Toddington, Stuart (1996) Method, Morality and the Impossibility of Legal Positivism. Ratio Juris, 9 (3). pp. 283-299. ISSN 0952-1917Metadata only available from this repository.
The dispute between Legal Positivists (eg, Hart) and Natural Lawyers (e.g., Finnis) concerns the existence or otherwise of a necessary (conceptual) connection between law and morality. Legal Positivists such as Hart deny this connection and assert the merely contingent relationship of law and morals. However, it can be demonstrated that implicit in the valid sociological method of concept formation of post-Austinian Positivists are interpretative or ideal-typical models of the practical rationality of the legal enterprise which are not, and cannot possibly be, value-neutral. With particular attention to the work of John Finnis and his incorporation of Weberian and Aristotelian methodological principles, this paper exposes, if not the truth of Natural Law Theory, the impossibility of Legal Positivism.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics|
H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
K Law > K Law (General)
|Schools:||The Business School|
|Depositing User:||Sara Taylor|
|Date Deposited:||01 Dec 2011 12:11|
|Last Modified:||01 Dec 2011 12:11|
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