University of Huddersfield Repository

Ward, Paul

Socialists and "true" patriotism in Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries

Original Citation


This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/3325/

The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:

- The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
- A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
- The content is not changed in any way.

For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.

http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
Socialists and ‘True’ Patriotism in Britain in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

Paul Ward

This is a preprint of an article submitted for consideration in the [JOURNAL TITLE] © [year of publication] [copyright Taylor & Francis]; [JOURNAL TITLE} is available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14608944.1999.9728110

Abstract
The relationships between socialism, national identity and patriotism have generated a large literature dating back to Marx’s dictum: ‘The working men have no country.’ Much of that literature focused on the supposed incompatibilities between socialism and patriotism. In Britain, most socialists simply got on with it and were in various ways patriotic all the same. This paper discusses the origins and characteristics of a left-wing patriotism developed by much of the British left, and argues that such appeals to national identity had a remarkable vitality through the Edwardian period and into the First World War.

Introduction
During the Boer War, Ernest Belfort Bax, leading Marxist theoretician in the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), noted a tendency among opponents of the war to use an alternative patriotism against the belligerent and jingoistic patriotism of the war’s supporters. He recognised this as a continuing radical tradition: ‘up till quite recently to be patriotic meant to be opposed to the monarch and the governing classes of your own
country in the interests of the people of your country’. He too opposed the war, yet he did so from a Marxist position, arguing that a British victory in South Africa would strengthen capitalism in Britain. He rejected patriotic opposition to the war and urged others to do likewise:

a word of protest against any attempt to revive the word ‘patriotism’, or to refurbish it for democratic purposes. Let us ... leave it to the designing rogues and beguiled fools now in possession of it. In its old sense the word has had its day. It is a bad word, at best, of necessity carrying with it the suggestion of race exclusiveness, even though this may be kept in the background, while at its worst it implies a glorification of national infamy. Social-Democrats want no ‘true patriotism’, whatever that may mean. They want to do away with Patriotism altogether and substitute in its place the ‘Internationalism’ of the class-conscious proletariat.

Since Bax many left-wing writers have debated whether socialism and patriotism are compatible. Some have classified patriotism of the left as somehow deviant. For example, Anthony Barnett rejects patriotism, arguing that the left would be better served if it ‘insist[ed] upon the plurality of national allegiances ... the diversity of regional differences; the plurality of racial and migrant strains; the importance of gender loyalties; the complexity of religious affiliations; and the conflicting allegiances of class.’ On the other hand, John Schwarzmantel has argued that ‘Socialists need to develop and sustain a concept of the nation, if not exactly a form of nationalism, and the idea of the nation need not and should not be the preserve of the Right’. As Miles Taylor has argued, ‘What socialist historians have failed to do is to separate the study of patriotism in the past from
their own attitudes towards patriotism in the present. This article argues that, certainly in
Britain, most socialists simply got on with it, and were, in various ways, patriotic all the
same. It examines the experience of socialism, patriotism and national identity in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the formative years of modern British socialism. It
begins by examining the origins of the left’s use of patriotism and ideas of national identity
in an earlier radical tradition, which were combined with the idea of socialism as a ‘new
life’ to give a distinctive quasi-millenarian flavouring to a left-wing historiography which
would act as a model on which a future socialist society could be created. Having drawn on
the past in this way, socialists then sought to legitimate socialism as falling within a British
tradition. This involves a brief discussion of the relationship between alternative identities
of place within a multinational United Kingdom, since such legitimisation looked to
English rather than British history. This version of English history privileged Parliament
within the national history providing a Whig interpretation, and it was upon this that the
Labour Party and some of its constituent socialist societies based their political strategy.
This turned readily into an attack on non-parliamentary socialisms as ‘foreign’, as outside
the British tradition. These versions of national identity held by the left were still in
opposition to the dominant paradigms of Britishness that emerged with the ‘new’
imperialism, but the left’s radical patriotism survived this confrontation and remained a
vibrant discourse throughout the Edwardian period and into the First World War. Faced by
the Russian Revolution, and the creation of the world’s first workers’ state, an alternative
centre of loyalty was found by some British socialists, who abandoned radical patriotism.
The mainstream left concentrated after 1917 on ensuring that Labour’s political strategy
conformed to the British parliamentary tradition.
Origins and Influences

Modern British socialism emerged just as the advocacy of an ‘ideological cluster’ of ‘a renewed militarism, a devotion to royalty, an identification and worship of national heroes ... and racial ideas associated with Social Darwinism’ was brought forth in justification of the wave of ‘new’ imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century. It would be wrong to suggest that this ideological barrage had no effect on modern British socialism, but it would be equally incorrect to see it as providing the main impetus for much of the left’s acceptance of patriotism. Patriotism and a sense of national identity were not imposed on the left from outside, but were an outgrowth of the left’s origins in the radical tradition and its own interpretation of British history.

Patriotism had long been part of the vocabulary of radicalism in Britain. In a pioneering essay, Christopher Hill showed how the Norman yoke theory was used to explain restrictions on liberty and the poor condition of the people from the mid-seventeenth century. This tradition, of citing English history to press forward claims for political and economic change had continued throughout the eighteenth century. Radicals during the reform agitations of the 1790s to 1840s had used the language of Englishness and Britishness. While political and social elites had sought since the late eighteenth century to take over and monopolise patriotism, even into the 1860s and 1870s radicals had felt at home with notions of national identity. The Tichborne agitation had been centred on the Magna Charta Association and its newspaper, *The Englishman*. Rohan McWilliam has described the dominant discourse of this largest radical agitation between Chartism and the rise of socialism as ideas of the free-born Englishman, independence and fair play. The links between the socialism of the 1880s and this earlier radical tradition are now well
established. These links were certainly a major source of many British socialists’ continuing use of a patriotic vocabulary. But the tone of left-wing patriotism in the 1880s and 1890s was changed by the idea of socialism as a new life. This provided a rupture with mid-century radicalism and injected a powerful ethical aspect into socialism. Socialism was discussed in millenarian terms, offering a whole new system of life. John Bruce Glasier noted the ‘frequency of the use of the metaphors, “dawn”, “morning”, “day” and the like’ in socialist propaganda which was, he said ‘emblematic of the promise of Socialism’. Socialists linked this millenarian approach to the past to construct a model of a socialist future. The resulting left-wing historiography provided a strong framework for radical patriotism to survive as a dominant theme in socialist propaganda at least until 1914.

Ruskin’s Romantic critique of industrialisation and the research of radical historians like Thorold Rogers were put to use to create an all-encompassing explanation for the rise of capitalism, but also to build a vision of a socialist future. The main feature of this socialist historiography was a belief that prior to the emergence of capitalism there had been a golden age of English labour. Again and again socialist propaganda referred to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as an age of independence and plenty for the mass of the people. H. M. Hyndman called the first chapter of *The Historical Basis of Socialism in England* (1883) ‘The golden age of the people’ and described the fifteenth century as a period when ‘labourers ... ate, drank, and worked well, and foreigners gazed in wonder at the rich clothing, sturdy frames, and independent mien of our English common men’. In a book co-authored with William Morris, Hyndman further described the fourteenth century as ‘inhabited by perhaps the most vigorous, freedom loving set of men the world ever
saw’. This tone was taken up by later socialists. Both T. D. Benson and Keir Hardie called the fifteenth century the ‘golden age of labour’ and Robert Blatchford summarised the whole of this historiography by choosing the title *Merrie England* for the most popular socialist book of the nineteenth century.  

Socialists believed that the development of capitalism had brought a decline in the standards of living of the majority of the British people. Capitalism had been made possible by the expropriation of the land from the peasantry of the past. Hence Blatchford explained that, ‘At present Britain does not belong to the British: it belongs to a few of the British.... It is because Britain does not belong to the British that a few are very rich and the many are very poor.’ The seizure of land and the commercialisation of farming had been undertaken at the expense of the mass of the people. Hyndman argued that ‘between the fifteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century the whole face of England had been changed.... The fine old yeoman class fell more and more into decrepitude.... By the middle of the eighteenth century there was scarcely a yeomen of the old type left.’ Socialists had proved to their own satisfaction that capitalism in the countryside had diverted the course of English history. Industrialisation had sealed the fate of the common people: Blatchford described the factory system as ‘evil in its origin, in its progress, in its motives, and in its effects.’ Socialists therefore saw their national task as the restoration of the people to the countryside. Only in this way could socialism be introduced. Hence the vision of socialism put forward was overwhelmingly rural, for it was there that socialists felt that the true national spirit of the British resided. William Morris’s *News from Nowhere* (1890) described what a future communist society might be like. The world described is almost identical to the England of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries described by Morris,
Hyndman and others in their more historical works. Morris’s vision of socialism in England contained ‘wide sunny meadows and garden-like tillage’, ‘houses ... amongst the fields with pleasant lanes leading down to them ...’ Such houses were ‘pretty in design ... countrified in appearance, like yeomen’s dwellings; some of red brick ... but more of plaster’. Morris’s vision was of an Arts and Crafts version of the medieval past, a re-building of rural England. Hence Hyndman and Morris claimed that their task was ‘restitution’, reclaiming for the people what was theirs, rather than ‘confiscation’.19

Such a view of the English past and socialist future was shared across the socialist movement. It led to an interest in the English countryside, through the Clarion Field Clubs, the infusion of medieval architecture into modern town planning, and a wish to revive past English culture. Hence Cecil Sharp and Vaughan Williams, who both described themselves as socialists, went in search of an authentic national music in the villages of England.20 Socialists at a local level staged fund-raising events taking ‘Merrie England’ and its interpretation of history as their theme. These could involve May-poles and Morris dancing, reconstructions of medieval architecture, and pageants such as ‘The Greenwood Tree and Robin Hood and his Merry Men and Maidens’, staged by Gorton Independent Labour Party (ILP) in December 1895.21 This interpretation of English history became part of the day-to-day propaganda of British socialists and reference to the past continued to be a tool in the struggle for social change, as it had been for radicals of earlier generations. When contemporary actions failed to live up to this model of the past, socialists drew attention to it. Deaths through starvation, or imprisonment for theft (as long as the sentenced was poverty-stricken) were reported under ironic headlines such as ‘Britain’s glory’ and ‘Happy England’.22
English and British history

Socialists faced the accusation that they represented an ideology that was foreign to the shores of Britain, an importation from the continent associated with the Paris Commune, anarchism and terrorism. The first issue of *Justice* claimed that ‘Democratic socialism was everywhere spoken of as merely another name for secret assassination or dynamite outrage, and the greatest efforts were made to show plainly that no matter how rife such ideas were abroad, socialism could never take root in England.’

Socialists were keen to refute allegations of foreignness and the idea that socialism could not grow in Britain.

Early socialists again referred to the past in their defence. Hyndman drew attention to *The Historical Basis of Socialism in England* and cited the names ‘Tyler, Cade, Ball, Kett, More, Bellers, Spence, Owen’. These, he wrote, ‘read to me like sound English names: not a foreigner in the whole batch’.

The SDF was seeking to establish its Britishness, its conformity to British history and to a British radical tradition. The SDF saw themselves as the successors to the Chartists, and Blatchford readily drew on William Cobbett in his support. Other socialists wanted to establish their place within a broader parliamentary tradition. The Fabian Society claimed an acceptance of ‘the conditions imposed on it ... by the national character and circumstances of the English people’ in order to justify its parliamentary and gradualist strategy. Likewise the founding conference of the Independent Labour Party was dominated by the debate over the name of the new organisation. While some delegates urged the inclusion of the word ‘socialist’ in the title, the majority favoured the Labour option arguing that it fitted better with the British nature of the party. Irish-born, Leeds socialist Tom Maguire later commented on the chosen name
that ‘suddenly a name was coined that hit off the genius of the English people’. The search for Britishness involved therefore the combining of a radical interpretation of England’s social history with a claim to be a part of Britain’s political tradition.

The choice of words here has been very deliberate. Socialists, as well as others, often simply conflated ‘England’ and ‘Britain’, and the historian James D. Young has seen the creation of a ‘British socialism’ based on English history as the imposition of a cultural imperialism. It was certainly the case that the late nineteenth century was witnessing an ironing out of regional cultural differences, or as José Harris has called it, the ‘nationalisation of culture’. But the socialist and labour movement was both regionally diverse and centralising at the same time. While socialists sought to create all-British organisations from among the fragments of organisation scattered throughout the United Kingdom they also maintained attachments to localities, regions and the nations of the periphery. The socialism of Blatchford and Philip Snowden was deliberately northern in character. Keir Hardie stressed the Celticness of his socialism in his appeal to voters in his Welsh constituency of Merthyr Tydfil, and he and other Scottish socialists referred frequently to Robert Burns, Border Tales and Scottish history as a source of inspiration. Such identities did not preclude other identities of a national or class nature. Socialists in the sub-nations of the United Kingdom (Ireland was the exception) found little problem in supporting Home Rule alongside the desire to see the creation of an all-British socialist and labour movement. Far from seeing home rule as pulling the United Kingdom apart, socialists saw it as likely to strengthen the union. Socialists from the sub-nations were therefore a centripetal force within Britain. They were prepared to subordinate Scottish and Welsh history to English history in order to ensure the growth of the movement nationally.
The English past was seen as both a place and time that could provide a powerful example of a society in essential harmony. The incursion of industrial capitalism had destroyed this harmony, but the interpretation also seemed to offer its own solution to many British socialists. Many of those in the Fabian Society and ILP, and later the Labour Party not only saw the past as leading to the victory of capitalism, but coincidentally saw British history as involving the growth of democratic institutions, with Parliament at the centre. Hence Ramsay MacDonald could argue in 1907 that ‘the history of Parliament is the history of the evolution of popular liberty in this country’. Substantial parts of the left accepted a Whig interpretation of English history in which political liberty had been steadily expanded. There were of course divisions within the left, which Barrow and Bullock have categorised as being between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ views of democracy. ‘Strong’ democrats sought to transform the British parliamentary system to enable it to become a vehicle to carry socialism forward. ‘Weak’ democrats tended to view the parliamentary system as fundamentally sound. Indeed MacDonald warned against ‘degrad[ing] in the imagination of the people even a bad House of Commons’ as ‘a most heinous crime for Socialists’. Barrow and Bullock remind us of the vigorous debate that took place inside the left in regard to ideas and strategy. This debate extended out from attitudes to Parliament and democracy to the Britishness of various brands of socialism. The ‘weak’ democrats of the ILP, the Fabian Society and the Labour Party claimed that they stood closest to the national history because they accepted parliamentary forms as they had evolved. Hence in 1907 MacDonald wrote that ‘With the formation of the Independent Labour Party, socialism in Britain entered upon a new phase. Continental shibboleths and phrases were discarded. The
propaganda became British. The history which it used, the modes of thought which it adopted, the political methods which it pursued, the allies which it sought for, were all determined by British conditions.’ J. Bruce Glasier, another Scottish ILP leader, called the party ‘the means of restoring the English tradition to our socialist agitation’.36

If for these non-SDF writers, the socialism of the ILP and Labour Party was British, then other socialisms were not: they could be branded as foreign. The SDF and Marxism, anarchism and later syndicalism were all declared to be un-British and unsuited to the national political history, traditions and character. MacDonald wrote of the SDF that its ‘foreign outlook, phrases and criticisms ... never quite fitted themselves into British conditions’. The Fabian Society bombastically claimed to have broken ‘the spell of Marxism in Britain’ and that ‘If German socialism would not suit, English socialism had to be formulated to take its place.’37 Syndicalism was criticised as ‘a word imported from France’, by the ILP’s Labour Leader, and ‘a French stranger in our language’, by MacDonald.38 MacDonald went on to argue that syndicalism’s major failing was its refusal to accept the nation as ‘a real unity ... with traditions, with habits, with a system of social conduct’. This alone would account for its failure, and the ILP and Labour acceptance of the nation would contribute to their success.39

MacDonald saw the nation as an organic community capable of evolutionary growth in the direction of socialism. The nation, he argued, ‘has a common life, it is an historical product, it has a law of evolution’. From this he concluded that ‘Parliament and the historical method, because they do express something deeper than class conflict ... are the way in which the expanding life of the community creates new social states’.40 British
socialism was therefore parliamentary because it accepted British history; this made the Labour Party the only true form of British socialism. The English past was seen as a site of struggle to gain political liberties, a fight successfully won when the House of Commons gained pre-eminence under the 1911 Parliament Act. On to the end of this struggle could be attached the struggle for social liberty, which socialists saw as their historic task. Again the site of struggle would be the House of Commons, situated in the English (and British) capital but also at the centre of English history.

Many British socialists, therefore, formulated their socialism within a construct of the nation. Yet socialism was also seen as international. How did these socialists relate their British socialism to the international socialist movement? First, British socialists saw no inherent contradiction between basing their socialism on national identity and internationalism. All British left-wing parties played as full a role in the Second International as their numbers would allow, most believing that a plurality of nations could co-exist peacefully. As Glasier explained, ‘internationalism does not involve the extinction of nations, but the brotherhood of nations’.

Secondly, this was, anyway, not exceptional within European socialism. While Marxism was more influential on the continent, socialists did not place themselves outside non-socialist radical traditions. In France, the Revolutionary and Republican traditions were seen as enhancing the strength of socialism, and in Germany, Social Democrats drew on Lassalle and other non-Marxist strains. Eduard Bernstein saw proletarian patriotism as a progressive force, and attachment to the nation was not confined to Revisionists: August Bebel explained the position of his party in regard to the nation: ‘what we oppose is not so much the idea of fatherland as such, that anyway belongs to the proletariat rather than to the ruling class, but the conditions ...
prevailing in this fatherland of ours’.\textsuperscript{42} Thirdly, British socialist were not so parochial that they were unaware either of continental socialists’ attitudes towards patriotism or the debates among European socialists about the forms socialism should take. Hence MacDonald was quite prepared to engage German Revisionism and the socialism of Jaurès in his project to construct a democratic socialism for Britain, but he was quite clear that what British socialism had to offer in such debates was the example of ‘the growth of British democratic institutions and the characteristics of British political methods’\textsuperscript{43}.

Radical Patriotism in Edwardian Britain

However much a ‘weak’ democratic view of British history and identity involved the acceptance of more conservative views of the nation, the left’s version of Britishness still stood in opposition to the bellicose, jingoistic version of the ‘new’ imperialism. With the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899 the socialists’ patriotism came up against the challenge of this conservative and imperial patriotism. Some gave way. Blatchford supported the British war effort. ‘[W]hen England is at war,’ he wrote, ‘I’m English’.\textsuperscript{44} Blatchford’s declaration of support for the war effort and the war’s apparent popularity among the working class raised doubts about democracy; the rationalism of the masses could not be counted on. Socialists were shocked by the behaviour of celebrating patriots. Glasier recorded in his diary: ‘Am utterly dismayed at this fearful exhibition of rowdyism and intolerance. All our civilization seems to fall away.... Alas, the people seem to have gone back. The Daily Mail and the other great Capitalist and Jewish papers have excited madness among them.’\textsuperscript{45} Justice on at least two occasions described ‘mafficking’ as ‘bestial’, and the ILP conference resolved:
That the displays of rowdyism and worse which were observable in the streets and public places after the relief of Mafeking, the capture of Pretoria, the return of the C[ity] I[mperial] V[olunteers] and on other occasions merit the serious attention of all who have the welfare of the nation at heart, as they seem to betoken a loss of dignity and a degeneration of the character of the race. That this conference regrets this degeneration, considering that the power to take joy and grief calmly indicated the innate stubbornness and self-control of the people and that these are among the greatest attributes of a great nation. 46

Miles Taylor has argued that in the face of this pessimistic view the left retreated from patriotism. 47 While it is certainly true that the left at times were anxious about the effects of such irrationality, they recovered remarkably quickly during and after the Boer War. As Bax noted, the tone of opposition to the war remained framed within patriotism. The Boers were seen as fighting for a pre-industrial and agrarian lifestyle similar to that in the English past celebrated by socialists. Furthermore the war could be blamed on Jewish influence, as J.A. Hobson’s *The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects* (1900) argued. 48 As the war dragged on, jingoist exuberance became much less common. *Justice* and *Labour Leader* respectively reported with relief the ‘Decay of the Mafficking Spirit’ and the absence of ‘Police and Patriots’ from anti-war meetings. 49 And the result of the first general election after the end of the Boer War was enough to convince socialists that democracy was going their way. The defeat of the Unionists and the election of twenty-nine Labour MPs were greeted with a renewal of faith in democracy and the people. 50 The left became capable of holding more than one image of the ‘masses’. In one version they could be easily provoked to jingoism by a conservative and imperialist press, but in another version they could be
won to support for Labour, socialism and ‘true’ patriotism. Therefore despite fears over the jingoism of the masses during the Boer War, the left did not give up patriotism. During the years of Liberal government after 1906 socialist and Labour figures continued to use radical patriotic vocabulary to express their opposition to aspects of government policy. This was particularly evident in the case of opposition to the increasingly friendly relations between Britain and Tsarist Russia. Thus the *New Age* described a demonstration in Trafalgar Square against Anglo-Russian negotiations as ‘a number of English patriots, incensed at the idea of a foul alliance of their country with a set of brutal butchers calling themselves the Russian Empire.’\(^5^1\) Tsarist Russia was seen as the antithesis of Britain, and its discussion on the left was conducted within a structure of contrasting national identities, where the left could claim a reading of Britishness that was more in keeping with the notion of liberty as central to the national tradition.

**The First World War**

The First World War was long anticipated by the British left. Many socialists in the ILP, Labour Party and SDF continued to play a role in the Second International discussing possible means to prevent war. A minority, however, put their patriotism to the fore and argued that Britain faced a ‘German menace’. From 1904 Blatchford warned that Britain needed to prepare itself for war against Germany, and he was joined by Hyndman and part of the SDF.\(^5^2\) While this led them towards the camp of the right-wing patriotic leagues, they attempted to maintain the radical edge to their patriotism. Britain needed defending, they argued, because it allowed more liberty than elsewhere. Blatchford explained: ‘There is no nation in the world so free as Britain. There is no nation where the subject has an equal liberty of speech and action.’\(^5^3\) To defend English liberty they called for a larger
Royal Navy, but these socialists also demanded compulsory military service. Even here, through the citizen army proposal, they maintained a commitment to a radical version of patriotism. Harry Quelch argued that ‘an unarmed nation cannot be free.... An armed nation ... is a guarantee of individual liberty, of social freedom, and of national independence.’ Such ideals could be promoted through a citizen army, ‘by the inculcation of true patriotism and international co-operation and inter-dependence’.

Across Europe, continental socialist parties likewise campaigned for citizen armies; the Second International upheld the right to national defence, and in the face of conscription, socialists saw the citizen army as a way of democratising militarism. British supporters of the citizen army cited such reasoning in their support. They also looked to the British Empire. The Australian Labor Party in government in 1910 had extended compulsory military training for home defence established by the previous Commonwealth government.

Radical patriotism survived the fresh outburst of jingoism that accompanied the outbreak of the First World War. While the labour movement divided into various brands of support for and opposition to the war, most claimed to carry the mantle of radical patriotism. Loyalist patriotism certainly played a part in the majority supporting the war, as M.A. Hamilton wrote of Labour MPs, ‘They were British citizens, first: only in second line members of a party.’ But acceptance of ‘my country, right or wrong’ was accompanied by a deeply held belief that, according to the axioms of radical patriotism, Britain was indeed in the right. Germany was the aggressor and had invaded Belgium. Likewise in France, socialists responded to the German invasion of their own country, as in Germany and
Austria-Hungary cited the Russian threat in support of their pro-war stance. The Second International had never denied the right of nations to self-defence, and in 1914 most could claim to be upholding such a right. As in France, the British pro-war left believed themselves to be fighting for the national characteristics of democracy and liberty. Blatchford argued that it was a war of ‘the democracies of a continent against the tyranny of the sceptre and the sword.’ J.H. Thomas urged young men, from recruiting platforms, ‘If you love liberty as I love liberty and if you respect freedom as I respect freedom, then it is your duty immediately to come to your country’s aid.’ Pro-war socialists tended to ignore the contradiction of fighting a war for liberty and democracy in alliance with tsarist Russia. The *New Statesman* in 1915 did however wonder whether ‘even Russian tyranny [might] be less black than it had been painted?’ and suggested that traditional left-wing hostility might have been prejudice. This reappraisal seemed necessary since ‘you cannot in common decency accept a man’s help and abuse him at the same time’.

The anti-war left opposed the war for a variety of reasons - Christian pacifism, socialism, internationalism and opposition to fighting in alliance with tsarist Russia. Very few indeed rejected the language of patriotism in articulating their opposition. The Socialist Labour Party with only 200 members, the Socialist Party of Great Britain with fewer, a handful of Marxists around John Maclean and an equally small group around Sylvia Pankhurst, opposed the war on revolutionary socialist grounds. The majority however framed their opposition, at least in part, within a patriotic discourse. Even on the anti-war wing of the BSP, the idea of national defence was accepted. The whole executive supported a Hyndmanite resolution published in *Justice* on 17 September 1914 that since ‘the national freedom and independence of this country are threatened by Prussian
militarism, the Party naturally desires to see the prosecution of the war to a speedy and successful issue’. Virtually all were agreed that Britain must win. MacDonald’s declaration that ‘Victory ... must be ours’ is well known, but other anti-war groups and figures made similar statements. The Union of Democratic Control decided from the start that, ‘This country is at war, and has for the moment one overwhelming preoccupation: to render safe our national inheritance.’ An ILP pamphlet on the war began, ‘Obviously the war must be finished now and whatever may be the rights or wrongs of its origin, a victory for German arms and the worst elements in German society which the war has put into authority, would bring political results to Europe which no one who loves peace and liberty could welcome.’

The constitutive elements of the left’s patriotism involved accepting, as an opposite, the construction of ‘Prussianism’. If Germany was autocratic, undemocratic and militarist, then Britain was not, and while the anti-war left could argue that secret diplomacy had caused the war, or that it was a capitalist war, most could not desire that Britain should lose. Indeed much of the anti-war left’s agitation revolved around preventing Britain from becoming ‘Prussianised’. They maintained an inward-looking patriotism even in the midst of war. As C.H. Norman of the ILP explained, ‘Patriotism is a passion impelling a person to serve his country (1) either in defending it from invasion; (2) or, in upholding the rights and liberties of the people, and maintaining the national laws and institutions against tyrannical infringements.’ The anti-war left saw patriotism’s true importance in the latter definition, and they opposed the wartime suppression of liberties which they saw as specifically English. These included the suppression of free speech under wartime regulations, but the chief focus was on opposition to conscription. This was an area where
the pro- and anti-war left could re-unite. Labour Party conferences passed resolutions against conscription and pro-war figures like J. H. Thomas were vocal in their opposition to compulsion. The language in which opposition to conscription was expressed posed left-wing patriotism against ‘my-country-right-or-wrong’ patriotism. Hence conscription was described by the ILP as ‘a violation of the principles of civic freedom hitherto prized as one of the chief heritages of British liberty’. Even in the midst of war therefore, much of the left continued to claim a true and inward-looking patriotism. Much of the anti-war left too used radical patriotism in their cause, claiming the right to be called real patriots, as they had done during the Boer War. Clement J. Bundock, assistant editor of the *Labour Leader* wrote that: ‘[A] patriot in truth is not he who will declare his country right when he knows it is wrong, but he who is jealous of his country’s honour and dignity and will protest against the defamation of his country’s name and bow his head in shame when he sees that name dishonoured. British patriots to-day are bowed in shame.’

The End of Radical Patriotism

Belfort Bax’s exhortation to the left to have nothing to do with patriotism had therefore been largely ignored. Of course parts of Bax’s warning had proved prophetic. Hugh Cunningham has argued that ‘in the age of imperialism it was impossible to demarcate a patriotism of the left. The language had passed to the right and those who employed it did so too.’ While this underestimates the continuing vitality of the radical patriotic tradition and the ability of much of the left to maintain their socialism with patriotism, it is also clear that some socialist-patriots did move steadily to the right, forsaking or re-working their socialism towards more nationalist idioms. In the Edwardian period Hyndman, Blatchford and others warned of the ‘German menace’ and their patriotism turned readily into
Germanophobia and calls for increased armaments. During the First World War a minority of socialists became super-patriots, condemning strike action as pro-German, verbally attacking anti-war figures, even inciting their arrest.\footnote{70} Such super-patriotism lost its advocates support within the labour movement. A.M. Thompson claimed that the Clarion’s circulation dropped from 60,000 to only 10,000 a week.\footnote{71} Hyndman’s National Socialist Party, formed of the pro-war elements in the BSP was but a rump.\footnote{72} By a massive majority, the Trade Union Congress rejected the super-patriotic seamen’s leader Havelock Wilson’s call for a trade union labour party excluding anti-war activists.\footnote{73} In such circumstances, the super-patriots turned outside the labour movement making links with the radical right. They abandoned the social aspects of their patriotism, replacing them with hostility to aliens and vehement defence of the British Empire, and hence excluded themselves from the labour movement.\footnote{74} Hyndman and Blatchford can be seen as residing within a tradition of radical conservatism,\footnote{75} whereas most socialists followed a more Liberal-Radical tradition. Hence George Barnes opposed increased armaments in 1909 by referring to John Bright.\footnote{76} It was this tradition, of an inward-looking patriotism, which enabled radical patriotism, or ‘true’ patriotism as it was sometimes called, to survive into the First World War, in the face of imperialist and jingoistic patriotism. Most of the left, even supporters of the war, were able to distinguish between different versions and felt confident in upholding their own distinctive and oppositional brand.

The changes through which British labour politics were passing as a result of war were enhanced by the Russian Revolutions of 1917.\footnote{77} At first, British reactions were entirely shaped by positions on the war. To the pro-war left, the March Revolution marked a victory for constitutionalism and Russia’s ability to continue to fight Germany, whereas for
the anti-war left, it marked a victory for the peace party. When Germany was defeated and with the Bolsheviks in power, the British left looked at the world’s first workers’ state with differing perspectives. Many on the left of the labour movement saw in Soviet Russia a new centre for their loyalties, which competed with even the most radical interpretation of patriotism. Such a view extended far wider than those who would later join the Communist Party of Great Britain. George Lansbury steered the *Daily Herald* in a pro-Soviet direction, earning the thanks of Litvinov, representative of the Bolsheviks in Britain. The ILP published pamphlets sympathetic to the Bolsheviks and two-thirds of its members wanted consultation about joining the Third International.

This sympathy posed a challenge to Whig interpretations of history which supported Labour’s parliamentary strategy. Pro-Bolsheviks in Britain argued that the nation’s history supported a revolutionary road. The Left Wing of the ILP argued that gradualism was ‘in an evident ignorance of the lessons of our own nation’s history’, and C.H. Norman pointed out that the Magna Carta and Bill of Rights had been won by revolution. During the period of Allied intervention, moderates in the labour movement were careful not to criticise Bolshevism in Russia. But faced by a challenge to their parliamentary strategy they argued that political conditions were very different in Britain. The ILP National Administrative Council, concerned by the pro-Bolshevism of many members, put it simply: ‘Russia is not England. The social and political history of the two countries are different.’ In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution therefore, the British left was engaged in a struggle over interpretations of history. As T.D. Benson argued, the British Bolsheviks wished to destroy ‘the whole of the English political system which is rooted in our national life by the tradition of seven centuries’. 
The Labour leadership believed that the party’s position had been immeasurably strengthened by the war and the divisions within Liberalism. After Allied intervention in Russia had ended, they increasingly saw any association of Labour with Communism as fundamentally damaging to the viability of a parliamentary strategy. Alongside the exclusion of CPGB members from the party, the leadership also sought to re-forge British socialism founded on gradualism, parliamentarism and representation of the whole nation. Sidney Webb in his presidential address to the 1923 Labour conference argued that the ‘practical British way’ eschewed violence. J.H. Thomas explained elsewhere that the Labour Party did not stand in opposition to the constitution.

The First World War and Russian Revolution had led to the fragmentation of radical patriotism. Once the war was over, the super-patriots disappeared into obscurity or returned to the Labour fold. To the left, Soviet Russia now provided a focus for their internationalism, while to the moderates, the concentration on a Whig interpretation of history led them increasingly to identify with the British state. Bolstered by their apparent advance in electoral terms, and a belief in the inevitability of a Labour government, they believed that they could form the state. They maintained an inward-looking patriotism, but it rested on a view of socialism that saw the state as benign, as a vehicle for socialist transformation. As J.H. Thomas explained: ‘The old England stands condemned, and the foundations of the new England are already laid - for years past the progressive forces, with ever increasing strength and efficiency, have been engaged in digging them out, and with the formation of a Labour government, the keystone will be placed in position, and slowly, but firmly and surely, a new, more healthy, more beautiful structure will be erected.’
Conclusion

The majority of the left in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries found it useful to make frequent references to national identity. True, they largely accepted Bax’s definition ‘that to be patriotic meant to be opposed to ... the governing classes of your own country in the interests of the people of your country’.\(^8\) But unlike Bax, they did not see this as out-dated and incompatible with socialism. Much of the British left found patriotism to be a readily adaptable concept. Through reference to the past it could express anti-capitalism and a desire to radically transform society. It could provide visions of a socialist future from within a British framework. It could be used to oppose war. National identity was carried forward by some, dominant within the Labour Party, though rarely unchallenged, to mean an acceptance of the belief that English history was a long struggle for liberty. Having accepted this, they were prepared to use this more restrictive version against non-parliamentary socialisms, which they branded as alien to British traditions and character. Notions of national identity in Britain in the age of imperialism were never the monopoly of one class, party or political position; ‘countervailing currents’ continually clashed with the dominant forms.\(^9\) The British left constructed their socialism within a British framework, in a sense inventing a tradition of British socialism. The ‘invention of tradition’ is often taken to imply an imposition of identity on to passive receptacles, and has been seen as a method for the integration of the working class into the nation.\(^9\) The legitimisation of British socialism by reference to the parliamentary history of the nation certainly aided in the integration of much of the left, as 1914 indicates, but the strength of the left’s version of national identity was that it was constructed from within. While it shared a sense of nationality with other more conservative political forces, its emphasis on
differences as well meant that much of the British left were able to sustain a conviction that not only did they belong to the nation, but that the nation and its history belonged to them.

Notes

1 Ernest Belfort Bax, ‘Patriotism’, *Justice*, May Day supplement 1901. This essay is a revised version of a paper delivered to the National Identities conference. Thanks to Martin Francis for comments on an earlier draft.

2 Ibid


17 Blatchford, Merrie England, p.35.
19 Hyndman and Morris, Summary of the Principles of Socialism, p.30.
21 Clarion, 30 November 1895. For further examples see Clarion, 2 March 1895, 26 October 1895; Labour Leader, 4 March 1899, 26 November 1909.
22 For example, Clarion, 12 March 1892, 6 January 1894.
23 Justice, 19 January 1884.


33 J. H. B. Masterman, *The House of Commons: Its Place in National History*, (London: John Murray, 1908), pp.29-30. MacDonald was chairing one of the lectures on which the book was based.

34 Barrow and Bullock, *Democratic Ideas*.


38 *Labour Leader*, 5 April 1912; J. Ramsay MacDonald, *Syndicalism: A Critical Examination*, (London: Constable, 1912), p.v. The British Socialist Party, formed in 1912 from the SDF, Clarion groups and left-wing elements in the ILP dissatisfied with the parliamentary performance, also attacked syndicalism as foreign for its rejection of the
political in favour of an industrial strategy, see for example *Justice*, 16 March 1912, 27 April 1912, 2 November 1912.


44 Clarion, 21 October 1899. For Blatchford’s support for the war see Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack, pp.60-2.


46 Justice, 2 and 30 June 1900; ILP, Annual Conference Report, 1901, p.43.

47 Taylor, ‘Patriotism, History and the Left’.


49 Justice, 25 May 1901; Labour Leader, 29 June 1901.

50 See for example, Labour Leader, 19 January 1906.

51 New Age, 18 July 1907. James O’Grady and Keir Hardie used similar language in the House of Commons in 1908 and 1909, see Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, vol. 190, columns 212, 261 and 5th Series, vol. 6, column 678. Radical patriotic vocabulary was also

52 For Blatchford see for example *Clarion*, 10, 17, 24 June 1906. For Hyndman, see for example *Justice*, 14 March 1908, 20 August 1910. For opposition to Hyndman within the SDF/BSP over his calls for increased armaments see *Justice*, 17 April 1909, 1 May 1909, *British Socialist Party, Conference Report, 1912, pp.20-2, 1913, p.37.*

53 *Clarion*, 16 April 1909.


60 For opposition based on hostility to Russia see Daily Herald, 3 August 1914 and MacDonald’s Commons’ speech of the same date in Peter Stansky (ed), The Left and the War: The British Labour Party and World War I, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.58.

61 For the SLP see Raymond Challinor, The Origins of British Bolshevism, (London: Croom Helm, 1977), pp.123-49. For Maclean see for example his letter to Justice, 19 September 1914. Pankhurst’s transition from socialist suffragette to revolutionary socialist was caused by the war, see Barbara Winslow, Sylvia Pankhurst: Sexual Politics and Political Activism, (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp.75-104.


64 Before the war the Fabian Society had been accused of ‘Prussianism’ for its concentration on the state as the vehicle for socialism. In the context of war the Society
stepped up its claims to Britishness. The anti-German tone of its official history written by Pease and published in 1916 can be no coincidence. Pease stressed the contrasts between the Germanness of Marxism and the Britishness of the Society’s socialism, and even cited Rupert Brooke’s membership as proof of Fabian patriotism: Pease, *History of the Fabian Society*, pp.23-4, 90-1, 236.


69 Cunningham, ‘The Language of Patriotism’, p.82.


78 For the pro-war left and the Revolution see for example G.J. Wardle, *Hansard*, 5th series, xci, 22 March 1917, 2085, 2090. For the anti-war see the account of the Leeds Convention held to celebrate the Revolution in *Herald*, 9 June 1917.


84 For opposition to possible British involvement in the Russo-Polish War, see L.J.
MacFarlane, “‘Hands Off Russia’, British Labour and the Russo-Polish War, 1920’, Past
and Present, 38, 1967, pp.126-52 and Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik
Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1921-1924, (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1979), pp.41-54.
85 Arthur Henderson, ‘Notes on Mr Williams’ Letter’, Labour Party, National Executive
Committee Papers, 1921.
86 Labour Party, Conference Report, 1923, pp.178-80; J.H. Thomas, When Labour Rules,
(London: Collins, 1920), pp.45-50. See also Philip Snowden, Labour and the New World,
(London: Waverly, n.d. [1921]).
87 Thomas, When Labour Rules, p.20
88 Justice, May Day supplement 1901.
89 Feldman, ‘Nationality and Ethnicity’, p.137.
90 Marcel van der Linden, ‘The National Integration of European Working Classes (1871-
1914): Exploring the Casual Configuration’, International Review of Social History, 33,
1988, pp.285-311; Jolyon Howarth, ‘French Workers and German Workers: The
Impossibility of Internationalism, 1900-1914’, European History Quarterly, 15, 1985, 71-
97; Ross McKibbin, ‘Why was there no Marxism in Great Britain?’ in his Ideologies of
Much of the anti-war left too used radical patriotism in their cause, claiming the right to be called real patriots, as they had done during the Boer War. Clement J. Bundock, assistant editor of the *Labour Leader* wrote that: ‘[A] patriot in truth is not he who will declare his country right when he knows it is wrong, but he who is jealous of his country’s honour and dignity and will protest against the defamation of his country’s name and bow his head in shame when he sees that name dishonoured. British patriots to-day are bowed in shame.’

Much of the anti-war left too used radical patriotism in their cause, claiming the right to be called real patriots, as they had done during the Boer War. Clement J. Bundock, assistant editor of the *Labour Leader* wrote that: ‘[A] patriot in truth is not he who will declare his country right when he knows it is wrong, but he who is jealous of his country’s honour and dignity and will protest against the defamation of his country’s name and bow his head in shame when he sees that name dishonoured. British patriots to-day are bowed in shame.’