HYBRID UPPER MIDDLE MANAGER
STRATEGIZING PRACTICES:
LINKING ARCHETYPES AND CONTINGENCIES
IN THE UK BUSINESS SCHOOL DEANSHIP

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My parents, husband, and daughters Isabella and Arianna have been hugely patient. A regime of yoga, TED talks, and Desert Island Discs has kept me relatively sane on this continuing journey of discovery.

Except for the point, the still point,

There would be no dance, and there is only the dance.

T.S. Eliot (1943a: 15–16)
DECLARATION AND DISCLAIMER

This thesis is my own original piece of work and it is based on data I collected and analysed. All extracts and non-original work have been attributed and cited. No part of this thesis has been published as yet unless acknowledged, or submitted for a degree elsewhere.

While permission has been granted to use the real names of the case studies and to attribute quotations to individuals, the interpretations are fully the author’s responsibility. There is no intention to make a value judgement on the quality of the strategy practices in any of the cases studied.
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACSB International</td>
<td>Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>The Association of Business Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM</td>
<td>Advanced Institute of Management Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBA</td>
<td>Association of MBAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBE</td>
<td>Association of Management and Business Education (merged with CUMS to form ABS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUA</td>
<td>Association of University Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAM</td>
<td>British Academy of Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>Department for Business, Innovation &amp; Skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Business School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIEBR</td>
<td>Centre for Industrial Economics and Business Research, subsequently the Industrial Relations Research Unit (IRRU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIHE</td>
<td>Council for Industry and Higher Education (from 2013, National Centre for Universities and Business, NCUB) the Council for Industry and Higher Education (CIHE, rebranded in 2013 as the National Centre for Universities and Business, NCUB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAA</td>
<td>Council for National Academic Awards (dissolved in 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate social responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUMS</td>
<td>Council of University Management Schools (merged with AMBE to form ABS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLMA</td>
<td>Distance learning MBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCH</td>
<td>European Case Clearing House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFMD</td>
<td>European Foundation for Management Development</td>
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EI  Emotional intelligence
EPSRC  Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
EQUIS  European Quality Improvement System, EFMD accreditation
ESRC  Economic and Social Research Council
50+20  Transforming management education, http://50plus20.org
GMAC  Graduate Management Admission Council
GMAT  Graduate Management Admission Test
GRLI  Globally Responsible Leadership
HEFCE  Higher Education Founding Council for England
HUMM  Hybrid upper middle manager – a termed coined in this thesis
KIS  Key Information Sets
LBS  London Business School
LEA  Local Education Authority
MLM  Mid-level manager
MPA  Master’s in Public Administration
NEDC  National Economic Development Council
NPM  New Public Management
NSS  National Student Survey
PRME  Principles for Responsible Management Education
QAA  Quality Assurance Agency
RAE  Research Assessment Exercise
REF  Research Excellence Framework
SAP  Strategy-as-practice
SBU  Strategic business unit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIBS</td>
<td>School of Industrial and Business Studies (former name of WBS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and medium-sized enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEM</td>
<td>Science, technology, engineering and mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td>Top management team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE</td>
<td>Upper echelons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFC</td>
<td>University Funding Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UGC</td>
<td>University Grants Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMM</td>
<td>Upper middle manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBS</td>
<td>Warwick Business School</td>
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<td>WMG</td>
<td>Warwick Manufacturing Group</td>
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ABSTRACT

This empirical study explores links between the micro-strategizing practices and roles of hybrid upper middle managers of professionalised business units using contingency theory and a strategy-as-practice lens. Five important contingencies are identified: (i) seniority; (ii) hybridity; (iii) centre-periphery relations; (iv) knowledge intensity; and (v) temporal changes during individual tenures and in a dynamic industry. Seven archetypes of strategist are derived from the analysis: Dealmaker; Debater; Defender; Deliberator; Doer; Drifter; Dynamo.

The thesis contributes to the sparse literature on business unit managers (Finkelstein et al, 2008: 10). It responds to Vaara and Whittington’s (2012: 286) call for greater ‘recognition of how [micro]activities are embedded in broader societal or macro-institutional contexts’ by making connections between practices, roles, contingencies, and archetypes. The study asks: How do management scholars strategize what they profess? The qualitative research design is based on first-order accounts of three groups of 24 UK business school deans: (1) 12 current, mainly university-based, business school deans; (2) in-depth vignettes of seven successive leaders (including a dean in the first dataset) over the history of a leading business school, and interviews with 28 additional respondents; and (3) a diverse sample of six veteran and novice deans. Interviews are available on YouTube.

The research context is a mature industry that has experienced phenomenal growth and major public policy shifts. The case studies raise interesting questions about strategists who are responsible for the impact and legitimacy of business and management education in a post-crisis era (Currie et al, 2010). This research contributes to strategic management literature by extending Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of middle management roles to produce archetypes of strategic practitioners. The central argument is that practices in the roles of ‘facilitating adaptability’ and ‘synthesizing information’ that were applied in deans’ professional capacities as management scholars and educators were more dominant in their discussions than activities related to ‘championing alternatives’ and ‘implementing deliberate strategy.’ The roles were more balanced amongst current deans. Individuals who were perceived as most successful adopted lengthy pre-tenure transitions, effective committee chairing behaviours, they completed full tenures, and exited voluntarily. They also built constructive centre-periphery relations, supportive teams, and consensus. In future, these crossover professionals need to demonstrate greater public legitimacy and performance management practices. Further research on the emergence of serial hybrid upper middle managers, transnational, cross-sector, microfoundations, and ethnographic studies is discussed.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. Summary

This thesis links the strategizing practices of upper middle managers in UK business schools within Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model of strategic roles. It considers a range of contingent factors drawing on a strategy-as-practice lens and temporal perspectives (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Tuttle, 1997). By categorising micro-practices within a typology of strategic middle management roles, the study identifies seven middle management strategist archetypes. It seeks to remedy three gaps in the current literature. These include: firstly the sparse research in the strategic management field on business unit managers (Finkelstein et al, 2008: 10) and the absence of any typology of SBU (strategic business unit) strategists. Secondly, this research project addresses the shortage of contextualized studies on the everyday micro-practices of what I call in this thesis ‘hybrid upper middle manager’ (HUMM) professionals below the upper echelons in the public sector outside healthcare. It argues for a practice framework rather than the demographic approach common in upper echelons literature (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and for a strategy-as-practice (Whittington, 1996) instead of a strategy-process lens (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). Thirdly, this study extends Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) conceptual framework of middle management strategic roles by investigating five contingencies overlooked in their work such as level of seniority, hybridity (bridging more than one profession), centre-periphery relations, knowledge intensity, managing professionals, public policy, as well as temporal considerations, for example, changing strategic behaviours between successors.
(Kesner and Sebora, 1994), during executive tenures (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) and industry sector dynamics. By linking practices, roles, and contingencies with archetypes of strategists, the thesis responds to Vaara and Whittington’s (2012: 286) call for greater ‘recognition of how [micro]activities are embedded in broader societal or macro-institutional contexts.’ The contextualised analysis addresses Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992: 165–166) recommendations that ‘research should continue to investigate contingencies that affect how middle managers contribute to strategy. In particular, future studies should examine involvement in various environmental and competitive settings.’

For the data collection and analysis, a series of comparative case studies was conducted at an interesting historical juncture post the financial crisis during 2008–2011. The three phases included: (a) an exploratory pilot study with a diverse range of a dozen current business school deans; (b) an in-depth single institutional case study of seven deans (including one in the first sample) with repeated interviews over four years; and (c) a third more diverse group of six respondents. The purpose in focusing on Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of the four strategic middle management roles of ‘facilitating adaptability’, ‘synthesizing information’, ‘championing alternatives’, and ‘implementing deliberate strategy’ by examining the strategizing behaviours of 24 business school deans was to investigate how these hybrid professionals (with the identities of scholar and academic leader, bridging academia and practice) work strategically. How do they legitimate the purpose, reputations, social, and economic impact of business schools and their own executive positions?
Results in this thesis from the coding of interview transcripts indicate five key contingencies that impact on this particular senior middle manager role in professionalised business units. The data analysis indicates firstly that many of these upper middle managers have emerged as hybrids with capabilities to reconcile multiple professional logics, ideologies, and discourses. Secondly, important daily practices include effective committee chairing, building constructive centre-periphery relations, consensus, and teams to enhance brand and legitimacy. Thirdly, there was a greater bias towards strategizing practices in the two roles of ‘facilitating adaptability’ and ‘synthesizing information’ than ‘championing alternatives’ and ‘implementing deliberate strategy.’ In the first dataset of current deans, however, attention to strategic behaviours in the four roles was more balanced. Fourthly, the findings suggested that prolonged transitions between roles and optimal tenures of six to eight years characterised behaviours of ‘serial’ deans who were perceived as relatively successful. Finally, the historical backdrop of a dynamic industry that is now maturing represents an important en/disabling contingent factor given the ‘cash cow’ status (Starkey and Tiratsoo, 2007) of university-based business schools.

These insights suggest that deans need to be sensitive to organisational culture, especially working with and managing academic peers, administrative professionals in the unit and in the central university. Roos (2014: 52) advises business school deans to ‘keep in touch with the culture...publicly standing up; walking around; participating in coffee break chats’; engaging ‘founders’ and
outside key stakeholders.’ Tyson, formerly dean of London Business School, argues that ‘the quality of our institutions ultimately depends upon our faculty, students and professional staff’ (Powell, 2006: 1212). A dean must deal with these multiple stakeholders and the ambiguity of contradictory and even duplicitous strategic narratives at the same time. Many business school deans are executive forms of ‘pracademic.’ Posner (2009: 15) defines pracademics as ‘effective brokers... who have occupied significant positions as both academics and practitioners... adaptable and cross-pressured actors [who] serve the indispensable roles of translating, coordinating and aligning perspectives across multiple constituencies.’ Chairs of the Federal Reserve Bernanke (Khademian, 2010) and Yellen, and Mervyn King, former Governor of the Bank of England, are examples of high profile pracademics.

The findings in this thesis are transferable to other knowledge-intensive organisations in the public sector, as well as professional service firms, and professional practices (e.g. Winch and Schneider, 1993; Empson et al, 2013). The ‘management’ of salaried experts is a key issue in business schools (AACSB, 2011: 190–191) that hire increasingly mobile academic labour. This is a concern in similar knowledge intensive organisations where knowledge workers strive for personal autonomy.

2. Research objectives

My interest in this unique study of the practices of UK business school deans is motivated by a need to make sense of high profile upper middle management (UMM) strategic roles in public sector professionalised organisations. The
rationale for adopting a strategic-as-practice lens is justified by four current conceptual and empirical limitations in the strategic management literature. Firstly, this study addresses scholars’ apparent neglect of business unit managers’ everyday strategic practices within complex pluralised organisations. Secondly, the research recognises the paucity of studies on how strategy and management experts strategize as strategic practitioners (rather than as consultants, researchers, or teachers) and first-order perceptions of their own practices which Paroutis and Heracleous (2013) have investigated. Thirdly, this study makes a contribution to the middle management role stream of strategy literature in the absence of links between middle management strategic roles and contingencies such as temporal perspectives (Quy, 2001; Roe et al, 2009) in not-for-profits such as loosely coupled educational institutions (Weick, 1976) outside North American research settings. This is achieved in the thesis by making connections between practices, roles, contingencies, and archetypes. Finally, while there are well-established classifications of organisational strategies (Miles and Snow, 1978; Miller and Friesen, 1978; Wissema et al, 1980) and managerial roles (Mintzberg, 1971) in the literature, there are no typologies of general upper middle manager business unit strategists. One exception is Powell and Angwin’s (2012) categorisation of four archetypes of chief strategy officer.

Business schools are interesting pluralistic sites for research because of the inherent tensions with expectations of them to contribute institutionally as cash cows while retaining scholarly credibility. As business school deans are responsible for an applied discipline in a professional school, they must interact with
management practitioners more than their counterparts in other types of academic units. The dynamic evolution of the business school sector lends itself to a study of intergenerational differences in deans’ micro-strategies in changing public policy contexts. This thesis draws on varying dimensions of time suggested by Tuttle (1997).

The business school industry has experienced explosive growth and huge popularity with students, particularly in the UK since the 1960s (Engwall and Danell, 2011). In a knowledge economy, there are clear strategic opportunities for these institutions to generate thought leadership (Lorange, 2010) and to make a significant impact with research and innovation that society values (Morsing and Sauquet Rovira, 2011). Accusations that MBA graduates were in part to blame for the 2008 financial crisis (as reviewed by Currie et al, 2010) have been echoed by criticisms from top business school industry insiders. For instance, Thomas and Cornuel (2012a: 330) state that current models of business schools have reached a tipping point. Indeed, Thomas et al (2013b) suggest business schools may be at a ‘tripping point’ where existing paradigm traps need to be overhauled (Thomas et al, 2014). Moreover, Starkey and Tiratsoo (2007: 55) depict the increasing complexity of the business school dean’s role over time and the high stakes nature of the role like that of a premier league football manager: ‘Forty years ago running a business school was something that a senior professor might well take as a matter of duty shortly before retirement. Nowadays deans almost constitute a profession in their own right, a cohort with unique and specialist skills...Deans may
be likened to sports coaches, hired to improve performance, fired at will, but with one eye always on building their own careers.’

The sample of 52 primary and secondary respondents in this study has been selected to provide rich data on the strategic practices of upper middle managers. The 24 business school deans who were the main subjects of the research represent diverse examples of influencing from a middle position in an environment of increasing marketisation, customer centricity, technological disruption, and government (de)regulation. These contingencies are highly challenging for academic leaders as hybrid middle managers who are responsible for ‘managing’ fellow higher education professionals in strategic business units.

The four-year data collection period (2008–2011) in this thesis and the case study design spanning over 40 years of one organisation in the second phase of the research project allow for attention to highly contextualised and historical details about the strategic practices of successive leaders. The position of the part-time researcher based in the UK’s Association of Business Schools enabled unprecedented access to a managerial élite (Pettigrew, 1992) when the legitimacy of existing business and educational models of management education was being seriously questioned (e.g. The Economist, 2014; Thomas et al, 2014).

A strategy-as-practice lens allows the reader of this study to see dynamic social practices situated in different times and contexts. This has enabled the thesis to extend Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model which is largely
atemporal, context free, and based on a large scale American statistical survey in the early 1990s of 259 middle managers in 25 organisations. Whetten (2009: 31) defines context as ‘the set of factors surrounding a phenomenon that exerts some direct or indirect influence on it.’ Responses in the data are underpinned by Floyd and Wooldridge’s questionnaire (1996: 149–151) which is listed in Appendix 1. The seven archetypes of strategists derived from the data are discussed in Chapters six and seven. They are based on an analysis within a new model developed in this thesis that connects practices, roles, archetypes, and contingencies. The four types of strategist derived in this study of the Dealmaker, Deliberator, Debater, Doer are mapped directly onto Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) middle management roles of facilitating, synthesizing, championing, and implementing. The three additional ideal types of Dynamo, Defender, and Drifter represent exemplary, cautious, and non-strategic behaviours respectively.
3. Research questions

To catch ‘reality in flight’, or at least respondents’ views of reality, Pettigrew (1990: 268) argues that ‘theoretically sound and practically useful research on change should explore the contexts, content, and process of change together with their interconnections through time.’ In an attempt to achieve this, the study seeks to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the strategizing practices of upper middle managers who are responsible for professionalised, hybrid business units in pluralised public sector organisations?

2. How do these strategists’ practices vary within different contexts in the same industry over time, within a typology of upper middle management roles?

3. What typology of hybrid upper middle manager strategist archetypes might be useful to understand activities in the role?
4. Structure of the thesis

Figure 1 outlines the ten chapters.

Figure 1: Structure of this thesis
Chapter one introduces the rationale for the research which is to address gaps in current literature on middle manager strategizing and role typology. It focuses on hybrid upper middle managers (UMMs) in a professionalised context of the public sector university-based business school deanship. It states the central research questions on strategic business unit manager strategizing practices in different contexts over time.

Chapter two considers definitions of middle managers and their strategic purpose. It critiques Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of middle management strategic roles and studies using this framework, as well as contingency theory. The second chapter reflects on hybrid professionals and the effects of shifts in public sector policy.

Chapter three reviews theoretical and empirical literature on strategists, practices, and strategy-as-practice. This chapter reflects on middle managers’ practices over time and reviews frameworks on temporal perspectives.

Chapter four explores the research setting by examining the evolution of debates on business schools, their leaders and business and management education globally. It then specifically examines changes in the UK, and developments at Warwick Business School (WBS) which is the case in the second dataset. These contingencies provide the backdrop to understanding business school deans’ behaviours and contextualises their strategic choices in the analysis.

Chapter five concentrates on the research methods, design, data collection, analysis, and epistemological foundations in this thesis. The quality of the research in terms of validity and reliability and the limitations of the research methods are discussed.
**Chapter six** details the data coding and relevant empirical findings for each of the four middle management strategizing roles in turn: facilitating adaptability, synthesizing information, championing alternatives, and implementing deliberate strategy. Within and cross-case analyses enable patterns of similarities and differences to be highlighted. Strategizing behaviours are categorised in the seven strategist archetypes.

**Chapter seven** explores interactions in the data between practices and contingencies that generated the strategist archetypes in this thesis from a typology of strategic middle management roles.

**Chapter eight** reflects on the research findings for each of the three datasets. It contextualises the UK business school landscape during 2008-2011 when the interviews were conducted.

**Chapter nine** presents the two main theoretical contributions of extending Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model using contingency and practice perspectives to produce a typology of strategists. Practical implications for business school leadership and limitations of this research project are also discussed.

Finally, **Chapter ten** suggests recommendations, future relevant research directions, and provides an overall conclusion.
CHAPTER TWO: MIDDLE MANAGERS’ STRATEGIC ROLES

1. Introduction

In response to Wooldridge and Floyd’s (1990) call for greater insights into organisational contingencies, this chapter combines literatures on middle managers and public sector hybrid professionals using contingency theory and a strategy-as-practice view. Chapter two reviews the literature on middle managers and the debates about whether they add to or detract from espoused strategy. This thesis seeks to understand the phenomenon of upper middle managers to inform an analysis of the empirical data collected at the business unit level. It aims to build a clear understanding empirically of Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of middle management strategic roles of facilitating, synthesizing, championing, and implementing. Their model is based on two dimensions of influencing direction and degree of alignment with the deliberate strategy. This conceptualisation of middle managers is used in this thesis to frame insights into the empirical data on managing professionals in a public sector context in order to shape and guide an understanding of the practices of business school deans. This study elaborates on the typology of four roles from a practice perspective by adopting the close-up, more everyday sociological standpoint (Whittington, 2007) applied in strategy-as-practice literature which will be reviewed in Chapter three.

Uniquely, this thesis looks at how upper middle managers, some of whom are professors of strategic management, actually practise strategy. This study fills a gap in the research on the first-order insights of strategists (Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013) in the public sector by exploring management scholars’
reflections on their own strategy work — essentially, how they practise what they profess. It also extends Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1996) work by adapting their large-scale survey conducted in the early 1990s, mainly in a US manufacturing context, to a UK higher education setting and by focusing on the strategizing practices within the roles. A strategy-as-practice extension of this process model allows for greater insights into how middle managers think, talk, (inter)act, and perform beyond considerations for merely narrow economic outputs.

Chapter two is structured as follows. Firstly it considers definitions of middle managers in terms of position and strategic value. Secondly, it reviews optimistic and pessimistic debates on middle managers’ prospects. Thirdly, the chapter critiques Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model of four middle management strategic roles and notes contingencies in their work and temporal perspectives. This section also highlights the contributions of studies that have drawn on Floyd and Wooldridge’s (ibid) theoretical model. The fourth section of the chapter considers the context of knowledge-intensive organisations and the identities of knowledge workers, in particular academic faculty. The literature review then examines debates about professions and professionals. Business school deans in this study are categorised as ‘hybrid professionals’ and as strategists who work with different professional logics although they may not call themselves managers or professionals. This raises the question: How are professionals ‘managed’? Section six considers the impact of public sector reforms on professionals. Section seven then reflects on the complexities of hybrid managers located in a senior middle position who are responsible for academic
peers and other professionals within the public sector discourse of marketisation.

Finally, chapter two ends with a review of work on archetypes.

2. What is a middle manager?

Traditionally, middle managers have been investigated in the literature with respect to their hierarchical positions and roles in implementing strategic directives. Opposing views on the strategic value of mid-level managers (MLMs) before drastic delayering in the 1980s are reconciled in an argument that their roles have changed rather than diminished, especially as a result of new technology (Pinsonneault and Kraemer, 1993).

It is useful initially to reflect on who or what is a middle manager. Dopson and Neumann (1998: 59) argue: ‘From extensive previous research, it is apparent that no real satisfactory definition exists.’ There is a lack of general agreement about the actual term ‘middle manager.’ Wooldridge et al (2008: 1217) highlight this incoherence: ‘The theoretical definition of middle management remains somewhat ambiguous, and the inconsistent definition of the focal unit has blurred issues of comparability across studies.’ The position of middle managers in organisational hierarchies is unclear in many studies. Middle managers represent a heterogeneous group, ranging from low-level bureaucrats to senior executives below the top management team (TMT). In his study, Huy (2001: 73) defines middle managers as ‘any managers two levels below the CEO and one level above line workers and professionals.’ Ogbonna and Wilkinson (2003: 1175) note that ‘[t]he term “middle manager”, while generally understood as those managers subject to management from “above” at the same time as they manage those
“below”, is recognised as problematic because of its varying usage in different organizations.’ Many authors view middle managers in the context of organisational structure. Uyterhoeven (1989: 136) describes a general middle manager as someone ‘who is responsible for a particular business unit at the intermediate level of the corporate hierarchy.’ Staehle and Schirmer (1992: 70) broadly note that middle managers are ‘employees who have at least two hierarchical levels under them and all staff employees with responsibility for managing personnel.’

For the purposes of this thesis, a relational and activity-based, rather than a narrowly structural, approach is adopted. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 111) define a middle manager in broad terms as ‘any individual who is regularly involved in, or interfaces with, the organization’s operations and who has some access to upper management.’ Bower (1986: 297–298), for instance, suggests that middle managers are the only individuals in the organisation ‘who are in a position to judge whether issues are being considered in the proper context.’ Furthermore, Schlesinger and Oshry (1984) highlighted middle managers’ integrative tasks between top management and the general workforce as well as across functions. Sayles (1993) also notes the importance of middle managers working sufficiently closely with those involved in operations and with external contacts. Jacques (1976: 23) construes middle managers as two-way conduits; they are actors who ‘take messages from senior and top managers and convert them into operational work, making sure that the various components fit with each other.’ Middle managers function more than just as linking pins (Likert, 1961) as they facilitate
strategic activities at the interface with top managers (Schilit, 1987; Nonaka, 1988; Dutton et al, 1997; Pappas et al, 2003). Uyterhoeven (1989: 137) acknowledges the vertical and peer relationships inherent in the middle management role: ‘the middle manager wears three hats in fulfilling the general management role’, i.e. a superior, subordinate, and an equal. Even before the era of mass downsizing, Horne and Lotion (1965: 32) argued that the middle management role ‘calls for the ability to shape and utilize the person-to-person channels of communication, to influence, to persuade, to facilitate.’

3. Middle managers’ strategic value

Given that middle managers do not represent a homogenous group, the contributions of middle managers are disputed in the literature. For example, their roles are variously portrayed as both strategically valuable (Currie, 1999a; Currie, 1999b; King et al, 2001; Huy, 2002) and expendable (Drucker, 1988; Gratton, 2011). Views on the purpose of middle managers have been equivocal, with scholars juxtaposing labels such as ‘dinosaurs’ or ‘dynamos’ (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1994), ‘saboteurs’ or ‘scapegoats’ (Fenton O’Creevy, 2001), ‘victims’ or ‘vanguards’ (Fulop, 1991), or paradoxically presenting them in the public sector as puppets who pull strings (Schartau, 1993). The real worth of middle managers to business and corporate strategies is determined by context and their ability to formulate as well as execute strategy.

This thesis starts with a guardly optimistic view of middle managers. Zhang et al (2008) recognise the multiple positive roles these individuals play: ‘Middle managers are in a pivotal position in organizations. They are responsible for
accomplishing organizational goals by interpreting and implementing organizational strategies, facilitating change, creating effective working environments, ensuring smooth running of operations, building teams and motivating subordinates’ (ibid: 112). As the number of middle managers has reduced (Cascio, 1993), it can be argued that those who remain have broader expertise and greater opportunities to innovate (Staehle and Schirmer, 1992). Nonaka (1988) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) see middle managers as serving critical roles in translating tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge through a ‘middle-up-down’ process. Delmestri and Walgenbach (2005: 215) also classify middle managers as knowledge brokers. Shi et al (2009) elaborate on types of brokerage. Furthermore, Delmestri and Walgenbach (2005: 215) emphasize the need to recognise organisational contingencies in studies on middle managers: ‘The social construction of middle management is indeed affected by the regulative, cognitive and normative context in which it is embedded.’ Being ‘middling’ is no longer good enough; managers in the middle must justify their strategic contributions within the specific context of their organisations. The business school deanship in this study is clearly a challenging position by virtue of the multiple roles deans play and the complexity of the contingencies in which they operate as strategic actors located in the middle of the organisation and at the head of a strategic business unit.
4. Floyd and Wooldridge’s middle management strategic roles

4.1 Overview

This section considers the theoretical framework selected to understand the business school deans’ behaviours in this study. Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of four strategic middle management roles is underlined by an assumption that strategy is ongoing, interactive, and iterative. This is consistent with a Mintzbergian view of emergent strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). In this thesis, Floyd and Wooldridge’s views of middle managers are framed from an activity-based approach to analyse behaviours and cognitive activities such as synthesizing. The model delineates these activities in terms of (a) the dimensions of upwards and downwards influence in the strategy process and (b) alignment with corporate strategy. Lateral influencing was subsequently added to the model in recognition of ‘more horizontal business structures’ (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1994: 53).

Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) recognise that middle managers more than simply implement upper managers’ directives. They see boundary-spanning middle managers as integral to the two-way processes of strategy formulation and execution. Like Kanter (1982) and Burgelman (1983a, 1983b), Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) regard middle managers as potential generators of innovative ideas upwards. Indeed, in delayered organisations where the upper echelons are dealing with shareholders and board members, middle managers are ideally placed to be in touch with emerging trends at the customer interface. In service firms this is often the point of innovation (Dodgson and Gann, 2010).
Middle managers are able to communicate new initiatives to top managers who operate in different networks. The network centrality (Ibarra, 1993) of the dynamic middle manager allows for a panoramic and holistic view to connect operational and strategic concerns. Burgelman (1983a) provided evidence of strategic developments generated by middle managers that were more realistic than the abstract directions determined by executives further up the hierarchy.

Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) theoretical model shown in Figure 2 comprises four interdependent middle management roles. The four roles within the two dimensions are: (i) facilitating adaptability (downward, divergent); (ii) synthesizing information (upward, integrative); (iii) championing alternatives (upward, divergent); and (iv) implementing deliberate strategy (downward, integrative). The roles are not necessarily sequential or linear. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 94) argue that ‘[t]he facilitating role is a crucial prerequisite of effective championing.’ It could be suggested, however, that selling the going in mandate is followed by the middle manager’s (re)synthesizing before championing of the revised mandate occurs when there is a better handle on the new realities.
FloLJd aŶd Wooldƌidge͛s (ibid) middle management strategic role typology draws on role theory which ‘explains roles by presuming that persons are members of social positions and hold expectations for their own behaviors and those of other persons’ (Biddle, 1986: 67). Rather than an exploration of economic results, this research examines strategizing activities. It respects Weick’s (1969: 44) call for organisational researchers to be ‘extravagant in their use of gerunds’ by recognising that the strategic roles highlighted in this study are on-going rather than one-off activities. The following sections investigate the four roles in turn.

4.1.1 Facilitating adaptability

FloLJd aŶd Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) role of ‘facilitating adaptability’ is based on nurturing adaptability and setting the stage for renewal. It suggests flexing and adapting rules differently from the strategic plan. Facilitating
adaptability indicates opportunities for emergence, for example to gather resources to experiment. Floyd and Wooldridge (1992: 155) define facilitating adaptability as:

‘fostering flexible organizational arrangements.’

This may indicate changes to existing strategy as well as the development of new activities. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) provide examples of managers hiding experiments from top management to gain additional resources, and bending rules to support emerging projects. Middle managers often adapt activities that diverge separately from the deliberate strategy to realise strategic changes in a context where social reality is continually being (re)constructed and new opportunities emerge.

Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 84) equate facilitating with experiential learning: ‘the nurturing and development of experimental programs and organizational arrangements that increase organizational flexibility, encourage organizational learning, and expand the firm’s repertoire of potential strategic responses.’ They use the metaphor of facilitating as ‘the flexible, accordion-like structure between the two parts of a reticulated passenger bus’ (ibid: 89) that allows simultaneously for flexibility within rigidity.

Furthermore, Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) distinguish two sides of facilitating: (i) subversive/destructive behaviours and (ii) nurturing creativity. The subversive middle manager plays the role of ‘diverting resources and hiding experimental
programs from top management...to work outside the system’ (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992: 48). Middle managers can appear reluctant to support a potentially unrealistic deliberate strategy imposed by top managers because middle managers are much closer to reality and know how strategic plans will translate pragmatically. These middle managers may accumulate additional resources to experiment covertly in activities that deviate from the official strategy, which top managers may subsequently vindicate.

Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) see the nurturing manager as someone who emphasizes growth, development, and learning. These middle managers need to create slack for experimentation built on interpersonal trust and team building. In this guise, ‘[m]iddle managers facilitate adaptation by creating innovative organizational arrangements and nurturing promising operating-level initiatives’ (ibid: 95). Floyd and Wooldridge (ibid: 93) list five behaviours of: ‘encouraging informal discussion and information sharing; relaxing regulations to get new projects started; buying time for experimental programs; locating and providing resources for trial projects; providing a safe haven for experimental programs.’ Team building is a very important part of the manager’s tool kit. Floyd and Wooldridge argue that ‘[i]n essence, effective facilitating rests on the manager’s sensitivity to group processes, the ability to coach others, and the willingness to be confrontational’ (ibid). In this view of middle management strategizing, there is a need for high quality discussion and listening, interpersonal trust, effective relational skills, nurturing, and learning to enhance decision making. Openness is seen as an important organisational feature (Argyris, 1964).
In their questionnaire, Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 149–151) suggest that when facilitating adaptability, effective middle managers:

1. Evaluate the merits of proposals generated in their unit, encouraging some, discouraging others.
2. Provide a safe haven for experimental programmes.
3. Encourage multidisciplinary problem-solving teams.
4. Provide resources and develop objectives/strategies for unofficial projects.
5. Relax regulations and procedures to start new projects.

4.1.2 Synthesizing information

While the four roles overlap and some middle managers may act before they think, it is suggested that synthesizing and facilitating usually precede and support championing and implementing. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 69) write that:

‘[s]ynthesizing is a subjective process by which middle managers inject strategic meaning into operating and strategic information and communicate their interpretations to others.’

Synthesizing activities include framing, labelling, and categorising issues. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 83) delineate the two main hallmarks of an effective synthesizer: (i) proactive learning: comprehending and articulating the strategic mindset, internalizing and externally testing core values; importing and interpreting strategic information; (ii) deliberately communicating: actively framing issues to align strategically; selectively selling issues and adjusting a ‘sales
approach’ to achieve desired goals. These roles link to Weick’s (1979) notion of organisational sensemaking.

In their questionnaire, Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 149–151) indicate that as part of the synthesizing information role, effective middle managers:

1. Monitor and assess the impact of changes in the organisation’s external environment.
2. Integrate information from a variety of sources to communicate its strategic significance.
3. Assess and communicate the business-level implications of new information to higher-level managers.
4. Proactively seek information about the business from customers, suppliers, competitors, business publications, and so on.
5. Monitor and communicate to higher-level managers the activities of competitors, suppliers, and other outside organisations.

Synthesizing is viewed as strategic when it influences decisions made regarding plans that entail hiring new talent, restructuring, changing product offerings, and internationalisation. It is assumed that most middle managers reflect first on what they are championing rather than sell the going-in mandate they have been given without first gathering additional information. More importantly, in the light of this thesis, synthesizing represents a cognitive capability that is well developed in deans’ previous roles as scholars and consultants. How is this analytical practice transferred to an executive position managing peers? Are there cases of paralysis by analysis, too much deliberation at the expense of action because the individuals
are ‘too academic’? Certainly there have been cases in the sector of very introverted scholars retreating to their studies and shutting their doors to write papers. These kinds of individuals are uncomfortable with the visibility and constant interruptions that deans are generally expected to manage. Alternatively, there may be an action bias in deans with more despotic tendencies who do not take time to gather and assimilate information through consensual mechanisms. A reason for this behaviour may be because they are frustrated by internal bureaucracy or academic colleagues who appear to be disengaged from institutional concerns.

As synthesizers, middle managers advance a shared strategic understanding through assimilating information from different sources that reaffirm the existing mandate or, more usually, result in a revised or new theme. Practices in this synthesizing role include framing, labelling, and categorising issues. Middle managers integrate multiple sources of information from a range of stakeholders that are translated to their superiors. This very much emphasizes middle managers’ network centrality within the organisation between the business unit periphery and the central parent and as a key boundary spanner between the institution and industry and more macro influences externally. Hence, there are depictions of deans as ‘Janus-like’ (Sarros et al, 1998: 82) as ‘they mediate the concerns of the university mission to faculty and at the same time try to champion the values of their faculty...they must learn to swivel without appearing dizzy, schizophrenic, or “two-faced”’ (Gmelch, 2004: 75).
4.1.3 Championing alternatives

Within their model, Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 55) describe the third role of championing alternatives as:

> ‘the persistent and persuasive communication of proposals that either provide the firm with new capabilities or allow the firm to use existing capabilities differently.’

In their questionnaire, Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 149–151) suggest when championing alternatives, effective middle managers:

1. Evaluate the merits of new proposals.
2. Search for new opportunities and bring them to the attention of higher-level managers.
3. Define and justify the role of new programs or processes to upper-level managers.
4. Justify programmes that have already been established to higher-level managers.
5. Propose new programmes or projects to higher-level managers.

Mantere (2003: 83–120) identified eight types of champion: empowered, excluded, abandoned, discontent, stressed, disregarded, puzzled and overwhelmed, depending on their sphere of influence. Like Dutton and Ashford (1993), Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) recognise the importance of upward influence for middle managers’ strategizing, although in this thesis for all the roles, we assume there are elements of lateral, downward, and outward influences in each. While synthesizing relies on making sense of information,
championing is about communicating these interpretations through metaphors and frames of reference that help constituents understand strategic choices. This includes ‘rhetorical strategies’ (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), written and verbal.

### 4.1.4 Implementing deliberate strategy

Finally, Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 96) define the fourth middle management strategic role of implementing deliberate strategy as:

> ‘a series of interventions designed to align organizational action with strategic intent.’

In this model, mid-level managers as ‘keepers of the paradigm’ (ibid: 102) fill the gaps between strategy formulation and execution using integrative and downward influences. Floyd and Wooldridge argue that implementation ‘entails an enormous range of intellectual, leadership, and administrative skills’ (ibid: 107).

Implementing is much more than simply an action plan and series of performance measures. Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) term ‘deliberate strategy’ contrasts with the adaptability in the facilitating role which suggests greater emergence and unintended strategies. They argue that as middle managers are nearer the action, they are often much better placed than top managers to understand how strategies can actually be implemented in practice.

In their survey, Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 149–151) consider that middle managers who are effective in implementing deliberate strategy do the following:
1. Implement action plans designed to meet top management objectives.

2. Translate organisational goals into objectives for individuals.

3. Communicate and sell top management initiatives to subordinates.

4. Translate organisational goals into departmental action plans.

5. Monitor activities within their unit to ensure that they support top management objectives.

Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) highlight the need for integrative action and for a focus downwards for strategic implementation. Again, as in the other roles, to use a theatrical term, strategizing ‘in the round’ might be more appropriate given the middle position of the manager, as implementation may depend on actions from top managers as well as laterally and externally. The ‘series of interventions’ and reference to ‘intent’ suggests a purposeful, linear approach while in practice ad hoc, emergent changes that were not necessarily originally intended might more realistically reflect the complexity of getting things done in a pluralistic unit in a large multi-unit organisation and in a mature industry sector. Compared with the synthesizing role, the focus here is similarly on convergence and closure. Implementing strategy differs from synthesizing information, however, in terms of an action bias rather than reflective assimilation concentrated on cognitive processes. Not, of course, that implementation should be done without thinking or questioning.

Strategic implementation was first defined by Schendel and Hofer (1979) from the perspective of controlling. Chandler (1962) recognised the influence of
organisational structure and processes, while Selznick (1957: 91–107) acknowledged the absorption of policy into the organisation’s social structure. Parmigiani and Holloway (2011: 457) define strategy implementation as ‘taking action through operations to execute strategy’, which they assume relies on managerial characteristics, internal organisation, and corporate influence (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984). Mintzberg (1978) argues that separating strategy formulation from implementation, thinkers from doers, imposes a false division of labour. Moreover, he has suggested that organisations are ‘overled and undermanaged’ (Mintzberg, 2009). He advises managers to listen to March, who stated that ‘[A]ll the practical problems of organizing meetings, giving orders or whatever, are important. Leadership involves plumbing as well as poetry’ (March and Augier, 2004: 173). The strategy literature on middle management has suggested that scholars have viewed them as doers rather than thinkers. This thesis on upper middle managers suggests the contrary, that some are more thinkers and delegaters than doers. It follows, then that they should pay more attention to both poetry (championing) and plumbing (implementing).

For the purposes of this thesis, strategy execution suggests developing dynamic capabilities. Teece et al (1997: 516) define dynamic capabilities as ‘the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences.’ Teece (2007) hypothesized three generic, behavioural dynamic capabilities as the bases for the fitness of an enterprise: (i) sensing and shaping opportunities and threats; (2) seizing opportunities; and (3) reconfiguring resources and structures to sustain competitiveness. Activities include making and carrying out strategic plans, resolving issues, making decisions, finishing projects and delivering results. In a
very narrow sense, when leading a research-intensive business school a primary performance measure of implementation is the acceptance of a highly cited academic article in a top ranked journal.

Various strategic management scholars have reflected on managing strategy in higher education in terms of politics and power (Baldridge, 1971; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Pfeffer and Moore, 1980); decision-making (Hills and Mahoney, 1978); and sensemaking (Gioia et al 1994; Gioia and Thomas, 1996). Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2002) explored formulating and implementing strategy in university top teams using a strategy-as-practice lens with a focus on direction setting, monitoring and control, resource allocation and interactions. Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984: 255) suggests that ‘[i]n professional organizations where goals are less tractable, as in universities or in some “think-tanks”, the behaviour of key operators can be perceived by observers to be somewhat disconnected.’ The ‘garbage can’ model of organizational choice (Cohen et al, 1972) of problems, solutions, decision makers and goals attaching and detaching themselves to and from each other may be less relevant in a more managed university sector in the 21st century. Despite more explicit goals in the business school sector, deans are working with professionals and have to adopt practices less akin to dictating and more based on nudging (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) professionals while demonstrating some respect for academic freedom. In a marketised sector, deans must also be more aware of distinguishing between the rhetoric of ambitions in mission statements and the reality of what has actually still to be achieved (Newman et al, 2004). Deans need to balance a ‘can do’ entrepreneurial culture with being mindful of scholarly practices that require abstraction and reflection.
As boundary spanners linking different constituencies and balancing the status quo and future aspirations, deans are continually striving to fill the implementation gap between the strategic plan and actual achievements. Golden et al (2000) argue that professionals and managers clash when because they interpret ‘identical’ issues in different ways.

Thomas (2007: 37) lists the following metrics as key performance measures in business schools: ‘financial measures – profitability, financial surplus, level of endowment funding; operational measures – faculty quality, student quality, research quality, teaching quality, programme efficiency, measures of market positioning; and organisational effectiveness – league table rankings, reputation, student satisfaction, employer satisfaction, accreditation.’ Dawson (2008: 159), one of the respondents in the third study, sees the business school as a ‘tri-fold hybrid organization’ with the triple objectives of aligning the interests of public sector management, a professional service partnership, and a commercial entity. A key challenge she recognised during her 11 years as director of Cambridge Judge Business School was ‘to realize a strategic plan for growth in revenues, reputation, and scale in such a way that growth is never at the expense of quality’ (ibid: 167). She aimed to advance knowledge and enable leadership through ‘creative and constructive solutions’ (ibid: 172).

It might be expected in this study that business school deans as scholars are experts in abstracting and conceptualising ideas. They should, therefore, be predisposed to formulating strategy. In a public sector context of highly autonomous professionals, the problematisation and articulation of an issue are interesting academic exercises. In such a pluralistic environment, strategy
Execution can be problematic, although the higher education policy environment has increasingly focused academic leaders on clearer performance metrics. The tenures of some business school deans mirror those of premier-league football managers, with a similar churn for falling in league tables. This reflects an increasingly results-focused approach.

Implementing, however, is far more than the cognitive exercise Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) suggest. In getting things done, deans must draw on emotional (Huy, 2002, 2011), social (Hendry, 2000), structural (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002), discursive (Vaara et al, 2004) and contextually sensitive practices to ensure strategy is executed.

### 4.1.5 Influencing from the middle upwards

Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) framework of four overlapping strategic management roles of middle managers offers insights into vertical influencing dimensions. This draws on previous studies of upward influencing to shape executives’ views (for example, Bower, 1970; Nonaka, 1988; Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Dutton et al, 1997). Middle managers’ ability to influence layers below them (Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Huy, 2002) enables ongoing (re)alignment of strategy throughout the organisational hierarchy.

In their role of synthesizing information, middle managers at the interface between the upper echelons and front line must demonstrate the ability to manage up (Austin, 1989). Their filtering and sensemaking by virtue of their particular vantage point from a middle position allow them to understand emergent strategies from which they can generate innovations. Before they can
sell issues they have filtered from a range of sources upwards, middle managers
need to synthesize the information and assess it against the prevailing intended
strategy. As ‘knowledge engineers’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 193), middle
managers are valuable for ‘transforming knowledge dynamically between two
structural layers.’ Well networked middle managers can develop strong strategic
influencing skills (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997). Individuals who are more
knowledgeable about their industry and about broader changes in the
environment tend to be more influential and credible when they mediate
relationships within their organisations (Astley and Sachdeva, 1984). Despite
Drucker’s (1989: 207) suggestion that future organisations will operate like
symphony orchestras with self-directed, autonomous professionals, Eccles (1992:
106) insists that intermediate layers of so called ‘mezzanine managers’ are critical
as they ‘co-ordinate, liaise, wheedle, negotiate.’

It is posited in this study that boundary spanning activities may rise over the
incumbent’s tenure. Middle managers tend to become more confident in dealing
with internal issues and increasingly direct their attention externally. There is a
risk, however, of them becoming distracted by external networking over time as
they get ‘stale in the saddle’ (Miller, 1991). Middle managers who are
predominantly either very internally or externally focused may have less influence
than those who balance their attention better. The latter can bring benchmarking
and competitor information to bear on the arguments they make upwards within
the organisation. Allowing slack for middle managers to network ‘in the round’
internally and externally can enrich their contributions to the organisation’s
strategy. If they are too internally or externally focused, middle managers may be accused of micromanaging or of absenteeism.

The reframing of strategic problems using multiple sources of information allows middle managers to champion alternatives as interpreters to influence top management thinking. This means the realised strategy diverges pragmatically from possibly unworkable abstractions stated in the original strategic plan. While synthesis requires reflective and cognitive behaviours, championing is reliant on ‘persistent and persuasive communication’ (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992: 155) which suggests rhetorical and verbal skills, the ability to change discourses. Floyd and Wooldridge (1994: 50) allude to the processes of filtering ideas and prioritising suggestions as part of the synthesizing role that precede championing.

4.1.6 Influencing from the middle downwards

As change agents, middle managers must ensure that strategy, whether aligned with or deviating from the espoused strategy, is executed. This is enabled by their facilitating role which involves others in the learning process. They support colleagues to participate in strategic change. This inevitably involves a degree of flexing arrangements through employee engagement and regulating emotions (Huy, 2002). Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model allows for radical, potentially subversive behaviours, skunk works, and forms of experimentation about which the upper echelons may be oblivious. Facilitating adaptability involves consulting others on the practicality of the strategies (Shi et al, 2009) to be implemented.
The network centrality of middle managers enables these individuals to gather multiple perspectives, to function at the edge of chaos (Lewin, 1999). They mediate between operations and abstract strategies to ensure strategic change is executed.

4.1.7 Combining the four roles

Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 107) argue that ‘there is a great deal of interdependence among the four roles, and effective middle managers move from one to the next in an almost seamless series of activities.’ In Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model, executing strategy is inherent in the experimentation of the facilitating role which relies on the activities of synthesizing and championing. Executing strategy entails controlling, closure, instrumentality, rather than exploration in the divergent roles of championing and facilitating. As Hambrick and Cannella (1989) indicate, strategy implementation entails the ability to sell the substance of an argument that has been carefully synthesized. The notion of ‘deliberate strategy’ has connotations of deliberations, which the synthesizing role suggests, and also of intended strategy that neglects the inevitable adaptations (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Burgelman, 1991) of official policies. This role of implementing strategy was commonly assigned to the middle manager in the strategic management literature, especially where there was a commander type top leadership style (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984). Burgelman (1983a) and Schilit (1987) in particular recognised middle managers’ entrepreneurial contributions to strategy making.

Some scholars suggest that middle managers resist implementing deliberate strategy out of self-interest (Guth and Macmillan, 1986) or to sabotage change
(Meyer, 2006). These middle managers may, however, be justified in doing so because they understand the impracticalities of the official plan (Balogun, 2003). In an age of performance management, middle managers are often measured on results rather than on how goals are achieved. Ideally, however, there should be sufficient slack in the system to allow flexibility for experimentation and some deviance from the stated strategy (Frohman and Johnson, 1993). Middle managers are in a position to influence and learn from peers and counterparts beyond their immediate position and thereby adjust to circumstances.

4.2 Critique of Floyd and Wooldridge’s model

4.2.1 Introduction

Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model is located in strategy as process research. As such, it does not detail the actual everyday situated practices of middle managers, their strategizing behaviours or circumstances. It neglects empirical data on specific contingencies that link these practices for particular individuals over time. Nevertheless, the framework provides a broad orienting model for considering middle managers’ upwards and downwards influencing and the extent of their alignment with deliberate strategy.

The contribution of this thesis is to extend Floyd and Wooldridge’s (ibid) typology using a strategy-as-practice approach and contingency theory to analyse qualitative data on hybrid professionalised business unit managers in a single public sector industry in the UK. Floyd and Wooldridge (1992) noted a gap in the literature, which this thesis attempts to fill. They recommend that ‘research should continue to investigate contingencies that affect how middle managers
contribute to strategy. In particular, future studies should examine involvement in various environmental and competitive settings’ (ibid: 165–166).

The next sections critically examine Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) framework on middle management strategic roles by exploring contingencies and time-based perspectives. The strengths and limitations of their model are highlighted. Articles that draw on the co-authors’ theoretical framework are also reviewed.

Research gaps identified in the Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of four strategic middle management roles form a useful foundation from which to explore questions about how UK business school deans strategize in different contexts. Wooldridge and Floyd (1990: 239) advocate more research on ‘the organizational conditions that facilitate/inhibit strategy involvement by middle managers.’ Their well-established model can be expanded theoretically using practice and contingency perspectives by its application to empirical evidence that provide contextualised and personalised evidence. The broad typology in their model is based on an eclectic, cross-sectional survey (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1996). This lends itself to further elaboration in qualitative, comparative case studies which specify categories of middle managers, their social behaviours in particular competitive environments. Using the framework, there is scope to explore differences in middle managers’ degrees of autonomy as managers and leaders and their relationships at different organisational levels and externally. In the current model, the two dimensions of influencing up and down and deviations from or compliance with existing strategy can be contested from critical management perspectives that question the purpose of organisations and political
perspectives. The existing framework allows researchers to pursue studies that extend the model by demonstrating greater sensitivity. This thesis considers emergence and temporal considerations such as how strategic actors change their practices and reflect on their strategizing activities during the seasons of their executive tenures (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) as institutional and industry lifecycles shift.

Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) middle management role typology provides a broad categorisation without differentiating individuals by seniority vertically in terms of proximity to the upper echelons or laterally by functional expertise. It is decontextualised and depersonalised, lacking sensitivity to details in changing circumstances such as hypercompetition. The framework neglects internal emotional and psychological struggles within the middle management position. The fourth role in the framework of ‘implementing deliberate strategy’ appears to neglect emergent or realised strategy. Furthermore, Floyd and Wooldridge’s (ibid) work fails to distinguish individual managers’ degrees of autonomy over time or the dynamics of different industry sectors. This middle management typology is based on a cross-sectional US survey in the 1990s of an eclectic mix of 259 individuals in 25 private firms, many in manufacturing (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1996). There is no attempt at gaining detailed insights into middle managers’ first-order reflections, how they actually practise strategy, what they and others think about their practices, or the complexity experienced by business unit managers in pluralised organisations. While Floyd and Wooldridge (ibid) highlight three negative stereotypes, they do not provide rich data on temporal changes in social and strategizing practices.
This thesis responds to these research gaps by considering meso level institutional contingencies and macro industry factors and their links with the everyday, situated micro-practices of strategic actors. The type of middle manager is made explicit in this study. A category of hybrid upper middle manager within professionalised business units is specified in the research design. As well as zooming out by contextualising the roles with reference to the SBU interface and broader changes in the sector and in society, connections are made between strategizing practices within Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) four roles by zooming in on individual strategists’ behaviours. A combination of contingency and practice approaches in this thesis aims to address Vaara and Whittington’s (2012: 286) call for greater ‘recognition of how [micro]activities are embedded in broader societal or macro-institutional contexts.’ Rich data are provided in this study from three datasets. The second dataset includes a sample of business school deans over the life time of a single institution who were interviewed at multiple points during 2008-2011. This thesis, therefore, expands Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model while being mindful of Carter’s (2013: 1053) arguments that strategy scholarship ‘needs to be understood in its cultural, organizational and political context.’

This research acknowledges some of the limitations in the stream of literature on middle management roles. Wooldridge et al (2008) note that ‘the lack of consistency in describing the roles has frustrated the development of cumulative research into the origins and consequences of middle manager strategic behavior’ (ibid: 1211). The problem is that ‘[a]uthors develop, describe, and label roles differently, thereby reducing the transparency of linkages across studies’ (ibid:
Wooldridge et al (ibid) advocate ‘a logically consistent and parsimonious set of middle management strategic roles’ and suggest that ‘future research might explore middle managers’ strategic influence in terms of underlying practical skills’ (ibid: 1213). This thesis responds to these concerns by labelling a specific set of hybrid upper middle manager. The strategy-as-practice perspective in this thesis is combined with contingency theory. This allows for ‘a fine-grained approach to uncover important contingency relationships’ (ibid: 1209) between the various environmental factors and strategizing practices within particular roles from which a set of strategist archetypes is generated from Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) middle management role typology. By combining their model with a strategy-as-practice perspective allows for dynamic and fine-grained insights. The application of contingency theory contextualises practices and allows for a greater understanding of micro-strategizing embedded in a wider setting. The typology of strategists generated in this thesis offers a useful heuristic of strategic actors against which patterns of behaviours can be compared for recruitment and development (Wissema, 1980).

Coincidentally, the first journal article (in Europe) on a strategy-as-practice (SAP) view (Whittington, 1996) was published in the same year that Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) produced their book The Strategic Middle Manager (in the USA) from which the model that frames middle managers’ roles is applied here. SAP was not then within the general repertoire of strategic management scholars to apply to the phenomenon of middle managers. SAP, however, has since been explored by various scholars such as Rouleau (2005) who examined sales and fashion collection middle managers in a retail firm. Rouleau and Balogun (2011)
investigated considered unit and functional managers. Wooldridge et al (2008: 1203) praise the benefits of Rouleau’s (2005) qualitative study on the basis that an ‘examination of these everyday practices provides finer-grained insight into the tactics middle managers use in their roles.’ Yet Wooldridge et al (2008: 1203) conflate strategy practice and process, referring to Rouleau’s (2005) study as a ‘micro-process approach in middle management research’ rather than acknowledging the micro-practice viewpoint that she adopts.

4.2.2 Contingent factors

Wooldridge and Floyd (1990) advocate more research on ‘the organizational conditions that facilitate/inhibit strategy involvement by middle managers’ (ibid: 239). This section considers organisational contingencies such as the nature of working in the public sector, managing professionals, and public policy changes.

Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model is premised on the need to recognise changes in middle management roles as a result of operating in an environment that demands continuous learning. They observe that ‘the pendulum has swung from merely managing stability to continuously searching for improvement and innovation’ (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1996: 144) as the environment has become more globally competitive. The authors view technology as an important enabler. Floyd and Wooldridge (1992) also note that munificence and industry dynamism affect middle managers’ roles. Other contingent factors include the organisation’s strategic type, i.e. prospector, analyser, defender, and reactor (Miles and Snow, 1978) which influences the predominance and strengths of strategic roles (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992: ibid: 52) adopted by middle managers. For example, Floyd and Wooldridge found that middle managers in
prospector organisations demonstrate higher levels of championing and facilitating than their counterparts in analyser and defender organisations.

The four strategic roles in Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1996) theoretical framework are also determined by middle managers’ intellectual, interpersonal, administrative, and political skills (ibid: 138) when influencing their superiors and subordinates and dealing with emotions. Middle managers’ capabilities in moving between the four roles, and the difficulties of transitions, are also acknowledged. Variations in middle managers’ behaviours can be accounted for in part by organisational slack, internal resources, openness to sharing information, organisational size, and financial performance. Personal resilience affects middle managers’ contributions as ‘reservoirs of capability’ (ibid: 15). The individual middle manager’s tenure and level in the hierarchy also influence others’ perceptions about their power and ability to enact their roles. Clearly, decentralisation, the degree of self-determination top managers allow middle managers (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1994), and commitment from the upper echelons are further contingencies to consider when applying the middle management typology to a context of strategists based in the midst of multiple professional social constructions.

It would appear that middle managers function in a world of dualities or multipolarities. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 17) state that middle managers ‘are crucial “linchpins” between the firm and its environment and between strategic and operational decision making.’ They span boundaries between top and lower level employees, strategy and operations, internal and external stakeholders, the present and future, dealing with core rigidity (Leonard-Barton, 1992) and dynamic
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997), exploiting efficiencies and exploring new opportunities. March (1991: 71) explains: ‘Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation. Exploitation includes such things as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution.’ Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 11) note how middle managers’ strategic activities include negotiating, conflict resolution, reconciling a ‘diversity of personalities and professional orientations’ which means middle managers have ‘to gain cooperation among a group of individuals who rarely see eye to eye.’ Moreover, they observe metaphorically that middle managers ‘captain a boat floating precariously in the confluence, buffeted by the current of both deliberate and emergent forces’ (ibid: 51–52). Middle managers’ strategic influencing, therefore, is constrained. Floyd and Wooldridge are helpful in providing examples of how middle managers might struggle in their roles, with stereotypes such as the ‘malcontent, empire builder, reactive manager’ (ibid: 66).

Floyd and Wooldridge recognise that strategic thinking and behaviours must adapt to market conditions and align with changes such as deregulation. Internal contingencies like ‘systems, structures, norms, and values’ (ibid: 85) also impact on middle managers’ roles. The authors point out the negative effects of institutional restructuring, such as fear and lack of trust. They also acknowledge variations in individual middle managers who ‘differ considerably in their ability to frame an issue, to build a coalition, and to make a coherent argument’ (ibid: 79), as well as differences in their levels of courage (ibid: 92). The cognitive capabilities of middle managers are important contingent factors when formulating and
implementing strategy. Within Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology, the four roles are contingent on each other. Floyd and Woodridge (1994) found that middle managers with higher levels of boundary spanning showed behaviours in the championing role because they gained ideas from interacting with their external networks to develop core capabilities. Circumstances where there are lower levels of slack, autonomy, loyalty, and trust in the psychological contract with their superiors and subordinates, and an environment where top managers do not value middle managers’ strategic contributions result in weakening of middle managers’ ability to enact their roles.

Contingency theory is an important framework in organisation studies. Lawrence and Lorsch (1986) argue that contingency theory is based on the fit between the organisation and its environment. Internally this requires a balance of differentiation and integration which are defined in turn as ‘the difference in cognitive and emotional orientation among managers in different functional departments’ and ‘the quality of the state of collaboration that exists among departments that are required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the environment’ (ibid: 11). Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model reflects these concerns for divergence from and convergence on existing strategy. The middle management role of facilitating adaptability suggests deviance from existing norms and making changes to fit the environment, a differentiation strategy (Porter, 1980) of uniqueness for competitive advantage. Practices within the implementing deliberate strategy role reflect integration, the kind of compliance behaviours that might be expected by central administration of its strategic business units to fit in with the corporate strategy. A common complaint
by business school deans is that an integrative ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ is applied to the business school by the centre as if it were a traditional academic unit. Yet to compete in the global marketplace as professional schools bridging academic and practitioner cultures, business schools must adopt differentiation strategies. Business schools are expected to be good citizens internally by financially supporting other parts of the university while at the same time competing aggressively on the basis of differentiation externally.

Lawrence and Lorsch (1986: xi) acknowledge criticisms of contingency theory for being ‘static and deterministic’ and for neglecting change processes or strategic choice. They admit that ‘The broad contingency approach...needs refinement and precision’ (ibid: xii). Sillince (2005: 618) states that ‘an important drawback in contingency theory: [is] its lack of microprocesses.’ Contingency theory has been criticised for an absence of dynamism or linkages between micro and macro levels. It is based on the premise that the environment determines structure and strategy. Burrell and Morgan (2000) argue that while contingency theory is based on open systems, it is often linked to structures rather than processes. This means that ‘[s]ocial systems theorists who wish to operationalise contingency theory thus face very real problems, in that a new methodology is needed which is consistent with the ontology and epistemology of a true open systems approach” (ibid: 180). Structural contingency theory assumes that an organisation adapts its structure to its contingencies internally and externally. Where there is environmental uncertainty, however, differentiation, decentralisation and finding a niche in the market may be adopted instead of an integration strategy. Business school deans are expected by the central university to comply with standards, to develop a
strategy congruent with the corporate strategy. At the same time, the market
demands conformance to quality standards but also seeks differentiation based on reputation. Academic faculty and students want to differentiate themselves in the market. Deans need to be plausible amongst multiple audiences, they need to allow for multiple voices in a pluralistic organisation and so strategies may appear equivocal, ambiguous, and open to different interpretations. Currie and Procter (2005) found that inconsistent expectations, role conflict and role ambiguity make middle managers reluctant to behave strategically. Top and middle management expectations which are consistent and reciprocal are, therefore, helpful, however, in turbulent times this can be problematic. As middle managers, business school deans are valuable for their strategic contributions as vertical mediators (Burgelman, 1994) and for their horizontal interactions (Nonaka, 1994). As boundary spanners (Balogun and Johnson, 2004), middle managers are well placed to detect environmental changes. Yet increasing uncertainty and changing education and business models add to the complexity of the dean’s role and tensions in centre-periphery relations where innovation is required but centralisation may constrain it.

Given the limitations of contingency theory, by considering temporal changes and interactions between micro, meso, and macro contingencies, this thesis allows for a consideration of dynamism and mid-level leaders’ degrees of freedom and self-determination. This study also focuses on everyday situated social practices via a strategy-as-practice lens which offers nuanced and specific insights into behaviours which integrate with official strategy and activities that diverge.
Donaldson (2001a: 2) emphasises the ‘three contingencies of environment, organizational size, and strategy.’ Deans act as social engineers and integrators, dealing with interpersonal conflict and reconciling the tensions between differentiation and integration internally and externally, between exploitation of efficiencies and exploration of effectiveness in the marketplace. Such integrative behaviours may point to the notion of a universally successful prototype of a dean with transferable capabilities between different types of strategic business unit. This belies, however, the importance of fit. Ghoshal and Nohria (1993: 34) argue ‘companies require different organizational horses to manage superior performance in different environmental courses.’ Consistent with Govindarajan’s (1989) case for matching divisional managers to business unit strategies, this thesis supports the need to consider the ‘fit’ and ‘misfit’ between the type of middle manager and the business unit context over time. ‘Fit’ for middle managers is also facilitated by positive socialisation which reduces role conflict and ambiguity (Currie and Procter, 2005). University-based business schools are professionalised business units and as ‘knowledge-intensive organizations [they] depend upon the generation, utilization and uniqueness of their knowledge base’ (Donaldson, 2001b: 956). Middle managers in such units must be sensitive to, and go with the grain of, the professionalised contexts within which they are formulating and implementing strategy. In his study of Harvard Business School, Anteby (2013) reveals the strong socialisation of faculty and students which promotes better business standards and moral complexity. The School provides detailed guidance on how to teach yet leaves what is taught to the faculty’s discretion and so is silent about particular aspects of faculty members’ work.
4.2.3 Temporal perspectives

The issue of time is an important contingent factor identified in this thesis. It is mentioned in some of Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) commentary on their model. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) assume that strategy is a ‘pattern in a stream of decisions or actions’ (Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985: 161) and they recognise unfolding ‘emergent strategies–patterns or consistencies [are] realized despite, or in the absence of, intentions’ (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985: 257). Floyd and Wooldridge (1992) make several references to time affecting the four middle management roles. They refer to economic shifts, the pace at which corporate strategies change, sequencing, synchronising, slack, emergence, and how individual middle managers’ capabilities shift over time. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) are particularly conscious of the historical trend from the late 1970s towards downsizing and the elimination of middle managers as organisations delayered.

Floyd and Wooldridge (ibid: 96) acknowledge that ‘strategy making accelerates to keep pace with changing conditions’ as middle managers grapple with mergers, downsizing, and restructuring. The authors contextualise their model in an environment of knowledge work, economic decline, demanding customers, global competition, and technical changes that require a learning mindset, cross border innovation and integration, and the need for ‘relationship oriented’ middle managers (ibid: 8). They state that ‘managing is a process, not a position’ (ibid: 143). As mentioned earlier, Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 54) are also mindful of the sequencing of the four roles in their model; for example ‘championing generally occurs as a consequence of synthesizing, facilitating, and implementing
deliberate strategy’ (ibid: 204). Within the facilitating role, they stress the importance of ‘buying time for experimental programs’ (ibid: 93). When middle managers are implementing strategy, Floyd and Wooldridge advise them that ‘participative approaches to action planning and system redesign work best when those participating feel “significant” time pressure’ (ibid: 106). As another example of temporal contingencies, Floyd and Wooldridge (1997: 470) observe that the four roles are not pursued ‘with equal intensity at all times.’

At the individual level, Floyd and Wooldridge (1992: 156) state that ‘since strategic responsibilities in Analyzer organizations vary considerably from manager to manager and for the same manager over time, there is likely to be more variance in reported levels of upward and divergent involvement.’ The difficulties of dealing with the present and the future simultaneously are also mentioned: ‘middle managers are expected to carry out top management’s intent, react to daily crises, and plan for the future of the business’ (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1996: 137). Floyd and Wooldridge (1994: 50) also reflect on how behaviours might be synchronised at an opportune moment: ‘[a]n opportunity can be championed successfully only when all agree the “timing is right.”’ The co-authors do not, however, collect detailed qualitative evidence from a specific cadre of senior level middle managers as this thesis attempts to do using interviews at several points in time.

4.2.4 Strengths and limitations of the model

This section evaluates the typology of four middle management strategy roles described above by combining insights into the thinking and doing of strategy. It recognises that ‘action and cognition are intertwined’ (Burgelman, 1988: 78). This thesis adopts Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1994: 55) optimistic point of view that
following delayering, ‘surviving managers enjoy a renewed sense of power and contribution.’ The middle management role framework alludes to the need for middle managers to demonstrate political astuteness and to deal with the physical and emotional stress caused by strategic change (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1996: 42). It highlights the importance of middle managers’ self-awareness, their need for ongoing self-improvement, and for them to be mentored.

Whereas Rouleau (2005) studied only two middle managers, Floyd and Wooldridge’s model has the advantage of being developed from a large scale statistical survey of 259 middle managers (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992) in a diverse range of 25 firms in the USA (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1994). A significant proportion of respondents were based in manufacturing, several in insurance, banking, and food services, and there were five middle managers in consulting, an occupation most relevant for this thesis. Importantly, in their study, Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 127) found that middle managers spent their time, in order of frequency, on implementing, synthesizing, championing, and facilitating. This finding differs from those in this thesis in terms of the order of the first and last roles which are reversed in this study. Floyd and Wooldridge (1992: 156) noted that analyser type organisations ‘are charged with more complex strategic responsibilities designed to manage shifting priorities’ than defenders or prospectors, as they simultaneously manage established products and new opportunities. In the case of knowledge-intensive organisations, such a dominance of the synthesizing analytical role might also be expected.

In terms of its limitations, however, the questionnaire data from which this typology of four strategic middle management roles was derived ignored public
sector organisations or firms outside the USA. Although Floyd and Wooldridge (1992: 154) define middle management as ‘the coordination of an organizational unit’s day-to-day activities with the activities of vertically related groups’, they do not consider one sector in depth from the perspective of everyday practices. The overlapping roles in Floyd and Wooldridge’s model focus on activities and reflections to support learning. There are no details, however, on emotional (Huy, 2011) or physical behaviours (Ropo and Parviainen, 1999) that would give practitioners useful insights into how to enact the role of middle manager. The model was developed over 20 years ago, before the rise of the internet and social media which have transformed organisational strategies and communications and flattened multilevel interactions. An additional potential weakness is that the theoretical framework does not distinguish between different types of middle manager with respect to seniority or level. Neither does it consider the fine-grained lived experiences of middle managers over their tenures, between successors, or the dynamics of specific industry sectors.

4.2.5 Studies that have used Floyd and Wooldridge’s model

A range of interesting and relevant studies has drawn on Floyd and Wooldridge’s typology of four middle management strategic roles. Table 1 summarises the enabling conditions identified in the literature for middle managers to make valuable strategic conditions within organisations. Research findings indicate that higher levels of seniority, boundary spanning, autonomy, network centrality, socialisation, training and development, upper manager and HR support and consistent expectations, job security and reduced professional opposition appear to enhance middle managers’ strategic influence.
Table 1: Enabling conditions for middle managers’ strategic contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Contributions to Middle Management Strategic Role Literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Floyd and Wooldridge (1992)</td>
<td>Prospector strategic types of organisations include middle managers with higher levels of championing behaviour. Middle managers in defender types of organisations demonstrate higher levels of synthesizing and implementing role behaviours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floyd and Wooldridge (1997)</td>
<td>Boundary spanning managers are more influential and more likely to participate in strategic activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currie (1999a)</td>
<td>Top managers should appreciate the value of middle managers and ensure robust centre-periphery relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>Top managers can reduce intra-organisational professional power to ensure middle managers direct change rather than merely act as change caretakers or supporters of strategic change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currie and Procter (2001)</td>
<td>Allow middle managers’ discretion despite prescriptive HR policies so that middle managers can contribute strategically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>Support middle managers with organisational and management development to enable their strategic input.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyett and Currie (2004)</td>
<td>Adapt organisational structures and human resource management to allow middle managers’ autonomy to span boundaries and modify the original strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currie and Procter (2005)</td>
<td>Job security enhances middle managers’ contributions with respect to risk taking and facilitating adaptability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>The absence of the constraining power of professionals, e.g. medical doctors, allows middle managers’ greater strategic influencing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>Appropriate socialisation and support for middle managers reduce ambiguity and role conflict and encourage middle managers’ entrepreneurial and autonomous behaviours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>If top managers’ expectations are less inconsistent, role conflict and ambiguity will be reduced and middle managers will be more willing to enact strategic roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mantere (2005, 2008)</td>
<td>Top managers’ role expectations can enable and constrain middle managers’ behaviour. Consistent, reciprocal expectations between top and middle managers reduce role conflict and enhance strategic behaviours. Eight enabling actions by top managers include: narration, contextualisation, resource allocation, respect, trust, responsiveness, inclusion, refereeing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currie (2006)</td>
<td>Middle managers located further up the hierarchy synthesize and champion more than lower level managers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These studies highlight contingencies that enable middle managers to contribute more effectively to strategic change. In practice, communications and implementation gaps and other constraining factors limit middle managers’ potential to be strategic. The next section considers a specific category of middle managers who occupy professional roles and who are responsible for knowledge workers in the public sector.
5. Professional context

The research setting in this thesis is characterised by the contingencies surrounding middle managers in a knowledge-intensive, public sector unit where they have to negotiate strategic change with different types of professionals. The phenomenon of ‘hybrid professional’ (e.g. Kitchener, 2000) is particularly pertinent to this study of business school deans as most are scholars, academic leaders, and strategic management practitioners. They formulate and execute strategy as managers in more than one professional field simultaneously – scholarship and academic leadership.

In the university context, Gouldner (1957, 1958) distinguished between ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘locals.’ The allegiance of cosmopolitans is to their disciplines and careers. In contrast, locals are faculty members who demonstrate greater loyalty to the organisation and an interest in parochial concerns. The competitive nature of business and management education means that leading business schools today employ a predominance of cosmopolitans who in some instances visit the institution infrequently possibly because they commute large distances and their overriding focus is on their personal scholarship. Some management scholars may be highly mobile in the international academic labour market. Academic salaries are strongly linked to reputational capital and the quality of individual research outputs (Moore et al, 2001). Meanwhile, professional support staff, i.e. administrators, might tend to function more like locals.

The bureaucratisation of academic faculty with the imposition of quality assurance mechanisms and a target culture could be interpreted as de-professionalisation. In
higher education with commercial pressures there are also issues about faculty incivility. Twale and De Luca (2008: xi) emphasize the ‘personal, social, cultural, organizational and structural’ reasons for academic members’ unprofessional behaviour. Bok (2003) suggests that academic faculty and students are colluding so professors can focus on their research by allowing grade inflation, while parents do not question the quality of education once their children have been accepted by reputable universities. The rise in the number of administrators (Ginsberg, 2011) encroaching on ‘professional fields’ (Kitchener, 2002) means that university professors may not see themselves as having a professional identity in the sense that professional support staff, administrators, and executives adopt an occupational self-identity; instead many academics attach themselves more to scholarly rather than professional associations and become decoupled from the institutions that employ them. Bok (2013) also observes a curious paradox which is perhaps less apparent amongst some business school deans: ‘A curious fact about leading business schools is that most of the professors lack either management training or any practical business experience.’

As this thesis explores strategizing behaviours in a professionalised business unit, i.e. a professionalised university school, it is useful to reflect on definitions of professions and professionals and ask how academic faculty see themselves. Schriesheim (1977) argued that a profession has at least four properties besides expertise: an ethical code, cohesion, collegial enforcement of standards, and autonomy. Hall (1968) highlighted attitudes of the professional association as an important reference point, a commitment to public service, self-regulation through peer review, a vocation and autonomy without yielding to external
pressures. Kerr et al’s (1977: 322) literature review on professionals emphasized expertise in an abstract body of knowledge gained over many years, autonomy, commitment to a specialism, identification with fellow professions/the profession, ethics beyond self-interest, professional conduct and respect for professional standards. Freidson’s (2001) notion of the ‘third logic’ suggests that professions control themselves within their own communities of practice and that professional associations mitigate the effects of market or organisational logics. Despite the constraints of government regulations and market forces impinging on professorial behaviours, in higher education it is assumed that peer review in activities such as publishing, external examining, and faculty recruitment allow for this third logic. In their model of context influencing distributive leadership (DL), Currie and Lockett (2011: 296) produce a model whereby ‘professional power is represented as a centrifugal force that, on the one hand, promotes DL through collegiality, but on the other, fragments or concentrates DL owing to its hierarchical arrangements.’ In a recession when centripetal forces drive centralisation, professionals may find their autonomy greatly constrained.

Moreover, Sennett (Stern, 2006) observes: ‘A most important motivator for professionals is being able to do a good job for its own sake, rather than just to meet a target. If you take that ability away from professionals they get very unhappy.’ Inevitably, there are concerns within professions over how they are controlled (Freidson, 1984) and whether they are being proletarianised (Navarro, 1988). Chapter four of this thesis reflects on debates related to management as a profession. In the university context, professional administrators who, for example, are members of the Association of University Administrators (AUA) may
ironically see themselves more as professionals than the management scholars they work with who teach executives and research management and generate theories the administrators may adopt.

A more nuanced focus on a specific category of organisational middle manager at the business unit level in this thesis helps to understand the role of the upper middle manager (UMM) in the setting of a professional school in a university. Wooldridge et al (ibid: 1192) recognise general divisional or strategic business unit heads as mid-level professionals. Yet in the strategic business unit (SBU) literature, the senior middle manager’s role has often been decontextualised and depersonalised. For example, Govindarajan (1989) argued for matching an SBU manager’s competences to the contingencies of a unit’s competitive strategy. He acknowledged, however, that he did not explore what these managers actually do. He concluded that: ‘In addition to focusing on managerial characteristics there is a clear need to study managerial behaviors’ (ibid: 266).

This thesis responds in part to Burgess and Currie’s (2013) call for more studies that ‘examine hybrid MLMs [middle level managers] and their strategic knowledge brokering role in public sector settings, other than healthcare’ by focusing on higher education. Ferlie et al (1996: 194) define the hybrid middle manager as a ‘bridge, who both represents the professional agenda and embodies...a managerial one.’ This type of individual is arguesably better placed than non-hybrid middle managers to co-ordinate the different professional disciplines that ensure strategy implementation. While Whitchurch (2008) has recognised the creation of a category of ‘third space’ blended professionals in universities who cross
boundaries between academic and professional domains, there have been no studies to date on the micro-strategies of scholar-leaders at the business unit level. Combining a strategy-as-practice perspective and contingency view, this research project illustrates how hybrid middle managers/leaders enact their strategic roles in brokering changes over time in professional public sector contexts.

What is interesting about this classification of middle manager is that hybrid professionals must navigate in several different worlds simultaneously, mediating and reconciling differences to realise official and emergent strategies. In the process, such hybrids may be ideally located to subvert systems to privilege their primary professional identities – in the case of deans as scholars or educators. Empirical studies on public sector hybrid middle managers and their strategic roles have examined healthcare professionals in particular such as hospital clinical directors (Kitchener, 2000) and directors of nursing (Carney, 2004). In education, academic middle managers in further education (Gleeson and Shain, 1999; Leader, 2004) and in universities (Hancock and Hellawell, 2003; Clegg and McAuley, 2005) have also been investigated in broad terms. The position of the hybrid middle manager over time may result in the postholder becoming deskilled in his or her original profession as they become more bureaucratised.

Fitzgerald and Ferlie (2000: 728) clearly state that “[h]ybrids“ are persons from a particular profession who are now managing professional colleagues and other staff.‘ They argue that this gives such blended professionals an advantage over other individuals who are non-hybrid managers lacking the expertise of the
professionals they are managing. An important proviso, however, is that hybrid professionals should retain the expert knowledge that makes them credible with their peers. ‘These advantages are lost if the professional gives up their professional practice, because they quickly become out of date, are distanced from colleagues and worse, are seen, politically, to have gone over to management’ (ibid). The ability to mobilise strategic activities when dealing with several professional camps and not to go native as a pure administrator or lose the respect of fellow scholars is challenging for business school deans.

Business schools represent an interesting form of hybrid organisation. In an earlier paper, Scott (1965: 65) used the term ‘heteronomous’ organisation where ‘the administration retains control over most professional activities.’ Battilana and Dorado (2010: 1419) define hybrids as ‘organizations that combine institutional logics in unprecedented ways.’ Pache and Santos (2013: 996) see hybrids ‘narrowly defined as organizations oriented toward both the market and the common Good’ and as sites of contradictions. Boyd et al (2009: 6) also describe hybrid organisations as values or mission driven, focused on the common good and the market. Powell (1990), however, suggests that such organisations are ‘neither market nor hierarchy’ but network forms. Schumpeter (2009: 78) comments on the advantages and disadvantages of managing hybrids: ‘Their supporters have long argued that they enjoy the best of both worlds: the security of the public sector and the derring-do of the private sector. The biggest problem with hybrid companies is that they are inherently confused organisations, buffeted by all sorts of contradictory pressures.’
In hybrid organisations, managers cope with ‘multiple forms of rationality’ (Lounsbury, 2007: 289). Battilana and Dorado (2010: 1420) suggest that ‘[d]ealing with multiple institutional logics is challenging for organizations because it is likely to trigger internal tensions that may generate conflicts among organization members.’ Heimer (1999: 18) notes the real dangers of operating in such an environment where: ‘a policy or practice that sends a favorable message to one audience may simultaneously send an offensive message to another.’ In their study of medical schools, Dunn and Jones (2010: 114) noted the difficulties in dealing with ‘plural logics.’ Similarly, in his work on public schools, Rowan (1982: 259-260) concluded that managers are constantly striving to balance competing views: ‘Balance is defined as the establishment of ideological consensus and harmonious working relations among legislatures, publics, regulatory agencies, and professional associations.’ Heimer (1999: 62) suggests that ‘[p]rofessionals should...be as concerned with the fortunes of their professions as with the futures of the organizations in which they work.’ However, the dilution of the psychological contract and decoupling of internationally mobile specialists from leading research universities makes this difficult in practice for hybrid academic-leaders such as business school deans.

Managing experts (Quinn et al, 1996) and professionals (Maister 1993; Robertson and Swan 2003) is challenging as professionals usually do not wish to be managed. Drucker (1952: 85) asserts that ‘the professional man's logic is such that he [sic] has difficulty understanding the businessman's [sic] reasoning.’ Leadership is often ambiguous in knowledge-intensive firms (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2003). Typically, there are dilemmas of expert autonomy and management control
When managing professionals, experts, knowledge workers, scholars, however individuals in business schools label themselves. The question arises: What kinds of strategizing practices are useful in managing other experts? Fitzgerald and Ferlie (2000) suggest that professionals in organisations might best be managed by appealing to their professionalism in terms of quality standards, ethics and peer review, which returns power to the professionals and generalist hybrid managers rather than allowing non hybrid professional managers to dominate. Mintzberg (1998) proposes that ‘covert leadership’ is most appropriate in such situations. Ropo and Parviainen (1999: 16): argue that ‘leadership in expert organizations needs to allow room for people to reveal their expertise and to excel...; it should listen, encourage and support, and reflect in interaction with others before deciding.’ Clearly, this requires time and patience.

6. Public sector middle managers and academic leadership

Section six of Chapter two reflects on public sector policy changes affecting higher education middle managers and the business school deanship. Chapter four will elaborate on the university-based business school as a research setting in greater detail. With exceptions such as Bryman and Lilley’s (2009) inconclusive UK study on what leadership scholars think of their own institutional leaders, there is a gap with little research that investigates business school faculty reflecting on the details of management practices in their own business units. This thesis includes views of deans’ colleagues about the deans’ roles. Predictably, metaphors of ‘herding cats’ (Bennis, 1997; Hammond, 2002) often appear in discussions with academic leaders about professors’ needs for autonomy (Raelin, 1995).
The changing nature of public sector organisations is an important contingency in this thesis. Ambiguity is inherent in large public sector organisations (Denis et al, 1996) because of conflicting professional values and an increasingly dominant discourse of public sector managerialism (Exworthy and Halford, 1998). The public sector policy environment of New Public Management (NPM) in higher education (Dent et al, 2004) since the 1980s has sought to modernise and make the public sector more effective based on techniques from the private sector (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). These policies have resulted in new behaviours in professionals (Ferlie et al, 2008) and new patterns of managerialism in higher education (Deem and Brehony, 2005). Middle managers may welcome a more business-like approach, yet efficiency drives, delayering, and customer-centric rhetoric within New Public Management lead them to question private sector methods adopted to deliver the ‘public goods’ they are responsible for providing. Willmott (1995) is especially concerned about commodification and the loss of control by academics.

The imposition of market values and loss of public funding for business schools could be viewed as a threat to university collegiality and professionalism. Power may be seen as moving from the professions and managers to students (BIS, 2011a) who are influenced by media rankings and other reputational measures. Disciplinary silos emerge within the university as profitable academic groups that resent financially cross-subsidising other departments internally when devolution makes apparent which areas are profitable. Managerialism in the public sector (Pollitt, 1990) and the issue of a public sector orientation (Stewart and Clarke, 1987) may be very important values in a school of management with a public policy focus (Ferlie et al, 2010). Furthermore, where there are shortages of
professors in particular disciplines globally such as finance scholars, this group may attain professional dominance (Freidson, 1984) over their colleagues. This is likely to mean that finance scholars are less subject to ‘managerialism’ than other specialists who are replaceable in research disciplines where there is overcapacity.

7. Archetypes

An analysis using Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of strategic middle management roles in different contexts has yielded a set of archetypes of strategists in this thesis. An archetype is a typical example of a configuration or pattern of a person’s attributes. Greenwood and Hinings (1993, 1052) define an archetype as ‘a single interpretive scheme’ that includes beliefs, values, and ideas. McKelvey (1982) defined typologies as forms of essentialism and suggested that archetypes originate from Lewin et al’s (1939) three basic types of authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire manager. Miller (1987: 686) talks about ‘gestalts, archetypes, or configurations.’ Doty and Glick (1994: 230) suggest that ‘[o]ne plausible reason for the popularity of typologies is that they appear to provide a parsimonious framework.’ Ideal types are produced by ‘the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diverse, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena’ (Weber, 1904: 90). In this study, the generalised archetypes are derived from clustering detailed observations into categories of strategist.

Furthermore, Kostera (2012: 29) argues that stereotypes close down individuals’ potential whereas archetypes allow for possibilities about an individual’s uniqueness. Jung’s (1991) psychological archetype captures dominant collective,
mainly unconscious, images of leaders in society. Maccoby (1976) generated four psychological types: craftsman, jungle fighter, company man, and gamesman. In management literature, archetypes are used to cluster behaviours to simplify recognisable protagonists such as the romantic leadership (Meindl et al, 1985) of heroes and villains, and intermediary categories. In very general terms, Mayo and Nohria (2005) suggest three individual organisational archetypes of leader, entrepreneur, and manager. Sinclair (1990) identifies eight types of leader archetypes: scientific manager, system manager, caring leader, politician, meaning manager, entrepreneur, visionary, moral guardian. Kostera (2012) proposes five managerial archetypes of sage, king, adventurer, trickster, and eternal child. Additionally, Kets de Vries (2013) categorises eight leadership archetypes: strategist, change-catalyst, transactor, builder, innovator, processor, coach, and communicator. Wissema et al (1980: 43) offer six managerial archetypes of pioneer, conqueror, level-headed, administrator, economiser, and insistent diplomat which are mapped respectively on to corporate strategies of explosive growth, expansion, continuous growth, consolidation, slip strategy, and contraction. Pondy and Mitroff (1979: 30) offer a more dynamic view by noting transitions between typologies: ‘leadership roles shift from technologist to linguist, from structural engineer to mythmaker.’

While archetypes may be gross simplifications (Rutenberg, 1970), categorisation of ideal types and their fit helps to simplify clusters of behaviours and complex phenomena. It is suggested that hybrid types are more suitable for dealing with conflicting contingencies (Gresov, 1989). As universities are highly pluralistic
organisations (Jarzabkowski and Fenton, 2006), it might be expected that middle manager strategists within them match their requisite hybridity.

8. Summary and conclusion

Chapter two has provided an overview of literature on middle managers’ strategic roles, hybrid professionals, and insights into the strategic issues facing academic leaders within a changing public policy landscape. Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology offers a structured model from a strategic management perspective that focuses managerial work, for example Mintzberg’s (1975, 1990) ten management roles, into a behavioural and cognitive framework. The co-authors themselves admit that there is a greater need for a contingency view (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992: 166). This thesis takes up the challenge for more contextualised empirical research by exploring strategic practices at the level of the individual hybrid upper middle manager. It examines institutional centre-periphery relations, industry sector, and wider policy changes impacting on the four middle manager roles identified by Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) from a strategy-as-practice perspective over time. This chapter has also considered various sets of archetypes.

If middle managers are to make valuable strategic inputs and produce appropriate outputs for organisations, they must operate at a sufficiently high and unfettered level to influence multiple stakeholders vertically, laterally, and externally. The position is rendered even more complex in public sector hybrid organisations where a wide range of stakeholders needs to be considered. This is especially the case when managing professionals and other knowledge workers whose
allegiances to their personal careers are likely to be stronger than to corporate
goals. Accounts described in the later empirical Chapters six to eight illustrate
differences in experiences and degrees of freedom that individual middle
managers navigate and negotiate which explain variations in the three datasets in
this thesis.
CHAPTER THREE: STRATEGIZING PRACTICES OVER TIME

1. Introduction

This third chapter reviews two literature streams: firstly on strategy-as-practice (SAP) and secondly temporal research in organisations. It aims to understand how middle managers’ practices in formulating and implementing strategic change over time. The thesis focuses on ‘strategizing [which] emphasizes the micro-level processes and practices involved as organizational members work to construct and enact organizational strategies, through both formal and informal means’ (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2003: 111). Vaara and Whittington (2012: 287) define practices as: ‘accepted ways of doing things, embodied and materially mediated, that are shared between actors and routinized over time.’ They refer to strategizing as ‘the sense of more or less deliberate strategy formulation, the organizing work involved in the implementation of strategies, and all the other activities that lead to the emergence of organizational strategies, conscious or not’ (ibid). Of course, a practice may not be recognised as strategic until much later after an event, for example an \textit{impromptu} corridor or golf course conversation may only be realised as strategic in retrospect.

Chapter three adopts a social practice perspective to examine business school deans’ activities. It asks the question: How do management scholars strategize what they profess? Part one explores studies on the activities of strategic actors in organisations. The justification for adopting a strategy-as-practice (SAP) lens is made through a review of strategic management literature and practice theory. SAP is differentiated from strategy process research. This third chapter reflects on
how the research is located within previous studies on middle managers and strategizing. Part two considers strategic change over time from a contingency perspective by reviewing literature on time such as life cycles, executive succession, and tenures.

2. Strategic management

Despite the field of strategic management being fragmented, Nag et al (2007: 952) argue that its ‘amorphous boundaries and inherent pluralism act as a common ground for scholars to thrive as a community, without being constrained by a dominant theoretical or methodological strait-jacket.’ Scholars such as Fredrickson (1990) tended to focus on strategic issues managers face rather than on managers’ behaviours. Following early studies on top strategists (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957; Learned et al, 1961; Andrews, 1971), there has been a revival of interest in strategy practitioners. Hambrick (1989) recognised the need for managers to be restored to strategic management research, however, his focus was again primarily on CEOs. The study in this thesis seeks to fill a gap in strategic management research on business units (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984), below the upper echelons (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), by drawing on empirical studies of middle manager strategizing (for example, Rouleau, 2005).

The field of strategic management research has undergone various shifts in its evolution from ‘inductive, case-studies largely on a single firm or industry, to deductive, large-scale statistical analyses seeking to validate scientific hypotheses’ (Hoskisson et al, 1999: 425). It then returned to in-depth cases that adopted a resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991).
Subsequently, attention was paid to individual strategists, for example Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996). The strategy-as-practice (Whittington, 1996) approach has labelled micro-strategizing as a further development of the field. Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009: 69) suggest that ‘[t]here is a curious absence of human actors and their actions in most strategy theories...Those studies that do incorporate individuals focus primarily on top managers, as if only one élite group could act strategically.’ Paroutis and Heracleous (2013: 935) reiterate that ‘[d]espite advancements in strategy-as-practice, our understanding of the meanings of strategy as perceived by organizational actors “in practice” is still fairly limited.’ Barry and Elmes (1997) also called for research on strategists’ own conceptions of strategy.

3. Strategy-as-practice

The adoption of contingency theory is a logical theoretical choice to conceptualise middle management behaviours given the situated nature of the strategy-as-practice lens. Since ‘strategizing includes all the actions, interactions and negotiations of multiple actors and the situated practices that they draw upon in accomplishing this activity’ (Jarzabkowski et al, 2007: 7-8), a contextualised view is necessary. Middle managers’ strategic agency is constrained by circumstances (Mantere, 2008) and so prevailing environmental influences cannot be ignored in a study of upper middle manager strategists. This study incorporates a macro concern for the environment and a micro level interest in grouping strategic behaviours within mid-level roles to generate a set of practitioner archetypes.
Several studies illustrate how contingent factors influence middle managers’ everyday strategizing practices. For instance, in their paper on top management team strategizing in a leading UK university, Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2002: 357) portray context as ‘an activity system in which actor, community, and the socio-cultural artefacts of interaction are integrated through activity.’

Figure 3 highlights the connections made in this thesis between the key strategic players, the practitioners who enact practices within their given social roles and positions where particular behaviours are expected. An understanding of prevailing contingencies of place, time, and markets determines the strategies that provide a purpose. This adds the person to Mintzberg’s (1987) five Ps of strategy – plan, ploy, pattern, position, perspective. Whittington’s (2006: 619) three Ps of strategy praxis, practices, and practitioners are integrated in this study by exploring actual activities, routine behaviours, and strategic actors.

![Figure 3: The 3Ps of strategy-as-practice in this study](image-url)
Whittington (2006: 619) writes that ‘strategy’s prime movers, strategy practitioners are those who do the work of making, shaping and executing strategies.’ He captures the benefits of practice theory to gain insights into strategists: ‘The essential insight of the practice perspective is that strategy is more than just a property of organizations; it is something that people do, with stuff that comes from outside as well as within organizations, and with effects that permeate through whole societies’ (ibid: 627). Whittington argues for greater integration, with links made between strategizing on the ground intra-organisationally and also at the extra-organisational level, taking into account prevailing exogenous influences. This contrasts with previous research that focuses on discrete areas of strategy such as micro studies of individuals (e.g. Samra-Fredericks, 2003), work on meso institutional level strategy (e.g. Balogun and Johnson, 2004), and more macro socio-political studies (e.g. Kornberger and Clegg, 2011).

In considering how business school deans develop their practices and capabilities in their roles over time, this thesis is underpinned by a ‘practice turn’ in the social sciences (Schatzki et al, 2001; Reckwitz 2002). This view reconciles the individual and society (Schatzki, 2005). The practice viewpoint concerns everyday practices (Goffman, 1959; De Certeau, 1984). Sztompka (1991), for example, was interested in the interactions between structures and actors. In organisational studies, practice relates to how individuals and groups carry out ‘real work’ through co-ordinated activities that are influenced by the group’s or organisation’s context (Cook and Brown, 1999).
Whittington (1996: 732) debunks the glamour of strategizing practices by suggesting that strategy entails craft, tacit, local, and detailed skills as well as flashes of brilliance: ‘all the meeting, the talking, the form-filling and the number-crunching...Getting things done involves the nitty-gritty, often tiresome and repetitive routines of strategy.’ Johnson et al (2003: 3) too stress mundane aspects of strategy work: ‘the detailed processes and practices which constitute the day-to-day activities of organisational life and which relate to strategic outcomes.’

Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009: 69) explain that ‘[s]trategy-as-practice (s-as-p) as a research topic is concerned with the doing of strategy; who does it, what they do, how they do it, what they use, and what implications this has for shaping strategy.’ Strategy-as-practice research stems from strategy process research which ‘primarily focused on the actions that lead to and support strategy’, i.e. planning and decision-making (Huff and Reger, 1987: 212). SAP supports Weick’s (1979) recommendation to be extravagant with gerunds and to re-envisage organisations as dynamic. It restores the actor into research on strategy (Whittington, 2006).

Vaara and Whittington (2012: 285) argue that ‘[t]he power of this perspective lies in its ability to explain how strategy-making is enabled and constrained by prevailing organizational and societal practices.’ Schatzki (1997: 284) takes the view that practice frameworks enable an understanding of how practices unfold over time. The practice turn in strategy (Whittington, 2006) provides insights into what strategists actually do close-up which is absent from Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of strategic middle management roles.
This thesis reflects on empirical studies of strategizing behaviours in non-profit organisations (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2003; Vaara et al, 2010; Denis et al, 2011; Kornberger and Clegg, 2011; Sillince et al, 2012) which are often neglected in strategic management literature. Some not-for-profit studies in the strategy-as-practice literature have examined managers’ strategizing in universities (Jarzabkowski, 2003; Jarzabkowski, 2008; Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2008; Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2011). Empirical work on middle management strategizing (Mantere, 2008; Suominen and Mantere, 2010; Rouleau and Balogun, 2011) are pertinent to this thesis. In terms of actual strategic episodes, insights into the importance of meetings (Hoon, 2007; Liu and Maitlis, 2013) and strategy away days (Hodgkinson et al, 2006; Johnson et al, 2010) are also relevant.

4. Strategists, practices, and processes

This section discusses strategy process and practice research. It makes the case for researching individual strategists located below the upper echelons. Importantly for this research, Finkelstein et al (2008: 10) suggest that ‘[t]he need to focus on business unit managers is great...it is at their level that many strategic initiatives are formulated and executed...However, such research has recently been sparse, probably due to the difficulty of obtaining data.’ Only a few studies have investigated the activities of actors below the CEO (Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007; Angwin et al, 2009) who are important practitioners (Whittington, 2006; Whittington, 2007) involved in making and executing strategy.

The strategy-as-practice lens is applied in this thesis as the approach sees strategy ‘as a socially accomplished, situated activity arising from the actions and
interactions of multiple level actors’ (Jarzabkowski, 2005: 6). From this perspective, strategy is something organisational actors ‘do’ (Johnson et al, 2003; Jarzabkowski et al, 2007) rather than a static plan gathering dust in a CEO’s office. This dynamic approach allows for research on the four Ps of praxis, practices, practitioners, and the profession of strategists (Whittington, 2007: 1578).

Whittington writes that ‘[p]ractices refer to the routines and norms of strategy work. These practices are both stand-alone – such as forming strategy project teams or doing strategy away-days – or implicit in the various tools of strategy’ (ibid: 1579).

Strategy-as-practice is not an entirely new phenomenon but links with research on strategy processes. Vaara and Whittington (2012: 320) suggest that ‘SAP and Strategy Process remain part of the same family and there are strong grounds for developing a shared agenda.’ The practice approach has evolved from process research. Table 2 highlights several distinct differences between the two perspectives.
Table 2: Differences between strategy process and practice research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strategy Process Research</th>
<th>Strategy-as-Practice Research</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>This ‘is concerned with understanding how organizational strategies are formulated and implemented and the processes of strategic change’ (Van de Ven, 1992: 169)</td>
<td>‘the ways in which actors are enabled by organizational and wider social practices in their decisions and actions’ (Vaara and Whittington, 2012: 286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Corporate level focus</td>
<td>Focus on what individuals actually do, habits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Systems focus</td>
<td>Behaviours of managers and others involved in strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Often depersonalised</td>
<td>Close-up, fine-grained, greater intimacy, and level of detail (e.g. Hendry and Seidl, 2003; Samra-Fredericks, 2003), it digs into processes (Brown and Duguid, 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Concerned with structures</td>
<td>Social interactions, learning, relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Concerned with operational levels</td>
<td>Situated, temporal, interested in routines, recursivity (Jarzabkowski, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Attention to ‘what’</td>
<td>Balogun et al (2003: 199): ‘strategizing research looks for know how, know when and know where’</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Research methods tend to be based on organisational case studies, interviews, much of the work is by scholars in the USA</td>
<td>Ethnographic studies, orientation to qualitative research, European scholars in particular have conducted these studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Economic underpinning</td>
<td>Sociological underpinning</td>
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The more sociological and person-oriented stance taken in this thesis on micro-strategizing practices from a SAP perspective acknowledges meso and macro level contingencies such as structural, systemic, and processual influences on the middle management function.

5. Middle managers’ practices

Table 3 lists articles on middle managers and their strategic activities.

‘Sensemaking’ (Balogun, 2003; Wooldridge et al, 2008; Rouleau and Balogun, 2011), championing (Rouleau, 2005; Ren and Guo, 2011), and communicating
(Carney, 2004) have attracted particular attention. Recent work has examined middle managers’ knowledge brokering functions (Shi et al., 2009; Burgess and Currie, 2013).

### Table 3: Articles on middle managers’ strategic roles

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Article Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Balogun (2003: 80)</td>
<td>‘The lack of appreciation of the true nature of middle-manager roles constrains the extent to which they are able to perform adequately within these roles.’ Key roles of middle managers: dealing with personal change, helping others through change, implementing change. Balogun focuses on sensemaking and implementation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘If our organizations really do contain middle managers working long hours with little perceived work/life balance or job security, mobilizing the middle may still prove difficult.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Rouleau (2005)</td>
<td>Sensemaking, interpreting, issue selling. Four strategic change micropractices: translating the orientation, overcoding the strategy, disciplining the client, justifying the change. These reflect Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) synthesizing and championing roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Wooldridge et al (2008: 977)</td>
<td>‘What separates an effective strategic player from a less effective strategic player is their ability to relate and engage in a way meaningful to those they seek to influence and lead.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>Shi et al (2009)</td>
<td>Middle managers’ five brokerage roles linked to Floyd and Wooldridge’s four strategic roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>Rouleau and Balogun (2011)</td>
<td>Middle managers’ sensemaking and talk in the two roles of ‘performing the conversation’ and ‘setting the scene.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>Ren and Guo (2011)</td>
<td>This paper splits the championing role into two for middle managers’ involvement in corporate entrepreneurship: (i) noticing opportunities and (ii) issue selling upwards. Organisational attention structures are important contingencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This stream of literature indicates a preoccupation with middle managers as strategic interpreters, communicators, and issue sellers. It also reiterates the importance of optimising middle managers’ value within appropriate structures to enable strategic conversations and interactions. Balancing roles and enhancing the
legitimacy of middle managers and their strategic business units are key themes that are relevant to this thesis.

6. Temporal perspectives on strategizing practices

As strategy-as-practice adopts a situated approach to social practices, an important contingency to consider in this thesis is time, chronologically, and historically. A temporal lens is used here to extend Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of middle manager roles. Ancona et al (2001: 660) suggest that ‘the language of time...will sharpen our contextual understanding’ of behaviours in organisations. Huy (2001: 610) argues that ‘change agents need to have temporal capability: the ability to comprehend various seemingly opposite temporal conceptions about change...[so] that they can both integrate and differentiate multiple temporal constructs and perform multiple and seemingly paradoxical activities.’ Huy (ibid: 611) identified four behaviours of commanding, engineering, teaching, and socialising that reflected change archetypes of commander, analyst, teacher, and facilitator. These roles map on to Floyd and Wooldridge’s typology of implementing, synthesizing, championing, and facilitating.

Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) do not provide an in-depth consideration of contingent factors such as time in their model. The upper middle managers studied in this thesis are working in many temporal dimensions. Time scales may clash in business schools for different teaching, publishing, and budget cycles. In order to understand how different aspects of time influence practices, Table 4 combines Tuttle’s (1997) four perspectives on time in processual research.
with Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model. Tuttle’s (1997) categories include:

(i) Physiological: body clock, life cycle
(ii) Objective: chronos, clock time, punctuality
(iii) Psychological: kairos, orientations to the past, present, future, and
(iv) Socially constructed relative time: contextualised, cultural.

Table 4: Strategic activities from time-based perspectives

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<th>Table 4: Strategic activities from time-based perspectives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physiological Time: Facilitating</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nurturing future generations for their careers, timing career opportunities at different life stages, discussing ideas at appropriate times of the day, week, year. Ensuring recovery time to re-energise after international travel, major events.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Physiological Time: Synthesizing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older, more experienced middle managers may be better listeners, more networked, while younger newer recruits could be more receptive and ask naïve questions that lead to improved understanding. Need to balance ideas from veterans and novices to gain a range of insights. Fatigue from endless meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physiological Time: Championing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Entrainment, timing of energy levels for announcements when listeners are alert. Selling benefits to people at different stages of their careers. Physically coping with dinners, energy for corridor conversations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physiological Time: Implementing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new middle manager may have higher energy levels to get things done faster and cope with international travel. A more experienced incumbent may be better at delegating and deliberating and have more time to attend to the job with an established track record, fewer domestic commitments with adult children. Offsetting declining productivity over tenure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective Time: Facilitating</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring sufficient time allocations for accelerating new ideas, networking. Building in breaks, time for play, improvisation (Crossan et al, 2005), emergence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective Time: Synthesizing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing diary appointments to have time to reflect, balancing time, being internally and externally aware. Prioritising agenda items before and within meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective Time: Championing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Time: Synthesizing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Time: Facilitating</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Time: Synthesizing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Time: Championing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Time: Implementing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Socially Constructive Relative Time: Facilitating</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socially Constructive Relative Time: Synthesizing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Socially Constructive Relative Time: Championing</strong></td>
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Socially Constructive Relative Time: Implementing

Urgency of deadlines in different industries, countries, e.g. a hybrid manager brings commercial high velocity pacing (Eisenhardt, 1989b) into an academic culture as a catalyst for new ventures (Gersick, 1994) but needs to be context sensitive. Succession effects – comparisons of performance with predecessors’ records.

If the dimensions of time and strategic roles are considered at the five levels of individual manager, business unit, institution, industry and wider environment, it can be seen that the upper middle manager’s attempts to be context sensitive are fraught with multiple considerations. For example, synthesizing information is influenced by different stages in the life cycles of the middle managers, whether they are mid-career or close to retirement in terms of their intellectual and physical energy to travel, their propensity to take risks, and tolerance for coping with the daily grind. For example, dealing with the ‘deadly dull issue of university “administration”’ (Dearlove, 1998) can really enervate deans. Middle managers need to be aware of path dependencies and the vicissitudes of the unit’s performance when formulating strategy. Other time-related considerations include the cycle of the tenure of the middle manager’s superior, successor effects (Brown, 1982; Beatty and Zajac, 1987), timing of strategic reviews, lags (typically two years in league table results and for publishing journal articles), psychological shocks in consulting about new ideas. In complex public sector organisations like universities, middle managers’ roles are shaped by the different temporal perceptions within professional subcultures internally and externally such as the acceptability and sequencing of evolutionary and revolutionary change (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), financial and quality auditors’ expectations. The middle managers’ activities involve entrainment, i.e. ‘the adjustment of the pace or cycle of one activity to match or synchronize with that of another’ (Ancona and Chong,
Middle managers’ roles demand that they facilitate windows of opportunity for serendipity, boundary spanning, mentoring, negotiating, timely announcements, down time for reflection, delegating to avoid overload, fatigue, and stress caused by time famine (Perlow, 1999). They need space to add value and to enhance their personal productivity. All these activities amount to a real balancing act within a fixed-term tenure just for the synthesizing roles in Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) framework given here as an example. This is in an environment when tangible results are expected and there are clear constraints on management autonomy.

In drawing on temporal literature, this thesis is mindful of individuals’ biographies and career trajectories. It is aware of how different type of institutions and the business school industry have evolved. The study also considers changes over time in UK public sector policy such as Thatcher’s education cuts, the introduction of significant tuition fees in England, and the impact of global recessions.

At the level of the middle manager, Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) five seasons of a CEO’s tenure can be applied to the senior middle manager’s changing mandate in one particular position. This model explains why managers’ strategic practices shift as they focus on different tasks at various stages in their tenure as they move through the five seasons of:

1. response to mandate
2. experimentation
3. selection of an enduring theme
The argument is that often executive tenures of long duration result in declining performance. In Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (ibid) framework, following initial experimentation with the going-in mandate, an executive fixes on a strategy but if they stay too long or fail to implement strategic renewal, they can experience strategic drift. Gabarro (1985, 2007) notes that it takes a new manager a long time to take charge in the first season through the processes of taking hold, immersion, reshaping, consolidation, and refinement. In their models, neither Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) nor Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) consider managers’ behaviours prior to being appointed and taking up a new role. This period may represent a significant opportunity for synthesis and for revisiting the going-in mandate. Antecedents and consequences matter in organisations’ histories. Figure 4 depicts Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) conceptualisation graphically for one example as an executive attends to tasks in different seasons. The co-authors acknowledge that the seasons are not necessarily linear, sequential or all fulfilled within a tenure. Hambrick and Fukutomi admit that their model can apply to any manager, not just the upper echelons. In their framework, a manager’s task knowledge rises over the tenure then plateaus. Task interest is high at the outset then falls.

Commitment to the going in paradigm may initially fall as the gap between reality and aspirations stated at the appointment interview is re-interpreted and then it strengthens. The executive’s power increases year-on-year as the range of sources of information the individual manager draws on declines.
Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) five seasons of a CEO’s tenure can be applied at the senior middle management level in this study. While the article is conceptual, the model could be used diagnostically to map a dean’s trajectory. The framework assumes that an executive’s paradigm is based on the interplay between the incumbent’s schema and repertoire, i.e. cognitive map and toolbox such as experiences of negotiating. This paradigm changes over the course of the tenure. Hambrick and Fukutomi (ibid: 728) suggest in relation to the experimentation stage of an executive’s tenure: ‘During this phase CEOs may relax their commitment to their paradigms, attempt new approaches to running their

Figure 4: An example of variations in tasks over an executive’s tenure
enterprises, and generally try broader gauged methods than they were willing to attempt in the initial days of their tenures.’ This echoes Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) facilitating adaptability role. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) see the first season as an opportunity for ‘reshaping’ previously agreed strategy. Response to mandate in Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (ibid) model maps on to Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) synthesizing information, making sense of the given strategy. The third season of an enduring theme allows for championing a message, while the fourth season of convergence echoes Floyd and Wooldridge’s (ibid) role of implementing deliberate strategy. The final season of dysfunction may link to Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1996) negative stereotypes.

The key phases over the tenure are outlined in Table 5.
Table 5: Hambrick and Fukutomi’s five seasons model

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<th>Season One: Response to mandate</th>
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<td>During the first season, the ‘going-in mandate’, the organisation’s (implicit) specific agenda as to why the executive was appointed (e.g. continuity, radical change) and the incumbent’s initial promises based on their track record are reviewed. This stage is ‘characterized by the CEO’s relatively high commitment to his or her paradigm..., relatively low task knowledge, use of diverse information sources, high task interest, and low power’ (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991: 728).</td>
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<th>Season Two: Experimentation</th>
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<td>This includes a phase of reshaping and considering divergent options.</td>
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<th>Season Three: Enduring theme</th>
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<td>The third stage is when there is recrystallisation of the paradigm, refinement, and readjustment.</td>
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<th>Season Four: Convergence</th>
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<td>In the fourth season, ‘[t]he CEO’s commitment to his or her paradigm is strong and getting stronger; task knowledge has increased greatly since the CEO arrived, but it has reached a plateau; the person is exposed to an ever narrower and more filtered information flow; task interest has started to wane, but the CEO’s power is relatively great and is still increasing’ (ibid: 731).</td>
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<th>Season Five: Dysfunction</th>
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<td>Season five can be quite prolonged. At this time, ‘[j]ob mastery gives way to boredom; exhilaration to fatigue; strategizing to habituation...inwardly the spark is dim; openness and responsiveness to stimuli are diminished...[the executive] will become more involved in ceremonies that are comfortable and less involved in acts of substance...[their] outside interests may increase as [they] search for new stimuli...[because they are] disengaged psychologically.’</td>
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Middle managers with experiences of working in high velocity environments (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) adopt distinct behaviours because of intense competition. Attitudes are also influenced by career progression, for example the state of ‘middlescence’ when managers are ‘[b]urned-out, bottlenecked, and bored’ (Morison et al, 2006: 78) as indicated in Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) dysfunctional season. The ability of middle managers to perform strategic roles is also affected by practical issues like executive travel (DeFrank et al, 2000) and more broadly by management fashions (Birnbaum, 2000), economic turbulence impacting on leaders (Lorange, 2010), industry dynamism (Henderson et al, 2006) over time, and locally by levels of centralisation which may swing like a pendulum during an institution’s history.
7. Summary and conclusion

This chapter has reviewed two literature streams, firstly on strategy-as-practice (SAP) and middle managers, and secondly research on time in organisations as a contingent factor in extending Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) roles to contextualise practices. Studies of middle managers have neglected the multiple temporal dimensions of upper middle managers’ strategic behaviours in the public sector. There is also a research gap in understanding social constructions of mid-level strategists over time at multiple levels (the individual, business unit, institution, industry, and society) who engage with a gamut of different professionals in complex settings. This thesis seeks to enhance our understanding of upper middle managers in a professionalised business unit. It connects individuals’ micro-strategizing in Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) role typology with local and macro contingencies to inform categories of strategist archetypes.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE RESEARCH SETTING

1. Introduction

This chapter provides insights into the research context to understand the backdrop against which the middle managers in this study are operating as strategic actors. To support a contingency approach, historical industry and institutional dynamics are considered here. With the exception of Gallos (2002), there is little research on business school leaders as middle managers to illustrate the experiences of these hybrids in professionalised contexts. Thomas et al (2013b: 202) argue that: ‘Business school deans are confronted with leading not only complex organisational forms but also reconciling diverse stakeholder interests in an era of “hyper competition”’ and yet ‘there is only limited coverage of the practice and role of deans.’ Wilkins and Huisman (2012: 381) admit in their research on rankings that they overlooked the individual level of the dean in not collecting data to ‘investigate in-depth particular strategies of individual business schools. Neither have we been able to detect the impact of great leaders of business schools.’ The pluralistic culture of an academic department in a professional school lends itself to an investigation of hybridity and the challenges of leading from a middle position.

Chapter four comprises a literature review of: (i) debates on business schools; (ii) an analysis of articles on business and management education in nine leading publications; (iii) a review of global developments in the business school industry; (iv) the policy context for British management education 1945–2013; (v) a specific overview of the development of Warwick Business School as the main institutional study in the second phase of the empirical data collection; and finally
(vi) literature on the business school deanship. These insights help to understand
deans’ behaviours, strategic choices, and macro-drivers influencing their micro-
practices.

2. Debates on business schools

This initial section reviews debates on business schools and business and
management education to contextualise the deanship historically in terms of
dominant discourses and future challenges.

As a past President of AACSB International, Honorary Life Member of EFMD,
former Chair of the Association of Business Schools (ABS), i.e. the major
accreditation and professional bodies in the USA, Europe, and UK, Howard Thomas
is uniquely placed to reflect on his first hand experiences of business schools
globally. A review of Thomas’s work on business and management education
provide a useful understanding of developments in business schools. From his
unique combination of experiences as a serial business school dean on three
continents (America, Asia, and Europe), Thomas has written about business school
leadership (Davies and Thomas, 2009; Fragueiro and Thomas, 2010a, 2010b, 2011;
Thomas and Thomas, 2011; Thomas et al, 2013a, 2013b) and about management
research (Thomas, 2009; Thomas and Wilson, 2009). He suggests that the
European model of business schools (Antunes and Thomas, 2007; Thomas, 2012)
is heterogeneous and based more on stakeholder capitalism than the hegemonic
US model. From the perspective of a highly cited strategic management scholar,
Thomas has reflected on the ‘competitive dynamics of management education’
(Thomas, 2007a) and ‘metrics for its success’ (Thomas, 2007b). Thomas (2007c)
has edited special issues of the *Journal of Management Development* (2009, 2011, 2012 and 2014) and a *Global Focus* supplement (Thomas et al, 2007) on the ‘role, value and purpose’ of management education. Most recently, Thomas et al (2013b: ix) have asked whether business schools are at tipping and tripping points where they need to ‘reinvent themselves and regain a new sense of identity and legitimacy among their key stakeholders.’ He argues that the high fees for business schools are unsustainable (Peters and Thomas, 2011a, 2011b; Thomas and Peters, 2012), given the effects of new technology (Thomas and Thomas, 2012). The future of business schools (Thomas, 2011, 2012; Thomas and Cornuel, 2011) and their legitimacy (Thomas and Cornuel 2012; Wilson and Thomas, 2012; Thomas et al, 2014) are viewed as key concerns in the business school community. Although a recent survey (Thomas et al, 2012) indicated that Henry Mintzberg, Peter Drucker, and C.K. Prahalad were at the time regarded as the most influential opinion leaders on management education, thinkers with a particular interest in the practice of management, accusations that business schools are self-serving, too detached from society, and produce arcane research that practitioners do not read appear as common themes in surveys and at conferences for business school deans (Thomas et al, 2013a).

Ken Starkey at Nottingham University Business School has also sustained an active interest in policy debates on modes of business and management research (e.g. Tranfield and Starkey, 1998; Starkey et al, 2009; Hodgkinson and Starkey, 2010). He contributed to the advisory group for the CEML report (2002) on the role of UK business schools in developing managers and leaders nationally. With his
colleagues, Starkey has considered different ways of designing the business school (Starkey et al, 2004), its future prospects (Starkey and Tempest, 2005). He has recommended changes such as the inclusion of entrepreneurship education (Binks et al, 2006) and the humanities (Starkey and Tempest, 2006) in the curriculum. Importantly, Starkey critically evaluates the purpose of business schools ‘beyond the bottom line’ (Starkey and Tiratsoo, 2007), advocating a model of the agora, which is a knowledge forum for multiple stakeholders. Thomas et al (2013b: 184) explain that Starkey’s model views business schools as more inclusive than just a source of credentials for private gain; they describe the agora as a ‘fourfold knowledge strategy – knowledge for management, knowledge for society, knowledge about management and knowledge about society.’ Patriotta and Starkey (2008) promote the importance of ‘moral imagination’ rather than the utilitarianism for which US business schools have often been criticised. In addition, Starkey and Tempest (2008, 2009a, 2009b) argue for business schools to develop a clearer sense of purpose now that the golden age for the US model of business schools appears to be over (Starkey, 2011).

3. Critiques of business and management education

This next section chronologically reviews literature that has critically appraised business schools and business and management education. At the end of the 1950s, the reports of the Ford (Gordon and Howell, 1959) and Carnegie (Pierson, 1959) Foundations criticised the quality of US business school faculty and the narrow curricula that concentrated on vocational skills. Simon (1991: 139) called these institutions ‘a wasteland of vocationalism that needed to be transformed into science-based professionalism.’ These reports resulted in a focus on scholarly
research publications and programmes that were more analytical. Subsequent criticism of business schools accused them of being disconnected from practice with an overly rational focus on maximising shareholder value. Ghoshal (2005: 76) argued that ‘by propagating ideologically inspired amoral theories, business schools have actively freed their students from any sense of moral responsibility.’ Podolny (2009) blamed business schools in part for the global financial crisis and Locke and Spender (2011) accused them of causing economic imbalance. Crainer and Dearlove (1998) attacked business schools for being supply driven and constructed in the faculty’s self-interest of pensions, publications, and their private consultancy work. Mintzberg (2004) argued for more real-world experiential learning and for business school students to consider responses to complex problems. Martin (2011), a long serving dean at Rotman, bemoaned casino capitalism that resulted in a detachment from the real market of making things which was manifested in the attitudes of the US model of the MBA. Zell (2001) also concluded that business schools had become too market-driven.

Prior literature includes insights from several deans who have written about their views on running business schools in North America (Gallos, 2002; Aspatore, 2006, 2008; Dhir, 2008; Moldoveanu and Martin, 2008). In Europe, Lorange (2008) has written extensively about his role at IMD. Based on his doctoral thesis, Fragueiro (Fragueiro and Thomas, 2011) explored political business school leadership at IMD, INSEAD, and London Business School (LBS) as well as IAE in Argentina, where Fragueiro was dean. Thomas (ibid) has detailed his reflections on his experiences as dean at Warwick Business School. Ferlie (Ferlie et al, 2010), who headed two
management departments in the University of London, reviews typologies of
types of business schools and advocates ‘a public interest school of
management.’ Additionally, deans of leading private Spanish business schools in
Barcelona and Madrid offer insights into the roles of business schools in the
corporate world and society (Canals, 2011, 2012; Iñiguez de Onzoño, 2011;
Sauquet in Morsing and Sauquet Rovira, 2011) and how business schools’
strategies are changing.

In the UK, head hunters have taken a long time to recruit to some deanships. For
example, at Imperial College it took 18 months before a new dean arrived from
the USA in 2013. Thomas et al (2012: 19) are concerned with ‘the deficit of
strategic leadership’ in business schools because often academics with leadership
potential do not step up to academic leadership roles as they perceive deans’ jobs
‘as multi-faceted, stressful and often characterised as similar to middle managers
squeezed between university presidents and demanding faculty members.’

Thomas (ibid) suggests that of the deans he has known ‘[a] few who have
experience, time and the courage, determination and resilience to follow through
their chosen path and strategic direction succeed.’ This type of dean is often
characterised as a level five leader ‘who blends extreme personal humility with
intense professional will’ (Collins, 2005: 135). Various biographies of business
schools provide glimpses into the deanship such as Goloskinski and Honack’s
(2008) history of Kellogg School of Management where Don Jacobs was dean for
26 years, accounts of INSEAD (Barsoux, 2000), and Cass (Williams, 2006).

Particularly influential business school deans who have written publicly about their
craft include George Bain (London Business School, Warwick Business School), Santiago Iñiguez de Onzoño (Instituto Empresa), Dipak Jain (Kellogg, INSEAD), Peter Lorange (IMD, Lorange Institute), Arnoud de Meyer (Cambridge Judge), Nitin Nohria (Harvard), Kai Peters (Ashridge), and Howard Thomas (Singapore Management University).

4. Key challenges

This next section outlines key challenges facing business school deans.

Undoubtedly, business schools in North America and Europe have been successful as profitable businesses and as significant income generators (Pfeffer and Fong, 2004) for their universities during years of unprecedented growth. There has, nevertheless, been a steady commentary on business schools that questions their credibility, purpose, and justifications for their confidence levels (Gioia, 2002). Comments related to business schools and economic crises suggest that business schools are in part to blame (Gioia, 2002; Podolny, 2009; Currie et al, 2010). Even in the early 1980s, Hayes and Abernathy (1980: 67) suggested that ‘[m]odern management principles may cause rather than cure sluggish economic performance.’

Rankings represent a particular fixation in leading business schools. The FT rankings began in 2001. Jain and Golosinksi (2009: 105) try and put rankings into perspective, arguing that business schools should ‘regard rankings as one part of a comprehensive feedback portfolio.’ Much has been written about ambivalent attitudes towards rankings (Dichev, 1999; Gioia and Corley, 2002; Fee et al, 2005; Bradshaw, 2007; Peters, 2007; Adler and Harzing, 2009; Wedlin, 2010). Khurana
(2007) talks of the tyranny of rankings that has resulted in a dysfunctional focus on earning and impression management rather than learning. Most recently, business school rankings reveal a fall in US business schools and a rise for European and Asian business schools as world power appears to be moving east (Collet and Vives, 2013). In addition to rankings, various writers have been exercised about the benefits of accreditations (Dillard and Tinker, 1996; Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2006; Trapnell, 2007; Urgel, 2007; Zammuto, 2008; Lowrie and Willmott, 2009).

The issue of homogenisation (Wilson and McKiernan, 2011) as a result of accreditations and rankings is important in the context of the dominance of a US model of business and management education and the preference in many parts of the world for faculty with US doctorates.

The value of the MBA has been singled out for particular critique. Yeaple (2012) reports on regular articles about the downturn in MBA applications of up to 50% in each of the years 1985, 1993, 2005, and 2011. The significant decline in MBA applications (Bradshaw, 2012a; Bradshaw, 2012b) means that students have greater choice. While Lataif (1992), former dean of Boston University’s School of Management, thought the traditional MBA model was doomed, Schlegelmilch and Thomas (2011) question whether the MBA will even exist in 2020. Mintzberg (2004) complained about what he perceived as the narrow pre-experience MBA curriculum in many US business schools. Indeed, Navarro (2008) claims that the MBA core curricula at top-ranked US business schools have been an exercise in failure. Many MBA graduates plan to work in financial services or management consulting rather than perhaps for other more noble organisations. Contardo and Wensley (2004) question the influence and limitations of a reliance on Harvard
Business School case studies in MBA programmes. Ironically, for Harvard Business School’s centenary, Datar et al (2011) provided six case studies on how top business schools (the Centre for Creative Leadership, Chicago, Harvard, INSEAD, Stanford, and Yale) revamped their MBA programmes to be more integrated, to include more critical thinking, and encourage a sense of social responsibility amongst students. The MBA oath (Anderson and Escher, 2010) was strongly encouraged by Khurana and Nohria, a leading management professor and the current dean at Harvard Business School. In a highly read article, Rubin and Dierdorff (2011) drew attention to the Abilene paradox of business school deans knowing that alumni wished they had received more soft skills training during their MBAs, yet deans are still prioritising hard analytical skills development.

Furthermore, debates about professionalism (Trank and Rynes, 2003) and the failed professionalisation of management project (Khurana and Nohria, 2008) are also part of the business school discourse on legitimacy. Khurana (2007) notes the ‘unfulfilled promise’ of the ‘management as a profession’ project as it was hijacked by a ‘market fundamentalism’ focused solely on financial results rather than responsible management and initiatives such as 50 + 20.

Insiders have been vociferous about the limitations of business schools. Pfeffer and Fong (2002, 2004) found fault in US business schools, claiming that they produce research that is not sufficiently scientific and that they are overly focused on the market. Even more stridently, Ghoshal (2005) accused business schools generally of amorality, and of providing teaching that damaged good management practices. Locke and Spender (2011) called business schools to account for
promoting an absence of ethical leadership, and for concentrating on the rationality of financial economics at the expense of society. Similarly, Khurana (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2009) added to the criticism: ‘I think where business schools went wrong was starting to see themselves as business and not enough as education. Too much of contemporary business education offers a narrow concept of the role of business in society.’ In response to such criticisms, business schools are partnering with various institutions to enhance their credibility, to portray a sense of humanism and social responsibility in the eyes of multiple stakeholders. These include initiatives with GRLI (Globally Responsible Leadership) and PRME (Principles for Responsible Management Education).

University-based business school deans must deal with the diversity of a myriad of stakeholders: academic faculty, accreditation agencies, employers, government, regulators, organisations, the media, parents, professional bodies, publishers, society, students, and universities. There are inherent tensions in providing a portfolio of products and services for high quality teaching, research, and engagement with practice. Thomas and Peters (2012) express serious concerns about the luxurious model of premium fees (Peters and Thomas, 2011a, 2011b) that business schools charge, and the high cost base of faculty salaries and pension schemes. Table 6 summarises typical debates in the literature on business schools (Ivory et al, 2006: 7).
Table 6: Conflicting themes in debates about business schools

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<tr>
<td>1. Business school research is too abstract and irrelevant to the needs of practising managers.</td>
<td>Not enough business school research is grounded in the methodological rigour of the social sciences, it is often too case based and discursive.</td>
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<td>2. Business school teaching is too theoretical, and not sufficiently focused on problems that managers actually face.</td>
<td>Business school teaching is too ‘customer focused’ and not sufficiently distant from, and critical of, management practice.</td>
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<td>3. MBAs, and business degrees generally, do not produce well rounded managers with leadership qualities.</td>
<td>MBAs are, or for a long time were, seen as a passport to career progression and greater earning power.</td>
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<td>4. Business education has made almost no impression on practising managers, and has failed to impact business performance.</td>
<td>Business schools are partly culpable for recent corporate scandals, and therefore have had a negative impact on business performance.</td>
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<td>5. There are too many business schools. Many of those taking degrees in management are unlikely to benefit much from their studies.</td>
<td>There are not enough business schools, UK firms cannot reliably on the university sector to supply the training/education that their managers need.</td>
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In such an environment of manifold criticisms, deans have to think strategically about existing business school models (Lorange, 2000, 2005; Thomas et al, 2013b). Thomas (2012: 21) suggests that the European model of a business school is distinguished by a focus on socially responsible capitalism, engagement with organisations and employees, globalisation, quality assurance, the development of soft and critical thinking skills, i.e. ‘a more balanced, and somewhat less analytically rigorous, perspective on management education’ than in the USA. In the UK, for example, there has been a tradition in many business schools of focusing on action learning, engagement with practice, customising executive education, and international outreach. Framing the identity and purpose of the business school is an important strategic activity for the dean. Bennis and O’Toole (2005: 98) ask ‘[w]hy have business schools embraced the scientific model of physicists and economists rather than the professional model of doctors and lawyers?’ Ferlie et al (2010) offer a range of different models including the public
interest school of management. Lorange (2012) provides a franchise model as one alternative while De Meyer (2011) argues that business schools should become schools for business. Pfeffer and Fong (2002) suggest business schools should model themselves on other professional schools rather than on arts and sciences, otherwise there is a danger of obsolescence.

Proposals for reconfiguring business education in the future are plentiful (Hitt, 1998; Calder and Tybout, 1999; Hawawini, 2005; Cornuel, 2007; Durand and Dameron, 2008, Thomas, 2011, 2012). In terms of rethinking the content provided by business schools, an entrepreneurial mindset is being encouraged (Chia, 1996; Binks et al, 2006), with a focus on innovation (Sullivan, 2011), and design thinking (Moldoveanu and Martin, 2008). Grey (2002, 2004) advocates the benefits of critical management education instead of a model of business schools as élite finishing schools that discourage reflection and represent ‘[t]he pedagogy of the privileged’ (The Economist, 2009: 82). Jain (UDaily, 2010), former dean of Kellogg and INSEAD, observed: ‘Now in the 21st century, we see the rise of Asia, China and India, and a shift in focus to human capital development and competencies.’ He viewed the purpose of business schools as ‘knowledge creation, knowledge dissemination and knowledge certification’ rather than as just credentialism.

The business school industry in the West has matured and become increasingly complex, resulting in the need to rethink current realities and uncertainties (Stacey, 2009). Business schools seem to be experiencing a crisis of legitimacy, with talk of a ‘new vision’ (Porter, 2004), reinvention (Grey, 2004; Thomas and Cornuel, 2012a), rethinking (Starkey et al, 2004; Schoemaker, 2008), retraining.
The angst about the legitimacy of management education has been manifold (Spender, 2005; Thomas and Wilson, 2011). Wilson and McKiernan (2011: 457) astutely observe that while EFMD’s Director General and CEO, Eric Cornuel (2005: 469) stated confidently in 2005 that ‘[b]usiness schools have without any doubt reached legitimacy in the field of education’, by 2012 Cornuel was admitting that ‘[i]t is commonly argued that business schools lack legitimacy’ (Thomas and Cornuel, 2012b: 444).

From a holistic standpoint, Khurana (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2009) advises: ‘[w]e need to look at the totality of the system of employers, students, faculty, curriculum, faculty-promotion criteria, rankings as a whole and think about how we get system change if we want profound improvement.’ Noorda (2012) emphasizes the institutional positioning of business schools within universities, arguing for greater autonomy to enable differentiation. Mintzberg (2009) offers a solution at the individual level: ‘As Stanford University emeritus professor James G. March put it: “Leadership involves plumbing as well as poetry.” Instead of distinguishing leaders from managers, we should encourage all managers to be leaders. And we should define “leadership” as management practiced well.’ Jain and Golosinski (2009: 105) warn that ‘[c]ertainly business schools must continue justifying their existence in ways that add value for their stakeholders, lest these institutions risk tumbling into irrelevance.’
The European Foundation for Management Education has produced the magazine *Global Focus* since 2007. To provide an overview of changing preoccupations in the sector, Figure 6 highlights the key themes covered in this practitioner publication for business schools and corporate universities. Articles on leadership appear to be the most common focus, with a regular concern for the MBA curriculum, globalisation, and corporate learning. There has also been a particular interest in management education in China, discussions about whether business schools are to blame for the financial crisis, and the future of business schools. Issues relating to research, doctoral programmes, and sustainability also feature in this business school industry publication. Other concerns include programme quality, the role of business schools in society, culture and teaching. Commentary by deans of leading business schools, e.g. Cambridge, IESE, IMD, INSEAD, London Business School, Stanford, are also featured. Only three articles have been included on the roles of university-based business school deans (Davies, 2008; Davies and Thomas, 2010; Davies and Laing, 2011). Appendix 2 further summarises articles on business schools in eight peer reviewed academic journals which indicate similar preoccupations.
5. Global developments in the business school industry

The aim of this next background section is to contextualize the business school deanship with a historical overview of how the business school industry has evolved. These insights can be linked to the empirical data. The first part reviews the development of the US model of business and management education. The second section compares this with Europe and other parts of the world to provide an external framework for the main debates on business and management education and research. Third, we concentrate on the phenomenal growth in British business schools since the second half of the 20th century and its maturity as an industry sector. Despite the position of UK business schools as relative newcomers within higher education globally, there has been considerable
expansion since the 1960s. Finally, this section reflects briefly on future prospects for business schools.

5.1 Historical developments and debates in North America

In the USA, business and management education had a much earlier start than in the UK. It has been a remarkable success in terms of revenue generation and accreditation (Zammuto, 2008). Wharton School, which was founded in 1881 at the University of Pennsylvania, is considered to be the first collegiate business school. Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College was established in 1900 and Harvard’s ‘delicate experiment’ (Cruikshank, 1987) created Harvard Business School in 1908 with a focus on case studies. The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB International) began in 1916 and it accredited business schools worldwide from 1919. The Academy of Management was formed in the USA in 1936.

There have been several influential reports on the value of business and management education in the USA. The Ford and Carnegie Foundations heavily criticised business and management education nationally. The Ford Foundation Report (Gordon and Howell, 1959) had a major impact on the quality of faculty credentials, student, curriculum and research. It recommended that business schools ‘need to move in the direction of a broader and more rigorous educational program, with higher standards of admission and student performance, with better informed and more scholarly faculties that are capable of carrying on more significant research’ (ibid: 425). The Ford Foundation Report resulted in business
schools teaching ethics, focusing more on theory and analysis, reducing the
number of case studies, and improving regulation. The Carnegie Foundation
Report (Pierson, 1959) complained of a lack of rigour in US business schools and
resulted in significant improvements in undergraduate business and management
education. Thirty years later, the Porter McKibbin Report, commissioned by
AACSB, called for: change and innovation; strategic planning by business schools
and clear mission statements; a curriculum with breadth, an external,
international and social focus; quality standards for faculty development and
recommendations ‘for business schools to turn for enrichment to virtually all
sectors of the university’ and the corporate community.

Other important commentators on business and management education in the
USA include the Nobel Memorial Prize winner in Economic Sciences Herbert Simon,
who noted the practice–theory gap. Simon (1967: 16) observed that: ‘Organizing a
professional school...is very much like mixing oil with water...Left to themselves,
the oil and water will separate again. So also will the disciplines and the
professions. Organizing, in these situations, is not a once-and-for-all activity. It is a
continuing administrative responsibility.’

Subsequently, in the 21st century, at the time of Enron’s collapse in 2004,
Mintzberg (2004) was seriously questioning the value of pre-experience, highly
quantitative, formulaic and self-serving American MBA programmes. Ghoshal
(2005: 75) suggested that ‘we—as business school faculty—need to own up to our
own role in creating Enrons. Our theories and ideas have done much to strengthen
the management practices that we are all now so loudly condemning.’ Moreover,
Khurana (2007) lamented the ‘unfulfilled promise of management as a profession.’ He wrote that ‘[t]he logic of professionalism that underlay the university-based business schools in its formative phase was replaced first by a managerialist logic that emphasized professional knowledge rather than professional ideas, and ultimately by a market logic that, taken to its conclusion, subverts the logic of professionalism altogether’ (ibid: 7). In their review of the remarkable post World War Two growth in business and management education in the USA, Augier and March (2011: 276) recommended that business schools in future should ‘veer away from dominance by economists’ to become more ethical and professional.

So, how do business school deans make sense of this barrage of criticism to determine what to do strategically on a daily basis? At a practical level in terms of investigating deans’ activities in this thesis, Figure 7 provides a model of the generic types of activities that different models of business schools engage in (Ivory et al, 2006: 16). The dimensions suggest that some business schools focus on undergraduate teaching, graduate schools may concentrate on research, while others adopt a social science, liberal arts, or knowledge economy orientation or concern themselves with training for professional bodies, e.g. accountants, human resource professionals. It is vital that deans determine the school’s identity and purpose if strategic drift is to be avoided.
5.2 British business schools

The section that follows shifts the focus to the UK, where business schools have experienced phenomenal growth since the mid-1960s. One in seven students and 25% of overseas students in the UK are currently studying business and management (ABS, 2012). The origins of university-based business and management education in the UK began with the establishment of professional associations in the 19th century and independent formal management education became more developed after the Second World War, with the need for greater production and competition (Williams, 2010). Birmingham University’s School of Commerce (now Birmingham Business School) claims to be England’s oldest business school, founded in 1902. Following the Franks Report (1963), London Business School (LBS) was founded in 1964 as the London Graduate School of Business (its MBA was ranked number three in 2013 in the Financial Times).
European Business Schools ranking). Manchester Business School was established at the same time. Appendix 3 provides an overview of when key UK business schools were established.

Most non-private business schools/schools of management in the UK are university-based, with exceptions such as Ashridge. London Business School is highly autonomous. Many UK business schools are full service, offering a range of undergraduate, postgraduate, executive, and doctoral programmes. LBS and Cranfield do not offer undergraduate programmes. Cambridge Judge and Saïd Business Schools focus predominantly on postgraduate study. Figure 8 shows that in 2012 the UK had the highest number (16 compared with 12 in France) of triple accredited (AACSB, AMBA, EQUIS) business schools in the world (Ashridge Business School, Aston Business School, Bradford University School of Management, Cass Business School, Cranfield School of Management, Durham Business School, ESCP Europe London, Henley Business School, Imperial College Business School, Lancaster University Management School, London Business School, Manchester Business School, Open University Business School, University of Sheffield Management School, Strathclyde Business School, Warwick Business School). This suggests that British business and management education represents a mature industry.
6. Overview of UK business and management education

6.1 Introduction

All UK universities offer business and management programmes. Since 1980, government funding for undergraduate teaching has declined, teaching class sizes have grown, and student contact time has been reduced. Challenges facing UK business schools include drastic reductions in MBA enrolments, reductions in UK students registering for part-time study, and a rise in specialist Master’s programmes. Many UK business schools have suffered financially because of the UK Border Agency’s immigration policy restricting student visas. There is a strong culture of accountability and audit despite significant reductions in state funding and devolved governance outside England. The Research Excellence Framework is an overwhelming preoccupation in most research-led business schools. Yet businesses face pressing social challenges that business schools are failing to
address adequately. These include, for example, the six challenges for multidisciplinary research that the UK Research Councils (n.d.) prioritise: the digital economy; energy; global food security; global uncertainties, security for all in a changing world; living with environmental change; lifelong health and wellbeing.

6.2 A historical view of the UK’s higher education landscape

This section provides an overview of UK higher education. Despite their phenomenal success, UK business schools are relative newcomers, especially in the oldest universities. The development of universities in the UK is delineated by five major periods with varying levels of funding, impact, and access. These include: (i) the founding of ancient, self-governing universities from the 12th century, that initially focused on classical scholarship for undergraduates (Halsey, 1992); (ii) the establishment of red brick institutions before the First World War followed by (iii) a second wave of civics; (iv) the creation following the 1963 Robbins Report of plate glass universities; and (v) from 1992 the conversion of polytechnics to new universities. The University of Oxford was founded before 1167, followed by Cambridge, St Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Edinburgh, known as the ancients. In the 19th century various other universities were formed including Durham, the University of London, Queen’s Belfast, Aberystwyth, Royal Holloway, Cardiff, Bangor, Queen Mary University of London, and the London School of Economics and Political Science. The red brick civic universities emerged before the First World War, for example Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, and Sheffield. Subsequently, a second wave of civic universities was established: Swansea, Reading, Nottingham, Southampton, Hull, Exeter and
Leicester. The Robbins Report (1963) recommended immediate expansion and Colleges of Advanced Technology were renamed as universities. This led in the 1960s to the doubling of UK universities from 20 to 43, with plate glass universities including the seven sisters, campus universities (East Anglia, Essex, Kent, Lancaster, Sussex, York), of which Warwick University was one. The Open University opened in 1969 and Buckingham was established in 1976 as a private university. The Further and Higher Education Act 1992 resulted in the removal of the binary divide and the creation from former polytechnics of the so-called new or post 1992 universities. In 2014, Universities UK has 134 members.

In terms of funding, initially universities were mainly private, operating on fees and endowments, and relatively autonomous from the government. In 1919, the Universities Grant Council (UGC) was established to distribute government funds (Shattock, 1994). After the Second World War and until the middle of the 1960s, government funding for universities increased and the UGC gained greater authority. Polytechnics were accountable to Local Education Authority Boards and they were more managerialist than universities. They had less autonomy, adopted an applied industry focus but earned far less research income than universities. The Robbins Report (1963) introduced massification of higher education to enhance the UK’s intellectual capital. Its stated widening participation intention was ‘that courses of higher education should be available for all those who are qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so.’

Subsequently, the Jarratt Report (1985) introduced the notion of the student as customer, and performance indicators for academics with the abolition of tenure.
It advocated the need for dedicated managers and there was an inevitable increase in managerialism. The 1988 Educational Reform Act replaced the UGC (University Grants Committee) with the University Funding Council (UFC). There was a new funding body for polytechnics and greater marketisation.

Clearly, the dissolution of the binary divide was a significant juncture in the history of UK higher education. The Higher Education Funding Council (HEFC) was created and the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) of 1992 was introduced to fund research excellence competitively. This period marked an audit culture and a concern with university governance and formal performance appraisals. It included Teaching Quality Audits conducted by the QAA regulatory body, capping of student numbers, annual league tables, greater public scrutiny, and a decline in government funding per student. In response, universities had to diversify their sources of income and portfolios. While the late 1960s and 1970s had been a period of significant expansion and change, the Thatcher government’s policy in the 1980s represented a sharp shock to the higher education sector.

Subsequently, the 1997 Dearing Report represented another major watershed with a shift from full government undergraduate tuition grants to a mixed system of grants and tuition fees of £1,000 pa with student loans. Dearing also recommended that teaching staff receive some training in teaching. In 2004, the UK government increased the maximum tuition fee charge to £3,000 pa and in 2010/11 this was increased to £3,290 pa. The proposals in the white paper Students at the Heart of the System (BIS, 2011a) focused on reforming funding; delivering a better student experience; enabling universities to increase social mobility; and reducing regulation and removing barriers for new providers.
Although the Browne Review’s (2010) recommendation to remove the cap on tuition fees was rejected, in England from 2012/13 annual undergraduate tuition fees rose to a maximum of £9,000 pa, with different arrangements in the devolved nations. The National Student Survey (NSS) for all final year undergraduate students was introduced in 2005 and universities were required to produce Key Information Sets (KIS) for students from 2012. The Research Excellence Framework 2014 for the first time introduced the requirement to demonstrate impact of research (weighted as 20%), which it is assumed business schools should be able to evidence clearly. Research Councils UK (RCUK, 2011: 1) defines excellent research with impact in broad terms as ‘the demonstrable contribution that excellent research makes to society and the economy.’

It can be seen, therefore, that the national higher education landscape from which UK business schools emerged during the 1960s has on the one hand been a tale of the decline of donnish dominion (Halsey, 1992), falling morale (Watson, 2009), increasing managerialism (Deem et al, 2009), and marketisation (Molesworth et al, 2010). On the other hand, British universities experienced great success in terms of reputational measures. According to the 2011 Times Higher Education World Rankings, the UK was second only to the USA for the number of top 100 universities in the world. The UK had one in seven of the world’s top 200 universities The UK’s higher education system represents 8.4% of total service exports (Killingley, 2012). Non-EU student fee income exceeded £2.5 billion in 2010. UK business schools represent a significant component of the UK’s higher education industry and they are a key support for local economies (Cooke and Galt, 2010). In 2013, perceived threats included visa restrictions, technology and
online courses, graduate employability, the leadership pipeline, internal cross-subsidies to the university, quality of students, faculty and facilities, and intense transnational competition.

7. The policy context for UK management education since 1945

Section seven focuses on the evolution of British business and management education over 70 years. It notes concerns which persist about the delivery of business and management education. A series of reports has influenced the trajectory of management development and qualifications in the UK. Post Second World War initiatives included the 1945 Baillieu Report which led to the formation of the British Institute of Management. The Diploma in Management Studies (DMS) was an outcome of the Urwick Report (1947). Subsequently, new independent management colleges were established such as the Administrative Staff College at Henley-on-Thames in 1945 and Ashridge in 1959.

The 1960s were a significant period of industry–government partnership in funding the development of UK business and management education. In 1960, the Foundation for Management Education (FME) was set up by a group of interested individuals, parliamentarians, industrialists, chair of the UGC and the principal of the Administrative Staff College, who met in the House of Commons regularly to discuss improving the nation’s competitiveness through university-based management courses (Nind, 1985). One of the most significant commissions in Britain that boosted the development of UK business schools was the Robbins Report (1963) that called for the establishment of two leading postgraduate business schools. Lord Franks (1963) recommended two new business schools in
major conurbations within universities that allowed some autonomy. This resulted in the formation of London Business School and Manchester Business School that accepted their first intake of Master’s students in 1965 and 1966 respectively. The FME was a crucial player and administered an £8m campaign for university management education jointly funded by the private and public sectors. In terms of the management curriculum, the Crick Report (1964) recommended degree level qualifications that developed skills in enterprise and critical judgment and the provision of sandwich courses with time spent in industry. The *Journal of Management Studies* was launched in 1964, the Platt Report (1968) advocated the development of regional management centres, and the journal *Long Range Planning* began in 1968.

In the 1970s, the importance of capacity building to support the growth of management education was highlighted. The National Economic Development Council (NEDC) proposed the establishment of at least one British Harvard Business School or MIT Sloan equivalent which never quite materialised. This Rose Report (1970) also acknowledged the shortage of faculty and need for 300 new teachers in management, which resulted in FME sponsoring fellows to achieve doctorates and attend courses in business schools outside the UK. Mant (1970) raised questions about who were the consumers of management education. What is now called Emerald Group Publishing was started in 1970 to publish journals on management subjects. At this time, Owen (1971) questioned the quality of teachers and outputs from business schools. In response to the need identified to strengthen support for business and management education, the Council of University Management Schools (CUMS) was launched in 1971 to encourage
informal networking amongst university deans who provided management education. Then in 1972, FME initiated the ECCH case clearing house at Cranfield University. As a consequence of the 1978 Foy Report, conferences and seminars for individuals from academia and industry were also encouraged.

Following the 1963 Robbins Report, there was a rapid expansion in higher education, however, Thatcher’s public sector cuts in the 1980s changed the landscape significantly. Initiatives in the 1980s included AMBA accreditation in 1983. Kemper’s (1983) paper in the *Journal of General Management* opened up discussions on management education in five countries. Charles Handy (who had experienced US business schools) and Derek Pugh from London Business School designed the effective manager course for the new Open University Business School in 1983. Subsequently, the 1984 Jarratt Report produced efficiency studies in universities and led to Griffiths and Murray’s (1985) proposal that British business schools should be privatised (a call Shackleton repeated in 2012); however, this was rejected. Furthermore, the British Academy of Management (BAM) was established in 1986, the same year as the Council for Industry and Higher Education (CIHE, rebranded in 2013 as the National Centre for Universities and Business, NCUB). In 1987, the Constable McCormick report entitled *The Making of British Managers* highlighted the risks of universities treating business schools as cash cows (a persistent complaint by deans today, e.g. Matthews, 2011) and supported greater financial autonomy. It recognised that Britain’s managers received fewer training and development opportunities compared with competitors in other leading industrialised economies. The report advocated the need for more effective managers and the supply of management education for
economic growth. The Handy Report (Handy et al, 1987) was highly critical and prompted the British government to allow any university to offer an MBA. In 1987, the Association of Management and Business Education (AMBE) was formed to represent business and management activities in polytechnics and colleges.

On a positive note, the 1989 RAE recognised business and management research as a distinct unit of assessment, with UMIST and Warwick performing particularly well and thereby gaining legitimacy for a relatively new discipline. As Chairman of CUMS, George Bain actively promoted and defended the business school sector. He ensured that in 1988/89 CUMS became a limited company and charity with a part-time employee. CUMS contributed to the Constable McCormick and Handy Reports, the UGC RAE discussions, a House of Lords debate on management education and engaged with government departments and research councils. As a consequence, there was greater representation of business school members on key committees, especially research councils, where the success of management research grant applications were poor compared with economics and other social science subjects.

The 1990s saw the increasing professionalisation of business schools. In 1990, the British Journal of Management was initiated. CUMS and AMBE merged to form the Association of Business Schools (ABS) in 1992. George Bain was instrumental in drawing attention to raising standards in management research through the Bain Commission. He noted in the statements of evidence that ‘[c]oncern has been expressed for some time about the quality of much management research, about the arrangements for funding, and about the need to strengthen the research culture in business schools and departments in the United Kingdom’ (Bain, 1993a).
Moreover, Bain recommended that ‘[t]he distinctive contribution of management research should be, in the long run, improved productivity leading to increased real national wealth and provision of funds for urgent social issues’ (Bain, 1993b: 7) by improving managers’ understanding and practice. In the final report, Bain (1994: 5) concluded that ‘[m]anagement research still does not make enough impact on users and thus on management practice. But its capacity to do so is not in doubt.’ In reviewing the Bain commission documents, McLaughlin and Thorpe (1993: 21) argued that ‘management and management research is impoverished’ and that the commission missed an opportunity to enhance the role of the UK’s research on management.

Another significant milestone for UK business schools was the creation in Brussels of EQUAL, the European Quality Improvement System, to support EQUIS accreditation of business schools from 1996. In the UK, after the Dearing Report (1997), undergraduate tuition fees were introduced. At this time, Tranfield and Starkey (1998) stimulated discussions about government policy and ‘the nature, social organization and promotion of management research.’

In this historical overview, we note developments in the 21st century as UK business and management schools matured. The Cleaver Report (2002) recommended improving demand and supply for management and leadership development and the need to link the two. In 2001, the Association of Business Schools launched capacity building cohort development programmes for (aspiring) deans of business schools and in 2004 a joint programme was initiated with BAM for directors of research. Importantly, the Advanced Institute of Management Research (AIM) was formed in October 2002 (until 2011), funded by ESRC and
EPSRC, to enhance the UK’s international status by raising the standard of management research. This was followed soon afterwards by Lambert’s (2003) *Review of Business-University Collaboration*, which provided a boost in government funding for universities’ engagement with industry. The ‘new’ Manchester Business School was formed in 2004 following local mergers and the closure of UMSIT. In 2005, HEFCE’s National Student Survey administered by MORI for all final year degree students was launched except in Scotland. This highlighted dissatisfaction, particularly with large class sizes and problems with how the speed at which business schools provided assessment feedback. The Higher Education Academy (HEA) supported the Business, Management, Accountancy and Finance (BMAF) subject centre for teaching from 2006 until 2011. At this time, the Leitch Report (2006) *Prosperity for all in the Global Economy – World Class Skills* emphasized the importance of lifelong skills development for the UK’s economy. The ABS/EFMD International Deans’ Programme began in 2007. The Graduate Management Admission Council (GMAC), which owns the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), opened its offices in London in 2007. Henley Business School merged with Reading University in 2008 following difficulties in Henley operating as an independent business school and the decline in MBA student registrations.

As a result of the Warry Report (2006) on the economic impact of research, the new rules for impact case studies and publications for REF 2014 overshadowed many strategies for business schools where deans were seeking to enhance research reputations. The rise in capped tuition fees for undergraduates in England from 2012/13 represented a watershed amidst concerns about unhelpful
border agency regulations on visas for students and faculty. It resulted in universities becoming more reliant on business schools as income generators offering popular subjects with high overseas student numbers. The Association of Business Schools launched an innovation task force (Thorpe and Rawlinson, 2013) in response to the BIS *Innovation and Research Strategy for Growth Report* (BIS, 2011b). The Wilson Review (2012) of business–university collaboration, which suggested a need for business and management education to feature more visibly in public debates, scarcely mentioned business schools. At the same time, Heseltine’s (2012) review of UK growth and competitiveness led to a pilot study on the role of Local Enterprise Partnerships to boost city regions, an activity for which UK business schools are well placed. BIS also convened a business school MSB task force (2012) on UK business schools’ collaboration with mid-sized businesses. A shock development for business schools was the *FT*’s decision in 2011 to omit AMBA accreditation in its MBA rankings criteria.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, not only in the UK but worldwide, associations of business schools have been concerned about the future of business and management education and the roles of business schools in society. In 2011, the Australian Business Deans Council launched its future of management education project. In 2012 EFMD held a symposium in Berlin on ‘The Future of Management Education’ to discuss its draft manifesto, with discussions at its 2013 annual conference for deans on future paths for management education. AACSB’s Blue Ribbon Committee on Accreditation Quality produced new standards in spring 2013 to incorporate recommendations from its task forces on the impact of research (2008) and on innovation (2010). Most recently, the Whitty review (2013)
has highlighted the importance of business schools in supporting SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises). As a result, ABS launched a small business charter scheme.

8. An overview of Warwick Business School

The purpose of this section in Chapter four is to explain the research setting for the second dataset. Developments in the business school industry, institutional changes at Warwick University and WBS, and the government policy context are considered. It reviews the rationale for the choice of Warwick Business School as the main institutional case study in this thesis. Secondly, it provides an understanding of where WBS is located in time and strategic space. Thirdly, this part highlights stages in the development of WBS during tenures of successive chairmen/deans: from its foundations through to institution building, consolidation, strategic drift, strategic renewal, acting deanships, and intensified performance management in the 21st century. Finally, reflections are offered on strategic choices and key players and incidents as WBS has evolved. Appendix 4 provides an overview of developments internally and externally during the formation of WBS.

Following the pilot study with the first dataset of a dozen deans, Warwick Business School was chosen to collect insights for a second dataset in this thesis to yield in-depth views of successive deans. An understanding of the main features of WBS and critical incidents during successive business school deans’ appointments help to contextualise the strategic roles and practices of the deans interviewed in the second phase of the data collection for this thesis. Warwick Business School is a
research-intensive department within the Faculty of Social Studies at Warwick University rather than a faculty in its own right. It was first founded as the School of Industrial and Business Studies (SIBS) in 1967, two years after the University of Warwick itself was established. It took its current name in 1987. WBS is the largest department in the multi-faculty university located on a semi-rural campus on the boundary between the City of Coventry and the County of Warwickshire in the English West Midlands. This particular research site was selected for the following key reasons (also highlighted in Chapter five, Table 9):

(1) WBS is a leading European institution with a strong reputation in the business school sector and based in a well-ranked, multi-faculty university. In the Times Higher Education 100 Under 50 rankings of universities in the world that are less than 50 years old in 2013, Warwick University was rated number 13, second in the UK.

(2) WBS is excellent without being élite and so other deans may consider there are lessons to be learned from WBS. It is a recognisable type with a research intensive and social science profile (Ivory et al, 2006: 16). As Appendix 5 shows, during the period 1984–2010 in the UK, WBS was ranked in the top six business schools for undergraduate programmes, top 45 for teaching/MBA programmes, and top 10 in research. In the FT Global MBA Ranking 2014, WBS is ranked number 25.

(3) WBS is a full-service, university-based business school and therefore representative within the UK. This makes it accessible and familiar to readers from the sector and it is more likely to resonate with their experiences than a standalone business school.

(4) WBS was founded in the 1960s soon after major investment in UK business schools began. It has not attracted substantial philanthropic endowments and it is not located in a major capital city, which means that some of its achievements may seem possible to emulate. It did receive some FME funding before 1984. WBS has a recognisable educational model and so other business schools can reasonably benchmark their own accomplishments against it.
(5) Deans at WBS have been highly influential in shaping the UK’s business school sector. For example, the Bain Commission (1994) on management research, three Warwick deans have been chairs of the Association of Business Schools (or its predecessor CUMS, e.g. Bain, Wensley, Thomas). Several WBS deans have been very active in the British Academy of Management (e.g. former Deputy and Acting Dean David Wilson was president of BAM). Indeed, the first British Academy of Management conference was hosted by WBS in 1987. Other notable contributions to the business school world include Howard Thomas’s roles as President of AACSB, Dean of Fellows of the Strategic Management Society, and honorary life member of EFMD. Another WBS dean, Robin Wensley, was Chair of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations and became Director of the Advanced Institute of Management Research, an important national body funded by the ESRC and EPSRC. Several WBS deans have been editors of influential academic journals, e.g. Robert Dyson, Robert Galliers. In the BAM 25th anniversary issue of the *British Journal of Management* in 2011, over half of the 20 submissions included current and former WBS faculty members. The editors of this special issue who were both WBS faculty and have experiences of being deans Wilson and McKiernan (2011: 457) warned that ‘business schools have reached a plateau in their extraordinary growth trajectory and may be in danger of impending decline.’

(6) Warwick Business School is well-known in the sector and many of its former faculty have become deans in other business schools such as Aston, Bath, Bedfordshire, Birkbeck, Birmingham, Keele, Kent, King’s College London, Leicester, London Business School, Loughborough, Murdoch in Australia, Oxford, Royal Holloway University of London, Singapore Management University, St. Andrews, and Sussex. This suggests that facets of academic leadership practised at WBS have been applied more widely in the business school diaspora.

(7) This study has drawn on insights from several publications that have documented developments at Warwick University. For example, Thompson (1970) berated its commercial focus and student radicalisation but his concerns demonstrated Warwick’s enduring engagement with industry. Shattock (1991) provided a pictorial historical review that showed how the university evolved from a green field site. Clark (1998) described the ‘Warwick way’ in his book on entrepreneurial European universities and this mind set has proved valuable in times of government funding cuts and austerity. In her doctoral thesis at Warwick Business School, Jarzabkowski (2000) investigated top team strategizing centrally at Warwick University, LSE and Oxford Brookes University. Parker (2014) based his observations on WBS.
The rise of Warwick Business School as a leading research-led European business school has been remarkable given that it was only founded in 1967 on a green field site without the financial endowments of Oxbridge or without being singled out for special financial support in the Franks (1963) Report. The University Grants Committee (UGC) founded the Universities of East Anglia, Essex, Kent, Lancaster, Sussex, and York at the same time as Warwick to be solid undergraduate teaching institutions. Warwick University benefited from a pioneering philosophy at the outset with a strong commitment to research excellence. The University’s founding vice-chancellor, Lord Butterworth (1965–1985), emphasised interdisciplinary collaboration with strong industry–university links and a bold entrepreneurial orientation. The University hired faculty who had a fresh approach to the development of disciplines and interdisciplinarity within a culture of academic excellence and relevance. Lord Rootes, chair of a local car company in Coventry, was a strong supporter of the University as it was established in England’s manufacturing heartlands. Butterworth firmly established Warwick as a leading business facing institution. This philosophy has persisted despite the decline in the UK’s manufacturing base. Unlike in many research-intensive universities (notably Cambridge, Oxford, UCL), WBS was created soon after the University, indeed before the Warwick Manufacturing Group, WMG, (established in 1980) and the medical school (created in 2000). This may account for its relative autonomy within its parent institution. The strategic decision to create a business school in a research-intensive university demonstrated a commitment to business and management education since the origins of Warwick University. Importantly, the Department of Economics has gained an excellent reputation alongside the
Business School. Since its foundation, the hallmark of Warwick University has been its ‘dynamism, quality and entrepreneurial zeal’ (Tony Blair, 2000). Although Thompson (1970) vehemently protested against the commercialisation of the academy at Warwick University because of its closeness to industry, this bold orientation was rewarded in the 1980s when alternative sources of funding beyond government grants became essential. In response to Thatcher’s 10% cuts from 1981/2 to 1983/4, Warwick University’s legendary Registrar Mike Shattock instituted the Earned Income Group and a ‘save half, make half policy’ (Clark, 1998: 16) to ensure a plurality of funding, for example through conference centres and a science park.

WBS represents a strong business school in a strong university. In the 2008 RAE, the University of Warwick was ranked seventh in the UK amongst multi-faculty institutions. It is a member of the Russell Group of leading research universities with medical schools. By 2013, Warwick University has become a highly selective and popular university, well respected for research and teaching excellence. The 2013 Complete University Ranking listed Warwick University sixth, The Guardian ranked the University fifth and The Sunday Times placed it tenth in the UK. The chancellor, Sir Richard Lambert, illustrates elements of the entrepreneurial Warwick Way in his own career as a former director-general of the Confederation of British Industry, editor of the FT, and author of the 2003 Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration. The ambition of the Vice-Chancellor Nigel Thrift is to take Warwick into the top 50 world universities – as measured by the quality of research output and the strength of student demand – by the university’s 50th birthday in 2015 (Thrift, 2007).
Perhaps atypically for a business school, Warwick has been well-known throughout its history for industrial relations, public sector management, and work with small businesses. There is often a debate in business schools whether to integrate the department of economics. It is interesting to note that the Business School has always operated separately from the Department of Economics. The first chairman [sic] of the School Brian Houlden (1967–1973) had formerly headed the National Coal Board’s operational research group and so exemplified the School’s focus on applied research. He ensured SIBS maintained an independent and distinct identity by establishing a BSc in Management Sciences that was more academic than programmes offered by polytechnics. Initially, four professorial chairs sponsored by companies and the Institute of Directors were created. In addition, younger scholars in industrial relations such as Keith Sissons, Richard Hyman, and Robert Dyson in operational research were also appointed. From the start, there was a clear commitment to industry relevance and academic excellence, a frequent tension for business school deans. Hugh Clegg was the School’s research leader and role model as Director of the Centre for Industrial Economics and Business Research (CIEBR), which became the Industrial Relations Research Unit (IRRU). George Bain from Oxford University and UMIST, a subsequent chairman of SIBS, also came to direct this unit. Critically, leading scholars from London Business School were hired such as Peter Doyle, Andrew Pettigrew, and Robin Wensley to help build the institution.

and Thom Watson (organisational behaviour, 1981–1983). At this time the
chairmanship of SIBS was a part-time elected position for three years. It is
interesting that Robert Dyson was a constant feature of WBS’s leadership over
four decades – as chair for three years, interim dean for a term to cover for Robin
Wensley’s sabbatical before his tenure renewal, as interim dean before Howard
Thomas, and then adviser on special projects such as the 2005 University of
Warwick in Asia proposal that was subsequently rejected by senate. Jenny
Hocking, the head of administration, was also a constant and influential player in
the business school over three decades.

An early critical incident for the leadership of WBS was a UGC report in 1982. This
highlighted underperformance in SIBS and resulted in Thom Watson moving to
become chair of the Faculty of Social Studies. He was replaced by George Bain
(1983–1989), a dynamic Canadian industrial relations scholar who was a skilled
mediator. Fragueiro and Thomas (2011: 229) describe Bain as ‘an excellent scholar
and charismatic personality...widely credited as the architect of Warwick Business
School.’ Bain harnessed the talents of the professoriat, he launched a distance
learning MBA three years before the Open University and formed a successful
partnership with the Registrar, Michael Shattock. Bain hired strong researchers,
articulated a vision to be ‘best in class’ and implemented a growth strategy. He
also improved the full-time MBA with a dedicated teaching centre, enhanced
executive education and other programmes, and ensured high standards of
research and teaching. Subsequently in 1989, he became Principal of London
Business School. WBS performed especially well in the first 1989 Research
Selectivity Exercise during Bain’s deanship.
Bain (2003) has noted that universities are characterised by pluralism, multiple, ambiguous, and conflicting goals. He observed that senior leaders need to behave more like partners in a professional services firm than as a corporate CEO. This makes strategic change problematic and means that it may be best achieved if there is some external pressure, such as an accreditation peer review team visit. Shattock’s role in supporting WBS was seen as pivotal and his partnership with Bain was an essential element in the school’s turnaround and early success following the unfavourable 1982 UGC report.

Robin Wensley, with a professorial chair uniquely titled Policy and Marketing, succeeded George Bain from 1989 until 1994. This represented a period of incremental change and consolidation. There was an emphasis on departmental seminars from distinguished scholars and on increasing teaching space. Wensley was fond of stories and intellectual debate and enthusiastic about discussing colleagues’ research with them. During 2004–2011 as Director of the Advanced Institute of Management Research (AIM), he was an important figure nationally in the drive to improve UK management research.

By the mid-1990s, tensions were emerging about levels of centralised decision making that were potentially hindering local entrepreneurial behaviours as the University of Warwick grew. Pettigrew and Ferlie in the business school produced a report for the university in 1996 that recommended a more decentralised structure and devolution. At the same time, an audit culture was developing in higher education with the establishment of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) in 1997. WBS became self-generating in its leadership succession and too inward looking, which led to a period of strategic drift. Bob Galliers (professor of
information systems) headed the business school during 1994–1998. He decided to launch a fund-raising campaign that lacked support internally and centrally. The 2001 RAE results for the Business School were below what had been expected. Several senior professors were concerned about the School’s lack of direction.

Galliers stepped down as dean and for the first time the University’s management decided to advertise the deanship of Warwick Business School externally as an executive position. Robert Dyson accepted the role again on an interim basis for two years. During this period the school gained triple accreditation, the first in the world, clearly demonstrating its international standing.

Like all the chairs/deans of Warwick Business School, despite being an external appointment, the first executive dean Howard Thomas (a professor of strategic management) was well-known to several members of the school. He had worked at London Business School soon after its foundation, at several US business schools and in Australia. He had also maintained active contacts in the UK while in the USA. Thomas had been a member of the AACSB accreditation panel that was assessing WBS’s initial accreditation. He was regarded as a mediator who understood both the American and European business school systems. In early January 1999, Howard Thomas was invited to apply for the WBS deanship. By July 1999 he had accepted and he eventually took up the post in summer 2000 from his deanship at Illinois. This lengthy transition enabled him to make regular visits to Warwick to consult with many staff and form a senior team. Soon after his arrival, WBS was ranked third nationally in the 2001 RAE – an impressive result.

Thomas’ tenure spanned almost ten years from 2000 and its focus again was for WBS to be the ‘best in class’ of leading UK business schools. He provides a detailed
account of his experiences as the Dean of Warwick Business School in chapter six of the book *Strategic Leadership in the Business School: Keeping One Step Ahead* (Fragueiro and Thomas, 2011: 223–248). Thomas had a track record of academic leadership in London Business School, Australia, Canada, Europe, and the USA, where he was dean for a decade in the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. During his deanship, the school achieved annual surpluses exceeding 30%. At Warwick, key strategies during Thomas’s tenure concentrated on: (i) financial devolution; (ii) research excellence; (iii) new facilities; (iv) professionalising alumni relations and re-focusing the advisory board; and (v) programme innovation, e.g. increasing the number of undergraduates and overseas student income. He oversaw the one Warwick MBA concept which combined different modes of study, the growth of executive education, and the launch of specialist Master’s programmes.

The first phase of Thomas’s deanship entailed budget devolution in 2002, thereby allowing greater autonomy. There was also agreement on the expansion of undergraduate students. Subsequently, research groups were restructured, more than a dozen new professors were recruited, including an associate dean for executive education, the advisory board was revamped, and fundraising, corporate relations, and league table rankings were prioritised.

During Howard Thomas’s second term as dean when he had two deputy deans, WBS celebrated its 40th anniversary in 2007. New building facilities were opened and new specialist Master’s and a PhD programme in finance were launched as the Business School’s operations became more international. The arrival of Nigel Thrift as Vice-Chancellor led to *Vision 2015* (Thrift, 2007) being formulated. Within
this, WBS aimed ‘to be in the top echelon of European business schools by 2015, through strong innovation and a positive step change in investment, encompassing academic and professional expertise, new teaching programmes, physical and IT infrastructure and international profile-raising.’

The final phase of Thomas’s deanship at WBS was characterised by greater centralisation in a context of financial pressures, the launch of the Global Energy MBA, and rebranding of specialist Master’s courses. Further building plans were, however, postponed and a disappointing RAE 2008 result placed Warwick joint fifth, below Cardiff Business School, which was interpreted by some as a sign of complacency. WBS was, nevertheless, named as a top 500 business super brand (Daily Telegraph, 2008). The 2009 Strategic Departmental Review made the university question what kind of business school it was intended to be. The review highlighted the need to consider seriously the trade-offs between being on the one hand a cash cow with a wide portfolio of activities and on the other hand a more narrowly research-intensive entity. Subsequently, Howard Thomas ‘retired’ from WBS in January 2010 to become Dean of Lee Kong Chian School of Business in Singapore Management University, which soon after appointed Arnoud de Meyer, former Dean of Cambridge Judge Business School, as its President. It is interesting to note that Howard Thomas is a phenomenon in his own right. Della Bradshaw (2011), the FT’s business education editor, commented that Howard Thomas deserves the ‘serial dean prize’ based on his substantial experience of leading business schools on three continents.

Howard Thomas’s tenure at Warwick was preceded by two years of Robert Dyson as acting dean and followed by a five months’ acting deanship by David Wilson, a
former deputy dean and professor of strategy. The latter announced that he did not intend to apply for the deanship. In the interim, he embarked on a recovery programme to address the tail of underperformers in the 2008 RAE by working with individuals. He was also initially engaged in discussions about streamlining parts of the administration. David Wilson’s acting position was short-lived, however, as Mark Taylor was appointed as dean and available to start immediately.

The 2008 RAE result at WBS was viewed by the University centre as much lower than expected. Soon after, Mark Taylor was appointed in March 2010 as the new Dean of Warwick Business School. Like his predecessors, he combined excellent academic credentials and practitioner experience as a former managing director at BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager. He is an archetypal hybrid as a highly cited scholar and former policy adviser to the government and banks. Taylor changed the School’s logo to align with the University and he introduced the strapline ‘thinking differently.’ He initiated a behavioural science teaching and research group, collaboration with the Royal Shakespeare Company, and embarked on an aggressive recruitment campaign for highly cited scholars to improve the School’s REF 2014 results. His vision of WBS was ‘to be the leading university-based business school in Europe.’ The School’s stated mission in 2013 was:

- To produce and disseminate world-class, cutting edge research that shapes the way organisations operate and businesses are led and managed.
To produce world-class, socially responsible, creative leaders and managers who think on a global scale, regardless of the size of their organisation.

To provide a lifelong return on investment for our students and alumni.

In summary, WBS represents an interesting case study in the evolution of business schools globally, nationally, and institutionally. Robin Wensley (personal correspondence) mentioned that someone once commented on a survey conducted by Ashridge which showed that most UK business schools at that time wanted to be like Warwick and thought it was feasible because WBS is excellent without being élite. The story of WBS is unusual in terms of the continuity of collective leadership (Robert Dyson, Paul Edwards, Jenny Hocking, John McGee, Robin Wensley) that persisted until Howard Thomas stepped down. The school exemplifies the tensions in managing a full portfolio with ambitions to excel in research and teaching within a full university. WBS has benefited from exceptional champions like George Bain and Michael Shattock, as well as intellectually energised individuals such as Robin Wensley and Andrew Pettigrew and other highly cited deans like Mark Taylor and Howard Thomas who possess real-world experience.

WBS evolved from a recruiting to a selective business school and gained confidence internationally after early questions were raised about its research performance and proximity to industry. The manufacturing heartland it once occupied has been replaced by a services sector and the enterprising ‘Warwick way’ DNA may have become less apparent as it has grown in size and complexity. Nevertheless, WBS provides a valuable setting for the main study in this thesis on
strategizing behaviours of senior middle managers who are caught like “the meat in the sandwich” between the central administration and the school staff, students and faculty’ (Fragueiro and Thomas, 2011: 247).

9. The deanship

Various commentators on the university deanship have acknowledged its complexity. Van Cleeve (1981) notes the difficulties in managing faculty because of their highly politicised nature. Del Favero (2006: 282) argues that ‘academic deans are worthy of our attention since they occupy a pivotal role at the nexus of academic and administrative operations’ and so must be ‘adept at navigating both academic and administrative cultures and the environmental complexity that these differences stimulate.’ She argues that scholarship requires ‘a relatively narrow focus and high value...placed on creativity, autonomy, and self-initiated work agendas’ compared with administration, which is ‘framed by rationality, efficiency, and an institutional focus that values consideration for the collective’ (Ibid: 283). Furthermore, De Boer and Goedegebuure (2009: 347) contend that ‘the deanship has become more demanding, more senior, more strategic, more complex and more managerial in nature.’ Engwall and Lindvall (2012: 206) observe that: ‘Politicians and the business community have considerable expectations as far as universities’ contributions to the public welfare and to economic growth’ yet these stakeholders are sceptical about university management. They need to appreciate ‘the demanding role of university leaders as stewards of complex and almost unmanageable organizations’ (ibid). Furthermore, Gmelch (2004: 76) highlights the difficult transitions from scholar to dean in terms of dichotomies in behaviours: from solitary to social; focused to fragmented; autonomy to
accountability; manuscripts to memoranda; private to public; professing to
persuading; stability to mobility; client to custodian; austerity to seeming
prosperity. It is the location of deans in a middle position that points to
entanglement and the need for enabling leadership between adaptive and
administrative functions, i.e. innovations and thought leadership in the business
unit of scholars within their disciplines and bureaucratic controls in the central
university. Rosser et al (2003: 2) summarise this multipolarity: ‘By virtue of their
midlevel placement within the higher education organizational structure [deans]
are in the center of controversy, conflict, and debate; they play the role of
coalition builder, negotiator, and facilitator...with overtones that are more political
and social than hierarchical or technical.’

Gallos (2002: 181) captures the exhilarating and exhausting double bind of the
business school dean who simultaneously handles ‘the administrative culture of
performance with its corporate-like expectations for managerial efficiency and
effectiveness’ and faculty members’ preferences for ‘minimal intrusion, maximum
support’ (ibid: 178). She writes from direct personal experience of the ‘daily
pressures of a life spent sandwiched between colliding cultures, local and global
concerns, and internal and external expectations’ (ibid: 183). Lorange (2000: 406)
echoes this and contends that ‘the key to creating value in a business school is
keeping the “dynamism” in dynamic balance.”’ Balancing roles and responsibilities
is a major task, as the two deans Fragueiro and Thomas (2011) indicate in their
reflections on ‘keeping one step ahead.’ They see environmental scanning, issue
diagnosis, issue legitimisation, and power mobilisation as the four key activities for
deans (ibid: 205-207).
Deans are expected to exhibit prosocial behaviour, i.e. helping others. Inevitably, deans working in complex organisations like universities (Baldridge, 1971) experience episodes of role strain (Goode, 1960). They can feel the role is incompatible, for instance because of interpersonal or intrapersonal role conflict (Merton, 1949) and as a result of differences between expectations of what they must and what they are able to achieve (Dahrendorf, 1958). Wolverton et al (1999: 81) highlighted such role conflict and its emotional labour in a professional bureaucracy: ‘deans walk a delicate administrative tightrope...the dean functions as a disciplinary expert, who happens to be carrying out administrative tasks, among other disciplinary experts...direct use of power is liable to bring him or her down.’

Many business schools are adopting strategies of an analyser organisation which ‘attempts to minimize risk while maximizing the opportunity for profit’ (Miles et al, 1978: 553). Such circumstances are ‘requiring [middle managers] to be both entrepreneur and bureaucrat’ (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992: 156) as they focus on efficiency and adaptability. The challenge for the business school dean as a manager in the middle is to make sense of strategy within the discourses about what is professionalism, public sector v. commercial values, centralisation v. decentralisation internally, academia v. practice. How does the dean present the unit as coherent and professional in different contexts and retain talent (Horwitz et al, 2003) while developing good institutional citizens? Deans have to recognise that many of their colleagues are reluctant managers (Goffee and Scase, 1992) and choose to be academics to research rather than practise management. The dean needs to ensure his or her team includes players with positive attitudes and high
energy who take an active role in strategy making rather than behave as spectators, victims, or as institutional cynics according to Lineberry’s energy investment model (Edmonstone, 2003; Tosti and Amarant, 2005).

It might be contested whether business schools are professional at all. Starbuck (1992: 716) suggests that: ‘In deciding whether a firm is knowledge-intensive, one ought to weigh its emphasis on esoteric expertise instead of widely shared knowledge.’ It could be argued that lower ranked business schools reproduce knowledge as a commodity rather than generate thought leadership. With the commoditisation of education and concerns about the absence of scholars as public intellectuals, it might be asked if business schools are indeed knowledge-intensive organisations. Some universities have been accused of being diploma mills, with organisations like Apple and Google instead being at the leading edge of knowledge creation and innovation.

Indeed, several writers (Haskell, 1981; Piper, 1992) have questioned if professors are professional. It might be asked whether business schools as professional schools in universities are really for the professions if academic faculty are more aligned to scholarly rather than professional associations. Starbuck (ibid: 717) observed that ‘[a]n expert may not be a professional.’ The narrow expertise of a research professor might mean that they see themselves first as scholars and knowledge workers rather than as salaried professionals. Alvesson (2004: 1) defines knowledge workers broadly as ‘having an interest in the use of judgement backed up to a high degree by theoretical, intellectual knowledge.’ The extent to
which the organisational environment allows deans and their staff to exercise judgement varies in different institutions.

Business school deans and their colleagues are not licensed to practise, so lack the professional status of lawyers and physicians. Indeed, deans and their academic colleagues in research-intensive universities may not perceive themselves foremost as professionals or knowledge workers. The latter may be associated with management consultancies where academic freedom is lacking and more executive type behaviours are encouraged. Academics’ expertise is developed through the socialisation of their doctoral training and from academic conferences (Learmonth and Humphreys, 2012). Recognition of their contributions to an abstract body of knowledge is demonstrated by the fact that faculty ‘recruitment, promotion, and tenure appear to be decided primarily based on the number of articles published in a fairly select group of peer-reviewed journals, based on their relative impact, selectivity, and relevance to business school rankings’ (De Rond and Miller, 2005: 322). ‘Expertise’ suggests know-how, proficiency, and capability which scholars are expected to demonstrate; however, the sense of certainty it implies does not capture the intellectual curiosity expected of management researchers. University bureaucrats are highly knowledgeable about regulations which academic faculty may not value or the latter may be disinterested in gaining this esoteric sector-specific type of knowledge in favour of knowledge valued by their scholarly community.

To address the lack of close attention paid to business unit managers in the strategic management literature, this study focuses on the activities of ‘crossover
professionals’ in the higher education sector. These business school deans are specialist scholars as well as generalist academic leaders. Although they might not call themselves ‘strategists’, or indeed ‘managers’ at all in an environment of peer review, business school deans are hybrid strategic actors who span different kinds of professional knowledge. They are key players who act as an intra and extra organisational nexus connecting disparate ideas. This Janusian position of ambidextrous professors (Markides, 2007) who work across boundaries offers a privileged or beleaguered occupational role, depending on your vantage point.

The business school deans’ own insights into their strategic behaviours in a knowledge-intensive unit that are explored in this thesis can be transferred to other academic departments or units in the public sector or professional service firms where professional peers are ‘managed’ (Raelin, 1986).

This thesis suggests that hybridity occurs before a professional is appointed as a middle manager since many of the deans in this study worked outside academia before embarking on their doctorates. Key players have worked transnationally and remain active in other types of organisations, especially as consultants, although few have run their own businesses. University-based business school deans represent a category of upper middle managers and professional hybrids in knowledge-intensive business units in the public sector. This blurring of roles as an expert scholar and general manager within a large complex multiunit organisation raises the question about how deans decide which strategic activities to prioritise and how to balance seemingly contradictory cultures.
The problem is that a dean may be appointed because of their track record in scholarship but as their tenure progresses and the deanship becomes more time consuming, their scholarship declines. This leads to them being labelled as mere administrators and their legitimacy declines amongst peers. While a professor of surgery may continue to wield a scalpel outside academia as dean of a medical school, often the only place where a business school dean may practise management is in the business school itself.

Business school deans’ roles are clearly influenced by their responsibilities for dealing with a multiplicity of ambiguity amongst professionals in the unit, centrally, and externally. For instance, they are managing professional schools in an academic context for students to become professional managers usually in a non academic environment. Yet some commentators suggest that management is not a true profession (Khurana and Nohria, 2008; Barker, 2010) and that the professionalisation of British business schools is incomplete (Larson, 2003). Business schools have been very good at supporting the establishment of several accreditation agencies and national business school associations (e.g. AACSB, EFMD) to set quality standards and build capacity and professional networking. The ideology and norms of professionalism are constantly being contested within any profession. In universities, for example, professional administrators create their own associations and adopt the term ‘professional.’ Fournier (1999) suggests that such an appeal to behaving like a professional is a ‘disciplinary mechanism.’ These new professionals may perceive themselves as professional in terms of their high commitment, long hours, and greater discretionary effort yet others regard this as self-exploitation and pseudo professionalism. These so called professionals,
however, often prioritise organisational targets over professional autonomy (Kennerley, 1992).

Academic freedom is clearly an important concept in higher education that needs to be balanced with accountability (Berdahl, 1990). A challenge for deans in an increasingly target driven culture is allowing academic staff sufficient freedom. Deans must reconcile the different perspectives and professional expertise of faculty and administrators (Holton and Phillips, 1995) so that the relationships mediated are constructive and symbiotic, holding each other in check, rather than adversarial.

Deans’ roles have changed with shifts in discourses from collegiality to professionalisation, through to managerialism and in some cases a sense of proletarianisation (Dearlove, 1997), with the creation of an industrial model of what Parker and Jary (1995) call the ‘McUniversity.’ Business schools have been accused of being seduced by rankings, possibly prioritising form over substance (Gioia and Corley, 2002), with academic staff being incentivised to focus on their publications rather than on students (De Rond and Miller, 2005). Moreover, Khurana (2007: 368) argues that: ‘the university-based business school of today is a troubled institution, one that has become unmoored from its original purpose and whose contemporary state is in many ways antithetical to the goals of professional education itself.’ It is little wonder that deans feel besieged (Gmelch and Seedorf, 1989) and that their contributions are unsung (Rosser, 2004: 317). It is all the more important, therefore, that this thesis investigates the everyday practices of a potentially ‘imperiled species’ (Gmelch et al, 1999).
The university-based business school deanship is particularly interesting as universities represent complex, pluralistic organisations with multiple stakeholders. The business school is an eclectic mix of diverse disciplines, epistemologies, and professions (e.g. economics, marketing, occupational psychology). The problematic design of the professional school with its mix of oil and water (Simon, 1967) and seemingly contradictory goals mean the dean must bridge academia and practice in ways that other deans are not expected to do to such an extent. Moreover, UK business schools are more complicated than other professional schools because they recruit significant numbers of overseas students and executives and engage with a range of organisations including small and medium size enterprises. Following a period of rapid growth over 40 years in a golden age (Thomas et al, 2013), business schools are now subjected to increasing centralisation and efficiencies (Diamond, 2011). Their legitimacy in the academy (Macfarlane, 1995), in the eyes of other organisations (McGrath, 2007), and in society (Wilson and McKiernan, 2011) is being challenged, as Chapter four will explain.

It is assumed that business school deans think and act as they do because of expectations of their role (role theory), and how it is socially constructed. They operate within design, cultural, and policy constraints and they have limited autonomy to influence these contingencies. Empirical data in this thesis have been collected to provide contextualised and temporal insights into changes over individuals’ tenures, as institutions develop, and the UK business school industry has matured. New market opportunities, government regulations, and social and macroeconomic changes, in particular New Public Management and the 2008
global financial crisis, provide the historical backdrop against which the changing roles of these middle management strategists highlighted in this study are explored.

Given the eclectic nature of a business school, the dean’s academic disciplinary interest in a specialist area is likely to be quite different from those of others in the business school. What binds the dean and the rest of the employees are a commitment to the quality of staff and students and the school’s reputation. This suggests a certain level of interdependencies and symbiotic relationships. In the 21st century, a cadre of executive full-time UK business school deans has emerged. Many hope at the outset of their tenures to maintain their personal scholarship, at least through doctoral supervision, but the all-consuming nature of the job as they constantly balance trade-offs usually render this aspiration unfulfilled. Rosovsky (1990) suggests that economists, like himself, are successful in such senior positions in academic administration because ‘they are comfortable with the notion of “trade-offs”... [they] are trained to consider “indirect effects”...economists use marginal reasoning: they tend to think in incremental rather than in absolute terms...[and they know] that the value of money changes’ (ibid: 26).

Business school deans need to control academics within workload allocation models and the needs of the organisation such as the bottom line based on accounting logic (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997). They have to reconcile demands for excellence that appear contradictory in reality. For instance, a young scholar needs to build his or her research publications to be promoted and submitted in
the REF (Research Excellence Framework). Time spent on this activity, however, reduces the individual’s attention to teaching large classes, which in turn has its own metrics such as the National Student Survey (NSS). A focus on income generation from overseas executive education appears a distraction from what matters to the early career scholar but this activity is essential for the unit itself. Deans must reconcile seemingly opposing goals when managing the business school’s portfolio. There are also conflicts in the role of business school dean where the assumption is that the unit will operate in a ‘business-like’ way to respond to market forces, yet critical management scholars and others may see themselves as public sector professionals, or as autonomous scholars, and do not wish to prioritise commercial activities. There exist anti-business management scholars, a healthy, rather paradoxical phenomenon in higher education.

Typically, UK business schools have tended to retain a high ratio of support staff and managers to academic faculty and they rely on a large number of adjuncts (Higher Education Academy, 2009) who provide part-time teaching. They also attract relatively very low research income compared with STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and mathematics). In times of austerity with the need for greater efficiencies (Diamond, 2011) and to fund higher salaries in the RAE/REF transfer rounds, business schools are not immune to greater centralisation within universities. There has also been a tendency most recently in UK higher education for restructuring into ever larger and fewer faculties with the creation of ‘super deans.’ While this may considerably enlarge the role of a business school dean who has pro-vice-chancellor responsibilities (often the case in newer, post 1992 universities), it diminishes the level of autonomy in the role within other
institutions where the dean becomes a department head who reports to a faculty dean rather than directly to the vice-chancellor.

The business school deanship offers a particular knowledge-intensive, professionalised context in which to explore Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) middle management role typology in greater depth. An on-going strategic issue for deans in the public sector is their degree of latitude in managing the business school. In turn, their academic colleagues are concerned about the encroachment of increasing centralisation, government metrics, and industry games of rankings and accreditations on their own academic freedom. The credibility of business and management education and the legitimacy of the dean are determined by how the incumbents mobilise strategic changes through coalition building and negotiating the idiosyncrasies of their particular context.

How do deans use their roles to ensure strategic goals are achieved?

This study seeks to explore what deans do in terms of building and sustaining their legitimacy in terms of reputational capital and financial viability by applying Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model at different points in history and in various types of business school. It investigates how business school deans balance attention to exploration and exploitation (Ren and Guo, 2011), to different roles, activities, and stakeholders over time. As upper middle managers, their roles are of interest, particularly given the complexity of the business unit–parent relationship and the plurality of multiple professionals and practitioners through whom business school deans must realise strategy. Clearly, there are common levers for strategic change such as accreditations, rankings, compliance with government policy frameworks such as quality assurance that structure the
activities of these strategists. It would seem that business school deans need to behave increasingly as ‘supra’ or ‘meta’ professionals to enact the range and complexity of strategic middle management roles expected of them.

Huy and Mintzberg (2003: 84) assert about universities that ‘mostly they hum along, experiencing less pervasive streams of small changes’ than other types of organisation. In the case of UK business schools, given the multiple rhythms of academic life (Frost and Taylor, 1996), competing values (Quinn, 1984; De Boer and Goedegebuure, 2009), and significant threats from technology and competitors, a more urgent consideration of temporal contingencies is justified. The current state of higher education is less genteel and collegial than Huy and Mintzberg (2003) depicted. The commitment to quality may be timeless but middle managers’ strategic roles must be dynamic. They must compete for the future (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) while functioning successfully in the present, and respecting past achievements.

Kuhn (1970: 67) states that a ‘period of pronounced professional insecurity’ often precedes the ‘emergence of new theories.’ As business schools struggle with self-reinvention and rethinking, if indeed the bubble has burst (Dameron and Durand, 2011) and current paradigm traps are being overturned (Thomas et al, 2914), then we would hope they can demonstrate appropriate dynamic capabilities (Teece et al, 1997: 516), the ‘ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments.’ Whitney (2012: 150) offers a solution at the individual level: ‘If you really want to move the world
forward, you need to innovate on the inside – and disrupt yourself.’ GMAC (2013)
echoes this in calling for business schools to ‘disrupt or be disrupted.’

10. Summary and conclusion

Given the self-questioning, as well as challenges from outside the business school
community, it is unsurprising that the appointment of a business school dean
represents a significant episode in the unit’s history. There is a global shortage of
business school doctoral students (AACSB, 2003, 2013) and faculty in some
disciplines (Gardner, 2011). The turnover of deans can be high (Alsop, 2008;
Symonds, 2009) and tenures very short, for example Garrett at Wharton was a
business school dean three times in just over three years (Bloomberg
Businessweek, 2014). Yet business and management studies represent the most
popular university subject, with one in seven students in the UK and the USA
studying business and management education. In a recent study on the role of UK
business schools, Thorpe and Rawlinson (2013: 7) recommend that these
institutions need to be much more clearly differentiated and they need to focus
on improving incentives and academic faculty capabilities. UK business schools
need to bring practice and practitioner experience into the curriculum with better
business engagement, cross-disciplinary research teams, and business school-
business engagement. This represents high expectations of the business school
deanship which makes many posts difficult to fill (Davies, 2013).

In this environment, Kring and Kaplan (2011: 1) call for the business school
deanship to be redefined with an emphasis on ‘strategic skills, enterprise
management, innovation, and people and relationship effectiveness.’ This thesis
examines how deans and their teams enact such behaviours, how they synthesize
the vast array of strategic drivers, how they engage faculty and others
meaningfully to generate and promote new ideas to realise the benefits of
business and management education within what is a typically a four to five-year
tenure (although post 1992 university deans may be on permanent contracts).

Everyday strategizing practices mentioned in the interviews are presented in the
empirical Chapters six to eight. These are analysed within the theoretical
frameworks and contextual landscape discussed in Chapters two to four. First,
Chapter five will detail the research methods used in this thesis.
CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODS

1. Introduction
This chapter explains the decisions made in selecting the qualitative research
inquiry to extend Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology of four
middle management strategic roles. The research design enables a focus on
specific contexts and practices of a particular category of middle management
which Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) did not consider in their survey. Bazeley
(2013: 3) defines qualitative analysis as ‘intense, engaging, challenging, non-linear,
contextualised, and highly variable.’ This means qualitative evidence can be
difficult to analyse compared with quantitative data (Miles, 1979). Miles and
Huberman (1994: 5) acknowledge that: ‘research is actually more a craft than a
slavish adherence to methodological rules. No study conforms exactly to a
standard methodology, each one calls for the researcher to bend the methodology
to the peculiarities of the setting.’ The decisions to co-produce vignettes with
subjects and to film interviews were made as this research project progressed.

Several studies on middle managers and strategy using the case study method
have focused on single organisations longitudinally, often hi-tech, IT, or telecoms
firms (e.g. Burgelman, 1994; Huy, 2002; Marginson, 2002) and other private sector
settings (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Boyett and Currie, 2004; Rouleau, 2005;
Laine and Vaara, 2006; Vilà and Canales, 2008). Other case studies investigate
these phenomena across several firms (Beatty and Lee, 1992; Kodama, 2005;
Meyer, 2006; Mantere, 2008). Few studies, however, except for Carney (2004) and
Currie and Procter (2005), have adopted the case study method to explore middle
management strategizing concepts in the public sector. This thesis seeks to add to the latter body of literature. Indeed, it moves beyond hospitals as research contexts to universities. This study draws on interpreting interviews with senior middle managers to address the central research question about the strategizing practices of business school deans as upper middle managers in professionalised business units.

Chapter five is organised as follows. Firstly, we consider the research design, its paradigmatic underpinning, project milestones, sampling, the use of a case study approach, interviews and documentary data collection methods, as well as triangulation. Secondly, we evaluate the quality of the research in terms of various forms of validity and reliability, and we examine debates about trustworthiness in qualitative research enquiry. Thirdly, the data analysis is explained, followed by reflections on the researcher’s role and ethical issues. Finally, the limitations of the research methods used in this thesis are discussed.

2. Research design

The research adopts an ethnographic approach in collecting data to understand the ‘social meanings and ordinary activities’ (Brewer, 2000: 10) of people in a professionalised organisation. In planning the research design for this thesis, I recognised the need for flexibility, as Gephart (2004: 435) acknowledges ‘[q]ualitative research is often designed at the same time it is being done.’ The initial 12 exploratory interviews were premised on the question ‘what do business school deans do?’ The purpose of this was ostensibly to address the practical problem of re-designing leadership development programmes for cohorts of
aspiring and current deans in a context of large numbers of vacancies for business school deans. As the project emerged, suggestions from colleagues at conferences to write up the case studies as vignettes with the informants to enhance the quality of the analysis were incorporated into the research design to provide detailed portraits (Kohler Riessman, 1993; Silverman 2000). Miles (1990: 37) defines a vignette as ‘a vivid account of a professional’s practice written according to a pre-specified outline, iterated through interaction with a researcher.’

I was also conscious of McGrath’s (1981: 179) notion of ‘dilemmatics’, i.e. ‘a series of interlocking choices in which we try simultaneously to maximise several conflicting desiderata’ about actors, behaviour and context. It was clear from the outset that the key actors would be business school deans. However, it was important to determine the line of enquiry theoretically and to decide the research setting. A focus on traits and performance outcomes was rejected in favour of exploring actual strategic behaviours. After all, Einstein (1934: 163) suggested: ‘If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist about the methods which he uses, I would give you the following piece of advice: Don’t listen to his words, examine his achievements.’

Initially, an international dataset was proposed based on alumni of the ABS/EFMD International Deans’ Programme which I direct. However, for pragmatic reasons of consistency in making comparisons and resource constraints in the timescale of a PhD, it was agreed to limit the dataset to 52 informants in total from the UK. There were also considerations about potential data overload (Dawson, 1997) and the need for an in-depth understanding of the rich data. Documentary data collection was, therefore, carried out only for the second sample.
2.1 Research paradigm

The research questions seek to understand how deans make sense of their own strategizing practices in particular contexts. The paradigm guiding this research, therefore, is based on an interpretivist framework which seeks to understand the experiences of social actors (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The ontological approach adopted in this thesis assumes that ‘social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished...through social interaction [and that these are]...in a constant state of revision’ (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 23). This viewpoint supports Becker’s (1970: 64) argument that ‘[t]o understand an individual’s behaviour, we must know how he perceives the situation.’ In terms of its epistemological position, this study is premised on socio-cultural relativism, the belief that ‘knowledge is shaped by the specific social and cultural circumstances of those making knowledge claims’ (Vogt et al, 2012: vii). A contextualised approach is consistent with the application of a strategy-as-practice lens. The research responds to Vaara and Whittington’s (2012: 286) call for greater recognition of the ‘macro-institutional nature of practices.’ Hence an examination of meso-level organisation actors’ micro-practices is combined within a strategic middle management role typology (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992, 1994, 1994) with an appreciation of the macro context.
2.2 Research schedule

The scheduling of the data collection and analysis was premised on the belief that ‘the accumulation of knowledge involves a continual cycling between theory and data’ Eisenhardt (1989a: 549). Mishler (1990: 416) defined guided inquiry as ‘the dialectic interplay of theory, methods, and findings over the course of a study.’

While the intended research plan was to interview a set of leading business school deans internationally, in practice methodological and practical considerations emerged that resulted in the first and second datasets representing a diverse range of British institutions, while the second dataset is an in-depth study of a single business school. Although a few individuals who were interviewed now work outside the UK, all subjects in this thesis predominantly focus their experiences on the UK deanship. This allows for comparability in a single sector and in one national setting. There are some local variations in the two business schools in devolved nations in this study such as government funding and tuition fees in Scotland and Wales.

The data collection comprised six key stages, each of which integrated findings from the previous step:

- **Phase 1**: exploratory interviews with a range of 12 current experienced business school deans, including one woman;
- **Phase 2a**: interviews with seven deans of a single business school, including filmed interviews. Two deans were currently in post when interviewed;
- **Phase 2b**: interviews with 29 other respondents about these seven deans in 2a;
- **Phase 2c**: collection of documentary data for 2a;
• **Phase 2d**: co-production of vignettes on the seven individuals; and
• **Phase 3**: filmed interviews with six deans, including four women, four veterans (two retired), and two relative newcomers to add to the diversity of the respondents in terms of gender (Oakley, 1981) and experience.

Table 7 summarises the key steps in the data collection during 2008–2011, including some preliminary work in 2007 which informed an ABS/AIM report on business school leadership (Ivory et al, 2008).

**Table 7: Data collection timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Collection</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with deans, AIM scholars</td>
<td>One business school.</td>
<td>(inc. 1 in pilot)</td>
<td>(2b) Secondary interviews and (2c)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Documentary data, both included in</td>
<td>Documentary data, both included in</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2(d)</td>
<td>2(d)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

The scheduling of the research processes was based on systematic steps suggested by Eisenhardt (1989a: 533) and Fox-Wolfgramm (1997: 442).

### 2.3 Sampling

Appendix 6 lists the 52 individuals interviewed as part of this research project.

The first phase included interviewing a purposive sample of 10 deans on the executive committee of the Association of Business Schools. These represented a wide range of schools and were well established in their posts. The sample included one woman. One new female dean on the committee did not respond. Two additional respondents were included in this sample who were approached after an email invitation to complete the MBTI psychometric questionnaire was
sent to all UK deans. One of these deans had previously worked at Warwick Business School and the other was working as dean of the second business school (that has since been merged) in the same institution as the non-respondent woman on the executive committee.

The second data selection phase was also purposive as all seven current and living former deans of Warwick Business School since 1978 were approached and they agreed to participate. This in-depth study incorporated the views of the deans’ colleagues that included snowball sampling in which ‘one participant leads to another’ (MacNealy, 1999: 157). The potential dangers of this approach are that it biases people with strong social connections (Berg, 2006). However, it was very helpful in accessing individuals who were less easy to reach. For example, I had emailed John McGee, a well regarded professor of strategy, who had worked closely with one of the Warwick deans for over four decades but he had been ill and had not responded. Fortuitously on his last day when he was clearing his office, John came into the office of a person I was interviewing and the interviewee explained my research. John agreed to see me and his observations were very insightful, filling gaps in my understanding. Another suggestion to interview key players outside the business school resulted in interviews with the current vice-chancellors of Warwick University and the University of Leicester and the current and former registrars of Warwick University, which provided different perspectives.

Table 8 lists the criteria for the choice of respondents in the first dataset. Tables 9 and 10 highlight why Warwick Business School was selected as the main study for
the second dataset and its distinguishing features. Table 11 describes the characteristics of interviewees in the third dataset.

Table 8: Criteria for selection of interviewees in the first dataset

1. Established, current deans, mid-tenure.
2. Representative of the sector – ABS executive committee members are elected by fellow UK business school deans.
3. Awareness of issues in business and management education.
4. Trust in the research that ABS conducts and in the researcher whose title at the time was Head of Policy and Development at ABS.

Table 9: Selection criteria for Warwick Business School as the single case study

1. A leading full service business school in a top multi-faculty university, not a school of management or graduate school.
2. Well-known and respected in the sector.
3. Pioneering, entrepreneurial and research intensive. Robin Wensley mentioned that Ashridge had once conducted a survey and one finding was that WBS was the business school others most wanted to emulate.
4. Founded soon after the university on a green field site, less than 50 years old.
5. Excellent but not élitist. A strong business school in a strong university.
6. Not an ancient university with significant endowments.

Table 10: Distinguishing features of Warwick Business School

1. George Bain is the only UK dean of a pre-1992 business school to become a vice-chancellor.
2. Howard Thomas has been dean on three continents – America, Europe and Asia.
3. Robert Dyson was chair, interim dean, and covered during a dean’s sabbatical, so in effect was dean at WBS three times.
4. Howard Thomas and Mark Taylor are highly cited deans. Mark Taylor states that he is currently the UK’s most highly cited dean.
5. George Bain, Robin Wensley, and Howard Thomas have chaired ABS (or its predecessor).
6. Robin Wensley was dean and then deputy dean for his successor and Director of AIM.
7. Atypically for a Russell Group university, the business school was formed soon after the University (before the Warwick Manufacturing Group and the medical school were established). It launched a distance learning MBA before the Open University.
8. First in the world to achieve triple accreditation.
9. The department of economics is not in the business school.
10. WBS has strong origins in industrial relations, the public sector, and links with SMEs and industry.

11. Located in the English Midlands with a sense population of nearby business schools: Asston, Birmingham, Coventry, Loughborough and two in both Leicester and Nottingham.

12. Located in a university which is a member of the Russell Group of research intensive universities with medical schools.

Table 11: Characteristics of interviewees in the third dataset

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Participants in the annual women deans’ lunch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Companions of ABS, i.e. individuals recognised for their significant contributions to business and management education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>It included a member of the ABS executive committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Two new deans, three veterans with over 10 years’ experience, one individual who had completed three deanships, and another moving into the third tenure of her second deanship.</td>
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</table>

The three phases of the research enabled a different focus at each stage. Firstly, a wide overview of themes was generated inductively from current deans in various institutions. Secondly, an in-depth understanding was achieved that focused on successive individuals in a single site. Thirdly, the investigation broadened out to check insights gained deductively by applying the Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) framework to a more diverse set of current and former deans.

The range of institutions represented in this study reflects the plurality of activities suggested in Ivory et al’s (2006: 16–17) profiling of business schools, illustrated in Figure 8.
2.4 Case study design

In order to explore the deans’ experiences and their colleagues’ views of them, a case study approach was adopted. Yin (1984: 23) states that ‘[a] case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.’ A case study design that included interviews and documentary analysis rather than a survey method (as used by Floyd and Wooldridge, 1996) was chosen for this thesis to guarantee high response rates. The interviews captured the full attention of busy informants and provided opportunities for real-time, dynamic, and lively exchanges and they allowed for probing. To generate insightful case studies, Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) recommend the development of a small number of intensive case studies to include contextualised, holistic descriptions, interpretations, and explanations.
Feagin et al (1991) suggest that cases are ideally suited for in-depth studies. Phase two of the research yielded seven vignettes in a single institutional case. The 24 research subjects in total enabled appropriate investigation from several angles. Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests that case studies are useful for asking descriptive, exploratory, and explanatory questions. They also allowed for comparative analysis, as Stake (2008: 121) argues: ‘we cannot understand a given case without knowing about other cases.’ Gerring (2007: 85) supports this view: ‘cross-case analysis is presumed in all case study analysis...[which] is, by definition, a study of some phenomenon broader than the unit under investigation.’ Miles et al (2013: 101) state that ‘[o]ne advantage of studying cross-case or multiple cases is to increase generalizability, reassuring yourself that the events and processes in one well-described setting are not wholly idiosyncratic.’

I was initially reluctant to focus on a single institution as one phase of the research. Theoretically, however, this yielded important insights into the phenomenon of strategizing over time for successive deans. Stake (1995: xi) advocates ‘the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances.’ Gerring (2007: 1) also calls for depth as a holistic device: ‘[w]e gain better understanding of the whole by focusing on a key part.’

An embedded design (Yin, 1994) is adopted in the second stage of the research with seven individual cases set within one institutional case. This is consistent with a strategy-as-practice perspective, as Whittington (2007: 1583–1584) believes that the study of social practice should aim to ‘[s]earch for connections and relationships, [and] recognise embeddedness.’ The research strategy here seeks to
provide ‘emic’ accounts, insider perspectives, that are complemented by the investigator’s more ‘etic’ and detached perspective.

Table 12 provides key definitions of case studies with examples from this research.

Table 12: Definitions of case studies with examples from the research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Examples in the research</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon. The study is conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of several data sources’ (Feagin et al, 1991: 2).</td>
<td>Primary data included live interviews with current deans <em>in situ</em> about topical problems using various data sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of narrative that ‘locate the global in the local’ using the researcher’s viewpoint (Hamel et al, 1993: v).</td>
<td>Narratives were important in the accounts interviewees gave as they reflected on local incidents in relation to global changes in the industry from which the researcher was able to abstract links to the theoretical framework for analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘detailed examination of one setting, or a single subject’ (Bogdan and Biklen, 2003: 258).</td>
<td>Focus on the business school industry and deanship as a single issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘casing’ that ‘can bring operational closure to some problematic relationship between ideas and evidence, between theory and data’ (Ragin, 1992: 217–218).</td>
<td>Practical recommendations for aspiring deans were produced from vignettes structured within the middle management strategizing roles framework. This cased the mass of material and ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘bounded system’ (Stake, 2008: 20).</td>
<td>The UK higher education system, business school entities, individual tenures and bounded the data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stake [2008: 121] ‘both a process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry.’</td>
<td>The activities entailed in writing the cases as case histories may be viewed as a phase distinct from the analysis stage of a finished output such as the vignettes.</td>
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2.5 Interviews

One-to-one, face-to-face interviews formed the main data collection method. In phase one, 12 deans were interviewed before and after ABS executive meetings in London or in individuals’ offices (Herzog, 2005). The interviews with the seven deans of Warwick Business School were conducted on site, at conferences, and one follow-up transatlantic interview was done via Skype. Interviews with
colleagues of these deans were carried out wherever this was convenient – in two cases in individuals’ homes. The majority of the filmed interviews were held at ABS offices, at Warwick, at Imperial College where a lunch for women deans was organised, and in the British Library before a lunch for companions of ABS. The total number of respondents and repeated interviews with WBS deans allowed for data saturation whereby it was felt that sufficient data had been collected to explain the phenomenon of upper middle management strategizing, including negative cases, within the resource constraints of a lone researcher sponsored by a small trade association. Ragin (in Baker and Edwards, 2012: 34) advises: ‘You should stop adding cases when you are no longer learning anything new.’ Warren (2002) recommends a minimum of 20–30 interviews for interview-based qualitative studies that are published (Bryman, 2012: 425).

Kvale (1996) suggests that successful interviews include a knowledgeable interviewer. Over time, my expertise about the business school sector grew, as I had been appointed at ABS two years prior to embarking on this doctorate. I aimed to adopt a clear, structured format with a relatively gentle style, allowing for silence, which gave the interviewee time to think and I probed to clarify issues. I knew from experience of conducting on-line surveys at ABS that deans are very busy and a 20% response rate was typical. I found that asking someone in person for a diary appointment to interview them for up to 90 minutes guaranteed their full attention in a way that other methods did not. Participants in the main study were re-interviewed on several occasions to ensure a more complete dataset.
All interviews were voice recorded with the interviewee’s permission and notes were taken during the interviews. Several times, individuals asked for the voice recorder to be paused while they made a comment off-record, usually a jibe or aside about someone’s personal domestic difficulties. It would have been a breach of trust not to respect this (Punch, 1994). Such remarks were often part of a stream of consciousness and humour (Hatch, 1997) which made the respondent more relaxed and open to discussion. Often I would write up these field notes of quotations, facts, and my observations while travelling back to London immediately afterwards. For the first dataset, all transcriptions of recordings were outsourced, partly as I felt the emotions were quite raw in places and the volume of interviews in a short time was quite high. Subsequently, I preferred to write up transcriptions myself of interviews with the deans who were the main subjects of the study. By doing this I was able to detect nuances and to gain greater familiarity with the data. For interviews with deans’ colleagues in the second study, detailed notes and verbatim quotes were made but not full transcriptions. Howard Thomas was interviewed in the first two datasets and Andrew Pettigrew was a respondent for phases 1 and 2b, i.e. as a dean and as a former colleague of WBS deans. Although this cannot be described as a longitudinal study, the repetition of interviews with WBS deans over three years, particularly in the case of Howard Thomas in the pilot study, represents more than the single snapshot research design that characterised Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1996) cross-sectional survey.

For the second phase of interviews, a preparatory discussion with the Dean of Warwick Business School, Howard Thomas, who had taken an interest in the
findings of the first phase of the research and agreed access to the School for this project, scoped out the following issues:

(i) Path dependences at the school, critical incidents in its history, and the founding ideology of the University.
(ii) Background reading on the University and internal documents, with support from the Dean’s Personal Assistant.
(iii) Potential respondents.
(iv) An overview of key challenges in the institution, higher education industry, and business and management education.
(v) Confirmation of access but no agreement on shadowing opportunities.

A total of 29 interviews were held with current and former members of the School and University to collect mainly retrospective data, as well as live data for two incumbent deans. It was decided not to include one former chair, Roger Fawthrop, as it was generally considered that the role had been a ‘non job’ before George Bain started. Robert Dyson was included, however, although he had preceded Bain, because he had been so active in the leadership of the Business School and within the University for over 40 years. No particularly sensitive areas were highlighted in this thesis, although there were inevitably inherent tensions between the dean and registrar over administrative faculty numbers in the business school which are common in many universities. At an early stage, a focus group lunch of the current and two former deans of WBS and its long-serving administrator was conducted. On reflection, I felt that while the discussion was interesting, it was difficult to control and so this method was discontinued in favour of one-to-one meetings.

To obtain rich data for interpretive coding, interview guides (Appendices 7, 8 and 9) were used to ensure consistency in asking questions (Burgess, 1984). Time was
allowed for open and follow-up questions and reflections. Five key questions were strictly applied for the filmed interviews where there were tight time constraints. They were intended to produce outputs of around 10 minutes each after some editing. Inevitably, unplanned and unsolicited conversations that covered some of the interview material took place at social events such as at the Academy of Management meetings, even over breakfast and in airports. Unsolicited insights were gained in the course of my job at ABS and while these were logged as a barometer of different opinions, they did not form the main focus of this study. Clearly, as many of the respondents are management researchers themselves, for many informants the research process was well understood and they did not find the voice recorder obtrusive. Several checked about confidentiality and one former WBS employee requested anonymity. In the empirical chapters of this thesis, direct quotations are attributed to deans who are identified by number and listed by name in Appendix 10. While Guenther (2009: 412) acknowledges that ‘the dominant paradigm in the social sciences is to protect confidentiality, disguising the names of organizations and places is taken for granted in published work’, she views this as problematic. In this study, the deans of Warwick Business School are difficult to disguise and so the decision was taken not to anonymise them throughout. For most of the questions, in line with Weiner-Levy and Popper-Giveon’s (2011: 2178) advice: ‘[c]ertain topics that arose during field work, data analysis or writing were suppressed, obscured and omitted from the final report, despite their relevance and significance’ because of their personal nature.

Interviews with respondents other than the 24 deans, especially with individuals who had left Warwick a long time ago, were more conversational and
impressionistic. Sir Bob Burgess, for example, had worked in Sociology as a counterpart of several of the deans before he became a vice-chancellor but he was not actually based in Warwick Business School so provided very general perspectives. One person refused to be interviewed as he felt he could not comment on his current dean. There were three non replies from a former vice-chancellor and two retired professors who had been at WBS, but these individuals were not central to the research. While one filmed interview had been planned with Sue Cox at the women’s lunch (I had previously interviewed her to provide information on a tribute to her at the lunch), an impromptu decision to maximise the opportunity on the day resulted in two additional interviews which were very useful for the third dataset. Overall, responses were positive and encouraging, with offers to read drafts of my thesis.

2.6 Documentary data
The aim of collecting documentary data was to inform the interviews specifically for the in-depth case study and to mitigate some of the myths around WBS from outsiders who were unfamiliar with the workings of the School close-up. Table 13 lists documents included in the analysis. This background information was very useful for the vignettes produced which were drafted to gain rich insights into individual cases. As Van Maanen (1979: 540) says, ‘facts do not speak for themselves and the fieldworker must therefore deal with another level of first-order fact, namely: the situationally, historically, and biographically mediated interpretations used by members of the organization.’ Clearly, documents are assembled for different purposes (Prior, 2011) so cannot necessarily be taken at face value. There are caveats to the analysis of some documents, such as alumni
newsletters, as several are of uncertain authorship or were written for public relations purposes. The deans about whom I was writing were able to help me make sense of these documents in relation to their experiences as a shared responsibility. This was useful in the triangulation process as the vignettes combined self-reports, others’ viewpoints, and archival data. Mathison (1988: 17) admits: ‘Practicing researchers and evaluators know that the image of data converging upon a single proposition about a social phenomenon is a phantom image.’

Table 13: Documentary and archival data

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Memoirs (Dyson, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Minutes of staff meetings for four deans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Alumni newsletters for three deans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Staff handbook (‘Bain’s bible’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Internal strategy documents in the case of three deans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Current materials supplied to accreditation panels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Publications by WBS deans on governance and business and management education and research, e.g. Taylor (2013), Thomas (Thomas and Cornuel, 2012a, b), Wensley (2011, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>CVs, Debretts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Citations data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>University of Warwick Modern Records Centre information on University meetings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Documentary data analysis may be viewed as an unobtrusive research method. Certainly in the case of WBS, various reports such as a UGC report in the 1982 stating that the business school needed to enhance the quality of its programmes, league table results, written accreditation feedback, and strategic department review documents were key triggers for change. Atkinson and Coffey (2011: 79) suggest that documentary analysis should ‘incorporate a clear understanding of how documents are produced, circulated, read, stored and used.’ Clearly,
documents are constructs that are not neutral or necessarily accurate, they have a particular authorship and readership. Atkinson and Coffey (ibid) advise that researchers ‘read between the lines’ of text, exploring rhetoric, temporal aspects, and inter-linkages between texts. Prior (2011: 94) also argues that ‘writing connects to action’ and that documents ‘drive and fashion episodes of human interaction’ (ibid: 104); they are not inert.

2.7 Triangulation
An important design element in the research was triangulation (coined by Webb et al, 1966), which attempts to verify two reference points. Jick (1979: 603–604) suggests that ‘triangulation may be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives but also to enrich our understanding by allowing for new or deeper dimensions to emerge.’ Triangulation techniques are used to avoid reliance on one exclusive method or single observation that may distort the research, thereby enhancing confidence in the quality of research findings. Mathison (1988: 13) states that the benefits of triangulation are to ‘control bias and establish valid propositions.’ This research project recognises the benefits of triangulation not only for confirmation and corroboration, but for completeness, to fill in missing gaps in the data (Breitmayer et al, 1993). Cohen and Manion (2000: 254) also support this perspective of seeing triangulation as an ‘attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint.’ Altrichter et al (2008: 147) endorse this view, arguing that triangulation ‘gives a more detailed and balanced picture of the situation.’
Denzin (1970: 310) categorised four types of triangulation using ‘multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data, and methodologies.’ He also considered triangulation of time (cross-sectional and longitudinal), space (e.g. using cross-cultural techniques) and combined levels of triangulation. In this study, theoretical triangulation has not been considered, as it appears problematic in reality. Methodological, co-coder, and data triangulation are applied here. Cohen and Manion (1989: 275) note that methodological triangulation is most frequently used in education.

McGrath (1981: 179) advises ‘one must use multiple methods selected from different classes of methods with different vulnerabilities.’ Jick (1979: 604) notes that the underlying assumption of triangulation is that one method alone is insufficient and ‘that the weaknesses in each single method will be compensated by the counterbalancing strengths of another’ that are complementary and provide a richer and more complete picture. This ignores, however, the potential for flaws in methods to be compounded within a package of research methods, thus diluting the benefits of triangulation.

It would seem from debates about triangulation that several scholars see its purpose as convergence and corroboration to reduce bias and increase accuracy. Others recognise the usefulness of the mechanism for revealing divergence and discrepancies and to allow for complexity and clarification. This thesis does not support the view that the purpose of triangulation is merely for convergence. Miles and Huberman (1984: 235) claim that ‘triangulation is supposed to support a finding by showing that independent measures of it agree with it or, at least, don’t contradict it.’ Creswell and Miller (2000: 126) focus on convergence, arguing that
triangulation is ‘a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study.’ This study prefers to adopt Patton’s (2002) view on the limitations of triangulation. He suggests that the technique should value discrepancies and treat them with caution. Patton observes that ‘[t]here is no magic in triangulation. The evaluator using different methods to investigate the same programme should not expect that the findings generated by those different methods will automatically come together to produce some nicely integrated whole.’ He makes an interesting point that the purpose of triangulation is ‘to study and understand when and why there are differences’ (ibid: 331). Points of difference and outliers are intrinsically interesting as ‘divergence can often turn out to be an opportunity for enriching the explanation’ (Phillips, 1971: 19). The approach here is in line with Duffy (1987) who proposes that triangulation is a vehicle that generates curious inconsistencies and contradictions for the researcher to interpret rather than representing an end in itself. Flick (1992) also suggests that triangulation for qualitative research results in further interpretations rather than the confirmation of one explanation.

The approach in this thesis is consistent with Buchanan and Dawson’s (2007) view that it is important for researchers to allow multiple voices from senior as well as junior employees from different data sources as a form of triangulation. Deans’ personal assistants were included amongst the respondents. ‘Between methods’ (Denzin 1978: 302) and ‘within-method’ (ibid: 301) triangulation are used in this thesis to enhance the quality of the research by corroborating, balancing, and enriching a range of evidence. Jick (1979: 603) observes that “‘within-method” triangulation essentially involves cross-checking for internal consistency or
reliability while “between-method” triangulation tests the degree of external validity.’

Illustrations of triangulation in this thesis are provided in Figure 9.

In this research project, some conflicting evidence was collected using interviews based on different sources. For example, one dean denied he had ever accepted another deanship midway through his current tenure. He had withdrawn from the new job offer after it had been announced on the internet. Several other interviewees confirmed that it had actually happened, noting how unsettling it had been. One very reliable respondent explained how he had dissuaded this person from taking up the position in a highly politicised national context.
Figure 10 outlines discrepancies found from triangulation within the method of interviews from different data sources in relation to the extent an individual chaired committees effectively.

Figure 10: Between method triangulation: interviews

Essentially, triangulation in this study seeks to mitigate the various forms of bias that are listed in Table 14 with several examples from the data.
Table 14: Potential sources of bias that triangulation seeks to mitigate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples in this study of potential sources of bias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Inaccurate recollection (Huber and Power: 1985)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One respondent said that his manager often asked people whether they were drainers of energy or not: ‘are you a sponge or a spring?’ The manager honestly could not recall using this phrase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Deliberate misinformation (Van Maanen, 1979)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One individual flatly denied he had ever applied for a job that others had said he had accepted and then withdrawn after it had briefly been announced on the internet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Attribution bias (Martinko, 1995)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several respondents portrayed some individual managers as being unalloyed heroes or failures. Yet the ‘hero’ had been banned for drink driving and the so-called ‘failure’ had initiated triple accreditation, the first to be achieved globally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Social desirability bias (Zerbem and Paulhus, 1987)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following an interview, one of the managers was asked by email how he ran meetings. He gave a lengthy reply couched in favourable terms about how consultative he was and yet this had not been mentioned in the interview. Others said of him and one other manager that it was very important for them to feel liked but this attitude did help his ability to make decisions in meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Retrospective sensemaking (Golden, 1992a)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents such as merging two research groups may at the time have been risky and contentious but individuals were able to present a more coherent story in hindsight. One person had vehemently opposed a merger at the time but in retrospect considered it was absolutely the right decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Researcher bias (Barley, 1995)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was a genuine sense of affection felt for the institution by interviewees in the second dataset which the researcher shared. The intensity of interviewing an incumbent in situ who was making radical changes and experiencing considerable antipathy made the researcher cautious. Working with one individual who was a committee chair and initially for a short time first supervisor of the researcher’s project, as well as head of the business school unit could have lead to accusations of bias because of the researcher’s multiple roles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A final form of triangulation in this thesis is presented in Figure 11 which suggests an overall triangulated inquiry based on an overview of factors about which I can reflect as the researcher (Patton, 2002: 66) in terms of key questions, stakeholders, and potential sources of bias.
In conclusion, Mathison (ibid: 17) is realistic about triangulation, suggesting that ‘we end up with data that occasionally converge, but frequently are inconsistent and even contradictory.’ Her response is that this ambiguity ‘places the responsibility with the researcher for the construction of plausible explanations about the phenomena being studied.’

3. Evaluating the quality of the research

3.1 Introduction

This section reviews the quality and rigour of the research produced in this thesis. Silverman (2005: 211) asserts that the key challenge for the qualitative researcher is being able to defend their research as more than merely selective ‘anecdotalism.’ In this thesis, care has been taken with regard to the validity and reliability of the evidence collated and the research processes, I am mindful of Scandura and Williams’ (2000: 1263) advice that ‘without rigor, relevance in
management research cannot be claimed.’ The research methodology followed Gibbert and Ruigrok’s (2010) three strategies to enhance rigour in designing, conducting, and reporting on the case studies with appropriate evidence by:

(i) Specifying research actions.
(ii) Helping the reader understand departures from the planned research and actual activities, including the rationale for trade-offs made.
(iii) Detailing the type of rigour for internal and construct validity in particular as external validity is more problematic.

The research actions focused mainly on data collected from interviews and documents. Analysis is based on writing up case studies (vignettes – see Davies, 2014a), coding for themes, frequency counts, and template analysis. Trade-offs included the number of interviews that were feasible and the time and expense of obtaining high quality data from respondents within a four-year period. The next section explains issues related to validity.

3.2 Validity

Validity is concerned with whether the research is focusing on what it was intended to study. It asks whether the methods are appropriate to the issues and if the conclusions drawn are mainly accurate. Kirk and Miller (1986: 41–42) define validity as ‘the quality of fit between an observation and the basis on which it is made.’ Several types of validity regarding the topic, methods, data, and interpretations are considered in this research project: construct validity, internal validity (descriptive, interpretative, theoretical, Miles and Huberman, 1994), external validity (generalisability), and face validity. It has been important to adopt various strategies to maximise validity (Kirk and Miller, 1986; LeCompte and
Preissle, 1993) although this is seen as more problematic in qualitative than quantitative research studies (Miles, 1979). In terms of the less rigorous criterion of face validity, Mosier (1947: 192) advised that a research instrument should ‘appear practical, pertinent and related to the purpose...it should not only be valid, but it should also appear valid.’ Given the readiness of respondents to accept invitations to participate in this research study, in some instances for multiple interviews, it is suggested that the research design achieved face validity.

Guba and Lincoln (1982; 1989) replaced reliability and validity with four aspects of the concept of ‘trustworthiness’: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability as guidelines, mainly at the end of the qualitative research process for constructivist research. Guba (1981: 90), however, admitted these criteria were ‘primitive.’ Mishler (1990) reformulates the notion of validation as trustworthiness amongst a research community, through a tacit appreciation of situated practices in the field rather than the imposition of standardised procedures. He focuses on social constructions and on-going discourse in the research community about exemplars (Kuhn, 1960) which he calls 'concrete models of practice' Mishler (1990: 415). Cronbach (1988: 6) supports this view: 'Acceptance or rejection of a practice or theory comes about because a community is persuaded.' From the series of presentations of findings from this research in academic and practitioner conferences and publications (e.g. Davies, 2010; Ferlie et al, 2014), there is a sense that the business school community is interested in and accepts the findings of this research as feasible.
3.2.1 Construct validity

Bagozzi et al (1991: 421) broadly defines construct validity ‘as the extent to which an operationalization measures the concept it is supposed to measure.’ Peter (1981: 134) explains that construct validity is ‘the degree that it assesses the magnitude and direction of a representative sample of the characteristics of the construct and...the degree that the measure is not contaminated with elements from the domain of other constructs or error.’ He argues that ‘construct validity cannot be assessed directly but only inferred’ by answering the question: ‘What can the empirical portion of construct validation really demonstrate about a measure?’ (ibid: 135). This thesis adopts an interpretivist approach and rejects the criterion of construct validity within the data collection stage. It supports Silverman’s (2005: 212) argument that ‘many of the models that underlie qualitative research are simply not compatible with the assumption that “true” fixes on “reality” can be obtained separately from particular ways of looking at it.’

For the analysis, a social constructivist approach is applied in this thesis which accepts the validity of constructs as respondents perceive them.

Verification has been built into the iterative research process throughout (Kvale, 1989; Creswell, 1997) to check systematically for errors and congruence as I moved back and forth between the research questions, literature and data collection and analysis. Hammersley (1992) and Morse (1998) warn against respondent verification as a threat to validity if the participants are allowed to judge the quality of research on their own terms for accuracy. The view taken in this research project is that member checking is appropriate for factual accuracy of descriptions but individuals might not recognise themselves as others describe.
them or in abstracted commentary and should not engage with the researcher about interpretations related to other respondents’ judgements.

3.2.2 Internal validity

Internal validity is concerned that the conclusions drawn are correct and that there is consistency with interpreting the subject matter as valid representations of the phenomena being studied. Indeed, for example, the majority of deans represent upper middle managers. This validity is enhanced by a sustained focus over time as meanings unfold to reveal repeated indications of evidence (Barley, 1995) through, for examples, multiple interviews with the individuals in the second dataset. Careful record keeping and continuous analysis served to mitigate potential threats to validity, preventing the researcher from ‘going native’ as a result of overexposure in the field (Denzin, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Barley, 1995). Only infrequent visits were made to Warwick Business School specifically to interview respondents. In the process of co-coding of transcripts, attention was paid to avoid type I errors, a false positive, where behaviours were claimed that did not exist. We also sought to avoid false negatives – type II errors where we failed to spot behaviours that were evidenced.

3.2.3 Descriptive validity

Maxwell (1992: 286) refers to descriptive validity as the factual accuracy of details recorded through contextual richness, with ‘primary descriptive validity: the descriptive validity of what the researcher reports having seen or heard (or touched, smelled, and so on)’ and ‘secondary descriptive validity: the validity of accounts of things that could in principle be observed, but that were inferred from other data.’ To the best of my knowledge, the details reported in this research
accurately reflect what was actually said by respondents and the information reported correctly corresponds to documentary data.

3.2.4 Interpretative validity
Interpretative validity relates to how findings resonate with participants in terms of capturing the meanings the respondents intended and to what extent the researcher was able to ‘catch reality in flight’ (Pettigrew, 1990: 268), as the respondents understood that reality. This required the researcher to some extent to get inside their heads and to understand their perspectives. Since many of the subjects were known professionally already to the investigator through their interactions in the professional association, interpretative validity can be claimed in this thesis. It is more difficult to appreciate the views of the retired interviewees, particularly when they were discussing their experiences in the 1970s. For example, Robert Dyson made the point that he was ‘chairMAN’ at Warwick Business School and there were no women faculty in the days of staff–student cricket games and warm beer, scenes that are no longer a feature of modern university life. Member checking (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) was an important exercise in the research design to ensure interpretative validity which was achieved mainly through the co-written vignettes for the second dataset and in the filmed interviews.

3.2.5 Theoretical validity
Johnson (1997: 286) defines theoretical validity as ‘the degree that a theoretical explanation developed from a research study fits the data, and, therefore, is credible and defensible.’ While I embarked on the exploratory interviews with vague theoretical notions of strategic leadership, the more explicit construct of
‘middleness’ was honed in subsequent analysis by drawing theoretically on middle management literature that validated interpretations of the datasets produced.

3.2.6 External validity

External validity or generalisability asks whether the results can be generalised beyond the immediate set of findings to other contexts, individuals, or times (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Ayres et al (2003: 881) suggest that ‘idiographic generalization’ can be achieved within and across case analysis. Tsoukas (1989: 559) stated that studies of individuals are externally valid when they explain causal patterns which reveal ‘multiple generative mechanisms that are potentially responsible for the occurrence of the events under study.’ It is not the primary aim of qualitative research to generalise from the particulars of a small sample to claim universal findings for a larger population, ecology, or across time. This study has attempted to show especially what is unique about the deans of Warwick Business School and other UK university-based business school deanships. Stake’s (1990) phrase ‘naturalistic generalization’ is probably the most relevant in terms of how the findings can be generalisable to a similar group of people in such circumstances, i.e. verisimilitude (Weick, 1989). This is why the study here reports on the demographics and names of people in the research, it lists the criteria for selecting the sample, contextual details and techniques used for data collection so that readers can decide the applicability of the results to their own situations as a form of generalisation or to repeat the study using replication logic (Yin, 1994). The latter assumes that the more studies on a similar issue support each other’s findings, the greater the generalisability.
Van Maanen (1979) suggests that idiographic studies can provide support for theoretical validity and explain patterns in the data that attain critical mass and coherence. Marshall and Rossman (2011) argue that findings from qualitative research may have some transferability to other situations and cases holistically. As an example, Birkinshaw et al (2000: 242) provide insights into generalisability of case studies when they reflect on their research: ‘[i]n terms of case study design, we are careful to acknowledge that this research cannot readily be generalized beyond the specific constraints we set...Our intention was to put forward a number of propositions and conceptual arguments that are not, to our knowledge, specific to the Swedish context.’ It is likely that the findings in this thesis are not specific to the UK university-based business school context but they resonate in other professional schools in higher education, in the public sector, and knowledge intensive contexts such as professional service firms.

In this study, respondent validation was achieved through the co-production of vignettes which demonstrated the accuracy of reportage (Yin, 1994) and the completeness of data (Leonard-Barton, 1995). Validation was also attained on development programmes where there was some resonance with participants who felt that the research questions were sufficiently probing to debunk myths about the business school deanship. Some of the researcher’s original preconceptions were challenged in these dialogues. For instance, one viewer regarded a dean as aggressive whereas another felt the same dean displayed exemplary negotiating skills.
3.3 Reliability

Silverman (2005: 210) defines reliability as ‘the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or different occasions.’ Throughout this project, checks for the reliability of the research findings considered issues of consistency, stability of procedures over time (Denzin, 1989), dependability, and replicability (Yin, 1994). Reliability also deals with the researcher as instrument, the standards applied to reflections in field notes, and inter-coder reliability in analysing sample data (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Fox-Wolfgramm, 1997).

Inconsistencies in collecting interview data by the same single researcher in this thesis, for example, are acknowledged with variations in the duration of exploratory interviews and changes over the four years in the increasing confidence of the researcher in the process. The issue of potential researcher bias was guarded against by recognising my own presuppositions (King, 1994) and identity as a female interviewer collecting primary interview data from mainly men (Cassell, 2005: 170) in the first and second phases of the study. It is not possible to replicate exactly the research as subjective decisions were made about how to deal with non-respondent bias; for instance, the scheduling of interviews depended on interviewees’ availability at a particular point in time. One respondent is no longer alive, others are not current deans so may have a difference outlook on their experiences retrospectively. The interviews were a social process that cannot be standardised or replicated exactly at a different point in time. Flexibility is important in qualitative inquiry, as Eisenhardt (1989a:
539) asserts that within a systematic approach ‘adjustments allow the researcher to probe emergent themes or to take advantage of special opportunities which may be present in a given situation.’ Nevertheless, a certain amount of replication is possible as strict standards were adhered to in terms of the research process, with interview guides, detailed field notes, transcripts, and filmed interviews. Many of the respondents are still available if another or the same researcher chose to repeat elements of this research. Inevitably, there are elements of the researcher’s judgement that cannot be replicated.

Inter-rater comparisons were made to mitigate researcher bias. Inter-coder checking was included in the research process mid-way through the coding of transcripts to check for reliability of a sample of data. This was broadly based on Fox-Wolffgramm’s (1997) approach. Two colleagues were briefed on the purpose of the research, the constructs in Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model, and the process to generate coding within a template (King, 1998). Examples of initial and final template analysis are provided in Appendices 11 and 12. Each co-coder was asked to code the same sections of text to check for inconsistent, inaccurate, or incomplete interpretations. The results were discussed with the researcher and the two co-coders. A range of between 85% and 93% reliability was found in convergence within the reports. Divergence was particularly experienced in the roles of facilitating and championing, as both were seen as forms of encouragement that resulted in some data being coded for both which demonstrated that the roles overlap within the original model. Coding discrepancies were clarified in relation to experimenting and issue selling.
4. Data analysis

The data collected included mainly interview transcripts and co-authored vignettes to gain an understanding of individuals’ experiences. For the vignettes in the second dataset, archival and documentary data were used to supplement the interviews. Draft vignettes written up of the Warwick Business School deans interviewed in this project are available on the web (Davies, 2014a). The data analysis was ongoing and it was structured and reduced in tabular displays (Huberman and Miles, 1983) inductively in the early stages. At a later phase, the data and commentary in the field notes were analysed deductively based on the typology of middle management strategizing. To gain familiarity with the audio-recorded interviews, I listened to them on an iPod. In order to open up the analysis beyond the perspectives of a single researcher and co-coders, I played several of the interview clips during leadership development programmes at ABS and on the Master’s courses I teach at Birkbeck and the Open University. This enabled the deans to be watched on a wider screen and meant that the interviews were exposed to a variety of audiences. This enabled insights from different stakeholders on the same materials to be discussed. The commentary on these viewings provided a ‘feel’ for whether the respondents’ accounts of the business school deanship resonated with viewers’ own experiences as middle managers and their perceptions of the interviewees.

Chapter six that follows explains in detail the data coding and analysis. In summary, for the first stage of the analysis phase, in the case of each middle manager, strategic practices were identified inductively using open, first-order coding. The second stage entailed inductive qualitative analysis to explore the
contingencies impacting on these strategizing behaviours using second-order coding. This was followed by stage three when Floyd and Wooldridge’s typology was applied as a template to categorise practices deductively into themes within the four roles. Additional categories were also noted. Subsequently, in stage four the practices identified in the roles were clustered into a set of strategist archetypes. Finally, comparisons were made between evidence in the three datasets across the seven archetypes identified.

Key outputs of the analyses of the data included:

- Thematic open coding: impressions, themes, codes, clusters, decontextualisation and recontextualisation
- Template analysis
- Word clouds – frequency counts using a ‘quasi-statistical analysis style’ (Miller and Crabtree, 1992: 18)
- Vignettes (Davies, 2014a)
- Coding trees, matrices and memos across all filmed transcripts; comparisons within single interviews, between interviews of the same group, from different groups, in pairs (Boeijije, 2002: 395). Sources of data included interview transcripts and notes and filmed interviews with deans for the second and third datasets.
- Comparisons of similarities and polar opposites (Pettigrew, 1990).

Initially, the data analysis process was tentative and slow (Dey, 1993). Transcripts were content analysed to cluster key themes using open, descriptive, and interpretive coding to produce initial and final templates in mind map format.

Stone et al (1966: 5) define content analysis as ‘any research technique for making
inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within text.’ The technique of template analysis allows for ‘thematic analysis that balances a relatively high degree of structure in the process of analysing textual data with the flexibility to adapt it to the needs of a particular study’ (King, 2012: 426).

First, an initial template was produced (Appendix 11) using a priori themes (Table 15) from three sets of transcripts, applying preliminary labels. This was repeated and modified to generate clear themes within a hierarchical coding format with similar issues clustered. Time, middleness, and boundary spanning emerged as integrative themes. Before the full set of 12 transcripts was worked through, checks for quality were made with independent coding carried out by two co-coders to compare and critique results and to clarify any errors. Several categories were merged and re-sorted and a few new codes were added to differentiate similar activities. A final template (Appendix 12) was generated from coding all the transcripts in the first dataset.

**Table 15: Initial template with a priori themes for the first dataset**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A priori themes</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-perceptions:</td>
<td>transitions from scholar to manager, inner locus of control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities:</td>
<td>mandate, positioning, values, drive, strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of: autonomy:</td>
<td>discretion, centre-periphery relations, professional and personal constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievements:</td>
<td>results, impact, perspectives over time of performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The template analysis informed the interview questions for the second phase of the study. Appendix 13 presents the frequency of word counts visually for the second dataset to show the deans’ priorities as reflected in the number of times a
particular topic was raised in open coding. Word clouds were created to summarise the density of attention to certain priorities. The multiple interview transcripts with these deans were combined with field notes from interviews about them and documentary data to co-produce vignettes on each. These accounts included a brief biography, career trajectories, experience in the deanship, recommendations to aspiring deans and for individuals who have retired or moved to other jobs, and reflections on life after the deanship. The cases provided insights into the ‘webs of significance’ (Geertz, 1973: 5) each individual had spun for themselves, in addition to the researcher’s interpretations based on a theoretical framework, and data from other respondents and documents. As Golden-Biddle and Locke (1997) advise, these were drafted to produce storylines. They were framed by a strategy-as-practice lens with interesting examples grounded in individuals’ everyday experiences of formulating and implementing strategy over their tenures. This exercise allowed for depth, frequent interactions in several cases over checking facts with the subjects. It facilitated an appreciation of how one dean’s tenure linked to and influenced another (e.g. pendulum effect of opposites being recruited in succession). It was helpful that Robert Dyson, the dean who had been in post in the 1970s, was writing parts of his memoirs (Dyson, 2010) at the same time as I was interviewing him.

Finally, the data analysis (explained in Chapter six) was based on open coding first, followed by coding within Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model of middle management strategic roles. This included all the transcripts in the first study plus the transcripts of the filmed interviews for the deans in the second and
third datasets. This process enabled within and cross-case comparisons which are detailed in the remaining chapters of this thesis. It allowed for clustering to examine similarities and differences, for instance deans from metropolitan universities were compared, and comparisons were made between serial deans.

5. The researcher’s role

The role of ‘researcher as instrument’ is important in qualitative research which recognises the value of subjectivity and relies less on standardised methods than quantitative research (Brodsky, 2008). There is an assumption that the inquiry-based investigator is the best-placed individual to comprehend the complexity and volume of data (Lave and Kvale, 1995). Stake (1995: 135) notes that the ‘[q]ualitative case study is highly personal research. Persons are studied in depth. Researchers are encouraged to include their own personal perspectives in the interpretation.’ Moreover, a strategy-as-practice approach to empirical research benefits from the researcher’s proximity to the phenomena being studied. I was conscious of Johnson et al’s (2007: 67) three concerns with potential risks. These include: (i) contamination with the researcher influencing what is being researched; (ii) ‘going native’; and (iii) political alignment, problems of favouring a particular view or individual. These risks were moderated in this research project by the use of multiple sources of data, peer review feedback on my conference papers related to the theoretical framework and data analysis, my separate work location in London, and my reflexivity in maintaining a personal learning log (Moon, 2004) where I recorded different types of field notes (Spradley, 1979) on my smartphone.
As a part-time student registered at the business school being researched in the second dataset and as Deputy Chief Executive working full-time at the Association of Business Schools where many of the respondents are colleagues, there were clear synergies in the research project in terms of ease of access and familiarity. Tietze (2012) explored the inter-subjectivity of the researcher-researched relationship as an insider-researcher when writing her own doctoral thesis. She found it impossible to be a total ‘professional stranger’ (Agar, 1981) as she shifted between her roles as student and colleague in the same institution.

From a positive perspective, this project supports Brannick and Coghlan’s (2007: 67) observation that ‘[t]he higher the status of the researcher, the more access she has.’ There were, nevertheless, potential pitfalls in being a semi-insider although not an employee of the business schools studied, because of possible confusion over multiple professional relationships. Merton (1972: 44) emphasizes the importance of understanding one’s claims whether as an insider or outsider. It is important to note that no pressure was exerted on me by members of Warwick Business School to portray it in a particularly favourable light. As my professional role is to represent all UK business schools, I was able to balance close knowledge of the sector with emotional detachment from the personalities involved. Indeed, at the Strategic Management Society conference in Rome in 2010 I presented my research to a group that included faculty from Warwick Business School. My supervisor remarked afterwards that he was pleased the WBS discussants took a theoretical interest in my presentation and did not recognise the research setting as their own employer.
The positive aspect of being a partial insider-researcher is familiarity with the jargon and key preoccupations within the sector. It can be less obtrusive, with the researcher achieving greater acceptability than a complete outsider. The insider-researcher can, therefore, develop greater empathy with respondents. The disadvantages of being considered an insider-researcher include accusations that the investigator does not probe as much as a naïve outsider. As an antidote to some of these criticisms, Johnson and Duberley (2003) advocate methodological and epistemic reflexivity with the researcher analysing and questioning their beliefs and meta-theories. Haverkamp (2005: 147) observes that ‘[t]he researcher’s values, personal history, and “position” on characteristics such as gender, culture, class, and age are inescapable elements of this inquiry.’ Pratt (2009: 859) advises that ‘[o]ne should be very clear about one’s “position in the field”’ and Antebay (2008) advocates clarity in the relationship between the researcher and the researched.

In this thesis the issue of voice is particularly interesting (Hertz, 1997). Stake (1995: 12) admits that ‘[u]ltimately, the interpretations of the researcher are likely to be emphasized more than the interpretations of those people studied, but the qualitative researcher tries to preserve the multiple realities, the different and even contradictory views of what is happening.’ Through the inclusion of direct quotations, I have sought to include multiple voices. As Sword (1999: 277) suggests, ‘[a]lthough some would criticize the subjectivity that is inherent in interpretivist work, no research is free of the biases, assumptions, and personality of the researcher. We cannot separate self from those activities in which we are...’
intimately involved.’ Fendt and Sachs (2008: 430) argue that ‘the intrinsic qualities of the researcher are an important determinant of overall research quality.’

Indeed, Kirk and Miller (1986: 21) make no pretence of a neutral researcher; they argue that ‘[i]n the case of qualitative observations, the issue of validity is not a matter of methodological hair-splitting about the fifth decimal point, but a question of whether the researcher sees what he or she thinks he or she sees.’ For them, what matters are currency, resonance, utility, and whether the results of a research project appear spurious. Benbasat et al (1987: 371) also acknowledge that with case studies the ‘results derived depend heavily on the integrative powers of the investigator.’ For this thesis, my expertise in the setting as a novice researcher and experience as a middle manager in a familiar sector have been an important part of my motivation on the research journey in reframing the apparently familiar, echoing T.S. Eliot (1943b: 59): ‘We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time.’

6. Ethical issues

Having considered the dilemmas of being a semi-insider researcher, this section considers ethical issues raised by this thesis. May (2001: 59) defines ethics in social science as an ‘attempt to formulate codes and principles of moral behaviour.’ In relation to research governance in the management field, Bell and Bryman (2007: 72) enumerate ethical principles mentioned in ethics codes in order of frequency: harm to participants; informed consent; anonymity; dignity; privacy; confidentiality; affiliation; honesty and transparency; deception; misrepresentation; reciprocity. Respondents participated voluntarily in this study,
although one needed some persuading to be filmed. The details of the subjects’ private lives were respected, rapport was developed during the interviews, and as far as I know, no information was deliberately distorted.

Other social science researchers, especially in health, where they are subject to medical ethics, might be particularly wary about issues of confidentiality in this thesis. Wiles et al (2008: 418) define confidentiality as ‘(1) not discussing information provided by an individual with others, and (2) presenting findings in ways that ensure individuals cannot be identified (chiefly through anonymisation).’ None of the deans requested anonymity for themselves. A key argument in this thesis is that deans should be more visible. As public figures responsible for the future of business and management education, I argue that they should be more open. It would have been confusing to adopt pseudonyms and to disguise the individuals who are well-known in the sector by changing their characteristics. The integrity of the research would have been compromised since the contextualisation of strategizing practices is a key argument in this thesis. The position adopted was that often people want their story told (Silverman, 1997; Wiles et al, 2006). Personal and institutional branding through story telling is integral to the deanship. In his thesis at Warwick University on the political leadership of three élite business schools (IMD, INSEAD, LBS), Frageiro (2007) did not disguise details about individual deans or their names.

Bell and Bryman (2007: 68) also note potential asymmetries that distinguish management research from social science research in general and medical school ethics in particular: ‘unlike many other social researchers, the relationships between management researchers and their participants are often characterized
by a power imbalance that favours the research subject rather than the researcher.’ I developed confidence in interviewing over the course of this study and did not feel intimidated by the senior professors I interviewed, although I was more circumspect when interviewing the current new dean of the business school where I was registered as a doctoral student.

When conducting this research, I aimed to adhere to the University of Warwick’s Research Code of Practice that promotes ‘the highest standards of integrity and professionalism.’ The Academy of Management’s (2005) statement was taken into account: ‘It is the duty of Academy members to interact with others in our community in a manner that recognises individual dignity and merit.’ When conducting and reporting on research the Academy advises: ‘careful design, execution, analysis, interpretation of results, and retention of data. Presentation of research should include a treatment of the data that is honest and that reveals both strengths and weaknesses of findings.’ This is echoed in the Strategic Management Society’s guidelines (2008: 3) that promote: ‘integrity in the research process and transparency in the presentation of assumptions, methods, results, and boundary conditions.’ I recognised the need to retain the integrity of the research throughout all steps in the process.

Issues of voice and verification of interviews posed other ethical dilemmas in the study when co-authoring the vignettes, in particular with the dean who was seen as least successful. He requested several changes, which resulted in the deletion of a few derogatory comments. George Bain stressed that the researcher’s voice should be acknowledged in the vignettes. Alvesson (2011) reflects on ethical issues relating to voice, the researcher’s privileged position, and problems of
misrepresentation. He suggests ‘that researchers should have a lot of respect for those being studied and refrain from a critical assessment of their interview statements, or at least, should be modest and careful when evaluating interviewee claims to tell the truth, as they see it’ (ibid: 147). On the other hand, Grinyer (2002) weighs up the pros and cons of participant anonymity and argues that ‘[t]he balance of protecting respondents from harm by hiding their identity while at the same time preventing “loss of ownership” is an issue that needs to be addressed by each researcher on an individual basis with each respondent.’ In practice, more attributions are made in the direct quotations than originally planned in this thesis using a numbering system so the reader can appreciate the context within which the speakers are commenting. As the project is based on contingency theory, the individuality of narratives matters.

7. Limitations of a case study approach

There are clearly merits and potential pitfalls in conducting a qualitative study as a lone semi-insider researcher in a single sector. Table 16 highlights Flyvbjerg’s (2006: 219) list of five misunderstandings and criticisms levelled against case study research. It includes examples from this study to justify choices made to ensure rigour as well as the reporting of interesting and actionable findings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Commentary on this study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge.</td>
<td>Deans as academic practitioners value theories to make sense of their experiences. As Lewin (1945: 129) suggests: ‘There is nothing so practical as a good theory.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) One cannot generalize from a single case; therefore, the single-case study cannot contribute to scientific development.</td>
<td>This thesis includes 24 individual cases. Business schools use single institutional case studies as artefacts for teaching routinely, and academics understand the power and limitations of this approach (Contardo and Wensley, 2004). There is scope for transferability to middle managers in other knowledge intensive organisations such as professional service firms. As business schools represent academic departments that are distinctively ‘business-like’, in a more competitive higher education environment. Lessons learned in this study may apply to other middle manager academics in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building.</td>
<td>The purpose of the research was to explore and extend an existing theoretical model in a particular context of a non-profit professionalised business unit and not theory building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) The case study contains a bias toward verification.</td>
<td>The emphasis here is not on corroboration but exploration of issues and behaviours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) It is often difficult to summarize specific case studies.</td>
<td>Filmed interviews and vignettes from this study are available on the web.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Summary and conclusion

This chapter has considered the benefits of using in-depth cases studies to generate rich insights into upper middle managers’ strategizing behaviours. Chapter five has acknowledged the limitations to generalisability within an interpretivist paradigm. To explore the strategizing practices of the key respondents, a representative sample of subjects and their colleagues, with one-to-one, face-to-face interviews as the dominant method supplemented by documentary data was used to understand the contingencies influencing Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) four middle management strategic roles in a professionalised context. There has been continuous dialogue in the research process between the theoretical concepts, empirical data, and analysis (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008) in an attempt to balance ‘rigour, relevance and pragmatism’ (Darke et al, 1998: 274).

The purpose of Chapter five has been to convey insights into the research choices made in conducting this project. This chapter has highlighted the key strategies, design, methodologies, and methods selected for data collection, and the debates underpinning these decisions. The following empirical chapters in this thesis provide descriptions of the data obtained to answer Patton’s (2002: 103) appeal (Figure 13): ‘just tell us just what you saw.’ Chapter six details the coding process and data analysis. Chapter seven explains linkages in the data between practices, roles, contingencies, and archetypes to make sense of the everyday practices of business school deans as hybrid upper middle manager strategists over time. Chapter eight discusses the research findings more broadly.
Young lady, the court doesn’t need to hear any more about difficulties with validity & reliability in qualitative research methods, discrepancies between different postmodern epistemologies, or this “Great Paradigm Debate.” Please just tell us what you saw.

Figure 12: Cartoon. ‘Please just tell us what you saw’

(Patton, 2002: 103)
CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS AND CODING

This section explains the coding processes. In the absence of a generally ‘accepted “boilerplate” for writing up qualitative methods and determining quality’ (Pratt, 2009: 856), the data analysis followed the ‘Gioia methodology’ (Langley and Abdallah, 2011; Gioia et al, 2013: 26). This is based on traditional grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). It entailed initial data coding using respondent-centric terms recorded comprehensively within each case (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The first phase was followed by listing second-order, theoretical terms of practices identified in the data and categorised in the four middle management roles which were examined in greater depth (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). These were then distilled into overarching dimensions based on theoretical concepts to generate archetypes.

Tabular displays (see Tables 17–23) were generated to present the evidence visually based on a data structure of the terms, conceptual themes, and aggregate dimensions which emerged from an abductive research approach. Through inductive and deductive analyses (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007: 1269), axial coding was used, i.e. ‘a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 96). The researcher’s commentary was then provided on key quotations to highlight the interplay of contingencies that impacted on the subjects. These included variations in institutional autonomy, government policy, prevailing prosperity or austerity impacting on the higher education sector (specifically business schools), the degree of knowledge intensity in teaching or research focused cultures, etc.
The five stages of the coding and data analysis process are outlined in Figure 13. The initial exploratory, inductive phase focused on open and first-order coding by identifying strategizing activities within each of the 24 cases of mid-level strategist. The purpose of the inductive qualitative analysis in stage two was to derive dimensions based on the macro, micro, and meso level contingencies influencing these strategizing practices using second-order coding. In the third stage, Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) four part model of strategic middle management roles was applied to the list of behaviours as a template. Practices were deductively coded into second-order themes within the four roles across the cases. The fourth stage involved generating a taxonomy of ideal types of hybrid middle management strategist from the bundles of practices within each role that were shaped by the five contingent dimensions highlighted in stage two. Finally, comparisons were made that examined differences between the seven archetypes in Table 24. Four archetypes of strategist emerged that mirrored activities in Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) four roles and three additional archetypes emerged.
1. Coding for each archetype

Tables 17–23 display the first- and second-order coding for the roles and archetypes. Table 24 makes cross-archetype comparisons with commentary on the contingencies evidenced within these ideal types. An asterisk denotes comments from secondary respondents.
## Table 17: Coding for facilitating adaptability, Dealmaker archetype

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Quotations: Facilitating Adaptability</th>
<th>First-order</th>
<th>Second-order</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I got tremendous enjoyment out of changing the institutions I was in.</td>
<td>changing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Changing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The biggest challenge is to influence the people you’re working with.</td>
<td>influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t be afraid of experimentation, trying things, and abandoning them if they don’t work.</td>
<td>experimentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I need to shake up my senior team. We’ve been a bit complacent.</td>
<td>shake up</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was a genuine motivation on my part to see what I could do to make a difference to the school basically.</td>
<td>make a difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m passionate about applying learning, applying research to solutions and developing individuals.</td>
<td>learning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a genuine objective, we’re not trying to be a pale copy of our competitors but to strike out and be fresh and innovative.</td>
<td>innovative</td>
<td>Innovating</td>
<td>INOVATING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That ability to be open minded and import ideas is really important.</td>
<td>import ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What energised me most was engaging with others about their ideas.</td>
<td>ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I re-invented myself, developing a higher level of emotional intelligence.</td>
<td>reinvented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our main focus was to improve programme recruitment and quality.</td>
<td>quality</td>
<td>Quality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since becoming dean, I’ve done no personal scholarship.</td>
<td>scholarship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The business school deanship has become a far more professional and well recognised role.</td>
<td>professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remember, always look outwards rather than inwards.</td>
<td>look outwards</td>
<td>Prospecting</td>
<td>MEDIATING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With him, every conversation is a negotiation.*</td>
<td>negotiation</td>
<td>Negotiating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I did a lot of arbitrations and mediations.</td>
<td>mediations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If you’re going to get anything done you need to form partnerships.</td>
<td>partnerships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’ve got at least 50 plates spinning, things that people will drop by, fire me emails, and live projects, juggling a huge breadth of things.</td>
<td>juggling</td>
<td>Balancing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You just can’t not do markets, you can’t not do building staff, you know. You’ve got to get it right in terms of the balance.</td>
<td>balance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See yourself in the middle of a variety of stakeholder relationships. Delegation is very important – keep really in contact with key people.</td>
<td>delegation</td>
<td>Delegating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deans have become much more engaged with the business community.</td>
<td>engaged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading a European business school is about managing heterogeneity.</td>
<td>heterogeneity</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You learn to want to nurture people, to move them on.</td>
<td>nurture</td>
<td>Nurturing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He was like a runaway train, huge energy.*</td>
<td>energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first thing you have to do is listen, try to get some accommodation.

You can’t command people to be innovative. Support them with how they might build that extraordinary advancement of knowledge.

What I most enjoyed is the way you can develop people’s careers. Support them with how they might build that extraordinary advancement of knowledge.

Everyone in positions of responsibility needs a club of people. You can learn from and help each other.

Every member of my top team blocks off time for research and we cover for each other. We are entirely respectful of each other’s free time.

One of the big things to build teams is to ensure you get the right people in the right roles, clarify expectations, and work together.

The data in Table 17 suggest Dealmaker archetypal behaviours include supporting others by mediating and innovating. This type focuses on facilitating adaptability and is characterised by being open to new ideas, and supporting experiments and innovation by mediating between people. The strategizing capability involved in facilitating activities relies on how loosely coupled the SBU is from the centre, the amount of slack available to ‘play’, to explore new ideas and models. These activities are also influenced by more intense industry dynamics forcing middle managers to differentiate. It may be a struggle for upper middle managers to behave sufficiently confidently at an early point in their tenure to enable adaptations of their mandate on appointment. It could be argued that the greater research selectivity and knowledge intensity required to play conservative publications games in addition to quality assurance, accreditation and media rankings games are constraining deans to play safe, to focus on compliance, and even to kill ideas rather than seek to add value. The Dealmaker type is engaged in activities that involve mentoring, coaching, partnering, making trade-offs, and developing future generations. The downside is that a Dealmaker may focus on the negotiating process rather than on the results.
Table 18: Coding for synthesizing information, Deliberator archetype

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Quotations: Synthesizing Information</th>
<th>First-order</th>
<th>Second-order</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We have themes for a strategy, memorable <strong>acronyms</strong>.</td>
<td>acronym</td>
<td>Combine</td>
<td><strong>COMBINING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We actually control the <strong>agenda</strong> very carefully.</td>
<td>agenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I loved the intellectual <strong>association</strong> with different departments.</td>
<td>association</td>
<td>Join</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with the Royal Shakespeare Company changes the <strong>cocktail</strong>.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I <strong>merged</strong> the graduate school with the main school, tidied it up.</td>
<td>merged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You have to do it by <strong>engagement</strong> and by listening.</td>
<td>engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future deans should look at <strong>partnerships</strong> in a fast changing world.</td>
<td>partnerships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was onus on the dean to articulate a <strong>coherent</strong> strategy.</td>
<td>coherent</td>
<td>Unify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It was a process of <strong>consolidating</strong> after my predecessor’s hares.</td>
<td>consolidating</td>
<td>Concentrate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have <strong>simplifying devices</strong>: market segmentation, different businesses, academic groups.</td>
<td>simplifying devices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <strong>portfolio</strong> model is more resilient in a downturn.</td>
<td>portfolio</td>
<td>Formulate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There were important questions about <strong>balancing</strong> student types.</td>
<td>balancing</td>
<td>Simplify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By the time I arrived, my team was <strong>figured out</strong>.</td>
<td>figured out</td>
<td>Interpret</td>
<td><strong>UNDERSTANDING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There’s no <strong>meaning</strong> without context.</td>
<td>meaning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After all the listening and <strong>understanding</strong>, you switch to activity.</td>
<td>understanding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are we framing management problems so people learn?</td>
<td>framing</td>
<td>Frame</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I formulate strategy in an academic way by writing a <strong>paper</strong>.</td>
<td>paper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The shared <strong>purpose</strong> is what keeps us all together.</td>
<td>purpose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure meetings so people have <strong>information</strong> to decide.</td>
<td>information</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving around with <strong>consulting</strong> and international experience, you collect a lot of wisdom.</td>
<td>consulting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I get good <strong>feedback</strong> from certain people.</td>
<td>feedback</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You must manage internally and be visible, give academic and business direction, build brand, gather</td>
<td>intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In contrast with the Dealmaker, the Deliberator may be perceived as more thoughtful, considered, cerebral, keen to see patterns in diverse data, however, this role still requires interaction to collect intelligence. Dealmakers may perceive Deliberators as slow. Deliberators may regard Dealmakers as unreflective and overly pragmatic.

Respondents’ comments indicate that the Deliberator archetype is focused on combining different sources of data to gain a better understanding for decision-making.
Deliberators concentrate more on analysis, synthesis, and closure, divergent activities, than the Dealmaker or Debater. For business schools, brand and reputation management are very important for legitimising the offering. Deans, however, must avoid confusing their own rhetoric, which is used to boost reputation and confidence and sales, with reality. Deliberators seek to combine information from diverse sources to help them understand patterns so they can reach a decision on the mandate and the way forward. The comment that ‘there is no meaning without context’ (echoing Mishler, 1979) was repeated multiple times by one respondent [D12/17]. Deliberator hybrid managers gain insights from the cross-fertilisation of ideas and ideally avoid paradigm traps by seeing things from different angles. The risk of the Deliberator type of strategist is inaction.
Table 19: Coding for championing alternatives, Debater archetype

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Quotations: Championing Alternatives</th>
<th>First-order</th>
<th>Second-order</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I’m chief sales officer.</td>
<td>sales</td>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>SELLING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never criticise your institution. You have to be positive but know the difference between rhetoric and reality.</td>
<td>be positive</td>
<td></td>
<td>be positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night after night, you have to turn up at social events, hand shaking events, bragging about how wonderful the place is.</td>
<td>bragging</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See yourself in the middle of a variety of stakeholder relationships. Keep in contact with your supporters in industry.</td>
<td>supporters</td>
<td>Supporting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m an enthusiastic, optimist so I always think there will be a solution and I always feel one can get people involved.</td>
<td>enthusiastic</td>
<td>Enthusing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All that extroverting. You have to be somebody that people respect and are willing to go and talk to.</td>
<td>extroverting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One of greatest challenges is the market and trying to position one’s school in the market in a sustainable way.</td>
<td>position</td>
<td>Persuading</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m not going to be beaten - comes back to winning again.</td>
<td>winning</td>
<td>Triumphing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrating your victories is very, very important. You notice I use the word ‘victory’ because you’re at risk so often.</td>
<td>celebrating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s quite interesting this debate about what business schools are going to be like because we’re not going to be able to carry on as we are, taking in all these overseas students.</td>
<td>debate</td>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The other thing that, you know, is really very important is the legitimacy of the business school in the context of the university.</td>
<td>legitimacy</td>
<td>Supporting</td>
<td>CONVINCING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it’s important to communicate, to bring people on side so we achieve a critical mass of support for the strategy.</td>
<td>support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When we were centralised it required you to argue your case to a different community and to persuade a group of senior peers who were not part of the business school.</td>
<td>persuade</td>
<td>Persuading</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s by far the most interesting job I’ve ever had. You can really influence change quite significantly. And I think that’s fun.</td>
<td>influence</td>
<td>Influencing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With him, every negotiation is a conversation. *</td>
<td>converse</td>
<td>Conversing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We had some good people. You could have a good chat with everyone.</td>
<td>chat</td>
<td></td>
<td>NARRATING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He’s very good at small talk, down-to-earth, chats with everyone.</td>
<td>small talk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NARRATING
I listen to people on the way so I’m consultative. I’ve been a consultant for a long period of time. It’s really trying to find the right place and where the narrative of the school gets the most traction.

I come with certain skills in terms of advocacy and public speaking that allow me to speak with a degree of confidence and, you know, command respect.

You cannot, you cannot, on threat of pain and death, tell people what to do.

There was onus on the dean to express and articulate a sort of coherent strategy that people would buy into.

You have to be brief and well briefed.*

You have to have people engaged in the constant dialogue and debate which shifts and changes and explore those strategic priorities and refine them.

The data in this study show that the Debater enjoys narrating the proposition and vision, convincing others of the merits of the enterprise and selling it to different stakeholders. The Debater tends to enjoy verbal exchanges and storytelling. These practices are used to engage others in the process of issue selling to convince them of strategic choices. Debating in the Dealmaker type complements deliberation in the Deliberator archetype to help construct the strategic vision and gain support as part of facilitation. George Bain compares a dean with a supermarket trolley, joking that business school deans can take more food and drink to sell the business school at dinners but are harder to steer.

Deans need to interface between boundaries and to reconcile tensions in discussions. As mid-level leaders they need to find family resemblances in multiple language games (Wittgenstein, 1953) amongst the different mindsets of professionals with often opposing goals. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996: 98) state that ‘effective implementation requires middle managers who can lead the
process of translating abstract strategies into priorities that can be understood at lower levels...middle managers must learn to communicate in two separate languages.’ Floyd and Wooldridge (ibid) argue that ‘top executives and operating-level personnel speak separate languages’ which means that ‘middle managers must learn to communicate in two separate languages’ (ibid: 99) when ‘translating strategy into actions’ (ibid: 101). Gallos (2002: 175) portrays the dean’s role as ‘bicultural and bimodal in nature [having to] adhere to the culture of the academy and the corporate-informed culture of administrative performance.’ In research intensive contexts, deans’ research peers whom they ‘manage’ may opt out to focus on their own personal research, unconcerned about the strategic issues of their own employing organisations. Through persuasive talk and covert leadership (Mintzberg, 1998) activities, deans can try to move such cosmopolitans (Gouldner, 1957, 1958) from ‘bystanders’ (Edmonstone, 2003) to ‘players.’

There is a risk, however, of Debaters talking at the expense of action. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) suggest that debate may lessen over an executive’s tenure. This is supported by Bedeian’s (2002) syndrome of the ‘dean’s disease’ (groupthink, Janis and Mann, 1977) where the dean’s team fails to challenge the dean who over time becomes worn down by the role and thus does not question the status quo or reinvent the prevailing strategy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Quotations: Implementing Deliberate Strategy</th>
<th>First-order</th>
<th>Second-order</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[In the 1980s] our main focus on programmes was to improve recruitment and the quality of those programmes - which we did.</td>
<td>improve</td>
<td>Enhancing</td>
<td>CHANGING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We were working in kinder and gentler times. Now the pace is relentless.</td>
<td>pace</td>
<td>Expediting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There were quite important questions about balancing types of student.</td>
<td>balancing</td>
<td>Mediating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One of the things I was most proud of was devolved budgeting.</td>
<td>devolved</td>
<td>Reforming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He merged the two units to balance the risks and there was a bloodbath. *</td>
<td>merged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The school had become complacent so strong decisive action was required.</td>
<td>action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The team is very important, getting the structure of the team right.</td>
<td>structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You must be absolutely disciplined about time and big pieces of work.</td>
<td>disciplined</td>
<td>Controlling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We have regular senior manager meetings on our KPIs so we keep control.</td>
<td>control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’ve got 25 performance objectives.</td>
<td>performance</td>
<td>Executing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some people want to be deans but they just don’t have the can do.</td>
<td>can do</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I came in to arrest the decline, fix it and move on.</td>
<td>fix</td>
<td>Controlling</td>
<td>CONTROLLING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m ruthless about blocking time for personal research and major meetings.</td>
<td>ruthless</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow through, accountability, monitoring are very important.</td>
<td>accountability</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s very important to get feedback informally, from the stories people tell.</td>
<td>feedback</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You have to ensure the quality of everything you deliver.</td>
<td>quality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I wanted to win at all costs, I was highly competitive.</td>
<td>win</td>
<td>Satisfying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting triple accreditation has been a key issue for differentiation.</td>
<td>accreditation</td>
<td>Achieving</td>
<td>COMPLETING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We don’t do gentle, there’s no time, we just have to get things done.</td>
<td>get things done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We’ve hired outstanding world-class professors and the result has been a tangible increase in the quality of research output.</td>
<td>result</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I set clear targets for everyone and we have an aggressive hiring programme.</td>
<td>targets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We have a clear performance management system.</td>
<td>performance</td>
<td>Performing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think we all like to criticise the rankings but we still play the game.</td>
<td>rankings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I made it incredibly <strong>profitable</strong>.</td>
<td>profitable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The biggest issue is challenges to the <strong>competence</strong> of our products.</td>
<td>competence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You can’t fail a reaccreditation visit, you can’t let your recruitment collapse. You’ve got to <strong>finish</strong> an RAE, you must accomplish that.</td>
<td>finish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Completing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My role is always the same — strategic change agent, <strong>turnaround</strong> specialist.</td>
<td>turnaround</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We had to <strong>close down</strong> the caravan parks of research centres that had proliferated.</td>
<td>close down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s always the same formula: <strong>cutting costs</strong>, reducing headcount, making a surplus.</td>
<td>cutting costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From coding evidence that fits the Doer archetype, strong tendencies were evident in some respondents to want to control activities and thereby achieve strategic change by completing strategic goals such as accreditations and rankings targets. The action and results bias of the Doer who focuses on tasks (Blake and Mouton, 1972) and on executing strategy may be at the expense of adopting a Deliberator’s reflective practitioner mode (Schön, 1984). Unconsidered implementation without regard for the consequences can be risky. The data suggest that the Doer’s attention is paid to closure and on shutting down distractions from the core strategy. The Doer archetype is interested in controlling and finishing, the implementation of changes in contrast with reflecting on blue skies options perhaps like the Deliberator. Some respondents suggested that there is little power in the dean’s suite except for the incumbent’s personal influence. Doers, therefore, need to develop credibility and not rely on position power (French and Raven, 1959). It seems from the data that many deans’ lives are driven by peer review accreditation visits, media rankings, and the bottom line which provide clear performance targets but the deans needs a team to achieve these. One post 1992 Doer type dean said he can demand that everyone attend a
staff meeting which he suspected was not the case in a research intensive university business school. In the second dataset, the Doer type ensured much higher levels of faculty attended staff meetings than his predecessors who allowed the situation where more managerial than academic staff participated.

In terms of contingencies, hybrid managers in post 1992 cultures (where there is less research intensity and deanships may be permanent appointments) appear to be more managerial than their counterparts in research cultures who may act more like research managers. The latter have to consult more about major strategic issues where there is a high performance culture and highly mobile talent who need to be persuaded and nudged into action rather than told. Centre-periphery relations tend to be tightly controlled during times of austerity to exploit resources. In such an environment, Doer archetypes harness the urgency in a crisis to get things done. As their tenures progress, Doers may become impatient to wrap up details and achievements before they move on to new positions. As industry dynamics become fiercer over time, the rules of the game become more explicit and the context operates at a higher, unforgiving velocity. In these circumstances, short-term strategies and ruthless behaviours to deliver results may favour the Doer type. Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) five seasons model suggests, however, that dysfunction may arise over time as the incumbent loses their drive and interest. Table 21 refers to FSCI, the four roles of facilitating, synthesizing, championing, and implementing (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992, 1994, 1996).
Table 21: Coding for the Dynamo archetype

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Quotations: Dynamo Archetype</th>
<th>First-order</th>
<th>Second-order</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It was like a runaway train, the <strong>pace</strong> was relentless.</td>
<td><strong>pace</strong></td>
<td><strong>Speed</strong></td>
<td><strong>GO-GETTING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I run meetings in a very structured way and I am a very <strong>forceful</strong> chairman. I warn people when I start, unless they know me well, that I’m going to <strong>push</strong> and push and push. What I’m always trying to do is to capture a point, sum up and see if people really agree. (F)</td>
<td><strong>forceful</strong></td>
<td><strong>Push</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m the chief <strong>sales</strong> officer. (C)</td>
<td><strong>sales</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’ve pursued an <strong>aggressive</strong> hiring programme.</td>
<td><strong>aggressive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people accept that the institutions I’m in <strong>changed considerably</strong> during the time I was there. (I)</td>
<td><strong>changed considerably</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I formulate strategy in an academic way. You don’t really know about a subject until you write an essay about it. You should always <strong>collect your thoughts</strong>. After talking to a range of people, I’ve always sat down and written a paper. I begin by writing first of all and collecting my thoughts and then beginning to promulgate the message. (S)</td>
<td><strong>collect your thoughts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An extreme upper middle manager (UMM) archetype is the Dynamo who is represented in the data as the obverse of the Drifter. This archetype encompasses activities in all four of Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) roles. The Dynamo is an energiser who makes powerful partnerships and consults and supports others to facilitate change. This type demonstrates high commitment and drive, a passion for what they do with a strong focus on performance management to get things done. There are dangers of being overly heroic. This archetype is often regarded as a powerhouse, indefatigable, and working prodigiously long hours. The Dynamo appears to be intensely curious and sustains high levels of intellectual energy. One exemplar talked about his strong negotiating experience, his loud gregarious manner yet his need to write and disseminate strategy papers in an ‘academic way.’ He viewed himself as the chief sales person and was very interested in military strategy. His strategizing practices in the role included making to do lists, signing off check lists, and chasing to ensure
action points were implemented, which impressed his senior administrator in ways that the other five deans she worked for did not.

Dynamo middle managers appear well placed to deal with industry hyper-competition to drive the pace of reform and deliver new models. Contexts of pioneering ambitions and expansion are appropriate for institution builder middle managers. In periods of consolidation and retrenchment, however, the Dynamo may not fulfil their promise. One of the long-time retired Dynamos who appeared to exemplify this balancing act very successfully in the 1980s admitted, ‘it’s horses for courses.’ He felt that he might not have achieved such a dramatic and successful turnaround in an immediate post 2008 financial crisis world.

It would seem from the evidence here, therefore, that the Dynamo appears aware of the fluidity of events and the constant tensions within the professionalised business unit. It helps if they adopt Evetts’ (2003: 412) perspective that ‘professionalism, as both normative value system and ideology of control, needs to continue to be contested and challenged.’ The Dynamo archetype also reflects Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1997: 29) observation about complexity leadership: ‘Like organizations, complex systems have large numbers of independent yet interacting actors. Rather than ever reaching a stable equilibrium, the most adaptive of these complex systems (e.g., intertidal ones) keep changing continuously by remaining at the poetically termed "edge of chaos" that exists between order and disorder. By staying in this intermediate zone, these systems never quite settle into a stable equilibrium but never quite fall apart.’ Dynamos are constantly interacting and dealing with their fluid middle position in the
organisation while formulating and finalising strategy amidst centripetal and centrifugal forces.

Table 22: Coding for the Defender archetype

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Quotations: Defender Archetype</th>
<th>First-order</th>
<th>Second-order</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Having a fantastic PA is a good part of the job. For example, when I was writing the book, she used to protect one day a week when I would go and do research in the British Library. This time was sacrosanct, you know, literally only the vice chancellor could disturb me.</td>
<td>protect</td>
<td>Protecting</td>
<td>PROTECTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very often universities use their business schools to cross subsidise other departments which are not doing so well. This causes a lot of resentment in the business school itself and it’s something that you have to fight against.</td>
<td>fight against</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m increasingly defending the school against the central university’s incursions.</td>
<td>defending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things escalate so rapidly to the dean and you have to work hard to deflect this.</td>
<td>deflect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Miles and Snow (1978: 29) define Defender organisations as places where managers ‘are highly expert in their organization’s limited area of operation but do not tend to search outside their narrow domains for new opportunities.’ Evidence in this thesis points to Defender strategist types being unimaginative, protective, playing safe, and seeking stability. They tended to be inward looking and did not seek to deviate much from existing strategy. On the positive side, Defender type managers were described in terms of a ‘strong moral compass’ and ‘safe pair of hands’ in realising incremental changes. From a negative perspective, they were portrayed as dull foot soldiers, interfering, and like Shakespeare’s Polonius in *Hamlet*, full of ‘wise’ sayings but not radical or sufficiently imaginative. As hybrid managers, Defenders were generally viewed as measured, liking order and careful, keeping their own counsel. They tended to keep the centre at bay and smooth over conflict. The examples in the data included individuals in the role as
interims typically or on three year contracts at the beginning or end of their careers. Those who were perceived as more successful were operating in the early days of the industry without high levels of sophistication or pace, or before internal reforms in the unit when there was more scope for their successors to build on a blue ocean strategy (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005).

**Table 23: Coding for the Drifter archetype**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Quotations: Drifter Archetype</th>
<th>First-order</th>
<th>Second-order</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We had away days, <em>sometimes</em> those were supported and sometimes less so. In those days a number of barons used to ensure their own endeavours were prioritised.</td>
<td><em>sometimes</em></td>
<td>Tentative</td>
<td>TRYING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was trying to identify opportunities, hearing what colleagues had to say, of course. But one felt one needed to provide some leadership in terms of putting forward ideas rather than simply waiting to hear what others were saying.</td>
<td><em>trying</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In those days it was quite a centralised <em>regime</em>. We had not as much autonomy as perhaps one has these days.</td>
<td><em>regime</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are <em>not enough</em> hours in the day but you try to maximise the number of hours that you do use for your research and for your scholarship.</td>
<td><em>not enough</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The non-strategist or anti-strategist is apparent in comments by and about Drifter archetypes. These individuals are unfocused, they are not team players or coalition builders. Their behaviours are usually unreflective, unsupported, and they fail to heed and act on advice. They seem unable to create focus or closure. Their tenures are typified by unrealistic, unconsidered, and unrealised aims, with considerable role strain (Goode, 1960) and involuntary or early exit. They are concerned about being liked rather than about driving through change. Often Drifters hate their job by the end of their tenures as they worry more and start to understand that their personal intentions to be strategic cannot be unrealised. Respondents made comments on Drifters such as ‘he never got it’ or ‘he lost it’ to
describe the hapless behaviours of these individuals. Drifter types appeared to operate as lone rangers in an adhocracy, lacking political acumen or self-awareness despite convivial or urbane personas. Drifters eventually find that their ‘followers’ do not grant them permission to be leaders (DeRue, and Ashford, 2010). This is illustrated most clearly in the case where there was a ‘palace coup.’

The contingencies Drifters were operating in showed that as professional hybrids they were nostalgic for their primary professional activities. They resented not being able to spend time on personal scholarship. They could not bridge the gap in moving from one profession to another, to let go, they failed to unlearn and relearn. As they tried to cope with having to relinquish their own scholarship, their resentment about time in committee meetings was exacerbated, as well as their irritation at interactions with the central ‘regime.’ One respondent admitted to having been outwitted by research barons who were building their own empires in the business school. Another felt trapped and overwhelmed and announced to everyone’s surprise at a staff meeting: ‘If you’re not with me, you must be against me.’ Drifters appeared constrained by industry dynamics that were moving increasingly to an audit culture. Literature on failed strategy amongst expert workers (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2003) and the reversal of strategic change (Mantere et al, 2012) might lend further insights into strategists who are demonstrating strategic drift. At best, Drifters attempt to be strategic but their tentative or inappropriate actions are ineffective as they fail to clarify the mandate or to mobilise others.
Table 24 briefly summarises commentaries on contingencies identified in the fifteen practices that were categorised in the interview coding for each of the seven strategist archetypes.

### Table 24: Cross-archetype comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role: 1. Facilitating Adaptability</th>
<th>Archetype: Dealmaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRACTICES</td>
<td>COMMENTARY, CONTINGENCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovating</td>
<td>Orientation towards relationship and reputation building for knowledge generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediating</td>
<td>Strong committee chairing and conflict resolution skills, extensive board experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting</td>
<td>An empathetic and supportive approach working in partnerships to align ambitions and support future generations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role: 2. Synthesizing Information</th>
<th>Archetype: Deliberator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRACTICES</td>
<td>COMMENTARY, CONTINGENCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combining</td>
<td>Global experience with two tenures as dean each for a decade enables ideas for a decade to be combined from different models.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Makes wide soundings to aid understanding, extensive networks over five decades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciding</td>
<td>A decision analysis scholar with considerable consulting experience who refuses to be pushed into decisions made hastily.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role: 3. Championing Alternatives</th>
<th>Archetype: Debater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRACTICES</td>
<td>COMMENTARY, CONTINGENCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrating</td>
<td>A great love of stories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>Very interested in others’ intellectual endeavours, positioning, brand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convincing</td>
<td>Well briefed, convivial, persuasive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role: 4. Implementing Deliberate Strategy</th>
<th>Archetype: Doer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRACTICES</td>
<td>COMMENTARY, CONTINGENCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing</td>
<td>High velocity changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling</td>
<td>Focus on performance management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completing</td>
<td>Strong task and achievement focus.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role: 5. All Four Floyd &amp; WoolDRidge Roles 1-4</th>
<th>Archetype: Dynamo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRACTICES</td>
<td>COMMENTARY, CONTINGENCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go-getting</td>
<td>Growth, expansion through diversity, institution building, checklist and results driven.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role: 6. Defending</th>
<th>Archetype: Defender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRACTICES</td>
<td>COMMENTARY, CONTINGENCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting</td>
<td>Defending from central interference. Seeking internal legitimacy, quality. Desire for order after sudden departures of predecessors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 14 illustrates how various types of strategist in the data have responded differently to the same strategic issue of the MBA. For example the Debater enjoyed a full discussion and vote at a staff meeting. The Doer convened an international advisory panel to review the viability of the Master’s in Public Administration (MPA) programme and decided not to offer it separately but to incorporate it into other Master’s. The Defender said he simply chaired a meeting on the issue as he had no particular view. The Deliberator thought carefully about what new product development was needed in a financial downturn and made the MBA modes of delivery more flexible. Finally, the dean with Dynamo type behaviours launched with the registrar the distance learning MBA which was ahead of its time and created a long lasting legacy of success.
Figure 14: Responses from different archetypes to similar issues

- **DEBATER:** Voted against doubling the full-time MBA.
- **DOER:** Closed the MPA and incorporated it into the MBA.
- **DELIBERATOR:** New product development, launched Global Energy MBA during recession. Streamlined MBA modes for flexible study modes.
- **DYNAMO:** Launched the country's first distance learning MBA – huge success over four decades.
- **DEFENDER:** Voted to launch the MPA.
CHAPTER SEVEN: PRACTICES, CONTINGENCIES, ARCHETYPES

This section explores the interactions between micro level strategies, meso, and macro contingent factors and the clustering of behaviours that resulted in the identification of ideal types of strategic practitioner in this study.

The five contingencies that were revealed in the data coding and analysis processes in this thesis contextualise Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) middle management role typology and are shown in Figure 15.

**Figure 15: Five contingencies identified in the data**

1. Seniority: upper middle managers
2. Hybrid professionals
3. Centre-periphery SBU relations
4. Knowledge intensity, professionalised
5. Time: changes over tenure, industry dynamics
The conceptualisation of variations in strategizing behaviours noted in this study were influenced by these five contingent factors: (i) seniority; (ii) hybridity; (iii) centre-periphery relations as business unit managers; (iv) knowledge intensity in professionalised organisations; (v) temporal changes during individual tenures and industry dynamics. Greater specificity of contingent factors within the broad theoretical framework of a strategic middle management role typology allows for more nuanced understanding of the interplay between roles, practices, and contexts.

Further analysis of how these five contingencies influenced clusters of strategizing behaviours within the typology of four roles led to the development in this thesis of a new typology of seven hybrid upper middle manager archetypes which is illustrated in Figure 16.
Figure 16: Seven archetypes of strategists derived from the data

(Role orientations: F – facilitating, S – synthesizing, C – championing, I – implementing)

Data collected from different institutional settings and from current and former deans enabled linkages to be made between micro, meso, and macro perspectives, i.e. practices, roles, and contingencies. This study combines a typology of middle management roles, a strategy-as-practice perspective, and contingency theory (highlighted in Figure 18). Micro-strategizing activities within important strategic business units are contextualised with reference to macro influences in order to produce a useful heuristic taxonomy of archetypical strategy practitioners in different types of institution. This allows current and prospective
incumbents of the business school deanship to consider variations in levels of hybridity as cross-over middle managers. It provides insights into the degrees of autonomy and support characterised within centre periphery relations. It also considers other contingent influences, for instance the unit’s knowledge intensity. Additionally, temporal factors such as the life cycles of executive tenures and industry dynamics shape strategizing practices in the complex role of the business school dean. This approach is consistent with Carter’s (2013: 1053) argument that ‘if strategy scholarship is to be relevant to the social sciences and society alike, it must have the capacity to explain major issues facing organizations...[and strategy scholarship] needs to be understood in its cultural, organizational and political context’ and not undertaken ‘in splendid isolation: immaculately clean of context’ (ibid: 1052).

Figure 17 summarises the main frameworks used to explore the phenomenon of the hybrid upper professionalised middle strategic business unit (SBU) manager in this thesis.
The benefits of applying a strategy-as-practice approach to middle management roles are to produce close-up, fine-grained, personalised and dynamic insights into micro-practices within these social positions based on the respondents’ own meanings. As SAP views strategy ‘as a socially accomplished, situated activity’ (Jarzabkowski, 2005: 6), it can focus too closely on local detail at the expense of wider social issues. The inclusion of contingency theory suggests that practices should not be reified but pragmatically conceptualised as behaviours fitting with the environment (Scott, 1981). Contingency theory assumes there is no best practice or full self-determination and that optimal behaviours depend on internal
and external circumstances and best fit. The application of archetype theory to conclude the coding of the datasets allows these practical behaviours within the roles in different contexts to be further abstracted into ideal types of strategic actor. Weber (1904: 90) stated that ‘an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view’ whereby ‘concrete individual phenomena...are arranged into a unified analytical construct.’ The ideal type is purely fictional in nature, a methodological ‘utopia [that] cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.’ Ideal types can be criticised for representing extremes and ignoring overlaps between types. Hay (2013: 84) suggests that depending on the size, complexity and nature of the business school, deans have the choice to play four non-exclusive roles: (i) a CEO with a focus on finances; (ii) an ambassador enhancing the school’s profile and promoting the vision; (iii) the primary fundraiser; (iv) as a catalyst to improve the unit’s intellectual capital. At the academic head of university level, Breakwell (2006: 53) identified four types of leader: healer, motivator, fundraiser, and research icon. The strategic management literature, however, except for Powell and Angwin’s (2012) four chief strategy officer archetypes, has tended to focus on strategic archetypes of organisations rather than on individual strategic actors (for example, Miles et al, 1978; Miller and Friesen, 1978), hence this study attempts to fill the gap on individual strategist archetypes.

Table 25 maps the strategist archetypes generated in this study against Powell and Angwin’s (2012) archetypes of chief strategy officers and Mintzberg’s (1971) managerial roles.
Table 25: Mapping five upper middle manager archetypes to similar studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archetypes of Chief Strategy Officers (Powell and Angwin, 2012)</th>
<th>Five Hybrid Upper Middle Manager Archetypes in this Thesis</th>
<th>Managerial Roles (Mintzberg, 1971)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coach</td>
<td>DEALMAKER</td>
<td>Negotiator, Disturbance Handler, Disseminator, Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Consultant</td>
<td>DELIBERATOR</td>
<td>Resource Allocator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEBATER</td>
<td>Spokesperson, Figurehead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Agent</td>
<td>DOER</td>
<td>Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DYNAMO</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In their paper, Paroutis and Pettigrew (2007: 110) explored strategic teams and the behaviours identified in ‘initiating’, ‘reflecting’, and ‘executing’ may be mapped to the Dealmaker, Deliberator, and Doer archetypes.

The overarching model developed in this thesis is presented in Figure 18, with the seven archetypes that emerged from the data and their biases indicated. The strategizing practices linked to the four strategic middle management roles of facilitating, synthesizing, championing, and implementing (F, S, C, I) are listed respectively for Dealmaker, Deliberator, Debater, and Doer.
Figure 18 outlines in general how connections between practices in roles within the contingencies were analysed to produce the taxonomy of strategists. Figure 19 illustrates how Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) role typology is explored in this thesis. Figures 20–26 illustrate specific examples for each archetype: Dealmaker, Deliberator, Debater, Doer, Defender, Drifter, and Dynamo.
1. ROLES: Floyd & Wooldridge's typology of four strategic middle management roles was applied to the data.

2. CONTINGENCIES: using a template of the four roles, data were analysed to explore five contingent factors: seniority, hybridity, centre-SBU periphery relations, knowledge intensity, and time: tenures and industry dynamics.

3. STRATEGIZING PRACTICES: 12 practices within the four roles were deduced in different contexts and three additional practices were induced from the data.

4. ARCHETYPES: seven strategist types were identified from the four roles plus three additional types of the non-strategist (Drifter), Defender and ideal combination type, the Dynamo.
The example in Figure 20 indicates how the interview data were analysed for middle managers with facilitating behaviours within the Dealmaker archetype. The five contingencies that emerged from the overall analysis revealed circumstances of start-ups, industry growth, and Defender predecessors, that encouraged experimentation, new ideas and partnerships. Behaviours linked to the Dealmaker archetype included nurturing colleagues and making trade-offs in deviating from the official strategy.
Figure 20: Linkages in the data for the Dealmaker archetype

Figure 21 illuminates linkages in the Deliberator archetype between cognitive behaviours that were observed in middle managers who were careful to frame their strategies. They used maps and simplifying devices, taking time to reflect,
consult on their going in mandate often well before they arrived and to analyse the strategic plan.

Figure 21: Linkages in the data for the Deliberator archetype

Figure 21: Linkages in the data for the Deliberator archetype
The third archetype of Debater shown in Figure 22 is derived from strategizing practices based on discussing and selling strategic choices. A context of consolidation provided one example of a Debater who followed a high paced Dynamo predecessor. The Debater was predisposed to corridor conversations and debates during staff meetings. He mooted the balance of executive education to research in the portfolio and whether to double the full-time MBA, a proposal that was rejected. Other practices included talking about market positioning, articulating a coherent strategy, especially as the business school industry matured, and promoting brand value. The Debater was focused on making the case why a one-size-fit-all approach is not necessarily appropriate for business schools within the university.
In the fourth archetype mapped directly on to the Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) role typology, the Doer’s behaviours tended to focus on strategy execution as shown in Figure 23. Strategizing examples in the data linked to this archetype were evidenced in a context of a mature industry where hyper-
compition meant a greater focus on results. Other instances in the data included Doer behaviours that followed a long-tenured dean where an accelerated pace and greater urgency were evident.
The Dynamo archetype in Figure 24 is linked to strategizing practices that combined behaviours which were perceived as successful in all four Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) roles, i.e. a strong cognitive understanding based...
on evidence, the ability to make strategic decisions, to facilitate experimentation, champion changes with the centre, unit, external stakeholders, and to concentrate on high performance and accomplishing results. This type included highly intellectually energised and resilient individuals who were clear about their mandate and priorities. Dynamo archetypes were effective listeners, team builders, and chairs of committees who worked with people face-to-face. Their language was typically upbeat and confident and they achieved turnaround mandates to recover from lacklustre predecessors in around six to eight years with clear exit points before they moved to more challenging roles.
The sixth archetype of Defender (Figure 25) revealed a defensive set of behaviours. These included efforts to protect the business school from the centre by focusing internally on incremental improvements to the status quo. This was apparent in caretaker and short-tenured deans pre-retirement. Where there was a very dominant focus on research and not accreditations, Defender behaviours sought to protect individuals being distracted from focusing on the Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE)/REF. This type tended to follow a Drifter or a long tenured Dynamo predecessor for a short time of stability and retrenchment of up to three years before a less Defender type was appointed.

Figure 25: Linkages in the data for the Defender archetype
In contrast to the other archetypes, Figure 26 profiles anti/non strategic behaviours which were observed in Drifters, individuals who exited abruptly from their middle management positions because of a lack of strategic focus. The Drifter’s need to be liked, their lack of indecision and strategic leadership were discussed. The narratives of these types included tales of blame, resenting the centre, feeling overwhelmed and alone, confused about how to formulate and enact strategic objectives and suffering from time famine in an audit and centralised context.

Figure 26: Linkages in the data for the Drifter archetype
CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The following sections summarise links between strategizing practices within the four roles and seven archetypes in different contexts for each of the three datasets. The P-R-A-C model (Figure 18) developed in this thesis brings together roles, practices, contingencies, and archetypes. Key insights gained into strategizing practices within the middle manager role typology in different contexts are explored. The findings help to understand how combining practice and contingency theories extends Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model 20 years after it was first developed by identifying five key contingencies. In this thesis, an exploration of micro-practices amongst mid-level leaders linked to institutional relations and macro industry, national policy, and global influences represents a key contribution. The behaviours of hybrid individuals below the upper echelons in business schools are examined over time as the ‘metrics for success’ (Thomas, 2007b) intensify in a dynamic industry over academic leaders’ tenures. The study was very timely as it began during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Much was being published in 2008 about pressures on business schools and deans (Alsop; Davies; Ivory et al; Lorange), future challenges (Durand and Dameron; Patriotta and Starkey; Schoemaker; Starkey and Tempest), the MBA curriculum (Moldoveanu and Martin; Navarro), and more widely about management as a profession (Khurana and Nohria). In the same vein that French and Grey (1996) had challenged the prevailing utilitarian model of management education, asking whether it was for education or for business, there was a great deal of self-questioning and rethinking about the purpose of business and management education, for example, Gregg and Stoner (2008). In the aftermath,
some deans (Canals, 2010) viewed the European sovereign debt crisis as a deficit of leadership and governance, not just a financial crisis.

1. The UK business school landscape during 2008-2011

This section explains the business school landscape at the time the interviews were conducted. The first dataset in this thesis comprises current deans who are established in the middle or towards the end of their tenures. The interviews were conducted during the Labour government, in the year 2008 when Henley Business School merged with Reading University and before the 2008 REF December results. The latter represents an important episode in the life cycles of many UK deans. For this research, interviews posted on YouTube were all filmed during 2011 for the second and third datasets at a time of the coalition government’s white paper, *Students at the Heart of the System* (BIS, 2011a), and before the substantial rise in undergraduate tuition fees in England in 2012/13. The higher education backdrop was a time of deregulation with the government’s encouragement of private providers such as BPP University and Regent’s University that were awarded university status in 2013. Turbulence in the business school world had been caused by other external factors such as when the *Financial Times* excluded AMBA from its rankings in 2009. Now some deans are questioning the value of the triple crown of three accreditations because of its time and financial burdens. There were also hard times in 2011 for overseas recruitment because of difficulties with UK visa applications and the removal of work visas for non EU graduates. Actual and perceived problems with student migration caused problems for all UK business schools except Cass, London and Warwick Business Schools (the most highly ranked in the *Financial Times*) with
recruiting full-time MBA programmes in the UK (Bradshaw, 2009, 2012; Bradshaw and Ortmans, 2013). MBA programmes in the UK comprise around 85% overseas students and represent strong export earnings.

During the final two rounds of interviews in this study there was increasing resentment amongst some business school deans and faculty members regarding universities' one-size-fits-all approach and financial cross-subsidisation (Matthews, 2011). After the 2008 RAE results, in the run up to the 2014 REF submission, in many business schools the war for talent globally in relation to research faculty was inflating salaries. At the same time, premium priced and executive education programmes were suffering, public sector cuts were biting, yet substantial financial subsidies from business schools to their universities were still expected.

The context of austerity from 2008 undoubtedly shaped views of Defender types of deans’ behaviours in the population interviewed. Several individuals commented on the industry formula of huge overseas numbers and high fees being unsustainable. Concerns were expressed about isomorphism in the sector, having to pander to accreditation bodies which some respondents viewed as a major distraction, possibly impacting negatively on business schools’ strategies (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2006). Across the three datasets, there were examples of consolidations, for instance one university in London with two business schools merged them into one. For some of the respondents, their business schools were being clustered into larger colleges and one dean left because he felt he was being demoted as he would no longer report directly to the vice-chancellor. Another dean without a doctorate did not have his contract renewed because the new
vice-chancellor wanted ‘REFable’ deans (i.e. those with publications worthy of submission to REF 2014).

In the UK, most recently business schools are expected to be economic ‘anchor institutions’ (The Work Foundation, 2010; Wilson, 2012: 33) and to engage ‘directly with local businesses on workable solutions to practical problems’ (Whitty, 2013: 9).

2. The first dataset

Interviews with deans in the first dataset in this study revealed a greater focus than amongst the other two groups interviewed on championing and implementing. Probably this can be accounted for by the fact that the business school industry has become more competitive and respondents who retired from the deanship – most of the second dataset and two individuals in the third dataset – were operating in far less competitive or turbulent times. Ray et al (2011) call for business schools to be more organisationally mindful to address their vulnerability in tough times and deans who were interviewed in situ demonstrated a greater sense of urgency than those who had retired.

In terms of commonalities between experiences of deans in the first group interviewed, the two who had been dean more than once both regretted staying too long in their first deanship. One respondent suggested that a third tenure in the same place rendered him ‘almost unemployable.’ A third of the deans in this sample knew they were leaving the role and only one subsequently moved to another deanship. One eventually became a civil servant in higher education.
With respect to the contingencies identified in this thesis that influence activities in their roles, the post 1992 deans were also university pro-vice-chancellors and so worked across the university in a senior role. Hybridity was particularly evident in the transnationals with three having worked and/or studied in the USA. Hybrid behaviours were apparent in their mixed professional experiences such as consulting. For example, one dean had been a tax inspector then a business historian, another had graduated as a biochemist, and a third had been a manager in manufacturing. The level of knowledge intensity in terms of where the deans worked differed considerably, ranging from Lancashire Business School with a very strong undergraduate teaching focus to the University of Bath’s School of Management where Andrew Pettigrew, an internationally leading management scholar, successfully raised the School’s 2008 RAE rankings. Yet some of these individuals in very different environments had been recruited ostensibly to enhance their school’s research profiles only to discover financial deficits which they first had to turn around. Hence centre-periphery relations were tested soon after their arrival. All were operating in a recession although in 2010 MBA intakes were favourable and countercyclical to the state of the national economy for many before a sharp decline in applications. There were considerable differences found in the data in the level of networking and boundary spanning within the business school community between deans in tripled accredited schools who were quite externally facing strategically and those in lower ranked schools without accreditations who were more concerned with internal operations.

The deans in this first dataset were characterised as being in the second half of Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) five seasons model. Three of the deans
interviewed in the first dataset officially retired but not for long: one moved to an accreditation job in Europe, another to a part-time professorship in a top UK business school and a third to a deanship in Asia. From this first group, two others were subsequently promoted to be a pro-vice-chancellor’s role in another university. A second became head of an Oxford college, as had one in the third dataset in Cambridge. Only one individual from the first group left higher education altogether.

It appears to be a deliberate career choice to move into the hybrid administrative role of dean although several respondents said it was unplanned. No one in this first dataset returned to a full-time academic position without administrative responsibilities. Unlike in the second dataset, this group comprised five deans (four professors) without doctorates which was a source of regret for a few. Two of these were deans twice, however, for the two without doctorates both experienced non-renewal of their tenures because a new vice-chancellor considered they did not fit with a research intensive mandate as the deans lacked current personal research credibility. As 10 of the 12 deans in this first sample were serving on the ABS Executive Committee, it can be assumed that the respondents were sufficiently confident about having established themselves internally to direct their attention externally by becoming an active committee member of the Association of Business School Deans.

In terms of linking activities within different archetypes to various contingencies, in this first dataset with regards to internal activities, deans with Dealmaker behaviours talked about being ambassadorial when dealing with the centre and difficult faculty members. They worked hard to resolve conflict and ensured they
attended important university meetings. For one respondent, the agreement with the centre for financial devolution which was a negotiating point on his appointment represented a watershed deal in the history of the business school because of the self-determination it allowed. The Deliberator middle managers in this first dataset talked about their practices in developing acronyms, inventing simplifying devices and maps and enjoying the intellectual challenge. In contrast, Debater type behaviours were evident in deans without doctorates who focused on selling executive education, industry engagement, and international collaborations externally. Doers tended to focus on relentless KPIs (key performance indicators) and achieving specific targets. Dynamo type behaviours were found in deans at their peak, powering on all cylinders where they felt they had synthesized the remit, mobilised support and were confident in promoting their offering. Several deans had mentored associate deans in their team who in turn supported them well. Some individuals interviewed were very clear about what need to be achieved because they already had a track record as dean and understood the typical trajectory of a tenure. The Defenders, by comparison, tended to be worriers who were concerned about having to ingratiate themselves with accreditation bodies. They were wondering where new models would emerge from a system that encouraged business schools to be ‘samey.’ Such deans showed defensive behaviours, protecting their units against the central administration as issues escalated to them and their concerns were not being prioritised by the centre. One of these deans was certain that the level of overseas student fees his business school attracted was unstainable. The Defenders were often near retirement. Finally, this first dataset, Drifter type behaviours were
evident in an individual who was overwhelmed by a huge number of performance objectives and ‘plate spinning.’ He felt that his compensation for the ‘thankless task’ (echoed by Bradshaw, 2013b) of being dean was inadequate for the lower quality he experienced in terms of family time, and his reduced personal consultancy and scholarship opportunities as a result of the deanship. This contrasts sharply with Howard Thomas who once declared that he would be happy to do the job for nothing (Times Higher, 2007) because he found being a dean so interesting.

Overall, Dealmakers in this first dataset were preoccupied with how to persuade others to join the unit and how to convince the centre to approve salary premiums. They believed business schools should not be treated like traditional academic departments because they are professional schools with particular design challenges (Simon, 1967). The Deliberators were interested in framing their deanship in the light of new models. Debaters focused on face-to-face discussions and on selling their research, teaching and consultancy, especially executive education. The Doers concentrated on the bottom line and relentless targets. Defenders felt unappreciated, stressed, and exhausted by a war of attrition. Drifters demonstrated much lower energy levels and self-confidence that the Dynamo archetypes. Of course, these are caricatures, exaggerated types, which ignore the overlaps between the archetypes and the more well-balanced and rounded behaviours of real-life individuals.

It might be argued that this first group is more representative of the future as they are current, in the second half of their tenures, and operating in a tough environment. The deans interviewed in the first dataset are seasoned and they are
acutely aware of the struggle to recruit students and faculty at a time of hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1994).

3. The second dataset

The second dataset of seven deans in one leading research-intensive business school adds to the richness of the study because of evidence of the ‘succession effect’ (Brown, 1982). This was only apparent in the third dataset between two pairs, two women who succeeded a male dean in different institutions. The second dataset represents an interesting institutional case because, as noted in Chapter 4, Warwick Business School is a strong business school in a strong pre-1992 university. The business school was originally founded in 1967, only two years after the university. This is not a phenomenon that happened at Oxford and Cambridge where the business schools were relatively recently established as full-service business schools (although focused mainly on executive and graduate programmes). Said Business School, Oxford, was established in 1996 and Cambridge Judge Business School in 2005, i.e. 900 and 796 years respectively after each university was founded. Despite this time lag, as ‘new kids on the block’ in prestigious universities the Oxbridge business schools are gaining ground rapidly amongst the ranks of leading global business schools and have attracted two deans who were faculty members at Harvard and INSEAD.

The second dataset in this thesis also provides an example of a powerful strategic axis during the second half of the 1980s consisting of the head of administration in the business school (Jenny Hocking MBE who had previously been at the centre), combined with the founding architect of the Business School, Sir George Bain, who was subsequently to be a vice-chancellor (the only pre-1992, Russell Group,
business school dean in the UK ever to be a vice-chancellor), plus the Registrar of his generation, Mike Shattock OBE. This centre-periphery dynamism would be difficult to replicate. All three individuals separately were to be recognised in the Queen’s honours. Another outlier in this sample is Howard Thomas who has uniquely been a serial business school dean (Bradshaw, 2006 and 2011) on three continents and whose experiences in the sector span five decades.

The evolution in this second sample from the business school’s internal focus during the 1970s under the leadership of an elected part-time dean to establish itself academically and to raise the quality of its programmes nationally is interesting to observe. There was a step change in the 1980s with a Dynamo, institution builder dean, replaced by a Debater who oversaw consolidation, followed perhaps inevitably because of complacency and in-breeding in its leadership by Drifter type behaviours in an era of audit and tighter governance mechanisms in the 1990s. This resulted at the start of the new millennium in an externally appointed Deliberator and Dynamo type who was charged with turning the business school around. His long tenure was succeeded for a short time by an interim who was internally focused. Most recently again a more Doer and Dynamo type of hybrid upper middle manager was hired who radically overhauled the unit. The latter was very much appointed as the vice-chancellor’s choice following strategic concerns about slippage in research rankings. Curiously, despite two external executive appointments of deans to this unit, both these individuals were well-known to the institution before they were recruited. The evolution of experiences in this dataset from the end of the 1970s to the second decade of the 21st century and reflections on the school’s trajectory from its foundations
uniquely offers comparisons between successors. In strategic management research, executive succession has typically been explored at the level of the CEO linked with organisational performance (e.g., Shen and Cannella, 2002) and neglected at the middle management level.

In terms of the five contingencies (see Figure 15) highlighted in this thesis of middle management level, hybridity, centre-periphery relations, professionalisation, and temporal concerns over the industry and dean’s lifecycle, the second dataset is particularly characterised by the entrepreneurial ‘Warwick way’ and strong departments (the business school is an academic department), a strong centre and weak faculty structures. WBS deans are and have been leading scholars with work experience outside academic and mostly supported by a very professionalised body of administrators. The fashion currently in UK higher education is for internal restructuring and the consolidation of units into large, powerful faculties. This has not been the case at Warwick University. It is interesting that Warwick Business School (unlike Warwick Medical School which was only established in 2000) has remained a school and not a faculty. The WBS deans in this sample illustrate how the role evolved from a lone part-time chair position supported by a personal assistant during the 1970s and occupied by non-professorial leader who was internally elected. The current deanship was advertised globally on a highly competitive salary for a highly cited scholar executive. One requirement was for the individual to be good in the board room and good in the class room. The dean is now supported by a large senior management of a pro dean and associate deans who are themselves top scholars.
Clearly, the size and complexity of the school have expanded considerably in 40 years.

The deans in this second sample demonstrate higher levels of hybridity than might be expected of leading scholars. This set of deans is characterised by extensive transnational work/study/sabbaticals in the USA and experience outside the academy, in consultancy, policy work, arbitrations, and financial services. Moreover, only one individual did not take a break before his doctorate. Almost half of the WBS deans took their doctorates while working and two completed their PhDs in two years. All appear to have bridged the academic-practice divide successfully throughout their careers despite working in an uncompromisingly selective research environment. This Business School is characterised by strong professional managers and faculty committed to excellent research. Three of the deans in the sample have contributed to the dynamic business school industry as chairs of the Association of Business Schools. The highest number of chairs of the Association of Business Schools in the country has been from this business school. They have been active in shaping the direction of management research (e.g. Bain, 1994; Wensley, 2013) as well as thought leadership on the industry (Thomas et al, 2014). Only two of the deans completed two tenures in full at Warwick Business School, while all (excluding interim deans) finished at least one term. The shortest tenure was for three years and the longest lasted a decade.

With respect to the middle management strategist archetypes that were derived from the data in this thesis, all seven types are presented in the different behaviours apparent in the interviews and vignettes written up on the subjects of the study in this second group. For instance, Dealmaker behaviours were
evidenced in mediating activities and in negotiating with the centre about earned income and a devolved budget. Debater behaviours in the 1990s focused on consolidation to dampen the pace following Dynamo behaviours to clarify the school’s brand, and re-balancing market positioning. This involved the dean chatting in the bar, and corridor conversations which frustrated the head of administration when these discussions were *ad hoc* and not formalised.

Deliberator type behaviours were apparent in deans who showed a high degree of reflexivity which, coupled with effective levels of emotional intelligence and a sense of humour to balance an analytical approach and powerful intellectual energies, were perceived as successful during a period of recovery and further growth.

Doer behaviours in this group were portrayed in deans who were regarded as decisive, with an action bias. Some deans with this type of behaviour worked prodigiously long hours. Bareham (2004: 20) observed from Lorange’s (2002) insights that deans’ change initiatives ‘can only be taken forward effectively if trust and credibility have been taken created.’ Some evidence in this thesis suggests, however, that while a dean’s vision may be credible, tough performance management processes by a Doer / Dynamo dean may make individuals question the trust they have in how these targets are being achieved which supports Parker’s (2014) concerns about why academics fail to resist a target culture. There is a danger that in a very tough business school environment where people are not able to meet their performance targets that colleagues feel the dean is demonstrating a lack of humanistic tendencies (Spitzeck et al, 2009) and the same kind of singlemindedness that resulted in the credit crunch.
In this institutional case, the interview data suggest that George Bain’s practices were characteristic of the Dynamo archetype. Commentators noted how he harnessed professorial talent and won the respect of full-time administrators for skilfully chairing meetings and ensuring work was achieved. He launched a highly successful DLMBA before other national business schools and headed the UK’s commission on management research. He was, therefore, highly dynamic and influential and working 18 hour days. Naturally, there is a risk of lapsing into nostalgic heroism when reflecting on this archetype. In contrast, Drifter behaviours were portrayed in deans who lacked focus or a coalition. Often others viewed them as not being tough enough and these individuals were concerned about their personal popularity. More resilient deans did not allow themselves to be derailed by this. In interviews, Drifter types tended to use quite negative language. Whether this was as a consequence of experiencing a comparatively less successful deanship or because their language caused less favourable outcomes is unclear. Defender behaviours were observed in deans who ensured internal priorities were established to improve academic status and programme quality standards within the university.

Compared with the first dataset, the vignettes in this second group provided a picture of sensemaking over time. Deans in this second group in particular discussed how they balanced the portfolio and worked alongside leading scholar colleagues. Respondents in this second group talked about how one deanship related to another. They reflected on continuity and change in the institution which was punctuated by several turnarounds to address complacency and slippage. The mandate since the Dynamo dean who had made a step change in
institutions building in the school in the 1980s has been to be ‘best in class.’

Commonalities amongst those in the second sample include discussions about ‘generativity’ in building future generations to support a non-negotiable commitment to excellence in scholarship. Gallos (2002: 178) echoes the importance of this facilitating role: ‘Good deans nurture individuality and the idiosyncratic strengths of faculty and staff in order to foster creativity and innovation.’

In terms of their next steps, one dean in the second dataset became a pro-vice-chancellor internally and then returned to the business school which provided useful networks for successive deans. One respondent moved to become a dean in the UK’s leading business school and then a vice-chancellor. A third interviewee became a provost in the USA. Yet another became director of the UK’s first management research body. An acting dean of WBS became a director of research in a different university following headship of a social science department at Warwick. One dean (who also featured in the first dataset) moved to Asia as a dean.

When I first undertook the research on deans, I had no idea how hybrid the subjects were. It was a surprise that six out of the seven deans at Warwick had not immediately completed their doctorates after graduation. Ironically, at my doctoral student induction at WBS I was warned by an academic responsible for the programme, whose own publications did not meet the school’s criteria for REF 2014 and subsequently left, that being part-time can lead to a ‘consultancy mind set.’ He clearly did not appreciate that several of the deans themselves were hybrid scholar practitioners who had not pursued uninterrupted academic careers.
In summary, for the second dataset, Defender behaviours were apparent at the end of the 1970s when the chair of the Business School was attempting to improve the quality of programmes and national recruitment and to gain legitimacy internally. This was following Thompson’s (1971) publication of *Warwick University Ltd.* and student campus occupations. Some academics had accused the university of selling out to industry. At that time, Warwick University was a recruiting not a highly selective institution as it is today. In the second half of the 1980s, when Thatcher was Prime Minister, Warwick University was forced to be innovative because of budget cuts. In the UK, managers’ roles were strengthened and the power of the unions was weakened at this time which proved auspicious for the study of management in business schools and so they experienced a ‘tail wind.’ This was an appropriate time for Dynamo behaviours in the deanship. In contrast, the 1990s were a period of consolidation, a ‘head wind’, characterised by more Debater middle manager behaviours when the dean discussed the need for more teaching space. The recession and internal stagnation resulted in strategic drift for the Business School. Subsequently, following an interim caretaker dean for two years, the turn of the millennium was signalled by the appointment of Howard Thomas who was based in the USA which was announced in 1999. Thomas was the first externally recruited dean and had a turnaround mandate. As a scholar in decision analysis, and one of the most well connected deans in the business school community, Thomas was able to energise significant changes over a decade (Fragueiro and Thomas, 2011).

Most recently, the current incumbent Mark Taylor is a very results driven dean. He was hired as a result of a global search while he was on sabbatical in a corporate
firm from the department of economics at Warwick. We might ask whether we will see more of this kind of dean in future leading business schools, someone with a history of rapid cross-sector, transnational career transitions. If the answer is ‘yes’, it is a very difficult task to find such individuals. Taylor admitted himself that for many years he actively avoided any leadership responsibilities in academia until the point when he decided to embark on an MBA in higher education and apply for the deanship in his early 50s. Mark Taylor has a formidable CV, including six academic degrees with a PPE from Oxford. He was a professor in his late 20s after completing a two year PhD. He has worked in several business schools and in the University outside the Business School. Taylor held full-time positions in the City of London, senior corporate roles in the financial services sector, he relocated for five years to the IMF in Washington and held a position in the Bank of England. As a highly cited scholar, he appears to be a rare exemplar of an individual who ‘straddles business and academia’ (Bradshaw, 2010a, 2010b). During his first tenure as dean, Taylor has significantly overhauled many aspects of the Business School, with the full support of the vice-chancellor. His mandate is to ensure the School rises in the UK’s 2014 research rankings and to be the leading university-based business school in Europe. Taylor has initiated innovations such as behavioural economics, collaborations with the Royal Shakespeare Company, and he is establishing a new executive education centre for Warwick in the Shard in London. He has revamped the MBA (Bradshaw, 2010b) and the school won an academic ‘Oscar’ in 2013 (Bradshaw, 2013a), the ECCH case prize. Such a high-paced and extensive change narrative is rarely seen amongst other university-
based business school deans, possibly because of organisational inertia and a lack of support from the vice-chancellor for radical changes.

This historical perspective in the research design for the second dataset on middle managers in one business school shows how the pace of change has intensified. The interviews revealed a shift from an inward looking, part-time, non-professorial position held by Robert Dyson who remained loyally with the university for four decades (WBS, 2007) following some initial industrial work experience, to the executive appointment of a very hybrid change agent with an urgent drive for fast-paced developments. The latter has radically overhauled the faculty and staffing profiles and many aspects of the Business School. Perhaps this latter exemplar is what is needed in an age of complexity if business schools are to appoint ‘dynamos’ rather than ‘dinosaurs’ (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992) to this important middle management position.

Indeed, GMAC (2013) suggests that business schools are currently operating in an age of ‘disrupt or be disrupted.’ Thomas et al (2014) also argue that the status quo is untenable and offer tough choices for the future of management education: ‘competitive destruction or constructive innovation.’ Moreover, there is a greater transnational market and significant difficulties in recruiting deans as universities do not appreciate the time it takes to fill a position (Allen et al, 2014). Stark statements from Steve Hodges (2014), President of Hult, which claims to be ‘the world’s most international business school’ that: ‘Traditional business education just doesn’t work, there’s far too much time spent in the classroom and not enough time spent understanding the practical realities of the business world’ are reminders that other forms of business education provider are more agile and
aggressive than public sector, university-based business schools. Against this backdrop, it would be interesting to speculate what might be the best fit in terms of future deans for Warwick Business School. At what stage might the School appoint an Asian woman after a history of all western men? Joel Podolny’s example of being a dean of a business school in a prestigious university (Yale) and then dean of Apple University is an interesting hybrid phenomenon that one might hope to envisage at some point in the future at Warwick. Already, the business schools at Cambridge, Imperial, Oxford and UCL, the UK’s top universities, have in the second decade of the 21st century appointed deans from outside the UK. Gradually, the deanship in England is becoming transnational. It will be an even tougher recruitment call for higher education institutions that fail to grasp the kind of private sector packages such transnational scholar-executives with effective fundraising and business development capabilities who bridge multiple professions will demand.

4. The third dataset

Finally, the third dataset in this thesis includes the most diverse sample of middle managers. It consists of four women, two retired, four individuals who have been dean for over 10 years, one who has been dean three times in very different institutions, and two interviewees who have done the job twice. In addition, the sample comprises two relative newcomers and four deans without doctorates, one in a leading business school which is not a feature of any of her three successors. Two individuals in this sample have worked in standalone institutions that focused on executive education, Ashridge and Henley. This contrasts with one who had worked at Ashridge in the first dataset and one with experience at
London Business School, a largely autonomous institution, in the second dataset.

All deans of an independent but non-profit business school in this sample have also been deans of a university-based business school. Two of the women in the third dataset were successors to the individual who had been dean three times which indicates the circularity of the ‘dean pool.’ This last round of interviews was conducted in the middle of 2011 with a diverse group of business school deans, well into the recession.

In relation to the five contingencies highlighted in this thesis of middle management level, hybridity, professionalisation, centre-periphery relations and temporal concerns over the industry and dean’s lifecycle, the third dataset illustrated mixed experiences ranging from two with experience as a director at Cambridge and others in large metropolitan teaching universities. In terms of seniority and autonomy, the individuals in the executive education independent business schools (charities) were chief executives reporting to a board of trustees. There had been a disagreement between one of these deans and his trustees who did not initially see the urgency for the business school to merge because of pension liabilities and a steep decline in MBA recruitment. A merger with a comprehensive university business school took place when his successor was in the deanship four years later. The deans in this third group demonstrated a versatility of hybrid professional experiences. One had moved into academia to the deanship from being responsible for talent management in financial services and another had been an industrial chemist. As expected, the deans in post 1992 universities operated in more managerial environments where they also had pro-vice-chancellor type roles and so were responsible for cross-university activities like...
some of the deans in the first dataset. The deans in leading accredited business schools that were searching to recruit the world’s top researchers had particularly strong concerns about attracting and retaining this talent. One of these was a faculty dean and she valued being at the university’s ‘top table’, working closely with the vice-chancellor rather than having to report to a faculty dean.

Respondents were well aware of industry dynamics and potential shakeouts in the UK. The imperatives to attend to global issues, consider emerging economies, to work with donors and ensure student satisfaction in a tough economic environment were emphasized in our discussions. The importance of fundraising was heightened and no longer regarded as optional compared with some of the individuals who had been deans much earlier in the second dataset during the 1970s. Long tenures of a decade in one institution are rare now amongst business school deans (Bradshaw, 2013b) and yet four deans in this third sample had experienced such long tenures. These individuals were consummate boundary spanners and very well networked in the business school community with strong business development capabilities and external profiles.

A variety of archetypal behaviours were shown in this third group. Dealmaker behaviours were evidenced in very supportive, personable, appreciative activities where deans built cohesive teams. One dean was focused on experimentation, another on business development and coping with different global economic trends. One new dean was concerned about ensuring student satisfaction in the context of higher fees and in an old building. She was anxious to raise staff morale by creating a nurturing environment. Deliberator activities were exemplified by the interesting exposition of how the Judge Institute for Management Studies was
initially managed at Cambridge by its first director. Debaters talked about sales for executive education particularly. The interviewee who had moved from industry immediately before becoming dean used very positive, confident, upbeat language to sell the school’s narrative. Doer archetype behaviours were apparent in discussions about having to carve out time to complete big pieces of work. Dynamos talked about activities related to organising, chairing, sensemaking, persuading others, ensuring follow up at committees after sufficient time for debate, working long hours, and walking for thinking between meetings. By comparison, Defender behaviours could be discerned in the interview about a dean failing to convince his trustees of the need to merge to ensure financial sustainability. Finally, some warnings about Drifter behaviours were mooted with the dean in her third tenure at the same business school. She was adamant that she only accepted this third contract because she was very clear about the mandate and the school needed her in turbulent times.

So, what did this third dataset reveal that the others did not in answering the question about middle level hybrid strategists’ behaviours in professionalised business units? There were more women in this sample, representing the greater diversity that McTiernan and Flynn (2011) celebrate in the business school deanship. Deans in this group talked of supporting others, appreciating camaraderie and inclusivity, working with others and the need for time to reflect. Those with experiences in non-university based business schools founded at the end of the 1950s suggested a greater need for business development and financial sustainability, implying that despite other deans’ wishes for greater autonomy, being independent is risky and not ideal. As in the other datasets, Dealmakers
enjoyed negotiating, Deliberators wanted to figure things out, and Debaters liked chatting. While Doers were pragmatic, Dynamos were feisty, Defenders sought stability, and Drifters remained confused and unsupported and exited involuntarily.

5. Summary

Table 26 summarises the five contingencies, 15 practices, and seven archetypes identified in this study that were revealed in the data coding process. It shows how connections are made from the analysis between the four Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) roles with practices mapped against them across all five contingencies. These four archetypes mapped directly onto the roles, with the addition of three more archetypes not linked to specific roles.
Table 26: Summary of roles, contingencies, practices, archetypes in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIDDLE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIC ROLE TYPOLOGY (4)</th>
<th>CONTINGENCIES (5)</th>
<th>PRACTICES (15)</th>
<th>ARCHETYPES (7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating adaptability</td>
<td>SENIORITY</td>
<td>Innovating Mediating Supporting</td>
<td>1. DEALMAKER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesizing information</td>
<td>HYBRIDITY</td>
<td>Combining Understanding Deciding</td>
<td>2. DELIBERATOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Championing alternatives</td>
<td>CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS</td>
<td>Narrating Selling Convincing</td>
<td>3. DEBATER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing deliberate strategy</td>
<td>KNOWLEDGE INTENSITY</td>
<td>Changing Controlling Completing</td>
<td>4. DOER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TIME: EXECUTIVE TENURE, INDUSTRY DYNAMICS</td>
<td>Go-getting Protecting</td>
<td>5. DYNAMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trying</td>
<td>6. DEFENDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. DRIFTER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences between the Drifter and Dynamo archetypes are shown in Table 27 as exemplars of polarities (Pettigrew, 1988) or extreme types, based on the five contingencies noted in the analysis. The Drifter was unable to control barons in the unit who formed their own fiefdoms while the Dynamo could cope with the pluralistic and hybrid nature of dealing with different units, successfully harnessed professorial talent and merged several research groups, despite some fierce opposition. In relation to the centre, the Drifter resented the central administration whereas the Dynamo formed a solid coalition. The Drifter was worried about slippage in quality and loss of key researchers, and experienced a disappointing research ranking result whereas the Dynamo enhanced the unit’s profile by negotiating two high profile professorial appointments for one advertised position and achieved a successful RAE result. In terms of personal
experiences of the dean’s tenure, the Drifter was ousted from the role and
exhausted while the Dynamo completed two tenures ‘like a runaway train.’ He
exited on his own terms after six years to another job. Finally, in terms of industry
dynamics, the Dynamo was operating in a context of ‘manager as hero’, and rode
the wave of management education while the Drifter was overwhelmed by
intensified competition, and a culture of greater governance and auditing. The two
polarities of archetypes demonstrate the elements of a strong sense of self-
efficacy (Bandura, 1977) and confidence by the Dynamo, who partnered
successfully with internal and central colleagues, set standards and delivered
tangible results. The Drifter behaviours are less reassuring and reminiscent of
Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1996: 66) malcontent stereotype.

Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) supports the view that in
attempting to recover from a declining situation such as declining competitive
advantage, a strategy of recovery is pursued with more risk taking behaviours than
in auspicious times. Gaps between aspiration and actual performance also
demonstrate the behavioural view of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) whereby
individuals are more amenable to deviations from existing strategy when there are
such discrepancies. Hence, in this study a Doer or Dynamo archetype for a
turnaround strategy in the second dataset appears to follow more Defender or
Drifter archetypal behaviours.
Table 27: Comparisons between Drifter and Dynamo archetypes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRIFTER</th>
<th>CONTINGENCIES</th>
<th>DYNAMO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intimidated by research barons internally, enjoys the status and title of the post but lacks focus and the strategic leadership behaviours required.</td>
<td>SENIORITY</td>
<td>Takes the initiative to invite review panels to provide insights for strategic planning, proactive in harnessing professorial talent to build the institution and work with superiors productively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to control barons</td>
<td>HYBRIDITY</td>
<td>Internal mergers finalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on and resentment of centralised regime.</td>
<td>CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS</td>
<td>Powerful axis of the head of central administration – dean – head of SBU administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensely aware of élite new entrants in the industry, presidd over the unit’s and own research slippage during tenure.</td>
<td>KNOWLEDGE INTENSITY</td>
<td>Non-negotiable high performance, ambitious expansion, ahead of its time, excellent research results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enervated, increasing absences, asked to step down.</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE TENURE</td>
<td>Prodigious working hours, energised, optimum six years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overwhelmed by audit culture, involuntary exit, felt a victim of circumstances and intensifying competition.</td>
<td>INDUSTRY DYNAMICS</td>
<td>Rode the wave, lode star beyond the business school, moved to greater roles. Influential in shaping the industry.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28 suggests the types of comments that distinct archetypes might make as a further illustration of differences between the archetypes.
As an executive tenure progresses, one individual may naturally move between the archetypes rather than represent a single caricature illustrated above. For example, pre-tenure a dean consults and mulls over the ‘going in mandate’ like a Deliberator archetype. When they arrive, they engage in meetings as a Debater and gradually make tradeoffs between different choices as a Dealmaker. As their tenure progresses, the middle manager needs to ensure they achieve results for renewal of their contract or move to a new role. This means that they must operate in Doer mode. It is hoped that mid tenure and at their peak, the manager is confident and competent and functions like the Dynamo archetype. Over time, however, they may become less trusting and less focused, weary and behave like a Defender. Finally, according to Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) fifth season they adopt the dysfunctional behaviours of the Drifter in the absence of strategic renewal.
It would be tempting to prescribe a formula from the above discussions of an exemplary heroic type of business school dean in an ideal context. For example, the perfect storm of a failed Drifter predecessor in a research intensive business school would suggest the need for a new Dynamo dean, a vigorous boundary spanner, located at a senior level in the organisation’s hierarchy optimally for six years until the next REF which provides a clear strategic goal to enhance performance. Preferably it would be a strong business school brand in a strong university, triple accredited with healthy endowments. There would be a sense of urgency from a fully supportive HR department and vice-chancellor who does not interfere and top researchers who do not resist change. Ideally the Dynamo dean would be able to implement a turnaround strategy with explicit expectations to rise in the research rankings. In this perfect set up, the dean is able to deal with potential conflict between managerial, practitioner, and scholarly divisions in the business school (Simon, 1967) which could be ruthlessly subverted to the agreed mandate. Clearly of course, it is not possible, however, to manufacture such scenarios in practice and in a postheroic leadership age (Crevani and Packendorff, 2007) as many factors emerge when aiming to realise a deliberate mandate. Nevertheless, modifications to Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992: 154) typology of middle management strategic roles in the P-R-A-C model (Figure 18) developed in this thesis at the very least help to make sense of the business school deanship.

The model of roles, practices, contingencies and archetypes presented in Figure 18 offers a framework for gaining insights into the multi-dimensional aspects of the UK business school deanship. It responds to the lack of research on SBU managers
and the dearth of research into strategists’ first-order views (Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013). Its application to empirical cases further enriches our understanding of the inner worlds of strategic actors and their actual behaviours thanks to the intersection of practice and contingency perspectives used with a middle management role typology. The strategy-as-practice movement has sought to be distinct from mainstream corporate strategy in formally recognised tracks at conferences of the Strategic Management Society, the Academy of Management, the European Group for Organizational Studies and the British Academy of Management. As the stream of SAP research approaches its second decade, there is scope to re-connect its micro-practice viewpoint to reconcile what Whittington (2012: 263) terms ‘big’ and ‘small’ strategy research, i.e. “Small Strategy’ is about financial performance, typically of firms in competitive industries although in this thesis I would prefer ‘small’ to mean micro-strategizing. ‘Big Strategy’ is about significance – impacts and purposes that stretch far beyond firm performance’ (ibid). Moreover, archetypes of a particular type of mid-level strategist indicated in this thesis complement recent literature on archetypal chief strategy officers (Powell and Angwin, 2012) and established work on organisational strategic types (Miller and Friesen, 1978; Miles and Snow, 1978).
CHAPTER NINE: CONTRIBUTIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS

1. Introduction

Findings in this thesis contribute to literature on middle managers and their strategic roles. In particular, insights are provided on academic leaders of university-based business schools. Chapter one identified empirical gaps in terms of the strategizing practices of hybrid upper middle managers in professionalised public sector business units outside healthcare. It considered how these strategists’ practices might vary within different contexts in the same industry over time.

Chapter two reviewed the utility of Floyd and Wooldridge's (1992, 1994, 1996) broadly conceptualised middle management typology. The model is applied in this thesis using a strategy-as-practice lens which is explained in Chapter three. Prevailing contingencies are examined internally in terms of an individual’s seniority, professional hybridity, centre-periphery relations, tenure, and externally with respect to the industry sector and broader social issues.

Chapter four reflected on (a) changes in the UK government’s policies that impact on business schools and (b) constraints and opportunities in the global market. Recently, Barber et al (2013: 3) highlighted the significant value of education and the threats of a technological tsunami: ‘Given the state of the global economy, tensions in international relations, massive gaps between wealth and poverty, the deepening threat of climate change and the ubiquity of weapons of mass
destruction, our contention is that we need a generation better educated, in the
broadest and most profound sense of that word, than ever before.’ Davies (2012: 40) emphasized the specific contributions of UK business schools for the national
economy as a major export earner, ‘teaching 14% of all higher education students
with 7% of the staff, the MBA, iconic buildings, university cross subsidies, lots of
overseas, postgraduate and executive students.’ Potential changes in business and
management education are constrained by the conventions of peer reviewed
journals, media rankings, and professional and accreditation bodies. The
symbolism of brand management, totemic journals, inflated professorial salaries,
state-of-the-art business school facilities, and expensive MBA programmes are
being questioned. Debates about legitimacy and new educational and business
models (Starkey and Tempest, 2009; Thomas et al, 2014; Thomas and Cornuel,
2014) make the business school deanship an interesting phenomenon to examine
for strategic management research.

This study is located in the middle management stream of strategy literature.
Firstly, the research provides empirical evidence to support claims about
strategizing practices within a typology of middle management roles. The
clustering of activities identified is explained to show how the set of seven
archetypal strategists was generated in this thesis based on five different
contingencies. Public sector micro-strategizing is an under-researched setting
outside healthcare. The conundrum of professors of strategy strategizing is an
interesting site to explore hybridisation within strategic business units in pluralised
contexts. A practice, situated, behavioural lens rather than process approach
allows the researcher to zoom in on first-order strategists’ insights. Secondly, the usefulness of Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) typology applied to hybrid professionals is evaluated in relation to a specified hybrid upper middle manager (UMM) as existing literature tends to omit details about the type of middle manager (Wooldridge et al, 2008), their levels or functions. Thirdly, this thesis contributes to literature on business school leadership at a time when serious questions are being raised about the legitimacy of business and management education. Suggestions about new paradigms demand further evolution of this mid-level leadership role and indicate opportunities to reconfigure the deanship. Finally, in this thesis the case studies, with two datasets of interviews filmed in 2011 offer unique access to the first-order views of SBU managers who can be difficult to access for strategic management research. The recorded interviews are readily available on the ABSUK YouTube channel. The rich data generated over four years (2008–2011) provide insights that are analysed within a clear conceptual framework that is frequently absent from publications with anecdotal advice and atheoretical reflections such as those by Aspatore (2008), Dhir (2008), and Friel (2013).

The empirical results in this thesis illustrate a strategic bias amongst the deans studied towards practices within the two strategic roles of ‘facilitating adaptability’ and ‘synthesizing information.’ This might be expected of individuals who are educators and researchers. The evidence points to a need for greater attention to be paid to ‘implementing deliberate strategy’ and ‘championing alternatives’, i.e. publicly legitimising new models and convincing others of the
value of business schools as thought leaders with strong performance management and innovation capabilities.

It is interesting that topics in the key conferences for business school deans in 2014 suggest different priorities in North America from Europe. Sessions on alumni fundraising, (re)branding, creative confidence, public sector budgets, emerging economies, venture capital and business school entrepreneurs were held at AACSB’s annual meeting in the USA, i.e. the championing and implementing roles of Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) model. In contrast, the European deans’ 2014 conference included issues such as sustainability, NGOs, pollution, social innovation which represent a more nurturing approach to management education seen in the synthesizing and facilitating roles of Floyd and Wooldridge’s model (ibid). Despite the globally competitive nature of business schools, and the hegemonic US model, regional differences are discernable.

The insights generated by this thesis lead to recommendations for deans to demonstrate stronger strategic capabilities in implementing deliberate strategy within the constraints in which they operate. These restrictions include industry paradigm traps that Worrell (2009) and Thomas et al (2014) emphasize in the aftermath of the most recent financial crisis, as well as strained centre-periphery relations, a government policy of regulation, deregulation to allow more private providers and innovation, and students’ concerns about employability. Other difficulties for business school deans include faculty disinterest in how their
university is managed, faculty stress, demanding executive students, and the popularity of business and management education with large class sizes. Contrary to views since Burgelman’s (1983a) and Schilit’s (1987) studies about how middle managers formulate rather than just implement strategy, the findings in this thesis suggest the reverse. Mintzberg (2009) thought that top managers had become too removed from considered reflections about the consequences of their decisions and too detached from hands on implementation, deficient behaviours which contributed to the financial crisis. Similarly, interviews with UK deans in this study indicate that some of these leaders may have become too detached from reality, spending their time formulating abstract strategy and zealously following industry games rather than taking time to reflect on understanding the implications of execution and how they effectively promote their real impact. Perhaps business school deans’ efforts would be better directed towards nurturing staff for the long-term beyond the next accreditation or REF and being closer to students and engaged research and innovation, speaking in the media, rather than focusing on the bottom line and media league tables.

The subtleties entailed in managing peers in a professionalised, knowledge intensive unit are particularly highlighted in this research project as business school deans tend to focus more on faculty than students. Ironically, scholars in business schools are subject to directives from professional administrators, in the unit and at the centre, who apply management techniques derived from the very theories the professors generate. Many independently minded academics prefer to view management as an object for research rather than an instrument to be
applied to them. Their allegiances are oriented more to their scholarly community, academic freedom, and personal careers rather than to their employers.

On the one hand, the empirical evidence might suggest that the dean’s role is impossible, and overloaded (Bradshaw, 2006). It could be argued that the business school deanship represents ‘a potentially endangered species’ (Davies, 2010) because of role ambiguity and strain caused by inhabiting multiple worlds, as well as difficulties with recruitment campaigns to appoint deans (Davies, 2013). Future scenarios may appear bleak with faculty deans from other disciplines such as law replacing the business school dean in some institutions. Drifter archetypes of deposed dean who are beleaguered and enervated are illustrated in the data.

Literature by insiders forecasting the end of business schools (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002), the demise of the MBA (Schlegelmilch and Thomas, 2011) and even the demise of half of US business schools within five years as a consequence of on-line education at top-tier institutions (Richards Lyons, at Haas, Berkeley, cited by Clark, 2014) provide a gloomy backdrop to a study of those charged with leading these important business units although the focus on the MBA is stronger in the USA than in Europe.

On the other hand, the case studies here demonstrate successful exemplars such as the Dynamo type who adroitly navigates multiple agendas, combining strategizing practices in all four middle management role types. This archetype exemplifies the drive and the ability to form strong teams and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al, 1997). Dynamos are clear about their strategic priorities and timing of
their exit from the deanship. Such strategists are influential boundary spanners who are able to work with the grain of prevailing circumstances internally and externally rather than fall victim to industry, institutional, and government controls. At best they are powerhouses who shape the industry within which they operate.

The public sector context of professional administrators and academic faculty that is moving to a discourse of greater marketisation offers a challenging mid-level position to research. The thesis has been influenced by studies in strategic management literature to illuminate the following themes:

(1) *Middle management role typology:* the cases of business school deans roles analysed within Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) framework illustrate the challenges of scholar executives practising what they profess. Recommendations are made for deans to move from a focus on abstract strategizing and facilitation to more activities in the roles of championing and implementing. Within the seven archetypes generated, this study encourages greater visibility for strategic behaviours within the Dynamo, Debater, and Doer types of strategist.

(2) *Strategizing practices:* respondents in this study were particularly well placed to reflect on the knowing—doing gap in terms of strategic behaviours because of their own experiences as management scholars and academic leaders. There was a sense that middle management is about ‘horses for courses.’ Certain types of
institution and prevailing circumstances are appropriate for different managers. For example, many individuals who were used to research intensive environments could not envisage working in teaching focused institutions. The three serial deans who were ‘triplers’, i.e. who had experienced three sets of deanships, were outliers in the sample as some moved from high to lower research intensive environments. The second dataset particularly revealed the importance of close-up studies as several assumptions about the deans’ limited levels of hybridity were subsequently dispelled on further inspection.

(3) Contingencies: the benefits of contextualising and situating the subjects in this study at a micro-level while paying attention to meso-level institutional, macro-level industry and wider social influences illustrate the usefulness of an embedded approach. This provides rich interactive data drawing both on endogenous forces and externalities such as government policy and industry dynamics nationally and globally.

2. Contributions

The central contribution of this thesis to strategic management literature is to extend Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) well-known typology from the 1990s on middle managers’ strategic roles. This thesis applies a strategy-as-practice perspective (Whittington, 1996) which emerged after Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992) framework was first developed. The strategy-as-practice lens allows for a finer-grained understanding of actual everyday practices in the four roles in the Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1996) model. This thesis emphasises the application of contingency theory to sensitisie the researcher to
the different contextual accounts of micro-practices in comparable positions in the same industry sector. Subsequently, coding behaviours within roles in different contexts for a specific level and type of middle manager (hybrid professional strategic business unit leader) allows for a general taxonomy of archetypical middle-level business unit strategists to be produced. The overarching model presented in Figure 18 of practices, contingencies roles and archetypes, therefore, builds on the findings of Floyd and Wooldridge’ (1996) large scale, multiple industry, and quantitative questionnaire in the USA. The value of a strategy-as-practice lens to this general model in a small-scale 21st century qualitative European study is to provide deeper insights into a specified position. Middle management literature is generally characterised by a lack of detail that specifies the horizontal functionality or vertical seniority of incumbents. This thesis has sought to redress this lack of specificity by defining the type of strategic actor clearly.

A combination of role typology, practice, and contingency theories applied to a well defined hybrid upper middle management role in a professionalised business unit enables patterns of relationships to be identified between roles, behaviours, and settings based on strategists’ first-order reflections. The resulting typology of seven strategist archetypes represents a second new development within the literature on strategic actors offered by this research project.

Thirdly, this thesis contributes to the growing literature about business schools. In particular, it explores existing paradigms whose legitimacy has been increasingly questioned over time and relates these to the role of dean. As the business school business has matured, there is greater focus on reputation as determined by rankings, revenue, and research publications, against a backdrop of growing
concern for social impact, innovation, and national economic growth. The business school deanship is growing increasingly complex as it has evolved from an internally elected to a high performance executive position in a hypercompetitive context. Well motivated, capable, professionalised cross-breed managers bridging multiple professions may be much more effective strategic actors than purebreds provided they retain personal credibility in their first discipline (Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000). For the business school deanship, such individuals are difficult to find. In actuality, a process of attrition over time with attention diverted to meetings and other managerial activities detracts from opportunities for deans’ personal scholarship, the reason they originally joined academia, and from their executive ability to make a difference.

2.1 Extending Floyd and Wooldridge’s model

The contextualist perspective adopted in this thesis assumes that meaning is derived from circumstances (Gergen, 1982). As the basis of a strategy-as-practice vantage point is a concern for socially situated practices, contingency theory enables useful insights into why strategists’ practices might vary over time, even in the same institution or for the same individual, as well as between successors and institutions. While Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) acknowledge general contingent factors such as downsizing and they produce middle manager stereotypes, for example malcontents and empire builders, the undifferentiated nature of middle managers in their work creates a gap in their conceptual model. A more nuanced understanding of strategizing realities for SBU managers is thus enabled by the strategy-as-practice stream of research in strategic management literature.
A key contribution from studying the intersection of roles, practices, and contingencies in this research is the emergence and interplay of five contingent factors of:

1. Seniority
2. Hybridity
3. Centre-periphery relations
4. Knowledge intensity, professionalised contexts outside healthcare
5. Time: executive tenure, industry dynamics

Using a strategy-as-practice approach demonstrates what it means to be a hybrid upper middle manager who straddles different professional languages and dominant logics in a strategic business unit. Moreover, the level of seniority is revealed as an important factor which distinguishes this study from upper echelons literature on CEOs (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and their top management teams in the organisation’s apex. Specifically, the positioning of middle managers at the SBU interface means that centre-periphery relations are important contingencies that affect the day-to-day activities of strategy formulation and implementation. This thesis adds to the complexity of the middle manager position by exploring the boundary spanning role in different environments of varying knowledge intensity and professionalism outside the usual realm of healthcare that is typically found in studies of hybrid middle managers (for example, Kitchener, 2000; Currie and Procter, 2005; Currie, 2006; Burgess and Currie, 2013). Finally, a temporal awareness in this research builds on Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1996) acknowledgement of changes in the fate of middle
managers by providing rich data on shifts in strategizing behaviours (a) during executive tenures at an individual level and (b) in the context of historical changes in policies and mindsets at a sector level as the pace of competition intensifies.

This research confirms observations made in other studies on dis/enablers of middle managers’ strategizing. These include higher levels of seniority (Currie, 2006), role clarity (Currie and Procter, 2005), support and appreciation from the middle manager’s superior (Currie, 1999a; Mantere, 2008), development and boundary spanning activities (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997) as well as lower levels of interference from HR (Boyett and Currie, 2004) which facilitate middle managers’ strategy making capabilities.

2.2 Strategist archetypes

As an addition to existing literature, this thesis has generated a set of strategist archetypes that were derived from the data: the seven Ds of the business school deanship. This study highlights strategy professors’ reflections on their own strategizing practices as hybrid-managers. The problem is that hybridity amongst professors may be increasingly difficult to find in a world of experts and specialist top journals despite research councils’ exhortations to increase multidisciplinarity. As the business school industry sector matures with incentives for early career academics to focus ruthlessly on publishing, in leading institutions it is becoming more difficult to find generalists with outstanding publications in highly cited journals and proven strategic management capabilities who are willing to apply for the business school deanship in the UK, like partners in professional service firms.
The seven archetypes of hybrid professional business unit manager in this thesis are inspired by Miles and Snow’s (1978) four categories of business level strategies (P-A-D-R: prospector, analyzer, defender, reactor). This thesis also considered the seven strategy team behaviours identified by Paroutis and Pettigrew (2007: 110) of executing, reflecting, initiating, coordinating, supporting, collaborating, shaping context which map onto Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) roles of implementing, synthesizing, championing, and facilitating strategy. The seven archetypes presented in this thesis also contribute to Whittington’s (2006) reference to the third ‘P’ in strategy-as-practice, i.e. the strategy practitioner. They also supplement Powell and Angwin’s (2012) four archetypes of chief strategy officers which are also based on discerning different patterns of behaviours and orientations.

In the three datasets investigated in this thesis, serial deans who have been deans twice, or even three times such as Charles Harvey, Howard Thomas, and Stephen Watson are especially interesting. They reveal adaptive and generative strategizing behaviours within different business school contexts. For instance, the business school settings included charities, new ‘managerialist’ business schools, start-ups in old and ancient universities, a large division in a university undergoing a significant financial crisis, a leading entrepreneurial Scottish business school, units without any accreditations, and others with triple accreditation. These individuals played various roles such as entrepreneur, divisional manager, CEO, scholar role model.

While acknowledging the risks inherent in focusing on essences by stereotyping, typecasting, and labelling absolutes, we argue that taxonomies of archetypes, like
cartoons, offer simplified extremes to help make sense of messy, complex real-life puzzles. The archetypes provide a useful heuristic. As there is a lack of research on strategic business unit managers (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Finkelstein et al, 2008), the archetypes of strategists identified in this thesis contribute to strategic management literature on strategy practitioners below the upper echelons. The study also contributes to the few studies on strategic actors that use a strategy-as-practice rather than strategy-as-process approach (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). This research is distinct from strategic leadership research that analyses the demographics of leaders at the upper echelons (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) as it offers a behavioural view of strategy at the upper middle manager level. The in-depth interview data from which the archetypes are derived in this thesis are generated from first-order insights of strategists which are rarely explored in strategic management literature, with exceptions like Barry and Elmes (1997) and Paroutis and Heracleous (2013). This research has, therefore, responded to Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1996) call for strategy scholars to pay more attention to individual strategists. This was echoed by Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009: 69): ‘There is a curious absence of human actors and their actions in most strategy theories.’ Models that help us understand strategic actors and their actions are, therefore, useful additions to behavioural strategy research.

3. Practical implications: The business school deanship

Finally, this study contributes to debates about the future configurations of business schools and their leaders and a renaissance in academic legitimacy (Thomas and Cornuel, 2014). Saturnine warnings about the hegemonic US model of business and management education abound. For instance, DeAngelo et al
(2005: 1) caution that ‘U.S. business schools are locked in a dysfunctional competition for media rankings that diverts resources from long-term knowledge creation’ which may mean they are ‘destined to lose their dominant global position and become a classic case study of how myopic decision-making begets institutional mediocrity.’ One might assume that the most immediate source to check for the fragility or otherwise of this prevailing model is to ask the strategic actors who are responsible for legitimating the value of business schools. Although The Economist (Schumpeter, 2014) casts doubts on the ability of business schools to take their own medicine for change.

An outsider might assume that business schools are more business-like than most other academic units. Yet insiders ask whether business schools can achieve form over substance (Gioia and Corley, 2002) amidst considerable hype? Can business schools behave more like schools than businesses (Ferlie et al, (2010)? Davies (2013: 82) reported that ‘Executive search firms find that candidates for business school deanships are the most likely to withdraw from interview panels in higher education as interviewees realise the job has been oversold.’ As mentioned in Chapter four, Kring and Kaplan (2011: 1) demand a skill set for future business school deans that is more strategic, entrepreneurial, innovative, relational, and people focused. Most recently, Davies and Hilton (2014) and Thomas et al (2014) claim that the future of the management education field can only be secured through transformations and innovations to match the challenges they face. This suggests that individual deans will need to change their behaviours. Strategic management scholars need to rethink the dominant paradigm and how they socially (re)construct their circumstances as social engineers. Just as behavioural
economics has become mainstream post the 2008 financial crisis, so individual
behavioural strategy (Lovallo and Sibony, 2010) is gaining more attention. Clinebell
and Clinebell (2008: 100) argue that: ‘The need for relevancy without returning to
a trade school model is a major challenge facing business schools in today’s
environment.’ Yet expectations remain high for business schools. For instance,
Gordon and Howell (1959: 127) believed that: ‘business education should educate
for the whole career.’ Alvesson and Sandberg (2013: 128) complain of ‘a serious
shortage of high-impact research in management studies.’ Willmott (2011)
suggests dysfunction is caused by ‘journal list fetishism and the perversion of
scholarship.’ Moreover, Clegg et al (2013: 1258) maintain that: ‘Business schools
are purveyors of symbolic capital for careers and the strategies associated with
these. In an organizational field that is open to malpractice on a catastrophic scale
and in which the gatekeeper function, such as it is, resides in a variety of for profit,
not-for-profit and public business schools, no other institution comes close to
assuming the mantle of responsibility.’ Such concerns about the responsibilities of
business schools and their deans are highly pertinent to this research study. These
issues demand ‘strategic changes in the ways in which higher education’s senior
managers frame its strategic mission and vision’ (ibid: 1250). Gaddis (2000) warns
of the dangers to university-based business schools of new non-university-based
enterprises and disrupters that he calls greyhounds, ‘stealth competitors.’ As a
former business school dean in the USA, he states that ‘traditional business
schools are in a subtle decline...because the old schools are not as responsive to
customer needs as emerging competitors are — and have not fully recognized
their vulnerability.’ For this reason, Gaddis (ibid) contends that ‘business school
administrators must alter their management strategies and reassess institutional attitudes...they must uphold the intellectual rigor and the challenges that make the business school worthy of university affiliation.’ Innovations such as hbx.hbs.edu are interesting challenges.

By understanding how the expectations and strategizing behaviours of the business school deanship vary in different institutions over time, we can improve the balance of activities and support for such hybrid upper middle manager strategists in professionalised business units. While acknowledging that professionals and managers inevitably conflict because they view similar strategic issues from different angles (Golden et al, 2000) and managing such relationships between academics and practitioners in a business school is ‘very much like mixing oil with water’ (Simon, 1967: 16), the aspirations for management to be professional (Khurana, 2007) and business schools to be ethical (Augier and March; 2011: 276) mean that these struggles often intersect in the role of the dean. If these upper middle managers are to improve the strategizing practices they profess and enhance their own practices, then further research on business school leaders would be valuable.

4. Limitations of the study

Certainly, this social science research study has a range of limitations which are noted below:

(i) Interview and documentary data

Much of the data is based on the subjects’ self-report and their colleagues’ retrospective commentaries. Some events discussed occurred 50 years ago. It assumes that the respondents were sufficiently reflexive and reliable (Giddens,
1984) in their reports. Direct observations in a longitudinal ethnography might have been preferable (for example, Pettigrew, 1973) but were not feasible given the time and budget constraints of a single researcher working full-time and studying part-time. The use of interviews and documentary materials rather than direct observation is adopted (Orlikowski, 2002). One dean, when asked during the research design process if he would consider the researcher shadowing him in meetings, like the observation techniques adopted by Jarzabkowski (2000) in several universities, strongly opposed the idea. The researcher was, however, able to observe him and other deans in the datasets in national committees and conferences that they chaired. Co-authoring vignettes in the main study with the subjects also allowed the researcher to observe directly how individuals operated. There is no guarantee that self-report equates to what others perceive as social constructions of reality. Triangulated research methods were used, however, to highlight self-deception, social desirability bias, retrospective sensemaking, and factual inaccuracies.

(ii) Sample size

This study investigates 24 respondents in 17 UK institutions who had experienced working as deans in 35 business schools. Generalisations to other hybrid business units and upper middle managers are, therefore, limited, although cross case comparisons were explored. Mintzberg (1973) only studied five executives for his doctoral thesis while Jarzabkowski (2000) investigated three universities for her dissertation. Typically, strategy-as-practice studies tend to draw on small datasets to encourage rich description (Geertz, 1994).
(iii) Performance management data

This thesis considers perceptions of success but does not provide quantitative data on an individual dean’s effectiveness and accomplishments as Goodall (2007) did in her doctoral study of scholar-leaders’ citations records. Financial performance outcomes during various deanships were not considered due to a lack of available historical financial data. The thesis is more concerned with behaviours, i.e. performativity, rather than economic performance although rankings and accreditations are an indication of important performance metrics.

(iv) National focus

Despite an initial proposal to undertake a thesis based on groups of international deans, for ease of comparison it was decided to focus on the UK. In practice, only two deans outside England (from Scotland and Wales) were engaged in the research. The UK university-based business school industry is one of the most popular and sophisticated in the world in terms of triple accreditations and international outreach (second only to the USA). It can be claimed that this study is representative of the heterogeneous European model of business and management in public sector universities (Antunes and Thomas, 2007).

(v) Absence of political perspectives

While a rational analytical perspective is not proposed in this study, neither does the research consider power and politics in any depth. Clearly, the respondents occupy important organisational positions and political considerations would be
an interesting avenue for research, as Fragueiro (2007) demonstrated in his doctoral study of deans in three élite business schools at IMD, INSEAD, and LBS.

(vi) **Focus on a single industry sector**

This thesis focuses on the university-based business school industry, the public sector, rather than on upper middle managers in other non-profit settings or the private sector. While its resonance beyond higher education might be limited, it may be relevant for expert managers in professional service firms. Other types of deans in professional schools (e.g. education, engineering, health, medicine) may draw on lessons from this study. As other university departments are becoming more commercially aware and focused on the impact of their research in austere times, the findings are transferable to middle managers in different academic disciplines where academic management may be less developed.

(vii) **Diversity of stakeholders’ perspectives**

This study concentrates on managers and draws on data from their colleagues (including deans’ secretaries). It does not solicit the views of lower level employees, students, or industry outsiders.
CHAPTER TEN: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Introduction

This final chapter considers possible future research avenues based on the findings in this thesis. Chapter ten reflects on recommendations indicated by the insights gained and provides an overall conclusion.

2. Future research directions

Future research could focus on particular theoretical aspects of archetypal strategists. Further work on archetypes of strategists might explore one ideal type in greater depth. We could also explore how identities are developed, how Dynamo strategizing practices can be supported, how Drifter behaviours might be avoided, and how team members can complement deans’ biases. The unit and level of analysis, different samples and methods could be modified for the collection of additional empirical data. Further studies might investigate multi-level interactions, the strategizing practices of upper middle managers across boundaries, or explore behaviours at specific levels in particular types of institution. At the micro-level, there is scope for a longitudinal cohort study using diary analysis. Deans’ strategy meetings could be observed. Other research projects could include comparisons of cross country cohorts, cross disciplinary studies of heads of different professional schools in universities, a study of a particular category of deans who are professors of strategy, or a specific sample of individuals who have cross university, pro-vice-chancellor roles would yield different viewpoints. We could explore the emergence of hybrid scholars and of transnational serial deans, comparing pairs of individuals. Further studies might also include ethnographic approaches to shadow deans or map their behaviours.
more closely to middle management role typologies during transitions between jobs and over their tenures. Future research at a meso-level could investigate dyads of deans and registrars/pro-vice chancellors in the same way as Empson et al (2013) explored the dyadic relationships between managing partners and their chief operating officers in law partnerships. It is possible to examine deans’ teams or views of the deanship from the centre or externally. Meetings might be observed that exemplify strategizing at the intersections of boundaries between business units or the centre and periphery or between the organisation and its environment. There is also scope to examine each of the five contingencies identified in this thesis in greater depth. At a macro-level, the phenomenon of the hybrid upper middle manager could be considered in the light of changing business and educational models (e.g. Thomas and Cornuel, 2014) or in relation to the capabilities of students graduating from particular business schools compared with their deans’ orientations. For instance, Horwitz (2010: 34) argues that business schools need to be transformed to prepare students for ‘[s]uccessful next-generation firms [which] will be collaborative and interconnected, forming partnerships and multiple-location virtual teams.’ Research across industry sectors could also be carried out to compare business unit managers’ strategizing practices. Different levels of hybridity may be distinguished as the business school industry landscape becomes increasingly specialised with a focus on greater research selectivity. Senior partners in professional service firms such as law or accountancy firms might also be interesting comparators of how to strategize amongst peers.
One management researcher who has recently become a dean is recording his personal reflections about the role during his daily commute. Another professor who has stepped down from the business school deanship is interviewing other deans to compare competing business unit and parent institution identities and narratives and issues of inauthentic and deceitful behaviours. Research questions relating to hybridity might reflect on how hybrid intellectual leaders with commercial acumen emerge in a world of specialist scholars. Further data could be collected to show how practices especially in the roles of championing and implementing are developed. In terms of the contingency of centre-periphery relations, future research projects might consider changes in the roles of faculty deans, inequities in different internal university tax regimes, and how business school deans manage upwards in the context of internal consolidation and larger business units. Researchers might ask how central administrators view business school strategizing practices. Further research in knowledge intensive organisations could also consider issues of talent management and succession planning. In the context of a globally mobile academic labour market, how do organisational élites and the squeezed middle strategize while taking into account the sensitivities of professionalised labour? The Economist (2011) suggests that mid-ranking schools are experiencing difficulties in a recession and should use this as a stimulus for innovation to deliver better value for money. With respect to the contingency of executive tenure, what are the effects of senior middle managers’ transnational careers, what happens during transitions? Is the UK business school deanship more likely to develop into a mainly fundraising model as in top US business schools? What is the importance of the dean’s team over time? How do
perspectives change during the life course in relation to orientations to time (Tuttle, 1997) and the seasons during managerial tenures and seasons (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Gmelch et al, 2011)? How high stakes is a career move into the business school deanship? What do deputy deans do? As the business school industry model is being questioned, future research directions might consider the impact of consortia, joint ventures of business schools, publishers, management consultancies, technology firms, the effects of mergers (e.g. Aalto, Neoma, Skema business schools), changing educational models using mobile apps, online courses, the impact of recessions, cuts in government funding, and changing public policy, and perceptions on the role of the business school leader.

Furthermore, future research on business school leadership can investigate performance outcomes, handovers, and succession strategies, using quantitative or mixed methods research. In terms of different methodological approaches, future relevant research projects may include shadowing, filming leaders, leaders’ use of smartphones, hybrid or agoric leadership, and leadership teams.

Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) strategic middle management role typology provides a broad, decontextualised, and eclectic overview. This thesis compensates for these drawbacks by researching a specific category of hybrid upper middle manager in a single industry using contingency theory and a strategy-as-practice approach. Floyd and Wooldridge’s (ibid) model was developed from cross-sectional survey data from US private sector firms whereas this thesis analysed in-depth face-to-face, one-to-one interviews to produce vignettes over four years that incorporated strategists’ first-order views. The role typology...
framework is static and discounts specific details about the functional and hierarchical levels of middle managers. In contrast, this thesis provides a dynamic appreciation of changes over time, including a single institution over its history and business unit managers in professionalised, pluralistic units in the public sector in a single industry. Executive tenures and industry turbulence are considered in this thesis which adopts a richer, personalised approach to understanding middle management strategizing than Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) framework.

Much of the literature on archetypes in strategy has focused on organisational rather than practitioner archetypes, e.g. Miles and Snow (1978), Mintzberg (1983), Porter (1980), Weber (1946). There is considerable scope to expand on the work of Thomas and Angwin (2012) to explore different categories of strategy practitioner.

In terms of what research business schools engage with, Birkinshaw et al.’s (2014: 38) ‘recommendations include asking bigger, better, and more challenging questions compared to the orthodoxy in our management research and engaging in modes of research that are not only intellectually challenging but that also have the potential of making a real impact on management practice.’ These observations apply generally to management research but could equally be applied to research on business schools or upper middle managers.
Further research relevant to this thesis might test some of the hypotheses that this research implies within each of the five contingencies. Evidence from this study indicates the kinds of propositions listed in Table 29.

**Table 29: Future research avenues based on the five contingencies in this study**

1. **Seniority**

   The literature suggests that middle managers who are more senior have greater autonomy and strategic influence. It would be interesting to explore faculty deans who have responsibility for the business school and business school deans in institutions where they have cross university roles. It is possible that greater seniority and a much wider portfolio dilute the attention incumbents pay to the business school and distract them from detailed strategizing practices needed to ensure strategy implementation in the business school unit compared with settings where there is a dedicated dean of the business school. A larger role may be less satisfying because of the loss of control and the greater span of control. This would be consistent with a statement in the data that the ‘business school deanship is the best job in the university’ [Dean 12/17] and Garrett’s (Aedy, 2014) comment that vice-chancellors have less satisfying roles as they must focus on STEM subjects.

2. **Hybrid managers**

   From this study, role conflict and role strain appear less prevalent in lifelong hybrid and serial business school deans as they seem to have developed capabilities in synthesizing and facilitating multiple agendas in multi-unit, pluralised organisations and to remain relatively relaxed. Individuals new to the deanship inevitably tend to experience initial cognitive dissonance in grappling with espoused and actual mandates. How does hybridity emerge and change over time and how do upper middle managers ensure a balance between professional roles to ensure continuing legitimacy amongst multiple constituents without completing going over to the ‘administrative dark side’?

3. **Centre-periphery management**

   Previous studies indicate that the more robust and supportive the relationships between the SBU manager and their superior, the greater the middle manager’s autonomy to develop and implement strategy and to exhibit the behaviours of a Dynamo strategist archetype. Further research might illuminate how this is actually achieved in practice and in institutions ranked at different levels.

4. **Knowledge intensity**

   It might be assumed that the more knowledge intensive the business unit, the clearer the mandate for implementation. For instance, the business school dean in this setting becomes a research manager with a specific remit to enhance research
quality rather than an all round general manager with a very mixed portfolio. The more knowledge intensive the context, the more facilitating and synthesizing behaviours based on the strategists’ primary roles as researchers and educators are evidenced, however, championing and implementing behaviours need to be developed. There are risks of leading scholars as deans focusing on esoteric research and abstract strategizing without demonstrating real impact or a solid grasp of strategy execution.

5. Time: Executive tenure
Two terms of the deanship in one institution (of around six to eight years) appear to be optimal. An individual who has successfully completed one deanship is often seen as a more legitimate candidate for a new deanship appointment when competing against individuals who are new to the role. Longitudinal research designs could reveal more precisely the strategizing behaviours and competences of middle managers exiting prematurely compared with the behaviours of deans in long tenures using relevant life-course and succession literature.

Industry dynamics
Over time, the role of business school dean has become more professionalised. The pace of competition has intensified with greater research selectivity, national rankings, and global competition. This has driven the demand for more championing and implementing strategic behaviours as prospecting mechanisms for new students and recruiting and retaining high quality faculty become more sophisticated. Business schools need to justify their legitimacy and return on investment in a post crisis era and remain alert to the development of new strategies in the sector. Further research on mapping changing industry models to types of strategic practitioners would be interesting to link organisational and individual strategic archetypes.

The micro-foundations stream of strategy (e.g. Felin and Foss, 2005, 2006) offers another avenue for future research on middle managers. This explores individual (inter)actions that may explain outcomes at the more collective firm level. Middle managers’ activities could also be explored through the lens of behavioural strategy (Gavetti, 2005) with a social psychological perspective as a further balance to the traditional macro bias in strategic management research.
3. Recommendations

This thesis has attempted to address research gaps in terms of middle managers being undifferentiated horizontally and vertically in their roles within existing literature. It has sought to do this by highlighting specific practices of SBU mid-level managers through understanding micro-strategizing in a macro context by recognising prevailing contingent institutional and industry influences on behaviours. The study has followed Hambrick’s (1989) call to rehumanise strategic management research and responds to Paroutis and Heracleous’ (2013) novel work on strategists’ first-order views. By choosing a strategy-as-practice lens, this research project reveals insiders’ perspectives on connections between micro-meso-macro influences, i.e. practices, roles, and contingencies. The case studies of hybrid academic leaders take middle management literature outside the healthcare sector to add an emerging taxonomy of hybrid professionalised middle manager strategist archetypes based on deans in UK university-based business schools.

Bolman and Gallos (2011: xiv) suggest four frames to analyse the academic leader as: (i) analyst/architect; (ii) compassionate politician; (iii) servant, catalyst, coach; and (iv) prophet and architect. This model might be mapped onto Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) four strategic middle management roles respectively of synthesizing information, championing alternatives, facilitating adaptability, and implementing deliberate strategy. These are evidenced in the Deliberator, Debater, Dealmaker, and Doer archetypes identified in this thesis. Bolman and Gallos (2011) do not highlight the importance of selling or strategy execution in their model directly although these activities may be seen in the
politician and catalyst frames. A key argument in this thesis is that the primary professional behaviours of the middle managers studied are evident in the roles of synthesizing information as researchers and facilitating adaptability as educators, however, to emulate the Dynamo archetype, more activities in the roles of championing alternatives and implementing deliberate strategy are needed in future. In an age of anti-heroes, we should beware of mythologising strategists (Paroutis et al, 2013). We should also heed Parker’s (2014: 282) concerns about the sustainability of implementation strategies which focus on ‘journal article productivity, league table position and profitable products [being] defined as [the dean’s] only criteria for success’ (ibid: 282). He asks: ‘If it [the university] is entirely constituted and legitimated on the basis of narrow key performance indicators, of predictably obedient economic actors managed by someone who assumes absolute authority, then in what sense is it capable of providing the sort of autonomous reflection which justifies the idea of a university as a different space for thought?’ (ibid: 289). We recommend more supportive infrastructures for strategic leaders and a better understanding of realistic aspirations to allow business schools to be more innovative and gain greater legitimacy as thought leaders that make a difference. Chia (2014) articulates the unique competitive advantage and contributions that business schools can make to organisations and society: “to offer counterintuitive viewpoints that challenge the dominant orthodoxy...They must harbour a healthy disdain for the immediate concerns, preoccupations and priorities of the business world.” It is interesting that to date, only one leading business school dean has given a TEDx talk – Nohria (2011) from
Harvard. We argue that surely if we have ‘ideas worth spreading’, then we need more TEDx deans.

All three datasets in this study have produced interesting examples of academic leaders who have been in the deanship role three times and represent positive deviants. One of these individuals was interviewed at the end of a decade long tenure and almost two years into his subsequent deanship in Asia. Overall, deans in the first group interviewed indicated immediate and pressing concerns. These represented individuals whose deanships were well established beyond the first season (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Gmelch et al, 2011). They can be said to be in the latter half of the stages in Super’s (1980: 289) life career rainbow which ranges from growth, exploration, establishment, maintenance to decline. The second dataset allowed for insights into the life course of one business school and enabled comparisons over five decades between successors and changing orientations to concepts of time (Tuttle, 1997). The third diverse set of data yielded views from several veterans and newcomers and proportionally more women. Across all three groups, common themes about the balancing of multiple objectives were clear, with an appreciation of how tough it is in the first season of a dean’s tenure to establish priorities, juggle diaries, gain buy in, and to work effectively across boundaries to realise expectations within the business school (where there is often considerable paradigm commensurability across academic disciplines), in addition to managing laterally, upwards, and outwards.

As the business school industry has matured to focus on rankings and reputation and to operate as a cash cow for the parent institution, the dominant discourse is now of renaissance. There seemed to be a general consensus that the golden age
for western business schools is over. If Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) roles are loosely applied to strategic behaviours observed in the UK business school industry, it could be argued that the sector has evolved from synthesizing the US model of business and management education (Tiratsoo, 2004) to facilitating different variants such as less quantitative and more socially aware models in Europe (Antunes and Thomas, 2007). The business school sector has shown evidence of championing activities in strong branding and in implementing deliberate strategy to demonstrate clear returns on investment and impact. More and more business schools have been defending themselves against accusations of irrelevance, obsolescence (The Economist, 2014) and even suggestions that business schools are damaging organisations (Ghoshal, 2005; Podolny, 2009). Yet the US model is being eroded, for example European and Asian business schools are overtaking US schools in the FT global MBA rankings (Collet and Vives, 2013). Thomas et al (2014), amongst others, have suggested various enlightening and gloomy scenarios. With tenures shortening (Bradshaw, 2013b), dramatic exits, and deanships taking a long time to recruit (Allen, 2014), the prospects for the university-based business school deanship in non-élite institutions are uncertain.

Jim March provides both optimistic and realistic viewpoints. He believes that the university administrator’s role is to balance exploitation and exploration: ‘[i]n a world in which most of the pressure is for efficiency and rationality, an administrator has to help sustain experimentation. In a world of craziness, an administrator has to sustain order’ (Augier, 2004: 176). The most optimistic scenarios for business schools are for them to reinvent themselves, remain vital, and socially relevant and collaborative. This is perhaps feasible for the élite (The
Economist, 2014), and the oligarchs (Boxall, 2013) but for the squeezed middle and lower ranked institutions there is potential for shakeouts. Consequently, the deanship could merely represent a well-educated ‘precariat’ if ‘[b]usiness schools are better at analysing disruptive innovation than at dealing with it’ (Schumpeter, 2014: 63) or disrupting themselves (GMAC, 2013).

Generally, the interviews in this study with 24 deans in the 21st century show an appreciation of what it is to strategize as a middle manager in much greater depth than Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1996) survey of 259 managers in 25 organisations during the 1990s. Conceptually, the strategy-as-practice lens applied in this thesis helps enrich middle management role typology close-up in different settings. It links mid-level managers’ micro-practices to the context of macro changes with the benefits of zooming in and out. The themes of middleness and hybridity are clearly conveyed in pluralistic units within multi-divisional and professionalised, non-private sector organisations over time. Moreover, the application of a role typology in a single industry suggests the possibility of developing typologies of strategists in other strategic business units at different levels.

Overall, the analysis in this thesis has confirmed the importance of boundary spanning (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992), a supportive centre, the need for role clarity and autonomy, themes found in existing strategy literature on middle managers. Since the 2002 articles by Gallos and Bedeian on the business school ‘dean’s squeeze’ and the ‘dean’s disease’ respectively, a whole host of new strategic issues over the past decade for business schools have emerged: social media, global competition, Asia rising, established media rankings and accreditation games, inter-disciplinarity, social challenges, the tyranny of top tier
The talent war for faculty and students has intensified. Consequently, a cadre of transnational business school deans is emerging, particularly in Asia from the west which raises a question about their roles as vectors of isomorphism (Allen et al, 2014). This thesis has also highlighted future research avenues such as an examination of serial deans and transnationals as interesting phenomena in terms of the metabilities of individuals who successfully sustain multiple deanships in different cultures. The study has emphasized a pluralistic and hybrid middle management role that spans multiple professions and organisational layers. Research on serial transnational deans would add further conceptual complexity.

In terms of practical recommendations, on the basis of the findings in this study business school deans might be advised to:

1. Question the espoused, going in mandate carefully and create the right conditions to accept the appointment so that the unit’s strategy is aligned with the central corporate strategy and goes with the grain of the dean’s profile.
2. Build a complementary team and positive relationships with the centre.
3. Allow time for reflection, reframing, and revitalisation.
4. Educate superiors and communicate with them regularly about expectations.
5. Delegate, build teams, and chair committees effectively to make clear, well-supported decisions.
6. Establish clear performance management systems that respect professional behaviours, work with the grain of the culture.
7. Establish clear values, moral behaviours, and a shared sense of purpose.
8. Following extensive consultation, formulate and sell a distinctive narrative of the strategic vision that includes a clear identity and intellectual leadership.
9. Develop a strategy for personal time, wellbeing, and energy management and balance attention to internal and external demands, networking and boundary spanning over the tenure.
10. Use positive language and see the dean as the chief sales person.
11. Accept the loss of time for personal scholarship, consider co-authorship, doctoral supervision.
12. Develop self-belief, self-confidence, listening, patience, and opportunities for strategic renewal.
13. Allow time for chat, environmental scanning, play, experimentation, and innovation.
14. Nurture, support, motivate, empower and mobilise others.
15. Seek opportunities to be coached and gain useful feedback.
16. Manage the deanship as a project and plan your exit.

What a new dean does clearly depends on circumstances. Questioning the going in mandate, auditing how the business school really is performing, clarifying the actual remit, building constructive relationships and clear expectations with the university centre, building a coalition internally, understanding the industry landscape and the institution’s and unit’s position within it are important activities. New deans need to consider how to develop dynamic practices in Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) four strategic middle management roles and consider their changing priorities and orientations over time. Issues about support for a new business school dean, their socialisation and understanding of performance management metrics and how these might be accomplished need clarification. This study suggests that business school deans should preferably report directly to the vice-chancellor. They need to establish clear routines, their degrees of freedom in managing an important strategic business unit and what help they will gain internally. Clear goals and performance management that respects professional autonomy, and identifying distinctive unit and corporate strategies are useful ingredients in the strategic mix. Within the championing role, upbeat positive internal and external communications and relations matter. In the synthesizing role, practices that synthesize and formulate strategic decisions as if
the deanship were a research project are helpful. The business school dean’s job can be very lonely and so being coached and mentored and facilitating change through social learning, nurturing others, practices that encourage interacting and experimenting are important to support new ideas to ensure commitment to implementation and to overcome inertia or a one-size-fits-all approach by the centre.

In terms of the strategizing practices identified in this project, it is recommended that business school deans facilitate adaptability by mediating with different stakeholders and through the allocation of resources to allow for innovation. As synthesizers, they need to combine information from different sources to inform decision making. In the championing role, business school deans must provide coherent narratives to convince others and sell their business unit. Ultimately, leadership is about change which requires not only imagination and innovation but control and discipline to produce results.

This thesis has provided rich empirical data to explore the strategizing practices of hybrid professionals using a typology of middle manager strategic roles to generate a typology of strategists based on contingent influences. The research gaps discussed in the first half of this thesis about middle managers being depersonalised and undifferentiated in existing literature are addressed in this study which contextualises specific categories of upper middle managers in knowledge intensive business units. The cases of particular hybrids in a professional bureaucracy moving towards a market logic provide a unique
understanding of strategizing practices. The exemplars refine the Floyd and Wooldridge (ibid) strategic middle management typology in greater depth, exposing differences between activities in the roles. Outlier archetypes of the Dynamo and Drifter are suggested for the results that do not map easily on to each of the four Floyd and Wooldridge (ibid) roles. The strategy-as-practice lens, together with a contingency perspective, expands the typology of middle managers’ involvement in strategic change to enable micro-strategizing and macro-level insights. Five features of context in relation to: (1) seniority; (2) hybrid upper middle managers; (3) strategic business unit managers and centre-periphery relations; (4) knowledge intensity and (5) temporal changes over individual tenures and industry dynamics allow for a more nuanced understanding of what it is to be a ‘strategist’ amongst academic peers. The evidence indicates predilections for roles developed in the primary profession of academic scholar and educator. They show the necessity in a changing industry landscape for middle managers to demonstrate championing alternatives and activities involved in executing strategy. These behaviours are needed for more self-promotion, legitimising, and explicit communication of innovation and impact. This represents a shift from the retired middle managers in the study (with the exception of George Bain) who tended to focus mainly on supportive and cognitive approaches to strategy.

The tough activities of demonstrating a real difference and communicating this powerfully are vital for future prototypes of business school deans. They have to balance the UK government’s policy of students at the heart of the system (BIS,
2011a) and greater research selectivity with the powerful influences of publishers’ journals and rankings, as well as accreditation agencies’ criteria and more tangible concerns about teaching quality, employability, and the bottom line. Assertions about the failed professionalisation of management project (Khurana, 2007) and the need for business schools to reform themselves radically (Thomas et al, 2014) are investigated here from the perspective of the business school dean. Khurana (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2009) argued that where ‘business schools went wrong was starting to see themselves as business and not enough as education.’ There are inevitably implications for the strategy work that deans practise, their legitimacy, and how the business school deanship might be remodelled.

The 24 case studies in this thesis illustrate in various contexts that with sufficient boundary spanning and autonomy and working strategically with academic peers and administrators, the hybrid upper middle manager can synthesize meaningfully to articulate clear strategic choices, sell these to their key stakeholders, and facilitate changes that are implemented. Where managers lack boundary spanning capabilities to work across professions, fail to develop robust centre-periphery relations and / or are unable to reconcile role strain or to meet ambitious expectations with realistic proposals and actions, then strategic drift often ensues. These mid-level executives do not work in isolation. Whether their experiences are exhilarating and impactful or lacklustre and fragmented resulting in them being stood down abruptly (Bradshaw, 2013b) depend on how they frame prevailing contingencies to formulate and implement appropriate strategies. Differences are found in the case studies in terms of individual and industry lifecycles, how the
deans navigate compliance with regulations and facilitate innovation, aligning
business and corporate level strategies while coping with the intellectual, physical,
and emotional challenges of the demanding position personally over time.

If we assume sufficient self-determination and no radical game changing
exogenous shocks, it is hoped that the future sustainability of business schools is
mainly within the remit of academic leaders, especially business school deans.
National governments rely on human and social capital with capacity for
innovation and knowledge generation to produce research and innovation for
growth (BIS, 2011b). As business schools are so popular with students, they have
the potential to be anchors of the economy and engines for recovery (Wilson,
2012) if they remain relevant and fit for purpose. Wilson and McKiernan (2011)
contend that deans must overcome ‘global mimicry’ if they are to resist
institutional pressures to conform. Business schools must leverage theoretical
knowledge to address pressing social and economic challenges through
interdisciplinary collaboration in addition to fundamental research. The future
developments of government and accrediting body policies and rankings criteria
can only progress through the courage of deans to challenge existing models and
to shape the business school industry so that it is fit for purpose, avoiding
obsolescence (The Economist, 2014).

Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1996) questionnaire is a useful diagnostic for middle
managers to reflect on their strategic roles but it is not a prescriptive tool for
change. The P-R-A-C model in Figure 18 integrates Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992,
role typology into a wider contingency framework and more focused micro-strategizing perspective. By recognising the types of strategists that exist in the business school industry, the case studies in this research enable deans to see where they may have developed blind spots and how attention to different strategizing practices over their tenures or amongst their leadership teams may be adjusted to fit the situations that confront them. Empowering business school deans to be influential strategic actors and to learn, conceptualise, and realise new forms of academic leadership in a dual world of experts and hybrids is a major opportunity. The central argument of this thesis is that strategizing practices are context dependant and that in some cases deans have moved too far from championing and implementing strategy. Some have focused instead on facilitating adaptability to what has been imposed on business schools and what they have synthesized from the current ‘faculty-dominated not-for-profit model’ (Schumpeter, 2014: 63). Now deans must effectively articulate the utility of their offering which needs to be repackaged to produce more demonstrable value for policy and practice to engage the public and key stakeholders in more compelling ways.

While Carter (2013: 1052) praises the strategy-as-practice field of research as ‘the first serious institutionalisation of a qualitative and sociological approach to strategy’, he acknowledges criticisms ‘that suggest it is managerialist, conservative in its understanding of strategy and often overly eclectic in its understanding of practice.’ This thesis has sought to understand issues about the purpose of business schools in society beyond their organisational value. It has reflected on the need to reform existing models to overcome inertia and to shape the dean’s
role. In contrast with studies on diverse types of undifferentiated middle managers, this research project concentrates on hybrid upper middle managers in professionalised, public sector business units. It specifies distinct archetypes of strategist derived from data provided by individual strategy practitioners to enhance academic leadership.

4. Summary and conclusion

In sum, the contribution of this study has firstly been to present rich and close-up empirical data to evidence assertions about strategizing practices within a role typology that has been applied to hybrid upper middle managers in professionalised business units. This has expanded our understanding of (i) contingencies and (ii) a typology of strategist archetypes. The research project does this by examining the practices of middle managers within the context of complex, public sector, knowledge-intensive business units. Detailed research on business unit managers’ practices and contingencies has been neglected by strategic management scholars (e.g. Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Govindarajan, 1988; Hambrick, 1989). The case studies here unpack behaviours from insiders who understand the language of management research and strategic management.

Secondly, this thesis has extended Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) framework for strategic middle management roles. It usefully combines the typology with strategy-as-practice perspectives and contingency theory to produce a typology of hybrid upper middle manager strategist archetypes within a professionalised context.
Thirdly, as a contribution to business school leadership literature, this study reflects on enablers and constraints in higher education that influence the behaviours of various types of strategic practitioner, thereby linking micro, meso, and macro levels.

Fourthly, the thesis provides first-order strategists’ viewpoints gathered by a semi-insider researcher hybrid manager-scholar.

The commentary provided here is relevant for allowing (prospective) deans and those hiring deans to realise that their struggles are not atypical. It is hoped that from the archetypes developed, current and future incumbents to this challenging middle position will understand more fully the potential pitfalls and the need to retain ‘wiggle room’ (Gallos, 2002: 179) in what for some hybrid upper middle managers can be a vice. On a positive note, consistent with Floyd and Wooldridge (1992), the individual cases in this thesis that were perceived as successful demonstrate how the centrality of an upper level middle management role can enable strategic choices to be executed to make a tangible difference.

As President J.F. Kennedy argued, ‘Leadership and learning are indispensable to each other.’ If deans are to remain effective middle manager dynamos and not dinosaurs (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1994), they must apply this maxim to their own roles. They represent the social learning business of continuous discovery and change (Kerr, 2001) that universities embody.
A typology of middle management strategic roles has been shown to be an interesting framework to combine with a strategy-as-practice lens and contingency theory. The study exemplifies strategizing behaviours of hybrid middle-level managers in a professionalised organisation. By contextualising specific types of strategist, this thesis acknowledges Currie’s (1999b) concerns that Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992, 1994, 1996) middle management typology is broad, insensitive to differentiation or the degree of autonomy in various circumstances that middle managers enjoy. Nevertheless, the model allows for an appreciation of everyday realities within the practices-roles-archetypes-contingencies (P-R-A-C) model developed in Figure 18. Ireland et al (1987) found that managers’ formulation of strategy depends on perceptions of their organisation’s strengths, weaknesses, and uncertainty. Strategist archetypes developed in this study shows how different institutional and historical contexts influence not just a generic middle management role but that of a divisional manager in a precise setting. The middle management strategic roles typology offers conceptual and practical insights into behaviours within UK business schools as the industry sector and business school deanship have developed. It provides a basis for further discussion of strategist archetypes in the business school community (e.g. Davies, 2014b).

In conclusion, this thesis is located within business and management literature on the need for ‘rethinking’ (Datar et al, 2010), re-imagining (Patriotta and Starkey, 2008), and re-inventing (Grey, 2004; Thomas and Cornuel, 2012a) business schools and their offerings. It expands these debates from the viewpoint of strategic leadership. The Academy of Management Learning & Education journal published two articles on the business school deanship from insider perspectives in its...
inaugural volume in 2002 (Bedeian; Gallos) and so updated perspectives provided here are timely in a digital age and the aftermath of the most recent financial crisis. Future research should continue to explore the relationships between micro-strategies, mid-level institutional positions, and wider macro influences as the higher education industry landscape changes. A quantitative or longitudinal research design or more ethnographic close-up studies could prove helpful in refining the archetypes and our curiosity about strategizing practices and contingencies in such hybrid and complex upper middle management roles. An annual ABS leadership survey was developed in 2013 to provide trend data about the business school deanship internationally.

5. Conclusions

Finally, I return to T.S. Eliot’s (1934a: 15-16) images on page viii of ‘the still point’ and ‘the dance’, of simultaneous stillness and motion in time. Like a whirling dervish or a pirouetting ballerina, the university-based business school dean in the role of senior hybrid upper middle manager must synthesize and aim for a ‘still point’, a strategic direction and sense of purpose, adopting the reflective focus of the university scholar. At the same time, they must engage with the hurly burly of the commercial ‘dance’, strategy as hustle (Bhide, 1986). They move through various archetypal practices within the roles of synthesizing, facilitating, championing, and implementing strategy. Ths may happen simultaneously in the same way as Schön (1986) recognised that practitioners ‘reflect in action.’ It is hoped that future cadres of hybrid upper middle managers are suitably supported to deal with uncertain contingencies and that they are sufficiently self-aware of
their own archetypal behaviours to enable them to demonstrate the legitimacy of significant strategic business units such as university business schools.
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schools that aren’t quite elite?’ London: The Economist, 15 October.
Bingley: Emerald.


## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Floyd and Wooldridge’s questionnaire

*(1996: 149–151)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. SYNTHESIZING INFORMATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1</strong> Monitor and assess the impact of changes in the organization’s external environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.2</strong> Integrate information from a variety of sources to communicate its strategic significance.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>1.3</strong> Assess and communicate the business-level implications of new information to higher-level managers.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1.4</strong> Proactively seek information about your business from customers, suppliers, competitors, business publications, and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.5</strong> Monitor and communicate to higher-level managers the activities of competitors, suppliers, and other outside organisations.</td>
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<tr>
<th>2. CHAMPIONING ALTERNATIVES</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.1</strong> Evaluate the merits of new proposals.</td>
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<td><strong>2.2</strong> Search for new opportunities and bring them to the attention of higher-level managers.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.3</strong> Define and justify the role of new programs or processes to upper-level managers.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.4</strong> Justify to higher-level managers programs that have already been established.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.5</strong> Propose new programs or projects to higher-level managers.</td>
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<tr>
<th>3. FACILITATING ADAPTABILITY</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3.1</strong> Evaluate the merits of proposals generated in my unit, encouraging some, discouraging others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.2</strong> Provide a safe haven for experimental programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.3</strong> Encourage multidisciplinary problem-solving teams.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>3.4</strong> Provide resources and develop objectives/strategies for unofficial projects.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3.5</strong> Relax regulations and procedures in order to get new projects started.</td>
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</table>
4. IMPLEMENTING DELIBERATE STRATEGY

4.1 Implement action plans designed to meet top management objectives.
4.2 Translate organizational goals into objectives for individuals.
4.3 Communicate and sell top management initiatives to subordinates.
4.4 Translate organizational goals into departmental action plans.
4.5 Monitor activities within your unit to ensure that they support top management objectives.
Appendix 2: Articles on business schools

To indicate preoccupations facing business school deans over time, relevant topics published in eight academic journals are highlighted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Academy of Management Journal</strong> (established in 1963)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business school curriculum, graduate school students, MBA rankings, research, CSR.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Academy of Management Learning &amp; Education</strong> (est. 2002)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Curriculum: history, global perspectives, critical management, culture, design thinking, web-based learning, the MBA. The business school model, comparisons with a professional services firm, within a university, alertness, how in touch with reality. Students – cheating, economic value of research, ROI MBA, diversity, inclusion. Business school failures. Arbaugh (2010: 280) suggests that “business school envy” rather than perceptions of inferiority may more accurately describe our position in the academy.’ Rankings, accreditations, deans (Bedeian, 2002; Gallos, 2002).</td>
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<th><strong>British Journal of Management</strong> (est. 1990)</th>
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<td>Huff and Huff (2001: 53) argue for Mode 3 research, i.e. an ‘appreciation and critique of the human condition, as it has been, is, and might become...to ensure survival and promote the common good.’ In 2004, Stiles compared the values of management academics in the UK and Canada and noted what little influence they have on business school strategies. In a special issue following the 2008 global financial crisis, the editors (Currie et al, 2010: 1), using critical in a wider sense than Ford et al (2010, 2012 or Antonacopoulou, 2010) argue that ‘it is beholden on us to reflect more deeply and critically on the purpose and content of business school education.’ Tourish et al (2010: 40) ‘encourage business school educators in leadership to adopt approaches which are more critical, relational and reflexive.’ In the BAM 25th anniversary issue of <em>BJM</em>, Durand and Dameron (2011: 563) repeat that ‘[b]usiness schools have lost their way.’ They argue that ‘something needs to be done about it. Interestingly enough, many retiring business school deans who deliver their last speech as they leave tend to say something of that sort. Yet, their successor immediately keeps going as before. There seems to be a lock-in situation, rooted in the ranking system.’ Masrani et al (2011) analyse how the British Academy of Management (BAM) and the Association of Business Schools (ABS) helped to gain legitimacy for management education in the UK; Ricart (2011) notes the successes of European business schools, and Engwall and Danell (2011: 434) devise a typology of British business schools based on their entry to the sector and orientation: (i) early institutions (Front-runners);</td>
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</table>
(ii) schools emerging from engineering (Engineers); (iii) schools on the recommendation of the Franks Report (Frankies); (iv) schools in universities chartered in the 1960s (Followers); (v) schools in the very old universities (Latecomers), for example respectively Ashridge, Imperial College, Manchester, Warwick, Cambridge Judge. Finally, Wilson and McKiernan (2011) warn that university-based business schools must retain a degree of autonomy to enable strategic choice in the context of isomorphic forces.

**Harvard Business Review** (est. 1922)

*Harvard Business Review* rarely prints articles with ‘business school’ in the title. In 1927, Gay described the founding of Harvard Business School. The other three articles in *HBR*’s history are negatively titled: Behrman and Levin (1984) asked whether business schools were ‘doing their job’ and Bennis and O’Toole (2005) in a well cited article argued that business schools had lost their way in pursuing a publications route. Most vociferously following the 2008 global financial crisis, Podolny (2009), the former dean of Yale School of Management and then Apple University, argued that business schools were to blame for the financial crisis. A series of viewpoints were published in June 2009 about whether they were indeed culpable. *Harvard Business Review* has also produced four articles on the MBA. For example, positive pieces by De Pasquale and Lange (1971) and Steele and Ward (1974) were written on job mobility and two more critical viewpoints were generated by Jenkins et al (1984) and by Lataif (1992), a former dean at Boston University, who questioned whether the traditional model of the MBA was doomed.

**Journal of Business Ethics** (est. 1982)

Mitroff (2004) claimed business school faculty are trapped in a fixation with A-rated journals: ‘I am writing to you because of the appalling and the sorry state of business schools. I am outraged over what we as business educators have allowed to develop’ (ibid: 185). Teaching ethics, corporate identity, CSR; students cheating; preparing women to be global managers; ethical codes and reflection; practical wisdom; moral development, rigour and relevance are other topics discussed.

**Journal of Management Studies** (est. 1964)


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<tr>
<th>Journal of Management Development (est. 1982)</th>
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<tr>
<td>The future of business schools and research, rankings, accreditations, strategy and the environment, curriculum challenges, the sustainability of the business school model, technology. Regular special issues.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Management Decision (est. 1967)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Research, missions, positioning, legitimacy, paradigms of business schools. Ethics, links to practice, two articles on business school deans (including an interview with Laura Tyson, former dean of London Business School).</td>
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### Appendix 3: Dates when key UK business schools were established

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### Appendix 4: Historical developments before and during WBS's evolution

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUSINESS SCHOOL</th>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Wharton School, Pennsylvania, founded</th>
<th>Harvard Business School founded</th>
<th>AACSB established</th>
<th>Academy of Management formed</th>
<th>Ford and Carnegie foundation reports</th>
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<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
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<td>1881</td>
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<tr>
<th>UK BUSINESS SCHOOL</th>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FME established</th>
<th>Crick Report</th>
<th>London Business School; Lancaster University Management School founded</th>
<th>AMBA established</th>
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<tr>
<td>WARWICK UNIVERSITY</td>
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<td>Foundation of Warwick University. VC Jack Butterworth 1965–1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK GOVERNMENT POLICY</td>
<td>Prime Minister Harold Macmillan</td>
<td>Education Act 1962. LEAs paid student grants.</td>
<td>Robbins and Franks Reports. Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Hume</td>
<td>Prime Minister Harold Wilson</td>
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<td>Edward Heath</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>James Callaghan</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Margaret Thatcher's spending cuts</td>
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<td>Industry</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>Cleaver Report, CEML.</td>
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<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>FT Global MBA rankings started</td>
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<td>FT Global MBA rankings started</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick University</td>
<td>Chair of ABS: Chris Greensted, Strathclyde</td>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>Bain Commission Management Research in the UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick University</td>
<td>Chair of ABS: Andrew Lock, Leeds University</td>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>Chair of ABS: Stephen Watson, Henley</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick University</td>
<td>Chair of ABS: Sue Cox, Lancaster</td>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>AIM founded.</td>
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</tbody>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warwick Business School</td>
<td>Very good RAE result</td>
<td>Dean Robert Galliers 1994–1998</td>
<td>Poor RAE result</td>
<td>First school in the world to gain triple accreditation AACSB, AMBA, EQUIS</td>
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<td>Warwick Business School</td>
<td>Expansion executive education</td>
<td>Five-year strategic planning</td>
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<td>Warwick Business School</td>
<td>Warwick University Expansion</td>
<td>Warwick University Expansion</td>
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<tr>
<th>Government Policy</th>
<th>Higher Education Act, binary line removal</th>
<th>Prime Minister Tony Blair. Dearing Report: Fee UG tuition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lambert Review of Business-University</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABS Chair:</td>
<td>Arthur Francis,</td>
<td>Warwick in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>proposal rejected</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMAF launched. ABS</td>
<td>Howard Thomas, WBS.</td>
<td>VC Nigel Thrift, Vision 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chair of ABS:</td>
<td>Michael Osbaldeston, Cranfield</td>
<td>RAE ranked 7th in UK multi-faculty universities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chair of ABS:</td>
<td>Huw Morris, Manchester Met</td>
<td>Dean Mark Taylor. No 1 UG provider UK Times Guide.</td>
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<td>BAM 25th anniversa ry. AIM</td>
<td>finished</td>
<td>Behavioural Science Group</td>
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<td>FME closed</td>
<td>Partnerships Monash, Queen Mary UoL, Center for Urban Science &amp; Progress, M5 Group</td>
<td>Business collaboration with the Royal Shakespeare Company launched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London campus</td>
<td>Vision 2015 to be in world's top 50</td>
<td>First MOOC</td>
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</table>

**Government Policy**

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
Appendix 5: UK business school rankings

Table 1: UK business school rankings for undergraduate business studies programmes (Wilkins and Huisman, 2012: 372)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<td>Warwick</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>=4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>=4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>=59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
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<td>City</td>
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§ UGC Report in *AMBA Guide to Business Schools*; remaining columns: *The Times Good University Guide*

Table 2: UK business school rankings for teaching/MBA programmes (Wilkins and Huisman, 2012: 374)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>2001</th>
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<td>Bath</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>Bradford</td>
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<td>=85</td>
<td>=89</td>
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<td>City</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>=89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loughborough</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Business School</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>London Business School</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

§ *AMBA Guide to Business Schools*; remaining columns: *The Financial Times*
Table 3: UK business school rankings for research in business and management studies. The RAE rankings are based on *Times Higher Education*. Rankings are based on averages of the quality profile scores. (Wilkins and Huisman, 2012: 376).

The RAE rankings are based on *Times Higher Education*. Rankings are based on averages of the quality profile scores. (Wilkins and Huisman, 2012: 376).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984 (Ranking)</th>
<th>1992 (RAE)</th>
<th>2001 (RAE)</th>
<th>2008 (RAE)</th>
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<td>London Business School</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>=11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>=9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>=9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>=5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>=16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cranfield</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial College London</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strathclyde</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>=11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

§ AMBA Guide to Business Schools
Appendix 6: Interviews completed

n = 52

* denotes two individuals in two phases. Current institutions at time of interview are listed.

12 PILOT INTERVIEWS 2008 – current and previous deanships
1. Paul Croney, Newcastle Business School
2. David Hamblin, Lancashire Business School, previously Bedfordshire
3. Charles Harvey, Strathclyde Business School, previously UWE, Strathclyde
4. Bob McNabb, Cardiff Business School
5. Jonathan Michie, Birmingham University Business School
6. Huw Morris, Manchester Metropolitan University Business School
7. Bob O'Keefe, School of Management, University of Surrey
8. Michael Osbaldeston, Cranfield School of Management, previously Ashridge
9. Mark Patton, Harrow Business School
10. *Andrew Pettigrew, University of Bath Management School
11. Ann Ridley, Portsmouth Business School
12. *Howard Thomas, Warwick Business School, previously University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

21 INTERVIEWS WITH 7 DEANS OF WARWICK BUSINESS SCHOOL 2009–2012
At least three interviews with each respondent including YouTube interviews on the ABS Channel: http://www.youtube.com/user/TheABSUK
13. Robert Dyson
14. George Bain
15. Robin Wensley
16. Robert Galliers
17. *Howard Thomas
18. David Wilson
19. Mark Taylor

SIX NON-WBS YOUTUBE INTERVIEWS
20. Ruth Ashford, Manchester Metropolitan University Business School
21. Sue Cox, Lancaster University Management School
22. Sandra Dawson, formerly Cambridge Judge Business School
23. Jane Houzer, Southbank University Business School
24. Kai Peters, Ashridge Business School, formerly Rotterdam
25. Stephen Watson, formerly Cambridge, Lancaster and Henley

29 INTERVIEWS WITH COLLEAGUES OF WARWICK BUSINESS SCHOOL DEANS
26. Suzanne Alexander, Leicester University
27. Jon Baldwin, Registrar, Warwick University
28. Anonymous
29. Bob Burgess, Vice-Chancellor, Leicester University
30. Gibson Burrell, School of Management, University of Leicester
31. Simon Collinson, WBS, later Dean at Birmingham Business School
32. Francesca Coles, WBS
33. Ian Davidson, University of Sussex
34. Linda Donovan, WBS
35. Paul Edwards, WBS
36. Ewan Ferlie, King’s College London
37. Joy Findlay, WBS
38. Jenny Hocking, WBS
39. Keith Hoskin, WBS
40. Bob Johnston, WBS
41. Karen Legge, WBS
42. John McGee, WBS
43. Peter McKiernan, University of St Andrews School of Management
44. Glenn Morgan, Cardiff Business School
45. Bob McNabb, Cardiff Business School
46. Claire New, WBS
47. *Andrew Pettigrew, Saïd Business School, Oxford
48. Philip Powell, Birkbeck
49. Maxine Robertson, Queen Mary University of London
50. Lucio Sarno, Cass Business School
51. John Saunders, Aston Business School
52. Mike Shattock, former Registrar, Warwick University
53. Mike Terry, WBS
54. Nigel Thrift, Vice-Chancellor, Warwick University
Appendix 7: Questions, phase one

1. Personal Profile and Motivations

1. What motivated you to become a dean?
2. What made you appointable?
3. What key skills does the role require?
4. Why did you choose this business school?
5. Do you consider your profile fits a particular type of business school?
6. What prepared you for the role?
7. Do you have an MBA? Have you studied in a business school?
8. Career history? Previous experience working in a business school?
9. Is it a fixed-term contract, and if so for how long?
10. What changes did you make personally when moving into the deanship?
11. How have you changed over time in the role?
12. How has the role impacted on your free time and family life?
13. How do you personally develop in the role?
14. How has the role changed?
15. How visible have you been in the media?
16. What are your future plans?
17. How do you see your exit?
18. Are you developing an internal successor?
19. Would you consider a deanship overseas?
20. Do you plan to be a PVC, vice-chancellor?

2. Self-Management

21. What do you do when you feel overloaded?
22. How do you energise yourself?
23. How has the deanship impacted on your personal scholarship?
24. How do you manage your time?
25. How do you switch off?
26. When do you reflect?
27. What do you enjoy in the role?
28. What have you learned?
29. Do you have a coach, mentor, role model?
30. How do you deal with setbacks?
31. How do you develop your network?
32. What critical incidents have you experienced?
33. What is your personal mantra that keeps you going?

3. Activities

34. What were your experiences at the start of your deanship?
35. How has what you do changed over time?
36. What committees do you chair and attend?
37. What management tools have you used in your role?
38. How has your management of your diary changed over time?
39. What do you find frustrating?
40. What is your relationship with the vice-chancellor and other senior staff?
41. What experiences do you have working outside academia?

4. Internal Arrangements

42. Who were your predecessors? Why did they leave?
43. Were you an internal appointment?
44. Did you consider other deanships?
45. Do you have a deputy?
46. Who is in your senior management team?
47. How do their skills complement yours?
48. How do you delegate?
49. How do you balance your team?
50. Who covers when you are on annual leave?
51. Is the business school a faculty in itself? Who do you report to?
52. What is the relative size of the business school within the university?
53. Does the business school include economics?
54. Do you have cross-university roles?
5. Strategic Management Issues

55. What was your initial mandate and how has this changed?
56. How did you plan strategy over your tenure?
57. How do you position the business school?
58. What are your priorities in the role?
59. What are the key challenges?

6. Personal Views

60. What are your views on your business school's financial and other contributions to the rest of the university?
61. Do you think business school deans should be academics?
62. What do you see as the future challenges in business and management education?
63. What advice would you give to those recruiting a successor?
64. What advice would you give to someone considering applying for a business school deanship?
65. How do you see the business school deanship evolving?
Appendix 8: Questions, secondary interviews on WBS deans

1. When were you at Warwick?
2. What was your role(s)?
3. Which dean(s) did you work with?
4. How did they compare in terms of their priorities and impact?
5. What were the high points?
6. What were the low points?
7. Any other memorable incidents?
8. How did you work with the dean(s)?
9. What were the relationships with the central university?
10. How would you characterise relations with other university departments, particularly the Warwick Manufacturing Group, the Department of Economics, the Medical School?
11. How much clout do you think the business school had?
12. Who were the key players in the business school?
13. What were the main challenges?
14. What were the key achievements?
15. What was happening in other business schools at the time?
16. Why do you think the deans operated in different ways?
17. How did they differ in terms of the pace of their deanships, approaches to the RAE/REF, fundraising, being hands on, their legacies?
18. What was the governance in the business school?
19. What was the relationship between the administrators and faculty?
20. What were your experiences of away days?
21. How have Warwick Business School and its deans changed over time?
22. If appropriate: Why did you leave WBS?
23. For respondents who became deans themselves: What did you learn about the role of dean from your time at WBS?
24. How did WBS deans compare with other deans you have worked with?
25. What elements of the entrepreneurial university did you see at WBS?
26. What strategic position do you think the business school is in now compared with its competitors?
27. Do you have any other interesting stories about the business school and its deans?
Appendix 9: Core questions in filmed interviews for datasets two and three

1. Why did you first become a business school dean?
2. How did you formulate and implement strategy?
3. How did you manage meetings?
4. What are your views on relations with the central university?
5. What were the critical incidents and key challenges?
Appendix 10: Demographics of deans in each dataset

The following tables provide background information on the deans interviewed in terms of their mandates for the roles where they were current or last dean, the institutional mission, their number of deanships and when they became dean. It also includes their academic discipline and role before the deanship and after.

### Group One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dean</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Institution’s Mission</th>
<th>No of Deanships</th>
<th>Stage in Tenure</th>
<th>Career Stage</th>
<th>Academic Discipline</th>
<th>Previous Role(s)</th>
<th>Subsequent Role(s)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Paul Croney (Newcastle Business School)</td>
<td>Profitability, new building</td>
<td>Business engagement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>Human resources No PhD</td>
<td>Associate dean</td>
<td>PVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>David Hamblin (Lancashire Business School)</td>
<td>Deficit recovery</td>
<td>Teaching focus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>Late</td>
<td>Operations No PhD</td>
<td>Dean</td>
<td>PVC</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Charles Harvey (Strathclyde Business School)</td>
<td>Arrest recruitment decline, research, accreditations</td>
<td>Research excellence, triple accreditation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>End</td>
<td>Late</td>
<td>Business history</td>
<td>Dean</td>
<td>PVC</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Robert McNabb (Cardiff Business School)</td>
<td>Research rankings</td>
<td>Research intensive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>Pre-retirement</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Associate dean</td>
<td>Retired</td>
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<td>Jonathan Michie (Birmingham Business)</td>
<td>Research quality</td>
<td>Research intensive</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Early 50s</td>
<td>Economics</td>
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<td>President Oxford college</td>
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<td>School</td>
<td>Problem/Focus</td>
<td>Timeframe</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Huw Morris (Manchester Metropolitan)</td>
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<td>Dean</td>
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<td>Links with professional bodies</td>
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<td>PVC, acting DVC, civil servant</td>
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<td>Bob O’Keefe (Surrey University Business School)</td>
<td>Form a single school</td>
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<td>Vice-principal, faculty dean</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Michael Osbaldeston (Cranfield School of Management)</td>
<td>FT rankings</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>End</td>
<td>Pre-retirement</td>
<td>Human resources</td>
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<td>Retired, accreditation director</td>
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<td>Mark Patton (Harrow Business School, University of Westminster)</td>
<td>Quality recruitment, surplus</td>
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<td>End before merger</td>
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<td>Archaeology</td>
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<td>Teaching focus</td>
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<td>Associate dean</td>
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<td>Novelist, OU teaching</td>
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<td>Andrew Pettigrew (University of Bath School of Management)</td>
<td>Research ratings, deficit turnaround</td>
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<td>End</td>
<td>Immediately pre-retirement</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
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<td>Portfolio consulting, part-time professor</td>
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<td>Ann Ridley (Portsmouth Business School)</td>
<td>Industry engagement, deficit recovery</td>
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<td>Second half</td>
<td>Immediately pre-retirement</td>
<td>Law No PhD</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Teaching focus, engagement with the professions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Head of department</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interim deanships</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Howard Thomas (WBS)</td>
<td>Turnaround after strategic drift</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>End, two terms</td>
<td>Pre-retirement</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Research intensive, triple accreditation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dean USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dean Asia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Group Two – Warwick Business School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dean</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Institution’s Mission</th>
<th>No of Deanships</th>
<th>Stage in Tenure</th>
<th>Career Stage</th>
<th>Academic Discipline</th>
<th>Previous Role(s)</th>
<th>Subsequent Role(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>George Bain (Canadian)</td>
<td>Institution building</td>
<td>Research intensive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>Aged 44</td>
<td>Industrial relations</td>
<td>Research centre director</td>
<td>Principal LBS, VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Robert Dyson</td>
<td>National quality, recruitment</td>
<td>Research intensive</td>
<td>3: 3yrs, acting term, interim 2yrs</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>Aged 35</td>
<td>Operational research</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>PVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Robert Galliers</td>
<td>Quality assurance, audit</td>
<td>Research intensive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>Aged 47</td>
<td>Information systems</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>USA, provost, vice-president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mark Taylor</td>
<td>To be Europe’s leading university-based business school</td>
<td>Research intensive, triple accreditation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Early</td>
<td>Aged 52</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Managing director, asset manager</td>
<td>Still in post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Howard Thomas</td>
<td>Turnaround following strategic drift</td>
<td>Research intensive, triple accreditation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>End</td>
<td>Aged 58</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Dean USA</td>
<td>Dean Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Robin Wensley</td>
<td>Consolidation</td>
<td>Research intensive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>Aged 45</td>
<td>Policy, marketing</td>
<td>Professor strategic management</td>
<td>Faculty Chair, Deputy dean, Director research council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>David Wilson</td>
<td>Recovery after disappointing RAE</td>
<td>Research intensive</td>
<td>1 acting</td>
<td>Early in acting role</td>
<td>Early 60s</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Deputy dean</td>
<td>Department head, research director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Group Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dean</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Institution’s Mission</th>
<th>No of Deanships</th>
<th>Stage in Tenure</th>
<th>Career Stage</th>
<th>Academic Discipline</th>
<th>Previous Role(s)</th>
<th>Subsequent Role(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ruth Ashford (Manchester Metropolitan)</td>
<td>Student satisfaction</td>
<td>‘Meeting student and employer expectations’</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Early</td>
<td>Early 50s</td>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>Associate dean</td>
<td>Still in post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Sue Cox (Lancaster University Management School)</td>
<td>Triple accreditation</td>
<td>Research excellence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>End 2nd tenure</td>
<td>Pre-retirement</td>
<td>Safety &amp; Risk Management No PhD</td>
<td>Dean</td>
<td>Still in post, 3rd tenure</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Sandra Dawson (Judge, Cambridge)</td>
<td>Establish a business school at the heart of Cambridge</td>
<td>Research excellence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Organisational Behaviour No PhD</td>
<td>College master, deputy director</td>
<td>Deputy VC, retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Jane Houzer (London South Bank University) (Canadian)</td>
<td>Student satisfaction</td>
<td>Recruitment, teaching</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>Early 50s</td>
<td>Human resources No PhD</td>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>Interim</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Kai Peters (Ashridge Business School)</td>
<td>Business development</td>
<td>Executive education, triple accreditation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>Early 40s</td>
<td>Leadership, executive education No PhD</td>
<td>Dean, Holland</td>
<td>Still in post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Stephen Watson (Henley Business School)</td>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td>Executive education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>Pre-retirement</td>
<td>Decision analysis</td>
<td>Dean</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 11: Initial template analysis, first dataset
Appendix 12: Final template analysis, first dataset

Integrating themes: time, middleness

- Alignment
- Fit
- Scholarship
- Society
- Cycles

- Shared purpose
- Priorities
- Mandate
- Formulating
- Executing
- Selling
- Positioning
- Meetings
- Talk
- Story telling
- Public relations

- Talent management
- Quality
- Espoused
- Actual
- Reputation
- Thought leadership

- Upper middle manager strategizing

- Parent
- Models
- Legitimacy
- Economic

- Contextualising

- Integrating themes: time, middleness

- Brand
- Negotiating
- Chairing
- Persuading
- Small talk
- Convincing
- Impression management

- Central taxes
- Protecting
- Rankings
- Bottom line

- Economic
- Society
- Reputation
- Quality
- Results

- Parent
- Models
- Legitimacy
- Economic

- Integrating themes: time, middleness