questions as it answers. First, we should be aware that fascism is often portrayed as a 'revolutionary', rather than a counter-revolutionary ideology. Clearly there is much evidence to suggest that fascism was overtly radical - its populism, economic dynamism, and belief in a 'new age'. Perhaps the best way to think about it is as an ideology that was able to embrace both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary ideas. Carsten rationalises things in the following way: he says there was a 'fascist revolution', but that all fascist movements included counter-revolutionary elements.[54]

Third, fascism has been interpreted as totalitarianism. This explanation dominated the 1950s and 1960s and was heavily influenced by Cold War attitudes (Griffin says it had waned by the 1980s). Associated in particular with the work of Hannah Arendt, this explanation depicts fascism and communism, controversially, as symptoms of an all-embracing totalitarianism. Liberals in particular favour this view.[55]

Here it is argued that fascism amounts to a totalitarian attack on the liberty of the individual, that it identifies an 'enemy within' (the Jews), and puts its faith, additionally, in 'permanent terror' and 'ideological rigidity'.[56] In the view of Friedrich 'fascist totalitarianism' incorporates six main features: an over-reaching ideology, a single political party, a state terror apparatus, a government-controlled media, a monopoly on arms and a centrally-directed economy.[57] For their part Neumann and the Frankfurt School focused on economics, suggesting that the relationship between capitalism and fascism was close and that fascism stood ultimately for 'totalitarian monopoly fascism'.[58]

For liberals the ramifications of this interpretation are clear: a war on fascism and its totalitarian 'brother', communism. For others the theory is of only partial merit.
Gregor suggests that it is a helpful aid but does not really add to our general understanding of fascism.[59] Kitchen, reflecting Marxist concerns, is equally sceptical:

Although the theories of totalitarianism have raised many important issues and set off a lively debate on the nature of fascism and communism, they have been far from satisfactory as theories of fascism. Only when the insistence on the essential identity of fascism and communism is denied is the theory capable of producing valid insights into the nature of fascism, but when this occurs 'totalitarianism' is given a different meaning and the original premises of the theory are abandoned. Liberal society is indeed challenged by the left and by the right, but the assumption that left and right must therefore be essentially similar is a severe hindrance to the understanding of either alternative.[60]

Finally we must note the contribution of Nolte to the historiography of fascism. His 'phenomenology' thesis has a curious reputation: it is acclaimed as a major contribution to the debate about fascism, is regularly referred to, and is one of the best-known individual theories, but few scholars are enthusiastic about its content. In addition, it fits into no neat categories and claims to be politically neutral - although Kitchen depicts Nolte as a historian who is attached to 'liberal-bourgeois society'.[61]

Chapter One of Nolte’s keynote study - published in 1965 - is entitled 'Fascism as Characteristic of an Era' and this sets the tone for his 561-page enquiry.[62] In general he argues that fascism, 'was a specifically inter-war phenomenon, linked to the unique combination of historical circumstances that characterised the period'.[63] In a sense this position is uncontroversial but it does have its significance. It means that Nolte has broken away from the Arendt’s 1951 'totalitarian' thesis and also encourages him to think of fascism in comparative terms - hence his interest in three European countries (France, Italy and Germany).[64] And in fascist historiography these were interesting and novel developments.

Nolte went further and interpreted fascism as 'resistance to transcendence', a fairly vague description but taken to imply that the ideology embraced by Mussolini and Hitler was, in his view, a reaction against modernity. Again, this is a fairly uncontroversial assertion but it is dressed up in such jargon that it perhaps appears more impressive than it actually is - and the same could also be said for many other parts of Nolte’s thesis.

Kitchen depicts the 'phenomenology' thesis as 'limited and confusing',[65] but it is an important landmark in the historiography of fascism and a useful reference point for students. Moreover in taking fascism 'seriously' as a political ideology, Nolte can rightly claim to have encouraged and provoked further historical enquiry.
So, 'thematic' perspectives cover the full spectrum - psychology, sociology, economics, politics - but how do they jutapose with 'polemical' interpretations?

Interpretations by political orientation

Over time, fascism, predictably, has become a great source of polemical debate. Commentators from across the political spectrum have elaborated their own specific approach to the subject, and in this section we will explore the full range of perspectives. It should be noted that considerable space will be devoted to the Marxist interpretation because, arguably, it is the most stark and controversial of all theories. It has also become a battleground and reference point that no polemicist or historian can ignore.

On the left it is difficult for some commentators to remain neutral about fascism. Take, for example, the following passage:

When writing about any political ideology, the historian is obliged to be critical. It would be a mistake to take the language of political figures at face value. The formal pronouncements of any leaders should be weighed against their practice. It is enough to assume that because a politician used words like 'freedom' or 'democracy', that these terms were meant in the way that a different audience might understand them. There is a need to analyse all ideologies critically, and this is especially true of fascism, a political tradition which from its inception set out to kill millions. Indeed, how can a historian, in all conscience, approach the study of fascism with neutrality? What is the meaning of objectivity when writing about a political system that plunged the world into a war in which at least forty million people died? How can the historian provide a neutral account of a system of politics which turned continental Europe into one gigantic prison camp? One cannot be balanced when writing about fascism, there is nothing positive to be said of it. Fascism is wholly unacceptable, as a method of political mobilisation, as a series of ideas, and as a system of rule.[66]

Notwithstanding the fact that Renton has located three Marxist strands - 'right', 'left' and 'dialectical'[67] - it is standard practice to talk in terms of two broad theses: 'Orthodox' and 'non-Orthodox'. The following two passages are representative of the Orthodox Marxist line:

Fascism is the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital. Fascism tries to secure a mass basis for monopolist capital among the petty bourgeoisie, appealing to the peasantry, artisans, office employees and civil servants who have been thrown out of their normal course of life, and particularly to the declassed elements in the big cities, also trying to penetrate into the working class.[68]
Fascism, a political trend which emerged in capitalist countries in the period of the *general crisis of capitalism* and which expresses the interests of the most reactionary and aggressive forces of the imperialistic *bourgeoisie*. *F.* in power is an *openly terroristic* dictatorship of these forces. *F.* is characterised by extreme *chauvinism, racism* and *anti-communism*, by the destruction of democratic freedoms, the wide practice of social demagogy and the strictest control over the public and private life of citizens.[69]

So, Orthodox Marxists (like Dimitrov, Palme Dutt and Togliatti before the war, and Petzold after it) took their line from Stalin and the Communist International in the 1930s and referred to fascism as the 'agent' of monopoly capitalism and high finance. Griffin states:

In November 1922, only weeks after Mussolini’s March on Rome, the Fourth Congress of the Communist International held in Moscow debated how Fascism was to be explained within a Marxist-Leninist perspective. One interpretation which resulted predictably saw it as an essentially reactionary movement which had been forced into existence when the attempted proletarian revolution of the so-called ‘red biennium’ (1919-20) threatened the bourgeois-liberal order. Like colonialism, imperialism and the First World War before it, fascism was thus accommodated without too much soul-searching (or ‘self-criticism’) within the teleological scheme of revolutionary socialism which predicted the imminent collapse of capitalism.[70]

Orthodox Marxists went on to make strong connections between the rise of fascism and industrial and imperialistic expansion; in this regard fascists are viewed as the 'lackeys' of big business and full-blown fascism is viewed exclusively in economistic terms.[71] It is also argued that fascist leaders duped the proletariat into thinking that fascism would help to build a 'new and better world'.[72]

Although the Comintern stated that on occasions fascist leaders resorted to 'anti-capitalist phraseology', it is self-evident that in leftist strictures fascism is simply viewed as being synonymous with capitalism.[73] Kitchen labels the Orthodox Marxist theory 'heteronomic' because implicit in it is the belief that fascism thrived on external factors (eg. capitalism) and adds: 'Central to all socialist theories of fascism is the insistence on the close relationship between fascism and industry'.[74] Accordingly, Marxist orthodoxy demands the overthrow of capitalism as the only way to rid modern society of fascism.

On the whole the Orthodox Marxist interpretation has been ridiculed by commentators. Turner, for example, refers to an 'ideological straitjacket' and states:

Almost without exception, these (Marxist) writings suffer from…over-reliance
on questionable, if not fraudulent scholarship, and from egregious misrepresentation of factual information. Until such independent Marxists who write about fascism acquaint themselves with the most recent findings of empirical scholarship and develop more scrupulous habits in their use of factual data, they cannot expect their position to receive a full hearing in the forum of international scholarship.[75]

In the light of these comments it is not difficult to point to the defects of the 'standard' Marxist line. It is not just crude, simplistic and over-focused on economic matters, but there is a tendency to identify fascists and fascism in every nook and cranny - in Spain, Poland, Greece, Portugal, Chile, Argentina, South Africa and even within the British Conservative Party.[76] Furthermore, the notion of 'social fascism' implies that even Social Democrats are fascists![77] The fact of the matter is that traditional Marxists are undiserning, unenthusiastic about nuanced analysis, and always on the lookout for 'new permutations'.[78]

Orthodox Marxists are invariably blinkered by the political dimension to fascism. In dogmatic terms, they affirm Horkheimer’s dictum that, 'whoever is not prepared to talk about capitalism should also remain silent about fascism' (and would also agree with Togliatti’s reworking of this: 'You can’t know what fascism is if you don’t know imperialism').[79] But in doing so, they over-estimate the grip that industrialists had on fascists and the links that existed between bourgeois society and fascism, automatically viewing the latter as a 'reactionary' response to the left and a form of 'anti-proletarian hysteria'.[80] Similarly, as Payne notes, they do not distinguish between the fascist right and conservative right.[81] In addition, old-style Marxists do not like to give the impression that fascism was in any way progressive or revolutionary. And to cap it all, Mosse and Nolte claim that Marxist theoreticians are simply misinformed. The former argues that they lack evidence to substantiate their theories, while the latter claims they failed to legislate for the growth of a political phenomenon outside of 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' or 'bourgeois democracy' (even though Marxists would argue that fascism was an innately bourgeois phenomenon).[82]

Thus, although the Orthodox Marxist view has little credibility among modern commentators, it is of crucial historiographical importance, and also helps us to comprehend three 'thematic' interpretations: those that see fascism as a product of 'extremism of the middle classes', as a function of modernisation, and as a counter-revolutionary force.[83]

Needless to say, Orthodox Marxists view all interpretations that do not emanate from the Orthodox fold as a product of 'bourgeois' historiography.[84] A range of non-Orthodox Marxist interpretations emerged in the 1930s and the post-war period as a response to 'changed circumstances'.[85] Thalheimer, Horkheimer, Vajda, Bauer, Galkin, Kühnl, Gramsci, Kitchen and Renton could all be labelled 'neo-Marxist' theoreticians, and all are viewed with suspicion by Orthodox Marxists.[86]
On the whole, ‘neo-Marxist’ theoreticians do not diverge radically from the Orthodox line, but do present their ideas differently (Gregor talks about a ‘Revised Standard Version’).[87] They still place significant emphasis on economic factors but are less crude and more synthetic. Kitchen, for example, has made a distinction between fascist regimes and military dictatorships, while others have differentiated between Italian and German experiences.[88] These might seem small advances, but given the rigidity of the Orthodox view we should probably interpret them as a radical departure! It is also a fact that East European and West European Marxists have advanced different theories of fascism:

Academics within the Soviet empire had little option but to apply to pre-war Comintern orthodoxy to demonstrate empirically the nexus formed by capitalism and state power in Mussolini’s Italy, the Third Reich, and what were assumed to be ‘weaker’ fascist regimes such as Franco’s Spain or Perón’s Argentina. Their limited perspective produced a steady flow of data-cum-propaganda about how such regimes functioned as socio-economic systems of production and destruction at the expense of the ‘people’. Western Marxists, on the other hand, were free to elaborate their own conceptual framework, drawing on the significant modifications to historical materialism pioneered by Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, or structuralists, which have allowed the power of ideology and the irrational to be recognised as well as the complexity of class relations under fascism. All were spurred on by the conviction that fascism cannot be safely consigned to ‘history’, but is a latent tendency in all modern states.[89]

By the early 1970s Western Marxists were further watering down the Orthodox line and adding nuances to the traditional view of fascism as a function of the rise of the middle classes and big business.[90] Fascism was now interpreted by some as ‘progressive’ and ‘revolutionary’, rather than simply reactionary.[91] Griffin reflects on the upsurge in neo-Marxist theorising:

It is hardly surprising if some highly nuanced Marxist interpretations of fascism came into being outside the hegemony of the Comintern even before the Second World War. The most significant of these were the elaborations of Marx’s concept of Bonapartism by Thalheimer and Bauer, and the sophisticated explanatory model of Fascism which Gramsci constructed on the basis of his concept of ideological hegemony and of Lenin’s theory of a ‘Prussian’ path to capitalism, both of which influenced post-war Marxist theorists. By the 1980s, crude equations of fascism with monopoly capitalism had become largely a thing of the past outside the East bloc.[92]

At times it appeared that a non-Marxist theory with strong socio-economic underpinnings had emerged. However, we should not exaggerate the amount of political space that separates non-Orthodox from Orthodox Marxists. Non-orthodox Marxists still
have a tendency to see fascism 'everywhere' and to campaign for stringent 'anti-fascist' measures, and in many ways neo-fascism is viewed as just as dangerous as Italian or German fascism in the inter-war years. The argument is that fascism is alive and not yet consigned to history.[93]

Likewise some non-Orthodox Marxists still hold that fascism was 'a specific form of reactionary mass movement', and economic factors are still viewed as being of pivotal importance.[94] And, as Petzold has argued, this marks all Marxists out as different: 'The question of what relationship the Nazi movement and fascist activism have at all to monopoly capital has become the main focus of the controversy between Marxist and non-Marxist historians in the field of fascist studies.'[95] This leads us on nicely to a consideration of other, non-Marxist interpretations.

In general terms conservatives are mistrustful of fascism. Although some admire the ideology of Mussolini and Hitler - reflecting the fact that many 'mainstream' conservatives made alliances with the two dictators - most focus on its 'plebeian traits' and denounce its radical and revolutionary tendencies. In nostalgic fashion conservatives such as Hermann Rauschning align themselves with 'traditional values' and the 'good old days' that preceded wholesale social and economic change.[96] Proponents of the nationalist view tend to see fascism as either the zenith or nadir of nation-based politics; they either support fascism on the basis that it places enormous emphasis on the nation, or yearn for better, earlier times.[97] The Christian interpretation, put forward by Luigi Sturzo (among others), sees fascism as a 'secular' phenomenon. Accordingly the Mussolini and Hitler regimes are viewed as the embodiment of a new 'godless' era, but the credibility of this perspective is placed in doubt by the pro-fascist leanings of some religious organisations in Germany and Italy.[98] The idealist interpretation emphasises the mythical character of fascism, while the Jewish perspective on the phenomenon 'is based on the most appalling of all human experiences. Nothing is more natural than that this conception should bring the whole weight of...experience to bear in favour of a distinction between National Socialism and fascism.'[99]

Aside from Marxist and neo-Marxist views, and notwithstanding the significance of the theses just outlined, it is liberal thinking on fascism that has gained most prominence. The first point to make here is that there are many shades of liberal opinion and not just one widely-held view. Indeed, at times, liberals would agree with Marxist analyses and buy into many of the 'thematic' theories discussed earlier. It would be fair to say, though, that liberal theses are not as contentious or disputed as leftist interpretations:

The debate over the nature of fascism within Marxism was pursued more energetically than in the liberal camp. There are several reasons for this: (1) in the inter-war period fascism was a rival revolutionary (or as Marxists would have it, counter-revolutionary) creed; (ii) fascism displayed a degree of
activist violence towards revolutionary Marxism which far surpassed the animosity of liberalism; (3) Marxist orthodoxy suggested that a precondition for fighting fascism was the scientific analysis of its dynamics; (iv) the debate reflected deep cleavages both between factions of revolutionary Marxists and between these and reformist socialists, especially social democrats.[100]

Furthermore it has been argued that in the early twentieth-century liberals found it difficult to adapt their version of history to 'a new form of political energy which sought to use nationalist myths to mobilise the masses in a spirit which was both reactionary and revolutionary, traditionalist and modernising, elitist and populist'.[101] But a liberal interpretation of fascism soon emerged, associated in the main with Salvatorelli and Borgese, and embraced later by others.[102]

The liberal view depicts fascism as a specifically European ideology and a political creed responsible for the Holocaust and the worst excesses of the twentieth century (and that was also implicated in Cold War antagonisms). Hence many liberals point to the intellectual bankruptcy of fascism and its lack of ideological coherence.[103] And as with many other interpretations, they also lump fascism and communism together as symptoms of the same totalitarian phenomenon - a strategy that annoys Marxists intensely![104]

Another perspective on the liberal thesis can be gleaned from the writings of Mosse. Ledeen, commenting on the ideas of the noted German historian, has stated:

(Mosse) rightly condemns several attempts to over-simplify the question of fascism, pointing out that the traditional liberal explanation - that fascism was some sort of temporary aberration - does not explain the great success of fascism everywhere in Europe, or that it finally fell only because of military defeat. Liberals who wish to believe that fascism was simply imposed on Europeans have great difficulty in explaining the virtual non-existence of opposition to fascism from within, and they generally ignore the fact that fascism came to power by legitimate means, not via coups d'état.[105]

So, the thesis is vulnerable to attack on a range of scores and it could be argued that liberals have a lot of explaining to do.

The analyses of Salvatorelli were informed by the liberal values of Italian unification and he ultimately coined the term 'Anti-Risorgimento' to describe the essence of fascist politics.[106] At the same time he anticipated the theses of Parsons and Lipset when, in 1923, he put forward the 'middle-class theory', arguing that fascism was the product of the 'humanistic petty bourgeoisie'.[107] Borgese, on the other hand, 'recognised the universal implications of fascism' but 'interpreted it within the context of the historical development of the Italian spirit since the Middle Ages'. He could appreciate
fascism’s ‘positive and creative elements’, but was also aware of its threat; hence the title of his book, Goliath: The March of Fascism.[108]

However, Renton, a neo-Marxist, depicts liberal historians in a different light. He says that even though they portray fascism as a ‘totalitarian political system’, commentators like Griffin, Payne and Eatwell - key names in the modern liberal school of ‘fascism studies’ - are guilty of detachment, neutrality, and near-apologetic analysis. Renton holds that a ‘comfortable’ liberal consensus exists today and argues that historians should be ‘taking sides’ on the issue of fascism rather than viewing it in an almost apolitical light. He contends that the ‘Age of Fascism’ is not over, that the ideology conceived by Mussolini and adapted by Hitler is still a threat in the contemporary world, and thus believes that liberals should not just dismiss the theses of anti-fascist historians. Overall Renton argues that through their enthusiastic interest in fascist ideas, liberal observers flatter and legitimise a ‘dangerous’ creed.[109]

Thus, the liberal thesis can be viewed in two contrasting ways: as an interpretation that demonises ‘totalitarian’ fascism, or, if we take Renton’s argument into account, as an approach that is not critical enough, that is interested in the ideas rather than the actions of fascists.

Thus, fascism is disputed territory. Historians have adopted a range of thematic and polemical perspectives and have invariably juxtaposed ideas and theories. And, whatever historians like Renton might say about the ‘detachment’ of modern liberal thinkers, all the scholars we have encountered so far are in no doubt as to the scale and gravity of fascism’s impact, especially ‘in power’ in Germany and Italy.

However, this cannot be said of ‘Historical Revisionists’. These people, who have gained significant notoriety in recent years, offer pseudo-academic arguments in support of the claim that fascism was an ‘innocent’ ideology. They do not offer interpretations of fascism, but denials. David Irving, the most notorious of this school, argues that ‘no documentary evidence exists that Hitler was aware of what was befalling the Jews’, and further, that ‘the extermination programme had gained a momentum of its own’. As a result of such statements, Irving has acquired the status of a pariah in the intellectual community.[110]

Eatwell suggests that Holocaust Denial theses rest on four main types of evidence - ‘confessional’, ‘scientific’, ‘statistical’ and ‘survivor testimony’ - plus an assessment of who ‘benefits’ from the Holocaust ‘myth’. And Griffin, reflecting on the arguments of Irving and others, says that revisionism has engaged in the ‘conscious minimilisation, relativisation or juggling away’ of fascism’s excesses. He goes on:
Taking advantage of the more poorly educated strata of post-1945 generations concerning the realities of the Second World War, ‘vulgar’ revisionism boils down to a point-blank denial that six million Jews died as victims of the Nazis’ genocidal anti-Semitic campaign, dismissing the idea as a historical myth put about by the Jews themselves or their backers.[112]

In conclusion it would appear that the revisionist phenomenon - however unpleasant - is an indication that the debate about fascism shows no sign of abating.

As we have seen, there is a range of competing interpretations. Several are associated with specific eras, or themes, or polemical positions. None is universally accepted and the majority are highly contentious. In locating political, cultural, economic, psychological, aesthetic and social interpretations, Hagtvet et al talk about 'theoretical discord'.[113] Clearly, the debate continues.

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[10] Payne, 'Concept'.
[38] See Gregor, *Interpretations*, p.89.
[44] Payne, 'Concept'.
[48] See Z.Sternhell, *Neither Right Nor Left*, Berkeley, University of California


[53] See Carsten, 'Interpretations'.

[54] Carsten, 'Interpretations'.


[57] Kitchen's summary, *Fascism*, p.27.


[65] Kitchen, *Fascism*, p.44.


[71] See Kitchen, *Fascism*, p.73, although at times Marxists didn't want to assume that the capitalism-fascism 'transformation' was inevitable.


[73] Comintern Sixth Annual Congress (1928), taken from Griffin, *Fascism*, p.262.


[76] See Griffin, *Fascism*, p.279; see also *ABC*, and Griffin, *Nature*, p.3.

[77] See Griffin, *Nature*, p.3. Stalin said social democracy and fascism were 'twins' - see Griffin, *Fascism*, p.261 & p.263. In 1928 the Comintern announced: 'Alongside social-democracy, which helps the bourgeoisie to oppress the working class and blunt its proletarian vigilance, stands fascism' (taken from Griffin, *Fascism*, p.261); in time, however, Social Democrats came to be regarded as
allies.
[81] Payne, 'Concept'.
[83] Traces of these explanations can be seen in the Orthodox Marxist view - all dealt with earlier.
[85] See Griffin, *Nature*, p. 3. However, the Orthodox view has never died out and was still prevalent in Eastern Europe up until the Fall of Communism. See Renton, *Fascism*, p. 4. Fascism, of course, has undergone the same evolution - hence the various strands of neo-fascism.
[86] See 'A-Z of Historians' for more on each of these thinkers.
[93] See Renton especially, *Fascism*.
[94] Renton, *Fascism*, p. 3.
[107] P. Vita-Finzi, 'Italian Fascism and the intellectuals', in SJ. Woolf (ed.), *The


[113] Hagtvet et al, 'Approaches'.