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Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias

Street, Chris N. H. and Kingstone, Alan (2016) Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias. British Journal of Psychology. ISSN 0007-1269 (In Press)

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Abstract

There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can they engage in an effortful re-evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess they can rely on context information to make an informed judgment. The account predicts, and we found, that if people are not forced to guess when under load, but rather can explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because they are no longer required to guess. Thus we conclude that belief formation can be better explained by an informed Cartesian account.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Schools: School of Human and Health Sciences > Centre for Applied Psychological Research
School of Human and Health Sciences > International Research Centre for Investigative Psychology
School of Human and Health Sciences
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Depositing User: Chris Street
Date Deposited: 09 Aug 2016 14:24
Last Modified: 09 Aug 2016 14:30
URI: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/29186

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