Search:
Computing and Library Services - delivering an inspiring information environment

Executive Incentive Schemes in Initial Public Offerings: The Effects of Multiple-Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance

Allcock, Deborah and Filatotchev, Igor (2009) Executive Incentive Schemes in Initial Public Offerings: The Effects of Multiple-Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance. Journal of Management. ISSN 1557-1211

This is the latest version of this item.

[img] Microsoft Word
JoM_RR4_Sept_08_Final_Submission_inc_abstract.doc - Accepted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only

Download (399kB)
[img]
Preview
PDF (Word to PDF conversion (via antiword) conversion from application/msword to application/pdf)
JoM_RR4_Sept_08_Final_Submission_inc_abstract.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (126kB) | Preview

Abstract

Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple-agency conflicts, this article examines factors affecting the implementation of equity-based incentive schemes in initial public offerings (IPOs). With a unique sample of U.K. IPO companies between the years 1998 and 2002, it shows that conditional (performance-related) incentive schemes are negatively associated with share ownership and board power of the IPO’s founding directors. However, the retained ownership of venture capital firms is positively associated with the probability of conditional incentive schemes. Board independence weakly effects on the toughness of executive compensation. The article’s interesting findings suggest a number of avenues for a future analysis of the governance development process in threshold firms.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Online first version
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Schools: The Business School
The Business School > Financial Ethics and Governance Research Group
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Graham Stone
Date Deposited: 05 May 2009 13:31
Last Modified: 28 Jul 2010 18:34
URI: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/4160

Available Versions of this Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

Repository Staff Only: item control page

View Item View Item

University of Huddersfield, Queensgate, Huddersfield, HD1 3DH Copyright and Disclaimer All rights reserved ©