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What impact does the teaching of History have on young people’s understanding of national identity?

Edward Hynes

A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science by Research

The University of Huddersfield

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What impact does the teaching of History have on young people’s understanding of national identity?

Edward Hynes

Abstract

This research paper examines the relationship between history teaching, citizenship education and the effect these subjects may have on a student’s notion of national identity, in particular how history education helps shape their perceptions of a British identity. History and citizenship education are both utilised as conduits to increase a sense of a national identity and civic engagement, nation building is strongly affiliated with national history but does history teaching have an impact on students’ perceptions of national identity? And is citizenship education working in producing young persons’ who view themselves as citizens of the United Kingdom? (UK). Additionally given the level of political interference in history teaching, citizenship education and national identities do students’ subscribe to political articulations of what Britishness is?

Introduction

Within the past decade ‘the form and purpose of history’ (Grever et al, 2008) has been the subject of a high profile political debate which can be seen as a direct consequence of the re-emergence of the contestation of the ‘politics of Britishness.’ (Andrews et al, 2009) The recent political discourse has focused on promoting the need for a British national identity to help unite British citizens through shared values and a common understanding of what Britishness is. This is in direct response to a growing feeling that a multi-national UK has lost its national identity. It seems the classroom has become the battleground on which competing groups dispute how and what history is taught which transcends into a struggle for culture, for identity and for hegemony.’ (Phillips, 1998: 42)

A central theme underlying the assertions that Britain is suffering an ‘identity crisis’ is that a post imperial Britain has since 1945 changed quite dramatically. This is both in terms of its demographic of citizens and its place in terms of international relations. The
processes and outcomes of both devolution and mass immigration have become distinct factors for this change. Furthermore a Britain coming to terms with the loss of an Empire and more recently the erosion of sovereignty to the European Union (EU) has resulted in a scramble to articulate a coherent idea of national identity. No more profoundly has this been felt than in the history classroom.

The main questions that this paper highlights are; firstly. Does history teaching succeed in increasing a sense of national identity for its students? Given the level of political interference and the importance attached to history teaching regarding Britishness and identity, it is of great importance to actually assess what if any impact history teaching actually has upon students of this discipline.

Secondly, are the students willing to subscribe to a version of Britishness and British history promoted by the state? Again there has been frequent political interference in both history teaching and in politicians articulating their respective versions, thus there is a need to assess this rhetoric against the notions of history students to see whether politicians’ renderings of Britishness reflect that of young students. This is especially the case as the students participating in this study will doubtless possess their own ideas regarding identity and what a national identity should perhaps be composed of. Young people are exposed to other external influences, ie from their own families and communities. These outside have a strong possibility of affecting their respective ideas and attitudes in relation to a national identity, possibly to a much greater extent than history or citizenship education. Therefore expecting them to willingly accept a notion of Britishness developed by politicians may be misguided.

Thirdly, we will assess to what extent students affiliate themselves as citizens of The United Kingdom (UK). Just has history teaching has been used as method for transmitting a sense of national identity, citizenship education has aimed to increase a sense of civic participation and political engagement. Therefore we will be highlighting what impact citizenship education has had on making students’ view themselves as citizens and their awareness of their rights and roles within a political community.

There has also been much debate surrounding the suitability of history teaching as a vehicle for which national identity should be promoted through. Berger and Lorenz
(2008) amongst others suppose that national history teaching is imperative for successful nation building. Nonetheless Britain’s distinctive status as a multi-national state means that finding a common British identity that all can relate to is problematic, there are four nations existing under the banner of the UK which means four differing historiographies of British history. Furthermore the UK is multi cultural and multi ethnic thus forging an inclusive sense of civic Britishness is difficult due to the diverse nature of such a plural society. This problem is further complicated when politicians on both sides scramble to appropriate the past in order to construct a history curriculum that they believe will build a greater sense of British identity. This is an important area to assess as policy makers and politicians today, and over the decades have attached a great degree of importance to history teaching which has become central to numerous policies especially in relation to citizenship and identity politics.

Despite the broad consensus that history teaching has a prescriptive part to play in galvanizing national identity, there is to date little comprehensive evidence that history teaching is indeed a suitable vehicle for policy makers to press the identity issue through with. Additionally there is no conclusive evidence that history teaching has any significant effect on students’ notions of national identity. Therefore to assess the impact that history has on young on students’ perceptions of a British identity is potentially a very important one. The study will also assess what aspects of Britishness make them allude to a sense of pride as politicians have recently attached great importance to one feeling proud of their country.

Methodology

This research project has required a large amount of desktop research including the researching of academic books and journals, Government publications including publications from the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), and the Department for Education and Skills (DfES). We have also utilised publications from non governmental organisations such as The Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR). Furthermore we have researched articles on this topic from British newspapers.
Further to the desktop research we have conducted visits to 2 schools in Kirklees to compile and analyse survey data from 72 history and citizenship education students. The research itself comprised of an anonymous questionnaire, which inculcates both quantitative and qualitative data sections that provide a detailed picture of the views and ideas of the participants regarding the topics on the survey. The selected schools that participated in the study represented contrasting socio economic backgrounds within the Kirklees area and were multi ethnic populated schools. This has provided us with data from students with differing social backgrounds, differing races and religions, and has in turn provided us with a wide demographic of students with an extensive range of views and opinions.

I received permission from both schools (Royds Hall High School and Colne Valley Specialist Arts College) to undertake the survey with pupils who were studying either history or citizenship at GCSE level. The sample size of the participants was 72 and all were aged between 14 -16 years old. All participants were made aware that whilst the survey was anonymous it was also voluntary. Both the staff and participants at the school were also informed that the results of the survey would be made available to them once the work had been completed, submitted and returned. The field research itself comprised of an anonymous, mainly scaled questioned survey, which was designed initially by Dr. Andrew Mycock and Dr. Catherine Mcglynn and adapted by myself for the purpose of this work. The participants completed the survey online and were supervised by myself and Dr. Mycock should problems arise with the mechanics of the survey or confusion surrounding any terminology used in the questionnaire, at no time during the completion of the survey were the participants advised on how they should answer any questions. The data was then analysed by myself and the findings presented in this work.

The methodology of using a mainly quantitative anonymous questionnaire meant that the participants’ responses to what is a complex issue could be analysed, measured and captured coherently. However the survey also included qualitative sections that asked the participants’ to provide examples of their own, these responses were collated by myself and grouped into wider categorisations that inculcated their specific responses. The only ethical concern has been my visits to the aforementioned schools, for this I
completed a Criminal record Bureau search (CRB) search and was accompanied on both visits to the schools by my main supervisor.

As this research paper is based in one local authority it is therefore comprised of a relatively small sample. Nonetheless the results from this study can be used alongside or against similar work in this area (Fenton, 2007, Grever et al, 2008, Clark 2009) for granting further understanding into why young people feel the way they do. The data collected from 72 students will offer an insight as to how young people perceive Britishness, how they relate to a national identity and what factors they feel are important in constructing and articulating a British identity.

Whilst this study is concerned with both history teaching and its relationship with national identity, there are a few limitations and aspects of both fields that we are not looking to explore. Firstly the study will not be looking to assess which type of history teaching is best suited to providing a national narrative that appeals to the most students, whilst we will be highlighting the debate that exists between ‘new’ and ‘traditional’ forms of history teaching we will not be looking to favour one over the other. Secondly although a sizeable portion of the study is dedicated to analysing participant’s responses on national identity and also highlighting the conflation between citizenship and nationality. We will not be assessing which identity the participants hold particular salience for and have omitted a question asking the respondents to provide their ‘nationality’.

Structure of Thesis

The initial focus of Chapter 1 is to identify the key theories surrounding nationalism and its complex connection with the state and citizenship. I will illustrate that nationalism and citizenship provoke competition from each other in regards to national and state identities, and the two concepts are often intertwined and confused. The first chapter will also address the complexities of a multi-nation state such as the UK and its relationship with nationalism and citizenship which is further complicated by the processes of immigration and devolution. An overview of the concept of Britishness is critically discussed in this first chapter which provides a conceptual overview which is then tied to some consideration of its empirical application in the case of the UK. Whilst assessing
the political discourse surrounding Britishness in order to relate this to the participants own notions of a British identity in further chapters.

In chapter 2 I will focus on history teaching and citizenship education, considering the complexities surrounding national history teaching. Whilst it is important to look at the context of the history debate, it is equally important to link some of the theories around nationalism and citizenship and their relationship with history teaching, and discuss some of the key theories surrounding the purpose of national history teaching. Illustrating that the amalgamation and confusion of nationality and citizenship highlighted in the last chapter is mirrored in the history classroom. I will also address the political interference that history teaching has been subject to and highlight the debate surrounding the differing methods of history teaching. The role of Citizenship education is analysed in this chapter, which focuses on the reason for its introduction, the problems it has encountered and its relationship with history teaching.

Chapters 3 and 4 will both comprise of the results from the field research. The questionnaire was entitled ‘What does it mean to be British?’ and comprises of 6 sections therefore the analysis of the survey will be also sectioned into 6 sub headings denoting the sections in the survey. The study contains both qualitative and quantitative data as questions included a multiple choice rating system but also direct qualitative questions asking the participants to describe in their own words their feelings on what Britishness was, what values it consisted of, and figures that made them feel proud/not proud to be British. In this section we will be analysing the data and assessing the findings by linking the findings to the theoretical and empirical work done in the previous chapters. Chapter 3 will explore findings that relate to the work outlined in chapter 1 and chapter 4 will address data that relates to the theoretical and empirical debates highlighted in chapter 2. The last section will be the Conclusion, where I will highlight the main themes and findings from the field research data, applying our findings to answer the original research questions that this study has posed.
Chapter 1

In this chapter the focus will be on nationalism and citizenship and how these complex factors behave in a modern multi-nation state such as the United Kingdom. Firstly we will identify some of the key theoretical arguments surrounding nationalism and its complicated relationship with the state and citizenship. We will argue that as the UK comprises four nations within a state, nationality and citizenship are often confused but are in fact very different concepts.

The next purpose of this chapter is to analyse Britishness, both conceptually and empirically. We will focus on the shifting description from early inceptions to more recent definitions, reflecting the changes of devolution, immigration and the decline of the empire in British society. This will address the application of some of the highlighted theoretical arguments and how they have transcended from theory to political rhetoric and policy discourse. We will also look at the problematic nature of creating an inclusive sense of Britishness as politicians struggle to agree on an articulation of what ‘Britishness’ is. It is important to analyse their rhetoric, as this will provide a fuller picture on the discourse surrounding national identity.

Understanding Nationalism

When we discuss the role of history in promoting national values and identity we are looking at an area that has long remained problematic and fragmented, given that nationalism as a subject is such a vast concept it its not surprising that ‘authors in one discipline are unfamiliar with theory in another, or that there is overlap and duplication.’ (Alter, 1985:169) Not only is there no agreed definition due to the multi discipline nature of nationalism, the study of nationalism has also undoubtedly shifted over time, and as Smith (2008, 318) suggests there is not just a single divide between differing protagonists such as modernists and primordialists but a whole series of different and cross cutting debates in an ever expanding field. Despite the swathes of literature and research in this complex field (Gellner, 1983. Anderson,1982. Hobsbawm,1989. Smith, 2003,2008. Bilig, 1990) it is possible to discern some of the key theories in this area. Although debates surrounding nationalism have changed over time, the ‘classic debate’
between perennial or primordialist notions of nationalism and the sociological modernist view remains an important one.

The perennial argument supposes that nations as well as nationalisms are ancient phenomena and did not emerge at the time of the French and American revolutions, as most modernist historians and social scientists claim. As Smith (2003, 25) notes neither nations nor nationalisms were the product of modernity. On the contrary, a sizeable number of European nations (and their nationalisms) can be traced back to the middle ages. Modernists view nationalism in an altogether different light. Viewing nations and nationalism as an ‘instrument of progress, they were to be seen as historically modern, not immemorial’ (Smith, 2008: 320) For Gellner the prerequisites and preservation of nationalism include universal literacy, and a society committed to economic growth through a commitment to social mobility. Gellner (1983) challenged amongst others the perennial view of nationalism. He argued that nationalism is ‘distinctive to modern industrial society and intimately connected to its mode of production.’ (O’Leary, 1997: 10) Therefore neither nationalism nor nations could be antique as per societies such as tribal or agrarian. In the modern industrial society, by contrast, nationalism is an essential part of the cultural environment, ‘a high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity. That is the secret of nationalism.’ (Gellner, 1983: 18) this insight attempts to show us that ‘modern societies were fundamentally nationalist whether they admitted it or not’ (McCrone & Kiely, 2000, 24).

In Hans Kohn’s essay ‘The idea of nationalism.’ Kohn attempted to justify the superiority of Western forms of nationalism (civic) over Eastern European nationalism (ethnic). Kohn’s dichotomy was that nationalism in the West was linked to individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism whereas in the East the opposite was the case (Kohn, 1944) The assumption being that ‘ethnic’ nationalism is disruptive and potentially leads to violence and state disintegration.’ (Hansen et al, 2009: 2). The absence of civic institutions and a bourgeoisie promoting tolerant and inclusive attitudes in Eastern countries (as was found in the West) meant nationalism was more organic and reliant upon intellectuals to articulate a national idea through the manipulation of memories, symbols, myths and ethnic identities. (Kuzio, 2002: 22)
Despite his influence in providing a framework for understanding nationalism Kuzio (2002) and Kymlicka (1996, 2000) have both criticised Kohn. In particular Kuzio (2002:36) has argued that Western states have not always been civic but have recently evolved from ethnic to civic states. The division of nationalism by geographic position posed by Kohn presupposes the West has always been fully inclusive of social and ethnic groups. This overlooks the Western liberal democracies that have also engaged in campaigns of cultural homogenisation and in the repression of minority nationalisms. (Kymlicka, 2000: 186).

An important theory for understanding the debate surrounding nationalism is Anderson’s (1989) concept that the nation is an ‘imagined political community.’ That is a nation is imagined because ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’. (Anderson, 1989: 6) What is interesting about this theory is that it relates to a ‘imagined political community’ that is, a relationship between members of the community within a state and the state itself. It is exclusively a political relationship that highlights a civic dimension of nationalism. McCrone & Kiely, (2000: 25) identify the ethnic dynamic of nationalism, ‘a cultural concept which binds people on the basis of shared identity.’ There is broad agreement that nationalism acts as a common identifier that possesses both ethnic and civic dimensions in much the same way as Kuzio identified ethnic and civic elements in all nations. Furthermore Anderson’s imagined community is one that assimilates ‘imagining and creation.’ (Anderson, 1991: 6) This creation is seen by Hobsbawm as what he termed the ‘invented tradition’ that is ‘traditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1989)

For Anderson the education and expansion of the ‘reading classes’ from what was previously exclusively for the ruling elites was coupled with the increased use for printing presses. However Hobsbawm (1989) also notes the use of education for inculcating a common patriotism, which in effect means occupying the masses to prevent any serious threat or revolution to the ruling clique. This was central for accelerating nationalism, and the rise in literacy had ‘to be understood in its relationship to vernacular print-capitalism.’ (Anderson, 1991: 76) Therefore we can see that education is viewed as an effective conduit for nation building. Both Anderson and Hobsbawm strongly indicate that
nationalism is something that is constructed through elite defined measures such as literacy and industry as opposed to the perennial approach of a more organic nationalism. This nationalism or nationhood inculcates two differing approaches as to its origins, emanating from these established perspectives of nationalism, whether that is the organic perennial approach or the more elite defined modernist view as discussed comes a sense of nationalism that through subtle devices reinforces nationalism on a daily basis. A concept of which Billig (1995) termed ‘banal nationalism.’

Billig’s thesis has ‘struck a chord for many academics trying to understand the subtle insinuation of nationhood into daily life,’ (Hearn, 2007) it is the idea that nationalism can be prolonged through implicit daily flagging in citizens lives. This ‘flagging’ includes symbolic reinforcements such as coins, flags and street names but also the use of language throughout media outlets, addressing a national audience by using deictic language such as ‘we’, ‘our’, ‘us’ and ‘here’ to signify the presence of the nation. (Billig, 1995) What we have discerned here is a number of the key theories surrounding the debate on nationalism. We have shown that as Western states are not purely comprised of civic nationalism the UK sits well with possessing both ethnic and civic nationalisms.

**The United Kingdom: Citizenship and Identity in a Multi-nation state**

We are primarily concerned with nationalism in relation to an individual’s identity and the salience that it may hold over other competing components of an identity. In the UK nationalism competes with citizenship as significant factors in for ones identity and whilst the two terms mean very different things they are often conflated to be the same. Citizenship is according to McCorne and Kiely (2000) a political concept deriving from people’s relationship to the state, and the promotion of Citizenship is often taken as integral to the democratic processes of the UK. However, when the state is comprised of four nations this relationship is complicated by sub-state national identities. The UK is ‘unfamiliar with, or hierarchically nervous about, the very concept of citizen’ (Crick, 2002). This notion of equal right as citizens and a political relationship with the state rather than the nation has particular resonance within multi-national states such as the UK, especially since devolution in 1997 significantly altered the constitutional settlement (Andrews and Mycock, 2007) It is within the context of increased devolution and secession to the EU that meanings of nationality and national identity are being re-
examined and redefined. Political and constitutional developments can encourage those from both ethnic majority and minority communities to reflect on the meaning of citizenship and the degree to which they experience a sense of belonging to the nation and state. (Olser, 2000)

Nationalism is regarded as a significant dimension of identity and as Gellner (1983) asserts most people see themselves, more or less as members of nations or states. This indicates the prominence of both cultural (nation) and political (state) identities. Certainly in the context of the UK both these actors hold significance over ones identity and are especially problematic as state identity (UK) and national identities (English, Scottish, Welsh, etc) have evolved in a highly implicit manner’ (McCrone & Kiely, 2000: 1) in this work we are looking at the concept of citizenship as a political identity but note that it has the potential to accommodate both (just as nationalism does) civic and cultural (ethnic) elements. Gellner asserted that ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.’ These assertions are somewhat problematic for the UK not least as England, Wales and Scotland can all be described as stateless nations and the UK is a state made up of multiple nations. Therefore in the UK congruence between national and state identities is rarely if ever achieved thus citizenship and nationality are often intertwined and compete with one another for prominence regarding identity. Just as there is a conflation of English and British history in the national curriculum, this is mirrored in identity politics with many treating national and state identities ‘as synonyms for each other’ (McCrone & Kiely, 2000, 19). This is further complicated as it is possible for a UK citizen residing in the UK to simultaneously possess dual national identities in the shape of Britishness (citizenship) and English, Scottish, Welsh (nationality) which can overlap and intertwine with one another.

A Crisis of Britishness

As Parekh (2000: 6) has commented every political community needs to and, as a rule, tends to develop a view of its own identity, of the kind of community it is and wishes to be, which follows on from Andersons ‘imagined political community’ theory. The problem for the UK is that there are differing viewpoints surrounding its identity. A number of commentators have argued that a shared sense of ‘Britishness’ could help a UK with
cultural diverse cities and neighbourhoods relate better to one another across religious and ethnic lines. While allegiance to the nation has declined slightly in favour to the sub state identities of the UK, nationality remains a significant factor of identification. This change in loyalties away from Britain to the constituent nations of the UK means that national and state identities are becoming interwoven and confused, furthermore politically Britishness has become increasingly important and equally problematic.

Muir & Wetherell (2010: 5) have illustrated that British society has moved towards a much greater cultural diversity, which is largely due to the processes of economic globalization which have resulted in sustained high levels of net immigration. This has helped Britain’s ethnic minority population increase from just 4 per cent in 1981 to 8 per cent in the 2001 census, and it is widely expected that this proportion will increase further by the time of the next census in 2011. The rise in migration and the resultant multi-cultural society that England in particular now possesses has increased and complicated the loss of a feeling of an English national identity.

State identity in the shape of a British identity has evolved alongside the national identities of Scotland, England and Wales. The increase in multiculturalism within Britain has added to the complexity and diversity of multiple identities resulting in ethnic and civic identities competing with one another. However it is possible to possess multiple identities at any given time. Certainly one identity may have preference over another, but identities are interchangeable depending on the individual. Fenton (2007: 327) notes that in the lives of individuals nation competes with other identities. Certainly those who hold regional identities as important in England such as the Cornish or Londoners may do so alongside their national identity, instead of or interchangeably with a sense of national identity. McCrone (2002:307) suggests that national identity is not fixed and can change over space and time. Therefore national identities are not essential, given or unproblematic. Whilst they are certainly not unproblematic nor a given, to many a national identity holds a great amount of influence, but that does not mean to say differing identities can not have primacy with an individual at different times. This is simply an individual's choice. It can be reasonable to expect for example a person to feel more English during a sporting event such as the World cup and perhaps more British at the Olympic Games and more attached to a regional identity in say supporting a county cricket match.
McCrone (2002) asserts that Englishness is something largely reserved for white natives, with some who view Britishness as being ‘tainted’ by multiculturalism. This suggests that Englishness is becoming a more instinctive identity and it would appear that a feeling of Englishness as opposed to Britishness is on the increase. With a few exceptions ‘the English appear to becoming more ‘English’ at the expense of being British.’ (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2007: 252) However Kenny and Lodge (2009: 225) suggest that whilst English nationalism may have risen slightly it has not replaced a sense of Britishness. Englishness has for many people added to the stock of multiple identities that we enjoy holding, thus a majority remain comfortable with the idea of holding dual loyalties to England and Britain.

Various factors have helped strengthen English identity over the last decade. Gamble (2003: 9) ascribes the rise of sub-state nationalisms to devolution, decolonisation, European integration and immigration, in particular that of England’s. Thus as England’s political extensions have been eroded the English are being forced to rediscover themselves and define themselves afresh in relation to Britain and the other nations of Britain. The development of devolution to Scotland and Wales undertaken by the Labour administration in 1997 has led to the home countries (excluding Northern Ireland), possessing an increased sense of national identity towards their sub-state nationalities rather than the overarching British one. Research carried out by the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) showed that a majority of people in Scotland felt more Scottish than British, similarly in Wales there has been a rise in those saying they feel more Welsh than British (Stone & Muir, 2007) thus arguably the process of devolution has weakened links to Britishness. One reason for the rise in Scottish nationalism as Keamey (2000: 23) argues is the dissatisfaction at British policies affecting them has had a profound effect on Scottish nationalism. Likewise the argument extends to the rise of Englishness which has in part risen due to grievances felt over inequalities of spending in the devolution programme and being ‘prompted to think of themselves in contradistinction to the dominant English.’ (Bryant, 2003: 394) However it can be misleading to think devolution is the sole cause of the rise of Englishness as Kenny & Lodge (2009: 223) claim it neglects the fragmentary complexity of contemporary manifestations of Englishness and wrongly identifies devolution as the sole cause of their emergence.
Nonetheless Kenny (2010) claims that an attachment to Englishness has become a more significant feature within the social culture of England than many of our politicians have realised, which can be ascribed to the increase of the ‘normalisation of manifestations of English symbolism and culture in everyday life.’ (Kenny & Lodge, 2009: 225) That this symbolism is commonplace highlights an example of what Billig termed ‘Banal Nationalism’.

We can utilise Anderson’s notion of an ‘imagined political community’ and see the glue holding Britain together has become much weaker due to greater challenges from devolution, European integration and migration. It is perhaps then not too strong to talk of a contemporary crisis of British identity.’ (Tilley & Heath, 2007: 663) In an attempt to address this perceived crisis politicians have sought to define what Britishness means in the twenty first century. As ‘Britishness’ is an essentially contested concept there is much debate as to how effective and relevant these politicians attempts have been.

The shifting nature of Britishness

As politicians clamour to express what Britishness is in the twenty first century it is first pertinent to explore its changing nature over the years. Recently the collapse of the British Empire, Immigration and the post war consensus has resulted in not only shifting notions of what Britishness is but a changing multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society that has resulted in changing relationships between the citizens and the state. The UK also has an imperial legacy which has resulted in mass immigration of people from around the world. To address the complexities of the UK it is important to grasp that the problematic nature of Britishness is not a new occurrence. The Act of Union in 1707 linked England and Scotland in a parliamentary union, this event ‘brought the ‘civic’ terms Britain and Britons into wider popular usage though still leaving intact ‘Englishness’ and ‘Scottishness’ as core ethnic identities.’ (Kearney, 2000: 19)

Regarding the historical origins and changing nature of a British identity. Colley (1996) asserted that a shared religion of Protestantism united an otherwise culturally divisive Britain as being remarkably different from those beyond their shores. There was also an element of geographical boundaries as Britain being an island kept Britons enclosed and together. Equally important for Colley (1999: 1) was the role of the Monarchy which acted
as a ‘charismatic, unifying icon’ enshrining a sense of Britishness in the 1940’s and 1950’s. The expansion of the British Empire was a significant factor in both British nationalism and citizenship. It meant Britain was not just composed of four nations but many territories worldwide whose nationals could be said to be subjects of the British Crown. Thus ‘Britain and the British came to be identified with the Crown, with Parliament, with the Protestant religion, and with the worldwide British’ (Kumar, 2000: 589–90). This version of Britishness according to Colley (1999) and Weight (2002) declined due to the erosion of the British Empire, ‘Imperial Britain became post-imperial Britain with extraordinary speed.’ (Kearney, 2000: 23) The empire had served in making ‘Scots, Welsh, English, and even many Irish men and women call themselves British as they could all as one united nation, share in the plunder and glory.’ (Colley, 1999: 1) Furthermore, Weight (2002) suggests that a change in our sense of Britishness occurred in the post-war period when a patriotic socialism based around government initiatives such as the Welfare State and being on the victorious side in the Second World War helped produce a feeling of commonality, that all British citizens were sharing the same experiences together.

The decline of the empire in post-war Britain allowed mass in-migration to Britain notably from the Caribbean but also from South Asia, Europe and Africa, by people who undoubtedly thought of themselves of British.’ (McCrone & Kiely, 2000, 26) This migration into Britain served in making many foreign nationals British citizens and successive immigration policies have meant mass migration resulting in Britain becoming a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. Therefore today’s articulations of what Britishness is have transformed from earlier incarnations, it is within this context that British politicians attempt to construct a national identity that they feel encapsulates modern British society. However it is not clear whether the young people of today can relate to their articulations nor do they necessarily agree with them.

**Recent political articulations of Britishness**

Since the early nineties there have been attempts by successive prime ministers to articulate their respective visions of what it means to be British. It is necessary to assess the rhetoric of the government in order to compare and contrast what the participants of the study think about Britishness and if the rhetoric of government has any bearing on
their own notions of our national identity, additionally it is important as the state places a sense of national identity above other identities in order to address this perceived loss of a feeling of ‘Britishness’.

John Major attempted to define Britishness, in relation to reassuring those worried at EU influence, Major’s assertion that Britishness is; ‘long shadows on county grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pools fillers and - as George Orwell said ‘old maids bicycling to holy communion through the morning mist.’ (Major, 1993) Is one of nostalgia, even almost romanticism. It also appears to exclusively relate to those residing in ‘middle’ or ‘little’ England rather than that of the whole of the UK.

Tony Blair emphasised that Britain was built on moral qualities of ‘tolerance, openness…strong communities and families…rights and responsibilities and an outward looking approach’ (Blair, 2000) what is uniquely British about these values is unclear as any Western liberal democracy could claim these for their own. According to Blair Britain was shaped by a ‘rich mix of all different ethnic and religious origins over the centuries’. (Blair, 2000) Again whilst this may be true of the UK it can also be applied to many other nations, furthermore Blair here inadvertently reinforces the view that the UK comprises of civic and ethnic nationalism.

Similar to Blair, Gordon Brown also indicated that shared values and ideals are intrinsic to ‘Britishness’, a ‘commitment to liberty, responsibility and fairness’ (Brown, 2006) strengthening a sense of community that in turn creates a sense of identity within the nation. He ‘argues for a new kind of patriotism based on shared values, rather than race or ethnicity.’ (Osler, 2009: 88) Brown has gone further than his predecessor in pursing a British identity, emphasising that Britishness is one of many plural identities a person may have ‘Welshman can be Welsh and British, just as a Cornishman…is Cornish, English and British and may be Muslim, Pakistani or Afro-Caribbean, Cornish, English and British’ (Brown, 2006) this is in a similar vein to Crick (2008) who asserted that: ‘British history, like Britishness as a concept or belief, is an overall, umbrella category,’ (2008: 72) Britishness as an umbrella category suggests that people can possess their regional national identities such as Scottish, Welsh or English as well as an overarching or all encompassing sense of a British identity. However as Byrant (2003) points out is easier for the Scots and the Welsh as many see Britishness as much more an overlay,
however this further complicates many English citizens relationship with Britishness as it is already often confused or intertwined with Englishness.

For Brown an important point appeared to be, attempting to push a nationalism designed by civic patriotism rather than any type of ethnic patriotism. This civic form of patriotism is based on liberty, democracy and the civic institutions that are associated with Britain. Advocating ‘participation and civic engagement that is assumed to follow from Patriotism’ (Osler, 2009: 89), Brown had even called for events to be held to celebrate being British. The idea of a Britishness day where the nation can ‘focus on the things that bring us together... whatever our backgrounds.’ (Brown, 2006) draws comparison and inspiration from America’s July 4 or Bastille Day in France. However, given the diverse make up of British society it is quite problematic to agree a suitable date let alone how and what exactly we should be celebrating. Another criticism of Brown is that he too took Britishness as synonymous for Englishness. Browns golden thread of liberty was sustained ‘by historic illustrations and literary references that are almost exclusively about England and Englishness, not Britain and Britishness.’ (Lee, 2006: 369) this includes his numerous misquotations and questionable references to Voltaire, Montesquieu, Burke and Orwell.

In contrast to Brown’s version, David Cameron has stated that Britishness would be ‘easier to promote if everyone felt like they were part of one country’ criticising the ‘wrong-headed doctrine of state multiculturalism’ (Cameron, 2009). This suggests that Cameron believes that Britishness as an identity should hold prominence over other identities such as sub-state and regional ones. Cameron further criticises Brown for utilising values that are not exclusively British and suggests creating an emotional connection with the ‘monarchy, our armed forces and our parliament’ (Cameron, 2009). Cameron’s version is a much more exclusive version of Britishness, attaching importance to one common language. Both Brown’s and Cameron’s versions are deliberately vague and both express the importance of British civic institutions. Whilst Brown sought shared values as a commonality in a diverse and plural society Cameron emphasises the use of English language as a conduit for pride and as a standard requirement for integration and of belonging to one country. Furthermore Cameron does not refer to the sub-state identities that the UK is comprised of, but rather Britishness
being about Britons. There is further evidence of Billig’s banal nationalism here with his use of deictic language.

**Conclusion**

Nationalism is an immense field of study incorporating an inter-discipline approach. Therefore due to the scale of study involved in nationalism this chapter has concentrated on highlighting some key theories surrounding nationalism, in particular those that are related to a modern multi-nation state. The chapter has shown that due to the complexities of a multi-national state, and the intricate relationship that exists between nationalism and citizenship, national identities are often conflated and complicated. This conflation has to a certain extent been aided by successive government policies of both immigration and devolution. The disjuncture between nationalism and citizenship and the problematic relationship between the two concepts has resulted in their competition with one another, the very fact that a person can possess a nationality and a stateness results not only in competition but these two different concepts becoming synonymous with each other. This in turn further complicates the efforts of politicians to articulate an inclusive version of Britishness rather than that of the sub state nation.

Accordingly this chapter has looked at the shifting nature of ‘Britishness’ from early inceptions to the post war period, and has illustrated the current political discourse that has stemmed from the perceived crisis of Britishness. Therefore it is possible to show the difference between the conceptual debate and the reality of the politics of national identity, this will also provide the current context in which students are expected to learn and digest the concept of Britishness. Thus an important question that this chapter has highlighted is. Are students willing to subscribe to a version of Britishness promoted by the state? This is an important issue to address given the level of political discourse on the subject. Moreover their failure to articulate a coherent version of Britishness will not just be felt in the classroom but is reflected in the wider British society.
Chapter 2

This chapter will focus on the complexities surrounding national history teaching, illustrating that the confusion of nationality and citizenship is mirrored in the history classroom. The chapter will also explore the current political discourse on the subject of history, highlighting the ideological rhetoric of national history teaching and addressing how this has been subjected to political interference. The main purpose then of this chapter is to provide an empirical framework in addition to the theoretical debates which in turn should provide a full context for which the study results are to be analysed and understood.

Thus this chapter will investigate a key question of the overall thesis, does history teachings have any impact on students' notions of Britishness? The chapter does not attempt to answer this question but provide a theoretical overview of the difficulties that surround national history in a multi-national state. Therefore the focus of this chapter will be to identify the theory behind national history as an important factor in nation building whilst showing that competing parties surrounding the direction of history teaching has intensified and complicated debate on the issue. The terminology of the ‘National Curriculum’ is also explored and deemed awkward as it implies one national programme of learning when in reality it is an area of policy that is regionally devolved.

As well as history teaching this chapter will partly focus on the debate surrounding citizenship education, exploring a few key reasons for its introduction and the problems citizenship education has encountered, and its relationship with history teaching.

The Complexities of National History

Attempting to teach the nation ‘better history’ has equated to policy makers identifying history as an appropriate vehicle for which to promote an inclusive overarching British identity. Whilst there is broad agreement that history has to play a major role in helping a shared British identity prosper, there is still considerable debate around which model of history teaching is best suited to the UK which raises questions as to the suitability of history as a vehicle for introducing a national identity if no one single coherent version can be agreed upon. An important clarification to raise at this juncture is that this thesis
is not concerned with which type of history is best suited to increasing British historical knowledge of students’, nor is it advocating one form over another. Matthews (2009, 1) links a failure to answer five specific isolated facts to a much wider disparity of knowledge and understanding of history, resulting in a whole generation that knows almost nothing about the history of their (or anyone else’s) country. However this theory is presuming that an incorrect answer indicates a lack of knowledge of the wider subject, a simple point is that students from different schools will have been taught different syllabuses and topics. In this thesis we are not looking at what each individual school is teaching or has taught, it is primarily concerned with history regardless of its typology and this relationship with students’ concepts of national identity.

The connection between history education and national identity is a strong and a much debated one and is certainly not confined to the UK. Clark (2009) notes the decline of national historical knowledge of students in Canada and Australia. The study highlighted that neither the teachers nor the students were responsive to a ‘fixed and content-driven national narrative in schools’ (Clark, 2009: 759) one that politicians and the media were adamant be included in the curriculum. Furthermore as Canada and Australia are both federations education policies are designed at regional level, making the implementation of a ‘national history’ just as if not more problematic than in the UK.

The notion of a national identity being promoted through history teaching has resulted in questions surrounding the purpose of history education. For many the ideal outcome of history teaching in Britain (besides imparting historical knowledge onto students) is as Andrews et al (2009) has suggested; preserving the national heritage, while simultaneously cultivating a new multicultural narrative of the nation. Levesque (2006: 350) enquires whether history is a disciplinary inquiry into the past? Or is it an uncritical heritage exercise meant to enhance identity and advance political claims? Given the level of political interference in history teaching over the last three decades the latter option seems to possess resonance, particularly because ‘ideological discourses of nationalism are circulated by authoritative, major social institutions’ (McKiernan, 1993: 34), such as schools. Whilst McKiernan goes on to point out that the UK has a society too plural for national discourses to take hold in schools, the aspiration from political actors is to form a sense of national identity through shared inclusive ideals that all can relate to such as a ‘commitment to liberty, responsibility and fairness’ (Brown, 2006)
Furthermore the effect of pursuing these national values in the classroom has pushed a national British identity into actively competing with alternative identities that young students possess. The ‘constructions of the nation are connected to competing conceptions of collective identity of a transnational character’ (Berger & Lorenz, 2009: 2) these transnational characters are identified as other prominent components of an identity such as religion, race, class, gender and ethnicity. Certainly in the UK ethnic narratives compete with ‘the master narrative of the nation’ (Berger & Lorenz, 2009: 2), which is increasingly promoted to be identified as a civic British one.

Although the UK was named as one of Kohn’s five civic states in the West, Kuzio (2002) has asserted that it has actually always possessed elements of both ethnic and civic nationalism. Conflict in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) provides substantial evidence that ethnic violence has occurred and continues to do so in the UK, which highlights that regardless of geographic positioning we can identify both civic and ethnic dimensions in modern multi-national states such as the UK. These elements can be illustrated through the two competing history methods. It does appear logical that ‘new history’ can be associated with a more civic sense of nationalism. For a start new history can be seen as accommodating views and histories of those from other ethnic and national backgrounds and has the potential to be critical of a mono-narrative cultural British history, thus projecting a ‘warts an all’ history of English and British histories. It is hoped that this attempt to incorporate various civic sentiments beyond that of religion or race would promote a sense of common culture and ‘ownership in the institutions and functions of the British state and civil society.’ (Hunt, 2007: 10)

Nonetheless while some may view new history as accommodating, it can be argued that it is simply assimilatory and compartmental, an example would be the inclusion of ‘black history month’ in the curriculum which rather than accommodating a ‘multicultural approach to history’ (Andrews et al, 2009: 367) highlights its distinction from mainstream British history by teaching stereotypical racialised ‘topics about slavery and post-war immigration’ (QCA, 2005: 6) Furthermore the argument that all nations have both civic and ethnic elements of nationalism highlights that despite ‘new history’ being associated with a more civic approach of history, ultimately it has its roots in ethnic nationalism no matter how it is presented.
Some myths (a crucial prerequisite for ethnic nationalism according to Kohn) are alive and well in history classrooms. It can be argued that through the more organic traditional history, heritage and patriotism are promoted and celebrated which in turn displays a more ethnic type of history. We can cite the trooping of the colour and Guy Fawkes as some of the examples of an English cultural history. Traditional history teaching that was prominent from the mid nineteenth century until the introduction of new history which began to ‘gain the upper hand in the 1970s’ (Matthews, 2009) was one that focused on the ‘achievements and the cultural heritage of Britain as a nation’ (Crawford, 1995: 440). Studying this type of homogenous history was seen by those on the right as essential for the survival of a nation under threat from amongst others ‘cultures with different attitudes and values’ (Deuchar, quoted in Crawford, 1995: 441).

Despite the ideological divides that separate the differing types of history teaching Berger and Lorenz (2009:13) have emphasised that both state elites and professional historians have presupposed that education in national history is essential for ‘nation-building’ and for responsible citizenship, aiding individual and collective identity formation. This process has been complicated through squabbles as to whether an inclusive national history rather than the traditional model of history is best suited to teach a multi national state in its classrooms. Terms such as the ‘National Curriculum’ (NC) appear innocuous enough however by its very essence it is problematic, the term suggests a homogenous national programme of learning in classrooms, however in reality each sub-state nation has implemented its own guidelines as to which and what history to teach. This reinforces the question as to the appropriateness of using history teaching in promoting the national identity, when in the case of the UK there are four individual historiographies in operation. Although devolution has intensified these ‘national’ splits within the delivery of a national curriculum, education is one of those matters that have long been subject to sub-state leadership.

Since the implementation of the NC in 1988 in England, all the nations that compose the UK have produced their own distinctive history syllabuses, reflecting the emergence of a broad-based ‘British’ historiography.’ (Phillips et al, 1999: 154) These devolved curriculums have to a certain extent implied the duality of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish national histories running concurrently with a Broader British state/civic history. Moreover in England the content and delivery of an English and British history have
often been conflated which has led to a ‘construction of what were largely English (and some Scottish) histories of these isles’ (Berger & Lorenz, 2009: 8). Although the NC has increased its focus on British rather than English histories by increasing statutory study units that focus on relations with other countries and the formation of the UK.

Phillips et al (1999: 156) has suggested that this wider view of British history amounts to only a fifth of all the units on the history syllabus with the remainder being at best open to interpretation and, at worst, potentially narrowly English in conception. However the QCA, (2007: 115) has stated that British history been taught at key stage 3 should include histories of the different parts of the British Isles and their impact on each other, and that pupils could explore both the separate histories and identities of Wales, Scotland, Ireland and England and their interrelationships which should develop an understanding of the historical origins of the UK. Despite this an OFSTED report, (2007: 24) has highlighted that the way many schools interpret the National Curriculum means a failure to tackle other important needs. For example, the curriculum is heavily based on aspects of English history. Those parts of the curriculum relating to Scotland, Wales and Ireland are very largely ignored. Importantly in many schools the stories of the people who have come to Britain over the centuries are ignored, even though these include the personal histories of some of the pupils.

It is within this framework of striving to include and represent Britain’s growing ‘ethnic, religious and cultural diversity’ (Olser, 2009: 85) and prevent growing division that the government commissioned the ‘Diversity and Citizenship review’ which sought to increase an understanding of the UK as a multinational state. Incorporating not only the devolved nations but also ‘immigration; commonwealth and the legacy of Empire and European union’ (DfES, 2007: 96), vital to these issues that affect students in the present day the report asserted that it ‘is equally important that they understand them through the lens of history’ (DfES, 2007: 96).

There has been a significant amount of rhetoric and publications surrounding the importance of history and citizenship education by policy makers (Brown, 2006, Balls 2007, Cameron, 2009, DfES, 2007, QCA, 2005, 2007) and its continuous use as a platform for which to direct a sense of Britishness fitting with a wider concern about its decline as a salient national identity for those living in the UK. However despite the
attachment of such importance to history teaching in helping to readdress this loss of Britishness there has been to date too few engages with its target audience. The studies that have taken place suggest the recipients of the message may not be ready to absorb it. Fenton (2007: 328) has indicated that a considerable number of young adults were either not interested in questions about national identity or articulated some kind of hostility towards national labels. Additionally Greaver et al (2008:15-16) showed that a majority of respondents were sceptical of the idea that common history creates mutual bonds and were somewhat resistant to the ingenuous attempt to ram home the nation’s culture.

**Politicians in the classroom**

The issue of using education as a vehicle for promoting both British values in today’s society and an ‘awareness of the cultural diversity that now characterises British society’ (Andrews et al, 2009) has remained in political prominence for many a decade. However recently the attacks by British born terrorists on British soil in 2005, highlighted and preceded an increase of ‘public debate in Britain on citizenship, national identity, multiculturalism and the integration of minorities.’ (Osler, 2009: 85) Britain’s almost unique status as a multi-national state means that finding a common British identity that all can relate to is problematic, furthermore the significant numbers of ethnic minority Britons whose own diverse cultures means a sense of British identity is judged as imperative for national unity. The problem of promoting Britishness through history teaching only increases as divisions occur when politicians on both sides scramble to appropriate the past in order to construct a history curriculum that they believe will build a greater sense of a British identity.

As with the concept of Britishness politicians have been eager to offer their thoughts on British history teaching with much debate surrounding the orientation of the content of history teaching. The debate of how history should be taught is however certainly not a new one, the dimensions of the argument have shifted slightly, but the core concept of this debate has been ongoing for many a decade. The idea of achieving a greater sense of British values and identity through British history and how ‘these concepts relate to citizenship and ethnic and religious diversity (Olser, 2009: 86) has rarely been absent from the political spotlight. We can place the differing and conflicting views on history
into two broad camps. Firstly there are those who advocate a traditional style of history teaching which places greater emphasis on the ‘transmission of the achievements and cultural heritage of the nation’ (Grever et al, 2008) this view is one that has recently been supported by the Conservative party as they view this method to be ‘a vehicle through which national cultural and moral values could be defended.’ (Crawford, 1995: 438) The counter to this is the call for history to reflect fully the ‘presence and achievements from ethnic minority backgrounds.’ (Greaver et al, 2008) that is a greater revisionist view of British history that gives a greater sensitivity to those from ‘social and ethnic backgrounds that have previously been omitted or portrayed negatively within orthodox school history.’ (Andrews et al, 2009: 367)

A key concern for many political actors has been which of the differing forms of history teaching provides pupils with not only a general knowledge of a British past, but a knowledge that can help to construct a strong sense of national identity, by enabling them to reflect on what it means to be British. One aspect that is agreed upon is that history and citizenship education is to play a substantial role in promoting a national identity, particularly the former. It is however becoming increasingly apparent that with Britain struggling to find a common identity, there is ‘no longer a history with a capital H; there are many competing histories.’ (Phillips, 1998: 41)

The introduction of ‘New History’ which began to ‘gain the upper hand in the 1970s’ (Matthews, 2009) challenged the more traditional method of teaching history, not only was there debate at an educational level but ‘Politicians and ideologues of both sides of the political spectrum…recognised the ideological and cultural significance of the subject. (Phillips, 1998: 42) During the 1980’s some Conservative commentators were critical of some aspects of history teaching especially peace studies and multicultural education which they considered ‘would lead to the neglect of British culture as the cornerstone of national integrity and identity’ (Crawford, 1995: 437) due partly to the fact that ‘new history’ had promoted alternative multicultural histories, encouraging pupils to ‘question and crucially evaluate established national narratives’. (Andrews et al, 2009: 367) which for many conservatives is acutely problematic, as John Patten states ‘…we have to understand our history. I do mean British history…To have national pride should be seen as a virtue, not a vice’ (Patten, 1994) This view that many New right advocates share understandably attracted considerable media attention; the Daily Mail announced
that children would grow up knowing nothing about ‘the gunpowder plot, Trafalgar, Waterloo or Winston Churchill’ (Daily Mail, 5 May, 1994, p.8 quoted in Crawford, 1995). This is a recurrent theme with newspapers quick to assist political claims that Britain’s national history is disappearing and being replaced by general skills based learning. ‘A generation of teenagers know almost nothing about the history of Britain because schools are sidelining knowledge in favour of trendy topics and generic skills… producing a generation of history numbskulls’ (Daily Mail, 2 July, 2009).

Graph 1

Whilst the method and delivery of history teaching is debated it is the content that politicians focus on. Graph 1 highlights the spectrum and divide surrounding the politicalised debate on the content of history teaching. It is of course possible to have history content that is critical and of a mono-narrative and also a plural narrative that is celebratory. However the broad consensus has been that advocates of ‘new history’ would be placed between the plural-narrative and critical axis and those supporting a traditional approach to history teaching would tend to be firmly around the mono-narrative and celebratory axis. This mono-narrative, celebratory narrative endorsed by many Conservatives reflects an inclusive approach to history teaching and also to national identity, which revolves around traditional British values being at the core of national integration regardless of the influence of other competing identity factors. This invokes Norman Tebbit’s now infamous ‘cricket test’ whereby ‘if you live in England, you should support your country of residence rather than your country of origin.’ (McCrone and Kiely, 2000: 20)
Despite Brown articulating Britain as a cosmopolitan society with a commitment to humanity and an important role to play on the world stage (which would be represented on Graph 1 near the plural-narrative and celebratory axis), when Brown addressed the role of history in schools he tended to side with the more traditional form of history teaching focusing on British rather than world or local history, asserting that ‘We should not recoil from our national history...I propose that British history should be given much more prominence in the curriculum – not just dates places and names, nor just a set of unconnected facts, but a narrative that encompasses our history.’ (Brown, 2006) This now changes Brown’s position on Graph 1 moving him to the mono-narrative and celebratory axis, where Conservatives Gove and Cameron are also situated.

Brown suggests that teaching a British history is central to discovering a common British identity, focusing on teaching Britain’s roots through the lens of an onwards march towards democracy, ‘the sole goal seems to be to understand British values through British history.’ (Osler, 2009: 88). Here again Brown conflates English events with British ones. Brown identifies ‘a golden thread of liberty stretching from Runnymede 1215, the Bill of rights 1689 to the four great Reform Acts, (Osler, 2009: 88) all of which can be considered English events not British.

There is little indication that history teaching and education will remain what is currently a mix of traditional and new methods of teaching and content. Both Cameron and Michael Gove, the Education secretary, have strongly promoted a return to traditional history lessons, as a remedy to the perceived lack of national identity and pride. Gove, (2010) has stressed the need the teach history in order as history is a narrative. As ‘children are growing up ignorant of one of the most inspiring stories I know – the history of our United Kingdom.’ Cameron (2009) has echoed the need to ‘bring back proper teaching of British history in our schools’, to replace the bite-sized, disjointed approach to learning about historical events apparently on offer in the current curriculum. Furthermore Gove (2009) ascribes building a modern, inclusive, patriotism by teaching proper narrative of British History - so that every Briton can take pride in this nation. Gove also believes that ‘Guilt about Britain’s past is misplaced.’ (Gove, 2010) which appears to endorse a ‘Our Islands Story’ narrative of British history, one problem here is that this has the potential to glorify all aspects of British history including the empire and slave trade which many believe should not be celebrated, there is also the potential that
this could isolate many students within the classroom. However Gove has recently backtracked conceding that ‘Our history has moments of pride and shame’ but still stresses that ‘one of the under-appreciated tragedies of our time has been the sundering of our society from its past.’ (Gove, 2010) the cause of which is a plural overtly critical narrative of British history.

**Citizenship Education – A lack of engagement**

As history has been the subject of political scrutiny and interference as regards to instilling a sense of national identity and national pride. Citizenship education has been the area under discussion where the focus has been on young person’s lack of civic participation and political engagement. Furthermore some commentators assert that citizenships introduction was a direct response to concern regarding a decline in levels of ‘social capital’ in Britain (Kisby, 2007). As citizenship can be taught as a separate subject or as a cross-curricular subject, it has most notably been utilised alongside history in somewhat of a two pronged attack to promote a sense of acceptance and understanding within a plural society (Kisby, 2007). The 2007 Diversity and Citizenship review’s main recommendation was to call for an extra dimension to citizenship education, namely a ‘fourth ‘strand’ ‘entitled Identity and Diversity: Living Together in the UK.’ (DfES, 2007: 14) this was in direct response to the challenges posed not just by increasing diversity within the UK but division and separation between different groups. Highlighted by the attacks by British born terrorists on British soil in 2005, it was hoped that citizenship education, would offer a shared identity based on membership of a political community (Blunkett, 2002)

There has been considerable debate as to the worth and benefits of citizenship education, surrounding its role regarding ‘citizenship, national identity, multiculturalism and the integration of minorities.’ (Osler, 2009: 85) The introduction of citizenship as compulsory for all students aged 11-16 in 2002, was seen by a significant consensus, at least in many quarters, as a positive step. (Mclaughlin, 2000) There has however been problems’ regarding the realisation and implementation of citizenship as a recognised curriculum subject, not least substantial and critical questions surrounding the definition, purposes and intended outcomes of such education. (Mclaughlin, 2000) Another main issue surrounding citizenship is its lack of tradition, as it is a relative new subject within
the curriculum there is no prescribed teaching and learning approach laid down. While it could be argued that all subjects within the curriculum contain competing models of content and delivery, concerns over the complexity of, and confusion over the definition of citizenship is heightened due to the lack of tradition of teaching citizenship. (Kerr & Cleaver, 2004: 8) this is further complicated as the definition and approach to citizenship education differs considerably in each of the ‘home’ countries that comprise the UK. Citizenship education has developed in diverse ways in the devolved UK education systems of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, this reflects the differing views concerning its place in the respective curriculums. However there is a broad consensus that the chief aims of citizenship education should be to increase political engagement amongst young people and encourage an inclusive framework of civic identities (Andrews and Mycock, 2007) whilst simultaneously enhancing the roles and responsibilities that young people have as citizens of the UK.

**Conclusion**

By illustrating the complexities of national history teaching we have also shown the strong link between history education and the pursuit of advocating national identity. This has put the purpose of history teaching under further scrutiny as to whether the onus is on history teaching to preserve the national heritage and advance political claims. We have demonstrated the theoretical debate surrounding history teaching, and have illustrated that some of the theories of nationalism and citizenship cited in the previous chapter can be applied to history teaching, as it can be argued that civic and ethnic forms of nationalism are represented by new and traditional methods of history teaching respectively.

This chapter has also addressed the reality of the politicalisation of history teaching. Whilst this study is not concerned with what type of history is being taught in schools it is important nonetheless to understand that history teaching has been at the centre of an ideological battle for control that has been ongoing since the 1960’s, between advocates of traditional history and those of new history. Given the amount of political rhetoric and interference in both history and citizenship education surrounding the content and how the subject should be taught leads us to the question as to whether history teaching does succeed in increasing the feeling of Britishness for its students? And does
citizenship education instill a notion of students' identifying themselves as UK citizens? The next section of the study concerns itself with the findings from our questionnaire which will give some indication as to firstly, whether students are influenced by history and citizenship teaching in their notions of Britishness and secondly if there is any commonality between politicians versions of Britishness and that of the students.
Chapter 3

This chapter along with the subsequent one provides an analysis of the data obtained from the field research. The study was entitled ‘What does it mean to be British?’ and comprised of 6 sections. Therefore the analysis of the survey in this section will also be sectioned into 6 sub headings denoting the sections in the survey spread out over the next two chapters. These 6 sections of the study contain both qualitative and quantitative data as questions included a multiple choice rating system but also direct qualitative questions asking the participants to describe in their own words their feelings on what Britishness was, what values it should consist of, and figures that made them feel proud/not proud to be British. In this chapter particular attention is paid to the data that relates to some of the issues outlined in chapter 1. For that reason issues surrounding a British identity, state and national identities and how relevant political articulations of Britishness are, are examined in this chapter. The findings from the study will be used primarily to answer the main research questions that have been set out and explored both theoretically and empirically in the previous chapters.

Background Information

The anonymous survey was undertaken in two 11-16 secondary schools within Kirklees local authority in Huddersfield during April and May 2010. 72 students participated in the questionnaire, all were aged between 14 and 16 years old which meant that they had all received citizenship education and most had at least a year of history education. In fact of the 72 participants 48 (66.7%) confirmed they were taking a formal qualification in history and 15 (20.8%) were not Whilst 9 (12.5%) respondents declined to answer. However all will have experienced cross curricular elements introduced to promote British values particularly through compulsory citizenship education, additionally all the participants will have undergone 3 years of history education.

To provide a demographic of the participants, of the 72 students forty four (61.1%) were female and 28 (38.9%) were male. As for religious beliefs, 21.2% stated they were Christian, 8.3% Muslim and 1.4% Hindu. 36.1% stated they had no religious beliefs and 19.4% said they were atheist or agnostic. 9 students declined to answer. This indicated that religiosity would not feature often in the responses of the survey, which is inline with
previous observations that the salience of religion and in particular Christianity has dramatically reduced when considering the concept of national identity in the UK. (Weight, 2000. Colley, 1998).

The first question of the study asked the participants to provide their places of birth, whilst we can not use the answers as a strong indication of a preferred identity (either local, national or state) nor can the study as a whole accurately indicate the overall importance of these identity tags available to the students, it is worth noting the distinction between the answers given. The data showed us that out of the 72 participants all but 5 were born within the UK, with one born in Sri Lanka and one from Ireland. It was not possible to ascertain where the other three were born as their answers depicted a date rather than a place. 65.3% of respondents provided a local location only as their place of birth (Huddersfield, Shropshire, Leeds etc) compared with only 13.9% and 2.8% who gave their nation (England, Scotland) or State (UK) respectively. There was also 12.5% who answered with both a local and national (Huddersfield, England) preference. Whilst not indicative of preferred identity tags it does show that a British identity does not always hold preference when it comes to birthplaces. It also seems that many young people have an inclination to mention their local place of birth rather than a national or state location. This may indicate that local environments register as salient to the participants as their interaction and majority of experiences occur within this local environment.

**What is it to be British?**

This first part of the survey consisted of a range of statements regarding differing views on Britishness and asked respondents how important each statement was to them in understanding the concept. There were five categories (not important, not too important, important, very important and extremely important) for the respondents to select from. Figure 1 shows the responses of the participants to each particular statement. One participant declined to offer an answer.
As figure 1 illustrates a number of the statements associated to the concepts of national and state (citizenship) identities as to their importance in relation to a British national identity.

What is evident from this data is that all the statements received a sizeable weighting of importance on what it means to be British according to the participants. This indicates that Issues surrounding nationality and citizenship, language, residence and integration were all seemingly important for the respondents. The ability to speak English was a statistic of note as 54.9% of respondents thought it extremely important and 23.9% thought it very important. This holds salience for the respondents more than any other statement available to them and indicates that an ability to speak a common language is of great importance in understanding Britishness. This does not necessarily reflect an exclusive sense of Britishness as being of key importance, a central theme emanating from this first question is that the respondents indicated that for them integration is also a key consideration for being British. Whilst being able to speak English scored the highest in the ‘extremely important’ category, this can be seen as a prerequisite for integration into UK society. It is apparent that understanding the culture and feeling part of the UK is just as, if not more important as being born in the UK or possessing a British passport, with 32.5% stating it was important, 31.0% very important and 12.7% extremely important.
Nonetheless 35.2% thought that been born in the UK was important with 22.5% and 15.5% stating it was very and extremely important, whilst 21.1% and 5.6% thought was not too important and not important respectively. Similarly 26.8% thought holding a British passport was important to being British with a further 31.0% and 22.5% believing it was very and extremely important. This shows us that both nationality and ones citizenship are both regarded as central factors in being British. Thus becoming a UK citizen and integrating into British culture is equally as significant as being born in the UK and deemed more important than having spent most of your life in the UK. Conversely the similar high importance rates for nationality and citizenship may indicate that the students are not clear about the distinction between the two concepts, but that both national and state identities are of importance. Furthermore this highlights the theoretical content explored in chapter 1 illustrating that national identities and state identities are often mistaken as a single entity especially by those residing in England.

There were also a number of statements in the ‘further comments’ section that provided additional articulations of the preferred identities for some of the participants. These comments give some evidence of a leaning towards an English rather than British identity. ‘we should not be taught how to be British as we are all different and should not have to be forced into being British, when some of us believe we are English!’ (Response, 17) this highlights both resentment towards being told how to be British and a preference for an English identity. Furthermore Responses 22 and 24 from participants also highlight a preference for an English identity than that of a British one. ‘Englishness is much more important than Britishness’ (22) ‘in my eyes I am English not British’ (24) These statements clearly show that some participants favour their sub-state identity over a British one, additionally it is possible to see that the respondents providing these statements were in the 20.3% who agreed strongly with the statement ‘Englishness is more important than Britishness’ (taken from figure 2).

With the exception of having British ancestry all the other statements received a relatively high ‘important’ or more weighting. This indicates that legal recognition as a UK citizen is held as pertinent as the integration and socialisation process, whereby persons feel part of a community whilst respecting the laws and political institutions. This notion of commonality relates to Anderson’s imagined political community in so far as the
respondents indicated that living within the UK was important and also feeling a part of society. That is the notion that residents and citizens can feel and imagine they are part of a national community.

**Understanding Britishness**

Politicians’ articulations of what Britishness is and what it should mean seem to be perpetually vague constructions surrounding ‘British values’ and shared ideals that embody a national British identity as possessing something for everybody. In a plural society such as the UK this is understandable, however the examples that policy makers stress as being important and prevalent in a British identity and within British values may not resonate in the same way for young people of today. This section on understanding Britishness asked the respondents to provide 3 examples of what Britishness is. Once again the number of answers declined from a relatively high response count for the first answer to a relatively low count for the last. 100% of the 63 participants who chose to answer the question provided one answer, 85.7% (54) could provide 2 answers and only 66.7% (42) managed to provide a third. 9 respondents declined to offer an answer in this section. Again this illustrates that whilst the participants are aware of the concept of Britishness and have an understanding of what it means to them, providing 3 specific examples of what it consists of is a difficult task for them. Although again the data shows there were more students who could think of 3 examples than those who could not.

The data infers that the participants clearly associate Britishness with an ‘emotion’ or an ‘attitude’. 28.3% of the respondents referenced a feeling or attitude in their answer, which meant emotions/attitudes were the highest scoring category of answers provided by the participants. Furthermore of all the answers included in the ‘emotion/attitude’ category 46.6% of these mentioned the specific term ‘pride’ which meant ‘pride’ in its own category would possess 13.2% of all answers given by the respondents.

Another category that was of a similar vein to attitudes/emotions was that of perceived British traits which received 7.5% of all answers overall in this section. The category of perceived British traits consisted of statements that possessed references to an activity or scenario that although stereotypical are often associated with Britain. The examples represented an almost nostalgic view of Britishness with responses perhaps illustrating
personal experiences of the participants, and is reminiscent of John Majors ideas of what Britishness is illustrated in chapter 1. When the findings relating to British traits is taken together with the category of attitudes/emotions we can say that an important construction of national identity for the participants is expressionist, that is Britishness for the respondents is to a certain extent not material but emotive. Illustrations of this provided by the participants included ‘fish and chips at the Blackpool pier’ (response no. 31), ‘watching football at the pub’ (response no. 14) and ‘Raining on the Cricket’ (response no. 3, 2nd answer).

The second highest scoring category was that of ‘other’ which accounted for 18.7% of all answers from the participants. One reason for this category scoring so highly was that as the answers to this question were so varied it was not possible to successfully categorise or quantify them all. Therefore many answers were grouped into the ‘other’ category. This may also be indicative of the varied nature of the concept of Britishness, these answers show that a national identity means many different things to different people. The category of ‘British food’ also scored relatively highly. It received 8.8% of responses in this section, which indicates that when articulating their ideas of a British national identity British cuisine is of importance to the participants.

The civic institutions of Britain were not a prominent feature in the answers provided by the participants. Civic institutions such as the NHS and British schools received just 3.8% of all responses in this section. This is of particular interest as both Gordon Brown and David Cameron have attached such importance on the role of Britain’s civic institutions in their respective articulations of what Britishness is. Whilst the majority of answers received referenced the NHS or education there was also a negative aspect with a mention of ‘two faced politicians’ (response 36, 2nd question) Furthermore David Cameron has also referenced the monarchy as an example of a common identifier in defining Britishness yet only 4 participants mentioned the Queen or the monarchy in this section (2.5% of all answers) this highlights that these respondents do not affiliate a monarch with modern representations of Britishness.

As well as civic institutions answers with historical references were also low. Only 1.6% of answers related to history for the first question, 5.0% of answers contained a historical reference. This perhaps shows that when participants are constructing a concept of
Britishness factors such as attitudes and feelings play a more important role than events from the past or the institutions of today.

In fact there were more responses from participants that thought Britishness was unimportant or not relevant than mentioned Britain’s civic institutions and equaled answers with an historical reference. 5.0% of all answers provided alluded to Britishness as a concept being unimportant or not relevant.

The category of Nationality and Citizenship was also one of note. Although answers relating to both were included in this category it was possible to see that there were answers from the participants that placed importance on being born in Britain and those that mentioned being British and British citizenship. 6.3% (10) of answers received related to Nationality and citizenship. Of these 10 answers 3 specifically mentioned ‘being born in Britain’ (response no. 20, 27, 63) and one response referred to both nationalism and citizenship ‘Being born in Britain or being a British citizen’ (response no.5). This may indicate that both being a British born national and becoming a British citizen are relatively important factors for Britishness. However it is not clear whether many of the answers stating ‘being British’ refer to just citizenship or are inclusive of being born in Britain. There was also some evidence of a small amount of anti-French sentiment and/or xenophobia as 3.1% of all answers included a reference to disliking the French or other foreign nation.

**British Values**

This question in the survey related to Britishness and the construction of British values. We asked the participants to provide up to three examples of what British values were to them. This question followed the same declining participation pattern as previous questions. 98.1% of the 54 respondents who participated in this question offered a first answer. 79.6% (43) provided a second and 59.3% (32) offered a third. 18 (25%) participants declined to offer any answer in this section. This could highlight that some of respondents found the concept of ‘British values’ difficult to comprehend and difficult to answer. This may also illustrate that perhaps some participants chose not to answer certain questions in this section and other parts of the survey due to a lack of interest or a lack of knowledge surrounding the topic.
Answers that possessed a reference to an attitude or emotion were again the highest scoring. 30.5% of the answers contained a feeling or attitude. Again this illustrates that participants attach importance to Britishness consisting of emotions rather than tangible examples. Of the 30.5% of attitudes and emotions, the feeling of ‘pride’ accounted for 25.6% and ‘respect’ accounted for 28.2% of all the answers in this category. This gave ‘pride’ and ‘respect’ 7.8% and 8.6% of all answers in this section respectively. Unlike other sections in this survey the participants did elaborate on some of the examples of these emotions/attitudes. Many of the ‘respect’ answers were varied and related to ‘respecting elders’, ‘respecting peoples’ rights’ and ‘respecting other people’. Whilst the majority of ‘pride’ answers were not specific, which again highlights that the participants are aware that pride plays a substantial role in their constructs of British values, however they could not be exact as to where to place this feeling of pride. Other notable emotions/feelings in this category were determination, patriotism, strength and tolerance.

Very much similar to ‘attitudes/emotions’ but with a subtle but important difference was that 8.6% of all answers related to putting into practice attributes associated with attitudes. For example ‘possessing good manners’ received 4 separate mentions whilst other statements such as ‘looking after your neighbours’ illustrates that for some participants demonstrating positive attitudes is as important as possessing them in the first place. Again British cuisine featured prominently with 13.3% of respondents citing this category in their answers, which may be a product of the intense media coverage ‘British food’ has received recently.

The category of ‘other’ was again used given the diverse and varied nature of the responses. 16.4% of all answers in this section were grouped into the ‘other’ category. The responses in this category were again extremely varied and included: money, accents, land, comedy, weather and ‘naming every player in the England football team at any given time’ (response no. 7). 3.9% of all answers indicated that the participants did not believe British values were important or relevant, whilst the same amount of answers (3.9%) contained language expressing a dislike for anyone not British.

British civic institutions had not been a prominent factor in previous sections of the survey, and this pattern continued in this section. Although 6.3% of all answers were
comparatively high in this section alone, it still only amounted to 8 out of a possible 128 answers. Once again this highlights that the respondents do not share the political discourse surrounding the importance of civic institutions and Britishness. The remaining categories of note were ‘family values’ which received 3.1% of all answers and references to the ‘British armed forces’ which received 3.9% of all answers. There were also 2 responses that indicated having the ability to speak English was important when considering British values.

The next section and question in the survey consisted of a range of statements regarding differing views on Britishness and asked respondents to agree or disagree with each statement. There were five categories (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree) for the respondents to select from.

Figure 2: How Britishness relates to me

The range of statements in this section related to the participants notions of how Britishness relates to them. Figure 2 shows the responses of the participants to each particular statement. 3 participants declined to offer an answer.

A first point to note is that of the participants’ attitudes British values. 11.8% agreed strongly and 48.5% agreed with the statement that ‘British values are key to understanding Britishness’. Only 7.4% disagreed and 8.8% disagreed strongly with this statement. Although over 60% of participants believe that British values are of
importance to Britishness, as discussed 25% of the respondents that took part in this survey could not provide an answer when asked to name examples of these ‘British values’. This is further highlighted perhaps by the 23.5% that neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement shown in figure 2. Nonetheless over 60% of the participants have indicated that British values are important to understanding Britishness.

Another point is that 16.2% strongly agreed and 44.1% agreed that ‘The government should not tell me how to be British’. This to a certain extent shows that the participants do not agree with government articulations of what Britishness is. Furthermore it may be indicative of the respondents being resistant to attempts by the government to promote their idea of national identity. This is in line with findings by Clarke (2009) and illustrates that government constructed examples of what ‘Britishness’ is and what British values are, do not resonate with the participants. Comments from the ‘further comments’ section of the field research provide further evidence that may indicate some students are not receptive to state articulations of national identity, ‘I do not think that we should be taught any views on being British. I think it is fair to have our own opinions on how to be British’ (response 18) this may be indicative of resentment towards what they perceived as a government attempting to force Britishness on students.

Although 30.9% of participants neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, when taken together with the statement ‘Being at school has increased my understanding of Britishness’ of which the responses were somewhat even. With 10.1% strongly agreed and 29.0% agreed. However 26.1% neither agreed nor disagreed and 21.7% disagreed and 13.0% disagreed strongly. This may suggest a degree of passiveness towards the idea of national identity. This assertion is further strengthened when we consider the data from the statement ‘Britishness is not important to me’ 33.8% disagreed and 20.6% strongly disagreed. This shows that a majority (54.4%) of the participants do hold a British national identity as important to them. However 25.0% neither disagreeing nor agreeing, 13.2% strongly agreeing and 7.4% agreeing does also suggest that a similar amount of participants do not believe Britishness is important. This finding echo’s Fenton (2007) who has noted that there is a significant element of indifference or disregard for a national identity.
The participants also disagreed with the statement that ‘Understanding Britishness is not important to be a UK citizen’ 36.2% disagreed and 15.9% strongly disagreed. This indicates that the participants believe that as a UK citizen one should possess an understanding of what Britishness is. This reiterates the earlier findings from this chapter that illustrated that the respondents felt a common understanding of our national identity was key to a successful integration of British society.

The final statement in this section asked whether the respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘Englishness is more important than Britishness’, interestingly 20.3% agreed strongly and 23.2% agreed. This could be an indication of a preferred national identity for the participants, or an example of conflation between Englishness and Britishness, however 39.1% neither agreed nor disagreed. As this is the only question on the survey surrounding Englishness to presume either a confusion or preference of identities would be misguided. However some of the additional comments provided by the participants already explored in this chapter indicated a preference for an English identity instead of that of a British one. Nonetheless this assertion is a tenuous one and it is not possible to make any substantive claims in regards to the participant’s preference for a national or sub-state identity, nor whether the respondents confuse the two concepts without further study in this area.
Chapter 4

This chapter explores and analyses the field research that relates to chapter 2. Accordingly questions that relate to history and citizenship education and their relationship with the participants notions of national identity and British citizenship are examined here. The data from the questions on British pride is also investigated and while this section could have been analysed in either this or the previous chapter, the association of national pride with some national historical narratives means it is perhaps more suited to being placed in a chapter focusing on the effects of education on participants constructs of Britishness.

A Question of Pride

Politicians have invariably associated the decline of national identity with a lack of pride. Often invoked alongside the concept of patriotism, policy makers want British citizens to feel a sense of satisfaction and pleasure in being British. British pride for many politicians also seems to be synonymous with British history (Gove, 2010. Cameron, 2009. Brown 2006). However the ideas and examples that policy makers feel we should associate with pride and what the participants of this study think may be very different. This next question asked the respondents to provide 3 examples that made them feel proud to be British and 3 that invoked a feeling of ‘not proud.’ One point to note here was although 100% of the 71 participants who chose to answer the question could provide one example, 98.6% (70) could provide two but only 77.5% (55) could provide three. These statistics show us that whilst the participants were aware of examples that did and did not make them feel proud to be British, they struggled to articulate 3 separate illustrations, although evidently there were more students who could think of three than those who could not.

This section provided us with some indication or evidence that history teaching does not exert too much influence on the students’ notions of associating British pride with history. Although 16.8% of all answers included some reference to historical examples, these responses included extremely vague examples being classed as historical such as ‘winning world wars’ (Response no 6) and even vaguer and inaccurate ‘not losing any war’ (Response no 3, 3rd Answer). Furthermore only two students (2.33%) provided
more than one historical reference out of their 3 possible answers in this section. This could indicate that the students do not associate pride with British historical events, or have a lack of knowledge or interest regarding the subject. Whilst the student's may not know about every aspect of British history, to say that they are not proud of Britain’s historic achievements is slightly unfair. Over half (59.4%) of all the responses that were associated with a British historical event referenced a perceived achievement, whether that was possessing an empire or being on the victorious side in World War Two. This shows that a sense of achievement and/or glory holds more importance than the fact it can be classed as historic. Additionally this indicates that the respondents adhered to a more celebratory historical narrative of British history. However, only 11.8% of respondents made reference to Britain’s reputation or characteristics. This included Britain’s status as a more economical developed country (MEDC) and its perceived high standing in global politics.

Although historical references were relatively low in the examples provided by respondents, there was only one category that appeared more and that was the category we have termed contemporary culture. Answers such as fashion, references to cuisine, TV, and sport have been placed into this category. 39.3% of respondents referenced contemporary culture in their answers.

This was clearly a very important factor when considering pride within Britishness. Not only does this indicate that a sense of national pride can be associated with events and examples that are relevant to the participants, it also shows that external influences have a profound effect on young peoples’ notions surrounding pride in their country, evidently more so than historical events learnt within the classroom. It is not so surprising that culture scored highly as the category inculcates many aspects of society that the participants will be familiar with or have knowledge about. The largest contributor to the cultural category was British cuisine which accounted for just over a third (31.2%) of all answers in this category and 12.2% of all answers in the ‘pride’ section of the survey, Taken together with the previous findings in the ‘understanding Britishness’ section this indicates that the cuisine of Britain is clearly something that the respondents attach a degree of importance to and a factor that acts as a serious conduit of national pride.
Civic institutions of Britain such as the National Health Service (NHS), welfare state and Parliament scored relatively low with only 14.8% of participants citing it in their responses. Again this is of particular interest as successive governments have recently promoted Britain's civic institutions as an important channel for pride. This finding shows to a certain extent that the participants do not liken institutions with a sense of pride or a positive vision of Britishness despite politicians’ best efforts to connect institutions such as the NHS and Parliament to a common understanding of what should be celebrated our national identity.

Given the amount of recent media attention on British service personnel serving abroad and of the repatriation ceremonies held in the UK we were surprised that armed forces were not selected more as an answer. Only 6.6% gave an answer with any reference to the armed forces. This may indicate that explicit symbolism such as the repatriation ceremonies does not really resonate with the participants.

What this data on the subject on pride has shown is that there is a wide variety of examples that participants were proud and not proud of. Whilst history has clearly had some effect on both proud/not proud fronts Given the political wrangling in recent time surrounding the Union flag, it was surprising that the flag of the Union received only one mention out of all 196 answers, this perhaps indicates that a sense of banal nationalism does not effect associations of Britishness, certainly in the respect of British pride.

In a similar vein, the next question asked the participants to name up to three examples that made the feel ‘not proud’ to be British. Again the number of responses declined from 69 respondents providing one example, 65 (94.2%) providing two and only 46 (66.7%) managing to provide a third. 3 participants declined to answer this question. This again highlights that although the participants are aware of examples that may make them feel ‘not proud’ to be British, when pressed they struggle to articulate more than one or two separate illustrations. Furthermore a high percentage of the examples provided by the respondents cross over the groupings we have constructed. For example ‘Drugs’ has been classed as within the criminal category but could have quite easily been accepted under social problems.
References to historical examples were extremely low in the ‘not proud’ section with only 2.8% of respondents providing any mention of them. The 2.8% equated to only 5 separate references to historical examples out of a possible 180, of these 3 were regarding Britain’s involvement in the slave trade and the other 2 mentioned the loss of the empire. This perhaps shows that advocates of traditional history need not worry too much about teaching a ‘warts and all’ narrative of British history as this data indicates historical examples covered on the syllabus are not (for these participants at least) synonymous with not been proud of Britain.

The category of ‘social problems’ received the highest percentage from participants in the ‘not proud’ section, as 28.3% of all answers related to the issue of ‘social problems’ overall. The issues included in this category were examples such as chavs, binge drinking, benefit fraud, anti-social behaviour, teenage pregnancies and people not getting involved within their communities. Within this category it is evident that one perceived typecast of perpetuating social problems received a significant percentage weighting. That was the term ‘chavs’, a term relating to the appearance and behaviour of an individual. 58.8% of all answers relating to ‘social problems’ included the specific term of ‘chav’, this meant 16.7% of all answers in the ‘not proud’ segment related directly to chavs. This illustrates that the well documented negative aspect of British society does have a profound effect on influencing what makes young persons feel not proud of Britain, especially that of the ‘chav’

This is even more evident if we take the score form the ‘immigration’ category which was frequently mentioned as a negative with respondents citing grievances with not speaking a common language and the perception that jobs were being unfairly taken by ‘immigrants’. This category received 11.7% (which is the same as ‘social problems’ without the ‘chav’ percentage taken into account). When these categories are combined it results in a total of 40.1% of participants providing a reference to perceived negative examples of British society. However 9.4% of respondents contrasted with this finding, stating that attitudes towards others are a reason for not being proud of Britain. These attitudes included references to prejudice, racism, discrimination, ignorance and stereotyping.
References to the Government or Politicians also received a high percentage in answers from participants in the ‘not proud’ section. 19.4% made a reference to the Government and politicians in their responses. This high scoring percentage that the category received may be indicative of recent media coverage surrounding British MP’s expenses claims.

Another category that scored relatively high was the ‘other’ category. This was a collection of responses that participants felt not proud about but did not relate to any of the other broad categories, 14.4% of respondents provided an example that could be described as an ‘other’. Examples included sporting failures, references to TV, specific geographic locations, music, terrorism and animal cruelty.

The next section surrounding pride and Britishness asked the participants to name 3 people who made them feel proud and then 3 people who made them feel not proud to be British. Again what was noticeable immediately was the pattern of the vast majority of participants being able to provide the first answer, a majority being able to provide a second and then only a minority being able to provide a third example. In this instance 64 respondents managed to provide one example, 53 (82.8%) managed two and only 36 (56.3%) students managed a third, 8 respondents did not participate in this section. Likewise in the corresponding ‘people who make you feel not proud’ section 62 participants could provide one answer, 44 (71.0%) could provide two and a disappointing 25 (40.3%) could manage three and 10 respondents decline to participate. This again highlights that whilst the participants are generally aware of figures that invoke pride and conversely ‘not pride’ providing numerous specific examples proved difficult.

Out of all the examples provided by the respondents Winston Churchill was the most popular figure receiving 11.1% of all responses. The second highest was that of a family member which received 10.4% of all responses and the next highest figure was the Queen with 9.2%.

Again given the amount of media attention the repatriation ceremonies at Wootton Bassett have received it was surprising that only 5.2% of participants made any reference to members of the armed forces although this 5.2% was the fourth highest answer, which highlights the numerous and diverse answers received. The most popular
examples that related to popular or contemporary culture were the figures of Simon Cowel and Cheryl Cole who received 3.9% and 2.6% respectively. Answers relating to popular culture equated to 73.2% of all responses and 2.6% were 'other' which included references to prominent figures that were not British.

Out of all the responses 24.2% made reference to a historical figure and the answers provided were broad and varied, however Churchill accounted for 46.0% of the historical figures. Furthermore for historical figures to receive just under a quarter of all responses indicates that those associated with achievements and positive contributions to society, and those associated with being victorious still resonates in relation to pride for the participants of this study. Another former Prime Minister who received a sizeable weighting was the Liberal David Lloyd George with 13.5%. Emmeline Pankhusrt, Charles Darwin and Alan Turing each received 5.4% of responses associated with historical references. Other figures of note included Alexander Fleming, Isaac Newton, Oliver Cromwell and Robert Baden-Powell. These figures illustrate varied examples from the participants. Interestingly the vast majority of 91.9% of the historical examples are indicative of recency, as only 8.1% of the historical figures mentioned in the survey were born before the start of the 19th century. Additionally one of these examples (Mary Anning) was born in 1799 and is thus remembered for her actions within the 19th century.

In the corresponding ‘not proud’ section recent political figures attracted the highest weightings. Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown was mentioned the most with 14.5% of all the answers provided. The British National Party leader Nick Griffin was the second highest as 9.9% of the responses referred to him. These findings could illustrate that the participants are reacting to recent events, and may be thought of as positive as the participants are engaging with current political affairs.

Historical references were surprisingly low given the high percentage they received in the ‘proud’ section. Only 5.3% (7 separate references) of all responses gave a reference to historical figure. Of this 5.3%, 3 references were made to Henry the eighth. Mary I (Bloody Mary), Guy Fawkes, William Shakespeare (?) and John Forrest were also mentioned. This meant that tabloid favourite Katy Price received the same (5.3%) amount of references as all historical figures. Although this segment was intended for
references for individual figures, the Government received 6 references (4.6%) and criminals and immigrants received 3.8% and 3.1% respectively. What the data from ‘not proud’ illustrates is that apart from Gordon Brown and Nick Griffin, figures that invoke ‘not proud’ sentiment are extremely varied, but tended to be examples from contemporary culture.

History Teaching and Britishness

The next section and question in the survey consisted of a range of statements regarding differing views on History teaching and asked respondents to agree or disagree with each statement. There were five categories (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree) for the respondents to select from. The range of statements in this section related to the participants notions of how and what history should be presented in the classroom. Figure 3 shows the responses of the participants to each particular statement. One participant declined to offer an answer.

Figure 3: History teaching, a common understanding or different views?

The first point to note here is that 42.9% and 12.9% (65.8% overall) agreed and strongly agreed with the statement that ‘ethnic minorities should be encouraged to preserve and celebrate their history and culture, and this should be reflected in history lessons’ with only 8.6% and 7.1% disagreeing and strongly disagreeing.
This would infer some support for a more inclusive British national narrative, an approach which is more closely related with ‘new history’ (and would be situated near the plural-narrative axis on graph 1 in chapter 2). At the same time the participants indicated that they agreed that ‘there are too many interpretations of British history’ as 39.1% and 14.5% agreed and strongly agreed respectively, although 37.7% neither agreed nor disagreed. This shows that whilst the respondents want ethnic minorities to explore their own history, they also believe that national history has become too plural, though the 37.7% figure could also indicate that some are not overly concerned with how many versions of British history there are.

A second point is that 28.2% and 43.7% disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively with the statement that ‘some parts of British history should not be taught as they are offensive to some citizens on grounds of religion or ethnicity’ This suggests that the participants feel that British history should not be carefully chosen or diluted in any way irrespective of any offence caused to those from ethnic and cultural minorities. This is more in line with a traditional method of history teaching (and would be placed near the celebratory and mono-narrative axis on graph 1 in chapter 2). Taken together with the data from the statement regarding ethnic minorities preserving their history in the classroom, it appears that whilst ethnic minorities should be encouraged to explore their histories, it is not acceptable to discard or censor epochs in British history solely on the basis that it may cause offence to others.

14.1% and 35.2% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed that ‘There is a lack of pride in British history which is reflected in history teaching in schools’. This concurs with criticisms from the Conservative party explored in chapter 2 aimed at ‘new history teaching’ and the lack of pride taken when teaching events in British history considered ‘traditional’. However whilst the participants may believe that history lessons today are lacking in pride, they do not generally think that ‘History teachers must be loyal to the state and always promote a positive view of the UK’. Only 5.6% strongly agreed and 12.7% agreed with this statement, whilst 33.8% disagreed and 19.7% disagreed strongly. (28.2% neither agreed nor disagreed)

This shows that the students’ may prefer a ‘warts en all’ narrative of British history and it would seem that this data echos that of Clark (2009) in that student’s are not receptive to
a state edited, overtly positive narrative of national history, but one that is balanced depicting both positive elements and narratives associated with ethnic and cultural minorities. Nonetheless the statement that read ‘The state should control what is taught in school history lessons to ensure we all have a common view of national identity and loyalty to the UK’ received inconclusive responses with 8.6% and 25.7% strongly disagreeing and disagreeing, 28.6% neither disagreeing nor agreeing leaving 21.4% and 15.7% agreeing and strongly agreeing.

Although the participants had indicated that ethnic minorities’ multi cultural histories should be promoted and explored in history lessons, it was also possible to discern that the participants view the benefits of immigration in relation to British history with some scepticism. Only 2.9% strongly agreed and 15.7% agreed that ‘Immigration and globalisation have strengthened my understanding of British history’ and 28.6% disagreed and 20.0% disagreed strongly whilst 32.9% neither disagreed nor agreed. Likewise 34.3% strongly agreed and 32.9% agreed with the statement ‘Immigrants seeking citizenship must pass a test which proves they understand our national history and culture’. To a certain extent this points to the participants advocating that key to a national identity and integration in communities is the notion that knowledge surrounding British history and cultures is of importance.

However at the same time 34.3% disagreed and 18.6% strongly disagreed with the statement that ‘It is impossible for people who do not share our history to be a British citizen’ therefore there is an element of contradiction and confusion within the respondents answers towards immigration. Taken together with immigrants passing a test, the data shows that although immigrants or others coming to live in the UK should display a sense of understanding and respect for a British history and culture which aids a notion of national identity, it is not imperative that ‘they’ share our history, but know of it.

As stated at the outset of the previous chapter, given the answers provided we did not believe that religiosity would bear much significance. The data from this section also seems to add credence to that claim. 38.0% neither disagreed nor agreed with the statement that ‘Religion should be the most important dimension in the teaching of British history and should be respected at all times’ however 25.4% and 22.5%
disagreed and strongly disagreed, leaving only a combined 14.1% who agreed and strongly agreed.

Figure 4: Studying history at school

The first point to take from figure 4 is that 64.8% of all the respondents believed that undergoing history education at school was not relevant to how British they felt. This would give an indication that learning history at school had little bearing on their ideas of Britishness. However 23.9% thought that learning history in school did in fact increase their sense of Britishness and 5.6% thought it made them feel very British. These figures compared favourably with the 2.8% that thought History education did not make them feel British and 2.8% that thought it did not make them feel British at all.

It is however, possible to further analyse the individual responses given to this question. Of the 64.8% of participants who answered that studying history was not relevant to how British they felt just under a quarter (23.9%) of the respondents were not taking a GCSE in history. Thus it is understandable that history education would not be relevant to their sense of Britishness. Furthermore of the 23.9% of participants who thought history increased their sense of national identity, 76.5% were undergoing a history GCSE. We can infer then that three quarters of participants who are taking a history GCSE do believe that it enhances their notions of Britishness.

The Findings from the History/Britishness section appear to indicate that participants do not have a preference for either ‘new’ or traditional methods of history teaching, but one
that has elements of both. The respondents have shown that they believe there is a lack of pride in history teaching and that there are too many versions of British history available. They also agree that those pupils from ethnic backgrounds should be able to learn and preserve their histories within history lessons.

**Citizenship Education**

The next section focused on citizenship education in secondary schools and the effect it may have or not have on how young people think about life in the UK. The statements relate to the current debate as to whether citizenship education actually has much influence on young people and how they view life in the UK. Again there were five categories (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree) for the respondents to select from. One student declined to offer any answers for this question. The responses form the participants were generally very positive for citizenship education, and the majority (53) of the students were aware that citizenship was being taught within their school, which as citizenship lessons have been compulsory since 2002 is not surprising, in fact we would have expected a higher amount of participants being conscious of citizenship education. This may illustrate that citizenship education in the schools participating in the study is amalgamated into other subjects.

*Figure 5: Is citizenship education changing the way young people think about living in the UK?*
Figure 5 illustrates that 5.6% and 39.4% of the participants strongly agreed and agreed respectively that citizenship education has given them a clear understanding of the rights and responsibilities of being a UK citizen. Furthermore 7.1% and 31.4% strongly agreed and agreed with the statement that ‘citizenship has increased my understanding of my role in the community’. This indicates that the participants are applying the skills and knowledge learnt in the classroom and utilising these in their respective communities. It would also seem that citizenship education has achieved its aim of increasing students’ understanding and knowledge surrounding political systems within the UK. 12.7% and 38.0% strongly agreed and agreed with the statement ‘citizenship education has improved my understanding of the British political system’, whilst only 14.1% and 11.3% disagreed and strongly disagreed and 23.9% neither agreed nor disagreed.

However whilst there is evidence that illustrates citizenship education has had a beneficial impact on the students’ understanding of political systems, and their rights as citizens, the responses to the statement ‘teachers should not tell me how to be a good citizen’ were less than conclusive. 16.9% and 21.1% strongly agreed and agreed that teachers should not instruct students on their behaviour outside the classroom whilst 14.1% and 11.3% disagreed and strongly disagreed, 38.0% neither disagreed nor agreed. This indicates that although the students are receptive to the content of citizenship education classes, how one participates within a community should be a matter of an individual’s discretion and not for a teacher to decide. Additionally it may indicate that the participants do not regard citizenship teacher’s views regarding citizenship as necessarily correct.

The data presented also indicated strong support for immigrants seeking citizenship to have to undertake and pass a citizenship test which proves understanding of how to be a UK citizen. 26.8% and 38.0% strongly agreed and agreed with this statement with only 8.5% and 7.0% disagreeing and strongly disagreeing. This may indicate that the participants believe that a common understanding of UK citizenship is imperative to successful community cohesion. The respondent’s answers seem to strongly favour the current government policy of immigrants undertaking a citizenship test.
Despite the generally favourable responses that citizenship education received from figure 5. Figure 6 shows that 52.9% of all the participants thought citizenship education as not relevant as to how they see themselves as UK citizens. However 15.7% agreed with the statement that citizenship education ‘Made you see yourself more like a UK citizen’ and 18.6% thought that citizenship lessons ‘Made you see yourself as a UK citizen’ this gives a combined 34.3% of participants that citizenship has had a positive influence on in relation to how they perceive themselves as UK citizens. This also compares favourably with the combined 12.9% of participants for whom citizenship did not have a positive influence on. These findings illustrate that just over a third of students believe that citizenship education has had a positive effect on their experience as a UK citizen. This infers to a certain extent that citizenship education does increase students’ awareness and knowledge surrounding their civic and political rights and responsibilities.
Conclusion

This study has concerned itself with a number of questions relating to young students and their relationships with history, citizenship education and national identity. We set out to ascertain whether history teaching has any influence on students’ notions of national identity, at the same time given the level of political discourse surrounding national identity do these same students concur with recent political articulations of what Britishness is? Lastly due to the purpose of citizenship education and its link to history teaching we wanted to know if the subject of citizenship education was achieving its aims of increasing political understanding and producing young persons who view themselves as citizens of the UK? In the first two chapters we have critically discussed both the theoretical and empirical contexts of nation building and national identity in regards to nationalism, history teaching and citizenship education. Then we have carried out and analysed a questionnaire in which young students have provided their views on these said topics. In this conclusion we will attempt to answer the main research questions posed at the beginning of this study.

We can say with a certain degree of conviction that young students do not believe that undergoing history education is of much relevance to how British they feel. Whilst there is a minority that do feel history lessons have increased their sense of Britishness, there is perhaps a sense of ambivalence towards history teaching which suggests that it does not have too much bearing on how British the participants feel.

Perhaps one reason for history teaching’s lack of influence on shaping national identity is that despite politicians and policy makers’ attachment to history as a instrument for promoting history, it is evident that young students are quite sceptical about state-promoted history programmes which seek to inculcate mutual bonds through a national narrative. This finding seems to a certain extent concur with other recent studies in that students’ are not receptive to state edited, overtly positive narrative of national history (Clark, 2009), but one that is balanced depicting both positive elements and critical narratives associated with ethnic and cultural minorities.

Whilst we were not looking to ascertain which if any of the much debated history teaching types provides a narrative that resonates the most with the students, we can
infer that students are receptive to elements of both new and traditional methods of history teaching. Students do believe an inclusive multi-narrative form of British history should be encouraged to help preserve and celebrate minorities’ histories within the classroom. Despite this it appears that whilst multi-ethnic narratives should be explored in the classroom, this should not be accommodated at the expense of a more traditional British historical narrative even if this was to cause offence to some on the grounds of religious beliefs or ethnicity. It seems that it is not acceptable to discard or censor epochs in British history solely on the basis that it may cause offence to others. This can be taken to imply that students believe elements of both traditional and new history approaches have a place in the classroom, which appears to echo claims made by many educationalists surrounding the orientation of history teaching.

Additionally it is clear that students do feel that history teachers convey a lack of pride when teaching British history modules. This corresponds with criticisms from the Conservative party aimed at ‘new history teaching’ and the lack of pride taken when teaching events in British history that they feel should be celebrated (Gove, 2010, Cameron, 2009) This also may confirm that some history teachers feel uncomfortable attempting to convey a sense of pride and question its appropriateness when teaching history. (Hand and Pearce, 2008)

Despite our findings that history does not overtly affect students’ perceptions of Britishness it is possible to discern that British historical achievements do to some extent invoke a sense of national pride, especially the British figures and successes associated to the Second World War. Whilst this displays a degree of recency it should be noted that it seems that a positive almost celebratory narrative of British history results in students associating British pride with historical events. This also illustrates to a certain extent that Britain’s role in the Second World War is still of great importance to young people despite the generation gaps that have formed over time. Conversely we can suggest that young people barely register a historical event/figure in relation to a feeling of not being proud to be British. What is interesting here is that given that there is some correlation between history and pride and hardly any connection whatsoever between history and not feeling proud, it is not unreasonable to claim that the participants seem to adhere to a more celebratory narrative of British history, which could imply that the students in this study are not taught a critical narrative of British history. Therefore we
can deduce that whilst history teaching does not influence students’ ideas of national identity history does to a certain degree have a bearing on students’ notions of national pride.

Given the purposely vague and broad articulations by politicians of what Britishness is, it is not too surprising that on some issues there is a slight degree of consensus between students and politicians. Primarily this agreement centres on the significance of UK citizens sharing a common language. There were strong indications that an ability to speak English was of great significance in understanding what is important in being British. It is however difficult to ascertain if this is a cultural or civic finding. On one hand it could be indicative of the difficulty facing those who do not speak English to integrate and participate within communities and also with the civic institutions that the UK contains. On the other hand this may simply indicate an aversion for non English speaking UK residents or migrants based purely on their inability to converse in the ‘home’ language.

Either way the factor of a common language being important has had a recent political voice with some policy makers attributing importance to everybody in the UK being able to speak English in order to promote integration. (May, 2010, Cameron, 2009)

However despite this one commonality between political rhetoric and students’ own ideas of Britishness, there is it would seem precious little else in the way of political and government discourse that the students subscribe to. This infers that young people do not like being told how to be British and are perhaps suspicious of government attempts to do so. This is inline with a growing body of thought that highlights young peoples’ indifference and disregard for national identity. (Fenton, 2007)

Whilst the civic institutions of the UK such as the National Health Service (NHS), welfare state, and Parliament are heralded as beacons of both Britishness and British pride by successive Prime ministers, it would appear that these British institutions hold little if any importance at all for young students. Instead we can suggest that British pride for young students is clearly associated with examples and instances that can be described as ‘contemporary culture’, (relating to British cuisine, fashion, sport and TV). Therefore despite politicians’ best efforts to connect institutions to a common understanding of
what should be celebrated about Britishness, our findings indicate that young people do not necessarily associate institutions with a sense of pride or a positive vision of national identity. On the contrary political institutions such as parliament are likened with a sense of being ‘not proud’ to be British. Whilst this may be a reaction due to recent media coverage surrounding British MP’s expenses claims, it also illustrates that although politicians may want parliament to be recognised as a civic institution deserving of pride, this feeling is noticeably not reciprocated by the participants in this study. This further highlights that students do not subscribe wholly to government articulations of Britishness, certainly not one that promotes British civic institutions as synonymous with a wider positive aspect of Britishness.

An area where there seems to be both agreement and disparity between politicians and students is that of British values. Gordon Brown (2006) asserted that Britain was built on liberty, responsibility, and fairness to all, and we can say that for young students British values are also of importance in relation to what Britishness is for them. However the students made little or no mention of liberty, fairness or responsibility and instead suggested that ‘pride’ and ‘respect’ may be better alternatives. No doubt these values could be probably applied as important principles for any nation or state around the globe as it is not clear what is specifically British about them. Despite this, for the participants at least a society that possesses both ‘pride’ and ‘respect’ is one they evidently relate to being British.

We can suggest that Britishness is clearly connected with an ‘emotion’ or an ‘attitude’ rather than (or more than) that of a tangible element, of these emotions we can say that the feeling of pride holds particular significance. However it is not only pride that seems to be an important emotion for young peoples’ articulations of national identity. Scenarios or activities that represent an almost nostalgic view of Britain (and often stereotypical) also play a part in shaping perceptions of national identity. Therefore we can say that an important construction is expressionist, that is, Britishness is to a certain extent not material but emotive.

Not only do students disagree with political constructions of what Britishness is they also appear to reject the notion that being at school has much bearing on understanding national identity. This apparent indifference and disregard for national identity echoes
Fenton’s (2007) findings. It may also highlight that ‘other’ identities have prevalence over that of national ones. In spite of this, understanding Britishness as a concept can be seen as an important prerequisite to being a UK citizen. Therefore while national identity may not be of too much concern for young people they view an understanding of national identity for anyone applying to become a citizen as salient, this to a certain extent highlights an ‘us’ and ‘them’ attitude to national identity.

In helping and equipping students to increase their knowledge surrounding the British political system and gain an understanding of young peoples’ rights and responsibilities as UK citizens, citizenship education appears to be achieving some of its core aims. The positive attribution towards citizenship education alludes to a certain extent that citizenship education does increase students’ awareness and knowledge surrounding their civic and political rights and responsibilities. However it is evident that many students’ believe that citizenship education is not relevant as to how they see themselves as a UK citizen. This can be seen as indicating that whilst citizenship education is providing results regarding students’ understanding of British politics and citizenship roles, students do not necessarily apply this knowledge to how they view their own roles and rights within society. Yes students are now more aware of the rights and responsibilities of UK citizens but this is not much use if young people do not believe it alters their individual positions within a national community, and in this respect citizenship education still has to effectively reach a higher number of its students.

A few doubts remain as to how citizenship education should be presented. Students appear to be unconvinced that teachers should instruct them on how to be a good citizen. This indicates that although the students are receptive to the content of citizenship education classes, how one participates within a community should be the matter of an individual’s discretion and not for a teacher to decide, that is to utilise the skills and knowledge learnt rather than behave in such a way within a community at a teacher’s behest. Furthermore whilst the majority of the students were aware that citizenship education was being taught within their school this leaves a large minority who did not. This builds on the points explored in chapter 2 that due to the lack of tradition, definition and purpose in teaching citizenship education it is often combined and taught within other subjects and as such we can say that some students fail to realise they are being taught it at all.
As citizenship education does appear to be increasing knowledge surrounding young people’s rights and responsibilities as UK citizens, it has also highlighted an indication of strong support for the citizenship test that would be citizens must pass to illustrate an understanding our national history, culture and understanding of how to be a UK citizen. This could indicate that the participants believe that a common understanding of UK citizenship is imperative to successful community cohesion, that immigrants or others coming to live in the UK should display a sense of understanding and respect for a British history and culture by passing a citizenship test. However, it is not imperative that ‘they’ share our history, but know of it.
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