University of Huddersfield Repository

Evans, Matthew

A critical stylistic analysis of the textual meanings of 'feminism', 'feminist(s)' and 'feminist' in UK national newspapers, 2000-2009

Original Citation


This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/30184/

The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:

- The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
- A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
- The content is not changed in any way.

For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.

http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
A CRITICAL STYLISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE TEXTUAL MEANINGS OF ‘FEMINISM’, ‘FEMINIST(S)’ AND ‘FEMINIST’ IN UK NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS, 2000-2009

MATTHEW EVANS

A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Huddersfield

July 2016
Copyright statement

i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns any copyright in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Huddersfield the right to use such copyright for any administrative, promotional, educational and/or teaching purposes.

ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, may be made only in accordance with the regulations of the University Library. Details of these regulations may be obtained from the Librarian. This page must form part of any such copies made.

iii. The ownership of any patents, designs, trademarks and any and all other intellectual property rights except for the Copyright (the “Intellectual Property Rights”) and any reproductions of copyright works, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property Rights and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property Rights and/or Reproductions.
Abstract

This thesis is a critical stylistic analysis of the meanings of the lexemes ‘feminism’, ‘feminist(s)’ and ‘feminist’ in UK national newspapers, 2000-2009. It uses the textual-conceptual functions set out in Jeffries (2010a) to investigate the linguistic contexts in which these lexemes occur within the data in order to assess to what extent the movement, the people who represent it, and things that are described as feminist are imbued with different textually constructed meanings.

The analysis tests previous studies’ findings concerning portrayals of feminism and feminists in the media. Expanding on and responding to this research, this study reports on five main findings:

- ‘Feminism’, ‘feminist(s)’ and ‘feminist’ have positive, as well as negative, meanings.
- ‘Feminism’ and ‘feminists’ are a western phenomenon, with different types in the past and present.
- ‘Feminism’ has a complex meaning, with no single, universal definition and a variety of types.
- ‘Feminism’ is presented as having undergone changes in meaning, as antonymous to other ideas and containing opposed meanings.
- Portrayals of ‘feminism’ are complex, with articles recognising and contesting different meanings of the lexemes.

These findings both confirm and question previous studies, which have argued that feminism and feminists are portrayed negatively in newspaper texts. It provides linguistic evidence to support claims made by other non-linguistic studies of the same genre and time period: that portrayals of feminism are “fragmented” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 49) and that they present feminism as consisting of approved and disapproved types (Dean, 2010).

I also discuss the lexemes ‘feminism’, ‘feminist(s)’ and ‘feminist’ in with regard to contested meaning, using critical stylistic tools to analyse how newspaper articles textually construct different meanings of the lexemes, and explicitly discuss and compare different definitions. The thesis argues that the analysis of textual meaning can be used to explore how the meanings of a lexeme or set of lexemes that “involve ideas and values” (Williams, 1983, p. 17) are constructed in a variety of ways through the linguistic context in which they occur. I also reflect on the usefulness of the textual-conceptual functions in the manual analysis of a large dataset, identifying ways in which an analysis that seeks to provide as full as possible an account of the textual construction of meaning can produce findings not possible through other means of analysis.
# Table of contents

Copyright statement 2  
Abstract 3  
Table of contents 4  
List of figures 10  
List of tables 11  
Dedications and acknowledgements 15  
Chapter 1: Introduction 16  
  1.1 Aims and research questions 17  
  1.2 The ‘feminist/s/ism’ data 18  
  1.3 Critical linguistic approaches 20  
    1.3.1 Critical discourse analysis 21  
    1.3.2 Critical stylistics and textual meaning 22  
      1.3.2.1 Critical stylistics and contested meaning 24  
      1.3.2.2 Critical stylistic and dataset analysis 26  
  1.4 Summary and outline of the thesis 29  
Chapter 2: Literature review 31  
  2.1 Feminism and ‘feminism’ 31  
    2.1.1 Origins and history of feminism 31  
    2.1.2 Origins and definitions of ‘feminism’ 33  
  2.2 Feminism in the media 34  
    2.2.1 Significance of media portrayals of feminism 35  
    2.2.2 Studies of media portrayals of feminism 36  
    2.2.3 Studies of UK national newspapers in the 2000s 39  
      2.2.3.1 'Domestication' in *The Guardian* and *The Times* 39  
      2.2.3.2 A corpus study of ‘feminism’ in UK newspapers 40  
      2.2.3.3 A content- and critical discourse analysis of UK newspapers 42
2.3 Frames in media portrayals of feminism 43

2.4 Summary 45

Chapter 3: The textual conceptual functions and a sample analysis 46

3.1 The textual conceptual functions 46

3.1.1 Naming and describing 46

3.1.2 Representing actions/events/states 48

3.1.3 Negating 51

3.1.4 Contrasting 53

3.1.5 Exemplifying and enumerating 56

3.1.6 Prioritising 57

3.1.7 Implying and assuming 58

3.1.8 Hypothesising 61

3.1.9 Presenting others’ speech, thought and writing 61

3.1.10 Representing time, space and society 63

3.2 A sample analysis – ‘Is Feminism Dead?’ 64

3.2.1 ‘Feminist/s/ism’ as metalanguage 65

3.2.2 Unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’ 67

3.2.2.1 Unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the representation of states 67

3.2.2.2 Unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the representation of actions 69

3.2.3 ‘Feminist/s/ism’ with minimal modification 70

3.2.4 ‘Feminist/s/ism’ with detailed modification 71

3.2.5 Concluding remarks 74

3.3 Summary 75

Chapter 4: Collection and annotation of the data 76

4.1 Collection of the data 76

4.1.1 Selection of the data source 76

4.1.2 Selection of the data 77

4.2 Creation of the datasets 80
4.2.1 Annotation of word class 80
4.2.2 Statistical overview of word class 81
4.3 Annotation of textual-conceptual functions 84
  4.3.1 Annotation of naming 84
    4.3.1.1 Nouns 84
    4.3.1.2 Adjectives 89
    4.3.1.3 Determiners 90
  4.3.2 Annotation of representing actions/events/states 91
    4.3.2.1 Selection of the data 91
    4.3.2.2 Annotation of transitivity processes 92
  4.3.3 Annotation of negating 95
  4.3.4 Annotation of contrasting 96
  4.3.5 Annotation of exemplifying and enumerating 98
  4.3.6 Annotation of prioritising 99
  4.3.7 Annotation of implying and assuming 100
  4.3.8 Annotation of hypothesising 102
  4.3.9 Annotation of presenting others’ speech, thought and writing 103
  4.3.10 Annotation of representing time, space and society 104

4.4 Summary 105

Chapter 5: The feminism dataset 106
  5.1 Statistical overview of the feminism dataset 107
  5.2 Unmodified ‘feminism’ 108
    5.2.1 ‘Feminism means/does not mean X’ 109
    5.2.2 ‘Feminism is X’ 113
      5.2.2.1 ‘Feminism is [noun phrase]’ 114
      5.2.2.2 ‘Feminism is [adjective phrase]’ 115
      5.2.2.3 ‘Feminism is [prepositional phrase]’ 117
      5.2.2.4 ‘Feminism is [wh-complement clause]’ 119
5.2.3 ‘Feminism is not X’ 121
5.2.4 ‘Feminism becomes X’ 124
5.3 ‘Feminism’ with minimal modification 126
5.4 ‘Feminism’ with detailed modification 129
5.4.1 ‘Feminism’ with appositive noun phrases 129
5.4.2 ‘Feminism’ with premodifying adjectives 133
  5.4.2.1 ‘First/second/third wave feminism’ 136
  5.4.2.2 ‘Old/new feminism’ 139
  5.4.2.3 ‘Radical/socialist feminism’ 145
5.5 Summary 148

Chapter 6: The feminist and feminists datasets 150
6.1 Statistical overview of the feminist and feminists datasets 150
  6.1.1 Statistical overview of the feminist dataset 150
  6.1.2 Statistical overview of the feminists dataset 153
6.2 The feminist dataset 154
  6.2.1 Unmodified ‘feminist’ 155
  6.2.2 ‘Feminist’ with minimal modification – ‘the feminist’ 159
  6.2.3 ‘Feminist’ with minimal modification - ‘a feminist’ 161
    6.2.3.1 ‘I am/become a feminist’ 162
    6.2.3.2 ‘X is/becomes a feminist’ 164
    6.2.3.3 ‘To be/being/become a feminist’ 165
    6.2.3.4 ‘You are/become a feminist’ 168
    6.2.3.5 ‘A feminist is/has X’ 170
  6.2.4 ‘Feminist’ with detailed modification 172
    6.2.4.1 ‘Feminist’ with appositive noun phrases 172
    6.2.4.2 ‘Feminist’ with premodifying adjectives 175
6.3 The feminists dataset 178
  6.3.1 Unmodified ‘feminists’ 178
Chapter 8: Conclusions  239

8.1 Research questions  239

8.1.1 The textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in UK national newspapers  240

8.1.1.1 Positive/negative portrayals  240

8.1.1.2 Geographical and temporal placement  241

8.1.1.3 Universality/complexity  242

8.1.1.4 Changes and oppositions  243

8.1.1.5 Complexity of portrayals  244

8.1.2 The contested meaning of ‘feminism’ in UK national newspapers  245

8.1.3 Critical stylistics as a suitable methodology for dataset analysis  247

8.2 Limitations and suggestions for future research  249

8.3 Concluding remarks  252

Bibliography  253

Appendices  264

Appendix 1: Mail 03a ‘Is feminism dead?’  264

Appendix 2: Head nouns premodified by adjectival ‘feminist’  271

Word count: 81,864
List of figures

Figure 1.1: Print newspaper sales 2000-2009 through Audit Bureau of calculations 19

Figure 4.1: Total occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ per newspaper 79

Figure 4.2: Total occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ per year 80

Figure 4.3: Total number of nouns, adjectives and determiners in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data 82

Figure 5.1: Statistical overview of naming in the feminism dataset 107

Figure 5.2: Statistical overview of transitivity processes in the feminism dataset 108

Figure 5.3: Semantic groupings of adjectives that premodify ‘feminism’ 134

Figure 6.1: Statistical overview of naming in the feminist dataset 151

Figure 6.2: Statistical overview of transitivity processes in the feminist dataset 152

Figure 6.3: Statistical overview of naming in the feminists dataset 153

Figure 6.4: Statistical overview of transitivity processes in the feminists dataset 154

Figure 6.5: Occurrences of ‘a feminist’ in relational processes 162

Figure 6.6: Semantic groupings of adjectives that premodify ‘feminist’ 175

Figure 6.7: Semantic groupings of adjectives that premodify ‘feminists’ 183

Figure 6.8: The role of ‘feminist’ in material action processes 193

Figure 6.9: The role of ‘feminists’ in material action processes 194

Figure 6.10: The role of ‘feminist’ in mental processes 195

Figure 6.11: The role of ‘feminists’ in mental processes 195

Figure 7.1: Statistical overview of the grammatical function of adjectival ‘feminist’ 199

Figure 7.2: Statistical overview of transitivity processes in the adjectives dataset 200
List of tables

Table 1.1: Critical stylistic framework of textual-conceptual functions 23
Table 3.1: Linguistic realisations of naming 47
Table 3.2: Material action transitivity process types 49
Table 3.3: Verbalisation transitivity process types 49
Table 3.4: Mental transitivity process types 50
Table 3.5: Relational transitivity process types 50
Table 3.6: Typology of negating 52
Table 3.7: Typology of syntactic frames of opposition 55
Table 3.8: Typology of presupposition triggers 59
Table 3.9: Flouts of the Gricean maxims 60
Table 4.1: Derivational forms in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data 83
Table 4.2: Annotation of ‘feminist/s/ism’-headed noun phrases 85
Table 4.3: Annotation of premodification of ‘feminist/s/ism’ 86
Table 4.4: Semantic groupings of adjectives 87
Table 4.5: Annotation of postmodification of ‘feminist/s/ism’ 88
Table 4.6: Annotation of appositive noun phrases and coordinates 88
Table 4.7: Annotation of phrases containing adjectival ‘feminist’ 89
Table 4.8: Annotation of head nouns and subjects modified by adjectival ‘feminist’ 89
Table 4.9: Annotation of adjectival coordinates of ‘feminist’ 90
Table 4.10: Annotation of determiner occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ 90
Table 4.11: Annotation of clause, verb, process and role 93
Table 4.12: Annotation of ambiguous transitivity processes 94
Table 4.13: Annotation of types and forms of negating 96
Table 4.14: Annotation of contrasting 97
Table 4.15: Annotation of exemplifying and enumerating 99
Table 4.16: Annotation of prioritising 100
Table 4.17: Annotation of assuming

Table 4.18: Annotation of implying

Table 4.19: Annotation of hypothesising

Table 4.20: Annotation of presenting speech, thought and writing

Table 4.21: Annotation of representing time/space/society

Table 5.1: Occurrences ‘what feminism means’ clauses

Table 5.2: Remaining occurrences of ‘feminism means X’

Table 5.3 Occurrences of ‘feminism is a word/name’

Table 5.4: Occurrences of ‘feminism is alive/dead’

Table 5.5: Occurrences of ‘feminism is about X’

Table 5.6: Occurrences of ‘what feminism is’

Table 5.7: Occurrences of ‘feminism is not dead’

Table 5.8: Occurrences of ‘feminism is not X, feminism is Y’

Table 5.9: Occurrences of unmodified ‘feminism’ in transitional oppositions

Table 5.10: Occurrences of individual ‘feminism’ in relational processes

Table 5.11: Occurrences of individual ‘feminism’ as an actor in material action processes

Table 5.12: Metalinguistic occurrences of ‘feminism’ in appositive noun phrases

Table 5.13: Remaining occurrences of ‘feminism’ in appositive noun phrases

Table 5.14: Most frequently occurring adjectives that premodify ‘feminism’

Table 5.15: Occurrences of ‘second wave feminism’

Table 5.16: Occurrences of ‘third wave feminism’

Table 5.17: Occurrences of ‘old(-style) feminism’

Table 5.18: Occurrences of ‘new feminism’

Table 5.19: Occurrences of ‘radical feminism’ in The Guardian

Table 6.1: Metalinguistic occurrences of ‘feminist’

Table 6.2: Occurrences of ‘the feminist’

Table 6.3: Occurrences of ‘I am not a feminist’

Table 6.4: Modalised and interrogative occurrences of ‘X is/becomes a feminist’
Table 6.5: Occurrences of ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ in relational processes 166
Table 6.6: Occurrences of ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ as circumstances 167
Table 6.7: Interrogative occurrences of ‘you are/become a feminist’ 168
Table 6.8: Modalised occurrences of ‘you are/become a feminist’ 169
Table 6.9: Occurrences of ‘a feminist is/has’ 171
Table 6.10: Occurrences of ‘feminist’ with appositive noun phrases in Guardian 02c 173
Table 6.11: Remaining occurrences of ‘feminist’ with appositive noun phrases 174
Table 6.12: Occurrences of ‘radical feminist’ 177
Table 6.13: Occurrences of unmodified ‘feminists’ as carriers in relational intensive processes 179
Table 6.14: Occurrences of ‘the feminists’ 181
Table 6.15: Occurrences of ‘radical feminists’ 184
Table 6.16: Occurrences of ‘militant feminists’ 186
Table 6.17: Relational classifiers relating to time that premodify ‘feminists’ 187
Table 6.18: Occurrences of ‘feminists’ with classifiers of time in contrasts 188
Table 6.19: Occurrences of ‘feminists’ with classifiers of time and other groups of women 189
Table 6.20: Descriptors of time that premodify ‘feminists’ 190
Table 6.21: Occurrences of ‘new/young/modern feminists’ in relational processes 191
Table 6.22: Miscellaneous descriptors that premodify ‘feminists’ 192
Table 7.1: Head nouns premodified by adjectival ‘feminist’ 202
Table 7.2: Occurrences of ‘feminist movement(s)’ in material action processes 204
Table 7.3: Occurrences of ‘feminist icon(s)’ in relational processes 206
Table 7.4: Occurrences of ‘feminist writer(s)’ in verbalisation processes 209
Table 7.5: Occurrences of ‘an individual is feminist’ 212
Table 7.6: Occurrences of ‘a group is feminist’ 214
Table 7.7: Head nouns premodified or complemented by ‘post-feminist’ 217
Table 7.8: Occurrences of adjectival ‘post-feminist’ in scare quotes 218
Table 7.9: Occurrences of adjectival ‘post-feminist’ in constructed oppositions 220
Table 7.10: Occurrences of adjectival ‘pre-feminist’ 222
Table 7.11: Head nouns premodified or complemented by ‘un-/non-feminist’ 224
Table 7.12: Head nouns premodified or complemented by ‘pseudo-feminist’ 225
Table 7.13: Head nouns premodified or complemented by ‘anti-feminist’ 227
Table 7.14: Semantic groupings of adjectives that occur in lists with ‘feminist’ 230
Table 7.15: Adjectives that occur in lists with ‘feminist’ 231
Table 7.16: Adjectives that occur in lists with ‘feminist’ – ‘new’, ‘young’ and ‘modern’ 233
Table 7.17: Adjectives that occur in lists with ‘feminist’ – ‘early’, ‘old’ and ‘original’ 236
Dedications and acknowledgements

Thank you to Lesley and Brian, and to everyone else at Huddersfield who has encouraged me since I started here as an undergraduate.

Thank you to all my friends and family, especially to mum for telling me it was OK if I dropped out of my A-levels, and to dad for telling me to stop moaning and get on with it.

And cheers, son.
Chapter 1: Introduction

As an undergraduate I had many arguments about gender politics. The words ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ would often appear in these arguments. Often, it seemed that it was differing ideas of what these words mean, rather than differences in political views, that caused disagreements. For example, one person might say ‘that’s not feminist’ to convey the idea that ‘that is against the idea of equal rights for women’, but the other might understand this to mean ‘that does not fit with an ideal of a matriarchal society’.

This sort of clash of definitions reflects wider discussion of what ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ mean in the twenty-first century. Popular feminist books such as Natasha Walter’s Living Dolls: The Return of Sexism (2010) and Caitlin Moran’s How to Be a Woman (2011) argue for the continuing importance of feminism, while blogs and campaigns such as The Everyday Sexism Project and No More Page 3 highlight issues that affect women in contemporary society. Against this backdrop, newspapers and other media contest the meanings of ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’, and whether their meanings have changed over time. For example, a 2012 Netmums survey of women’s attitudes to feminism, which itself debated the meaning of ‘feminist’, resulted in discussion of the survey’s results and the meaning of ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ across UK national newspapers and other media. This contestation of the meaning of ‘feminism’ comes several decades after the feminist demonstrations of the 1960s and 1970s, such as the famous ‘bra-burning’ protest at the 1968 Miss America pageant: in spite of its familiarity, ‘feminism’ is a word that continues to defy simple definition.

Existing studies of feminism in the media focus on whether the movement is portrayed in a positive or a negative light (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012), and the possible effects of these portrayals on readers (e.g. Callaghan et al., 1999, Lenart, 1996; Lind & Salo, 2002). Research finds that the movement and its advocates are portrayed negatively, and suggests that this results in people having negative attitudes towards them. However, little attention has been given to the words that denote the movement and the people involved. This study is concerned with how the meanings of ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ are constructed textually and how these meanings are contested in a particular section of the media, i.e. UK national newspapers in the 2000s.

Section 1.1 discusses the aims of the thesis and the research questions that it answers. The remainder of the introductory chapter introduces the data that the investigation is based on and the approach that I use to analyse it. Section 1.2 discusses the data that I use and the reasons for the investigation’s focus on UK national newspapers from 2000 to 2009. Section 1.3 then provides an overview of critical linguistic approaches that look at language and ideology and large sets of data, and discusses their limitations. This provides a foundation for section 1.3, which introduces critical stylistics and the ideas of textual and contested meaning on which the thesis is based, as well as contextualising my critical stylistic analysis of a dataset within the field of research that takes a similar approach to the analysis of bodies of data. Section 1.5 summarises the chapter and provides an outline of the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Aims and research questions

The study is an investigation into textual meanings of the nouns ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist(s)’ and the adjective ‘feminist’ (hereafter referred to collectively as ‘feminist/s/ism’) in UK national newspapers between 2000 and 2009. The investigation involves the annotation and analysis of a dataset of 2,539 occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ for defined linguistic features, and addresses the following research questions:

1. What are the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the context of UK national newspapers, 2000-2009?
2. How is the meaning of ‘feminism’ contested in UK national newspapers, 2000-2009?
3. How is critical stylistics a suitable methodology for the analysis of a large dataset?

The research questions address the content of the data I investigate and the methodology that I use to annotate and analyse it. Question 1 addresses the fact that while previous studies have looked at how feminism and feminists are portrayed in the media (see section 2.2), there has been little research into the meanings of the words that denote the movement and its advocates. Specifically, this question is interested in the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the data - those meanings that can be accessed through a critical stylistic analysis of occurrences. This method of linguistic analysis and the concept of textual meaning are discussed in detail in section 1.4, which contextualises it against other critical linguistic approaches to analysis discussed in section 1.3. The investigation required to answer question 1 allows me to draw conclusions related to question 2, which acknowledges existing ideas about the meaning of ‘feminism’ – that it is hard to define and that it has multiple, contested meanings (see discussion in section 2.1.2) – and assesses how they are reflected in the data. Question 3 is concerned with the methodological approach used to investigate the textual meaning of ‘feminist/s/ism’, and how the manual critical stylistic annotation and analysis of a dataset is a fruitful and practical method for answering research questions such as 1 and 2.

The analysis of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in this study requires a starting point against which textual meanings can be compared. I use the Oxford English Dictionary’s (2015) definitions of the nouns ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ and the adjective ‘feminist’ for this purpose:

Feminism, n.: Advocacy of equality of the sexes and the establishment of the political, social, and economic rights of the female sex; the movement associated with this.

Feminist, n.: An advocate or supporter of the rights and equality of women.

Feminist, a.: Of, relating to, or advocating the rights and equality of women.
Occurrences of each of these lexemes in the dataset are analysed separately in chapters 5-7. This division reflects the fact that each lexeme has its own meaning and grammatical roles (Biber et al., 2002, p. 15), i.e. uses of the noun that represents the movement are different to those of the noun that represents its advocates, and different again to those of the adjective, which attributes to someone or something the quality of being associated with the movement. The individual analysis of each lexeme also ensures that the study provides a full picture of textual meanings of 'feminist/s/ism' and therefore expands on existing linguistic research that focuses on 'feminism' (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012) and 'feminism' and 'feminist(s)' (Lind & Salo, 2002) in media texts (see discussion of research on feminism in the media in section 2.2).

1.2 The ‘feminist/s/ism’ data

The data for the study consists of UK national newspaper articles from the decade between 2000 and 2009. This expands on previous studies of this genre and time period (see discussion in section 2.2.3) by focusing on newspaper data that covers the entirety of the first decade of the 2000s. This focus addresses Dean’s (2010) concern that “analysis of the role of the print media in post-feminist discourse is a curiously neglected area” (p. 394) and builds on Mendes’ (2011a) “snapshot” (p. 43) of the construction of feminism in newspapers in 2008.

Previous studies suggest that the 2000s are an interesting period for investigation due to “a recent proliferation of discourse specifically about feminism in the British quality press” (Dean, 2010, pp. 394-395), in particular in The Guardian and inspired by Ariel Levy’s book on women’s sexuality, Female Chauvinist Pigs (2005). Mendes (2011a) also finds explicit discussion of the definitions and applications of ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ in her 2008 data. Media debate in the 2000s arose partly as a result of burgeoning interest in feminist activism, with Redfern and Aune (2010) noting that the decade saw “a staggering number of feminist organisations and campaigning groups […] formed in the UK” (p. 10). Redfern and Aune’s (2010) study is itself one of a number of popular feminist publications (including Banyard, 2010; Baumgardner & Richards, 2000; Levy, 2005; Walter, 2010) to look at “the new feminist movement” (p. 17) and its significance in the new century. This interest in the movement and its (changing) meaning raises a question about whether ‘feminism’ in the 2000s has various meanings, or whether newspapers discuss ‘feminism’ as though it denotes a single “monolithic” (Douglas, 1994, p. 274) movement.

One concern with the choice of newspapers is whether this genre remains an important source of information, especially in the light of declining circulation figures (see figure 1.1). However, Conboy (2010) notes that the advent of the internet has forced newspapers to embrace new technologies. The online success of newspaper titles such as The Guardian – and their new international reach - means that “the number of newspapers sold is not the same as the number of people who read a newspaper” (Baker et al., 2013, p. 257). For example, while figure 1.1 shows that The Guardian’s print sales decreased from an average of 401,560 per day in January 2000 to
358,844 in January 2009, National Readership Survey figures show that its daily readership for print and online editions combined was 1.1 million at the end of this period¹.

A related concern is how newspapers are edited and how their content is filtered, with limits on what is included and the extent to which a subject such as feminism is covered. However, these limitations are a strength as well as a weakness. Electronic repositories such as Nexis UK provide access to the contents of the range of national newspapers available in the UK: the genre is clearly defined and recognisable, and the researcher simply needs to ensure that the data is representative of the genre as a whole. The recognisability of national newspapers also has other benefits. For instance, Mendes (2011a) justifies her use of newspaper data by noting that their regularity and reach “give them potential for quickly disseminating timely information about the women’s movement to millions each day” (p. 23). Not only does daily publication mean that newspapers reflect and respond to events quickly, but also that they feature texts of varying styles, including “news, features, editorials, comment, letters to the editor, advertisements and cartoons” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 23). Wardle (2004) expands on this by noting that newspapers “reflect the available discourses” (p. 7), including the positions of both the authorities and those most involved with stories. This characteristic also addresses the concern that they may not reflect the growing discussion of feminism online and

² Figures derived from reports at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/abcs [Accessed 27th September 2015]
through other mediums: although they may not directly cover the same issues as, for example, feminist blogs, newspapers nonetheless reflect such genres.

A further reason for investigating newspapers is that they cover the spectrum of mainstream British politics (Evans & Schuller, 2015, p. 130). Previous studies have used this representativeness to compare portrayals of feminism in newspapers that approach the issue from different ideological standpoints, for example Dean’s (2010) comparison of the “left-leaning and broadly pro-feminist” (p. 391) The Guardian with The Times, which he deems “more conservative and ambivalent” (p. 391). In the present study, I focus on the range of textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ across publications, and seek evidence of how these meanings are contested: rather than drawing comparisons between publications or article types, I wish to uncover the range of meanings constructed within this genre and time period. For this reason, I investigate UK national newspapers’ coverage of feminism as a whole, rather than making assumptions about the values and attitudes of particular newspapers or attempting to draw comparisons between the coverage provided by different publications. This approach also responds to the observations of previous studies that have compared different newspapers’ articles on feminism. For example, Dean (2010) recognises that the range of writers who contribute to a single publication, such as The Guardian, makes it “nonsensical to conceptualise a single ‘Guardian position’ on feminism” (p. 396), meaning that textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are also likely to vary within, as well as across, newspapers. Mendes (2011a, p. 9) goes further, arguing that attitudes towards, and meanings attributed to, feminism can vary within a single article. The sample analysis of a Daily Mail article in section 3.2 provides evidence for Mendes’ (2011a) observation, demonstrating how an article from the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data is purposefully structured to reflect different views of feminism.

Chapter 4 provides further discussion of the newspapers that are included in the data and how I conducted the annotation of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data. The remainder of chapter 1 discusses critical linguistic approaches (section 1.3) and the thesis’s critical stylistic approach to the analysis of textual and contested meaning in a dataset (section 1.4).

1.3 Critical linguistic approaches

The present section contextualises the present study within previous critical linguistic research that looks at ideology in language and at large collections of data. Section 1.3.1 summarises the critical discourse analysis approach to language study, discussing its motivations and the data it looks at. Section 1.3.2 then introduces the critical stylistic approach to textual meaning, comparing it to critical discourse analysis and defining the tools of analysis used in the investigation of textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’. I then define contested meaning, observing how it has been studied in previous critical stylistic work (section 1.3.2.1) and describe the manual critical stylistic approach to the analysis of a dataset used in the thesis, noting how it helps address the limitations of other critical linguistic approaches to the analysis of language data (section 1.3.2.2).
1.3.1 Critical discourse analysis

Research in the field of critical linguistics attempts to show up “the connections between language, power and ideology” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 5). Much of this work is carried out under the title of critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA has its origins in the form of critical linguistics developed in the 1970s by scholars including Fowler (1996, p. 3), who wished to introduce a type of linguistic analysis that could uncover the ideologies that are implicit in discourse. The precise approaches taken in CDA vary. For example, Fowler (1991) notes that the linguistic methodology he employs is “essentially eclectic” (p. 69). However, what unites work in the field of critical discourse analysis is a commitment to “showing how social inequalities are reflected and created in language” (Pennycook, 2002, p. 41).

Much work in CDA shares the belief that ideology is an inherent feature of language, even in texts which appear or aim to be ‘neutral’ (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 8). Definitions of ‘ideology’ within CDA vary, but there is a general consensus that the word refers to any beliefs that are shared by groups of people and constitute a particular view of the world (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 12). Written and spoken texts both reflect and shape our worldview (KhosraviNik, 2009, pp. 478-479), meaning that language has a role in how reality and society are constructed (Lukin, 2013, p. 424). Text producers may wilfully construct texts so as to help propagate a particular ideology, but all texts are ideological regardless of intention (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 3): they may or may not be ideologically manipulative, but they are always ideologically loaded (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 3). As a result of this belief, CDA studies analyse not only texts produced by powerful institutions such as governments, but also texts such as “swimming pool regulations […] and university guidelines on student enrolment” (Simpson, 1993, p. 5).

CDA holds that particular features of language – for example, nominalisation, modality and transitivity - are especially involved in the naturalisation of ideologies, whereby ideas about the world become common sense (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 9). Many of these features are covered by the grammar introduced by Halliday’s *Introduction to Functional Grammar* (2004), which provides a means of looking at the different ways in which a text can create meaning (p. 3). By analysing the lexical and grammatical choices that a text producer makes, the analyst is able to provide an account of the ideologies present in a text (Hart, 2013, p. 402). Through the use of analytical tools such as transitivity, modality, nominalisation (discussed in chapter 3 below) – the analyst is able to access those ideologies that may exist below the level of a reader or hearer’s awareness and therefore subliminally shape the recipient’s worldview. This use of an approach that draws from different disciplines and methodologies has led practitioners to deem it a school of inquiry, rather than a precise method (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 5).

CDA’s willingness to utilise an eclectic and undefined range of tools of analysis has attracted criticism. Widdowson (1998), for example, argues that CDA studies simply “take from theory whatever concept comes usefully to hand” (p. 137): there is no agreed set of tools of analysis, and so research in the field varies greatly in methodological approach. Without the rigorous application of a clearly-defined means of analysis, CDA studies can appear incomplete – a study looking at the use of
nominalisations in a text may find that a text contains particular ideologies, but a study of modality in the same text might produce different, and perhaps countering, conclusions about the ideologies in the text. This can be a particular problem in light of how CDA studies tend to set out from a particular political position, aiming to investigate a perceived social problem (Al-Hejin, 2015, p. 20). If a researcher has identified a perceived problem before embarking on their analysis then there is the danger that they will pick those tools that yield findings which back up their suspicions, or that they will focus on those examples of language use that best fit their convictions.

1.3.2 Critical stylistics and textual meaning

Critical stylistics addresses concerns about the lack of rigour in existing critical linguistic approaches. It does this by providing a means of analysis that attempts to account for the range of ways in which texts produce textual meaning: the “provisionally complete list” (Jeffries, 2014 p. 412) of textual-conceptual functions.

Like other critical linguistic approaches, critical stylistics is “a method of finding the ideology in any text” (Jeffries, 2014, p. 410). In particular, it shares with other approaches an interest in how “ideology may be ‘naturalised’ to the extent that it becomes ‘common sense’” (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 9) as a result of the use of language. Unlike previous critical linguistic approaches, however, critical stylistics makes use of a defined set of tools, which represent a synthesis of those previously used in stylistic approaches to the study of meaning in literary texts and those found in critical linguistic approaches such as CDA. Critical stylistics employs these tools to look at “the broader definition of style, which focuses on the choices a text producer makes” (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 3). These choices are investigated by analysing textual-conceptual functions, which account for “the fact that texts can create specific types of meaning in a number of different ways” (2014, p. 409).

Table 1.1 provides an overview of the ten textual-conceptual functions (see section 3.1 for a more detailed account of each):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual-conceptual function</th>
<th>Linguistic realisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naming and describing</td>
<td>Choice of nominal; modification of nominal through pre- and postmodifiers; nominalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representing actions/events/states</td>
<td>Choice of transitivity process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negating</td>
<td>Negation of a clause through negative particle; negation of a word through morphology; semantics and pragmatics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equating and contrasting</td>
<td>Apposition; parallel structures; relational transitivity processes; syntactic frames</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplifying and enumerating</td>
<td>Lists indicating hyponymous or meronymous sense relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritising</td>
<td>Positioning of information in main or subordinate clauses; active and passive constructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implying and assuming</td>
<td>Presupposition and implicature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesising</td>
<td>Modality choices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenting others’ speech and thought</td>
<td>Speech and thought presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representing time, space and society</td>
<td>Deixis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Critical stylistic framework of textual-conceptual functions

The ‘conceptual’ part of textual-conceptual functions refers to the way the tools “try to capture what a text is doing conceptually in presenting the world” (Jeffries, 2014, p. 409), and the ‘textual’ part refers to “how the resources of the linguistic system are […] used to produce this conceptual meaning” (p. 409). For example, Evans and Jeffries (2015) analyse the noun ‘choice’ in terms of naming, finding that political manifestos frequently modify it through adjectives such as ‘parental’ and ‘patient’ (p. 765): here, the textual resources of the linguistic system – the ability to make the reference of a noun more specific by premodifying it with an adjective – are used to produce a conceptual meaning, i.e. the idea of particular individuals (parents, patients) having “ownership” (p. 763) of a type of choice relating to public services. Evans and Jeffries (2015) demonstrate that the way in which ‘choice’ is presented textually - through these and other aspects of naming – *does* something conceptually: it presents the idea of a choice in public services akin to the notion of ‘consumer choice’ recognised in the commercial world (p. 770).
The textual-conceptual functions, then, allow the researcher to make clear links between what it is that a text is doing and how it is doing it (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 409), and to provide evidence for their interpretations. The use of textual-conceptual functions also makes critical stylistics distinct from previous critical linguistic approaches in that they are based on the recognition that a single feature of language can play a role in creating different types of textual meaning: for example, the analysis of transitivity can help to uncover the ways in which texts describe how someone or something interacts with the world (representations of actions/events/states) or reveal how texts present different entities as though they were equivalent with each other (equating). Further, critical stylistics accounts for the fact that a feature of language previously studied in critical linguistics – for example nominalisation – is just one of a number of realisations of a particular aspect of the way that texts produce meaning; in this instance, naming and describing, along with the other realisations - choice of nominal and pre- and postmodifiers.

I use the full range of the textual-conceptual functions outlined above to analyse textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ (Chapters 5-7). This allows me to gain as full as possible a picture of how newspaper articles textually construct the meanings of the lexemes. Through analysis of the textual-conceptual functions, I show that ‘feminist’, ‘feminist(s)’ and ‘feminism’ have both positive and negative meanings, and that ‘feminism’ denotes a western phenomenon that has had different meanings at different times. I also find that the textual meaning of ‘feminist/s/ism’ is complex, with no “single, unified and undifferentiated” (Jeffries, 2011, p. 43) meaning: ‘feminism’ is a lexeme that can change meaning and contain different varieties that are opposed to each other. Analysis using the textual-conceptual functions is also useful for testing previous studies’ arguments about how newspaper articles discuss meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ (see section 2.2), finding that writers approve of some types of feminism at the expense of others, support feminism from a “defensive position” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 9), and contrast their own perceptions with those of others. Section 8.1.1 summarises the analysis’s findings concerning the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the data.

The remainder of section 1.3.2 discusses how the thesis uses critical stylistic analysis to look at contested meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ and how I use a manual approach to the analysis of a dataset in order to provide an overview of the textual and contested meanings of a large number of occurrences of the lexemes. The ten textual-conceptual functions are discussed in greater detail in section 3.1, and their role in the creation of textual meaning is demonstrated in a sample analysis of a text from the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data in section 3.2.

1.3.2.1 Critical stylistics and contested meaning

The discussion above introduces the idea of textual meaning, and how the thesis uses this idea to investigate how texts construct the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’. The present section turns to the idea of contested meaning, which is the focus of the second research question and focuses more precisely on particular lexemes and how their meanings are actively contested in texts. The present study’s approach to contested meaning builds on previous critical stylistic studies into the meanings of the
lexemes ‘choice’ (Evans & Jeffries, 2015) and ‘terror’ (Evans & Schuller, 2015). Each of these studies uses analysis based on the textual-conceptual functions to investigate how a particular genre constructs a lexeme's meanings in such a way as to acknowledge different possible perceptions or interpretations of their meanings. The present study investigates ‘feminist/s/ism’ from a similar angle, and provides evidence that newspaper articles explicitly contest the lexemes’ meanings. The discussion here looks at the roots of the notion of contested meaning, and at previous critical stylistic work that explores its presence in texts.

The idea of contested meaning has its roots in Gallie’s (1956) notion of the ‘contested concept’. Gallie (1956) uses this term to refer to a range of concepts that are “essentially complex, and, chiefly for this reason, essentially contested” (p. 107) (Gallie’s emphasis). In particular, he uses the idea of the contested concept to look at various definitions of art, arguing that “uniformity of judgement and appraisal, although so necessary in many fields of activity, is by no means necessary or even desirable in all” (Gallie, 1956, p. 114). The idea that it may not be desirable, let alone possible, to provide a single, uncontested definition of a concept has been the subject of previous discussion of feminism (see discussion in chapter 2). For example, Tuttle (1987) observes that there are “many individual definitions of feminism, and its fundamental meaning is in dispute” (p. 107), while Kornegger (2002, p. 13) argues that the lack of a universal definition makes the feminist movement, and the ideas that underpin it, difficult to attack.

Gallie’s (1956) work on contested concepts influenced subsequent linguistic work that focused more specifically on the meanings of lexemes themselves. The idea that certain lexemes have contested meanings is crucial to Williams’ (1983) account of ‘cultural keywords’, his term for those words – like ‘democracy’ and ‘radical’ - that “involve ideas and values” (Williams, 1983, p. 17). Durant (2008) observes that the meanings of these words are “actively contested” (p. 136) and, as such, cannot be satisfactorily captured by a dictionary definition, which cannot fully reflect historical developments or political changes. Williams (1983) investigates contestation of meaning by analysing keywords’ “own internal developments and structures” (p. 23), looking, for example, at how the meaning of ‘democracy’ has changed as a result of the practices involved in different times and places (pp. 93-98). However, Williams (1983) admits that his essays do not account for the fact that contested meaning is in part a result of “complex and (though variably) systematic properties of language itself” (p. 22).

Critical stylistic research (Evans & Jeffries, 2015; Evans & Schuller, 2015; Jeffries, 2011; Jeffries & Walker, 2012) has sought to address these limitations through analyses based on the textual-conceptual functions. This type of analysis allows researchers to account for the “complex [...] and systematic properties of language” recognised by Williams (1983, p. 22). For example, Evans and Schuller’s (2015) analysis of naming, hypothesising and assuming enables them to show how newspaper articles are able to use ‘terrorism’ to describe a referent that does not fit standard definitions of the lexeme. Crucial here is the semantic distinction between the sense of a lexeme – the “abstract representation of what the referents of a word have in common” (Murphy, 2010, p. 36) – and its possible referents, i.e. “the set of things that it can refer to [...] in the world” (p. 35). Evans and
Schuller (2015) argue that analysis of “systematic properties of language” (Williams, 1983, p. 22) helps to show how the sense of a lexeme – ‘terror/ism’ - can be extended so that it can be applied to unconventional referents. They find that naming, in particular, plays a crucial role in this process: rather than simply using the lexeme ‘terrorism’ to refer to the attack, writers premodify it with adjectives such as ‘new’ and ‘lone-wolf’ (Schuller & Evans, 2015, pp. 143-144). This allows writers to “update” readers’ understanding of terrorism” (Schuller & Evans, 2015, p. 146): if the attack does not seem as clear a referent of ‘terrorism’ as previous incidents, then this may be because it is a ‘new’ type of referent; if the apparently individual and random nature of the attack does not seem to fit with the sense of ‘terrorism’ as referring to a coordinated attack by an organised group, then that is because this is an example of a specific version of ‘terrorism’ – ‘lone-wolf terrorism’. In this way, writers are able to contest the meaning of ‘terrorism’, opening it up to new interpretations.

Previous critical stylistic studies have used a limited range of the textual-conceptual-functions to examine contested meaning: Evans and Schuller (2015) analyse naming, hypothesising and presupposing, Evans and Jeffries’ (2015) study of ‘choice’ focuses on naming, and Jeffries (2011) investigates ‘radicalisation’ and ‘democracy’ through naming, representing actions/events/states, and exemplifying and enumerating. This thesis is the first attempt to examine the contested meaning of a lexeme or set of lexemes using the full range of textual-conceptual functions. The comparatively large number of occurrences of the search term that are investigated – 2,539 occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ compared to, for example, 367 occurrences of ‘choice’ in Evans and Jeffries (2015) – also enables me to pay particular attention to metalinguistic occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’: those where writers discuss “the linguistic expression, and not the thing it refers to” (Meyer, 2002, p.3) (see discussion in section 3.2.1). These occurrences are of particular interest for the investigation of contested meaning, and analysis in chapters 5-7 demonstrates how writers contrast differing perceptions of the lexemes’ meanings, discuss the difficulty of providing an undifferentiated definition of ‘feminism’, and present ‘feminist’ as a label that can apply to a referent to a greater or lesser extent. Section 8.1.2 draws conclusions on how the lexemes’ meanings are contested in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data.

The remainder of the present section discusses the manual approach to the analysis of a dataset that the investigation uses, and how the thesis addresses the third research question concerning how critical stylistic analysis is a suitable methodology for the analysis of a large dataset.

1.3.2.2 Critical stylistics and dataset analysis

The present study uses the manual annotation and analysis of a dataset to investigate textual and contested meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’. This approach builds on existing critical stylistic research (Coffey, 2013; Davies, 2008; Evans & Jeffries, 2015; Evans & Schuller, 2015; Jeffries & Walker, 2012; Nahajec, 2009, 2012; Tabbert, 2015). In particular, it represents a development of the methodological approach of Evans and Jeffries (2015) and Evans and Schuller (2015), each of which analyses the presence of between one and three textual-conceptual functions in a dataset of sentences that feature a particular lexeme or set of lexemes. The discussion here provides an overview of critical
Much critical linguistic research is based on corpus-critical approaches that utilise techniques associated with corpus linguistics (CL), “the study of language based on examples of real life language use” (McEnery & Wilson, 1996, p. 1). CL utilises computer software to investigate large bodies of data. By uploading corpora to software programs such as WMatrix (Rayson, 2009) or AntConc (Anthony, 2009), researchers are able to gain statistical overviews of their collected texts, which then allow them to search and compare corpora for various linguistic features. These capabilities allow linguists to base their studies of linguistic patterns on a foundation of empirical evidence (Lee, 2008, p. 90), with the identification of patterns in a large dataset helping to validate findings (Baker & Levon, 2015, p. 2). This aspect of corpus-critical work has helped to deal with some of the limitations of critical linguistic approaches, which have tended to base their findings on a single text, or small selection of texts, that may not be representative of wider language use.

Methods commonly used in corpus linguistic studies include keyness, collocation and concordance lines. These methods allow researchers to navigate large bodies of data, and to identify “entry points” (Mautner, 2007, p. 55) for analysis based on critical linguistic methods. Statistical tests for keyness allow researchers to find linguistic forms that are “statistically unusual relative to some norm” (Culpeper, 2009, p. 34), while overviews of collocations show up “the above chance frequent co-occurrence of two words” (Baker et al., 2008, p. 278). Concordance lines allow researchers to focus in on a particular search term, providing a list of all its occurrences in the contexts in which it appears (Baker, 2006, p. 71). These approaches have been used in previous critical stylistic studies (Coffey, 2013; Jeffries & Walker, 2012; Tabbert, 2015) as the basis for analysis that uses critical stylistic methods. For example, Coffey (2013) uses keyness, collocates and concordances as an “organisational aid” (p. 74), identifying statistically salient patterns in her data of women’s magazines, which she then investigates though the textual-conceptual functions of naming, representing actions/events/states, equating and contrasting, and implying and assuming. This corpus-critical stylistic approach builds on previous corpus-critical linguistic work which uses corpus methods to provide an empirical foundation for qualitative analysis (Lee, 2008, p. 90).

The investigation of ‘feminist/s/ism’ is similar to corpus approaches in that it is based on an overview of linguistic features of the data, which are then used to produce statistical overviews that provide entry points for analysis. It differs from corpus-critical studies in that both the annotation and analysis stages are carried out manually. This approach builds on previous critical stylistic studies of datasets by Evans and Jeffries (2015) and Evans and Schuller (2015). Each of these investigations consists of two stages. The first stage consists of a manual annotation of a set of sentences that contain a particular lexeme, or set of related lexemes, for between one and three textual-conceptual functions: Evans and Jeffries (2015) annotate a dataset of sentences containing the lexeme ‘choice’ for naming, and Evans and Schuller (2015) annotate a dataset of occurrences of ‘terror’, ‘terrorist(s)’ and ‘terrorism’ for naming, hypothesising and assuming. The second stage then provides a more detailed study of the lexeme(s) in terms of these textual-conceptual functions, allowing the
researchers to “explore in-depth how particular lexical items are used in a particular discourse type or context” (Evans & Jeffries, 2015, p. 773). A key strength of these studies is that they are based on a thorough account of a single aspect of how texts construct the meaning of a particular lexeme or set of lexemes, something made possible by the focus on a relatively small set of data compared to that used in corpus studies (Evans & Jeffries, 2015, p. 773).

The present study builds on research by Evans and Jeffries (2015) and Evans and Schuller (2015) by expanding the annotation and analysis stages to account for all ten of the textual-conceptual functions identified by Jeffries (2010a). This means that the investigation is based on as full as possible a picture of how the lexemes are used in a particular genre and time period. The annotation stage provides a full annotation of every occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in its sentential context (see discussion in section 4.3). I then use this annotation to provide statistical overviews of the lexemes ‘feminism’, ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’, and adjectival ‘feminist’ (see sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1), which provide a bridge to the analysis stage. These overviews are based on two of the textual-conceptual functions – naming and representing actions/events/states – selected for their pertinence to a large percentage of occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ (see section 4.3 for further discussion), and provide entry points for the analysis, which draws on the full annotation of all occurrences in order to analyse textual meaning, drawing on the textual-conceptual functions that are most relevant and provide the greatest analytical insight. For example, the statistical overviews of naming and representing actions/events/states for ‘feminism’ (see section 5.1) demonstrate that most occurrences of ‘feminism’ are unmodified, and that the largest percentage appear in representations of states. This provides an entry point into the data, with the analysis looking at representations of states in which unmodified ‘feminism’ occurs. Here, the textual meaning of ‘feminism’ is analysed according to the pertinence of particular textual-conceptual functions to particular patterns, for example the analysis of speech presentation and implying to investigate the textual meanings of ‘feminism’ in the ‘feminism is dead’ structure (see section 5.2.2.2).

Although I do not use corpus methods to help navigate the data, the critical stylistic approach provides a similar foundation for the critical analysis of language. The statistical overviews provide similar entry points to those produced through the use of corpus tools, and the subsequent analysis is based on an annotation that accounts for a variety of features of language that cannot be searched for through corpus tools. For example, the textual-conceptual function of assuming and implying, which arises through pragmatic means rather than being identifiable through the presence of particular words or linguistic structures, requires a manual approach. The annotation also provides similar information to that provided by corpus tools, and in some cases provides a greater level of detail. The annotation of naming, for instance, provides a full overview of words that co-occur with ‘feminist/s/ism’ in noun phrases: this allows me not only to see what words frequently occur in the pre- and postmodification of ‘feminist/s/ism’ (and to focus on those that occur most frequently), but also provides a more detailed picture than that afforded by studies of collocation – it demonstrates how words co-occur (e.g. as premodifiers or postmodifiers), as well as the simple fact that they co-occur. The analysis stage then allows me to consider in greater detail those features of the data identified by
the annotation and statistical overviews as being of interest, utilising the full range of textual-conceptual functions and accounting for how they interact to produce textual meaning. The use of the manual approach during both the annotation and analysis stages also allows me to remain close to the data throughout the investigation: by providing every occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’ with the same level of analysis in the initial annotation stage, I am able to gain a familiarity with the data that is not possible through the use of corpus methods, and treat all occurrences as equal. The annotation of every occurrence in its sentential context also goes beyond corpus studies that base their investigations on concordance lines: whereas these studies start out from a list of the occurrences of a search term within their context, my annotation provides not only the sentential context but also a much greater level of detail concerning linguistic features of that context.

Chapter 4 explains how I annotated the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data for the textual-conceptual functions. It provides particular detail on naming and representing actions/events/states, as the annotation of these textual-conceptual functions provides the foundation for the annotation of the remaining textual-conceptual functions and generates statistical overviews of each of the lexemes (see sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1). Chapters 5-7 report on the analysis I conducted based on these entry points, and allows me to answer the thesis’s research question concerning how critical stylistics is a useful methodology for the analysis of a large dataset.

1.4 Summary and outline of the thesis

This chapter has introduced the thesis. It has discussed the aims of the study and stated the three research questions it answers. It has discussed critical linguistic approaches to the study of language and explained the methodological approach that I use to look at the textual and contested meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in a dataset of UK national newspapers. This methodological approach allows me to make five key findings about the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in UK national newspapers (2000-2009):

- ‘Feminism’, ‘feminist(s)’ and ‘feminist’ have positive, as well as negative, meanings.
- ‘Feminism’ and ‘feminists’ are a western phenomenon, with different types in the past and present.
- ‘Feminism’ has a complex meaning, with no single, universal definition and a variety of types.
- ‘Feminism’ is presented as having undergone changes in meaning, as antonymous to other ideas and containing opposed meanings.
- Portrayals of ‘feminism’ are complex, with articles recognising and contesting different meanings of the lexemes.
The manual critical stylistic approach also enables me to show how the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are contested in the data. In particular, the investigation finds that metalinguistic discussion of the lexemes themselves both contests the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ and acknowledges the fact that they are contested, and that the lexemes are discussed in terms of ‘rules’ that enable their use, with the applicability of the meaning of ‘feminist’ for particular referents debated. In addition to discussing textual and contested meaning in the data, I also focus on the usefulness of a critical stylistic approach for this type of analysis, finding that it allows the researcher to gain a rich overview of the textual construction of a large number of occurrences of a set of lexemes, enables the navigation of this data through statistical overviews, and aids in the analysis of how different features of language combine to create textual meaning.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the history of feminism and discusses different definitions of ‘feminism’. It looks at existing research on feminism in the media, paying particular attention to other studies that have investigated UK national newspapers in the 2000s.

Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of the textual-conceptual functions outlined in section 1.3.1 and a sample analysis of an article, demonstrating how the functions are involved in the construction of textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’.

Chapter 4 details the process by which I sourced and collected the data. I explain how I divided the data according to word class and how I annotated each occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’ according to the textual-conceptual functions.

Chapters 5-7 present the results of the analysis of the data. Chapter 5 focuses on ‘feminism’, chapter 6 looks at the use of the singular and plural forms of the noun ‘feminist’, and chapter 7 looks at the people and things described by adjectival ‘feminist’.

Chapter 8 summarises the findings of chapters 5-7 and discusses them in relation to the research questions outlined in section 1.1. I summarise the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in UK national newspapers between 2000 and 2009, and discuss how ‘feminism’ has contested meanings in this context. I also comment on how the manual critical stylistic approach helps to shed light on these questions. Finally, I discuss limitations of the study and suggest possible avenues for future research that could build on the methodological and analytical work carried out in the investigation of textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’.
Chapter 2: Literature review

Chapter 1 set out the research questions concerning that the study aims to answer and introduced the methodological approach to the investigation of textual meanings of 'feminist/s/ism'. The present chapter reviews the existing research into portrayals of feminism in the media. It places the present study's investigation of the textual meanings of 'feminist/s/ism' within the context of previous work, and identifies areas in which the present study fills gaps in the literature.

Section 2.1 discusses the background of the feminist movement and observes debate about, and perceived changes in, the meaning of 'feminism'. Section 2.2 reviews the existing research on feminism in the media, paying particular attention to three studies of the subject in UK national newspapers in the 2000s: Dean (2010), Jaworksa and Krishnamurthy (2012), and Mendes (2011a, 2012). Section 2.3 summarises the findings of previous studies, providing five frames that act as a benchmark for my own analysis. These frames allow me to demonstrate how my own findings compare to those of previous studies. Section 2.4 concludes the literature review and discusses how I test previous studies' findings in the sample analysis in chapter 3 and the full dataset analysis in chapters 5-7.

2.1 Feminism and ‘feminism’

The discussion below provides a summary of the history of feminism as a movement and the origins and meanings of the lexeme ‘feminism’, building on the outline drawn in section 1.2. Drawing on feminist literature, I discuss the question of whether it is possible to identify a precise definition of ‘feminism’. I also provide an overview of how the denotative meaning of ‘feminism’ has been perceived to change over time and the connotative meanings that have been attributed to it.

2.1.1 Origins and history of feminism

Feminism is most often described as a movement, a belief and/or an outlook concerned with women's rights and relations between the genders. The movement/belief/outlook account is summarised by Kelly (1982), who defines feminism as:

- “A movement […] in opposition to male defamation and mistreatment of women” (p. 67).
- “A belief that the sexes are culturally, and not just biologically, formed” (p. 67).
- “An outlook that transcended the accepted value systems of the time by exposing and opposing […] prejudice and narrowness” (p. 67).
The idea of feminism as a belief and outlook – and therefore something personal and individual – has lead writers such as Rowbotham (1972, p. 16) to argue that it is hard to define, and that the origins of feminism can be traced back as far as the beginnings of women's rejections of male dominance. However, feminism as it is recognised today is generally perceived to have its origins in the ‘first wave’ movement of the 1800s. Scharff (2011) observes the three periods conventionally recognised by the waves metaphor:

- First wave, 1800s – “the fight for women’s political citizenship” (p. 463).
- Second wave, 1960s – “the women's movement that gained renewed momentum” (p. 463).
- Third wave, 1990s - “young women's critical and diverse engagements with second wave feminism” (p. 463).

First wave feminism is most commonly associated with the campaign for suffrage (Mendes, 2012, p. 556). This campaigning led to women being granted voting rights around the world, and laid the groundwork for second wave feminism. The second wave extended the aims of the movement in an attempt to secure greater freedoms for women, including “equal rights, pay and sexual and reproductive freedom” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 140).

Walby (2011, p. 55) argues that the second is the most recognisable of the waves, coinciding as it did with a burgeoning mass media which reported on feminist demonstrations and broadcast the idea of feminism around the western world. Media portrayals during this period – in particular those of the feminists who protested at the 1968 Miss America pageant - resulted in what Hinds and Stacey (2001) call “the mythical, and most persistent, icon of second-wave feminism: the bra-burner”. At the other end of the waves metaphor, third (and subsequent) waves are defined according to the ways in which they respond to the aims and beliefs of the second wave by “rejecting the need and use of a singular, united feminist movement” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 557). Mendes (2011a, p. 145) suggests that it is at this point that the meaning of ‘feminism’ becomes contested, with much debate within feminism concerning what feminism means and who can call themselves ‘feminist’ in the twenty-first century.

Some scholars question the division of feminism into waves. Feminists including Muriel Fox argue that there is no third wave, as the issues associated with the second wave of the 1960s and 1970s have not been solved (from interview, Mendes, 2011a, p. 132). Conversely, writers such as Cochrane (2013) contend that a third wave has come and gone, and that a fourth wave is now identifiable in campaigns such as No More Page Three and blogs such as the Everyday Sexism Project. Moran (2011) provides one way of dealing with these differing points of view, suggesting that it may be preferable to think of feminism as “an incoming tide” (p. 14) rather than a series of individual waves. Other writers observe a split between feminism and ‘post-feminism’. Genz and Brabon (2009) note in their study of post-feminism that this derivational form of causes confusion due to the “complex if not contradictory” (p. 3) connotations of the ‘post’ prefix. For many, including Faludi (1991,
Those connotations are purely negative, evoking ‘anti-feminism’ and a backlash against the goals of feminism. Genz and Brabon (2009, p. 3) recognise that ‘post-feminism’ is often used in this way in the media, for example in stories about the death of feminism. For others, the connotations are less negative: post-feminism is a belief that the aims of feminism have already been achieved, rather than a lack of belief in the aims of feminism (Callaghan et al., 1999, p. 163). Mendes (2011a) recognises that both accounts of post-feminism are found in newspaper coverage of feminism, with some uses of ‘post-feminism’ and ‘post-feminist’ referring to “those who avidly disavow feminism” (p. 8) and others to “those who embrace the feminist identity but want to separate themselves from the Second Wave” (p. 8). ‘Post-feminism’ also has ramifications for how people understand ‘feminism’: it raises the question of where ‘feminism’ ends and ‘post-feminism’ begins, as well as shifting attention away from an understanding of what ‘feminism’ itself means (Baumgardner & Richards, 2001, p. 79).

The present study of textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ takes as a benchmark the Oxford English Dictionary (2015) definition of ‘feminism’ noted in section 1.1. Kelly’s (1982, p. 67) account of the movement, belief and outlook aspects of feminism also provides a helpful means of considering how ‘feminism’ is used in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data. The analysis in chapters 5-7 also reflects on how the first, second, third and possible other waves are discussed, and considers the textual meanings of ‘post-feminist/s/ism’ in the newspaper articles analysed.

2.1.2 Origins and definitions of ‘feminism’

The word ‘feminism’ is relatively new compared to the span of Western political thought that spawned the movement (Beasley, 1999, p. xiii). Feminist writers such as Freedman (2007, p. xi) note that while ‘feminism’ was coined as recently as the nineteenth century, the ‘woman question’ and debate about women’s rights has been an important debate in Western culture since the fifteenth century. The Oxford English Dictionary (2015) observes the word’s roots in the French ‘féminisme’, which was used in the nineteenth century to denote early French suffragists such as Hubertine Auclert (Baumgardner & Richards, 2001, p. 51). ‘Feminism’ and ‘feminist’ first appeared in English in the late 1800s, the OED (2015) noting its first known appearance in Athaeneum in 1895: “her intellectual evolution and her coquettings with the doctrines of ‘feminism’ are traced with real humour”. In America, ‘feminism’ is thought to have first appeared in print in 1906 in an article about the suffragist Madeleine Pelletier (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000, p. 51). However, ‘feminist’ was not immediately used to describe the movement for women’s rights; ‘women’s liberationist’ was favoured in the 1960s, before ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’ became popular as a means of referring to all those committed to the cause of women’s rights (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000, p. 51).

Definitions of ‘feminism’ vary. Moseley and Read (2002) observe that feminism is “never available in some pure or unmediated form” (p. 234). Difficulties in defining ‘feminism’ go back as far as 1913 and writer Rebecca West’s (1913) famous quote that “I myself have never been able to find out precisely what feminism is: I only know that people call me a feminist whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat” (p. 5). The successes of the second wave of the
1960s and 1970s, and the media attention that it received, did not necessarily result in a clearer definition: the *Encyclopaedia of Feminism*, published in 1987, notes that “there are many individual definitions of feminism, and its fundamental meaning is in dispute” (Tuttle, 1987, p. 107). However, many feminist writers argue that the lack of a clear definition is not a weakness. For example, Mendes (2011a, p. 140) suggests that the complexity of ‘feminism’ reflects the fact that feminism is an ideology with a wide span across time and place, with different priorities in different locations and periods. Some feminists make this complexity part of their definitions: Kornegger (2002), for example, defines feminism as “a many-headed monster which cannot be destroyed by singular decapitation” (p. 13), making a virtue out of the non-universal nature of feminism.

While there is disagreement about the denotative meaning of ‘feminism’, connotative meanings are recognised throughout feminist literature. Walters (2005, p. 3) notes that ‘feminism’ has always had negative connotations, and that the word was strictly pejorative until it was claimed by campaigners and came to replace ‘women’s liberation’ in the 1960s and 1970s. This shift, Walters (2005) suggests, reflected a greater concentration on “problems specific to women in their reproductive and social roles” (p. 3). Walby (2011) argues that the negative connotations of ‘feminism’ persist, in particular those relating to “separatism, extremism, men-avoiding lesbianism” (p. 3). ‘Feminist’ is also seen to carry negative connotations: Walters (2005, p. 3) recalls that, during the 1960s and 1970s, ‘feminist’ was often seen as synonymous with pejorative terms for women such as ‘man-hater’, ‘harridan’ and ‘witch’, while Baumgardner and Richards (2000, p. 50) argue that many still consider it to be as unappealing as other offensive terms for women, such as ‘cunt’ and ‘bitch’. Feminist writers argue that these negative connotative meanings discourage people from using ‘feminist’ to describe themselves, blaming them for what is called the ‘I’m not a feminist, but…’ phenomenon, whereby people (particularly young women) preface sentiments that suggest support for women’s rights with a disclaimer (Walby, 2011, p. 3). Levy (2006) suggests that another aspect of the rejection of ‘feminism’ is the willing adoption of other words that are associated with the movement, but that are deemed to carry less of a stigma. She notes that while ‘feminism’ has “fallen further and further out of favour” (Levy, 2006, p. 86), words such as ‘liberation’ and ‘empowerment’ have become increasingly popular. Walby (2011, p. 3) goes as far as to suggest that words such as ‘gender equality’, ‘equal opportunities’ and ‘diversity’ have come about as a means to label feminist ideas without having to use the word, and that the media’s caricaturing and ridiculing of feminists has played a vital role in this shift.

### 2.2 Feminism in the media

The present section turns to previous studies of how feminism is portrayed in the media. Section 2.2.1 looks at the motivations for previous studies, before section 2.2.2 provides an overview of the findings of existing research. Section 2.2.3 focuses on three studies that are of particular pertinence to the present study due to their focus on a similar genre and time period: Dean (2010), Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) and Mendes (2011a, 2012). These three recent studies are notable for the fact
that they provide a generally less pessimistic view of the way feminism and feminists are discussed in 
the media than older studies.

The discussion in the present section provides the foundation for the five frames provided in 
section 2.3, which provide a benchmark for my own analysis of textual meanings of 'feminist/s/ism'.

2.2.1 Significance of media portrayals of feminism

Much research on feminism in the media is motivated by the belief that the way in which it is 
that the media is where “most feminism in the West now happens” (p. 40) and is therefore central in 
shaping readers’ perceptions of it. Many feminist scholars consider this to be a problem, believing that 
feminism is portrayed negatively by those who write in the media, and that journalists are in turn 
responsible for ‘feminism’ having become “a dirty word” (Douglas, 1994, p. 165). Surveys of people’s 
responses to feminism have found some evidence for these claims. For example, Buschman and 
Lenart’s (1996) survey of 544 college students aged between 18-22 years old finds that only 17% 
consider themselves to be feminists. Further, they observe that even those who are supportive of 
feminism have negative perceptions of it based on “stereotyping of the movement in popular 
discourse” (Buschman & Lenart, 1996, p. 72). Callaghan et al.’s (1999, p. 172) study of 4,000 Scottish 
men and women also finds that respondents, regardless of whether or not they are sympathetic to 
feminism, perceive the movement and its advocates in a negative light, labelling them ‘unreasonable’, 
‘ugly’ and ‘aggressive’. This leads the researchers to argue that negative media portrayals of 
feminism in the media are “the major reason for the reluctance of young women to identify with 
feminism” (Callaghan et al., 1999, p. 172).

Studies of people’s identification with feminism such as Buschman and Lenart (1996), 
Callaghan et al. (1999) and Zucker (2004) take as read what the latter calls “the overwhelmingly 
negative portrayal of feminism and feminists by the popular media” (p. 425). Faludi (1991) suggests 
that this treatment of feminism leads to “an endless feedback loop that perpetuates and exaggerates 
its own false image of womanhood” (p. 9), while Redfern and Aune (2010) note that media stories 
tend to focus on young women’s lack of feminism, meaning that “the more we hear the ‘fact’ that 
people aren’t feminists, the more it seems a self-fulfilling prophecy” (p. 3). However, as Jaworska and 
Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 403) note, although many studies hold allegedly negative media portrayals of 
feminism responsible for people’s distaste for feminism, there has been little attempt to answer the 
question of whether portrayals are as negative as is assumed.

Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 review studies that have sought to answer the question of whether 
media portrayals of feminism are indeed negative. I also use this discussion to argue for the 
importance of the present study’s approach of using a critical stylistic analysis to investigate how the 
textual meanings of the lexemes ‘feminism’, ‘feminist’ and ‘feminist(s)’ themselves are constructed in 
media texts.
2.2.2 Studies of media portrayals of feminism

Much existing work on feminism in the media takes the form of general surveys (for example Callaghan et al., 1999; Rhode, 1995) and cultural analysis (e.g. Chaudhuri, 2000; Hinds & Stacey, 2001; Schaffer, 1998). Other studies (including Danner & Walsh, 1999; Lind & Salo, 2002) employ content analysis - a means of analysing texts for “meanings, symbolic qualities, and content” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 486). A small number of studies employ techniques drawn from corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis: Lind and Salo (2002) use “co-word analysis” (p. 216) to look at words that occur frequently alongside search terms including ‘feminism’ and ‘feminists’ in a corpus of US radio and television news reports, and Marling (2010) uses a corpus of data from the Estonian newspaper Postimees to look at the “lexical framing” and “collocational and contextual position” (p. 12) of ‘feminism’.

Mendes (2012) notes that the majority of research finds that feminism “has been misrepresented, distorted or constructed as ‘deviant’” (p. 556). For example, Callaghan et al. (1999) argue that even relatively positive portrayals from the late twentieth century depict feminism as “tangential to the lives of contemporary women and […] mired in bitterness, silliness and anti-male dogma” (p. 163). Accounts of feminism in the early twenty-first century such as Redfern and Aune (2010) contend that negativity is a part of newspaper coverage of feminism regardless of a publication’s political orientation: left-wing journalists complain about young women’s lack of feminism, while those with a right-wing perspective “complain that ‘feminism has gone too far’” (p. 1). This tendency has been noted not just in Anglo-American studies, but also in studies of newspapers in nations including Estonia, where Marling (2010) observes that even positive references to the movement “get drowned out in the general off-hand dismissal of the philosophy and practice of feminism” (p. 15).

Much writing on feminism in the media contends that feminism is portrayed as though it were no longer relevant. McRobbie (2009) refers to this as “an undoing or dismantling of feminism” (p. 8) that portrays feminism as something that is no longer necessary. This focus on feminism’s alleged redundancy is identified in overviews such as Rhode (1995), which observes that since the 1970s the media has portrayed feminism as “dead, dying, or permanently disabled” (p. 691). Scholars including Christie (1998, p. 213) suggest that the recurrence of ‘feminism is dead’ stories reflects the media’s natural tendency to favour stories about events – for example, the supposed end of a movement – over stories about ideas and political debate. Rhode (1995) expands on this, arguing that the media’s appetite for “dramatic events, startling sound bites, and ‘good visuals’” (p. 692) leads them to focus on feminists who are relatively extreme in their political views. The argument here is that the media portrays feminism as either conclusively dead or as having already achieved emancipation, and therefore become irrelevant (Christie, 1998, p. 213); those who still align themselves with the movement are considered “radical, unbalanced, unattractive and inimical to family values” (Callaghan et al., 1999, p. 164). In some cases, Mendes (2011b) suggests, famous feminists themselves are brought in to legitimise ‘feminism is dead’ stories, with articles using them to “reinforce the movement’s downfall” (p. 492).
Previous studies suggest that feminists’ ‘extremity’ is in part communicated through the consistent use of terms such as ‘radical’ and ‘militant’. These words are deemed to be inherently negative when used to describe the movement and its advocates. For example, Danner and Walsh’s (1999) study of newspaper reports on the UN’s 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women observes that attendees referred to as ‘radical feminists’ are portrayed as “unfeminine, irrelevant, undignified and trivial” (p. 72), while Marling (2010) argues that the frequent collocation of ‘feminism’ with ‘radical’ in her corpus is evidence of a “semi-compulsory link between feminism and aggression” (p. 13). The present study aims to avoid the kind of assumptions about positive/negative connotations of adjectives such as ‘radical’ and ‘militant’ made by studies such as Danner and Walsh (1999), which bases its argument that feminists are presented as “unfeminine, irrelevant, undignified and trivial” (p. 72) on the fact that conference attendees tended to be referred to as ‘radical feminists’. They provide little evidence for this ‘general’ characterisation and do not make clear whether it is the result of frequent use of the adjective ‘radical’, other linguistic features of the texts, or the researchers’ own interpretation of the texts’ portrayals of feminists. Similarly, although Marling (2010) backs up her argument concerning a link between feminism and aggression with the evidence that ‘militant feminism’ is “the most frequent collocation in the corpus” (p. 12), she does not provide either statistics or textual analysis to demonstrate that this collocation is necessarily negative. Instead, there is an assumption that ‘militant feminism’ is one of a number of phrases associated with feminism “that carry a strongly negative connotation” (Marling, 2010, p. 12). The analysis of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the present study avoids these interpretative leaps by providing a thorough analysis of the textual meaning of occurrences, rather than simply categorising examples of, for instance, ‘radical feminist’ as inherently negative (for example, see the discussion of ‘radical feminism’ in section 5.4.2.3).

Previous studies also highlight articles’ differentiation of feminists from ‘real’ women (Schaffer, 1998, p. 321). Some researchers (for example Hinds & Stacey, 2002; Scharff, 2011; Taylor, 2003) observe that this is achieved through the portrayal of feminism and femininity as “mutually exclusive” (Scharff, 2011, p. 460), although it has also been suggested that more recent coverage discusses a “potential compatibility between the previously polarised categories of feminism and femininity” (Hinds & Stacey, 2001, p. 153). Other studies such as Rhode (1995) note that reporters construct the feminists/real women distinction in their coverage of protests, in which they provide the most radical quotes from feminists and contrast them with the views of “regular” women on the street” (p. 701). Lind and Salo (2002) provide the strongest evidence of this distinction in their finding that feminists are more likely than women to appear in “agency frames” (p. 221) that reflect “an active individual having strength, capability, a voice, leadership, power” (p. 221). Lind and Salo’s (2002) comparison of ‘women’ and ‘feminists’ provides evidence that feminists are portrayed as doing different things to ‘regular’ women, a portrayal that believe is not entirely negative: those described as ‘feminists’ have “more agency and are less victimised” (p. 225) than ordinary ‘women’. However, similar to Danner and Walsh (1999) and Marling (2010), Lind and Salo’s (2002) means of reaching conclusions as to whether portrayals are positive or negative is based on an impressionistic methodology: their findings - such as the observation that “feminist references appear within an agency frame proportionally more often than do references to women” (p. 221) - are based on the pairing of words such as ‘activist’ and
‘leader’ with ‘feminist(s)’ and ‘feminism’, but there is little explanation of what constitutes ‘agency’ and why this is the case, or of whether the textual context in which the word pairs appear reveals anything more specific about the presentation of feminists or anything that might contradict the patterns that are suggested by the word pairs alone. Nonetheless, Lind and Salo’s (2002) observations are backed up by other studies. For example, North (2009) suggests that the media tends to concentrate on individuals rather than the movement itself, with a particular focus on “a small group of ‘superstar’ media spokeswomen” (p. 743), a phenomenon that Baumgardner and Richards (2000, p. 55) suggest implies that the pronouncements of a small number of figures are taken as representative of all feminists. The present study tests these observations through critical stylistic analysis of who ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ represent in context. As well as looking at the kinds of words with which ‘feminist(s)/ism’ commonly occur, the analysis of, for example, the kinds of events, actions and states that feminists are represented as being involved in tests the argument that ‘feminists’ denotes agency.

Other studies recognise changes in the way in which feminists are portrayed in the media. The distinctions they find between, for example, “the monstrous outsiders of the 1960s and 1970s” (Hinds & Stacey, 2001, p. 155) and more recent types of feminist are pertinent to the present study, as the twenty-first century vantage point of the data provides evidence of different types of feminism and feminist from different periods of time. Schaffer (1998) suggests that the absence of any evidence of bra-burning in the 1990s led to a new portrayal of 1990s feminists as a “vindictive, puritanical and punishing new generation of ‘feminazis’” (p. 322) who were distinct from the ‘bra-burners’ of the second wave. Hinds and Stacey (2001), in their cultural analysis of 400 UK national newspaper articles from 1968 to 2001, also note a move away from radical feminists, although they suggest that the 1990s brought portrayals of “the incorporated Ms” (p. 155) who represents a “reconciliation between feminism and femininity” (p. 169). The present study’s analysis of the way different types of ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ are named and described tests these observations of apparent divisions in the reference of ‘feminist(s)’. In particular, analysis of ways in which the nouns ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ are modified provides a more through account of types of feminist than studies such as Hinds and Stacey (2001), in which the analysis is based on “a rather uneven selection [of newspaper articles] that came to the attention of the research assistant” (p. 156) and which focuses on “three iconic figures, constituted in different ways through a set of discursive moves” (p. 156). While these “discursive moves” (Hinds & Stacey, 2001, p. 156) may relate to some of the features of language analysed in the present study, the investigation here provides a detailed analysis of textual meaning in a representative dataset, rather than basing its findings on sections of texts selected and interpreted according to preconceptions about cultural figures.

The studies discussed here use different approaches to focus on various parts of the media. However, they are helpful to the present study in that they suggest possible areas of interest in the data. The remainder of section 2.2 provides an account of three recent studies that focus on the same genre and time period as the present study, and that are less pessimistic in their conclusions concerning portrayals of feminism and feminists. Section 2.3 then draws on the totality of the studies reviewed in the present chapter in order to produce five frames that reflect common patterns found in
previous studies, and which provide a benchmark for the analysis of textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’.

2.2.3 Studies of UK national newspapers in the 2000s

Dean (2010), Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) and Mendes (2011a, 2012) all investigate feminism in UK national newspapers in the 2000s. Each uses a different methodological approach to look at newspaper data, and each investigates whether the findings of previous studies are reflected in texts from the 2000s. In sections 2.2.3.1 to 2.2.3.3 I look at the approach and findings of each in turn.

2.2.3.1 ‘Domestication’ in The Guardian and The Times

Dean’s (2010) study is motivated by the lack of previous research into “the role of print media in post-feminist discourse” (p. 394), i.e. discussion of feminism in newspapers after the second wave of the 1960s and 1970s. The study is a discourse analysis that tests Dean’s (2010) conviction that media portrayals of feminism are not wholly positive or negative, but instead mixed, and that ‘feminism’ in this context consists of different types. In particular, he focuses on evidence of a process of ‘domestication’, whereby articles support a politically moderate contemporary feminism at the same time as dismissing an excessively political feminism synonymous with the past (Dean, 2010, p. 393).

Dean’s (2010) study is restricted to “the British quality press” (p. 391), specifically The Guardian and The Times. These newspapers are selected for their differing political perspectives, The Guardian aligning with the left-wing and The Times with the right-wing (Dean, 2010, p. 35). This limits the scope of the study, and the fact that the dataset comprises 49 Guardian articles and only 19 Times articles means that it does not provide a balanced comparison of the two newspapers. Further, Dean (2010) selects his data by searching for “feminism” in each newspaper’s online search engine and then choosing articles which “have as their main referent an issue directly relevant to feminism and/or gender relations, and which explicitly refer to feminism at least once” (p. 395) (Dean’s emphasis). It is not specified what constitutes a ‘main referent’, leaving the impression that pertinent data may have been excluded. Although the present study does not make comparisons between newspapers, the data used provides a more balanced reflection of discussion of feminism across the range of UK national newspapers, based on a more objective approach to the selection of articles (see the discussion of data collection in chapter 4).

Dean (2010) provides a “comparative analysis” (p. 395) of The Guardian and The Times, identifying “specific issues or themes” (p. 396) in each. For example, he finds that although Guardian articles often support the aims of feminism, they often begin with “the invocation of a popular repudiation of feminism” (Dean, 2010, p. 396) which the writer proceeds to argue against, while Times articles discuss feminism as though it existed mainly in the 1970s (p. 399). Some of Dean’s (2010) claims – such as his observation that, in The Times, feminism “hovers uncertainly around the fringes
of the articles, usually without being addressed head on” (p. 399) – are difficult to test, and the data is a means of demonstrating the presence of domestication, rather than the basis for a detailed investigation of what ‘feminism’ means in the two newspapers.

Dean’s (2010) focus on domestication provides evidence of “an uneasy oscillation between a bold affirmation of feminism, on the one hand, and a disavowal of some of its (perceived) less palatable dimensions” (p. 397). This oscillation can be seen, for example, in the way that different types of feminism are discussed through what Dean (2010) terms “binary oppositions” (p. 402), which contrast reasonable types of feminism with more radical types. Dean (2010) suggests not only that feminists are contrasted with other women (as observed by the studies discussed in section 2.2.2), but that contrasts are drawn between different feminists. These arguments are pertinent to the present study in that they observe how feminism and feminists are linguistically constructed in the data: through qualifiers that denote different types of feminism, and through contrasts that emphasise differences between them. The present study’s emphasis on the textually constructed meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ allows me to shed more light on these observations, with the emphasis on analysing the meanings of particular occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ rather than on determining which articles affirm feminism and which repudiate it.

2.2.3.2 A corpus study of ‘feminism’ in UK newspapers

Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) study investigates the search term ‘feminism’ in corpora of UK and German national newspapers from 1990-2009. Their study is motivated by a lack of previous linguistic research on feminism in the media (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 402), and uses a corpus linguistic methodology to investigate collocates of ‘feminism’, i.e. those words that occur statistically most often in the company of the search term. By looking at collocation profiles of ‘feminism’, Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) investigate whether newspaper portrayals of feminism are as negative as previous studies claim them to be (p. 403).

Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) study is the most rigorous of the three 2000s studies in terms of how the data is collected. Their UK newspaper corpus consists of articles from each of the national UK newspapers during the period 2000-2009, providing a thorough overview of the genre and period under investigation. However, similar to Dean (2010), Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) only include articles in which feminism is “the primary topic” (p. 406), i.e. articles in which it appears in the headline or opening paragraph. Although their criteria for selecting articles is more clearly defined than Dean’s (2010), it still invites the question of what data may have been excluded – especially considering that the study uses computer-based, rather than manual, analysis to analyse its data. The use of manual analysis in the present study means that the quantity of data is necessarily limited in comparison to that of Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012). However, the data collection process includes those articles in which the search terms occur statistically most frequently, rather than making distinctions based on at which points in articles ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurs. This approach ensures
that articles in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurs frequently, but not necessarily in the headline and/or opening paragraph, are included.

Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) analysis uses computer software to produce a list of collocates before focusing on several frequent lexico-grammatical patterns – ‘of feminism’, ‘feminism is’ and ‘feminism and’ (p. 415) – and the adjectives that occur most frequently alongside ‘feminism’. This analysis leads the researchers to observe the presence of five frames used in portrayals of feminism:

- “Feminism is strongly historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417).
- “Feminism is often negatively framed as a movement that did not achieve much” (p. 417).
- “There is a tendency to see feminism as a commodity” (p. 417).
- Feminism has “a number of collocates associated with sexuality, particularly with homosexuality” (p. 417).
- “Feminism is firmly located in Western countries” (p. 417).

These frames are impressionistic, as they are largely based on the frequent occurrences of certain collocates. For example, the claim for the second of the five frames is based on “the frequent occurrence of words such as dead, failure and post.” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417): while the evidence of these collocates alone might suggest that feminism “is finished” (p. 417), a more detailed qualitative analysis of the collocates in context would allow the researchers to make more confident claims concerning the veracity of these frames. The annotation and analysis stages of the present study (chapters 4 and 5-7) provide a more detailed account of the textual context of each occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’, and demonstrate that findings based on statistics alone can be misleading. For example, the analysis of ‘feminism’ (chapter 5) shows that although ‘dead’ does indeed occur frequently in the context of ‘feminism’, this is often negated in propositions such as ‘feminism is not dead’ (see section 5.2.3).

Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) frames provide evidence of recurrent themes in the way ‘feminism’ is used in newspapers. Their observations of the ways in which ‘feminism’ is modified by adjectives – for example, to present differences between ‘new feminism’ and ‘old feminism’ (p. 421) – and used in lexico-grammatical patterns such as ‘feminist is’ propositions provides statistical evidence for some of the claims made in previous studies (see section 2.2.2). Of particular note are Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) observations about references to ‘new feminism’: they note that while the adjectives ‘changing’ and ‘new’ frequently premodify ‘feminism’, such instances are often surrounded by scare quotes, indicating that the idea of a new feminism is “treated ironically, or its existence [...] questioned” (p. 416). This leads the researchers to conclude that regardless of what time period newspapers discuss, “the discourse prosody of the search term feminism tends to be rather negative” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417). The present study expands on Jaworska
and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) observations concerning media portrayals of feminism by using a wider range of means of qualitative analysis to look at the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’.

### 2.2.3.3 A content- and critical discourse analysis of UK newspapers

Mendes’ study of feminism in UK national newspapers consists of a book-length analysis (2011a) of UK and American newspapers between 1968 to 1982 and in 2008, and an article (2012) discussing differences in portrayals of feminism in each period. Her work on newspaper articles in the 2000s is motivated by a lack research into post-feminism and the third wave (Mendes, 2012, p. 556), and aims to “interrogate what is quietly assumed to be true” (2011a, p. 3), i.e. that representations of feminism in the media are generally negative.

Mendes (2012) selects newspapers that cover a “range in ideology” (p. 558), from the relatively right-wing *Daily Mail* and *Times* to the relatively left-wing *Guardian* and *Daily Mirror*. Like Dean (2010), Mendes (2011a, 2012) makes assumptions about different newspapers’ ideologies and analyses only a small selection of the newspapers available, placing limits on the reliability of her findings. The methodological approach draws on content analysis, which is used to “explore broad patterns of coverage”, and critical discourse analysis, which detects “embedded ideologies” (2011b, p. 486). Mendes (2011b) describes how CDA analyses “the relationship between language, social practice, ideology and power” (2011b, p. 486), but provides no clear linguistic methodology: the analysis involves “taking an overall look at the article, assessing which ideologies were prioritised, whom the discourse served, what it revealed about the society in which it was produced, and how it helped/hindered the movement and its goals” (2012, p. 559).

Mendes (2012) notes changing trends in the way feminism is portrayed during the two time periods. She observes an emphasis on ’newness’ in 2008, noticeable in a “shift in feminism’s ‘enemy’” (p. 561): whereas older stories draw an opposition between radical and non-radical feminists, newer stories contrast second wave feminists with third wave feminists. Mendes (2012) observes that the second wave is “derided as ‘retro’ or ‘old-school’” (p. 561), while the third wave is described using terms such as ‘modern’, ‘fun’ and ‘sexy’ (p. 561). Further, she finds evidence of a “lifestyling” of feminism (2011a, p. 560): while the 2008 data demonstrates that coverage still discusses political matters and women’s rights, it also focuses on “softer” issues such as fashion, leisure and popular culture (p. 560). These findings hint at the focus on “the new, choice and girlpower” (Taylor, 2003, p. 182) identified in previous studies (for example Farrell, 1995; Rhode, 1995; Taylor, 2003) and are investigated more thoroughly in the present study through the analysis of textual-conceptual functions (chapters 5-7). For example, analysis of the way in which different feminists are named and described provides evidence of the division of ‘feminism’ into old and new varieties, while analysis of contrasting and the representation of actions, events and states shows how differences between these varieties are emphasised.
Mendes (2011b, p. 284) concludes her analyses of data from the 2000s by observing that there were more positive portrayals than found by previous studies. However, she also notes her concern that even when articles portray feminism positively, their support is often “launched from a defensive position, for example, arguing how feminism had not harmed society, or was still needed” (2011a, p. 10). This tendency has also been noted by Marling (2010), who finds that even pro-feminism articles refer to it “in negative grammatical constructions, for example, denying the narrowly feminist intent of gender equality policies” (p. 15). The present study's analysis of the meaning of ‘feminist/s/ism’ finds evidence to support these claims, in particular through the analysis of instances where the lexemes ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ themselves are explicitly discussed.

### 2.3 Frames in media portrayals of feminism

The present investigation builds on the previous studies discussed in section 2.2 by analysing a dataset of occurrences of ‘feminism’, ‘feminist(s)’ and ‘feminist’ using the textual-conceptual functions introduced in section 1.4. To test the convictions of previous research, I use a set of five frames similar to those identified by Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 417). These frames are based on common patterns that previous studies have identified in how feminism is portrayed in the media, and provide a benchmark for the analysis in chapters 5-7. The five frames are:

1. Positive/negative portrayals.
2. Geographical and temporal placement.
4. Changes and oppositions.
5. Complexity of portrayals.

The ‘Positive/negative portrayals’ frame reflects differences in previous studies’ conclusions concerning how feminism is portrayed. There is a consensus among the studies discussed in section 2.2.2 that newspapers portray feminism in a negative light, but two of the more recent studies discussed in section 2.2.3 - Dean (2010) and Mendes (2011a, 2012) - contend that portrayals are in fact more mixed. In particular, my own analysis addresses several patterns of negativity found in previous studies: the notion that feminism is dead or irrelevant (Callaghan et al., 1999; Christie, 1998; Rhode, 1995), the association of feminism with political extremity and stereotypes such as a lack of femininity and homosexuality (Callaghan et al., 1999; Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012), people’s (particularly young women’s) rejection of feminism (Redfern & Aune, 2010; Walby, 2011), and the use of quotes from feminists themselves to dismiss feminism (Mendes, 2011b, p. 492).
The ‘Geographical and temporal placement’ frame is based on previous studies’ findings concerning where and when feminism is portrayed as existing. In terms of geography, research suggests that feminism is portrayed as a largely western phenomenon (Baumgardner & Richards, 2001; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012), while temporally it is located firmly in the past – in particular around the time of the second wave of the 1960s and 1970s (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012). On the other hand, recent research suggests that there is also a renewed emphasis on more contemporary forms of ‘new feminism’ (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012), albeit that this concept is often treated with a degree of scepticism by writers (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 416).

The ‘Universality/complexity’ frame recognises two differing opinions in the existing literature: that feminism is portrayed as a single, universal movement (Callaghan et al., 1999; Douglas, 1994), or that it is portrayed as complex, consisting of different varieties (Dean, 2010; Mendes, 2011a, 2012). Studies that argue that feminism is portrayed as in some way universal argue that feminism is perceived as “monolithic” (Douglas, 1994, p. 274) and that a small number of well-known feminists are taken as representative of the whole movement (Baumgardner & Richards, 2001, p. 79). On the other hand, studies that argue that feminism is portrayed as complex point to the fact that the movement is described as dividing into different types (Dean, 2010) and that it is defined according to what it is not rather than what it is (Marling, 2010), with coverage suggesting uncertainty about what feminism means and who can be a feminist (Mendes, 2011a, p. 132).

The ‘Changes and oppositions’ frame stems from previous studies’ observations of how newspapers portray shifts in what constitutes feminism over time, and oppositions not only between feminism and other bodies (for example between feminists and other women), but also within feminism itself. In particular, studies note a move from the second wave to the third wave, and from feminism to post-feminism (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a). Oppositions are drawn between feminists aligned to these different varieties of feminism, as well as between more and less politically-inclined feminists in general (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012). Oppositions are also noted between feminists and other people, including non-feminist women (Lind & Salo, 2002; Rhode, 1995; Taylor, 2003).

The final frame, ‘Complexity of portrayals’, draws on the findings of the studies of 2000s newspapers discussed in section 2.2.3. While these studies contend that media portrayals of feminism are not as negative as previous studies have suggested, they also observe that support for particular types of feminism is connected to a dismissal of other types (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012), that positive portrayals of feminism tend to come from a “defensive position” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 10), and that articles are often presented as an argument with a hypothetical, less supportive individual (Dean, 2010, p. 397), with an emphasis on the repudiation of popular negative perceptions of feminism rather than the putting forward of more positive ideas about it.
2.4 Summary

This literature review has provided an account of the denotative and connotative meanings attributed to ‘feminism’ in feminist literature, demonstrating that the lexemes under investigation are considered to have contested meanings. The overview of previous studies of feminism in the media in section 2.2 demonstrates that most research finds that feminism is portrayed in a negative light, and that much existing research considers this to be a cause of people’s lack of understanding of, and support for, feminism (Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Callaghan et al., 1999; Lind & Salo, 2002). However, as section 2.2.3 demonstrates, several 2000s-based studies have contended that not all media portrayals of feminism are necessarily negative (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) and that there is evidence of some support for feminism in UK national newspapers in the 2000s.

The five frames listed in section 2.3 reflect the findings of previous studies, and provide a benchmark for the findings of the present study. Looking at, for example, the way the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are constructed through the textual-conceptual function of contrasting allows me to explore in greater depth the argument that newspapers tend to portray feminists in opposition to other women (Lind & Salo, 2002; Rhode, 1995; Taylor, 2002). In chapter 3, I provide a full account of the textual-conceptual functions used in the present study and a sample analysis, which demonstrates how the functions interact to construct textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ and how the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in a specific newspaper article relate to the frames outlined in section 2.3.
Chapter 3: The textual-conceptual functions and a sample analysis

This chapter provides a more detailed explanation of the critical stylistic textual-conceptual functions introduced in chapter 1, and a critical stylistic analysis demonstrating how they work to construct textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in a sample article. Section 3.1 discusses each of the ten functions that I use in the annotation and analysis of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data (chapters 4 and 5-7) and provides examples of how each helps to uncover textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’. Section 3.2 provides an in-depth analysis of how the textual-conceptual functions constructions construct the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in one of the 240 articles represented in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ dataset, highlighting instances where the functions interact. This introduction serves as a foundation for the discussion of the annotation of the textual-conceptual functions in chapter 4.

3.1 The textual-conceptual functions

This section outlines each of the ten textual-conceptual functions identified by Jeffries (2010a). For each of the functions, I provide a model of the different ways in which it can be realised linguistically, and discuss how it functions in texts to play a role in the textual construction of meaning.

3.1.1 Naming and describing

Naming and describing (naming hereafter) looks at the ways in which language allows a text producer to describe a referent (Jeffries, 2010a, pp. 17-18). Jeffries (2007) suggests that names used to make reference are “one of the potentially most influential choices any writer makes” (p. 63), with the choice that a text producer makes between, for example, ‘protestor’ and ‘rioter’ telling the reader something about their attitude toward a referent (Beaton-Thome, 2013, p. 381). Reisigl and Wodak (2001) refer to noun choices as “referential strategies” (pp. 44-46), arguing that they influence readers’ perceptions of those referred to.

Jeffries (2010a, p. 19) recognises the capacity of the noun phrase to contain additional information about a referent beyond the choice of head noun. Text producers are able to ‘package up’ opinions and assumptions about a referent in pre- and postmodification of a head noun, presenting assumptions about and opinions of the referent as inherent to the referent, and making them difficult to argue with (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 19). For example, a writer may describe how ‘the radical feminists demonstrated’, thereby packaging up the referents’ radical quality and placing the focus of the clause on the verbal element - the fact of their having demonstrated (adjectival transformations are discussed in section 3.1.6 below). This aspect of naming – where certain qualities are assumed to be true – is related to the idea of the existential presupposition, in which the referent of a definite noun phrase is presupposed to exist (see the discussion of assuming in section 3.1.7 below). Naming,
however, looks at the contents of all noun phrases, whether definite – for example ‘the radical feminist’ - or indefinite, e.g. ‘a radical feminist’.

Table 3.1 provides a summary of the different ways in which texts name and describe referents, with examples from the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic realisation</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun choice</td>
<td>Woman / feminist / bra-burner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Noun phrase modification | Odd, demented, man-hating feminists (*Telegraph 01c*)  
                          | Feminists all over the world (*Independent 08b*)  
                          | The seventies bra-burning feminists who fought for women's right to be equal (*Express 05a*)  
                          | Feminists, these so-called 24-carat, ball-breaking, bovver-booted females (*Express 03a*) |
| Nominalisation         | The practical application of feminism (*Telegraph 01c*) |

(Adapted from Jeffries, 2010a, p. 20)

Table 3.1: Linguistic realisations of naming

Most obviously, adjectives that premodify a noun – for example “Odd, demented, man-hating feminists” (*Telegraph 01c*) – package up assumptions about qualities that the referent has, such as being “odd”, “demented” and “man-hating”. Postmodification via prepositional phrases (“feminists in this country” (*Mirror 02b*)) and relative clauses (“feminists who want men to be like women” (*Independent 00a*)) allow for recursion via the embedding of prepositional phrases and relative clauses, and apposition - where two adjacent noun phrases are presented as equivalent (Biber et al., 1999, p. 638) – provides two descriptions of a single referent, for example “feminists, these so-called 24-carat, ball-breaking, bovver-booted females” (*Express 03a*). Other means of premodification allow for further detail to be provided through enumerators and quantifiers ('many', 'two', 'first') and determiners ('a’, ‘the’, ‘his’).

A further linguistic realisation of naming used in critical linguistic studies (for example Fowler et al., 1979; Kuo & Nakamura, 2005; van Dijk, 1991) is nominalisation, which focuses on “the transformation of a process (an action) into a noun (a name, or nominal)” (Richardson, 2007, p. 241), as in “the practical application of feminism” (*Telegraph 01c*). Nominalisations omit tense and often do not indicate an agent or patient (Fairclough, 2001, p. 103): this process of reification means that “processes and qualities assume the status of things” (Fowler, 1991, p. 80) (Fowler’s emphasis). By
referring to “the defeat of ‘first-wave’ feminism” (Independent 06b) rather than asserting that “first-wave” feminism was defeated, a text producer presents what might be contentious and arguable as definite and tangible.

The different realisations of naming are important in the construction of textual meaning, whether through the choice of a particular head noun that has specific connotations – for example ‘fugitive’ or ‘leaker’ to refer to a whistle-blower (Branum and Charteris-Black, 2015, p. 14) – or the use of particular adjectives embedded within a noun phrase, e.g. the use of noun phrases such as ‘the new terrorism’ to help journalists categorise a recent crime as terrorist (Evans & Schuller, 2015). In the present study, the analysis of naming allows me to investigate the way writers pick out particular types of feminism and feminist – e.g. new and old, political and non-political (see section 5.4.2) – and what people and things are attributed the quality of being feminist through the packaging up of adjectival ‘feminist’ into references to them (see chapter 7).

3.1.2 Representing actions/events/states

Representing actions/events/states focuses on the verbal element of the clause, in which the choice of verb affects how readers and hearers see the information provided (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 37). The present study uses Halliday’s (2004) model of transitivity to analyse how ‘feminist/s/ism’ is represented in actions, events and states. Transitivity looks at how the “goings-on” (Halliday, 2004, p. 101) of reality are expressed in the clause, and demonstrates how “speakers encode in language their mental picture of reality” (Simpson, 1993, p. 88). This mental picture is labelled the ‘process’, and consists of up to three components: the process (expressed by the verb phrase), the participants involved (expressed by noun phrases), and the circumstances of the process (expressed by adverbial and prepositional phrases). These components are found in examples of material action processes, in which something is done or something happens (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 40):
Material action intention process involves a process, participants and circumstances, with the process enacted wittingly by the actor, while the supervision process depicts a process that simply happened rather than being consciously enacted. Lack of intention is even more pronounced in the event process, in which the actor is inanimate. A further possible participant is the recipient, fulfilled by “feminism”, which receives “a kick up the backside” (Sun 06c).

Verbalisation processes (V) involve actions enacted through language (Halliday, 2004, p. 171), and are realised by verbs of speech and written communication:

### Table 3.2: Material action transitivity process types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material process</th>
<th>Participant roles</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intention (MAI)</td>
<td>Actor, process, goal</td>
<td>Feminists (actor) burnt (process) their bras (goal) to challenge restrictive ideas (circumstance) (Times 08c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervention (MAS)</td>
<td>Actor, process</td>
<td>The radical feminist Andrea Dworkin (actor) died (process) (Times 06c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event (MAE)</td>
<td>Actor, process</td>
<td>The feminist pendulum (actor) has swung (process) (Sun 02c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention (MAI)</td>
<td>Actor, process, goal, recipient</td>
<td>They (actor) gave (process) feminism (recipient) a kick up the backside (goal) (Sun 06c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.3: Verbalisation transitivity process types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant roles</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sayer, process, verbiage</td>
<td>“Dworkin pretends to be a daring truth-teller” (verbiage), wrote (process) the feminist (sayer) (Mail 05a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayer, process, verbiage, target</td>
<td>She (sayer) once described (process) fellow feminist Gloria Steinem (target) as “a female chauvinist boar” (verbiage) (Mail 00b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayer, process, verbiage, receiver</td>
<td>Leon (sayer) bizarrely tells (process) feminist Laurie (receiver): “feminism doesn’t exist” (verbiage) (Mirror 09c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Up to five different roles can be fulfilled in verbalisation processes: sayer (similar to the actor in a material action process), process (a verb of speech or writing), verbiage (a report of what was said), target (the source of praise, blame, etc.) and receiver (the person to whom the verbiage is directed).

Mental processes describe processes of sensing, and are therefore more “internalised” (Simpson, 1993, p. 91):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mental process</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception (MP)</td>
<td>Feminists (senser) saw (process) toplessness (phenomenon) as a struggle for women to do what they liked (Sun 09a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction (MR)</td>
<td>Feminists (senser) don't like (process) men (phenomenon) (Guardian 07a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition (MC)</td>
<td>Feminists (senser) imagined (process) how technology could soon free women (phenomenon) (Times 01b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Mental transitivity process types

Mental processes involve the roles of senser (similar to actor/sayer), process and phenomenon (the person or thing being perceived, reacted to or thought about).

Relational processes differ from the other process types in that they describe states, rather than actions or events:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relational process</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensive (RI)</td>
<td>Feminism (carrier) is a force for good (attribute) (Express 09a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possessive (RP)</td>
<td>Feminism (carrier) clearly has an image problem (attribute) (Independent 09c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circumstantial (RC)</td>
<td>Feminism (carrier) was at a crossroads (attribute) (Times 04b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5: Relational transitivity process types

Relational intensive processes express a relationship of equivalence between one thing and another, relational possessive processes a relationship of possession between a possessor and possessed, and relational circumstantial processes a relationship between a carrier and a circumstance such as location. Similar to relational processes are existential processes (E), which feature ‘there’ in subject
position, followed by the copula verb and a complement, for example “there are different types of feminism” (Independent 06a).

The analysis of representing actions/events/states enables the researcher to look at how textual meaning is created through depictions of how referents interact with the world. For example, Mulderrig (2003) analyses New Labour education policy documents, finding that material action processes present the government as active (actors), while pupils are merely beneficiaries (goals and recipients). The predominance of particular types of process can also result in the impression of much or little activity, static descriptions of scenes, etc. (Jeffries, 2014, p. 413). In the present study, the statistical overviews of processes involving ‘feminist/s/ism’ allows me to identify interesting patterns in the data, for example the fact that ‘feminist’ tends to be represented in relational processes (see section 6.1). This in turn allows me to explore patterns in the data including definitions of ‘feminism’ (see section 5.2.1), while analysis of the kinds of actions in which ‘feminist(s)’ plays an active role allows me to question previous studies’ claims about the kinds of things that feminists are portrayed as doing (for example the analysis of material action processes in which ‘radical feminists’ is the actor in section 6.3.3.1).

3.1.3 Negating

Negating looks at a textual practice which involves the presentation of “non-existent versions of the world” (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 106). Prototypically, negating attaches itself to the verb in a clause, presenting the reader with a picture of what is not the case, for example in “feminism is not an exclusive club” (Guardian 01c). Much of negating’s potential for creating meaning relies on the “cognitive processing” (Nahajec, 2009, p. 125) through which a reader determines why they are being told about something that is not the case, rather than something that is the case. For example, a reader may infer that a writer is telling them what feminism is not rather than what it is in order to imply something about what people other than the writer think about feminism (section 3.1.7 below discusses the relationship between negating to implying).

There are a variety of forms of negating, all of which “put into the mind of the reader a different world where that situation is reality” (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 111). Nahajec (2012) represents the first concerted attempt to draw up a typology of negating, outlined below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syntactic</th>
<th>Morphological</th>
<th>Semantic</th>
<th>Pragmatic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Un-</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Conditional constructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>In- (il-, im-, ig-, ir-)</td>
<td>Lack</td>
<td>If you had x, then y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Non-</td>
<td>Avoid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Dis-</td>
<td>Omit</td>
<td>Modals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-one</td>
<td>De-</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>You should have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobody</td>
<td>A- (an-)</td>
<td>Forget</td>
<td>I wish you had</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowhere</td>
<td>Ex-</td>
<td>Refuse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>-less</td>
<td></td>
<td>Grammaticalised metaphors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither… nor</td>
<td>-free</td>
<td>Almost</td>
<td>Out of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nearly</td>
<td>Ruled out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral forms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-</td>
<td>Peripheral forms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contra-</td>
<td>Barely</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beyond me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-</td>
<td>Hardly</td>
<td></td>
<td>Short of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-</td>
<td>Scarcely</td>
<td></td>
<td>Apart from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td></td>
<td>Expletive forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo</td>
<td>Little</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fuck all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diddly squat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bugger all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jack shit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Structural forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Too x to y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Nahajec, 2012, p. 129)

**Table 3.6: Typology of negating**
The various syntactic forms of negating reverse the polarity of a clause, for example in “nobody cares about ‘feminism’ now” (Mail 03a), “feminism never meant the degradation of women” and “neither Stoller nor Henzel takes a second-wave feminist approach” (Guardian 05a). Negating can also be built into a word’s morphology, usually in the form of a prefix. Different prefixes demonstrate the range of meaning that is possible through negating: for example, ‘anti-feminist’ suggests opposition to the idea of feminism, while ‘non-feminist’ suggests a lack of feminism.

Semantic and pragmatic forms of negating are harder to identify, as they are not based on a finite range of forms. Semantic forms present the idea of absence or lack of action (Jeffries, 2010a, pp. 108-109), for example in “feminism fails to bring a fairer deal for women” (Mail 02b), which can be understood as negative in a similar way to semantic forms by rephrasing using syntactic forms, for example as ‘feminism does not bring a fairer deal for women’. Like semantic forms, pragmatic forms do not feature overt markers, but can also be understood on analogy with prototypical negators (Nahajec, 2012, p. 161): a commonly observed form of pragmatic negating is the past tense conditional ‘if… then’ structure, which implies that the situation being described did not happen (Nahajec, 2012, p. 161) (‘if… then’ structures are discussed further in relation to hypothesising in section 4.3.8 below), while expletive negators such as ‘fuck all’ and ‘jack shit’ have become “grammaticalised” (p. 161) to the point where they function as negators. The ‘feminist/s/ism’ data does contain examples of pragmatic negating such as “if you had a feminist world, [then] you wouldn’t have a hierarchical world” (Times 07c). However, due to the small number of such examples, and the difficulty of pinning down exactly what forms should be included or excluded, I have not included pragmatic forms of negating in the study.

What is common to all forms of negating is that they have the effect of presenting the idea of a lack. They also all put into the reader’s mind “both the negated and the positive proposition” (Jeffries, 2014, p. 416). Studies such as Hidalgo Downing (2002) investigate how texts such as poems use this function of negating to create an “alternativity […] understood in terms of the departure from expected patterns of experience” (p. 131). The analysis of negating in the present study allows me to account for how writers create alternative ideas about the meaning of ‘feminism’, for example by denying the idea of it as a movement that no longer exists (see, for example, the discussion of the ‘feminism is not dead’ structure in section 5.2.2.2). The analysis of negating is also crucial in allowing me to look at the kinds of things that the articles deem cannot be described by the word ‘feminist’, for example the ideas and beliefs described by the negated derivational form ‘anti-feminist’ (see section 7.4.3).

3.1.4 Contrasting

Equating and contrasting looks at how texts present different entities as either equivalent to each other or opposed to each other (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 51). Equating is realised through the apposition of noun phrases and through relational processes. Because I look at these linguistic forms as part of the
annotation of naming (see section 3.1.1 above) and of representing actions/events/states (section 3.1.2), I concentrate here on contrasting, which is realised through syntactic frames of opposition.

The linguistic study of opposition has its roots in lexical semantic work on relations of antonymy between “words that could be intuitively recognised as opposites” (Jones, 2002, p. 1). Studies such as Jones (2002) recognise that antonyms commonly occur in particular syntactic frames – for example ‘either X or Y’ - which emphasise a relationship of opposition between two elements. The use of antonyms in these frames – for example ‘either left or right’, ‘between love and hate’ – solidifies our perception of them as opposites. The use of conventional antonyms such as left/right and love/hate in syntactic frames may be of little ideological interest, but Davies (2012) notes that syntactic structures that usually house conventional opposites such as bad/good can create new opposites “that rely on the context of their production and consumption for their oppositional status” (pp. 41-42). A number of studies have outlined typologies of syntactic frames in which opposites can occur (Davies, 2008; Jeffries, 2010a, 2010b; Jones, 2002; Mettinger, 1994). The present study uses Davies’s (2012) typology:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Syntactic frames</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negated opposition</td>
<td>X not Y; Not X, Y</td>
<td>Ladettism is simply a stereotype of adolescent vulgarity, not a product of feminism (Mail 04b)</td>
<td>One element is emphasised over the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional opposition</td>
<td>X turns into Y; X becomes Y</td>
<td>Women’s liberation became feminism (Guardian 00a)</td>
<td>One element becomes the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative opposition</td>
<td>More X than Y; X is more A than Y</td>
<td>The scramble of actors to [...] seemed to smack more of a celebrity bandwagon than a feminist movement (Guardian 04a)</td>
<td>One element is measured against the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacive opposition</td>
<td>X rather than Y; X instead of Y; X in place of Y</td>
<td>I am an egalitarian rather than a feminist (Independent 01b)</td>
<td>One element is preferred to the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concessive opposition</td>
<td>X but Y; despite X, Y; while X, Y; Although X, Y; X, yet Y</td>
<td>Feminism has succeeded, partly. But so has individualism (Mirror 03a)</td>
<td>One element is presented as surprising in light of the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit opposition</td>
<td>X contrasted with Y; X opposed to Y; The difference between X and Y; X against Y</td>
<td>Our brand of feminism is different from what has gone before (Independent 09c)</td>
<td>The oppositeness of two elements is explicitly stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallelism</td>
<td>He likes X, she likes Y; Your house is X, mine is Y</td>
<td>The apparent decline of feminism and the rise of the sexualised society are connected (Times 09c)</td>
<td>Repetition of a linguistic structure emphasises the oppositeness of two elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binarised opposition</td>
<td>Either X or Y</td>
<td>Strong independent female role model, or 34DD feminist caricature for blokes? (Independent 01a)</td>
<td>Presents a choice between two elements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7: Typology of syntactic frames of opposition

(Adapted from Davies, 2012, pp. 49-51)
What is common to the different syntactic frames of opposition is that they construct new opposites, which in context are treated as akin to antonyms. This makes contrasting of particular interest to the study of a particular lexeme or set of lexemes, as looking at their appearance in constructed oppositions provides a fuller picture of the meanings with which they are imbued: in the annotation and analysis of ‘feminist/s/ism’, apposition and relational intensive processes demonstrates what is presented as equivalent to the lexemes, while oppositional structures demonstrate what is presented as contrasting with them.

Davies (2012) notes that news texts “regularly use constructed binaries as part of their rhetorical armoury” (p. 70). This is demonstrated by his investigation of newspapers’ portrayals of trade unions, which construct oppositions between extremists and ‘regular’ members of the public in order to portray unions in a negative light (Davies, 2008). As noted in section 2.2, previous studies of feminism in the media (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworka & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a) have found similar binaries in news coverage of feminism. The present study analyses contrasting in order to look at how binaries are constructed linguistically, and also to investigate the types of things and people with which feminism and feminists are presented as contrasting. These include contrasts between old and new feminisms which not only present feminism as something complex which divides into different types, but also demonstrate how writers express their preference for one certain types over others (see, for example, the analysis of ‘old feminism’ and ‘new feminism’ in section 5.4.2.2).

### 3.1.5 Exemplifying and enumerating

Exemplifying and enumerating concerns the two means of presenting lists in English. Exemplification is evident where items are used to provide examples of a category, and where no claim is made for comprehensiveness. Examples of exemplifying consist of a list of similar linguistic items (such as noun phrases), and their status as examples is made explicit by a phrase such as ‘for example’, as in “Many of Showalter’s candidates for places in the ‘feminist intellectual heritage’ would be selected by all: Mary Wollstonecraft, Charlotte Perkins Gilman […] and Simone de Beauvoir, for example” (Times 01a). Enumerating involves thorough, itemised lists, which are presented as though they are comprehensive (Jeffries, 2014, p. 414), for example in “the Church is intent on aligning itself against gays, feminists and North London Lefties” (Independent 07c). What is notable about this example of enumeration is that it does not make an explicit claim to be complete; rather, the lack of an exemplifying phrase such as ‘for instance’ simply gives the impression of comprehensiveness.

Our tendency to view lists of three or more items such as “gays, feminists and North London lefties” as in some sense complete has been recognised by scholars such as Beard (2000), who notes that the three-part list “is embedded in certain cultures as giving a sense of unity and completeness” (p. 38). Jeffries (2007) notes that three-part lists are common in women’s magazines, with their use providing a sense of “reassuring” (p. 125) completeness even though the three items may simply reiterate a single point, or have been plucked at random. In the present study,
exemplifying and enumerating are of interest for the way they “create categories and category members” (Jeffries, 2007, p. 120) of which ‘feminist/s/ism’ is a member. As Jeffries (2007, p. 120) notes, the way in which lists – whether they serve an exemplifying or enumerating function – draw a connection between members of a list (for example, types of people against home the Church is aligned) has a similar effect to the sense of equation achieved through relational intensive processes and apposition. This is of particular interest in the investigation of other adjectives with which ‘feminist’ frequently occurs in lists, for example in the use of lists to help construct the idea of things and people that are either ‘new/young/modern’ and ‘feminist’ or ‘early/old/original’ and ‘feminist’ (see section 7.5).

3.1.6 Prioritising

Prioritising takes into account how the structure of a clause serves to foreground some information while backgrounding other information (Jeffries, 2014, p. 415). Jeffries (2010a, p. 87) notes that there is a range of ways in which information can be prioritised in English sentences, each of which has the effect of making some parts of a sentence more prominent than others. Jeffries (2010a, p. 80) focuses on three ways in which elements may be prioritised in English: through the arrangement of information structure, transformations in clause structure, and subordination. The present study bases its annotation and analysis of prioritising on these three forms of prioritising.

Analysis of the information structure of a sentence involves looking at a sentence and distinguishing which is the last compulsory element, which carries the focus of a sentence. For example, in the sentence “feminism was at a crossroads” (Times 04b), the adverbial is the last compulsory element, carrying the focus; if fronting is used to rearrange the sentence to produce “at a crossroads was feminism”, then “feminism” becomes the focus of the clause. The focus of the information structure can also be changed through clefting, whereby a certain element is placed in the focal position through an ‘it is…’ or ‘it was… structure, placing the focus on the clausal complement, for example in “it is feminism which loses its power” (Guardian 02a).

Transformations in English relate to the underlying structure of a sentence. This underlying structure can be changed in a number of ways that change the focus of a sentence. Jeffries (2010a, pp. 84-85) observes two particular transformations that are of interest to the present study. Adjectival transformations, which involve the placing of an adjective within a noun phrase, are one of the aspects of naming discussed in section 3.1.1 above: the transformation from predicative to attributive position allows a text producer to place the focus on other parts of the clause, for example in the shift from “Feminists are angry and don’t like men” (Guardian 07a) to ‘Angry feminists don’t like men’. Passive transformations involve a shift from an active to a passive sentence structure, which makes the subject of a sentence disposable (Jeffries, 2010, p. 84), for example in the change from “feminists have driven women into a corner” (Times 03a) to ‘women have been driven into a corner by feminists’.
The third means of changing the focus in an English sentence is subordination. This concerns the way in which something that is at a higher syntactic level receives a greater degree of focus than those at a lower level. As Jeffries (2010, p. 86) notes, placing something at a lower level makes it less open to questioning, as with the clause concerning feminism in “I was fascinated by that period because it was a society where feminism and lesbianism were starting to emerge” (Sun 03b). In this example, the clause in which “feminism and lesbianism” is the subject comes at a low level of the clause structure: there is a main clause (“I was fascinated by that period”) with an optional adverbial clause (“because it was a society”) in which the complement is postmodified by a relative clause with “feminism and lesbianism” as the subject.

The present study looks at how prioritising is used to assume certain information about ‘feminist/s/ism’. There are overlaps with the textual-conceptual functions of naming and assuming and implying. For example, the analysis of ‘feminist’ looks at how prioritising is used to assume the feminism of particular speakers through postmodifying relative clauses: in examples such as “Katha Pollitt – who is the author of several books on feminism […] – welcomes the book” (Independent 01c), the fact of an individual’s feminism is assumed, and places the significance of what they say in a certain light (if someone who writes about feminism says this, then the welcome must be significant) (see section 5.4.1).

3.1.7 Implying and assuming

Implying and assuming relates to the pragmatic notion of implying and the semantic notion of presupposition, respectively. Both implicature and presupposition are means of communicating meaning beyond that which is explicitly stated in a proposition. Presupposition has a range of recognisable triggers, while the inference of an implied meaning depends on the reader or hearer’s realisation that a speaker or hearer has communicated an ‘additional’ meaning by saying something that, on the surface, appears to be in some way uncooperative.

Presuppositions divide into existential presuppositions, which arise from definite noun phrases, and logical presuppositions, which arise from an open-ended range of triggers. The former arise from noun phrases such as “the result of the triumph of cultural feminism in academe” (Independent 00b), where the existence of the referent is presupposed by the use of the definite determiner (Jeffries, 2014, p. 415). Existential presuppositions can be seen as a particularly powerful type of naming: not only do they package up assumptions about a referent (see discussion in section 3.1.1 above), but they also assume its existence. Levinson (1983) provides a list of triggers of logical presuppositions, which involve “aspects of surface structure” (p. 179) that give rise to assumed meanings. The annotation of presupposition in the present study takes into account five of these, recognised in Jeffries’ (2010a, pp. 94-98) overview of assuming. Table 3.8 describes these triggers using examples from the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data:
### Table 3.8: Typology of presupposition triggers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>Assumed meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I [...] started getting into feminism (Guardian 07a)</td>
<td>Change of state verb</td>
<td>The writer was <em>not</em> into feminism before</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I [...] realise that the apparent decline of feminism and the rise of the sexualised society are connected (Times 09c)</td>
<td>Factive verb</td>
<td>The apparent decline of feminism and the rise of the sexualised society <em>are</em> connected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It <em>is</em> feminism [...] that is being blamed (Times 09a)</td>
<td>Cleft sentence</td>
<td>That blame <em>is</em> being apportioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t start singing a requiem for feminism quite yet (Mail 03a)</td>
<td>Iterative word</td>
<td>Feminism has been claimed before</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The feminist writer [...] was <em>as ambitious</em> as any bright twenty-something (Times 03c)</td>
<td>Comparative structure</td>
<td>Any bright twenty-something <em>was</em> ambitious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implying is based on Grice’s (1975) pragmatic concept of implicature, whereby an implied meaning arises when one or more of the maxims of quality (say what you believe to be true), quantity (make your contribution as informative as is required), relation (be relevant) or manner (be clear) is flouted, i.e. broken in a way that it is assumed the reader/hearer will understand. These maxims form the cooperative principle, which assumes that, ordinarily, a speaker or writer will abide by the principle to “Make your conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice, 1975, pp. 41-58). Because we assume that people ordinarily abide by this principle, we are able to interpret flouts of the maxims as somehow abiding by the principle, and therefore infer an implied meaning. Table 3.9 provides examples of each kind of implicature from the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Maxim flouted</th>
<th>Implied meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminists […] are all man-hating, humourless warthogs (Mail 03b)</td>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Feminists are not warthogs, but must be similar to them in some respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m just not sure what feminism means now (Mail 06b)</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>The writer is sure about what feminism meant previously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a feminist with many good friends, I resent Ms Lessing saying: “Feminists enjoy hating men” (Express 01a)</td>
<td>Relation</td>
<td>The writer’s status as a feminist with friends disproves Lessing’s perception of feminists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminism is not dead (Guardian 07c)</td>
<td>Quantity/ relation/ manner</td>
<td>Feminism is alive (quantity, relation), and this is a surprising fact (manner)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.9: Flouts of the Gricean maxims

These examples provide evidence that implicature is more pragmatic than semantics – implicatures do not arise from particular words or structures, but from an interaction of language, context and our expectations of cooperation (Grice, 1975). “Feminism isn’t dead” (Mail 02a) also demonstrates the difficulties of ascertaining which maxim is being flouted: a negated proposition can be considered a flout of quantity and manner (explaining what is not the case is less informative than explaining what is the case, and is more vague and obscure) (Leech, 1983, p. 101) or relation, as no “positive information” (Nahajec, 2009, p. 113) is added to the discourse.

Implying and assuming are crucial to a full understanding of textual meaning as they allow the analyst to account for meanings that are communicated implicitly, as well as explicitly. Assumed and implied meanings are relatively ‘hidden’ (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 102), and so their analysis is important for a full account of how a text is likely to affect a reader’s understanding of what is being discussed. For example, Coffey (2013) analyses the use of presuppositions and implicatures in women’s magazines, and finds that implicatures are used to emphasise “the idea of male dominance in relationships” (p. 207). The analysis of assuming and implying in the present study allows me to explore, for example, how articles construct ‘feminism’ as something malleable that can undergo changes in meaning (see section 5.2.4) and how writers not only explicitly define certain types of feminism, but in doing so produce implied meanings about the existence and nature of other feminisms (section 5.3).
3.1.8 Hypothesising

Hypothesising is based on modality, “the degree of commitment with which a speaker vouches for a proposition” (Fowler, 1986, p. 57). Modality can be realised through a variety of linguistic forms, including auxiliary verbs (“you think feminism is a dirty, outmoded word” (Mail 09b)), auxiliary modal verbs (“feminists might have been too idealistic about female solidarity” (Times 00c)), adverbs (“Bindel’s brand of feminism is definitely woman-biased” (Independent 07a)), adjectives (“I’m just not sure what feminism means now” (Mail 06b)) and conditional structures (“if that’s feminism in the Year 2000 [then] I, for one, am going to forget it” (Sun 00b)). Each form demonstrates the text producer’s level of belief in the proposition expressed (Fowler, 1991, p. 64). Note that propositions containing no modality are also possible, as in the categorical assertion “the French feminists are very feminine” (Times 02a).

The different modal forms contribute to four modal systems, recognised by Simpson (1993, p. 47). Epistemic modality signals the degree to which a text producer considers a proposition to be true, for example in “this might be the core battle in modern feminism” (Guardian 05a), with perception modality as a subcategory in which modal forms relate to human perception (Simpson, 1993, p. 50), e.g. “feminism clearly has an image problem” (Independent 09c). The deontic and boulomaic systems reflect the desirability of a proposition being true, the former reflecting degree of commitment – for example “a new version of feminism should offer a lot more than history lessons” (Times 08b) – and the latter wishes and desires, e.g. “feminists may have feared that a focus on motherhood risked driving women back into full-time domesticity” (Independent 01a).

Hypothesising is an important aspect of the construction of textual meaning as it enables the reader or hearer to access the text producer’s views of what is being discussed. For example, Fairclough (1989, p. 129) observes how newspaper articles tend to present information as categorical assertions, without modality, presenting what may be conjecture as though it were fact. Jeffries (2007) also reflects on this tendency for writers to express a high degree of certainty, for example in women’s magazines’ use of strongly certain epistemic modality to discuss matters to do with personal health. In the present study, the analysis of hypothesising highlights instances where writers express their beliefs about the meaning of ‘feminist/s/ism’, whether it is their uncertainty about the lexemes’ meanings or their views on how ‘feminism’ ought to be understood (see, for example, the discussion of epistemic modality in relation to old and new varieties of feminism in section 5.4.2.2).

3.1.9 Presenting others’ speech, thought and writing

The analysis of presenting others’ speech, thought and writing look at how text producers quote others. There is necessarily a question of faithfulness when representing others’ speech and thoughts. For example, written speech presentation cannot capture intonation, and we can never have direct access to others’ thoughts (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 130). Text producers can also be manipulative when deciding how directly quotes of speech and thought should be presented.
Short (2007, p. 225) recognises the categories of speech presentation below, from least to most direct. Note that the examples are all based on one example from the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data: this is an example of direct speech, which represents the ‘norm’ for speech presentation as it is the closest to an accurate representation of what was said and who said it (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 134) The examples of free indirect speech and free direct speech each include a contextualising sentence (in brackets), as they are difficult to illustrate out of context:

- Narrator’s presentation of voice (NV) – ‘A feminist spoke’.
- Narrator’s representation of a speech act (NRSA) – ‘A feminist interjected’.
- Indirect speech (IS) – ‘A feminist asked if they should be talking about that’.
- Free indirect speech (FIS) – ‘(A feminist was worried.) Should they be talking about that?’.
- Direct speech (DS) – “Should we be talking about this?” interjects a fellow feminist” (Independent 03b).
- Free direct speech (FDS) – ‘(A feminist was worried.) Should we be talking about this?’

Short (2007, p. 227) observes that there are equivalent categories for the presentation of writing, with verbs that denote writing – for example ‘wrote’, ‘record’, ‘put down’ – taking the place of verbs that denote speech. In the annotation and analysis of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data, I look at the presentation of others’ writing in addition to that of speech and thought as laid out in Jeffries (2010a, pp. 130-145).

Because thought presentation is at best approximate, the less direct types of thought presentation are considered the most faithful, as they the inevitable distance between the text producer and the thinker. Indirect thought presentation is considered the ‘norm’, as it represents the narrator’s attempt to represent what was thought, without making a strong claim for faithfulness of language (Jeffries, 2010a, pp. 134-135). Note that examples of narrator’s representation of thought and narrator’s representation of a thought act can look unusual, as thought is not usually reported in this way. As with the examples of speech presentation, contextualising sentences are included to help illustrate the free forms:

- Narrator’s presentation of thought (NRT) – ‘Feminists thought hard’.
- Narrator’s representation of a thought act (NRTA) – ‘Feminists believed’.
- Indirect thought (IT) – “Feminists believed that men and women were the same” (Mail 02a).
- Free indirect thought (FIT) – ‘(Feminists had many opinions about gender relations.) Men and women were the same’.
- ‘Feminists had views on the similarity of men and women’.
- Direct thought (DT) – ‘Feminists believed “Men and women are the same”’. 
• Free direct thought (FDT) – ‘(Feminists had many opinions about gender relations.) Men and women are the same’.

Previous critical stylistic studies have used models of presenting others’ speech, thought and writing to look at how words and thoughts are attributed to people, and the potential for portraying sayers, writers or thinkers in ideological ways. For example, Tabbert (2015, p. 102) looks at news reports of criminal cases, and how the presentation of authoritative parties’ speech is used to construct offenders. Previous studies of feminism in the media, while not using a linguistic approach to speech presentation, have found that the way in which individuals are quoted helps to present feminism and feminists in a certain light, whether through the use of quotes from ‘extreme’ feminists that serve to put a distance between ‘normal’ people and feminists (Rhode, 1995, p. 701) or the use of pessimistic quotes from renowned feminists in order to reinforce a negative view of feminism (Mendes, 2011b, p. 492). In the present study, analysis of the presentation of speech, thought and writing helps to show how particular understandings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are attributed to particular groups (for example in the discussion of the ‘I am not a feminist, but’ phenomenon in section 6.2.3.1) and how the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are used to present particular views on gender politics and related matters in a particular light (see section 6.2.4.1).

3.1.10 Representing time, space and society

Representing time, space and society is based on deixis, which involves those words whose reference depends on the context in which they are used. These include words for place (“Feminism here is dead” (Mail 03a), “it’s time for those feminists to step aside” (Times 08a)), time (“we need feminism now” (Guardian 01a), “She has missed the point about feminism today” (Independent 08a)), person (“we don’t need feminists” (Express 03a), “I don’t believe in feminism” (Telegraph 08c)) and social relations (“So long Ms Steinem, hello Mrs Realist” (Times 00b)). Many deictic words are either proximal or distal, allowing the text producer to construct the idea of things that are close – for example “my feminism” (Guardian 04a), “these feminists” (Telegraph 00c) - or far away, e.g. “their feminism” (Mail 08c), “those feminists” (Times 02a). Tense is also deictic in nature, with the tensed verb in a sentence demonstrating whether something is being presented as proximal or distal, for example in “feminism is alive” (Guardian 06a) and “feminism was a mistake” (Telegraph 06c).

The choices that a text producer makes in respect to different deictic words are important as they not only place the speaker or writer themselves in a particular position, but also potentially the hearer or reader. Generally, we expect that a text producer occupies what is called the ‘deictic centre’ of a text, with the deictic choices they make reflecting this positioning: a text producer is likely, for example, to use ‘I’ to refer to themselves and ‘that’ (rather than ‘this’) to refer to something far away. As readers and hearers, we are capable of deictic projection, placing ourselves in the position of the text producer as we hear or read a text (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 149). Deictic projection leads us, for
example, to feel close to people that a text producer refers to as ‘these feminists’, or distant from a belief referred to as ‘their feminism’. The present study uses the analysis of representations of time, space and society to look, for instance, at how articles construct different, personal varieties of feminism (see section 5.3) and place certain types of feminist and feminism in the present or past (see, for example, the analysis of tense in relation to ‘radical feminists’ in section 6.3.3.1).

3.2 A sample analysis – ‘Is Feminism Dead?’

Section 3.1 outlines the textual-conceptual functions used in the investigation, and provides indications of how they are used to analyse the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’. The present section provides a sample analysis of one of the newspaper articles from the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data. This analysis provides a more detailed picture of how the textual-conceptual functions are involved in the construction of textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’. In particular, the analysis shows how different textual-conceptual functions can interact to create specific meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ and how a critical stylistic analysis can demonstrate that the meanings of a set of lexemes are contested in a particular text. The analysis also reflects on instances where there is evidence for or against the frames relating to how feminism is portrayed in the media discussed in section 2.3.

The sample text is called ‘Is Feminism Dead?’, and was published in the Daily Mail in 2003 (the full text is reproduced in the appendices, appendix 1). I selected this article in part because of its format: rather than providing a news story relating to feminism or a single writer's views on the subject, the article consists of ten different writers’ responses to the question posed in the headline. This format, in which different writers or women are asked for their opinions on feminism, is used in a number of articles in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data. In itself, it is evidence of the fact that feminism is contested in the data, and therefore is a suitable choice for a sample analysis of the different textual meanings attributed to ‘feminist/s/ism’. In ‘Is Feminism Dead?’, each writer is introduced with a short description of their credentials – for example, “Ann Leslie, the Daily Mail’s award-winning chief foreign correspondent, is married with a daughter” – accompanied with a summary of their response to the question of whether or not feminism is dead, headed with either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. The ‘Yes’s and ‘No’s are evenly split, with journalists Ann Leslie and Lynda Lee-Potter, gap year student Anna Stothard, writer Chrissy Iley and magazine editor Marcelle D’Argy Smith arguing that feminism is dead, while journalists Jenni Murray, Bel Mooney and Samantha Norman, author Kathy Lette and magazine editor Cristina Odone argue that feminism is not dead.

In the introduction to her analysis of articles from the Daily Mail, Mendes (2012) suggests that the newspaper’s “conservative” and “populist” (p. 558) nature is likely to result in negative portrayals of feminism. However, the fact that ‘Is Feminism Dead?’ gives equal space to contrasting views suggests that this is an example of a newspaper article that is not straightforwardly negative or positive about feminism. Rather, the format and the differing views that are presented provide evidence for another of Mendes’ (2011a) observations about how feminism is discussed in newspapers: that it is often “contradictory [...] within the same newspaper or article itself” (p. 9).
use of an analysis using the textual-conceptual functions also demonstrates that the way the ‘Yes, feminism is dead’ and ‘No, feminism is not dead’ writers portray feminism is more subtle and complex than the simple ‘Yes’/’No’ headings might suggest.

The analysis here, like that of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data in chapters 5-7, uses the textual-conceptual functions of naming and representing actions/events/states to provide entry points. The full range of textual-conceptual functions is then used to fully analyse individual occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’. I also use the sample analysis to explain the idea of ‘metalanguage’ (Meyer, 2002, p. 3) and the means by which I distinguish different types of naming that apply to occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’: unmodified occurrences, occurrences with minimal modification, and occurrences with detailed modification. I first of all analyse occurrences of metalanguage (section 3.2.1), which are particularly pertinent to the study of the textual meaning of the lexemes under investigation, before looking at occurrences pertaining to the different types of naming (sections 3.2.2 to 3.2.5).

3.2.1 ‘Feminist/s/ism’ as metalanguage

An overview of how ‘feminist/s/ism’ is named in the article highlights occurrences of metalanguage. These are occurrences where a writer discusses “the linguistic expression, and not the thing it refers to” (Meyer, 2002, p. 3). Examples of metalanguage are of particular relevance to this study, as they are instances where writers explicitly discuss, and contest the lexemes themselves. Some examples of metalanguage can be found through the analysis of the textual-conceptual function of naming, i.e. those where ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurs alongside an appositive noun phrase such as ‘the term’ or ‘the word’, for example in “The word ‘feminist’ in those days had the exciting smack of revolution; now, I’m afraid, the very word makes most of us yawn” (Leslie – ‘Yes’). In this instance, Leslie uses metalanguage to discuss the connotative meanings of “feminist”: through a relational possessive process, she represents a state in which “The word ‘feminist’” had the quality of having “the exciting smack of revolution”. The representation of a particular time is also pertinent here, with Leslie presenting this (positive) state as having only existed in the past through the use of the past tense and the distal deictic marker of time “those days”. This distancing is further emphasised by the following subordinate clause, starting with “now”. Here, the textual-conceptual function of contrasting is used to construct an opposition between the positive, past connotations of ‘feminist’ and contemporary, negative reactions to it: the proximal deictic marker of time “now” acts as an opposition trigger, and – in combination with the use of the present tense – contrasts ‘feminist’’s past and present, less exciting connotations. Whereas the old meaning of ‘feminist’ is represented in a state in which it is attributed a positive quality, the modern meaning is represented in an action, as the actor in a material action process of making people yawn. Leslie’s use of proximal person deixis – the first person plural in “most of us” also has a powerful effect, presenting this proposition as one that applies to the majority of readers.

Occurrences of metalanguage are also identifiable through the use of scare quotes. This type of metalanguage in ‘Is Feminism Dead?’ also presents ‘feminist/s/ism’ as something to be wary of, or
as something that is vague and unclear. The undesirability of ‘feminism’ is made most starkly clear by D’Argy Smith (‘Yes’), who opens her argument with the observation that “Of course nobody cares about ‘feminism’ now”. In this instance, it could be argued that the scare quotes indicate D’Argy Smith’s scepticism about the existence of feminism - a feature of newspaper articles previously observed by Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) – rather than being an instance of a reference to the lexeme itself. Here, the interaction of the textual-conceptual functions of representing actions/events/states and negating presents ‘feminism’ in a particular (negative) light: ‘feminism’ is the phenomenon in a mental reaction process of caring, and the negation of the sensor – “nobody” – portrays ‘feminism’ as something that people, without exception, have a negative reaction to. The textual-conceptual function of representing time plays a similar role to that which it plays in the Leslie example above: the negative observations being made about ‘feminist/s/ism’ are located in the present through the deictic time expression “now”, limiting the scope of the proposition to the present day. Further, the use of “now” creates an implied meaning: because D’Argy Smith only provides information about people’s reactions to ‘feminism’ in the present day, there is a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975) that implies that people’s opinions of feminism may have been more favourable in the past.

The other instance of metalanguage among the ‘Yes’ responses comes in Leslie’s response. Her argument opens with a famous quote from early 20th century writer Rebecca West, who observed that “people call me a ‘feminist’ whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat or a prostitute” (see discussion in section 2.1.2). This quote – from 1913 - demonstrates that the perception that the meaning of ‘feminist’ is vague is not new. Again, analysis of the textual-conceptual function of representing actions/events/states is informative: West is the target of a verbalisation process, in which ‘feminist’ itself is the verbiage. It is the adverbial clause detailing the circumstances in which this process of calling occurs that is crucial to the textual meaning of ‘feminist’: West does not provide a definition of ‘feminist’, and so the reader is left to infer something about the word’s meaning from the fact that it used to note a difference between a woman and a doormat or prostitute. As with the Leslie and D’Argy Amith examples, the textual-conceptual function plays a part in creating additional meaning: the vagueness of West’s account of what ‘feminist’ means flouts the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), resulting in the implicature that ‘feminist’ simply denotes someone who has their own thoughts and a sense of independence. Leslie uses the West quote to underline the fact that ‘feminist’ no longer has this meaning: “But that was in 1913 and she wasn’t even allowed to vote”. Here, a combination of the textual-conceptual functions of contrasting and implying produces another argument for the irrelevance of ‘feminist/s/ism’ today: “But” triggers a concessive opposition, with the following clause subverting the expectations set up by the first (Quirk et al., 1972, p. 745), and the contents of this second clause flout the maxim of relation (Grice, 1975) – ‘feminist’ had a meaning when women like West suffered greater oppression, but the comparative lack of oppression today means that ‘feminist’ no longer has any meaning.

The final occurrence of metalanguage in ‘Is Feminism Dead?’ is from Lette’s ‘No’ response. Lette critiques the derivational form ‘post-feminist’, with the textual-conceptual functions of contrasting
and implying again interacting to present a cynical impression of the meaning of a particular form of ‘feminist/s/ism’. After detailing statistics that show that women do more housework than men, Lette argues that “any woman who calls herself a ‘post-feminist’ has kept her Wonderbra and burnt her brains”. Central to the textual meaning of ‘post-feminist’ here is the contrast that is drawn between “Wonderbra” and “brains”: that these should be considered opposites in this context is clear from the near antonymous processes in which they are the goal – burning and keeping. This contrast in turn produces the implied meaning that those who use the term ‘post-feminist’ are foolish. This meaning occurs as a result of a flout of the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975): Lette does not explicitly say that post-feminists are foolish, but the contrast between an item that symbolises consumerism and sexuality on the one hand, and the organ associated with intellectualism on the other, implies that post-feminists favour frivolity over political thought. The reader’s understanding of this contrast – between the superordinates of ‘consumerist’ and ‘intellectual’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ – partly depends on their knowledge of the kinds of activism that feminists were infamously involved in, such as the alleged burning of bras at the 1968 Miss America pageant. Like the other examples of metalanguage from the ‘Yes’ responses, the textual meaning of ‘feminist/s/ism’ that Lette creates presents the idea of a feminist past and a less feminist present: unlike the other examples, Lette is ambivalent about ‘post-feminist’, rather than the more familiar ‘feminist’.

3.2.2 Unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’

Unmodified occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are those to which no pre- or postmodification is attached. These occurrences are of interest to the investigation of the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ as – by not specifying a specific variety or group - they present ‘feminism’ as a universal and feminists as a homogenous group. The way the other textual-conceptual functions construct the textual meanings of unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’ are therefore of interest in relation to the contrasting arguments that newspaper articles portray feminism as either “monolithic” (Douglas, 1994, p. 274) or “fragmented” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 49).

The analysis below uses the textual-conceptual function of representing actions/events/states as a foundation. This function allows me to look at how, through representations of states, writers provide their own definitions of ‘feminist/s/ism’ and acknowledge the contestability of these definitions (section 3.2.2.1). I then turn to an analysis of representations of actions, showing how material action processes present ‘feminism’ as a force that has had negative effects.

3.2.2.1 Unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the representation of states

Where unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’ is represented in a state, writers ascribe definitions and qualities to it. These relational processes also provide evidence of the contestation of the meaning of ‘feminist/s/ism’. The definitions attributed to ‘feminism’ resemble the OED (2015) definition quoted in section 1.1: “Advocacy of equality of the sexes and the establishment of the political, social, and
economic rights of the female sex; the movement associated with this’. For example, Lee-Potter (‘Yes’) uses the textual-conceptual function of presenting speech to quote a famous feminist’s definition of feminism that emphasises the idea of feminism as a belief (Kelly, 1982, p. 67), observing that “As writer Marilyn French says: ‘Feminism is a belief that women matter as much as men do’”. This definition also focuses on the significance of the relationship between men and women to feminism, with the comparative structure – “women matter as much as men do” – producing the assumed meaning that men matter through a logical presupposition: French’s definition observes that men’s importance is assumed, and seeks to make a case for women’s equality in this respect. Mooney’s (‘No’) definition also emphasises the idea of feminism as a belief and as something primarily concerned with relations between the sexes: “To me, feminism means simply knowing the sexes are equal, that men and women have to work together in mutual respect to create a better world”. With “To me”, Mooney acknowledges the contestability of the meaning of ‘feminism’: the adverbial plays a hypothesising role, and the proximally deictic “me” limits the applicability of this definition to Mooney alone, acknowledging that others may have different definitions.

Stothard’s ‘Yes’ response also provides a definition of feminism, and the interaction of the textual-conceptual functions of representing actions/events/states and contrasting demonstrates the contestability of ‘feminism’. Stothard argues that “Feminism should not be about the pressure to have everything at once, but about the freedom to choose what you want”. Here, the two different states in which feminism is represented are contrasted through the negated opposition frame – ‘should not be X, but Y’ – drawing a contrast between an unsatisfactory conception of what feminism is about and a more approved one. This contrast is strengthened by the near antonymous “pressure” and “freedom”, as well as the deontically modal “should”, which not only shows that Stothard has a preference for one definition over the other, but that her approach to the definition of ‘feminism’ is a prescriptivist one. There is also an interaction of the textual-conceptual functions of representing society and implying in Stothard’s assertion that “Feminism doesn’t mean so much to my generation”. Like the Mooney definition, this example uses an adverbial that contains person deixis to limit the applicability of a proposition concerning feminism to a particular group of people – in this case, Stothard (who is nineteen years-old) and people of a similar age. The lack of any information about what feminism might mean to other generations results in a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), with the reader left to infer that feminism may have been more meaningful to previous generations. The textual-conceptual functions of prioritising and contrasting also play a role in explaining Stothard’s perception of feminism in the subordinate clause, in which a negated opposition underlines the fact that feminism’s goals have been accomplished: “not because we don’t think it’s important, but because our equality – at least in this country – has already been established”. The because-clause here not only provides an explanation for the attitude of Stothard’s generation, but the negated clause serves as a defence against the perception that this generation is simply apathetic.

‘Feminism’ also appears as a carrier in the ‘Yes’ responses of Iley and D’Argy Smith. The textual-conceptual function of contrasting is used by Iley to compare different perceptions of feminism, in her observation that “Feminism sounds more like a medical condition than cause”. Here, the
attribute features a comparative ‘more X than Y’ opposition, measuring one opposite – “a medical condition” – against another, “cause” (Jones, 2002, p. 76). In this instance, the plane of difference (Davies, 2008, p. 185) on which the opposites are placed at different ends would appear to be one of ‘advantageousness to one’s health’, with a medical condition being at the less advantageous end and cause at the more advantageous end. D’Argy Smith also attributes a negative quality to feminism, directly addressing the headline question in her categorical assertion that “Feminism is dead”. However, this example demonstrates that while writers do portray feminism as dead (as noted by previous studies, for example Callaghan et al., 1999; Christie, 1998; Rhode, 1995), this does not necessarily mean that writers’ perceptions of feminism are negative: D’Argy Smith again uses contrasting, with the concessive opposition trigger at the start of the next sentence – “But” – contrasting the unfortunate fact of feminism’s death with her perception of this event - “But I grieve in silence”. The material action process of grieving is clearly a negatively evaluative one; the meaning of “in silence” is less obvious. D’Argy Smith may mean that she chooses not to be vocal and demonstrative about her grief, or that she is grieving alone. The latter interpretation depends on the inference of an implied meaning brought about through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), as D’Argy Smith does not explain what other people are doing in response to feminism’s passing. Either way, the use of “But” to contrast the representation of a state in which feminism is dead with the representation of an action in which the writer is grieving demonstrates that, in this particular instance, a writer is presenting feminism’s demise as something regrettable.

3.2.2.2 Unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the representation of actions and events

Neither ‘feminist’ not ‘feminists’ occurs as an actor in any material action processes in ‘Is Feminism Dead?’ However, ‘feminism’ does appear as the actor in representations of actions and events. These occurrences are difficult to classify in terms of whether they are material action intention processes that involve an animate actor or - given the fact that ‘feminism’ is not a sentient being – material action event processes in which the actor is an inanimate entity, with the action being one that simply unfolds, rather than one put into motion by an animate actor. This blurring of the transitivity categories creates the effect of feminism as in some way alive, and able to act on the world as a united body.

‘Feminism’ is the actor in two material action processes in Iley’s ‘Yes’ response. The first instance is in a material action process in which Iley observes how “feminism created its own glass ceiling – women who are not supportive of each other and are much more competitive than men”. Although creating is usually an intentional process, in this instance it would seem to be a supervision process, as the goal – a metaphorical glass ceiling stopping women from achieving what they might - is clearly negatively evaluative. The second instance in Iley’s article has feminism as the actor in a process of teaching: “Feminism has also taught us that not having it all makes us feel guilty, and that ‘trying to have it all’ gives us at best a headache and at worst a breakdown”. The person deixis “us” refers anaphorically to “women” in the previous sentence, and the lesson being taught here seems salutary at best: as a woman, you are doomed either to feel guilty or to suffer some form of ill health.
The third process in which ‘feminism’ is the actor is again negatively evaluative: Lette (‘No’) observes that “men are claiming that feminism has passed its amuse-by date”. While Lette’s response is pro-feminist (‘No, feminism is not dead’), this example demonstrates how writers invoke others’ repudiations of feminism: in this instance, Lette uses the textual-conceptual function of presenting speech to observe negative perceptions of feminism (note the use of the inclusive noun “men” and indirect speech presentation to summarise the views of a large portion of the world’s population). The unfamiliarity of the phrase “amuse-by date” also brings about an implicature through a flout of the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975): men not only see feminism as irrelevant, but also as no longer even having the quality of being amusing in its irrelevance.

The material action processes in which unmodified ‘feminism’ is an actor highlight one way in which writers can construct a particular textual meaning of ‘feminism’: representing what is usually seen as a movement, belief or outlook (Kelly, 1982, p. 67) as an entity that actively brings about actions and events creates the sense of feminism as some sort of force. The goals that result from these actions and events are either negative or distressing, reinforcing the idea of feminism as a movement that either did not achieve much, or that in places even did harm.

3.2.3 ‘Feminist/s/ism’ with minimal modification

In the present study, ‘minimal modification’ is used to refer to the modification of a head noun through determiners – for example ‘the’, ‘his’, ‘Britain’s’ - and/or predeterminers, e.g. ‘first’, ‘one of’, ‘three’. Occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ with minimal modification pick out a particular feminism, feminist or group of feminists, for example ‘the feminist’, ‘her feminism’, ‘some of the feminists’.

Occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ with minimal modification in ‘Is Feminism Dead?’ take the form of ‘a feminist’. As noted in the analysis of unmodified ‘feminism’ in actions and events (see section 3.2.2.2 above), ‘feminist’ does not appear as an actor in representations of actions and events. Instead, it appears in representations of states that concern whether or not a particular individual is a feminist. These occurrences reflect a characteristic of media portrayals of feminism observed by Mendes (2011a, p. 132): anxiety about who can or cannot be a feminist. ‘A feminist’ occurs as the carrier in relational processes, and there are no occurrences in which someone’s feminism is presented as straightforward and incontestable. This is most clearly the case where negating is used to reverse the meaning of a proposition, as in Murray and Mooney’s ‘No’ responses. In each instance, the textual-conceptual function of speech presentation attributes words that express uncertainty about the speaker or hearer’s feminist credentials to someone else: Murray observes that “for 30 years I’ve been hearing women say: ‘I’m not a feminist, but didn’t like it when they sacked me when I was pregnant’”, while Mooney recalls how “a newspaper editor asked me: ‘You’re not a feminist, you?’” Murray’s observation fits with previous studies’ (for example Walby, 2011) detection of the ‘I’m not a feminist, but’ construction in media portrayals of feminism, while the interrogative used by Murray’s editor demonstrates others’ uncertainty about who is a feminist. These examples demonstrate how even pro-feminist writers discuss others’ uncertainty or lack of enthusiasm concerning feminism. This
is also notable in the closing sentence of Murray’s ‘No’ response, in which she says that “The older and wiser among us can only wait for the day when they’re finally forced to say, ‘Yes. I am a feminist. And proud of it’”. Again, speech presentation presents someone else discussing who is or is not a feminist. Importantly however, in this instance the speech occurs at a low level of the clause structure, and is purely hypothetical. The “day” when people say this is the goal in a material supervision process of waiting for something, with the actor being “The older and wiser among us”: this – in particular the use of the proximal person deixis “us”, which brings the “older and wiser” among the readers onside – contrasts with the “they” who may one day declare themselves to be feminist, which refers cataphorically to “the young” in a previous sentence. Here, again, the idea of a split between generations is presented: the “older and wiser” understand the significance of feminism, while “the young”, at present, do not.

Other examples emphasise the idea of people being uncertain about who the ‘feminist’ label can be applied to. A couple of these are discussed in relation to metalanguage (section 3.2.1), in the Rebecca West quote about the circumstances in which she is called a ‘feminist’ (Leslie – ‘Yes’) and Lettie’s (‘No’) sceptical comments about people who describe themselves as a ‘post-feminist’. In a further example from Leslie’s response, the categorical assertion in her statement that “Every woman is a feminist these days” displays a complete certainty about the feminism of all those referred to in the carrier element. However, the subsequent optional adverbial makes it clear that this is not Leslie’s perception of things, but rather that of the writer Natasha Walter: “according to the author of The New Feminism, a dreary book I had to review not long ago, which tried to breathe life into the dead corpse of feminism as an ideology”. This adverbial attributes the sentiment of the main clause to Walter, and the complex way in which Walter is named makes it clear that Leslie is cynical about the veracity of this point of view: Walter is denoted by the noun “author”, which is postmodified by the prepositional phrase “of The New Feminism”, which in turn is presented as equivalent with the appositive noun phrase starting with “a dreary book”. The amount of (negative) detail packaged up into the noun phrase that refers to Walter demonstrates how naming can be used to package up a lot of assumptions and opinions about a referent, and how this information can in turn affect the meaning of the main proposition of a sentence – in this case, that ‘feminist’ does not in fact apply to all women.

3.2.4 ‘Feminist/s/ism’ with detailed modification

The present study uses ‘detailed modification’ to refer to the use of premodifying adjectives (for example ‘radical’, ‘new’, ‘feisty’), appositive noun phrases (e.g. ‘the word feminist’) and postmodifying prepositional phrases (‘of the second wave’, ‘in the 1960s’) and relative clauses (‘who fought for women’s rights’, ‘which is based on ideology’) in addition to the types of minimal modification discussed in section 3.2.3 above. Note that occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ with detailed modification are likely to present feminism and feminists as more various than unmodified occurrences or occurrences with minimal modification, picking out specific types and varieties (Dean, 2010). Naming itself is of greater ideological interest in cases of detailed modification: the packaging up of detailed
information into the noun phrase allows writers to present assumptions and opinions about feminism
and feminists as inherent to the referent.

Leslie’s reference to Natasha Walter’s *The New Feminism* (discussed in section 3.2.3 above)
is among a number of examples of detailed modification where the writers package up negative views
of, and stereotypes about, feminism and feminists. The majority of these occurrences appear in the
‘Yes, feminism is dead’ arguments. For example, Leslie’s reference to *The New Feminism* includes
the noun phrase “the dead corpse of feminism as an ideology”. This example demonstrates the
overlap between the textual-conceptual functions of naming and assuming: the use of the definite
determiner “the” produces an existential presupposition about the contents of the noun phrase – the
corpse is assumed to exist. The postmodification specifies that it is the ideological side of feminism
that is dead, and Leslie also uses contrasting to present the idea of a gap between older, ideological
feminists and younger, more care-free women: “[Natasha Walter] condescendingly put them right,
informing young women that they shouldn’t feel they’re not feminists just because they like men
and push-up bras – unlike her own feminist mother, who believes that even depilatories are ideological”.
Here, a concessive opposition is created by the trigger “unlike”, which emphasises the gap between
ideologues and non-ideologues. Leslie’s preference for the non-ideologues is made clear by the
detailed naming of Walter’s mother who, Leslie claims, “believes that even depilatories are ideological”:
“even” here triggers a logical presupposition – if Natasha Walter’s mother deems even depilatories to be ideological, then presumably she deems anything to be ideological.

Leslie also emphasises the idea of feminism as something old and overtly political in other
instances of naming. She notes that “the Equal Opportunities Commission study discovered that we
think of the ideological feminism of the past as ‘old-fashioned’ and ‘man-hating’”. There is another
existential presupposition here, which assumes that this type of feminism exists (or at least existed at
one point), and the characterisation of it as “old-fashioned” and “man-hating” is the phenomenon in a
mental reaction process of ‘thinking of’, thereby emphasising people’s negative perceptions of
feminism through the representation of actions/events/states. The assertion is leant extra strength by
the fact that the person deixis “we”, an inclusive plural pronoun, is the senser in the mental
process/thinker in the presentation of thought – Leslie assumes that the reader will be onside with her
view of “the ideological feminism of the past”. Leslie once more uses naming to package up ideas
about irrelevance and extremity in her observation that “Surely […] that puritanically bossy period of
feminism only now exists in Ye Olde Feminist Folkloric Ghetto, ‘personed’ by covens of ageing Speculum Sisters who still believe that shaving one’s armpits is a betrayal of the Revolution”. Here,
the first noun phrase produces an existential presupposition that a “bossy” type of feminism exists;
further, this type of feminism is portrayed as the existent in an existential process, with the adverbial
placing it in “only” one place – “Ye Olde Feminist Folkloric Ghetto”. This second noun phrase
produces another existential presupposition, and a significant amount of information is packaged up
about the kind of people – the negatively evaluative “covens” – who occupy such a place. The
absurdity that this type of feminism could still exist is underlined through the textual-conceptual
function of hypothesising, with the epistemic adverb “Surely” expressing Leslie’s high level of
confidence about the irrelevance of this type of feminism, and also through a logical presupposition in the second noun phrase, triggered by “still”: it is assumed that the “covens” have for some time believed that “shaving one’s armpits is a betrayal of the Revolution”, a belief that Leslie considers foolish. Lee-Potter also speculates as to the origins of negatively stereotyped feminists, suggesting that “The most aggressive feminists, I suspect, came from families where there was a domineering father and a disappointed, defeated mother”. This proposition also uses hypothesising, with the modal verb “suspect” conveying Lee-Potter’s degree of confidence about the proposition, itself a relational circumstance process speculating on the type of home life that this type of feminist grew up with.

There is also an implied meaning here – Lee-Potter does not make the relevance of this speculation clear, thereby flouting the maxim of relation (Grice, 1975) to imply that one only grows up to be feminist in an aggressive way if one has grown up in unhappy circumstances.

Other occurrences of detailed modification portray contemporary feminism as something that is difficult to define, or that possibly does not even exist. Stothard’s ‘Yes’ response includes two references to the concept of a ‘new’ feminism. Like instances observed by Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012, p. 416) study of UK newspapers, these demonstrate the writer’s suspicions that this is a dubious concept. Stothard’s response opens with the observation that “There are subtle anomalies in the way men and women are viewed, but 21st-century feminism no longer has much to fight about”. Here, the premodification of ‘feminism’ posits the existence of a particular feminism attached to a particular, contemporary, point in time. However, both the negation of the state in which this new type of feminism is represented – a relational possessive process of (not) having “much to fight about” – and the contrast through the concessive opposition triggered by “but”, which notes that the sentiment of this proposition is surprising in light of the existence of gender inequalities, emphasise the irrelevance of this new feminism. A further meaning comes about through the textual-conceptual function of assuming, with the iterative trigger “no longer” presupposing the idea that feminism did once have something to fight about, thereby drawing a line between the importance of an older feminism, and the lack of importance of the newer variety. Stothard also notes that the boys at her sixth form “seemed justifiably confused as to their role in this new ‘comfortable feminism’”: here, quotation marks are used to create an effect of ironic distancing, and the placing of this type of feminism subordinate to the complement “confused” emphasises the difficulties of understanding what this type of feminism means.

A final example appears in Norman’s ‘No’ response, in which she notes her position in a feminist lineage: her grandmother was “a pre-feminist” in a time before feminism, and her mother was “one of the first bona fide feminists”. However, Norman ruefully concedes that this “leaves me, I guess, a post-feminist feminist in less well-defined territory”. This example demonstrates how different textual-conceptual functions interact to produce a specific meaning of ‘feminist/s/ism’. First of all, the use of “post-feminist” to premodify “feminist” creates the seemingly contradictory idea of a type of feminist who exists subsequent to the time of feminism, while the postmodification – “in less well-defined territory” – underlines the elusive nature of this type of feminist. The textual-conceptual function of implying is again crucial to how writers construct different meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’.
Norman does not specify what territory this territory is less-defined than, and so the reader is left to infer that this is a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), with Norman drawing a comparison with the relatively defined territory occupied by her mother and grandmother’s generations. Norman’s confidence about contemporary feminism is also evident in her use of the textual-conceptual function of hypothesising, with the epistemically modal “I guess” modalising the proposition in which she attributes to herself the quality of being “a post-feminist feminist”: Norman herself is not certain that this is the type of feminist that she is. Finally, the textual-conceptual function of contrasting emphasises the comparison between Norman on one side, and her grandmother and mother on the other. Norman’s grandmother and mother each appear as carriers in relational processes, in which they are attributed the qualities of being “a pre-feminist” and “one of the first bona fide feminists” respectively; these representations of states are placed in parallel with the relational process in which Norman herself is the carrier, serving to emphasise the differences between the generations. The relationship of antonymy between “pre-feminist” and “post-feminist”, and the fact that Norman’s mother’s feminist credentials are described as “bona fide” (and, through a flout of the maxim of relation (Grice, 1975), therefore somehow more ‘real’ than Norman’s) enhances the idea of different possible meanings of ‘feminist’. This particular example powerfully demonstrates how even pro-feminist articles express uncertainty about what feminism means in the 21st century, and about who can be a feminist.

3.2.5 Concluding remarks

The sample analysis of ‘Is Feminism Dead?’ has demonstrated how the textual-conceptual functions construct textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’. For example, the analysis of naming identifies different types of feminism and feminists, the analysis of representing actions/events/states identifies instances where writers provide definitions of ‘feminist/s/ism’, and the analysis of contrasting and presenting time, space and society highlights occurrences of explicit contestation of the lexemes’ meanings. The identification of occurrences of metalanguage was also useful in identifying places in the data in which the writers explicitly discuss denotative and connotative meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’.

The sample analysis also demonstrates the usefulness of the textual-conceptual functions of naming and representing actions/events/states as entry points for a critical stylistic analysis that employs the full range of functions. Naming is pertinent to all occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’, while representing actions/events/states is pertinent to the vast majority (with the exception of rare occurrences that do not occur in a clause). Having identified, for example, unmodified occurrences of ‘feminism’, it was then possible to look at how feminism as an entirety is represented in different types of processes, for example relational processes that provide definitions. I then used a full analysis to demonstrate, for example, how Stothard constructs a particular textual meaning of ‘feminism’ which contests other definitions, in this instance through the use of hypothesising, negating and contrasting in addition to naming and representing actions/events/states. The analyses of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data in chapters 5-7 deal with a far greater amount of data, and so sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1 provide
statistical overviews of naming and representing actions/events/states, identifying entry points for the full analysis of ‘feminism’, ‘feminist(s)’ and adjectival ‘feminist’.

Critical stylistic analysis is also shown to be able to provide linguistic evidence for and against previous studies’ perceptions concerning the way feminism is portrayed in newspaper articles. Many of the findings in the analysis are pertinent to the frames outlined in section 2.3. For instance, the analysis of contrasting showed how constructed oppositions create contrasts between old and new types of feminism and feminist, and radical and non-radical types of feminism and women, while the analysis of naming and presenting time, space and society showed that political strands of feminism are placed in the past, while new types of feminism are treated as somehow vague. Full analysis utilising the range of textual-conceptual functions also provided linguistic evidence for the idea that feminism is portrayed as complex, for example in the way naming, representing actions/events/states, contrasting and hypothesising in Norman’s argument emphasise the idea of different types of feminist in different ages, with some easier to define than others.

3.3 Summary

This chapter has described each of the textual-conceptual functions set out by Jeffries (2010a) and has detailed the different ways in which they are linguistically realised in texts. The sample analysis in section 3.2 demonstrated how each of the functions plays a role in constructing the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in an article taken from the data, and the usefulness of naming and representing actions/events/states to provide entry points for a full critical stylistic analysis.

In chapter 4, I explain how I collected the data and built datasets, before describing the process by which I annotated these for each of the ten textual-conceptual functions. This annotation then serves as the foundation for the analysis in chapters 5-7.
Chapter 4: Collection and annotation of the data

This chapter explains how I sourced and collected the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data, and how I annotated it according to the textual-conceptual functions outlined in chapter 3. The requirement for the data was that it should be both representative and manageable. The data had to cover the period between 2000 and 2009 and the range of UK national newspapers, with an ample amount of data to represent each year and each newspaper. A representative dataset ensures that the investigation offers a more thorough picture of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in newspaper articles than existing studies of the period (see discussion in section 2.2). The dataset also had to be of a manageable size, so that the annotation of the textual-conceptual functions would not be too time-consuming and would form a clear and accessible foundation for the subsequent analysis (chapters 5-7).

Section 4.1 discusses the source of the data and how I selected data that was as representative as possible. Section 4.2 describes how and why I divided the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data into five datasets corresponding to word class, before section 4.3 explains the process by which I annotated the datasets for the textual-conceptual functions introduced in chapter 3. I also discuss how I dealt with problems concerning the extent to which I could analyse each occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’ during the annotation process, for example decisions on what level of clausal analysis to use when annotating transitivity processes.

4.1 Collection of the data

The discussion below provides a description of the data source that I selected (section 4.1.1) and an explanation of how I selected the data that makes up the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data (section 4.1.2).

4.1.1 Selection of the data source

The data source for the study is Nexis UK, a searchable electronic repository available through LexisNexis. Nexis UK (Nexis hereafter) allows the researcher to search for particular search terms in various types of corpora, including newspaper corpora3. This has made it a popular resource for corpus linguistic studies of newspaper data (for example Baker & Levon, 2015; Branum & Charteris-Black, 2015; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012).

The Nexis corpus ‘UK Publications’ includes data for eight of the ten top-selling UK national newspapers in the National Readership Survey (NRS) figures for the final month of the period under investigation – December 20094:

3 See http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis for more information on Nexis UK.
4 See http://www.nrs.co.uk/toplinereadership.html.
The two titles from the NRS list that are not available are The Daily Star and The Daily Record. The former is a red-top tabloid similar to The Sun, and the latter focuses specifically on Scottish issues. With the exception of these omissions, the newspapers available through Nexis cover the main titles available to readers across the UK through 2000-2009.

Data covering the entirety of 2000-2009 is available for seven of the eight newspapers. The exception is The Telegraph, for which data covering the period from 1st January 2000 to 30th October 2000 is not available. However, the data available for the remainder of The Telegraph in 2000 does include articles on feminism, and so it is still possible to gain a picture of The Telegraph's coverage of feminism in 2000. Of the eight newspapers, Nexis includes Sunday editions for all except The Sun, which during the period under investigation was represented on a Sunday by The News of the World. In line with previous research on press portrayals of particular groups (for example Kim, 2014), I decided to include all editions and sections in the data. Therefore, articles relating to feminism from sports, finance sections and fashion supplements are included in the data, providing as broad as possible a picture of the impression of feminism that each newspaper would have given its readers.

4.1.2 Selection of the data

I used Nexis’s wildcard option – ‘feminis!’ - to find data covering the newspapers’ use of ‘feminist/s/ism’ between 2000 and 2009. This brought up results that included not only the root forms ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’, but also words formed by the addition of morphemes in word-final position, for example ‘feminisms’ and ‘feministing’. However, the wildcard search does not pick up on variations formed by adding morphemes to the beginning of the word. This meant that variations such as ‘anti-feminist’ were recognised by Nexis (which treats the hyphen as a space), while unhyphenated variations (‘antifeminist’) were not. It is possible, therefore, that articles that contain uses of unhyphenated derivational forms were not identified by Nexis, and are therefore not included in the data. However, where unhyphenated forms do occur in the articles in the data, I include them so as to give as full as possible an overview of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the texts.
The data comprises three articles per newspaper per year, in order to ensure that all newspapers and the entirety of the period under investigation are represented. I used Nexis to order search results according to relevance, ranking the results “according to greatest frequency and relevancy of terms” (Lexis Nexis, 2012, p. 16). This meant that those articles in which the search term occurred most frequently in relation to total number of words appeared at the top of the results. I also used Nexis’s ‘duplicate options’ setting to ensure that reproductions of the same article would not appear in the results. Performing each search – for example ‘feminis!’ in The Mail from 1st January 2003 to 31st December 2003 – in turn, I found that selecting the three most relevant articles from each newspaper and year (240 articles in total) provided me with 2,539 occurrences of the search term. This fell within my expectations of what would be manageable. It also allowed for future alterations: if, during the annotation and analysis stages, I found that the amount of data was too great, I could revisit the Nexis relevance results and remove the third most relevant article for each year of each newspaper from the data, resulting in a smaller and more manageable amount of data.

I downloaded the results of each search into individual Word files – for example Mail 03, which contained the three most relevant Mail articles from 2003 (including ‘Is Feminism Dead?’), analysed in section 3.2 - and provided a code for each article within each file, e.g. Mail 03a (‘Is Feminism Dead?’), Mail 03b (‘Sorry, But Warthogs Have You Beat, Guys’) and Mail 03c (‘Girlyvision’). This resulted in a total of 80 files, one for each year of each newspaper. I then used Word’s search function to search for the segment ‘feminis’, allowing me to find all occurrences of ‘feminism’, ‘feminist(s)’ and derivational forms such as ‘post-feminist’ and ‘anti-feminism’. I placed each sentence in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurred into an Excel file, and labelled each sentence according to the newspaper and article it appeared in, and the date of publication. This ensured that I could easily find any contextual information that I might need during the annotation and analysis stages. I also labelled occurrences according to their placement in an article (for example headline, photo caption, main body), whether they were part of the title of a book, magazine, etc. (e.g. in the book title The New Feminism), and if they were from a passage of reported speech (e.g. “National Public Radio asks if she’s the ‘new face of feminism’” (Guardian 08a)).

At this stage it was possible to gain an overview of how much of the data was drawn from each newspaper and each year. Figure 4.1 shows how the 2,539 occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are distributed across the eight newspapers:
Although the focus of the study is not on differences between the various newspapers’ coverage of feminism, figure 4.1 provides an early result. It shows that a greater proportion of occurrences are from the broadsheets (The Guardian, The Independent, The Telegraph and The Times) than the tabloids. This accords with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy's (2012, p. 409) finding that 'feminism' in the Bank of English reference corpus occurs more in broadsheets than tabloids. The predominance of The Guardian also reflects its status as “probably the only mainstream publication in the UK that frequently tackles questions to do with the current state of feminism” (Dean, 2010, p. 396). This could be seen to make the study unbalanced, with the balance in favour of the broadsheets. However, I argue that the fact that different newspapers account for varying proportions of the data reflects the relative levels of attention that each newspaper gives to feminism: a reader’s understanding of the meaning of ‘feminist/ism’ would be more influenced by the broadsheets than the tabloids were they to read all the newspapers in the data.

The data also provides a snapshot of coverage across the decade. Figure 4.2 shows how many occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ were taken from each year:
The number of occurrences fluctuates between 166 in 2005 and 342 in 2009. Because of the way in which I gathered data (selecting articles with the most occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in comparison to total words), figure 4.2 does not show trends in coverage of feminism and feminists across the decade. It does, however, demonstrate that there is a spread of data representing the whole of the decade.

4.2 Creation of the datasets

The discussion here describes how I annotated the data for word class, providing an overview of ‘feminism’, ‘feminist(s)’ and adjectival ‘feminist’ in the data, before using this annotation to divide the data into five separate datasets.

4.2.1 Annotation of word class

The first stage of annotation was to label each occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’ for word class. In the case of ‘feminist’, I looked at each sentence in order to determine noun and adjectival occurrences. I also annotated occurrences of ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ that functioned as a determiner – e.g. “feminism's battles” (Express 01b) – in the belief that there may be differences between the way that ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ are used as nouns and the way that they are used as determiners. This annotation was informed by Biber et al.'s *Longman Grammar* (1999), which “describes the actual use of grammatical features in different varieties of English” (p. 4); its descriptions of typical grammatical
features of newspaper language proved especially helpful during the annotation and analysis stages (see, for example, the discussion of ‘block language’ in section 6.1).

In some cases, I returned to the original data files in order to determine word class. Occurrences that were difficult to categorise included those in minimal sentences, e.g. “Feminine vs Feminist” (Mail 01b). Here, I categorised ‘feminist’ as an adjective on the grounds that it is coordinated with an adjective, and words coordinate with others of the same class (Biber et al., 1999, p. 68). For occurrences that appeared in scare quotes - e.g. “you can take any quality you think I have and apply it to ‘feminist’” (Times 02c) - I used a substitution test, determining that, in this example from Times 02c, ‘feminist’ is a noun as substituting it would require a noun or noun phrase in order for the proposition to still make sense.

In some instances, ‘feminism’ occurs in compound noun phrases such as “feminism drive” (Sun 09b), “feminism jungle” (Mail 03c) and “feminism bandwagon” (Guardian 06c). I annotated these occurrences as nouns on the basis that they are more akin to noun + noun compounds such as ‘bar code’ or ‘lamp post’ than to adjective + noun compounds such as ‘real estate’ or ‘greatcoat’ (Biber et al., 1999, p. 326). Conducting a test for stress patterns also suggested that each occurrence carries initial stress, a characteristic of noun compounds such as ‘heart attack’ (Biber et al., 1999, p. 590), reinforcing the impression of each of these occurrences as a noun, e.g. “the Americans who were first into the feminism jungle appear to have emerged on the far side” (Mail 03c).

Before beginning the annotation of the textual-conceptual functions, I divided the 2,539 occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ into five datasets based on word class. Three of the datasets account for the different possible noun forms – ‘feminism’, ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ – and the other two for adjectives and determiners. This division reflects the fact that ‘feminism’ as a phenomenon, the people represented by ‘feminist(s)’, and things described as ‘feminist’ are discussed in different ways, as well as the fact that the different grammatical roles that each word class plays necessitates different approaches to annotation. The five datasets also included related derivational forms, as occurrences of these were either compound nouns (as described above) or derived nouns or adjectives formed with prefixes that do not result in a change of word class. For example, I included occurrences of ‘anti-feminism’ in the feminism dataset, and noun and adjectival occurrences of ‘post-feminist’ in the feminist and adjectives datasets.

4.2.2 Statistical overview of word class

The creation of separate datasets for different word classes provides an initial impression of the make-up of the data. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of ‘feminist/s/ism’ into nouns, adjectives and determiners:
Figure 4.3 shows that the majority of occurrences (1,841) are nouns, with 673 adjectives and 25 determiners. ‘Feminism’ accounts for slightly over half (996) of noun occurrences. There are then 410 occurrences of ‘feminist’ and a slightly greater number of occurrences of plural ‘feminists’ (435).

Table 4.1 details the derived nouns and adjectives contained in each dataset:
The majority of derivational forms are adjectival, and account for 12% of the adjectives dataset. This may be the result of the greater adaptability of adjective forms to occur in derived forms. It is notable that the most frequent prefix for derivational forms in each dataset is ‘post-‘. This corresponds with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012, pp. 416-417) finding that ‘post-‘ frequently modifies ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ in UK national newspapers, a finding that in turn leads them to suggest that “feminism is often framed as a thing of the past” (pp. 416-417). Mendes (2012) also comments on ‘post-‘ forms, suggesting that they present the idea of feminism as “dead” or redundant (p. 554). The frequency of ‘post-‘ in my own data, allied with findings from previous studies (see discussion of post-feminism in section 2.1.1), indicates that analysis of these forms is necessary for a full understanding of the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ (see, for example, the discussion of adjectival ‘post-feminist’ in section 7.4.1). Negating is also a feature of the prefixes – ‘anti-‘, ‘non-‘, ‘un-‘ - in table 4.1, highlighting the role of derivation in presenting the idea of antithetical forms of feminism and feminists (see discussion of negated derivational forms of adjectival ‘feminist’ in section 7.4.3).

The remainder of chapter 4 describes the process by which I annotated the five datasets using the textual-conceptual functions.
4.3 Annotation of textual-conceptual functions

The present section explains how I annotated the datasets using the ten textual-conceptual functions outlined in chapter 3. I discuss the annotation of naming and of representing actions/events/states in particular detail, reflecting the fact that the annotation of these textual-conceptual functions provides the foundations for the annotation of the other eight functions: for example, I base the annotation of negating on the annotation of representing actions/events/states, rather than returning to the sentences selected during the data collection process discussed in section 4.1.2.

The attention I afford to naming and representing actions/events/states also reflects the role these textual-conceptual functions play in providing a foundation for the analysis. Each of the 2,539 occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ is of interest in terms of naming, whether it is modified or not modified: modified occurrences are of interest for the way they package up information about, and perceptions of, feminism and feminists (see the discussion of naming in section 3.1.1), while unmodified occurrences are of interest for the way they represent feminism and feminists as universals. Similarly, the majority of occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are part of at least one transitivity process (see section 4.3.2.2), and are therefore represented as involved in an action, event or state. By contrast, the other textual-conceptual functions apply to fewer occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’, and are therefore less central in how textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are constructed. As noted in section 3.2, I also use naming and representing actions/events/states to provide entry points for the analysis of ‘feminist/s/ism’ (see sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1).

4.3.1 Annotation of naming

I annotated naming for each of the five datasets. The following discussion explains the process I used for nouns, adjectives and determiners.

4.3.1.1 Nouns

I annotated each noun occurrence according to both the full noun phrase in which it occurs and the noun phrase in which it is head, with the detailed annotation of pre- and postmodification focusing on the latter, for example “traditional feminists” rather than “some especially restless demons that afflict traditional feminists” (Independent 01a). This reflects the fact that the annotation of full noun phrases would be complex and result in an annotation that would be difficult to analyse. Table 4.2 provides a snapshot of how I annotated naming in the noun datasets:
Table 4.2: Annotation of ‘feminist/s/ism’-headed noun phrases

The focus on noun phrases in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ is the head highlights one of the problems of annotating textual-conceptual functions in a large collection of data. If the intention is to focus on a particular word, then dealing with all noun phrases in their entirety may prove impractical. In this case, I decided to use a consistent approach to naming across the data that would maintain a strong focus on the object of study – ‘feminist/s/ism’ - and the way it is packaged up in noun phrases.

The annotation of pre- and postmodification reflects the structuring of noun phrases: any premodifiers, followed by the head noun, and then any postmodification. The columns preceding the form column account for the different possibilities in the way a head noun can be premodified: predeterminers (for example ‘some of’, ‘all of’), determiners (e.g. ‘her’, ‘Britain’s’), further predeterminers (e.g. ‘first’, ‘three’) and adjectives (e.g. ‘fellow’, ‘crazy’). I included quantifying collectives such as ‘generation of’ and ‘bunch of’ in the predeterminer column, as they perform a similar function to other forms noted by Biber et al. (1999, p. 248) such as ‘a number of’ and ‘a couple of’.
I also categorised premodifying adjectives in order to gain a more detailed picture of the different ways in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ is described. To do this, I used Biber et al.’s (1999, pp. 508-509) distinction between descriptors – adjectives that tend to be gradable, and that denote features like colour, age and size – and classifiers, which tend to be non-gradable and place referents into categories. This distinction is useful for looking at how the textual meaning of ‘feminist/s/ism’ is constructed, and for testing previous studies’ (Dean, 2010; Jarowska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2012) claims that newspaper articles have a tendency to divide feminism into different varieties (see section 2.3). Biber et al. (1999) split descriptors and classifiers into smaller semantic groupings, reflecting the roles that different types of adjectives fulfil. Table 4.4 provides a summary of these groupings, with examples from the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phrase</th>
<th>Predeterminer</th>
<th>Determiner</th>
<th>Predeterminer</th>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The fringe of odd, demented, man-hating feminists (Telegraph 01c)</td>
<td>The fringe</td>
<td>odd</td>
<td>demented</td>
<td>man-</td>
<td>hating</td>
<td>feminists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-wave, capital-letter (Telegraph 05b)</td>
<td>First-</td>
<td>capital-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>feminists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One of Britain’s first feminists (Sun 01a)</td>
<td>One of</td>
<td>Britain’s</td>
<td>first</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>feminists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Annotation of premodification of ‘feminist/s/ism’
Table 4.4: Semantic groupings of adjectives

This means of grouping adjectives is not perfect, for the reason that some adjectives defy simple categorisation. For example, an adjective such as ‘aggressive’ clearly plays a describing, as opposed to a categorising, role, but it is difficult to determine whether it ought to be classified as a miscellaneous/descriptive descriptor or – considering its negative connotations – evaluative/emotive descriptor. Other adjectives – for example ‘militant’, ‘radical’, ‘traditional’ – could be perceived as descriptors or classifiers: miscellaneous/descriptive descriptors that draw attention to a certain quality of the referent, or topical/other classifiers that reflect a particular subject area or the referent’s relationship to a noun, e.g. ‘militancy’, ‘radicalism’ or ‘tradition’. I categorised such occurrence as classifiers, due to the fact that attributive uses (those being looked at in this annotation) tend to carry a greater sense of classification than predicative uses, which note a particular aspect of the referent, for example in ‘the feminist is radical’. The frequent occurrence of adjectives such as ‘militant’, ‘radical’ and ‘traditional’ in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data further suggested that these are recognised types of feminist. These semantic groupings provide a means of gaining an impression of the ways in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ is premodified – for example, demonstrating that particular noun forms frequently occur with adjectives relating to time or affiliation (see, for example, the analysis of adjectives that premodify ‘feminists’ in section 6.3.3.3) – and further analysis in chapters 5-7 looks in greater detail at these classifications.

The annotation of post-modification captures postmodifying prepositional phrases and relative clauses in a single column:
Table 4.5: Annotation of postmodification of ‘feminist/s/ism’

The placing of postmodification in a single column reflects the fact that breaking some prepositional phrases and relative clauses down further into constituent parts would be arduous and produce an elaborate annotation.

The annotation of naming of nouns also accounts for apposition:

Table 4.6: Annotation of appositive noun phrases and coordinates

Appositive noun phrases such as those in “feminists, these so-called 24-carat, ball-breaking, bovver-booted females” (Express 03a) have equivalent status, sharing the same referent (Biber et al., 1999, p. 638). Apposition is not included in Jeffries’ (2010a) account of the textual-conceptual function of naming, which treats apposition as a linguistic realisation of the equating function. However, I include it in the annotation of naming as noun phrases used in apposition with ‘feminist/s/ism’ - such as “these so-called 24-carat, ball-breaking, bovver-booted females” – provide further detail about the referent, packaging information up in the noun phrase in a similar way to other forms of pre- and postmodification.
As with the annotation of nouns, the annotation of adjectives is based on the noun phrase, detailing the full phrase in which ‘feminist’ occurs and the phrase in which a noun that is premodified by ‘feminist’ is the head:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full phrase</th>
<th>Phrase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminist art <em>(Guardian 07b)</em></td>
<td>feminist art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie Bindel, a feminist campaigner and journalist <em>(Guardian 05c)</em></td>
<td>feminist campaigner and journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More of a need for feminist activism than ever <em>(Guardian 09a)</em></td>
<td>feminist activism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: Annotation of phrases containing adjectival ‘feminist’

The annotation accounts for occurrences where ‘feminist’ is a premodifier of a head noun – for example “feminist art” *(Guardian 07b)* - and occurrences where it acts as a clausal complement, e.g. “the movies were feminist” *(Mail 08b)*. Where ‘feminist’ is part of a complement, the full phrase and phrase columns detail the adjective phrase used, e.g. ‘feminist’ or ‘anti-feminist’. The head noun and subject columns annotate the elements described by premodifying and complement occurrences of ‘feminist’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Head noun</th>
<th>Head noun</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Julie Bindel, a feminist campaigner and journalist, admitted being infuriated <em>(Guardian 05c)</em></td>
<td>feminist</td>
<td>campaigner</td>
<td>journalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This generation is truly post-feminist <em>(Telegraph 01b)</em></td>
<td>post-feminist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m fat, lesbian and blatantly feminist <em>(Sun 06b)</em></td>
<td>feminist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8: Annotation of head nouns and subjects modified by adjectival ‘feminist’

89
Where the subject consists of just a pronoun – for example “I” in “I’m fat, lesbian and blatantly feminist” (Sun 06b) - I used the original data files to provide detail about the referent in the subject column, e.g. “I [Beth Ditto]”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>Coordinate</th>
<th>Coordinate</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Head noun</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lads, bras and other burning feminist issues (Independent 00b)</td>
<td>burning</td>
<td></td>
<td>feminist</td>
<td>issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m fat, lesbian and blatantly feminist (Sun 06b)</td>
<td>fat</td>
<td>lesbian</td>
<td>feminist</td>
<td>I [Beth Ditto]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.9: Annotation of adjectival coordinates of ‘feminist’

This annotation ensures that the overview of complement occurrences of ‘feminist’ provides the same level of detail to that of premodifier occurrences. Adjectives that coordinate with ‘feminist’ are also annotated and categorised according to their semantic grouping (see discussion in section 4.3.1.1 above).

4.3.1.3 Determiners

As with the annotation of adjectives, the annotation of determiners accounts for the form of each occurrence (for example ‘feminism’s’, ‘feminists’”) and the (noun) phrase in which it occurs, for example “feminism’s demise” (Mail 09b). The annotation focuses on the head noun being premodified by a determiner form of ‘feminism’ or ‘feminist’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Phrase</th>
<th>Head noun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminism’s</td>
<td>feminism’s demise (Mail 09b)</td>
<td>demise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminists’</td>
<td>the feminists’ hate list (Times 03c)</td>
<td>hate list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminists’</td>
<td>radical feminists’ disapproval of a catalogue of explorations (Independent 06b)</td>
<td>disapproval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.10: Annotation of determiner occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’
I did not record any further detail for determiners as they do not coordinate with other words of their class. The majority of the small number of occurrences (25) also carry little pre- or postmodification. Although a phrase like ‘the liberal feminism of the Sixties’ attitude towards men’ could hypothetically occur, modification of the majority of occurrences is limited to determiners and predeterminers, the one exception being “radical feminists’ disapproval” (Independent 06b). Accordingly, the annotation focuses on who or what is described as belonging to ‘feminist/s/ism’.

4.3.2 Annotation of representing actions/events/states

The annotation of representing actions/events/states followed the same process for each dataset. The division of the data into different datasets makes particular sense in the case of representing actions/events/states as the concept of ‘feminism’ plays a different type of role in transitivity processes to the people referred to by ‘feminist(s)’, and a different role again to the people and things described by adjectival ‘feminist’.

In the following discussion, section 4.3.2.1 discusses how I decided precisely what data to annotate before section 4.3.2.2 explains how I carried out each part of the annotation.

4.3.2.1 Selection of the data

The decision as to what data to annotate was less straightforward in the case of representing actions/events/states. Whereas with naming there was a choice to make between annotating full noun phrases or just those of which ‘feminist/s/ism’ was the head noun, for transitivity processes the decision as to what unit of language to focus on was more complicated. For complex sentences such as “I was fascinated by that period because it was a society where feminism and lesbianism were starting to emerge” (Sun 03b), a full annotation would have to account for the main clause (“I was fascinated by that period”), the adverbial clause (“because it was a society […]”) and the postmodifying relative clause (“where feminism and lesbianism were starting to emerge”). However, accounting for all of this detail would require a complex annotation. The annotation of representing actions/events/states therefore focuses on the immediate clause, e.g. “feminism and lesbianism were starting to emerge”, while I used the annotation of prioritising (see section 4.3.6 below) to highlight those occurrences that appear at a lower clause level and therefore needed to be taken into account when performing the analysis of ‘feminist/s/ism’.

The focus on the immediate clause means that the annotation misses some detail. However, it does provide a concise overview of the types of process in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ is involved and the roles it plays. In much previous research that uses transitivity analysis, there is a lack of clarity regarding what analysis focuses on. For example, Lukin’s (2013) study of the word ‘war’ in a corpus of TV news reports that cover the 2003 invasion of Iraq observes that “four percent of instances of the lexical item ‘war’ enter into a transitive configuration as the Agent of some impactful process” (p. 436).
However, it is not clear how the terminology ‘impactful process’ relates to a model of transitivity, and Lukin (2013) neglects to give an account of how this figure was reached: for example, Lukin does not state whether all levels of a clause were taken into account, or just the immediate clausal context of each occurrence of ‘war’. Similarly, Mautner (2007) looks at transitivity patterns in “a 100-line sample of elderly as an attributive adjective” (p. 62) in her study of ‘elderly’ in the Wordbanks Online corpus, noting that “just over a quarter of instances (26) include a material process with an elderly Actor” (p. 62). Again, it is unclear which levels of clause structure are being taken into account, or in what other types of process the search term appears. The analysis in the present study is built on a thorough annotation of the immediate clausal context of every occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’ that occurs in a clause. There are some drawbacks to this approach. For example, the annotation of the sentence “I don’t think you can blame feminism for that” (Guardian 08b) focuses on the subordinate clause “you can blame feminism for that”, which expresses a proposition that is at odds with that expressed by the full sentence. However, the annotation of prioritising (see section 4.3.6 below) allowed me to take the wider clausal context into account during the analysis stage, for example in the analysis of the ‘feminism is dead’ pattern (see section 5.2.2.2).

4.3.2.2 Annotation of transitivity processes

The annotation of transitivity processes details the clause being focused on and the process it expresses. It separates out the verb that expresses a process, the process type, and the role that ‘feminist/s/ism’ fulfils. Where a predicate contains coordinated verbs, the annotation includes each verb, with the process and role columns accounting for each process expressed. For post-predicate infinitive clauses such as “Germaine Greer, author of the seminal Sixties feminist tome The Female Eunuch, is hoping to cause a new wave of scandal” (Express 03c), I use the post-predicate verb in the annotation (“cause”), as this expresses the vital process, whereas the controlling verb (“hoping”) simply provides information about perception, intention or modality (Biber et al., 1999, p. 693):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Process 2</th>
<th>Role 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminists are blamed for a large number of wrongs <em>(Express 09b)</em></td>
<td>feminists are blamed</td>
<td>blame</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Phenomenon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why, then, should any feminist want to stand up for a bunch of stuffy judges [...] <em>(Independent 00c)</em></td>
<td>should any feminist want to stand up for a bunch of stuffy judges</td>
<td>stand up</td>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>Actor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminists still proclaim that a woman with power, is per se, better news than a man <em>(Independent 04b)</em></td>
<td>Feminists still proclaim that a woman with power is, per se, better news than a man</td>
<td>proclaim</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Sayer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-feminism in both theory [...] and reality [...] is new and growing <em>(Independent 00b)</em></td>
<td>Anti-feminism in both theory [...] and reality [...] is new and growing</td>
<td>is / grow</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>MAE</td>
<td>Actor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.11: Annotation of clause, verb, process and role**

Some sentences in the data do not contain a verb, such as the subheading “A very unlikely feminist” *(Mail 09a)*. In instances where there was no clause to annotate, I left the clause column blank. However, I did annotate examples such as “Radical feminist who condemned pornography and dismissed men as moral cretins” *(Telegraph 05a)*, where I could annotate the process expressed in the relative clause (for this example, I treated the relative pronoun “who” as the subject). In other sentences, a verb is elided, e.g. “Berry No Feminist” *(Mirror 02c)*. I felt that readers would easily be able to interpret an intended predicator in such examples, and so annotated the clause using the assumed predicator, e.g. the copula verb ‘to be’, which expresses a relational intensive process between a carrier - Halle Berry - and an attribute, a lack of feminism.

In the case of cleft sentences, there is more than one possible process that could be annotated. For example, “it is feminism which loses its power” *(Guardian 02a)* could be annotated for either the cleft structure “it is feminism” - containing a dummy pronoun, the copula verb and an object - or the relative clause “which loses its power”, where the relative pronoun refers anaphorically to
“feminism”. The former interpretation would identify a relational intensive process with a carrier (“it”) and an attribute (“feminism”), whereas the latter would identify a material action process with an actor (“feminism”), a process (“loses”) and a goal (“its power”). As the purpose of clefting is simply to focus on a particular element in a clause (see the discussion of prioritising in section 3.1.6), the annotation here focuses on the unclefted clause (see section 4.3.6 below for an explanation of how the annotation of prioritising accounts for the focusing function of clefting). Similarly, I annotated wh-clauses according to the unclesed form of the clause: for example, for “what feminist supporters have recently denounced as troglodytic misogyny in media portrayals of Hillary has in fact been a function of her own strange sexual accommodations” (Telegraph 08a), I focus on “feminist supporters have recently denounced […] a function”. Again, the important meaning of the cleft is the underlying clause, and it is this aspect of the cleft structure that provides the most accurate impression of what ‘feminist/s/ism’ is ‘doing’ in terms of the representation of actions/events/states.

In some instances, it was difficult to decide which process type a particular clause expressed. Halliday (2004) notes that the process types are “fuzzy categories” (p. 172), and this makes the description of a large collection of clauses difficult: some occurrences do not fit neatly into one process type. The majority of difficult cases in the data involve verbs that express processes which could be interpreted as either material action or mental processes, or as material action or verbalisation processes, such as those below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those thousands of women who dismissed the notion of feminism in 2006 (Mail 02a)</td>
<td>dismiss</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Phenomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would identify myself as a feminist (Mirror 03b)</td>
<td>identify</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Circumstance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanzmann was roundly booed by radical feminists (Independent 08b)</td>
<td>boo</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Sayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spice Girls were accused by feminists of betraying women (Express 06c)</td>
<td>accuse</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Sayer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.12: Annotation of ambiguous transitivity processes

Using only the context provided by the clause, it is difficult to know how to annotate these examples in terms of transitivity processes. They demonstrate the validity of Matthiessen’s (1995) observation that the process types “correspond to regions in a continuous space” (p. 1874) rather than “categorically different options” (p. 1874). “Dismiss” and “identify”, then, might exist at the boundaries between the mental and verbalisation process types, and “boo” and “accuse” at the boundary between
verbalisation and material action processes. In order to annotate these examples according to process type, I focused on the textual meaning being created in each instance. This reflects Halliday’s (2004) emphasis on “the contribution made by different process types in the construction of discourse” (p. 174): annotating transitivity processes is not a case of assigning verbs to categories, but of looking at the meaning created by the transitivity process in context. Therefore, I annotated “accused” in “the Spice Girls were accused by feminists of betraying women” (Express 06c) as a verbalisation process, as the adverbial “of betraying women” gives an indication of what was said. Where the context did not provide a strong impression of which type a process should be assigned to, I considered what type of activity, at a minimum, was required in each: for example, ‘identifying’ something must at least involve some sort of mental process, and so I annotated “I would identify myself as a feminist” (Mirror 03b) as such.

My focus on textual meaning also meant that the same verb could express different types of transitivity process in different sentences. For example, I annotated “blame” as expressing a verbalisation process in “Fay Weldon […] blamed them for binge-drinking, ‘sluttishness’ and happy-slapping” (Sun 07a) as the adverbial clause contains a piece of reported speech (“sluttishness”), but as the expression of a mental process in “Doyle seems to blame feminism for the problems that men and women have” (Telegraph 02b), where the lack of speech presentation and the modal auxiliary verb “seems” suggest that the writer is making an assumption about Doyle’s views. In such instances it was important to prioritise contextual information over the semantics of a particular verb. In the Doyle example, the mental process in the next sentence – “She thinks that successful career women let the bullying tactics they might employ in the boardroom spill over into the bedroom” – further suggests that the annotation of “blame” as expressing a mental process is correct.

This method of annotating processes is not perfect. However, I applied it consistently, realising that such decisions highlight one of the problems with the model of transitivity. This annotation also allowed me to produce statistical overviews of the relative use of different transitivity processes in each of the datasets, providing entry points for the analysis in chapters 5-7 (see sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1). It is also important to note that the possible participant roles in each of the different types of process are not dissimilar. For example, while a process such as that expressed in “you cannot judge a Barbie doll, or a feminist” (Guardian 09b) could be annotated as either a material action, verbalisation or mental process, the role played by ‘feminist’ is similar in each interpretation: whether it is considered a goal, a target or a phenomenon, in each it is the thing being affected by the process described by the verb. The important point here is that the subsequent analysis, regardless of how the process was annotated, looks at the textual meaning attaching to ‘feminist’, which in each case is the passive object of the clause.

4.3.3 Annotation of negating

The annotation of negating is based on the clauses selected for the annotation of transitivity processes. As well as using the clause column to find instances of negating, I consulted the sentence
column in order to identify examples that occurred in non-clauses, ensuring that I did not exclude instances such as “a very unlikely feminist” (Mail 09a). I placed examples in a negating column, with type and form columns detailing the specifics of each instance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negating</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is that really anti-feminist? (Mail 08b)</td>
<td>Morphological - adjective</td>
<td>anti-feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There has not been a single influential feminist book (Times 09b)</td>
<td>Syntactic</td>
<td>not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing sympathetic reports of feminism’s ‘failure’ to win mass support (Independent 03c)</td>
<td>Semantic - noun</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.13: Annotation of types and forms of negating**

I took care to identify instances of negating from the potentially open-ended range of semantic negators. The majority of instances that I found are included in Nahajec’s (2012) typology (see section 3.1.3), with the only exceptions being instances of ‘false’ and ‘phoney’, for example in “the false prophets of feminism” (Guardian 04c) and “Marriage of a Phoney Feminist” (Mail 00a). I labelled these occurrences as examples of semantic negation as they are forms that “realise an absence” (Nahajec, 2012, p. 212) (of Gloria Steinem’s lack of feminist credentials and the veracity of the “prophets of feminism” respectively). They also have a similarly negative meaning to the prefix ‘pseudo’, listed as one of the morphological negators in Nahajec’s (2012) typology.

The annotation of negating only goes so far in the detail it provides. For example, while “failure” is listed in the form column, the more detailed analysis presented in chapters 5-7 is necessary to explain the significance of this negative form in relation to the relevant occurrence of ‘feminism’. However, by cross-referencing the details captured here with the annotation of transitivity processes, it is possible to gain a detailed picture of negating in the data. Given that the proportion of occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ that are affected by some form of negating is also relatively small (379 of 2,539 occurrences, or 14.9%), the type and form details provide a good basis for the analysis of this feature of the data.

### 4.3.4 Annotation of contrasting

I consulted the data files in order to provide a full picture of contrasting, as opposition can occur across sentences. This meant I could include parallel structures such as “the feminism I subscribe to takes this as a given. The feminism I reject tells me that having a child changes nothing”
(Independent 07a), where a contrast is created between elements that play the same role in adjacent sentences.

It was necessary to place some limits on what I annotated. The annotation accounts for those instances of opposition where ‘feminist/s/ism’ is contrasted with another noun phrase, adjective or determiner, e.g. “feminism has been replaced by narcissism” (Times 09b), but does not account for other oppositional structures where ‘feminist/s/ism’ is not directly contrasted with something else, for example “it does this not to assert that men are the new oppressed and women the new oppressors, but to try and do away with the very dualism in Western culture on which crude – i.e. successful - feminism has been based” (Independent 02b). This level of annotation allowed me to account for the most significant uses of contrasting: those which present another element as having the opposite meaning to ‘feminist/s/ism’ itself.

The annotation details the oppositional structure and the type of opposition, with additional columns containing the contrasted elements, i.e. the ‘feminist/s/ism’-based element and the contrasted element:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contrasting</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>‘Feminist/s/ism’</th>
<th>Not ‘feminist/s/ism’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>These women are individualists, not feminists (Guardian 09a)</td>
<td>Negated</td>
<td>feminists</td>
<td>individualists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminism has become a dirty word (Express 04a)</td>
<td>Transitional</td>
<td>Feminism</td>
<td>a dirty word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The feminism I subscribe to takes this as a given. The feminism I reject tells me that having a child changes nothing […] (Independent 07a)</td>
<td>Parallelism</td>
<td>The feminism I subscribe to</td>
<td>the feminism I reject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.14: Annotation of contrasting

During the annotation I made one addition to Davies’s (2012) typology of opposition (discussed in section 3.1.4). Davies (2012) suggests that “the coordinator and is unlikely to generate novel oppositions. It can only frame those that already have canonical oppositional status” (p. 68). However, I argue that examples of ‘X and Y’ frames, while not as common as other oppositional structures, suggest that there is a case for seeing it as a possible frame. The Mail 01a headline “The Feminist and the Housewife” is one example: while many readers may conceive feminist activism and housewifery as contrasting, it would be hard to argue that they are canonical opposites, as Davies
(2012, p. 68) suggests is necessary for ‘X and Y’ frames. The main body of the article, though, makes it clear that the feminist of the headline (the “radical feminist” Wendy Robertson) and the housewife (her daughter, Debora, who is described as “a middle-class, conservatively dressed housewife”) are to be seen as opposites, with “The Feminist and the Housewife” implying a relation of contrast similar to that in ‘the X and the Y’ fable titles such as ‘The Tortoise and the Hare’ (Leech & Short, 2007, p. 314). What is clear is that the text is creating a textual meaning of contrast through the ‘X and Y’ frame – the main body of the article and assumptions about the connotations that readers can be expected to have for ‘feminist’ and ‘housewife’ mean that a new opposition is constructed through the ‘X and Y’ frame. I therefore include coordinated opposition as a type of oppositional structure in the annotation and analysis.

4.3.5 Annotation of exemplifying and enumerating

The annotation of exemplifying and enumerating provides an overview of noun phrases with which ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist(s)’ occur in a list, and adjectives with which adjectival ‘feminist’ occurs in a list. The annotation details all occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ that occur in a set of two or more similar structures, for example the noun phrases ‘feminism’, ‘diversity’ and ‘gay and lesbian rights’ in the Guardian 08b sentence “Four well-known activists […] discuss the cultural changes they have seen over the last 40 years in feminism, sexuality, politics - and men”. The form and other element columns account for the different items with which ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurs in a list:
### Exemplifying / enumerating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exemplifying / enumerating</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Other element 1</th>
<th>Other element 2</th>
<th>Other element 3</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A different blogger [...] invites people to contribute articles [...] ‘radical feminism’, for instance, or ‘1970s feminism and what it means today’ (Guardian 06b)</td>
<td>‘radical feminism’</td>
<td>’1970s feminism and what it means today’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exemplifying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All these ideas that I had thought were the left - feminism and diversity and gay and lesbian rights - were suddenly very chic (Guardian 00c)</td>
<td>feminism</td>
<td>diversity</td>
<td>gay and lesbian rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>Enumerating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four well-known activists [...] discuss the cultural changes they have seen over the last 40 years in feminism, sexuality, politics - and men (Guardian 08b)</td>
<td>feminism</td>
<td>sexuality</td>
<td>politics</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>Enumerating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.15: Annotation of exemplifying and enumerating

The type column classifies occurrences of listing according to whether they are instances of exemplifying or enumerating. This accounts for the pragmatic effects of the different lists in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurs. For example, the phrase “for instance” in “‘radical feminism’, for instance, or ‘1970s feminism and what it means today’” (Guardian 06b) makes it an explicit example of exemplifying, whereas the four-part list in Guardian 08b (“feminism, sexuality, politics – and men”) suggests a literally complete list, and the three-part list in Guardian 00c (“feminism and diversity and gay and lesbian rights”) suggests a list that is, at least symbolically, complete (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 70).

### 4.3.6 Annotation of prioritising

The annotation of prioritising takes into account key aspects of how texts prioritise particular bits of information over others. It focuses on where ‘feminist/s/ism’ appears in the clause structure of a sentence, and accounts for the aspects of prioritising described in section 3.1.6, including cleft sentences, passive constructions and the placing of information in adverbials:
The clause position column identifies occurrences that appear at a higher or lower level of the clause structure, and the prioritising column accounts for the type of prioritising involved (see discussion in section 3.1.6) This annotation is helpful as it augments the information provided by the clause column in the annotation of representing actions/events/states (see section 4.3.2 above); taking this column into account during the analysis made it clear where ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurred at a lower level and how this might affect the textual meaning of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in these instances (see, for example, the discussion of the ‘feminism is dead’ structure in section 5.2.2.2).

### 4.3.7 Annotation of implying and assuming

The annotation of implying and assuming is similar to that for contrasting, in that it was necessary to go beyond the immediate clausal context in order to find examples of implying. This was particularly the case for examples of flouts of the maxim of quality: simply looking at the sentences compiled in the datasets would not provide a full overview of all instances where a writer says something that they believe to be false. This particular textual-conceptual function is an example of how a manual annotation of texts is required to produce a full account of how textual meaning is created, as certain types of implicature cannot be captured through corpus tools.

The annotation of assuming accounts for instances of existential and logical presuppositions, while the annotation of implying accounts for flouts of the maxims of Grice’s (1975) co-operative principle. Table 4.17 provides a snapshot of how I annotated instances of existential and logical presupposition:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assuming and implying</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>Assumed/implied meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Their feminism was based on the belief that women were different from men (Mail 08c)</td>
<td>Existential presupposition</td>
<td>Definite determiner – ‘the’</td>
<td>Referent exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Feminist’ has become a derogatory term (Times 09a)</td>
<td>Logical presupposition</td>
<td>Change of state – ‘become’</td>
<td>‘Feminist’ was not a derogatory term before</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m certainly not an active feminist anymore (Mail 06b)</td>
<td>Logical presupposition</td>
<td>Iterative word – ‘anymore’</td>
<td>Subject was an active feminist before</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.17: Annotation of assuming

I based the annotation of existential presuppositions on the annotation of naming (see section 4.3.1), which includes a column detailing the full noun phrase in which each occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’ appears. This allowed me to capture not only examples of definite noun phrases in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ is the head – for example “her feminism” (Telegraph 06b) - but also examples of wider noun phrases in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ is part of the pre- or postmodification of the head, e.g. “the writings of the leading liberationist feminist Rosemarie Tong” (Independent 06c). The annotation also details the trigger that gives rise to a presupposition and the assumed meaning that results.

As observed in the discussion of assuming in section 3.1.7, the range of logical presupposition triggers is open-ended. The annotation therefore focuses on those that are observed in Jeffries’ (2010a, pp. 95-98) account of triggers: change of state verbs, factive verbs, cleft sentences, iterative words and comparative structures. The trigger and assumed/implied meaning columns again account for the word or structure that gives rise to the presupposition – for example ‘become’, ‘anymore’ – and the meaning that is presupposed as a result.

I annotated examples of implicature in the same annotation, noting which maxim was flouted to produce a particular implicature, and summarising the implied meaning created in each instance:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assuming and implying</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>Assumed/implied meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminists, let me remind you, are all man-hating, humourless warthogs (<em>Mail 03b</em>)</td>
<td>Implicature</td>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Feminists are in some respect similar to warthogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminism isn’t dead</td>
<td>Implicature</td>
<td>Quantity/ relation/manner</td>
<td>Feminism is alive (although this may be somehow surprising)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.18: Annotation of implying

Implying is by its nature more tricky than the other textual-conceptual functions to detect and to explain. Some implicatures, such as that produced by “feminism isn’t dead” (*Guardian 07c*) arise from the use of a particular structure, such as a negated clause (see the discussion of the relationship between negating and implying in section 3.1.7), but others, such as that in *Mail 03b*, do not. What inference the writer intends the reader to make in any particular case is also not clear-cut. Therefore, it is possible that the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data contains instances of implicatures that were intended by writers, but which I have missed in my annotation, and also that my interpretation of implied meanings does not match precisely those intended by writers. The implied meanings captured in the assumed/implied meaning column, therefore, capture as accurate as possible an impression of implied meaning in the data, rather than a definitive account.

4.3.8 Annotation of hypothesising

I annotated hypothesising in the data by consulting the sentence column and the clause column in the annotation of representing actions/events/states (section 4.3.2). This means that the annotation of hypothesising not only accounts for modality within the immediate textual context of ‘feminist/s/ism’, but also modality in the wider clausal context:
The annotation of hypothesising notes the modal form attached to an occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’ and the category of modality involved (note that categorical assertions are not annotated). The examples that are of greatest interest to the present study are those where modality affects the clause in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurs, for example in “You are probably a feminist” (*Express 09a*). However, it was also important to account for instances of modality that occur outside the immediate clausal context, as an annotation that did not account for this would provide a misleading impression of the data. For example, ignoring the fact that “feminism is about reawakening people” (*Guardian 07a*) is subordinate to the clause “I think” would give the impression that what is stated as merely a conviction was in fact stated as a fact, through a categorical assertion. As such, I used an asterisk to mark those occurrences of modality – as in *Independent 01a* - that occur at a higher clausal level.

### Table 4.19: Annotation of hypothesising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>Modal form</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You are probably a feminist (<em>Express 09a</em>)</td>
<td>Adverb – ‘probably’</td>
<td>Epistemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new version of feminism should offer a lot more than history lessons (<em>Times 08b</em>)</td>
<td>Auxiliary verb – ‘should’</td>
<td>Deontic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think feminism is about reawakening people (<em>Guardian 07a</em>)</td>
<td><em>Lexical verb – ‘think’</em></td>
<td>Epistemic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.9 Annotation of presenting others’ speech, thought and writing

For the annotation of presenting others’ speech, thought and writing, I searched through the sentence column. This allowed me to identify instances where ‘feminist/s/ism’ is either the subject doing the saying, thinking or writing – for example “leading modern feminist Helen Wilkinson [...] said: ‘To turn the attacks on new feminists is totally misguided’” (*Sun 01a*) - or where ‘feminist/s/ism’ is part of what is being said, thought or written, e.g. “Camille Paglia once called Wolf ‘the Dan Quayle of feminism’” (*Guardian 01b*). I then consulted the initial labelling of the data, in which I observed all occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ that are a part of reported speech, thought or writing (see section 4.1.2 above). This allowed me to account for occurrences where the reporting clause in a piece of speech, thought or writing presentation occurs outside of the immediate sentence, for example in “Rowbotham says she finds younger women mysterious [...] ‘There's a dying down of feminism as politics’” (*Guardian 00a*).

The annotation of presenting speech, thought and writing uses the models from Short (2007) summarised in section 3.1.9. It was necessary to provide multiple levels of annotation for some occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’, in order to fully account for the different types of speech, thought and/or writing presentation attached to them:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>S/T/W presentation</th>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>S/T/W presentation 2</th>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I resent Ms Lessing saying: “Feminists enjoy humiliating men” <em>(Express 01a)</em></td>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Say</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>DT</td>
<td>Resent</td>
<td>Thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Maureen Dowd writes: “If Gloria Steinem had had a crystal ball [...]” <em>(Guardian 06a)</em></td>
<td>DW</td>
<td>Writes</td>
<td>Writer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminists believe that women should have the right to control their lives <em>(Mail 00c)</em></td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Believe</td>
<td>Thinker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.20: Annotation of presenting speech, thought and writing

Table 4.20 shows how I annotated each occurrence of speech, thought and writing presentation according to the type of presentation involved, the verb that reports a piece of speech, thought or writing, and whether ‘feminist/s/ism’ is part of the sayer/thinker/writer or what is being said/thought/written. The example relating to Doris Lessing shows how I annotated those occurrences where, for example, the presentation of speech (e.g. “Ms Lessing saying ‘Feminists enjoy humiliating men’ *(Express 01a)*) is embedded within the presentation of thought (e.g. “I resent Ms Lessing saying...”). In such cases, the annotation towards the left deals with the lowest level of speech, thought or writing presentation (for example what Doris Lessing is supposed to have said), with higher levels branching out towards the right, e.g. the article writer’s thoughts about what Lessing is supposed to have said.

### 4.3.10 Annotation of representing time, space and society

The annotation of representing time, space and society focuses on the use of person, place and time deixis, as well as tense, in the clauses identified in the annotation of representing actions/events/states (see section 4.3.2 above). An attempt to take full sentences into account – with
different tenses and multiple uses of the small number of deictic expressions – would be unwieldy, resulting in an uninformative annotation. Therefore, the focus is on the immediate clausal context:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Tense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminism here is dead (Mail 03a)</td>
<td>here</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Present simple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She was the stereotype of the Millie Tant feminist (Guardian 05c)</td>
<td></td>
<td>She</td>
<td></td>
<td>Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She has missed the point about feminism today (Independent 08a)</td>
<td>today</td>
<td>She</td>
<td></td>
<td>Present perfect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.21: Annotation of representing time/space/society

The aim of this annotation is to provide an overview of how deictic expressions present ‘feminist/s/ism’ in time, space and society. In particular, the detailing of the tense of clauses helps to provide an overview of how ‘feminist/s/ism’ is positioned in time.

### 4.4 Summary

This chapter has explained how I collected the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data and annotated it according to each of the ten textual-conceptual functions. This annotation provides the foundation for the analysis, in particular through the statistical overviews of naming and representing actions/events/states (see sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1). I now provide the results of my analysis of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the data: chapter 5 analyses the feminism dataset, chapter 6 investigates the feminist and feminists datasets, and chapter 7 focuses on the adjectives dataset.
Chapter 5: The feminism dataset

In this chapter I analyse the data in the feminism dataset. The analysis addresses the study’s three research questions:

4. What are the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the context of UK national newspapers, 2000-2009?
5. How is the meaning of ‘feminism’ contested in UK national newspapers, 2000-2009?
6. How is critical stylistics a suitable methodology for the analysis of a large dataset?

Section 5.1 discusses statistical overviews of naming and representing actions/events/states. These overviews provide entry points for the analysis, which uses the annotation of the full range of textual-conceptual functions described in chapter 4 in order to look at textual meanings of ‘feminism’. The analysis focuses first of all on unmodified occurrences of ‘feminism’ (section 5.2), before analysing occurrences with minimal modification (section 5.3) and detailed modification (section 5.4).

I use the Oxford English Dictionary (2015) definition of ‘feminism’ - “advocacy of equality of the sexes and the establishment of the political, social, and economic rights of the female sex; the movement associated with this” - as a benchmark for the analysis of textual meanings. The analysis also responds to the five frames discussed in section 2.3:

6. Positive/negative portrayals.
8. Universality/complexity.
9. Changes and oppositions.

The analysis of textual meaning addresses each of these frames. In particular, I find evidence that: negative textual meanings of ‘feminism’ are contested by writers, different types of ‘feminism’ are located in different time periods, ‘feminism’ is presented as having multiple and ambiguous meanings, contrasts are drawn between different varieties, and portrayals of ‘feminism’ are complex, with writers explicitly contesting meanings of ‘feminism’. 
5.1 Statistical overview of the feminism dataset

I used the annotation of naming discussed in section 4.3.1 to produce a statistical overview of how ‘feminism’ is named in the feminism dataset. Unmodified occurrences have no modification, minimally modified occurrences are modified by determiners and/or predeterminers, and occurrences with detailed modification are modified by some or all of determiners, predeterminers, premodifying adjectives, appositive noun phrases, and postmodifying prepositional phrases or relative clauses:

![Figure 5.1: Statistical overview of naming in the feminism dataset](image)

Figure 5.1 shows that the majority of occurrences of ‘feminism’ (71%) are unmodified. This suggests that ‘feminism’ tends to be treated as a universal in the articles, as though it were “monolithic” (Douglas, 1994, p. 274). Where ‘feminism’ is modified, just 6% of occurrences are modified through minimal modification, and the remaining 23% through more detailed modification.

The overview of representing actions/events/states is based on the annotation of transitivity processes (see section 4.3.2). Figure 5.2 shows the types of processes in which ‘feminism’ occurs:
Figure 5.2: Statistical overview of transitivity processes in the feminism dataset

Relational processes account for the greatest number of process types in which ‘feminism’ occurs (42%), meaning that ‘feminism’ appears more often in representations of states than in representations of actions or events. This result is unsurprising in light of the fact that ‘feminism’ refers to a concept, rather than an animate being. However, material action processes account for nearly as many processes featuring ‘feminism’ (40%). While material action processes are perceived as the prototypical means of expressing meaning through a clause (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 40), the high percentage of this type of process is surprising given that ‘feminism’ refers to a concept, belief or outlook that cannot act as an agent or be acted on, at least in a literal sense.

The analysis below uses these statistical overviews as entry points. The high percentage of occurrences of unmodified ‘feminism’ and the prominence of relational processes leads me to begin the investigation by analysing the representation of feminism as a whole in states (section 5.2). Section 5.3 investigates the relatively small number of occurrences of ‘feminism’ with minimal modification, looking at how they divide feminism into different types. Section 5.4 concludes the analysis by looking at how assumptions about feminism are built into references to it, investigating how different varieties of feminism are represented in actions and states.

5.2 Unmodified ‘feminism’

The present section focuses on those occurrences of ‘feminism’ that have no pre- or postmodification. These occurrences are of particular interest as they present ‘feminism’ as standing for the concept or movement as a whole. This means that the way textual meaning is created through the other textual-
conceptual functions is pertinent in a particular way – the types of actions, events and states that ‘feminism’ is presented in, for instance, represent the way feminism as a whole interacts with the world.

Figure 5.2 shows that ‘feminism’ occurs more often in relational processes than in other types of processes (413 processes, accounting for 42% of the total in the feminism dataset). The majority of these are relational intensive processes (355 processes, accounting for 86% of relational processes), which define a carrier in terms of an attribute, e.g. “feminism is a strange ideology” (Independent 03a). I here focus on the 156 of these relational intensive processes in which unmodified ‘feminism’ is the head noun in the carrier role. This means that I do not include occurrences such as “the latest US fashion in feminism is the silliest since burning your bra” (Express 01b) – where “fashion” is the head – in the analysis. This focus allows me to hone in on the processes in which a universal conception of ‘feminism’ is being defined, a focus which directly approaches the first research question which this study seeks to answer, concerning the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’.

The analysis below looks at four different structures among these 156 processes. Section 5.2.1 looks at ‘feminism means/does not mean X’, in which a definition of ‘feminism’ itself is provided. Section 5.2.2 and section 5.2.3 discuss processes that use the copula verb ‘to be’, looking at ‘feminism is X’ and ‘feminism is not x’ respectively. Finally, section 5.2.4 focuses on the ‘feminism becomes X’ structure, which not only expresses a relational intensive process but also uses contrasting to portray feminism as having undergone a transition. The discussion shows that writers attribute a variety of textual meanings to ‘feminism’, both through their own glosses of the word and through the use of speech and thought presentation and social deixis to attribute particular meanings to particular groups, as well as the use of contrasting to present the idea of changes in what constitutes feminism. The meaning of ‘feminism’ is also explicitly contested in the articles: a variety of textual-conceptual functions - notably implying, negating and representing time, space and society - are used to argue with certain perceptions about the meaning of ‘feminism’, such as the idea that feminism is dead. This contestation demonstrates the complexity of portrayals of ‘feminism’: a key part of writers’ portrayals involves the dismissal of others’ perceptions.

5.2.1 ‘Feminism means/does not mean X’

21 of the 156 processes in which unmodified ‘feminism’ is a carrier use the verb ‘mean’. These ‘feminism means/does not mean X’ processes account for a relatively small proportion of the total processes. However, they are of particular interest as they provide writers’ definitions of the lexeme itself. The analysis focuses on the 12 of the 21 processes that feature a wh-complement clause (Biber et al., 1999, p. 683) – ‘what feminism means’ – before turning to the remaining 9 processes. It shows that while some of the meanings attributed to ‘feminism’ align with the OED (2015) definition, the meaning of ‘feminism’ is presented as something complex, with different meanings for different people and different times. The definitions also demonstrate how the meaning of ‘feminism’ is contested, in particular through the use of implying to evoke the idea of different definitions.

109
Table 5.1 comprises the 12 occurrences of the ‘what feminism means’ complement clause:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 02a</td>
<td>By the time I was old enough to understand what ‘feminism’ meant it was already a dirty word [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express 02a</td>
<td>We asked five female writers to tell us what feminism means to them in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01c</td>
<td>As we begin the 21st century, what does feminism mean to us?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01c</td>
<td>[...] men and women gathered in February 1914 to talk about ‘what feminism means to me’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 09a</td>
<td>We all also differ in terms of what feminism means to us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 08a</td>
<td>But what did we mean by feminism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 08a</td>
<td>“This isn’t what we meant by feminism”, she informed us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 08a</td>
<td>This isn’t what we meant by feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 06b</td>
<td>I’m just not sure what feminism means now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 03c</td>
<td>Just such a responsive glitter, I am sure, came to the eye of many a listener to the Woman’s Hour debate, ‘What Does Feminism Mean to You?’ [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 07b</td>
<td>[...] young women today have no concept of what feminism once meant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08c</td>
<td>Women now have to decide for themselves what they mean by feminism [...]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Occurrences of ‘what feminism means’ clauses

These clauses demonstrate ways in which ‘feminism’ is treated as complex, and ways in which its meaning is contested. What is notable in many of the examples is how the presentation of society portrays ‘feminism’ as having particular meanings for particular people, for example in “what feminism means to them” (Express 02a), “what feminism means to me” (Guardian 01c) and “what feminism means to us” (Guardian 09a). The use of person deixis in each instance not only restricts these definitions to particular groups of people, but also produces a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): by only explaining what ‘feminism’ means to a particular person or group of people, they imply that ‘feminism’ has other meanings for other people. The idea of ‘feminism’ having different meanings for different people is made more explicit in Guardian 09a and Independent 08a. In Guardian 09a, “what feminism means” is described as something that “differ[s]” for the subject, “we”: it is not clear whether the first person plural pronoun is being used inclusively or exclusively, but either way the
possibility of different, contested meanings of ‘feminism’ is portrayed. In *Independent 08a*, the relational process in which “what we meant by feminism” is the attribute is negated, with the writer distancing themselves from the meaning of ‘feminism’ represented by “this”: again, the idea of differing meanings of ‘feminism’ is portrayed.

The *Independent 08a* occurrences also demonstrate how ‘feminism’ is complex in terms of having different meanings at different times. While the main clause portrays the present through the use of the present tense – “This isn’t” – the wh-complement clause uses the past tense – “what we *meant* by feminism”, evoking the idea of differing meanings divided by time. The wh-complement clause is also in the past tense in *Times 07b*, which attributes a lack of knowledge of the meaning of ‘feminism’ to “young women today”. Here, the deictic time expression “today” hones in on a particular generation of women in the present, and the thing that is attributed to them is negated – they have “no concept of what feminism once meant”: the generation gap is emphasised by the past tense of the wh-complement clause and the time adverbial “once”, presenting the idea of some lost meaning of ‘feminism’. Other examples of time deixis and adverbials focus on contemporary meanings of ‘feminism’, although they also underline its ambiguity. For example, the deictic time expression “now” in *Mail 06b* and *Times 08c* presents contemporary meanings of ‘feminism’: however, the main clause in *Mail 06b* is a negated representation of a state in which the writer presents themselves as uncertain about the contemporary meaning of ‘feminism’, while the combination of a mental process of deciding and the deontic modal “have” in *Times 08c* emphasises the idea that a new generation of women has to decide on its own meaning for the word. The idea of different meanings for different times is also emphasised by adverbials of time in *Express 02a* – “what feminism means to them in 2002” – and *Guardian 01c* – “As we begin the 21st century, what does feminism mean to us?” Similar to the use of person deixis, these uses of time deixis produce an additional implied meaning through a flout of quantity (Grice, 1975): ‘feminism’ must mean/have meant something different at another time.

The remaining ‘feminism means X’ processes express greater confidence about what ‘feminism’ means:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01c</td>
<td>For Marie Jenny Howe […] feminism meant a “changed psychology, the creation of a new consciousness in women”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>Feminism means having the balls to confront the stereotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 08a</td>
<td>Or feminism means shouting, “leave him, Tarquin. He ain’t worth it”, before bundling your fella into a cab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 08a</td>
<td>But feminism means something different to women now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 03a</td>
<td>To me, feminism means simply knowing the sexes are equal, that men and women have to work together in mutual respect create a better world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 03a</td>
<td>Feminism doesn’t mean so much to my generation, not because we don’t think it’s important, but because our equality - at least in this country - has already been established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 06b</td>
<td>Feminism can mean a lot of things to a lot of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 08c</td>
<td>Feminism never meant the degradation of women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 09b</td>
<td>Feminism means no fun or make-up, anger and hating men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.2: Remaining occurrences of ‘feminism means X’**

The personal nature of definitions of ‘feminism’ is again evident in adverbials that attribute particular definitions to particular people: “for Marie Jenny Howe” (Guardian 01c), “to women now” (Independent 08a), “to me” (Mail 03a), “to my generation” (Mail 03a) and “to a lot of people” (Mail 06b). The difficulty of providing a clear definition is also explicitly acknowledged in Independent 08a and Mail 06b, in which the attributes are the vague “something different” and the open-ended “a lot of things to a lot of people”. Other attributes are more detailed in the definitions they provide, and accord with the OED (2015) definition of ‘feminism’: Guardian 01c and Mail 03a observe the importance of women and equality between the sexes, while Guardian 07a is more allusive in its acknowledgement of the significance of gender with its definition of ‘feminism’ as “having the balls to confront the stereotypes”, with “balls” denoting a body part and attitude usually associated with maleness.

The definitions provided by Independent 08a, Mail 08c and Times 09b depend on implied meanings. Each provides what is ultimately a positive interpretation of what ‘feminism’ means, but does so by linking ‘feminism’ with negative attributes. In Mail 08c, the use of litotes - a double negative “to achieve an ironic effect” (Beaton-Thome, 2013, p. 387) – produces the implied meaning that ‘feminism’ is about a positive attitude to women through the use of the syntactic negation of the
proposition, with “never” cancelling out the idea that feminism meant “the degradation of women”. This implied meaning can be seen as resulting from either a flout of the maxim of manner (the writer could state what they mean more clearly) or quantity (the writer does not say anything about what feminism actually is) (Grice, 1975): the reader is not told anything about what ‘feminism’ did mean, but is left to infer that it meant the opposite of “degradation”.

In Independent 08a and Times 09b, flouts of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975) produce implied meanings of ‘feminism’. Each relies on the wider context for its correct interpretation, demonstrating the importance of looking beyond the sentence in which ‘feminism’ occurs. Independent 08a’s definition is in the context of a discussion of why it is hypocritical that women should be expected to remain sober in order to take care of drunk men, causing the writer to suggest that ‘feminism’ means stopping men from getting into fights. The Times 09b definition appears in a discussion of the writer’s opinions about young women who claim not to care about feminism, and represents what they perceive ‘feminism’ to mean (“no fun or make-up, anger and hating men”), a perception that the writer clearly does not share. This example demonstrates the complexity of textual meaning. The sentence can be interpreted as a flout of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975), as the writer means the opposite of what they are saying; however, the wider context means this definition of ‘feminism’ could be read as part of the free presentation of direct thought, following the previous sentence - “The only feminist they can think of is Julie Bindel. Feminism means no fun […]” Here, the second sentence could be interpreted as a phenomenon of the mental process “think” in the first sentence, which is attributed to “they” (younger women). This example supports the argument that it is important to look at the wider context to interpret textual meaning – not doing so would result in a mistaken impression of the textual meaning of this occurrence of ‘feminism’. These examples also demonstrate how writers argue with “an imagined interlocutor” (Dean, 2010, p. 397): writers use thought presentation and implying to present definitions which they then argue against, contesting the meaning of ‘feminism’.

5.2.2 ‘Feminism is X’

The analysis here looks at the 102 occurrences of unmodified ‘feminism’ that fulfil the role of carrier in a relational process using the copular verb in a ‘feminism is X’ structure. To make the discussion of a large quantity of occurrences of ‘feminism’ manageable, the analysis is divided according to the type of grammatical entity that fulfils the role of attribute: section 5.2.2.1 looks at noun phrases (33 occurrences), section 5.2.2.2 at adjective phrases (42), section 5.2.2.3 at prepositional phrases (18) and section 5.2.2.4 at wh-complement clauses (9).

Some of the occurrences below correspond to the OED and Kelly (1982, p. 67) definitions of ‘feminism’, in particular occurrences that appear in ‘feminism is about’ structures. However, ‘feminism’ is also presented as complex. Whereas the analysis of the ‘feminism means/does not mean X’ structures discussed in section 5.2.1 showed that feminism is presented as dividing into different personal varieties, the ‘feminism is X’ structures demonstrate how writers attribute different meanings
to different people, but then contest these definitions. In particular, thought presentation and deictic expressions for representing time and society are used to attribute particular (mis)understandings of what ‘feminism’ means to particular people, and to suggest that certain understandings of feminism – in particular that it is dead – are misguided.

5.2.2.1 ‘Feminism is [noun phrase]’

The X element is a noun phrase in 33 of the 102 ‘feminism is X’ structures. The nature of these attributes is varied. Many of the head nouns correspond to Kelly’s (1982, p. 67) definition of ‘feminism’ as a “movement” (Guardian 06c, Mail 06a), “belief” (Guardian 03c, Mail 03a) and outlook (“idea” in Telegraph 05c, “ideology” in Independent 03a, “mindset” in Mail 03c). In other definitions the head noun of the attribute – ‘name’, ‘word’ – highlights that it is the lexeme ‘feminism’ itself that is being discussed. In these instances, the definitions are negative. However, similar to the instances of implying and thought presentation discussed in section 5.2.1, these show how writers contend with the (alleged) perceptions of others. In particular, thought presentation is used to attribute negative perceptions to others.

Table 5.3 comprises the examples of ‘feminism is [noun phrase]’ in which the attribute is ‘word’ or ‘name’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 04a</td>
<td>Young women today could be forgiven for thinking that feminism was little more than the name given to an interminable media debate about how to get your work/life balance right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 00b</td>
<td>In a climate in which feminism counts as the F-word unless its politics have received an egalitarian makeover (as post-feminism or power feminism), Whelehan’s book ought to be welcomed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 09b</td>
<td>You think feminism is a dirty, outmoded word we don’t need any more?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 08c</td>
<td>She found that increasingly the most important thing to girls is how sexually attractive they are to men and, that for many young women, feminism is a dirty word</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: Occurrences of ‘feminism is a word/name’
Taken in isolation, each of the clauses in table 5.3 portrays ‘feminism’ as having a negative meaning. *Independent 00b* equates it with ‘fuck’, *Mail 09b* and *Telegraph 08c* use the premodifiers “dirty” and “outmoded”, and *Guardian 04a* uses the negatively evaluative “interminable”. However, the use of thought presentation makes it clear that these are negative connotative meanings, and that these meanings exist for people other than the writers themselves. In *Guardian 04a* and *Mail 09b* the proposition that ‘feminism’ is “the name given to an interminable media debate” or “a dirty, outmoded word” is presented as the thought of others – “Young women” and “You” respectively. The attribution of this thought to “You” in the rhetorical question in *Mail 09b* is particularly noteworthy: this is a pertinent example of a writer arguing with an imagined interlocutor (Dean, 2010, p. 397), in this instance by making an assumption about the readers’ own thoughts about ‘feminism’.

*Telegraph 08c* does not use thought presentation, but the adverbial “for many young women” performs a similar role to a reporting clause, restricting the applicability of “feminism is a dirty word” to this particular group. Similar to *Guardian 04a* and *Mail 09b*, it attributes a particular understanding of ‘feminism’ to a particular group. *Telegraph 08c* differs slightly in that negative meanings of ‘feminism’ are attributed to a “climate”, the head noun of a noun phrase in which “feminism counts as the F-word” is part of the postmodification. This example is also significant for the way it prioritises information: the climate is part of an adverbial of place, contextualising the main clause, which states that Imelda Whelehan’s book *Overloaded* “ought to be welcomed”. The deontically modal “ought” in the main clause – which lacks a subject – strongly suggests that *Overloaded* should be seen as a good thing, and the adverbial presents the reason why, i.e. because ‘feminism’ is seen negatively. These examples demonstrate the “defensive position” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 9) from which support for feminism often comes: while the writers themselves do not attribute negative meanings to ‘feminism’, they do make observations of others’ negative perceptions, using these to argue in favour of more positive perceptions.

### 5.2.2.2 ‘Feminism is [adjective phrase]’

X is an adjective phrase in 42 of the 102 ‘feminism is X’ structures. A total of 48 adjectives are used to fill the attribute role in these relational processes. The most common theme concerns whether feminism is ‘alive’ or ‘dead’, with these antonyms – and synonyms of ‘dead’ – accounting for 17 of the 48 adjectives. This accords with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) finding that the adjective ‘dead’ occurs frequently to the right of the ‘feminism is’ structure (p. 416), and suggests that feminism is portrayed negatively and as a thing of the past – if it is dead, then it cannot be relevant today. However, as with the ‘feminism is [noun phrase]’ examples, writers frequently attribute negative perceptions of ‘feminism’ to others through thought presentation. Negating and hypothesising are also used to question the validity of the view that feminism is dead.

Table 5.4 comprises the ‘feminism is alive/dead’ structures:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Feminism is alive’</td>
<td>Guardian 06a, Mail 06a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Feminism is dead’</td>
<td>Guardian 03b (x 2), Guardian 05a, Independent 03a, Mail 02a (x 2), Mail 03a, Mail 03b (x 2), Times 03a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Feminism is redundant’</td>
<td>Guardian 03b, Times 03a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Feminism is over’</td>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Feminism is finished’</td>
<td>Independent 03c, Mail 03b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4: Occurrences of ‘feminism is alive/dead’

There are two occurrences of ‘feminism is alive’ against a total of 15 occurrences of ‘feminism is dead/redundant/over/finished’. This suggests a grim diagnosis of feminism’s health. However, the wider context reveals a more complicated picture. Seven of the 15 pronouncements of feminism’s death appear in the presentation of speech/thought/writing, distancing the writer from responsibility for the proposition’s accuracy:

- “People keep telling me that feminism is dead” (Guardian 03b).
- “A report ordered by the Equal Opportunities Commission suggests that feminism is dead” (Times 03a).
- “Feminism is finished, The Guardian announced last week” (Independent 03a).
- “Time magazine ran an article asking, ‘Is Feminism Dead?’” (Guardian 05a).
- “Who says feminism is dead?” (Guardian 03b).
- “It’s strange, isn’t it, to be told that feminism is dead” (Mail 03a).
- “Everyone thinks feminism is over” (Guardian 07a).

In these occurrences, various others are presented as saying and thinking things about feminism and its apparent death. Only Guardian 05a uses a direct report of speech, quoting the title of a Time magazine article to observe a trend for articles questioning feminism’s status (notable in the Mail 03a article discussed in section 3.2) noticed by previous studies of feminism in the media (for example Kamen, 1991; Redfern & Aune, 2010; Rhode, 1995). A further two ‘feminism is dead’ structures are attributed to others, one through being the phenomenon in a mental perception process of hearing – “it’s strange to hear that feminism is finished” (Mail 03b) – and another through a nominalisation of announcements by unspecified sayers - “such stern condemnation has already inspired a rash of announcements that feminism is dead” (Independent 03a).
Six other ‘feminism is dead’ structures are either defeased or modalised through negating or hypothesising. Mail 02a argues that even though the feminist writers Doris Lessing and Fay Weldon are not as “man-hating” as formerly, “it doesn’t mean feminism is dead”, negating the proposition of feminism’s death in the main clause, while Guardian 03b uses a conditional ‘if… then’ structure to make it clear that feminism would only be redundant in particular circumstances – “if women and men […] were free, equal human beings, [then] feminism would be redundant”. Times 03a (“is feminism redundant?”), Mail 02a and 03a (“is feminism dead?”) and Guardian 03b (“who says feminism is dead?”) all use interrogative structures to question feminism’s status, rather than to outright announce its death.

The remaining ‘feminism is dead’ structure occurs at the beginning of the Mail 03b article, ‘Sorry, But Warthogs Have You Beat, Guys’. In this instance, the writer is flouting the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975) to imply that feminism is, in fact, alive – a position made clear in some of the quotes noted above, including “it’s strange to be told that feminism is dead after reading those loving obits of Katharine Hepburn”. This article, in particular, makes a point of linking the ideas of feminism and death, and then denying the association. However, as Lind and Salo (2002) observe, the linking of ideas such as ‘feminism’ and ‘death’ – even if the association is negated – still produces the “net effect” (p. 217) of an association between the two. These examples arguing against negative ideas about ‘feminism’ also demonstrate Mendes’ (2011a) point that when newspapers feature support for feminism, it is “often launched from a defensive position, arguing how feminism has not harmed society” (p. 9).

### 5.2.2.3 ‘Feminism is [prepositional phrase]’

The attribute is a prepositional phrase in 18 of the 102 ‘feminism is X’ structures. The use of a prepositional phrase as a complement means there is greater variety in the grammatical realisations of the attribute – how-clauses, non-finite verb phrases and noun phrases. These definitions of feminism portray ‘feminism’ as having a positive meaning. Like the definitions of ‘feminism’ in articles in Dean’s (2010) study, they emphasise the importance of gender equality. Some also hint at what Mendes (2011a, pp. 10-11) calls the ‘lifestyling’ of feminism, whereby self-improvement is prioritised over a more collectivist ideology.

The 18 occurrences of ‘feminism is about X’ are compiled below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Publication</strong></th>
<th>Feminism is about…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 08a</td>
<td>women being free to do what they wanted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06b</td>
<td>sisterhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06a</td>
<td>a multiplicity of voices, growing louder and louder online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>reawakening people to the fact that there are still big problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 09a</td>
<td>women choosing how to behave and having the same rights and freedoms to behave badly as men do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 01a</td>
<td>how male domination has to be replaced by female domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>real sisterhood […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>everything in the world, a vision of how the world can be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 01a</td>
<td>having choices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 01a</td>
<td>loving yourself as a woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 09a</td>
<td>being the best you can be for you</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror 07c</td>
<td>equality - for men and women in the workplace AND at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 02b</td>
<td>having the power to do whatever you want to do with your life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 04a (x 2)</td>
<td>being proud of yourself, your body and your sexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 03c</td>
<td>how gender precludes you from doing nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 00a</td>
<td>choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 05a</td>
<td>securing for females the potential to be chief executives, prime ministers and merchant bankers while functioning as wives and mothers as well</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.5: Occurrences of ‘feminism is about X’**

Many of these definitions, like the noun phrase attributes discussed in section 5.2.2.1, correspond to the *OED* (2015) definition of ‘feminism’ as “advocacy of equality of the sexes and the establishment of the political, social, and economic rights of the female sex”. *Guardian 09a, Mirror 07c, Telegraph 03c* and *Times 05a*, in particular, draw attention to relationships between men and women, and the importance of women being treated the same as men, while others fall onto the ‘individualist’ side of the individualist/collectivist divide observed by Mendes (2011a, p. 159). *Guardian 06b* and *Independent 07a*, in particular, allude to the idea of a collectivist feminism in their definitions of
feminism as being about “sisterhood”, while the emphasis on “choice” in other definitions – for example the explicit uses of “choice(s)” and “choosing” in Guardian 09a, Mail 01a and Times 00a – reflects Taylor’s (2003, p. 182) suggestion that modern media conceptions of feminism use ‘choice’ to symbolise the importance of individual freedom. This sense of individualism is also constructed through the use of person deixis, with the second person singular “you” and “yourself” used in the representation of states which are beneficial for the individual: “loving yourself as a woman” (Mail 01a), “having the power to do whatever you want to do with your life” (Sun 02b), “being proud of yourself, your body and your sexuality” (Sun 04a). In these examples, the representation of states, rather than actions, is symbolic of a focus on the self rather than on collective action. Of particular note is Mail 09a, in which feminism is not only described as being about “being the best you can be”, but the adverbial contextualises this state through the adverbial “for you”, further emphasising the importance of the individual.

5.2.2.4 ‘Feminism is [wh-complement clause]’

Nine attributes in ‘feminism is X’ structures appear in wh-complement clauses in post-predicate position. Whereas the other ‘feminism is X’ structures discussed in section 5.2.2 present the idea of different feminisms for different people or times, and argue against particular conceptions of ‘feminism’, the ‘feminism is [wh-complement clause]’ occurrences reflect uncertainty about what exactly feminism is.

Table 5.6 comprises each of the nine occurrences:
In each wh-complement clause, it is the definition or nature of feminism that is being questioned. This reflects a concern noted in Jaworska and Krishnamurthy's (2012) study regarding “what feminism really is” (p. 418) and is evidenced by the use of negating. In the Rebecca West quote cited in Express 03a and 09b (and discussed in the sample analysis in section 3.2), the predicator “to find out” postmodifies the complement “able”, which itself is negated by the adverb “never”, emphasising West’s inability to understand what feminism is. In Guardian 06b and 08b, the predicator “know” is negated, attributing a lack of knowledge of feminism to the subjects, while in Mail 06b the knowledge of “people my age” is modalised by the verb in the main clause, “to think”, which is negated to express the writer’s doubts. ‘What feminism is’ is also part of the postmodification of larger noun phrases that stress confusion: “an embarrassing and complete failure to recognise what feminism is really about” (Express 01b), “our confusion about what feminism is” (Mail 03b). Elsewhere, “attitudes towards what feminism is” are placed after the predicator “to change” (Mail 09a), portraying feminism as mutable. In the remaining occurrence, the writer explains that “we had arrived hoping to learn more about what feminism was, or had been, before the ‘post’ kicked in” (Guardian 01a). While the prefix ‘post-’ can have different meanings (see section 2.1.1), in this instance its use in the circumstance “before the ‘post’ kicked in” suggests that feminism is “historical and no longer
current” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 411). Overall, the wh-complement clauses present ‘feminism’ as referring to something that is too complex for certain people to understand.

5.2.3 ‘Feminism is not X’

The ‘feminism is not X’ structure occurs 24 times. Although this is a much smaller number than the 102 occurrences of ‘feminism is X’, the use of negating in these examples provides evidence that ‘feminism’ is often described according to what it is not (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000, p. 61). Strikingly, 11 of the 24 ‘feminism is not X’ structures are part of the presentation of speech, with female writers defining what feminism is not, for example ‘“feminism has never been dead – it’s just that the media has been lazy’, says Andi Zeisler, the founding editor of Bitch’ (Guardian 07c). In particular, writers and those whose speech is being presented argue against the idea that feminism is dead (see the analysis of ‘feminism is [adjective phrase]’ in section 5.2.2.2 above), with the use of negating enabling them to argue against this common perception. Contrasting is also used to expand on the ideas that are negated, as a means for writers to present feminism in a more positive light.

In each of the ‘feminism is not X’ structures, a proposition is negated. However, in many occurrences the effect is that, ultimately, something positive is said about ‘feminism’. This is most obvious in the examples below, each of which contests the idea that feminism is dead:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07c</td>
<td>[…] there’s a groundswell of new feminist magazines, which are evidence not just that feminism isn’t dead, but that it’s thriving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07c</td>
<td>Feminism has never been dead – it’s just that the media has been lazy […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 08a</td>
<td>[…] feminism isn’t dead yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 02a</td>
<td>Feminism isn’t dead, it’s simply lying dormant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7: Occurrences of ‘feminism is not dead’

The ‘feminism is not dead’ structures are a form of litotes, with their meaning depending on a double negative (Beaton-Thome, 2013, p. 387) and a flout of manner and/or quantity (Grice, 1975) (see discussion of the ‘feminism does not mean X’ structure in section 5.2.1). In ‘feminism is not dead’, the semantically negative ‘dead’ is negated by the syntactic negation of the proposition (‘not’, ‘never’), resulting in an implied positive meaning – that feminism is alive. However, the linking of ideas such as ‘feminism’ and ‘death’ – even if the association is negated – will still cause readers to associate the
two (Lind & Salo, 2002, p. 217). As a result, the state of being dead, or at least of enjoying only dubious health, is part of the textual meaning of ‘feminism’ in this context.

Eight of the 24 ‘feminism is not X’ structures demonstrate an awareness of this problem, with the writer or speaker expanding the structure into a ‘feminism is not X, feminism is Y’ structure that allows them to contrast a negative perception of what ‘feminism’ means with a more positive one. This use of contrasting allows writers to argue against others’ negative perceptions of feminism. Table 5.8 lists the X and Y coordinates in these instances of negated opposition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Feminism is not</th>
<th>Feminism is</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01b</td>
<td>a rigid set of given positions, an agenda, an ideology</td>
<td>radical [...] a premise of freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 03b</td>
<td>cool</td>
<td>the realm of middle-aged nostalgia for youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07c</td>
<td>dead</td>
<td>thriving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 09a</td>
<td>about chiding other women, or establishing yet another set of standards for women to be judged against</td>
<td>a social justice movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 09b</td>
<td>scary or a fringe movement</td>
<td>a movement for the good of all society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 02a</td>
<td>dead</td>
<td>lying dormant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 03a</td>
<td>about the pressure to have everything at once</td>
<td>about the freedom to choose what you want</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 09b</td>
<td>about rights or social advances</td>
<td>shopping</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8: Occurrences of ‘feminism is not X, feminism is Y’

Two of the ‘feminism is not dead’ structures are expanded to produce a contrast with what feminism is – either the near antonymous thriving (Guardian 07c) or the less obviously positive lying dormant (Mail 02a). The latter example demonstrates the power of contrasting to construct new opposites. Ordinarily, ‘dormant’ might be seen as residing nearest the ‘dead’ end of the “plane of difference” (Davies, 2008, p. 185) between the conventional opposites ‘alive’ and ‘dead’. Here, however, dead and dormant are opposites, with the latter taking on a more positive evaluative meaning than would
ordinarily be the case: at least there is the promise of feminism being conscious and fully alive again at some point in the future.

In other instances, negated opposition is used not just to try to undermine the connotations of death attached to ‘feminism’, but also to stress connotations of freedom and inclusivity. Each of these constructed oppositions can be traced to more conventional superordinate opposites: the contrasts between a rigid set of given positions, an agenda, an ideology and radical [...] a premise of freedom (Guardian 01b), and about the pressure to have everything at once and about the freedom to choose what you want (Mail 03a) both have connotations of the more conventional limited/free, while establishing yet another set of standards and a social justice movement (Guardian 09a), and a fringe movement and a movement for the good of all society (Guardian 09b) both relate to the antonyms exclusivity/inclusivity. Again, there is the sense of writers and speakers having to create a positive meaning for ‘feminism’ by first of all arguing against negative connotations (Mendes, 2011a, p. 9).

The remaining two examples from table 5.8 appear to provide more negative definitions of what feminism is. However, each discusses ‘feminism’ from the point of view of others, again arguing support for feminism from a defensive position (Mendes, 2011a, p. 10). Times 09b’s rights or social advances/shopping opposition occurs in the following passage:

“[...] the language of women’s liberation was ransacked by companies trying to flog us stuff. Suddenly feminism wasn’t about rights or social advances, but shopping”

The exact meaning of the ‘feminism wasn’t about X, but Y’ opposition can only be understood in the context of the previous sentence, in which “the language of women’s liberation” (here synonymous with ‘feminism’) is the goal in a material action process of ransacking by “companies trying to flog us stuff”. It is not that the writer thinks ‘feminism’ equates with shopping, but that in this particular context they believe that it does. Similarly, a negative view of ‘feminism’ – “not cool” – is presented as the perception of others through an adverbial phrase in Guardian 03b:

“[...] for women of my generation (I’m a child of the 70s), feminism is supposedly not cool. It’s the realm of middle-aged women nostalgic for lost youth”

This example demonstrates the importance of a consideration of the full range of ways of creating textual meaning. The contextualisation of the state – “feminism is supposedly not cool” – being represented with the circumstance “for women of my generation” limits the validity of the proposition as applying to only a certain group of people, while the modal adverb “supposedly” allows the writer to hypothesise about the likeliness of feminism not being cool – this is only something that is supposed
by some. In each of these examples, writers make use of contrasting to acknowledge and then subvert others’ perceptions of feminism.

5.2.4 ‘Feminism becomes X’

The analysis of ‘feminism is not X, feminism is Y’ (see section 5.2.3) demonstrates that contrasting is used to argue against the idea of feminism’s death. Unmodified ‘feminism’ also appears in contrasts that portray changes in feminism. The present section analyses the eight instances of unmodified ‘feminism’ that appear in a ‘feminism becomes X’ structure. These occurrences involve a transitional opposition, whereby feminism is presented as changing from one state to another (Davies, 2012, p. 62). These occurrences are of particular interest in light of Davies’s (2012) contention that transitional oppositions do not “assert, express a preference for, compare, or demonstrate the unexpectedness of one state or opinion over another” (p. 62), but rather neutrally portray a change of state. The eight cases of ‘feminism becomes X’ are notable for the fact that they consistently portray the element that is being transitioned into as negative.

The eight occurrences of ‘feminism becomes X’ are compiled in table 5.9:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>X element</th>
<th>Y element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 04a (x 2)</td>
<td>feminism</td>
<td>a dirty word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00a</td>
<td>women’s liberation</td>
<td>feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 04a</td>
<td>feminism</td>
<td>a way to make the women repulsed by a war-obsessed Prime Minister, vote for him again after all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 01b</td>
<td>feminism</td>
<td>a term of abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 06a</td>
<td>feminism</td>
<td>a career option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 06b</td>
<td>feminism</td>
<td>a ‘dirty word’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 02b</td>
<td>feminism</td>
<td>the Establishment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9: Occurrences of unmodified ‘feminism’ in transitional oppositions

By presenting ‘feminism’ as the thing being transitioned from, the articles express the idea of ‘feminism’ as something that has passed, in accordance with studies that argue that newspapers place feminism in the past (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2012). However, these examples of transitional opposition suggest that ‘feminism’ has become
something negative or unexpected, going against Davies’s (2012, p. 62) contention that this type of opposition frame presents neutral changes. This is demonstrated by examples of metalanguage:

- “Feminism has become a dirty word” (*Express 04a* x 2).
- “Feminism has become a term of abuse” (*Mail 01b*).
- “Feminism had become a ‘dirty word’” (*Mail 06b*).

These examples express a transition of pejoration in the meaning or connotations of ‘feminism’. They also accord with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012, p. 416) finding that ‘dirty word’ appears recurrently to the right of the ‘feminism is a/the’ structure. By looking at the wider context, it is possible to see that each is also part of the writer’s presentation of speech, which is attributed to either a feminist writer (Erica Jong in *Express 04a*, Naomi Wolf in *Mail 01b*) or a worker for a feminist organisation (Amy Pratt of Womankind Worldwide in *Mail 06b*). Jong goes on to say that “young women today are reacting: rebelling, really, against their mothers’ generations”, while Pratt notes that “a lot of us believe equality has been achieved”: rather than expressing a distaste for ‘feminism’, they are bemoaning what they see as the pejoration of the word. Wolf’s sentiments are more conflicted, and her verbiage is an example of the discussion of possible alternatives to ‘feminism’: “feminism has become a term of abuse, almost. Maybe I would like to be called something else”. The contrasts do not note the cause of the transitions they portray, the changes apparently having occurred of their own accord. This is partly a result of the use of the relational intensive verb ‘become’, which presents a change as “unfolding ‘inertly’, without an input of energy” (Halliday, 2004, p. 211). As examples of the explicit discussion of ‘feminism’, these transitional oppositions suggest that the word has undergone a shift in meaning, and that this has been a process of pejoration.

Other transitions are also negative, for example *Independent 04a*’s suggestion that feminism may have become a way to make the women repulsed by a war-obsessed Prime Minister vote for him again after all. This example relies on Grice’s (1975) maxim of relation in order to be interpreted correctly: readers are likely to infer from their own knowledge of ‘feminism’ – and the fact that it is portrayed as having preceded the Y element – that this transition represents a narrowing down from something larger or more substantial. Other examples also portray unexpected transitional oppositions: “feminism became a career option”, “feminism has become the Establishment” (*Times 02b*). The surprising textual meaning in each instance – that ‘feminism’ could be associated with words like “career option” and “the Establishment” – is a result of the interaction of the representation of a state and the expression of a contrast: the relational intensive process expresses a relationship of equivalence between a carrier and an attribute, with the two defining each other; however, the transitional opposition treats them as X and Y elements, with a shift from one to the other.

In the one instance where feminism is the Y element which is being transitioned into, *Guardian 00a* emphasises a transition in the state of feminism itself: “women’s liberation became feminism, a quite different politics that soon splintered into a maelstrom of competing
arguments and identities”. This particular opposition is counterintuitive, portraying what might usually be seen as synonyms as though they are antonyms (although feminist writers such as Greer (2000, p. 2) observe a distinction between the two). The fact that an appositive noun phrase packages up the idea of ‘feminism’ having splintered suggests that the Y element is the ‘bad’ superordinate, giving the impression that a formerly positive and pure movement has been watered down. This also accords with Greer’s (2000) view of the shift between ‘women’s liberation’ and ‘feminism’, in which she laments that “what none of us noticed was that the ideal of liberation was fading out with the word” (p. 2).

5.3 ‘Feminism’ with minimal modification

58 occurrences of ‘feminism’ are minimally modified through determiners and/or predeterminers. These occurrences account for 6% of the total in the dataset (figure 5.1). This is a relatively small section of the dataset, but these occurrences are of interest as they refer to particular types of feminism, thereby presenting it as “fragmented” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 49). The discussion of ‘feminism’ with minimal modification here focuses on 27 of the 58 occurrences, each of which uses determiners to package up the idea of a feminism that belongs to a particular individual or group, e.g. ‘my feminism’. These occurrences are similar to the ‘feminism means/does not mean X’ structures discussed in section 5.2.1 in that they present feminism as something that is complex and “deeply individual and personal” (Mendes, 2012, p. 559). The following analysis of ‘individual feminism’ looks at the two most common transitivity process roles among the 27 occurrences: carriers in relational processes (11 occurrences) and actors in material action processes (eight occurrences).

Where individual feminism is a carrier, the premodification of ‘feminism’ marks it out as a particular type and the relational process provides a definition of this particular strand of feminism. Table 5.10 comprises the 11 occurrences of individual feminism as a carrier:
In each occurrence in table 5.10, a particular type of feminism is defined. However, the fact that naming is used to portray the idea of feminism as something that can belong to individuals – “my” (Guardian 09b), “Bindel’s” (Independent 07a), etc. – means that each process also implies something about other types of feminism. For example, Mail 09a’s assertion that “HGB [Cosmopolitan editor Helen Gurley Brown]’s brand of feminism is totally non-judgemental” flouts the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): the use of the determiner “HGB” acknowledges that there are other types of feminism, but it is only Brown’s particular brand that is defined in the relational process. The reader is left to infer that other people’s brands of feminism are judgemental. This demonstrates the potential of naming to give rise to textual meaning – the packaging up of propositions about a referent into the noun phrase means that the proposition itself gives rise to implied meanings about other possible carriers. In this way, each of the relational processes in table 5.10 defines ‘feminism’ as something complex: not only does the naming acknowledge the individual nature of feminism, but the definitions of these
feminisms imply that, for example, while one brand of feminism might be “woman-biased” (*Independent 07a*), others are not.

The occurrences of individual feminism as an actor in material action processes are more explicit about the existence of different types of feminism. These processes are also notable for the way they define feminism as something malleable that can change over time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 03a</em></td>
<td>[…] my mother’s feminism never made me feel uncomfortable or different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 03a</em></td>
<td>[…] my mum’s feminism has mellowed, but I don’t think she has any regrets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 04a</em></td>
<td>[…] my feminism just slipped from my head into my body […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 04a</em></td>
<td>Ensler’s brand of feminism has evolved since <em>The Vagina Monologues</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 05c</em></td>
<td>Dworkin’s feminism often came into conflict with the more compromising theories of others, such as Naomi Wolf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mail 09a</em></td>
<td>I think HGB’s inclusive brand of feminism has outlasted all the others […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mail 09a</em></td>
<td>What has HGB’s ‘bare your bra rather than burn it’ kind of feminism ever done for you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sun 09a</em></td>
<td>My sort of feminism tried hard to demystify women’s bodies […]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.11: Occurrences of individual ‘feminism’ as an actor in material action processes

The idea of feminism as something changeable is expressed in several material action supervision processes. These are processes where something “just happens” (Simpson, 1993, p. 89), without any intention on the part of the actor. Particular types of feminism are presented as having “mellowed” (*Guardian 03a*), “slipped” between parts of the body (*Guardian 04a*) or “evolved” (*Guardian 04a*). In these examples, feminism is not only something that differs depending on who possesses it, but that can change involuntarily over time. Other material action processes make explicit the existence of different types of feminism, and present them as contradictory (Mendes, 2011a, p. 9). For example, *Mail 09a* acknowledges the existence of multiple feminisms, naming Helen Gurley Brown’s own brand and, more generally, “all the others”: the former is the actor, and presented as having “outlasted” the goal of the process – “all the others”. This presents the idea of multiple feminisms which vary in terms of longevity. *Guardian 05c* focuses on feminist writer Andrea Dworkin’s type of feminism, which is presented as the actor in the process “came into conflict”, with “the more compromising theories of others” as the goal. This example again presents the idea of conflict between different types of
feminism. The naming of theories as “more compromising” further suggests the idea of stricter and more lenient types of feminism, reflecting Dean’s (2010) observation of “a reasonable/moderate feminism and an excessive or overly radical feminism” (p. 402).

5.4 ‘Feminism’ with detailed modification

I now turn to occurrences of ‘feminism’ that are modified by premodifying adjectives, appositive noun phrases and post-modifying prepositional phrases and relative clauses. This level of modification allows writers to package up a greater amount of information into ‘feminism’-headed noun phrases. 230 occurrences of ‘feminism’ carry detailed modification (figure 5.1), accounting for 23% of occurrences in the feminism dataset. The analysis below is divided into two parts: section 5.4.1 focuses on the modification of ‘feminism’ through appositive noun phrases, and section 5.4.2 on the adjectives that occur in the premodification of ‘feminism’. The discussion of apposition shows how feminism and the lexeme ‘feminism’ itself are discussed in the data, finding that the word is often portrayed as somehow problematic, while the analysis of adjectives shows how feminism is divided into different varieties reflecting different time periods and levels of political commitment.

5.4.1 ‘Feminism’ with appositive noun phrases

There are 24 occurrences of apposition in the feminism dataset. The analysis here disregards four occurrences that relate to Natasha Walter’s The New Feminism, as they are specifically about a book rather than feminism itself. I first of all focus on eight occurrences of metalanguage, before looking at the remaining 12 occurrences, which use apposition to “provide background information” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 639) about feminism. The analysis finds that portrayals of feminism and ‘feminism’ are mixed: they are equated with other things that are both positive and negative, while some examples address problems related to the word ‘feminism’, for example that while the concepts underlying ‘feminism’ are valuable, the lexeme itself is perceived to be undesirable.

Table 5.12 comprises the eight metalinguistic occurrences of ‘feminism’ in appositive noun phrases, where ‘feminism’ is presented as equivalent to another noun phrase headed by either ‘word’, ‘term’ or ‘phrase’:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 09a</td>
<td>The term feminism needs to be redefined for the present age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06a</td>
<td>It's the word feminism that is the problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 01a</td>
<td>When testing questions for her study, Can Do Girls, respondents advised her to remove the word 'feminism' because they were uncomfortable with it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 04c</td>
<td>Whoever coined the phrase ‘post-feminism’ should be shot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 09a</td>
<td>Most women my age don’t like the word feminism and don’t choose to identify as feminists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 09a</td>
<td>[…] I can hear the rustle of disdain once more as the words feminism and HGB are mentioned in the same sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 09b</td>
<td>Ever tried saying the word ‘feminism’ without a sneer?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 09a</td>
<td>But then I got tetchy all over again about losing the word feminism […]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.12: Metalinguistic occurrences of ‘feminism’ in appositive noun phrases

The discussion of ‘feminism’ in these examples is notable for the fact that there are no clear accounts of the denotative meaning of the lexeme. Guardian 06a is the only instance in which ‘feminism’ appears in the representation of a state, with a relational intensive process presenting it as equivalent to “the problem”. The problematic nature of ‘feminism’ is underlined by the use of the definite determiner – the problem, not just a problem – and the use of a cleft structure, which places the focus on “the word feminism” and serves to presuppose the content of the relative clause, i.e. that the word is indeed “the problem”. The notion of ‘feminism’ itself being in some way problematic or undesirable occurs throughout the sentences in processes in which ‘feminism’ fulfils a passive role in mental, verbalisation and material action processes. In Independent 09a, “the word ‘feminism’” is a phenomenon that women “don’t like”. The verbalisation processes in Telegraph 09b and Mail 09a are more complex presentations of people’s negative reactions to ‘feminism’. The rhetorical question in Telegraph 09b implies that ‘feminism’ is undesirable through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): no answer to the question “ever tried saying the word ‘feminism’ without a sneer?” is provided, leaving the reader to infer that this is not possible. It is not clear whether the implicature is that it is not possible to say ‘feminism’ without sneering at the word or that something about the word itself causes a speaker’s face to become contorted: in either case, it is implied that ‘feminism’ has negative connotations. Mail 09a presents it as incompatible with another word, “HGB” (referring to Cosmopolitan editor Helen Gurley Brown). Here, the mentioning of the two words together is presented in an adverbial and is the cause of “the rustle of disdain” that the writer can hear. This
example demonstrates that what ‘feminism’ represents is deemed to be incompatible with what certain figures such as Brown represent, providing evidence for Mendes’ (2011a) observation of conflict over “who could be called a feminist” (p. 158).

Where ‘feminism’ is the goal in a material action process, its undesirability is made clear where its removal is being advised (Independent 01a) and where it “needs to be redefined for the present age” (Express 09a). The latter example presents the idea of ‘feminism’ as something malleable, and the adverbial “for the present age” reflects Dean’s (2010) observation that feminism is “temporally situated in the past” (p. 401); the idea of ‘feminism’ being “redefined” leaves open the idea that it may be possible to adapt it and make it suitable for the present. The final two examples, from Times 09a and Independent 04c, show ‘feminism’ in a more positive light. ‘Feminism’ again appears in an adverbial in Times 09a, where the possibility of its loss is the cause of the writer’s having become “tetchy”, while Independent 04c highlights the complexity of the derivational form ‘post-feminism’: “the phrase ‘post-feminism’” is the goal in a material action process of coining, and the proposition of the main clause is that the actor in this process – “whoever” – ought to be shot. This condoning of violence against someone who has coined a feminist term might appear to represent another example of hostility towards ‘feminism’. However, the writer’s opinions about misogynist denouncements of Big Brother contestants make it clear that he or she is sympathetic towards feminism, and that this is an instance in which a writer considers the term ‘post-feminism’ to be synonymous with the disavowal of feminism, rather than symbolic of a more contemporary wave of feminism (Mendes, 2011a, p. 8).

The remaining examples of apposition present feminism as equivalent with the contents of other words and phrases:
Table 5.13: Remaining occurrences of ‘feminism’ in appositive noun phrases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00a</td>
<td>Women’s liberation became feminism, a quite different politics that soon splintered into a maelstrom of competing arguments and identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00c</td>
<td>[...] all these ideas that I had thought were the left - feminism and diversity and gay and lesbian rights - were suddenly very chic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06a</td>
<td>She’s part of what is called ‘pro-sex feminism’, a movement that doesn’t see what is wrong with having sexuality and sexual attractiveness as part of the message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06b</td>
<td>Each carnival [...] is hosted by a different blogger, who invites people to contribute articles on current events or a general theme: ‘radical feminism’, for instance, or ‘1970s feminism and what it means today’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07b</td>
<td>This was followed a few weeks later by Global Feminisms, an exhibition [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 08a</td>
<td>It’s like some dystopian future... feminism without any feminists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror 03a</td>
<td>I don’t care what we call it - Feminism, Girl Power, even Margery - but we still need some word that says that women don’t always get an even deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 01c</td>
<td>Vindictiveness has always been an element in any reform movement, whether it is socialism, liberalism or feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 07c</td>
<td>And feminism, another out-of-favour concept, holds the solution [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08b</td>
<td>[...] feminism should be taught in schools: a ‘reinvigorated’ feminism that is designed to appeal to young women [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 09a</td>
<td>If [...] it is feminism - a movement designed to make women equal in status to men; the only movement in the past 2,000 years specifically and solely dedicated to making women happy - that is being blamed for making women unhappy [then] we’re going to have to do some serious rebranding [...]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These examples of apposition present feminism in a variety of ways. Times 07c and Telegraph 01c are sceptical in their portrayals of feminism, likening it to other concepts and movements that are in some way undesirable. The former places ‘feminism’ in apposition with the negatively evaluative noun phrase “another out-of-favour concept”, in which the iterative “another” presupposes that other, similar concepts (that are not in favour) also exist. Telegraph 01c places feminism in a list with “socialism” and “liberalism”, which are all portrayed as equivalent with “any reform movement”; this in turn postmodifies “an element”, which is presented as equivalent with “vindictiveness” through the
representation of a state. These examples reflect previous studies’ findings that feminism is presented as “tangential to the lives of contemporary women and [...] mired in bitterness” (Callaghan et al., 1999, p. 163).

Other relations of equivalence involving feminism are less negative. Guardian 06a places a particular variety of feminism – “pro-sex feminism” – in scare quotes; the gloss provided by the appositive noun phrase – which emphasises the importance of sexuality to this variety – reflects previous studies’ observations of portrayals of more contemporary, “sexy” types of feminism (Mendes, 2012, p. 561). Times 09a uses the sense of equivalence provided by apposition to define ‘feminism’ in a positive way in keeping with the OED (2015) definition, placing the emphasis on equality between the sexes (Dean, 2010): “a movement designed to make women equal in status to men; the only movement in the past 2,000 years specifically and solely dedicated to making women happy”. However, the hypothesising ‘if... then’ structure observes that, in spite of these merits, feminism is being “blamed for making women unhappy”. The writer makes their own support for feminism clear in the “then” clause – “we’re going to have to do some serious rebranding”. Here, the use of the proximal person deixis “we” as the actor and the strong deontic modality of “have to” provide a sort of rallying cry for the “rebranding” of feminism: if people view feminism negatively, then it is important that people work together to change that perception.

The Times 09a example is also notable for “rebranding”, in which the iterative trigger “re-” presupposes that feminism has been branded before, and emphasises the need for change. The idea of ‘feminism’ having somehow changed, or needing to be changed, is found in a number of the examples in table 5.13. Times 08b and Mirror 03a, like Times 09a, use iterative triggers to emphasise the idea of feminism’s continuing importance. In Times 08b, deontic modality - “should” - emphasises the importance of teaching feminism, and in particular “a ‘reinvigorated’ feminism that is designed to appeal to young women”. Here, the “re-” prefix presupposes that feminism has lost its invigoration, and that – as Times 09a suggests – while feminism itself may have fallen out of favour, the ideas that it denotes are still important. Mirror 03a goes further, emphasising the importance of feminist ideas over the importance of the words that are used to represent them. Here, ‘feminism’ is listed alongside other possible names for “it” – “Girl Power” and “Margery” – and the writer uses the negation of a mental reaction process (“I don’t care what we call it”) to emphasise that the name used is inconsequential. However, this apathy is contrasted with the next clause through a concessive opposition, observing “but we still need some word that says that women don’t always get a fair deal”: apathy about word form is contrasted with the necessity for a word that has the sort of meaning associated with ‘feminism’, with the iterative trigger “still” presupposing that this need has existed in the past, and emphasising that it still exists today.

5.4.2 ‘Feminism’ with premodifying adjectives

This section provides an overview of the 161 adjectives used in the premodification of occurrences of ‘feminism’, categorising them according to Biber et al.’s (1999, pp. 508-509) distinction between
descriptors and classifiers (see section 4.3.1.1) and looking at the most frequently occurring adjectives. This overview allows me to draw some early comparisons to the findings of previous studies, before the analysis in sections 5.4.2.1 to 5.4.2.3 looks in greater depth at frequently occurring combinations of adjectives and ‘feminism’.

Figure 5.3 shows how the adjectives that premodify ‘feminism’ are divided according to Biber et al.’s (1999, pp. 508-509) distinction between different types of descriptors and classifiers:

Classifiers (55%) account for a slightly higher proportion of the adjectives than descriptors (45%). The most common subcategories are time descriptors (27% of all adjectives) and topical/other classifiers (30%). The prevalence of time descriptors may reflect Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) finding that feminism is “heavily historicised through frequent references to past decades and the history of the movement” (p. 413), while the use of topical/other classifiers – those that describe referents “in relation to other referents” (Biber, et al., 1999, p. 508) – reflects Dean’s (2010, p. 402) observation that feminism is frequently divided into different types, for example old/new and reasonable/radical.

The impression that time is an important aspect of the premodification of ‘feminism’ is supported by the raw figures for premodifying adjectives that occur most frequently in the feminism dataset:
Table 5.14: Most frequently occurring adjectives that premodify ‘feminism’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>No. of occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern(-day)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-wave</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American, old(-style)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western(-style), third-wave</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British, contemporary, lipstick, Power, traditional</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The prominence of the time descriptor ‘new’ is interesting in light of Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012, p. 416) finding that it is a common collocate of ‘feminism’, a result that itself lent weight to previous studies convictions concerning how newspaper articles frequently invoke “a new and ‘glamorous’ feminism” (Hinds & Stacey, 2001, p. 394) in order to dismiss the feminism(s) of previous generations. The presence of ‘modern(-day)’, ‘contemporary’ and ‘old(-style)’ in the list supports the impression that portrayals of this division also appear in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data. ‘Second-wave’ and ‘third-wave’, which I classify as relational classifiers that delimit “the referent of a noun […] in relation to other referents” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 509), add to the impression of different groups of feminists divided by time.

Previous studies (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Lind & Salo, 2002) have noted that ‘feminism’ frequently co-occurs with ‘radical’, ‘socialist’ and other adjectives that denote political movements. ‘Radical’ and ‘socialist’ – topical/other classifiers that pinpoint a particular type of feminism – are also prominent here, occurring ten and 4 times respectively. Other topical classifiers – ‘lipstick’, ‘power’, ‘traditional’ – also evoke the idea of different feminisms that are politicised to varying degrees. Finally, ‘American’, ‘Western(-style)’ and ‘British’ suggest an Anglo-Saxon bias previously identified in Jaworska & Krishnamurthy’s (2012, p. 411) finding that collocates associate feminism with the West.

The following analysis of ‘feminism’ and premodifying adjectives focuses on the patterns identified here: discussion of feminism in terms of the waves metaphor (described in section 2.1.1), the emphasis on new and old varieties of feminism, and references to the political nature of feminism. The discussion finds evidence not only that ‘feminism’ has contested meanings, but that different
types of feminism are frequently placed in opposition to each other (as with the individual varieties discussed in section 5.3). In particular, while second wave and political varieties of feminism are located in the past, the articles compare them favourably to newer varieties, which are seen to be vague. This contrast provides evidence for Dean’s (2010) observations concerning domestication, whereby a radical feminism is placed in the past, and a more moderate feminism located in the present. However, the analysis of textual meaning demonstrates that the articles do not necessarily favour newer varieties over older ones.

5.4.2.1 ‘First/second/third wave feminism’

The waves metaphor is used in the premodification of 15 occurrences of ‘feminism’. There are nine instances of ‘second wave’, five of ‘third wave’ and just one of ‘first wave’. The acknowledgement of different ‘waves’ of feminism underscores its contested meaning, as something that has different meanings at different times. The analysis here demonstrates that where premodification picks out the second wave, it presents ‘feminism’ as “historical and no longer current” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 411). This effect is achieved through the use of other modification and the tense of states, actions and events in which ‘feminism’ occurs, e.g. “the new idolatry of shiny careerism promulgated by the second-wave feminism of the late 1960s” (Telegraph 08a). There is also evidence that while the third wave is marked out as different to the second wave, the exact meaning of this particular feminism is ambiguous (Mendes, 2012, p. 556).

The one occurrence of ‘first-wave feminism’ is placed firmly in the past in the nominalisation “the defeat of ‘first-wave’ feminism in America in the late 19th century” (Independent 06b). The use of a nominalisation reifies the idea of this wave of feminism having passed, and the postmodifying prepositional phrase “in the late 19th century” emphasises our distance from it. The use of scare quotes around ‘first-wave’ implies that this original wave is also ambiguous from a 21st century vantage point. This historicising of feminism is also evident in the use of naming and tense in the nine references to ‘second wave feminism’:
The former editor of *Ms* magazine was one of over 200 activists interviewed by Susan Brownmiller for *In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution*, her account of the birth of *second-wave feminism* in America.

Sheila Rowbotham, a pioneer of *second-wave feminism*, has admitted that “none of it is as simple as we thought back then”.

The experience piqued my interest in speaking to people who had grown up with politicised mothers during the heady days of *second-wave feminism*.

The creeping silence on feminism matters - particularly for younger women who did not experience even third-wave, let alone *second-wave* feminism.

As with *second-wave feminism*, this online movement is open to the accusation that it simply represents privileged white women.

All are rightly ‘lamented’ for […] their recourse, often under the guise of irony, to ‘retro–sexism’ - as Whelehan calls nostalgia for gender relations before *second-wave feminism*.

It’s also true that *second-wave feminism* didn’t risk focusing on childbirth and motherhood because the emphasis had to be on competing in the workplace.

[…] she identified with the new idolatry of shiny careerism promulgated by the *second-wave feminism* of the late 1960s […].

It may make you wonder what happened to the passion of *second-wave feminism* […].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00b</td>
<td>The former editor of <em>Ms</em> magazine was one of over 200 activists interviewed by Susan Brownmiller for <em>In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution</em>, her account of the birth of <em>second-wave feminism</em> in America.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01a</td>
<td>Sheila Rowbotham, a pioneer of <em>second-wave feminism</em>, has admitted that “none of it is as simple as we thought back then”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 03a</td>
<td>The experience piqued my interest in speaking to people who had grown up with politicised mothers during the heady days of <em>second-wave feminism</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06a</td>
<td>The creeping silence on feminism matters - particularly for younger women who did not experience even third-wave, let alone <em>second-wave</em> feminism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06b</td>
<td>As with <em>second-wave feminism</em>, this online movement is open to the accusation that it simply represents privileged white women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 00b</td>
<td>All are rightly ‘lamented’ for […] their recourse, often under the guise of irony, to ‘retro–sexism’ - as Whelehan calls nostalgia for gender relations before <em>second-wave feminism</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 01a</td>
<td>It’s also true that <em>second-wave feminism</em> didn’t risk focusing on childbirth and motherhood because the emphasis had to be on competing in the workplace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 08a</td>
<td>[…] she identified with the new idolatry of shiny careerism promulgated by the <em>second-wave feminism</em> of the late 1960s […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 09c</td>
<td>It may make you wonder what happened to the passion of <em>second-wave feminism</em> […]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.15: Occurrences of ‘second wave feminism’

*Telegraph 08a* and *Independent 00b* place ‘second-wave feminism’ in the past through different uses of postmodifying phrases. The former packages up the historical connotations of this wave in the postmodifying prepositional phrase “of the late 1960s”, while the latter places it in the postmodification of the head noun “nostalgia”, again highlighting its historical nature. In *Guardian 00b*, the apposition of “her account of the birth of second-wave feminism in America” with the head noun “*Memoir*” also places the second-wave in the past. In other instances, the tense of representations of actions, events and states involving second-wave feminism historicise it, for example in “second-wave feminism didn’t risk focusing on childbirth and motherhood” (*Independent 01a*). Uncertainty about what followed (or did not follow) the second-wave is also implied. For example, in *Telegraph 09c*, “it” refers cataphorically to “the gender debate”, which causes the senser in the subordinate mental process to
wonder “what happened to the passion of second-wave feminism”. Here, the past tense of the wh-clause places the second-wave in the past, and the rhetorical question form flouts the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), creating the implicature that this wave – and its associated “passion” – has disappeared, with no indication of what, if anything, has replaced it. In *Guardian 01a*, the glossing of the sayer, Sheila Rowbotham, as “a pioneer of second-wave feminism” through an appositive noun phrase gives the reader the contextual information for interpreting her verbiage, that “none of it is as simple as we thought back then”. This example demonstrates the extent to which ideas packaged up into noun phrases can enable readers to interpret propositions that may otherwise prove difficult: the information in the appositive noun phrase allows the reader to understand that the distal time deixis “then” refers to the time of the second-wave of feminism. Here, ‘feminism’ is not only attached to the past, but is characterised as something too simple to apply today.

The third wave is not historicised in the same way. The one exception is from *Guardian 06a*, where the third-wave and the second-wave both occur in a relative clause that postmodifies “younger women”, who are the phenomenon in a process of not experiencing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 05a</em></td>
<td>This, says Stoller, is one of the fundamental issues on which third-wave feminism differs from its precursors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 05a</em></td>
<td>This isn’t to say that a new respect for craft is the beginning and end of American third-wave feminism […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 06a</em></td>
<td>The creeping silence on feminism matters - particularly for younger women who did not experience even third-wave, let alone second-wave, feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 09a</em></td>
<td>“Third-wave feminism is pluralistic, strives to be multi-ethnic, is pro-sex and tolerant of other women’s choices”, she said</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Independent 06a</em></td>
<td>Meg Sanders, 46, a writer from Stratford-upon-Avon, said a ‘third-wave feminism’ was needed to follow the suffragette movement and the 1970s movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.16: Occurrences of ‘third wave feminism’**

The other sentences here differentiate the third wave from the second and also define it as ambiguous. For example, in *Independent 06a* “a ‘third-wave’ feminism” is the phenomenon in a mental process of needing, with the adverbial contextualising this need temporally – “to follow the suffragette movement and the 1970s movement”. The use of scare quotes to refer to the third-wave suggests that it is also hard to identify (although note that it appears in the verbiage of a verbalisation
process, and so this may be reported speech). The Naomi Wolf quote from *Guardian 09a* uses a relational process to explicitly attribute the possibility of multiple meanings to the third wave: “third-wave feminism is pluralistic”. The relational process here also gives rise to an implicature about other waves of feminism through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): the third-wave is pluralistic, but if this needs to be spelled out then previous waves must not have been. Differentiation from previous waves is more explicit in *Guardian 05a*, in which a quote from feminist magazine founder Debbie Stoller uses a relational process to note that “third-wave feminism differs from its precursors”. Here, the anaphoric “this” in the main clause refers back to Stoller’s discussion of sexuality, thereby presenting the third and second waves as differing in terms of their treatment of this subject. This accords with Mendes’ (2011a, p. 557) observation that the third-wave is defined by the way it responds to the second. *Guardian 05a* provides little in the way of a definition of third wave feminism, but seeks to defease possible assumptions about it. This is done through the negation of a verbalisation process which makes a proposition about the third wave, equating it with “a new respect for craft”. Again, an implied meaning arises from a flout of quantity (Grice, 1975): “new” emphasises that this respect for craft was not a feature of the second wave.

### 5.4.2.2 ‘Old/new feminism’

‘New’ and ‘old(-style)’ are used in the premodification of 25 and six occurrences of ‘feminism’, respectively. Previous studies of feminism in UK newspapers in the 2000s (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) have observed how articles distinguish between old and new feminisms. Mendes (2012) finds evidence that the former is “derided as ‘retro’ or ‘old-school’” (p. 561) while the latter is “‘modern’, ‘fun’ and ‘sexy’” (p. 561). Dean (2010) believes that this is a conscious strategy on the part of writers, who define ‘feminism’ according to its temporality in order to repudiate old feminism while approving a “less excessive feminism in the present” (p. 393). However, as hinted at by the analysis of ‘third wave feminism’ in section 5.4.2.1, the analysis below suggests that older feminisms, while placed firmly in the past, are presented as less ambiguous than newer varieties, which the articles find difficult to define.

Table 5.17 comprises the six occurrences of ‘old(-style) feminism’:
Each of the articles referring to ‘old(-style) feminism’ notes a contrast between it and newer ideas of feminism. The textual-conceptual function of contrasting itself performs this role, with parallelisms casting different feminisms in a relationship of opposition. The two occurrences from *Express 09a* appear in the following passage, with the opposed elements highlighted:

“That is because feminism in the Noughties has changed. Old-style feminism was important. Any of us who have ever taken the Pill, considered having an abortion, held a managerial job, bought a house or voted have a lot to thank old feminism for”.

**Feminism in the Noughties** and **old-style feminism** are both subjects in adjacent clauses, with the modifiers “in the Noughties” and “old-style” emphasising that this parallelism is presenting them as opposites and that at least two types of feminism, defined by their place in time, are possible. The older feminism is also defined more positively, occurring as the carrier in a relational intensive process which attributes to it the quality of importance, although this significance is placed in the past through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): the past tense states something that was the case about “old-style feminism”, but does not go on to explicitly say anything about its present (lack of) importance. Taken in context, there appears to be a further implied meaning: while the newer feminism appears in an apparently neutral process of having changed, the fact that the older feminism is singled out as the important one flouts the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), implying that this change is negative. The impression of the older feminism as the better of the two is emphasised by the following sentence, in which “old feminism” is the receiver in a verbalisation process of thanking.
The fact that the proximal person deixis “us” is the sayer in this process also brings the reader onside, enhancing the impression of old feminism as important to everyone.

While *Express 09a* implies that new feminism is less important than old feminism, *Guardian 01a* is more explicit in its condemnation of the former:

“We don’t need a new feminism that gives us equality at work and leaves our private selves in crisis. We need the old feminism back […]”

The parallelism here arises from the placement of new and old feminisms in adjacent clauses in which it is the phenomenon in a mental process of needing. New feminism’s comparative lack of desirability is made clear through the syntactic negation of the mental process in which it appears. The naming of the two feminisms emphasises the difference in desirability: the newer feminism is indefinite, while the older feminism is definite, and its existence presupposed by the use of the definite determiner, thereby presenting the former as ambiguous and the latter as definable and dependable. Further, the newer form is postmodified by a relative clause that defines it through another constructed opposition between public life and private life: while new feminism may have positive effects for public life, it leaves “our private selves in crisis”.

*Mail 04a* also marks a contrast between time periods, although in this instance it is old feminism that is aligned with the negative superordinate:

“There was so much that was repressive about the old feminism - having to wear overalls and worrying all the time that men were trying to humiliate you. It was all too bound up with anger and rage. But my generation don’t need to believe that we should be the same as men in every way, because we know that we’re not.”

Here, the old feminism is the carrier in relational processes in which it is attributed the qualities of being repressive and angry. This is contrasted with my generation (the naming of which, notably, does not use ‘feminism’), which is the senser in a mental process where the phenomenon counteracts the ideas associated with the old feminism. These ideas are associated with old feminism through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): the beliefs are not explicitly attributed to the old feminism, but because it is being contrasted with my generation, the implicature is that the old feminism does believe “that we should be the same as men”.

As with *Mail 04a*, the remaining occurrences place feminism in the past, but without contrasting it with a newer form of feminism. *Guardian 09a* discusses *Jezebel*, a website for young women, and argues that “it uses the language of old-style feminism to betray the movement’s ideals”.

141
Here, Jezebel is the actor in material processes of using and betraying, with “old-style feminism” the goal in each: while feminism is being placed in the past through naming, it is the newer phenomenon – Jezebel - that is presented negatively, as being exploitative. In Independent 01a, old feminism’s location in the past is emphasised through an adverbial which contextualises a process of learning about old feminism: “through my 23-year-old son and his many female friends, I have learnt how little we understand about both the failures and successes of old feminism”. This example demonstrates how adverbials enable writers to make implicatures, as a flout of relation (Grice, 1975) arises from the fact that the reasons why the writer was able to learn this as a result of her son are not explicitly stated; instead, the use of the premodifier “23-year-old” and coordination with “his many female friends” serves to imply the existence of a distance between youth and the ability for the sexes to befriend each other and old feminism.

Nine of the 25 occurrences of ‘new feminism’ relate to Natasha Walter’s book The New Feminism. As noted in the discussion of appositive noun phrases (see section 5.4.1), this could be seen to detract from the impression that ‘new feminism’ is prominent in the dataset. However, the fact that newness is frequently packaged up into references to ‘feminism’ affects the meaning of ‘feminism’, imbuing it with the meaning of something temporal and changeable, as “a movement in flux, always in need of a re-make” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 416). In the analysis here, however, I concentrate on the 16 examples of ‘new feminism’ that do not relate to Walter’s book. These examples are compiled in table 5.18:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 02a</td>
<td>What Is the New Feminism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00b</td>
<td>She has little time for the new, mainstream feminism […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01a</td>
<td>We don’t need a new feminism that gives us equality at work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 05b</td>
<td>[…] the media always look for the ‘new sexy feminism’ […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06a</td>
<td>New Feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 03a</td>
<td>The poor boys seemed justifiably confused as to their role in this new ‘comfortable feminism’ […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 04a</td>
<td>Shopping Is the New Feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 04a</td>
<td>[…] shopping is not only the new sex but the new feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 09b</td>
<td>SOS for a New Feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 09b</td>
<td>[…] what we all really need now […] is our very own brand of New Feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 09b</td>
<td>The new feminism, it seems, still has an awfully long way to go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 06a</td>
<td>It is to do with ‘new feminism’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 06a</td>
<td>[…] how is the new feminism different from the old objectification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 06a</td>
<td>I suppose this new feminism can be seen as part of a continuum […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 06a</td>
<td>There is going to be a Guardian debate on the meaning of the new feminism […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 09a</td>
<td>‘New Feminism’ would just make everyone think of New Labour’s busted flush</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.18: Occurrences of ‘new feminism’

A feature of the naming of new feminism is the use of scare quotes. This aspect of the presentation of new feminism is also observed by Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 416), who see it as evidence that new feminism is either treated ironically or its existence treated as questionable. The occurrences in the feminism dataset back up this impression, although scare quotes are used to achieve quite different effects. In Mail 03a, “this new ‘comfortable feminism’” (previously discussed in the sample analysis in section 3.2) is part of the adverbial, given as the cause of young men’s confusion. Here, the premodification of ‘feminism’ with the proximal deictic marker “this” evokes an idea being presented for close inspection, and its merits questioned. Guardian 05b questions the very existence of new feminism, with Sheila Jeffreys – described in the article as a “radical feminist” –
presenting new feminism as the goal in a material action process of looking. Again, naming is important in determining what is being implied about ‘new feminism’: in this instance, the sheer length and detail of the postmodification of “new sexy feminism” (a flout of the relation of quantity (Grice, 1975)) suggests that this feminism is being treated with suspicion – it is a confection that allows the media to act in the ways described in the postmodification, rather than something that actually exists. In the case of Times 09a, “New Feminism” is metalanguage in a material action process in which the term makes people think of “New Labour’s busted flush”. Here, it is the term “New Feminism” itself that is being questioned, the proposition being that the use of the adjective ‘new’ would cause people to equate it with New Labour, itself glossed as a “busted flush”.

Telegraph 06a also treats ‘new feminism’ as suspect. In the article’s opening paragraph, the writer notes that his “feeling of alienation […] is to do with ‘new feminism’”. Again, there is the sense of this being an instance of metalanguage, its equation with alienation through a relational intensive process suggesting that the writer is wary of it. New feminism is the subject of this article, entitled ‘Am I the Last True Feminist?’, and a total of four occurrences of “new feminism” combine to create a feeling of uncertainty about the phenomenon. This is clear in the writer’s use of a rhetorical question to ask “how is the new feminism different from the old objectification […] the treatment of women as sex objects?” Here there is a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): no answer is supplied, and so the reader is left to infer that “the new feminism” and “the old objectification” are not different. Elsewhere, the writer uses hypothesising to sound a note of caution about new feminism:

“I suppose this new feminism can be seen as part of a continuum that began with the militant feminists of the 1970s, the ones who said there was no need for men, and progressed to the ‘lipstick feminism’ of Natasha Walter - she who argued that it was acceptable for women to want to be feminine. There is going to be a Guardian debate on the meaning of the new feminism at London’s City University tomorrow night and that might shed some light on this.”

In the first instance, “this new feminism” is the phenomenon in a mental process of seeing, which is modalised by the auxiliary verb “can” in the immediate clause and the modal verb “suppose” in the main clause, in which the writer is the senser. The writer continues, constructing a transitional opposition between the militant feminists of the 1970s, the ones who said there was no need for men on the one hand, and the ‘lipstick feminism’ of Natasha Walter - she who argued that it was acceptable for women to want to be feminine on the other. Here, the writer explicitly discusses a similar idea to Dean’s (2010, p. 393) concept of domestication, whereby radical feminism is placed in the past and a newer feminism is presented as being less political. Similar to the examples of apposition discussed in section 5.4.1, appositive noun phrases are used to provide detailed, difficult to contest arguments about both old and new feminisms. Finally, the writer observes that “there is going to be a Guardian debate on the meaning of the new feminism”, drawing attention to ‘the new feminism’ as metalanguage by placing it in the postmodification of “meaning”. However, the writer's
uncertainty is underlined further by the coordinated clause, which refers anaphorically to the debate: “that might shed some light on this”. Again, a modal auxiliary – “might” - is used to hypothesise about new feminism; in this instance, to express uncertainty about the likelihood of its meaning being defined.

The attention afforded to the idea of ‘new feminism’ is evidenced by article headlines in Table 5.18: “What Is the New Feminism?” (Express 02a), “New Feminism” (Guardian 06a), “Shopping Is the New Feminism” (Mail 04a), “SOS for a New Feminism” (Mail 09b). The Mail 04a and 09b articles, like others discussed here, present the idea of new feminism as questionable or hard to define. Mail 04a, in particular, demonstrates the importance of looking at occurrences in context, as they do not in fact describe a new feminism but rather the fact that it has been succeeded by shopping: “Shopping Is the New Feminism”, “shopping is not only the new sex but the new feminism”. Here, there is a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): a proposition is made about shopping, but if shopping is the new feminism, then the question is raised as to what feminism now is – the implicature being that shopping has made it redundant. Mail 09b’s “SOS for a New Feminism”, on the other hand, presents the idea of new feminism as desirable, but still ambiguous. The naming in the headline itself, with “New Feminism” postmodifying “SOS”, presents the idea of a new feminism as desirable – it is something that could save our souls. However, the use of the indefinite determiner “a” makes it clear that there is no concrete form of new feminism to which to point. Elsewhere in the article, new feminism is the phenomenon in a mental process of needing – “what we all really need now […] is our very own brand of New Feminism”. Again, new feminism is desirable (it is needed, and the plural pronoun “we” brings the reader onside), but vague: the premodification of new feminism – “our very own brand of” – implies that other brands exist, but that they are not suitable for ‘us’. The article’s anxiety about new feminism is summed up in its final sentence, which reflects on an 11 year-old boy’s preference for his mother to be a “stay-at-home mum” by concluding that “the new feminism, it seems, still has an awfully long way to go”. This relational possessive process neatly summarises the impression given of new feminism in the dataset – that although it is often seen as something desirable, it is also not sufficient in any recognisable, existent form.

5.4.2.3 ‘Radical/socialist feminism’

Of the list of adjectives that most frequently premodify ‘feminism’ (table 5.14), ‘radical’ and ‘socialist’ evoke previous studies’ (for example Dean, 2010; Lind & Salo, 2002; Marling, 2010) findings that newspapers present feminism as a movement that has “a strong sense of extremism” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 410). However, all four occurrences of ‘socialist feminism’ in the dataset, and seven of the ten occurrences of ‘radical feminism’, appear in a single newspaper - The Guardian. While the present study does not seek to make comparisons between the newspapers in the data, this gives the impression that ‘feminism’ does not have as strong a political sense across newspapers as previous studies have suggested. The analysis here focuses on ‘socialist feminism’ and ‘radical
feminism’ in The Guardian, finding that while these political varieties of feminism are indeed placed in the past, they are presented as having had more substance than other varieties that have followed.

One occurrence of ‘socialist feminism’ appears in Guardian 03a, in which a writer reminisces about the relationships of his mother, feminist writer Cora Kaplan: “she built up friendships with a group of women who became a hugely influential part of socialist feminism”. The remaining three occurrences, from ‘Sheila Rowbotham: Trailblazer of Feminism’ (Guardian 00a), are of greater interest for the way they present this political type of feminism, describing it as changeable and as distinct from ordinary ‘feminism’. The article discusses how Rowbotham’s work is being “rediscovered by a new generation”, and observes a process by which this type of feminism has come to be seen as undesirable. A relational intensive process attributing the quality of “no longer being sexy” to socialist feminism contextualises this state through the adverbial “by the early 1980s”, presenting socialist feminism as something that can be more or less desirable at different times. A similar process is described in “what happened to Sheila Rowbotham was what happened to socialist feminism: both were suddenly considered unfashionable, dull”. Here, the combination of the mental process of considering and the adverb “suddenly” makes explicit the fact that feminism’s fashionableness is changeable. Feminism and socialist feminism are also separated out in the observation that “in these places [non-European countries] feminism and socialist feminism are not only about body politics but about bread-and-butter issues”. Here, feminism is presented as something complex through the use of naming, an adverbial and contrasting: the coordination of feminism and socialist feminism presents them as somehow separate (there is standard ‘feminism’, and then another type of feminism), and the attribute in the relational intensive process uses a ‘not only X but Y’ opposition frame to construct body politics and bread and butter issues as opposites, while acknowledging that feminism and socialist feminism are about both. This is significant in light of the adverbial “in these places”, which contextualises the proposition within a certain place: a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975) means that the reader is left to infer that feminism and socialist feminism are each only about one or the other in other places (Europe). In this one sentence, then, different textual-conceptual functions combine to present the meaning of ‘feminism’ as fragmented (Mendes, 2011a, p. 9), consisting of different types which are about different things, and which vary across countries.

Table 5.19 comprises the seven occurrences of ‘radical feminism’ in The Guardian:
Radical feminism in *The Guardian* is “situated in the past” (Dean, 2010, p. 401). However, the sentences in table 5.19 do not provide evidence for Dean’s (2010) assertion that this distancing enables writers to present the idea of “a more moderate, less excessive feminism in the present” (p. 393). Instead, there is a suggestion that there has been no adequate replacement. This is the case in the three occurrences from ‘Look Back in Anger [...]’ (*Guardian 00b*). The title of the article uses parallelism to contrast the US in the 60s with now, and this constructed opposition underlines the fact that radical feminism existed in the 1960s, and can only be revisited (for example, by Susan Brownmiller) in the present day. In the main body of the article, a relational intensive process defines radical feminism as “the only movement to make women’s bodies the site of political struggle”. Here, the quantifying adjective “only” makes it clear that no other type of feminism – or other movement generally – has had this quality. The naming of radical feminism also differentiates it from anything contemporary in the postmodifying relative clause “that seems almost perverse in this safe, self-contained era”. Again, a time adverbial contextualising a proposition in the here and now presents radical feminism as something from the past; however, there is little here to indicate that it is the previous generation's type of feminism that is being derided.
Guardian 05b precedes Sheila Jeffreys’ complaint about “new sexy feminism” (discussed above in section 5.4.2.2). Here, Jeffreys takes issue with the idea that radical feminism only existed in the past. This idea is nominalised and portrayed as the actor in a material action process of exasperating Jeffreys, who goes on to dismiss the idea of a newer version of feminism: there is no need for radical feminism to be succeeded by an alternative variety. In Guardian 04a, the ‘X is a long way from Y’ frame creates a contrast between a therapeutic emphasis on ‘inner spirit’ and the radical feminism Ensler grew up with in the 1960s and 70s. Again, however, it seems that radical feminism is being favoured here: the use of scare quotes around “inner spirit” suggests that the former element is being treated ironically, and the adjectives that premodify each head noun – therapeutic/radical – evoke a superordinate trivial/serious opposition, which itself suggests a bad/good opposition. In these examples, radical feminism, rather than being repudiated in favour of a more moderate, less politically-involved feminism, is presented as something of substance that has not been adequately replaced by more lightweight alternatives.

5.5 Summary

The analysis of textual meanings of ‘feminism’ in this chapter has demonstrated that its meanings are contested, and that critical stylistic analysis using the textual-conceptual functions finds evidence for and against the findings of previous studies of portrayals of feminism in the media.

One of the key contentions of previous studies of feminism in the media is that it is portrayed negatively, for example through announcements of the death of feminism (for example Callaghan et al., 1999; Christie, 1998; Rhode, 1995) and the stereotyping of feminism as overtly political (e.g. Callaghan et al., 1999; Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012). The analysis found evidence of these patterns in the feminism dataset: analysis of the representation of states showed that ‘feminism’ is connected with the adjective ‘dead’, and the overview of adjectives that premodify ‘feminism’ found premodifiers that denote political action. However, closer analysis presented a more complex picture: writers attribute the idea that feminism is ‘dead’ to others through the presentation of speech, arguing with this perception of the movement, while the packaging up of feminism’s political nature appeared largely in one newspaper – The Guardian – and was compared favourably to more moderate forms of feminism. The analysis of contrasting, in particular, showed how the meanings of ‘feminism’ are contested through comparisons between more and less political feminisms.

The analysis of premodifying adjectives denoting location showed that ‘feminism’ is presented as something that, as previous studies (for example Baumgardner & Richards, 2001; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012) suggest, exists primarily in the west. The temporal location of ‘feminism’ is less clear cut. The first and second waves of feminism are historicised through a variety of means, including naming and the representation of time, but the overview of premodifying adjectives showed that articles are also concerned with ‘new feminism’. Initially, the presence of the ‘feminism is dead’ structure in the analysis of unmodified occurrences suggested that ‘feminism’ is
placed in the past in this very firm way, but the different ways in which writers contest this perception of feminism – for example through negating and the presentation of others’ speech and thought – demonstrated that feminism is presented as an ongoing concern.

The high percentage of occurrences of ‘feminism’ that are unmodified, and their frequent occurrence in relational processes that attribute to them meanings that resemble the *OED* (2015) definition, suggested that feminism is presented as a universal, with a single identifiable meaning. However, closer analysis using the textual-conceptual functions demonstrated that, even where ‘feminism’ is unmodified, meanings are attributed not only to particular times, but also particular groups and individuals. The adjectives used to premodify ‘feminism’ also showed that feminism is divided into different types along political/non-political and collectivist/individual lines, reflecting Dean’s (2010) notion of domestication, whereby articles favour a modern, non-political feminism over an older, political feminism.

‘Feminism’ is also presented as a lexeme that can change meaning. In many instances, the articles observe how it has picked up negative connotations over time, or show their support for the underlying meanings of ‘feminism’ in spite of their concerns about the word itself. The different types of feminism are also placed in opposition to each other, with writers discussing their relative merits. The textual-conceptual function of contrasting showed how oppositions between different varieties are linguistically constructed, with political feminisms’ existence in the past contrasted with newer feminisms that are extant. Analysis of these contrasts demonstrated that while more political feminisms may be located temporally in the past, their political nature is often favoured by writers, who deem ‘new’ feminism to be comparatively hard to define.

Analysis using the textual-conceptual functions also provided evidence for some of the observations made by previous studies about the nature of portrayals of feminism in the 2000s. Writers use the presentation of speech to cite or create interlocutors who have negative perceptions of feminism (Dean, 2010, p. 397), and proceed to argue against their convictions that, for example, feminism is dead. Where feminism and ‘feminism’ are defined, writers also make use of negating and implying to construct meanings: these methods of discussing feminism demonstrated how writers show their support for feminism by contesting the meanings that others attribute to ‘feminism’.

Chapter 6 now turns to an analysis of ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’, looking at the textual meaning of the lexemes that refer to those who represent the feminist movement.
Chapter 6: The feminist and feminists datasets

In this chapter I analyse the textual meanings of the nouns ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ in the data. My analysis is based on the annotation of textual-conceptual functions for the feminist and feminists datasets discussed in chapter 4. It addresses the three research questions stated in section 1.1 concerning textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’, how these meanings are contested, and how analysis of the textual-conceptual functions can help to investigate these meanings.

The analysis proceeds from the identification of patterns in a statistical overview of naming and representing actions/events/states (see section 6.1 below). Section 6.2 focuses on the feminist dataset, before section 6.3 turns to the feminists dataset. Section 6.4 concludes the analysis by taking a closer look at differences in how singular ‘feminist’ and plural ‘feminists’ are represented in actions, events and states.

I use the Oxford English Dictionary (2015) definition of ‘feminist’ – “an advocate or supporter of the rights and equality of women” – as the benchmark for the analysis of textual meanings. The analysis also relates my findings to the five frames discussed in section 2.3. The analysis of ‘feminist(s)’ finds, like the analysis of ‘feminism’ (see chapter 5), that meanings are contested, with articles making distinctions between various types of feminist, discussing different perceptions of the meaning of ‘feminist’, and contrasting positive and negative views of feminists.

6.1 Statistical overview of the feminist and feminists datasets

This section provides a statistical overview of naming and representations of actions, events and states in the feminist (section 6.1.1) and feminists (section 6.1.2) datasets. It identifies noteworthy statistical results, and indicates how the analysis of the feminist (section 6.2) and feminists (section 6.3) datasets explores them.

6.1.1 Statistical overview of the feminist dataset

The analysis of the feminism dataset showed that although the majority of occurrences of ‘feminism’ are unmodified (see section 5.1), these occurrences do not necessarily present ‘feminism’ as universal. The statistical overview of naming in the feminist dataset, by itself, suggests that the articles present different types of feminist, rather than portraying feminists as “all alike” (Douglas, 1991, p. 274):
98% of occurrences of ‘feminist’ are modified. 58% of the total occurrences are minimally modified and 40% have detailed modification. This may simply reflect the fact that ‘feminist’ refers to an individual person, and so uses of a generic form of ‘feminist’ are unlikely (‘feminism is good’ would be unmarked, whereas ‘feminist is good’ would be marked). The small number of unmodified occurrences is therefore of interest, due to their unusual nature. The genre may suggest that these are likely to be examples of block language, which is used in newspaper headlines (e.g. ‘FEMINIST CAUSES UPROAR’) to “strip language of all but the most information-bearing forms” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 263). Section 6.2.1 tests this impression.

Surprisingly, a statistical overview of the transitivity processes in which ‘feminist’ occurs suggests that those who represent the movement are represented much more frequently in states than in actions:
Over half (53%) of the processes in which ‘feminist’ appears are relational processes. While it is not surprising that metalinguistic occurrences of ‘feminist’ – such as “‘feminist’ has become a derogatory term” (Times 09a) – would appear in relational processes, figure 6.1 shows that these unmodified occurrences account for a small portion of the feminist dataset: most occurrences of ‘feminist’ are modified, picking out a particular referent, and so it is surprising that such a small percentage of overall occurrences appear in representations of actions and events. A point of comparison here is Coffey’s (2013, p. 159) overview of process types in which male agents occur in a corpus of women’s magazines. Coffey’s (2013) findings are more in line with what might be expected for an animate, human referent: male referents appear most often in material action processes (30% of the total), with relational processes accounting for 27% (p. 159), leading her to conclude that “magazine writers are mostly engaged in presenting men’s actions and states of being” (p. 160). While methodological differences between Coffey’s (2013) study and the present study make direct comparisons difficult, the statistics for ‘feminist’ suggest that individual feminists in the newspaper data are less active than the men in Coffey’s (2013) corpus of women’s magazines, with a greater emphasis on states of being.

The statistical overview presented here provides entry points for the analysis of ‘feminist’. Section 6.1 opens the analysis with an investigation of the small number of occurrences of unmodified ‘feminist’, which are interesting as uses of metalanguage where writers discuss the lexeme itself through representations of states. Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 investigate the overlap between the most prominent type of modification – minimal modification – and the most common type of transitivity process, the relational process, looking at ‘the feminist’ and ‘a feminist’ in turn. Section 6.2.4
concludes the analysis of ‘feminist’ by looking at occurrences with detailed modification and how they are represented in actions, events and states.

### 6.1.2 Statistical overview of the feminists dataset

Unsurprisingly, a much higher percentage of occurrences of ‘feminists’ (42%) than ‘feminist’ (2%) are unmodified. This may simply be due to the grammar of the form – plural countable nouns such as ‘feminists’ can be “zero article” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 261), with no determiner:

![Figure 6.3: Statistical overview of naming in the feminists dataset](image)

A greater percentage of occurrences of ‘feminists’ (58%) than ‘feminism’ (29%) (see section 5.1) are modified, adding to the impression that the people involved in the movement are more likely to be described in detail and divided into types. As with the naming of singular ‘feminist’, a large proportion of occurrences have detailed modification, again suggesting that a lot of information about feminists is built into references to them.

The apparently small proportion of material action processes in the feminist dataset contrasts with the corresponding statistics for the feminists dataset:
Material action processes account for 37% of processes featuring ‘feminists’, compared to 18% of processes in which ‘feminist’ occurs. This suggests that feminists as a group are portrayed as more “action-oriented” (Bloor & Bloor, 2004, p. 112) than individuals. The feminists dataset also contains a greater proportion of mental processes than the feminist dataset, a striking result given that it is easier to (convincingly) present the thoughts of individuals than of groups.

The analysis of ‘feminists’ begins by looking at unmodified occurrences (section 6.3.1), in particular looking at the overlap with representations of states in order to investigate how feminists as a whole are defined. Section 6.3.2 turns to ‘feminists’ with minimal modification, focusing on the frequent occurrences of ‘the feminists’ in representations of actions, before section 6.3.3 concludes the analysis of the feminists dataset by looking at the types of adjectives that are used to premodify those occurrences with detailed modification, investigating what different groupings of feminists are recognised in the data. Section 6.4 concludes the analysis of ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ by providing a more fine-grained statistical overview and comparison of material action and mental processes in the feminist and feminists datasets, commenting on the roles that the singular and plural forms play in these process types.

### 6.2 The feminist dataset

The analysis of the 410 occurrences of ‘feminist’ in the feminist dataset is based on the statistical overview of naming and representing actions/events/states (see section 6.1 above). I first of all discuss the small number of occurrences of unmodified ‘feminist’ in the dataset, before looking at
minimally modified occurrences, focusing first of all on the four occurrences of ‘the feminist’ before looking at the way ‘a feminist’ – which accounts for 214 of the 238 minimally modified occurrences of ‘feminist’ - is used in relational processes. I complete the discussion of the feminist dataset by looking at occurrences of ‘feminist’ with detailed modification, focusing on the use of apposition and premodifying adjectives in the naming of individual feminists.

6.2.1 Unmodified ‘feminist’

Only eight of the 410 occurrences of ‘feminist’ are unmodified. This statistic may reflect the fact that ‘feminist’ is a singular noun and therefore tends to require a determiner to pick out a particular referent. It might be assumed that these eight occurrences are examples of ‘block language’, typical of newspaper headlines where “communicative needs strip language of all but the most information-bearing forms” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 263). Examples of block language are found in newspaper headlines in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data, for example in the removal of a determiner in ‘March of Feminism?’ (Mail 06b) and the lack of a subject in ‘Lay Off Men’ (Sun 01a). However, only one – ‘Feminist’ (Sun 04c) - is from a headline, subheading or caption. While this example refers to an individual - the author, who discusses his apparent credentials as a feminist (“I’m a feminist and I’m all in favour of women snooker referees”) - the remaining seven are examples of metalanguage, referring to the lexeme itself. These occurrences discuss the complexity of ‘feminist’, and demonstrate the repudiation of negative views of it. Writers address the issue of the meaning of ‘feminist’ in an indirect way, for example by hypothesising about possible meanings or implying the validity or invalidity of particular meanings. The analysis therefore demonstrates why an analysis that utilises the range of textual-conceptual functions is crucial for a full understanding of the textual meaning of a lexeme in context.

Table 6.1 comprises the seven metalinguistic occurrences of ‘feminist’ that are analysed in this section:
Table 6.1: Metalinguistic occurrences of ‘feminist’

Mirror 04c discusses ‘feminist’ in terms of other words with which it does (not) belong. To understand the textual meaning of ‘feminist’ here, it is necessary to look at the wider context:

“I wouldn’t be surprised if half the audience watching Life Begins were men. And like her lover, think Maggie is ‘fun, fresh, feisty and another word beginning with F’. And that word is not feminist.”

The clause “that word is not feminist” demonstrates how negating can function to create implied meanings. As noted in the discussion of ‘feminism means/does not mean x’ structures (section 5.2.1), examples like this can be seen as a flout of one or more of the maxims of quantity, manner and relation (Leech, 1983; Nahajec, 2009). In this instance, the proposition that “that word” is not X does not give the reader sufficient information about actuality (quantity), is ambiguous (manner), and is not clearly relevant (relation). While it is not clear what the “word beginning with F” might be, part of the implied meaning is that ‘feminist’ does not belong in the company of positively evaluative words such as “fun, fresh, feisty”. Therefore, if ‘feminist’ does not belong with these words, then people to whom the adjective does apply are not fun, fresh or feisty.

Express 03a provides an example of how complex discussion of the meaning of ‘feminist/ism’ is, with the writer citing a negative definition of ‘feminist’ in order to argue against it.
Express 03a and the remaining examples argue for a more positive understanding of ‘feminist’ than the Mirror 04c example above:

“What do you call a woman who hates men? There isn’t a word for it, is there? But, don’t worry, ‘feminist’ will do. Because you can be sure if anyone calls you a feminist these days, they mean it as an insult.”

Here, ‘feminist’ is presented as equivalent with ‘misandrist’: the definition of ‘feminist’ arises from a verbalisation process in which the process of calling one thing another results in a relationship of equivalence between the two - ‘you (sayer) call (process) a woman who hates men (target) a “feminist” (verbiage)’. This appears to be a negative definition of ‘feminist’. However, the because-clause in the following sentence provides context, and attributes it to people other than the writer through a presentation of speech in which the sayer - “anyone” - might call the target - “you” - a feminist. The wider context, in which the writer claims to be “proud of feminism”, makes it clear that she does not agree with the ‘hatred of men’ definition. In this context, the example is a flout of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975) – the writer is in fact implying that while other people think “feminist” means ‘a woman who hates men’, they themselves do not believe this to be true. This sense of a writer arguing with others’ perceptions is enhanced by their use of social deixis: “you”, which is used to address the reader, is more proximal than the “they” who are using “feminist” in an insulting way, creating the sense of an unspecified group who do not understand ‘feminist’ in the right way.

Independent 03a uses a similar “invocation of a popular repudiation of feminism” (Dean, 2010, p. 396) to argue against negative perceptions of ‘feminist’. The relational intensive process “‘feminist’ is too political and provocative a sign for most of us to bother with the hassle of hanging it round our necks” attributes a negatively evaluated quality to ‘feminist’: being a political and provocative sign may not be a bad thing, but the intensifier “too” makes it clear that these qualities are more extreme than is desirable. However, the next sentence uses the concessive opposition trigger “but” to create a contrast with a feminist writer’s definition of feminism:

“But return to Marilyn French’s definition of feminism – ‘the belief that women matter as much as men do’ - and it becomes clear that feminism, in essence, is actually a modest enough proposal, and one that only misogynists of both sexes would take issue with.”

Here, contrasting is used to argue against a negative view of ‘feminist’: feminism is “a modest enough proposal”, and so ‘feminist’ should not be considered “too political and provocative a sign”. This allows the writer to repudiate a negative view. However, that such support for feminism is based on initial accounts of negative views may serve to keep negative stereotypes in readers’ minds.
Other examples address the issue of whether or not it is important that ‘feminist’ should have a universal definition. *Times 02c* asks *Playboy* editor Christie Ann Hefner whether or not she is a “feisty feminist”, to which she replies “I suppose you can take any quality you think I have and apply it to ‘feminist’”. Hefner flouts the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), as she does not provide the expected ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question: the implied meaning is that ‘feminist’ is appropriate for her, as “any quality you think I have” can be applied to it. This material action process, where ‘feminist’ is the recipient of “any quality”, presents it as a word that can be valid for different reasons, with ‘feminist’ status resulting from different qualities. *Express 09a*, conversely, expresses concern about the idea of ‘feminist’ having an open definition:

> “When challenged by friends or your boyfriend or husband asking you what ‘feminist’ means […] we need to have a clear answer.”

The wh-complement clause is a relational intensive process that leaves the definition of ‘feminist’ open (see the discussion of ‘what feminism means’ clauses in section 5.2.1). In this instance it is also the verbiage in a verbalisation process of asking, and the writer’s use of the plural pronoun “we” and deontically modal “need” presents the idea of a “clear” definition as essential to everyone, the reader included. Both *Times 02c* and *Express 09a* present ‘feminist’ as having a complex meaning, but express opposing views as to the desirability of this complexity.

The remaining occurrences of unmodified ‘feminist’ focus on the importance of the lexeme and on other words with which it does or does not belong. *Mail 06a* contextualises ‘feminist’ in women’s lives:

> “She thinks of herself as living in an equal world on equal terms with her husband […] That’s all very well […] until injustice, harassment, or poor wages knock on our own door. Then we’ll know why it matters to tick the box marked ‘feminist’.”

‘Feminist’ is here presented as a goal in a material action process of ticking, or not ticking, a box. The writer uses a variation of the ‘if… then’ hypothesising structure (‘when X happens, then Y will happen’) to highlight the conditions which will make identifying as a ‘feminist’ matter. In this way, the writer makes an argument common in feminist literature – that (young) women are not feminists, although they ought to be – and phrases it in terms of the importance of the word ‘feminist’ itself. *Times 09a* also uses a conditional structure to make an argument for the use of ‘feminist’:
“If ‘feminist’ has become a derogatory term, then I would like to purposely start using it for its shock value - in the same way rappers use ‘n*****’.”

Here, ‘feminist’ appears in both a relational intensive process and a constructed opposition. The relational intensive process presents ‘feminist’ as equivalent to “a derogatory term”, while the transitional opposition triggered by “become” highlights that this equivalence has come about as the result of a process. This relates to the presentation of ‘feminist/s/ism’ as having undergone a process of pejoration, discussed in section 2.1.2. In this instance, the interaction of textual-conceptual functions presents this pejoration as unimportant: the hypothesising ‘if… then’ structure stresses that if ‘feminist’ has become derogatory, then the writer would like to use it for its shock value. Again, negative perceptions of ‘feminist’ are acknowledged, only to be subverted.

The statistical overview of naming in the feminist dataset (see section 6.1) showed that there are only a small number of unmodified occurrences of ‘feminist’ (2% of the total occurrences of ‘feminist’). However, analysis of these occurrences has demonstrated how critical stylistic annotation and analysis can help to identify areas of the data that, although minor in terms of frequency, shed light on interesting patterns in how the object of study is constructed linguistically. In the case of unmodified ‘feminist’, a small section of the data has provided pertinent examples of how articles both contest and discuss the contestation of the meaning of ‘feminist’. This section was identified through a statistical overview based on textual-conceptual functions, and which accounts for detailed information about the linguistic context of occurrences. The significance of the findings here for the investigation into textual and contested meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ also demonstrates the veracity of Coffey’s (2013) point that occurrences that are statistically infrequent can “have more ideological impact that those with a higher statistical significance” (p. 29): the analysis of unmodified ‘feminist’ shows that the ways in which it is discussed in the data is likely to have a particularly strong effect on readers’ impressions of the meanings of the lexemes.

6.2.2 ‘Feminist’ with minimal modification – ‘the feminist’

There are only four occurrences of ‘the feminist’ in the feminist dataset. However, they are of interest for the way they allow writers to discuss differences between different types of feminism, and different perceptions about who is (not) a feminist. The use of the definite article in ‘the feminist’ evokes the idea of an archetypal feminist, and writers compare this figure to other figures – ‘the housewife’ and ‘the post-feminist’. These examples show how writers use comparisons with other lexemes – ‘housewife’, ‘post-feminist’ – to textually construct the meaning of ‘feminist’.

Table 6.2 comprises the four occurrences of ‘the feminist’:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 02c</td>
<td>FEMINIST, POST: One who uses the hard-won equality of the feminist to advocate a woman's right to wear lippy and always be on a diet, yet not be called an airhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 05a</td>
<td>[...] there is something about the kind of discourse it invites that I think is ultimately political – an emphasis on the fellowship of women that [...] fell out of favour with the rather lame 1990s concept of the postfeminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 08a</td>
<td>[...] you can't open a newspaper or turn on the television without running across a piece about how the Republican vice-presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, is not just a feminist, but the feminist – a sign that all is right in the US when it comes to gender equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 01a</td>
<td>The Feminist and the Housewife</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: Occurrences of ‘the feminist’

The headline of Mail 01a refers to feminist Wendy Robertson (“The Feminist”) and her daughter, Debora (“The Housewife”). This example provides an argument for the possibility of an ‘X and Y’ frame of coordinated opposition (see discussion in section 4.3.4): although the “Feminist” and “Housewife” elements are coordinated in a way that usually denotes some sort of similarity, the context of the article – which contrasts the differing lifestyle choices and political views of mother and daughter – makes it clear that they are being presented as opposites. This example is a boundary case in discussion of whether an ‘X and Y’ frame can present an opposition between non-conventional opposites (Davies, 2012, p. 68): while feminist/housewife are not conventional opposites, readers will be aware of the fact that the two have contrasting connotations – for example independence/dependence, career-oriented/home-oriented – and therefore infer that the two are to be seen as opposites. The use of definite reference for “Feminist” and “Housewife”, and the stylistic similarity of the headline to the names of fables such as ‘The Tortoise and the Hare’, helps the writer to say something about the meaning of ‘feminist’: if the feminist is antonymous to the housewife, then the meaning of ‘feminist’ must be opposed to that of ‘housewife’.

Guardian 02c and 05a compare the idea of ‘the feminist’ to the idea of ‘the post-feminist’. Guardian 02c is a mock encyclopaedia of what the article calls “The gender war”. It uses naming to powerful effect, with the glossary style meaning that the apposition of the noun phrases “FEMINIST, POST” and “one who uses […]”, and the relative clause in the postmodification of “one”, allow the writer to package up a lot of information about what they consider a post-feminist to be. While this example does not use contrasting, a comparison is nonetheless made between post-feminists and the archetypal feminist through a material action process in which the former “use” the equality won by the latter. This marks a clear distinction between the figure of the feminist – who won equality – and
the post-feminist, who merely takes advantage of these achievements. **Guardian 05a** is also unfavourable about post-feminism. Here, “the post-feminist” postmodifies the noun phrase “the rather lame concept”: the post-feminist is a concept, rather than a real person, and one that is negatively evaluated through the adjective “lame”. As with **Guardian 02c**, while there is no constructed opposition there is the sense of post-feminism being compared to feminism, a sense that derives from a material action event processes in which the actor - “an emphasis on the fellowship of women” - falls out of favour, with the circumstantial element – the concept of the post-feminist – providing the reason for this. These **Guardian** comparisons of ‘the feminist’ and ‘the post-feminist’, like those between older and new feminisms discussed in section 5.4, present the former as having more substance than the latter.

The final **Guardian** example contrasts the archetypal figure of the feminist with the then US Republican vice-presidential candidate, Sarah Palin. Here, ‘the feminist’ occurs as an attribute in a relational intensive process in which Palin is the carrier. The use of definite reference emphasises Palin’s feminist status. However, this example demonstrates the importance of looking at the wider context in order to determine textual meaning. Although apposition is used to present an equivalence between “running across a piece” about Palin’s feminism on the one hand and the health of gender equality in the US on the other, the context – “the Wall Street Journal calls it ‘Sarah Palin Feminism’. I call it well-spun garbage” – makes it clear that the writer is flouting the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975): the fact that Sarah Palin is being presented as ‘the feminist’ is a sign that all is not right for gender equality in the US. Like the other ‘the feminist’ examples, **Guardian 08a** presents the meaning of ‘feminism’ as contested: the meaning of ‘feminist’ is something that the writer and members of the media in the US disagree on.

### 6.2.3 ‘Feminist’ with minimal modification - ‘a feminist’

‘A feminist’ accounts for 214 of the 238 occurrences of minimally modified ‘feminist’. It most often occurs in relational processes (145 of 214 occurrences), reflecting the tendency for occurrences of ‘feminist’ in general to appear in relational processes (see figure 6.3). This focus best allows me to approach the research question regarding the textual meaning of ‘feminist’ in the data, as relational processes represent states in which ‘feminist’ plays a role.

The analysis focuses on the 141 of the 145 relational processes in which ‘a feminist’ is either an attribute (131) or a carrier (10). These 141 processes are broken down further into different lexicogrammatical structures: ‘I am/become a feminist’, ‘X is/becomes a feminist’, the non-finite clause ‘to be/being/become a feminist’, ‘you are/become a feminist’ and ‘a feminist is/has’. The analysis discusses each structure in turn, starting with the most frequently occurring structure and ending with the least frequently occurring:
The fact that ‘I’ is the most frequent carrier suggests that writers place an emphasis on their own status as feminists, while ‘you are/become a feminist’ suggests an additional focus on the reader. The analysis of these structures is helpful in exploring whether the data contains evidence of discussion concerning “who could be called a feminist” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 158). In particular, the analysis shows that writers present the idea of a definition of ‘feminist’ that involves rules concerning things you must or must not do in order to be a feminist. However, analysis using the textual-conceptual functions demonstrates that writers contest this idea, emphasising that ‘feminist’ has a broad and inclusive, rather than narrow and exclusive, meaning.

### 6.2.3.1 ‘I am/become a feminist’

‘I am/become a feminist’ occurs 48 times. Prominent among these occurrences is the use of negating, which is found in 18 of the 48 structures. At first sight, this suggests that writers frequently deny that the sense of ‘feminist’ applies to them. However, closer analysis demonstrates that negating at a higher clausal level, and the use of speech presentation to attribute ‘I am not a feminist’ to others, is used to argue for the wide applicability of ‘feminist’.

In four occurrences of the ‘I am not a feminist’ structure, the writer makes a statement about their own lack of feminism:
Table 6.3: Occurrences of ‘I am not a feminist’

Of these, only Times 09c categorically asserts ‘I am not a feminist’. In Express 04a and Times 08b, the negated proposition is subordinate to negation at a higher level: in the former, the writer’s not being a feminist is the phenomenon in a negated mental process of seeing, while in the latter it is the phenomenon in a negated mental process of remembering. Independent 08b contextualises a possible lack of feminism through the use of a conditional ‘if… then’ structure, in which ‘I am not a feminist’ only applies in circumstances where a hypothetical understanding of what it means to be a feminist applies. Consideration of the wider context, then, demonstrates that the ‘I am not a feminist’ structure is not actually used by writers to deny their feminism in these instances.

The remaining 14 occurrences of ‘I am not a feminist’ are similar in that they are not admissions of a lack of feminism. Instead, they involve the discussion of what Walby (2011) terms “the phenomenon of the person who states ‘I’m not a feminist, but...’” (p. 3). ‘I am not a feminist’ is either part of the presentation of a general group’s speech – for example “‘I’m not a feminist, no’, most women will say” (Times 09a) – or nominalised as a stock phrase, reifying its status as a common phenomenon, e.g. “the phrase ‘I’m not a feminist’ is always intriguing” (Mail 02c). These uses exemplify what Dean (2010, p. 396) recognises as articles’ invocation of negative perceptions about feminism, which are then argued against. Examples such as “the young women who tell researchers ‘I’m not a feminist’ have benefited immeasurably from its achievements” (Independent 03c) allow the writers to point out problems with this attitude: in this instance, a relational possessive process is used to present women who use the phrase as owing a debt to feminism. This has important ramifications for the meaning of ‘feminist’ in the data: contesting someone else’s insistence that ‘feminist’ does not apply to them serves to extend the possible application of the word, communicating to readers the idea that the meaning of ‘feminist’ may apply to them, even if they themselves are not convinced that it does.
6.2.3.2 ‘X is/becomes a feminist’

The 34 occurrences of ‘X is/becomes a feminist’ demonstrate the complexity of ‘feminist’: a variety of figures fulfil the ‘X’ element, both recognised feminist figures such as Germaine Greer (*Mirror 05b*) and Julie Bindel (*Independent 07a*), and less obvious candidates such as Jordan (*Times 09a*) and “my boss at *Nuts*” (*Times 09c*). Nine of the 34 occurrences of ‘X is/becomes a feminist’ also feature hypothesising and/or interrogative structures. While some demonstrate uncertainty about whether ‘feminist’ can apply to particular individuals, strong epistemic modality is used to deny the idea of a restrictive definition of ‘feminist’

Table 6.4 comprises the nine modalised or interrogative occurrences of ‘X is/becomes a feminist’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 04c</em></td>
<td><em>Is the Pope a feminist?</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 06c</em></td>
<td><em>But can a man ever really be a feminist?</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 09b</em></td>
<td><em>Barbie can be a feminist, too</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 09b</em></td>
<td><em>[…] a woman could make many traditionally feminist choices […] but she could equally well choose to do none of these and still be a feminist</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 09c</em></td>
<td><em>[…] she’s just tweeted about how she can be a feminist and still have a leg wax</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Independent 09a</em></td>
<td><em>[…] as long as women’s decisions are real choices, then she can be a feminist whatever those decisions are</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mail 09a</em></td>
<td><em>How can a woman who has spent 45 years telling us how to please a man in bed possibly be a feminist?</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Times 07a</em></td>
<td><em>Is she a feminist?</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Times 08c</em></td>
<td><em>Is Carrie Bradshaw a feminist?</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4: Modalised and interrogative occurrences of ‘X is/becomes a feminist’

*Guardian 04c* and *06c*, *Mail 09a*, and *Times 07a* and *08c* are all examples of relational processes that have an interrogative structure, meaning that uncertainty is expressed about whether the meaning of ‘feminist’ can be attributed to the individuals concerned. The modalised occurrences are more positive about the possibility of their carriers being feminist. For example, the use of the additive adverbial ‘too’
in “Barbie can be a feminist, too” (Guardian 09b) shows that “the current proposition is being added to a previous one” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 780). Here, ‘too’ acts as an iterative trigger, giving rise to the presupposition that there has been or will be “some earlier or later occurrence of the process” (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 97): not only can ‘feminist’ be applied to others, but it can also be applied to Barbie. Guardian 09b and Independent 09a also use epistemic modality, presenting the idea that ‘feminist’ can apply to different types of women. In these examples, writers take issue with perceptions of the requirements that someone needs to fulfil in order for ‘feminist’ to fit them.

Guardian 09c uses a constructed opposition to contrast a woman who does not make traditionally feminist choices with a feminist. Davies (2012) does not list ‘still’ among the possible triggers of concessive opposition, but it here works in the same way as triggers such as ‘but’ to “subvert expectations set up in one of the clauses” (p. 58): while it might be expected that not making traditional feminist choices would mean that one is not a feminist, the constructed opposition suggests that the two are not in fact antonymous. A similar point about women’s decisions and being a feminist is made in the conditional ‘as long as... then’ structure in Independent 09a: the one condition for ‘feminist’ status is that women’s decisions are “real choices”. In both instances, writers argue against a prescriptive understanding of ‘feminist’, where part of the lexeme’s meaning is that the individual must make particular sorts of choices. The emphasis on ‘choice’ also reflects Taylor’s (2003, p. 182) observation that modern media portrayals of feminism focus on the idea of individual choice.

6.2.3.3 ‘To be/being/become a feminist’

‘To be/being/become a feminist’ accounts for 28 of the 145 relational processes under discussion. Like ‘X is/becomes a feminist’ structure (see section 6.1.3.2 above), these structures focus on the idea of rules that may be attached to ‘feminist’. However, these rules are often argued against in the wider context, in particular through the representation of states. The analysis focuses on the seven of the 28 structures that occur within a larger relational process and those that fulfil the role of circumstance in processes, with both types of occurrence exemplifying the discussion of ‘feminist’ rules.

Table 6.5 comprises occurrences of ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ that appear in relational processes:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 09b</td>
<td>Being a feminist does not mean you hate men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01b</td>
<td>[...] she writes that she felt it was “dangerous” to be a feminist when her baby was young […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07b</td>
<td>[...] I think there is still the perception that being a feminist means hating men […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 08b</td>
<td>If being a feminist is to want to be a ‘man like any other’, as Beauvoir did, then I am definitely not a feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08a</td>
<td>[...] it is possible to be both a model and a feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08c</td>
<td>Whatever being a feminist entails, I’m pretty sure that it forbids concurring with avuncular men who make statements that confuse you</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08c</td>
<td>Because back then, going by the archive footage, it was easy to be a feminist because it was fun</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.5: Occurrences of ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ in relational processes**

Four of the processes use the ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ structure to discuss the relationship between feminism and men. Dean’s (2010, p. 399) analysis of The Guardian suggests that articles seek to present feminism as men-friendly, and this is the case in Express 09b and Guardian 07b. Express 09b uses a negated relational intensive process to deny that being a feminist requires hatred of men, while the perception that this is a requisite for being a feminist is nominalised in the existential process in Guardian 07b. This existential process is the phenomenon in a mental process of thinking, with the writer – who elsewhere calls this perception “a cliché” - as senser. Both deny the accuracy of a common perception of requirements attached to ‘feminist’, while Times 08a coordinates “a model” and “a feminist” in the attribute to assure the reader that being one does not preclude being the other. This is another example of a defeased opposition, with the coordination of two elements – “a model” and “a feminist” – simultaneously acknowledging the perception of them as opposites and bringing them together.

Independent 08b and Times 08c also relate feminism to men. In Independent 08b a conditional ‘if… then’ structure stipulates a condition – being a feminist means wanting to be like men - under which the writer would not be a feminist. Here, the use of hypothesising presents the rules attached to ‘feminist’ as unclear. The same textual-conceptual function has a similar effect in Times 08c, in which ‘being a feminist’ is the carrier in a relational process in which it is attributed “whatever”. In the wider clausal context, the writer uses the epistemically modal “pretty sure” to state their level of confidence that ‘being a feminist’ means not permitting men to have power over women. These
examples are both more uncertain and more complex in the way they present the relationship between being a feminist and men: while the use of hypothesising downplays the writers’ certainty, the former presents the idea of being like men as undesirable and the latter presents the idea of concurring with a certain type of man as undesirable.

Where ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ is a circumstance, the process states a rule attached to ‘feminist’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>I don’t think you have to pass a test to be a feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 09b</td>
<td>These feminin’ts, as I call them, are put off precisely because they feel that to be a feminist you are expected to look a particular way and sign up to a very specific set of beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 06b</td>
<td>Society thinks that to be a feminist you have to dress a certain way and be a certain way, but that’s not true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 02c</td>
<td>The idea then that to be a feminist you shouldn’t wear make-up was a silly idea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08a</td>
<td>In the past, you had to subscribe to a whole set of beliefs to be a feminist, including how you should look and behave</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6: Occurrences of ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ as circumstances

The sentences in table 6.6 are examples of the repudiation of perceptions about feminism (Dean, 2010). Each of the underlined rules is either negated or contextualised and thereby called into question. “You have to pass a test” in Guardian 07a is subverted by the negated mental process of thinking in the main clause, while “you have to dress a certain way and be a certain way” in Mail 06b is placed in a constructed opposition with the cataphoric “but that’s not true”, negating the existence of this rule. Times 02c and 08a do not deny rules quite so clearly, but their use of the past tense (and the time adverbial “in the past” in Times 08a) suggests that these rules no longer exist, and the idea of the rule “you shouldn’t wear make-up” (Times 02c) is attributed the quality of being “a silly idea”. In Guardian 09b, the rule “you are expected to look a particular way” is not negated or historicised, but it is the phenomenon in a mental process of feeling, where the senser is “they”, referring cataphorically to “feminin’ts”, the writer’s term for people who say “I’m not a feminist but…” While the attachment of ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ to rules gives the impression that ‘feminist’ has certain expectations attached, analysis of the wider context demonstrates that articles repudiate these ideas.
6.2.3.4 ‘You are/become a feminist’

The ‘you are/become a feminist’ structure occurs 20 times. These occurrences are similar to ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ in that they present the idea of requirements that must be met for the use of ‘feminist’ to be applicable. Again, however, analysis of interrogatives and hypothesising shows how writers argue against perceptions about what ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ mean. The defeasing of rules is especially pertinent in the case of ‘you are/become a feminist’, as this particular use of social deixis serves to involve the reader. By addressing the reader directly in this way, the writers are able to reassure them about what being a feminist does and does not entail.

Table 6.7 comprises the eight interrogative occurrences of ‘you are/become a feminist’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 09a</td>
<td>So are you a feminist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express 09a</td>
<td>[…] when your girlfriends ask, “You’re a feminist aren’t you? What does it mean and am I one?” we need to have a clear answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>Can you be a feminist and go to a lap-dancing club?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>How did you become a feminist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 03a</td>
<td>Can you only be a feminist if the people you put first - your children - are girls?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>Surely the real question should be not ‘why are you a feminist?’ but ‘why aren’t you one?’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 03a</td>
<td>Years ago a newspaper editor asked me: “you’re not a feminist, you?” with such distaste in his voice you’d have thought he was accusing me of child abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 01a</td>
<td>It bores me still to be on the receiving end of the pathetic question, ‘you’re not really a feminist, are you?’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.7: Interrogative occurrences of ‘you are/become a feminist’

These interrogatives show how articles attempt to “define what feminism is and who can appropriate this label” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 132). Four of the eight (Mail 03a, Times 01a and the two examples from Express 09a) focus on the question of whether an individual is a feminist; three of these use tag questions to indicate that the askers have preconceptions about what a feminist is and whether particular individuals fit the definition. Independent 07a is a ‘why’ question, suggesting that choosing whether or not to be a feminist is optional, while Guardian 07a asks a ‘how’ question, presenting...
feminism as something that a person has to attain in some way. This idea of rules or standards that are attached to being a feminist is also put across in Guardian 07a and Independent 03a, which use hypothesising in the form of the epistemically modal ‘can’. The use of the interrogative to frame the coordination of “be a feminist” and “go to a lap-dancing club” in Guardian 07a leaves open the question of whether or not these elements are opposite to each other or share some sort of characteristic, while Independent 03a demonstrates uncertainty about what possibilities ‘feminist’ allows through an ‘if… then’ structure.

A total of eight of the ‘you are/become a feminist’ structures feature hypothesising. These occurrences use modal forms to repudiate the idea that the label ‘feminist’ precludes certain behaviours and preferences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 09a</td>
<td>[...] you are probably a feminist without realising it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06a</td>
<td>I think you can be a strong, sexy woman and still be a feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>But, yes, you can do it and still be a feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>[...] you don’t have to be a feminist to understand that King’s definition is just too blandly inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 09c</td>
<td>What we need to get across is that you can be feminine and a feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 09a</td>
<td>Her attitude was that you could be a feminist and appear naked in Playboy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 09a</td>
<td>You could be a feminist and cook your man's every meal […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08a</td>
<td>Yes, you can wear lipstick and be a feminist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8: Modalised occurrences of ‘you are/become a feminist’

Independent 07a negates deontic modality in its discussion of Labour politician Oona King’s definition of ‘feminism’, assuring the reader that being a feminist does not provide insight that non-feminists do not have access to, while Express 09a uses the epistemically confident “probably” to assure the reader that they are likely to be a feminist, thereby presenting ‘feminist’ as something that can apply to someone even if they are not aware of it.

The remaining six occurrences are all similar in that the meanings created by different textual-conceptual functions combine to assure readers that ‘feminist’ can apply to those who enjoy seemingly incongruous activities. Each uses the second person pronoun to address the reader directly, with a relational intensive process attributing the quality of being ‘a feminist’ to the reader.
Hypothesising is also evident in each, with the epistemic/deontic modal auxiliary verbs ‘can’ and ‘could’ assuring the reader that it is possible or allowable to be a feminist and to be or do something else. The coordination of two actions/states/events or qualities demonstrates how writers coordinate two elements that could be seen as contrasting (for example being feminine and being a feminist (Independent 09c)), but defease the possible opposition by representing actions/events/states in which the reader is able to be or do both. Through this combination of naming, hypothesising and representing actions/events/states, the writers incorporate words and ideas (‘feminine’, posing for Playboy) that might usually be seen as non-feminist into the meaning of ‘feminist’.

6.2.3.5 ‘A feminist is/has X’

‘A feminist’ fulfils the role of carrier in just 10 of the 145 relational processes. This in itself suggests that articles devote less space to defining what a feminist is than they do to categorisations of who is (not) a feminist (see the discussion of media portrayals of feminism in section 2.2.2). In five of the 10 ‘a feminist is/has X’ structures, the phrasal verb ‘look like’ expresses the representation of a state. This suggests a focus on feminists’ physical appearance, something that Mendes (2011b, p. 491) argues is used to highlight differences and similarities between feminists and ‘normal’ women. However, as with the other structures analysed in section 6.2.3, there is evidence of articles arguing against stereotypical definitions and connotations of ‘feminist’.

Table 6.9 comprises the 10 occurrences of ‘a feminist is/has’:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>I wear a T-shirt with the slogan ‘This is what a feminist looks like’ because I don't fit the stereotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>Even if a feminist was angry and hairy, then so what?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>Why not simply wear a T-shirt saying: ‘A feminist is a person who admires other feminists’, or one saying ‘This is what a decent person looks like’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>All of which conspires to suggest that a feminist doesn’t look very much like me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>That estimable campaigning group The Fawcett Society has challenged “well-known public figures” to don its “infamous” T-shirts saying: ‘This is what a feminist looks like’ […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>We know what a feminist looks like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>The thriller writer Sarah Waters, who has also been co-opted into this great struggle to ascertain that a feminist has no defining physical characteristics, takes the knotty problem of feminist identification one step further</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 09b</td>
<td>He was portrayed, Superman fashion, ripping off his shirt and tie to reveal a costume that said: ‘This is what a feminist looks like’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 01a</td>
<td>To quote Margaret Forster […] : “A feminist […] is a man or a woman who strives to secure a society in which neither sex finds gender alone a handicap to progress”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08a</td>
<td>I thought the protesters looked a bit silly, a bit like a stereotypical idea of what a feminist should be</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.9: Occurrences of ‘a feminist is/has’

Three of the five ‘a feminist looks like X’ structures (Guardian 07a, Independent 07a, Mail 09b) are citations of the ‘This is what a feminist looks like’ T-shirt slogan used by the feminist organisation the Fawcett Society. The remaining two occurrences also appear in discussion of the T-shirt in Independent 07a. Three other occurrences of the ‘a feminist is/has X’ structure focus on feminists’ appearances; however, textual-conceptual functions work to subvert expectations: in Times 06b, a circumstance of time historicises an idea of what a feminist looks like - “in the 1970s and 1980s, the image of a feminist was someone whose boiler suit, cropped hair and absence of makeup repudiated centuries of obligation to pander to men”; in Independent 07a, syntactic negation – “a feminist has no defining characteristics” - subverts the idea that feminists can be identified by their looks, and in
a conditional structure makes it clear that a feminist’s appearance is unimportant: “even if a feminist was angry and hairy, then so what?” Although ideas about feminists’ appearance are discussed in the data, there is little evidence among these examples that writers resort to stereotypes.

6.2.4 ‘Feminist’ with detailed modification

Figure 6.1 shows that 164 of the 410 occurrences of ‘feminist’ in the feminist dataset are modified through detailed modification – premodifying adjectives, postmodifying prepositional phrases and relative clauses and appositive noun phrases. This equates to 40% of occurrences of ‘feminist’, a relatively high proportion compared to the 23% of occurrences of ‘feminism’ with detailed modification (figure 6.1). This suggests that more description is packaged into the naming of individuals who represent the movement than into the naming of the movement itself.

The analysis of the ‘feminist’ dataset concludes by focusing on the 64 occurrences of appositive noun phrases that co-occur with ‘feminist’, and the 165 adjectives that are used in the premodification of ‘feminist’. Occurrences of apposition that explicitly discuss ‘feminist’ show that ‘feminist’ and derived forms are contested in the articles, and that the ‘feminist’ label is used to add weight to arguments concerning gender relations. The overview of adjectives shows that previous studies’ (for example Dean, 2010; Lind & Salo, 2002; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) assumptions about newspapers’ use of qualifiers to present feminists in a negative light are overly pessimistic.

6.2.4.1 ‘Feminist’ with appositive noun phrases

There are 64 occurrences of apposition in which ‘feminist’ is the head of an appositive noun phrase. In 50 instances, apposition is used to provide what Biber et al. (1999) term “background information about people” (p. 639); in the remaining 14, there is metalinguistic discussion of the lexeme ‘feminist’ itself. Occurrences of the former have the effect of implying the significance of particular feminist figures, while the latter demonstrate the contestation of the meaning of feminist terms in the data.

Apposition in which an individual is glossed as a feminist - for example “time for men to hit back says Lessing the arch feminist” (Mail 01c) - not only provides background information, but also underlines the significance of what the referent is saying or doing. As referents are usually picked out by a single noun phrase, the provision of extra information flouts the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), leaving the reader to infer that the individual’s feminist credentials are of particular pertinence to the action, event or state expressed in the proposition. In the Mail 01c example, the verbiage attributed to the writer Doris Lessing – which expresses a pro-men, anti-feminist attitude – is made more emphatic by the use of apposition: if a feminist is saying that men are hard done by, then it must be true. A similar sense of endorsement is expressed in other examples, such as Sun 08a: “arch-feminist Julie Burchill, who once lived with a woman, says why she believes females must continue to take their kit off”. This example, from an article defending The Sun’s continuing publication of pictures of topless
models, packages up the idea of Burchill’s feminism in order to enhance the supportive sentiments expressed in the verbiage: if an arch-feminist supports Page 3, then Page 3 must be OK. By emphasising the feminist credentials of someone offering their views on a matter to do with gender relations in this way, articles present the idea of particular feminist figures standing for feminists generally (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000; North, 2009).

The remaining 14 occurrences of ‘feminist’ in apposition provide definitions of ‘feminist’ or other types of discussion of it. Table 6.10 comprises five occurrences from Guardian 02c (entitled The Gender Agenda’), which provides a glossary of terminology related to “The Gender Wars”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEMINIST, FEMININE: One who advocates the equality of women, while reserving the right to be cutely unable to pick up heavy things or complex ideas (see Ally McBeal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMINIST: One who advocates women’s rights on the grounds of sexual equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMINIST, NEW: One who advocates women’s rights, but precedes each advocation with the phrase, ‘I’m not a bra-burner or anything’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMINIST, OLD-SCHOOL: One who used to be a feminist, but now feels too irked by young post-feminists (see below) to really give a shit (see Fay Weldon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMINIST, POST: One who uses the hard-won equality of the feminist to advocate a woman’s right to wear lippy and always be on a diet, yet not be called an airhead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 6.10: Occurrences of ‘feminist’ with appositive noun phrases in Guardian 02c |

In these examples, apposition provides a gloss of ‘feminist’ and related derivational and premodified forms. The fact that there are five separate entries for ‘feminist’ could cause confusion for readers, a possibility that the article recognises: “confused? You should be – the terrain is more crowded, more densely defined, than ever before”. The definition of ‘feminist’ is close to the OED (2015) definition (“an advocate or supporter of the rights and equality of women”): this emphasises the mocking tone of the other entries, each of which is formed using the kinds of qualifiers observed in previous studies of feminism in the media (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) relating to age/generation, femininity and the passing of feminism. The irreverent tone of these definitions is constructed through concessive oppositions. In each, the first clause is contrasted with a clause that subverts the expectations attached to the first (Quirk et al., 1972, p. 745), for example in the description of “FEMINIST, NEW” as someone who advocates women’s rights but also precedes each advocation with the phrase, “I’m not a bra-burner or anything”. This glossary creates the impression of ‘feminist’ as splitting into different types: a prototypical ‘feminist’ and then
other types which share characteristics, but which differ in crucial respects. These respects resemble breakings of the ‘rules’ discussed in section 6.2.3: for example, you know that someone is a ‘feminine feminist’, rather than simply a ‘feminist’, because they wish to maintain “the right to be cutely unable to pick up heavy things or complex ideas”.

The remaining nine examples of ‘feminist’ in apposition use the appositive noun phrases “the word”, “the term” and “the phrase” to indicate that it is the lexeme itself, rather than an individual, that is being discussed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 09a</td>
<td>[…] the word feminist is too linked to images of women burning their bras […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express 09a</td>
<td>[…] we need to know what we mean by the word feminist […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 03a</td>
<td>[…] I was aware of my mother using the word ‘feminist’ […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06c</td>
<td>I’m interested in how the phrase ‘pro-feminist’ is used […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 06a</td>
<td>[…] the term feminist appears to have lost its lustre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 03a</td>
<td>My maternal grandmother was a pre-feminist […] recognised, since the term ‘feminist’ didn’t exist in her day, as ‘a strong woman’ […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 03a</td>
<td>The word ‘feminist’ in those days had the exciting smack of revolution […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 07a</td>
<td>It even eschews the term feminist in some cases […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 09a</td>
<td>[…] the loss of the word feminist is appalling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.11: Remaining occurrences of ‘feminist’ with appositive noun phrases

These examples demonstrate that the meaning of ‘feminist’ is contested, and that writers recognise this. For example, the what-clause in Express 09a is a relational intensive process, but does not provide a definition of what ‘feminist’ means, while the how-clause in Guardian 06c observes that the phrase ‘pro-feminist’ can be used in different ways, or with different purposes. Other examples discuss connotations of ‘feminist’ or its (lack of) fashionableness, with the representation of actions and states presenting it in a certain light. For example, the relational process in Express 09a puts ‘feminist’ in the context of bra-burners, with the intensifier “too” emphasising that the strength of this connotation is too great for the word to be seen positively, while the relational possessive process in Mail 03a attributes something positive to ‘feminist’ – “the exciting smack of revolution” – but places this in the past through the circumstance of time “in those days”. Independent 06a and Mail 07a are both material action processes in which ‘feminist’ is rejected somehow: in the former it is the goal in a
process of eschewing and in the latter it is the actor in a process of losing “its lustre”. Each of these presents ‘feminist’ as a word that is sometimes rejected or has become pejorative. *Times 09a* uses a nominalisation – “the loss of the word feminist” – to reify the idea of ‘feminist' becoming redundant, the nominalised verb “loss” presenting ‘feminist’ as something that can be mislaid by accident. The attribute, “appalling”, presents this loss as something concrete but negative.

### 6.2.4.2 ‘Feminist’ with premodifying adjectives

132 of the 410 occurrences of ‘feminist’ are premodified by one or more adjectives. The range of adjectives used demonstrates that different types of feminist are discussed in the data. The analysis here looks at the types of adjectives used and discusses occurrences of ‘radical feminist’, which previous studies (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Marling, 2010) argue demonstrates a “link between feminism and aggression” (Marling, 2010, p. 13), but which does not have a negative textual meaning in the feminist dataset.

Figure 6.6 provides an overview of the adjectives that premodify ‘feminist’, distinguished according to the semantic groupings defined by Biber et al. (1999, pp. 508-509) and discussed in section 4.3.1.1:

![Figure 6.6: Semantic groupings of adjectives that premodify ‘feminist’](image)

Figure 6.6 shows that a greater number of descriptors (94, or 60.65%) than classifiers (61, or 39.35%) are used in the premodification of ‘feminist’. The extent of the difference is questionable, but it is
interesting that this is a reverse of the pattern in premodification of ‘feminism’, for which 45% of premodifying adjectives are descriptors and 55% classifiers (see section 5.4.2). This difference suggests that there is an emphasis on describing categories of feminism and qualities of feminists. The majority of descriptors (63 of 94) are miscellaneous descriptors which describe particular feminists according to personal characteristics such as ‘shy’, ‘feisty’ and ‘reluctant’. Other miscellaneous descriptors emphasise the idea of ‘feminist’ as something that can apply to an individual to a greater or lesser extent: ‘strident’, ‘ardent’ and ‘staunch’ all carry a sense of degree of commitment, emphasising the idea that one feminist can be more or less committed to the cause of feminism than another.

The majority of classifiers (36 of 61) are topical/other classifiers, including ‘radical’ (11 occurrences), ‘militant’ (2) and ‘bra-burning’ (2). ‘Radical’ is the premodifying adjective that occurs most frequently in the feminist dataset, supporting Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012, p. 410) finding that ‘radical’ is the most common adjective that collocates with ‘feminist’ in the Bank of English corpus and a common collocate of ‘feminist’ in UK newspapers. Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) argue that ‘radical’ has “distinctly negative connotations” (p. 413) and that its collocation with ‘feminist’ presents feminists as being involved in “rather threatening and aggressive activism” (p. 412). However, they make their classification of ‘radical feminist’ as a “negative collocational pattern” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 418) without providing analysis of any concordances. The occurrences of ‘radical feminist’ in the feminist dataset in table 6.12, below, contradict the assumption that it has negative connotations:
The textual meaning of ‘radical feminist’ does not have “threatening and aggressive” connotations. The closest thing to this sort of depiction of radical feminists is in Telegraph 05a, which discusses the American feminist Andrea Dworkin: Dworkin is the actor in the representation of actions of condemning and dismissing, and her campaigning is described as ferocious. There is little other evidence that ‘radical feminist’ has negative connotations, although in several occurrences contrasting presents the idea of people transitioning into being radical feminists. Instances of transitional opposition in Mail 01a – “Wendy Robertson […] turned into a radical feminist” – and Guardian 01b – “pregnancy, birth and motherhood […] have made me a more radical feminist” – present radicalisation as a process whereby an individual either becomes a radical feminist or becomes “more” of a radical feminist. In these constructed oppositions there is no sense of radical feminist aligning with a negative superordinate: in fact, the parallelism in Express 01c suggests that it is better to be a radical feminist than a housewife, as the former is presented as the intended consequence of a material action process of raising a daughter, with the concessive clause indicating that the daughter’s becoming a housewife was surprising and undesirable. While these occurrences differentiate ‘regular’ women from ‘radical feminists’ – a woman can go from being one to the other, but cannot be both – analysis of the wider context of occurrences of ‘radical feminist’ suggests that
there is little evidence to support Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) claim that the collocation of ‘radical’ and ‘feminist’ presents feminists as “threatening and aggressive” (p. 412).

6.3 The feminists dataset

The remainder of the analysis in the present chapter discusses the feminists dataset. Previous corpus-critical studies (for example Beaton-Thome, 2013; Mautner, 2007) have observed that texts referring to groups of individuals can dehumanise the individuals involved, while studies of feminism in the media have argued that groups of feminists tend to be presented as aggressive and involved in subversive activities (for example Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Lind & Salo, 2002; Rhode, 1995). The analysis here looks at the textual meaning of ‘feminists’ in the dataset and how the textual-conceptual functions construct meanings of ‘feminists’, finding that political types of feminist are placed in the past, new feminists are treated with suspicion, and generic groups of feminists are presented as threatening.

6.3.1 Unmodified ‘feminists’

‘Feminists’ is unmodified in 185 of the 435 occurrences in the feminists dataset. This means that 42% of occurrences of ‘feminists’ refer to feminists as a single, homogenous group. The analysis here focuses on the 12 occurrences of ‘feminists’ that appear as the carrier in a relational process, and where the use of generic reference (Biber et al., 1999, p. 265) means that feminists as a whole are being defined. These processes provide evidence of the attribution of negative meanings to ‘feminists’. However, analysis of presenting others’ speech and thought, implying and contrasting shows that the meanings of ‘feminists’ are contested in these examples, with writers arguing against negative perceptions.

Table 6.13 comprises the 12 occurrences of unmodified ‘feminists’ as a carrier in a relational intensive process:
The qualities attributed to ‘feminists’ in these representations of states are familiar from previous studies of feminism in the media (for example Callaghan et al., 1999; Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012) which find that feminists are portrayed as unfeminine – for example as “like men in dungarees” (Independent 07a), “angry” (Guardian 07a), “humourless” (Mail 03b) - and overtly political, e.g. as ”martyrs” (Independent 03a), “political” (Mail 07a) and ”too idealistic” (Times 00c). However, analysis of the wider context shows that negative perceptions about feminists are contested.

Four of the 12 occurrences are part of the verbiage in the presentation of others’ speech (Guardian 07a, Independent 07a, Mail 07a, Sun 08b) and do not, therefore, necessarily represent the views of the writer. In Mail 07a, Doris Lessing attributes the quality of being “political” to feminists (a word that takes on a negative meaning in the context of the coordinated verbs “turned on” and “failed to achieve”), while in Sun 08b Julia Morley, chair of the Miss World organisation, asks the hypothetical question “Who are feminists anyway?” before providing the answer “they are lesbians who want to be men”. Feminist writer Kat Banyard’s suggestion that “feminists are angry” (Guardian 07a) comes in response to the question “what are the clichés about feminism?”, meaning that it is presented as equivalent to “the clichés about feminism”, while in Independent 07a the attribution of ‘looking like

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 00c</td>
<td>Feminists were, in fact, divided on Mrs Thatcher’s ascendancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>Feminists are angry […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 03a</td>
<td>Feminists in this regard are martyrs among us […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>[…] feminists looked like men in dungarees who hadn’t had a wash […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 07a</td>
<td>They are what feminists look like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 01b</td>
<td>[…] feminists can, surprise, surprise, be sexy and beautiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 03b</td>
<td>Feminists, let me remind you, are all man-hating, humourless warthogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 07a</td>
<td>[…] feminists became political […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 07b</td>
<td>Feminists were wrong, however, in trying to reverse […] gender roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 08b</td>
<td>Who are feminists anyway?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 01b</td>
<td>So why are feminists now so discredited in the eyes of some women?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 00c</td>
<td>Feminists might have been too idealistic about female solidarity […]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.13: Occurrences of unmodified ‘feminists’ as carriers in relational intensive processes
men’ to feminists is the verbiage in a verbalisation process in which “conventional wisdom” is the sayer. The clauses from Independent 03a and Mail 03b also represent the views of people: in the former, the following circumstance - detailing how feminists have been “caricatured as being childless or sexless” – makes it clear that this proposition represents the views of others, i.e. feminists are martyrs according to the caricatures of others; in the latter, the writer flouts the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975), saying the opposite of what they mean in order to imply that feminists are not man-hating, humourless or warthogs – it is only that others think this is the case. This intention is evident from the preceding sentence, a passivized mental perception process in which “feminism is seen as outdated”.

Mail 07b and Times 00c attribute ideas of incorrectness and over-idealism to ‘feminists’, but also use contrasting to make more positive observations. In the former, the concessive opposition trigger “however” places the clause in opposition with the preceding sentence, which notes that “the feminist movement was right to fight for female sexuality”: the criticism here concerns the extremity of some feminists’ actions, rather than the actions of all feminists. Times 00c also uses concessive opposition to balance out a negative view of feminists, with the trigger “but” preceding the observation that “it rings hollow to reclaim bitchiness as a manifestation of girl power”: even if idealism is a negative aspect of feminists, it does not mean that “bitchiness” is a good alternative to feminism. These examples again demonstrate that while negative qualities are attributed to “feminist/s/ism”, the wider context often shows that articles argue with or question negative perceptions of feminism and feminists.

6.3.2 ‘Feminists’ with minimal modification

69 of the 435 occurrences of ‘feminists’ are minimally modified through determiners and/or predeterminers. These include 11 instances of ‘the feminists’. While the analysis of ‘radical feminist’ in section 6.2.4.2 suggests that previous studies (for example Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012) may be overly pessimistic in their view of how feminists are portrayed, the representation of actions, events and states that ‘the feminists’ are involved in is more negative and provides evidence of the sort of associations of aggressive behaviour observed by Lind and Salo (2002). I argue here that the use of the definite determiner – which assumes that the referent is “known to the speaker and the addressee” (Biber et al., 1999. P. 263) - creates a particular, threatening textual meaning for ‘feminists’.

Table 6.14 comprises the 11 instances of ‘the feminists’ in the feminists dataset:
If so, say the feminists, blame Scary, Posh, Sporty, Ginger and Baby […]  
As Sam Baker […] says, “the feminists were the cool ones”  
Did you expect the feminists to be as angry with you as they were?  
But hang on - the feminists say - is there any proof that men rape in order to disseminate their genes?  
The feminists told us we shouldn’t rely on men for status or money  
 […] the feminists got a good 15 years out of the personal versus political  
The feminists never called or emailed to ask what had become of me  
But it was the feminists who really hated the idea of women’s fiction […]  
[…] the feminists, as far as I’m concerned, went way over the top  
The feminists want to forget you exist  
As far as the feminists are concerned, if the choices that people freely make end up producing unequal outcomes in the workplace, then their free choices must be overridden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 06c</td>
<td>If so, say the feminists, blame Scary, Posh, Sporty, Ginger and Baby […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06a</td>
<td>As Sam Baker […] says, “the feminists were the cool ones”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 00a</td>
<td>Did you expect the feminists to be as angry with you as they were?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 00c</td>
<td>But hang on - the feminists say - is there any proof that men rape in order to disseminate their genes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 05a</td>
<td>The feminists told us we shouldn’t rely on men for status or money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 01b</td>
<td>[…] the feminists got a good 15 years out of the personal versus political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 04b</td>
<td>The feminists never called or emailed to ask what had become of me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 07a</td>
<td>But it was the feminists who really hated the idea of women’s fiction […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 09b</td>
<td>[…] the feminists, as far as I’m concerned, went way over the top</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 00a</td>
<td>The feminists want to forget you exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 00a</td>
<td>As far as the feminists are concerned, if the choices that people freely make end up producing unequal outcomes in the workplace, then their free choices must be overridden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.14: Occurrences of ‘the feminists’

Whereas only one of 11 occurrences of ‘radical feminist’ is an active agent in a process (see section 6.2.4.2), ‘the feminists’ is the actor, carrier, senser or sayer in each of the processes in which it occurs. Further, the states and actions they are involved in present feminists negatively, with the exception of the positively evaluative attribute “the cool ones” (Guardian 06a). In the other relational intensive process in which ‘the feminists’ is the carrier, they are attributed the quality of being angry. Where ‘the feminists’ is an actor in a material action process, the activities that are associated with ‘feminists’ either evoke the idea of excessiveness (Telegraph 01b and 09b) or are negated (Telegraph 04b). The latter is an example of a negated proposition flouting the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), as it is less informative to tell a reader what someone “never” did than what they did do (Leech, 1983): in this instance, the implied meaning is that the feminists should have called or emailed.

‘The feminists’ is a senser in three mental processes, in spite of the fact that it is difficult to have access to the thoughts of a group of people (see the discussion in section 6.4 below for further discussion of mental processes in the feminist and feminists datasets). Feminists “want to forget you exist” (Times 00a) and “hate the idea of women’s fiction” (Telegraph 07a), with the choices of verb
portraying feminists as inconsiderate and resentful. In *Times 00a*, the feminists believe that people’s “free choices must be overridden”, presenting feminists as having oppressive views. In the three verbalisation processes, feminists are presented as bossy and judgemental, telling people what they should or should not do (*Sun 05a*), blaming the Spice Girls for young women’s apparent faults (*Express 06c*) and challenging others’ convictions about sexual assault (*Mail 00c*). The negative way in which ‘the feminists’ are represented in actions, events and states – and the way in which they are presented as interacting with others – provides evidence for Lind and Salo’s (2002) argument that feminists are portrayed as being involved in different activities to others and as being aggressive.

Biber et al. (1999) suggest that, in fiction and other genres, people are “frequently presented to the reader as if familiar” (p. 265): using the definite article implies that the group being referred to is somehow typical of what readers or listeners would expect of that particular group. This appears to be true in the uses of ‘the feminists’: using an existential presupposition to present the idea of the feminists as a single mass portrays them in a more threatening way than would be possible with, for example, ‘some feminists’. This relates to Baker et al.’s (2013) findings relating to the use of definite references to refer to ‘the Muslim world’ and ‘the Muslim community’ in British newspaper articles, which they suggest serve to group a large number of people together, presenting them as “distinct, reasonably homogenous entities” (p. 275). There are also similarities here with, for example, the way sports commentators refer to a nation’s players as ‘the Germans’ rather than ‘Germany’, making them sound inherently more menacing.

### 6.3.3 ‘Feminists’ with detailed modification

181 occurrences of ‘feminists’ have detailed modification. The analysis here focuses on adjectives, using Biber et al.’s (1999, pp. 508-509) semantic groupings of descriptors and classifiers to look at what sort of information about feminists is packaged up into the naming of feminists and whether this differs from how individuals are named. The interaction of naming and representing actions/events/states shows that there is evidence for previous studies’ (e.g. Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) convictions that the media discusses radical feminists as something from the past and that lines are drawn between ‘old’ and ‘new’ feminists (Mendes, 2011a, p. 561).

The analysis of premodifying adjectives in the feminist dataset showed that they consist of 60.65% descriptors and 39.35% classifiers (see section 6.2.4.2). While the difference in percentages is not huge, this was the reverse of the statistics for premodifying adjectives in the feminism dataset, which are made up of 55% classifiers and 45% determiners (see section 5.4.2). This difference suggests that individual feminists are described according to personal characteristics (‘shy’, ‘feisty’, ‘reluctant’, etc.), whereas the premodification of the movement itself plays a classifying role, presenting ‘feminism’ as something that is divided into different categories (‘French’, ‘militant’, ‘third-wave’, etc.). Figure 6.7 suggests that the naming of ‘feminists’ has more in common with that of ‘feminism’ than ‘feminist’:
Of the total of 149 adjectives that premodify ‘feminists’, 88 are classifiers (60.4%) and 59 are determiners (39.6%). While the difference in percentages is not great, this suggests that – like in the feminism dataset - there is a greater emphasis on classification than on description. This impression is strengthened by the fact that while miscellaneous descriptors such as ‘humourless’, ‘lousy’ and ‘saucy’ account for 40.65% of the adjectives that premodify ‘feminist’, they only account for 15.44% of adjectives that premodify ‘feminists’. The remainder of section 6.3 looks in greater detail at the classifiers and descriptors that premodify ‘feminists’, finding that premodifying adjectives are used to separate out different types of feminist according to time period and extent of political beliefs, with contrasting and representations of actions allowing writers to further define splits between different groups.

### 6.3.3.1 ‘Feminists’ with topical classifiers

Of the semantic groupings of classifiers, topical classifiers premodify ‘feminists’ most frequently (42, or 28.19% of all adjectives that premodify ‘feminists’). Topical classifiers – such as ‘education’, ‘man-loving’ and ‘militant’ – provide a “subject area” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 509) or show the relationship of ‘feminists’ to a noun. They include adjectives that present the meaning of ‘feminists’ as political. This political type of feminist is, in Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) term, “historicised” (p. 415) through the use of the past tense. Of the total of 42 topical classifiers, those that occur most frequently are ‘radical’ (seven occurrences), ‘militant’ (five), ‘liberal’ (four) and ‘bra-burning’ (three).
The frequent packaging up of these adjectives with ‘feminists’ reflects Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) finding that common collocates of ‘feminism’ frame it as “a political movement closely associated with radicalism, militancy, and leftist ideology” (p. 413). In particular, previous studies (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Marling, 2010) have pointed out the frequency with which ‘radical’ collocates with ‘feminism’, with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) arguing that the adjective has “distinctly negative connotations” (p. 413). The analysis of ‘radical feminist’ in section 6.2.4.2 contends that there is little evidence that it has negative connotations in the feminist dataset. The analysis here looks at whether the same is true of occurrences of ‘radical feminists’, ‘militant feminists’, ‘liberal feminists’ and ‘bra-burning feminists’, finding that political types of feminist tend to be “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 415) and contrasted with less radical types of feminist.

Table 6.15 comprises the seven occurrences of ‘radical feminists’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guardian 00c</strong></td>
<td>We […] are interrupted a couple of times: first by her husband […] then by his mother, Michele Landsberg, one of Canada’s foremost radical feminists […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guardian 05b</strong></td>
<td>Although many of the more radical feminists agreed, most went wild at being told they were “counter-revolutionary”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guardian 05b</strong></td>
<td>While many of her generation of radical feminists have given up fighting, Jeffreys’ passion has not abated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent 00b</strong></td>
<td>Radical feminists later responded to the ‘Underneath they’re all loveable’ poster campaign for the eponymous brand of bras by replacing the adjective with ‘angry’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent 00c</strong></td>
<td>[…] the radical British feminists Lorraine Kelly and Jill Radford claim that the law’s distinction between rape and sex is problematic […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent 08b</strong></td>
<td>Lanzmann was roundly booed by radical feminists […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Telegraph 06b</strong></td>
<td>But within a short time, with the emergence of radical feminists fixated on such issues as lesbianism, the myth of the vaginal orgasm and warfare with men, NOW became bedevilled by power struggles and ideological differences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.15: Occurrences of ‘radical feminists’**

Occurrences of ‘radical feminists’ are similar to occurrences of ‘the feminists’ (discussed in section 6.3.2) in that they are the active agents in clauses. ‘Radical feminists’ are presented as actors in
material action processes of interrupting (Guardian 00c), giving up (Guardian 05b) and responding (Independent 00b); sayers in verbalisation processes of claiming (Independent 00b) and booing (Independent 08b), and sensers in a mental process of agreeing (Guardian 05b). In the remaining example (Telegraph 06b), they are part of the circumstance in a process of becoming bedevilled and presented in a relational process in a postmodifying relative clause as being “fixated”. Some of these processes – interrupting, booing, being fixated - reflect the findings in section 6.3.2, which show that ‘the feminists’ are presented as aggressive and threatening.

Concessive opposition in the two Guardian 05b examples also presents the idea of ‘radical feminists’ splitting into further groupings – many of the more radical feminists versus most [feminists], and many of [Sheila Jeffreys’] generation of radical feminists versus [Sheila] Jeffreys. These constructed oppositions present different radical feminists agreeing or disagreeing and giving up or carrying on fighting. Guardian 05b is also an example of how ‘radical feminists’ are “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 413) through references to the past: the fighting done by many radical feminists is a thing of the past. Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 411) base their claims concerning historicisation on the frequent occurrence of collocates such as ‘1970s’ and ‘post-’; the examples from the feminists dataset show that historicisation is also the result of the use of the past tense (the two examples from Guardian 05b, Independent 00b and 08b, Telegraph 06b), with the wider context showing that the radical feminists concerned are discussing a feminist pamphlet in 1979 (Guardian 05b), responding to a bra advert in the 1960s (Independent 00b), booing at Simone de Beauvoir’s funeral in 1986 (Independent 08b), and emerging around the time of the inception of the National Organisation for Women (NOW) in the 1960s.

Occurrences of ‘militant feminists’ demonstrate the importance of taking into account how the textual-conceptual functions interact to construct textual meaning. In this instance, interactions between naming, representing states and representing time demonstrate how a certain type of feminist is “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417):
Tense in *Express 03b* and *Mirror 05a* places militant feminists in the past: the former discusses Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst, who died in 1928 and 1958 respectively, while the referents of the latter are described as being responsible for “the sort of ludicrous feminist nonsense that went out of fashion in the real world in the 70s”, with the circumstance “in the 70s” reinforcing the historicisation. In *Mirror 03b* and *Telegraph 06a*, naming places militant feminists in the past: the former refers to “descendants of Britain’s first militant feminists”, emphasising that they have been superseded by future generations, while the latter uses a postmodifying prepositional phrase to refer to militant feminists “of the 1970s”. The idea of ‘militant feminists’ having been replaced by other types of ‘feminists’ is strengthened through contrasting in the transitional opposition “a continuum that began with the militant feminists of the 1970s […] and progressed to the ‘lipstick feminism’ of Natasha Walter”. Here, naming further stresses the idea of political and apolitical types of ‘feminists’ and ‘feminism’: the previous generation of feminists are militant while the more recent brand of feminism is lipstick. This example in particular provides evidence for Mendes’ (2011a) conviction that newspapers emphasise the “lifestyling” of feminism (p. 11) and a move away from collective action towards a focus on personal identity.

The sense of ‘feminists’ being able to refer to different, opposing groups is also evident in the way ‘liberal feminists’ are presented. *Guardian 05b* uses a material action process to describe a conflict between liberal feminists (the actor) and earlier feminists (the goal) – “liberal feminists and postmodernists’ challenge the early feminist critique of beauty practices” – while in *Telegraph 05a* liberal feminists are the actor in a material action process of irritating the goal, “the American radical feminist” Andrea Dworkin: “she was irritated by liberal feminists such as Naomi Wolf”. The combination of naming and the representation of actions in these examples creates the impression of different types of ‘feminists’ who are actively opposed to each other.
It is surprising that there are so few (three) instances of ‘bra-burning feminists’ in the data, given the perception of previous studies (for example Hinds & Stacey, 2001) that this continues to be a common stereotype in newspaper coverage of feminism. In the three instances in which ‘bra-burning’ is used, there is again a sense of this type of feminist belonging to the past. In Express 00b, a proposition concerning Germaine Greer’s book The Female Eunuch contextualises it in the past through a circumstance of time and the past tense – “in the middle of a trans-Atlantic war between bra-burning separatist feminists and an intellectual elite of feminist theorists, Greer’s book was different” – while Express 05a uses naming to package up not only the idea of feminists being bra-burners, but also the idea of them belonging to a previous decade: “I’m deserting the Seventies bra-burning feminists”. The remaining example reflects Hinds and Stacey’s (2001) argument that bra-burning feminists are a myth – a group from the past that did not actually exist – with the use of scare quotes distancing the writer from this perception of feminists: “it has also acquired this bad name in the media which is all about ‘bra-burning feminists’” (Independent 06a).

6.3.3.2 ‘Feminists’ with relational classifiers

The 35 relational classifiers in the feminists dataset place particular groups of feminists in relation to others. 26 imbue ‘feminists’ with the quality of representing people from a particular period of time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relational qualifier</th>
<th>No. of occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s/seventies</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older, second-wave</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old-school</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier, first-wave, latter-day, new-fangled, original, previous, third-wave</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.17: Relational classifiers relating to time that premodify ‘feminists’

The relational classifiers of time provide evidence for Dean’s (2010) claim that feminism tends to be “temporally situated in the past” (p. 401): 21 out of 26 of these classifiers place those referred to by ‘feminists’ in the past. Further, instances of contrasting reflect Dean's (2010) observation that the feminism of the past is contrasted with more contemporary forms: each constructed opposition
presents the idea of opposition among groups that can be described as ‘feminists’ or between feminists and other groups of women. In each instance, the opposed groups contrast along lines of time.

Table 6.18 comprises occurrences of ‘feminists’ with classifiers of time in contrasts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00a</td>
<td>A new generation of feminist historians and academics talk of her work with respect, but younger media feminists tend to ignore rather than dismiss her […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 05b</td>
<td>[…] she seems not to mind those with a small ‘f’; only first-wave, capital-letter Feminists grate […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08a</td>
<td>[…] given the polarising of opinion between old-school feminists and modern young women engaged with popular culture […] there is much room for judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 09b</td>
<td>If old-school feminists protest against this pornification, we are accused of being anti-sex</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.18: Occurrences of ‘feminists’ with classifiers of time in contrasts

Times 08a and 09b use explicit opposition to present contrasts between ‘feminists’ and young women. In the former, a ‘between X and Y’ frame contrasts old-school feminists with modern young women engaged in popular culture, while Times 09b opposes old-school feminists and this pornification, with the latter element referring to young women’s use of words such as ‘slut’ to describe themselves: not only are old feminists and young women opposed to each other, but the explicit opposition trigger “protest against” presents this opposition as taking an active form, in a material action process in which old feminists are the actor and the actions of young women are the goal. These oppositions evoke previous findings of oppositions between ‘serious’ and ‘frivolous’ forms of ‘feminism’, with the former presented as “critically engaged” (Dean, 2010, p. 399) and the latter as less politically aware and more concerned with popular culture (Mendes, 2011a, p. 136).

Telegraph 05b and Guardian 00a use concessive oppositions to present ‘feminists’ as splitting into different varieties that represent different generations. Telegraph 05b discusses novelist Margaret Atwood’s views on feminists, contrasting the acceptable - those with a small ‘f’ - with the unacceptable - first-wave, capital-letter Feminists. The distinction between uppercase ‘Feminists’ and lowercase ‘feminists’ reflects Dean’s (2010) observation of an opposition between radical feminists from the past and moderate feminists in the present: those from the past took the label ‘Feminists’ more seriously, whereas those from later waves are more relaxed about the term (and, as
a result, cause Margaret Atwood less aggravation). Guardian 00a complicates the meaning of ‘feminists’ further, drawing a distinction between a new generation of feminist historians and academics and younger media feminists. Both elements are described as “new”/“young”: instead of drawing a contrast based on age or generation, this opposition contrasts feminists who are academics with feminists who work in the media, presenting the idea of ‘feminists’ as referring to different contemporary groups, one of which continues to embrace old feminist ideas and icons and another which draws away from them, reflecting the differing interpretations of ‘post-feminist’ discussed in section 2.1.1.

The representation of actions, events and states also draws lines between older and newer feminists and women. In the examples in table 6.19, referents corresponding to feminists and other women fulfil different roles in material action, verbalisation and mental processes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 05a</td>
<td>I’m deserting the Seventies bra-burning feminists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07a</td>
<td>Second wave feminists tell me I’m a bad feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 09c</td>
<td>A judgemental cohort of older feminists beating up their daughters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 03a</td>
<td>Older feminists […] stare at sexually aggressive young women today with simple despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 09a</td>
<td>We older feminists did our younger sisters a disservice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.19: Occurrences of ‘feminists’ with classifiers of time and other groups of women

Material action processes present feminists and other women performing actions that affect others negatively: older feminists (actor) do younger feminists (recipient) a disservice (goal) (Telegraph 09a), older feminists (actor) beat up their daughters (goal) (Guardian 09c), and an article’s writer (actor) deserts Seventies feminists (goal) (Express 05a). The sense of ‘feminists’ as denoting people who are involved in conflict is also emphasised in a verbalisation process of second-wave feminists (sayer) telling an article’s writer (receiver) that they are a bad feminist (Guardian 07a) and a mental process in which older feminists (senser) stare at younger sisters (phenomenon) and despair of them (Independent 03a). These examples show how the articles not only use naming to draw distinctions between different types of feminists according to time and generation, but also use transitivity processes to represent actions of conflict between them.
6.3.3.3 ‘Feminists’ with time descriptors

The analysis of relational classifiers above demonstrates that premodifying adjectives divide ‘feminists’ into different types and draw comparisons between them based on time. Time is also a facet of descriptors that are used in the premodification of ‘feminists’, with time descriptors the most common type (26 of 59). Whereas the majority of relational classifiers place ‘feminists’ in the past, the descriptors note the existence of more contemporary feminists while also presenting feminists as occasionally ‘over the top’ in their political convictions and activities. There is also evidence of what Dean (2010) calls “anxiety” (p. 396) about modern-day feminists, with writers uncertain of who they are, or whether they exist in the first place. Table 6.20 shows which types of feminists time descriptors focus on:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time descriptor</th>
<th>No. of occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early, modern</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-established, old</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.20: Descriptors of time that premodify ‘feminists’

Time descriptors focus on contemporary feminists (22 descriptors) over feminists from the past (four). However, the sense of feminists as being something from the past is reinforced in many of these examples. This reflects a trend noted by Mendes (2011a, p. 158), whereby articles question what contemporary feminism is and who modern feminists are. This is demonstrated by the representation of ‘new/young/modern feminists’ in states:
The new feminists are not anti-male […]  
Young feminists are involved in ‘subvertising’, making cut-and-paste ‘zines’ railing at sexism, organising the Ladyfest feminist music festivals  
The new feminists are the old feminists  
[…] who are the new feminists?  
We wanted to show that young feminists aren’t crazy or mean, but cool  
We know what modern feminists look like, but do we know what they now believe?

Table 6.21: Occurrences of ‘new/young/modern feminists’ in relational processes

Two of the occurrences here pose questions about ‘new/young/modern feminists’ and demonstrate uncertainty about who exactly they are and what they believe: “who are the new feminists?” (Guardian 06a), “do we know what [modern feminists] now believe?” (Independent 07a). The contrasting of what modern feminists look like with what modern feminists believe through concessive opposition also reflects the concern that contemporary forms of feminism are more concerned with “appearance, style, or personal qualities” (Lind & Salo, 2002, p. 217): the first what-clause is the phenomenon in a mental process of knowing – an epistemically confident verb – whereas the second is phrased as an interrogative. In two other occurrences – Express 01a and Guardian 06b – negating and contrasting highlight writers’ awareness of negative perceptions of new and young feminists: Express 01a negates the relational process attributing being “anti-male” to new feminists, while the concessive opposition in Guardian 06b negates the attribution of the qualities of being “crazy or mean” and contrasts them with the quality of being “cool”. In the remaining examples, Guardian 06a uses a relational intensive process to observe a relationship of equivalence between “the new feminists” and “the old feminists”, thereby presenting both types as the same, while the relational circumstantial process in Guardian 03b presents young feminists as being involved in activities that do not look dissimilar to traditional feminist activities, such as “railing against sexism”. These examples suggest that while naming in the articles picks out different types of ‘feminists’, the interaction of other textual-conceptual functions plays down differences between them, demonstrating how a consideration of these different aspects of how texts create meaning can help provide a more thorough understanding of the meanings attributed to ‘feminist/s/ism’.
6.3.3.4 ‘Feminists’ with miscellaneous descriptors

There are 23 miscellaneous descriptors in the feminists dataset. Whereas many of the miscellaneous descriptors used in the naming of individual feminists focus on aspects of personality and appearance (see section 6.2.4.2), those that premodify ‘feminists’ as groups emphasise either their degree of commitment to feminism or their state of mind:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Miscellaneous descriptor</th>
<th>No. of occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strident</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-described/proclaimed, serious</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive, articulate, baying, chronically offended, demented, fainthearted, formidable, hairy-armed, hard-line, odd, politically active, rabid, radical, raving, sabre-toothed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.22: Miscellaneous descriptors that premodify ‘feminists’

Some of these descriptors – ‘self-proclaimed’, ‘serious’ – simply express the notion of feminists as committed and determined. However, ‘odd’, ‘raving’, ‘aggressive’ and ‘hard-line’ go beyond this, carrying negative connotations to do with individuals or groups being committed to something beyond an extent that is sensible (see the discussion of ‘the feminists’ in section 6.3.2). What is important here is that the reader is not given the opportunity to question the association of these qualities with ‘feminists’ – the adjectives describing groups of feminists are packaged up into noun phrases, rather than used as complements in propositions which can be argued against.

6.4 Material action and mental processes in the feminist and feminists datasets

This chapter concludes with a more detailed analysis of the observations made in section 6.1 concerning how ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ are represented in actions, events and states. The statistical overviews of representing actions/events/states (figures 6.3 and 6.4) show that a higher proportion of occurrences of ‘feminists’ (37%) than ‘feminist’ (18%) occur in material action processes, and that the same is true for mental processes – 14.76% of occurrences of ‘feminists’ and 8.66% of occurrences of ‘feminist’. The analysis below looks at the significance of these results, beginning with a further breakdown of the roles that ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ play in material action and mental processes.
While the statistical overviews of representing actions/events/states show that ‘feminists’ is more likely to occur in material action processes than ‘feminist’, this does not necessarily mean that ‘feminists’ is presented as more active than ‘feminist’, as an overview of process types alone does not take into account the roles that the plural and singular forms fulfil. Figure 6.8 provides a more detailed overview of the roles that ‘feminist’ fulfils in material action processes:

![Figure 6.8: The role of ‘feminist’ in material action processes](image)

‘Feminist' occurs as an actor in just under half (45.83%) of material action processes, while appearances as a goal or recipient account for just over a quarter (27.78% combined) of occurrences. However, figure 6.9 shows that ‘feminists’ is much more likely to be the actor in a process (70.7% of occurrences), and also that it is less likely to be the goal or recipient (16.56% combined):
Figure 6.9: The role of ‘feminists’ in material action processes

These overviews suggest that groups of feminists are more likely to be portrayed as active. This strengthens the impression given by the present chapter’s findings concerning ‘the feminists’ (discussed in section 6.3.2) and ‘radical feminists’ (section 6.3.3.1).

There is an even more striking difference in the roles that ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ perform in mental processes. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show that whereas the majority of occurrences of ‘feminist’ appear in circumstances (64.7%), the majority of occurrences of ‘feminists’ fulfil the role of senser (70.15%):
These findings support the initial impression provided by the overview of representing actions/events/states: groups of feminists are portrayed as more active than individual feminists. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 also suggest, counter-intuitively, that the articles are more likely to discuss the
thoughts of groups of feminists than of individual feminists (who could more easily be consulted for their thoughts).

Figures 6.10 and 6.11 demonstrate differences in the ways that individual feminists and groups of feminists are focused on grammatically. However, it is worth looking in greater detail at ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ in mental processes. In some instances where ‘feminist’ occurs as part of a circumstance in a mental process, it serves an adverbial role that contextualises the proposition, e.g. “like every good feminist, she didn’t see why she should do all the cleaning” (Mail 09c), “as a staunch feminist, Hillary always previously disdained the fluffy vote” (Express 08b). However, in the majority of occurrences (17 of 22), ‘feminist’ is a circumstance describing how the phenomenon is, or ought to be, perceived. Examples such as “I consider myself a feminist” (Express 02c) and “she was, and still is, seen as an extreme, man-hating feminist” (Guardian 05b) demonstrate discussion of individuals’ feminist credentials. In some cases – ‘see’, ‘think of’ – the mental process verbs are modal, expressing doubt over whether a particular individual is a feminist. Even in instances where the mental process verb is not conventionally seen as modal, the fact that a mental process is being used instead of a relational process/categorical assertion (‘I am a feminist’) presents the individual’s feminism as contentious, for example in “I consider myself a card-carrying feminist” (Express 08a), “I would identify myself as a feminist” (Mirror 03b).

It is also important to note that – as with occurrences of ‘feminists’ generally (see figure 6.2) – in instances where ‘feminists’ is a senser, the noun often carries either minimal or detailed modification (28 of 46 occurrences). This means that the writers are only making assumptions about what a particular subset of feminists thinks, as when quantifiers such as ‘some’ and ‘many’ are used, e.g. “sleeping around was considered by some feminists as almost a revolutionary duty” (Times 04b), “those feminists may have feared that a focus on motherhood risked driving women back into full-time domesticity” (Independent 01a). While no clear, overriding patterns emerge in the data as to the types of things feminists do or do not think or believe, the fact that the thoughts of a large and mixed group are presented in this way is significant.

6.5 Summary

The analysis of textual meanings of ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’, like the analysis of ‘feminism’ in chapter 5, has shown that the people who represent feminism are portrayed in a variety of ways. Critical stylistic analysis demonstrates that different meanings of ‘feminist(s)’ arise from the use of naming to refer to particular types of feminist, the use of contrasting to compare different types, and uses of metalanguage that address perceptions of the lexemes ‘feminist’ and ‘feminists’ themselves.

The findings in this chapter expand on previous research into media portrayals of feminists. Some initial findings suggested that there is evidence that feminists are presented negatively in the articles. For example, the ‘a feminist looks like’ structure suggested that there is an emphasis on feminists’ appearances – as observed in Mendes’ (2011b) study - while the overviews of premodifying
adjectives demonstrated the prominence of premodifiers that denote political action, reflecting previous studies’ observations concerning portrayals of feminists as politically active (for example Lind & Salo, 2002). Analysis of the wider context of ‘a feminist looks like’ demonstrated that occurrences either referred to a pro-feminist T-shirt slogan or exemplified writers’ interrogation of stereotypes about feminists; more in-depth analysis of the textual meaning of, for example, ‘radical feminist(s)’ demonstrated that political types of feminists are not portrayed in a uniformly negative light, instead simply being portrayed as actively involved in political activities. However, the analysis of ‘the feminists’ did provide evidence of less favourable treatment of feminists: the combination of naming (generic reference through the definite determiner) and the representation of actions (‘the feminists’ as the actor in material action processes) showed that where feminists are referred to as a mass group in this way, they are portrayed as being engaged in subversive actions.

The feminist and feminists datasets again showed that more political types of feminism and feminist are “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417), in particular through the use of time deixis and contrasts which place political feminists in opposition to more contemporary types, reflecting Dean’s (2010) observation of “domestication” (p. 392) in articles from the 2000s. ‘New’ feminists, in turn, are presented as ambiguous, with writers questioning what it means to be a ‘feminist’ today. Occurrences of metalinguistic discussion of ‘feminist’ in the data also indicated articles’ engagement with the status of ‘feminist’ itself: in many instances, writers observe the negative meanings attributed to ‘feminist’ by others, but contest these meanings with their own, more positive, interpretations. Occurrences of ‘I’m not a feminist’ also showed how findings that might at first appear negative – the frequent presentation of people’s denial of their feminism – in fact highlight writers’ critiques of negative perceptions of ‘feminist/s/ism’: in this case, writers present others’ speech and thoughts in order to argue against them, in the process contesting others’ more narrow definitions of to whom ‘feminist’ can apply.

Related to the ‘I’m not a feminist’ findings are those that concern rules associated with ‘feminist’. The analysis of the representation of states in the feminist dataset showed that articles frequently acknowledge supposed aspects of the meaning of ‘feminist’ – for example, that if someone is a ‘feminist’, then by definition they cannot be ‘sexy’, or must abide by an established set of beliefs. Again, analysis using the range of textual-conceptual functions showed that these limiting ideas about the meaning of ‘feminist’ are argued against, for example through the use of negating at a higher clausal level (‘you don’t have to pass a test to be a feminist’), or contrasts that defease the idea that ‘feminist’ shares a relation of antonymy with other words like ‘model’ or ‘leg wax’. Although the analysis demonstrates that negative portrayals of ‘feminist(s)’ are present in the data, it also demonstrates that these portrayals are contested by writers.

Chapter 7 completes the analysis of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data by analysing the use of adjectival ‘feminist’.
Chapter 7: The adjectives dataset

This chapter analyses the 673 occurrences of ‘feminist’ in the adjectives dataset. Previous studies of feminism in the media have focused on the way that the movement of feminism is portrayed (for example Chaudhuri, 2000; Mendes, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Rhode, 1995) with others also looking at the people involved (for example Hinds & Stacey, 2001; North, 2009; Riley, 2001). However, there has been little discussion of whom and what are described as being feminist, and how. The statistical overview of word class (see section 4.2.2) shows that adjectival ‘feminist’ accounts for over a quarter of the 2,539 occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’, and so it is important to consider its use.

Among previous studies, Lind and Salo’s (2002) study of US news media texts pays the most attention to the ways in which adjectival ‘feminist’ is used. Their study uses the search terms ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’, meaning that adjectival uses are included in their results. Lind and Salo (2002) argue, for example, that the common occurrence of word pairs featuring adjectival ‘feminist’ alongside ‘agenda’, ‘revolution’ and ‘sisterhood’ demonstrates the close linking of feminism and “a concern for improving general conditions for women, and for the women’s movement in general” (p. 220). However, their analysis does not provide an account of textual meaning, with the different forms of ‘feminist/s/ism’ bunched together to support their argument for the presence of different frames in the data (the examples above constitute part of a “goals frame” to do with “civil rights, workplace rights, reproductive rights, preventing violence toward women, and improving general conditions for women” (Lind & Salo, 2002, p. 220)). The other previous corpus linguistic study of feminism in the media, Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012), focuses on the search term ‘feminism’, meaning that occurrences of the adjectival form are neglected. The present chapter provides a thorough investigation of adjectival ‘feminist’ and its textual meanings.

Adjectival ‘feminist’ is also of interest to the present study for similar reasons to the unmodified forms of the nouns ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist(s)’. Because adjectives tend not to be modified by other words, and are therefore “assumed to be understood without further explanation” (Jeffries & Walker, 2012, p. 221), adjectival ‘feminist’ imbues the subjects and head nouns it modifies with the quality of being feminist in a universal sense (although note the discussion of the prominence of derivational forms of adjectival ‘feminist’ in section 4.2.2).

The analysis proceeds from a statistical overview of the grammatical role that adjectival ‘feminist’ plays and its appearance in representations of actions/events/states. I then investigate patterns in the textual meanings of ‘feminist’ in attributive position, where it premodifies a head noun (section 7.2), before turning to those occurrences that take up the other possible syntactic position – predicative occurrences that complement a subject (section 7.3). The analysis concludes with analyses focusing on derivational forms of ‘feminist’ (section 7.4) and occurrences of ‘feminist’ that appear in lists with other adjectives (section 7.5).
7.1 **Statistical overview of the adjectives dataset**

Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the way adjectival ‘feminist’ is used. The overview of naming here is different to that for noun forms, as adjectives are not pre- or postmodified in the same way (although section 7.5 discusses other adjectives that occur in lists with adjectival ‘feminist’). Figure 7.1 divides adjective occurrences according to whether they occur in attributive position (‘the feminist writer’) or predicative position (‘the writer is feminist’):

![Figure 7.1: Statistical overview of the grammatical function of adjectival ‘feminist’](image)

The vast majority of occurrences of adjectival ‘feminist’ appear within a nominal, rather than occurring as clausal complements. This indicates that the feminist nature of someone or something tends to be packaged up and assumed (‘the feminist writer’) instead of being the subject of a proposition (‘the writer is feminist’). Chapter 7 analyses each of these grammatical uses of ‘feminist’, looking at the types of head noun that ‘feminist’ premodifies (section 7.2) and the types of subject that it complements (section 7.3).

Figure 7.2 shows the division of transitivity process types in the adjectives dataset:
Material action processes account for a higher proportion of the adjectives dataset than of the feminism dataset (see section 5.1) or the feminist and feminists datasets (section 6.1). This suggests a stronger link between people and things that are described as feminist and action of some sort.

The analysis below begins by looking at attributive ‘feminist’ (section 7.2), which account for the majority of occurrences. In particular, it looks at how individuals and entities described as feminist are represented in actions and states. The representation of states is also the focus of section 7.3, due to the grammatical role that predicative ‘feminist’ plays, with the analysis looking at who is explicitly described as (not) being feminist. Section 7.4 focuses specifically on derivational forms of ‘feminist’, again making use of the analysis of representations of states to look at how people and things are classified according to how they relate to ‘feminist’ in terms of time (‘pre-feminist’, ‘post-feminist’) and their non-compatibility with feminism (‘un-feminist’, ‘non-feminist’, ‘pseudo-feminist’, ‘anti-feminist’). Section 7.5 concludes the analysis with an investigation of how else the people and things labelled as ‘feminist’ are described, i.e. through adjectives that occur in lists with ‘feminist’, and how they are described through representations of states and presented as interacting with each other in representations of actions.

7.2 Attributive ‘feminist’

The analysis in this section focuses on the 631 occurrences of adjectival ‘feminist’ that occur within a noun phrase, premodifying a head noun or nouns. These occurrences package up a referent’s feminist quality into the noun phrase, meaning that the connection between a referent and their
feminism is presented as incontrovertible. Some occurrences of attributive ‘feminist’ modify more than one head noun, for example, “history” and “literature” in “my boss at Nuts […] knew her feminist history and literature” (Times 09c). This results in a total of 641 head nouns, 197 of which occur on just one occasion. The large number of singular occurrences are excluded from the analysis here, which focuses on those that occur two or more times (a full version of table 7.1, accounting for singular occurrences, is included in appendix 2).

Table 7.1 lists those head nouns that are premodified by ‘feminist’ on more than one occasion:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head noun</th>
<th>No. of occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement(s)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Icon(s)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writer(s)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue(s)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine(s)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activism</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group(s), revolution</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blog(s), mother(s)/mums</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda, idea(s)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s), organisation(s), principle(s), theory/ies</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artist(s), cause(s), heroine(s), message</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument(s), book(s), era, literature, thought</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic(s), ideal(s), ideology, Intellectual Heritage, meeting(s), novel(s), politics, thinker(s), work(s)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbie, campaign(s), card, columnist, critics, historian(s), men, network(s), role model, slogan(s), symbol(s), theology, values, women, world</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act, activist(s), age, attitudes, backlash, banner, battle(s), belief(s), celebrity, commentators, criticism, critique, demands, establishment, fantasy, fascist(i), feminist, festival, fight, figure, fire, friend(s), generation, history, label, language, media, men’s groups, narrative, polemic, press, publisher, rebel, rhetoric, scholar(s), society, terms, texts, theme(s), theorists, viewpoint(s), views, writing(s)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.1: Head nouns premodified by adjectival ‘feminist’**

The head nouns provide evidence that supports previous studies’ findings. Some of the most frequently occurring nouns in the adjectives dataset – including ‘movement’, ‘agenda’, ‘belief(s)’ and ‘revolution’ – also appear in the ‘goals frame’ that Lind and Salo (2002) identify in their study of American news texts, providing evidence of how articles are “concerned with improving general conditions for women” (pp. 219-220). While Lind and Salo’s (2002) classification of words into frames
is impressionistic (see discussion in section 2.2.2), the fact that ‘feminist’ frequently modifies these and other nouns such as ‘issue(s)’, ‘activism’, ‘idea(s)’, ‘principle(s)’, ‘theory/ies’, ‘cause(s)’, ‘message’ and ‘argument(s)’ demonstrates that the quality of being feminist is closely associated with ideas of activism and political aims. Other head nouns provide evidence for Mendes’ (2011a, pp. 135-136) observation that newspaper articles about feminism focus on connections between feminism and popular culture, for example ‘magazine(s)’, ‘art’, ‘blog(s)’, ‘book(s)’ and ‘literature’.

The remainder of the analysis in this section focuses on the three head nouns that are premodified by ‘feminist’ 20 or more times. This cut-off point narrows the focus of the analysis, but also allows me to investigate those referents with which ‘feminist’ is most frequently associated. The analysis demonstrates how writers use the presentation of others’ speech to argue with negative perceptions of feminism, how the idea of the ‘feminist icon’ is used to observe the possibility of different types of feminist, and how the thoughts of feminist writers are used to discuss uncertainty about feminism and oppositions in which feminism is involved.

7.2.1 ‘Feminist movement(s)’

The analysis of ‘feminism’ showed that it frequently occurs in material action processes (42% of occurrences - see figure 5.2). The same is true for ‘feminist movement(s)’, with material action processes accounting for 53.5% of the transitivity processes in which it appears. This suggests that ‘feminist movement(s)’ is often represented as being involved in some sort of action. The analysis here focuses on the 10 occurrences of ‘feminist movement(s)’ that are actors in material action processes, showing that apparently negative portrayals of the movement are part of the presentation of speech, and that assumptions about the death of feminism are contested.

Table 7.2 comprises the ten occurrences of ‘feminist movement’ as the actor in a material action process:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 02c</td>
<td>The character-as-syndrome was adopted first […] by right-wingers, to mean tragic figure of female solitude […] sold out by the feminist movement […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 03a</td>
<td>The feminist movement has done so much that I think she felt able to move on to human rights work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 03b</td>
<td>Others say the feminist movement has died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06b</td>
<td>The feminist movement has always produced plenty of meaty writing and lively debate […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 05b</td>
<td>The Bill Clinton she depicts is a crude, foulmouthed, arrogant ‘liberal misogynist’ […] Yet America’s ferocious feminist movement turned a blind eye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror 06c</td>
<td>The Vatican said the feminist movement had “reinforced the individualistic image of man and woman” and by doing so was “surpassing the family”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 01a</td>
<td>Erin […] said […] “The feminist movement have expunged men out of the family”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 00a</td>
<td>Doris Lessing vehemently denies that she is, or ever was, a feminist: “[…] I don’t think the feminist movement has done very well for itself”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 00b</td>
<td>[…] she says “[…] one minute we are saying we want complete independence - a view that has been pounded into them by the feminist movement - and the next we’re saying we are tired and screaming for help”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 05a</td>
<td>The feminist movement is waning because we are too busy waxing our legs, our hardwood floors, our top lips and our silly pink Smart cars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Occurrences of ‘feminist movement(s)’ as actor in a material action process

Two of the processes (Guardian 03b, Times 05a) provide further evidence of the link between feminism and death in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ dataset. However, similar to the examples of ‘feminism is dead’ (see section 5.2.2.2), examples of ‘the feminist movement is dead’ do not simply make a negative assessment of feminism’s health. Times 05a represents the feminist movement in a state of “waning”, but the reasons provided by the because-clause – “we are too busy waxing our legs”, etc. – imply that the writer is not happy with this state of affairs. The reasons provided are all stereotypically non-feminist, and so the reader is able to infer that the writer is breaking the maxim of relation (Grice, 1975) in order to imply that feminism would not be dying if “we” (note the use of proximal person deixis to involve the reader) acted differently. The sentence from Guardian 03b is contrasted with the
previous sentence – “Some say the feminist fight has been won” - through parallel ‘X says Y’ structures, drawing attention to the fact that the health of feminism is contested. The has died/fight has been won contrast also evokes the different perceptions of what it means to adopt a ‘post-feminist’ view, i.e. whether it means taking a hostile view of feminism, or simply believing that it is no longer necessary (Mendes, 2011a, p. 8). As with examples of ‘feminism is dead’, the writer cites the arguments of others – that the feminist movement has died – before going on to assert their own, more positive take, in this instance that “feminism exists, as it always has done”.

Other material action processes in which ‘feminist movement’ is the actor in negatively evaluative processes also demonstrate how negative ideas about feminism are presented as part of others’ speech. In cases where the material action verbs have connotations of violence – ‘expunging’ (Sun 01a), ‘pounding into’ (Telegraph 00b) – the writers are presenting the speech of others (women’s refuge founder Erin Pizzey and divorce lawyer Vanessa Lloyd Platt, respectively). Similarly, the notions that the feminist movement has ‘surpassed’ the family unit and that it has not done well are attributed to the Vatican (Mirror 06c) and writer Doris Lessing (Telegraph 00a) through the presentation of speech, while Guardian 02c attributes the view that the feminist movement has “sold out” a specific type of woman to “right-wingers” through the circumstance of the main clause – “adopted [...] to mean”. The only explicitly negative portrayal of feminists on the part of the writers is Mail 05b, which uses concessive ‘X, yet Y’ opposition frame to emphasise the outrageousness of the feminist movement’s turning of a blind eye to Bill Clinton’s poor behaviour. Here, the negative perception of the movement is underlined through its naming as “America’s ferocious feminist movement”. Elsewhere, in Guardian 03a and Guardian 06b, the movement is presented as having “done so much” and “produced plenty of meaty writing and lively debate”, actions that are positively evaluated through the use of the amplifier + pronoun “so much” and the adjectives “meaty” and “lively”, which have connotations of substance and vivacity. Occurrences of ‘feminist movement’ in material action processes demonstrate a range of portrayals: while some articles (for example Sun 01a, Telegraph 00a) use feminist spokespeople to present ‘feminist’ as associated with violent or anti-male behaviour (Mendes, 2011b, p. 492), others are more positive or recognise contrasting perceptions of the movement.

7.2.2 ‘Feminist icon(s)’

The frequent occurrence of ‘feminist icon(s)’ suggests an emphasis on particular individuals who are taken to stand for all feminists, or who at least are treated as particularly strong examples of feminists (Baumgardner & Richards, 2001, p. 79). 17 of the 27 processes are relational intensive processes, suggesting that there is an emphasis on defining who these individuals are and reflecting Mendes’ (2011a, p. 132) observation that articles devote attention to discussions of who can be a feminist. Analysis of these occurrences demonstrates that those defined as representative of feminism in this way are “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417).

Table 7.3 comprises the 17 occurrences of ‘feminist icon(s)’ in relational intensive process:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 06b</td>
<td>Tina is a post-modern feminist icon [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01c</td>
<td>[...] in the age of communication and modern media, our feminist icons are likely to be successful women raised to celebrity status by the power of publicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01c</td>
<td>The great feminist icons of the past were intellectuals before they were celebrities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01c</td>
<td>From Mary Wollstonecraft to Oprah Winfrey, a few women in every generation have become feminist icons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01c</td>
<td>Senator Clinton, Oprah Winfrey and Princess Diana are different sorts of feminist icon from those who came before, but they are powerful figures nonetheless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 08b</td>
<td>She [Simone de Beauvoir] was the feminist icon who seduced her female students before passing them on to her male lover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 01c</td>
<td>Miss Lessing [...] became a feminist icon [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 08a</td>
<td>Alice Walker is the feminist icon who wrote The Colour Purple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 08b</td>
<td>Bond girls are feminist icons!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror 01a</td>
<td>[...] she [Doris Lessing] is a feminist icon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror 04b</td>
<td>Is Jordan a feminist icon?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror 05c</td>
<td>A feminist icon for sure, but many younger readers may be unaware of her [Germaine Greer’s] substantial achievements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 04a</td>
<td>Why shouldn’t our Page 3 stunners be modern feminist icons?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 04a</td>
<td>Jordan’s the feminist icon of 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 01a</td>
<td>In the age of mass communication and modern media, our feminist icons are more likely to be successful women raised to celebrity status by the power of publicity - real or representational First Ladies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 01c</td>
<td>The great feminist icons were anything but saints [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 05b</td>
<td>She may be a feminist icon, but has Kahlo’s halo started to slip [...]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: Occurrences of ‘feminist icon(s)’ in relational intensive processes
Similar to the occurrences of ‘X is/becomes a feminist’ discussed in section 6.2.3.2, these representations of states show that not only recognised feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir (Independent 08b), Doris Lessing (Mail 01c) and Germaine Greer (Mirror 05c) are identified as significant feminists, but also less obvious figures such as the model Jordan (Mirror 04b, Sun 04a) and Bond girls (Mail 08b). The analysis below shows that writers distinguish between different types of feminist icon in a variety of ways, in particular observing differences in to whom ‘feminist’ can be applied in different time periods.

The idea that ‘feminist icon’ has different meanings in the 2000s to those in the past is made explicit in Guardian 01c, in which Bill Clinton, Oprah Winfrey and Princess Diana are attributed the quality of being “different sorts of feminist icon to those who came before”. While the writer makes a distinction between Clinton et al. and previous icons, they use a contrast – triggered by “but” – to observe that both old and new types of icon are “powerful figures”: the use of concessive opposition, which distinguishes the information in the second clause as surprising in light of the first (Quirk et al., 1972, p. 745), recognises the assumption that the more modern type might tend to be taken less seriously than the older type. Guardian 01c also evokes this idea of an opposition between more serious and more trivial feminists in instances of implying. These arise through flouts of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975). In one instance, the writer states that “the great feminist icons of the past were intellectuals before they were celebrities”: the use of naming to specify icons from a particular era – “the past” – produces an implicature that the proposition does not hold for more contemporary feminists, who presumably become celebrities without first of all being intellectuals. The other instance (which also appears in edited form in Times 01a) also evokes this intellectual/celebrity distinction, using naming - the pinpointing of “our feminist icons” – and the time adverbial “in the age of communication and modern media” to limit the scope of the proposition equating feminist icons and celebrity women to contemporary icons, thereby implying that previous icons perhaps became so by other means.

Contrasting presents feminist iconicity as something that one can attain, and also as something that one can lose. Transitional ‘X becomes Y’ oppositions in Guardian 01c and Mail 01c present processes whereby women including Mary Wollstonecraft, Oprah Winfrey and Doris Lessing become feminists. Mirror 05c and Times 05b, on the other hand, present the idea that someone can lose their iconicity. The former defines Germaine Greer as a feminist icon, but the concessive opposition triggered by “but” observes that this status may not be recognised by younger Mirror writers, while the latter defines artist Frida Kahlo as an icon, but again uses a concessive ‘X, but Y’ opposition to question whether she may be in danger of losing this status. The precariousness of icon status is further emphasised by the use of hypothesising in both examples, with the relational process in Mirror 05c modalised by “for sure” and the one in Times 05b by the modal auxiliary verb “may”. In other articles, interrogatives are used to question the icon status of less likely feminists, namely the model Jordan and other Page 3 models. Mirror 04b is cautious, asking “Is Jordan a feminist icon?”, while Sun 04a adopts a more confident tone, using a deontically modal form to question “Why shouldn’t our Page 3 stunners be modern feminist icons?” This hypothetical question implies that the
“Page 3 stunners” can be feminist icons by flouting the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), while the use of naming to specify “modern feminist icons” produces a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): nothing is said about non-modern types, and so the implied meaning is that ‘feminist’ and “Page 3 stunner” could not both have applied to the same referent in previous times. These examples again demonstrate the presence of debate in the data about who is and who is not, and who can and who cannot be, a feminist.

7.2.3 ‘Feminist writer(s)’

There are 24 occurrences of ‘feminist writer(s)’, which appear in a total of 22 transitivity processes. These occurrences appear most frequently in verbalisation processes, and demonstrate how articles in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ dataset bring in feminist “spokeswomen” (North, 2009, p. 743) to provide their opinion on feminist matters and matters affecting women.

The ten examples of ‘feminist writer(s)’ in verbalisation processes are compiled in table 7.4:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 08a</td>
<td>[...] feminist writer Rebecca Traister says: “Palin’s femininity is one that is recognisable to most women: she's the kind of broad who speaks on behalf of other broads but appears not to like them very much... It's like some dystopian future... feminism without any feminists”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 01a</td>
<td>[...] every new young feminist writer - from Natasha Walter to Naomi Wolf - has been greeted with cruel derision by the established sisterhood [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 01a</td>
<td>[...] every new young feminist writer has been greeted with cruel derision by the established sisterhood [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 05b</td>
<td>The feminist writer Beatrix Campbell described her as “quixotic, anarchic, impressive, surprising, game, witty and up for a laugh”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 09a</td>
<td>[…] I asked the feminist writer Ariel Levy, below, why so many women my age have the “I’m not a feminist but...” attitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 09c</td>
<td>“It is not clear what the feminist agenda now is”, said the feminist writer Alison Wolf of King’s College London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror 02a</td>
<td>Feminist writer Germaine Greer has confirmed she will run for the rectorship of St Andrews University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 02b</td>
<td>“The assumption that men can be fooled by false passivity is insulting to both men and women”, says American feminist writer Anne Roiphe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 03c</td>
<td>Erica Jong, the feminist writer who extolled the virtues of the ‘zipless f***’ in the 1970s, says she is “so ignorant”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 07b</td>
<td>She seems to fit what the “post-post-feminist” writer, Laura Kipnis, describes in her latest book, The Female Thing, as a product of the “feminine-industrial complex” - a woman trying to balance the independence that feminism has won with the idea that female weakness is a virtue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4: Occurrences of ‘feminist writer(s)’ in verbalisation processes

These examples, like the instances of ‘feminist’ in appositive noun phrases discussed in section 6.4.2.1, show how naming and representing actions/events/states interact to produce an implicature: that what is expressed in the verbiage is significant in light of the fact that it is a feminist saying it. In the occurrences in table 7.4, feminist writers express their uncertainty about feminism and observe different perspectives on feminist matters, while other examples observe divisions between feminists.
Feminists’ statements concerning their own uncertainty about feminism are exemplified by feminist writer Alison Wolf’s comments in *Independent 09c*, in which she admits that “It is not clear what the feminist agenda now is”. Here, negating – “It is not clear” – and the representation of time “what the feminist agenda now is” – combine to present contemporary feminism as something uncertain; by restricting this uncertainty to feminism in the present, Wolf also implies – through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975) – that the feminist agenda was clear in the past. In *Guardian 08a*, *Telegraph 02b* and *Times 07b*, presentations of speech depict feminist writers observing contradictions relating to feminism and femininity. In *Guardian 08a*, writer Rebecca Traister uses the representation of a state to equate the kind of femininity associated with Sarah Palin with the idea of “feminism without any feminists”, constructing the counterintuitive idea of a variety of ‘feminism’ that exists without advocates. The *Times 07b* and *Telegraph 02b* examples both concern conflict between feminism and femininity. *Times 07b* observes writer Laura Kipnis’s recognition of a “feminine-industrial complex”, which the article glosses through apposition as “a woman trying to balance the independence that feminism has won with the idea that female weakness is a virtue”: here, a contrast between the independence granted by feminism and female weakness is constructed through an explicit ‘balance X with Y’ opposition frame. In *Telegraph 02b*, writer Anne Roiphe, glossed as a ‘feminist writer’ through apposition, is quoted on her thoughts on the idea of female weakness, or “female passivity” as she calls it – an idea that she deems “insulting” to both men and women.

Other examples of the presentations of feminists’ speech observe contrasts between different women. In *Times 03c*, feminist writer Erica Jong is quoted on her thoughts on fellow writer Danielle Crittenden, describing her in negatively evaluative terms as “so ignorant”. In *Independent 01a*, feminist writers are the target of other feminists’ ire: “every new young feminist writer” is the recipient in a material action process of being “greeted with cruel derision”, with “the established sisterhood” as the actor. Although an opposition frame is not used here, the use of near antonyms in the naming of those at either end of the unfriendly greeting – “new” feminist writers and the “established” sisterhood – helps to emphasise the idea of a bitter division between older and newer feminists.

### 7.3 Predicative ‘feminist’

The analysis in this section looks at the 42 occurrences of predicative ‘feminist’ that function as a clausal complement. These occurrences make up a small portion of the adjectives dataset, with the majority of occurrences – 631 of 673 – discussed above in the analysis of attributive occurrences. However, predicative occurrences are of interest as they represent instances where someone or something’s possession of (or lack of) a ‘feminist’ quality is the proposition of the sentence. Rather than packaging up a referent’s feminist qualities into a noun phrase, these occurrences explicitly address who (or what) does or does not possess the quality of being feminist.

The referents that appear as subjects where ‘feminist’ is a complement are varied. They include activities – “[female bonding]’s not exactly radical, or even necessarily feminist” (*Independent
– and thoughts, for example “what, unfortunately, remains feminist […] is the assumption that all lone parents are female” (Independent 04a). Some of these referents demonstrate Mendes’ (2010a) argument that newspapers have a preoccupation with “the relationship between feminism and popular culture” (p. 136), for example books (“No Logo has been leapt upon by some commentators who […] see it as anti-feminist” (Guardian 00c)), films (“Barbara Broccoli never claimed […] the movies were feminist” (Mail 08b) and other cultural phenomena (“to call the Tab Totties’ exhibitionism ‘post-feminist’ is in no way to suggest that it is a symptom of feminism” (Telegraph 09a). The individuals and groups who appear as subjects are also often public figures. The analysis below focuses on the 14 occurrences of ‘an individual is feminist’ and the 14 occurrences of ‘a group is feminist’. Each of these patterns shows articles’ discussion of the complexity of ‘feminist’ and who can use it.

### 7.3.1 ‘An individual is feminist’

Occurrences of ‘an individual is feminist’ demonstrate writers’ and others’ (perceived) uncertainty about who can be labelled ‘feminist’. In some instances, ‘feminist’ is also used as a gradable adjective, presenting it as a word that can apply to an individual to a greater or lesser extent. It is also discussed as a label that may not apply to someone even though they want it to.

Table 7.5 comprises the 14 occurrences of ‘an individual is feminist’:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guardian 03a</strong></td>
<td>At 18 or 19, I would proudly have proclaimed myself either pro-feminist or feminist. Now, though, I think it’s a joke for a man to describe himself as a feminist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guardian 06c</strong></td>
<td>And given that, what man wouldn’t want to call himself pro-feminist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guardian 08a</strong></td>
<td>[…] why spend so much time framing Palin as feminist if we’re all just a bunch of hairy man-haters?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent 08c</strong></td>
<td>This may seem like a funny set of ideas for a woman so ardently feminist that she’s nicknamed Harriet Harperson to subscribe to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mail 01b</strong></td>
<td>Feminine vs. feminist. She’s the beautiful, trendy feminist […] But what exactly does author Naomi Wolf believe in?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mail 03a</strong></td>
<td>Feminist? Oh yeah! Let me wear those suffragette colours […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mail 06b</strong></td>
<td>I don’t see how you can be a woman and not be feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mirror 09a</strong></td>
<td>Dalai ‘Feminist’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sun 06b</strong></td>
<td>[…] “I’m fat, lesbian and blatantly feminist”, [Beth Ditto] proclaims […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Times 02c</strong></td>
<td>Christie Ann Hefner runs the business side of the Playboy empire […] Feminist? I don’t think so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Times 08c</strong></td>
<td>[…] I cannot […] declare that I am exactly as feminist as I would like to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Times 09a</strong></td>
<td>I’m literally pro-‘feminist’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Times 09b</strong></td>
<td>[…] I was fretting myself into borderline paralysis about whether I was being anti-feminist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.5: Occurrences of ‘an individual is feminist’**

Writers express doubts about whether they themselves are ‘feminist’ in **Guardian 03a**, **Times 08c** and **Times 09b**. These examples present the applicability of ‘feminist’ as something complex and difficult to ascertain: ‘feminist’ is a label that can apply at some stages of one’s life but not at others, is a label that one can want to use but not feel able to, and, in its negated form, is a label that people wish to avoid. **Guardian 03a** presents the idea of ‘feminist’ being a label that someone sheds: ‘feminist’ is the verbiage in a verbalisation process of proclaiming in which the writer is the target. However, this proclamation is placed in the past through the use of past tense and the time adverbial “At 18 or 19”, and the concessive opposition triggered by the proximal deictic marker of time “Now” contrasts the
applicability of ‘feminist’ then with its non-applicability in the present. *Times 08c* and *Times 09b* express a greater level of concern about whether ‘feminist’ or ‘anti-feminist’ apply to the writer. In the former, the writer uses ‘feminist’ as a gradable adjective – one is not simply feminist or not feminist, but can be feminist to different degrees. This gradable quality arises from the comparative “I am exactly as feminist as I would like to be” structure, and the presupposition that arises from it, i.e. that there is a desirable level of feminism – “as I would like to be” – that the writer has not attained. This clause is in turn subordinate to a negated verbalisation process of declaring – someone may wish to use the ‘feminist’ label to describe themselves, but still not be able to use it. A similar anxiety is present in *Times 09b*, in which the representation of a state that labels the writer as “anti-feminist” is the cause of the writer’s “fretting”: not only can someone not be able to declare oneself ‘feminist’ even if they want to (*Times 08c*), but it is possible to worry about whether one is the opposite of ‘feminist’.

The other examples of a writer attributing the ‘feminist’ label to themselves are more confident, but still demonstrate anxiety about the applicability of ‘feminist’. Like the comparative structure in *Times 08c*, modification through adverbs presents ‘feminist’ as a gradable adjective that can apply to a referent to a greater or lesser extent: singer Beth Ditto describes herself as “blatantly feminist” (*Sun 06c*), while another writer describes themselves as “literally pro-feminist” (*Times 09a*). Although these adverbs express a high level of confidence about the subjects’ feminist qualities, the fact that the writers hedge in this way, rather than using straightforward categorical assertions to declare their own feminism (i.e. ‘I am feminist’) demonstrates an awareness of the trickiness of ‘feminist’. This caution is emphasised by the fact that *Times 09a* uses the derivational form “pro-feminist”, rather than simply ‘feminist’: the writer is not bold enough to claim to be ‘feminist’, merely claiming themselves to be in favour of those who are.

Other examples observe the contested nature of ‘feminist’ by establishing the presence of an imagined interlocutor (Dean, 2010, p. 397). This effect is achieved through the use of rhetorical questions and questions that are presented as the free direct speech or thought of others. *Guardian 06c* and *Guardian 08a* are examples of the former: in *Guardian 06c*, the writer uses a rhetorical question to ask why men would not apply ‘feminist’ to themselves, while *Guardian 08a* uses the same technique to question why politicians apply ‘feminist’ to the then Republican leadership candidate Sarah Palin if they view feminists as “hairy man-haters”. In both instances, a writer flouts the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), using an interrogative structure to imply, rather than state categorically, that men *ought* to apply ‘feminist’ to themselves and, more negatively, that ‘feminist’ does not apply to Palin. This indirect way of describing the applicability of ‘feminist’ demonstrates the writers’ awareness of uncertainty about to whom ‘feminist’ can apply. *Mail 03a* and *Times 02c* are similar in this respect, although in these instances it is simply the word ‘feminist’ itself to which an interrogative is applied; the fact that the writer provides an answer in each instance provides the impression that these questions are supposed to be interpreted as presentations of the speech or thought of a hypothetical reader (the lack of a reporting clause in each instance means they must be free forms, and also makes it hard to tell if this is the writers’ intention). In *Mail 03a*, the question concerns whether the writer themselves is feminist, and they provide an affirmative answer (“Oh yeah!”), while
in *Times 02c* the question concerns *Playboy* chairman Chistine Ann Hefner, with a negative answer provided. The use of this rhetorical strategy shows how writers assume readers’ own uncertainty about the meaning and applicability of ‘feminist’.

### 7.3.2 ‘A group is feminist’

Table 7.6 comprises the 14 occurrences of ‘a group is feminist’. The analysis focuses on how writers present ‘feminist’ and derivational forms as having complex meanings, and the emphasis on women’s perceived lack of feminism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Express 09a</em></td>
<td>If women want to be both feminine and feminist it’s not a problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 03a</em></td>
<td>I’ve been out with other people who weren’t actively feminist […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 03a</em></td>
<td>[…] women of my own generation don’t typically define themselves as feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 05a</em></td>
<td>[…] that’s when it dawned on me: all those people who looked down on knitting - and housework, and housewives - were not being feminist at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 05a</em></td>
<td>[…] they were being anti-feminist […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 07a</em></td>
<td>[…] if people want to call us feminist that’s fine by me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Independent 06a</em></td>
<td>Only one British female in four calls herself feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Independent 07b</em></td>
<td>[…] they say young women are not feminist, but it is not true […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mail 03b</em></td>
<td>Yet many women don’t identify themselves as feminist […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mail 04a</em></td>
<td>“My generation is not interested in being called feminist”, she says</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Telegraph 01b</em></td>
<td>This generation is truly post-feminist: they don’t politicise their marriages and when you look at the issues women are consumed with day to day, they’re very much removed from the political realm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Telegraph 01b</em></td>
<td>[…] you have highly conservative bodies, like the army or the navy, who are as radically feminist as you can probably be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Times 08a</em></td>
<td>Funky, fun and feminist […] the women who are rebranding the f word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Times 08a</em></td>
<td>I don’t know if we’re third-wave or post-feminist […]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 7.6: Occurrences of ‘a group is feminist’ |
In the ‘a group is feminist’ structures, negating is used to deny the feminism of certain parties: in some instances, a writer or speaker labels others not feminist, while others provide evidence for previous studies’ conviction that articles present the idea of others rejecting the ‘feminist’ label (Redfern & Aune, 2010; Walby, 2011). Guardian 03a and Guardian 05a deny the feminism of others, but in a way that recognises the difficulty of deciding who ‘feminist’ applies to. Guardian 03a uses naming to identify “other people who weren’t actively feminist”, negating the representation of a state to deny a group’s feminism: however, the iterative trigger “other” presupposes that some people were feminist, and the premodifier “actively” produces an implicature (through a flout of the maxim of quant (Grice, 1975)) that these people may have been feminist in a non-active way, again suggesting that ‘feminist’ can apply to an individual to different degrees. The two examples from Guardian 05a refer to the same group of people who disapprove of knitting and other ‘feminine’ activities, and whose feminism is denied through the negation of the representation of a state of being feminist. This negated clause is also part of a constructed opposition which emphasises their lack of feminism by observing that that they were “anti-feminist”. This example demonstrates how the meaning of ‘feminist’ is contested: the use of contrasting reflects the debate around femininity and feminism, and whether they are “mutually exclusive” (Scharff, 2011, p. 460) – in this instance, a writer is arguing against this constructed opposition, and therefore for a more inclusive definition of ‘feminist’.

Other occurrences of feminist denial appear in the presentation of others’ (lack of) speech. In Guardian 03a and Mail 03b, “women of my own generation” and “many women” are the sayers in verbalisation processes of defining or identifying themselves as feminists: the negation of these processes backs up the conviction that women, in particular young women, are portrayed as rejecting feminism in newspapers (Redfern & Aune, 2010; Walby, 2011). Independent 06a does not use negating, observing that “one British female in four” does use ‘feminist’ of themselves: however, the use of the quantifier “only” in the naming of British women presents this as a disappointing tally. Similarly, “My generation” is presented in a negated state of being “interested in being called feminist” in Mail 04a. However, there is also evidence of an awareness of this trend to focus on young women’s lack of feminism: in Independent 07b, the writer uses the distal marker of person deixis “they” to observe what others say about this lack, and uses a concessive opposition – “but it is not true” – to cancel out this view.

The ‘a group is feminist’ structures also demonstrate uncertainty about the meaning of ‘feminist’, and the complexity of ‘feminist’ and related terms. Express 09a, like the Guardian 05a examples above, takes issue with the femininity/feminism opposition through a hypothetical ‘if...then’ structure which assures the reader that ‘feminine’ and ‘feminist’ are not antonyms – the representation of a state equates being both with not “being a problem”. In Times 08a, it is the writer themselves who is uncertain about the meaning of different ‘feminist’ terms: they present an explicit opposition between “third-wave” feminist and “post-feminist” in a ‘X or Y’ structure, which in turn is the phenomenon in a negated mental process of knowing, demonstrating uncertainty about the meaning of different types of ‘feminist’.
7.4 Derivational forms of ‘feminist’

82 of the 673 occurrences in the adjectives dataset (12.18%) are derivational forms such as ‘anarcho-feminist’, ‘post-feminist’ and ‘uber-feminist’. Derivational forms occur for a much larger percentage of adjectives than for nouns (see section 4.2.2). The most common derivational form among adjectives is ‘post-feminist’ (or ‘post-post-feminist’), which occurs 35 times, while at the opposite end of the spectrum there are five occurrences of ‘pre-feminist’. Of the remaining 42 occurrences, 21 involve a form of morphological negation - ‘anti-feminist’, ‘non-feminist’, ‘pseudo-feminist’ or ‘un-feminist’.

The analysis here focuses on ‘(post-)post-feminist’ (section 7.4.1), ‘pre-feminist’ (section 7.4.1) and the negated forms ‘anti-feminist’, ‘non-feminist’, ‘pseudo-feminist’ and ‘un-feminist’ section 7.4.3. The discussion of each demonstrates the drawing of divisions between people and things that are ‘feminist’ and those that are not. It also provides evidence of how articles not only contest the meaning of ‘feminist’, but express uncertainty about how the label can be used in the present day (Mendes, 2011a, p. 145).

7.4.1 ‘Post-feminist’

The derivational form ‘post-feminist’ has received attention in previous studies of feminism in the media (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a). Discussion of the meaning of ‘post-feminist’ emphasises the connotations it has for ‘feminism’ itself – that as a movement or idea it is ‘dead’ or ‘over’. For example, Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) find that ‘feminism’ is frequently modified by ‘post-’, and argue that it is used to imply that “feminism is historical and no longer current” (p. 411). Other studies, however, note that the word can have positive connotations, demonstrating the ambiguity of ‘feminism’ generally: Mendes (2011a) argues that the term can denote not only “those who avidly disavow feminism, arguing that it is unnecessary or redundant”, but also “those who embrace the feminist identity but want to separate themselves from the Second Wave” (p. 8). The frequent use of ‘post-feminist’ as an adjective (35 occurrences in the adjectives dataset) suggests that the possibility of something beyond feminism – in one sense or another – exists. Together with ‘pre-feminist’, it also suggests a desire to split time into periods before, during and after feminism.

The head nouns that are premodified or complemented by ‘post-feminist’ reinforce the idea of it as an adjective that denotes a period of time subsequent to ‘feminism’ or a generation of people that follows ‘feminism’:
Table 7.7: Head nouns premodified or complemented by ‘post-feminist’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head noun</th>
<th>No. of occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, movement, women</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 year-old, America, audiences, confectionery, delusion, drama,</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exhibitionism, family life, feminist, heroine, ideology, men, nothing,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power woman, raunch culture, rebel, society, symbol, unit, wives, world,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>writer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sense of ‘post-feminist’ as being used to describe a period of time subsequent to the ‘feminist’ age is reinforced by nouns that denote periods of time, such as ‘era’ and ‘age’. Its use as a premodifier of nouns that denote people - ‘movement’, ‘women’, ‘24 year-old’, ‘audiences’, ‘feminist’, ‘heroine’, ‘men’, ‘power woman’, ‘rebel’, ‘wives’, ‘writer’ – evokes the idea of ‘post-feminist’ as a word that draws a line between generations, while ‘generation’ evokes both senses. The analysis here focuses on two features of occurrences of adjectival ‘post-feminist’: the use of scare quotes to express uncertainty about the validity of ‘post-feminist’ as a label, and the use of contrasting to present oppositions between people and things that are either ‘feminist’ or ‘post-feminist’ and to deny the validity of ‘post-feminist’ interpretations of people and things.

Table 7.8 comprises the five occurrences of ‘post-feminist’ in scare quotes:
Women’s Liberation's most obnoxious critics always talk about a ‘post-feminist era’, meaning they desperately want it to be over.

There are people who like to talk about the ‘post-feminist era’. That is a very clever term. It means women have got what they want so they should now hold their collective tongues and return to the kitchen from whence they came.

Some politicians talk about this ‘post-feminist era’, meaning they want us to believe it is over, that we have all gone away.

Only 29 per cent said they would call themselves feminists, while 68 per cent rejected the label and 3 per cent remained undecided. The findings could be indicative of a ‘post-feminist’ generation of younger women who consider the term to carry too much stigma.

[Diana Spencer] seems to fit what the ‘post-post-feminist’ writer, Laura Kipnis, describes in her latest book, The Female Thing, as a product of the ‘feminine-industrial complex’.

Table 7.8: Occurrences of adjectival ‘post-feminist’ in scare quotes

Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 416) note that ‘feminism’ is often placed in scare quotes in newspaper articles. They observe that this is particularly the case for the collocation ‘new feminism’, arguing that this demonstrates that it is treated in an ironic way or is presented as not actually existing (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 416). Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) also suggest that the frequent occurrence of the prefix ‘post-’ in and of itself presents feminism as “finished” (p. 417). However, the examples in table 7.8 suggest that in some cases it is ‘post-feminist’, rather than ‘feminist’, that is treated as though it were suspicious, in turn presenting ordinary ‘feminism’ in a more positive light. Rather than questioning whether feminism exists, these occurrences instead emphasise that it does still exist, and question instead whether something ‘post-feminist’ exists.

In the Express examples, scepticism about ‘post-feminist’ is the result of the use of speech presentation. “‘Post-feminist’ era” is part of the verbiage in a verbalisation process in each example. Further, they each use indirect speech presentation to present what critics, people or politicians have said, with the subordinating conjunction “about” indicating that this is a summary of what was said, rather than a verbatim report (Leech & Short, 1981, p. 319). This means that the reported speech is not a faithful account of what was said, but the use of quotation marks around ‘post-feminist era’ in each example suggests that these words were used. Each instance is also an example of metalanguage, with the writer making their cynicism about ‘post-feminist era’ clear through a relational
intensive process of meaning, with ‘post-feminist era’ denoting that “they [Women’s Liberation’s most obnoxious critics] desperately want it to be over” (*Express 03a*), that “women have got what they want so they should now hold their collective tongues and return to the kitchen from whence they came”, (*Express 07b*) and that “they [some politicians] want us to believe it is over, that we have all gone away” (*Express 09b*). Each article regards ‘post-feminist’ in the more negative sense observed by Mendes (2011a), as denoting “those who avidly disavow feminism” (p. 8), and uses indirect speech presentation to sum up others’ use of the term in a way that allows them to attack it.

*Independent 06a* also uses ‘post-feminist’ to explicitly address the meaning of ‘feminist’. Reporting on a survey of young women’s attitudes to feminism, it notes that the majority of respondents did not take a favourable view of ‘feminist’. The modal auxiliary “could” attached to the following relational process expresses a degree of uncertainty about what the findings mean, but the interpretation – that young women’s rejection of ‘feminist’ could indicate that they are ‘post-feminist’ and view ‘feminist’ negatively – again evokes Mendes’ (2011a, p. 8) definition of ‘post-feminist’ as denoting a disavowal of feminism. In *Times 07b*, the meaning of “post-post-feminist” is ambiguous. The lack of explanation, its placement in scare quotes, and its use in the naming of a writer suggest that this may be a label that the writer Laura Kipnis uses of herself. The other use of ‘post-post-feminist’ appears in a relational circumstance process – “today’s post-post-feminist ideology comes from ‘chick lit’” (*Express 02a*) – that also places its origins in writers’ work. The meaning of ‘post-post-feminist’ in these examples presents the idea of ‘feminist’ having a further layer of possible complexity, with a further movement away from feminism.

The idea of ‘post-feminist’ denoting a period of time and a generation subsequent to feminism is also evoked through the use of contrasting:
[...] they show a striking progression - from the apparently free and post-feminist 24-year-old to [...] the re-politicised woman in her mid-thirties.

Far from being some post-feminist power-woman, Michelle’s odd behaviour comes from a desperate need to believe Her Man is smiling on her.

My mother was one of the first bone fide feminists who marched in the Sixties to campaign for equal rights. Which leaves me, I guess, a post-feminist feminist in less well-defined territory.

Ladette culture is NOT a sassy, sexy post-feminist movement, it’s just a show of adolescent vulgarity.

We are living in a post-feminist society - after a women’s movement.

Instead of seeing her as a post-feminist rebel against the stuffed-shirt royal establishment, [Germaine Greer] says that Diana undermined the whole idea of womanhood because of the way she behaved after she had split up with the Prince of Wales.

I don’t know if we’re third-wave or post-feminist, but we definitely want to be all things and don’t feel like we can’t be.

Table 7.9: Occurrences of adjectival ‘post-feminist’ in constructed oppositions

The contrasts in table 7.9 emphasise the transition from ‘feminist’ to ‘post-feminist’, and also emphasise the idea of a distinction between the ‘political’ nature of the feminist era and the relatively non-political nature of more recent times, as recognised in Dean’s (2010, p. 393) concept of domestication. The transition between ‘feminist’ and ‘post-feminist’ is portrayed in *Times 02b*, in which the preposition “after” gives rise to a parallelism between living in a post-feminist society and living in a women’s movement. This constructs the idea of two distinct periods, with the placing of a post-feminist society in the present tense emphasising the idea that a women’s movement (presumably synonymous with ‘feminism’) only existed in the past. The parallel relational intensive processes in *Mail 03a* present a similar shift from a feminist era - “My mother was one of the first bona fide feminists” - to a post-feminist era, in which the writer is “a post-feminist feminist in less well-defined territory”. As noted in the sample analysis (section 3.2.4), this contrast presents feminist/post-feminist as being aligned with superordinates relating to realness (“bona fide”) and vagueness (“less well-defined”), respectively. ‘Post-feminist’ is also presented as having a vague meaning in *Times 08a* (discussed above in section 7.3.2): here, the writer contrasts third-wave and
post-feminist, explicitly stating their own uncertainty about whether it applies to them. In Mail 03a and Times 08a, the writers themselves are uncertain what is meant by derivational forms of ‘feminist’.

The transitional opposition in Guardian 01a suggests that the transition from feminism to post-feminism comes with the age of an individual, rather than changing eras. Here, the ‘from X to Y’ opposition aligns ‘post-feminist’ attitudes with women in their mid-twenties, and re-politicised (presumably in terms of ‘feminist’) attitudes with women in their mid-thirties. Again, an interest in politics is attributed to the feminist, and not the post-feminist, side of the opposition. Further, the transition in this case goes from ‘post-feminist’ to ‘feminist’, in a reversal of the expected movement from one to the other. The remaining examples are similar to the occurrences in scare quotes discussed above, but use contrasting instead of speech presentation to reject an interpretation of something as being ‘post-feminist’ and positive. In Independent 04c, Mail 04b and Times 07b, ‘post-feminist’ is part of the premodification in a positively evaluative noun phrase: however, in each case a constructed opposition is used to contrast this positive, post-feminist interpretation with a more damning interpretation. In Independent 04c, a concessive opposition constructed with the ‘far from X, Y’ frame rejects the interpretation of Big Brother contestant Michelle Bass’s behaviour as that of some post-feminist power-women in favour of an interpretation that sees it as a desperate need to believe Her Man is smiling on her: Bass’s behaviour is not ‘post-feminist’ in an empowering way, but instead shows her dependence on men. A concessive opposition is also used in Times 07b to present Germaine Greer’s opinion of Diana Spencer: the former considers the latter to have undermined the whole idea of womanhood, rather than to have been a post-feminist rebel, emphasising the idea of post-feminism as individualist rather than collectivist. This negative view of the idea of post-feminism is also evident in the representation of a state in Mail 04b, which uses a negated opposition to attribute to “Laddette culture” the quality of being a show of adolescent vulgarity, rather than a sassy, sexy post-feminist movement. By using contrasting to deny the veracity of post-feminist interpretations of women and their behaviour, these examples question the validity of the ‘post-feminist’ label.

The use of ‘post-feminist’ in the adjectives dataset presents it as having a vague meaning. Like with the examples of ‘new feminism’ and ‘third-wave feminism’ discussed in section 5.4.2, the idea of something ‘feminist’ that exists subsequent to the readily recognised feminism of the second wave causes trouble. In particular, the examples of ‘post-feminist’ that occur in scare quotes, and the instances of contrasting where a ‘post-feminist’ interpretation of a person or thing is negated, suggest that writers themselves find ‘post-feminist’ at best vague, and at worst meaningless.

7.4.2 ‘Pre-feminist’

The discussion in section 7.4.1 above shows that ‘post-feminist’, and the possibility that we are now living in a world in which feminism no longer applies, is treated with suspicion. The five occurrences of ‘pre-feminist’ demonstrate the articles’ discussion of a time prior to feminism. The analysis shows that
‘pre-feminist’ is used to refer to the idea of a way of being a woman that existed before feminism, and that writers issue warnings that a return to this period is possible.

Table 7.10 comprises the five occurrences of ‘pre-feminist’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 01c</td>
<td>[...] sending out strong messages roughly in accordance with what is perceived to be the feminist agenda is what courts have been doing in many jurisdictions for years now. Yet in doing so, they have served to subvert female autonomy, recreating a pre-feminist victim-womanhood which must be vigorously protected by the institutions of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 02b</td>
<td>Surrendering control means going back to pre-feminist ideas of womanhood [...] single women should smile at every man they meet, always wear form-fitting clothes and make-up, and give “sincere thanks or a compliment to at least one male a day”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 03a</td>
<td>[...] the submissiveness of the other wives in Stepford drenches the suburb in a hot coating of male-fantasy sexuality: how luscious the pre-feminist male dream of domestic womanhood was as it was being threatened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 00c</td>
<td>Out went the bitchy, backbiting, competitive world of pre-feminist girlhood. In came ideas of sisterhood, solidarity, female friendship and ‘girls’ nights out’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 03c</td>
<td>Crittenden’s heroine believes that staying at home is the right thing to do and in real life the author celebrates the role of the stay-at-home mum [...] it may sound like a return to the pre-feminist 1950s but it is hard to write Crittenden off as old-fashioned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.10: Occurrences of adjectival ‘pre-feminist’

In four of the noun phrases in which ‘pre-feminist’ occurs, it premodifies ‘womanhood’ or ‘girlhood’. These noun phrases, and the wider clausal context, present these pre-feminist ideas of femininity as old-fashioned and oppressive. *Telegraph 01c* refers to a “pre-feminist victim-womanhood”, while *Telegraph 02b* postmodifies “pre-feminist ideas of womanhood” with oppressive ideas of how women ought to behave in relation to men, such as smiling at them and dressing for their pleasure. *Telegraph 03a* also emphasises the powerful position of men before feminism, referring to “the pre-feminist male dream of domestic womanhood” and thereby presupposing the existence of a male ideal of women as subservient to men, while *Times 03c* equates the idea of “a return to the pre-feminist 1950s” with writer Danielle Crittenden’s beliefs concerning the importance of “the stay-at-home mum” through the representation of a state (“sound like”). Naming in *Times 00c*, on the other hand, focuses on competition between women themselves, rather than between men and women, with the “competitive
world of pre-feminist girlhood" premodified by the negatively evaluative adjectives “bitchy” and “backbiting”. The transition between the pre-feminist age and the feminist era is made explicit here through a contrast created by a parallelism between the “Out” and “In” clauses, with competitive pre-feminism replaced by the more positive “ideas of sisterhood, solidarity, female friendship and ‘girls’ nights out”.

*Times 00c* presents the idea of a transition from pre-feminism to feminism, but the other occurrences - like the *Guardian 01a* example of a transition from post-feminism to feminism discussed in section 7.4.1 above - stress the possibility that this transition could be reversed. In *Telegraph 01c*, “pre-feminist victim-womanhood” is presented as the goal in a material action process of being re-created, with the “re-” prefix presupposing the prior existence of this type of womanhood, and emphasising the possibility that court rules could bring about a return to it. *Times 03c* and *Telegraph 02b* also present the possibility of a return: *Times 03c* does this through the nominalisation “a return to the pre-feminist 1950s”, while *Telegraph 02b* uses a relational intensive process to equate the non-finite clauses “Surrendering control” and “going back to pre-feminist ideas of womanhood”. The textual construction of ‘pre-feminist’ – as denoting an era that was oppressive for women, but could exist again – enables the writers to underline the progress that feminism enabled for women.

### 7.4.3 Negated forms of ‘feminist’

Where ‘feminist’ is modified through morphological negation, there are 13 occurrences of ‘anti-feminist’, three of ‘non-feminist’, three of ‘un-feminist’ and two of ‘pseudo-feminist’. These different forms demonstrate the range of meaning that is possible through the use of different negating prefixes. While each serves to indicate that “the attribute designated in the base word does not apply in the situation that is the focus of the discourse” (Nahajec, 2012, p. 139), the different prefixes have subtly different meanings: ‘un-’ and ‘non-’ suggest a lack, ‘pseudo-’ evokes the quality of being fake, and ‘anti-’ provides a sense of opposition. In the analysis that follows, I first of all look at forms denoting a lack (section 7.4.3.1), before turning to forms denoting a fake quality (section 7.4.3.2), and finally forms denoting opposition (section 7.4.3.3). The analysis shows how writers construct oppositions between what is ‘feminist’ and what is not in order to contest the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’, to argue against negative perceptions and to discuss the complexity of ‘feminist/s/ism’.

#### 7.4.3.1 ‘Un-feminist’ and ‘non-feminist’

Table 7.11 comprises the three occurrences of ‘un-feminist’ and the three occurrences of ‘non-feminist’, all of which suggest the lack of the quality of being ‘feminist’:
The use of ‘un-feminist’ and ‘non-feminist’ is similar to that of occurrences of the noun ‘feminist’ that appear in ‘to be/being/become a feminist’ (see section 6.2.3.3) and ‘you are/become a feminist’ (see section 6.2.3.4). These structures observe the idea of conditions that must be in place for the use of ‘feminist’ to be valid, but then argue against these rules. Each occurrence of ‘un-feminist’ appears in the representation of a state. In *Express 09a*, ‘un-feminist’ is equated with judging someone for wearing an outfit, and in *Times 08a* with telling someone they should not wear make-up. Both the wearing of certain outfits and make-up are generally perceived as un-feminist habits, a perception acknowledged and argued against in *Express 09a*: “if women want to be both feminine and feminist it’s not a problem”. The representation of ‘un-feminist’ in states that equate it with the use of rules to judge someone or to tell them off results in their subversion: it is not the wearing of certain outfits or make-up that is un-feminist, but rather the rules about not wearing them. These uses of ‘un-feminist’ thereby provide evidence for Hinds and Stacey’s (2001) observation that more recent portrayals of feminism in newspapers emphasise the “potential compatibility between the previously polarised categories of feminism and femininity” (p. 153).

‘Non-feminist’ is also used to express the view that certain lifestyle choices should not be judged. In *Telegraph 08a*, a concessive opposition triggered by “though” draws a contrast between then Democrat leadership candidate Hilary Clinton’s interest in issues affecting women and children on the one hand, and her statements about “women who chose a non-feminist path” on the other.
Here, the concessive opposition presents this second proposition as surprising in light of the first (Quirk et al., 1972, p. 745): if Clinton cares about “women’s and children’s issues”, then it is surprising that she is not more positive about women to whom ‘non-feminist’ might apply. This suggests that it is unimportant whether a woman chooses a ‘feminist’ or a ‘non-feminist’ path. *Independent 02a* also concerns the views of a politician, in this instance the then UK Home Secretary David Blunkett. Here, ‘non-feminist’ premodifies “alternative lifestyle”, which itself postmodifies “Mr Blunkett’s most recent pronouncements”. The meaning of this sentence is vague, with the deictic marker of discourse “this” not having a clear reference in the wider context. However, the interrogative structure of the following sentence asks why parenting issues that affect Muslim families are “addressed so critically and so personally”, giving the impression that Blunkett’s pronouncements concerned these issues. The use of a rhetorical question flouts the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975): the reader is not being told something clearly, and the implied meaning is that ‘non-feminist’ parenting issues should not be commented on, regardless of the social group involved.

### 7.4.3.2 ‘Pseudo-feminist’

The occurrences of ‘pseudo-feminist’ are interesting in that they present the matter of whether something is ‘feminist’ or not as more complex than would be the case if they simply stated ‘X is not feminist’. It is not simply a matter of whether something is feminist or not feminist, there is also a question of realness - something can appear to be feminist without actually being so:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 00c</em></td>
<td>So, on the one hand, you’re politically totally disempowered, and on the other all the imagery is pseudo-feminist. Benetton is an anti-racism organisation, Starbucks does this third-world-chic thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guardian 05c</em></td>
<td>[…] in a world where even having Botox is claimed as some kind of pseudo-feminist act, she was the real thing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.12: Head nouns premodified or complemented by ‘pseudo-feminist’**

These occurrences are similar to those of ‘un-feminist’ and ‘non-feminist’ in that they suggest that others’ perceptions of what is or is not ‘feminist’ are incorrect. *Guardian 05c* uses the presentation of speech to construct the idea of people labelling facial surgery as somehow ‘feminist’. The fact that no sayer is provided in the reporting clause allows the writer to construct a vague interlocutor, and to contrast their pseudo-feminist ideas with Andrea Dworkin, who is attributed the quality of being “the real thing” through the representation of a state. *Guardian 00c* is part of a discussion of the opposition
between “advertising and branding” and the “alternative politics and culture” to which feminism belongs, the former having apparently co-opted the latter. The explicit ‘on the one hand… on the other hand’ opposition frame here emphasises this cooption, an effect that depends on implicature: the negative idea of political disempowerment is contrasted with the idea of pseudo-feminist imagery and corporations doing apparently liberal things – being anti-racist and doing “this third-world-chic thing”. However, the context makes it clear that the writer’s tone is sarcastic – the idea of Benetton and Starbucks being genuinely politically alternative is being subverted through a flout of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975). This serves to make both sides of the constructed opposition negative, emphasising the negativity of things that are ‘pseudo-feminist’.

7.4.3.3 ‘Anti-feminist’

‘Un-feminist’, ‘non-feminist’ and ‘pseudo-feminist’ all present the idea that certain things and views are not feminist, even though other people may claim that they are. The 13 examples of ‘anti-feminist’ differ in that they place the emphasis on how things can be deliberately opposed to feminism. They also demonstrate articles’ discussion of the difficulties of “attempting to define what feminism is and who can appropriate this label” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 132).

Table 7.13 comprises the 13 occurrences of ‘anti-feminist’: 


226
Table 7.13: Head nouns premodified or complemented by ‘anti-feminist’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00c</td>
<td>No Logo has been leapt upon by some commentators who are thrilled by Naomi Klein’s rejection of the identity politics of her youth, and so see it as anti-feminist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 05a</td>
<td>[…] all those people who looked down on knitting […] were not being feminist at all. In fact, they were being antifeminist […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 08a</td>
<td>And despite the talk about being the party of change […] propping up anti-feminist women as trailblazers is typical of the Republicans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 08a</td>
<td>[…] it’s not Palin’s anti-feminist bona fides alone that matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 00a</td>
<td>She [Camille Paglia] has been described as […] An anti-feminist feminist […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 03a</td>
<td>Anti-feminist propaganda is widespread and still manages to characterise feminists as sex-starved, childless man-haters […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 04c</td>
<td>A populist anti-feminist backlash is brewing, not just in the Big Brother house but in the wider culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 08b</td>
<td>But is that [every Bond girl being ravished by James Bond] really anti-feminist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 05c</td>
<td>You may think this [the writer’s opinion on how to promote a healthy sexual attitude and maintain childhood innocence] is anti-feminist. But feminism is not about telling a woman what she can and can’t do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 02c</td>
<td>Judging from the attention his anti-feminist thesis has received, he seems to have struck a chord […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 06a</td>
<td>I am surprised, all the same, by the persistence of the ideological blind spot that has led women […] to make transparent excuses for the behaviour of some of the world’s most anti-feminist regimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 06a</td>
<td>[…] I could never have imagined that many of the same crowd I hung out with then would today be standing shoulder-to-shoulder with militantly anti-feminist Islamic fundamentalist groups […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 09a</td>
<td>[…] I was fretting myself into borderline paralysis about whether I was being anti-feminist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notably, the one instance in which a writer uses ‘anti-feminist’ to label themselves is complex. In Times 09a, the clause “I was being anti-feminist” occurs at a low level of the clause structure as part
of the postmodification of the “borderline paralysis” which the writer is suffering. This example demonstrates writers’ uncertainty about what ‘feminist’ means and whether it applies to them: it is a sufficiently slippery word that someone might worry that they are in fact anti-feminist (i.e. they do not want to be, but think they might be). The complexity of ‘feminist’ is also underlined in Independent 00a, which uses the presentation of speech to observe how an unnamed party has labelled the writer Camille Paglia as “an anti-feminist feminist”. The use of an adjective that denotes beliefs that are opposed to feminism to premodify ‘feminist’ is counterintuitive: if even a feminist can be anti-feminist, then the meaning of ‘feminist’ must be complex. The other examples in table 7.13 show how articles contest the meaning of ‘feminist’ and portray things that are anti-feminist in a negative light, as threatening.

The negated opposition in Guardian 05a (discussed in section 7.3.1) above constructs a contrast between feminist/anti-feminist through a ‘not X, but Y’ frame. These labels are both attributed to the carrier of a relational intensive process – “all those people who looked down on knitting” – with the writer preferring the ‘anti-feminist’ description. This example demonstrates how contrasting is used to powerful effect: writers not only say whether something is feminist or not, but assert that if it is not feminist, then it must be the precise opposite. Similarly, Sun 05c uses contrasting - and hypothesising and implying – to contest the feminist/anti-feminist status of particular attitudes towards sex. The notion that these beliefs are anti-feminist is modalised at a higher clause level through the lexical verb “think”, contrasting with the second clause in the concessive opposition triggered by “But” – a categorical assertion that states as a matter of fact that “feminism is not about telling a woman what she can and can’t do”. There is a flout of the maxim of relation (Grice, 1975) here, as the second clause does not clearly relate to the first: one is to do with whether an attitude is feminist or not, the other is to do with what feminism is about. This flout produces an implicature that although the opinion may seem anti-feminist, it is in fact not, as this definition of feminism precludes it from being so. Mail 08b also uses implying to contest whether something is feminist/anti-feminist: the attribution of “anti-feminist” to the James Bond films is phrased as a hypothetical question, flouting the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975) (the proposition could be made more clearly, and the reader is unable to provide an answer) to imply that the Bond films are, in fact, feminist. Each of these examples demonstrates that not only do the articles debate what can be ‘feminist’, but also divide things into two, opposed groupings: feminist and anti-feminist.

The sense of anti-feminism as negative and threatening is present in Independent 03a and Independent 04c. In Independent 03a, “Anti-feminist propaganda” has a role in two transitivity processes, being presented in a state of being “widespread” and as the actor in a material action process of characterising feminists in a negative light, as “sex-starved, childless man-haters”. The sense of this propaganda as a threat is enhanced by the logical presupposition trigger “still”, which emphasises that propaganda has made these characterisations of feminists previously. Independent 03a is a good example of how writers discuss feminism from a defensive position (Mendes, 2011a, p. 10): although the sentiments are pro-feminist, there is an emphasis on the negative perceptions of others (“sex-starved, childless man-haters”). Independent 04c also portrays anti-feminism as
threatening by representing an inanimate, anti-feminist actor – “A populist anti-feminist backlash” - in a material action process, in this case a process of “brewing”. Again, the use of the present tense serves to make this threat appear close at hand, and the concessive opposition in the circumstantial adverbial – “not just in the Big Brother house, but in the wider culture” – emphasises it: here, the ability of concessive opposition to present something as surprising emphasises the fact that although it may seem that anti-feminism is restricted to the cast of a television programme, it is in fact more widespread.

7.5 ‘Feminist’ in lists

Adjectival ‘feminist’ occurs in lists of adjectives that premodify a head noun – for example “a sassy, sexy, post-feminist movement” (Mail 04b) - or complement a subject, e.g. “I’m fat, lesbian and blatantly feminist” (Sun 06b). The adjectives with which ‘feminist’ is listed provide a similar sort of detail to the pre- and postmodifying elements discussed in chapters 5 and 6, as the presentation of collections of linguistic items in lists suggests some sort of connection between them (Jeffries, 2007, p. 120).

Table 7.14 uses Biber et al.’s (1999, pp. 508-509) typology of semantic categories of adjectives to categorise the 184 adjectives that appear with ‘feminist’ in lists. It is worth noting that ‘feminist’ itself is a topical classifier, placing the head noun into a category (feminist/not feminist) and being (prototypically) non-gradable (although note occurrences such as “a woman so ardently feminist that she’s nicknamed Harriet Harperson” (Independent 08c)):
Table 7.14: Semantic groupings of adjectives that occur in lists with ‘feminist’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 x size/quantity/extent</strong></td>
<td>11-year, big, burgeoning, deepest, fat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>27 x time</strong></td>
<td>Early (x 3), eight year-old, long-standing, new (x 11), old(e) (x 5), young (x 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>18 x evaluative emotive</strong></td>
<td>Bad, better, classic (x 2), correct, crude, false, glamorous (x 2), good, great (x 3), hottest, important (x 2), seminal, wicked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>52 x miscellaneous/descriptive</strong></td>
<td>34DD, approaching, bra-less, burning, controversial, counter-intuitive, famed, famous (x 2), feisty, ferocious, forward-thinking, free, fully-fledged, fun, funky, good-for-society, hard, hard-hitting, hysterical, implacable, independent-minded, influential (x 3), key, ludicrous, mischievous, online, outspoken, paranoid, populist, positive, profound, public, sassy, self-important, self-styled, serious (x 2), sexy, single, so-called, sometimes-called, strident, strong, successful (x 2), sustained, vocal, well-trodden, wild</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classifiers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>40 x relational/classificational/restrictive</strong></td>
<td>1970s, 70s and 80s, 19th century, alternative, basic, best-known, best-selling, earlier, leading (x 6), modern (x 3), nearest, newly-founded, normal, official, old-school, original (x3), outdated, particular, post-modern, precedent, prominent, second-wave (x3), Sixties, standard, strongest, third-wave, typical, ultimate (x 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>13 x affiliative</strong></td>
<td>American/US (x 4), British/Brit-born (x 3), international, Irish, Ladyfest, London (x 2), Lothian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>29 x topical/other</strong></td>
<td>Anti-apartheid, Bourgeois, celebrity, cultural, fashion, feminine (x 2), feminist (x 2), intellectual, left-wing, lesbian, mainstream, not feminist, politically correct, post-lapsarian, pro-feminist, radical (x 6), socialist (x 4), state-funded, traditional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Biber et al., 1999, pp. 508-509)

Table 7.14 shows that miscellaneous descriptors (52 adjectives) and relational classifiers (40 adjectives) occur most often in lists with ‘feminist’ (52 adjectives). The frequent occurrence of ‘feminist’ alongside miscellaneous descriptors such as ‘funky’, ‘paranoid’ and ‘self-important’ suggests that people and things described as feminist are also frequently described in terms of individual characteristics. Time descriptors are the second most common category of descriptors, suggesting an emphasis on time period and age, as noted in previous studies (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska &
The most common varieties of classifiers are relational classifiers and topical classifiers, which suggests that feminist people and things are often further classified according to their position within this grouping and in terms of other means of classification.

An overview of the adjectives which occur most frequently with ‘feminist’ backs up the impression that time is an important feature when describing people and things as feminist:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>No. of occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading, young, old(e)(-school)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early/i(eri), radical, socialist</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American, British/Brit-born, great, modern, original, second-wave, influential</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.15: Adjectives that occur in lists with ‘feminist’

This overview of adjectives that occur in lists with adjectival ‘feminist’, like that of adjectives that premodify ‘feminism’ (see section 5.4.2), suggests a concentration on specifically Anglo-American types of feminism, as noted in Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) study of UK newspapers: both ‘American’ and ‘British’/’Brit-born’ appear in spite of the fact that affiliative classifiers account for a relatively small percentage of the coordinates. The relational classifier ‘leading’ and miscellaneous descriptor ‘influential’ hint at a sense of hierarchy within the world of feminists and feminism, while the topical classifiers ‘radical’ and ‘socialist’ narrow down the type of feminism being discussed to a politicised variety (this is in keeping with the findings regarding premodifiers in chapters 5 and 6). The remainder emphasise aspects of age and time period. These results fit with what previous studies have noted about the media’s apparent desire to divide feminism into new and old varieties (Mendes, 2012, p. 561) and to focus particularly on “a new and ‘glamorous’ feminism” (Dean, 2010, p. 394). The analysis below focuses on time descriptors and the relational classifiers ‘modern’ and ‘original’. It finds that co-occurrences of ‘new’ and ‘feminist’ assume the existence of a new feminism, and that oppositions and hostilities are drawn between old and new feminisms.

7.5.1 ‘New/young/modern’ and ‘feminist’

A total of 20 occurrences of ‘new’, ‘young’ and ‘modern’ occur in lists with ‘feminist’ in the premodification of nouns. The packaging up of ‘feminist’ with ‘new/young/modern’ allows writers to
presuppose the existence of new varieties of feminism, while implying and representations of actions and states posit differences between new and old feminisms.

Occurrences of ‘new/young/modern’ and ‘feminist’ are compiled in table 7.16:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express 02c</td>
<td>[...] my young, feminist heart boiled with rage and resentment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00a</td>
<td>The first review of <em>A Century of Women</em> that came in was by Naomi Wolf, then the hottest young feminist writer around [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00b</td>
<td>She [...] is scathing about figures like Naomi Wolf and about the new feminist conservatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01a</td>
<td>Two of us arrived, armed with our copies of <em>New Feminist Criticism</em> [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01c</td>
<td>[...] the modern feminist heroine cannot deny fame or flee from it [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 03b</td>
<td>The young feminist webzine <em>The F Word</em> attracts 25,000 hits a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 03b</td>
<td>[...] I’m up for a good - old, new, sustained, whatever - feminist fracas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07c</td>
<td>This resurgence in feminist activism of all kinds has been mirrored online, with a constant stream of new British feminist blogs being created [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 07c</td>
<td>[...] there’s a groundswell of new feminist magazines [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 08b</td>
<td>[...] there are stirrings of a new feminist movement [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 01a</td>
<td>[...] every new young feminist writer has been greeted with cruel derision by the established sisterhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 01a</td>
<td>[...] every new young feminist writer - from Natasha Walter to Naomi Wolf - has been greeted with cruel derision by the established sisterhood [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 02b</td>
<td>[...] much of the media is paying lip-service to the new feminist-inspired orthodoxies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 08b</td>
<td>The celebrated first sentence of the second part [...] is regarded as one of the starting points of modern, radical, feminist thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 09b</td>
<td>[...] hundreds of women each month are joining new feminist networks [...]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent 09b</td>
<td>Catherine Redfern, who conducted the survey for <em>Reclaiming the F Word: The New Feminist Movement</em>, which she is co-writing with Kristin Aune, said: “we want to tell people that feminism is still here [...]”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 04a</td>
<td>Why shouldn’t our Page 3 stunners be modern feminist icons?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 09b</td>
<td>[...] even a young feminist author who I interviewed said that she’d never swim if her legs weren’t smooth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.16: Adjectives that occur in lists with ‘feminist’ – ‘new’, ‘young’ and ‘modern’**
The existence of people and things that are both new and feminist is emphasised through existential presuppositions and existential transitivity processes. Definite noun phrases presuppose the existence of ideas, reflecting the ‘outlook’ element of Kelly’s (1982, p. 67) definition of ‘feminism’: “the new feminist conservatism” (Guardian 00b), “the new feminist-inspired orthodoxies” (Independent 02b) and “the starting points of modern, radical, feminist thought” (Independent 08b). These existential presuppositions contest the idea that feminism is an old idea that does not change: ways of thinking can be both feminist and new. Other existential presuppositions and existential processes presuppose the existence of an archetype – “the modern feminist heroine” (Guardian 01c) – and publications – “The young feminist webzine” (Guardian 03b), “there’s a groundswell of new feminist magazines” (Guardian 07c). The idea of the feminist movement as something that can be renewed is also emphasised in “The New Feminist Movement” (Independent 09b) and “there are stirrings of a new feminist movement” (Guardian 08b). The head nouns for which ‘new’ and ‘feminist’ form part of the postmodification in the existential processes go further: “groundswell” (Guardian 07c) and “stirrings” (Guardian 08b) suggest that these new feminisms are only just beginning to come into existence.

While the articles present the idea of new and imminent feminisms, they also present new and old feminisms as divided. This is clearest in the verbalisation process in Independent 01a, in which “every new young feminist” is the target of the welcome from the sayer, “the established sisterhood”. This greeting is modified by the adverbial “with cruel derision”, making clear the hostility that the older feminism holds toward the newer feminism, and which is emphasised by the near antonyms “new” and “established” in the premodification of each party. Guardian 00b observes a similar division between an old feminism – represented by feminist Susan Brownmiller – and the new feminism represented by Naomi Wolf. In this instance, a relational intensive process is used to describe Brownmiller as “scathing”, with the relative clauses in the postmodification - “about figures like Naomi Wolf and about the new feminist conservatism” - making the causes of the older feminism’s vitriol clear. “The new feminist conservatism” evokes the radical/moderate binary observed by Dean (2010, p. 402), and instances of implying elsewhere in the examples also carry this sense of observing differences between the feminisms, as well as oppositions. By singling out “the modern feminist heroine”, Guardian 01c flouts the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), implying that what is true for new feminist heroines – that they “cannot deny fame or flee from it” – might not be true for older feminist heroines. In this instance, the writer associates new feminism with celebrity (“fame”), leaving the reader to infer that this was not something that affected older feminisms. The use of an adjective that denotes newness alongside ‘feminist’ in Sun 04a also creates an implicature about the differences between new and old feminisms: in this example (discussed in the analysis of ‘feminist icon(s)’ in section 7.2.2 above), the writer flouts the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975) by asking a rhetorical question – “Why shouldn’t our Page 3 stunners be modern feminist icons?” The implied answer here is that there is no reason why modern feminism and topless modelling should not go hand in hand. The restriction of this proposition to modern feminism means that there is also a flout of
quantity (Grice, 1975), as the writer says nothing about the relationship between older feminisms and topless modelling. While not explicitly drawing a divide between old and new feminisms, Sun 04a nonetheless implies that while old feminism was not compatible with Page 3, new feminism is different in this respect, evoking the idea of a new, more sexualised feminism observed in previous studies (for example Mendes, 2012, p. 561).

7.5.2 ‘Early/old/original’ and ‘feminist’

A total of 13 occurrences of ‘early’/‘earlier’, ‘old(e)(-school)’ and ‘original’ occur in lists with ‘feminist’ in the premodification of nouns. These occurrences provide further evidence of how representations of states make distinctions between different feminist ages, which are presented as antagonistic to each other.

Occurrences of ‘early/old/original’ and ‘feminist’ are compiled in table 7.17:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00a</td>
<td>In her own recent memoir of <strong>early feminist activism</strong> in the United States, Susan Brownmiller records the intense pressures on these early stars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 00a</td>
<td>No one was less a part of the <strong>old feminist establishment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 01a</td>
<td>Natasha Walter has advised us to do away with the <strong>old feminist adage</strong> – ‘the personal is political’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 03b</td>
<td>[…] I’m up for a good - <strong>old</strong>, new, sustained, whatever - <strong>feminist fracas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 04a</td>
<td>The popularity of <em>The Vagina Monologues</em> can be read as a depressing revelation of how little <strong>earlier feminist works</strong> had achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 05b</td>
<td>The book is one she has wanted to write for years, as “liberal feminists and postmodernists” challenge the <strong>early feminist critique</strong> of beauty practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 06c</td>
<td>The <strong>original pro-feminist men’s movement</strong> […] grew out of the progressive left’s frustration […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian 08c</td>
<td>Just as the play laughs at gender politics […] it can also laugh at some <strong>old-school feminist dogma</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 03a</td>
<td>[…] that puritanically bossy period of feminism only now exists in Ye Olde Feminist Folkloric Ghetto […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail 08c</td>
<td>The <strong>original 19th-century feminist pioneers</strong>, who fought for women’s rights in a society where they really were second-class citizens, would surely have been appalled without measure had they been able to see into the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph 02c</td>
<td>[…] Prof Tooley traces the malaise back to the <strong>early feminist writings</strong> of Betty Friedan, Germaine Greer and Gloria Steinem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 05c</td>
<td>[…] it’s impossible for a woman to write about anything - sex, love, the menopause, even politics - without the <strong>old feminist mantra</strong> that ‘the personal is political’ being reversed and hung round her neck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times 08a</td>
<td>Subscribing to the <strong>original feminist theories</strong> of equality […] they [a new breed of feminist] pick the fights that mean something to them, ignoring the elements of feminist politics they find irrelevant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.17: Adjectives that occur in lists with ‘feminist’ – ‘early’, ‘old’ and ‘original’**

Similar to the examples of ‘new/young/modern’ and ‘feminist’ discussed above, examples of ‘early/old/original’ and ‘feminist’ oppose old and new feminisms through how they interact in
representations of interactions and states. However, the examples analysed here reverse the direction of antagonism, with things that are ‘new/young/modern’ and ‘feminist’ presented as showing hostility towards things that are ‘early/old/original’ and ‘feminist’. This is most clearly the case in *Guardian 08c*, in which the contemporary play *The Female of the Species* is the sayer in a verbalisation process of laughing at the target, “some old-school feminist dogma”. The division is also evident in material action processes, which present contemporary feminists as actors who perform hostile actions on the goal - ideas associated with older feminisms represented by the head nouns “critique”, “adage” and “theories”; in *Guardian 05b*, “the early feminist critique of beauty practices” is challenged by “liberal feminists and postmodernists”, while contemporary feminist writer Natasha Walter is presented as advising people to “do away with” the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’ in *Guardian 01a*. Each of these actions presents the idea of feminism as complex, dividing into different types, and also presents one type as critical of the other in a way that reflects Scharff’s (2011) definition of third wave feminism as “young women’s critical and diverse engagements with second-wave feminism” (p. 463). This idea of a new feminism that has shed some of the ideas and meanings associated with old feminism is demonstrated neatly by the three material action processes attributed to “a new breed of feminist” in *Times 08a*: “Subscribing to the original feminist theories of equality”, but “ignoring the elements of feminist politics they find irrelevant” in order to “pick the fights that mean something to them”. The premodifiers “new” and “original” and the verbs “Subscribing” and “ignoring” emphasise divisions within feminism and the fact that new feminists are able to adapt the meaning of ‘feminism’ according to their will.

Representations of actions, events and states also present things that are both ‘early/old/original’ and ‘feminist’ as being the cause of problems, archaic and unimpressive in terms of their accomplishments. In the material action process in *Telegraph 02c*, the academic James Tooley is the actor in a process of tracing a malaise; the adverbial – “to the early feminist writings of Betty Friedan, Gemaine Greer and Gloria Steinem” – presents something ‘early/old/original’ and feminist as the root of problems. In *Mail 03a* and *Guardian 04a*, an existential process and tense, respectively, demonstrate how this type of feminism is “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417). The adverbial “in Ye Olde Feminist Folkloric Ghetto” in *Mail 03a* contextualises where “that puritanically bossy period of feminism” exists, with the distal deictic marker of space “that” and negative connotations associated with “Ghetto” and “bossy” emphasising the undesirability of old feminism, while the past perfect tense in the how-clause “how little earlier feminist works had achieved” in *Guardian 04a* presents old feminism as something from the past, and as something “that did not achieve much” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417).

This analysis of adjectives that denote time and ‘feminist’ reinforces the idea that ‘feminist’ can be used to describe different people in different periods of time. Contrary to the discussion of different ages of feminism in section 5.4.2, however, the evidence here suggests that having the qualities of being ‘early/old/original’ and ‘feminist’ is negative, whereas having the qualities of being ‘new/young/modern’ and ‘feminist’ is positive.
7.6 Summary

The analysis of textual meanings of ‘feminist’ has again demonstrated that the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are contested. Some of the examples discussed, such as the various uses of negated derivational forms of ‘feminist’ and instances where ‘feminist’ is used as a gradable adjective, demonstrate the complexity of the lexemes: writers use these forms to divide the world into things that are feminist and things that are not, and to present the idea of different levels of feminism.

The overview of adjectives with which ‘feminist’ occurs in lists, like that of adjectives that premodify ‘feminism’ in chapter 5, demonstrated that although there are only a small number of affiliative classifiers referring to place, they are – in keeping with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) findings - consistently associated with the west. Indeed, the fact that there are only a small number may reflect writers’ assumptions about feminism’s geographical placement. The overview also indicated that things and people that are feminist are divided into new and old varieties. As in the analysis of ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist(s)’, there was evidence here that writers locate political varieties of feminism in the past, with newer varieties presented as less attached to a particular way of being feminist, reflecting Dean’s (2010) observation of “domestication” (p. 392) in articles about 21st-century feminism. Analysis using the model of transitivity to look at how articles present interactions between different varieties of feminist was helpful here, demonstrating that newer feminist people and groups are presented in actions of reacting to older feminist people and ideas.

The analysis of adjectival ‘feminist’ again indicates that ‘feminist/s/ism’ has complex meanings in the data. A simple way of demonstrating this was through the overview of people to whom ‘feminist icon(s)’ can refer, covering figures ranging from the conventional (Germaine Greer, Doris Lessing) to the less obvious (Page 3 models, Bond girls). Although the use of textual-conceptual functions such as implying and hypothesising indicated that some of the claims made for less likely feminist icons are somewhat tongue in cheek, the presence of these occurrences demonstrates that the meaning of ‘feminist’ is contested in the data. The analysis of derivational forms also demonstrates contestation: for example, writers use contrasting to argue whether the status of a person or activity is ‘feminist’ or its opposite, while the frequent use of ‘post-feminist’ suggests the need to question where feminism ends and something else begins. However, it is notable that things that the articles deem ‘anti-feminist’ are seen as a threat, rather than something positive, and that positive ideas about the meaning of ‘post-feminist’ are attributed to others through the presentation of speech, providing writers with a position to argue against in order to provide a positive view of feminism. Not only was the idea of post-feminism questioned in this way, but analysis of implying and speech and thought presentation indicated that the view that things that are feminist are dead is contested in the data.

This chapter completes the analysis of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by relating the findings of chapters 5-7 to the three research questions stated and discussing limitations of the study and possible avenues for future research.
Chapter 8: Conclusions

This chapter summarises the findings of the critical stylistic analysis reported on in this thesis. The investigation consisted of the annotation and analysis of a dataset of occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in UK national newspapers. The initial annotation stage analysed all 2,539 occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ for the range of textual-conceptual functions identified by Jeffries (2010a), and provided an overview of the data, which I then used to identify entry points for the analysis stage. This second stage again utilised the full range of textual-conceptual functions to provide as full as possible an account of how textual and contested meanings of ‘feminists/s/ism’ are constructed. This approach built on previous work in critical stylistics by Evans and Jeffries (2015) and Evans and Schuller (2015) that annotate smaller datasets for a narrower range of textual-conceptual functions: using the annotation of the full range of textual-conceptual functions provided a more complete overview of how a set of texts construct the meanings of a set of lexemes. It also represents a more focused analysis of the construction of meaning in texts than that of Coffey (2013) and Tabbert (2015), each of which uses corpus methods to provide an initial overview of the data. By using critical stylistic analysis in both stages of the investigation, I was able to focus throughout on the different ways in which texts create meaning, and to gain a greater familiarity with the data.

In the discussion below I first of all restate the research questions set out in chapter 1. I answer each research question by summarising the findings of the analysis in chapters 5-7, drawing conclusions on the contents of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data and the methodological approach used to analyse it (section 8.1). I then discuss the limitations of the study and suggest areas for future critical stylistic research (section 8.2) before providing concluding remarks (section 8.3).

8.1 Research questions

The analysis conducted in this thesis answers three research questions:

1. What are the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the context of UK national newspapers, 2000-2009?
2. How is the meaning of ‘feminism’ contested in UK national newspapers, 2000-2009?
3. How is critical stylistics a suitable methodology for the analysis of a large dataset?

These questions address the content of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data and the methodological approach I used to analyse it. Questions 1 and 2 relate to how meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are constructed in the data: the different ways in which its meanings are textually constructed, and how meanings are contested in the context of UK national newspapers. I address these questions by summarising the findings reported in chapters 5-7. Question 3 relates to the manual critical stylistic method of analysis.
that I used to answer these questions, and considers the ways in which this is a useful method for the analysis of a large dataset.

8.1.1 The textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in UK national newspapers

This section discusses the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ found through the analysis in chapters 5-7. It relates the findings to the five frames of media portrayals of feminism observed in section 2.3. The discussion argues that textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are not as negative as previous studies (see section 2.2) indicate. It also observes that ‘feminist/s/ism’ refers to a western phenomenon with both new and old varieties, with the existence of these and other varieties presenting ‘feminist/s/ism’ as referring to a complex set of ideas, people and things. ‘Feminist/s/ism’ is also shown to have undergone changes in meaning, with some of the ideas and people represented by the lexemes presented as opposed to each other. Portrayals of the meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are themselves also shown to be complex, with articles favouring some meanings over others, supporting feminism from a defensive position and arguing against the perceptions of others.

8.1.1.1 Positive/negative portrayals

Previous research (see section 2.2) finds that feminism and feminists have been “misrepresented, distorted or constructed as deviant” (Mendes, 2012, p. 556). Studies that focus on twenty-first century newspaper articles (Dean, 2010; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) have been more optimistic, although the linguistic study most similar to the thesis in terms of data used and focus on the lexemes finds that ‘feminism’ has a negative discourse prosody (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417). My investigation of ‘feminist/s/ism’ finds that while the textual meanings constructed in UK national newspapers in the 2000s are often negative, the overall picture is more nuanced. This can be seen in the way textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ relate to some of the key points made by previous studies about negative coverage of feminism.

One of the most pertinent findings to come out of the study concerns the often observed connection (for example in Callaghan et al., 1998; Christie, 1998; Rhode, 1995) between feminism and death. Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) argue that the co-occurrence of ‘feminism’ and ‘dead’ presents feminism as “finished” (p. 417). While my analysis of each of the lexemes showed that ‘feminist/s/ism’ and ‘dead’ frequently co-occur (for example in the ‘feminism is [adjective phrase]’ structure discussed in section 5.2.2.2), closer analysis demonstrated that the articles frequently contest the idea of feminism’s death, e.g. through the use of negating to reverse propositions about feminism’s death or presentations of speech and thought which acknowledge this perception of feminism, before arguing against it. While Lind and Salo (2002, p. 217) note that such instances nonetheless produce a strong association between feminism and death, this aspect of the meaning of ‘feminism’ – that it refers to a defunct movement – is contested in the articles. Analysis of evidence of stereotyping in the data – for example, the idea that ‘feminist’ denotes someone who is “radical,
unbalanced” (Callaghan et al., 1999, p. 164) or “unfeminine” (Danner & Walsh, 1999, p. 72) – found a similar story. Adjectives denoting a political nature are packaged up into the naming of feminism and feminists: however, although they mark contrasts between feminists and other women – for example through the presentation of transitional oppositions through which a woman becomes a radical feminist (see section 6.2.4.2) – there was little evidence that politically active feminisms or feminists were presented in a negative light.

The analysis also found evidence of people’s rejection of feminism, for example in occurrences of the ‘I’m not a feminist’ structure observed by studies including Walby (2011, p. 3) (see analysis in section 6.2.3.1). However, while the use of speech presentation to attribute this sentiment to others gives ‘feminist’ a negative textual meaning of undesirability, writers use this to argue that those who share it can actually be referred to as ‘feminist’, even though they feel its meaning precludes them. There was also evidence of how articles use quotes from famous feminists to “reinforce the movement’s downfall” (Mendes, 2011b, p. 492) (see section 6.2.4.1), although these quotes are used more to emphasises the idea of the failings of more recent types of feminism than to dismiss feminism as a whole. The data shows that while articles acknowledge negative textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’, they also debate them.

**8.1.1.2 Geographical and temporal placement**

Previous studies of feminism in the media observe that feminism is located geographically in the west (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012) and temporally in the past (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012). Dean (2010) suggests that this temporal placement has an ideological basis, allowing writers to present ‘feminism’ as referring to something that is now “largely irrelevant and no longer necessary” (p. 400). The analysis of how ‘feminist/s/ism’ is named demonstrated that, where affiliative classifiers are used to tie feminism to a particular location, ‘feminism’ denotes a western movement (see, for example, section 5.4.2). Likewise, the feminists deemed to be representative of the movement – for example those attributed the status of ‘feminist icon’ (see section 7.2.2) – are from the west.

The temporal placement of ‘feminist/s/ism’ is more complicated. The first and second waves are placed in the past through a variety of means (see section 5.4.2.1), for example through naming (“The second wave feminisms of the late 1960s” (Telegraph 08a)) and representations of time (“Second wave feminism didn’t risk focusing on childbirth” (Independent 01a)). However, analysis of the same textual-conceptual functions demonstrated that the third wave is deemed still to exist (see section 5.4.2.1), and the denials of feminism’s death (discussed in section 8.1.1.1 above) present ‘feminism’ as denoting a movement that is still alive. As Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) observe, there is also an emphasis on the idea of new varieties of feminism, suggesting that feminism not only still exists, but that it is “in flux” (p. 416) and has changing meanings. This was most clearly noticeable in the overviews of premodifying adjectives and adjectives with which ‘feminist’ appears in lists, in which ‘new’, ‘modern’ and ‘contemporary’ were common (see section 7.5). The articles also use a
variety of means to draw comparisons between new and old varieties of feminism, emphasising the perception of ‘feminism’ as “fragmented” (Mendes, 2011b, p. 484). In particular, there is evidence to back up Dean’s (2010, p. 401) assertion that radical types of feminism are located in the past, with ‘new’ feminism presented as more moderate, for example through the use of contrasting to construct the idea of transitions from political to non-political feminists (see section 6.3.3.1).

8.1.1.3 Universality/complexity

Previous studies of feminism in the media are split between those that find that feminism is portrayed as a single, universal movement whose advocates are “all alike” (Douglas, 1991, p. 274), and those that deem portrayals to be “nuanced and fragmented” (Mendes, 2011b, p. 484). The analysis of textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ found some evidence for the former position: for example, a large percentage of occurrences of ‘feminism’ are unmodified (see section 5.1), suggesting that the lexeme refers to a single, recognisable referent, while analysis of naming and speech presentation (see, for example, the analysis of ‘feminist writer(s)’ in section 7.2.3) provides evidence for North’s (2009) observation that “superstar’ media spokeswomen” (p. 743) are used to represent feminism as a whole. Further, many of the definitions of ‘feminism’ constructed by representations of states – for example “Feminism means simply knowing the sexes are equal” (Mail 03a) – closely correspond to the OED (2015) definitions of ‘feminist/s/ism’ cited at the beginning of the investigation (see section 1.1).

However, the overall impression given by the data is that ‘feminism’ has a complex meaning. This can be seen in the types of things and ideas that are presented as equivalent with feminism in relational intensive processes. For example, the various attributes in ‘feminism is [prepositional phrase]’ structures (see section 5.2.2.3) showed that feminism is perceived as both individualist (for example “feminism is about sisterhood” (Guardian 06b)) and collectivist (e.g. “feminism is about being the best you can be for you” (Mail 09a)). Complexity is also demonstrated by the fact that even unmodified occurrences of ‘feminism’ are presented as variable (see section 5.2), for example through representations of states that attribute to it qualities such as meaning “a lot of things to a lot of people” (Mail 06b) and as applying only to particular times or groups, e.g. through adverbials like “What feminism means to them” (Express 02a). Similarly, the analysis of representations of states in the feminist dataset (see section 6.2.3.2) showed that the noun ‘feminist’ is applied to a wide variety of figures: not only famous advocates such as Germaine Greer or Doris Lessing, but also less obvious choices such as topless models and Bond girls. As Dean (2010) observes, there are also “distinctions between different manifestations of feminism” (p. 392), particularly along the lines of old and new, and political and non-political, varieties (see section 8.1.1.4 below). This variation is itself the focus of some articles, such as ‘The Gender Agenda’ (Guardian 02c), which provides a dictionary-style guide to different types of feminist including “old-school” feminists and “feminine” feminists.

Other patterns in the data demonstrate the elusiveness of clear definitions of the lexemes. The interaction of representing actions/events/states and negating provides definitions of what
feminism is not (Marling, 2010) (see, for example, section 5.2.3), while writers also express their own uncertainty about the kind of people that ‘feminist’ denotes (Mendes, 2011a, p. 132), particularly in the discussion of new and modern feminists (see section 6.3.3.3). These difficulties are illustrated by uses of derivational forms of adjectival ‘feminist’, for example in the use of contrasting in Mail 03a to draw distinctions between those who were pre-feminist, those who were feminist, and those who are post-feminist (see section 7.4.1).

8.1.1.4 Changes and oppositions

Previous studies observe that articles present feminism as something that has changed over time, in particular through transitions between ‘waves’ of feminism (Dean, 2010; Hinds & Stacey, 2001; Mendes, 2011a). In the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data, the fact that the second wave has passed is made clear through naming and the representation of time, which present it as “historical and no longer current” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 411), for example in references to “the second-wave feminism of the late 1960s” (Telegraph 08a) and “second-wave feminism didn’t risk focusing on childbirth and motherhood” (Independent 01a). This contrasts with the third wave, which is presented as existing in the present and is attributed the quality of being different from previous incarnations, for example in “third-wave feminism differs from its precursors” (Guardian 05a). In these ways, a line is drawn between the second and third waves. The data also contains evidence of the shift from feminism to post-feminism, for example where the lexemes ‘feminist/s/ism’ and ‘post-feminist/s/ism’ appear in contrasts such as “We are living in a post-feminist society – after a women’s movement” (Times 02b).

Other uses of contrasting observe transitions from feminism to other phenomena. These tend to reflect the type of a change in feminism’s focus observed by Taylor (2003) from individualist to collectivist ideas. For example, the analysis of ‘feminism becomes X’ structures (see section 5.2.4) showed that feminism is the thing transitioned from in oppositions with phenomena such as a career option. Individual varieties of feminism, as well as feminism as a whole, can also change: the analysis of ‘feminism’ with minimal modification (section 5.3) demonstrates that individual varieties of feminism are presented as actors in processes of mellowing, evolving and becoming physical as opposed to intellectual. Again, these transitions suggest a process by which ‘feminism’ loses some of its more political meanings, becoming more closely associated with “softer” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 560) issues.

The analysis also demonstrated that not only are there different varieties of feminism and feminists that are distinguished by time or their (non-)political nature, but also oppositions between these varieties. In particular, there is evidence of divisions between old and political feminists on one hand, and new and non-political feminists on the other. In some cases, explicit divisions are presented between old and new feminists in contrasts such as “the polarising of opinion between old-school feminists and modern young women engaged with popular culture” (Times 08a), where the use of naming within a contrast allows a writer to provide detail that emphasises divisions. In other
cases, representations of actions enable writers to present the idea of feminists interacting with each other in hostile ways: older feminists are presented as aggressive (“a judgemental cohort of older feminists beating up their daughters” (Guardian 09c)), while newer feminists interrogate older feminist ideas (“liberal feminists and postmodernists challenge the early feminist critique of beauty practices” (Guardian 05b)). These oppositions between generations demonstrate articles’ awareness of the perception of more recent waves of feminism as a critical response to the ideas of earlier waves (Mendes, 2011a, p. 557).

8.1.1.5 Complexity of portrayals

Analysis using the textual-conceptual functions was also able to make some revealing findings about the nature of portrayals of feminism. In particular, it found evidence for observations made by previous studies of the same genre and time period (Dean, 2010; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) concerning how newspaper articles discuss feminism.

The crux of Dean’s (2010) study of The Guardian and The Times is his notion of domestication. His investigation finds evidence that there is “a bold affirmation of feminism, on the one hand, and a disavowal of some of its (perceived) less palatable dimensions” (Dean, 2010, p. 397). The analysis found evidence that articles do indeed present some varieties as favourable over others, but this evidence also counters Dean’s (2010) suggestion that radical forms of feminism are repudiated in favour of “a more acceptable form of feminism in the present” (p. 399). The analysis of contrasts in which old and new feminism are presented as opposites provided linguistic evidence of how articles present what Dean (2010) calls “binary oppositions” (p. 402), but these oppositions demonstrate the favouring of old feminism over new. This preference was particular clear in contrasts such as “We don’t need a new feminism that gives us equality at work and leaves our private selves in crisis. We need the old feminism back” (Guardian 01a), where naming is used to construct the idea of an old, clear feminism (“the old feminism”) and a vague, new feminism with limitations (“a new feminism that gives us equality at work and leaves our private selves in crisis”).

The analysis also found evidence of how articles support feminism from a “defensive position” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 10) and are “cast against an imagined interlocutor” (Dean, 2010, p. 397). One of the ways in which this is realised is in writers’ attempts to define what feminism is (see section 5.2.2). Often, positive textual meanings are attributed to feminism, but through definitions of what it is not, rather than what it is (Marling, 2010, p. 15). This was particularly noticeable in denials of feminism’s death that arise through implying (discussed above in section 8.1.1.1), for example in the flout of the maxims of quantity/relation/manner (Grice, 1975) in “Feminism isn’t dead” (Independent 08a). In other instances, this defensive approach to discussing feminism was extended through contrasting, putting forward alternative perceptions as in “Feminism isn’t dead […] it’s thriving” (Guardian 07c). Similarly, writers use imagined interlocutors (Dean, 2010, p. 397) to give them a position to argue against: negative textual meanings of ‘feminism’ are often part of the presentation of someone’s speech or thought – for example in “Conventional wisdom decreed that feminists looked like men in dungarees”
(Independent 07a) – and give writers a springboard from which to provide more positive textual meanings.

8.1.2 The contested meaning of ‘feminism’ in UK national newspapers

The textual meanings discussed in section 8.1.1 above demonstrate how ‘feminism’ has no one, consistent meaning: it can be both positive and negative and consists of different varieties corresponding to particular times and individuals, some of which are opposed to each other and some of which demonstrate changes that the movement has gone through. In addition to the variety of textual meanings attributed to ‘feminist/s/ism’, there is also evidence of how the meanings of the lexemes are explicitly contested in articles. The discussion below focuses on three key aspects of how meanings are contested: examples of metalanguage, the discussion of ‘rules’ attached to use of ‘feminist’, and uses of adjectival ‘feminist’ and derivational forms that contest how it can be used and to what extent it applies to particular referents.

The analysis of occurrences of metalanguage demonstrated that writers show an awareness of important issues to do with the lexemes’ meanings. In many cases, the analysis showed that those things deemed equivalent to ‘feminism’ – for example “knowing the sexes are equal” (Mail 03a), “having the balls to confront the stereotypes” (Guardian 07a) – correspond to the OED (2015) definition of feminism, emphasising the importance of gender equality. However, it is also common for the attributes in these relational processes to observe the variety of interpretations that are possible: definitions acknowledge that the meaning of ‘feminism’ varies depending on the person doing the defining – for example in “Feminism can mean a lot of things to a lot of people” (Mail 06b) – and the period of time concerned, e.g. “Feminism means something different to women now” (Mail 06b). Other instances, such as the ‘what feminism means’ structures analysed in section 5.2.1, demonstrate that this potential for multiplicity of meaning results in uncertainty: interrogatives – “What did we mean by feminism?” (Independent 08a) - and combinations of negating and hypothesising – “I’m just not sure what feminism means now” (Mail 06b) – are used to express uncertainty about what ‘feminism’ means, and are notable for the way this uncertainty is attached to the here and now through proximal markers of person (“we”) and time (“now”). Some articles are explicit attempts to deal with the difficulty of defining ‘feminist/s/ism’: for example, ‘The Gender Agenda’ (Guardian 02c) provides a glossary-style account of the meanings of various forms of ‘feminist’, such as ‘post-feminist’, ‘feminine feminist’ and ‘old-school feminist’.

Other occurrences of metalanguage present ‘feminism’ as a lexeme that can undergo changes in connotative meaning, with writers defending the lexeme against negative perceptions. Instances of contrasting show how perceptions of the lexeme have changed over time, through transitional opposition frames that observe how “feminism has become a dirty word” (Express 04a) and contrasts that place positive connotations in the past and negative connotations in the present, for example “The word ‘feminist’ in those days had the exciting smack of revolution; now, I’m afraid, the very word makes most of us yawn” (Mail 03a). These observations of negative
connotative meanings are backed up by representations of actions in which people respond negatively to ‘feminism’, such as the negated mental reaction process in “Most women my age don’t like the word feminism” (Independent 09a). However, other writers occupy the “defensive position” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 10) discussed in section 8.1.1.5 above when observing negative perceptions of ‘feminism’, and use it to put forward more positive ideas. For example, Independent 03a contrasts observations concerning the undesirability of the “political and provocative meanings” of ‘feminism’ with a positive definition by writer Marilyn French, while Times 09a observes the possibility that ‘feminism’ has developed negative meanings, and uses a hypothesising ‘if...then’ structure to posit that if ‘feminist’ is now derogatory, then the writer “would like to purposefully start using it for its shock value”. Still other examples support feminism by arguing that the lexeme itself is unimportant, and that it is the underlying meanings that are important, for example in Mirror 03a’s argument that “I don’t care what we call [...] Feminism [...] but we still need some word that says that women don’t always get an even deal”.

The analysis of the feminist dataset showed that the meanings of ‘feminist’ are contested through the discussion of ‘rules’. Where occurrences of ‘a feminist’ appear in representations of states (see section 6.2.3), it is often in non-finite clauses such as ‘to be a feminist’, which are used to express the idea of conditions attached to ‘feminist’, such as “to be a feminist you shouldn’t wear make-up” (Times 02c) or “being a feminist means hating men” (Guardian 07b). These rules limit the scope of the sense of ‘feminist’: if someone wears make-up, then they cannot be a referent of ‘feminist’; if someone does not hate men, then they cannot be a ‘feminist’. However, these rule structures are striking for the way they contest these narrow meanings of ‘feminist’ through a variety of linguistic means: in some cases, this is through negating – for example “Being a feminist does not mean you hate men” (Express 09b) – and in other cases through the contextualisation of particular meanings of ‘feminist’ in a certain time, e.g. “In the past, you had to subscribe to a whole set of beliefs to be a feminist” (Times 08s). In particular, these rules evoke the idea of a “potential compatibility between the previously polarised categories of feminism and femininity” (Hinds & Stacey, 2001, p. 153), using concessive oppositions to emphasise that “you can be a strong, sexy woman and still be a feminist” (Guardian 06a) and “be feminine and yet be a feminist” (Independent 09c). These examples demonstrate taht articles do not portray ‘feminism’ and ‘femininity’ as antonyms, as argued by previous studies (Scharff, 2011; Taylor, 2003).

The analysis of the adjectives dataset demonstrated both that the sense of ‘feminist’ can be used to label a wide variety of referents, and that there are certain difficulties attached to the lexeme. For example, the overview of the figures attributed the quality of being ‘feminist icon(s)’ (see section 7.2.1) demonstrated that the ‘feminist’ label can be used not only to label recognisable feminist figures such as Germaine Greer and Doris Lessing, but also less likely referents such as Bond girls and glamour models. In some cases, writers provide arguments for their use of ‘feminist icon(s)’, demonstrating their awareness that they are contesting the meaning of ‘feminist’. This contestation is achieved through implying, for example flouts of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975) that leave the reader to infer that other types of ‘feminist’ individual are possible – “in the age of mass
communication, our feminist icons are likely to be successful women” (Guardian 01c) – and of the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), in hypothetical questions such as “Why shouldn’t our Page 3 stunners be modern feminist icons?” (Sun 04a) that argue for the ‘feminist’ status of particular groups. Other adjectival occurrences present ‘feminist’ as a gradable adjective, or contest the idea that certain things are ‘feminist’ through derivational forms. For example, one writer in Times 08c notes that “I cannot [...] declare that I am exactly as feminist as I would like to be”: here, the comparative ‘as X as Y’ structure presents ‘feminist’ as a gradable adjective – it is possible to be more or less feminist – and the use of negating emphasises the idea that ‘feminist’ does not apply to someone just because they want it to. Attributions of the quality of being ‘pseudo-feminist’ to “imagery” (Guardian 00c) and “having Botox” (Guardian 05c) also demonstrate that it is possible to contest others’ definitions of what is ‘feminist’ and what is not.

8.1.3 Critical stylistics as a suitable methodology for dataset analysis

The analysis of the ‘feminist/s/ism’ data has demonstrated that critical stylistics is a suitable methodology for analysing a dataset. It shows that it is possible to rigorously annotate a dataset in order to provide a richly detailed overview of occurrences of a set of lexemes, to navigate that dataset using statistical overviews of particular features of language, and to analyse it according to the range of ways in which texts construct meaning, thereby answering research questions concerning textual and contested meanings of lexemes.

The annotation stage described in chapter 4 showed that the textual-conceptual functions can be used to annotate a dataset. While the focus on the particular sentences in which occurrences appear means that decisions have to be made as to the level of annotation that is possible and desirable, these decisions can be described in a way that makes the process clear. For example, the annotation of transitivity processes necessitates decisions about what to analyse: whether to account for multiple levels of clause structure, or just the immediate clausal context of an occurrence. The annotation showed that it is possible both to be clear about what is and is not being analysed, and to use other textual-conceptual functions to help account for information that the annotation of a function misses: for example, the annotation of prioritising identifies where ‘feminism’ occurs at a lower level of the clause structure, drawing the analyst’s attention to occurrences that may need to be considered in greater detail. The nature of some textual-conceptual functions, such as contrasting and assuming and implying, also required an annotation that looked beyond the sentential context in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurs. Again, explanation of the process ensured that the process taken was clear and repeatable, or could be developed in future research. The use of a dataset that is relatively small compared to the bodies of data used in corpus linguistic studies also meant that it was both possible to go back to the original data files to account, for example, for instances of contrasting that occur across sentences, and to do this for the entirety of the data without the process becoming too time-consuming.
The investigation’s focus on an amount of data suitable for manual annotation also ensured that it was possible to “explore in-depth how particular lexical items are used in a particular discourse type” (Evans & Jeffries, 2015, p. 773). This approach made possible a level of detail that cannot yet be achieved through corpus methods. For example, the annotation of naming (and subsequent overviews of adjectives that premodify, or occur in lists with, ‘feminist/s/ism’) not only provided similar information to the overviews of collocates provided by corpus methods, but also a greater level of detail – not only how frequently words co-occur, but also how they occur. The annotation of a textual-conceptual function such as assuming and implying also made it possible to gain a more thorough overview of textual meanings: annotation that showed where flouts of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975) occurred, for instance, highlighted that some occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ had textual meanings at odds with those that they might, at first sight, be deemed to possess.

The annotation of the dataset also helped provide means of navigating the data. The annotation itself showed up occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ that appear in scare quotes or which appear in apposition with noun phrases such as ‘the word’ and ‘the term’. These occurrences of metalanguage provided particularly pertinent data for the investigation of textual and contested meanings, while the annotation of representing actions/events/states made it possible to quickly identify occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ that are the carriers in relational intensive processes, and therefore of particular interest for the study of definitions of feminism, feminists and the lexemes that represent them. The statistical overviews of two of the textual-conceptual functions – naming and representing actions/events/states – also showed how it is possible to use critical stylistic annotation to provide entry points based on how lexemes are treated in a dataset. These overviews indicated patterns in how the lexemes are treated in noun phrases and clauses, producing immediately interesting findings, for example that ‘feminism’ tends to be an unmodified noun, and that the noun ‘feminist’ occurs most frequently in representations of states, rather than actions. The overviews also identified sections of the data that, while relatively infrequent in occurrence, were interesting in terms of their grammatical unusualness. For example, although only 2% of occurrences of the noun ‘feminist’ are unmodified (see section 6.1) – an unsurprising finding considering that ‘feminist’ is a count noun that usually requires premodification through a determiner – analysis showed that these occurrences were instances of metalanguage, and therefore of particular interest to the study of textual and contested meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’.

Having identified areas for investigation, analysis using the full range of textual-conceptual functions provided a detailed linguistic account of how textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are constructed. This enabled me to test the impressions of textual meaning provided by the annotation. For instance, the statistical overviews of ‘feminism’ indicated that it tends to be unmodified and to appear in representations of states: the crossover point between these two findings allowed me to investigate parts of the data where feminism as a whole is defined, and to look at the relevant lexicogrammatical structures, such as ‘feminism is [adjective phrase]’. An overview of adjective phrases that occur as attributes in these relational processes suggested that feminism is often presented as ‘dead’: however, detailed analysis showed that this connection is often made within
speech or thought presentation, or is an instance of a flout of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975) – analysis using the range of textual-conceptual functions was therefore able to demonstrate that this impression of the textual meaning of feminism as ‘dead’ was misleading. In other instances, analysis using the range of textual-conceptual functions made it possible to identify different aspects of textual meaning attached to a particular occurrence. For instance, the analysis of representations of states in which minimally modified occurrences of ‘feminism’ are defined showed that not only are particular individuals’ types of feminism defined, but textual meanings of other types of feminism are also implied through flouts of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975).

Analysis using the range of textual-conceptual functions also makes it possible to test the findings of both corpus-critical and non-linguistic studies. Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) study of ‘feminism’ in the same genre and a similar time period found that the lexeme frequently collocates with the prefix ‘post’-, leading the researchers to suggest that it indicates that “feminism is often framed as a thing of the past” (p. 417). However, analysis of occurrences of ‘post-feminist’ through naming, speech presentation and other textual-conceptual functions indicated that the lexeme itself, and the ideas that it refers to, are often treated with suspicion by writers, rather than being used to argue that feminism no longer exists. The analysis was also able to corroborate and call into question the findings of non-linguistic studies. Analysis using the textual-conceptual function of contrasting provided more rigorous, linguistic evidence for Dean’s (2010) observation that coverage of feminism is often based on “binary oppositions” (p. 402), while interactions between contrasting and other textual-conceptual functions such as naming and representing actions/events/states countered his claim that old, political forms of feminism are rejected in favour of newer, non-political forms (p. 391): although older forms are defined as more political, they tend to be favoured over newer forms, which are deemed to be vague. Analysis using a variety of textual-conceptual functions also provided evidence for claims made by previous studies of the same genre and time period that would otherwise be difficult to test, for example that feminism is supported from a “defensive position” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 10) and that “articles are cast against an imagined interlocutor” (Dean, 2010, p. 397): the use of negated relational intensive processes to define what feminism is according to what it is not, and the attribution of negative textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ to others through speech and thought presentation, indicated that these claims have a linguistic basis.

8.2 Limitations and suggestions for future research

I used a critical stylistic approach for both the annotation and analysis stages of the study. While this approach was in keeping with my aim of focusing on textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ throughout the investigation, it has limitations. The manual approach taken makes it difficult to make claims for the statistical significance of my findings or to provide a thorough account of the textual meaning of each and every occurrence, and also makes a degree of researcher bias unavoidable. The findings are also restricted to a particular genre and time period.
There was a practical limit to the size of the dataset that I could analyse using this method of manual analysis, which means that although my annotation of the data produces statistical overviews of two of the textual-conceptual functions (i.e. naming and representing actions/events/states), it was not possible to make claims about the statistical significance (or otherwise) of my findings. The 2,539 occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the dataset, and my use of the full range of textual-conceptual functions in their analysis, provided me with enough data to produce evidenced findings concerning the textual meanings of the lexemes and to test previous corpus- and non-linguistic studies’ findings concerning media portrayals of feminism (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012). However, the dataset is small in comparison to the corpora used in corpus linguistic studies. For example, while my study analyses a total of 240 articles containing ‘feminist/s/ism’, Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) corpus linguistic study of ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist(s)’ in the same genre and time period is based on 1,275 articles. The analysis of textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ has allowed me to test the statistics-based findings of Jaworska and Krishnamurthy’s (2012) study, for example, calling into question their argument that feminism is portrayed as “a movement [...] which is finished” (p. 417): more detailed analysis demonstrated that articles question this view of feminism (see section 8.1.1.1 above). However, an approach that embraced corpus linguistic and critical stylistic methods would be able to provide both quantitative and qualitative evidence for its claims. A corpus-critical approach would also make it possible to test some of my findings against a larger data set. For example, my finding that ‘the feminists’ are presented as threatening through their positioning as actors in representations of actions is based on a relatively small number of examples: a collocation such as ‘the’ + ‘feminists’ would be easily searchable in a large corpus, producing a greater amount of data against which to test my findings. Developments in corpus programmes could also enable a method of research into textual meaning that has a more rigorous statistical underpinning. For example, developments allowing a researcher to use a corpus programme to tag instances of negating or opposition triggers could help make the analysis of these textual-conceptual functions across larger amounts of data a possibility.

The annotation of occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ provides a thorough overview of the dataset, which could be utilised by other studies that wished to test my findings or investigate different entry points or analytical methods. However, although the ‘feminist/s/ism’ dataset is small in comparison to corpora used in corpus linguistic studies, it was nonetheless not possible to analyse every occurrence of ‘feminist/s/ism’. As a result, the dataset may contain textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ that were not uncovered by my analysis. A future research project might be better served if it focused on a smaller range of textual-conceptual functions, or interactions between particular functions: this might provide a more thorough account of particular aspects of how meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are textually constructed. For example, the finding that naming is used to package up speakers’ feminism in presentations of speech could be tested more thoroughly through an investigation that focused on occurrences of ‘feminist/s/ism’ involved in speech presentation, and could look in greater detail at how ‘feminist/s/ism’ is used in this way to lend a certain significance (‘if a feminist says this, then…’) - to the views that are presented. Another possible means of analysis would be the type of qualitative analysis presented in the sample analysis in section 3.2. A smaller amount of data would enable a
researcher to maintain a focus on the full range of textual-conceptual functions, and also to look at entire articles in more detail. Whereas my analysis focuses on the sentences in which ‘feminist/s/ism’ occurs, an analysis of a smaller amount of data could look beyond the sentential context to look at how the wider context constructs meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ – in particular, this could account for occurrences not accounted for by my approach, i.e. those where ‘feminist/s/ism’ is referred to anaphorically or cataphorically through pronouns. Comparisons could also be made between articles from different publications, as in Dean’s (2010) study of The Guardian and The Times: for example, a study focusing on contrasting could test his convictions about the presence of “binaries such as reasonable versus radical feminism” (p. 394) in newspapers.

My findings are based on a qualitative annotation and analysis of ‘feminist/s/ism’. The investigation is founded on an approach – critical stylistics – that attempts to provide as full as possible a picture of how textual meaning is constructed, and the method and limits of the annotation process are thoroughly explained (see chapter 4). However, the analysis itself is qualitative in nature, and the interpretation of how meanings are textually constructed involves a degree of researcher bias: another researcher, depending on their orientation towards the subject matter or views of the publications included in the data, might uncover different textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’. As noted above, the incorporation of corpus methods could help to shore up findings relating to textual meanings. Another possibility is to use respondent testing to see if readers observe similar meanings to those identified through critical stylistic analysis. This sort of study could build on that of Callaghan et al. (1999), which uses questionnaires to compare respondents’ reports concerning their own feminist identification with their responses to questionnaires concerned with “gender-related issues” (p. 165). For example, respondents could first of all be asked for their opinions on feminism, before reading an article or set of articles identified as of interest for the textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ that they contain: respondents could then be consulted on whether or not they get the impression of ‘feminism’ as having a universal or complex meaning, or whether they recognise the types of oppositions identified through the analysis of contrasting. It may be particularly enlightening to test respondents’ views on reports of the same story in different publications, or responses to an article such as ‘Is Feminism Dead?’ (see section 3.2) which presents contrasting views of feminism. The testing of perceived textual meanings through this type of analysis could challenge and perhaps refine the critical stylistic account of how textual meaning is created.

The findings of the present study are also based on a single genre and time period. Despite declining print sales figures, newspapers – particularly in their online incarnations (Conboy, 2010) - remain an important and influential part of the media (Baker et al., 2013, p. 257). However, critical stylistic analysis of other genres such as online blogs, or of publications from different time periods, could provide interesting points of comparison, answering research questions relating to whether different genres or time periods construct different textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’. Analysis of online articles and their corresponding comments sections, such as those in the ‘Comment Is Free’ section of The Guardian’s website, could also shed light on how textual meanings of ‘feminist/s/ism’ are contested in writers’ responses to each other.
8.3 Concluding remarks

This thesis has demonstrated that it is possible to investigate the textual meanings of a set of related lexemes through the critical stylistic analysis of a large dataset. It has shown that a manual approach to the analysis of textual meaning can uncover evidence that a particular group of lexemes has differing meanings, which are contested in the data.

The thesis has also attempted to show that it is important to test perceptions of how a movement and its advocates are presented in the media. Analysis through textual-conceptual functions can provide an account of the range of ways in which the meanings of a set of lexemes are constructed textually, and also allows the researcher to test previous, non-linguistic arguments about a concept such as feminism. Annotation and analysis of a dataset using the range of textual meanings can provide a thorough overview of how textual meanings are constructed.

I have contributed to research on feminism in the media by questioning the assumption that the media presents feminism and feminists in a negative way in the media. Basing the analysis of media texts on a defined set of linguistic tools of analysis, I have found that the picture is more nuanced, and that while the contestation of ‘feminism’, ‘feminist(s)’ and ‘feminist’ may cause confusion for readers, the fact that ‘feminism’ is not presented as having a single, universal meaning opens up the opportunity for readers to consider the lexemes’ meanings for themselves.
Bibliography


North, L. (2009). Rejecting the ‘F-word’: how ‘feminism’ and ‘feminists’ are understood in the newsroom. *Journalism, 10*(6), 739-757.


Appendices

Appendix 1

The text below is one of the three *Daily Mail* articles in the ‘feminist/s/ism’ dataset from 2003. This article is used for the sample analysis in section 3.2.

Is feminism dead?

Yes

Ann Leslie, the *Daily Mail*’s award-winning chief foreign correspondent, is married with a daughter. She says:

The feisty and fearless writer Rebecca West declared crossly that “people call me a ‘feminist’ whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat or a prostitute”. But that was in 1913 and she wasn’t even allowed to vote.

The word “feminist” in those days had the exciting smack of revolution; now, I’m afraid, the very word makes most of us yawn.

Every woman is a feminist these days, according to the author of *The New Feminism*, a dreary book I had to review not long ago, which tried to breathe life into the dead corpse of feminism as an ideology.

But, the author discovered to her shock, many of these women who are feminists, don’t actually think they are! She condescendingly put them right, informing young women that they shouldn’t feel they’re not feminists just because they like men and push-up bras - unlike her own feminist mother who believes that even depilatories are ideological.

Surely, however, that puritanically bossy period of feminism only now exists in Ye Olde Feminist Folkloric Ghetto, ‘personed’ by covens of ageing Speculum Sisters who still believe that shaving one’s armpits is a betrayal of the Revolution.

No wonder the Equal Opportunities Commission study discovered that we think of the ideological feminism of the past as ‘old-fashioned’ and ‘man-hating’ because, frankly, it is and very often was. Yes, of course there are still problems over childcare, unequal pay and ‘work-life balance’ issues.

But somehow to declare yourself to be a ‘feminist’ is, in effect, to declare that ‘I’m a folkloric ghetto-dwelling, self-pitying, self-righteous bore’.
Anna Stothard, 19, is the daughter of former Times editor Sir Peter and novelist Sally Emerson. Currently on her gap year, she will be going to Oxford University to study English Literature soon. She says:

There are subtle anomalies in the way men and women are viewed, but 21st-century feminism no longer has much to fight about. I’ve never tried to climb the corporate ladder, so have never come close to the ‘glass ceiling’, but I did go to a boy’s school for the sixth form.

The girls often acted like Christmas decorations, bubbling around the common room in knee-high boots and simpering over their lipstick before class, yet they did better in exams and could generally argue their male counterparts into the ground.

The poor boys seemed justifiably confused as to their role in this new ‘comfortable feminism’, not knowing whether they should open the door for a girl and risk having it knocked back in their faces.

Some of my female friends want to devote their lives to having children and bringing up a family, some want to be high-powered lawyers. Feminism should not be about the pressure to have everything at once, but about the freedom to choose what you want.

Feminism doesn’t mean so much to my generation, not because we don’t think it’s important, but because our equality - at least in this country - has already been established.

Lynda Lee-Potter is a star columnist for the Daily Mail and an author in her own right. She says:

We’re surely now in the happy position of having the best of feminism, but with the sense to have discarded the daft bits.

I never felt any need to prove that women are as good as men because it seemed self-evident.

All the influences in my early career were remarkable women - from my mother to the female boss who gave me my first chance in journalism.

The most aggressive feminists, I suspect, came from families where there was a domineering father and a disappointed, defeated mother. As writer Marilyn French says: “Feminism is a belief that women matter as much as men do”. In many instances, I’d say we matter more.
Author Kathy Lette, 42, is married and lives in London with her two children. She says:

When I was growing up in the sexist Seventies, women were seen as little more than a life support system to an ovary.

We were human handbags, something attractive for men to drape over their arms at parties.

And then along came Germaine Greer. She was a Femocet missile, targeting misogynistic men then nuking them.

Admittedly, we younger girls got her message a little wrong at first. We thought that ‘sexual liberation’ gave us the freedom to behave like blokes.

The men were laughing all the way to the sperm bank. Of course, they believed in ‘free love’ - they didn’t have to pay for it.

In Australia, ‘Greer’ is now rhyming slang for ‘beer’, and men are claiming that feminism has passed its amuse-by date.

Well, if so, then why are women still getting concussion hitting our heads on the glass ceiling - and being paid less an hour than men to clean it?

Why are women also still doing the bulk of the childcare and most of the housework? Statistics show that British men have increased their contribution to housework, on average, by 3.6 minutes a week.

In other words, any woman who calls herself a ‘post-feminist’ has kept her wonder bra and burnt her brains.

No

Journalist and radio presenter Jenni Murray, 50, lives with her partner in North London, and has two grownup sons. She says:

Is it really so surprising, that young women today are reluctant to use the f-word? Those of us who are proud to admit we are feminists are invariably characterised as ball-breaking man-haters who go around in dungarees and don’t like makeup.

For the record, I adore my partner and my sons, wouldn’t be seen dead in dungarees and never leave the house without eyeliner, mascara, blusher and an immaculate manicure.

But for 30 years I’ve been hearing women say: ‘I’m not a feminist, but didn’t like it when they sacked me when I was pregnant’, or ‘I earn so much less than the guys in my office’, or ‘I hate it when the blokes at work have Britney in her undies as a screensaver’, or ‘I’m really worried about my pension because I took time out to look after the kids’.
The young today see themselves as having equal opportunities in education and work, and it’s only when the babies come along - and their career hits the buffers - that they discover the realities of the unequal world.

The older and wiser among us can only wait for the day when they’re finally forced to say, ‘Yes. I am a feminist. And proud of it’.

Yes

Writer Chrissy Iley is married and lives in London and Los Angeles. She says:

Feminism sounds more like a medical condition than cause.

I think it was invented by men who wanted us to split the cost of dinner and still get sex - we lose out both ways.

But feminism created its own glass ceiling - women who are not supportive of each other and are much more competitive than men.

Men cleverly carried on using typically ‘male’ characteristics to succeed: bullying, brute force and the old boys’ club. These simply didn’t translate for women. My experience is that men and women both abuse power, but women abuse it more on other women.

Feminism has also taught us that not having it all makes us feel guilty, and trying to ‘have it all’ gives us at best a headache and at worst a breakdown.

Of course, in the beginning there was a point to the women’s rights movement - because we had no rights. Now I think that positive discrimination creates victims and a compromise that is uncomfortable: as restricting as a corset but not as pretty.

New research says that more women want to have partners and children much younger and put their careers on hold as the biological clock is less easy to adjust - but then they’ll go and rule the world.

Perhaps this is a better form of matriarchy.

No

Writer and journalist Samantha Norman, 40, is the daughter of film critic Barry Norman. She is divorced and lives in West London with her two young sons. She says:

I am from a long line of feminists.
My maternal grandmother was a pre-feminist: a single mother in the Forties, recognised, since the term ‘feminist’ didn’t exist in her day, as ‘a strong woman’ who raised three children and dominated her community.

My mother was one of the first bone fide feminists who marched in the Sixties to campaign for equal rights.

Which leaves me, I guess, a post-feminist feminist in less well-defined territory.

There’s no doubt that conditions for women have improved immeasurably since their time.

Yet it remains an irrefutable fact that while all people are deemed equal these days, men tend to be just that little bit more equal than others.

I see the continuing struggle for emancipation everywhere. I got divorced recently and learnt first-hand how little the legal system respects the role of homemaker and child-raiser.

I see friends struggling in their relationships - both men and women - to embrace the tenets of feminism and still conform to the conventions of marriage.

There are still glass ceilings, unequal pay and unequal treatment.

The struggle continues, and long may it.

No

Cristina Odone, 42, deputy editor of the New Statesman, lives with her partner in London. She says:

Your male boss won’t pat your bottom lest you sue him for sexual harassment; he won’t crack jokes about your ‘time of the month’ affecting your productivity lest you sue him for sexual discrimination; and he won’t hire someone to replace you while you’re off on maternity leave lest you take him to the industrial tribunal.

So don’t start singing a requiem for feminism quite yet: it’s alive, and reining in the basic instincts of every would-be misogynist. But you may have noticed that we are talking ‘male’ boss here: for, despite all the feminist triumphs, your boss is still likely to be a man. Women have come far - but still have a long way to go.

This explains why so many of us reject the extremist, fist-clenching, man-hating champions of feminism: their wrongheaded priorities - wanting to call a manhole a personhole - risk distracting us from fighting the on-going important battles at hand, namely for equal pay for equal work, and greater access to the top posts.
Yes

Marcelle D’Argy Smith, a former editor of *Cosmopolitan*, is single and lives in West London. She says:

Of course nobody cares about ‘feminism’ now. They haven’t cared about it for years. Too many British women have a horror of doing anything to jeopardise male approval, believing that if you’re pro-women you’re seen as anti-man.

If young women today are happily preoccupied with celebrities, navel piercing, text messaging and have no interest in politics, so be it. Who can blame them in the current climate? But the rest of us aren’t fighting for them.

Things have improved dramatically for women in the past 30 years - and yet we still get paid only about 80 per cent of what men do in the workplace.

All the surveys show that women are still doing the bulk of the housework and bringing up the children.

Only 18 per cent of MPs are women.

Only about 10 per cent of women are QCs.

Childcare was more easily available during World War II than it is now. Men’s secretaries and PAs are tax-deductible; childcare isn’t.

There are inequalities wherever you look. But women today don’t give a damn. Feminism here is dead. But I grieve in silence.

No

Novelist and journalist Bel Mooney, 56, is married to Jonathan Dimbleby. She lives in Bath and has a son and a daughter. She says:

Years ago a newspaper editor asked me: “You’re not a feminist, you?” with such distaste in his voice you’d have thought he was accusing me of child abuse. I replied: “Don’t know what else to be”. To me, feminism means simply knowing the sexes are equal, that men and women have to work together in mutual respect to create a better world. And we’re not there yet. Women are as much in need of liberation as ever.

What sort of world is it when many teenage girls define themselves solely in terms of their ability to be sexy, and when truly shocking numbers of them deliberately get pregnant because baby will give them some kudos, not to mention benefits?

Violence against women is on the increase. The pernicious spread of pornography on the internet panders to the worst abusive male fantasies and it is truly astonishing how many young
women (not ‘professionals’) collude in their own degradation. If we don’t respect ourselves how can we expect men to?

Feminist? Oh yeah! Let me wear those suffragette colours, let me stand at the barricades, as we start all over again.
Appendix 2

The table below details each of the head nouns that is premodified by adjectival ‘feminist’ in the adjectives dataset. This table appears in section 7.2 (table 7.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head noun</th>
<th>No. of occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement(s)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Icon(s)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writer(s)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue(s)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine(s)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activism</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group(s), revolution</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blog(s), mother(s)/mums</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda, idea(s)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s), organisation(s), principle(s), theory/ies</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artist(s), cause(s), heroine(s), message</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument(s), book(s), era, literature, thought</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic(s), ideal(s), ideology, Intellectual Heritage, meeting(s), novel(s), politics, thinker(s), work(s)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbie, campaign(s), card, columnist, critics, historian(s), men, network(s), role model, slogan(s), symbol(s), theology, values, women, world</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act, activist(s), age, attitudes, backlash, banner, battle(s), belief(s), celebrity, commentators, criticism, critique, demands, establishment, fantasy, fascist(i), feminist, festival, fight, figure, fire, friend(s), generation, history, label, language, media, men’s groups, narrative, polemic, press, publisher, rebel, rhetoric, scholar(s), society, terms, texts, theme(s), theorists, viewpoint(s), views, writing(s)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s, 24 year-old, academic circles, action fighters, adage, advances, agitation, aims, altar, alternative, America, analysis, anthem, apparatchiks, application,</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- approach, art critics, aspiration, assassins, assertion, audiences, austerity, badges, bestseller, bloggers, blogosphere, bona fides, brigade, campaigner, campaigning, canon, caricature, carnival, challenges, champion, cheerleading, choices, claptrap, claque, cliché, collective, colossus, concepts, confectionery, conference, consciousness, conservatism, contemporaries, context, conviction, corner, credentials, credo, creed, crowd, cultural heritage, culture, death syndrome, delusion, demonstration, devotees, dilemma, dirge, discussion, doctrines, dogma, drama, dream, Eaves Housing, education, emotion, equality agenda, eye, family life, fanatics, farce, fashion zine, finger-wagging, folkloric ghetto, foremothers, fortune, fracas, freedom, French woman, future, girlhood, grand panjandrums, grounds, gynaecologist, hair theory, heart, heyday, high priestess, identification, induction centre, initiatives, insights, intellectual, interpretations, inventions, Islamic fundamentalist, journalist, kind of sex, legend, lessons, literary criticism, male dream, man, mantra, martyrs, matters, men’s movement, mentality, militant, mistress-plan, mode, morality tale, movers and shakers, music festivals, musicologist, myth, nonsense, nothing, offering, old guard, one, opinions, orthodoxies, outburst, outrage, path, pendulum, perspective, philosopher, philosophy, pioneers, pit-holes, policies, political agenda, political stances, pornography, power-woman, pressure, professor, project, propaganda, protagonist, protests, psychobabble, publication, publishing drought, punches, punk movement, raunch culture, reading, regimes, Republican women, response, resurgence, review, schooling, selfishness, sensibilities, settlement, shape, shoes, slant, solutions, speech, stance, status, stereotypes, students, successes, supporters, tag, teachers, thesis, thing, thinking, tome, trauma, triumphs, tropes, troupe, truth squad, TV pundit, unit, veil-burner, victimhood, victim-womanhood, vim, vote, webzine, witch, wives, zeitgeist