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The effects of company risk, founders' characteristics and corporate governance on executive incentive schemes in UK initial public offerings

Allcock, Deborah and Filatotchev, Igor (2007) The effects of company risk, founders' characteristics and corporate governance on executive incentive schemes in UK initial public offerings. Working Paper. Financial Ethics and Governance Research Group, Huddersfield, UK. (Submitted)

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    Combining the agency perspective, resource-based view and upper echelon research, this paper examines factors affecting the implementation of equity based incentive schemes in initial public offerings (IPOs). In line with agency research, the probability of equity-based incentives is negatively associated with the IPO firm’s riskiness. The paper shows that performance-related incentive schemes are negatively associated with share ownership and board power of the IPO’s founding directors. Large-block share ownership is positively associated with the probability of conditional incentive schemes. However, board independence and non-executive directors’ interests do not have any effects on “toughness” of executive compensation. The paper suggests a number of avenues for a future analysis of governance development process in “threshold” firms.

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    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Additional Information: UoA 35 (Accounting and Finance) Note: a revised version of this paper has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Management ( Copyright The Authors 2007
    Subjects: H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
    Schools: The Business School
    The Business School > Financial Ethics and Governance Research Group
    Related URLs:

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    Date Deposited: 03 Oct 2007
    Last Modified: 28 Jul 2010 19:21

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