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Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) and Housing in the UK.

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Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) and Housing in the UK

Professor Rachel Armitage
Director: Secure Societies Institu

Director: Secure Societies Institute









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
Introduction













Lecture content



- Introduction to Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED).
- Introduction to Secured by Design (SBD).
- Implementation of CPTED and SBD in UK.
- Does CPTED reduce police recorded crime?
- Does CPTED impact upon offender decision making?
- Does SBD reduce crime?
- Can the principles of CPTED by transferred to other countries, cultures, climates?









Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)

What is it?









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A method of reducing crime through the design and manipulation of the built environment (planning stage)

Houses

Schools

Hospitals

Commercial

Railway stations









Creating Defensible Space

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Use of design to create **symbolic barriers** that portray the message that an area is private.







Limiting through movement

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Less opportunities to **notice** the house.

Less access/escape routes.





Offenders are more likely to be **observed** (or feel like that are being observed) by neighbours and/or passers by.





Management and maintenance

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The area is well maintained giving the impression that **people care** and would challenge the offender if observed.







Standards of physical security




_	
	The house is difficult to get into. Doing so would take time and would be
	Lock Snapping/Mole Gripping

The principles of CPTED

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	Poyner (1983)	Cozens et al (2005)	Armitage (2013)	Ekblom et al (2013)	Montoya et al (2016)
	Surveillance	Surveillance	Surveillance	Surveillance	Surveillance
	Movement control	Access control	Movement control	Access and connectivity	Access control
	Activity support	Activity support		Activity	Activity support
	Motivational reinforcement				
		Target hardening	Physical security		Target hardening
		Image	Management and maintenance	Pubiic image	Image maintenance
		Defensible space	Defensible space	Ownership	
		Territoriality			Territoriality
				Structure and spatial layout	



New Opportunity Theories

"Crime becomes a risk to be calculated (by the offender and the potential victim) or as an accident to be avoided, rather than a moral aberration which needs to be specially explained"

(Garland, 1996 p.450-451).









Rational Choice Theory

(Cornish and Clarke, 1986)

Make calculations
based upon <u>risk</u>
<u>versus rewards</u> or
<u>costs versus</u>
<u>benefits</u>...to maximise
benefits of offending.

Prevention:
Influence offender
thinking/decision –
increase risks and
reduce rewards.









Routine Activity
Theory (Cohen
and Felson, 1979)

Crime requires: a
Suitable Target, a
Motivated Offender
and absence of a
Capable Guardian

Prevention: Make target less suitable; ensure presence of capable guardian, demotivate offender.









Crime Pattern
Theory
(Brantingham and
Brantingham, 1981)

Offenders go to jobs, visit friends, shop like the rest of us (*Activity Space*). These locations plus spaces between form *Awareness Space*.

Alter design so offender less likely to pass by/become aware of targets.









CPTED aims to block opportunities

- Offenders are less likely to 'pass by' your house as part of their day-to-day activities.
- If they do, the design and layout of your house and surrounding properties will influence their 'perceptions' of risk.
- If they are not deterred by the perceptions of the risk of being noticed/challenged, they will find physically overcoming the security too difficult.







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Secured by Design (SBD)

What is it?









Secured by Design



Police Preferred Specification

Secured by Design: Standards based on principles of CPTED HUDDERSFIELD



Secured by Design




Official Police Security Initiative



NEW SCHOOLS 2014



COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
2015



Secured by Design: Interactive toolkit

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http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/interactive-design-guide/









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Implementing CPTED/SBD in the UK









How are CPTED & SBD delivered in England and Wales Huddersfield



- Each police force has ALO/CPDA/DOCOs.
- Review planning applications, advice on crime risk, deliver SBD, influence planning policy/strategy.
- Predominantly warranted police or retired police.
- Police station/local authority planning dept.
- Jan 2009 347
- Nov 2014 125

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Difference in delivery West Yorkshire Police



- 5 police districts/local authorities
- 5 ALOs one per police district
- Located in local authority planning departments.
- Retired/warranted police
- Formal meetings once every two months.

Difference in delivery Greater Manchester Police



 10 local authorities/police


Only Police Force in England and Wales to recruit from built environment background!

Only Police Force in England and Wales to 'require'
Crime Impact Statement with each planning application
and to charge for this service!



 Local authorities require a Crime Impact Statement –

Legislation, regulation, policy & guidance to support CPTED in planning system Huddersfield



UNIVERSITY OF THE YEAR







Crime and Disorder Act (1998) – Section 17 Section

"Responsible authorities

must....without prejudice to any other obligation imposed upon it...exercise its functions with due regard to...the need to do all it reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in its area"

Inspiring tomo

Building Regulation – Approved Document Q

The building must be designed and constructed in such a way that it adequately resists unauthorised access from outside the building and unauthorised access from within the building to flats within the building.









National Planning Policy Framework

Planning policies and decisions should aim to ensure that developments: create safe and accessible environments where crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine quality of life or community cohesion.









National Planning Policy Guidance - Design

"Designing out crime should be central to the planning and delivery of a new development. The prevention

of crime and the enhancement of community safety are matters that a local authority should consider when exercising its planning functions"

"Pre-application discussions between police Crime Prevention Design Advisors will ensure that applicants are aware right at the beginning of the design process of the level of risk and the sorts of measures available to mitigate this risk in a proportionate and well-designed manner"

Inspiring

Local Planning Policy – Local Plan

Must be in line with national policy.....ALO/CPDA/DOCO can shape this policy at local level!











CPTED/SBD – Individual elements of Design Impact on crime

Police recorded crime










Which design features influence crime? Huddersfield

Design Features Checklist



Through movement



Road layout



Surveillance





European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research

March 2011, Volume 17, <u>Issue 1</u>, pp 29–54

It Looks Good, but What is it Like to Live There? Exploring the Impact of Innovative Housing Design on Crime

Authors Authors and affiliations

Rachel Armitage , Leanne Monchuk, Michelle Rogerson









Evaluating the effectiveness of SBD Does it work?










SBD is based on CPTED but... CPTED is not SBD



Evaluation of Secured by Design in West Yorkshire

Armitage and Monchuk (2009)












Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009) HUDDERSFIELD




Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009) HUDDERSFIELD




Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009) Huddensfield




Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009) Huddensfield



Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009) HUDDERSFIELD



Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009) Huddensfield





Sear

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Security Journal

October 2011, Volume 24, <u>Issue 4</u>, pp 320–343

Sustaining the crime reduction impact of designing out crime: Re-evaluating the Secured by Design scheme 10 years on

Authors

Authors and affiliations

Rachel Armitage , Leanne Monchuk



Restricted to Repository staff only Download (6MB)










Inspiring tomorrow's professionals

Evaluating Secured by Design (as a scheme)

Evaluation	Key findings	Issue/problem
Armitage 2000	-55% reduction in crime (refurbs) -Burglary 71% higher NSBD -Total crime 34% higher NSBD -Self reported burglary 8.4% (NSBD), 2.9% (SBD)	Sample built 1994- 1998
Pascoe 1999	Burglary 31% higher NSBD	Sample built pre- 1999
Brown 1999	SBD 40% fewer burglaries/vehicle crime	Sample built pre- 1999
Teedon and Reid 2009	SBD total housebreaking fell 61% NSBD fell 21%	Just Part 2 (windows and doors)

SBD as an Evolving Standard



Year Estate was Built









What does it cost?

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Upper floor apartment Ground floor apartment

2/3 bedroom detached house

4 bedroom detached house

780 **SEK**

2679 SEK

1897 SEK

2232 SEK



Residential burglary costs 28,455 SEK







Let's recap....



CPTED/SBD – Individual elements of Design Impact on crime

Offender decision making









CPTED...in the words of the offender?



- 22 adult prolific burglars currently serving a prison sentence across 3 prisons in Yorkshire.
- 16 photographs:

"From what you can see from the photo, can you describe what would <u>attract</u> you to this property when selecting a target for burglary"

"From what you can see from the photo, can you describe what would <u>deter</u> you (put you off) from selecting this property as a target for burglary"

Quick test! Did they say 'yes' or 'no'?
















The principles of CPTED

Surveillance









Secured by Design Homes



"For the majority of housing developments, it will be desirable for dwelling frontages to be open to view, so walls, fences and hedges will need to be kept low"

"Planting should not impede the opportunity for natural surveillance".

"Dwellings should be <u>positioned facing each other</u> to allow <u>neighbours</u> <u>to easily view</u> their surroundings".











Surveillance – don't like clear visibility

This is a burglar's dream house!
The hedge is high and blocks the view from the road. The gate is so high, no-one can see you and the busy road masks any noise that I make.

Open fences would put me off.

This would be a perfect target.

Passers by can't see in so
they wouldn't notice you
breaking in. The high gate and
hedges block the view so noone can see what is going on
inside.

I'd feel more
exposed
if the walls and
fences
were lower.

Surveillance – don't like houses facing the street

I'd keep away – wouldn't
want anything to do with
that. They could be
looking out of the windows
– you only need one of
them on that street

Surveillance – don't like the true cul-de-sac

I wouldn't target houses on a cul-de-sac because you feel trapped and it's difficult if someone challenges you. They might say 'what are you doing?' and you say you are lost and then you have to walk back out the way you came in and they are looking at you.

The principles of CPTED

Physical security









Secured by Design Homes




Physical security – Part 2 of SBD











Physical security – don't like good quality locks

Yes, I can tell by looking at the lock that it would be easy to snap.

Having mole grips is like having the key to the door!

The hinges are on the outside of that door for God's sake, it's a 3 minute job. It's a cheap arse door that one!

This lock can
easily be molegripped. You can
tell because it's
thin. The new ones
are chunkier.

If manufacturers know that we can mole grip a lock, why don't they change that lock to make it harder to break in?

I would snap the cylinder on the side door – it's a really poor design is that door.

Physical security – not deterred by burglar alarms

Good alarms don't stop when you pull them off the wall.

The cheap ones do!

Physical security – attracted to excessive security

The security grille makes me think there's something worth taking.

The principles of CPTED

Through movement









Secured by Design Homes

"Whilst it is accepted that through routes will be included within development layouts, the designer must ensure that the security of the development is not compromised by excessive permeability."

"Footpaths linking culs-de- sac to one another can be particularly problematic, and in such cases the layout may need to be reconsidered."











Through movement - gives them legitimacy

Yes, this is perfect! Easy pickings. I would first walk up and down this footpath. Noone would give me a second glance. Even if I was a tramp walking up and down I wouldn't look out of place – it's a footpath, no-one can question you.

Through movement – allows them to evade police

The appeal of a footpath is that you know how you are getting in and how you escape

Having ginnels on an estate is great, cos you know the area better than the police, you'll easily lose them. You know the routes!

Those ginnels and footpaths are more or less an escape route.

Burglars like footpaths, it makes it easy as the police can't get there easily

Through movement - don't have to retrace their steps

On a cul-de-sac, you have to walk back out the way you came in.

If it's a cul-de-sac it's usually one way in, one way out.
You'd be stupid to do a cul-de-sac.

I wouldn't go further into the cul-de-sac. There is no reason to be on a cul-de-sac unless you live there. You aren't going anywhere so you are a stranger. If it's a through road you can just keep walking through.

The principles of CPTED

Defensible space









Secured by Design Homes


"Where it is desirable to limit access/use to residents and their legitimate visitors, features such as <u>rumble strips</u>, <u>change of road surface (by colour or texture)</u>, <u>pillars</u>, <u>brick piers or narrowing of the carriageway</u> may be used".











Defensible space – don't like feeling that everyone knows each other Huddersfield

If a burglar had anything about them they'd know that all the people that live in those houses know each other and would be chatting to each other.

People living here will have a bee in their bonnet. This is a private road for private people. I would feel awkward here. It's all about the bluff and I couldn't pull it off here.

Everyone that lives there will be focused on the entrance and what goes on. They'll all know each other, keep an eye out for each other.

But.....


Implementation of Defensible Space The concept of Management/Maintenance











Defensible space – 'private road'

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The 'private road'
just means they
have something to
protect, so
something to steal.

'Private Road' tells me they've bought their house – it's not council. The word 'private' makes me think it's an exclusive area and they have more money.
That would attract me.


'Private road'
suggests this
isn't council
housing so won't
be on benefits.

I'd think 'private road' means they've got coin.

It's a 'Private Road', this tells me they've bought houses, no council ones.

'Private Road' means they all bought their houses. You don't get rented properties on a Private Road do you.





Management and maintenance

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No, it doesn't look worth breaking into as there would be nothing to take.

No, it's too scruffy there is nothing worth taking.

No, I wouldn't burgle this house. I would try and offer them help! Phone the council and get them some support!

They are scruffy b@stards they aren't going to have owt.
Look at the state of that garden.

No – I wouldn't be in that area burgling. I'd go in with nothing and come out with nothing.

No, they would have nothing to steal.

They look methed out.

I wouldn't go there.

Those gardens are dirty and horrible, that'd put me off – you want a nice tidy garden, if you mow your lawn, you care for your house and will have nice things.

If the house is well looked after, it tells me they've got money!

The principles of CPTED

CPTED principle	Proportion of offenders who referred to each CPTED concept (n=22)
Surveillance	100%
Physical security	100%
Movement control	82%
Management and maintenance	77%
Defensible space	36%

CPTED principle	Number of specific references to the term	Number of references to the concept
Surveillance	0	133
Physical security	0	103
Management and maintenance	1	40
Movement control	0	39
Defensible space	0	11



"Why my house?" – Exploring the influence of residential housing design on burglar decision making.

Armitage, Rachel and Joyce, Chris (2016) "Why my house?" – Exploring the influence of residential housing design on burglar decision making. In: Rebuilding Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED. Routledge, Oxford, UK. (In Press)







Help

Search Browse

Author Corner













Transferability of CPTED principles Other countries, cultures, climates









Limiting through movement Consider climate



- Footpaths should have clear surveillance, no obstructions and good lighting.
- Due to climate, footpaths (Sikkas) must maximise shade.
- Achieved through high walls/vegetation.
- Restricts surveillance/creates hiding places.

Limiting through movement Consider culture



- Cultural importance placed on owning all boundary walls of property.
- Avoid 'sharing' boundary walls.
- Results in leftover land/spaces.
- These are not footpaths but are used for access/escape.

Ownership/territoriality Consider culture



- Emirati tradition of 'gifting' plots at birth.
- Plot given at birth BUT may not be developed on for decades.
- Buildings surrounded by open space/building sites.
- Can create a lack of ownership and lack of clarity as to who should (and should not be) in the area.



Exercise









		ι

[I]		
Please insert an image that clearly demonstrates this principle.		University of UDDERSFIELD
		J: ciple. ntation of you must
Please describe how this principle is demonstrated in the		<i>y</i> = 0
image.		d (or not)
		the area
Please comment on		
the transferability of		2012
this principle (consider climate,		IN ER Iversity of the Year THE QUEEN'S AWARD FOR ENTERPRISE
culture etc.)		

Inspi



Thank-you

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@DrRArmitage







