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Executive Incentive Schemes in Initial Public Offerings: The Effects of Multiple-Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance

Allcock, Deborah and Filatotchev, Igor (2009) Executive Incentive Schemes in Initial Public Offerings: The Effects of Multiple-Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance. Journal of Management. ISSN 1557-1211

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      Abstract

      Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple-agency conflicts, this article examines factors affecting the implementation of equity-based incentive schemes in initial public offerings (IPOs). With a unique sample of U.K. IPO companies between the years 1998 and 2002, it shows that conditional (performance-related) incentive schemes are negatively associated with share ownership and board power of the IPO’s founding directors. However, the retained ownership of venture capital firms is positively associated with the probability of conditional incentive schemes. Board independence weakly effects on the toughness of executive compensation. The article’s interesting findings suggest a number of avenues for a future analysis of the governance development process in threshold firms.

      Item Type: Article
      Additional Information: Online first version
      Subjects: H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
      Schools: The Business School
      The Business School > Financial Ethics and Governance Research Group
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      Depositing User: Graham Stone
      Date Deposited: 05 May 2009 14:31
      Last Modified: 28 Jul 2010 19:34
      URI: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/4160

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